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diff --git a/39155-8.txt b/39155-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..216dd41 --- /dev/null +++ b/39155-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,24127 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded +on the Theory of Evolution, by C. M. Williams + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution + +Author: C. M. Williams + +Release Date: March 15, 2012 [EBook #39155] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A REVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF *** + + + + +Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, +Josephine Paolucci and the Online Distributed Proofreading +Team at http://www.pgdp.net. + + + + + + + + +[Illustration] + + + + +A REVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF ETHICS FOUNDED ON THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION + +BY + +C. M. WILLIAMS + +New York +MACMILLAN & CO. +AND LONDON +1893 + +_All rights reserved_ + +COPYRIGHT, 1892, +BY MACMILLAN & CO. + +TYPOGRAPHY BY J. S. CUSHING & CO., BOSTON, U.S.A. + +PRESSWORK BY BERWICK & SMITH, BOSTON, U.S.A. + + * * * * * + +TO MY FIRST TEACHER OF MORALS + +MY MOTHER + +THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY +DEDICATED + + + + +PREFACE + + +Of the Ethics founded on the theory of Evolution, I have considered only +the independent theories which have been elaborated to systems. I have +omitted consideration of many works which bear on Evolutional Ethics as +practical or exhortative treatises, or compilations of facts, but which +involve no distinctly worked-out theory of morals. On the other hand, I +have ventured to include Professor von Gizycki's "Moralphilosophie" +among the theoretical systems founded upon the theory of Evolution, +since, although the popular form of the work renders the prominence of +the latter theory impracticable, the warp of Evolution is clearly +perceptible throughout it. In analyzing Höffding's work, I have made use +not of the Danish but the German edition of his "Ethics," which was +translated with his coöperation. + +It is generally customary for an author to acknowledge, in the preface +of his book, his especial indebtedness to those who have most influenced +the growth of his thought in the line of research treated in the book. +But I find this duty a difficult one to perform. Many of the authors +whose work has aided me are cited in the text. But it is impossible, +with regard to many points, to say to whom one is indebted, or most +indebted, since much that one reads is so assimilated into one's +organized thought, and changed in the process of assimilation, that its +source and original form are no longer remembered. Besides this, much is +always owed to personal influence and argument, and also to indefinite +and minute forces whose workings it is impossible to trace. The growth +of thought is, like any other growth, by imperceptible degrees and +infinitesimal increments, and we breathe in ideas from our mental +atmosphere as we breathe in perfumes or infections from our physical +atmosphere. It is, of course, unnecessary to mention Mr. Spencer's name +in this connection, since it goes without saying, that every one who +writes on Ethics in their relation to the Theory of Evolution must owe +much to him, even where he differs from him. But there is perhaps one +name which it is fitting that I should mention here, since the influence +of its bearer on my work, although one for which I have reason to feel +peculiarly indebted, is not of a nature to determine its mention in +connection with any particular theory. I refer to my first teacher of +Philosophy, Professor M. Stuart Phelps, now deceased, whose life and +labor all those who had the privilege of sharing his instruction and +benefiting by his kindness must ever hold in grateful remembrance. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +PART I + + PAGES + +INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 1-2 + +DARWIN 2-12 + +WALLACE 12-23 + +HAECKEL 23-28 + +SPENCER 28-76 + +FISKE 77-82 + +ROLPH 82-107 + +BARRATT 107-120 + +STEPHEN 120-143 + +CARNERI 143-175 + +HÖFFDING 175-200 + +GIZYCKI 200-224 + +ALEXANDER 225-263 + +(REE) 264-268 + +PART II + +INTRODUCTION + + Refutation of _a priori_ objections to Evolutional Ethics, and a + statement of reasons for supposing that an application of the + theory of Evolution to Ethics must be of use 269-276 + + +CHAPTER I + +THE CONCEPTS OF EVOLUTION + + Extension of the meaning of Darwinian concepts since + Darwin--Lewes on the Struggle for Existence as internal--The + mystery of "Variation" according to Darwin not a metaphysical + mystery, but one of the incompleteness of scientific + knowledge--Rolph's criticism of the Darwinian conception of the + Struggle for Existence criticised--General classification of the + theories of Evolution--Fechner's theory of the Tendency to + Stability--Petzoldt on Fechner--Petzoldt's concepts of Tendency + and Competition--Zöllner and Du Prel--Examination of the concept + of Absolute Stability, and of a full stability of the universe, + in the light of the question as to the finite or infinite + character of the material universe--Periodicity in + Organisms--Criticism of the concepts of Cause and + Effect--Criticism of Spencer's definition of Life--The concepts + of Heredity and Adaptation--The point of dispute with regard to + Variation--Darwin, Haeckel, and Eimer with regard to the + inheritance of individual acquirements--Criticisms of + Weismann--Habit in the life of the individual--Advantage of the + method pursued by Avenarius in the "Kritik der reinen + Erfahrung"--Lamarck on the relation of Use and Function--Darwin + on Habit and Instinct--Function and Tendency to + Function--Relation of organism and environment--Theory of a + special vital force--The relation of exercise to strength of + Tendency--The concepts of Cause and Effect as applied to + organism and environment--Relation of primary tendency to + later-evolved function--Form and Function--The mixture of types + in sexual propagation--Summary of conclusions 277-306 + + +CHAPTER II + +INTELLIGENCE AND "END" + + The question as to the extent to which Reason is diffused in the + universe--Darwin and Haeckel on Reason and Instinct--Du Prel on + Reason as a fundamental property of all matter--Carneri on the + automatism of animals--The dependence of theories on this + question on the starting-point assumed in the + argument--Difficulties of assigning a limit-line to + Reason--Schneider's criteria--Insectivorous plants--Knight, + Darwin, etc., on the movements of plants--Race-habits--So-called + reflex-action in man--From non-analogy no inference + possible--Arbitrary nature of the assumptions involved in the + two starting-points of query--Reason = Cause or Effect?--Further + criticism of the concepts of Cause and Effect--The bias of the + specialist--Attempted definition of the province of + reason--Definition of "End"--Unreliability of inference as to + the nature of ends in other individuals; in other + species--Possible inferences from the analogy of the nervous + system--Certain possible limiting assumptions as to the province + of knowledge in animal species--The Law of the Variation of + Pain and Pleasure in function--The ultimate + dilemma--Examinations of Teleological conceptions with respect + to the Tendency to Stability--Criticism of Wallace on the Origin + of Life, or of Consciousness--Summary of conclusions 307-340 + + +CHAPTER III + +THE WILL + + Difficulties of definition--The Will and + Consciousness--"Involuntary" action--Will in passivity--The + concept of Choice--"Ends" and the Will--The Future and Will--The + External and Will--Criticism of Barratt's axioms and + propositions--Discussion of the relation of Thought and Feeling + to Will--The argument of the Physiologist--The argument of the + Evolutionist--The argument from social statistics--The argument + from Psychiatry, Criminology, etc.--The argument from the + psychological principles on which Evolutional Ethics is + founded--Definition of Natural Law and Necessity--The positive + factors of Evolution--The positive and active character of the + organism as the result of evolution--The equivalence of + Conditions and Results--The positive character of the organism + as a part of Nature--The sense of Freedom as the sense of + Activity--The theory of the Will as determined by Motives--As + determined by Feeling--As determined by the desirability of the + end or object--The argument of Concomitance and that of Sequence + as used by both Materialist and Spiritualist--The endeavor to + prove (1) the causal character of physiological process; (2) the + causal character of Consciousness--Inconsistencies of these + attempts 341-359 + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THOUGHT, FEELING, AND WILL IN EVOLUTION + + Hume on Reason and Passion--The constant connection of Thought + with Feeling, and with Feeling as pleasure or pain--The question + as to whether Thought or Feeling is primary--Application of + answer to previous considerations on the diffusion of + Consciousness in Nature--The relation of the concepts of the + Pleasurable and Painful to the concept of "End"--Will as a + constant accompaniment of Consciousness--Absurdities to which + the division of Consciousness into distinct faculties leads--Law + of the growth of functional tendency and of pleasure in + function--The New as a disturber of equilibrium--The pleasure + involved in the overcoming of obstacles--The equilibrium of + function as Health--Connection of the pleasure of food-taking + with Health--Criticism of Rolph's principle of the Insatiability + of Life--Further criticism of Rolph on the Darwinian theory of + Growth--The coördinate progress of physiological adaptation with + the advancement of knowledge, and with the variation of Feeling + and Will--The pleasure of the strongest motive as relative, not + absolute--The character of the End in view--The pleasure of + anticipation and the pleasure of the event--Criticism of + Sidgwick on Hedonism--Criticism of Rolph's theory of Want as + universal motive--Suicide--Rest--The diminution of pain with + lapse of time as adaptation--Pleasure in pain as pleasure in + function--The relation of Health to Happiness--The theory of the + absolute Freedom of Feeling--The concepts of Cause and Effect as + applied to the evolution of Thought, Feeling, and + Will--Application of conclusions to the Teleological Argument 360-382 + + +CHAPTER V + +EGOISM AND ALTRUISM IN EVOLUTION + + Prototypes in other animal species of what we term Egoism and + Altruism in man; care for the young on the part of the + parent-animal; mutual aid between the sexes; animal + societies--Experiments of Lubbock showing the irregularity and + caprice of action altruistic in form, among the ants--Benno + Scheitz on maternal care among lower species--Answers to the + argument of automatism--Dependence of a theory of moral + Evolution on the definition of Egoism and Altruism--The + significance of the terms progressive--The possibility of + differences in the form of the evolution of Altruism, in + different species--The possibility of the combination of + different forms in the evolution of a single species--Discussion + of the question of the first beginning of action prompted by + altruistic motive--The argument of the illogical nature of a + supposed development of Altruism from Egoism--The question as to + whether Health, the Preservation of Species, or Pleasure, is the + actual final end of action--The question of Heredity in relation + to that of the moral evolution--Stephen's views--Arguments from + Ribot, Dugdale's "Jukes," etc. 383-422 + + +CHAPTER VI + +CONSCIENCE + + The gradual character of the evolution of Altruism--Paul + Friedmann on the genesis of benevolence--The observable growth + of Altruism from Egoism in the individual--Human society as + necessitated by increase of the species--Criticism of Darwin's + form of statement on this point--The mixed character of the + motives which lead to advancement--The necessity of evolution, + primal organisms once having come into existence--General + features of the moral evolution in the human race--Personal and + Social Virtues--Racial evolution as subordinate to the evolution + of the species--Criticism of Stephen--The theory of the + connection of Intelligence and Morality--Testimony of Maudsley, + Lombroso, Dugdale--The advantages of conformity to social + standards--Definition of "advantage"--Arguments from the general + direction of social advancement--The direction of evolution in + the race as a whole and in the individual not always the + same--Conclusion: the connection of Intelligence with Morality + not invariable--Definition of Morality--Identification of + Morality with Justice--Special rules of morality--Morality as + inward--The virtue of Truthfulness--Necessity of individual + sacrifice--Dependence of Justice on certain general features of + particular circumstances---Definition of Conscience--The mixed + character of remorse--The theory of Conscience as a special + sense--Criticism of Utilitarianism--Criticism of some forms of + reaction against Utilitarianism--The terms "higher" and "lower" + as applied to pleasures and "ends"--The idea of a "return to + Nature"--The objection to Evolutional Ethics on the ground of + degradation--Struggle as an element of virtue--The evolution of + social rewards and punishments--Criticism of the objection to + state-punishment on the ground of Determinism--Morality and the + question of the Transcendental--Conscience in other species--The + contempt for "mere habit"--The concepts of Cause and Effect as + applied to the moral evolution 423-465 + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE MORAL PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN SPECIES AS SHOWN BY HISTORY + + The assimilative character of human progress--The character of + our savage ancestors--Greek civilization--The Greek treatment of + children--Of old men--Human sacrifices among the + Greeks--Slaughter of prisoners--Slavery--The Greek attitude + towards the fundamental virtues of trustworthiness--Athenian + Democracy--Roman civilization--Treatment of children--Human + sacrifices--Gladiatorial shows--Slavery--Moral character of the + Middle Ages--Human sacrifice in England before the Roman + conquest--Slave laws--State punishment in England: burning, + hanging, and boiling, quartering and disembowelling--Women under + the criminal law--Blood-money--The classification of + crimes--Caste-favor in English criminal + law--Mutilation--Flaying--Ordeals--Punishment by starvation--The + press--The rack--"Skevington's Daughter"--Benefit of Clergy--The + position of the English churl--The worship of rank--Hanging for + petty theft--The pillory--Brutality of public feeling--Condition + of the prisons--Jail-breaking, bribery, etc.--More concerning + women under the law--Favor to rank--The logical consistency of + human character in its various directions of action--General + comparison of the past with the present--The evidence of + literature--Modern philanthropy--Decrease of national + prejudices--Growth of the democratic spirit--Lack of imagination + a reason for the failure to realize the evils of the past--The + Golden Age of Man 466-499 + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE RESULTS OF ETHICAL INQUIRY ON AN EVOLUTIONAL BASIS + + Criticism of Alexander's theory of the right as always absolute + right and as the expression, on all planes of development, of an + equal equilibrium--The Moral Evolution as one involving the + whole of humanity and the whole earth--Gradual relaxation of the + Struggle for Existence--The final limitation of the increase in + density of population--The increase of vitality--The habituation + to progress--The gradual coördination of individual with social + welfare through (1) Spread and increase of sympathy with the + individual on the part of society as a whole; (2) Growth of + individual predilections in the direction of harmony with social + requirements--Decrease of punishment through (1) Increase in + general sympathy; (2) Increase of amenability of the individual + to influence--Increase of pleasure in pleasure--The possible + egoistic element in sympathy with pain--Criticism of Rolph on + Want as necessary to induce action--The moral evolution and + emotion--Criticism of Spencer on Altruism--Criticism of Wundt on + Evolutional Ethics--The theory that Evolution adds nothing to + Ethics--Criticism of Stephen on the impossibility of predicting + the course of Evolution--The Moral Evolution as willed--The + motives furnished by Evolutional Ethics--The theological + doctrine of a "change of heart"--The doctrine of the + Atonement--Divine forgiveness--Theology and social evils--The + prominence of the idea of self-salvation in Christian + doctrine--Human sacrifice among the Jews--Biblical authority for + the killing of witches and heretics--The infliction of death for + ceremonial offences among the Jews--The visiting of the sins of + the fathers upon the children--Slave-holding, adultery, murder, + etc., by God's chosen, bloodshed and cruelty of all sorts by + God's express command--Animal sacrifice among the Jews--The + original idea of Jehovah and of Heaven--The autocracy of the + Jewish priesthood confirmed by Christ--Forced exegesis--The + asceticism of Christianity--Slavery and the New + Testament--Predestination, Hell, and the Justification of the + Elect--The defence of Christianity as being a comforting + belief 500-528 + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE IDEAL AND THE WAY OF ITS ATTAINMENT + + Criticism of Stephen's assertion that the ideal cannot be + determined--The necessity of the choice between evils, under + present social conditions--The argument for individual + gratification of "natural desire"--Dangers of + Utilitarianism--Moral right of the minority and the ethical + demand for compensation to the minority--The contest between + Individualist and Socialist--Criticism of Spencer on personal + vice--Individualistic errors--Socialistic pessimism--The idea of + a "return to Nature"--The Socialistic glorification of the + laborer--The agitation against machinery--The agitation against + luxury--The abolition of luxury and the population question--The + proposed change of social "environment"--Socialism at the + present date--Arbitrary character of many Socialistic + ideas--Criticisms of Bellamy--The idea of a + Revolution--Conclusions--The education of the child--The right + of the child to state protection--The advantages of parental + control--The education of women--The question of + prostitution--Monogamy or polygamy?--Temporary + contracts--Divorce--The argument that the freedom of women must + involve the forfeiture of chivalric feeling in men--The respect + for age--Desirable changes in criminal law--Criticism of Bellamy + on Crime--The question of Capital Punishment--Arguments + for--Arguments against--Conclusions--The conflict between + justice and mercy--The supreme arbiter--The courage of Moral + Sincerity--Heroic characters--The final destruction of the human + species--The loss of belief in personal immortality--The human + and earthly ideal 529-581 + + + + +A REVIEW OF EVOLUTIONAL ETHICS + +PART I + + + + +INTRODUCTORY REMARKS + +In the preface to the latest edition of his "Natürliche +Schöpfungsgeschichte," Haeckel, writing of recent developments of +thought on the subject of evolution, and the change of attitude +observable in our later literature, says: "The vast mass of literature, +yearly increasing in astonishing measure, on the theory of evolution in +its various branches, best illustrates the remarkable change which +public opinion has undergone. Twenty years ago, the greater part of this +literature was in opposition to Darwin; to-day such opposition is not to +be feared from well-informed students of science. On the other hand, +almost the whole literature of biology now gives testimony in Darwin's +favor, for almost all zoölogical, and botanical, anatomic, and +ontogenetic works are founded upon the principles of the development of +species, and derive from Darwin their best and most fruitful ideas." + +No science is a better exponent of this radical and important change +than that which has to do with the principles of morals; for by no +science was the theory of evolution assailed, in the beginning, with +more vehemence and indefatigability. Not only did the zealous adherents +of Christian dogma fear to find, in the destruction of all distinct +barriers between the different forms of animal life, a ground for the +denial of God's especial favor to man, and the worshippers of emotional +morals become indignant at the unveiling of the divine Mystic (as if +only ignorance were reverence, and only the Unknown worthy of homage), +but even the less conservative schools of philosophy often showed +themselves unfavorable or hesitant towards the new ideas, dreading their +implications. All this is changed. If England's most popular living +philosopher was among the first to declare himself for Darwin, and to +revise his whole system in accordance with the theory of evolution, so +that this theory early began to find adherents among students of +philosophy in all lands where English is spoken, it was not long before +the newer schools of France and Germany began to follow in their wake. +Now every year, and almost every month, brings with it a fresh supply of +books, pamphlets, and magazine articles on "The Evolution of Morality," +"L'Evolution de la Morale," "Die Evolution der Sittlichkeit," +"Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus," etc. So many are the waters which now +pour themselves into this common stream that the current threatens soon +to become too deep and swift for any but the most expert swimmers. + +In a short review of Evolutional Ethics, it will be impossible to +consider all the literature that has added to our knowledge on this +subject; we must confine ourselves to the few books that are most +prominent. The first laborer in this line, not only indirectly through +general theory, but also directly through particular theory, is, as +usual, Charles Darwin; and though Darwin was himself no psychologist, +and moreover advances his ideas on the origin and development of morals +only in the tentative manner that necessarily attaches to a first +attempt when made by so conscientious a thinker, he doubtless suggested +to all other writers in this field a very large part of that which was +best in their work. A Review of Evolutional Ethics must, therefore, in +order to start with the proper origin of the science, begin with + + + + +CHARLES DARWIN + + +In the essay on "Instinct" appended to G. J. Romanes' "Mental Evolution +in Animals,"[1] Darwin says: "The social instinct is indispensable to +some animals, useful to still more, and apparently only pleasant to some +few animals." The social tendency being thus classed as an instinct, it +belongs to our work to examine what are Darwin's theories as to the +origin and nature of instinct. + +In the chapter on "Instinct," in "The Origin of Species," Darwin +premises: "I have nothing to do with the origin of the mental powers, +any more than I have with that of life itself."[2] Again: "Frederick +Cuvier and several of the older metaphysicians have compared instinct +with habit. This comparison gives, I think, an accurate notion of the +frame of mind under which an instinctive action is performed, but not +necessarily of its origin.... If we suppose any habitual action to +become inherited--and it can be shown that this does sometimes +happen--then the resemblance between what originally was a habit and an +instinct becomes so close as not to be distinguished.... But it would be +a serious error to suppose that the greater number of instincts have +been acquired by habit in one generation, and then transmitted by +inheritance to succeeding generations. It can be clearly shown that the +most wonderful instincts with which we are acquainted, namely, those of +the hive-bee and of many ants, could not possibly have been acquired by +habit."[3] Of one of the habits of these last-named insects Darwin, +however, writes: "I have not rarely felt that small and trifling +instincts were a greater difficulty on our theory than those which have +so justly excited the wonder of mankind; for an instinct, if really of +no considerable importance in the struggle for life, could not be +modified or formed through natural selection. Perhaps as striking an +instance as can be given is that of the workers of the hive-bee arranged +in files and ventilating, by a peculiar movement of their wings, the +well-closed hive: this ventilation has been artificially imitated, and +as it is carried on even during winter, there can be no doubt that it is +to bring in free air and displace the carbonic acid gas; therefore _it +is in truth indispensable, and we may imagine the stages_--a few bees +first going to the orifice to fan themselves--_by which the instinct +might have been arrived at_."[4] Again: "Glancing at instincts, +marvellous as some are, they offer no greater difficulty than do +corporeal structures on the theory of the natural selection of +successive slight, but profitable modifications. We can thus understand +why nature moves by graduated steps in endowing different animals of +the same class with their several instincts."[5] And again: "As I +believe, the most wonderful of all known instincts, that of the +hive-bee, can be explained by natural selection having taken advantage +of numerous successive, slight modifications of simpler instincts, +natural selection having, by slow degrees, more and more perfectly led +the bees to sweep equal spheres at a given distance from each other in a +double layer, and to build up and excavate the wax along the planes of +intersection; the bees, of course, no more knowing that they swept their +spheres at one particular distance from each other, than they know what +are the several angles of the hexagonal prisms and of the basal rhombic +plates; the motive power of the process of natural selection having been +the construction of cells of due strength and of the proper size and +shape for the larvæ, this being effected with the greatest possible +economy of labor and wax; that individual swarm which thus made the best +cells with least labor, and least waste of honey in the secretion of +wax, having succeeded best, and having transmitted their newly acquired +economical instincts to new swarms, which in their turn will have had +the best chance of succeeding in the struggle for existence."[6] And +further, of instinct in general: "It will be universally admitted that +instincts are as important as corporeal structures for the welfare of +each species, under its present conditions of life. Under changed +conditions of life, it is at least possible that slight modifications of +instinct might be profitable to a species; and if it can be shown that +instincts do vary ever so little, then I can see no difficulty in +natural selection preserving and continually accumulating variations of +instinct to any extent that was profitable. It is thus, as I believe, +that all the most complex and wonderful instincts have originated. As +modifications of corporeal structure arise from, and are increased by, +use or habit, and are diminished or lost by disuse, so I do not doubt it +has been with instincts"; though Darwin adds: "But I believe that the +effects of habit are in many cases of subordinate importance to the +effects of the natural selection of what may be called spontaneous +variations of instincts; that is, of variations produced by the same +unknown causes which produce slight deviations of bodily structure." +However, "No complex instinct can possibly be produced through natural +selection, except by the slow and gradual accumulation of numerous +slight, yet profitable, variations."[7] And of habit as connected with +heredity, Darwin writes: "Changed habits produce an inherited effect, as +in the period of the flowering of plants when transported from one +climate to another. With animals the increased use or disuse of parts +has had a more marked influence.... No breeder doubts how strong is the +tendency to inheritance; that like produces like is his fundamental +belief; doubts have been thrown on this principle only by theoretical +writers.... If strange and rare deviations of structure are really +inherited, less strange and commoner deviations may be freely admitted +to be inheritable. Perhaps the correct way of viewing the whole subject +would be to look at the inheritance of every character whatever as the +rule, and non-inheritance as the anomaly.... If it could be shown that +our domestic varieties manifested a strong tendency to reversion--that +is, to lose their acquired characters whilst kept under the same +conditions, and whilst kept in a considerable body, so that free +intercrossing might check, by blending together, any slight deviations +in their structure, in such case I grant that we could deduce nothing +from domestic varieties in regard to species. But there is not a shadow +of evidence in favor of this view; to assert that we could not breed our +cart and race horses, long and short horned cattle, and poultry of +various breeds, and esculent vegetables, for an unlimited number of +generations, would be opposed to all experience."[8] Darwin recognizes, +in instinct, the possibility for the play of a certain amount of +imitation, as also of intelligence and experience,[9] though denying to +these the range attributed to them by Wallace. And summing up his theory +in the essay given by Romanes, he writes: "It may not be logical, but to +my imagination it is far more satisfactory, to look at the young cuckoo +ejecting his foster brothers, ants making slaves, the larvæ of the +ichneumidæ feeding within the live bodies of their prey, cats playing +with mice, otters and cormorants with living fish, not as instincts +specially given by the Creator, but as very small parts of one general +law leading to the advancement of all organic bodies--Multiply, Vary, +let the strongest Live and the weakest Die." + +It will thus be seen that Darwin, while confessing a disability to +account for the origin of _Instinct_,--beginning with some form of +instinct as already existent, just as he begins with life as already +existent,--does advance some perfectly definite views as to the probable +origins of _instincts_,--namely, preservation, in the struggle for +existence, of numerous slight but profitable variations. The assertion +of the inadequacy of habit to account for the origin of more complex +instincts, as in the case of the hive-bees, when compared with the +subsequent explanation, in the same connection, of the rise of these +very instincts partly by habit acquired from experience and imitation, +partly by accidental modifications of simpler instincts, both taken +advantage of by natural selection,--would seem to limit the term +"habit," as here used, to modes of action acquired during the life of +the individual; this interpretation of the word being confirmed by the +additional phrase "in one generation." But here, as everywhere in +Darwin's work, an unknown quantity appears--namely, the cause of +variation; _i.e._ of the differences, or tendency to differ, of +offspring, from the parental type. + +In "The Descent of Man," published twelve years later than "The Origin +of Species," and "The Variation of Plants and Animals under +Domestication," which appeared yet three years later, Darwin's views on +instinct and habit are still further elaborated, and a definition of the +relation of these to reason, pleasure, pain, and the moral sense, +attempted. In Vol. I. of the former work, Darwin devotes two chapters to +these subjects. Instinct he calls, pages 116-122, "inherited habit"; and +on page 168 he says: "But as love, sympathy, and self-command became +strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes clearer, so +that man can value justly the judgments of his fellows, he will feel +himself impelled, apart from any transitory pleasure or pain, to certain +lines of conduct." Here, I take it, the word "habit" cannot be +interpreted as referring to one generation of men, but to the race as a +whole, a general continuity being thus ascribed to the inheritance of +mental characteristics, and the important concept of progress as +adaptation acquired. In contrasting reason with instinct, Darwin thinks +that instinct and intelligence do not, as Cuvier maintained, stand in +inverse ratio to each other, but that a high degree of intelligence is +compatible with complex instincts--as in the case of the beaver; "yet it +is not improbable that there is a certain amount of interference +between the development of free intelligence and of instinct,--which +latter implies some inherited modification of the brain. Little is known +about the functions of the brain, but we can perceive that, as the +intellectual powers become highly developed, the various parts of the +brain must be connected by very intricate channels of the freest +intercommunication; and as a consequence, each separate part would +perhaps tend to be less well fitted to answer to particular +sensations or associations in a definite and inherited--that is, +instinctive--manner. There seems even to exist some relation between a +low degree of intelligence and a strong tendency to the formation of +fixed, though not inherited habits; for, as a sagacious physician +remarked to me, persons who are slightly imbecile tend to act in +everything by routine or habit; and they are rendered much happier if +this is encouraged."[10] Darwin thinks instinctive action and action +from habit may not be connected with either pleasure or pain, though he +would seem to contradict this view in the latter part of the passage +just quoted, and again where he says: "Although a habit may be blindly +and implicitly followed, independently of any pleasure or pain felt at +the moment, yet if it be forcibly and abruptly checked, a vague sense of +dissatisfaction is generally experienced."[11] + +In writing of the social instinct, Darwin begins with it as already +existent, and seems, moreover, to maintain concerning it a theory of +purpose elsewhere denied in his works and, indeed, antagonistic to the +whole principle of the struggle for existence. He says: "It has often +been assumed that animals were in the first place rendered social, and +that they feel, as a consequence, uncomfortable when separated from each +other, and comfortable whilst together; but it is a more probable view +that these sensations were first developed, _in order that_ those +animals which would profit by living in society, _should be induced to +live together_, in the same manner as the sense of hunger and the +pleasure of eating were, no doubt, first acquired, in order to induce +animals to eat."[12] If it were not for the expressions "should be +induced" and "to induce," the words "in order that," taken in connection +with what follows, might be interpreted as referring to mere sequence of +time, as, on page 199, where Darwin refers to the "social faculties" +simply as antecedent to society, they evidently do. For he says: "In +order that primeval man, or the ape-like progenitors of man, should +become social, they must have acquired the same instinctive feelings +which induce other animals to live in a body." The sentences referred to +which follow the first quotation are as follows: "The feeling of +pleasure from society is probably an extension of the parental or filial +affections, since the social instinct seems to be developed by the young +remaining for a long time with their parents; and this extension may be +attributed in part to habit, but chiefly to natural selection. With +those animals which were benefited by living in close association, the +individuals which took the greatest pleasure in society would best +escape various dangers, whilst those that cared least for their +comrades, and lived solitary, would perish in greater numbers. With +respect to the origin of the parental and filial affections, which +apparently lie at the base of the social instincts, we know not the +steps by which they have been gained; but we may infer that it has been +to a large extent through natural selection." The passage may possibly +be consistently explained by the idea of the Survival of the Fittest, +but it is at least very unclear in its wording. At the beginning of +Chapter IV. of the same book, Darwin also gives a synopsis of the +development of the moral sense from the social instincts, through the +pleasure of association and service, remorse being a result of the power +of representation, regard for the approbation and disapprobation of +fellows arising from sympathy with them until resulting habit plays a +very important part in guiding the conduct of the individual. Another +passage, however, again introduces an antagonism between habit, +instinct, and reason, and natural selection: "It is impossible to decide +in many cases whether certain social instincts have been acquired +through natural selection, or are the indirect result of other instincts +and faculties, such as sympathy, reason, experience, and a tendency to +imitation; or again, whether they are simply the result of +long-continued habit." Darwin distinguishes between "the all-important +emotion of sympathy," and that of love. "A mother may passionately love +her sleeping and passive infant, but she can hardly at such times be +said to feel sympathy for it"; but he includes both love and sympathy +under the head of "sympathetic emotions"; and on page 163 he says: "With +mankind, selfishness, experience, and imitation probably add, as Mr. +Bain has shown, to the power of sympathy; for we are led by the hope of +receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic kindness to +others; and sympathy is much strengthened by habit." Again, on page 166, +"instinctive love and sympathy" would seem to be contrasted with love +and sympathy as habit, the increase of such feelings in the race through +habit, elsewhere more or less distinctly asserted, being here ignored: +"Although man, as he now exists, has few special instincts, having lost +any which his early progenitors may have possessed, this is no reason +why he should not have retained, from an extremely remote period, some +degree of instinctive love and sympathy for his fellows. We are, indeed, +all conscious that we do possess such sympathetic feelings; but our +consciousness does not tell us whether they are instinctive, having +originated long ago in the same manner as with the lower animals, or +whether they have been acquired by each of us during our early years." +But again, on page 220, sympathy is referred to as an element of the +social instincts:[13] "It should, however, be borne in mind that the +enforcement of public opinion depends on our appreciation of the +approbation and disapprobation of others; and this appreciation is +founded on our sympathy, which it can hardly be doubted was originally +developed through natural selection as one of the most important +elements of the social instincts"; though, on pages 167, 168, the social +instinct is again contrasted with sympathy, since according to Darwin +the desire for the approbation of others and the consequent yielding to +their wishes is the result of sympathy: "Thus the social instincts, +which must have been acquired by man in a very rude state, and probably +even by his early ape-like progenitors, still give the impulse to some +of his best actions; but his actions are in a higher degree determined +by the expressed wishes and judgments of his fellow-men." Again the +social and the maternal instincts and sympathy are identified and +classed as under the dominion of the moral sense, pages 168-170: "It is +evident, in the first place, that with mankind the instinctive impulses +have different degrees of strength; a savage, will risk his own life to +save that of a member of the same community, but will be wholly +indifferent about a stranger; a young and timid mother urged by the +maternal instinct will, without a moment's hesitation, run the greatest +danger for her own infant, but not for a mere fellow-creature. +Nevertheless, many a civilized man, or even boy, who never before risked +his life for another, but full of courage and sympathy, has disregarded +the instinct of self-preservation, and plunged at once into a torrent to +save a drowning man, though a stranger.... Such actions as the above +appear to be the simple result of the greater strength of the social or +maternal instincts than that of any other instinct or motive; for they +are performed too instantaneously for reflection, or for pleasure or +pain to be felt at the time; though, if prevented by any cause, distress +or even misery might be felt.... I am aware that some persons maintain +that actions performed impulsively, as in the above cases, do not come +under the dominion of the moral sense, and cannot be called moral.... On +the contrary, we all feel that an act cannot be considered as perfect or +as performed in the most noble manner, unless it be done impulsively, +without deliberation or effort, in the same manner as by a man in whom +the requisite qualities are innate." Darwin defines the office of the +moral sense as "telling us what to do,"[14] that of conscience,--which +includes remorse, repentance, regret or shame, fear of the gods and of +the disapprobation of men,--as reproving us if we disobey it;[15] +conscience seems elsewhere to be defined as concerned with resolve to +better future action; and in still another passage, the moral sense and +conscience are identified. But again, in another paragraph, Darwin seems +to ascribe remorse or regret, not to the baulking of an instinct, but to +a _judgment_ of having been baulked: "A man cannot prevent past +impressions often repassing through his mind; he will thus be driven to +make a comparison between the impressions of past hunger, vengeance +satisfied, or danger shunned at other men's cost, with the almost +ever-present instinct of sympathy, and with his early knowledge of what +others consider as praiseworthy or blamable. This knowledge cannot be +banished from his mind, and from instinctive sympathy is esteemed of +great moment. He will then feel as if he had been baulked in following a +present instinct or habit, and this with all animals causes +dissatisfaction, or even misery."[16] But, in spite of all +indefiniteness in the use of terms and uncertainty as to the +interrelations of "the social instincts," sympathy, reason, pleasure, +and the moral sense, it is, after all, comparatively easy to gather, +after a little deeper study, the general and more important features of +Darwin's theory as to the origin of morality. We may state these as +follows: The social instinct led men or their ape-like progenitors to +society,[17] this instinct growing out of the parental or filial +affections through habit and natural selection. Virtue is, at first, +only tribal.[18] The social qualities of sympathy, fidelity, and courage +implied in mutual aid and defence, were no doubt acquired by man through +the same means. "When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same +country, came into competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the +one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympathetic, and +faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to +aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer +the other.... Selfish and contentious people will not cohere, and +without coherence nothing can be effected. A tribe rich in the above +qualities would spread and be victorious over other tribes; but in the +course of time it would, judging from all past history, be in its turn +overcome by some other tribe still more highly endowed. Thus the social +and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused +throughout the world." Though in a warlike state, where courage is +especially necessary to tribal existence, the bravest men would perish +in larger numbers than other men, and the survival of the unfittest +would seem thus to be secured, the influence of their bravery on others +might excite the latter to imitation and do far more good than the +begetting of offspring who would inherit their bravery. So, also, pity, +though inciting modern society to the preservation of the weak, yet is +useful in that it cultivates sympathy; and so, too, wealth, affording +leisure for intellectual pursuits and a wider choice in marriage, tends, +in the end, to the preservation of the fittest morally, by direct or +indirect means.[19] Altruistic action, followed from selfish motives, +may become habit; habits of benevolence certainly strengthen the feeling +of sympathy; and "habits followed during many generations probably tend +to be inherited." Furthermore, melancholy tends often to suicide, as +violence, and quarrelsomeness to a bloody end, intemperance to the +destruction of individual life, and profligacy to disease and sterility; +so that some elimination of the worst dispositions takes place. These +are some of the probable steps of advancement, though the process is +too complex to be clearly followed out. The approbation of +others--the strengthening of sympathies by habit--example and +imitation--reason--experience and even self-interest--instruction during +youth, and religious feelings--are the causes which lead to the +advancement of morality.[20] In the paragraph just quoted, Darwin says: +"With civilized nations, as far as an advanced standard of morality and +an increased number of fairly good men are concerned, natural selection +apparently effects but little, though the fundamental social instincts +were originally thus gained"; but he later writes: "Judging from all +that we know of man and the lower animals, there has always been +sufficient variability in their intellectual and moral faculties for a +steady advance through natural selection"; and he further says: "No +doubt such advance demands many favorable concurrent circumstances; but +it may well be doubted whether the most favorable would have sufficed, +had not the rate of increase been rapid, and the consequent struggle for +existence extremely severe."[21] The end or aim of morality is the +general good, rather than the general happiness, though "no doubt the +welfare and the happiness of the individual usually coincide; and a +contented, happy tribe will flourish better than one that is +discontented and unhappy.... As all wish for happiness, the 'greatest +happiness principle' will have become a most important secondary guide +and object; the social instinct, however, together with sympathy (which +leads to our regarding the approbation and disapprobation of others), +having served as the primary impulse and guide."[22] And with regard to +the future, Darwin says: "Looking to future generations, there is no +cause to fear that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we may +expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed +by inheritance. In this case the struggle between our higher and lower +impulses will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant."[23] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] P. 381. This essay originally formed part of the chapter on +"Instinct" in "The Origin of Species," but was omitted for the sake of +condensation. + +[2] Vol. I. p. 319. + +[3] Pp. 320, 321. + +[4] Appendix to "Mental Evolution in Animals," pp. 378, 379. The italics +are my own. + +[5] "The Origin of Species," II. p. 286. + +[6] Ibid. I. pp. 353, 354. + +[7] "The Origin of Species," I. pp. 321, 322. + +[8] Ibid. I. pp. 12-17. + +[9] Appendix to "Mental Evolution in Animals," pp. 370, 383; see also +"The Descent of Man," I. p. 102 _et seq._; and "Nature" for Feb. 13, +1873, introduction to a letter to the editor from William Higginson. + +[10] P. 103. + +[11] Pp. 160, 161. + +[12] P. 161. + +[13] See also p. 171. And, p. 172, sympathy is designated as "a +fundamental element of the social instincts." + +[14] P. 178. + +[15] Pp. 174, 178. + +[16] P. 173. + +[17] "Descent of Man," I. p. 199, etc. + +[18] Ibid. p. 179. + +[19] Ibid. pp. 199-209. + +[20] Ibid. p. 212. + +[21] Ibid. pp. 219, 220. + +[22] Ibid. p. 185. + +[23] Ibid. p. 192. + + + + +ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE + + +"Whatever we may define instinct to be, it is evidently some form of +mental manifestation," says Wallace in his "Contributions to Natural +Selection" (1871). We know little of the senses of animals; some animals +may even possess senses which we have not, and by which stores of +knowledge of the outside world may be opened that are closed to us. We +do not know certainly, for instance, what is the office of the little +stalked balls that are the sole remnants of hind wings in flies, or what +is the office of the third joints of the antennæ in the same insects, +though both these evidently correspond to some sense. How can we pretend +to fathom the profound mystery of the mental nature of animals, and +decide what or how much they can perceive or remember, reason or +reflect? Defining instinct, then, as "the performance by an animal of +complex acts, absolutely without instruction," Wallace refuses to accept +the theory of such action, in any case where all other modes of +explanation have not been exhausted; for "a point which can be proved +should not be assumed, and a totally unknown power should not be brought +in to explain facts, when known powers may be sufficient." He maintains +that there is a possibility, for instance, of the instruction of young +birds by old in the art of nest-building. It is quite likely that birds +remember the form, size, position, and materials of the nest in which +they were hatched, as it is also probable that young birds often pair +with old ones who have experience in nest-building. Man's architecture +is also chiefly imitative. "Birds brought up from the egg in cages do +not make the characteristic nest of their species, even though the +proper materials are supplied them, and often make no nest at all, but +rudely heap together a quantity of materials." "No one has ever yet +obtained the eggs of some bird which builds an elaborate nest, hatched +those eggs by steam or under quite a distinct parent, placed them +afterwards in an extensive aviary or covered garden, where the situation +and the materials of a nest similar to that of the parent-birds may be +found, and then seen what kind of nest these birds would build. If under +these rigorous conditions they choose the same materials, the same +situation, and construct the nest in the same way and as perfectly as +their parents did, instinct would be proved in their case; now it is +only assumed.... So no one has ever carefully taken the pupæ of a hive +of bees out of the comb, removed them from the presence of other bees, +and loosed them in a large conservatory with plenty of flowers and food, +and observed what kind of cells they would construct. But till this is +done no one can say that, with every new swarm there are no bees older +than those of the same year, who may be the teachers in forming the new +comb."[24] "Young birds never have the song peculiar to their species +if they have not heard it, whereas they acquire very easily the song of +almost any other bird with which they are associated." Moreover, there +are failures and imperfections in the nesting of birds that are not +compatible with the theory of instinct, which is supposed to be +infallible, but are quite so with the theory of intelligence and +imitation. Furthermore, in their manner of building, birds adapt +themselves to circumstances and frequently alter and improve. The theory +of instincts in man is likewise in the wrong. The sucking of the child, +which is said to be instinctive, is merely one of those _simple_ acts +dependent on organization, like breathing or muscular motion. "So +walking is evidently dependent on the arrangement of the bones and +joints, and the pleasurable exertion of the muscles, which lead to the +vertical posture becoming gradually the most agreeable one; and there +can be little doubt that an infant would learn of itself to walk, even +if suckled by a wild beast." + +The theory of instinct "implies innate ideas[25] of a very definite +kind, and if established, would overthrow Mr. Mill's Sensationalism and +all the modern philosophy of experience." + +The reason why natural selection acts so powerfully upon animals, is to +be found mainly in their individual isolation. "A slight injury, a +temporary illness, will often end in death, because it leaves the +individual powerless against its enemies.... There is, as a rule, no +mutual assistance between adults, which enables them to tide over a +period of sickness. Neither is there any division of labor; each must +fulfil _all_ the conditions of its existence, and therefore natural +selection keeps all up to a pretty uniform standard." But in man as we +now behold him, this is different. He is social and sympathetic; and in +society, a division of labor takes place that leaves the physically +defective still something to do by which he may sustain life, and saves +him from the extreme penalty which falls upon animals so defective. By +his skill in constructing for himself tools and clothing and in planting +his own food, man has an immense advantage over the animals, in whom a +change of structure must take place in adaptation to changed conditions. +Moreover, he not only escapes natural selection himself, but "is +actually able to take away some of that power from nature, which, before +his appearance, she universally exercised," establishing so his +supremacy by means of that subtle force we term mind. "We can anticipate +the time when the earth will produce only cultivated plants and domestic +animals, when man's selection shall have supplanted natural selection." + +We must, in future geological study, trace back the gradually decreasing +brain of former races to a time when the body as well begins materially +to differ, if we would wish to reach the starting-point of the human +family. Before that time man had not mind enough to preserve his body +from change. From this point, however, we shall probably see that, while +all other forms of animal life changed again and again, man's physical +character became fixed and almost immutable, advance taking place only +in his mental and moral characteristics, with which are united +modifications of the brain, as well as of the head and face, parts that +are immediately connected with the brain and the medium of the most +refined emotions. By man's superior sympathetic and moral feelings, he +becomes fitted for the social state. There is one feature, however, in +which natural selection will still act upon him--namely, the color of +the skin, which, as Mr. Darwin has shown, is correlated with +constitutional peculiarities, liability to certain diseases being often +accompanied by marked external characteristics; so that, in certain +countries, certain tints would be likely to be weeded out, and certain +other tints, with which, again, color and texture of the hair seem to be +associated, would be established by natural selection. + +Natural selection has no power "to produce modifications which are in +any degree injurious to their possessor, and Mr. Darwin uses the strong +expression that a single case of this kind would be fatal to his theory. +If, therefore, we find in man any characters which all the evidence we +can obtain goes to show would have been actually injurious to him on +their first appearance, they could not possibly have been produced by +natural selection. Neither could any specially developed organ have been +so produced if it had been merely useless to its possessor, or if its +use were not proportionate to its degree of development. Such cases as +these would prove that some other law, or some other power, than natural +selection, had been at work. But if, further, we could see that these +very modifications, though hurtful or useless at the time when they +first appeared, became in the highest degree useful at a much later +period, and are essential to the full moral and intellectual development +of human nature, we should then infer the action of mind, foreseeing the +future and preparing for it, just as surely as we do when we see the +breeder set himself to work with the determination to produce a definite +improvement in some cultivated plant or domestic animal"; we should +infer a creation by law. Skull-measurement shows that the brain of the +savage was, and is, larger than it needs to be, and "capable, if +cultivated and developed, of performing work of a degree and kind far +beyond what he ever requires it to do." In evidence of this, Wallace +cites the measurements of Esquimaux skulls and the testimony of Paul +Broca to the fine form and capacity of the skulls of Les Eyzies, a race +of cave-dwellers undoubtedly contemporary with the reindeer in Southern +France.[26] He also argues that the loss, by man, of the hairy covering +so long persistent in the mammalia, cannot have taken place on account +of its lack of usefulness, since even the most savage tribes show a need +of it, endeavoring to replace it by artificial coverings, especially on +the back. This naked skin is, however, of importance to civilization, +since it leads to the adoption of both clothing and houses, and +develops, through the former, the sense of modesty. The loss of the +prehensile character of the whole foot, and especially of the pedal +thumb, is a preparation for civilization. So, too, the capacity of the +human voice for music, of little use to savages, since their singing +consists only in a sort of monotonous howling, must be regarded as a +preparation for the civilized man's delight in music, and probably also +for a higher state than that to which we have yet attained. + +Nor can the sanctity which attaches to virtue, even among savages, be +explained by utility or natural selection. The "mystic sense of wrong," +which, although few laws enforce truth, yet attaches to untruth, even +among whole tribes of utter savages, is an example of such sanctity. +Wallace adds, however, in the same breath: "No very severe reprobation +follows untruth. In all ages, falsehood has been thought venial or even +laudable under certain conditions." He asserts that "the utilitarian +doctrine is not sufficient to account for the development of the moral +sense," but seems, nevertheless, to adopt a utilitarian principle as the +basis of the moral sense when he says: "Where free play is allowed to +the relations between man and man, this feeling [_i.e._ of sanctity] +attaches itself to those acts of universal utility or self-sacrifice +which are the products of our affections and sympathies which we term +moral"; and he adds: "while it may be, and often is, perverted to give +the same sanction to acts of narrow and conventional utility which are +really immoral,--as when the Hindoo will tell a lie, but will sooner +starve than eat unclean food; and looks upon the marriage of adult +females as gross immorality." The explanation of this inconsistency is, +according to Wallace, that the strength of the moral feeling, in any +case, will depend on the individual or racial constitution, and on +education and habit; and the acts to which its sanctions are applied +will depend on the extent of modification of the simple feelings and +affections by custom, law, and religion. If a moral sense is an +essential part of our nature, it is easy to see that its sanction may +often be given to acts which are useless or immoral, just as the natural +appetite for drink is perverted by the drunkard into the means of his +destruction. + +These phenomena of the preparation of the human being for civilization +and morality can be explained only on the supposition of a superior +intelligence which has guided man's development in a definite direction, +just as man guides the development of many animal forms. By a superior +intelligence is not necessarily meant the supreme intelligence. The +modern cultivated mind seems incapable of realizing between it and the +Deity other grades of intelligence, which the law of Continuity would, +however, force us to infer: and rejecting first causes for any and every +especial effect in the universe, except in the sense that the action of +any intelligent being is a first cause, we can still conceive that the +development of the essentially human portions of man's structure may +have been, in this sense, "determined by the directing influence of some +higher intelligent beings acting through natural and universal +laws."[27] "It is probable that the true law of this development lies +too deep for our discovery." Wallace quotes, in support of his theory, +some of Professor Tyndall's much-disputed statements,--to the effect +that the chasm between the phenomena of mind and those of brain is +impassable. "To say that mind is a product or function of protoplasm, or +of its molecular changes, is to use words to which we can attach no +clear conception. You cannot have in the whole what does not exist in +any of the parts;[28] and those who argue thus should put forth a +precise definition of matter with clearly enumerated properties, and +show that the necessary result of a certain complex arrangement of the +elements or atoms of that matter will be the production of +self-consciousness. There is no escape from the dilemma,--either all +matter is conscious, or consciousness is[29] something distinct from +matter, and in the latter case its presence in material forms is a proof +of the existence of conscious beings outside of, and independent of, +what we term matter. + +"The merest rudiment of sensation or self-consciousness is infinitely +removed from absolutely non-sentient or unconscious matter. We can +conceive of no physical addition to, or modification of, an unconscious +mass which should create consciousness, no step in the series of changes +organized matter may undergo, which should bring sensation where there +was no sensation or power of sensation at the preceding step. It is +because the things are utterly incomparable and incommensurable that we +can only conceive of _sensation_ coming to matter from without, while +_life_ may be conceived as merely a specific modification and +coördination of the matter and the forces that compose the universe, and +with which we are separately acquainted. We may admit with Professor +Huxley, that _protoplasm_ is the 'matter of life' and the cause of +organization; but we cannot admit or conceive that _protoplasm_ is the +primary source of sensation and consciousness, or that it can ever of +itself become _conscious_ in the same way as we may perhaps conceive +that it may become _alive_." + +Wallace then reaches, without further preliminary discussion, the +conclusion that "matter is essentially force" (arguing that we may draw +this conclusion from the preceding considerations); that "matter, as +popularly understood, does not exist, and is, in fact, philosophically +inconceivable. When we touch matter, we only really experience +sensations of resistance, implying repulsive force; and no other sense +can give us such apparently solid proofs of the reality of matter as +touch does." Wallace considers it a great step in advance thus "to get +rid of the notion that matter is a thing in itself which can exist _per +se_, and must have been eternal, since it is supposed to be +indestructible and uncreated,--that force, or the forces of nature, are +another thing given or added to matter, or else its necessary +properties,--and that mind is yet another thing, either a product of +this matter and its supposed inherent forces, or distinct from and +co-existent with it"; and to be able to substitute for this theory "the +far simpler and more consistent belief, that matter, as an entity +distinct from force, does not exist; and that FORCE is a product of +MIND." + +"If we are satisfied that force or forces are all that exist in the +material universe, we are next led to inquire what is force." We are +acquainted with two kinds of force--our own will-force, and the forces +of nature. Freedom of the will cannot be disproved, for it cannot be +shown that there is not one-thousandth of a grain's difference between +the force exerted by the body and the force derived from without. "If, +therefore, we have traced one force, however minute, to an origin in our +will, while we have no knowledge of any other primary cause of force, it +does not seem an improbable conclusion that all force may be will-force; +and thus, that the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but +actually _is_ the _will_ of higher intelligences, or of one Supreme +Intelligence." + +But though Wallace declares "natural selection, as the law of the +strongest, inadequate" to account for man's mental and moral +development, since the finer feelings and capacities could have been of +no use to human beings in the early stages of barbarism, and further +maintains that it is also difficult to understand how "feelings +developed by one set of actions could be transferred to acts of which +the utility was partial, imaginary, or altogether absent," he +nevertheless has other passages like the following: "In proportion as +physical characteristics become of less importance, mental and moral +qualities will have increasing influence on the well-being of the race. +Capacity for acting in concert for protection and for the acquisition of +food and shelter; sympathy, which leads all in turn to assist each +other; the sense of right, which checks depredations upon our fellows; +the smaller development of the combative and destructive propensities, +self-restraint in present appetites; and that intelligent foresight +which prepares for the future, are all qualities that, from their +earliest appearance, must have been for the benefit of each community, +and would, therefore, have become the subjects of natural selection. For +it is evident that such qualities would be for the well-being of man; +would guard him against external enemies, against internal dissensions, +and against the effects of inclement seasons and impending famine, more +surely than could any merely physical modification. Tribes in which such +mental and moral qualities were predominant would therefore have an +advantage over other tribes in which they were less developed, would +live and maintain their numbers, while the others would decrease and +finally succumb." "From the time, therefore, when the social and +sympathetic feelings came into active operation, and the intellectual +and moral faculties became fairly developed, man would cease to be +influenced by natural selection in his physical form and structure. As +an animal, he would remain almost stationary, the changes of the +surrounding universe ceasing to produce in him that powerful modifying +effect which they exercise over other parts of the organic world. But +from the moment that the form of his body became stationary, his mind +would become subject to those very influences from which his body had +escaped; every slight variation in his mental and moral nature which +should enable him better to guard against adverse circumstances, and +combine for mutual comfort and protection would be preserved and +accumulated; the better and higher specimens of our race would therefore +increase and spread, the lower and more brutal would give way and +successively die out, and that rapid advancement of mental organization +would occur which has raised the very lowest races of man so far above +the brutes (although differing so little from some of them in physical +structure) and, in conjunction with scarcely perceptible modifications +of form, has developed the wonderful intellect of the European races." +"When the power that had hitherto modified the body had its action +transferred to the mind, then races would advance and become improved, +merely by the harsh discipline of a sterile soil and inclement seasons; +under their influence a hardier, a more provident, and a more social +race would be developed." And especially: "If my conclusions are just, +it must inevitably follow that the higher--the more intellectual and +moral--must displace the lower and more degraded races; and the power of +natural selection, still acting on his mental organization, must ever +lead to a more perfect adaptation of man's higher faculties to the +conditions of surrounding nature and to the exigencies of the social +state. While his external form will probably ever remain unchanged, +except in the development of that perfect beauty which results from a +healthy and well-organized body, refined and ennobled by the highest +intellectual faculties and sympathetic emotions, his mental constitution +may advance and improve, till the world is again inhabited by a single +nearly homogeneous race, no individual of which will be inferior to the +noblest specimens of existing humanity. + +"Our progress towards such a result is very slow, but it still seems to +be a progress." + +In "Darwinism" (1889), Wallace advocates Weismann's theory of heredity. +With regard to instinct, he uses arguments similar to those of his +earlier work. He says of the hunting instincts of dogs: "At first sight +it appears as if the acquired habits of our trained dogs--pointers, +retrievers, etc.--are certainly inherited; but this need not be the +case, because there must be some structural or physical peculiarities, +such as modifications in the attachments of muscles, increased delicacy +of smell or sight, or peculiar likes and dislikes, which are inherited; +and from these, peculiar habits follow as a natural consequence, or are +easily acquired." So that he thus defines instinct, by implication, as +he does also in his former book, as inherited habit which has no +correlative in physical organization, and is unconnected with feelings +of liking or disliking. He further says: "Again, much of the perfection +of instinct is due to the extreme severity of the selection, any failure +involving destruction"; and adds that, even if we admit the inheritance +of the effects of the direct action of the environment on the +individual, the effects are so small in comparison with the amount of +spontaneous variation of every part of the organism, that they must be +quite overshadowed by the latter.[30] In his theory of a higher +intelligence guiding human development, Wallace seems, in this book, to +have abandoned all his former arguments except those from the mental and +moral faculties, and it is perhaps due to a perception of the +inconsistencies of his former utterances on the subject of the moral +sense that he barely touches upon it in this book. On the other hand, he +has elaborated his arguments from the mathematical and artistic +faculties, and added an argument from wit and humor, none of which are +found, he urges, among savages, except in their very rudiments, and none +of which could have been developed by natural selection, since none +could have been a cause of man's conquest in his struggles with wild +beasts or with other tribes or nations. In answer to the objection that +the law of Continuity, which he has quoted as favoring the belief in the +existence of grades of supernatural beings between man and the Deity, +tells against the introduction of new causes in man's development, +Wallace maintains that there are certainly two other points in evolution +where such new causes come into play,--namely, at the beginning of life +and at the beginning of consciousness. "Increase of complexity in +chemical compounds, with consequent instability, even if we admit that +it may have produced protoplasm as a chemical compound, could certainly +not have produced living protoplasm,--protoplasm which has the power of +growth and reproduction, and of that continuous process of development +which has resulted in the marvellous variety and complex organization of +the whole vegetable kingdom, or, that is, vitality."[31] "All idea of +mere complication of structure producing" consciousness is "out of the +question." "Because man's physical structure has been developed from an +animal form by natural selection, it does not follow that his mental +nature, even though developed _pari passu_ with it, has been developed +by the same causes only."[32] Yet, in assuming Weismann's theory, +Wallace asserts: "Whatever other causes have been at work, Natural +Selection is supreme, to an extent which even Darwin himself hesitated +to claim for it." "While admitting, as Darwin always admitted, the +coöperation of the fundamental laws of growth and variation, of +correlation and heredity, in determining the direction of lines of +variation, or in the initiation of peculiar organs, we find that +variation and natural selection are ever-present agencies which take +possession, as it were, of every minute change originated by these +fundamental causes, check or favor their further development, or modify +them in countless ways according to the varying needs of the +organism."[33] + +In the opening portions of this book Wallace introduces a teleological +argument to the effect that the pain which we ordinarily conceive as +connected with the struggle for existence among lower species is mostly +a figment of our imagination. Periods of suffering are comparatively +short, since death speedily and without anticipation puts an end to +those animals in any way incapacitated. Livingstone describes how, when +seized by a lion, a sort of stupor succeeded the first shock, so that he +felt neither fear nor pain; it is probable that terror induces this same +condition in animals seized by beasts of prey, and that their end is +therefore painless after the first shock. Cold is generally severest at +night and tends to produce sleep and painless extinction. Hunger is +scarcely felt during periods of excitement, "and when food is scarce, +the excitement of seeking it is at its greatest." Nor is the gradual +exhaustion and weakness of slow starvation necessarily painful. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[24] For criticism of these arguments, see Romanes, "Mental Evolution in +Animals," p. 225, etc.; also "Animal Intelligence." In his second +edition of this book (1891), Wallace notices a few of the instances +cited by Romanes in objection to his theory: such as the recognition of +the hen's call by a chicken hatched in an incubator, the fear shown, on +the other hand, at the note of a hawk, and the fear exhibited by most +young animals at the voice or presence of their natural enemies. Of +these he says, however: "But in all these cases we have comparatively +simple motions or acts induced by feelings of liking or disliking, and +we can see that they may be due to definite nervous and muscular +coördinations which are essential to the existence of the species. That +a chicken should feel pleasure at the sound of a hen's voice, and pain +or fear at that of a hawk, and should move towards the one and away from +the other, is a fact of the same nature as the liking of an infant for +milk and its dislike of beer, with the motion of the head towards the +one and away from the other when offered to it." Of two authentic cases +of the building of a nest by young birds, without instruction, he says +that, in one case (that of ring-doves), the nest is a very simple one, +and that the birds also received some assistance; and in the other case +the nest was not built with the neatness ordinarily characteristic of +the species. (See "Natural Selection and Tropical Nature," pp. 108-112.) +The most of Romanes' instances and arguments he does not notice or +answer. + +[25] In his second edition, Wallace writes "not only innate ideas, but +innate knowledge." + +[26] In the second edition of this book, Wallace maintains the same +position with regard to skull-measurement as a criterion of mental +capacity. Nor does he notice distinctions in skull-form or the +proportions of different parts of the brain to each other, except in the +one case of the Eyzies. + +[27] See Wallace on "Miracles and Modern Spiritualism," "The +Psycho-physiological Sciences and their Assailants," and "The Scientific +Aspect of the Supernatural." + +[28] Wallace omits this particular clause in his second edition. + +[29] The second edition reads "is, or pertains to." + +[30] Pp. 442, 443. + +[31] This is contradictory of the passages on the subject of life above +noticed as occurring in the "Contributions to Natural Selection," and +retained in the second edition of that book. + +[32] P. 463. + +[33] P. 444. + + + + +ERNST HAECKEL + + +In his "Anthropogenie" (1874), Haeckel says: "The soul, or 'psyche' of +man has evolved, as function of the cerebro-spinal nerve-chord +simultaneously with the latter, and just as, even yet, brain and spinal +column develop from the simple nerve-chord, so the human mind, or the +soul-activity of the whole human race, has evolved, gradually and step +by step, from the lower vertebrate soul. 'Spirit' and 'soul' are only +higher and combined or differentiated powers of the same function which +we designate with the general expression 'force.'"[34] In his essay on +"Cell-souls and Soul-cells" (1878), Haeckel attributes to all animals +the possession of soul, and adds that "we cannot wholly deny a soul to +the plants also." The possession of soul he defines as the "capacity of +sensibility in the organism to excitations of various sorts, and of +reaction upon these excitations with certain movements." "This uniform +character of protoplasm gifted with soul permits us the hypothesis that +the ultimate factors of the soul-life are the plastidules, the +invisible, homogeneous, elemental particles, or molecules, of +protoplasm, which, in limitless multiplicity, compose the unnumbered +cells." The soul connected with the higher developments of brain and +spinal column is likewise a higher development, and differs from the +soul connected with the uncentralized organization of lower species. In +the latest edition of his "Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte" (1889), he +further asserts that all matter is possessed of soul, and that "the +antithesis which we have assumed between living and dead nature does not +exist. When a stone, thrown into the air, falls to the earth according +to fixed laws, or when a crystal is formed in a solution of salts, or +when sulphur and quicksilver combine to form cinnabar, these phenomena +are not more and not less mechanical phenomena of life than the growth +and bloom of the plants, than the propagation and sense-activity of +animals, than the perception and thought-processes of human beings."[35] +And both in this work and in his "Anthropogenie" he quotes the words of +Goethe, that "matter can never exist and act without soul, the soul can +never exist and act without matter." This last statement is, however, +rather a metaphysical one, in distinction from Haeckel's other +statements on this subject, which are properly naturalistic. + +In his lecture on "Cell-souls and Soul-cells," Haeckel says of instinct: +"Unbiassed observation, applying its tests without prejudice, shows +conclusively that the so-called 'instinct' of the animals is nothing +else than a sum of psychical functions originally acquired by +adaptation, fixed by habit, and descending from generation to +generation by inheritance. Originally carried out with consciousness and +reflection, many instinctive actions of the animals have become +unconscious, as have, in like manner, the ordinary acts of intelligence +in man. These too, may, with the same justice, be regarded as the +expression of innate instinct, as often is the impulse to +self-preservation, maternal love, and the social impulse. Instinct is +not an exclusive attribute of the animal-brain, nor is reason an +especial endowment of man; there is, on the contrary, for the unbiassed +observer, a long, long scale of gradual improvement and evolution in +psychic life, which may be traced step by step, from the higher to lower +human beings, from the perfect to the imperfect animals, until we reach +those simple worms, whose nerve-ganglia are the beginning of all the +numberless brain-forms of the scale." + +In his "Anthropogenie," Haeckel denies Free Will, maintaining that all +phenomena are the result of mechanical causes--_causæ efficientes_, not +_causæ finales_. In an essay on the "Relation of the Theory of Evolution +in its present form to Science in General" (1877), he says of Ethics: +"By far the most important and the most difficult demand which Practical +Philosophy makes upon the theory of Evolution seems to be that of a new +theory of Morals. Certainly in the future, as in the past, the careful +development of moral character and of religious conviction must be the +chief problem of education. But until now the greater number of people +have clung to the conviction that this most important problem could be +solved only in connection with certain ecclesiastical articles of faith. +And since these dogmas, especially as connected with ancient myths of +the Creation, are in direct opposition to the facts of evolution, the +latter have been believed to be, in the highest degree, inimical to +religion and morality. + +"This fear we believe to be erroneous. It has its origin in the +continual confusion of the true, reasonable, nature-religion and the +dogmatic, mythological, church-religion. The Comparative History of +Religions, an important branch of Anthropology, teaches us the manifold +nature of outward form in which different peoples and epochs have, in +accordance with their individual character, enveloped religious thought. +It shows us that the dogmatic teachings of the church-religion itself +are subject to a slow, continuous evolution. New churches and sects +arise, old ones disappear; at the best, a particular tenet of faith +lasts but a few thousand years, an inconsiderably short space of time +compared with the æons of the geological periods. Finally, the History +of Civilization shows us to how small an extent true morality has been +associated with any particular ecclesiastical form. The greatest +rudeness and barbarity of custom often goes hand in hand with the +absolute dominion of an all-powerful church; in confirmation of which +assertion one need only remember the Middle Ages. On the other hand, we +behold the highest standard of perfection attained by men who have +severed connection with every creed. + +"Independent of every confession of faith, there lives in the breast of +every human being the germ of a pure nature-religion; this is +indissolubly bound up with the noblest sides of human life. Its highest +commandment is love, the restraint of our natural egoism for the benefit +of our fellow-men, and for the good of human society whose members we +are. This natural law of morality is much older than all +church-religion. It has developed out of the social instincts of the +animals. We meet with its rudiments among all animals, especially among +all mammals. Following the laws of association and of division of labor, +many individuals of such species unite to form the higher community of +the swarm, herd, or tribe. The existence of the latter is necessarily +dependent upon the mutual relations of the members of the community and +the sacrifices which these make to the whole society at the cost of +their own egoism. The consciousness of this necessity of self-sacrifice, +the sense of duty, is nothing else than a social instinct. But this +instinct is always a psychical habit, which was originally acquired, but +which, becoming in the course of time hereditary, appears at last as +innate. + +"In order to convince ourselves of the wonderful power of the sense of +duty among animals, we need only to destroy an ant-hill. Immediately we +see, in the midst of the destruction, thousands of zealous citizens +employed, not in the rescue of their own precious lives, but in the +protection of the beloved community to which they belong. Brave soldiers +of the ant-state prepare to offer strong resistance to our intruding +finger; instructors of youth rescue the so-called ant-eggs, the precious +larvæ, on which the future of the state depends; busy workers +immediately begin with undiminished courage to clear away the ruins and +to prepare new dwellings. But the admirable state of civilization among +these ants, among bees and other social animals, has been developed, +just as has been our own, from the rudest beginnings. + +"Even those finest and most beautiful forms of human emotion which we +especially celebrate in poetry are to be found prefigured among the +animals. Have not the tender mother-love of the lioness, the touching +affection between male and female parrots, the self-sacrificing fidelity +of the dog, been long proverbial? The noblest emotions of sympathy and +love, which direct action, are here, as with human beings, nothing else +than ennobled instinct." Beginning with this conception, the Ethics of +Evolution has to seek for no new principle, but, on the contrary, to +trace back the old rules of duty to their scientific basis. Long before +the rise of all church-religion, these natural commandments regulated +the lawful relations of human beings, as of gregarious animals. This +significant fact the church-religions should utilize, instead of +disputing. For the future does not belong to that Theology which +declares war against the triumphant Theory of Evolution, but to that +which makes it its own, acknowledges it, and turns it to advantage. + +"Far, therefore, from fearing, from the influence of the Theory of +Evolution, a subversion of all accepted moral law and a destructive +emancipation of Egoism, we, on the contrary, look forward to a system of +Ethics erected upon the indestructible foundation of unchanging natural +law, since at the same time with the clear recognition of our true place +in nature, the study of Anthropogeny opens to us the comprehension of +the necessary character of our old rules of duty. Like theoretical +science, Practical Philosophy and Pedagogy will no longer derive their +most important principles from so-called revelations, but from the +scientific truths of Evolution. This victory of Monism over Dualism +opens to us a most hopeful prospect of an unending continuation of our +moral, as of our intellectual evolution. In this sense, we welcome the +Theory of Evolution in its present form newly stated by Darwin, as a +challenge--the most important challenge of pure and applied science." + +As touching on the idea of a nature-religion as conceived by Haeckel, +may be noticed, however, a passage which occurs at the end of chapter +XII. of the "Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte," as well as the passage +before referred to in which it is asserted that we know only _causæ +efficientes_, never _causæ finales_. The passage is as follows: "The +general significance of the degenerated or rudimentary organs in the +most important questions of natural philosophy cannot be over-estimated. +On these may be founded a theory of Disteleology as opposed to the +ancient, usual Teleology." + +With especial theories of Heredity advocated by Haeckel we are not +concerned, except in one respect. Even in the first edition of his +"Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte," Haeckel makes a distinction between +conservative and progressive inheritance, and in the edition of 1889 he +still maintains this division against Weismann and others, claiming the +heredity of acquired habit, under certain circumstances, and showing +conclusively that even wounds and blemishes received during the life of +an individual may be, in some instances, inherited by descendants.[36] +The laws of progressive heredity he gives as four: (1) the law of the +inheritance of adaptation; (2) the law of the surer inheritance of +qualities fixed by continual operation of its causes on individual +generations; (3) the law of homochronous inheritance or inheritance at a +corresponding age; (4) the law of homotypous inheritance, which may be +otherwise called the law of inheritance in corresponding parts of the +body.[37] + +Having thus glanced at the special theories by which the great original +authorities paved the way for a system of Evolutional Ethics, we may +direct our attention to the more purely philosophical writers who have +turned these theories to advantage and elaborated them. The first on the +list is + +FOOTNOTES: + +[34] P. 703 _et seq._ + +[35] Erster Vortrag. + +[36] P. 194 _et seq._ + +[37] For illustrations and proofs of these laws, see the "Natürliche +Schöpfungsgeschichte," pp. 193-197. + + + + +HERBERT SPENCER + + +In treating of Mr. Spencer's work, it is necessary to begin with a book +which made its appearance before the publication of "The Origin of +Species," namely, "Social Statics" (1851), Mr. Spencer's first +noteworthy publication. In this are contained some remarkable +statements, which are of especial worth as showing in what measure the +thought of the time was already tending in the direction of the +revelations of its greatest prophet, and science, in England as in +Germany, was slowly coming to recognize the unity of nature in life and +human progress. An analysis of the first and theoretical part of this +work will be, therefore, of use, and with this we will begin. + +Mr. Spencer opens his book with some criticisms of Utilitarianism or the +"Expediency Philosophy." Every rule, in order to be of value, must have +a definite meaning. The rule of "the greatest happiness to the greatest +number" supposes mankind to be unanimous in the definition of the +greatest happiness; the standard of happiness is, however, infinitely +variable, in nations and in individuals. For happiness signifies a +gratified state of all the faculties; and no two individuals are alike +in faculties. In endeavoring to fix a standard, we are met by such +insolvable problems as: What is the ratio between mental and bodily +enjoyments constituting the greatest happiness? Which is most truly an +element in the desired felicity, content or aspiration? The conclusion +we inevitably reach is that a true conception of what human life should +be is possible only to the ideal man,--in whom the component feelings +exist in their normal proportions. The world as yet contains no such +men, and we are left with an insolvable riddle on our hands. + +There is the same uncertainty as to the mode of obtaining the greatest +happiness. + +The Expediency Philosophy believes that man's intellect is competent to +observe accurately and to grasp at once the multiplied phenomena of life +and derive therefrom the knowledge which shall enable him to say whether +such or such measures will conduce to the greatest happiness of the +greatest number. + +If without knowledge of terrestrial phenomena and their laws, Newton had +attempted a theory of planetary and stellar equilibrium, he might have +cogitated to all eternity without result. Such an attempt, however, +would have been far less absurd than the attempt to find out the +principles of public polity by a direct examination of that wonderfully +intricate combination, Society. In order to understand Society it is +necessary to comprehend Man. + +Another mistake of the Expediency Philosophy is that it assumes the +eternity of government, which marks a certain stage of civilization, but +which will by no means necessarily last forever. Time was when the +history of a people was the history of its government. Feudalism, +serfdom, slavery,--all were forms of government. Progress means less +government; constitutional forms, political freedom, democracy, all mean +this. Government is a sign of imperfection, an evil necessary against +knavery; it must exist only so long as this exists. The Expediency +Philosophy is, however, founded on government; takes it into +partnership: but a system of moral philosophy professes to be a code of +correct rules for the best, as well as the worst, members of society, +and applicable to humanity in its highest conceivable perfection. Of the +Expediency Philosophy it must, therefore, be said that it can claim no +scientific character, since: + +Its fundamental proposition is not an axiom but a problem to be solved; + +It is expressed in terms possessing no fixed acceptation; + +It would require omniscience to carry it into practice; + +And, moreover, it takes imperfection for its basis. + +The existence of society argues a certain fitness and desire of mankind +for it; without this, it would not exist, as eating and drinking, and +the nourishment and protection of offspring would not take place if +there were no corresponding desires, but merely an abstract opinion in +favor of the worth of the two. In the method of nature, there is always +some prompter, called a desire, answering to each of the actions which +it is requisite for us to perform. It is probable, therefore, that we +shall find an instrumentality of this sort prompting us to morality. In +objection to the theory of a moral sense, the want of uniformity in +judgment as to what is right is often advanced. But none deny the +importance of appetite, though all know that it is by no means an +infallible guide in the choice of kind or quantity of food. The same may +be said of parental affection. The foundation of the claim of any man +that he has as great a right to happiness as any other can be found in +the last analysis in feeling only; he feels that it is so. + +None but those committed to a preconceived theory can fail to recognize +the workings of such a faculty as the moral sense. It is clear that the +perceptions of propriety or impropriety of conduct do not originate with +the intellect but with the emotional faculties. The intellect, +uninfluenced by desire, would show both miser and spendthrift that their +habits were unwise; whereas the intellect, influenced by desire, makes +each think the other a fool, but does not enable him to see his own +foolishness. + +This is a universal law: Every feeling is accompanied by a sense of the +rightness of those actions which give it gratification. From an impulse +to behave in a way we call equitable arises a perception that it is +proper, and a conviction that it is good. There is, however, a +perpetual conflict amongst feelings, from which results an incongruity +of beliefs. + +It has been said that codes derived from the moral sense have no +stability since this sense ratifies one principle at one time and place, +another at another. The same objection applies, however, to every other +system of morals, and happily there is an answer to the objection. The +error criticised is one of application, not of doctrine. The decisions +of the Geometric Sense are conflicting; yet there are certain axioms +upon which all agree; and in the same manner there are moral axioms to +be found, upon which all must agree. Disagreement is to be looked for +among imperfect characters. But nature's laws know no exception: Obey or +suffer are the alternatives. A progress from entire unconsciousness of +these laws to the conviction that law is universal and inevitable, +constancy an essential attribute of divine rule, is the substance of the +progress of man. The end of these unbending utterances is universal +good; we have no alternative but to assume the law of constancy to be +the best possible one. As with the physical, so with the ethical; all +religions teach the inevitableness of punishment and reward, with which +deeds are _necessarily_ and _indissolubly_ connected. It is of infinite +importance to recognize and follow the laws of society. To the objection +that one cannot always be guided by abstract principles, that there are +exceptions where prudence must act, it may be replied that there are no +exceptions to the laws of nature; that even if, in a particular +instance, partial good may result, a far greater general evil is +entailed by the opening of the way to future disobediences, and that we +cannot, moreover, be sure that an exceptional disobedience will bring +the anticipated benefits. Moral as well as physical evil is the result +of a want of congruity between the faculties and their sphere of action. +With regard to the results of varying conditions upon man, we have three +alternative theories from which to choose: either man remains entirely +unaltered by his surroundings, or he grows more unfitted for them, or +else he grows more fitted for them. The first two suppositions being +absurd, we are obliged to admit the remaining one. And since all evil +results from non-adaptation, and non-adaptation is being continually +diminished, it follows that evil must be continually diminishing. The +evil in society shows that man is not yet completely adapted to a state +which requires that each individual shall have such desires only as may +be fully satisfied without trenching upon the ability of other +individuals to obtain a like satisfaction. The primitive condition of +man required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his +own; the old attribute still clings to him in some measure; the belief +in human perfectibility amounts to the belief that man will eventually +become completely suited to his mode of life. Progress is not an +accident but a necessity; and if, instead of proposing it as a rule of +human conduct, Bentham had simply assumed the "greatest happiness" to be +the creative purpose, his position would have been tenable enough. It is +one thing, however, to hold that greatest happiness is the creative +purpose, and quite a different thing to hold that greatest happiness +should be the immediate aim of mankind. Truth has two sides, a divine +and a human; or, it is for man to ascertain the conditions which lead to +the greatest happiness, and to live in conformity with these. + +The men who are to realize this greatest sum of happiness must be such +as can obtain complete happiness without diminishing the activity and +happiness of others. The first great condition of the attainment of the +end is, therefore, justice, and, as a supplement to this, negative and +positive beneficence,--abstinence from diminishing the spheres of +activity of others, and further, a positive increase of their pleasure. +For man is sympathetic, and the sympathetic pleasures increase the sum +total of happiness. + +The exercise[38] of all the faculties in which happiness consists is not +only man's right but also his duty. For the fact of pain, of punishment, +proves that God intends and wills such exercise. But the exercise of all +the faculties is freedom; all men have, therefore, a right to freedom of +action. This principle, however, implies a limitation of man by men, +whereby we arrive at the general proposition that every man may claim +the fullest liberty to exercise his feelings _compatible with the +possession of a like liberty in every other man_. In the progress of +mankind, or adaptation, the conduct which hurts necessary feelings in +others must inevitably undergo restraint and consequent limitation; +conduct which hurts only their incidental feelings, as those of caste or +prejudice, will not inevitably be restrained, but if it springs from +necessary feelings, will, on the contrary, be continued at the expense +of these incidental feelings and to their final suppression. Morality is +_not_, therefore, to be interpreted as a refraining from the infliction +of any pain whatever, for some sentiment must be wounded; and by much +wounding it is gradually weakened. When men mutually behave in a way +that offends some essential element in the nature of each, and all in +turn have to bear the consequent suffering, there will arise a tendency +to curb the desire that makes them so behave. + +Questions of individual morality seem to present a difficulty to this +theory of freedom. Thus, for instance, on the principle above adopted, +the liberty of drunkenness cannot be condemned as long as the drunkard +respects a like liberty in others; and here we fall into the +inconsistency of affirming that a man is at liberty to do something +essentially destructive of happiness. However, if we admit, as we must, +that liberty is the _primary_ law, no desire to get a secondary law +fulfilled can warrant us in breaking this primary one; we must deal with +secondary laws as best we can. + +The first principle above stated may also be secondarily derived. The +regulation of conduct is not left to the accident of a philosophical +inquiry; the agent of morality is the Moral Sense. + +In all ages, but more especially in recent ones, have there been +affirmations of the equality of all men and their equal right to +happiness. When we find that a belief like this is not only permanent +but daily gaining ground, we have good reason to conclude that it +corresponds to some essential element of our moral constitution; more +especially since we find that its existence is in harmony with that +chief prerequisite to greatest happiness lately dwelt upon; and that its +growth is in harmony with the law of adaptation, by which the greatest +happiness is being wrought out. + +To assert, however, that the sense of justice is but the gradually +acquired conviction that benefits spring from some kinds of action, and +evils from other kinds, the sympathies and antipathies contracted +manifesting themselves as a love of justice and a hatred of injustice, +is as absurd as to conclude that hunger springs from a conviction of the +benefit of eating. + +The Moral Sense must be regarded as a special faculty, since, otherwise, +there would be nothing during the dormancy of the other faculties, which +must sometimes occur, to prevent an infringement on the freedom +requisite for their future action. + +As Adam Smith has shown in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," the proper +regulation of our conduct to others is secured by means of a faculty +whose function it is to excite in each being the emotions displayed by +the beings about him. The sentiment of justice is nothing but a +sympathetic affection of the instinct of personal rights, a sort of +reflex function of it. Other things being equal, those persons +possessing the strongest sense of personal rights have, also, the +strongest sense of the rights of others. There is no _necessary_ +connection between the two; but in the average of cases they bear a +constant ratio. + +It may be objected that if the truth that every man has a freedom to do +all that he wills, provided he infringe not upon the equal freedom of +others, be an axiom, it should be recognized by all, as is not the case. +This difficulty seems in part due to the impossibility of making the +perfect law recognize an imperfect state. It may further be answered +that the Bushman knows nothing of the science of mathematics, yet that +arithmetic is a fact; the difference in men's moral perceptions is no +difficulty in our way, but rather illustrates the truth of our theory, +since man is not yet adapted to the social state. + +In further confirmation of the doctrine of the free exercise of +function, it may be added that, since non-fulfilment of desire produces +misery, if God is to be regarded as willing such non-fulfilment, he must +be regarded as willing men's misery; which is absurd. If men are not +naturally free, then a doctrine of the divine right of kings is easily +reached, and whoever is king must be regarded as such by divine right, +no matter how he reached the throne. + +Spencer then proceeds to apply his first principle or axiom of freedom +to prove the right to life and liberty, to the use of the earth, to +property and free speech; and considers further the rights of women and +of children, and the political rights of individuals; the constitution +and duty of the state; commerce, education, and the poor-laws; +government colonization, sanitary supervision, postal arrangements, etc. +A remarkable feature of this part of "Social Statics" is that Spencer, +while applying his principle with quite an opposite result to all other +property, advocates the nationalization of the land, on the ground that +the freedom of the individual is right only in so far as it does not +hinder a like freedom in others; and that the monopolization of the +privileges of land-ownership by individuals does prevent the enjoyment +of the same privilege by others. + + +GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS + +The course of civilization could not possibly have been other than it +has been. + +Progress shows us that perfect individuation joined to the greatest +mutual dependence will be reached in the future of the race. There will +be an ultimate identity of personal and social interests, and a +disappearance of evil. Spencer gives, however, a number of arguments to +prove that the interest of society is, at present also, the interest of +the individual. + + * * * * * + +The "Theory of Population" (published in 1852), which is founded on the +theory of an antagonism between the intellectual and the reproductive +powers, and on the ancient theory of a direct relation between +skull-capacity or brain-size and intellectual power, contains this +passage: "From the beginning, pressure of population has been the +proximate cause of progress. It produced the original diffusion of the +race. It compelled men to abandon predatory habits and take to +agriculture. It led to the clearing of the earth's surface. It forced +men into the social state; made social organization inevitable; and has +developed the social sentiments. It has stimulated to progressive +improvements in production, and to increased skill and intelligence. It +is daily pressing us into closer contact and more mutually dependent +relationships. And after having caused, as it ultimately must, the due +peopling of the globe, and the bringing of all its habitable parts into +the highest state of culture,--after having brought all processes for +the satisfaction of human wants to the greatest perfection,--after +having, at the same time, developed the intellect into complete +competency for its work, and the feelings into complete fitness for +social life,--after having done all this, we see the pressure of +population, as it gradually finishes its work, must gradually bring +itself to an end." + +In a letter to Mr. Mill, published in Bain's "Mental and Moral Science" +(p. 721, 3d edition), Spencer repudiates the title of Anti-Utilitarian, +which Mr. Mill, in view of the criticisms of Utilitarianism contained in +"Social Statics," had applied to him. He defines his position in respect +to Utilitarianism as follows: "I have never regarded myself as an +Anti-Utilitarian. My dissent from the doctrine of Utility as commonly +understood, concerns, not the object to be reached by men, but the +method of reaching it. While I admit that happiness is the ultimate end +to be contemplated, I do not admit that it should be the proximate end. +The Expediency Philosophy, having concluded that happiness is a thing to +be achieved, assumes that Morality has no other business than +empirically to generalize the results of conduct, and to supply for the +guidance of conduct nothing more than its empirical generalizations. + +"But the view for which I contend is, that Morality properly +so-called--the science of right conduct--has for its object to determine +how and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other +modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but +must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things, and I +conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws +of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily +tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having +done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and +are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness +or misery. + +"Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning. During its early +stages, planetary astronomy consisted of nothing more than accumulated +observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and +planets; from which accumulated observations it came by and by to be +empirically predicted, with an approach to truth, that certain of the +heavenly bodies would have certain positions at certain times. But the +modern science of planetary astronomy consists of deductions from the +law of gravitation--deductions showing why the celestial bodies +necessarily occupy certain places at certain times. Now the kind of +relation which thus exists between ancient and modern astronomy is +analogous to the kind of relation which, I conceive, exists between the +Expediency Morality and Moral Science properly so-called. And the +objection which I have to the current Utilitarianism is, that it +recognizes no more developed form of morality--does not see that it has +reached but the initial stage of Moral Science. + +"To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that, +corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed Moral +Science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race, certain +fundamental moral intuitions; and that, though these moral intuitions +are the results of accumulated experiences of Utility, gradually +organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of +conscious experience. Just in the same way that I believe the intuition +of space possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from the +organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals, +who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organizations--just +as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and +complete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of +thought, apparently quite independent of experience; so do I believe +that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all +past generations of the human race, have been producing nervous +modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have +become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions +responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in +the individual experiences of utility. I also hold that, just as the +space-intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of geometry, and +has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them, so will +moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of Moral Science; and +will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them." + +In "Recent Discussions in Science, Philosophy, and Morals"[39] (1871), +Spencer, after quoting portions of the above letter as defining his +position, continues with a consideration of the continual readjustment +of the compromise between the ideal and the practicable, the former of +which prescribes a system far too good for men as they are, the latter +of which does not of itself tend to establish a system better than the +existing one; and he reiterates his law of the perfect man as follows:-- + +"Granted that we are chiefly interested in ascertaining what is +_relatively_ right, it still follows that we must first consider what is +absolutely right; since the one conception presupposes the other." +Spencer further expressly repudiates empirical Utilitarianism, and +denies the assertion of Mr. Hutton that he by implication recognizes no +parentage for morals beyond that of the accumulation and organization of +the facts of experience. On this head he says:-- + +"In the genesis of an idea, the successive experiences, be they of +sounds, colors, touches, tastes, or be they of the special objects that +combine many of these into groups, have so much in common that each, +when it occurs, can be definitely thought of as like those which +preceded it. But in the genesis of an emotion, the successive +experiences so far differ that each of them, when it occurs, suggests +past experiences which are not specifically similar, but have only a +general similarity; and, at the same time, it suggests benefits or evils +in past experience which likewise are various in their special natures, +though they have a certain community of general nature. Hence it results +that the consciousness aroused is a multitudinous confused +consciousness, in which, along with a certain kind of combination among +impressions received from without, there is a vague cloud of ideal +combinations akin to them, and a vague mass of ideal feelings of +pleasure or pain that were associated with them. We have abundant proof +that feelings grow up without reference to recognized causes and +consequences, and without the possessor of them being able to say why +they have grown up, though analysis, nevertheless, shows that they have +been formed out of connected experiences. The experiences of utility I +refer to are those which become registered, not as distinctly recognized +connections between certain kinds of acts and certain kinds of remote +results, but those which become registered in the shape of associations +between groups of feelings that have often recurred together, +though the relation between them has not been consciously +generalized"--associations which though little perceived, nevertheless +serve as incentives or deterrents. Much deeper down than the history of +the human race must we go to find the beginnings of these connections. +The appearances and sounds which excite in the infant a vague dread +indicate danger; and do so because they are the physiological +accompaniments of destructive action. + +"What we call the natural language of anger is due to a partial +contraction of those muscles which actual combat would call into play; +and all marks of irritation, down to that passing shade over the brow +which accompanies slight annoyance, are incipient stages of these same +contractions. Conversely with the natural language of pleasure, and of +that state of mind which we call amicable feeling; this, too, has a +physical interpretation." + +Of the altruistic sentiments, Spencer says: "The development of these +has gone on only as fast as society has advanced to a state in which the +activities are mainly peaceful. The root of all the altruistic +sentiments is sympathy, and sympathy could become dominant only when the +mode of life, instead of being one that habitually inflicted direct +pain, became one which conferred direct and indirect benefits; the pains +inflicted being mainly incidental and indirect." Sympathy is "the +concomitant of gregariousness; the two having all along increased by +reciprocal aid." + +"If we suppose all thought of rewards or punishments, immediate or +remote, to be left out of consideration, it is clear that any one who +hesitates to inflict a pain because of the vivid representation of that +pain which rises in his consciousness, is restrained not by any sense of +obligation or by any formulated doctrine of utility, but by the painful +associations established in him. And it is clear that if, after repeated +experiences of the moral discomfort he has felt from witnessing the +unhappiness indirectly caused by some of his acts, he is led to check +himself when again tempted to those acts, the restraint is of like +nature. Conversely with the pleasure-giving acts, repetitions of kind +deeds and experiences of the sympathetic gratifications that follow tend +continually to make stronger the association between deeds and feelings +of happiness." + +Spencer continues: "Eventually these experiences may be consciously +generalized, and there may result a deliberate pursuit of the +sympathetic gratifications. There may also come to be distinctly +recognized the truths that the remoter results are respectively +detrimental and beneficial--that due regard for others is conducive to +ultimate personal welfare, and disregard of others to ultimate personal +disaster; and then there may become current such summations of +experience as 'honesty is the best policy.' But so far from regarding +these intellectual recognitions of utility as preceding and causing the +moral sentiment, I regard the moral sentiment as preceding such +recognitions of utility and making them possible. The pleasures and +pains directly resulting, in experience, from sympathetic and +unsympathetic actions, had first to be slowly associated with such +actions, and the resulting incentives and deterrents frequently obeyed, +before there could arise the perceptions that sympathetic and +unsympathetic actions are remotely beneficial or detrimental to the +actor; and they had to be obeyed still longer and more generally before +there could arise the perceptions that they are socially beneficial and +detrimental. When, however, the remote effects, personal and social, +have gained general recognition, are expressed in current maxims, and +lead to injunctions having the religious sanction, the sentiments that +prompt sympathetic actions and check unsympathetic ones, are immensely +strengthened by their alliances. Approbation and reprobation, divine and +human, come to be associated in thought with the sympathetic and +unsympathetic actions respectively. The commands of a creed, the legal +penalties, and the code of social conduct, mutually enforce them; and +every child, as it grows up, daily has impressed on it, by the words and +faces and voices of those around, the authority of these highest +principles." + +The altruistic sentiments develop, and altruistic action becomes +habitual, "until at length these altruistic sentiments begin to call in +question the authority of those ego-altruistic sentiments which once +ruled unchallenged." + +And Spencer sums up his objections to the interpretation of his theory +of the development of the moral sentiment as follows: "What I have said +will make it clear that two fundamental errors have been made in the +interpretation put upon it. Both Utility and Experience have been +construed in senses much too narrow. + +"Utility, convenient a word as it is from its comprehensiveness, has +very inconvenient and misleading implications. It vividly suggests uses +and means and proximate ends, but very faintly suggests the pleasures, +positive or negative, which are the ultimate ends, and which, in the +ethical meaning of the word, are alone considered; and, further, it +implies conscious recognition of means and ends--implies the deliberate +taking of some course to gain a perceived benefit. Experience, too, in +its ordinary acceptation, connotes definite perceptions of causes and +consequences, as standing in observed relations, and is not taken to +include the connections found in consciousness between states that occur +together, when the relation between them, causal or other, is not +perceived. It is in their widest senses, however, that I habitually use +these words, as will be manifest to every one who reads the 'Principles +of Psychology.'" + +In his essay on Prison Ethics (1860), Spencer says: "The antagonistic +schools of morals, like many other antagonistic schools, are both right +and both wrong. The _a priori_ school has its truth; the _a posteriori_ +school has its truth; and for the proper guidance of conduct there +should be due recognition of both. On the one hand, it is asserted that +there is an absolute standard of rectitude; and respecting certain +classes of actions, it is rightly asserted. From the fundamental laws of +life and the conditions of social existence are deducible certain +imperative limitations to individual action--limitations which are +essential to a perfect life, individual and social; or, in other words, +essential to the greatest possible happiness. And these limitations, +following inevitably as they do from undeniable first principles, deep +as the nature of life itself, constitute what we may distinguish as +absolute morality. + +"On the other hand, it is contended, and in a sense rightly contended, +that with men as they are, and society as it is, the dictates of +absolute morality are impracticable. Legal control, which involves the +infliction of pain, alike on those who are restrained and on those who +pay the cost of restraining them, is proved by this fact to be not +absolutely moral, seeing that absolute morality is the regulation of +conduct in such way that pain shall not be inflicted. Wherefore, if it +be admitted that legal control is at present indispensable, it must be +admitted that these _a priori_ rules cannot be immediately carried out. +And hence it follows that we must adapt our laws and actions to the +existing character of mankind--that we must estimate the good or evil +resulting from this or that arrangement, and so reach _a posteriori_ a +code fitted for the time being. In short, we must fall back on +expediency." Spencer then goes on to argue that an advanced penal code +is as impossible to an early stage of civilization as is an advanced +form of government; a bloody penal code is both a natural product of the +time and a needful restraint for the time, and is also the only one +which could be carried out by the existing administration. + +The aim of morality is life, of absolute morality complete life; society +is therefore justified in coercing the criminal who breaks through the +conditions of life or constrains us to do so. Coercion is legitimate to +the extent of compelling restitution, and preventing a repetition of +aggressions; no further. Less bloody systems of punishment, wherever +introduced, have borne excellent fruit. It may be deductively shown that +the best of all systems must be that best calculated to reform the +criminal; too severe punishment, instead of awakening a sense of guilt, +prevents the same, begetting a sense of injustice towards the +inflicting power, which causes resentment; so that, even if the +criminal, on reëntering society, commits no further crime, he is +restrained by the lowest of motives--fear. The industrial system applied +in prisons must have the best results--counteracting habits of idleness, +strengthening self-control, and educating the will. + +The principle of freedom, which runs through all Spencer's works, is +especially enounced again, in his essay, "The Man versus the State" +(1884), in which he combats "the great political superstition" of +so-called "paternal government." He says: "Reduced to its lowest terms, +every proposal to interfere with citizens' activities further than by +enforcing their mutual limitations, is a proposal to improve life by +breaking through the fundamental conditions of life."[40] + +In "The Data of Ethics" (published 1874), Mr. Spencer assumes a somewhat +different standpoint from that of his earlier works bearing on morals. +The course of reasoning contained in this book is as follows:-- + +The doctrine that correlatives imply one another has, for one of its +common examples, the relation between the conceptions of whole and part. +Beyond the primary truth that no idea of a whole can be framed without a +nascent idea of parts constituting it, and that no idea of a part can be +framed without a nascent idea of some whole to which it belongs, there +is the secondary truth that there can be no correct idea of a part +without a correct idea of the correlative whole. Still less, when part +and whole are dynamically related, and least of all when the whole is +organic, can the part be understood except by comprehension of the whole +to which it belongs. This truth holds not only of material but also of +immaterial aggregates. + +Conduct is a whole and, in a sense, an organic whole, and Ethics, of +which it is a part, cannot be understood except through the +understanding of the whole of conduct. + +A definition of conduct must exclude purposeless actions,--such, for +instance, as those of an epileptic in a fit. Hence the definition +emerges either: acts adjusted to ends; or, the adjustment of acts to +ends; according as we contemplate the formed body of acts, or think of +the form alone. And conduct, in its full acceptation, must be taken as +comprehending all adjustments of acts to ends, from the simplest to the +most complex, whatever their special natures and whether they are +considered separately or in their totality. + +A large part of conduct is non-ethical, indifferent; this passes, by +small degrees and in countless ways, into conduct which is either moral +or immoral. + +The acts of all living creatures, as acts adjusted to ends, come within +the definition of conduct; the conduct of the higher animals as compared +with that of man, and of the lower animals as compared with the higher, +differs mainly in that the adjustments of acts to ends is relatively +simple and relatively incomplete. And as in other cases, so in this +case, we must interpret the more developed by the less developed; human +conduct as a part of the whole of the conduct of animate beings. And +further: as, in order to understand the part of human conduct with which +Ethics is concerned, we must study it as a part of human conduct as a +whole, and in order to understand human conduct, we must again study it +as a part of the whole of conduct exhibited in animate beings, so, in +order to comprehend this too, we must regard it as an outcome of former, +less developed conduct, out of which it has arisen. Our first step must +be to study the evolution of conduct. + +Morphology deals with physical structure, physiology with the processes +carried on in the body. But we enter on the subject of conduct when we +begin to study such combinations among the actions of sensory and +motor-organs as are externally manifested. + +We saw that conduct is distinguished from the totality of actions by the +exclusion of purposeless actions; but during evolution this distinction +arises by degrees. We trace up conduct to the vertebrates and through +the vertebrates to man, and find that here the adjustments of acts to +ends are both more numerous and better than among lower mammals; and we +find the same thing on comparing the doings of higher races of men with +those of lower. These better adjustments favor, not only prolongation, +but also increased amount of life. + +And among these adjustments of acts to ends, there are not only such as +further individual life but also, evolving with these, such as favor the +life of the species. Race-maintaining conduct, like self-maintaining +conduct, arises gradually out of that which cannot be called conduct. +The multitudinous creatures of all kinds which fill the earth are +engaged in a continuous struggle for existence, in which the adjustments +of acts to ends, being imperfectly evolved, miss completeness because +they cannot be made by one creature without other creatures being +prevented from making them. This imperfectly evolved conduct introduces +us, by antithesis, to conduct which is perfectly evolved,--such +adjustments that each creature may make them without preventing other +creatures making them also. The conditions of such conduct cannot exist +in predatory savage life; nor can it exist where there remains +antagonism between individuals forming a group, or between groups of +individuals,--two traits of life necessarily associated, since the +nature which prompts international aggression prompts aggression of +individuals on one another also. Hence the limit of evolution can be +reached by conduct only in permanently peaceful societies; can be +approached only as war decreases and dies out. + +The principle of beneficence is not derived by Spencer from the +principle of freedom, in "Social Statics"; and here, as in the latter +book, Spencer has difficulty with it. He says: "A gap in this outline +must now be filled up. There remains a further advance not yet even +hinted. For beyond so behaving that each achieves his ends without +preventing others from achieving their ends, the members of a society +may give mutual help in the achievement of ends. And if either +indirectly by industrial coöperation, or directly by volunteered aid, +fellow-citizens can make easier for one another the adjustments of acts +to ends, then their conduct assumes a still higher phase of evolution; +since whatever facilitates the making of adjustments by each increases +the totality of the adjustments made, and serves to render the lives of +all more complete." + +Thus, then, says Spencer, "we have been led to see that Ethics has for +its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the +last stages of its evolution." + +By comparing the meanings of a word in different connections, and +observing what they have in common, we learn its essential significance. +Material objects we are accustomed to designate as good or bad according +as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends. The good +knife is one which will cut; the good gun is one which will carry far +and true; and so on. So of inanimate actions, and so, also, of living +things and actions. A good jump is a jump which, remoter ends ignored, +well achieves the immediate purpose of a jump; and a stroke at billiards +is called good when the movements are skilfully adjusted to the +requirements. So too our use of the words good and bad with respect to +conduct under its ethical aspects has regard to the efficiency or +non-efficiency of the adjustments of acts to ends. This last truth is, +through the entanglements of social relations, by which men's actions +often simultaneously affect the welfares of self, of offspring, and of +fellow-citizens, somewhat disguised. Nevertheless, when we disentangle +the three orders of ends, and consider each separately, it becomes clear +that the conduct which achieves each kind of end is regarded as +relatively good; and conduct which fails to achieve it is regarded as +relatively bad. The goodness ascribed to a man of business, as such, is +measured by the activity and ability with which he buys and sells to +advantage, and may coexist with a hard treatment of dependents which is +reprobated. The ethical judgments we pass on such self-regarding acts +are ordinarily little emphasized; partly because the promptings of the +self-regarding desires, generally strong enough, do not need moral +enforcement, and partly because the promptings of the other-regarding +desires, less strong, do need moral enforcement. With regard to the +second class of adjustments of acts to ends, which subserve the rearing +of offspring, we no longer find any obscurity in the application of the +words good and bad to them, according as they are efficient or +inefficient. And most emphatic are the application of the words, in this +sense, throughout the third division of conduct comprising the deeds by +which men affect one another. Always, then, acts are good or bad, +according as they are well or ill-adapted to ends. That is, good is the +name we apply to the relatively more evolved conduct; and bad is the +name we apply to that which is relatively less evolved; for we have seen +that "evolution, tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its +limits when individual life is the greatest, both in length and breadth; +and we now see that, leaving other ends aside, we regard as good the +conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending to +self-destruction." With increasing power of maintaining individual life +goes increasing power of perpetuating the species by fostering progeny; +and the establishment of an associated state both makes possible and +requires a form of conduct such that life may be completed in each and +in his offspring, not only without preventing completion of it in +others, but with furtherance of it in others; and this is the form of +conduct most emphatically termed good. "Moreover, just as we saw that +evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously +achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in +fellow-men; so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the +conduct conceived as best, when it fulfils all three classes of ends at +the same time." + +Has this evolution been a mistake? The pessimist claims so, the optimist +claims not. But there is one postulate in which both pessimists and +optimists agree--namely, that it is evident that life is good or bad, +according as it does, or does not, have a surplus of agreeable feeling; +if a future life is included in the theory of either, the assumption is +still the same, that life is a blessing or a curse according as +existence, now considered in both worlds, contains more of pleasure or +of pain; and the implication is therefore that conduct which conduces to +the preservation of self, the family, and society, is good or bad in the +same measure. "Thus there is no escape from the admission that conduct +is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or +painful." So that if self-mutilation furthered life, and picking a man's +pocket brightened his prospects, we should regard these acts as good. +Approach to such a constitution as effects complete adjustment of acts +to ends of every kind is, however, an approach to perfection, and +therefore means approach to that which secures greater happiness. +"Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an +inexpugnable element of the conception" of moral aim. + +Here follow criticisms of the religious school of morals, which bases +its system on the will of God, and of the school of "pure +intuitionists," who hold "that men have been divinely endowed with moral +faculties." "It must be either admitted or denied that the acts called +good and the acts called bad naturally conduce, the one to human +well-being and the other to human ill-being. Is it admitted? Then the +admission amounts to an assertion that the conduciveness is shown by +experience; and this involves abandonment of the doctrine that there is +no origin for morals apart from divine injunctions. Is it denied that +acts classed as good and bad differ in their effects? Then it is tacitly +affirmed that human affairs would go on just as well in ignorance of +the distinction; and the alleged need for commandments from God +disappears." To affirm that we know some things to be right and other +things to be wrong, by virtue of a supernaturally given conscience; and +thus tacitly to affirm that we do not otherwise know right from wrong, +is tacitly to deny any natural relations between acts and results. For +if there exist any such relations, then we may ascertain by induction, +or deduction, or both, what these are. And if it be admitted that +because of such natural relations happiness is produced by this kind of +conduct, which is therefore to be approved; while misery is produced by +that kind of conduct, which is therefore to be condemned; then it is +admitted that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determinable, and +must finally be determined, by the goodness or badness of the effects +that flow from them, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Spencer also +repeats and enlarges upon his formerly stated objections to +utilitarianism as superficial: "The utilitarianism which recognizes only +the principles of conduct reached by induction, is but preparatory to +the utilitarianism which deduces these principles from the processes of +life as carried on under established conditions of existence." + +Every science begins by accumulating observations, and presently +generalizes these empirically, but only when it reaches the stage at +which its empirical generalizations are included in a rational +generalization, does it become developed science. So with Ethics; a +preparation in the simpler sciences is presupposed. It has a biological +aspect; since it concerns certain effects, inner and outer, individual +and social, of the vital changes going on in the highest type of +animals. It has a psychological aspect; for its subject-matter is an +aggregate of actions that are prompted by feelings and guided by +intelligence. And it has a sociological aspect; for these actions, some +of them directly, and all of them indirectly, affect associated beings. +Belonging under one aspect of each of these sciences,--physical, +biological, psychological, sociological,--it can find its ultimate +interpretations only in those fundamental truths which are common to all +of them, as different aspects of evolving life. + + +THE PHYSICAL VIEW + +While an aggregate evolves, not only the matter composing it, but also +the motion of that matter, passes from an indefinite, incoherent +homogeneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity. It is so with +conduct. The conduct of lowly organized creatures has its successive +portions feebly connected. From these up to man may be observed an +increase in cohesion. Man, even in his lowest state, displays in his +conduct far more coherent combinations of motions; and in civilized man +this trait of developed conduct becomes more conspicuous still. But an +even greater coherence among its component motions broadly distinguishes +the conduct we call moral from the conduct we call immoral. The +application of the word dissolute to the last, and of the word +self-restrained to the first, implies this fact. The sequences of +conduct in the moral man are more easily to be specified, as implied by +the word trustworthy applied to them; while those of the less principled +man cannot be so specified; as is implied by the word untrustworthy. +Indefiniteness accompanies incoherence in conduct that is little +evolved; and throughout the ascending stages of evolving conduct there +is an increasingly definite coördination of the motions constituting it, +until we reach the conscientious man, who is exact in all his +transactions. With this increase of definiteness and coherence goes also +an increase of heterogeneity; the moral man performs more varied duties, +adjustments of acts to ends in more varied relations, than does the +immoral man. + +Evolution in conduct is, like all other evolution, towards +equilibrium,--not the equilibrium reached by the individual in death, +but a moving equilibrium. His evolution consists in a continual +adjustment of inner to outer relations, until a state of society shall +be reached in which the individual will find his nature congruous with +the environment. + + +THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW + +"The truth that the ideally moral man is one in whom the moving +equilibrium is perfect, or approaches nearest to perfection, becomes, +when translated with physiological language, the truth that he is one in +whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled." Either excess or +defect in the performance of function results in a lowering of life, for +the time being at least. Hence, the performance of every function is, in +a sense, a moral obligation. One test of action is thus given us. An +action must be classed as right or wrong in respect of its immediate +bearings, according as it does or does not tend either to the +maintenance of complete life for the time being or the prolongation of +life to its full extent. This is true even though the remoter bearings +of the action may call for a different classification. The seeming +paradoxy of this statement results from the tendency, so difficult to +avoid, to judge a conclusion which presupposes an ideal humanity, by its +applicability to humanity as now existing. In the ideal state, towards +which evolution tends, any falling short of function implies deviation +from perfectly moral conduct. + +"Fit connections between acts and results must establish themselves in +living things, even before consciousness arises; and after the rise of +consciousness these connections can change in no other way than to +become better established. At the very outset, life is maintained by +persistence in acts which conduce to it and desistence from acts which +impede it; and whenever sentience makes its appearance as an +accompaniment, its forms must be such that in the one case the produced +feeling is of a kind that will be sought--pleasure, and in the other +case is of a kind that will be shunned--pain." So, in the case of the +seizure of food, for example, "the pleasurable sensation," everywhere +where it arises, must be itself the stimulus to the contraction by which +the pleasurable sensation is maintained and increased; or must be so +bound up with the stimulus that the two increase together. "And this +relation, which we see is directly established in the case of a +fundamental function, must be indirectly established with all other +functions; since non-establishment of it in any particular case implies, +in so far, unfitness to the conditions of existence." "Sentient +existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are +life-sustaining acts." + +It is true that, in mankind as at present constituted, guidance by +present or proximate pleasures and pains fails throughout a wide range +of cases. This arises throughout evolution by changes in the +environment, from which result partial misadjustments of the feelings, +necessitating readjustments. This general cause of derangement has been +operating on human beings in the changes from a primitive to a +civilized condition through the direct opposition and struggle of the +militant and the industrial spirit, in a manner unusually decided, +persistent, and involved. + +But there is a still further relation between pleasure and welfare to be +considered. There are connections between pleasure in general, and +physiological exaltation, and between pain in general and physiological +depression. Every pleasure increases vitality, every pain decreases +vitality. Non-recognition of these general truths vitiates moral +speculation at large. "'You have had your gratification--it is past; and +you are as you were before,' says the moralist to one; and to another he +says: 'You have borne the suffering--it is over; and there the matter +ends.' Both statements are false; leaving out of view indirect results, +the direct results are that the one has moved a step away from death, +and the other has moved a step towards death." + +However, it is with the indirect results that the moralist is especially +concerned; since remote consequences of action are especially to be +considered in ethical questions. But doubtless a better understanding of +biological truths would be to the benefit of moral theory and society at +large. + +Spencer especially combats, in a note at the end of this chapter, +Barratt's theory, stated in "Physical Ethics," that movements of +retraction and withdrawal and movements that secure the continuance of +the impression of any acting force, are the external marks, +respectively, of pain and pleasure. A great part of the vital processes, +even in creatures of developed nervous systems, are carried on by +unconscious reflex action, and there is, therefore, no propriety in +assuming the existence of what we understand by consciousness in +creatures not only devoid of nervous systems but devoid of structures in +general. It is more proper to conceive such feelings as arising +gradually, by the compounding of ultimate elements of consciousness. + + +THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW + +"Mind consists of feelings and the relations among feelings.[41] By +compositions of the relations, and ideas of relations, intelligence +arises. By composition of feelings, and ideas of feelings, emotion +arises. And, other things equal, the evolution of either is great in +proportion as the composition is great. One of the necessary +implications is that cognition becomes higher in proportion as it is +remoter from reflex action; while emotion becomes higher in proportion +as it is remoter from sensation."[42] + +"The mental process by which, in any case, the adjustment of acts to +ends is effected and which, under its higher forms, becomes the +subject-matter of ethical judgments, is, as above implied, divisible +into the rise of a feeling or feelings constituting the motive, and the +thought or thoughts through which the motive is shaped and finally +issues in action. The first of these elements, originally an excitement, +becomes a simple sensation; then a compound sensation; then a cluster of +partially presentative and partially representative sensations, forming +an incipient emotion; then a cluster of exclusively ideal or +representative sensations forming an emotion proper; then a cluster of +such clusters forming a compound emotion; and eventually becomes a still +more involved emotion composed of the ideal forms of such compound +emotions. The other element, beginning with that immediate passage of a +single stimulus into a single motion, called reflex action, presently +comes to be a set of associated discharges of stimuli producing +associated motions; constituting instinct. Step by step arise more +entangled combinations of stimuli, somewhat variable in their modes of +union, leading to complex motions, similarly variable in their +adjustments; whence occasional hesitations in the sensori-motor +processes. Presently is reached a stage at which the combined clusters +of impressions, not all present together, issue in actions not all +simultaneous, implying representation of results, or thought. Afterwards +follow stages in which various thoughts have time to pass before the +composite motives produce the appropriate actions, until at last arise +those long deliberations during which the probabilities of various +consequences are estimated, and the promptings of the correlative +feelings balanced; constituting calm judgment. That, under either of its +aspects, the later forms of this mental process are the higher, +ethically considered as well as otherwise considered, will be readily +seen."[43] + +"Observe, then, what follows respecting the relative authorities of +motives. Throughout the ascent from low creatures up to man, and from +the lowest types of man to the highest, self-preservation has been +increased by the subordination of simple excitations to compound +excitations,--the subjection of immediate sensations to the ideas of +sensations to come,--the overruling of presentative feelings by +representative feelings, and of representative feelings by +re-representative feelings. As life has advanced, the accompanying +sentience has become increasingly ideal; and among feelings produced by +the compounding of ideas, the highest, and those which are evolved +latest, are the re-compounded or doubly ideal. Hence it follows that, as +guides, the feelings have authorities proportionate to the degrees in +which they are removed, by their complexity and their ideality, from +simple sensations and appetites. A further implication is made clear by +studying the intellectual sides of these mental processes by which acts +are adjusted to ends. Where they are low and simple, these comprehend +the guiding only of immediate acts by immediate stimuli--the entire +transaction in each case, lasting but a moment, refers only to a +proximate result. But with the development of intelligence and the +growing ideality of the motives, the ends to which the acts are adjusted +cease to be exclusively immediate. The more ideal motives concern ends +that are more distant; and with approach to the highest types, present +ends become increasingly subordinate to those future ends which the +ideal motives have for their objects. Hence there arises a certain +presumption in favor of a motive which refers to a remote good, in +comparison with one which refers to a proximate good."[44] + +Out of the three controls of conduct, the political, the religious, and +the social, the first and the last of which are generated in the social +state through the supremacy of individuals in the midst of a control +that is also, in some degree, exerted by the whole community, the moral +consciousness grows; the feeling of moral obligation in general arising +in a manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated, out +of concrete instances. As in such groupings of instances the different +components are mutually cancelled to form the abstract idea, so in +groupings of the emotions, there takes place a mutual cancelling of +diverse components; the common component is made relatively appreciable, +and becomes an abstract feeling. That which the moral feelings--the +feelings that prompt honesty, truthfulness, etc.--have in common, is +complexity and re-representative character. The idea of +authoritativeness has, therefore, come to be connected with feelings +having these traits: the implication being that the lower and simpler +feelings are without authority. Another element--that of +coerciveness--originated from experience of those several forms of +restraint that have established themselves in the course of +civilization--the political, religious, and social. By punishment is +generated the sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty +includes, and which the word obligation indicates. This sense, however, +becomes indirectly connected with the feelings distinguished as moral; +and slowly fades as these emerge from amidst the political, religious, +and social motives, and become distinct and predominant. The sense of +duty is, therefore, transitory, fading as a motive as pleasure in +right-doing is evolved. + + +THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW + +"Not for the human race only, but for every race, there are laws of +right living. Given its environment and its structure, and there is, for +each kind of creature, a set of actions adapted in their kinds, amounts, +and combinations, to secure the highest conservation its nature +permits." Yet in man we find an additional factor in the formula for +life: for man is sociable to a degree not found anywhere else among +animals. The conditions of the associated state have therefore called +for an emphasizing of those restraints on conduct entailed by the +presence of fellow-men. "From the sociological point of view, then, +Ethics becomes nothing else than a definite account of the forms of +conduct that are fitted to the associated state, in such wise that the +lives of each and all may be the greatest possible, alike in length and +breadth." "But here we are met by a fact which forbids us thus to put in +the foreground the welfare of citizens, individually considered, and +requires us to put in the foreground the welfare of the society as a +whole. The life of the social organism must, as an end, rank above the +lives of its units." These two ends are not harmonious at the outset, +since as long as communities are endangered by rival communities, a +sacrifice of private to public claims is necessary. When, however, +antagonism between communities shall cease, there will cease to be any +public claims at variance with private claims; the need for the +subordination of individual lives to the general life will cease, and +the latter, having from the beginning had furtherance of individual +lives as its ultimate purpose, will come to have this as its proximate +purpose. Between the commands of duty towards members of the same +community and towards those of different communities as between the +sentiments answering to these relations, there is, at present, conflict. +In the course of evolution, however, the various forms of subjection +countenanced by a warlike régime--slavery, the subjection of women to +men, and paternal absolutism, become more and more unpopular, and are +done away with. For each kind and degree of social evolution, there is +an appropriate compromise between the moral code of enmity and that of +amity; this is, for the time being, authoritative.[45] But such +compromise belongs to incomplete conduct; the end of evolution is in the +annihilation of enmity between societies as between individuals. Nor is +a mere abstinence from mutual injury enough. Without coöperation for +satisfying wants the social state loses its _raison d'être_. In all +efforts for coöperation equivalence of exchange is a necessary basis; +all failure to fulfil such equivalence causes antagonism and thus a +diminution of social coherence; in the social, as in the animal +organism, waste without repair destroys the equilibrium of the parts; +fulfilment of contract is, therefore, the primary condition of the +welfare of society. + +And even mutual punctiliousness in the fulfilment of contract is not +sufficient to the moral ideal. Daily experience proves that every one +would suffer many evils and lose many goods, did none give him unpaid +assistance. The limit of the evolution of conduct is not reached until, +beyond avoidance of direct and indirect injuries to others, there are +spontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others. The form of nature +which thus adds beneficence to justice, is one which adaptation to the +social state produces. "The social man has not reached that +harmonization of constitution with conditions forming the limit of +evolution, so long as there remains space for the growth of faculties +which, by their exercise, bring positive benefit to others and +satisfaction to self. If the presence of fellow-men, while putting +certain limits to each man's sphere of activity, opens certain other +spheres of activity in which feelings, while achieving their +gratifications, do not diminish but add to the gratifications of others, +then such spheres will inevitably be occupied."[46] But of beneficence, +as well as of justice, sympathy is the root. + +The assumption that feelings can be arranged in a scale of +desirability, against which Mr. Sidgwick especially argues in his +objections to (empirical) egoistic hedonism, is not necessarily an +element of such hedonism, although Bentham, in naming intensity, +duration, certainty, and proximity as traits entering into an estimation +of the relative value of a pleasure or pain, has committed himself to +it. But if a debtor who cannot pay offers to compound for his debt by +making over to me any one of various objects of property, will I not +endeavor to estimate their relative value, though I may not be able to +do it exactly; and if I choose wrongly is therefore the ground of choice +to be abandoned? Mr. Sidgwick's argument against empirical hedonism must +tell, moreover, in a still greater degree, against his own +utilitarianism, since this is applicable, not to the individual simply, +but to many classes of differing individuals. To this difficulty must be +added, moreover, the future indeterminateness of the means for obtaining +such universal happiness. Mr. Sidgwick's objection contains, however, a +partial truth; for guidance in the pursuit of happiness through the mere +balancing of pleasures and pains is, if partially practicable throughout +a certain range of conduct, futile throughout a much wider range. "It is +quite consistent to assert that happiness is the ultimate aim of action, +and at the same time to deny that it can be reached by making it the +immediate aim. I go with Mr. Sidgwick as far as the conclusion that 'we +must at least admit the desirability of confirming or correcting the +results of such comparisons (of pleasures and pains) by any other method +upon which we may find reason to rely'; and I then go further, and say +that throughout a large part of conduct guidance by such comparisons is +to be entirely set aside and replaced by other guidance." + +The fact cited by Mr. Sidgwick as the "fundamental paradox of hedonism," +that to get the pleasures of pursuit one must "forget" them, is +explained by the fact that the pleasures of pursuit lie greatly in the +consciousness of capability in the efficient use of means, and the sense +of the admiration excited thereby in others. And so the "fundamental +paradox" disappears. Yet the truth of the pleasure derived from means as +distinguished from ends is of significance. Throughout the evolution of +conduct we find a growing complexity of adjustment of acts to ends, the +interposition of more and more complex means, each as a step to the +next, and leading to the final attainment of even remoter ends. Of +these means, each set, with its accompanying satisfaction, developed +with the function, comes at last to be regarded as proximate end, and +constitutes an obligation; and each later and higher order of means +comes to take precedence in time and authoritativeness of each earlier +and lower order of means. In this manner arises the authoritativeness of +moral requirements, as designating the latest and highest order of +means. + +Such means are more determinable than the end--happiness--for any +society. What constitutes happiness is more difficult of determination +than what constitutes the means of its attainment. We may now see our +way to reconciling sundry conflicting ethical theories, which generally +embody portions of the truth, and simply require to be combined in +proper order in order to embody the whole truth. The theological theory +contains a part. If for the divine will, supposed to be supernaturally +revealed, we substitute the naturally revealed end towards which the +Power manifested throughout Evolution works; then, since evolution has +been, and is still, working towards the highest life, it follows that +conformity to those principles by which the highest life is achieved, is +furtherance of that end. The doctrine that perfection or excellence of +nature should be the purpose of pursuit, is in one sense true; for it +tacitly recognizes that ideal form of being which the highest life +implies, and to which evolution tends. There is a truth, also, in the +doctrine that virtue must be the aim; for this is another form of the +doctrine that the aim must be to fulfil the conditions to achievement of +the highest life. That the intuitions of a moral faculty should guide +our conduct is a proposition in which a truth is contained; for these +intuitions are the slowly organized results of experiences received by +the race while living in presence of these conditions. And that +happiness is the supreme end is beyond question true; for it is the +concomitant of that highest life which every theory of moral guidance +has, distinctly or vaguely, in view. + +Thus, those ethical systems which make virtue, right, obligation, the +cardinal aims, are seen to be complementary to those ethical systems +which make welfare, happiness, pleasure, the cardinal aims. + +Spencer follows up this argument with a chapter on the relativity of +pleasures and pains, and then proceeds with an argument against +excessive altruism as, in the end, selfish, since it is destructive to +the power for work and to individual life, diminishes the vigor of +offspring, and finally results in the survival of the less altruistic as +the fittest; this chapter is under the heading "Egoism versus Altruism." +It is followed by a chapter on Altruism versus Egoism, in which is shown +that some individual self-sacrifice, at least to offspring, is found far +down in the scale of being; that altruism is, therefore, "no less +primordial than self-preservation,"[47] and hence no less imperative; +that this altruism, at first unconscious, becomes, in higher stages of +evolution, conscious; and that if often selfish in motive, it may be +without any element of conscious self-regard, although it conduces +greatly to egoistic satisfaction. Indeed, pure egoism defeats itself, +since pleasure palls by over-indulgence, is dulled by maturity, and +almost destroyed by old age. He that can find pleasure in ministering to +that of others has, however, a source of pleasure which may serve in +place of personal pleasure. In the associated state, a certain altruism +is, and must necessarily be, an advantage to each member of the +community. Whatever conduces to the well-being of each is conducive to +the well-being of all. + +Here follows a criticism of utilitarianism as one form of pure altruism, +since, according to the utilitarian doctrine, each individual is to +count for one, not more than one, and the individual share of happiness +thus becomes infinitesimal as compared with general happiness. Shall A, +who has, by labor, acquired some material happiness, take the attitude +of a disinterested spectator with regard to their use, as Mr. Mill +recommends? And will he, as such, decide on a division of these means to +happiness with B, C, and D, who have not labored to produce them? From +the conclusion that a really disinterested spectator would not decree +any such division, Spencer seems to draw the conclusion that Mr. Mill's +position is untenable. He further illustrates the untenability of +utilitarianism (as pure altruism) by the figure of a cluster of bodies +generating heat, each of which will have, as long as it generates heat +for itself, a certain amount of proper heat and a certain amount of heat +derived from the others; whereas the whole cluster will become cold as +soon as each ceases to generate heat for itself and depends on the heat +generated by the rest. Utilitarianism involves the further paradox that, +to achieve the greatest sum of happiness, each individual must be more +egoistic than altruistic. "For, speaking generally, sympathetic +pleasures must ever continue less intense than the pleasures with which +there is sympathy." And while the individual must be extremely +unegoistic in that he is willing to yield up the benefit for which he +has labored, he must, at the same time, be extremely egoistic, since he +is so selfish as willingly to let others yield up to him the benefits +they have labored for. "To assume that egoistic pleasures may be +relinquished to any extent is to fall into one of those many errors of +ethical speculation which result from ignoring the laws of biology.... +To yield up normal pleasure is to yield up so much life; and there +arises the question:--to what extent may this be done?... Surrender, +carried to a certain point, is extremely mischievous, and to a further +point, fatal."[48] After beginning, however, with this assertion that to +assume that egoistic pleasure may be relinquished to any extent is to +fall, from ignorance of biology, into an error of ethical speculation, +Spencer reaches only the conclusion that, if the individual is to +continue living, he _must_ take "certain amounts" of those pleasures +which go along with the fulfilment of the bodily functions, and that +"the portion of happiness which it is possible for him to yield up for +redistribution is a limited portion." He further argues that "a +perfectly moral law must be one which becomes perfectly practicable as +human nature becomes perfect"; but that the law of utilitarianism does +not so become practicable, since opportunities for practising altruism, +which originate in imperfection in others, will diminish and finally +disappear in the ideal state. There is no addition to happiness by +redistribution, and there is the additional labor and loss of time of +such redistribution. The conclusion must be that "general happiness is +to be achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own +happiness by individuals, while reciprocally, the happiness of +individuals is to be achieved in part by their pursuit of the general +happiness." The chapter on the conciliation of altruism and egoism is +occupied with the development of sympathy, as the militant spirit grows +less. The expression of emotion, as also the power of interpreting such +expression, must become greater as the impelling cause to concealment +found in lack of sympathy, disappears. When conditions require any class +of activities to be relatively great, there will arise a relatively +great pleasure accompanying that class of activities; the scope for +altruistic activities will not exceed the desire for altruistic +satisfaction. Such altruistic satisfaction, though in a transfigured +sense egoistic, will not be pursued egoistically--that is, from egoistic +motives. General altruism will resist too great altruism in the +individual, and as the occasion for self-sacrifice disappears, altruism +will take on the ultimate form of sympathy with the pleasure of others +produced by the successful activities of these. And so there will +disappear the apparently permanent opposition between egoism and +altruism. + +The last two chapters of "The Data of Ethics" deal with Ethics as the +law of the ideal man in an ideal society, and treat of the attainment of +general principles in this science as in other sciences by the neglect +of conflicting factors, and the recognition of fundamental factors, in +the gradually accumulated knowledge of society. On account of the +diversity of men and societies, a code of perfect personal conduct can +never be made definite; only certain general conditions of perfection +can be pointed out. As life is now carried on, the conflict of claims is +continual; and ethical science, here necessarily empirical, can do no +more than aid in making least objectionable compromises. Absolute +Ethics, which supplies the law of perfect right-doing possible only in +an ideal state, does not greatly aid Relative Ethics, yet it aids +somewhat, as keeping before consciousness an ideal conciliation of +claims, and suggesting search for the best form of compromise possible +under the circumstances. + +"Justice," which constitutes Part IV. of "The Principles of Ethics," and +to which "The Data of Ethics" belongs as Part I., was published (1891) +in advance of Parts II. and III. The argument of the book runs as +follows:-- + +Ethics properly involves a consideration of the conduct of animals as +well as of human beings, for the primary subject-matter of Ethics is +conduct considered as producing good and bad results to self or others, +or both, not, as most people believe, conduct as calling forth +approbation or disapprobation. And even on this latter view, Ethics +includes Animal Ethics, since we feel approbation or disapprobation with +regard to many actions of animals. + +Animal Ethics includes, as its two cardinal principles, the opposed +classes of altruistic and egoistic acts. For preservation of the +species, benefits received must be, during immaturity, inversely +proportionate to merit or capacities possessed, merit being measured by +powers of self-sustentation, and after maturity, directly proportionate +to worth as measured by fitness to the conditions of existence. +Furthermore, though the species is made up of individuals, many of these +individuals may disappear and the species still be preserved, whereas +its disappearance as a whole involves absolute failure in achieving the +end, so that, where preservation of individuals conflicts with +preservation of the species, the individuals must be sacrificed. + +The principle that among adults benefits must be in proportion to +merits, implies in its biological aspect survival of the fittest. Its +violation involves double harm to the species by sacrifice of the +superior to the inferior, and consequent increase of the inferior. +"Interpreted in ethical terms, it is that each individual ought to be +subject to the effects of its own nature and resulting conduct"; and +throughout sub-human life this rule holds without qualification. The +same principle is displayed in the mutual relations of the parts of +organisms, every part being nourished in proportion to its use or +function, a balancing of the relative powers of the parts being thus +effected, and the organism "fitted as a whole to its existence by having +its parts continuously proportioned to the requirements." In a parallel +manner, the species as a whole is fitted to its environment by the +greater prosperity to self and offspring that comes to those better +adapted. + +But sub-human justice is extremely imperfect, alike in general and in +detail. + +In general it is imperfect, in that the sustentation of multitudinous +species depends on the wholesale destruction of others; so that, in the +species serving as prey, the relations between conduct and consequence +are so habitually broken that in very few individuals are they long +maintained. It is true the destruction of the species serving as prey is +the result of their natures; "but this violent ending of the immense +majority implies that the species is one in which justice, as above +conceived, is displayed in but small measure." Sub-human justice is also +imperfect in detail, in that the relation between conduct and +consequences is, in such an immense proportion of cases, broken by +accidents,--such as scarcity of food, inclemencies of weather, invasions +by parasites, attacks of enemies,--which fall indiscriminately on the +superior and the inferior. As organization becomes higher, sub-human +justice becomes more decided; as general superiority increases, there +is less dependence on accident, and individual differences become more +important. + +With the beginning of gregariousness, we find the new element of +coöperation, passive or active, which is an advantage to the species. +This involves so much restraint of conflicting acts as will leave a +balance of advantage; else survival of the fittest will exterminate the +variety in which association begins. The experience of the evils of not +maintaining such limits to action results in an inherited tendency to +maintain them. The general consciousness of the need for maintaining +them results in punishment of their disregard. Self-subordination among +solitary animals is found only in parenthood; among gregarious animals +there is a further subjection of the individual to his kind, and where +an occasional sacrifice of life furthers the preservation of species, +sub-human justice may rightly have this second limitation. + +In order of priority, the law of relation between conduct and +consequence, the principle that each individual ought to receive the +good and evil resulting from his own nature, stands first; it is the +primary law holding of all creatures. The law of the restraint, in +gregarious animals, of interfering acts, is second in time and +authority, and is simply a specification of the form which the primary +law takes under conditions of gregarious life, since, in asserting +restriction of the interactions of conduct and consequence, it tacitly +reasserts that these interactions must be maintained in other +individuals, that is, in all individuals. The third law, of the +occasional sacrifice of individuals to their kind, is later and narrower +in application, and a qualification of the first law. The first law is +absolute for animals in general; the second is absolute for gregarious +animals; but the third "is relative to the existence of enemies of such +kinds that, in contending with them, the species gains more than it +loses by the sacrifice of a few members; and in the absence of such +enemies this qualification imposed by the third law disappears." + +As human life is a development of sub-human life, so human justice is a +development of sub-human justice. According to pure justice, the +individual should suffer the consequences of his acts, and that such is +the general opinion is implied in such common expressions as: "He has no +one to blame but himself"; "He has made his own bed, and now he must lie +on it"; "He has got no more than he deserved"; or, "He has fairly earned +his reward." + +The truth that, with higher organization, danger from accident becomes +less, longevity is greater, and so differences count for more, showing +their effects for longer periods, and justice therefore becomes greater, +applies also to human beings. The rate of mortality decreases with man, +and according to his civilization. + +More clearly in the case of human beings than in that of other animals +is it shown that gregariousness establishes itself because it profits +the variety. Where a variety live on wild food, they associate only in +small groups; game and fruit, widely distributed, can support these +only. "But greater gregariousness arises where agriculture makes +possible the support of a large number on a small area; and where the +accompanying development of industries introduces many and various +coöperations." The advantages of coöperation can be had only by +conformity to the conditions which association imposes--by such +limitation of the pursuits of individuals as to leave a surplus of +advantage to associated life. "This truth is illustrated by the +unprosperous or decaying state of communities in which the trespasses of +individuals on one another are so numerous and great as generally to +prevent them from severally receiving the normal results of their +labors." Mutual restraint being more imperative with human beings than +with animals, there is with them a still more marked habit of +punishment. + +"Through all which sets of facts is manifested the truth, recognized +practically if not theoretically, that each individual, carrying on the +actions which subserve his life, and not prevented from receiving their +normal results, good and bad, shall carry on these actions under such +restraints as are imposed by the carrying on of kindred actions by other +individuals, who have similarly to receive such normal results, good and +bad. And vaguely, if not definitely, this is seen to constitute what is +called justice." + +In the highest gregarious creature, the necessity which we found, of an +occasional sacrifice of the individual in defence of species, assumes +large proportions, the defence being not only against enemies of other +kinds, but also against enemies of the same kind. This obligation is +less than that of care for offspring, or mutual restraint. It exists +only as necessary to protect the society against destruction, hence only +for defensive, not for offensive, war. It may be objected that war +peoples the earth with the stronger, but this is not necessarily so, +since the conquered may merely be fewer in number. And further, it is +only during the earlier stages of human progress that the development of +strength, courage, and cunning are of chief importance. But for an +accident, Persia would have conquered Greece; and Tartar hordes once +very nearly overwhelmed European civilization. The races best fitted for +social life do not necessarily conquer, and there are injurious moral +reactions on both conquering and conquered. Only defensive war retains a +quasi-ethical justification. It belongs, however, to a transitional +state, and is not justified by Absolute Ethics. + +As the organs of inferior animals are moulded into fitness for the +requirements of life, so, simultaneously, through nervous modifications, +their sensations, instincts, emotions, and intellectual aptitudes are +also moulded to these requirements,--in the gregarious animals to the +conditions of gregarious life. Many evolutionists appear to regard the +variability of man as ceasing with civilized life, but the whole analogy +of nature is against such a theory; we must assume that man, like other +animals, is moulded to suit his requirements, and that moral changes are +among those thus wrought out. Aggressive actions often entail suffering +on the individuals of a group performing them, as well as on the group +as a whole, and on the other hand, harmonious coöperation in a group +profits the average of its members; so that there is a tendency to +survival of groups having such adaptation of nature. And just as a love +of property, formerly gratified by possession of food and shelter, came +later to be extended to the weapons for obtaining these, and, later, +even to the raw materials, the pleasure in ownership becoming more and +more abstract and remote from material satisfaction, so the natural +impatience of animal nature at restraint of its powers becomes in man a +sentiment of egoistic justice, for justice requires the free play of all +forces in order that the results of character may fall upon the +individual. It is more difficult to understand how the altruistic +sentiment of justice comes into being. On one hand, its implication is +that it can be developed only by adaptation to social life; on the +other, it appears that social life is impossible without the maintenance +of those equitable relations which imply a sentiment of justice. These +requirements are fulfilled by a pro-altruistic sentiment of justice, +which takes its place. The first deterrent from aggression, among +animals, is fear of retaliation; a further restraint, with man, is fear +of reprobation or social disgrace. To these are to be added the feelings +arising under political and religious authority--the dread of legal +punishment and the dread of divine vengeance; and these four kinds of +feelings coöperate, forming a body of feeling, which checks the +primitive tendency to pursue the objects of desire without regard to the +interests of fellow-men, and though containing nothing of the altruistic +sentiment of justice, makes social coöperation possible. Creatures which +become gregarious, tend to become sympathetic in degrees proportionate +to their intelligence--by sympathy being meant the arousing of kindred +feeling by the witness of a display of feeling in others, sympathy being +fostered by common enjoyments and sufferings. The altruistic sentiment +of justice is slow in assuming a high form, "partly because its primary +component does not become highly developed until a late phase of +progress, partly because it is relatively complex, and partly because it +implies a stretch of imagination not possible for low intelligences." +As, until pain has been felt, there cannot be sympathy with pain, so the +altruistic sentiment of justice cannot be developed until the egoistic +sentiment has arisen; moreover, the sentiment of justice is concerned, +not only with concrete pains and pleasures, but also with their +conditions, and hence this sentiment demands a development of the power +of mental representation. + +There is a close connection between the sentiment of justice and the +social type. Predominant militancy affords no scope for the egoistic +sentiment of justice, and at the same time sympathy is perpetually +seared by militant activities. On the other hand, as fast as voluntary +coöperation, which characterizes the industrial type of society, becomes +more general than compulsory coöperation, which characterizes the +militant type of society, individual activities become less restrained, +and the sentiment which rejoices in the scope for them is encouraged; +while simultaneously, the occasions for repressing the sympathies become +less frequent. + +The idea of justice is different from the mere sentiment of justice; the +former gradually arising from the latter, in the course of generations, +by experience of the limits to which action can be carried without +causing resentment from others. But since the kinds of activity are many +and become increasingly various with the development of social life, it +is a long time before the general nature of the limit common to all +cases can be conceived. A further reason for the slowness of development +is, that the arising ideas of justice have been perpetually confused by +the conflicting requirements of internal amity and external enmity. + +Two elements, a positive and a negative, constitute the idea of +justice--that of man's recognition of his claims to unimpeded activities +and the results they bring, and that of the limits which the presence of +other men necessitate. The primordial ideal suggested is inequality, for +since the principal is that each should receive the results due to his +own nature, then, since men differ in their powers, unequal benefits are +implied. But mutual limitations suggest a contrary idea, experience +showing that the bounds to which one may pursue his own ends are, on the +average, the same for all, so that the idea of equality arises. +Unbalanced appreciations of these two factors in human justice lead to +divergent moral and social theories. + +Among the rudest men the appreciations are no higher than among inferior +gregarious animals. Where war has developed political organization the +idea of inequality predominates, but the idea is one, not of natural, +but of artificial apportionment. And in general, we find that the +primary or brute factor in justice is but little qualified by the human +factor. + +All movements are rhythmical, social movements included, and after the +idea of justice in which inequality predominates comes a conception in +which the idea of equality unduly predominates--as in Bentham's ethical +theory, where "one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with +proper allowance made for kind), is accounted for exactly as much as +another's"; and this is the theory which Communism would reduce to +practice. It is an absolute denial of the principle of inequality, and +must apply alike to the worthy and unworthy, as well as to the superior +and inferior in physical and intellectual capacities, since moral +inequalities are as much inherited as others. Here we have a deliberate +abolition of that cardinal distinction between the ethics of the family +and the ethics of the state emphasized at the outset--"an abolition +which, as we saw, must eventuate in decay and disappearance of the +species or variety in which it takes place." + +The true principle shows an amalgamation of these two. "The equality +concerns the mutually limited spheres of action which must be maintained +if associated men are to coöperate harmoniously. The inequality concerns +the results which each may achieve by carrying on his actions within the +implied limits. No incongruity exists when the ideas of equality and +inequality are applied, the one to the bounds and the other to the +benefits. Contrariwise, the two may be, and must be, simultaneously +asserted." + +"Any considerable acceptance of so definite an idea of justice is not to +be expected. It is an idea appropriate to an ultimate state, and can be +but partially entertained during transitional states; for the prevailing +ideas must, on the average, be congruous with existing institutions and +activities." During the thirty, or rather forty years' peace, and +weakening of militant organization, the idea of justice became clearer; +but since then the idea of regimentation has spread. It is predominant +in the conception of socialism with its army of workers with appointed +tasks and apportioned shares of products, and every act of Parliament +which takes money from the individual for public purposes shows a +tendency in the same direction. In the countries where militancy is most +pronounced, socialism is most highly developed. "Sympathy, which, a +generation ago, was taking the shape of justice, is relapsing into +generosity; and the generosity is exercised by inflicting injustice. +Daily legislation betrays little anxiety that each shall have that which +belongs to him, but great anxiety that he shall have that which belongs +to somebody else." + +The formula of justice may be expressed thus: "Every man is free to do +that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any +other man." + +This is not to be interpreted as meaning that aggression is permissible +as long as retaliation is permitted; for the formula means that +interference with another's life is limited, that life shall not be +impeded in one case further than is necessary to the maintenance of +other lives; it does not countenance a superfluous interference on the +ground that an equal interference may balance it. In earlier stages, the +conception of justice was this erroneous one of a balancing of +injuries--an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. By oscillations +which become gradually less, social equilibrium is approached; and with +this approach to equilibrium comes approach to a definite theory of +equilibrium. + +In the reigning school of politics and morals, scorn is expressed for +every doctrine which implies restraint of immediate expediency, or what +appears to be such;--contempt for generalizations and abstract +principles, with unlimited faith in political machinery. Strangely +enough, we find this approval of political empiricism and disbelief in +any other guidance, in the world of science also. The accepted +scientific fact that causation holds of the actions of incorporated men +as of other parts of nature, remains a dead letter; there is no attempt +to identify the causation, and ridicule is visited upon those who +endeavor to find a definite expression for the fundamental principle of +harmonious social order. + +Peoples with whom confusion is not caused by the conflicting disciplines +of outer war and internal peace, early arrive at the principle of +equity, and accordingly some uncivilized tribes show a stronger sense of +it than is found among civilized peoples. Nevertheless, the conception +of justice has slowly evolved to some extent, and is expressed in such +formulæ as, "Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you" +(too sweeping a statement of the equality of claims, since it implies no +recognition of the inequality necessary in the shares of good +respectively appropriate), or in the Kantian rule, which is an +allotropic form of the Christian rule. Jurists, too, have recognized a +natural law of equity underlying human law. To the reproach that belief +in such a law is an _a priori_ belief, it may be answered that _a +priori_ beliefs are explained by the theory of evolution, as arising +with determination of the nervous system and certain resulting +necessities of thought, and that they differ from _a posteriori_ beliefs +merely in the circumstance "that they are the products of the +experiences of innumerable successive individuals, instead of the +experiences of a single individual." If we ask for the ground of the +greatest happiness principle, we come to an _a priori_ belief also; for +whence is the postulate? If it is an induction, where and by whom has +the induction been drawn; and if it is a truth of experience derived +from careful observation, then what are the observations, and when was +there generalized that vast mass of them on which all politics and +morals should be built? "Not only are there no such experiences, no such +observations, no such inductions, but it is impossible that any should +be assigned." The like is true of Bentham's rule: "Everybody to count +for one, nobody for more than one," and also of the objection to this +rule, that happiness cannot be divided, or greatest happiness obtained, +by equal division of the means to happiness; they all lead, in the last +analysis, to an _a priori_ belief. Moreover, the rule of natural equity, +the freedom of each limited only by the like freedom of all, is not an +exclusively _a priori_ belief, but although the immediate dictum of the +human consciousness after subjection to the discipline of prolonged +social life, it is deducible from the conditions to be fulfilled, +firstly for the maintenance of life at large, and secondly for the +maintenance of social life. + +Rights, properly so-called, are corollaries from the law of equal +freedom, and "so far is it from its being true, as some claim, that the +warrant for what are properly called rights is derived from law, it is, +conversely, true that law derives its warrant from them." + +In the application of this theory to practical questions, Mr. Spencer's +"Justice" differs from "Social Statics," which it resembles in form and +method, in general in the greatly increased conservatism of the views +expressed. This is shown in all parts of the book, though perhaps most +clearly in those parts relating to the Rights of Women, to the Land +Question, and to the Limits of State-Duties. "Social Statics" advocated +land-nationalization; but "Justice," though still asserting the original +right of the aggregate of men forming the community to the use of the +earth, as that from which all material objects capable of being owned +are derived and so that on which the right to property is originally +dependent, denies the expediency and the justice of a present +redistribution of the land according to this principle; and this because +of the confusion of claims at the present time, the impossibility of +ascertaining whose ancestors were the robbers and whose the robbed in +the gradually arising monopoly, the wrong of making descendants +responsible for the sins of their ancestors, and leaving those now +dependent on the land without compensation for their loss, and the fact +that any claim to the land is merely a claim to it in its original +condition, not in its present state of drainage and cultivation effected +by the labor of generations. Moreover, "under the existing system of +ownership, those who manage the land experience a direct connection +between effort and benefit, while, were it under state-ownership, those +who managed it would experience no such direct connection. The vices of +officialism would inevitably entail immense evils." + +The whole of the practical part of "Justice" is especially directed +against Socialism; in general, the course of history shows a less and +less interference with personal freedom, and growing benefit from this +cause. The practicality of woman suffrage and of universal man suffrage +at the present time is denied. If earlier legislation was too much for +the benefit of wealthy and ruling classes, recent extensions of the +suffrage have resulted in still more injurious class-legislation of +another sort. + +In this book, Mr. Spencer seems to adhere to his theory of a "final +perfect adaptation to the conditions of social life." Not only is the +distinction between Relative and Absolute Ethics still drawn, but there +are numerous references to an "ultimate state," though certain of these +references might suggest the view that by such a state was meant only +the attainment of so great a degree of civilization as would involve the +cessation of wars.[49] Other passages, however, seem to contradict this +view. One may be especially cited; it is as follows: "This law [of the +gradual reëstablishment of deranged harmony, through adaptation and +heredity], holding of human beings among others, implies that the nature +which we inherit from an uncivilized past, and which is still very +imperfectly fitted to the partially-civilized present, will, if allowed +to do so, slowly adjust itself to the requirements of a fully-civilized +future." And after some consideration of adaptation up to the present +time, the paragraph concludes: "If, in the course of these few thousand +years, the discipline of social life has done so much, it is folly to +suppose that it cannot do more--folly to suppose that it will not, in +course of time, do all that has to be done."[50] But in the abridged and +revised edition of "Social Statics" (1892), the following passage occurs +as part of a note at the end of the chapter on "The Evanescence (? +Diminution) of Evil." "The rate of progress towards any adapted form +must diminish with the approach to complete adaptation, since the force +producing it must diminish; so that other causes apart, perfect +adaptation can be reached only in infinite time."[51] + +Vol. I. of "The Principles of Ethics," including Parts I., II., and +III., appeared in August, 1892. In this volume, "The Data of Ethics," +reprinted as Part I., remains unchanged, except for one or two +unimportant sentences. To this Part I. is, however, appended a chapter +which was, according to Mr. Spencer, written for the first publication +of "The Data of Ethics," but was either put aside for some reason, or +else overlooked, probably the latter, says the author, since it contains +material which should have been embodied. The chapter is headed "The +Conciliation," and seems to correspond to the two chapters on "Trial and +Compromise" and "Conciliation" which follow the chapters on "Egoism +_versus_ Altruism," and "Altruism _versus_ Egoism"; for it begins with a +consideration of the conflict of claims shown by "the last two +chapters," the apparent impossibility of the establishment of an +equilibrium, and the consequent apparent necessity of self-sacrifice. +But this conflict between egoism and altruism is merely transitional and +is in process of gradual disappearance, in the same manner in which the +present degree of conciliation of the two has been reached,--namely, by +the growth of such a constitution in each creature as entails pleasure +in altruistic action. Even with the lower animals, the acts which are +necessary to care for ova or young are the fulfilment of an instinct +which is gratified by the act; and in the human race, conciliation +between egoism and altruism, which goes hand in hand with evolution, has +reached a high degree. In the evolution of the human race itself, from +savagery to its present condition, there has been a marked increase of +this conciliation; this is true not only in the family, but to a small +extent also with regard to the larger groups of men constituting +societies. There is decrease of cruelty, increase of justice, both in +the form of state institutions and in their methods of administration, +more active benevolence, and a public sentiment that leads large numbers +of people to find egoistic gratification in the pursuit of the general +good even to the neglect of private interests. Self-sacrifice thus +ceases to be sacrifice in the ordinary sense of the word, since it comes +to bring with it more pleasure than pain. The future must hold in store +changes analogous to those of the past, but these must go on much more +rapidly under the present comparatively peaceful organization of society +than they have during the militant life of the past. This moral +development is retarded, however, not only by the degree of militancy +yet existing, but also by the necessity for a certain degree of +bluntness of feeling, too great sensitiveness to the suffering of others +entailing, while the pressure of population is as great as at present, a +misery that would make life intolerable. It is likely that, with social +progress, human fertility will decrease as cerebral activity increases, +until a comparative balance of fertility and mortality is reached as +"human evolution approaches its limit of complete adaptation to the +social state"; and sympathy will increase in proportion, no longer +entailing on its possessor more of pain than of pleasure, but the +contrary. "Sympathy is the root of every other kind of altruism than +that which, from the beginning, originates the parental activities. It +is the root of that higher altruism which, apart from the +philoprogenitive instinct, produces desire for the happiness of others +and reluctance to inflict pain upon them. These two traits are +inevitably associated. The same mental faculty which reproduces in the +individual consciousness the feelings that are being displayed by other +beings, acts equally to reproduce those states when they are pleasurable +or when they are painful." + +The general corollary from the above-described process of evolution is +that, with the increase of sympathy there arises the double result, that +by its increase it tends to decrease the causes of human misery, and in +proportion as it does this, it becomes itself the cause of further +reflected happiness received by each from others. "And the limit towards +which this evolution approaches is one under which, as the amount of +pain suffered by those around from individual imperfections and from +imperfections of social arrangement and conduct, becomes relatively +small, and simultaneously the growth of sympathy goes on with little +check, the sympathy becomes at the same time almost exclusively a source +of pleasure received from the happiness of others, and not of pains +received from their pains. And as this condition is approached, the +function of sympathy is not that of stimulating to self-sacrifice and of +entailing upon its possessor positive or negative pain, but its function +becomes that of making him a recipient of positive pleasure." Thus +altruism will overgrow egoism, becoming itself a source of egoistic +pleasure, and eventually, with the diminution of the pressure of +population, there will come a state in which egoism and altruism are so +conciliated that the one merges in the other. + +Among the social animals, with the ant and the bee, for instance, who +cannot be supposed to possess a sense of duty, we see that this +identification of egoism and altruism, as necessary to social life, has +taken place to a considerable extent; and since pleasure of every kind +is the concomitant of nervous structure, we can understand the pleasure +in altruistic as well as in egoistic activities, as soon as there exists +the nervous structure answering to these activities. As certainly as +there yet exist in civilized men instincts of the chase inherited from +savage ancestors, there are growing up and will continue to grow up in +men, these other structures which will prompt to altruistic activities. + +Part II. of "The Principles of Ethics" is concerned with "The +Inductions of Ethics." It opens with a chapter on the confusion of +ethical thought due to the fact that, conforming to the general law of +evolution, "the set of conceptions constituting ethics, together with +the associated sentiments, arise out of a relatively incoherent and +indefinite consciousness; and slowly acquire coherence and definiteness +at the same time that the aggregate of them differentiates from the +larger aggregate with which it originally mingled. Long remaining +undistinguished, and then but vaguely discernible as something +independent, ethics must be expected to acquire a distinct embodiment +only when mental evolution has reached a high stage." "Originally, +ethics has no existence apart from religion, which holds it in solution. +Religion itself, in its earliest form, is undistinguished from +ancestor-worship," which passes, in the second stage, into worship of +dead rulers, and is a method of propitiation, prompted by self-interest. +Among some peoples, the idea of sin is limited to offences against the +gods; and in those other cases where there are ethical commands, the +propriety of not offending God is the primary reason given for obeying +them. This last phase of thought is illustrated by the religion of the +Hebrews, among whom good and bad conduct was but little associated with +the intrinsic natures of right and wrong. The popular belief is still +that right and wrong become such by divine fiat. + +The gods of primitive, warlike peoples were gods of war, and the belief +in the moral virtue and honor of war still holds large place in the +thought of the world. The ethics of enmity, thus taught at the same time +with the ethics of amity necessary to the internal life of society, gave +rise to utterly inconsistent and contradictory sentiments and ideas, +which, in considerable measure, still exist side by side, in our +churches and outside them. + +But, together with these ethical conceptions, there have slowly evolved +other, utilitarian conceptions, derived from a recognition of the +natural consequences of acts. Authority has been introduced into these +conceptions as the source of the duty of action in accordance with them; +yet there has generally been also some perception of their fitness. Such +utilitarian conceptions are to be found in the later Hebrew writings, +among the Egyptians, Greeks, etc. "The divergence of expediency-ethics +from theological ethics is well illustrated in Paley, who in his +official character derived right and wrong from divine commands, and in +his unofficial character derived them from observation of consequences. +Since his day, the last of these views has spread at the expense of the +first." + +A still further simultaneous origin of moral dictates is found in the +sentiments which have arisen with such habits of conformity to rules of +conduct as have been furthered by survival of the fittest. We thus have +a conflict of ethical ideas arising from the conflict of these various +sanctions; and also from the further conflict that ensues where a later +religion has been grafted on a more primitive one, as is the case +everywhere in Christendom. + +Among modern writers who assert the existence of a moral sense, there is +a division between those who regard the dicta of conscience as supreme, +and those who hold them to be subordinate to divine commands. The two +are agreed in so far as they regard conscience as having a supernatural +origin; and, in that they both recognize the moral sentiment as innate +and suppose human nature to be everywhere the same, they are also, by +implication, alike in supposing that the moral sentiment is identical in +all men. + +But as a matter of fact, the moral sentiment is connected with entirely +different rules among different peoples, prescribing monogamy among one +people, polygamy among another; demanding faithfulness and chastity on +the part of women among one people, encouraging adultery among another, +etc. + +Common elements in all codes of rules for conduct are the consciousness +of authority, whether that of a God, of a ruler or government, or of +conscience, the more or less definite sense of power or coercion on the +part of this authority, and the representation of public opinion. These +elements, combined in different proportions, result in an idea and a +feeling of obligation, forming a body of thought and feeling which may +be termed pro-ethical, and which, with the mass of mankind, stands in +place of the ethical. + +"For now let us observe that the ethical sentiment and idea, properly +so-called, are independent of the ideas and sentiments above described +as derived from external authorities, and coercions, and +approbations--religious, political, or social. The true moral +consciousness which we name conscience does not refer to those extrinsic +results of conduct which take the shape of praise or blame, reward or +punishment, externally awarded; but it refers to the intrinsic results +of conduct which in part and by some intellectually perceived, are +mainly and by most intuitively felt. The moral consciousness proper +does not contemplate obligations as artificially imposed by an external +power; nor is it chiefly occupied with estimates of the amounts of +pleasure and pain which given actions may produce, though these may be +clearly or dimly perceived; but it is chiefly occupied with recognition +of, and regard for, those _conditions_ by fulfilment of which happiness +is achieved or misery avoided." It may or may not be in harmony with the +pro-ethical sentiment; but in any case it is "vaguely or distinctly +recognized as the rightful ruler, responding as it does to consequences +which are not artificial and variable, but to consequences which are +natural and permanent." With the established supremacy of this ethical +sentiment, the feeling of obligation retires into the background, right +actions being performed "spontaneously or from liking." "Though, while +the moral nature is imperfectly developed, there may often arise +conformity to the ethical sentiment under a sense of compulsion by it; +and though, in other cases, non-conformity to it may cause subsequent +self-reproach (as instance a remembered lack of gratitude, which may be +a source of pain without there being any thought of extrinsic penalty); +yet with a moral nature completely balanced, neither of these feelings +will arise, because that which is done is done in satisfaction of the +appropriate desire." + +Where the really ethical sentiment conflicts with the factitious idea +and sentiment of obedience to legal authority, the latter may rule at +the expense of the former, as, for instance, in the case of a pedler +condemned for selling without a license. "His act of selling is morally +justifiable, and forbidding him to sell without a license is morally +unjustifiable--is an interference with his due liberty which is +ethically unwarranted." + +The remainder of Part II. of the "Principles of Ethics" is occupied with +data cited to show that the amount of internal aggression, of revenge +and robbery, is greater among peoples much occupied with external +aggression, and that these decrease, while justice, generosity (which +Mr. Spencer defines as having a double root, in the philoprogenitive +instinct and the relatively modern feeling of sympathy), humanity +(including kindness, pity, mercy), filial obedience, and industry, +increase as more peaceful habits are reached. A greater veracity is also +indirectly the result of this evolution, since a coercive internal +structure of society is connected with external enmity, and such +coercive structure is unfavorable to veracity. Chastity also increases +with the social evolution, though it does not necessarily characterize +societies of the non-militant type. Its increase is connected with the +growth of the higher moral and æsthetic feelings; romantic love plays a +predominant part in our art. Intemperance, as causing, indirectly, +social evil by a lowering of social efficiency, must, in like manner, +decrease with social advancement. + +In summing up his inductions, Spencer says: "Though, as shown in my +first work, 'Social Statics,' I once espoused the doctrine of the +intuitive moralists,... yet it has gradually become clear to me that the +qualifications required practically obliterate the doctrine as +enunciated by them. It has become clear to me that if, among ourselves, +the current belief is that a man who robs and does not repent will be +eternally damned, while an accepted proverb among the Bilochs is, that +'God will not favor a man who does not steal and rob'; it is impossible +to hold that men have in common an innate perception of right and wrong. + +"But now, while we are shown that the moral sense doctrine in its +original form is not true, we are also shown that it adumbrates a truth, +and a much higher truth. For the facts cited... unite in proving that +the sentiments and ideas current in each society become adjusted to the +kinds of activity predominating in it.... If the life of internal amity +continues unbroken from generation to generation, there must result not +only the appropriate code, but the appropriate emotional nature.... Men +so conditioned will acquire, to the degree needful for complete +guidance, that innate conscience which intuitive moralists erroneously +suppose to be possessed by mankind at large. There needs but a +continuance of absolute peace externally, and a rigorous insistance on +non-aggression internally, to insure the moulding of men into a form +naturally characterized by all the virtues." Complete exemption from war +has already been attained by some few isolated peoples. "May we not +reasonably infer that the state reached by these small uncultured tribes +may be reached by the great cultured nations, when the life of internal +amity shall be unqualified by the life of external enmity?" + +Part III. of the "Principles of Ethics" is occupied with practical +considerations concerning "The Ethics of Individual Life," under the +headings "Activity," "Rest," "Nutrition," "Stimulation," "Culture," +"Amusements," "Marriage," "Parenthood." Of the general ethical relation +of the individual to society, Spencer says:--"Integration being the +primary process of evolution, we may expect that the aggregate of +conceptions constituting ethics enlarges at the same time that its +components acquire heterogeneity, definiteness, and that kind of +cohesion which system gives to them. As fulfilling this expectation, we +may first note that while drawing within its range of judgment numerous +actions of men towards one another which at first were not recognized as +right or wrong, it finally takes into its sphere the various divisions +of private conduct--those actions of each individual which directly +concern himself only, and in but remote ways concern his fellows." + +Ethics has been commonly regarded as merely a system of interdicts on +certain kinds of acts which men would like to do and of injunctions to +perform certain acts which they would like not to do. It says nothing +about the great mass of acts constituting normal life, though these have +their ethical aspect. The pleasurable has been too often regarded as +outside the legitimate sphere of ethical approval, where not directly +the rightful subject of ethical disapproval. But pleasure is an +accompaniment of vitality, and furthers the vital activities; and if the +general happiness is to be the aim of action, then the happiness of each +unit is a fit aim; and there is unquestionably "a division of ethics +which yields sanction to all the normal actions of individual life, +while it forbids the abnormal ones." There is an altruistic as well as +an egoistic justification of the care for self, since the health of +descendants and the ability to provide for offspring is directly +concerned; and since such care is needful to exclude the risk of +becoming a burden to others. And there is a further positive +justification of egoism which results from the obligation to expend some +effort for others, and to become, as far as possible, a source of social +pleasure to others. + +It will be seen, from the above analysis, that the chapter appended to +Part I. still speaks of an ultimate state of complete adjustment to +social life[52]; this chapter was, however, published from the original +MS. without alteration. Some passages in Part II. seem to involve the +same idea of a possible complete attainment of the ethical end,[53] but +Part III. closes with reference to "an approximately complete adjustment +of the nature to the life which has to be led." + +FOOTNOTES: + +[38] Spencer elsewhere says "due exercise," _vide_ p. 76. + +[39] Essay on "Morals and Moral Sentiment." + +[40] P. 105. + +[41] _Vide_ "Principles of Psychology." + +[42] P. 104. + +[43] Pp. 104,105. + +[44] Pp. 108, 109. + +[45] Pp. 134, 148. + +[46] P. 147. + +[47] Pp. 202, 203. + +[48] P. 231. + +[49] See pp. 71, 193. + +[50] Pp. 258, 259. + +[51] As the "revision" of the theoretical part of this book chiefly +consists, like its abridgment, in the elimination of the references to +Divine Will and other earlier views held before acquaintance with +Darwin's theory of life, there is nothing in the book, in distinction +from Mr. Spencer's other later works, that needs especially to be +considered here. + +[52] See, for instance, _supra_, p. 70. + +[53] See _supra_, p. 75. + + + + +JOHN FISKE + + +As Herbert Spencer's closest follower, John Fiske deserves to stand next +him in order of analysis. Fiske accepts, though evidently with +reluctance, what he terms "the terrible theory" of evolution, which +establishes the fact of man's consanguinity with dumb beasts. In his +book on "The Destiny of Man" (1884), he sets forth his theory of the +evolution of society as foreshowing man's final destiny. With regard to +the beginnings of psychical development in the course of evolution, he +thus expresses himself: "At length there came a wonderful +moment;--silent and unnoticed, even as the day of the Lord which cometh +like a thief in the night, there arrived that wonderful moment at which +psychical changes began to be of more use than physical changes to the +brute ancestor of man. Through further ages of ceaseless struggle the +profitable variations in this creature occurred oftener and oftener in +the brain, and less often in other parts of the organism, until bye and +bye the size of his brain had been doubled and its complexity of +structure increased a thousandfold, while in other respects his +appearance was not so very different from that of his brother apes.... +No fact in nature is fraught with deeper meaning than this two-sided +fact of the extreme physical similarity and enormous psychical +divergence between man and the group of animals to which he traces his +pedigree. It shows that when humanity began to be evolved, an entirely +new chapter in the history of the universe was opened. Henceforth the +life of the nascent soul came to be first in importance, and the bodily +life became subordinated to it. Henceforth it appeared that the process +of zoölogical change had come to an end, and a process of psychological +change was to take its place. Henceforth along this supreme line there +was to be no further evolution of new species through physical +variation, but through the accumulation of psychical variations one +particular species was to be indefinitely perfected.... Henceforth, in +short, the dominant aspect of evolution was to be, not the genesis of +species, but the progress of civilization.... In the deadly struggle for +existence, which has raged throughout countless æons of time, the whole +creation has been groaning and travailing together in order to bring +forth that last consummate specimen of God's handiwork, the Human Soul." + +And further, of the genesis of this Human Soul: "With the growth of the +higher centres, the capacities of action become so various and +indeterminate that definite direction is not given to them until after +birth." By the increase of cerebral surface, infancy, which is the +period of plasticity, is prolonged, Man becomes teachable, and though +inherited tendencies and aptitudes still form the foundations of +character, yet the career of the individual is no longer wholly +predetermined by the careers of its ancestors, but individual experience +comes to count as an enormous factor in modifying the career of mankind +from generation to generation. + +The psychical development of humanity since its earlier stages has been +largely due to the reaction of individuals upon one another in those +various relations which we characterize as social. + +Foreshadowings of social relations occur in the animal world. +Rudimentary moral sentiments are also clearly discernible in the highest +members of various mammalian orders and in all but the lowest members of +our own order. But in respect of definiteness and permanence, the +relations between animals in a state of gregariousness fall far short of +the relations between individuals in the rudest human society. The +primordial unit of human society is the family, the establishment of +which was made necessary and took place through the lengthening of +infancy. When childhood had come to extend over a period of ten or a +dozen years, a period which would have been doubled where several +children were born in succession to the same parents, the relationships +between father and mother, brothers and sisters, must have become firmly +knit; thus the family came into existence, and the way was opened for +the growth of sympathies and ethical feelings. The rudimentary form of +the ethical feelings was that of the transient affection of a female +bird or mammal for its young. First given a definite direction through +the genesis of the primitive human family, the development of altruism +has yet scarcely kept pace with the general development of intelligence; +the advance of civilized man in justice and kindness has been less +marked than his advance in quick intelligence. But the creative energy +which has been thus at work through the bygone eternity is not going to +become quiescent to-morrow; the psychical development of man is +destined to go on in the future as it has in the past. And from the +"Origin of Man," when thoroughly comprehended, we may catch some +glimpses of his destiny. + +The earlier condition of things was a state of universal warfare, on +account of the limitation of the food-supply. This warfare was checked +by the beginnings of industrial civilization, which made it possible for +a vastly greater population to live upon a given area, and in many ways +favored social compactness. A new basis of political combination was now +furnished by territorial continuity and by community of occupation. The +supply of food was no longer strictly limited, for it could be +indefinitely increased by peaceful industry; and, moreover, in the free +exchange of the products of labor, it ceased to be true that one man's +interest was opposed to another's. Men did not, it is true, at once +recognize this fact, but have done so only gradually. When the clan had +grown into the state, and the state into the empire, in which many +states were brought together in pacific relations, the recognized sphere +of moral obligation became enlarged, until at length it comprehended all +mankind. The coalescence of groups of men into larger and larger +political aggregates has been the chief work of civilization; and the +chief obstacle to such coalescence has been warfare. Great political +bodies have arisen in three ways. The first, conquest without +incorporation, proved itself suicidal. The second way was conquest with +incorporation, but without representation; and this lacking, the +government retrograded and gradually became a despotism. The third +method, federation, has been the policy of the English government. The +advantage of the habit of self-government has been shown in England's +wide conquest and colonization. The federative method of political +union, pacific in its very conception, is assuming an unquestionable +sway and destined to become universal; the progress of the race will be, +as it has been, with the gradual elimination of warfare. + +In a race of inferior animals, any maladjustment is quickly removed by +natural selection. But in man there is a wide interval between the +highest and lowest degree of completeness which are compatible with +maintenance of life; in all grades of civilization above the lowest, +there are so many kinds of superiorities which severally enable men to +survive, notwithstanding accompanying inferiorities, that natural +selection cannot, by itself, rectify any particular unfitness. Hence, +the action of natural selection upon man has long since been essentially +diminished through the operation of social conditions. Therefore the +wicked flourish. Vice is but slowly eliminated, because mankind has so +many other qualities, besides the bad ones, which enable it, in spite of +them, to subsist and achieve progress. + +The fundamental difference between civilized man and the savage lies in +the representative power, the imagination, by which men comprehend +pleasure and pain in others. Use and disuse, in place of natural +selection, have come to be paramount with man; and though the ethical +emotions are still too feeble, they will be more and more strengthened +by use, while the manifestation of selfish and hateful feelings will be +more and more weakened by disuse. Man is slowly passing from a primitive +social state, in which he was little better than a brute, toward an +ultimate social state, in which his character shall have become so +transformed that nothing of the brute can be detected in it. The +"original sin" of theology is the brute inheritance, which is being +gradually eliminated; and the message of Christianity: "Blessed are the +meek, for they shall inherit the earth" will be realized in the state of +universal peace towards which mankind is tending. Strife and Sorrow +shall disappear. Peace and Love shall reign supreme. The goal of +evolution is the perfecting of man, whereby we see, more than ever, that +he is the chief object of divine care, the fruition of that creative +energy which is manifested throughout the knowable universe. + +We know soul only in connection with body. Yet nothing could be more +grossly unscientific than the famous remark of Cabanis that the brain +secretes thought as the liver secretes bile; the molecular movements of +the brain and the phenomena of thought and feeling are merely +concomitants related in some unknown way. It is not even correct to say +that thought goes on in the brain. He who regards man as the consummate +fruition of creative energy and the chief object of divine care, is +almost irresistibly driven to the belief that the soul's career is not +completed with the life upon the earth. Difficulties to this theory he +will meet; yet the alternative view contains difficulties at least as +great; nor is there any problem in the simplest and most exact +departments of science which does not speedily lead us to a +transcendental problem that we can neither solve nor elude. A broad +common sense argument has often to be called in, where keen-edged +metaphysical analysis has confessed itself baffled. The doctrine of +evolution does not allow us to take the atheistic view of the position +of man; the Darwinian theory, properly understood, replaces as much +teleology as it destroys. In the Titanic events of the development of +worlds from the nebular mist and their after-destruction, we may find no +signs of purpose, or even of a dramatic tendency; but on the earth we do +find distinct indications of a dramatic tendency; though doubtless not +of purpose in the limited human sense. Are we to regard the Creator's +work as like that of a child, who builds houses out of blocks just for +the pleasure of knocking them down again? On such a view the riddle of +the universe becomes a riddle without a meaning. "I can see no +insuperable difficulty in the notion that at some period in the +evolution of humanity this divine spark [the soul] may have acquired +sufficient concentration and steadiness to survive the wreck of material +forms and endure forever. Such a crowning wonder seems to me no more +than the fit climax to a creative work that has been ineffably beautiful +and marvellous in all its myriad stages." + +Fiske gives some further definition of social evolution in man, in his +"Cosmic Philosophy" (1874). He there denies the incompatibility of +free-will with causation, saying that "it is the doctrine of +lawlessness, and not the causationist doctrine, which is incompatible +with liberty and destructive of responsibility."[54] + +He further postulates heterogeneity of the environment as "the chief +proximate determining cause of social progress," and defines such +evolution as "a continuous establishment of psychical relations within +the community, in conformity to physical and psychical relations arising +in the environment, during which both the community and the environment +pass from a state of relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a +state of relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which +the constituent units of the community become ever more distinctly +individual."[55] "The progress of a community, as of an organism, is a +process of _adaptation_--the continuous establishment of inner relations +in conformity to outer relations. If we contemplate material +civilization under its widest aspect, we discover its legitimate aim to +be the attainment and maintenance of an equilibrium between the wants +of men and the outward means of satisfying them. And while approaching +this goal, society is ever acquiring in its economic structure both +greater heterogeneity and greater specialization. It is not only that +agriculture, manufactures, commerce, legislation, the acts of the ruler, +the judge, and the physician, have, since ancient times, grown +immeasurably multiform, both in their processes and in their appliances; +but it is also that this specialization has resulted in the greatly +increased ability of society to adapt itself to the emergencies by which +it is now beset."[56] Religion, too, is adjustment; form after form has +been outgrown and perished, yet the life of Christianity, incorporated +in ever higher forms, is continually renewed. The omission of the moral +feeling, as a factor, from Comte's interpretation of the progress of +society, is a fatal defect, since moral and social progress depend more +on feelings than on ideas. As Wallace shows, tribes which combined for +mutual help and protection, restrained appetite by foresight, and felt +sympathy, would have an advantage in the struggle for existence. + +"As surely as the astronomer can predict the future state of the +heavens, the sociologist can foresee that the process of adaptation must +go on until, in a remote future, it comes to an end in proximate +equilibrium. The increasing interdependence of human interests must +eventually go far to realize the dream of the philosophic poet, of a +Parliament of Man, a Federation of the World. + +"'When the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law,' and when +the desires of each individual shall be in proximate equilibrium with +the means of satisfying them and with the simultaneous desires of all +surrounding individuals."[57] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[54] Vol. II. p. 189. + +[55] Ibid. p. 223, 224. + +[56] Vol. II. p. 212. + +[57] Ibid. pp. 227, 228. + + + + +W. H. ROLPH + +"BIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS" ("Biologische Probleme," 1884) + + +For what purpose are we in the world? asks the philosopher, and lays, +with this question, the foundation for later errors. In the effort to +rescue from destruction the theory of a creative intelligence, teleology +has adapted itself to many forms of scientific theory, not excepting +that of evolution. It reads into evolution progress towards what is, in +one way or another, assumed to be an end. But we really know, in the +universe, nothing but continuity, eternal change according to natural +law, and so only _causæ efficientes_, never _causæ finales_; and organic +development as well as processes in inorganic nature are to be explained +in this manner. The assumption that the result of a process is an end +towards which the process was directed is unwarranted. The question of +science is not: Wherefore is any creature in the world? but: What is he? +What is his actual aim, that is, his endeavor? + +In the answer to this question, all philosophical schools have something +in common. Happiness, in one form or another, is acknowledged to be the +"end" of life in this sense. A follower of the utilitarian school may +define happiness as the "sublime feeling that one has taken part in the +continuous improvement of humanity, and the increase of human +happiness," but his words are less a definition of the concept than a +designation of the way in which happiness is to be arrived at. The +"sublime feeling" can be represented only as a feeling of happiness, of +joy. The religious theory, too, which represents the joys of religion on +earth and in heaven, as compensating for the evils of this life, makes +happiness the end of life, though in a different manner. Spencer is +right in declaring that happiness, however it may be defined, always +means, in the end, a greater amount of pleasure than of pain. At this +point, however, the harmony of the schools ceases. The question as to +the method by which this surplus of pleasure is to be obtained is +answered in different ways. All say, indeed, by seeking good and +avoiding evil. But opinion is divided as to what is good and what is +evil. + +Rolph here introduces a long criticism of the different schools. Against +utilitarianism he urges that, in so far as it makes the happiness of the +greatest number its principle, it asserts the right of the majority over +a minority, and so advocates, by implication, an absolute subjection to +authority. + +Our whole moral education has for its aim to give the young as high a +conception as possible of the happiness which springs from virtue and, +on the other hand, to decry the pleasure which may result from forbidden +acts. We seek, in this manner, to diminish the inward struggle and bring +about the right result. He who has grown up under good influences +escapes many temptations to which a man of less moral education falls a +prey. According to Wallock, who makes the degree of inner struggle the +measure of virtue, the man of better education in this case, the more +moral man, must have less merit than the less moral man. Wallock thus +founders on the rock which Kant so skilfully avoids; according to the +former, the man whose lusts have been mastered by education could never +equal the man of evil instincts, and the chastity of a Magdalen must be +regarded as more moral than that of a pure woman. + +Spencer's theory, that the conduct of the higher animals is better +adjusted to ends than that of lower species, is erroneous; the lower +animals are exactly as well organized for the ends of their existence as +are the higher animals for theirs; the tapeworm is relatively just as +perfect as the human being, in comparison with whom he possesses many +superior qualities. The common judgment that the human being is superior +does not accord with the real adjustment of things, but with our human +conception of the ideal end of organization, our anthropocentric idea of +the aim of life. We foolishly believe that the tapeworm and every other +animal has the same end as the human being, and rank the animals +according to this principle, instead of tracing the different +genealogical branches to a like height and then comparing them. Not the +fitness for ends, but the kind and multiplicity of the ends for which +there is fitness, determine our judgment; and the ends by which we judge +are those of our own life. We judge subjectively and absolutely instead +of objectively and relatively. We are ever unconsciously influenced by +the conception that nature, in creating the tapeworm, merely made a +false step and a step backwards in her way towards the creation of man. +That all animals are adapted, some in a greater, some in a less degree, +to the ends of their existence, is proved by the simple fact of their +existence, that is, of their survival in the struggle for existence; but +which are in a higher, and which are in a less degree so adapted, is, in +the individual instance, extremely difficult to determine. In any +attempt at such an estimate, we must meet with peculiar difficulties, +resulting from the fact that we judge of the adaptation to ends with +less certainty the further from us any animal is in its organization. A +comparison such as Spencer institutes is possible only with respect to +like functions of similar organs in closely related forms. + +The assertion that increase of ability for self-preservation leads to +better care for the young, and makes of such care a duty, is likewise +erroneous. For, up to the highly organized class of the crustacea, we +have no example of care for the young. In the struggle for existence, +the species which survive must be such as not only are in themselves +best fitted for survival, but as also bring forth best fitted progeny. +Nor has Spencer made clear on what ground natural process is to be +regarded as identical with duty. In truth he has succeeded in showing +only that care for the young is wide-spread in the animal kingdom, from +which fact naturally follows that it is a quality which tends to the +preservation of species. + +It cannot be conceded that such a perfection as Spencer pictures, where +each shall fulfil all the functions of his own life in the most perfect +and complete manner without interfering with a like freedom in others, +is possible. The assertion involves the extension to all living beings +of that ideal principle of equal claims which Spencer repudiates with +regard to man,--showing that not all men are capable of a like degree of +happiness and that individuals desire, moreover, pleasure differing in +quality. Furthermore, a world of beings which, like the animals and many +plants, can support life only by means of organic material, must, in +order to exist, destroy organic life, either animal or vegetable. The +theory does not even hold with regard to individuals of the same +species; Spencer himself acknowledges the truth of the principles of +Malthus and of Darwin, according to which, even with the lowest rate of +increase, a struggle of competition must soon arise between individuals +of the same species. + +Nor does Spencer's proof of the fundamental character of altruism hold, +on investigation. He demonstrates that through the animal species up to +man, there is less and less self-sacrifice of the mother animal in +giving birth to offspring. But this physical sacrifice is not altruism; +altruism lies in conscious care for the young after birth, and this is +not lessened, but increased, the higher we ascend. + +That morality is but greater adjustment of acts to ends cannot be +admitted. If, in ordinary speech, the word good refers to greatest +adjustment to ends, whatever the ends may be, that is no proof that it +must have the same significance in Ethics. A good shot may be a good one +in that it hits the mark; but what if it kill a man? The acts of +criminals may be as well adjusted to their ends and as easy to predict +as those of a good man. Spencer's theory would lead, consistently +carried out, to the principle that the means justify the end, an +assertion that is even more dangerous than its opposite. The fact is, +that in Ethics it is the nature of the end which is of importance. + +Spencer endeavors to show that only normal exercise of function is +favorable to life, and so moral;--that excess and deprivation are both +injurious. It is not true, however, that excess is always injurious; +within certain bounds it is made up for by reserves in the animal +organism. Or, if Spencer should answer to this objection, that his +"normal" is not to be represented by a sharp line, difficult to keep to, +but by a broad road within which excess is safe, such a representation +would both burden his theory with two dividing-lines, and moreover would +not save it. For he has not deemed it necessary to treat the concept +"normal" to an exact definition, and we find him using it in his later +deductions in an entirely new sense--not as equilibrium between capacity +of function and its exercise, but in the ideal significance of a harmony +between the claims of the individual on the one side, and those of the +environment on the other. This normal is nowhere actually to be found +and cannot, from the nature of things, be arrived at. By addition of +this significance, the word normal becomes indefinite in meaning, and is +used, now in one sense, now in the other. Normal exercise of function +has, however, nothing to do with the claims of the environment, which +generally demands, indeed, a deviation from the normal. + +Nor is Spencer's analysis of the beginning of the process of +food-seizure, adduced in support of the theory that happiness and +morality are commensurable, confirmed by facts. According to this +theory, the process of food-taking begins with the contact of animal and +food, in which act the commencement of diffusion of food in the body of +the animal causes a pleasure which leads to the seizure of its prey and +the further act of devouring it. The theory might hold of the lowest +organisms, but could not be true of any animal furnished with an +impenetrable shell or skin. Nor would the seizure follow with sufficient +promptness if it were left to the action of the pleasure caused by +diffusion. Moreover, we should expect to find, according to this theory, +a much more general and finer development of the organ of taste among +the animals,--to find it as a special organ on the lowest planes of +animal life; it is, on the contrary, the latest of the special senses to +develop. It is the reaction on the sense of touch, the lowest and most +general of the special senses, which causes the seizure of nourishment. +We must, therefore, deny that pleasure is the motive to the seizure of +food, and so, too, reject the conclusion that it is the motive to every +other act. + +Besides arguing that normal function brings pleasure, Spencer has +attempted to prove that all pleasure has its spring in normal function, +and is therefore moral. Could he succeed in so doing, hedonism would be +proved. For since all schools agree in regarding happiness as the end of +life, and since all these, in common, acknowledge happiness to be an +excess of pleasure over pain, enjoyment might be regarded as the +absolute guide. But if, as Spencer acknowledges, pleasure and morality +are only in a perfectly adapted society commensurate, then in only such +a society can pleasure be the criterion; and since we do not live in a +perfectly adapted society, the theory is not applicable to us, and if +practicably applied would be fatal to society. + +Against Spencer's theory of the final spontaneity of morality, many +objections may be urged, among others especially the one that such a +morality ceases to be morality at all, virtue being possible, as Kant +has demonstrated, only where a certain conquest of desire is achieved. +Such a morality is, moreover, unattainable, an extravagant fancy. + + +THE PROBLEM OF FOOD-TAKING + +Rolph thinks Spencer's theory awakes the conjecture that it was not +first arrived at through investigation, but rests upon a preconceived +opinion, as do to a greater or less extent all theories on this subject. +It seems as if the author had first attached himself to that theory +which best accorded with his scientific bias, and then tried whether +this theory might be proved or supported by facts of biology and +psychology. One might surmise, from the very skilful, but often too +artificial argument, that the author pursued the following train of +thought. Pleasure, and indeed the greatest possible pleasure, is the end +of endeavor in the organic world, that is, the psychical cause of +endeavor. May it not also be the physical cause? + +Rolph answers this question with a denial, and endeavors to show that +the taking of food has its cause in the insatiability of all organic +substance. The theory of Spontaneous Generation contains nothing +impossible or improbable; is, on the contrary, a necessary logical +assumption not to be disproved by the mere result of experiment under +conditions of the laboratory. It is easy to imagine that organic +elements, which are to be found in great quantities in inorganic nature, +may come together by chance, or rather in the natural order of things, +to the formation of protoplasm. + +The movement of these masses of protoplasm seems, at first glance, to +set the law of gravitation at defiance, but we may answer that an +ascending balloon might seem, to an uninstructed observer, to do the +same, although its movement is merely the natural result of that force; +it is not necessary, therefore, to assume a free inner motive, the soul, +as the cause of the one motion or the other. The first assimilation of +food has its beginning in the process of endosmose and exosmose, in +which the protoplasm, as in general the denser fluid, increases in +volume, taking up more than it gives out; the process occurring, in +detail, according to the special relations of attraction in the parts. +The organism always takes up the greatest amount possible under the +circumstances, exactly as, in the inorganic world, water takes up the +greatest amount possible of salt or any other soluble substance; the +growth of a crystal, and the oxidation of iron are illustrations of the +same principle. Of the limit of this capacity to take up new matter into +the organism we know nothing; all recent experiments go to show that the +organism is capable, under propitious circumstances, of an enormous +receptivity, such as, under natural conditions, it never reaches. The +lower animals feed continually, and their whole lives are passed in this +employment. In plants the tendency is seen still more clearly. +Experiments with electric, violet, and ultra-violet light show an +enormous growth in plants exposed to its action. But this can be only an +indirect growth, namely, the exorbitant acceleration of organic change +and assimilation. This fact is proved by experiments turning on increase +of warmth in soil; from which is seen to result an unusual development +of that part of the plant to which growth is especially directed at the +time. When the warmth of an incubator is increased, the animal organ +especially engaged in development at the time is affected in like +manner. So that we may assume that the organism is capable of responding +to every demand that nature makes upon it under normal conditions; and +since the greatest possible assimilation under the existing conditions +is thus removed from the control of the creature, the latter appears +practically insatiable. This insatiability must appear to the observer +an inner impulse of the organism, an effort towards increase of +nourishment. It may be called mechanical hunger in distinction from +psychical hunger, of which it is the basis. It is not necessary to take +into consideration, in the question as to the degree of assimilation +possible, the amount of excretion of substance by the organism; we must, +on the contrary, assert that this is dependent upon the amount of +assimilation. The measure of growth depends, therefore, on the degree of +assimilation of new material. This degree, however, like the degree to +which the matter may be dissolved in a liquid in the case of inorganic +matter, is especially affected by light and warmth. The creature which +comes into existence in the sun will experience a decrease of organic +change when placed in the shade; and the creature which comes into +existence in the shade will experience an increase of such change under +the influence of the sun, a decrease again with a return to the shade. +This decrease means hunger,--harm. Experiments with zoöspores throw an +interesting light upon these relations. They show that the zoöspores, +although suited to very different degrees of light, all shun darkness. +Although when in the light they soon come to rest, divide, and copulate, +they remain, in the darkness, in a state of continual unrest and motion. +They grow so thin "that they almost excite pity" (Strassburger), and +finally perish of hunger. Only such zoöspores as are distinguished by +sex and copulate come to rest, or those of such sorts as prey upon +others. It is easy to perceive that the unrest of the zoöspores in the +darkness springs from lack of nourishment, from hunger; they seek +feverishly for the light, without which assimilation follows with +insufficient energy to satisfy need and render life possible. In +darkness, copulation alone can do this; copulation takes, then, the +place of normal nourishment. + +Or let us consider the case of an organism which has originated in the +shade. Heat, as we know, increases chemical change, in inorganic as well +as organic matter; it hastens the disintegration of certain compounds, +and alone renders it possible in many cases. In general, we may assert +that increase of temperature within certain limits increases +assimilation; that is, capacity to assimilate. Therefore, if an animal +is placed in the sun, its capacity, that is, its need, to assimilate is +increased, although assimilation is much more energetic than before. +Need to assimilate or hunger is, therefore, dependent upon the supply of +food, although, doubtless, also on other conditions, especially those of +light and temperature. If this is true, the hunger of a simple organism +that assimilates energetically must be more intense than that of one +which assimilates slowly, in spite of the consumption of an enormous +quantity of food in the case of the former. Botanists know (Sachs, +"Lehrbuch der Botanik," p. 613) "that growth may be so hastened by too +high a temperature that assimilation (especially under scanty light) +does not suffice to provide the necessary material for it. The +transpiration of the leaves may be so increased that the roots cannot +repair the loss. And on the other hand, a too low temperature of the +soil may so diminish the action of the roots that even a small loss by +transpiration cannot be repaired." + +At what stage of organization psychical hunger is added to mechanical +hunger, or whether it may be identified with it, we cannot say. In any +case, the former appears exceedingly early, for excitations of hunger +may be observed in creatures very low in the scale of being. Certainly +hunger is never absent where there is movement. + +Hunger, a sense of pain, is, therefore, the first impulse to action.[58] + +With a like effort in the attempt to obtain food, that organism will be +best nourished which commands the best means of obtaining and preparing +its food,--the best apparatus for the seizure and grinding of food, and +the best salivary gland. And finally, greater surface of skin, of lungs, +of gills, or of intestines, causes greater capacity for assimilation, +and since this surface is increased by cell-division or propagation, the +capacity of the organism for assimilation grows with its capacity of +propagation.[59] Protoplasm is never entirely homogeneous, and we must +suppose some difference even in the beginning; such difference is, +indeed, fundamental through the very composition of protoplasm from the +four fundamental elements, and this or that other element. These +different elements must be held together by forces of attraction, and +the direction of these forces must have some common centre represented +by some differentiation of the protoplasm, whether as clearer spot, or +as nucleus. This spontaneously generated organism, neither animal nor +plant, is nourished, as we have seen, by diffusion, by the +transformation of inorganic into organic substance. The lowest organisms +possess no definite organs for taking food; they manifest, however, +phenomena of movement which are exactly like those of the animal +organism, for they appear unconditioned and hence voluntary. Locomotion +is, in the lowest animal forms, the only means of obtaining nourishment. +The amoeba surrounds and takes in whatever is by chance met with. +Animals a little higher in the scale swim about and seek their food; or, +remaining in one place, they cause, by means of cilia, a movement of the +water towards a certain part of the body, a sort of mouth where the +protoplasm is open and can take up the prey in the same manner as does +the amoeba. Ascending the scale of life, we find more and more +complicated apparatus for the seizure of food, for its preparation and +digestion, and the beginning of a nervous system, first as the +differentiation of certain muscle-cells, then in connection with a +special sense, that of hearing. If we assume any pleasure to be +connected with the earliest acts of assimilation, it must be that of the +satisfaction of a want, the stilling of pain in the form of hunger. + + +THE PROBLEM OF PERFECTIBILITY + +In the earliest forms of propagation, the younger organism is a true +copy of that from which it springs, the trifling differences being due, +as Schmankewicz has shown, to outer influences. The differences of male, +female, worker, and soldier are due to such outer influences. The +differences in the younger organism, where propagation takes place +through copulation, may be explained by the mixture of types, through +which, by action and reaction, some qualities are intensified, while +some others become latent or are entirely destroyed. To these mutual +influences are to be added such as come from without, especially those +of warmth, and of quantity and quality of food. Under too great an +increase in temperature, the young organism may even be destroyed, the +process of assimilation not being able to keep pace with it. Those +variations which have led to the development of existing forms, that is, +which were favorable to life, are chiefly such as could be brought about +by relative or absolute increase of assimilation. This is true of +mental, as well as of physical, qualities. + +It is a fact established without doubt, that the most common and most +widely distributed species show the greatest variability, and that those +species, on the contrary, which are now rare, although they were, +perhaps, at earlier periods, the most common and extremely variable, +vary, at the present date, the least of all. Following Darwin, one +generally draws the conclusion that the severity of the struggle for +existence favors the formation of varieties. For, it is said, the most +common species fight the severest battle with one another, while the +scanty representatives of rarer species come the least into competition +and continue unchanged. But this theory is, in two ways, erroneous. In +the first place, no attention is paid to the fact that a rare species +may be exposed to a severe struggle against another species for the same +nourishment, while a common species may, on the other hand, be exposed +to no such struggle, and, supporting life from a generous supply of +food, be subjected to but slight pressure. The conception of the +Darwinians means nothing more or less than that the individuals of a +species vary the more, the less favorable the conditions of nourishment; +and this cannot be conceded. Again, the fact is to be taken into +consideration, that the species at present common must have passed +through a favorable period in which food was so plentiful that it not +only afforded an abundance to individuals past the dangers of infancy +and youth, but allowed, in addition, the existence of an ever-increasing +number of individuals. And it is this period of increase, of abundance, +not a period of struggle, which has developed the variations we now have +before our eyes. In the same manner one must conclude, with regard to +the rarer species, that the formerly existing numerous varieties were +destroyed during the period of decline, that is, of overpowering +pressure. We have abundant proof of this in the fact that domesticated +species, which are carefully tended and fed, and so wholly withdrawn +from the struggle for existence, vary enormously, and produce the most +wonderful monstrosities. + +To what direct causes the appearance of a variety is due, is a question +as yet unanswered. But Weismann's investigations have shown us that +climate plays a large part in their development. Embryology teaches us, +moreover, that the development of the young organism does not take place +with the same uniformity in all organs, but that, on the contrary, in +one period one organ, in another, another, undergoes a more rapid +growth, which may be influenced by variations in food or temperature. +Through such variations the development of monstrosities is explained. +We know that influences of nourishment are operative in the development +of the larvæ of bees to workers or to queens, and we can easily conceive +that other organs besides the sexual are subject to these influences. +The field in which such influences may be operative is, indeed, +boundless. + +All these considerations lead us to the conclusion that variability in +general, but especially that variability resulting in a so-called +improvement of the varieties producing it, is an accompaniment of +prosperous conditions. This is a conclusion not yet reached in zoölogy, +although botanists long ago recognized, in abundance of food, the most +essential condition for the development of variations. + +Darwinism fails to account for any need of nourishment beyond that +necessary for the maintenance of the _status quo_ of life. According to +Darwin, the animal can acquire only sufficient for the repair of loss. +The struggle for existence is, therefore, according to him, a struggle +of self-defence, and its results could be, at the best, only the +maintenance of species in their present position or, in a less favorable +case, their decline, and finally their destruction. But this view is +wholly false. The animal acquires not only enough to repair loss, but +much more. How could the first amoeba have propagated itself, if it +consumed no more than it needed for mere self-maintenance, and how could +evolution have taken place? We have seen that, even in the inorganic +world, there is not an equality of loss and repair, but that, in osmose, +the denser fluid takes up more than it gives, while the fluid that is +less dense loses more than it receives, and the mutual exchange reaches +the maximum possible under the existing circumstances. It is this +characteristic which renders the involuntary and forced tendency of the +organism to satiation independent of the amount of waste; this +mechanical hunger is the spring of the insatiability of organisms, and +explains to us their increase in number, the process of increasing +perfection, and individual development. Without it, an eternity would +not have sufficed for evolution; we should still have only a world of +primitive amoebæ. + +This theory of development is, then, the opposite of that ordinarily +assumed. The latter asserts that increase of growth demands increase of +nourishment, whereas this asserts the fact that increase of nourishment +determines growth. The struggle for existence is not a struggle for the +mere necessaries to maintain life, but a struggle for increase of +acquisition, increase of life; it is not a struggle of defence, but an +attack which only under certain circumstances becomes a defence. The +rule with which we advise our friends is, "Forward! strive to better +yourself!" though we may endeavor, in hypocritical spirit, to persuade +to contentment those who come into competition with our interests. + +The chief points, therefore, in which this theory differs from that of +Darwin, are as follows:-- + +"The struggle for existence is really a struggle for increase of +nourishment, of life; and independent of the supply of the moment, it +goes on at all times, hence even in a state of abundance. + +"Limitation of supply by competition leads to fixation of the species +and, in the end, to its decrease and disappearance. + +"Sickness, climate, and direct enemies are the destructive agencies, and +must secure more propitious conditions for survivors, the stronger their +effect. + +"Only under conditions of prosperity can the survivors propagate +largely, and perfect themselves, separating into varieties and species. + +"The increase and differentiation of the organic world shows us that +conditions of prosperity have been the rule, those of want the +exception." + +Rolph's extremely interesting chapter on Propagation traces the sexual +instinct to the "mechanical hunger." The earliest example which may be +adduced in support of this theory is that of the zoöspores which, by +copulation, sustain life for a time under the unfavorable conditions of +darkness, the thinner male representing, as does also the spermatozoön, +the seeking individual suffering from want, the female representing a +means of sustenance. The sex of the young organism is in like manner +referred by Rolph to conditions of nourishment during development. We +now come to the chapter on + + +ANIMAL OR NATURAL ETHICS + +The existence of morality presupposes the existence of commandments of +duty, and of an authority. Among animals, as well as among human beings, +we find recognized authority and can discern the principles of action +which constitute the duty of any particular animal. Authority among the +lower animals is based on might, which is, indeed, the universal source +of authority, without which no authority can exist. Personal authority +is but a particular form of the authority of circumstances; and to this +authority every creature must be subject. It consists of two factors: +the outer authority of the environment, and the inner authority of +impulse. Duty is obedience to authority. The duty of the organism +consists in action that corresponds to these two authorities, following +the direction given as the resultant of the mixture of the two +components. That is, that manner of life is right or moral which renders +the life of the organism the fullest possible under the circumstances. +The unreasoning organism is unconsciously drawn to seek this maximum, +while the reasoning being seeks it through reflection. The impulse to +happiness includes, therefore, for the reasoning being, the impulse to +morality; or, ideally expressed, the relative morality equals the +relative happiness; morality and happiness are the same thing. + +An authority without the means of enforcing itself is a +self-contradiction. The means by which nature makes its authority felt +is organic excitation. In proportion to its strength, an excitation +produces sensation, in case it is not too weak to make itself felt at +all. Every excitation has a definite significance and may come from +without or within. Pleasant excitations are always, primarily, the +feeling of the stilling of pain, though there are pains, such as, for +instance, that of a wound, the toothache, headache, an aching corn, +which have no corresponding feeling of pleasure. Nor is pleasure the +only offspring of pain, since pain may bring forth pain. Pleasure +depends, in its character as pleasure as well as in its strength, on the +feeling preceding it in the organism; that is, its quality is the +result, not of the degree of organic excitation, but of the order of +succession of the feelings. For this reason, the same feeling which +brings pleasure to one individual may bring pain to another. + +This whole deduction is at variance with Spencer's theory that +pleasurable excitations are favorable to life, painful ones injurious. +And since observation is in direct opposition to his assertion, his +followers have been obliged to supplement it with the conception that +pain is gradually weeded out by natural selection. On the contrary, we +need pain at every instant, since it is the impulse to action; +persistence in the same condition through lack of excitation, must +result in death; pleasure can never originate action, it can only cause +persistence in action already begun. The fact has been too often +overlooked, that the motive and the "end" of an action are by no means +the same. The motive is pain, and the end is either simply the stilling +of pain or an additional positive pleasure. There are, therefore, many +actions which are directed to no concrete positive end, but only to the +purely negative end of escape from pain without consideration of the +further results; a striking example of such action is suicide. Even +where positive pleasure appears as an end, it is never in itself the +motive to action. In order to become a motive, it must first be +transformed into an excitation, into desire for pleasure; and this +desire for a definite or an indefinite pleasure is, in its essence, +pain--the pain of the absence of pleasure.[60] + +The pleasure sought may be one already known through experience, or it +may be one not yet experienced. In the latter case, the desire is +awakened by instruction or reflection, or else induced by instinct. But +the motive is always the same, namely, a seeking after pleasure, hence a +feeling of pain. + +This view furnishes us with a psychical explanation of the association +of ideas, the mysterious so-called transferrence of the feeling of +pleasure from the end to the means. Pleasure begins as soon as we have +begun the action which will bring us with certainty to the end desired, +and this pleasure may reach such a degree of strength at some point of +the process as to conquer the desire for the real end, hem further +action, and dispose to continuance at the point reached. The action of +the miser may be thus explained. + +The objection that, if pain is the motive, the organism is nothing but a +bundle of pains, is by no means valid, for it overlooks the fact that +pain remains, in an immense number of cases, below the threshold of +consciousness; as in the case of organic action, where it is rhythmic. +The same is true of reflex action. To any close observer of the lower +organisms, it seems most probable that these possess consciousness (see +Wundt, "Physiologische Psychologie"), nor is it by any means proved that +the plants do not possess it likewise. It is certainly remarkable that +exactly the lowest plants, which stand so near the animals in the +phenomena of their life, exhibit movements closely resembling those of +animals. And it is, moreover, a fact that automatic and reflex actions +increase with the degree of organization, and are most numerous in human +beings. With increased exercise, one chain of movements after the other +is withdrawn from consciousness; and through this removal from +consciousness action gains in certainty and rapidity, and in energy +also, since the part of the force which was before lost in inducing +consciousness is now released. Such removal from consciousness is, +therefore, a benefit to the organism, as an adaptation to the increased +demands of circumstances. Movements which thus become unconscious are +each and every one of them movements which have but one definite end and +an interruption of which either kills or seriously injures the organism, +or at least brings disorder into its life for the time being. An easily +excited consciousness would be an exceeding danger to the animal. +Conscious action is directed to the attainment of variable ends by means +which are also variable. It cannot, therefore, astonish us that +consciousness disappeared in plants after the loss of free motion. + +By the regular exercise of certain actions or of trains of thought, +either through necessity or by habit certain tracks are worn or taken +possession of, so that the whole process, from the excitation to the +action resulting upon it, takes place with such rapidity that we are no +longer conscious of its separate phases and so of the growth of the +result. + +The first commandment of animal ethics is, therefore: "Flee pain"; and +closely associated with it is a second commandment furnished by the +insatiability of the organism, the impulse to happiness, to increase of +life. The principle of Spencer's ethics, according to which normal +living is right living, would result in stagnation. Right living +consists, on the contrary, in progress, in passing beyond the normal. No +educator would hesitate for an instant to pronounce the continuance of a +pupil upon a present normal immoral, and to oppose it with all his +powers. From day to day the developing organism advances the line of its +normal activity. And as in the individual, so in the species: every new +generation exceeds in a certain measure the activity of the last. Not +rest, but motion, constitutes the normal; not rest, but motion, is +happiness, and the spring of happiness. Not that being which has no +wants, but that which develops and satisfies the greatest possible +number of wants, is the happiest, leads the most pleasurable life. When +we apply these principles to the animals, we reach the conception that +all such as lead a solitary life live morally when they endeavor, with +all their powers, to better their own condition. That they injure plants +and other animals in so doing need not trouble us, since they are forced +to do so in order to maintain life. The principle on which animal life +is based is hence preëminently egoistic and acknowledges no other right +than that of might. Spencer, in speaking of altruism on the lowest plane +of animal life, makes the fundamental and quite fatal mistake that he +does not first sharply and distinctly define egoism. Had he done this, +he would certainly have found that, for egoism, as for altruism, the +criterion of consciousness, of will, is indispensable. In his definition +of altruism as consisting in those acts which in any way benefit others, +he does nothing less than get rid of egoism altogether, since there are +no acts which do not, in the end, benefit others than the performer. The +greater number of the young brought forth by lowest organisms serve as +food for other species, and hence the parent animal, in bringing forth +such numbers, favors these species rather than her own flesh and blood. +The fly would act altruistically, according to Spencer's definition, in +being caught in the net of the spider. + +A creature which gets its food, as do many of the lower species, without +exertion of its own, does not act egoistically, nor does the animal +which, in the natural course of its growth, brings forth young by +spontaneous division; but that animal may do so which acquires its food +by means of any voluntary actions, however insignificant, or which +voluntarily protects and cares for its young; and such voluntary action +increases rather than decreases with greater organization. Real egoism +begins with the voluntary acquisition of food, a process continued in +the forced excretion of the young. But since this action benefits the +second generation, we may regard it as the connecting link between +egoism and altruism. It is not purely altruistic; altruism proper begins +with the nourishment and care of the young. And to what degree we have a +right to consider even this as really altruistic can be determined only +by further investigation. The emptying of the milk-glands is combined +with pleasure; it may therefore be regarded as primarily egoistic, and +furnishes us with a further example of the development of altruism from +egoism. Altruism increases, not only with higher organization, but also +with a higher development of social life. + +The beginnings of society are to be found in the family life of animals; +the most primitive form of this is the temporary, voluntary association +of male and female among the higher species; that is, the anthropoids +and vertebrates. On this merely temporary association follows, as a +higher stage, the lasting family union, which exists among comparatively +few animals. The so-called "states" of the animals are, in their most +typical instances, nothing but families living in a condition of +polyandry. + +Closer association gives opportunity for a misuse of the powers and aims +of the individual, before impossible. Examples of this are the theft of +honey from one hive of bees by the workers of another, and the carrying +off of the young by wasps and ants, as also the slaughter of the drones. +Since the robber of yesterday may be the robbed of to-day, such acts are +harmful to individuals, to the family, and to the species. They diminish +the degree of life, and are opposed to animal ethics. The association of +male and female, since only temporary, affords little opportunity for +immorality, and the duties of parents to their young are, for the most +part, faithfully performed. In striking contrast to the natural morality +of wild animals is the immorality of domestic animals, which give +themselves up to every sort of vice when not restrained. The moral +conditions of any associated animals not under control, whether in +zoölogical gardens, in the town, or in the country, is, in fact, +monstrous. Immorality increases with the closer association of animals. +The closer the contact and the looser the bond between the individuals +of a species, the greater the opportunity for immorality, and the worse +the resulting habits. The careless life of pleasure led by animals that +live in solitude, is interfered with, in a state of association, by +certain duties. How far the performance of such duties springs from a +concealed pleasure, or from instinct, or follows upon the command of +authority, we, unfortunately, cannot say. The limitation of +gratification signifies, however, decrease of pleasure. The needs of +different animals differ according to differing organization; higher +organization means greater and more complicated desire, the satisfaction +of which is often impossible, but it means also the attainment of +capacity for greater pleasure in form and intensity. Hence even the +partly attained pleasure of the higher animals is, in intensity as well +as in fulness, much greater than the completely attained pleasure of the +lower animals. + + +HUMANE ETHICS + +Rolph contests Lubbock's theory that the early type of man lived in a +condition of sexual promiscuity, and gives as a reason for his opinion +the "strict" monogamy of those animals which are most closely related to +man. The customs of such animals should have as much weight, as +evidence, as those of any of the present tribes of savages, since these +tribes are as old as civilized races, and their customs cannot, +therefore, be unhesitatingly regarded as primary ones. + +The real needs of men, those the gratification of which is indispensable +to the maintenance of life, are few. By experience, and by experience +alone, can man learn that present gratification may mean future pain, +and so be withheld from such gratification; for only disinclination to +one form of pleasure can induce inclination to another form. In the +simplicity of primitive social conditions and the uniform character of +action under such conditions, rules of experience must have been early +formed, which, inherited by succeeding generations, became the rules of +conduct.[61] With the development of authority,--first the paternal +authority, then that of the family, and finally that of the elders of +the tribe,--the possibility of establishing rules of action, and +inducing morality, increased. The very nomination of elders, to which +primitive authority may almost everywhere be traced, shows how great was +the respect for experience. + +Spencer remarks, in one place in his "Data of Ethics," that human beings +first banded themselves together because they found it more advantageous +to coöperate. This is only conditionally true. Before human beings could +find association advantageous, they must have accumulated experience of +it. That they did this by their own inclination is certainly not true. +Wherever we find two solitary beings coming together by chance, enmity +is the first feeling excited, and war the result. Everything new, +everything unknown, causes aversion, and this aversion must lead to +misunderstandings and war the more surely because each of the opponents +feels himself disturbed in his supposed right to limitless possession. +Human beings must first have warred with one another before they came to +the knowledge, not that social life, that is, mutual forbearance, was +more advantageous, but that more closely associated individuals gained +in power against a common enemy by their association. Man did not choose +society, but was, on the contrary, forced into it, for good or evil, +through increase of his kind. The discovery of the first tools must have +had an immense influence upon increase in the number of individuals, +which was before limited by struggle with wild animals, and by the +restriction of food to fruit. We must conclude that, under such +circumstances, a lasting contract was inevitable, and that, with it, +vices suddenly appeared which had before existed only potentially, as +predisposition. War or theft must have followed the mutual limitation of +rights, but against this disturbance of the peace other members of the +society must have banded themselves together. The weaker must soon have +been driven from their possessions by the stronger, and must then have +united for the purpose of obtaining, by association, what they were +unable to acquire otherwise. The growing children settled near their +parents, with whom they entered into a family union, in which the father +represented the authority. In this arrangement is the germ of civil +order,--of the ideas of right and wrong. Inner conflicts can at first +scarcely have occurred, since the possessions of the family were in +common, and a conception of theft between members of the family could +not exist. Furthermore, there was scarcely anything worth stealing, for +the implements must have been so primitive that each individual could +easily manufacture them for himself. Only women could have been, in the +beginning, an object of conflict, and for avoidance of this conflict +laws and customs arose, which are, to our modern minds, inexplicable. +Real polyandry may doubtless be explained by the idea of the common +right of possession among brothers; it has, in most cases, this +significance. It is extended, indeed, later, to more distant relatives, +and gains finally a solemn significance, the presentation of the wife, +or of one of a number of wives, being a symbol of fraternity by which +the guest is honored. + +With the manufacture of better tools and weapons, temptation to theft +was increased, and authority began to be directed inwards to the society +itself, since inner conflict injured the family in its contests with +outer enemies. What is true of the family in this connection, is true of +the tribe. A joint egoism of the society as a whole must thus have been +developed, as soon as the first step of association was taken. The +earliest law is always negative, a prohibition, not a positive command. + +War had its good as well as its evil side, since it made different +peoples acquainted and gave them knowledge of each other's tools, +weapons, and customs. War was, at first, the only means by which peoples +learned to know each other. The establishment of peace led to the union +of different peoples, or at least to peaceful intercourse by exchange, +which united the tribes by common interests, corrected ideas, and +tempered customs. + +The egoistic impulses, the feeling of unconditional right to possession, +are the impulses with which the child is born; morality is not inborn, +but must be developed by education, as is shown by the example of such +children as are neglected in education.[62] Or, if there is anything +innate in the direction of morality, it is merely a certain inherited +predisposition acquired in the course of the thousands of years of +social intercourse, which makes it easier for us to respond to +education. If this is not so, and the impulse to morality is innate, why +has it required so many centuries for man to make the simple connection +of ideas, that what is just towards one man is just towards another. In +this feeling of justice, acquired through an extension of egoism, is the +root of all virtue. It is the spring of sympathy or benevolence, which +can be developed only where the feeling of the like rights of others is +strong. + +But an unconsidered over-estimate of this feeling is the source of +Spencer's Utopia, as it is of that of present socialism. We have seen +that authority is a primary and necessary factor of society. Authority, +virtue, and duty are interdependent, and must be of about the same +antiquity. From all compulsion imposed by authority, the creature, by +its nature, attempts to escape, and the feeling which prompts this +attempt has been falsely called the instinct of freedom. Authority +exceeds its bounds, where it issues commands not demanded by the general +conditions existing in the society. But though these conditions may +demand a limitation of personal freedom, their requirements must, +nevertheless, in general, be enforced. + +Natural and Humane Ethics may thus be at variance in some things; may in +others, coincide. There is no necessary conflict and no necessary +agreement between them; therefore the theological theory of an absolute +contradiction between them is false, as is also the teleological theory +of their coincidence. The latter theory, not being able to deny that the +moral and the natural do not always coincide under present +circumstances, endeavors to avoid the difficulty by calling these +conditions abnormal. The theory falls into two errors: in the first +place, it ignores the fact that we have our organs, not _for_ use but +_by_ use; and that our inherited characteristics may be regarded as an +adjustment to the conditions of our ancestors, but not an adjustment to +our own; and in the second place, there are no abnormal conditions. +There are new or changed conditions, but either there are no abnormal +ones, or all are abnormal. + +But although increase of life means also increase of desire, although +the organism is insatiable, yet there is, as we have seen, an increase +of happiness, both in quantity and quality, with higher organization. +The absolute amount is increased, but not the relative amount, the +amount realizable in proportion to desire. + +Want does not lead to improvement, as Darwin maintains, and the +individual cannot be just or sympathetic in a condition of want. The +freer he is from the direct care of the acquirement of necessities, the +more manifold capabilities will he develop, and the greater will be his +happiness. + +The task which authority must set itself, in order to secure greater +justice in society, and so greater happiness, is twofold, a positive and +a negative task. The positive task consists in such an education of the +young as will enable them by their own effort to advance towards their +individual ideal of happiness, and in the inculcation of such an ideal +as corresponds to their individual talents and means, and is attainable +under the existing circumstances. The negative task, already implied in +the positive one, is the imposition of necessary restrictions in the +means used for the attainment of happiness. Within the limits set by +justice, the individual has a natural right to seek his own pleasure, +and for each individual an attainable maximum may be reckoned. This is +not saying, however, that the individual has a just claim to this +maximum, in case he cannot, or will not, be sufficiently energetic to +gain it by his own efforts. It is an error of modern times to suppose +that the realization of happiness rests in any other hand than that of +the individual himself--that the state can make and decree happiness. +Happiness cannot be secured by means of decrees, by a division of goods, +or by gifts. Division is always unjust, since it leaves out of +consideration that individuality of character which is the only measure +of sensibility to pleasure. The negative part of the task is to be +accomplished less by inculcation of many special virtues than by the +continual direction of the attention to the fundamental virtue of +justice. The positive task is to be accomplished by the most thorough +education of the intelligence of the individual, through which he shall +learn to inquire the reason of moral precepts, to judge for himself, and +then to act on the decision he arrives at. We have seen that the ethical +education of the present time tends to reduce inner struggle, rendering +the results of wrong-doing as repellant as possible. One in whom has +been instilled a very terrible conception of the sufferings resulting, +in the present and future life, from wrong-doing, will perhaps +automatically avoid the evil; and the means for a moral education seem +thus attained. However, it is not so; for when the individual accustoms +himself to being directed in action, not by his own carefully won +experience, but by feelings instilled by others, concerning the ethical +character of which his own insight does not, and cannot, afford him any +explanation, he opens the way to every chance influence, and becomes the +plaything of unknown forces; while he at the same time divests himself +of that personal responsibility without which no society can exist. The +true ideal of education is such as sharpens the judgment and accustoms +the individual to consider his action from all sides, in the +consciousness of personal responsibility. Only through such action is +man the possessor of freedom. He who acts without reflection, from +unreliable emotion, is not free. The freest possible decision is that +which is reached as the result of such a careful consideration of all +the single components of reflection that no one of them exceeds in its +influence its real worth. The ideal of education is not, therefore, the +production of spontaneous decision and action, but of reasoning, +conscious action. That this principle is the only right one is shown by +our former observations, according to which, as society develops, more +and more actions are the result of reflection. And in case a state of +moral perfection is attainable, it can be arrived at only as each member +of the society acts from perfect reflection, not from impulse or +instinct. In attempting social improvement, we must take example by the +chemist, who does not attempt a chemical combination by force but +endeavors to attain the conditions under which the elements will unite, +through their own inner laws, to the desired, homogeneous body. This is +a wearisome process; but it is the shortest and swiftest, for it leads +us to the desired end. + +The single virtues cannot be regarded as ideal principles. They +contradict each other, and whether the one or the other should have the +preference depends on the individual case and can be decided only by +reflection. The formulation of these general rules of conduct under the +name of virtues has, practically, only the advantage of reducing the +numberless possibilities of action to a few; but such principles can +never be exhaustive. Wherever the individual forgets this fact and is +led to regard virtue as an end, instead of as the means to an innocent +happiness, virtue ceases to be virtue and becomes its opposite. Thus +thrift becomes avarice, generosity extravagance, courage foolhardiness, +openness want of consideration, gentleness weakness, and chastity +celibacy. The single virtues are only abstractions from special +circumstances generalized to an ideal of action. But in practical life, +we have to do with individual cases whose conditions are by no means +ideal, and cannot be treated as ideal. We must act, in each case, for +the relative best, not for absolute good; and what is best for one sex +or in one society may not be best for the other sex or in another +society. A compromise between idealism and realism is everywhere +necessary; and such a compromise is made, despite all fine words to the +contrary, by every one,--by one only more openly or consciously than +another. It is comforting to remark that mankind shows itself, and +always has shown itself, instinctively taking the road to the attainment +of the end. + +Through an extension of relations, authority, at first represented by a +single individual, the head of the family or tribe, reaches the point of +development where the one ruler is unable to rule all parts, and decide +all questions, alone, so that he is obliged to call in help. He +naturally chooses men near to him, with whose character he is +acquainted. But there arises, by this division of authority, the danger +of its misuse to the disadvantage of the ruler himself. Since despotic +government depends on might alone, and the voice of the people has no +influence, every person in any way related to the ruler represents a +danger. Nevertheless, the establishment of new powers to assist the +ruler was the starting-point of constitutional government. For by this +division of power the ruler rendered it impossible for himself to govern +without help from others, and opened the way to a contract of compromise +with the people. The influence of individuals upon the state spread, +thus, to the people itself. Self-government, pure parliamentarism, is +the ultimate end to be reached by the process. + +We have seen that neither pleasure, nor utility, nor virtue, nor, +finally, religion, can be regarded as the absolute means, but only as +the relative means to the attainment of happiness. Both the hedonist and +the utilitarian need to correct and further define their principle, as +well in respect to the end to be attained, as in respect to the means +proposed. Their principles are not to be rejected, but fanaticism is to +be condemned. Principles may have exceptions; but fanaticism recognizes +no exceptions. + +As to man's final end. Though he has attained to the power of shaping, +to some extent, his own environment and means of existence, yet he does +not occupy an exceptional position in the animal kingdom, and must cease +to exist unless he submits to adapt himself. It has been almost the rule +that the highest animals of an epoch have later died out and been +replaced by some new aristocracy, developed from somewhat lower forms. +It is to be supposed that man, also, will be destroyed, whether by a new +ice-age or by a period of heat. By the very fact of his supremacy, he +disturbs the primal equilibrium, and originates conditions which, even +now, press hard upon single lands and may easily become dangerous to all +civilization. Destruction may also threaten mankind morally, for the +development of morality hitherto gives no surety of its continuance. +Every advancement brings with it some evil, every virtue contains the +germs of some vice. Modern humanity has given us an unreasoning +soft-heartedness, with an extravagant malady of forgiveness which is +nothing less than immorality itself, since it on the one hand undermines +the general sense of justice, while on the other it prompts and +encourages wrong-doing. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[58] For further arguments in support of this assertion, see +"Biologische Probleme," pp. 64-66, etc. + +[59] Und da diese Fläche durch Zelltheilung oder Fortpflanzung +vergrössert wird, so wächst die Aufnahmefähigkeit des Organismus mit der +Fortpflanzungsfähigkeit desselben (p. 67). + +[60] Und diese Begierde... ist ihrem innersten Kerne nach, eine Unlust, +ein Leid: das Leid des Entbehrens des Genusses (p. 176). + +[61] Bei der Binfachheit der primitiven socialen Verhältnisse und der +Einförmigkeit der Lebenstätigkeit müssen sich bald Erfahrungsregeln +gebildet haben, die nun durch Vererbung übertragen und damit zu +Lebensregeln vertieft wurden (p. 195). + +[62] Compare _supra_, p. 100, note. + + + + +ALFRED BARRATT + + +Alfred Barratt's "Physical Ethics" (1869) deals with First Principles, +"Pure," as distinguished from "Applied," Ethics, the aim of the science, +as stated by the author, being "to try to establish the first principle +which is the condition of further progress. If we can establish a +principle _a priori_, and then verify its universality by an appeal to +mental phenomena and to philosophical theories, its existence as a fact +will be made certain; if, in addition to this, we can connect it with +laws still more general and with the family of natural sciences, it will +be no longer a fact, but become a scientific law, a section of the +universal code; and the title of this essay will be justified." + +_Part First_ of "Physical Ethics" is occupied with the statement of +axioms, definitions, and propositions "derived from general experience." +They are as follows:-- + +"_Axiom 1._--Actions, like objects, are capable of being classified +according to their properties, and of being measured by a definite +standard. + +"_Obs._--This axiom merely means that the qualities of actions, like +those of objects, are fixed and constant, so that the same action has +always the same properties and moral value, and, under the same +circumstances, always produces the same effect.... It follows from this +axiom that it is possible to act so as to attain a definite object, and +thus a general end of action may be arrived at.... + +"_Axiom 2._--The end of action (being some common property or effect) is +a possible object of knowledge. + +"_Axiom 3._--We are capable of being affected by any external object +only through our faculties, or (in other words) as a part of our +consciousness. + +"_Axiom 4._--Faculties are known only by their action, or (in other +words) so far as they are portions of our consciousness. + +"_Axiom 5._--The sphere of action lies in the adaptation of 'inner' to +'outer' sequences, of faculties to the laws of nature. + +"_Axiom 6._--The constitution of man and other animal beings is an +organism consisting of a number of parts, each having its appropriate +function, and the end of each part results from the performance of its +function. + +"_Axiom 7._--Approbation is the standard whereby we judge of the moral +value of actions, and is the universal mark of the due performance of a +function and of the attainment of an end." + + +DEFINITIONS + +"1. Good is the object of moral approbation. The highest good is, +therefore, the ultimate object of such approbation, the end of action. + +"2. Pleasure is that state of consciousness which follows upon the +unimpeded performance (as such) of its function, by one or more of the +parts of our organism." + + +PROPOSITION I + +"The Good is relative to our faculties. For no object can affect us +except through our faculties (Axiom 3); but to be known by us is to +affect us; + +"Therefore, nothing can be known except through our faculties, or (in +other words) except in relation to our faculties; + +"But the Good, or End of Action, is a possible object of knowledge +(Axiom 2); + +"Hence the Good is relative to our faculties. + +"_Corollary 1._--The highest good of man at any time is relative to his +faculties at that time. + +"_Corollary 2._--Since ideas derive their elements from experience, the +idea of perfect Good, or God, can only be an idealization of humanity. + + +PROPOSITION II + +"The Good is a state of Consciousness. For, the Good is a possible +object of knowledge (Axiom 2); but all objects of knowledge are states +of consciousness; + +"Hence the Good is a state of Consciousness. Or, the Good exists (or is +capable of being known) only by affecting our faculties, or, in other +words, only as an affection of our faculties (Proposition I); + +"But an affection of our faculties is a state of consciousness; + +"Hence the Good exists only as a state of consciousness. + +"_Obs._--... To speak of anything existent external to our +consciousness, is, as we saw, a pure hypothesis, incapable of proof, +perfectly unintelligible and void of utility. When, therefore, we make +use of the ordinary dualistic phraseology, we must remember that the two +worlds there distinguished are merely two divisions of the universe of +self considered as distinct for convenience of language, but differing +only as two classes comprehended under a common genus. + + +PROPOSITION III + +"The Good is relative to circumstances. For, the Good is determined by, +and therefore lies in action (Axioms 7, 6, Obs.); but Action is relative +to circumstances (Axiom 5). Hence the Good is relative to circumstances. + + +PROPOSITION IV + +"The Good depends upon the adaptation of faculties to circumstances. + +"For, the Good is identical with the end (Def.); which results from the +performance of function by each part of the organism (Axiom 6). + +"But the function of each part is its adaptation to circumstances +(Axioms 5, 6): Hence the Good depends upon the adaptation of faculties +to circumstances. + +"_Corollary._--Since man is an organism composed of parts (Axiom 6), the +whole good of man is the sum of the goods of his parts, and therefore +depends upon the adaptation of all his parts to their corresponding +circumstances. + + +PROPOSITION V + +"The Good is Pleasure. + +"For the good results from the due performance of functions (Prop. IV); +but the Good is a state of consciousness (Prop. II), therefore the Good +is the state of consciousness which results from the due performance of +functions (as such). Hence (by Definition), the Good is Pleasure. + +"_Obs._--By our definitions of Good and Pleasure it was evident that +they were coëxtensive, being both marks of the same thing; to prove +their identity it was necessary to show that Good is a state of +consciousness." + +Of these propositions Barratt says that I and II are perhaps the most +important, since they assert the impossibility of Transcendentalism. + +_Part Second_ of "Physical Ethics" is a "Verification by Special +Experience." + + +THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL SENSE + +The assumption of a moral sense has already been made in the definition +of Good as the object of Approbation. + +Our previous reasoning would lead us nevertheless to guess that this +sense is not, in its nature, a simple and indecomposable faculty. How, +then, did this sense arise, and what is its nature and composition? + +In the lowest animal organization, there are merely vague and indefinite +states of consciousness corresponding to the undeveloped state of +physical function. With the development and specialization of advancing +evolution arises Perception; by which likeness and unlikeness among +sensations are distinguished, and classification is begun. + +"At first only the most obvious resemblances are noticed, but as +experience progresses, wider and wider classes ever tend to be formed, +till at last we arrive at those highest ideas which are coëxtensive with +experience. These, though the last in order of birth, become the +starting-points of science--just as men formed the idea of stones +falling long before they discovered the law of attraction, yet by that +law they afterwards 'explain' the former fact. Thus we trace the whole +of Perception or Knowledge to this power of comparison and noting +likenesses, and this we see to be coincident with the organization of +consciousness into central meeting-places or ganglia, in which different +sensations are presented to a common tribunal and so compared together. +We see, therefore, that Perception does not originate consciousness; it +only organizes and develops it. We cannot, therefore, agree with Mr. +Herbert Spencer, who will not allow consciousness to the lowest +animals."[63] + +The process of perception or Knowledge works, not only on states of +consciousness themselves, but on the changes from one state to another, +or, in other words, on relations. Thus results, on the one hand, +recognition of objects; on the other, argument and reasoning, for the +most abstruse reasoning is nothing more than a classification of +relations. + +"We have now, therefore, two distinct divisions of Consciousness: +_Sensation_, which as before consists only of pleasure and pain, though +now of different kinds; and _Perception_, which classifies states of +consciousness and their relations, and is therefore concerned only with +change. Knowledge, therefore, has originally no other object than +different pleasures and pains, but eventually it attends so much to the +differences and resemblances that it ceases to remember the pleasure or +pain; in its absorption in the relation it well-nigh forgets the things +related. This process is furthered by the fact that, as the medium gets +more extended, each part of it has less average effect upon the +organism: the primary pleasures and pains being spread over a larger +surface are less intense, and so obtrude themselves less. This is +exemplified by the common observation that sensation and perception tend +to exclude each other.... Nevertheless pleasure and pain ever remain +indissolubly connected with consciousness, though their presence is +often unheeded, and only the more violent forms force themselves on the +attention. + +"What is true of these simple forms of consciousness, is true of their +later development. The relation of sensation to perception is the same +as that between the faculties of which these are respectively the germs, +emotion and intellect. For emotion is associated sensations of pleasure +and pain; and intellect is associated perceptions of change and +relation. Hence by their very nature these are at once mutually +exclusive and inseparable. A strong emotion drives out reason, and much +reasoning chills emotion.... Yet we can give _some_ reason for any +emotion; and we feel some emotion in working a mathematical problem.... +In every intentional act it is evident that both are involved; the end +being given by emotion, the means by reasoning. Reasoning can give no +end, it can only arrange, elicit, suggest; emotion can give no means, +for it cannot classify or observe relations. In the building up, +therefore, of any moral faculty, both these elements must take a part. +Hence it will be well to trace, a little more closely, their mode of +formation, and their connection with muscular activity. + +"When in the course of experience a certain sequence of sensation +frequently recurs, the consciousness becomes habituated to it, and the +return of the first sensation is followed by an idea or associative +image of the others.... Hence the idea of pleasure or pain not actually +felt comes to be associated with objects, which, if placed in certain +different positions, would effect us in the way imagined.... Pleasure +may thus be associated through a train of ideas of any length.... After +a time this process becomes organic, the intermediate terms are lost, +and pleasure is _directly_ connected with sensations and ideas that are +in themselves not distinctly pleasurable. + +"Now by various trains of association, various pleasures and pains are +connected with the same object. These different combinations of +pleasures and pains, some of which arise, before reasoning, by +unintentional association, but the higher of which are the results of +automatization of reasoning, form the different emotions.... + +"Action in its origin is simply the correlative of sensation. +Contractility and irritability are the two general properties of vital +tissue, or rather are two sides of one fundamental property which is +also known under the name of sensibility--the power of contraction under +irritation, or of expressing impressed force. Irritability means merely +the phenomena of consciousness, the development of which we have +hitherto been tracing, though we have been throughout obliged to express +ourselves in the language of the inner, and not of the outer +experience.... This internal development we have already examined; we +must now turn to the obverse external development which takes its origin +in contractility. + +"The connection between these two fundamental properties is exceedingly +intimate, that of ultimate identity or at any rate inseparability. For +not only is contraction universally the result of irritation, but the +only evidence that we have of irritation is the contraction which +follows, and in their early stages the two represent one and the same +process. When, however, the expression, in action, of force impressed +in sensation, becomes indirect and immediate, the name of irritability +is given to the _immediate_, internal results of its impression, while +contractility expresses the action _ultimately_ expressed. Hence the +seat of irritability is preëminently the nervous system, while +contractility, or the _vis musculosa_, is the name of the special +property of the muscular tissue. + +"Considering them however in their origin, they together represent a +certain form of the transmission of force.... Some kinds of impressed +force are followed by movements of retraction and withdrawal, others by +such as secure a continuance of the impression. These two kinds of +contraction are the phenomena and external marks of pain and pleasure +respectively. Hence the tissue acts so as to secure pleasure and avoid +pain by a law as truly physical and natural as that whereby a needle +turns to the pole, or a tree to the light.... Hence, the law of +Self-Conservation, or of the direction of Action, is merely another mode +of expressing the fundamental property of animal tissue, which we have +every reason to believe is derived from the more elementary physical +properties of matter. The course of action is just as dependent on +physical laws as that of a stone which falls to the ground. The belief +in external consciousness makes no difference either way; the earliest +phenomena of such consciousness are those of pleasure and pain, +therefore we can suppose it to exist only as pleasure and pain. In the +one case we say that action aims at, or naturally results in, the +phenomena of pleasure; in the other case that it aims at the actual +consciousness of pleasure. + +"The expression of impressed force, or the connection of action and +sensation, is at first in the unorganized tissue direct and immediate, +without the agency of nervous communication, or to return again to the +ordinary psychological language, is unintentional or involuntary.... The +earliest modification is due to association, whereby secondary +sensations, or (as they are called later when they become perceived) +ideas are produced. These manifest themselves as weaker repetitions of +the primary pleasures and pains, and, therefore, are naturally followed +by like results.... The process is this: the force originally impressed +by the first sensation, instead of being all expressed in action, is +partly induced by habituation into an internal channel, and so +transformed into the kind of force which generally impresses the second +kind of sensation, and this now produces its appropriate action. Hence +part of the original force has undergone two transformations instead of +one; the immediate antecedent of action being the force produced by +association, or in other words, the associated pleasure. This is the +rudiment of _motive_, which, however, is not generally called by that +name till it is _perceived_. The same process may go on through two or +more links of association; the first transformed force being again +transformed internally instead of expressed, and the second again in its +turn, until eventually a transformation is reached which finds its +easiest way of escape in action; the immediate motive power being that +transformation of force, or that associated pleasure, which immediately +precedes the action. Actions of this kind constitute the lower phenomena +of instinct: and we see therefore that they may depend on any number of +links of unperceived, or, as we say, unconscious reasoning; and that +their motive is also 'unconscious.' These actions stand half way between +Reflex and Voluntary Actions.... + +"We now come to the third and last development of associated action. +Here not only is each associated idea perceived, but the change, in each +case, is also a fresh centre of association; whereby similar changes are +connected with it, and it is referred to a class. Hence the whole train +is perceived, not only by the classification of each of its parts with +similar previous sensations, but by the classification of each of its +sequences with previous like sequences: in other words, it is now a +chain of reasoning from the past to the present. That associated +pleasure from which this reasoned train commences is now called the +_motive_ (though really the immediate motive power lies in the last +transformation which directly precedes the active expression) and the +series of ideas intervening between this and the action is called the +_means_. Hence the motive associates the means, and the motive power is +transmitted through them till it is finally expressed in the action +which is appropriate to the attainment of the pleasurable state whose +idea is its source. This association of means with ends is at first +sight opposed to the natural direction, which is from antecedent to +consequent; but when a line of nervous connection is formed, a current +may be transmitted indifferently in either direction. An effect may lead +us to think of its cause, as easily as a cause associates its effect. +By the sequence of action and sensation, a connection is established +between their ideas, which is independent of the order of excitation. +This last kind of action is that which we call voluntary, and the series +of classified ideas and relations which lead to it is called Reasoning. +If at any point the current is attracted in two or more directions by +different trains of association, deliberation is the result; and the +eventual victory of one and the consequent transmission of the force +along it is entitled Will. + +"We have therefore distinguished four kinds of action: _Reflex Action_, +which is purely physical and independent of association, and which is +the last link in all the derived varieties; _Lower Instinctive Action_, +which is caused by the first introduction of association, and is hardly +to be distinguished in its phenomena from the last;... _Higher +Instinctive Action_, which involves perception of qualities or +objects;... and finally, _Voluntary_ or _Intentional Action_, such as we +find it in man.... Though we have separated these classes from each +other for clearness of description, there is no distinct line to be +drawn anywhere between them. Each fades insensibly into the next.... +Evolution, we must remember, does not advance by stages; these are +merely marks that we make ourselves, like the constellations in +astronomy, for convenience of study. + +"Finally, we must remark that the last two kinds of Action ever tend to +relapse into the second, which subjectively is a mere form of the first. +Association of all kinds tends to become organic. By this we mean that, +as the connection becomes more definitely marked and easy, the perpetual +radiation which occurs as the current passes the different points on its +path, disappears; and the whole current passes unimpaired. First, the +radiation caused by the changes disappears, and reasoning becomes +instinct, as in doing a mathematical example from mere memory of the +different steps. Secondly, the radiation from the different nervous +centres also disappears, and the current which ends in action becomes +not only unreasoning but unperceived, as in walking or reading aloud +while thinking of something else.... + +"Long habituation has two effects: it increases the number of trains +connected with each object, and also the length of each. If we suppose +the simpler emotions to have, by this time, become organic or apparently +simple states of consciousness, a continuance of association tends to +connect them together in bundles, as they themselves were originally +bundles of elementary pleasures and pains. Hence the emotions become +organized in their turn so as to form higher emotions, and eventually, +when association has completed its work,... this organization ends in +one supreme emotion, which is the head of the emotional or sensitive +side of the consciousness.... + +"Turning next to the second effect of prolonged habituation, we find +that, with objects or actions with which pleasure was at first +associated and which so were called pleasurable, further association +often connects a subsequent pain which increased experience has shown +always to follow upon the immediate pleasure. This pain often more than +counterbalances the preceding pleasure; hence when it is taken into the +emotion, that emotion becomes one no longer of appetition but of +aversion, and the object or action is remembered as one not to be sought +after but avoided. It cannot, however, be called painful, because it +causes immediate pleasure, so a new name has to be invented, and it is +called Bad, or Evil. Similarly, many things which are immediately +associated with pain are found to be eventually followed by pleasure +which more than counterbalances the pain, and as this experience becomes +consolidated by the power of association, they attract rather than +repel, and for a name whereby to distinguish them, are called Good; so +that Good and Evil are correlative terms like Pleasure and Pain, and +mean respectively the greatest total Pleasure, and the greatest total +Pain. Now this experience when once acquired is never lost, but by +virtue of hereditary transmission descends from parents to children. +But, as in the case of the simpler emotions, only the results survive, +and not the means whereby they were arrived at; so that, in a short +time, the words Good and Evil come to be quite separated from Pleasant +and Painful; nay, as might be expected from their origin, they tend to +acquire exactly opposite meanings; for Pleasure and Pain come to signify +only immediate pleasure and pain; and the final reckoning is often +considerably at variance with the first item; as in a race the man who +leads for the first lap seldom wins in the end.... + +"This, then, is the origin of the Moral Sense.... The Moral Sense, +therefore, is merely one of the emotions," though the last of all in the +order of evolution; it can only claim a life of some two or three +centuries; and there are even some who still doubt its existence. "Man +at any rate is the only animal who possesses it in its latest +development; for even in horses and dogs we cannot believe that it has +passed the intentional or conscious stage.... Good, with them, has no +artificial meaning; it is simply identical with the greatest pleasure." + +Only by complete and perfect obedience to all emotions can perfect +freedom from regret be obtained in the gratification of all desire. Man +is at present passion's slave, because he is so only in part; "for the +cause of repentance is never the attainment of some pleasure, but always +the non-attainment of more: not the satisfaction of one desire, but the +inability to satisfy all. The highest virtue, therefore, consists in +being led, not by one desire, but by all; in the complete organization +of the Moral Nature." + + +OF THE SOCIAL RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL + +When we assert the end of Action to be Pleasure, do we mean the pleasure +of the individual, or universal happiness? "Good has been shown to +follow immediately on the adaptation of an organism to circumstances; it +is evident that external objects can affect it only in so far as they +form part of these circumstances. Hence it follows that the pleasure and +pain of others can come in only incidentally; from the fact that each +man is not an isolated unit, but a member of society. But further, this +social medium itself is, after all, nothing but a part of the individual +affected by it; it is one division of that primary side of his nature, +by which the other side, the emotional, the intellectual, the moral, is +being continually moulded and fashioned; and even if we take the +narrower meaning of self, the pleasures and pains of others cannot +possibly affect a man's actions or emotions except in so far as they +become a part of his. If man aims at pleasure merely by the physical law +of action, that pleasure must evidently be ultimately his own; and +whether it be or be not preceded by phenomena which he calls the +pleasures and pains of others, is a question not of principle but of +detail, just as the force of a pound weight is unaltered whether it be +composed of lead or of feathers, or whether it act directly or through +pulleys. + +"The principle, therefore, is clear enough, that the happiness of others +can have only an indirect influence upon the good of each individual. +But it is equally clear that this direct influence must be of no mean +extent, and that it is now our duty to trace its history." Here follows +a scheme of the development of the state from the family, which last was +necessitated by the helplessness of infancy, and from which arose the +habit of human association. We have no evidence from history or science +that mankind has not always existed in a state of society; there is no +warrant for assuming an earlier condition of isolation. "Hence to the +human race the earliest Good was inseparably bound up with what we now +call the Family Virtues."[64] The state, thus originated, developed as a +social organism, with ever greater integration, heterogeneity, and +complexity of parts, and "the End or Good of each individual became +largely modified by the extension of the medium to which his actions had +to be adapted"; man became a member, not only of the family but of the +state, and the conceptions of his nature and duty became wider, "so that +at last the more perfectly each attains his own interest, and the more +pleasure he gathers to his own store, the more certainly does he secure +the universal happiness of mankind." If a man aims, as Spinoza remarks, +at doing real good to himself, he will be sure to do most good to +others. + + +THE UNSELFISH EMOTIONS + +Under this head is traced the genesis of sympathy through representation +of the pains and pleasures of others and interpretation of them by +individual experience in the same environment; and the genesis of +benevolence, the active side of sympathy, through habit associated with +the ideas of the pleasures and pains of others. Love is defined as +"originally the association of many pleasures with one individual." From +the wider experience of man as a member of a state is developed justice +or the sense of equality of right, patriotism, etc. All these feelings +are hereditary. + + +OF THE RELATION OF MAN TO NATURE + +This portion of the book treats of the gradual development of knowledge +to wider and wider generalization; of the extension of sympathy from man +to the animal world also; of the universality of consciousness, which +exists in the inanimate as well as the animate world; of the perfection +of morality through the perfection of knowledge, since "knowledge moulds +emotion, and absolute virtue is nothing but absolute correspondence with +nature in action resulting from thought"; and of the evolution of +religion, through knowledge, to a religion of knowledge of the real +universe or of humanity. + + +OF THE WILL + +Under this heading the metaphysical doctrine of freedom of the will is +combated as a contradiction of the laws of Cause and Effect. Praise and +blame, reward and punishment, are desirable because of their effect on +action. + + +OF OBLIGATION + +Barratt defines obligation as a "violent motive." Paley says: "If a man +finds the pleasure of sin to exceed the remorse of conscience, of which +he alone is the judge, the moral-instinct man, so far as I can +understand, has nothing more to offer." What, then, asks Barratt, has he +himself to offer if a man finds the pleasure of sin to exceed the pain +entailed by disobedience to the external command? It may, indeed, be the +fact that particular kinds of motive only come from particular sources, +but unless we can prove that those coming from a command are always the +strongest, we cannot claim for them a position such as that implied by +the word obligation, of being the highest or most universal motives. In +a contest between two motives, it is not the kind but the quantity which +decides. For if two pleasures or pains be equal, what does it matter +where they came from? And if they be not equal, the greater, whatever +its source, will always be the stronger motive. + +"Hence obligation is nothing more than a 'violent motive.' Prudence and +duty are both the following of the greatest pleasure; but so far as in +ordinary language we make a distinction between them, the pleasure aimed +at in prudence is proximate and only slightly greater than the pain, +whereas in duty it is not only very considerably greater, but the +greatness is further glorified by a dim aureole of magnificent +generalities and the halo of an unfathomable future.... + +"And as the result of a motive is in no way dependent on its external +source, so neither is it influenced by its mode of internal operation. A +motive may be strong either by its own natural force as a large excess +of associated pleasure in one direction, or by the facility artificially +given to its expression by the long-continued custom, either in +ourselves or in our fathers, of acting in a certain way on certain +occasions. In other words, the strength of a motive is not absolute, it +is relative to the habits and predispositions of our organisms; but the +strongest motive, whatever its kind, prevails in all cases. + +"Obligation is often, again, confounded with compulsion: but submission +to physical force is not morally an act at all, because its [Greek: +archê] or immediate antecedent is external to us, and therefore +independent of our moral laws." + + +OF PLEASURES THAT ARE CALLED BAD + +"We saw that Good differs from Pleasure simply by a widening of the +field of calculation; whereby the pleasure of the moment is often found +to entail future pain greater than itself (allowance being made for +perspective), and is therefore condemned as Bad. When, therefore, we +speak of Pleasure as opposed to Good, we always mean the pleasure of the +moment; or very often by a still further narrowing of the term, sensual +as opposed to intellectual pleasures." + +FOOTNOTES: + +[63] Pp. 39, 40. + +[64] P. 73. + + + + +LESLIE STEPHEN + +"THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS" (1882) + + +While with regard to the matter of Ethics,--the general classifications +of right and wrong conduct,--moralists are almost unanimous, with regard +to its form,--the essence and criterion of right and wrong,--there is +great disagreement. All widely spread opinions deserve respect by their +mere existence; they are phenomena to be accounted for. On the subject +of morals, as on all other subjects, opinions gradually modify and +approach each other; but a perfect agreement will probably not be +arrived at. + +Leaving aside metaphysical questions, however, we may be able to find, +as in physical science, some constants or ultimate elements which, +though they, according to the metaphysician's view, require further +analysis, yet constitute, within their sphere, scientific knowledge +independent of metaphysics. The follower of Hegel means, in all +probability, precisely the same thing as the follower of Hume, when he +says that a mother loves her child; though, when they come to reflect +upon certain ulterior imports of the phrases used, they may come to +different conclusions. The formula remains the same; for all purposes of +conduct it evokes the same impressions, sentiments, and sensible images, +and it therefore represents a stage at which all theories must coincide, +though they start, or profess to start, from the most opposite bases. +"Mothers love their children" is not unconditionally true; some mothers +do not love their children; but the statement is of worth as +approximating scientific truth. It may be well to attempt to ascertain +in how far it may be rendered scientific. + +In the physical sciences, the statements of laws arrived at by the labor +of generations are ideal statements, in which a mass of modifying +circumstances are disregarded for the sake of simplification. Even in +these sciences, the power of prediction is small. Of the complicated +conditions of human action we have even less accurate knowledge than of +those of physical phenomena, though this does not lead us, any more than +in the physical sciences, to suppose that prediction would not be +possible if we knew the conditions. So far as man is a thing or an +animal, it is comparatively easy to determine his conduct. Given a +starving dog and a lump of meat in contact, you can predict the result. +But to determine the behavior of a human being with a glass of water +presented to his lips, you must be able to calculate the action of human +motive and to unravel the tangled skein of thought and feeling in its +variation in the individual under consideration. Moreover, much of the +life of the individual is ruled, not by conscious motive, but by +automatic habit, acquired through education. The prediction of action in +society as a unit is not less difficult than the prediction of +individual action, for if individual differences neutralize each other, +so that a certain uniformity in the influence of circumstances is shown +by statistics, it is not the less difficult to predict what these +uniformities will be. Society as an organism, not a mere aggregate, +presents, in the interaction of more complicated conditions, greater +difficulties than does the individual as such; and it may be said that +prediction of the course of history, even in general terms and for a +brief period, would require an intellect as much superior to that of +Socrates as the intellect of Socrates is superior to that of an ape. + +And yet mankind does possess knowledge of conduct, which does not differ +in kind from scientific knowledge; there is, in fact, but one kind of +knowledge, which passes into scientific knowledge as it becomes more +definite and articulate. The knowledge that mankind possesses consists +in what we have thus far taken for granted, that under the same +circumstances of outward environment and inward character, human conduct +does not change. Of society, as of an organism, we cannot say _a priori_ +that it is so and could not have been otherwise; we can only show, _a +posteriori_, how different parts mutually imply each other, so that, +given the whole, we can see that any particular part could not have been +otherwise. Our gain from such knowledge is the recognition that there +may be discoverable laws of growth essentially relevant to our +investigation of conduct. So long as reasoning was conducted upon the +tacit assumption that social phenomena can be satisfactorily explained +by studying their constituent elements separately, attention was +diverted from the important principles of the interrelation of parts to +the whole. The theory of evolution brings out the fact that every +organism, whether social or individual, represents the product of an +indefinite series of adjustments between it and its environment. Every +race or society is part of a larger system, product of the continuous +play of a number of forces constantly shifting with an effort towards +general equilibrium, so that every permanent property represents, not an +accidental similarity, but a correspondence between the organism and +some permanent conditions of life. To solve the problem of existence by +calculation is an impossibility; but our own lives are working it out; +the evolution of history is the solution of our problem. And when we +fully recognize that a problem is being solved, we have only to gain +some appreciation of its general nature and conditions, in order to +reach some important, though limited, conclusions, which may fairly be +called scientific, as to the meaning of the answer. These conclusions +are not scientific in the sense of giving us quantitative and precise +formulæ, but they may be so far scientific as to be certain and +reliable. + +Thus we may be able to show how a given set of instincts corresponds to +certain permanent conditions under which they were developed, and +(returning to the problem of differing theories of morals with which we +started) to show what is the cause of differing opinions. Our +investigations of the problem of morality have nothing to do, in the +first instance, with moral principles which are, or profess to be, +deduced from pure logic, independent of any particular fact; they deal +with actual moral sentiments as historical facts. The word moral, as +used in our considerations, does not, therefore, refer to an ideal moral +code, but to the one actually existing in the case considered. + +Ethical speculation, as thus understood, must be concerned with +psychological inquiries--inquiries in regions where the vague doctrines +of common sense have not yet crystallized into scientific coherence; we +must therefore proceed with caution. + +The contention between materialist and idealist is irrelevant to our +discussion. The fact that mechanical processes underlie all mental +process does not make the latter the less a fact; nor can the mechanical +statement ever supersede the psychological statement. The proposition +that hunger makes men eat will express truth, whatever material +implications are involved in the statement. + +Conduct is determined by feeling; we fly from pain, we seek pleasure; +life is a continuous struggle to minimize suffering and lay a firm grasp +upon happiness. "Good" means everything that favors happiness, and "bad" +everything that is conducive to misery; nor can any other intelligible +meaning be assigned to the words. The difficulty of proving these +propositions lies in the fact that they are primary doctrines, for proof +of which we must appeal to the direct testimony of consciousness. But +critics oppose, not so much the propositions themselves, as certain +supposed implications. By pain and pleasure is here meant every +conceivable form of agreeable or disagreeable feeling. The assertion +that conduct is determined by pain and pleasure is not meant as a denial +that it is also, in some sense, determined by the reason; but a state of +consciousness which is neither painful or pleasurable cannot be an +object of desire or aversion. The reason is often contrasted with the +feelings in its determination of conduct, the reasonable man being +defined as one who, instead of being the slave of immediate impulse, is +capable of adapting means to ends and following, thus, courses of +conduct not in themselves agreeable but promising a greater total of +happiness. The fact is, however, that all happiness that determines the +will is future; conduct is determined, in every case, not by a future +feeling of pleasure, which, as future, does not yet exist, but by +present feeling. It is therefore more accurate to say that conduct is +determined by the pleasantest judgment than to say that it is determined +by the judgment of what is pleasantest. The intention of the agent is +defined by the foreseen consequences of his conduct; his end is defined +by that part of the foreseen consequences which he actually desires; and +the end defines the motive, that is, the feeling, which actually +determines conduct. The pleasantest end is adopted because the foretaste +of the pleasure is itself pleasurable. The intellect and the emotions +are in reality related as form and substance, and cannot be divided. + +In the action of pain and pleasure, it seems to be an obvious fact that +pain, as pain, represents tension, that is, a state of feeling from +which there is a tendency to change; pleasure represents equilibrium, or +a state in which there is a tendency to persist. The worm writhes on the +hook, and the mind may be said to writhe under a painful emotion in the +effort to writhe into some more tolerable position. In the act of +choice, each mode of action is tried ideally, and the individual settles +into that which is, on the whole, the easiest. The analogy which +naturally offers itself and seems to give the best account of the facts +is the mechanical principle of least resistance. It is not, perhaps, +superfluous to remark that the volition may exercise a very small +influence, even when the limiting conditions are in a great part ideal. +The more painful is not necessarily the less permanent condition. It is +one in which there is an additional chance against permanence. Terror +sets up so disturbed a condition that the mind cannot settle into any +definite course. We can no more alter arbitrarily the circumstances of +our microcosm than those of the external world. It is as difficult to +avoid brooding in vain regret as to evade a physical constraint. + +Reason and feeling are bound together in inseparable unity. But reason, +whatever its nature, is the faculty which enables us to act with a view +to the distant and the future. A great part of conduct is automatic; it +is either not determined by conscious motives, or it is determined by +motives which, though they rise for a moment to the surface of +consciousness, are forgotten as soon as felt. Of our conscious conduct, +again, part may be called instinctive and part reasonable. These modes +of action pass into each other by imperceptible degrees. The instinctive +may be converted into reasoned as the consequences become manifest, and +the reasoned become instinctive as the consequences are left out of +account. So, again, the instinctive action becomes automatic when it is +performed without leaving any trace upon consciousness. It may still be +voluntary in the sense that the agent may be able to refrain from it if +his attention happens to be aroused. Habitual actions pass through all +these gradations. When the reason is called into action, it is not in +virtue of a purely logical operation that it conquers if it does so; it +is in virtue of the fact that it reveals a new set of forces ready to +spring into action to the necessary degree. + +We may be said to feel by signs as well as to reason by signs. The sight +of a red flag may deter us from crossing a rifle range without calling +up to our imagination all the effects of a bullet traversing the body. +If the motive which prompts us to run the risk be strong, it may be +necessary to convert a greater volume of latent, into active emotion; +and as we frequently fail to do this, we often run risks which we should +avoid were the consequences distinctly contemplated. + +The development of the whole nature implies a development of both the +emotional and the intellectual nature; new sensibilities imply new +sentiments; and increased range of thought is associated with an equal +growth in complexity and variety of emotion. The more reasonable being +acts with emotion, but his emotions have more complex and refined +methods. The reasonable man is a better mirror of the world without him, +his conduct shows a better adaptation to ends and a greater logical +consistency in its parts; more harmony of action between the different +instincts. The important question is not solved by these facts. We may +still ask: How is the relation between the different instincts, the +influence exerted by each member of the federation, determined? + +We start with certain fixed relations between our various instincts; and +however these may change afterwards, our character is so far determined +from the start. Again, it is plain that this inherited balance varies +greatly with different peoples and gives rise to different types. In one +man the sensual passions have a greater relative importance than in his +neighbor, and so forth. And the question arises, whether we can +determine which of these types is most reasonable. + +In the construction of the bow, we may suppose that, from rude +beginnings, through discovery of better and better forms as adapted to +ends in view in its construction, a form of bow would finally be reached +which would represent the maximum of efficiency. This bow may be called +the typical bow. As exquisitely adapted to its purpose, it arouses in us +æsthetic satisfaction. Like the bow, every organism represents the +solution of a problem, as well as a set of data for a new problem. As +the bow is felt out, so the animal is always feeling itself out. The +problem which it solves is how to hold its own against the surrounding +pressure and the active competition of innumerable rivals. Though we +cannot apply an _a priori_ method, cannot define the materials of which +men are made or the end which they have to fulfil, we can determine to +some extent their typical excellence. Recognizing the general nature of +the great problem which is being worked out, we can discover what is +implied in some of the results. The process of evolution must be, at +every moment, a process of discovering a maximum of efficiency; though +the conditions are always varying slowly, and an absolute maximum is +inconceivable. At every point of the process, there is a certain +determinate direction along which development must take place. The form +which represents this direction is the typical form, any deviation from +which is a defect. It is conceivable that the highest efficiency in +different departments of conduct may imply consistent conditions. The +greatest philosopher may also be the greatest athlete and the greatest +poet. It is equally clear that there is no necessary connection. What, +then, is the relative value of different kinds of efficiency? A complete +answer to the question might bring out the fact, which seems on other +grounds probable, that it is an advantage to a race to include a great +variety of different types. It is enough, however, to say that, in +speaking of a type, the assertion is not intended, that there is one +special type conformity to which is a condition of efficiency, but that +evolution is always the working out of a problem, the solution of which +implies the attainment of certain general qualities. + +We have changed our point of view from the consideration of pain and +pleasure to that of the conditions of existence. The fact is simply, +that the constants in one problem are variables in the other. Given a +certain character, the agent does what gives him pleasure. But if we ask +how he comes to have that character, the only mode of answering is by +referring to the conditions of existence. His character must be such as +to fit him for the struggle for existence. There must therefore be a +correlation between painful and pernicious actions on the one hand, and +pleasurable and temporal on the other. The useful in the sense of the +pleasure-giving must approximately coincide with the useful in the sense +of the life-preserving. All conduct may be considered as a set of +habits, to each of which there is a corresponding instinct--the word +habit being used to designate any mode of conduct, automatic or +voluntary, which may be brought under a general rule, instinct denoting +all conscious impulses to action, whether including more or less +reasoned choice, and whether innate or acquired. Habits graduate from +the essential processes which constitute life rather than maintain it, +and which are, for the most part, automatic, to the most superficial and +transitory. In order that the proposition "This habit is a bad one" may +have any real meaning, we must assume that the organism can exist +without it. A habit cannot be removed as one takes off a coat, as has +been too often assumed; the whole character of the man is affected by +its removal. + +A capacity is essential if it is essential under normal conditions of +environment. The quality which makes a race survive may not always be a +source of advantage to every individual, or even to the average +individual. Since the animal which is better adapted for continuing its +species will have an advantage in the struggle, even though it may not +be so well adapted for pursuing its own happiness, an instinct grows and +decays not on account of its effects on the individual, but on account +of its effects upon the race. The qualities of the individual and those +of the race mutually imply each other, since the individual can no more +be considered apart from society than the apple can be considered apart +from the tree on which it grows. It remains true, however, that certain +qualities of the apple may vary whilst the relation to the tree remains +approximately the same, as also that the individual may vary in his +qualities to some extent, his relation to society remaining +approximately constant; and qualities thus variable may be regarded as, +in so far, independent of society. + +Social development takes place without corresponding change of +individual organization. We cannot interpret the changes from savage +life arrived at in present civilization, as representing an essential, +great, or corresponding difference in the innate faculties of the +civilized man from those of the savage, but must regard them rather as +representing the accumulation of mental and material wealth. The child, +learning, with the words of his language, their implicit meanings, has +his feelings modified by them, is thus a philosopher and metaphysician +in the cradle by the associations given him, and is educated from +infancy by the necessity of conforming his activities to those of the +surrounding mass. All organization implies uniformities of conduct, and +therefore continuous discipline. Society is an organism in this sense, +not in any mystical sense. It is not an organism with a single centre of +consciousness. + +An organization implies organs; and these are to be found in the various +organizations, political, religious, etc., by which, through a greater +or less division of labor, certain special functions are relegated to +particular associations. We thus have not only to go beyond the +individual and refer to the organs in order to determine the "law" or +form of any instinct developed through the social factor, but we have +also to classify the various social instincts by reference to the +complex structure of society, which implies a distribution into mutually +dependent organs. Moreover, such organs, though primarily directed to a +specific end, acquire a vitality independent of any special end, become +organs discharging a complex function, and imply the existence of a +correspondingly complex set of instincts. We come really to love an +organization because it supplies us with a means of cultivating certain +emotions and of enjoying the society of our fellows; it would be an +entirely inadequate account of the facts if we regarded it simply as the +means of attaining that pleasure which has given the pretext for its +formation. + +The organs of society are not, however, distinct from each other as the +physical organs are distinct; the same individuals may be members of +various organizations. The race is not, in fact, analogous to the higher +organism, which forms a whole separated from all similar wholes, but to +an organism of the lower type, which consists of mutually connected +parts spreading independently in dependence upon external conditions, +and capable of indefinite extension, not of united growth. We may +consider the race, thus, as forming social tissue, rather than +constituting an organism. The tissue is built up of men, as the tissue +of physiology is said to be built up of cells. The laws of growth and +vitality of the organs of society are always relative to the underlying +properties of the tissue; although, in particular cases, the more +civilized race may be supplanted by the less civilized, we may assume +that these accidental and contingent advantages will be eliminated on +the average, and the general tendency will be to the predominance of +those races which have intrinsically the strongest tissue. Not the state +as such, and (as we have seen) not the individual, is the unit of +evolution; the state may develop when the external pressure is little or +nothing; the social tissue is that primary unit upon which the process +of social evolution impinges. The family is not, itself, a mode of +organization coördinate with other social organs, but rather represents +the immediate and primitive relation which holds men together. It is +quite possible to suppose men living together without any political and +social organization; but some association between the sexes, however +temporary and casual, and some protection of infants by parents, are +absolutely necessary to the continuance of the race beyond a single +generation. A change in family associations implies a corresponding +change of vast importance in the intimate structure of society itself, +in the social tissue. The state may make a marriage law, but it cannot +create or modify the family tie beyond certain narrow limits. It can +bestow privileges upon some one kind of association, but it cannot +originate it, cannot enforce fidelity and chastity. + +The social tissue is its own end, or depends upon the whole system of +instincts possessed by man as a social and rational creature. + +The development of society as an organic structure implies the +development of customs in the race, and habits in the individuals +forming it. There must be certain rules of conduct which are observed by +all, in order that corresponding rules may be observed by each. + +Custom in the civilized society may be distinguished from positive law. +In primitive states, the distinction is imperceptible. The authority of +law itself must rest upon custom,--the custom of obedience. But physical +force alone, or the dread of its application, cannot produce obedience; +the application of such force is so little essential that a state of +society is conceivable, in which it should disappear altogether; men +might be willing to obey their rulers simply from respect and affection. +The power of applying coercion in case of need must no doubt increase as +the strength of the social bond increases; but that bond is also the +stronger, in proportion as the need of applying it becomes less. The +whole social structure, then, must rest, in the last resort, upon the +existence of certain organic customs, which cannot be explained from +without. They depend, for their force and vitality, upon the instincts +of the individual as modified by the social factor; they correspond to a +given state of the social tissue. A legal sanction may be added to any +custom whatever, and thus it may seem that a state can make its own +constitution and define its own organic laws; in reality, however, the +power of making a certain constitution presupposes a readiness to act +together and accept certain rules as binding, and thus implies a whole +set of established customs, essential to the life of the society and +giving rise to special types of character in its members. Every law of +conduct more or less affects the character of the persons subject to it, +so long as it is enforced; and necessarily, every variation in the +character more or less affects the sentiments from which the external +law derives its force. The correspondence, however, is not so intimate +that one mode of statement can always be rendered into the other. For +laws, indeed elaborate codes, are developed without seriously affecting +the general character of the underlying customs, and in the same way +instincts may vary widely without producing any normal change in the +external order, though they affect the mode in which it works. The +essence of any law is in the mutual pressure of the different parts of +the social structure. Any association with a given end will have laws +determined with reference to that end. When we pass, however, from the +organ to the tissue, we still have an organic structure with certain +rules of conduct and corresponding instincts, but we no longer have a +definite end or a fixed material. The material, that is, is to be +regarded as developing and determining the development of the subsidiary +organs. And since the most efficient society normally survives, we may +inversely infer from the survival of a society that it has developed the +properties on which its efficiency depends. The actual laws existing at +any period may not represent the greatest degree of efficiency possible; +but they must be an approximate statement of the essential conditions. + +The moral law, as applicable to all members of a society, defines some +of the most important qualities of the social tissue. It is as +independent of the legislature as are the movements of the planets. This +is true whether you resolve morality into reason or make it dependent +upon utility. The action of any set of people can no more change the +nature of facts than that of logical necessities. This is, however, +fully true only of morality as it ought to be in correspondence with +facts. Actual morality corresponds to men's theories about facts, and it +may, therefore, deviate from what the code would be if they were +incapable of error. But it is plain that, though it varies, it must vary +within incomparably narrower limits than other systems of law, because +its variation is determined by far more general conditions; it maintains +itself, so to speak, by the direct action of the organic instincts. The +doctrines of the greatest moral teacher, though somewhat in advance of +prevailing standards, are successful only in proportion as they are +congenial to existing sentiments, give articulate shape to thoughts +already obscurely present in the social medium. Like Socrates, the +reformer must be something of a midwife. Morality grows, and is not +made; that is, it is the fruit of a gradual evolution of the organic +instinct continued through many generations. The ordinary mind resists +any change in principles instilled into it from birth; the great masses +are sluggish in movement. + +The moral law has to be expressed in the form: "Be this," not "Do this." +The existence of a character such that variations of circumstances will +cause no deviation from morality is the only security for morals. The +legislator is forced to classify conduct by its objective +manifestations. But the cunning of the man who desires to evade the code +can still devise innumerable methods of accomplishing his end +indirectly. Law permits what it does not prohibit, and is, therefore, in +danger of producing hypocrisy instead of virtue. + +The process by which the moral law (or rather, the law of conduct which +includes, but is not coincident with the moral law) is developed, is a +process of generalization. It corresponds to a vast induction carried on +by the race as organized in society. Beginning with modes of conduct +which are seen to be bad, society gradually perceives that the ultimate +principle of classification must be by the primary feelings, that rules +of conduct must be expressed in terms of character, and other rules +which concern the application of these to more special cases must take a +subordinate position and be regarded as only of conditional value. All +these rules must necessarily correspond, within very narrow limits, to a +statement of the conditions of vitality of the tissue which they +characterize. In an ideal state of society, every general principle +would also be recognized in every particular rule. This is a result a +gradual approximation to which, rather than its actual attainment, must +be anticipated. + +Morality implies action for the good of others in some sense. Society +may be regarded both as an aggregate and as an organism. There are +certain qualities which we may suppose to vary in the individual without +necessarily involving a change in the social structure. How is the +general rule, as distinguished from other rules, deduced from the +general principle of social vitality? + +The law of nature has but one precept, "Be strong." But when we regard +the individual in his relations to society, the law takes on different +forms. This may be expressed by saying that the law "Be strong," has two +main branches, "Be prudent" and "Be virtuous," the first applying to +cases in which the individual is primarily affected, the other to those +in which the units are affected through society and the social factor +must be taken into account. + +To find a classification of the virtues that will not run into infinite +detail or be a simple affirmation of the general principle, the internal +development of moral character under its emotional and intellectual +aspects may furnish a sufficient method. The general formula of primary +individual virtues is: "Be strong." The condition of vitality of the +individual as a complex of instincts, is expressed by the formula: "Be +temperate." And the class of virtues referring to the conditions of +intellectual efficiency, has the general rule: "Be truthful." + +_Ceteris paribus_, an increase of individual energy is an advantage to +society; and, as a matter of fact, we find that civilized society +differs conspicuously from the ruder in stimulating more vigorously and +systematically the various energies of its members. The most conspicuous +virtue of this class is the virtue of courage. In more primitive +conditions, courage, as necessary to the preservation of society, is +regarded as a virtue in itself; later, some mixture of judgment and +reason is required in its exercise; and finally, since it may be +combined with other anti-social qualities, it is not approved in the +same manner as the more directly social virtues. Courage is now regarded +merely as one manifestation of a character which is fitted for all the +requirements of social existence. + +The courage of the bulldog is blind instinct. Where such an instinct +exists, the animal survives by reason of it, not because he forms any +conscious judgment of its advantages. It seems necessary to suppose that +races owed their survival to military prowess when reflection was still +in the most rudimentary stage. The utility of courage must have been a +very obvious discovery as soon as reflection became possible; but the +quality must have existed, in some degree, before it could be +discovered, although the existence of a distinct moral sentiment +doubtless implies some reflection. Moreover, the instincts which imply a +perception of utility must themselves comply with the conditions of +existence, must themselves be useful. Increased intelligence might act +to the disadvantage of the race by increasing selfish cowardice through +a keener perception of personal, as distinct from social, risk; but this +cannot be true ultimately, since we perceive that intelligent races have +an advantage; we may suppose that those races are most successful in +which a perception of the vitality of courage goes along with an +increase of courage. This principle must be regarded, therefore, as +working, not only through the less conscious instinct of the lower +races, but also upon the judgments of a highly civilized society. The +like is true, _mutatis mutandis_, of other qualities (such as industry, +energy, and so forth) which belong to the same class. + +The estimate of courage differs with respect to the two sexes, as does +also that of chastity. The historical explanation is simple; courage was +necessary in men in early social stages, to race-preservation; to women, +on the other hand, has been given, from early times, a class of social +functions not requiring courage. The estimate, once fixed, survives even +when some of its early conditions disappear. The savage acquired his +wife by knocking her down; to him the ideal feminine character must +have included readiness to be knocked down, or at least unreadiness to +strike again; and, as some of the forms of marriage recall the early +system, so in the sentiments with which it is regarded there may still +linger something of the early instinct associated with striking and +being struck. + +The virtues of chastity and temperance occupy an intermediate position +between the virtues of strength and the directly social virtues. Some of +them are a part of the prudential, and others of the directly moral +code. Temperance is primarily prudential, but the sexual and parental +instincts concern the most intimate structure of society. Our +instinctive classification of temperance as higher than courage has good +reason; the classification of it as a personal virtue cannot be +maintained. A man whose vice injures only himself in the first place, +becomes incapable of benefiting others. As we condemn the man whose +character is bad, whether external circumstances do, or do not, give him +an opportunity of displaying it, so we object logically to the man who +is destroying his social qualities, whether the immediate effect of his +conduct tells upon himself or upon others. Another element, an +instinctive disgust at sensuality, seems to precede judgment upon +intemperance, with a strength not to be accounted for by a mere summing +up of consequences. The human hog revolts us as the smell of the sty +turns our stomach. The justification of the instinct is not that it +implies a judgment of what is useful, but rather that it is a useful +judgment. As men become more intellectual, sympathetic, and so forth, +they gain fresh sensibilities, which are not simple judgments of +consequences but as direct, imperative, and substantial, as any of the +primitive sensibilities. To get rid of the sensibility you must lower +the whole tone of the character. Asceticism, which has arisen chiefly at +times of great indulgence, may have been of use if only as a +demonstration of the possibility of conquering the prevailing passions. +In a similar manner, we may think a great reformer, a Howard for +example, admirable, though he neglects duties which must be performed in +the ordinary case. We thus admit that the general moral code of +benevolence prescribes different conduct according to a man's +opportunities and talents. + +Truth is a virtue of slow growth; the savage, like the child, is unable +to distinguish clearly the difference between imagination, hypothesis, +and historical statement. The perception of the utility of truth first +takes the external form: "Lie not," which corresponds approximately but +not perfectly to the internal rule: "Be trustworthy." The internal rule, +as such, is the higher; the external may have exceptions. + +We come, at last, to the directly social virtues of justice and +benevolence. So far as truth and temperance are strictly virtuous, they +may be classed, the one under justice, the other under benevolence. +There is no real conflict between justice and benevolence; so far as a +man is really benevolent, he will not wish to benefit some to the injury +of others. Justice seems to consist in the application to conduct of the +principle of sufficient reason. + +It is not safe to infer altruistic intention merely from altruistic +consequences. The sexual appetite appears to be the most selfish of +impulses, in that it prompts to conduct often ruinous to its objects. On +the other hand, it is the root of all social virtues. We cannot be sure +that the hen who covers her chicks regards them as more than comfortable +furniture in the nest. Altruism begins with the capability of benevolent +intention; where the conferring of pleasure upon others becomes a +possible motive. The generation of pleasure in others' happiness has +been traced to association; but, though the pleasant association +doubtless prepares the way for the higher sentiment, the latter is +something more. + +It is true that all conduct is egoistic, in the sense that all conduct +has its source in the pain and pleasure of the doer; but there is great +difference between conduct that regards human beings as mere means to +personal pleasure and that which takes into account their feelings as +sentient beings. Sympathy springs from the primary intellectual power of +representation. I cannot properly know a man without knowledge of his +thoughts and feelings. Cruelty is, in many cases, simple insensibility, +incapacity for projecting ourselves into the position of other beings. +We may desire the pain of others when it is useful as a deterrent, or +secures our own safety; yet to think about other beings is, in general, +to stimulate our sympathies, our sensibility being thus quickened by the +same power which implies intellectual progress. + +To believe in the existence of sentient beings is to take into account +their feelings, to believe that they have feelings, which may persist +when I am not aware of them. A real belief, again, implies that, at the +moment of belief, I have representative sensations or emotions +corresponding to those which imply the actual presence of the object. To +take sentience into account is to sympathize, to feel with. The only +condition necessary for the sympathy to exist, and to be capable, +therefore, of becoming a motive, is that I should really believe in the +object, and hence have representative feelings. Systematically to ignore +these relations is to act as I should act if I were an egoist in the +extremest sense and held that there were no consciousness in the world +except my own. But really to carry out this principle is to be an idiot; +for an essential part of the world as interesting to me is constituted +by the feelings of other conscious agents, and I can ignore their +existence only at the cost of losing all the intelligence which +distinguishes me from the lower animals. It is true that this vicarious +sympathy, this pain at another's pain, may result in our simply getting +rid of our own pain by going away from the sufferer, removing him, or +dismissing him from our mind; as a fact, these methods are often +pursued. But in many cases, such a course is impossible without the +renunciation, at the same time, of many pleasures. If a man is to live +with his friends, he must share their joys and sorrows; the choice is +not between a particular pain and its absence, but involves the whole +question of the renunciation of companionship. Emotions are inevitable, +whether sympathetic or not, in proportion, not simply to the pain and +pleasure at the moment, but to the intensity and degree in which they +form part of the world of the individual,--the world constituted, not by +mere sensations, but by the whole system of thoughts and emotions +sustained by the framework of perception. The existence of pure +malignity must, it is true, be admitted; it may be partly explained as +love of the "sensational," the novel; the full explanation must be left +to the psychologist. Sympathy is the natural and fundamental fact. If +intellectual progress carried with it inferior sociability, it would +tend to be eliminated; the world would be to the stupid; it must carry +with it something which counterbalances the anti-social tendency. Reason +is that which enables a human being to take account of future, as well +as present pleasures. The working of the instincts or feelings, which +dictates conduct, approximately coincides with the prevision as to the +maximum of happiness obtainable by the agent; normally, it is prudent +to be virtuous; and the sympathetic motives, so to speak, always develop +within the framework provided by the other motives. To become reasonable +is to act on general principles, and to act consistently; and this +includes the condition that a statement of the real cause of my action +should equally assign the reason of my action. The law which my feelings +actually follow must coincide with the principle which commends itself +to my reason. In order, then, that a being provided with the social +instincts should act reasonably it is necessary that he should take that +course of conduct which gives the greatest chances of happiness to the +organization of which he forms a part. As the pain or pleasure in +another's pain or pleasure is direct, so the end willed is willed as +pleasurable to the subject, and the statement that altruism involves the +contradiction of aiming at something else than the real end--the +pleasure of the subject--in order to secure that end, is erroneous. The +fact probably is that the mind "flickers," taking into consideration +various consistent and mutually dependent ends, some of which may be +primarily egoistic, some altruistic. The physician is not benevolent +enough to cure me unless he expects a fee; but he may act also out of +sympathy; he need not be always thinking of his fee. Our sympathies +would be stifled, if it were not for the coöperation of motives of a +different kind. + +Altruism is the faculty essentially necessary to moral conduct; but the +altruistic sentiment is not to be identified with morality. The +elementary sympathy must be regulated and disciplined, in order that it +may give rise to true morality. Virtues, for instance, which belong to +the type of truthfulness and justice, generally imply a severe restraint +of the immediate sympathetic impulses. + +We recognize the internal motive as desirable, and recognize a +difference between the man who acts only from prudential motives and the +one who acts from moral motives. We consider the latter meritorious, +that is, that he has a certain claim upon society, inasmuch as he has +done for nothing what another man will only do for pay, or has refrained +from action from which a less moral man can be restrained only by +coercion. Wherever society finds sacrifice of the individual necessary, +it pays for it in terms of merit. Merit is the value put upon virtue; it +is a function of the social forces, by which our characters are moulded. + +Every character is developed under circumstances, and depends upon +mutual adjustment with these; we cannot disentangle the two factors. +Upon the power to infer future action the science of Ethics depends. The +action of the individual is not a matter of chance; in this sense it is +caused. But the instinct from which the action springs is not something +external to the man, which moves him; there is not the man plus the +instinct; the whole man, including the instinct, acts in a certain way, +in which he would not act if he did not possess the instinct. We are +accustomed to say that a man has inherited certain qualities; but the +man is not one thing and the inherited qualities another; the whole man +is inherited. Merit implies effort. This does not mean that effort, +taken absolutely, is the measure of merit. Such an assumption would lead +to our excusing men for the very qualities that make them wicked,--the +murderer because of his spiteful disposition, for instance. The man is +most meritorious who is virtuous with the least effort--provided always +that he has the normal passions of a man. By these, however, since they +are morally neutral, he is accessible to temptation and to a certain +struggle. + +Conscience appears, historically, as a development of simpler instincts; +it is not a primary or a separate faculty; material morality makes its +appearance long before the conscious recognition of a moral law. The +existence of conscience is undeniable. Yet moralists are much given to +exaggerate the sorrow which it actually excites. In almost every case, +the pain which we feel for a bad act is complex, and due only in part to +our conviction that we have broken the moral law. If we regard +conscience as a separate faculty judging of action by some inherent +power, we have to attribute to it reason and feeling. It is not a +primary attribute of the agent (to borrow Spinoza's language), but a +mode of the attributes. + +There is, indeed, a sensibility which seems to have as good a claim as +any to be regarded as elementary, and which is clearly concerned in most +of our moral judgments: the sense of shame. This is excited by the +consciousness of the judgment of others. It operates, however, not only +in cases of a breach of morality; but often more strongly even in cases +not concerned directly with morality; and may even operate against the +moral code. But the variation is clearly not indefinite. Social +development implies the development of a certain type of character, +which includes, as essential, certain moral qualities; the +consciousness of the code and of the condemnation of certain classes of +acts, which it would cause, is implied in the sense of shame. The sense +is closely connected with the instinctive disgust before noticed. It +seems to have especial reference to decency and indecency. The value of +the sense of decency cannot be measured by a consideration of a +particular set of bad consequences from indecent actions other than the +shock to decency; we must consider the whole difference between a state +of society which does, and one which does not, possess it; it is an +essential symptom of refinement and delicacy. Again, the judgments of +conscience may be compared to æsthetic judgments. The difference between +the æsthetic and other pleasures depends upon the form of gratification, +not upon the instincts gratified, and seems to correspond to the +difference between work and play. The artist may appeal to our moral +emotions, giving us imaginary ideals; but emotion at the contemplation +of such types is in the æsthetic phase when we simply enjoy their +contemplation, and it passes into the practical phase as soon as it +begins to have a definite relation to the conduct of our lives. Only in +so far as the moral law has become internal, is the delight in heroic or +benevolent energy spontaneous; in so far, we may speak of the existence +of a moral, as of an æsthetic, sense. A man of fine moral sensibility +may, indeed, like the artist, perceive finer moral discords than can be +measured by formulæ; and may thus supply a more delicate test. But the +complex problem of a difference in moral judgment may yet be solved +approximately by reference to the test of social welfare; the highest +type is that which is best fitted for the conditions of social welfare. +The collective experience of the race is always progressing towards a +more accurate solution of the problem. + +The utilitarian theory, which makes happiness the criterion of morals, +coincides approximately with the evolutionist theory which makes health +of the society the criterion; for, as we have seen, health and happiness +approximately coincide. The utilitarian theory fails, however, in one or +two respects. It gets rid, as much as possible, of _a priori_ truths, +and rejects intuitions; it bases its argument on the assumption that all +knowledge is empirical and the ethical problem to be solved by a summing +up of the consequences of action. It thus neglects the truth which is +implied by evolution,--that the organism itself is solving the problem; +it neglects the instinctive sense generated by social evolution. +Moreover, it considers society as an aggregate of similar individuals, +taking little account of the variability of human desire. And, further, +the utilitarian theory lays its stress upon morality as extrinsic; +according to it, love of morality for its own sake, as love of the means +to the end, must be as unreasonable as the miser's love for his gold. +Association, in this sense, means illusion; and the more reasonable we +become, the more we should deliver ourselves from the bondage of such +errors; the theory fails just at the point where true morality begins. +Furthermore, in substituting the external rule: "Do this," for "Be +this," it seems to fall into the error of expediency. Though lying is +assumed to be, on the whole, detrimental to happiness, truth is +maintained to be desirable only where it contributes to happiness. The +utilitarian destroys, to some extent, the force of the objection to this +by asserting the danger of trusting ourselves. The force of this +objection is only seen, however, when it is applied, not to the +external, but to the internal code; we instinctively feel the danger to +character in the lie, and hesitate to trust human nature in the +establishment of such a precedent, just as we object to permitting the +taking of life even in cases where prolonged life means prolonged +misery, because we cannot trust human nature with the decision as to +life and death. We make binding laws of morality, and leave it to the +man of exceptional qualities to break them; for the generality of +mankind, the stricter code is safer. + +What is the sanction of morality? Why should a man be virtuous? The +answer depends upon the answer to the previous question: What is it to +be virtuous? If, for example, virtue means all such conduct as promotes +happiness, the motives to virtuous conduct must be all such motives as +impel a man to aim at increasing the sum of happiness. These motives +constitute the sanction, and the sanction may be defined either as an +intrinsic, or as an extrinsic, sanction; that is, it may be argued +either that virtuous conduct leads to consequences which are desirable +to every man, whether he be or be not virtuous; or, on the other hand, +that virtuous conduct as such, and irrespectively of any future +consequences, makes the agent happier. The problem is, thus, to find a +scientific basis for the art of conduct. The "sanction" must supply the +motive power by which individuals are to be made virtuous. This is, for +the practical moralist, the culminating point of all ethical inquiry. +Now there is, by our theory, a necessary and immediate relation between +social vitality and morality. But it does not follow that there is the +same intimate connection in the individual case. The sacrifice of some +of its members may be essential to the welfare of the society itself. + +We have, then, to answer three questions: first, whether the virtuous +man, as such, is happier than the vicious; second, whether it is worth +while, on prudential grounds, for the vicious man to acquire the +virtuous character; and third, whether it can be worth while, in the +same sense, for the vicious man to observe the moral law. + +If any man outside the pulpit were to ask himself what were the main +conditions of happiness, the answer would certainly include health as +the first, most essential, most sufficient condition. But the whole +process of nature, upon the evolutionist doctrine, implies a correlation +between the painful and the pernicious, and thus the elaboration of +types in which this problem is solved by an ever-increasing efficiency +and complexity of organization. Hence we may infer that the typical or +ideal character, at any given stage of development, the organization +which, as we may say, represents the true line of advance, corresponds +to a maximum of vitality. It seems, again, that this typical form, as +the healthiest, must represent not only the strongest type--that is, the +type most capable of resisting unfavorable influences--but also the +happiest type; for every deviation from it affords a strong presumption, +not merely of liability to the destructive processes which are +distinctly morbid, but also to a diminished efficiency under normal +conditions. However, the typical man, though he is, on this theory, the +virtuous man, is also much more than is generally understood by that +name. Happiness is the reward offered, not for virtue alone, but for +conformity to the law of nature, "Be strong." Beauty, strength, +intellectual vigor, æsthetic sensibility, prudence, industry, and so +forth, are all implied in the best type, and are, so far, conducive to +happiness. If virtue be taken in the narrower sense as implying chiefly +the negative quality of habitual abstinence from forbidden actions, +there is no reason to suppose that it coincides with happiness. You can +raise a presumption that moral excellence coincides closely with a happy +nature only when you extend "moral" to include all admirable qualities. +It is chiefly practical reasons which cause an attempted evasion of this +conclusion; the practical moralist holds that the non-social qualities +may be left to take care of themselves, but that stress must be laid +upon the social qualities as the more important, in order to obtain them +in society. + +Sympathetic motives may lead to self-sacrifice; but this is also true of +selfish motives; gin is a more potent source of imprudence, even in a +moderate sense, than family affection; and the sympathetic motives have +on their side the far greater intrinsic advantage, that they promote +ends more permanent, far richer in interest, and giving a proper +employment to all the faculties of our nature, besides the intrinsic +advantages that spring from friendly relations with the society of which +we form a part. It is, however, true that higher activity of any sort +may cause pain in an uncongenial medium, and that, hence, the man who is +morally in advance of his age may suffer through his morality; every +reformer who breaks with the world, though for the world's good, must +expect much pain. "Be good if you would be happy," seems to be the +verdict even of worldly prudence; but it adds in an emphatic aside, "Be +not too good." We must acknowledge that excessive virtue cannot be +recommended to the selfish person upon grounds intelligible to him. +There is, however, a general advantage in possessing more varied +possibilities of enjoyment, and in being on the side of the strongest +forces, those of progress. + +Extreme self-sacrifice is sometimes demanded of a man by his moral +principles. Is the sacrifice worth making? Would Regulus have suffered, +from remorse, pain worse than death, had he chosen life at the cost of +honor, or would he have found, as many do, that remorse is amongst the +passions most easily lived down? To these questions can only be answered +that morality must often involve pain, but that the virtuous man +nevertheless chooses it. + +We must thus conclude, leaving one great difficulty unsolved; and this +is because this difficulty is intrinsically insoluble; there is no +absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness. The scientific +moralist has to do with facts; beyond these he cannot go. From the +scientific point of view, we may hold that evolution implies progress, +and that progress implies a solution of many discords and an extirpation +of many evils; but there is no reason for supposing that all evil will +be extirpated and perfect harmony attained. New sensibilities bring with +them new dangers; even sympathy, when not guided by knowledge, may lead +to rash changes productive of evil as well as good. To improve, whether +for the race or the individual, whether in knowledge or in sympathy, is +to be put in a position where a new set of experiments has to be tried, +and experience to be bought at the price of pain. + +It is true that beyond the science lies the art; we must incite the +intrinsic motives to good through the pressure of the social factor. A +certain disadvantage to the individual cannot form a reason for our not +endeavoring to make him moral as far as possible; the good of society as +a whole is involved; and even the man who is himself immoral sees the +advantage of living in a moral medium, and would prefer that the world +at large should not be guided by his own principles. + + + + +B. CARNERI + + +Carneri begins his book on "Morality and Darwinism" ("Sittlichkeit und +Darwinismus," 1871), with the rejection of the older Spiritualism in +favor of Idealism, on the ground that modern investigation has made it +impossible for philosophy to assume any foundation but one sanctioned by +science; and with a rejection of dualism in favor of monism, on the +ground that the investigations of Wundt and others have shown the +psychical and the physical to be identical. + +Instinct is defined by Carneri as thought upon the standpoint of mere +sensation, but following the laws of the same logic as governs conscious +thought. There is, thus, according to his view, no exception to be taken +to the conception which represents instinct as the action of mental +force, the difference between it and human reason as one of degree only. +It is nevertheless a confusion which ascribes reason to the animals. +Even their intelligence is one-sided, since it does not reach +self-consciousness, and it is not to be regarded as an unqualified +improvement upon instinct, since the latter loses both in intensity and +in certainty of action when it no longer governs undisturbed by other +influences: only such animals as are endowed with intelligence +ever eat of injurious food. In human beings instinct has almost +disappeared;--almost, we say, since savages do many things in an +instinctive manner, and even civilized men at times perform acts which, +on account of the exceeding rapidity of their execution, cannot be +regarded as the results of reflection. Instinct may be compared to +polarity in magnetism, according to which opposites are attracted. +Instinct was evolved by natural selection. But intelligence and judgment +are doubtless also to be found even far down in the scale of species. +The brute consciousness is, nevertheless, only a transition-stage, in +which the individual is still lost in the species; and, as such, it is +not to be confused with human reason. Consciousness in the brutes is +purely subjective, a consciousness "für sich"; while in human beings it +is consciousness "an und für sich," consciousness that becomes +subject-object through the concepts developed by language. + +Man is as unconditionally subject to the law of causality, psychically +and physically, as the merest atom. There is no such thing as chance; +but in this very fact lies a consolation. In the concept of +individualization in its broadest sense, is included the conception of +freedom, and in the very nature of man there is an indestructible +impulse to freedom; his being, as self-conscious, is identical with the +latter impulse. This increases with increasing civilization, and has +finally become the problem by the solution of which alone man can attain +to self-satisfaction. It is true that the power of choice is +inconsistent with the law of causality; but in the manner in which the +man, as a thinking being, takes his stand over against the species, he +becomes a person, an individuality. As one of the species, he shares the +characteristics of the species, is an expression of the species-idea, +and his action is determined outwardly by things; but it is so +determined only mediately by means of thought, of concepts; these are +the immediate determinants. Hence, man's relation to things is a +different one according to the grade of his knowledge. In so far as this +is adequate, that is, corresponds to the truth of actuality, his +relation is an active one; in so far as it is, on the contrary, +inadequate, the relation is a passive one. + +Character is inborn and can never be effaced but only clarified, though +this least through the bitter experience of the results of action. As +the horse loses his sure-footedness after one fall, and falls again more +easily, so we lose, through many a deed, the motive furnished by the +consciousness of never having committed it, and have a greater tendency +to repeat it. If an act has bad results, it is more likely that an +attempt to avoid these results by cunning will be made at later +opportunities for the act, than that the act itself will be avoided. +And even if it were to be avoided, such avoidance would not constitute +an improvement of the character; the latter would but hide itself under +a mask to reappear at the first prospect of exemption from punishment. +That which alone can modify character is a considerable extension of +knowledge. For, since all things influence us only in proportion to the +worth we attribute to them, their power over us must differ according to +the correctness or incorrectness of our judgment. Therefore, the more we +regard things in the light of their actual worth and hence also in their +relations to each other, the more our character, beholding in these +relations the general as the true, will incline to avoid extremes in +action. A preponderantly sensual character remains such through life; +but there is no doubt that a careful education, which makes it +acquainted with nobler principles and develops a sensibility to true +beauty, may ennoble it; while, if the education is, on the contrary, +neglected, it must sink deeper and deeper into the mire of coarseness +and vulgarity. + +Character is the sum of its "affections," that is, of all +states and motions of the disposition. These are divisible into +"passions,"--included under selfishness, which is the general, +all-embracing passion,--and the active conditions of existence. These +two divisions are also identical with pain and pleasure, passion with +pain, and activity with pleasure. All desires have their root in the +primary instinct of self-preservation and self-propagation, the instinct +of self-propagation being only the racial form of the instinct of +self-preservation. The instinct of self-propagation is the highest of +all the passions, yet, as Spinoza says, every form of love which +recognizes another cause than mental freedom is easily turned to +hate,--if it is not already a sort of madness, nourished rather by +discord than concord. The various forms of family love, the love of +country, and friendship, noble sisters of love in the narrower sense, +result in desirable activity only as they exist in the form of concepts. +Civilization is nothing but the struggle of inadequate and adequate +concepts, in which, as in the struggle for existence in nature, only +that is triumphant which, instead of assuming a position of separation, +makes the general and the conditions of existence its own; so that +charity in the widest sense of the term is, of all humane feelings, that +to which the palm has been given. In this feeling, the dialectic +movement of the concept "man" is completed and perfected, the single +man, instead of perishing in the struggle of all against all, first +working his way upward out of his species and then taking up, in his own +being, the whole of mankind through the medium of benevolence. By this +evolution he raises himself to the level of the general. Far higher than +that confused sympathy which, in lending temporary aid to one, brings +lasting harm to many, is this adequate concept; true benevolence is +founded upon the clearest reasoning, and is the activity of the mind's +fullest power. The discord which self-consciousness has caused in man +can be done away with only by the greatest possible clarification of +self-consciousness: man returns mentally to the bosom of the universal, +when every living thing causes him to exclaim in the words of the Indian +philosopher: "Behold thyself." + +Ethics ranks higher than morals, the latter merely comprising a +collection of particular rules of conduct which, as particular, bear the +stamp of the individual, the non-universal. The details of morality +change according to epochs and peoples. This change has been regarded as +an argument that there is no absolute but only relative good. But the +concept of the Good is, like the concept of the Beautiful, the fruit of +education; that is, it is the product of mind, which, through its own +evolution, arrives at Knowledge. When we do away with all concessions to +one-sided, extravagant desires, abstain from placing mind above the +universal law of causality, and are content with the facts made known to +us by science, we perceive that the absolute True, Beautiful, and Good, +bears the character of the Universal. In this universal character it has +always finally found expression in human life, and in this character it +will always find expression. The idea which reaches perfect expression +in the dialectic movement of these three concepts, the True, the +Beautiful, and the Good, has come into existence by the mediation of the +self-individualizing self-consciousness, just as the evolution on the +earth, which reaches its completion in man, is the outcome of the first +chemical process. Not only have the two one law,--(mind is only in so +far realized[65] as nature is expressed through it, and the actuality of +nature is its expression in mind) but both are, in fact, one, the +succession in their development on the earth being a succession only in +relation to the earth, and for us in this respect. Although to our +notion of time, thousands of millions of years lie between the two, +their separation does not represent a second for the universe and its +eternity, for the comprehension of which it must be disregarded. + +The good man is he who does good for its own sake, without effort, not +out of momentary caprice, but out of perfect knowledge and conviction. +He is free, since he acts out of his own character, the law of nature +appearing as the law of his own mind; freedom lies in the absence of +discord and strife in the mind. The good man has strength of soul, just +as the man who lifts a weight without effort, not he who lifts it only +with the greatest effort, possesses strength of body. + +There is no absolute Evil in contrast to the absolute Good. Evil is +negative. The perfection of man is identical with the attainment of +absolute Good through evolution. + +Morality knows nothing of either reward or punishment; for it there are +only causes and effects. This truth, on which morality is based, lends +to the freedom out of which its activity proceeds a deeper worth. The +eternal laws of mind point the way by which mankind has to proceed; it +is the same way by which man has become man and by which he must +proceed, even if he did not will to advance thus. In the struggle for +existence, which knows only victory or destruction, progress is a +necessity of nature, but it is less painful and more rapid the more +clearly these laws come to be perceived by consciousness. Yet, however +clear they may be, it is only by a tireless endeavor which shrinks from +no sacrifice, that progress takes place. The end which morality has in +view is distant, for it is high; but only with its attainment will +mankind fully deserve its name when "struggle has been transformed to +labor, when no insignia are recognized but those of right, no weapon +used but intelligence, no banner raised but that of civilization." + +In the volume, "Man the 'End' of Man" ("Der Mensch als Selbstzweck," +1877), "a positive criticism of Hartmann's Philosophy of the +Unconscious," Carneri defines instinct as no form of real thought, +nothing dependent upon perception, but merely an inherited, mechanical +dexterity dependent upon sensation. For the assumption that thought is +the source of instinct must lead us naturally, on account of the +existence of the latter where the centralizing organ of thought is +absent, to the theory that thought is universal in nature; that is, we +shall arrive at a theory of atom-souls. It is evident here that not +Carneri's definition of instinct so much as his conception of thought +is changed from the one adopted in "Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus," +thought being now limited, as it was not in the former book, to +self-conscious mental activity, assumed to be dependent upon nervous +centralization in the brain. In this book also, the author defines the +idea as something having mental existence, though not, he says, in any +metaphysical sense. His idealism is not of such sort that he recognizes +any other way to the attainment of ideas than that of science; and to +him "the service of the materialist who gives us information concerning +the function of the smallest nerve-fibres is of more worth than that of +the idealist who originates a whole philosophical system." The work of +philosophy lies in the rejection of all that is contrary to science, and +the clarification of ideals. + +The will may be defined, not as a definite, separate power, but as the +self-conscious impulse to action resulting from excitation. Any other +definition is inconsistent with the theory of evolution, according to +which that individuation which is the first condition of the struggle +for existence, is nevertheless but the expression of all previously +existing oppositions. To make of the will or of the impulse to +self-preservation anything separate and individual, is as childish as to +personify death. The individual is totality as unity. Darwinism teaches +us, not that the world together with man has been created according to +any teleological principle, but that it has developed by virtue of +motion. The human being moves by virtue of reciprocal action and +reaction with the world. Yet only by virtue of his unity as feeling does +he think and will. Individuality is that which stamps all our activity +with the mark of the ego, which causes us to recognize every impulse +that moves in us as our impulse, to call all our willing ours. The +psychical, the summation of functions to which we give this name, +reaches consummation in the clarification of feeling to consciousness, +in which the desire of an action or of abstinence from an action appears +to us as our will. As thought is based on perception, so will is based +on impulse; and since thought and will appear as the two highest +opposites of feeling, and this, according to our definition, springs +from sensation by way of perception, the will, including action and +abstinence from action, arises out of the general sensitivity. The +progress of science authorizes the expectation that the close relation +of sensitivity to simple reaction will one day be discovered. + +The conceptions of teleology are groundless. The so-called "ends" of +nature have the peculiarity that they are according to the means. It +does not rain in order that there may be vegetation, but vegetation +exists because it is conditioned by the rain. Only with thinking man, in +his struggle for existence, arises the concept of ends; man has not +attained to civilization by help of a friend; rather has he wrung +civilization from nature as an enemy; compelled by it to the exertion of +his whole strength, and growing in cunning by exercise, he has learned +to use the weaknesses of his foe to his own advantage. To want he owes +the greatest things that he has accomplished. By way of labor alone can +victory over nature be achieved and salvation won. + +The standpoint of faith is childlike. Faith does not reason, and may not +do so if it wishes to remain faith. The child can comprehend nature and +man's relation to it only by the language of faith, and there are large +classes of people who, for a long time, will be accessible to no other +language but this. But faith must decrease in the same ratio as mankind +outgrows intellectual childhood. In the same measure, the worth of the +philosophical solution of certain problems must increase; and among the +most important of these problems must be reckoned that of bridging the +chasm between the individual and the world, which has grown wider with +the awakening of consciousness. It lies in the nature of self-conscious +thought to reach out beyond itself, just as it lies in the nature of +sense-perception to regard this "beyond" as the world to come. Hence the +endless longing which seeks the ruler of the world to come, and despairs +without him; until the supposed right to a future life is perceived to +be the right to the Only Whole, and an end is set in the attainment of +this whole. For the thinking man an aimless life has no meaning; there +is only one means of bridging the chasm; namely, that mankind shall set +itself an end. + +A final destruction of life upon the earth must surely come, whether it +be in the shape of a sudden catastrophe or as the result of a slow +process. But such an end can no more be regarded as the "end" in the +philosophical sense than death can be regarded, in the same sense, as +the "end" of the individual life. By the development of ideas, which are +concepts of reason in distinction from concepts of the understanding, we +arrive at a notion of the ideal as end. + +In the ethical ideal, there is contained more than the empiricist can +offer. The enthusiasm with which the true artist starves for his art, or +the martyr perishes for his conviction, can never be fully explained +from the empirical standpoint. One does not even need to be an idealist +in order to act thus; but the materialist or the realist who possesses +true love of beauty and a heart framed for great deeds, merely deceives +himself when he refuses to acknowledge the All-embracing which therein +overwhelms him. Sociology and the History of Civilization can only point +out how man has attained to the ideas of the Beautiful and the Good; +what these are and wherefore their influence is so powerful,--the real +worth of the Beautiful and the Good,--thought by concepts alone can +show. + +The Idea of Man, as he has already developed and may yet develop, is, as +far as our knowledge reaches, the highest of human thoughts. We are +therefore formulating no metaphysical theory in personifying mankind, +and pointing out that the perfecting of which it is capable is the great +end which it has set itself. We know, by our knowledge of human nature, +that mankind will always endeavor to be happy, and that it will approach +nearer perfection the more real and general its happiness becomes. + +The particular rules of morality may and must change; but the highest +principle of all morality is changeless. From the purest moral feeling +came Schiller's words: "Live with thy generation, but be not its +creature; serve thy contemporaries, but in that which they need, not +that which they prize. Without having shared their guilt, share with +noble resignation their punishments, and yield thyself freely to the +yoke which they both illy could do without and illy bear. By the +steadfast courage with which thou refusest their pleasure, thou shalt +prove to them that it is not cowardice which causes thy submission." In +these three sentences there lies a whole system of ethics. + +In the will to good, indivisible from a feeling of freedom, of which no +power on earth can rob us, lies true happiness. + +For mind, as for matter, the law of the indestructibility of force, of +work, is true. That which appears as force or energy is motion; every +impulse to motion is motion, and only in so far as it appears, can the +quantity of motion, force, energy, increase or diminish; as a matter of +fact, it always remains the same. But just as the activity and force of +matter increase with its differentiation, so the activity and energy of +the mind increase with intelligence. It is through intelligence that we +come to a comprehension of the distinction between good and evil, and +through intelligence that we are able to increase social prosperity, and +so morality. + +There are no innate, primary human rights; there are only acquired +rights which man has gained for himself in the process of development. + +If we were to express negatively the end which mankind sets itself, we +should define it as the greatest possible reduction of pain. Conscious +existence is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure; but the general +progress heedlessly overrides the individual being, and we therefore +have to erect barriers against the stream which thus turns pleasure into +pain. + +Pain and pleasure are relative to the individual. Every sensation is +pleasurable as long as it does not exceed in strength a certain limit +corresponding, in each case, to the nature of the individual. Since, +however, every sensation becomes, by perception, feeling, thought +appears as a modifying factor in all pain which does not arise from too +extreme physical injury. The manner in which our perceptions, +thought-images, are formed, the store of thought-images and concepts +which we possess, and hence our thought-capacity, combined with the +extent and clearness of our knowledge, are decisive not only with +respect to the avoidance of pain and attainment of pleasure, but also +with respect to our attitude towards pain and pleasure in general; every +pain and every pleasure has, in the last analysis, such worth alone as +we attribute to it. The universalization of true education, the increase +of intelligence, is, therefore, the means by which man's lot may be +bettered. + +Through the conditions of the earth's atmosphere, man has grown to be +the glorious creature that he is. If we gradually give him, by +education, an advantageous love of life and pleasure therein, and at the +same time do not neglect the cultivation of ethical principles, virtue +will become, with the increase of happiness, a necessity. + +If intelligence is to bear the fruit which we thus demand of it, its +nature must be such as not only to be nourished by actual life, but also +to uplift by its increase the whole man. And this is, in fact, the case; +where it is not so, we have to do with a one-sided development such as +existing circumstances often condition, but which cannot be regarded as +normal. This point of view is the necessary consequence of the unity +which we postulate of man. If thought and will have their origin in +feeling, and if will clarifies itself through the clarification of +thought, then all advance in thought leads, in general, to an advance in +feeling, and true intelligence is inseparable from true love. We use the +word "love" here, as designating intelligence in its highest sense, and +declare, moreover, that we would desire to see this meaning alone +attached to love. Over against the conception of love which we find in +Hartmann and Schopenhauer, we place the conception of Spinoza, who +designates it as a free, reasonable activity, and says of it as +distinguished from passion that "the love of both man and wife has for +its cause, not a pleasing exterior merely, but especially freedom of +soul." + +If we regard intelligence and love in their highest antithesis, the one +appears as the appropriative, the other as the self-devoting conception +of things. But since we form a conception of things and make them our +own only in proportion to our intelligence, our attitude towards them +must be according to this measure; and since there is no action without +reaction, intelligence must be broadened by love as well as love +clarified by intelligence. The highest of all is intelligence; but it is +love that first lends it creative power; without love it cannot create, +but only destroy. Everything great and noble that man can point out as +his work is due to love--love of mankind, love of country, love of +knowledge, love of art, love of labor in general. If the devotion is +deficient in purity, determined by extraneous motives, the work will +bear marks of the deficiency. The reason why the power of love is so +much greater than every other power is that its all-embracing, boundless +character reacts upon it as a feeling of eternity, enabling it to +undertake all things, as if it might conquer even death. Life, +considered in its parts, is cheerless; but love, regarding it in its +totality, points out to it the way of salvation through itself. Love is +the concrete element which exalts the abstraction of Intelligence to +incarnate Idea; therefore is love the idealizing principle from which +intelligence draws belief in its own aims. And if one questions whence +comes the conception of immortality, impossible to be won from +experience, love must confess itself guilty of originating it, being +unable, to exist without this self-delusion. + +Carneri thus places himself in direct opposition to Schopenhauer's and +Hartmann's notion of love, which, he says, "falls like a deep shadow +over their whole conception of the world"; and he pleads in favor of a +standpoint which shall make self-perfection the aim of existence for +woman as for man. He propounds a theory of education for woman which, +according to his own statement, places him at one in spirit with Mill; +but he avers that he cannot follow the latter in his more extreme views, +which, he says, were evidently assumed by Mill only in view of the +strength of the enemy with which he had to contend. The book ends with +the following paragraph:-- + +"We do not run after ideals; hence no plan floats before us, according +to which the world should be shaped anew. He who understands how to read +the book of History knows that, in no one place does the identity of +form and content come more clearly into view than in others, and that, +with every new content, there is always a new form also. The modern +state has by no means outlived itself yet, and those who endeavor to do +away with it know not what they are about. Instead of thinking upon a +new form, let us devote our care to the clarification of the content. No +one deceives himself as to the suffering in the world; but he deceives +himself who thinks that he alone can bring about a better condition. +Only the action of all can better things. Therefore, that which remains +for us to do can be summed up in these few words: _Let us make every +effort possible to place every one in a position to help himself._ This +is the only ethical conception of universal reform. Let us prize +knowledge above all things, and let us show that we so prize it by +increasing it and diffusing it as much as lies in our power; let us +prize it above all things, and prove that we do so by using it for the +good of mankind. By knowledge we have become human beings, because +knowledge has brought us to a comprehension of the Beautiful and the +Good. It is knowledge that sets life an end in the attainment of the +Good, and knowledge that glorifies our path to that end. Let us educate +for ourselves wives that shall not merely dimly feel what we think, but +such as will bring to the execution of our will a clear understanding. +Let us educate for ourselves wives who, fired by the same feelings as +our own, will unite their efforts with ours in the education of a +generation that shall take _morally_ the stand upon which the science of +the century finds itself. Let us seek true happiness if we would find +virtue. It is to no wisdom, but it is likewise to no foolishness that we +owe the existence of the world. Man can be foolish; but he can also be +wise; and if he is wise, then the world too is wisely arranged." + +Carneri begins his "First Principles of Ethics" ("Grundlegung der +Ethik," 1881) with an investigation of the origin of primary concepts +and our knowledge through these. In order to bring light into our +conception, we must first of all learn the way to the concept; for then +only can we see how the concept completes itself in the judgment, and +becomes, in reasoning, the criterion of its own worth. + +The problem which first presents itself to us is that of Life in +general. The problem is inseparable from that of corporeality. If we +follow phenomena to their last conceivable reduction, we finally pass +from the perception of mass to the concept of matter; but further than +this we cannot go. At least, we can perceive only material things, and +that which we call the spiritual in distinction from the corporeal has +always something corporeal as its basis; and if we do not wish to +dispense with the reliable guidance of experience, we shall not overleap +this barrier. Science cannot reckon with supernatural factors. + +What matter _is_ we cannot know; that it exists, however, that the +phenomena of nature are no empty seeming, sensation, as the felt result +of the mutual relation between us and the outer world, testifies. +Sensation is the basis of our self-consciousness, of the only full and +irrefutable certainty that we possess. As to what true Being or +Existence is, there is disagreement; but there can be none regarding the +fact that we are conscious of our sensations; and upon this +consciousness rests the postulate of the materiality[66] of all +existence. In order to assert the materiality of all phenomena, we are +forced to distinguish between a corporeal and a non-corporeal action of +matter; matter operates mentally when its division or differentiation +proceeds so far that the resulting phenomena can no longer be perceived +by the senses, but only conceived by thought. The indivisibility of mind +from corporeality follows directly from this definition of the mental +side of nature. We distinguish between the two only for convenience' +sake. The newer Psychology knows nothing of Sensuality in the old sense +of the word, since the basis of all psychical effects is physical. + +For matter operating mentally, as for matter operating corporeally, +there are no specific energies; it is, as Wundt expresses it, +functionally indifferent. The differing results of a high +differentiation of centralized organisms arise in accordance with the +changing combinations of elementary parts and nerve activities. These +results are not, however, to be regarded as the mere effects of matter, +but as phenomena of the same, in fact, as the consummation and crown of +the whole evolution of nature. Even in the sense-organs we see the +differentiation of matter advance beyond the sphere of sense-perception. +Therefore, in distinguishing between mind and matter, we are still in +the realm of the natural, and follow the path of experience, if by +experience is understood not alone immediate experience, but also the +conclusions which directly or by strict analogy may be drawn from it. + +The theory of an atom-soul and the theory of an organizing principle +must be abandoned as teleological, and so inconsistent with the facts of +evolution. The theory which holds force to be a transcendental +existence, a something outside of matter, must also be rejected. With +the endless divisibility is given an endless motion, inward or outward; +the endlessly divisible matter exists in endless motion, or what is the +same, the endless motion is the endlessly divided matter. Hence motion, +like matter, can never diminish; only the form of its appearance +changes. + +The order in nature cannot be used as the basis of a teleological +argument; what we call order of nature is necessity as distinguished +from chance. For example, the statement that the life of the earth +requires the alternation of day and night means merely that, since day +and night alternate upon the earth, only such beings could arise and +continue in existence thereon as flourish under this alternation. + +The first appearance of protoplasm introduces no strictly new thing, but +only a new form of matter with life-motion; and the formation of germs +is only a further step of the process. The most important characteristic +of all life is sensation. This is the form in which, in all living +things, that which in the rest of nature we call reaction, appears. That +it is so easy for us to say in the same breath, the animal possesses +sensation; and, by this particular excitation we produce in him this +particular sensation, has its reason in the fact that the animal is not +only capable of sensation, but is, moreover, continually in a state of +sensation. By the fact of its continual reaction upon sensation, it +keeps itself alive. Hence the two concepts coincide, so to speak; +sensation is to life what divisibility is to matter. We express with +these words more than a similitude, since all sensation is based upon +motion, is, indeed, motion, and every motion may be reduced to a +division or differentiation in the broadest sense of the word. All +further distinctions, as, for instance, with respect to the mode of +sensation (which belongs, without doubt, to plants as well as to +animals), we leave unnoticed; all differences in the forms of life are +but those of degree, though they may be wide differences of degree; they +are to be ascribed to the influence of outer circumstances. + +Sensation develops in the direction of least resistance. In the animal +world, we have to distinguish between outer and inner factors, with the +latter of which a new element seems to be introduced. The difference +between the two is not, however, one of essence, since the will, too, is +determined by outward circumstance. The inner factors of evolution are +comprised in the germ, from which the individual is produced; while the +environment constitutes the outer factors. The individual enters the +world with a certain reserve quantity of force, which represents his +power of resistance to outside forces, and he passes the more rapidly +from youth to age the more rapidly this force is consumed. This +accumulation of force is, therefore, identical with the impulse to +self-preservation, which, as modified by various inner and outer +excitations, manifests itself in various forms. But he who, as +unimpassioned thinker, desires progress, desires also retrogression; he +who desires youth desires age, since the two concepts are correlative +and the one includes the other; old age, and finally death, must come to +our planet as a whole, as well as to the human individual. The original +tendencies of the total character determine, for the most part, the +manner in which the individual sustains the struggle for existence; yet +the environment is in no less degree active in this determination. Not +less important than the manner of reaction is the differing +susceptibility to particular kinds of excitation; the character +resulting from the mutual action and reaction of individual and world +depends upon the manner in which the individual adapts himself to +circumstances, ennobles and disciplines himself. + +In idealism, as long as it remains within proper bounds, there is +certainly truth; he who derides it, derides himself. But realism has +also its truth, as long as it does not misjudge the worth of concepts, +by which alone we clearly recognize what things are to us, what their +relations to us are, and so how we have to deal with them. Concrete +concepts inform us as to what is true and what is not true in phenomena. +There is no greater mistake than to suppose that what things are in +themselves, not what they are for us, is of importance to us; as if we +could have an interest in that which things are not for us. The decisive +point is the fact that, not things as they appear to us, but their +rightly conceived appearance, their appearance as understood by adequate +concepts, is the beginning and end of knowledge. Hence the true student +of nature can no more do without the concept than the true philosopher +can leave material perception out of account. Stiff-necked Materialism +is as one-sided as old-time Metaphysics; the one has no meaning for its +form, the other no form for its content; the one is a corpse, the other +a ghost, and each strives in vain to attain the warmth of life. Natural +Science and Philosophy must tread different paths, in so far as division +of labor requires them to do so; but they labor at the two sides of one +whole. Nature is not a machine, but life in its fullest form, and the +task set us is to understand her as she is, not to patch together a +nature out of disconnected scraps. + +Carneri adopts the definition given by Claude Bernard, to whom life is +neither a principle nor a result, but a conflict. To the chemical +synthesis, from which protoplasm results, is added, through mechanical +integration, morphological synthesis, to whose special form inherited +characteristics are related as elements. Through the conflict within +living forms, and between these and the rest of the world, motion, +attaining to the character of function, appears as continuous +consumption. Destruction and renewal are inseparable correlative +concepts. This fact is contained in the concept of the conservation of +force, work, and motion. We may distinguish between (1) latent life, +such as that accumulated in the germ, (2) the merely oscillating +plant-life, and (3) free animal life. With this distinction, we place +ourselves upon the standpoint of the individual, for whom there is both +beginning and end, and to whom renewal is subordinated to destruction; +for consumption, death is the characteristic of living in distinction +from non-living matter. If, therefore, we regard life as identical with +death, we merely assert that we consider death identical with life, and +that, in the broader sense of the word, for the universe as a whole, +there is no death. That which Claude Bernard designates as Construction +is the differentiation and division of labor arising in the process of +integration. The cell constitutes the first integration of protoplasm. +In it, motion takes place in a particular form, organizes according to +this form, causes division and synthesis, and impresses features of +character that, by their action and reaction with the environment, +either effect their own destruction, or else maintain their existence, +propagate themselves, become fixed, and undergo further evolution. In +this manner species arise and vary: and the more primitive the form, the +more variable it is; the more advanced, the more fixed. Hence the +invariable character of the germ-cells. In bone-formation, it is clearly +shown that special structure begins very early,--in the cell, namely; +but it is preserved only where it is aided by the necessary action and +reaction. Autonomic in itself, life submits itself to the general laws +of evolution.[67] As the direction of motion is determined for whole +groups of cells by the direction of the motion of the protoplasm in the +single cells, so organic function is determined by the grouping of the +irritable, contractile, sensible cells. From the first origin of life up +to its most perfect development, everything is formed at the cost of +other forms. If life is, therefore, to be conceived as a conflict, it is +a conflict as wide as the universe itself, and we say, with Claude +Bernard, that "life may be characterized, but not defined." + +Everything that has sensation lives. As life depends upon particular +combinations of particular elements, so sensation is the characteristic +mark of such combinations, and a higher form of that simple reaction +common to nature in general. Reaction has its reason in the motion +arising from the endless divisibility of matter, through which the most +different combinations and reactions are produced. Since we have before +us, in our contemplation of corporeal nature, not abstract matter in +general, but some sixty or more special chemical elements, we must, in +thinking of atoms, have in mind atoms of these particular elements, and +not atoms of abstract matter in general; of such atoms of matter in +general, or, if one will, of primordial matter, we can know only that +they would in general attract and repel. Only by degrees can a +particular reaction of the elements have been developed; and since our +known elements have particular different reactions, they must be the +product of different combinations. Sensation is due to certain +combinations of these elements; when the combinations no longer exist, +the atoms of these elements still react according to their +characteristic method as atoms of particular elements, but the sensation +dependent on their peculiar combinations is destroyed. The atom as such +is devoid of sensation, and we may convert our earlier proposition, +making it read: Only that which lives is sensible. We know quite well +how much of this course of reasoning is of hypothetic nature; but the +strictest consistency cannot be denied it. The method which explains +life by the assumption of sensible atoms is a much shorter and easier +one; but is it not likewise a method of greater risk? And is there no +danger that, in rejecting a method by which all changes in phenomena are +referred to functions of combinations of elements, we may seek, in +matter itself, something that is not matter? The above theory of life, +also, takes its departure from the assumption that all was, originally, +in the formation of the world, living in the broader sense of the word. +But here we are concerned with life in the narrower sense of the word, +as distinguished from what we call dead nature. + +Soul is, therefore, according to our definition, equivalent to animal +life, in contrast to the life of the plant. The significance of the +distinction lies in the intermediation of the general organic unity, not +in a qualitative division. The elements are the same; only their +connection is different, and that which distinguishes the animal is a +centralization of the organs. In referring to the possession of soul by +the animal, we simply point out the independent manner in which, by +reason of sensation, its impulses govern, and develop, through the +scale, up to consciousness and will. Of course the gradations are very +numerous, inasmuch as the functions of the soul are determined by the +development of the organism. The difference between animals whose +sensation attains clear consciousness and such as do not attain to more +than a mechanical action, does not concern us, as long as we regard the +psychical phenomena in their most general form. Every animal possesses +soul; we avoid the expression "_a_ soul," as giving the soul the +significance of something by itself. In like manner, we do not say that +_a_ life, but that life belongs to the animal. The chief condition +necessary to soul as to life consists in union to a whole, and soul +represents the gradation by which life lifts itself to the plane where +it becomes a mirror of the world. + +Sensation, as centralized in the brain, becomes perception, the +sensation of a part becoming the sensation of the whole, a _feeling_ of +the individual. It is perceptions which cause movement. To find a +connection between perception as generally understood and the action of +the muscle would be as difficult as to show the connection between body +and soul in the sense of Spirit. But if we regard perception as feeling, +then the awakening of a corresponding impulse, and the transformation of +this into will, which finds expression in a corresponding motion, is +something so natural that it needs but a glance at the nerve-apparatus +in order to comprehend the rapidity of the whole process. With regard to +the unconscious character of the greater part of the process, and its +corresponding rapidity, we have to consider the gradual nature of the +development of the nervous system, the gradual drill of the parts, until +the whole process becomes perfect. By feeling is here not meant +necessarily feeling as pain or pleasure. This quality of feeling does +not necessarily belong to every perception, else thought, as a train of +perceptions, would be unbearable; a certain strength of feeling is +necessary in order that it may attain the character of pain or pleasure; +as we recognize a boundary at which sensation begins, so we recognize +one at which feeling begins to attain the character of pleasure and from +which, up to a second boundary-line, it continues to appear as pleasure; +beyond this line it appears as pain. Moderate feeling is beneficial to +the organism, immoderate feeling harmful; hence the appearance of the +one as pleasure, and of the other as pain. We say expressly "moderate," +not "weak" feeling, because too weak feeling may also, under certain +conditions, be painful. Horwicz rightly protests against any attempt to +arrange the feelings in an exact scale, since a particular feeling may +lead to quite different phenomena of emotion, according to the +particular circumstances and the particular development which it +undergoes in the organism, and since it is furthermore nothing +changeless and distinct, but merely an energy that necessarily leads to +activity. Hence it is that the excitation which does not pass the stage +of sensation remains localized, but when it attains to the stage of +feeling takes possession of the whole individual, and brings the +essential tendency of his being[68] to expression. + +As Carneri tends to interpret the sensation which he predicates of the +lower animals as a mere higher reaction of living matter, and thus +wholly mechanical, so he tends to regard the activity of all animals +which lack brain (under which he understands especially the nervous +developments found in the gray matter which contains Haeckel's +"soul-cells") as devoid of pleasure and pain, and due to mere +inheritance and force of habit. So the action of the ants is not to be +attributed to intelligence, but to mere reaction upon sensation due to +inheritance and exercise; and so the movements of a butterfly impaled +upon a red-hot needle would be attributable to the hindrance of its +flight, not to pain.[69] Thus, with Carneri, the words "sensation," +"soul," "perception," and "feeling," lose their ordinary significance; +and this fact must be held in mind in the interpretation of his +assertions that "all animals have soul," and "all animals have +sensation." + +Carneri further cites Haeckel's definition of the organism as a +cell-monarchy, in which different individuals, and different groups of +individuals, having different duties, are guided by a central power. He +does not intend thus to assume special centres for consciousness and +will, but only to assert that, through such centralization, the +expression of the whole individual, as total consciousness and total +will, takes place. + +Not only the brain, but other parts of the nervous system, are affected +in perception; and the same parts are operative in remembrance. Thus the +association of ideas is explained. + +As long as the animal remains upon the plane of mere instinct, it has +only blind impulses.[70] Only in the most highly organized animals do we +find the first traces of conscious, though not yet of self-conscious, +will. In that the animal knows what it will, it distinguishes clearly +the objects of its will, and hence its own impulses. Upon the earlier +plane of mere self-preservation, the beneficial, harmful, and +indifferent were not yet made inward, but only distinguished outwardly +by nature in the struggle for existence, in which the fittest survived; +in consciousness, however, the harmful and advantageous become inward, +taking the form of pain and pleasure. But the animal never gets beyond +the concrete case,--in which his inherited instincts, working with a +rapidity and freedom we often see imitated in the passions of men, +sometimes act so advantageously as almost to deceive us into believing +them the result of reflection; yet sometimes, again, bring most +disastrous results. The animal never attains to a notion of the Whole. +Associations and general perceptions the higher animal species have, but +not concepts. + +Impulses appear, in their primary form in the animals, as passions.[71] +The first beginning of the ethical may be found in the passion of love +in the broadest sense of the word, as sexual love and the love of +offspring. The first is chiefly exacting, the second is higher, in that +it gives. + +That which divides man physically from the brutes is merely the union of +qualities, all of which, but never all of which united, we find among +the animals; that which divides him mentally from them is self-conscious +thought, developed by means of speech. Through the development of +attention, which arises in connection with a greater and greater +centralization, sensation becomes perception, this develops further to +general perceptions, and is still further perfected to concepts. + +Carneri believes primitive man to have been, not more benevolent than +the animals, but less so. Leaving out of account the carnivorous +animals, the brutes seem to satisfy their own wants without interfering +with the satisfaction of others, and, except where the possession of +females is concerned, to live in peace with each other. On the other +hand, the influence of man upon the domestic animals may be seen in the +greed of the dog, who, as capable of instruction, takes on himself all +the evil qualities of his master. The cat, who is not so intelligent as +the dog, is not thus influenced. + +For nature there is no good and evil. The animal which tears and devours +its prey is no worse than the swollen stream, that uproots the trees in +its course. With consciousness, intention awakes; yet in the brute this +is only secondary; the brute distinguishes between pain and pleasure, +but not between these as the result of its own action in distinction +from that of nature outside itself. Only the self-consciousness of the +human being knows good and evil; nature does not know evil, for she does +not know the opposition on which it is based. There is wisdom in the +story of Genesis, which sees in the beginning of knowledge, the +commencement of evil. The awakening of self-feeling is the beginning of +a chasm, through the full development of which the individual is at +length separated from nature. With self-consciousness and the feeling of +boundless isolation that therein comes over him, man begins his ethical +development. + +But the ethical does not begin with the human being known to us by +natural history; even yet there are races of man which stand lower than +many species of animals; and the early development of moral activity was +of necessity much more of the nature of that which we call evil than of +that which we call good. The mind is a sort of light; and as warmth is +indivisible from the motion which we call light, and the first warmth of +the sun could only burn, so the motion which we call mind could at first +only have destroyed; self-consciousness, in its earliest stages, can +have produced only the intense feelings which lie nearer pain than +pleasure. As man came to have intention, and gained new wants in +development, he could regard the intentions of his fellow-men only with +distrust. Envy, hatred, dislike, were developed long before the family, +and, later, the tribe furnished opportunity for love. Self-consciousness +could, at first, interpret good and evil only as having reference to +self, just as it also conceived its freedom as that of its own caprice. +The desire for happiness and endeavor to attain it is the primary +incentive to all human undertakings. It is erroneous to suppose that man +is nearer to the brutes by this impulse; the animal does not possess it, +has only the impulse to self-preservation. + +The idea that man and wife together first constitute the complete human +being, and that the real future of this human being lies in the +children--the idea of the family is, certainly, of all ideas, +primordial, though it probably came late to consciousness. From the +family developed the tribe with the eldest at its head. The more +peaceful the tribe, the more others combined against it, and by their +combination compelled it still further to strengthen its resources. The +feeling of power awakened by the growing concord extended further and +further, and finally made its way to the individual with the full force +of the Idea. This development, but more especially the compelling power +of the struggle for existence, soon called the bravest to command in +place of the eldest of the tribe. + +It is by the agency of no other being that, in the mutual relation of +physical and mental activity, consciousness is attained; man himself +comes to a feeling of himself. In the being endowed with soul, who on +the one hand attains, through integration, an independence that appears +as the impulse to self-preservation, on the other hand becomes conscious +of this impulse to self-preservation through a centralized nervous +system that raises the part-sensations to feelings of the whole, +sensation divides into two chief functions, which appear as passion and +thought. We are not concerned, in thought and passion, with opposites, +but with an opposition which a single phenomenon develops through +manifold action and reaction with the rest of the world of phenomena. +The distinction is merely a convenience in finer investigations; there +is, in fact, as little thought without emotion as emotion without +thought. And since emotion always manifests itself as will, this highest +opposition is best defined as that of thought and will. In order to +understand the human being, we must analyze these two sides of +consciousness. + +Carneri's examination of the primary laws of thought can be only touched +upon here. In the law of Identity, or, negatively speaking, the law of +Consistency,[72] there comes to our consciousness a more general Species +which includes a determinate species. "The adequate, clear, correct, +corresponding[73] concept is consistent with itself," means, the +adequate concept finds itself again in every object which it includes. +The law of Identity expresses, therefore, not entire sameness, with +which the cessation of all thought would be reached, but simple +consistency. It affords us, thus, the means of recognizing the Untrue in +that which is not what it is called, hence also the means of recognizing +the True. The law of Excluded Middle contains an extension or doubling +of the law of Identity, in that the identity here appears, not in the +form of consistency, but in that of contradiction; as, "either--or." Not +one, but two cases are supposed, only one of which can exist or be true. +The disjunctive proposition which corresponds to it is not less +determinate than the categorical proposition which corresponds to the +law or judgment of Identity, but is rather, on the contrary, a more +forcible affirmation of it. In this determinate nature lies the worth +of the Excluded Middle. Du Bois Raymond's address on the Limits of +Knowledge has caused much joy to conservative thinkers; but these have +made much more out of it than it really means. There is either for us a +transcendental, or there is not; and if not, then we are limited to the +knowledge of nature. The scientific limit set to our knowledge by our +hypotheses and theories is, however, merely a limit set for the purpose +of rounding knowledge to a whole, not of closing it to a further +advancement; but such hypotheses must be consistent with experience and +founded upon it; otherwise we leave knowledge behind us and abandon the +hope of it. We cannot say what, within the province of science, man will +not know, except that he never will know everything. + +The law of Causality is the most important law of thought, after that of +Identity. Reason and result are often confused with cause and effect. +The reason on account of which we do a thing is not, however, the cause +by which it occurs. The cause is the complexity of all conditions which +make it possible, and the reason of its performance coincides with a +conscious design on our part that constitutes our purpose. Causality has +nothing in common with the concept of purpose. The principal of +Sufficient Reason has been made the bridge between Causality and Design. +Probably human experience reached first the conception that nothing +occurs without sufficient reason, and only later, by a further mental +step, the conviction that everything for which the necessary conditions +exist takes place. With this conviction, the concept of causality became +clear; but, at the same time the bridge which connects it with the +theory of design in the succession of events was destroyed, so that only +a logical leap can restore us to this incomplete conception of earlier +experience. Causal necessity excludes purposed necessity. That which +takes place may be regarded as, in one direction, conformable to an end, +but may, on the other hand, conform to no end in any direction. A +succession of events conforms to purpose only in so far as it is +regarded by a particular consciousness which combines it in thought with +ends of its own or such as it ascribes to another consciousness. In the +law of Causality, as in the law of Identity, the necessity of +self-consistency and the self-consistency of Necessity reaches +expression. The sufficient reason is simply the completeness of the +conditions, with the existence of which the event takes place, and the +absence of which the event fails to take place. + +Spinoza's "Will and intellect are one and the same" is the ethical law +of Identity. All thought is willed; that is, indivisible from a certain +coloring which it has in virtue of its identity with the will, just as +all will is connected with thought; there is, indeed, a will-less +thought, which might, however, just as correctly be called "unthinking +thought,"[74] just as "unthinking willing" is, in reality, will-less +willing. In all mental operations, the identity of the two functions is +found. A will is unthinkable without something willed--an end, given by +thought. It is the fact that, in his practical life, man recognizes +purpose as a necessity, which causes him to read purpose into nature. + +"At the basis of identity lies a concept which throws light upon the +teleological principle. This is the concept of the General. The basis of +the principle of identity is a concept of species which embraces the +general in contrast to the singular and particular; just as the judgment +of Identity constitutes an advance to still greater Generality. The +concept of the General which reaches expression in species coincides +with the concept: Law of Nature. The Law is, for a particular circle of +events, what the Species is for a particular circle of objects. As in +the Species, the characteristics are expressed which an object must +exhibit in order to belong to it, so in the Law the conditions are +expressed which much exist in order that the instance included under it +may take place. The relation of Identity to Causality is unmistakable. +Species and Law include no mere plurality of objects and instances, for +as often as the instance comes to pass the law is fulfilled, and the +number belonging to a species is, in conception, limitless. Worlds like +our earth may come into existence again and again; hence specimens of a +certain species, eternally destroyed, may eternally renew themselves, +and instances which fall under a certain law may eternally occur. Simply +their conditions must exist in order that they may occur. Such cases +form, therefore, a whole; and this is Totality in Little." The +importance of every whole which sets itself over against the greater +whole has already been noticed. The former whole constitutes the concept +of Individuality which, as Undivided Unity, becomes independent. "The +limitlessness which we claim for the whole is one of conception; we thus +seek to make that which is incomprehensible conceivable." The concept +does not need to be imagined; it may be thought. "Every one knows what +he means when he opposes the whole to the part. The whole is not a +larger part, but the opposite of the part, as 'all' constitutes the +opposite of the many and the particular." + +What we aim at, in this analysis, is a true Realism in the conception of +the Purposeful. The Purposeful is that which conduces to an end, the +Useful. From Individuality follows the individual nature of ends. Every +man has his own ends, and in the attempt to attain his ends does not +hesitate to set himself in opposition to all the rest of mankind. If he +is sufficiently energetic and cunning, he may even succeed, for a time, +in his endeavors, to the harm of humanity. Yet to have the whole of +humanity against oneself is to endeavor to proceed in the direction of +greater resistance, and the process must, sooner or later, result in the +triumph of the stronger power. In the struggle for existence, in its +larger as well as its smaller manifestations, the individual seeks, with +all his power, to satisfy the impulse to happiness which arises with +conscious existence; while the species, as the complex of all energies +developed by its parts, has an impulse to self-preservation of its own, +which, by its action as type, has originated and preserved for centuries +the conception of changeless kind. + +"Here is the beginning of the dawn, whose sun, however, in order to +become visible and impart warmth, must rise still higher. The certainty +afforded in the law of Identity in positive form, in the law of +Contradiction in negative form, in the law of Excluded Middle in the +form of an opposition, and in the law of Sufficient Reason in +conditional form, is based upon Causality, Community of Species, or +Totality. For this reason, deduction and induction are only then to be +relied upon when the first form of reasoning has for its middle +proposition one that expresses causality, community of species, or +totality, and the latter form of reasoning takes these for its point of +departure. The analysis of Deduction is of worth as clarifying and +confirming thought, and thus extending its field as often as the +syntheses of Induction stand the proof of the process of clarification. +The supernaturalism of Dualism leads to a dead, the natural character of +Monism to a living, dialectic,--to the dialectic of Becoming. The +concept assumes a concrete form, and, as higher and higher rising sun, +enables us to conceive what it will be to us as Idea. The understanding +knows nothing of ideas; their realm is that of the reason; yet since the +reason is but a higher development of the understanding, the +commencement of this dawn must be perceptible in it. Moreover, the +division which we make between the two originates in our genetic +treatment of the subject, which seeks to explain the concept by showing +the course of its development. Yet the distinction is no empty +abstraction which may not claim life and form to a certain extent. The +human being is always the whole human being; but he is not always +uniformly developed, either physically or mentally. In one individual +the understanding, in another the reason, manifests itself more plainly +in thought. This is also true of the race, the people, and the epoch, as +of the individual. Modern development has turned more and more from the +ideal to material interests; we seem to be progressing towards a +reaction," but what that reaction will be, we cannot say; it may be a +reaction in the worst sense. The mistakes of the understanding cannot be +predicted. With the point of culmination, the extreme is reached, and in +Spiritualism may be found traces of a touching of extremes. Yet the +influence of the understanding is to be relied on in so far as it is the +clear mirror of Necessity. The understanding may err, just because it is +conscious; but experience always corrects these mistakes. Nature, as +gifted with mind, is no new nature; the laws of thought are the natural +laws of the mind. In their mirror the will sees the accomplishment of +the first mental development, and learns to comprehend this, on higher +mental planes, as Common Weal. + +The opposition of the individual to the rest of the world which arises +with self-consciousness and individuality is greater, the greater the +individuality. To the struggle for existence is added the struggle for +happiness, which, separating into numberless desires that gain in +attractiveness with every obstacle opposed to their satisfaction, is the +origin of all the passions,--of greed, jealousy, envy, hatred, etc. +Through passion, which is the exaggeration of activities that, in a +normal form, are good, man is led into a struggle for false happiness, +just as the concepts under which his passions arise are false. The +individual against the world cannot attain happiness for himself. The +greatest good, peace of soul, freedom from passion, is attained only +through knowledge, by which the concepts of the individual are +corrected; it is attained, not as dead incapability of emotion, but only +as clear enjoyment of life after past storm. Labor and education are +the path to true happiness and, through true happiness, to virtue. The +passions are not separate existences; the whole man is the passion of +his heart; the whole man feels, just as the whole man thinks. But just +for this reason, because of the identity of will and understanding, the +correction of the concept is the correction of will. This is not saying +that will and understanding are never in opposition to each other; the +apparent opposition is, however, merely a hesitation of the will, which +does not know what it really will. It is true that one passion can be +conquered only by another; we cannot will an emotion that leads to a +certain course of action; but we can fix our attention on the objects +which produce it, and by thus reaching a clear recognition of their +actual and necessary relations, affect our own action. It is true that +man does as he wills; but he wills necessarily as he does. According to +the doctrine of freedom, it must be exactly those who act without +knowing wherefore they act, and who are thus driven by blind impulse, +who are the most fully self-determined. A real freedom and conquest of +necessity can, on the contrary, be attained only by obedience. Just as, +in the animal, the summation of impulses and desires reaches a focus in +feeling, so in man, in proportion to his development, the summation is +in consciousness, the focus of which is the point of concentration of +the will's activity. Spinoza's "Will and understanding are one" means: +the activity of the will is the realization of the activity of thought. +Every one, the more self-sacrificing, as the less self-sacrificing man, +does that which is to him the pleasantest; egoism turns the scale in +both cases; only in the one case the egoism has a basis of broader love. +And since we act according to our conception of things, the question of +our responsibility is the question of our full possession of +consciousness. The necessity of nature must take away our desert, as far +as a future life and its reward are concerned; but from the standpoint +of a being who desires happiness and attains to it through evolution, +necessity gains a new aspect. Natural Selection is Natural Necessity. + +Yet not in the understanding, as such, but in the reason, is the +reconciliation of the same with will. Reason in the narrower sense is a +higher development of the understanding, constitutes its completion and +perfection, and presupposes a high degree of culture; though in a wider +sense, as the half-unconscious modification of the impulses by +adjustment to the needs of the species, it develops early in man. By it +alone man becomes man in the full sense of the word. The activity of the +mere understanding is an analytical, that of the reason a synthetical +one, the return of cold consciousness to warm feeling, of abstract mind +to concrete nature. Truth lies, for the reason, in Totality; hence, to +it, the General alone is comprehensible. It has to do, not with abstract +concepts, to which nothing in the realms of the mental or physical +corresponds, but with concepts of species, concrete concepts, which we +call, in distinction from abstract concepts, ideas. By ideas is not +meant existences in the Platonic sense, but the Typical in species. + +The impulse to happiness which arises with consciousness as thought and +will, calls itself "I." It is the individual who, with every nerve-cell +and every drop of blood, attempts his own realization. But all +individuals are alike in this, that they reach, at last, a point where +they recognize the fact that their ego is but a miserable half which +needs a Thou to its completion. In the union of the Thou and the I, the +first I becomes a complete and perfect I. Man and woman both realize +that only together do they represent the whole human being. I and Thou +together constitute a We. The ego remains after, as before the union, +the axis upon which the whole world turns. But the egoism of mere +understanding is, by a broader thought, elevated to the altruism of +reason. As the highest union of thought and will, the reason becomes +Idea in and for itself, actual, absolute Idea. With the We was born the +Saviour who should reconcile the sharply opposed factors of awaking +consciousness. The light of his gospel spread in wider and wider +circles; man and woman no longer beheld, each, merely his own happiness +in the other; they saw their mutual happiness in their children, and +their own and their children's happiness in friends, and their own and +their children's and their friends' happiness in their fellow-men. The I +of the reason is the self-conscious We. + +The struggle for happiness has brought forth, out of the privileges and +endeavors of individuals, civilization in its present form. Want and the +necessity for labor have been the spur to endeavor and advance. Through +the concepts of ends and of intention, the self-conscious will further +evolved ideas, which themselves undergo a struggle in the activities to +which they give rise; and this is no longer the struggle for existence, +but the struggle for civilization. + +There are three Ideas which, arising out of the extension of the I to +Thou and We, are the spring of all ethical conceptions; these are Love, +Humanity, and Public Spirit.[75] Love is the passion of passions and is +the spring of all capacity to altruistic emotion. Love is life in its +highest degree;[76] and by the manner in which a human being loves one +may know what manner of man he is, and what will be the nature of his +feelings towards his fellow-men in other relations of life. A man's +conduct towards women is the surest test of his character. That which +Spencer calls Integration, that which has created all nature, from the +first germ to the perfect human being, and, as preservative cell-labor, +still continues to create,--this infinite Something comes to +consciousness in the human being, as Love. On the lowest plane it can +appear only as simple impulse; but what, developing from stage to stage, +it can accomplish, the history of Love shows us. + +To these three ideas of Love, Humanity (or Benevolence), and Public +Spirit correspond three outward phenomena, which bear such relation to +them in the development of morality as the body bears to the soul. These +are: the Family, the State-form, and the Representatives of Great Ideas. +These latter, the men who have been pioneers of civilization, we do not +need to pity or regard as victims, though life was to them a mighty +struggle and a restless labor; in their suffering was their pleasure; +and that which impelled them and compelled them to attain their end was +the impulse to happiness. Therein lies the wonderful secret of the +clarified impulse to happiness, that it finds its highest satisfaction +in itself. Such representatives of great ideas are those in whom the +species overcomes the individual, and out of the species "man" the +species-man is developed. That which they express is the True, if only +the True for, and in, mankind. In this lies their worth; as worth in +Science also, and in the Beautiful, lies in the truth of the Idea that +is therein expressed. The True becomes practical in the Good. + +The reason is thus the first condition of happiness, and freedom of the +will lies in the ethical ennoblement of reason, which is nothing more +nor less than obedience, as the total result of all natural causes; by +it the individual is lost in the species as a whole. This ethical height +does not consist in impulse, but in the self-conscious activity of will. +Its mental expression is an Ethical Sense, in distinction from the Moral +Sense of the Intuitionists. Through it man is at one with himself as +with his kind. + +The Ethical Sense is not the common property of the species. Just as it +has, however, reached expression in a few, so it is more and more +realized in the many by the process of evolution, through which a common +will, purpose, and good are necessarily finally evolved from all +striving of individual wills after happiness. Ethical ideas arise as the +result of experience, and in them man gradually attains reason. + +For the Reason to which Love, Public Spirit, and Humanity are the +natural element, the General (Common) as truth, is no empty conception, +but a promise whose fulfilment is the Good and the Beautiful. The +faithfulness of this Reason never swerves, since it depends on no fear, +but springs from the clearest conviction, and therefore is one with the +love which it feels and inspires. Its friendship is as strong as it is +unselfish, for it does not call anything "friendship" that is based on +other relations than those of mind. Its generosity is always strength, +its mercy never weakness. As far as its power reaches, so far and no +farther do its remorse and pity extend; for all passions which reduce or +dim the activity of the soul are unreasonable. The way to the attainment +of the ethical spirit is pleasure, which guides, though it often +misguides us; fortunately, on the wrong paths we sooner or later meet +with pain, while on the right path we are ever accompanied by pleasure +as "transition from less to greater perfection," to quote Spinoza. The +feeling of Responsibility consists in the soul's recognition of all its +action and omission of action as its own, and in the courage to endure +the consequences of these. + +The ethical Ideal, which the ethical imagination as "scientific" +conceives, is the truly happy man, the man fully in harmony with +himself. This idea is to be regarded as a star by which we are to shape +our course, not as an end to be fully attained. Through labor mankind +approaches this ideal, attains knowledge from experience, and clarifies +the concept of happiness. The "I" extends itself to an "I" of mankind, +so that the individual, in making self his end, comes to make the whole +of mankind his end. The ideal cannot be fully realized; the happiness +of all cannot be attained; so that there is always choice between two +evils, never choice of perfect good, and it is necessary to be content +with the greatest good of the greatest number as principle of action. + +This is an ideal which is actually and necessarily evolved. Benevolence +has become more general, and has attained a degree not conceived of in +former times. The ideal of a happy humanity has gained definite +outlines, and has become an earnest aim towards which we steer with +filling sails. The end is not to be reached by force, which brings in +its train evil that cannot be gotten rid of for generations, but must be +attained within the bounds prescribed by the state, through education +and increase of intelligence. Nor can the state declare and ensure +happiness; the duties of the state are chiefly negative, as Bentham has +said. Each individual sacrifices a portion of his happiness in order +that the rest may be secured to him by the state; the first-named part +comprises his duties, the rest constitutes his rights; the office of the +state is to hold each to his duties and secure to each his rights. There +is no perfect state, just as there is no perfectly good individual; but +there is progress in states as in individuals. + +The merely Useful can never furnish a full solution of the problem of +Ethics, any more than Mathematics and Mechanics or Physics and +Physiology can do so. The Perfect is much more than the merely Useful. +Spencer finds the condition of happiness in the exercise of function. +But he regards happiness as the final end of morality, while, according +to our system, the latter is the product of the former. + +Carneri again pleads, in this book, for the like right of woman with man +to mental culture, and to labor which shall make her independent of the +caprice of man; the good of the family alone to be regarded as the +limiting factor. + +The extent of Carneri's work on the subject of Ethics makes it +impossible to consider minor points of his theory, such as are included, +for instance, in his criticism of Hartmann, of Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, +and others; or to define more clearly than has been done his relation to +Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, etc. His book "Entwicklung und Glückseligkeit," +published in 1886, is a collection of essays which first appeared +separately in "Kosmos," and which, as such, do not hold to each other +the relation of parts of an organic whole. They are chiefly a +recapitulation of the views already expressed in the "Grundlegung der +Ethik," with some extensions and possibly some modifications;--these +last, however, chiefly of an extraneous character. In these essays +Carneri demands a systematic moral training in the common school, to the +end of the development of conscience, such training to be non-religious, +though not anti-religious excepting in case the religion itself be seen +to transgress the laws of right established by humane reason; he +protests against the error of Materialism, as likewise against that of +the Apriorists and the "Ideologists" or Idealists in the narrower sense +of the word; and he reaffirms, defines, and further defends his +standpoint as that of a "Real-idealist"; that is, of one to whom Kant is +the point of departure in a farther evolution of theory. He reaffirms +the oneness of the universe, so of man with nature, restates the +self-identity of the individual in will and thought, limits the +knowledge of man to nature as it is for us, but invests it with +certainty within these bounds, and reasserts the necessity of the +progress of the whole through the efforts of the many for happiness. He +lays further stress upon the absence of morality, not only among the +animals, in whom at least general ethical feelings, in distinction from +those towards individuals, are not found, but also among savages; +morality being not the incentive to, but the product of the state. From +this standpoint, he combats Socialism as proposing impossible ideals, +since it presupposes ethically perfect men as governing and being +governed by the laws, and since it disposes of the freedom of the +individual. The theory of compulsion reckons without the will of man as +he is and must be. Man has no primordial rights (except, perhaps, the +right to get and keep all he can); he has only rights that he has gained +by the help of the state. There is no one commandment in which man's +whole duty may be expressed, unless it be, perhaps, some such new +rendering of Kant's words as this: Act always in such a manner that the +maxims of thy will might be taken as the principle by which to render +happy the greatest possible number of human beings. But this can never +become a categorical imperative for all men. Morality lies in the Will +to Good, which becomes in the moral, or according to Carneri's phrase, +the ethical man, a second nature: his sense of duty is joy in duty, +highest satisfaction of his desire for happiness. It might perhaps be +claimed that Carneri, in his theory of the Conscience, has in this book +laid more stress on feeling than in his others; however, it is to be +recollected that, with him, thought and feeling are no distinct +faculties, but that conscience means less an impulse unconscious of +final ends than a self-conscious attitude or readiness of the will as +the result of conviction. + +Carneri's latest book, "Die Lebensführung des modernen Menschen" (1891), +is practical rather than theoretical, a consideration of general +problems and rules of action. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[65] Wirklich. + +[66] Stofflichkeit; by this word Carneri designates "das Gemeinsame +aller Gegenständlichkeit." + +[67] An sich autonom, unterwirft sich das Leben den Cesetzen, die aus +der allgemeinen Entwicklung sich ergeben. + +[68] Daseinstrieb. + +[69] Pp. 112, 113. + +[70] Dunkle Triebe. + +[71] Affecte. + +[72] Widerspruchslosigkeit. + +[73] Entsprechend. + +[74] Gedankenloses Denken. + +[75] Gemeinsinn oder Gemeingeist, pp. 340, 410. Carneri explains this +word as equivalent to the English "common-sense," but defines the latter +as feeling for the general, the universal. + +[76] Potenz. + + + + +HARALD HÖFFDING + +"ETHICS" ("Ethik," 1887) + + +Ethical judgments contain an estimate of the worth of human actions. +Every such estimate presupposes the existence of a need, a feeling which +spurs us on to the judgment of the action, as also the existence of a +standard, an ideal, according to which we judge. The motive to the +ethical judgment may be called the basis of Ethics. The standard +involved in the ethical judgment determines the content of Ethics, in +that it decides which actions, which directions and modes of life, are +to be called good in the ethical sense. The ethical basis is the +subjective, the standard the objective, principle in Ethics; the +character of an ethical conception depends upon this presupposed basis, +the applied standard, and the relation between the two. + +The feelings and impulses of the individual are not only influenced by +his own experience, but bear also a character derived from the +experience of the whole species; hence the ethical judgments delivered +by the individual are the result of the whole experience of his kind. It +is by virtue of this circumstance that the ethical system of the +individual gains its power; as ethics of the species, it is a condition +of the health and vitality of human life. + +This actual working Ethics of the species and of life has been named +Positive Morality. Such Positive Morality manifests itself in the +every-day judgments and principles of men, often in the form of +proverbs, and may express either the enduring worldly wisdom of a +nation, a tribe, or a religious society, or the less enduring "public +opinion" of a century or an epoch. + +Is it well to treat such Positive Morality to a criticism, which, +arousing, as it must, doubts and questions, will interfere with the +certainty and energy of action that characterize unreflecting instinct? +Is it well to examine the principles of such a system from a scientific +standpoint? We may answer: Life itself leads naturally to such +questionings; only where the view is narrow and the problems simple is +there full security from doubt. With the growth of experience begins a +comparison of the different laws and ideals, the differing institutions +of different epochs and peoples of which one learns; or new experience +presents problems which cannot be solved by means of the system handed +down; or the individual seeks some orderly arrangement of the great +multiplicity of ethical judgments which he himself pronounces or hears +others pronounce, for the purpose of distinguishing between the more and +the less important ones. It is certainly a serious point in an +individual's or a nation's development when reflection and criticism +begin; but where life leads naturally to such questionings, we must +either find some answer to them or else some reason why they shall not +be answered. Moreover, it is to be noticed that certainty and force of +action are not absolute Goods. The greatest energy may take a most +disastrous direction, and must then be checked. To a new and better +insight, when attained, one must endeavor to secure all the energy +possible. All evolution consists in the diversion of energy from lower +to higher ends. + +A scientific system of Ethics does not, and cannot, take the place of +Positive Morality; it only supplies the latter with a basis of reason, +broadens, and develops it. Such a scientific system only endeavors to +discover in accordance with what principles we direct our life, and to +secure for these, when ascertained, greater clearness and inner harmony. +In the mental life of the human being, a continuous action and reaction +of the conscious and the unconscious takes place, as well as of +perception, feeling, and will. What is won in the one province may +profit the others also. + +Two tasks of Scientific Ethics, as Historical Ethics and as +Philosophical Ethics, are to be distinguished. Historical Ethics has to +do with the description and explanation of the development of Positive +Morality. Philosophical Ethics has to decide upon the worth of the +various forms assumed by the latter. Philosophical Ethics is a practical +science, and is based upon the supposition that we set ourselves ends +which may be reached through human action. Every ethical judgment +presupposes such an end, for feeling is set in motion by the sight or +the thought of an act only when the latter promotes, or stands in the +way of something, the existence and success of which are desired by us. +Not all that is developed as practical morality can be pronounced good. +On the other hand, customs which were at first assumed from motives +which must be condemned by Philosophical Ethics, may yet prove +themselves good, and may be practised, later, from higher motives; and +such customs cannot then be condemned on account of their origin. Hence, +Philosophical Ethics is both conservative and radical; it respects +nothing simply because it exists; but since it endeavors to furnish +guidance beyond present standards, it attempts to show how that which +has been developed historically may be given new forms and thus used for +further progress. It is difficult, from a broader view, to distinguish +perfectly between Historical and Philosophical Ethics; the historian has +an ideal which he applies more or less in his researches; and the +philosopher in Ethics is more or less ruled by the prevailing opinions +of his time. This necessitates a continual re-discussion of problems. +Yet it does not prevent the existence, in any system, of lasting +principles among the less enduring ones. + +Theological Ethics is directly opposed to Historical Ethics as well as +to Philosophical Ethics. It builds upon tradition, upon truth as +something historically revealed. So far, it might appear as if +Theological Ethics were related to Historical Ethics. But the system of +the former does not recognize the method of scientific research, since +the revelation on which it is based is due, according to its doctrine, +to an interposition of supernatural forces not to be explained by the +physical, psychological, and social laws that serve as the foundation of +historical science. It demands a unique position for its historical +basis, and asserts that this must be looked at in an entirely different +light from that in which the rest of the history of the world is +regarded. It appears to approach Philosophical Ethics in instituting an +examination of the worth of historic acts and modes of life. But it +undertakes this examination, not according to any principle that can be +found in nature, but from the point of view of a supernatural revelation +of an ideal. Its foundation is an absolute principle of Authority; its +good is that which is God's will. But how is the individual to be sure +as to what, in the single case, is God's will? By the inward testimony? +How is he to distinguish certainly between such and his own natural +thoughts and feelings; what means of distinction can be applied? In +passing thus to the province of Psychology, we assume a human means of +distinction, and the principle of Authority loses its force. Or if it be +said that we should receive this principle of Authority because it +answers to a need of our nature, we may ask how we know that the need is +one that should be satisfied? Its mere existence cannot guarantee that. +Or how, then, are we to distinguish which of other wishes and needs of +our nature should, and which should not, be gratified? Is the principle +of Authority to decide this? Then we argue in a circle. + +A similar circle is adopted by such theologians as attempt to combine +the two assertions: "The good is good because God wills it"; and "God +wills it because it is good." If the good is identical with God's will, +this means that he wills it because it is his will; if he, however, +first recognizes something as good, and therefore wills it, then his +will bows to a law and rule, and is not, in itself, the cause whereby +the Good is good. + +Have we not, as a fact, already broken with the absolute principle of +Authority as soon as we begin to reflect, to endeavor to bring the +various commandments of Authority into harmony with each other, thus +applying the measure of our own reason to them? + +But it is not these inner contradictions alone which hinder +Philosophical Ethics from making use of theological assumptions; that +which has called Philosophical Ethics into existence and lends it +interest, is the conviction that the ultimate reason of the ethical must +lie in man himself. However lofty may be the ideal, it can become man's +ideal only through his own recognition of it as ideal. For this reason +Socrates was the founder of Ethics by the command: "Know thyself!" In +this command is expressed the principle of free investigation, the +opposite to that of blind obedience. The desire to make Ethics as far as +possible independent of assailable assumptions is likewise active in the +establishment of a system of Philosophical Ethics. + +In the great, sometimes too great, regard paid to the distinction +between the subjective and the objective worth of actions, and the +contest as to the relative importance of the two factors, the fact is +often overlooked, that the standard by which ethical judgment is +pronounced is itself of subjective nature. The question arises as to +wherefore we seek a general and objective standard. + +It is a fact that human beings reflect upon their own acts, pronouncing +them, according to the result of this reflection, good or bad. How are +such judgments as these possible? + +We will suppose, first, the simplest conceivable case, namely, that the +acting subject pronounces judgment on his own act without consideration +of the existence of other beings. Such a judgment must presuppose +memory; but it presupposes something more, namely pain or pleasure +through memory; an end is aimed at only because the thought of a result +causes pleasure. In the simple case supposed, the feeling which +determines the end can be only that of the individual himself, and the +latter will judge the act as good or bad according as it has affected +his own life. The character and significance of the judgment will depend +on whether the feeling of pain or pleasure is determined only by the +single moment or has reference to the life of the individual as a whole. +The lower the life of consciousness, the more isolated and independent +are the single moments of time in relation to each other, and the less +is the significance of the memory and the thought of the ego as a whole +embracing the single moments with their content. Only a half-unconscious +instinct hinders the individual from losing himself in the moment; the +instinct of self-preservation leads him to consider the future and to +make use of the experience of the past. The more he loses himself in the +moment, the less is the power of judgment, since comparison and action +and reaction of the different states cannot take place. The single +moment bears to all others the relation of an absolute egoist, who does +not wish to relinquish any part of its satisfaction for their advantage. + +And here we may perceive the possibility of a standpoint upon which all +judgment is dispensed with. Such a standpoint is represented by +Aristippus of Cyrene, who asserts the sovereignty of the moment. It is +not without its justification. Ethics itself must show cause for the +relinquishment of the satisfaction of the moment in favor of other +moments. + +If the principle of the sovereignty of the moment could be practically +carried out, no reasoning could overthrow it. However, there can +scarcely be a conscious individual in whom there are not instincts and +impulses which reach beyond the moment. When a momentary state of +feeling, as the effect of an act of the subject, comes together in +consciousness with the feeling determined by the conception of the life +as totality (the result of memory and comparison), a new feeling arises +which is either one of harmony or one of discord. The standard by which +judgment is pronounced is determined by this feeling. The capacity for +such feelings is conscience, as this may manifest itself in entirely +isolated individuals. Conscience, in the broadest sense of the word, is +a feeling of relations, and requires only a relation between central and +peripheral feelings,--feelings of wider, and feelings of narrower +thought-connection. The single moment and the single act are judged +according to their worth as parts of the individual life as totality. + +And here the individual is confronted by the necessity of bringing the +single parts of his life into harmony. The problem is certainly never +solved by any individual involuntarily. The estimation of earlier acts +according to the assistance they give in this task is, therefore, at +this point, of great importance to the individual. The judgment +pronounced is thus not only made possible through the central feeling +which corresponds to the life as totality, but is determined by it. An +acute sense for that which benefits the individual life whose single +members are the moments, is a condition of the continuance and +development of the life; it is a higher sort of instinct of +self-preservation, and need not be confined to the continuance of +physical life, but may also refer to the ideal needs. + +And here we come upon the standpoint of Individualistic Ethics. From +such a standpoint, the problem is to determine, not only how much energy +may be used in the single moments of time, but also in what manner it +should be used in order to secure as great variety and many-sidedness as +may be consistent with the interests of the life as totality. Nor are +the interests of the life to be summed up in physical self-preservation; +the individual acquires, in the natural course of things, interests of +increased ideality and complexity, through which the life gains in +content. + +The ethical law, from the standpoint of Individualism, is expressed by a +formula which requires harmonious relation between the interest of the +life as totality and the impulse of the moment; it consists of two chief +mandates: (1) The single instant should have no greater independence +than corresponds to its significance in the life as totality; (2) but, +on the other hand, the single moments should be as richly and intensely +lived as is consistent with the preservation of the life's totality. + +Of Individualism, or the principle of the Sovereignty of the Individual, +the same is true as of the sovereignty of the moment, that no reasoning +can overthrow it; if the individual recognizes no end but his own life, +there is no logical way of transition to another standpoint. A change of +aim can take place only through such a change in the central feelings +which determine the standard of the individual that a wider circle of +conceptions enter into his reflections. Until this takes place, there is +no use in appealing to conscience. + +The science of Ethics has often claimed to be a science of pure reason. +This claim is opposed to its character as a practical science, since +action can be judged only according to the ends it had in view, and ends +presuppose feelings of pain and pleasure. On the other hand, there is, +in the mere capacity for pain and pleasure, no limitation of the extent +of the circle of conceptions with which the feelings of pain and +pleasure are connected. + +Individualism can be carried out in practice only approximately; the +individual has his origin in the species, and lives his whole life as a +part of the life of his kind, with an organization in which the results +of the action and passion of earlier generations are inherited, and in a +mental atmosphere which has induced the development of his species. And +just as the instinct of self-preservation did away with the isolation of +the single moments of the individual life, becoming, thus, the basis of +feelings determined by the interests of the life as totality, so the +sympathetic instincts do away with the isolation of the single +individuals and determine the conditions of the life of the species in +the minds of its individuals. The most primitive form of the sympathetic +instincts is exhibited in the family. Here, however loose and variable +the relation of man and wife may be, that of mother and child cannot, by +its nature, be done away with or essentially changed. In this case, the +sympathetic feeling springs immediately from the natural instinct, and +the relation is the nucleus which makes possible the higher forms of +family life. In the family circle, the sympathetic feelings are +cultivated, and arrive at such strength that they come to include ever +wider and wider circles of human beings. Indeed, the mother-love remains +forever the image and criterion of all sympathy, as well in respect to +strength as to purity. + +When sympathy has reached full purity, it is a feeling of pain or +pleasure determined by the fact that other beings feel pain or pleasure. +The most important point of its development was when it so broadened as +to include all mankind. The Peripatetic and the Stoic schools of Greek +philosophy led to this idea of love to all humanity and the natural +union of all men in one great society. But this idea acquired greater +historic importance when it became a chief commandment of a great +religion,--of Christianity. To this sympathetic feeling the criterion of +good and evil is no longer to be found in the individual life, but is +dependent on the life of the whole society of which the individual is a +member. + +Yet sympathy is not, from this standpoint, identical with the ethical +feeling, conscience. Conscience is here, too, a feeling of relations +determined by the relation between the ruling or central feeling of the +individual and the results of action. When the individual feels his own +interests subordinate to the good of the whole of which, through +sympathy, he regards himself as a part, the ethical feeling appears as +the feeling of duty. A feeling of duty may be spoken of, likewise, from +the standpoint of pure Individualism, for the concept of duty expresses +only the relation of a lower, narrower consideration to a higher; and +this is represented, in Individualism, by the relation of the single +moments to the life as a whole. + +From another point of view, the ethical feeling appears, in its higher +development, as the feeling of justice, which, while regarding the good +of the whole as the chief end, considers also the peculiarities of +individuals. Sympathy in its active form is impulse to share. This +sharing must be carried out according to fixed principles; where +sympathy is universal, differences of division can be justified only by +the fact that the Goods divided, if otherwise divided, would not be in +so high a degree Goods to those to whom they reverted, or would not +conduce to so great progress of the society as a whole. The ethical law +upon this standpoint, the standpoint of Humane Ethics, can be no other +as to content, than that action shall conduce to the greatest possible +welfare and the greatest possible progress of the greatest possible +number of conscious beings; and this law includes two chief mandates, a +negative and a positive mandate: (1) The individual may not receive more +than befits the position which, in consequence of his peculiar +qualities, he occupies among his kind; (2) but, on the other hand, the +capacities and impulses of every individual shall be as fully and +richly developed and satisfied as is consistent with the demands of the +life of the species as a whole. These two mandates follow with logical +necessity from the concept of society as a multiplicity of conscious +beings united into one whole. It is contrary to the unity of society, +that an individual, or that individuals, should be wilfully preferred to +others; every exceptional position must be justified by the demands of +the general conditions of life; on the other hand, a society is the more +perfect the more freely and more independently the single members move, +and the larger the number of different possibilities it realizes, if, at +the same time, unity is preserved and attains an ever higher character +and ever increasing validity. + +When the ethical feeling develops, upon the basis of sympathy, to the +feeling of duty and justice, the principle included in the above law +becomes the standard according to which the individual judges his own +actions as well as those of others, and pronounces them good or bad. The +good is that which preserves and develops the welfare of conscious +beings. + +The ethical principle now arrived at applies to the deeds of conscious +beings, presupposing an end in view. Unconscious nature affects man's +life, but its workings have no ethical character. The ethical judgment +is itself determined by the principle on which it is pronounced, and +hence it serves to produce greater welfare. This is especially to be +seen where the judging and the acting individual are one and the same +person; in other cases, it becomes a special problem to bring the acting +individual to the recognition of the principle; this is a problem of +psychologic-pedagogical nature. + +The word "welfare" is used in preference to utility or happiness in +order to prevent misunderstanding, and may be defined as including all +that serves to satisfy the needs of man's nature. Ethics must take into +consideration all the gradations of life, and cannot, therefore, +distinguish in the beginning between outer and inner, higher and lower, +welfare. Such a distinction is already an ethical judgment, and can be +made only after determination of the ethical criterion. Another mistake +is the stress often laid upon momentary feelings of pain and pleasure. +Pain signifies, it is true, the beginning of the disintegration of life, +and pleasure its normal and harmonious development; yet each must be +considered in its relation to the whole consciousness, the whole +character, and the whole social state. So-called utilitarianism has +injured its own cause by resolving consciousness into a sum of feelings, +and society into a collection of individuals. The significance of single +feelings of pain and pleasure for the welfare of society cannot be +determined as if the problem were a simple arithmetical one. + +The reasoning of Philosophical Ethics must not be confused with +practical reflection. In the last we are led by instincts and impulses, +by motives of which we are, for the most part, wholly unconscious, by +thoughts and feelings the first origin of which we cannot designate. We +follow the "positive morality" to which we have accustomed ourselves and +which is, in part, an inheritance of our species. Ethics as an art +precedes Ethics as a science; the aim of the latter is partly to show by +what principles the former is guided, and partly to correct these +principles. + +The ethical principle broadens out, thus, from the single moment of the +individual life until it embraces the whole of mankind; but there are +many points in the course of the development at which we can make a +stand, and there may, therefore, be as many philosophical systems as +there are larger or smaller totalities. The position of the man who +holds fast consistently to a principle that determines the criterion by +the family, the caste, the nation, a sect, as highest totality, is as +unassailable as we have seen that of the individualist to be. The +psychologic-historical evolution alone can bring us, through the changes +which it produces in the feelings, beyond these criterions. In other +words, every criterion has a psychologic-historical basis. He who is to +recognize and carry out practically the principle of the greatest +possible welfare, must be no egoist or individualist, no fanatical +patriot or sectarian; this is the subjective condition necessary to the +objective principle. The conscience which is to be regulated by the +objective principle is always itself the condition of the recognition of +this principle. A system which leaves this fact out of consideration +takes on a dogmatic character. The basis of all ethical judgments is +feeling. By this is not meant, however, that the standpoint of an +individual cannot be influenced by argument; the feelings are always +connected with concepts, and discussion of these concepts is both +possible and must react upon them even if only very gradually. + +Conscience is not infallible in its application of the objective +principle; a wider experience may show it to have erred. Conscience is +highest authority, but still an authority which may continually perfect +itself. The objective principle makes possible the mutual correction of +different consciences and the self-correction of the conscience of the +individual through self-judgment. + +The difference between Subjective Ethics and Objective Ethics, as here +explained, does not coincide with the difference between Individual +Ethics and Social Ethics. Objective Ethics includes both the latter, +since it recognizes individual peculiarities. It has yet to be decided +whether, within the bounds of Objective Ethics, Individual Ethics and +Social Ethics are dependent upon each other, or whether one, and if one +then which one, determines the other. It has to be decided whether, +according to the principle of welfare, the free self-development of the +individual is to be limited by the conditions of social life, or _vice +versa_. Within the limits of Objective Ethics, there may arise an +Individualism of another sort than that before mentioned, founded, not +upon the sovereignty of the individual, but upon the principle of +welfare, which demands as many independent and peculiar points of +departure for action as possible. The like is true, also, of the +question of smaller organizations within larger ones. + +The history of Ethics shows us that the ethical judgment of actions at +first regarded the outer act itself and its results, but was gradually +extended to include the motive, the disposition, the character of the +acting subject. It is perfectly natural that regard should first be +attracted to that which is the object of sense-perception. Moreover, +action at an earlier stage of development is essentially reflex action, +and the expression of instinct; the motives are simple and transparent, +and interest does not linger long with them. The great revolutions in +Ethics appear as essentially progress with regard to the importance +accorded, in ethical judgment, to the inner factors of action. This +greater inwardness is combined with a generalization; for the rejection +of a motive is the rejection of all action occasioned by it, and the +ethical acceptance of a motive the acceptance of all action springing +from it. Hence the transference of regard to inner conditions represents +a great simplification of the ethical law. Examples of such a +transference may be found in the rupture between Christianity and +Judaism, and between Protestantism and Catholicism. + +In this way, too, Objective Ethics leads to Subjective Ethics. The +objective judgment not only presupposes a subjective basis, but also +finds some of its best objects in actions which spring from the same +mental constitution which is the basis of the judgment. Here, the basis +of mental constitution and the motive coincide; the ethical law demands +the existence of the moral disposition by which it itself exists in the +species. This Kant expresses in the assertion that it is a duty to +possess conscience. Since the recognition of duties presupposes the +existence of conscience, it might seem as if here were an argument in a +circle. But that this is an illusion may be seen from the fact that the +basis of ethical judgment and the motive do not necessarily coincide and +that it is not necessarily an imperfection when they do not coincide. It +may be necessary in some cases, in accordance with the principle of +welfare, that other motives than the sense of duty shall guide the +action; it may be necessary and healthful, for example, that in some +cases man should be led by the instinct of self-preservation, or by an +immediate sympathy, to labor for the welfare of others, and that +conscience should not be aroused in every single act. It may even be a +sign of perfection when actions that demand exertion and sacrifice are +carried out without the intervention of a sense of duty. Indeed, mental +drill in the end renders that which at first took place by means of a +long psychological process of reflection and will, direct and without +special consciousness of its reason. + +All Ethics is practical Idealism. All systems assume an end, and an end +is not anything at present existing, but something which ought to be. +All systems assume, therefore, strong feeling, impulse, and endeavor, +combined with the image of that which is the object of the endeavor. But +the ideal must have points of contact with actuality, so that at least +an approach to it is practicable; it must be physically, +psychologically, and historically possible. + +Ethical ideals deviate from the actual in three ways. In the first +place, there is often in actual willing and doing something directly +opposed to the principle of welfare. In this case, the office of Ethics +is to restrain and forbid. To this function corresponds, in the +practical life of the will, the hemming by which involuntary, original, +or acquired impulses and inclinations are repressed. Again, actual +willing and doing often exhibit only a weak and imperfect realization +of that which Ethics demands. Here there must be an increase in the +degree as well as in the extent of the realization. To this corresponds, +in the practical life of the will, effort and attention, the power of +the will, through its influence upon conceptions and feelings, to react +upon itself. And finally, there may be, in willing and doing, a lack of +unity and harmony; various opposed tendencies and impulses may make +themselves felt. Here a process of harmonizing and concentration is +necessary. And to this corresponds, in the practical life of the will, a +drilling in connected action and trains of thought, and in the power to +make an end of reflection by decision. In all three cases, the principle +of welfare is to be followed; and the three processes are to be applied +not only in the development of the individual but also in that of +societies, and of the species. + +That which manifests itself in conscience is a species-instinct. In the +feeling of judgment, the relation between central and peripheral factors +finds expression, neither of which, and least of all the central +factors, are developed by individual experience, but both of which are, +on the contrary, the product of the experience of the species. What Kant +called the Categorical Imperative is, in fact, an instinct; and every +instinct speaks unconditionally, categorically, gives no reasons and +admits of no excuse. + +No instinct finds expression without the existence of conditions which +call it forth; but all manner of individual and social circumstances may +furnish such conditions. + +When conscience begins to be conscious of its office, it manifests +itself as an Impulse.[77] The thought of actions which the instinctive +judgment has recognized, or to the performance of which it has perhaps +incited, is combined with pleasure, the conception of actions of the +opposite nature with pain. The tendency arises to linger with the former +and to repeat them, and to turn from the latter, if no stronger impulses +of another sort make themselves felt. + +Conscience may develop, without losing entirely its instinctive or +impulsive character, to practical reason. This takes place through the +development of the conceptions which determine the conscience as +impulse, to greater clearness and distinctness. When conscience acts as +instinct, the individual does not know what he does. If it acts as +impulse, he has a dawning consciousness of his acts. And when it +becomes practical reason, there arises a clear consciousness of ethical +laws and ethical ideals. In different individuals, conscience may appear +in very different forms and degrees, as instinct, impulse, practical +reason, sense of duty, sense of justice. Sometimes it appears as mainly +negative and restraining, sometimes again as chiefly positive, partly +harmonizing and partly increasing. Here it appears as enthusiastic +devotion, there as quiet and continuous tendency. It would be impossible +to name even the principal forms in which it may manifest itself, but it +is of great importance to call attention to the fact of these individual +differences, since we suffer at present from a dogmatism that has but +one measure for all these different manifestations. + +We must go a step farther still. There may be men who possess no +strictly ethical feeling and who do not need it. Such men do what they +can with their whole heart without applying any reflective standard to +their own or others' acts. They entirely absorb themselves with +unflagging zeal in a work that perfectly corresponds to their +capabilities and impulses, without any doubt of its rightfulness and +import. They may devote themselves to art and science, to the service of +society, or to their family. Or they belong to the class of happy +natures who spread light and joy by their mere existence. They act in +accordance with the law, without being in possession of the law, and +what objection can Ethics have to offer to this? Ethics is for the sake +of life, not life for the sake of Ethics. + +Since all ethical judgments have conscience for their psychological +basis, conscience is highest authority, highest law-giver, in comparison +with which every other authority is subordinate and derived. To wish to +go beyond one's conscience is to wish to go beyond oneself. When I yield +to another human being whose judgment I trust more than my own, this can +be justified only as it takes place through my conscience. Conscience is +infallible, if one understands by infallibility that it is, at every +instant, the highest judge; this infallibility does not mean, however, +that it does not err. Every earnest conviction takes the form of +conscience; the truth is not, however, secured by the mere form. Was it +not from conviction that Aristotle asserted the right of slavery, and +Calvin, with Melancthon's approval, sent Servetus to the stake? + +Not less dogmatic than Fichte's assertion that conscience never deceives +us, is the view which regards a system of Ethics as merely the science +of the forms of society and of outward acts, and thus declares +conscience to be without authority in comparison with outer +circumstances and their demands. The law which we obey must always +express itself in the form of conscience. The light which illumines for +us all other things must be within ourselves. + +Here we perceive the possibility of a conflict between Subjective Ethics +and Objective Ethics, between the two principles upon which Ethics is +founded. There can be no other solution to the problem than that we +shall follow the command of conscience, provided it speaks clearly and +after sufficient deliberation. It may be added that conscience can +correct and control itself, the later and more experienced conscience +criticising the earlier. As long as the individual acts according to his +best conviction, he is morally healthy; hence, from an ethical point of +view, a pernicious action carried out under the conviction that it is +good is to be preferred to a good action performed with the conviction +that it is bad. In the former case, the spring is pure; in the latter it +is corrupt. Only he who has courage to make mistakes can accomplish +anything great. It is not the cold and narrow, but those who are zealous +for the true and good, who thus err. + +The power of self-correction can be developed only when some definite +principle or criterion may be found. Such a principle is that of +welfare. The problem of the application of this principle to action is, +however, like that of the application of the principle of causality to +actual phenomena, an endless one. + +In close relation to the concept of Authority stands that of Sanction. +The Authority commands or forbids, the Sanction enables the command or +prohibition to remain in force. The sanction consists in the pain or +pleasure connected with the observation or transgression of the command, +in the reward or punishment which one brings on oneself through one's +action, in the heaven or hell which one approaches by the action. It is +only, however, when the authority itself is an outward one that the +sanction holds this outward relation to the action. In this outward form +it has no immediate ethical significance. The ethical character of an +action is dependent, in subjective regard, on its origin in the +intention of the performer, in objective regard, on its harmony with the +principle of welfare. What ethical significance could it have that here +a feeling of pain or pleasure not arising from the action itself, is +added to it? The outer sanction of reward and punishment is thus but an +educating sanction. The inner sanction consists in a feeling of harmony +and unity with one's own highest convictions, of consistency between +one's ideas and one's actual willing. Thus arises an inner peace that +may be stronger than all contradiction and opposition from without. + +Such an inner sanction is not only an effect of the action, but a +feeling already present before the action. It was the preservation and +full development of this feeling that led to the decision and made it +possible. Blessedness, says Spinoza, is not the reward of virtue, but +virtue itself. + +The manner in which the ethical is so often made dependent upon certain +fixed religious or speculative assumptions must be, from an ethical +point of view, matter for great solicitude. In the first place, it is +easy to suppose that the man who no longer respects these dogmas may +have emancipated himself also from the ethical maxims dependent upon +them, and would be most consistent if he acted in accordance with the +principle: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." In the second +place, action is reft of its ethical character when the attention is +directed to things outside its essence and origin, and considerations of +reward and punishment are declared to be a necessary motive. Not even a +belief in progress within the world of experience can have any absolute +worth for Ethics. It may be theoretically difficult to maintain such a +belief; and even if the victorious direction of evolution were shown to +be unfavorable to Ethics, ethical principles would not be destroyed. +Simply the problems would be different; pity and resignation would +acquire greater importance. Wherever the ethical disposition were +present, it would take the side of the conquered and remain upon that +side though the gods themselves were with the conquerors. Ethical worth +does not depend upon mere might. + +The birth-hour of conscience is the time when, through the difference +between ideal and actuality, a certain feeling arises. Its death-hour +would be the instant in which the difference forever disappeared. Such a +disappearance might occur in two ways, either through the conquest of +the ideal by actuality or through that of actuality by the ideal. The +objection has been made to the theory of evolution that it fulfilled +the first of these possibilities, and so left no room for Ethics. But +the very fact of the existence of ethical impulses as the actual result +of evolution would seem to belie this theory. And indeed, we see that +evolution is not physical growth alone, but mental as well; and that the +important feature of man's development consists in his aspiration +through desires and impulses, which act as moving forces in his life. +Aspiration is necessary to his evolution, and indifference and lack of +sensibility an obstacle to it. The theory of evolution leads directly to +Ethics, in that it shows that the struggle for existence becomes, in its +higher forms, a common struggle for the continuance and development of +human life. The theory of evolution takes us, indeed, not only to, but +beyond, Ethics; for, according to Spencer, the ethical sense is but an +intermediate condition in a development toward a state of "organic +morality," where right-doing will be involuntary and natural, and a +special ethical sense no longer existent or necessary. Such a state +would constitute the realization of the second alternative mentioned +above, with which Ethics would come to an end. This state is +conceivable, and Ethics could have no objection to offer to it. Yet we +are still far from such a condition, and though we may strengthen our +courage and hope with the thought of a continual progress of human +nature, yet the assumption of such an end to evolution cannot have an +essential influence upon the method of Ethics. + +We must, in fact, suppose that progress will bring us new problems and +new ideals, that, as the Ethics of the civilized man includes whole +provinces unknown to the savage, so many relations will certainly +present themselves in the future whose ethical significance our present +thick-skinned condition, our ignorance and egoism, prevent us from +comprehending. + +Can one do more than one's duty? From the standpoint of ethical systems +which are founded on authority or any outward principle, this question +may be answered in the affirmative. The Roman Catholic Church +distinguishes, for instance, between that which is commanded and that +which, beyond the command, is merely advised. But he who follows an +inward sanction cannot but feel that he has done no more than his duty +when he has done all that lies in his power for the welfare of mankind. +It may be right, from a pedagogical standpoint, to give especial praise +to actions that tower above the usual; he who performs them, however, +only then possesses the right spirit when he feels that he has done no +more than his duty, and could not have done otherwise. Even from a +pedagogical standpoint, the difference between duty and merely +counselled action, beyond the duty commanded, can be only a relative +one; that which is, upon a lower plane of development, merely advised, +becomes, upon a higher plane, one of the most elementary duties; mercy +to the conquered may be a high virtue in a savage, but to the civilized +man it is a primary rule of morals. + +It is of the highest importance to keep in mind the fact that conscience +itself is a cause, and that ethical judgment, arising as a feeling, +takes part, by its influence upon the will, in the ethical evolution +towards highest welfare. Keeping this in mind, it is easy to see that +Ethics not only calls for no limitation of the law of Causality, but +that such a limitation would be pernicious, even destructive, to Ethics. + +There are at least six different significations in which the expression +"freedom of the will" may be used. + +It may be used to denote absence of outward constraint; but this might +rather be called a freedom of action than a freedom of the will. + +It may be used to denote absence of inner constraint; the will which +springs from pain or fear is often called unfree in distinction from the +will which springs from pleasure or hope. + +It may refer to energy and vitality of the will. Here the stress is laid +upon the amount which the will can accomplish, not, however, upon its +independence of causes. One can be a determinist and yet concede that +the will plays an important part in the world; or one can be an +indeterminist and yet assume that free will plays but a small part in +the world. + +By freedom of the will is often meant the power of choice. This freedom +is not opposed, however, to causality, but to blindness of action, +subjection to momentary impulses. "Free will" denotes, in this case, +self-conscious will. + +Or the word "freedom" may refer to the will as ruled by ethical motives. +In this sense, only the good man is free. This significance of the word +is the oldest, comes down to us from Socrates, and is used by Augustine, +Spinoza, and many others. + +But the sense of the word "freedom" with which the strife between +Determinism and Indeterminism has to do is that in accordance with +which a free will is not subject to the law of Causality, is not, like +other phenomena, a link in the chain of causes, but is, on the contrary, +a cause, without being an effect. To be free in will is, according to +this definition, to will without cause,--independent of all that has +gone before. + +Indeterminism destroys the bond between the individual and his kind, +between the individual and the rest of existence. Indeterminism is hence +unable to regard existence as a totality. Every deeper philosophical or +religious conception becomes, thus, impossible; the only religious +conception consistent with Indeterminism is Polytheism, since every +being that can form the absolute beginning of a chain of causes is a +little god, an absolute being. This fact is to be noted, for the reason +that Determinism is sometimes designated as a godless doctrine. + +The assertion that the will is without cause, and the assertion that we +ourselves are the cause of our willing, are two different assertions. +The last finds a cause in our nature. Thoughts and feelings, tendencies, +instincts, and impulses arise in us, and in these the origin of the acts +of the will is to be sought. + +If the will, or a part of it, is not subject to the law of Causality, it +stands in relation to the whole personality as something isolated and +accidental. The Indeterminist who asserts that Determinism makes man a +mere machine, himself makes of him something much meaner, something +incoherent and accidental. Ethical judgment is based upon the assumption +that my action is mine; it is, therefore, clear and certain only when +motives and the decision they cause are known. The less my actions can +be understood by knowledge of my character, the more easily I may be +regarded as irresponsible. Although law regards, by its nature, action +and not motive, yet even the judge must gain an insight into the +motives, the outer and inner relations from which the deed originated, +both in order to determine the degree of punishment necessary, and in +order even to be fully persuaded that the action really took place. + +Many recent Indeterminists designate the freedom of the will as +exceedingly small. They thus extend the dissolution of the unity of +existence and of the unity of personality to the act of willing itself. +Moreover, if responsibility depends upon freedom, it is impossible to +see how reward and punishment are to be justified upon this standpoint; +since the individual can say with reason that he is not guilty with +respect to the whole, but only with respect to a very small part of his +act. + +The words Responsibility, Guilt, Accountability, are taken, like so many +other ethical expressions, from Jurisprudence, or rather they come to us +from a time when the distinction between the province of Jurisprudence +and that of Ethics had not yet been recognized. That I am made +accountable for my action means that I stand as the one to whom reward +or punishment for the deed is meted out. _For what reason_ the action is +rewarded or punished is a question by itself. + +In relation to Ethics, the feeling of guilt, of responsibility or +accountability, signifies that my act is subjected to the judgment of +conscience. If I find discord between my act and that which I recognize +as good, remorse arises,--a feeling of inner disharmony, unworthiness, +and self-contempt which may increase until it becomes the greatest +psychical pain. This feeling may be defined, from a deterministic +standpoint, as dissatisfaction with oneself because one has not acted +otherwise, and the wish that one had done so. This wish arises in the +moment of reflection, when one weighs one's act. From the present wish +is not, however, to be concluded that one could just as well have acted +otherwise _at the moment the act took place_. Such an illusion dates the +experience dearly bought with mistake and remorse back to an earlier +period. According to the theory of retribution, remorse must be greatest +in him who has committed the greatest crime. This is not so, however; +since remorse arises from a contrast between ideal and act, which +contrast can take place only when the conception of the ideal is strong; +the purest and best characters often have the strongest feelings of +remorse. + +Remorse first arises when a new attitude of mind is attained different +from that which ruled at the time of the action. Time is necessary for +this new feeling to replace the old, if it is to be more than a +momentary passion, and during this interval the two feelings are both +active in consciousness. This is the time of the birth-pains by which +the new character comes into being. The significance of remorse lies in +the fact that it urges forward, that it gives birth to impulse and +endeavor after a higher plane. Only because remorse is a _motive_, is it +of ethical nature. + +If the law of Causality were not active in the realm of the psychical, +this ethical endeavor would be hopeless. Only where order reigns can +the will accomplish anything. Only as we know the law of outer nature, +and know what conditions must be produced in order to bring about a +certain result, can we serve our own ends in this province; and the like +is true in our relation to human nature. Here the problem is to find +motives of the right sort and of sufficient strength. Of what use were +all possible exertion if, under given conditions, the same motive were +followed by now this, now the other entirely different decision. I am +master of my future willing only in so far as a causal relation exists +between my present and my future will. We find, therefore, that the +reason why responsibility goes no further back in the causal chain than +the will, is this: that it is the will which is to be acted on and +altered. That which precedes the act of the will interests us, +ethically, only in so far as it influences the will. + +It is a strange assertion, sometimes made, that the consistent +Determinist must be a mere spectator of his own and others' lives. As if +one could feel no pain or pleasure and no desire to interfere, because +one believes life to be subject to law. It is true that theoretical +study may weaken practical interest; but Indeterminism is a theory as +well as Determinism. + +What the ethically bad is follows from what has already been said. It +consists of a more or less conscious isolation of the single moment in +the life of the individual, or of the single individual in the life of +the species, such that not only a hindrance to the welfare of individual +or species arises, but also a relaxation of energy and a diminution of +the coherence of individual or species. In most such cases, inertia is +at work. The one moment demands to be lived without any consideration of +others, the individual will not move outside the circle of his own +interests. Such a resistance to influence may be unconscious. It may be +authorized in so far as it is a condition of the development of real +willing that action shall not immediately respond to impression. In this +resistance lies, therefore, the germ of the ethical as well as the +non-ethical life of the will. The clearer consciousness becomes, the +more this inertia takes on the character of defiance. Or the discord +felt through consciousness of the good may be so painful that the +individual desires to free himself at any price. In this case, no +remorse is felt; on the contrary, the individual seeks to dull the +awakened consciousness, or to get rid of it. + +It is important to note that conceptions develop, in this connection, +faster than feelings. And as long as the former do not find points of +connection with the existing feelings, they will have no practical +influence. The bad consists in the persistence, from inertia or +defiance, upon a lower plane of development after the consciousness of a +higher has arisen. Evil is the animal in man, the remains of an earlier +plane of life. From the instincts of self-preservation and +self-propagation in their most primitive forms, the ethically bad is +produced, and offers fierce resistance to harmonizing influences. + +Evil is, furthermore, a sociological phenomenon; the general +psychological elements take on different forms under different +historical conditions; society, in its different forms and functions, is +always one of the determining factors of its development. The criminal +is, like the saint, the child of his time. + +It appears, therefore, that the term "bad" is applied from a standpoint +not shared by him to whom it is applied. If the man who stands upon the +lower plane of morals possessed the full and clear consciousness that +the predicate of badness applied to his conduct, the corresponding +feelings and impulses must arise in him, and his conduct be altered. It +is psychologically impossible to act against our fixed and full +conviction, if this is not blunted by other impulses. + +The definition of the good must be, on different ethical planes, a +different one. But when a disinterested and universal sympathy +determines the ethical judgment, only that can be good which preserves +and adds to the welfare of conscious beings, increases their pleasure or +diminishes their pain. Every action which tends in this direction +without producing further results of an opposite nature, is authorized; +every action of which the opposite is true is to be rejected. + +Since, in general, pleasure is connected with the healthy and natural +use of the powers, with that which preserves and benefits life, and pain +is connected with the opposite of this, Ethics merely continues the work +begun by nature, in aiming at human progress, at as rich and harmonious +a development of human powers as is possible. The problems of Ethics +concern, therefore, the pleasures of the moment as well as those of the +whole life, the pleasures of the individual as well as those of the +whole species. This remains true even if we accept the pessimistic view +that all life is pain; the good would consist, from this point of view, +in as great alleviation of pain as possible. Even the ascetic tortures +himself only in order to gain greater good. + +The ethical end as welfare is not to be conceived as a state of +continuance on the same plane. Such a continuance is impossible; +evolution does not stand still; every step of progress creates new +needs, the satisfaction of which again demands endeavor; perfect +satisfaction is impossible. Even the development of sympathy makes it +easier to wound us in many ways and brings us larger duties. The need of +variety alone would make continuance upon one plane impossible; we labor +not only in order to arrive at conscious ends, but also in order to +relieve ourselves of accumulated energy. The highest end that we can +conceive is a progress in which each step is felt as a good because it +affords scope for action without over-exertion. + +Activity is also welfare. But it is so only in so far as it is healthful +activity; when the powers are over-exerted or dissipated in action, +having no common end, or when their application in one direction is at +the cost of other more important directions, progress ceases to be +welfare. The evolution of civilization contains an element of blindness +and heedlessness which is bound up with both its excellencies and its +faults. But civilization is not an act of choice; it is the continuance +of the evolution of nature. Progress is necessary; it is impossible to +remain upon any level attained. Ethics must, therefore, accept progress +as a fact. It does not feel an admiration for an order of nature in +which no advance appears possible without one-sidedness and dissipation +of energy. It is not so hard-hearted that it could forget, in the +seeming splendor of outward results, the anxiety and pain, the sweat and +blood, with which these were won. It demands, therefore, that the heavy +burdens be lightened, the scattered forces united, and all capabilities +that are of worth developed. On the other hand, Ethics is not so +sentimental and short-sighted that it could forget that progress can +take place only through exertion and suffering. Its chief task with +regard to progress is to impress upon the mind the fact that life should +not be made a mere means to the solution of impersonal problems. +Civilization is a means for the individual, not _vice versa_. + +The natural division of Ethics is into Individual Ethics and Social +Ethics. It has sometimes been assumed that the whole duty of man could +be summed up in Individual Ethics. However, it is not necessarily true +that that which assists the best development of the individual serves +society as a whole also. When the attention is directed so excessively +to oneself, the general welfare is likely to be forgotten. On the other +hand, a too great subjection of individual interests makes a man a mere +parasite, robbing him of all self-dependence. When Ethics condemns the +instinct of self-preservation, it condemns its own means. If the impulse +to self-preservation, self-assertion, and self-development were evil, +then our essential nature would be evil, and Ethics would be impossible. +The right relation of the two principles is given in the principle of +welfare. Mill's book "On Liberty" denies the ethical significance of +self-development and forgets the individual's oneness with his kind, in +declaring personal vices of no importance to the general welfare. That +which Mill wished to defend was the freedom of the individual, the loss +of which through the compulsion of society and the "moral police" he +feared. But he might have accomplished this purpose without denying the +ethical value of self-development. There is nothing that is a ground for +greater solicitude than the mistake that public opinion and Ethics are +one, and that a condition of things is no longer a subject for ethical +condemnation when no outer power has the right to denounce it. + +The first question which presents itself in Individual Ethics is: How is +the individual to educate himself to an ethical personality? Here the +development and strengthening of the ethical principle as governing and +determining the life of the individual is concerned. The problem is one +with the determination of the chief virtue which includes all other +ethical qualities. This virtue is justice, which includes in itself the +two groups contained under Self-assertion and Self-sacrifice.[78] + +In the application of this general theory of Ethics, Höffding maintains +the radical-conservative and individual-social position already stated. +The principle of welfare demands the reconciliation of the free +development of the individual and the progress of society as a whole; +the individual does not live to himself alone, hence the state has a +right to demand sacrifices; but it must always be able to show good +reason for such; the burden of proof lies with the side which would take +away the most valuable possession of the individual,--the right to free +self-development in the ever-shifting direction of his need. This very +characteristic of change makes it impossible for the state to decide for +the individual what are his needs, and how they may be satisfied; hence +the best course of the state is a chiefly restrictive one. The relation +between state-help and self-help must be exactly the reverse of that +which Socialism, in remarkable agreement with Bureaucracy and +Absolutism, asserts. Socialism presupposes not only perfection in the +governed but also perfection in the persons to whom the government is +entrusted. It assumes, moreover, that pleasure in activity and its +resulting power of originality and invention would not be weakened if +men's right of initiative were taken from them and their needs +determined by others. Much of the good even now accomplished by the +state in its functions is due to the competition with individual +undertakings. + +Philanthropy, on the part of individuals as on that of the state, will +best follow this same principle of indirect aid, in order to obtain the +best results through education of character. Organization is desirable +on the part of individuals, but the state will achieve best results by +acting through smaller organizations which afford a wider field and the +possibility of more intelligent work. In its methods of punishment, +also, the state must have regard, not only to prevention through fear, +but also and chiefly to the bettering of the criminal character; capital +punishment and life-long imprisonment cannot be justified from a higher +ethical standpoint. Freedom should be allowed and tolerance shown the +various religious sects as corresponding to various needs. The more +liberal education of woman, which will make her capable of greater +independence of thought and action, is one of the chief means to the +solution of the marriage-question. The ideal of marriage is free +monogamy; in polygamy, the purely physical must always rule; that part +of self which one can surrender to many can be only the animal; long +association and sympathy alone admit to the sanctuary of love. It +belongs to the nature of true love to believe in its own endlessness; it +is, therefore, incompatible with its nature to arrange for a mere +temporary union. Yet where an unhappy union exists, divorce should be +permitted. Strict divorce laws have always fettered and burdened nobler +natures, while light-minded people have easily found means of escape. + +The view that the artist occupies a peculiar position in his ideal +world, must free himself from the actual world, and live only for his +ideal, is ethically false; art should lend form to actual life, defining +and clarifying it, broadening the view and educating sympathy. A great +artist is, at the same time, half a prophet; his whole people and epoch +must learn to know themselves through him. Freedom is to be regarded as +both means and end. A representative government is not only an education +for the people, who through freedom alone can learn to use freedom, but +affords the state, moreover, a firmer foundation in the consciousness of +its citizens that they are responsible for the existing condition of +things. + +The development of conscience in force and extent takes place through +thought and imagination. Knowledge alone is not enough; it must be fixed +by exercise,--made a persistent thought, until it becomes, by means of +the laws of association, such a thought as will easily come in play +whenever the case requires it. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[77] Trieb. + +[78] Selbstbehauptung und Hingebung. + + + + +GEORG VON GIZYCKI + +"MORAL PHILOSOPHY" ("Moralphilosophie," 1889) + + +Moral Philosophy has a scientific and a practical office. Its scientific +task is to supply the human being with a clearer, more thorough +understanding, founded on ultimate reasons, of his moral life. Its +practical task is to answer the important question: How am I to act? How +shall I order my life? + +It was not left to science first to direct human action. Custom and law +seek to order the doing and leaving undone of the members of society. +Ethical philosophy ascertains means of testing the actually existing +ideas of morality, and thus enables us to better law and custom. + +A highest criterion, one only, is necessary, by which to judge of the +morality of a deed. If there were more than one, the judgment might fall +out differently from the different standpoints furnished by these. + +When I regard the qualities which I consider morally good, I perceive +that they all have a direction conducive to the general welfare or +happiness; and when I regard the qualities which I consider morally bad, +I find that they all have an aim prejudicial to the general welfare or +happiness. + +When I attempt to convince any one that certain conduct which he +considers right is wrong, by showing him that it is opposed to the +general welfare, my final appeal is to his conscience. And in the same +manner, when I correct some of my own moral conceptions, it is my +conscience which determines me to the proof of them, and my conscience +which is the standard that determines my decision. Conscience is the +principle underlying my moral convictions. But I do not possess, in +conscience, a moral power which never errs; hence it behooves me to +judge carefully. Body and mind both have their laws on which depend the +welfare and happiness of society; the last results of science and human +experience give us these laws. + +There are few things in regard to which there is so great unanimity as +there is in regard to the right and good. In the fundamental questions, +all the more highly civilized peoples are, for the most part, agreed. + +On the lowest planes of civilization, only the narrowest tribal +association is taken into consideration in morals, but gradually, with +the growth of experience, growth of the understanding, which permits the +recognition, in a much higher degree, of the results of action and the +power of sympathy, ever larger circles of human beings are +regarded,--the tribe, the nation, the whole of mankind, all sentient +beings. In this development of conscience and benevolence, there is +nothing to cause moral uncertainty or contempt of conscience; for, in +that case, the fact that there was once a time when human beings were +not on the earth must be a reason for contempt of everything human. + +We call various different things good, of worth, others bad, evil; there +must be something common to all these, on account of which we apply the +common term to them. That which is thus common to them is their relation +to a consciousness for which they are good or bad, and not to a merely +perceiving consciousness, but to one that feels and wills. As true and +false relate to the intellectual side of human nature, so do good and +bad relate to the side of feeling and will. Such things are good as are +the mediate or immediate cause of agreeable states of consciousness or +of the prevention or removal of disagreeable states; and on the other +hand, such things are bad as are the cause of pain or the hindrance of +pleasure. We say of these things that they are agreeable or +disagreeable. Or we may use, instead of "agreeable," the term "object +of desire," and instead of "disagreeable," the term "object of +aversion"; for all that is agreeable has an attractive influence upon +the will, and all that is disagreeable or painful has a repellant one. +Joy is that condition of consciousness which we seek to attain and +preserve, whose existence we prefer to its non-existence; and pain is +that state of consciousness which we seek to avoid and destroy, whose +non-existence we prefer to its existence. + +The good is often defined as that which conduces to some end; but an end +is nothing other than something willed; that which conduces to an end is +the cause of something that is willed, so that this explanation also +refers back to a consciousness. + +Whatever is existent for us must be existent in us, in our +consciousness. Our states of consciousness are either painful, or +indifferent, or pleasant. We must turn, therefore, in the last analysis, +not to things, but to the mind, if we wish to distinguish what is good +and what is bad; and according to the differing constitution of +different minds, the same things may be good or bad. There is good and +bad with respect to our body or senses, and good and bad with respect to +our mind. A moral good is one which causes conscious states of moral +satisfaction. + +The good has often been divided into the useful and the agreeable. The +agreeable is that which causes immediate, the useful that which causes +mediate pleasure. A thing may be both useful and agreeable; and the like +is true of the disagreeable and the harmful. The useful and the harmful +in this, as it were inner, (subjective) sense, are to be distinguished +from the useful and the harmful in an objective sense; in the last +sense, that is useful which tends to the preservation of life. Between +the useful and harmful, and the pleasurable and painful, in this sense, +there must exist, as the theory of evolution teaches us, a wide-reaching +correspondence. Living beings do that which is pleasurable to them; they +avoid that which is painful; they continue alive when they do that which +is conducive to life and avoid that which is harmful to life. This +continuous process of exterminating those beings to whom the harmful is +agreeable and the useful painful, must tend to make the harmful coincide +with the painful, and the useful with the pleasurable. The agreement is, +however, far from being a perfect one; and it is the less so, the more +complicated are the conditions of life. It is the most imperfect in +human beings. + +Good is that which causes pleasure or prevents pain; that is better +which causes more pleasure or prevents more pain. A thing may cause both +joy and pain; in this case, the excess decides whether a thing is good +or bad; and the greater the excess, the better or the worse is the +thing. The greatest possible excess of satisfied states of consciousness +in the life of a human being one may call his greatest possible +happiness. The greatest possible happiness is hence the standard by +which good and evil are determined. + +From these reflections is to be seen that a distinction is to be made +between that which is _desired_ and that which is _desirable_. All that +is desired is pleasurable, yet much that is pleasurable has pain for its +result,--pain that is far greater than the momentary pleasure. + +The good is often considered as opposed to the agreeable, and the bad as +opposed to the disagreeable or painful. In this case, by pain and +pleasure are understood feelings of the moment, by good and bad are +understood enduring, or at least long-continuing causes of lasting or +oft-recurring pain or pleasure; momentary pleasure may be bought at the +expense of long suffering; and short pain may be the condition of the +prevention of greater evil. + +A thing may be good as regards one individual, bad as regards another. A +thing is truly good as regards a society when its total effect has for +the society lasting beneficial results, that is, accords with the +happiness of the society during its whole existence; and that is for +mankind truly good which is, in its total effect, beneficial to present +and future humanity. + +In general, we may say that, when we order our conduct by the thought to +serve mankind to the best of our ability, we have a satisfied +consciousness, a good conscience. In so far, therefore, a noble deed is +good for ourselves as well as for society. The question whether or not +the performance of our duty corresponds to our greatest possible +happiness, is a different one. But the good man does not allow this +thought the chief role in consciousness; he is filled with the thought +of doing his duty in devoting himself to the happiness of mankind, and +there is but _one_ form of his own happiness which he will not forego, +namely, the blessedness of a good conscience. This consciousness, this +blessedness which unites the human being to mankind, he should regard +as his highest good; for it is a moral good; and the dissatisfaction +which lies in the consciousness of having violated his duty towards +mankind he should regard as the greatest evil. + +It may be objected that this morally satisfied consciousness, this sort +of joy, cannot be called a good. A good is the _cause_ of pleasurable +states of consciousness. But it would appear strange to claim that joy, +happiness, are not goods, and pain, unhappiness, not evils; the terms +"good" and "evil" and "worth" refer not only to joy and suffering, but +also to _desire_ and _will_; and no one doubts that happiness is an +object of desire, and pain an object of aversion. + +From what has been said it appears that happiness cannot be defined as +"satisfaction of the desires." Such satisfaction may have unhappiness as +its result. Not all desires are to be satisfied simply because they are +desires. + +The study of the history of moral conceptions appears to show us that +most changes in this province are the result of a change of views +concerning the effects of actions with regard to the welfare of society; +hence, that they were the fruit of experience. This process of change +takes place, however, very gradually; the rules which are the result of +experience are handed down, for the most part, without statement of +reasons; and only in a very limited measure do the new generations labor +for a progressive development of moral conceptions. We cannot wonder +that a clear consciousness of the highest reasons of moral precepts is +seldom to be found. Yet in civilized societies, the conviction is +general that at least an average conformity to rules of morality is the +indispensable condition of the safety and the good of society. The +answer to the question: What would happen if every one were to act thus? +has been regarded, from earliest times, as decisive with regard to the +moral quality of an act. + +When we recognize that actions which we call good and bad are so called +because of their causal relation to pain and pleasure, the belief must +arise in us, that the worth of qualities of character depends on the +promise they contain of future action. The most important power for the +happiness or misery of humanity is the character of human beings. Hence +the morally good, excellence of character, is to be regarded as +preëminently Good. And so it appears that our instinctive judgments are +justified by the deliberations of calm reason. + +The question: Why shall I act in accordance with the general welfare? is +answered by these considerations; because such action is right and +reasonable, enjoined by conscience and reason, by human nature itself in +its higher development. He who does not recognize this fact, who does +not find in it the highest and holiest of commandments, and who yet +desires to act reasonably and well, recognizing duties to all men, does +not see what he himself really will. + +The conception of right-doing is the motive of the human being, in so +far as he is good. The teacher who desires to have moral influence will +endeavor to awaken this motive in his hearers or readers. For this +purpose he must appeal to their actual characters. And it is as much a +_petitio principii_ to assume, in Ethics, the existence of moral +feelings, as to assume, in Optics, the existence of sight. Just as there +are blind persons, so there are persons without moral feelings. These +are, however, comparatively few; some trace of moral feeling, of +conscience, is to be found in almost every member of society. + +The general welfare, that is, the greatest possible true happiness of +all, not the greatest happiness of the smallest number which is often +the ruling principle of state laws, nor the greatest happiness of the +greatest number without consideration of the minority,--is the highest +ethical criterion. It may be difficult to ascertain wherein this +happiness consists; Bentham demands, for the determination of the worth +of an action, a calculation of the intensity, duration, certainty, +fecundity, and purity, of the feelings produced by it. But the happiness +and misery of mankind is surely the most important object of mankind; it +must be, therefore, our highest care to ascertain the results of an +action _as far as we are able_. And, in fact, the most important results +of any form of action are generally ascertainable. + +To make endeavor after one's own and others' perfection the criterion of +morality is to set up a false standard, a form without a content, since +"perfection" designates merely a state that accords with some +preconceived concept or end. The question is: What end shall human +perfection realize? The criterion of general welfare alone can define +human perfection. It is such a constitution of man's bodily and +spiritual characteristics as conduces in the highest degree to general +happiness. + +Too long and detailed a consideration of possible results is not +desirable in every case where action is called for. There is seldom time +for a consideration of the intensity, duration, etc., of resulting pain +and pleasure. It is well, in most cases, to follow the general moral +rules we have attained to through previous reflection. In cases of +doubt, we need to appeal to our highest criterion. Often such doubt may +be caused by selfishness, by the hidden desire to act, after all, for +our own benefit; we need, therefore, to put to ourselves the question: +How would we judge the action of another in our own position? Thus we +arrive at the highest moral commandment, which is: So act that thy +conduct, if made general, would be for the good of mankind. And the +force of example is here one of the factors to be considered. + +It has been asked what right one has to assert the rule that each one is +to count for one, and no one for more than one, in moral decisions. May +not one human being's capacity for happiness be greater than another's, +and his happiness, therefore, more to be considered? It may be answered +that bad men have never been embarrassed for an excuse for selfishness, +but that the arrogance of regarding one's own happiness as of greater +worth than that of others has brought incalculable harm into the world, +and that the only safe method of calculation for the purpose of +furthering the general welfare, is the rule above given,--that each one +shall count as one and no more. + +The rule that the greatest possible happiness of _all_ is to be striven +for, is an assertion that the happiness of every one is to be +considered, that not that of the lowest human being is to be interfered +with unless such interference is _necessary_ in order to prevent still +greater harm to others; and that no such interference shall be greater +than is positively necessary in accordance with this aim. The highest +moral law is thus nothing more than the Christian commandment of love to +all men. And the rule "To count each as one, no more," may receive the +restrictive clause "in so far as the good of the whole of society is not +diminished by so doing." + +Some Darwinians are inclined to regard the preservation of existence as +the criterion by which to judge the moral quality of action. "Aim for +the preservation of the species" would be, from their standpoint, the +moral law. But mere existence is not happiness; that is shown by the +fact of suicide. However, it is true that health is one of the +conditions of happiness. Pessimists are generally men of an unhappy +temperament, often of morbid physical constitution; medical science +must, in its progress, help to prevent the development of such morose +dispositions. Want of love may also be a cause of pessimism; most +pessimists have been lonely men. And want of employment may also lead to +pessimism. If we follow Rousseau's advice not to listen to those who are +in exceptional abnormal positions, but appeal to those who constitute +the great majority, we shall conclude that, in general, the happiness of +men greatly exceeds their misery. The increase of suicide is often used +as an argument that civilization has not caused an increase, but a +decrease, of happiness. To this argument it may be answered that the +religious scruples which formerly withheld men from this extreme step +have diminished, that men have grown more self-conscious and independent +in action; and that, moreover, our age is one of unrest, a +transition-period such as no other period has been. When we examine the +lives of tribes on a low plane of civilization, we find their existence +full of uncertainty and of superstitious fear, and at the mercy of the +forces of nature. Without doubt, much misery exists; a great part of it, +however, is caused by the disappointment of too extreme demands for +happiness; the individual must not require that life shall be continuous +rapture. + +The recognition of what right action is, is not its accomplishment. Pain +and pleasure determine the will,--the pain and pleasure of the person +who wills, since he cannot feel with the feelings of others or will with +their will any more than he can move with their limbs. He may have a +conception of the welfare or suffering of others, but a mere mental +image does not determine the will. Only when such a conception arouses +pleasure or pain in the subject himself, are will and action possible. + +Love consists in joy in the thought of the beloved person, with joy in +his joy, and pain in his pain. He who seeks to render happy one whom he +loves does not, as a rule, consider the fact that he will himself have a +joy in the happiness of that other; his aim is to give pleasure, not to +himself, but to the other. But the thought of doing for him is combined +with pleasure, the thought of not doing for him is combined with pain; +and these present feelings determine the will. + +That which distinguishes the moral from the immoral man is that, +in the former, the notions of the right and good rouse strong +feelings,--feelings of pain at the thought of acting contrary to them, +of pleasure at the thought of acting in accordance with them, feelings +which may overpower all others; while in the immoral man these +conceptions call forth no feelings or only such weak ones as offer no +sufficient opposition to the influence of other feelings. Both men act +from feeling, but not from the same feelings. + +Do we, by proving that the moral, as well as the immoral man is +determined in his action by feelings, show that the one approximates to, +or is identical with the other? By no means. In that case, the proof +that both the moral man and the immoral man will with their own will, +and act through their own limbs, that both possess arms, hands, senses, +feelings, understanding, in short, that both are human beings, must +show, in the same manner, an approximation of the moral to the immoral +man. A perceptive, intellectual, objective side, and an emotional, +inner, subjective side are to be distinguished in all action; and only +the confusion of the two has led to the fancy that, with the proof that +all action proceeds from the pain or pleasure of the person who wills, +it is shown that all action, every human being, is selfish, and that +unselfishness is a figment of the imagination. It is not the expected +pleasure that moves the will; it is only when the conception of future +happiness or misery awakens present feelings stronger than other present +feelings which would move the will in another direction, that willing +and action can follow in accordance with that conception. Hence, there +is nothing so remarkable in the sacrifice of one's own happiness. It is +not morally desirable that self-love should be weak, but only that +conscience and general benevolence should be stronger still. + +Many who have recognized the reality of sympathy and benevolence have +not regarded them as primary but as evolved from egoism. However, if the +word egoism is to have a distinct meaning, it must be interpreted as the +conscious preference of one's own good to that of others. But with +self-consciousness is likewise developed the consciousness of other +beings, and the latter, as the former, clothes itself with +feelings--with egoistic feelings, and with sympathetic feelings as well. + +It is further to be remarked that the proof that an action is +disinterested, is no proof of its moral worth. The worst action,--an +action of pure cruelty, envy, or hatred, may be disinterested, that is, +it may have for its end the pain of another without consideration of the +advantage of the doer. + +The effects, as pain or pleasure, of conduct opposed to, or in harmony +with, civil or moral law, in so far as such effects can be predicted +and, as thus predicted, they influence the will, are called Sanctions. +One may distinguish between a physical, a political, a social, a +sympathetic, and a moral sanction. Doubtless the conduct recommended by +self-love, as a result of these sanctions, coincides, to a very large +extent, to a larger extent than egoists in the rule perceive, with that +which the good of society demands; but it is just as certain that, in +many cases, the way of selfish cunning and that of virtue diverge. The +outer sanctions do not insure the coincidence of duty and one's own +happiness; nor does the sympathetic sanction secure this, for sympathy +is often on the side opposed to duty. There is but one sanction which is +ever on the side of action in accordance with duty: the moral sanction, +the peace and joy which accompany the knowledge of having done right. +Duty and self-interest coincide the more nearly, the better and more +unanimous the various sanctions are, and, especially, the more strongly +the moral feelings are developed in a society; one of the tasks society +has to set itself is to labor for the greatest possible concord of duty +and self-interest. But this harmony will never become an absolutely +perfect one and self-sacrifice impossible. Man needs, therefore, some +end which shall depend upon himself alone, if he is to be kept from +discouragement and despair. Such an end is the consciousness of +right-doing. He who chooses this as highest end must devote himself to +the service of mankind, as well as he who makes the advancement of the +good of mankind his end. The thought of this end will prevent him from +being blinded by self-interest in answering the question as to what +right and duty are, and will also preserve him from permitting himself +one or the other pet sin under the excuse that he will atone for it by +other good actions; it will compel him to the endeavor to fulfil every +duty. And though he may not be perfectly happy, he will be happier than +the man who makes the good of humanity his end; since he is less +dependent upon outer events. Benevolence and conscience are not the +same. The latter constrains us to do right, that is, to perform actions +the expected results of which are in harmony with the general welfare; +it has attained its end when the right action is performed, and it has +failed to attain its end when this aim is frustrated. Man has a deep +inner longing for happiness of some sort. When he does not find it upon +earth, he seeks it in some other world. He has often a deep inner +yearning for holiness, and a secret dissatisfaction in his own conduct. +Ethics satisfies this double longing in commanding him to renounce his +greatest happiness and endeavor to attain moral blessedness, the +happiness of holiness. + +Perhaps some one may object that this is a selfish view of the moral +life. Is it selfish to renounce one's greatest happiness in order to +attain only peace of conscience? That no one were without such +selfishness! He who sets himself this end will act better, more in +accordance with the good of humanity, than he who makes the advancement +of human welfare his ultimate aim. Hence the human being _should_ choose +this end. Therefore, the highest moral commandment, the Categorical +Imperative, receives this form: "Strive to attain peace of conscience in +devoting thyself to the service of mankind." + +By "right" we understand what is in conformity with a standard of action +which we recognize, by "wrong," what is in opposition to it. The +recognition and application of the standard belong to the reason. But +not to reason alone; every rule is the outcome of feelings; and this is +the reason why ideas of right possess the power of motives. + +Judgment of action may take place in two ways: immediately, through the +feeling; and mediately, through moral rules, the adoption of which, +however, presupposes feeling. According to the disposition, the +education, the circumstances, of a man, the one or the other form of +judgment prevails. The words "obligation," "commandment," "duty," "law," +express the fact that something lies without the mere free pleasure of +the acting individual, is withdrawn from its sphere. + +It has been said that a distinction is to be made between duty and the +sense of duty--that an objective duty still exists, even when no +corresponding inner sense of duty is present. This merely means that +some one else in distinction from the acting person recognizes a moral +law, by which he may blame the action. Duties are actions sanctioned by +one or another sort of punishment. The moral sanction is self-blame. But +not the performer of an act alone, others also, pronounce judgment on +his action, and in the rule there exists a greater or less harmony +between his judgment and that of others. To self-condemnation is added +the consciousness of having deserved the blame of others. + +Human actions are not only an object of displeasure or of indifference, +but also of praise, gratitude, love, admiration. Actions which reveal a +character above the average are regarded as meritorious according to the +measure of their superiority; they deserve recognition, respect, praise, +honor. + +Three classes of actions to which public opinion applies its sanction +may be distinguished: actions blamed; those the neglect of which is +blamed; and those which are praised. The first two classes, sanctioned +by a punishment, are regarded as duty; the last class, sanctioned by at +least mental reward, are actions of desert. Actions the omission of +which is punished or blamed are not actions of desert, but of duty and +obligation. + +The boundary-line between duty and desert is not fixed and definite; in +the measure in which the moral condition of a society is perfected, the +province of that which is regarded as duty is extended into that which +was formerly regarded as desert. The distinction between duty and desert +has, in general, only an outward significance; it has regard to the +relation to others, to the social sanction. The moral human being does +not inquire what entitles him to praise, but simply what is right; and +he does not compare himself with others but with his moral ideal. Hence +he recognizes, with regard to himself, only duty, not desert. He aspires +to attain, not the approbation of others, but his own, and he attains +this only when he has done that which he holds to be the best possible. + +The moral significance of the outward sanction lies in its educating +influence; it acts as counterpoise to inclination to action opposed to +the moral law, and facilitates, thus, the victory of the moral motives, +which increase in strength through use. If it is true that a condition +of "heteronomy" always precedes that of "autonomy," then the outer +sanction is the indispensable condition of the evolution of moral +feelings. + +It has sometimes been said that the human being is under obligation to +others only. But it seems that this view has proceeded from a confusion +of the moral with the juridic significance of the word "duty." It is not +to be doubted that the consciousness of duty would not develop in an +individual who grew up in solitude,--but speech and reason likewise +would not become his. The law of morality applies not only to social +conduct but also to conduct having reference to self. + +By "moral law" is not meant a law in the sense that it is imposed on +human beings from without, by another; it is exactly the peculiarity of +the moral law that it is self-imposed as the voice of conscience. + +Virtue is related to duty as the enduring characteristic to the single +action, or the lasting will to obligation, to the "ought"; virtue is a +disposition to act in accordance with duty. Vice is a characteristic +which continually determines actions opposed to duty. + +There may be exceptional cases where vice is innate, as is idiocy or +insanity, but the records of prisons and reformatories where a moral +influence has been attempted, show us that germs of good may exist even +in those apparently wholly given over to vice. It is true that the +capacity for moral education is narrowed with every added year of life; +but it is impossible for us to say, with certainty, how great this +decrease of capacity may be.[79] + +The most essential influence for moral betterment is that which the +personality of an earnest human being exerts by example and precept. The +awakening and strengthening of good impulses is not, however, the +immediate destruction of the bad; and struggle is often necessary if the +good shall conquer. The more frequent the victory, the easier it +becomes. Every virtue can be acquired at least in some degree, if the +wish to acquire it be sufficiently strong and persistent. + +But although such struggle as this is often necessary, exactly the sign +of the attainment of virtue consists in the absence of self-compulsion; +by this absence, its perfection is measured. + +The assertion, occasionally heard, that virtue is in proportion to +struggle, amounts to the contradictory assertion that the more perfect +the man is, the less is his virtue. The truths which, imperfectly +comprehended, lead to this opinion, are these: We distinguish by the +name of virtue that moral constitution which rises above the average. It +is presupposed, however, that its possessor has, in general, the +impulses and capacities belonging to human nature; he could not be +called temperate in any particular direction, if he did not possess the +capacity of enjoyment which leads many to intemperance. Moreover, the +control of strong impulses from a desire to do right presupposes a +strong sense of duty; and it is on account of this sense of duty that we +respect a man. But if an individual distinguished by a strong sense of +duty gradually succeeds in tempering his impulses and ridding himself of +his faults, his virtue is not less, but more perfect. And finally, the +fact is also to be taken into consideration that, while one cannot +necessarily conclude, from a man's innate love for some especial class +of good actions, that he will do his duty in other directions also, this +is an inference which can be drawn where actions are performed from a +sense of duty. + +A certain degree of intelligence is a condition of virtue; a being +without reason is not a moral being, as the animal is not; but morality +requires only average human intelligence. + +There is no greater error than the opinion that virtue is not concerned +with action; for virtue is excellence of character which leads to right +action; action is the test of moral worth. + +In olden times, an attempt was often made to set up one especial form of +character as universal ideal. Such an attempt is injustifiable, since +the nature and circumstances of individuals differ. In morality, too, +there may be originality. + +In the judgment of an action, two questions must be distinguished: the +question whether the action is right or wrong, and the question as to +what inference shall be drawn from it with regard to the character of +the performer. + +In the action, there must be distinguished the following points: the +movement of the body; the results of the act; the act of the will; the +intent; the presence or absence of a conviction that the action will not +have evil results; the part of the intent willed, not merely as means +but as end; and the incentive, or feeling from which the action springs. +The chief end and the incentive together are often called the motive. +The movement of the body is not an object of moral judgment, as are not, +also, the outer results of the action as such. Nor is a mere act of the +will as such, but its nature, of moral importance. + +No human motive or incentive is, in itself, bad. Not even anger and +hatred are in themselves evil; since wrath against wrong is justifiable. +Yet motives are by no means morally of the same worth; while where +motives directed to the good of the individual are at work, the action +will be, in nine cases out of ten, in accordance with the general good; +it will be, let us say, in nine cases out of ten, contrary to the +general good where motives of malevolence are active. And for this +reason the motive in the single case gives us a clue to the character. +There exists a certain stability of character which makes it likely that +the individual who acts out of good motives on one occasion will do so +again. Of greatest worth are the motives which spring from desire for +the general good; these are moral motives. Actions may be right, yet +immoral, and moral yet wrong. Yet the theory that the objective judgment +of an action, and the judgment of the character of the doer have nothing +in common is erroneous; for in both cases the highest ground of +reasonable judgment is the same; namely, the general good. + +Blame is not merely for the sake of prevention through fear; since we +may blame a deed and not its doer. When a man does what we consider +wrong under the impression that he is acting for the general good, we do +not endeavor to frighten him from his conduct by blame, but to convince +him of his error. + +But the significance of the motives of an action does not lie merely in +our inference from them to the character of the doer; from the actual, +or inferred, motives of the action spring its most important results; +namely, its influence upon the morality of human beings. Every moral +action reacts for good upon the performer, strengthening his tendency to +such conduct; and it is, besides, an inciting example. + +It is not necessary for morality that all actions should take place +directly from desire for the general good, but only that the belief be +present that they are in harmony with the general good; duty need not be +the only motive, but simply the ruling one; one may act immediately from +other motives. + +The æsthetic judgment of a character is to be distinguished from the +moral judgment of it. Much that pleases one æsthetically in character is +morally indifferent; and much that is morally of the greatest worth has +little or no æsthetic value. The talk of an identity of the beautiful +and the good has caused much confusion. + +Things have particular qualities according to which they affect us and +are affected. All that I can predicate of things, all their being is +their effect. And when I say that a certain thing, as long as it does +not change, will, under the same circumstances, operate in the same way, +I assert merely that this certain thing, as long as it remains +unchanged, is this certain thing. It may often be difficult or +impossible to determine whether or not the thing has changed, but if it +has not changed, it must, under the same circumstances, operate in the +same manner as formerly. As everything is, at each moment, a definite +thing, so is also every human being; he has definite qualities, and if +these do not change, neither does his action under the same +circumstances; if it could change, he would act according to that which +he is not. + +Different individuals have different innate tendencies; and differing +circumstances develop similar tendencies in different ways. The history +of the human being is his character, if we add what he has inherited to +his own history. To reflect upon human nature is to assume its +conformity to law; to deny such conformity involves ceasing from thought +on it; for thought means the conclusion of like from like. Though the +action of the human being depends, in a high degree, upon circumstances, +we can often predict, from a knowledge of his character, the general +nature of his action. And if our expectation should be, for once, +disappointed, we do not say that his character has suddenly passed into +its opposite, but that we had an insufficient knowledge of the +circumstances, or that we imputed to him a character which he did not +really possess. We have thus to distinguish two groups of facts in the +contemplation of a particular action: the present constitution of the +doer of the action, and that of the outward circumstances concerned; if +a change occurs in either, the conduct will also change. Criminal +statistics are evidence of the effects of similar circumstances upon +similar characters. + +Those who deny the action of cause and effect in the conduct of men as +contradictory of freedom, cannot refer to physical or political liberty, +since the absence of these does not involve the absence of cause and +effect. The free will which is said to be peculiar to the human being +and not possessed by the animals, is an absence of subjection to the +impressions of the moment, and this has been regarded as an activity of +pure reason. But, as Höffding says, the contest of the reason with the +passions is really a contest between feelings combined with reflections +of reason and other violent feelings that are combined with few +thought-elements. This free will is the capacity of reflection gained by +experience. It is not a negation of cause and effect, for the act of the +will is determined by the feelings, thoughts, inclinations, which +precede it; it may be determined by reflection as opposed to the +impressions of the moment. The word "freedom" is also used to denote +moral freedom, or the freedom from determination by immoral motives; in +such case, however, moral motives determine. + +But it must be remembered that the natural law of cause and effect is +not like a law in the sense of the political law; it is not something +imposed from the outside. Natural laws are rules formed by men to +express the regularity of events in one sentence; things do not obey the +laws, but the laws are according to things. When we say: Gunpowder +"must" explode when it comes in contact with a flame, the explosion is +necessary; we do not mean that the gunpowder is compelled, under certain +circumstances, to explode; it explodes of its own essential nature. +"Necessity" designates, not a state of things, but a state of the +understanding regarding them. The same is true of the words "possible" +and "accidental." The accidental is the unintentional. The bullet which +accidentally killed a man was not sent with the intention of killing +him. Or "accident" is used of that with regard to which we are ignorant +and cannot predict; the word does not, in this sense either, denote an +absence of cause. Objectively, nothing is "possible"; either it is, or +it is not. Great confusion is, however, caused by a want of clearness in +the interpretation of the words "possible," "impossible," "necessary," +etc., with regard to the will. When I say: "It is _possible_ for the +good man to perform even the worst action, he _can_ perform it"; and: +"It is not _possible_ for the good man to perform a bad act, he cannot +do it"; I use the words "possible" and "can" in two quite different +senses. The first sentence means: "Even the best man can perform the +worst act _if he will_"; the second: "The good man never has the will; +it follows from his nature that he does not possess it; it would be a +self-contradiction to say that he has it." The human being can do this +or that if he wills, provided no outer force opposes his will; but +whether he wills or not depends upon his character. His will is not +uncaused. + +It has been said that "one should not allow himself to be determined, +but should himself determine his act." This assertion makes self +something distinct from one's thoughts and feelings. Free will has also +been interpreted as choice between motives. The human being does not, +however, choose between motives but between acts, and his choice is free +in that he can, as has been said, choose this or that act _if he will_; +but his choice is not the less caused. When, in reflection on a past +act, the human being says to himself: "It was possible for me to act +otherwise," he means, as a rule, simply: "If I had thought as I do now, +I should not have acted thus; but I did not think as I do now." The +delusion that he might have acted differently under the same outer +circumstances and with the same thoughts and feelings, arises from the +difficulty of realizing, from his present standpoint, his position at +the time of action. It may, indeed, seem to us, after we have chosen a +certain course, that another was the easier; but can it be possible that +one preferred the former course when he yet really preferred the latter? +It is the strongest motive that determines the action. Or, if it be +objected to this assertion, that our only criterion of the strength of +motives is their effect as overcoming other motives, the assertion that +the will follows the strongest motive would still exclude accident in +choice; the assertion would amount to this: that the motive which +determines the will in the one instance will always, under the same +outer and inner circumstances, determine it. So Mill remarks that, when +we say that the heavier weight will weigh down the other, we understand +by "heavier weight," merely the one which will weigh down the other. +Nevertheless, the sentence is not senseless, since it means that there +is, in many or most cases, a heavier weight, and that its action is +always the same. Education by others, and self-education would be +useless, if the same thoughts and feelings could, under the same +circumstances, produce now this, now that totally different result, and +not always the same one. + +Kant's doctrine of freedom includes practical freedom (which is not, +according to his definition, opposed to causality) and transcendental +freedom; he seems, however, not always to have kept the distinction +between the two clearly in view. His theory of transcendental freedom is +grounded upon the doctrine of the pure ideality of time. The only method +of saving the doctrine of freedom is, according to Kant, the theory that +the law of necessity applies to things as phenomena but not to things +in themselves. If phenomena are not to be regarded as things in +themselves, but as mere thought-images, they must themselves have +reasons which are not phenomena. Such a cause for pure reason[80] is not +determined by phenomena, although its effects appear as phenomena. The +causal action of reason does not have a beginning in time, but is the +constant condition, outside time, of all free action of the will. + +Kant failed, however, to prove the pure ideality of time, as Riehl has +sufficiently shown. Moreover, were the _intelligibile_ character of +reason the cause of action as phenomenon, there would be no possibility +of moral improvement, since the noumenon is not affected by +phenomena,--an inference which Schopenhauer makes in adopting Kant's +theory. Moreover, if space has, as Kant also assumes, transcendental +ideality, plurality is not conceivable; hence, the moral difference of +characters, and the science of Ethics itself, could have no +transcendental significance. It is evident that Kant argues from the +standpoint of an assumption of a "soul-thing," a constant "substratum" +of psychical phenomena,--a standpoint which he himself criticizes. He +identifies this thing-in-itself, moreover, with the reason, although he +himself declares that the concept of the thing-in-itself is but a +concept limiting reason.[81] He makes the reason a thing-in-itself +outside time, although it is an activity, a process of consciousness in +time. The thought of duty, of the categorical imperative, is a +phenomenon, and if the will is determined thereby, it is determined by +something in time. Kant takes but little account, moreover, of the fact +of birth. Is the _intelligibile_ character born? If so, it is preceded +by something in time; if not, it must be eternal, existing before birth +as well as after death. And how can he assert, too, that an action might +have been other than it was, if it depended upon the constitution of the +_intelligibile_ character, and this is as it is, and operates as it is? + +Schopenhauer's argument for transcendental freedom contains many +self-contradictions, and is founded on the fiction of a first free +choice of character. Schopenhauer asserts, however, that character is +innate. If so, how is it chosen? The theory assumes that one is before +he is. An act of choice presupposes a chooser, and, according to his own +words, "Every _existentia_ presupposes an _essentia_"; that is, every +existence must have a particular being, essence. + +Accountability assumes that some one is held answerable for an action or +event, and is, as answerable, amenable to punishment. The punishment may +be one of law, of society, or a moral punishment. The concept of +responsibility is closely allied to that of accountability; it assumes, +in general, that a person is the author of a deed. Responsibility may be +immediate, when the author of the deed was also its performer, or +mediate, when the performer was another person. + +Remorse is pain at the recognition of the immorality of a past action. +With the pain is often connected the wish that the action had not been +performed. This wish is naturally unreasonable, since it is directed to +the impossible. Yet it is not idle, as Schopenhauer asserts, since it +has an effect upon future action. There is often also an egoistic +regret, or one not called forth especially by the conscience, for a past +action. This may or may not be moral, according as it is or is not in +harmony with the general welfare. + +The friends of the theory of chance as regards the will have asserted +that shame, remorse, would be impossible, if the human being recognized +the fact that his act was necessary. They have neglected, however, to +give any reasons for this remarkable assertion. If a man recognizes that +the constitution of his mind was such as to lead unavoidably to vicious +acts, this is the strongest motive for condemnation of his own moral +constitution, for pain at it, and an endeavor to better it. But if the +act had no necessary foundation in his character, if it was merely an +accident that his will chose thus, then, since the act is past and there +is no reason for drawing conclusions from it with regard to future +action, how does it concern him? + +Blame and punishment, as well as self-blame, have regard to character +and so to the future. Acts are not blameworthy and punishable if they +have no cause. Punishment is inflicted from two motives: as a +preventive, and as an expression of the felt need of retribution. +Originally, mankind punished from a desire for revenge. This is not the +moral motive. Not the criminal alone, but the whole constitution of +society, is responsible for his crime. If, then, punishment is allowable +for the sake of prevention, it cannot, as an evil, be permissible +further than is in accordance with this end. Punishment of the insane +could be justified only in case it could prevent insanity. + +Nor is desert based upon an uncaused character of the will. We do not +admire, praise, and reward great genius the less because genius is +inborn; nor do we admire the moral man the less because his father +before him was distinguished by deeds of philanthropy. We admire him for +what he _is_. + +The doctrine of causality in human action is far from being what it is +sometimes called, a doctrine of fatalism. Fatalism assumes that, +whatever a man may do, a power outside him determines the event; but the +recognition of cause and effect in human action is the recognition of +the fact that the actions of human beings are never without result. + +It is often said that morality is founded upon religion. Assuming that, +by religion, is meant the belief in a personal God and in the +immortality of the soul, is this true? + +If a mighty tyrant commanded a man to do what was contrary to his +conscience, if he promised rich reward for obedience and fearful torture +for disobedience, would obedience therefore be moral? Why is it +represented as wrong to follow Satan's commands and right to follow +God's will? Evidently not because God is mighty but because he is good, +and Satan is bad. But if it is, thus, a matter of duty, and not merely +one of selfish cunning, to obey God's will, then his will must be +directed to the good; and this presupposes the good to be something in +itself, without regard to the fact that God wills it. If God is a moral +being, this must be so. + +This is, in fact, an assumption which the moral members of society have, +in general, made. They boast of the morals of their religion, comparing +it, in this respect, with other religions; and thus they subject it to +the test of morality. Moreover, when we examine the Christian gospel, we +find that it in general assumes the moral laws as already existent and +only urges obedience to them. The good is, as we have seen, that which +conduces to the general welfare. The earliest religions had no +connection with rules of morality; these have developed with the social +life of human beings and have, in it, their root. + +As to the belief in immortality, cannot the human being do right without +the thought of the reward and punishment of another life? As a matter of +fact, many good men have not possessed such a belief. The distance of +such an end often makes its effect a weak one, and the motive may easily +become selfish. Yet it is true that a loss of faith may include a loss +of morality, in case the belief exist that there is no basis for +morality outside religion; the responsibility of such a loss of morality +lies with those who teach this latter doctrine. Through love to others +and the thought of the immortality of influence, the moral man gains a +larger life and loses the fear of death. He who has thus faced the +thought of death finds life more earnest but not less happy. Each hour +has not the less its own joy because there is an end, at last. Nor, in +spite of the deep pain the loss of friends causes us, do we lose them +wholly, since the memory of all that was best in them may remain with +us. Our own pain may bring to us a deeper sympathy with, and love for, +others. + +If we are able to love the good in God, we may also learn to love the +good in those about us, and be incited, by it, to emulation. The love of +the good in men has always had stronger effect than love for a distant +God of whom but little was known. It was the thought of the man Buddha +which exerted an ennobling influence upon thousands, and it was the +thought of another human being that moved the "christians" more strongly +than did that of a Father in Heaven. Do we love father and mother, +brother or sister, wife or child, or our friends, for God's sake? Why +may we not love all men, as we love our friends and children, for their +own sake? + +It has been said that there is no accountability, if not to God. But if +God is the author of the world, he must himself be the cause of evil, +either by direct influence or by neglect to avert. Where, then, is the +justice of his punishment? It does not suffice to answer that God's +justice is not our justice; for in that case, what right have we to +apply the word to him at all? + +History demonstrates the fact that morality is by no means necessarily +connected with religion. In the name of religion millions upon millions +of human beings, and these often the most upright and conscientious men +of their nation, have been put to death, and thus the civilization of +whole peoples has been retarded. Slavery in America had no stronger +friends than the churches. How is the forgiveness of sins by God to be +justified? Are the evils which they caused any the less existent because +of such forgiveness, and is it well for the doer to escape, in this way, +the sense of responsibility? Only labor for the good of humanity is the +way of atonement. We ourselves are the creators of the kingdom of +righteousness. + +Many claim that Ethics is not indeed based upon Theology, but that it +needs a metaphysical, a teleological, foundation. For it presupposes +that human life has an "end." If we wish to ascertain how our life +should be conducted, we must ascertain what is the end Nature has in +view for us. + +But an end is an effect imagined beforehand and willed, which we cannot +bring about immediately but only through a chain of causes. These causes +we call the means to the end. They too are willed, but only indirectly +and because the end is attainable only through them. These processes to +an end are sometimes treated as if the causal succession in them were +reversed, so that the last effect appears as the beginning, and the +future determines the present; in this sense, the end has been called +the end-cause, because the final link of the process causes the +beginning. But this is a senseless conception, since the future, that +which does not yet exist, cannot now operate. In fact, the succession of +causes and effects is no more broken into in the processes leading to an +end than in any other processes. When a human being imagines to himself +a result and endeavors to bring it about, these mental processes are not +future but present; and they are not determined by an influence of the +future upon the present, but by an influence of the past upon the +present; they follow from experience, that is, from that which has +already occurred. They are causal processes in which the activities of +understanding and will have part. Hence "ends" exist in nature in so far +as they exist in man and the higher animals; but outside these, ends +cannot be predicated, unless Nature is regarded either as gifted with +imagination and will or as the creation of a being possessing these. But +imagination and will require, according to all our experience, a highly +developed nervous system, and to assume their existence where such a +centralized system does not exist is scientifically injustifiable. +Moreover, the laws of thought by no means determine us to inquire after +a cause of the whole world, since the concept of cause is applicable +only to changes, not, however, to enduring existences and their +qualities. + +Or let us assume that we had discovered an end set by Nature. Then, +either it would appear useless to interfere with its attainment and +unnecessary to assist in it, or it would appear to us possible to oppose +this end. In this latter case, cause must be shown why we should assist, +or should resist, the process of Nature. + +Many philosophers have said that man should live according to his own +nature. If the word "nature" here denotes the totality of his +characteristics, it is evident that the worst actions are not less +natural than the best. Therefore, the word nature cannot, as here used, +have this sense; the natural in this sense is not identical with the +moral. Nor can the term as here used refer to the usual, for in that +case the greatest moral excellence, as unusual, must be rejected. Nor +can it be used to designate the more primary, for in that case, again, +the later developments of benevolence and truthfulness should be +rejected. + +The word can have but one other sense, namely, as opposed to artificial. +But what is in man artificial and what is natural? It seems that the +natural is understood as that which is not the work of human intention +and reflection, of labor, and of education. Innate impulses would be, +according to this definition, natural. But it is evident that one cannot +abandon himself to his blind impulses; society could not exist under +such circumstances. + +Or if it be said that, since all organs and impulses of the human being +tend to preservation of the species, and that this must, therefore, be +the end, then let us say "the preservation of the species," or "the good +of mankind" but not "the natural life," is the end for man to attempt. + +Nature as a whole is neither good nor bad. Her cruelty in the struggle +for life is continuous. Yet this is not "cruelty," in so far as it is +not willed. She has often selected the best men for her sacrifices. Yet +this is not all that is to be said of the relation of Darwinism to +Ethics. The law of natural selection regulates not only the life of the +individual but also that of peoples and nations. Evil may arise and +prosper in society. But it has no permanent existence. The chances that +the descendants of human beings possessing evil characteristics will +long survive, that they will not, sooner or later, perish as the result +of conflict with the mandates of health, or the laws of the state, or +the demands of society, are not great. In the life of nations, it +appears more clearly than in the life of the individual, that "Death is +the price of sin." Should in any society the opinion gain power that the +struggle for existence authorizes or demands a regardless pursuit of +one's own interests, an oppression and robbery of the weak by the +strong, an annihilation of pain through the annihilation of the +suffering individuals, an outrooting of conscience, and the natural +voice of pity which raises protest against such a course; should +selfishness be bred, and physical strength and refined cunning become +the highest ideal; such a community would be on the verge of its own +destruction; it would have labored for this result by justifying the +struggle of all against all, permitting this the moment that a conflict +of interests arose. Let times of need and danger, times of national war, +come, and we shall see what is the fate of a society in which love of +country, self-sacrifice, a sense of the ideal, respect for truth and +justice, are only subjects for scorn. "The world's history is its +judgment-day." + +All positive human authorities are subject to the authority of the +conditions of life. If they do not take note of the nature of things, if +they disturb the foundations of social life, their endeavors must +finally suffer shipwreck on the rock of this powerful impersonal +authority. + +Natural selection is therefore a power of judgment, in that it preserves +the just and lets the evil perish. Will this war of the good with the +evil always continue? Or will the perfect kingdom of righteousness one +day prevail? We hope this last but we cannot know certainly. + +We ourselves shall decide our future, by our acts. + + * * * * * + +In an essay written for the Society for Ethical Culture, and read +October 10, 1891, before the London branch of that society, Gizycki +reconstructs his theory of the right final end of life, advocating as +such the General Welfare, instead of Peace of Conscience in the pursuit +of the same. The objections to his own former theory offered are, +chiefly, that if peace of conscience is regarded as the final end, the +individual is likely to take too little account of the outward effects +of his action, to be too little impressed by the evil results which +should teach him greater care. The good of society is regarded by the +virtuous man as more important than his own happiness, as that for which +he is willing to sacrifice his own peace. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[79] The references here are to Lombroso, "Der Verbrecher," deutsche +Ausgabe, S. 129 u. f.; H. v. Valentini, "Das Verbrecherthum im +preussischen Staate," S. 226 u. f. + +[80] Intelligibile Ursache. + +[81] Grenzbegriff. + + + + +S. ALEXANDER + +"MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS" (1889) + + +The proper business of Ethics is the study of moral judgments--or, if we +say of human conduct, then of conduct as submitted to the praise or +blame of moral judgments. But these judgments are not mere opinions; +conduct is not that which is "judged" to be right in distinction from +that which is right; and thus the analysis of such judgments is a +systematization of both conceptions and facts. + +The task of Ethics falls into two parts. It has (1) to supply a +_catalogue raisonné_ of the moral observances of life, the various moral +judgments which make up the contents of the moral consciousness, and (2) +to discuss what it is that the moral judgment, as such, expresses. + +Nothing is more striking at the present time than the convergence of +different schools of Ethics--English Utilitarianism developing into +Evolutional Ethics, on the one hand, and the idealism associated with +the German philosophy derived from Kant on the other. The convergence is +not, of course, in mere practical precepts, but in method also. It +consists in an "objectivity" or impartiality of treatment, commonly +called "scientific." There is also a convergence in general results +which consists in a recognition of a kind of proportion between +individual and society, expressed by the phrase "organic connection." +The theory of egoism, pure and simple, has been long dead; +Utilitarianism succeeded it and enlarged the moral end. Evolution +continued the process of enlarging the individual interest, and has +given precision to the relation between the individual and the moral +law. But in this it has added nothing new; for Hegel, in the early part +of the century, gave life to Kant's formula by treating the law of +morality as realized in the society and the state. The change in ethical +conception is not due to biological research alone, but to the study of +history also, and to other general changes in the practical data on +which its principles are built. The social and political history of the +century represents the growth of the idea of freedom, which has properly +two sides--that of individual liberty of healthy development, and that +of the solidarity of society and the responsibility of the individual +to it. With the increasing complexity of interests and the growth of +individual freedom, has come, however, a certain sense of loneliness to +the individual in the midst of modern competition, and this explains, to +a great extent, the increase of suicide in the present century. + +The convergence of dissimilar theories affords us some prospect of +obtaining a satisfactory statement of the ethical truths towards which +they seem to move. + +Our inquiry falls into two parts, according as we analyze the +conceptions which relate to the existence of the moral judgment or those +connected with its growth, maintenance, and change--the statics or the +dynamics of morality. To these two divisions is to be added a third, +preliminary division, more closely allied with the statical examination +of morality. These three parts are represented by the questions: (1) +What is it that is good? To what are the terms good and bad applied? (2) +Why is it good? What does its goodness mean? (3) How does goodness come +into being; how is it maintained; how does it advance? + +Moral judgments apply to voluntary action, that is, action distinguished +by the presence of an idea of the end to be attained "not merely _in_ +consciousness but _to_ consciousness," and the conversion of the idea +into the actual reality of presentation. The terms good and bad, indeed, +are applied, not only outside the realm of morals, but also, within it, +to desires and thoughts; but to these only as they are the objects of +volition, in that the will at present allows them to persist in +consciousness or in that their present occurrence is regarded as the +result of past willing. + +The conduct to which we apply moral judgment is a whole made up of many +parts--and actions, consequences, and internal feelings have value for +morality only in so far as they are its elements. + +External action concerns conduct only in so far as the object of +volitions (which may be either internal or external) is derived from +this source. Voluntary external action is not external only, but has +also an internal side; and not whether I succeed in performing a certain +action or am prevented in the middle of it, but whether I willed it, is +of importance to moral judgment. Conduct is sometimes considered +separately from character; but this separation results from confusing +conduct with mere action. A character exists only in its conduct, and +all moral actions issue from character. + +The consequences cannot be separated from conduct in the moral judgment, +except in so far as they could not have been foreseen. The consequences +of conduct are a most important part of action, in that they should be +considered by the person willing, and should influence the nature of his +conduct. + +The internal side of conduct is represented by the moral sentiments. +These are to be distinguished from the mere motives, which, defined as +something that has propulsive force, whether a feeling or a passion, +does not enter into moral action except as absorbed into volition. No +emotion is, in itself, right or wrong, but is only indirectly judged as +such as it makes a difference to the action--as an aptitude of mind +which tends to this or that predominating form of conduct. Moral +sentiments, on the other hand, as moral aptitudes effective for +particular conduct, contain an additional element. Moral sentiments, +thus defined, being equivalent to conduct, it follows that the mere +possession of sentiments cannot constitute the difference between +intrinsic or internal, and customary morality; customs are themselves a +matter of sentiment. Thus "conduct as a concrete whole has an inward +element of sentiment and an outward element of action, and these are +different, on the one hand from mere given feelings, on the other from +mere action." "Conduct is this unity of feeling and action in which mere +feeling is modified by the idea of action, and mere action becomes a +mental, or, if we like, a spiritual thing." "Conduct and character are +the same thing facing different ways." "Think of a man's conduct in +relation to the mental conditions from which it proceeds, and you think +of his character; think of his character as it produces results beyond +these sentiments themselves, and you have conduct." + +There are no morally indifferent acts; when viewed in general and +broader lights, all acts are either good or bad; though there are some +cases of really indifferent means arising from the mechanism of action; +as, for instance, that I am to go to London is not indifferent, but we +may suppose that the fact that I may go by the road or by the river +makes no difference to my volition. There is no distinction between +virtue and prudence as regard for self, but prudence, in so far as it is +compatible with social requirements, is a duty and a virtue. + +Ethics, then, has to do with conduct as a whole in its external and its +internal aspects. In distinction from Psychology, it has to do with it +not merely as a fact to be analyzed, but with reference to its nature, +quality, or content, judged by a standard of value. It is not dependent +upon Metaphysics, but precedes it in order of time, whatever may be said +of the order of importance; Metaphysics examines, properly, the ultimate +questions left over unanswered by the other sciences. From the purely +physical method, Ethics has advanced to a biological method; and the +doctrine that pleasure is the end of right action has been replaced by +the idea of social vitality as the end. + + +STATICAL ANALYSIS--MORAL ORDER + +The recognition of the reference in morality to society has been implied +in all ethical theories; theories of selfish pleasure themselves +recognize the social element in individual gratification, even Cyrenaic +theories recommending selection and refinement of pleasures, and +containing a reference to personal dignity which implies a conception of +man as typical of a perfection that others may sympathize in and attain. +Individualism and Universalism in morals differ only in the order in +which they take their terms. "To the former, the individual comes first +and is the measure of the law; to the latter, the law or society comes +first, and is the measure of the worth of the individual." Nevertheless, +the ethical problem is very differently conceived by the two schools. +But the History of Philosophy shows a tendency to harmonization of the +two; we find that Individualism becomes more and more socialistic, while +Universalism becomes more and more conscious of individuality. We may +trace this movement, in the case of Individualism, in the development of +the philosophic theory of morality as true benevolence from the theory +of benevolence as merely another form of self-love. The earlier +conceptions of Universalism, emphasizing the good as something binding +irrespective of the inclinations of the individual, issue in particular +formulæ of virtue; later conceptions recognize the differences of +individual cases while still insisting on the universal or authoritative +character of morality. The problem receives its definite shape when the +explanation of authority is sought, not in some categorical imperative, +but in the very nature of society itself, which, if a whole, is yet a +whole made up of individuals. Ethical inquiry thus naturally breaks up +into two parts, according as we consider the meaning of right and wrong +for the individual, or for society as embracing many individuals. + +As far as morality concerns itself with the individual, the good act +implies a certain adjustment of functions to one another, too much in +any one direction implying a defect in others. "The good life as a whole +is a system of consecutive acts, where each function has its limits +prescribed for it by the demands of all the other functions." And the +good character is "an order or systematic arrangement of volitions." The +goodness of an act is thus a matter of equilibration or adjustment of +the elements of an individual's nature. In this proportion or adjustment +consists the reasonableness, rationality (ratio, [Greek: logos]) of good +conduct. This does not mean that the principle of morality is the result +of reason, for moral adjustment is no more specially the work of reason +than of any other mental faculty. + +This account of good character uses ideas which apply, _mutatis +mutandis_, to the life of any organism, as well as to the mind of man; +it merely explains, in terms of human experience, the elements involved +in the conception of organization; the difference lies simply in the +nature of the elements involved in the adjustment, the elements being, +in the case before us, conscious acts. To the question whether such a +definition of morality would not apply rather to conduct than to +character, and whether, the volitions being conceived as a series in +time, it does not dissolve the unity of character, may be answered that +conduct and character have already been shown to be identical, and that +unity can no more be denied to the series of acts involved than it can +be denied to the growing plant or animal whose functions are successive. +The unity conditioned by time is a unity characterized by succession, as +that of space by extension. The objection, as it gathers its strength +from a persuasion that the good character should be described by the +feelings or sentiments of any one time, is legitimate; good conduct is +built upon a man's needs or desires and is defined as satisfying every +part of his nature in its proportion; so that an equilibrium of the +emotions and the moral sentiments is involved in morality, and any +sentiment is moral which can be equilibrated with the rest. "The good +man may be described either as an equilibrated order of conduct, or as +an equilibrium of moral sentiments or of the parts of his nature. +Nevertheless, the order of conduct is a prior conception to that of +structural equilibrium." In a machine, the combination of parts is made +in order to produce the motion of the engine, and the equilibrium is +maintained by the motion. "In the organism, the bodily structure retains +its proportion only in so far as it is in physiological action, and this +physiological action subserves the conduct of the organism," while "in +like manner the equilibrium of moral sentiments exists only through +conduct and is determined by the requirements of conduct." The +equilibrium is effected simultaneously both for conduct and the moral +structure. The ideal is a plan of conduct, ideal in that it is never +fully attained. The ideal is hypothetical in two senses. It supposes +that every member of the order is good, whereas no life contains good +acts only; and that the order itself remains permanent, whereas morality +is necessarily progressive. Nevertheless, it is to be observed that the +ideal is a realized ideal. It is realized in every good act, since the +good act is the act which has the shape it would wear in the ideal +order. "Though it is adjusted to imaginary elements, it realizes the +whole so far as its own particular share is concerned." + +Morality implies the existence of society. It is useless to inquire what +would be moral in case the human individual were an isolated being; the +fact is that he is not so, and that all moral judgment implies not only +the judgment of other individuals besides the acting individual, but +also the function of the acting individual as a member of a society. Yet +each member of a society has his special individual work, so that duty +varies according to individual circumstances, and so far from its being +true that morality is not a respecter of persons, it is a fact that it +is always a respecter of persons. This does not deny that there are +certain common bounds of morality, which allow the formation of some +general propositions; nor does it mean that each individual is at +liberty to construct his own moral precepts. The individuality of +morality, which finds a place or vocation for each individual, involves +an equilibrium between the members of society, in which consists the +morality of the whole. + +The so-called self-regarding virtues are social as well as +self-regarding; their disregard involves evil, not to the individual +alone, but to others also. It may be objected that acts and thoughts +which can never be known to others are condemned by conscience. In +answer it must be observed:-- + +(1) That the knowledge of others is a matter of degree; my friends know +my actions; and in order to judge an action, it is not necessary to +suppose the whole nation looking on. + +(2) That as personal morality becomes more and more complex, and hence +knowledge by others less and less possible, we leave the judgment of an +act more to the conscience of the individual, as vicegerent of the moral +law. "Acts which are wrong when nobody knows them have come to be so by +a process beginning with simple acts which are known, that is, known in +their outward appearance." The act, known or unknown, leaves its impress +upon character, raising or lowering the efficiency of the agent; and +hence is judged good or bad. The study of art and science has, thus, +moral value, as influencing character. + +Good and bad acts and conduct are thus to be distinguished by their +adjustment or non-adjustment to the social order. The adjustment takes +place in a similar manner as in a trial of strength, and the compromise +between the different individuals must be taken as measuring the actual +forces which were engaged. + +The social organism has both its morphological, or structural, and its +physiological or functional aspect; and here, once more, the order of +functions is a prior conception to the structural order; in the society, +conduct bears to structure the relation which physiological action in +the body bears to the bodily structure. The social ideal is doubly +hypothetical, implying that all members of the society are good and that +society is statical. + +That to which moral judgment applies with regard to the individual's +relation to society, is the adjustment of individual wills regarded +either as directly appearing or as latent and capable of acting, the +occasion being given. The moral principle in society as a whole is thus, +as in the case of the individual, a rational one, and Aristotle rightly +gives the same name ([Greek: orthos logos]) to it as to the principle of +individual action. The moral individual is the reproduction in small of +the social order. But "the two conditions that the individual must be a +harmony within himself, and that he must possess all the powers that are +required of him for the purposes of society, are not different, but +identical." For the absence of such powers implies the absence of +adjustment to his conditions, failing which adjustment the inner harmony +is impossible, although life may be continued, just as it may be +continued under diseased physical conditions. + +Good men may thus be said to conform to a certain type or ideal; but +this type is not merely something to which they are fashioned, but to +which they themselves are the contributory elements. Hence the social +ideal is a species of which all good men are the individual instances; +and the species exists, not, as in the case of natural science, as a +generalization in the mind of the observer or as an identical plan upon +which the members are organized, not as a mere collection of +individuals, but as in itself an organism. "Let it not be objected that, +since no society is in perfect equilibrium, and the ideal exists only in +good men, the ideal is therefore as much a creation of the observer's +mind as a natural species. An ideal implies no contrast of observer and +observed: conduct is something mental: the ideal is a reality of mind, +existing in the minds of those who act upon it. The social ideal has +thus a concrete existence in the collective action of good men." + +In this manner, the supposed independence of the tendencies towards +Individualism and Universalism disappears, the harmony of the individual +and his harmony with society being identical--a true independence being +equivalent to true coöperation. + +Morality implying adjustment to the ideal order, a realization of the +bearings of our acts is important. But we need no special moral faculty +to teach us morality; it is prompted by thoughts and feelings that, as +the result of a process of compromise, are thoughts and feelings +adjusted to a social order. + +Obligation "expresses that an act is the act required." "It is that +relation in which the single part of the order stands to the whole +order, when it is confronted by the whole," whether we consider the +single act in relation to the whole character of the individual, or the +single individual in his relations to society. "Duty in the abstract is +the name which comprehends obligation in all its details; a duty in the +concrete is any good act regarded in its relation to the whole. On the +other hand, the whole has _authority_ against its parts, and every +particular duty is said to have authority just so far as it is backed by +the whole mass of duties," as the command of a sovereign has authority +because it gives expression to the will of the whole society over which +he presides. Obligation "corresponds to the necessity under which an +organism lies of acting in a certain manner in order to conform to its +type." Duty is thus not necessarily antagonistic to inclination, as +Kant conceived it, since, in the good man, inclinations are adjusted to +the requirements of social life; and obligation is thus different from +compulsion, which, as attendant on authority, applies to the bad, not +the good, man. The negative side of compulsion is responsibility, which +implies that, in the case of transgression, the person will be called to +account. Duty, though thus free from the idea of antagonism, is itself +always negative, implying subjection of the individual to the larger +order. It is from this negativity that duty lends itself to the legal +idea of compulsion, and in general wears a legal garb. + +In law, rights and duties are correlative, the right of one implying +duties of others, and _vice versa_; but in morals, rights and duties are +not merely correlative but identical; it is a duty to insist on rights +in so far as these rights are moral, not merely legal, and the +individual has a right to the performance of duty. + +The moral judgment is a judgment on a fact, but expresses, nevertheless, +a fact also; it expresses an adjustment to an ideal order, which, if +ideal, is yet a fact, although never realized in its entirety. Thus +morality is not a mere matter of opinion. Opinions may differ with +regard to a fact of morality as different individuals differ in the +apprehension of a physical fact. An action is not right simply because I +think it is so; but the opinion of the good man represents what is +really good. + +Goodness is a mental fact; the apprehension of goodness, as the passing +of judgment upon it, is different from it; but it is nevertheless, in +another sense, the goodness of the good man which approves or is the +approbation of the good act; and "badness exists in the mind of the good +man and is known as disapprobation." The quality of an action is that +which excites approbation; its goodness or adjustment is nothing but the +approbation of the good man, but not of other men. In like manner, duty +and the sense of duty are the same thing. When the act judged is +presented to the mind only as idea, the feeling of approbation or +disapprobation is that which we know as the working of the moral sense +or conscience. + +It is this truth that goodness and approbation are identical that +Intuitionism builds upon. Intuitionism, however, regards goodness as +some new quality of action, peculiar and inexplicable; while a true +analysis looks upon goodness as no new quality, the moral judgment +merely placing a mark upon any action as conforming to a certain order +or equilibrated system wanted. + +There is in the good man a vague mass of moral sentiments and emotions; +and when the idea of any act comes in contact with these, a feeling of +satisfaction or dissatisfaction arises, according as the idea fuses with +this mass of sentiments or fails in adjustment to them. Moral promptings +are merely promptings which have been adjusted on one side and the other +until they have come to be in harmony with social conditions; they grow +out of the natural feelings by the process of adjustment. The word +"conscience," as it is more generally used, seems to emphasize the +element of reflection in a greater degree than "moral sense." The +explanation of the apparent independence of conscience is merely that, +in the good man, the moral order is realized, and action from moral +principle takes place spontaneously. In so far as this is true, he is, +in the ethical sense, free, yet not free in the sense that he is to be +bound by his own conscience alone in opposition to the judgment of all +other consciences; "on the contrary, the conscience sits as a tribunal +on a man's acts or intentions, just because it is the representative of +the moral order." + +In speaking of a "perverted conscience," morality condemns the isolation +of a man's ideas about right conduct, from the judgment of his fellows. + +The conscience, by reason of the element of reflectiveness, is higher +than the moral sense; and the cultivation of a refined conscience is the +basis of all morality. Yet this very reflectiveness involves danger, in +that, attaching itself as it does to the negative side of duty, it tends +to associate the latter with the idea of painfulness rather than of +pleasure, and to induce fear, and also in that it tends to develop a +morbid subjectivity of feeling through too much self-examination. + +Good conduct, as good in virtue of the equilibrium it establishes +between the various parts of conduct itself, should contain within +itself the whole justification of morality. As such, it is the end of +morality, in that it is both the object and purpose, the aim or desire; +and in that it is also the standard, criterion, or result by which +conduct is measured. + +Good conduct involves a common good as part of the moral order, and so +creative of a tie between all members of society. The common good is +thus not to be conceived as something that might be, as it were, cut up +and distributed, but as common in that it involves an adjustment of +claims. The common good is thus, in a sense, objective, or objectively +valid, though not objective in the sense that it exists outside the +minds of men, but in the sense that it is a compromise between wills, in +which each mind surrenders merely personal whims for a common agreement. + +Since there seems a discrepancy between my own good and the good of +others, how do I make the good of others my object, going beyond myself +in the range of my interest? And how is self-sacrifice possible? The +answer to the first question is that morality reconciles the likes and +dislikes of individuals, so that self-love and love of others describe +the moral relation from opposite ends; every act of respect for others +is an act of self-furtherance. + +We are entitled to assume, as not needing proof, that the instincts of +altruism are as fundamental and original as those of self-love. But if +we use stricter reasoning, we can see how, in either case, we identify +ourselves with others. Altruism is merely a form of conduct in which the +egoistic element, though present, retires into the background; while in +all right egoism, we aim at the good of others as well as our own good, +though our own good appears as the more prominent feature in the act of +willing. We must not be understood as willing, in altruism, another's +good in any mystical sense, in the sense of any identification of self +with others; we will the good of others in quite a different sense from +that in which we will our own good, the idea of their good being a +representation in our mind from the analogy of our own experience; and +the good attained by each party to the transaction is different and +incommunicable. Neither must egoism or altruism be interpreted in the +sense that, in either, reflection on the end as distinctively the good +of self or of others is involved; the moral agent in general throws his +energies into this or that course of action, because it is felt to be +what is wanted, without further reflectiveness. + +Human beings, as plastic shapes, moulded by contact, adjust themselves +to each other, and thus it comes about that certain personal claims are +waived. Self-sacrifice is a real fact, a fact attested by the existence +of the bad, to whom such sacrifice involves a loss of happiness and is +impossible. It means the abandonment of a real good which the individual +would seize under other circumstances. It is sometimes contended that +real self-sacrifice is impossible, either (1) because the sacrifice is +really pleasanter to the agent, or (2) because he is compensated for his +loss. But the evident fact that self-sacrifice is pleasanter to the +agent does not involve the seeking of his own pleasure by the agent, and +even if it be admitted that there is always the forecast of compensation +in the mind of the agent, yet part of the forecast is the picture of +happiness foregone. But here, as before, it may be said that the element +of reflection, the weighing of one's own and others' happiness against +each other is read into the act by the onlooker, and is not necessarily +involved. That his own self-sacrifice, the compensation of his own +consciousness of right-doing outweighs, to the moral man, the pleasure +of lower aims, does not mean that the individual is selfish in seeking +self-sacrifice. And, in fact, that any ulterior aim of self-satisfaction +beyond the act itself is sought, in self-sacrifice, by the moral man, is +false; the greatest acts of heroism are characterized by complete +absorption in the impersonal end sought, the good of the agent thus not +lying beyond, but consisting in his action. Acts characterized by +another spirit than this we do not term self-sacrifice. + +As all conduct is a matter of will, so morality is concerned not merely +with the virtues, the practical dealings of men, but also with all that +strengthens or weakens the will and, in general, conduces to character. +In judging a man, the significance of his individual gifts, and the +responsibility which attends the cultivation of these gifts must be +recognized. Not special virtues alone must be considered, but the whole +man must be judged and the significance of his self-cultivation in this +or that direction observed. This does not mean that the exceptional +faults of exceptional men are to be condoned. On the contrary, there is +no reason to suppose that special gifts confer a special privilege +rather than a special responsibility. Judged in the entirety of their +character, such men may not be worse than others, and this fact should +be regarded; but we should not defend their sins as such. The neglect of +self-cultivation in one direction may be necessary to action in another +direction; but the moral criterion of such self-cultivation or action is +to be found in morality as an equilibrium of powers. + +Perfection is not itself sufficient to define the end. Perfect is that +which is the best possible; perfection as a perfect activity rather +than a perfect state (as we must conceive it) is equivalent to the best +possible conduct. But the moral end can be understood as perfection only +when by the best possible conduct is understood that which is the best +possible under circumstances determined by morality itself. The fullest +development as demanded by morality is not necessarily the perfection of +development in any particular case, that is, with regard to any +particular gift or individual. Or, in other words, perfection in both +its absolute and its comparative meaning, is a conception which belongs, +not to morality as such, but to the materials out of which morality is +constituted. Take "perfect" as equivalent to "best," then perfection is +equally involved in every good action. The good is always the best; what +is right is perfect; morality discards degrees of comparison. But the +degree of perfection to which any power or individual is to be developed +is determined, morally, by the principle of equilibrium. Moreover, we +may recognize degrees of perfection in individuals who are, +nevertheless, not to be classified as of less or greater moral value. + +There are two different conceptions of merit, the one as applied to +magnitude of actual achievement, the other to magnitude of effort. The +apparent discrepancy vanishes on reflection, since both conceptions +apply to what passes beyond the average and measures the distance +between the two. + +Against the hedonistic doctrine, it has been urged by Green that +pleasure as such is not the end of action, for even where the single +pleasure is desired there is always the thought of a permanent self +whose good is supposed to lie in the direction of this pleasure; while a +sum of pleasures cannot, as such, be an object of desire, since +pleasures, as separate and transitory in contradistinction from the +permanent self, cannot be added together in fact, but only in thought; +and with regard to a greatest sum of pleasures the difficulty is still +greater, since pleasures admit of indefinite increase, and their sum can +never be the greatest possible. In so far as desire is supposed to be +for pleasures and nothing else, the argument that a sum of pleasures +cannot be desired must be admitted. The transiency of the pleasures has, +however, nothing to do with the question; the reason why a sum of +pleasures cannot form a single pleasure is that they are pleasures with +a higher idea--that of a series involving a plan. This does not prove +that a sum of pleasures might not be the criterion of conduct. It must +be admitted that "sum" is an unfortunate word, since it seems to imply +that the pleasures must be combined in one total result; but such an +interpretation of the word is not necessary. A series of pleasures is +properly nothing more than an aggregate or combination of pleasures, +partly successive, partly coëxistent. Nor does the greatest possible +happiness mean a happiness than which no greater is possible, but the +greatest possible under the given conditions. The polemic is directed +against the individualistic psychology, which regards mental states as a +mere succession of events. So far the arguments enforce a great +principle; a mere succession of feelings or sensations could never yield +a conception of a sum apprehended as a sum. But this is irrelevant. For +such an idea we require much more than sensation: we require memory, +perception, the idea of a self. But this is only saying that morality +requires more than mere sensation, and the argument assumes the +standpoint it is fighting, treating mental states as mere events. It, +moreover, introduces the idea of a permanent self as something superior +to mere sensations, whereas perhaps this self is elaborated from +sensational elements. Furthermore, if the proposition means that a mind +which had only sensations could not have a sum of sensations, this may +be denied. A sum is possible from three positions--that of the +conception of a spectator, that of a reflecting consciousness, and that +of a feeling consciousness which feels its states continuously, though +it may not feel them as continuous, for such a feeling would argue +comparison and reflection. The polemic, therefore, while in so far right +as it is directed against individualistic psychology, seems to assign +wrong reasons for a rejection of hedonism; Utilitarians, while speaking +of pleasures in the language of psychology, treat them really as +something more than mere events--treat them as we really combine them by +processes much higher than sensation. A refutation of hedonism must +consist in showing that pleasures really differ in kind, and cannot, +therefore, be compared in intensity. "Pleasure" is often used as +equivalent to a pleasant sensation; such pleasures differ in kind, as in +the case of gratified hunger, ambition, and the like, and cannot be +actually added, either in thought or in enjoyment, because +incommensurable. "Pleasure" is often used, also, to refer, not to the +sensation itself, but to its pleasantness, and here the same thing is +true; if we distinguish the quality and the tone of feeling, as usual in +psychology, the classification of tones as pleasurable and painful is +insufficient. "The tones of colors and sounds, for instance, are more +naturally represented by the mood of mind they suggest: red has a warm +tone, black a sad, gray a sober, the organ a solemn tone."[82] The tone +of some feelings is too indefinite for description,--a vague comfort or +discomfort,--while the tone may rise to a condition to be described only +by "bliss" or "rapture." Pleasure and pain depend, moreover, not only on +the quality and quantity of the feeling, but on the whole condition of +the mind, pleasure indicating agreement with the mind, pain +non-agreement. Every pleasure being a function of the sensation in which +it is an element, the supposed sum of pleasures must be made up of +pleasures every one of which is qualified as that which is produced by a +certain activity. "The sum of pleasures, therefore, re-introduces the +distinctions and contents of the moral order, and, though an expression +of the criterion of conduct, is therefore, like perfection, not an +independent criterion." The element of quality in pleasure may be +_verified_ more easily as what may be called _preferability_. The term +preferability does not mean that there is an inherent moral value in +every pleasure, in virtue of which pleasures may be distinguished as +higher or lower--obviously an erroneous view, for higher and lower is an +antithesis established by morality itself; the value depends on the kind +of pleasure, and the preferability is that in the good man's mind. + +It might be objected that even though pleasures differ in kind, a +comparison and summation of them might be possible, just as comparison +and summation of weights is possible, although weight depends not on +bulk alone but also on specific gravity. It cannot be denied that some +numerical expression for qualities of pleasure may yet be found, by +which they may be compared. But it is to be noted that, the higher we go +in the scale of existence, the more distinct becomes the growth of a +principle of selection or distribution which the members of a +combination must follow in order to produce a given quantitative result. +In chemistry we may obtain the atomic equivalent of sulphuric acid (98) +in many ways, but we can obtain the acid itself only by specific +combinations in specific proportions. In determining what food to give +an animal, we must consider not bulk alone but the nutritiousness of +various sorts. We might express the nutritiousness of various foods by +numbers, but the numerical equivalent would tell us nothing, unless we +knew the kinds of food to be combined. And in the same way we might +express the sum of pleasures as end numerically, but until we know the +kinds of activities and so of pleasures to be combined to this sum, the +formula is useless to inform us as to the end or method of attaining it. +The popular conception of happiness avoids all the difficulties and +perplexities caused by setting up pleasure as the end, because in that +conception pleasures and pains are never considered apart from conduct +and character. Thus, though the end involves pleasure, the criterion is +good conduct. The good conduct necessarily involves pleasure, for +conduct which only outwardly conforms to the moral rule, and in which +the agent does not take pleasure, is not really good. + +The pleasure-formula thus represented as the standard of conduct is to +be distinguished, as actual ethical pleasure in the act, from the +pleasures attendant on the act as results, and which may be termed +pathological in a Kantian sense. The ethical pleasure need not be +unmixed, for the act which satisfies one part of a man's nature does not +necessarily satisfy all the other parts. But the ethical pleasure must +be present as the total reaction of character considered apart from the +incidentals of result. + +Pleasures and pains may be divided into two classes, active and passive; +active pleasures being those attendant on an act, as gratification of an +impulse, passive pleasures those which come to us as enjoyments, not as +the gratification of the impulse producing an act, though perhaps +resulting from our act. Active pains are those of want, passive those of +suffering. The pleasures accompanying an act as pleasures of attainment +are always pleasures of gratification, but not of gratification merely, +for they gratify a sentiment directed towards an object previously +present to the mind in idea; and it is because the volition realizes the +idea that the pleasures are called pleasures of attainment, and in this +fact lies also their ethical value. The ethical pleasure in the action +itself is not to be confused with the mere pleasure in the explicit +consciousness of right-doing, which argues special reflectiveness. The +ethical pleasure meant is identical with the feeling of approbation, not +as a reflection on the act as idea, but as present in the act itself. +But the ethical pleasures are not independent of the incidental +pleasures, but depend upon them, the latter themselves being considered +in determining what acts are to be performed. + +The pleasure-formula of the end represents the end in terms of all the +ethical pleasures secured by good action; and now we can see how +morality can be expressed in terms of all the pleasures and pains +involved in action, the purely ethical pleasures being reckoned among +the rest. Every pleasure is an inducement to persistence, every pain an +inducement to change; hence, since the society of good persons, or the +kingdom of powers within a man's own mind acquiesce in the moral order +as the equilibrium in which all their claims are gratified as far as may +be, it follows that the order of good conduct represents the maximum of +happiness. The end thus _involves_ the greatest happiness of the +greatest number. + +If pleasure is but a part of the standard of morality, is it, then, the +object of conduct? If the idea before the mind to be realized in action +is called the object of the action, then in the same sense the pleasure +connected with the idea, which must be pleasant, is the object of +conduct. The difficulty in agreeing that the pleasure of the idea is +part of the object of desire arises from two causes: (1) confusion of +the object of desire with the character or criterion of the object; (2) +a misunderstanding of how the ideal object is related to the result. As +to the latter cause, it may be said that the idea is only in this sense +an idea of the result, that the result is the idea as it is realized; +the elements of the idea are derived from the past, and the desire is +not for the prospective pleasure of the end. As to the first cause, +though it is false that the prospective pleasure must necessarily be +part of the idea, the opposite conclusion is not necessarily legitimate +that desire is not for pleasure at all. It is true that, in order to +distinguish one object from another, we need to know what kind of an +object it is; but to conclude that, therefore, the desire is not for +pleasure, is to confuse the actual idea before the mind in desire with +its quality. That we do not make pleasure an object in the sense that +the pleasantness of the object itself is what we have before us in +desire, is obvious. Such a desire would argue a reflectiveness which has +been shown not to be necessarily characteristic of action. Nor is it the +pleasure of an act which is the cause of the desire, even if we suppose +this not in the sense that reflection apprehends it as cause. To suppose +this is to confuse the cause with its sign. The pleasure is a function +of the quality of the object. The element of reflectiveness _may_ enter +into a consideration of the object, and the prospective pleasure thus +become an element of the object of desire. But it is only a part; the +pleasure alone cannot be the object of desire. The pleasure which is +thus a part of the object is not a future pleasure, but that which is +actually present in our minds, belonging to the ideal object as part of +it--the represented pleasure of attainment. To call the pleasure desired +the prospective pleasure is to confound the reflection of the spectator +with the actual fact in the mind of the agent to an act. The pleasure +is, moreover, not pleasure in general, but the pleasure of the agent; +but this is not stating that the act is necessarily selfish. + +Since every object of desire and will includes pleasure, the so-called +"paradox of hedonism"--that pleasure is lost by seeking after it--cannot +be explained by holding that pleasure is not itself the object of +desire, and that consequently pleasure is never, in enjoyment, what it +is in idea. This last is true, for no idea is in reality what it is as +idea. But the explanation lies rather in pointing out how foolish it is +to seek for what is a sign or effect rather than for its cause. + +In the good man, the pleasure of attainment is the ethical sense of +approbation, and this is also goodness. It may, however, be asserted +that it is not this ethical pleasure, this goodness as such, that is +desired by the good man; again, it is only in exceptional cases of +reflectiveness that goodness or the right action as such is +distinctively desired; and herein lies Kant's mistake in asserting that +a moral act must be done from a sense of duty. + +Active pains, as wants, are what prompt to action, and are, so, the +conditions of conduct. Though in themselves evil, as pain, they cannot +be considered by themselves apart from the action to which they lead. As +for passive pains, in so far as they are the result of evil action on +the part of others, they ought not to have occurred, and we try to +prevent their repetition by punishment. Those sufferings incidental to +right conduct are to be borne, in so far as they are inevitable, as a +necessary evil in that which, considered as a whole, is good. As soon as +they cease to be inevitable, they are to be removed. We do not imagine, +however, that pain may ever be wholly removed. But the statement that +pain is inevitable to right conduct is not to be interpreted as an +assertion that it is for the sake of goodness, as a discipline,--a +metaphysical conception depending on the idea of a divine purpose. + +Morality is thus a kind of optimism, not ignoring the reality of pains +in right conduct, but treating them as part of the given conditions +which it has to turn to the best account, by the creation of a conduct +and character involving ethical pleasures. Pessimistic theories do not +ignore this optimism of morality; but in such theories the fact of pain +is emphasized and dwelt upon, and morality is regarded only as a means +of lessening pain, or, as in the case of Von Hartmann, finally getting +rid of it altogether by a universal suicide. It is impossible to +determine whether existence represents an excess of pain or of pleasure, +since the answer to the problem is a matter of individual temperament; +and, moreover, pleasures and pains cannot be (as yet) merely +quantitatively compared. Another error of pessimism consists in +comparing pleasures and pains in detail and supposing the result to hold +good in the general sum; but even in cases where pleasures are greatly +outweighed by pains, the pains may sink in value considered in +connection with the rest of life. The desirability of non-existence +could be maintained only as a race should be developed desiring it; but +the whole course of history is in the opposite direction. + +The question, Is life worth living? involves two: (1) Is it actually +preferable to the creature who lives it? (2) Can any life be said to +have a real value; is any life subjectively, is any objectively, +preferable? The answer to the first question is the fact of life, for +the mysterious instinct of self-preservation called in to account for +the continuance of existence is one of the elements to be considered in +the problem, cannot be excluded. It is true that only certain kinds of +life are preferable, but the very meaning of the principle of selection +is the securing of the life that is worth living. + +Having arrived at this answer, we can no longer compare existence and +non-existence in respect to preferability, and the second problem +presents itself to us as the question as to what existence is of value. +The answer is the moral life, goodness, as including all the activities +of character. + +The moral end has sometimes been defined as social vitality. Vitality +is, in strictness, the energy to live, and has two aspects. It is (1) +the force which keeps a creature alive, or (2) the force which keeps it +well. As implying the keeping up of vital functions, the notion of +continued existence represents the end, but represents it in its lowest +aspect, its least and poorest significance, and is an insufficient +description; for not existence can be the end, but existence of a +certain sort. "Existence, in fact, is an abstraction to which nothing +corresponds in experience: nothing exists except upon certain terms. +Given the type, the end of the creature is to continue the existence of +that type; but continuance of existence is nothing more nor less than +the performance of those functions which constitute the type of life in +question: it is not separated from those functions as something which +they subserve." If the functions in man or animal are said to be +determined by the need of maintaining his existence, it may be answered +that his existence is these functions. In this sense of continued +existence as the repetition of vital functions in their order, it is +true, but only secondarily true, that the end is to preserve life. But +the doctrine of evolution implies much more than such preservation. It +means the victorious continuance of life. But because a type is +victorious, we cannot infer that the end of the type is to maintain its +victorious existence in the sense of aiming at victory. To do this is to +read into the end a theory of how the type came into existence. The end +of a type is to act according to the type; the victory over rivals +affords the opportunity of this. The preservation of existence is a +condition of the end, not the end itself; to regard it as such is to +confuse cause with effect. + +Vitality as health, on the other hand, implies the equilibrium which +constitutes good conduct good. It must, however, "be observed that +health is not a further specification or a limitation of continued life, +but is coëxtensive with it." + +But health, as applied to morals, is a metaphorical term. Morality does +not consist in mere physical vitality; on the contrary, some sacrifice +of such vitality may be necessary, the perfect physical vitality may be +inconsistent with the development of higher and finer mental functions. +"With this proviso, vitality as health is simply another name for the +character of good conduct which wins it the title of good." + +There is often a distinction made between virtue and duty, the former +word seeming to include the latter and go beyond it. However, it is not +only virtuous to do one's duty, but it is also the duty of the +individual to do his best. In fact, the two, virtue and duty, are +coëxtensive, the term "virtue" describing conduct by the quality of the +agent's mind, the term "duty" by the nature of the act performed. +Nevertheless, there are actions to which it is more natural to apply the +term "virtue," "duty" being colored by legal implications. In the legal +sense, duty fixes, not the highest line of conduct, but the lowest +limit, beneath which conduct must not fall. Virtue, as contrasted with +duty in the legal sense, seems to be coëxtensive with merit. Negative +merit, however, where a man is good in spite of some great disadvantage, +does not make an act virtuous in distinction from dutiful conduct. It is +the duty of a man with a passion for drink to repress it; but we do not +term his performance virtuous, though it may be meritorious. Merit, that +is, implies a scale within the range of good acts themselves. Virtue and +duty coincide, however, only so long as the moral value of actions are +considered. For we distinguish two different classes of virtues, or two +senses of the word "virtue," corresponding to the distinction of ethical +and pathological, the pathological virtues being certain gifts of +emotion or sentiment, which are sometimes thought to make action more +virtuous, but do not alter its real character. "Thus, for example, the +virtue of benevolence may be thought imperfect without kindly feeling, +though a man may be benevolent without any such spontaneous movement. +Chastity, again, may in some natures be accompanied by, and flow from, a +delicacy of feeling which makes all unlawful suggestions impossible. +Now, if these emotions were necessary to their respective virtues, we +should have to admit that duty was less than virtue. But we must +maintain that they are excellences which do not alter the moral +character of conduct, and may be absent altogether and leave the agent +as virtuous as if they were present. Some persons, indeed, would say +that there was less virtue in characters which possessed these emotional +endowments.... In themselves, they are not virtues in the ethical sense, +but only 'add a lustre' to habits of will. They may even be ineffectual, +as often happens with very good-natured persons, or they may be +positively bad. Courage, for instance, we admire even in a villain. We +may conclude, then, that these excellences of disposition are only +valuable in so far as they are helps to virtue, and we praise the brave +villain on account of a quality which is of the utmost importance for +actual goodness. They enter into our ideal of the perfect or complete +character, though, if we estimate our ideal of perfection, we shall +find, I think, that we attach less value to them when they are native +than when they have been produced by a constant discipline." + +It might seem, then, that we could classify duties under virtues. To a +considerable extent such a classification is possible. But it must be +imperfect, because there are duties--for example, filial duty, or the +duty of casting one's vote in a political contest--which do not +correspond to any general head of virtue, or may be ranked under several +heads: and again, we may rank along with virtues which stand for duties +qualities of conduct which do not correspond to duties in the same +sense; as, for instance, in a list of heads of duties, wisdom and +self-control. The enumeration mixes up two classifications, in the one +of which we group observances together under certain heads, in the other +of which we enumerate certain elements of good action in general, +certain aspects which every good action presents, and we exhibit them as +qualities in the agent's mind. The two classifications are combined in +the ancient description of morality under the heads of wisdom, courage, +temperance, and justice. The better classification is by moral +institutions, where the moral life is already mapped out for us into its +different parts. Such a scheme of classification will consider (_a_) the +Individual, (_b_) the Family, (_c_) the Society, (_d_) the State; the +fourth division including international duties, the third not being +necessarily limited to a particular society, but extending to all +mankind. + + +DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS--MORAL GROWTH AND PROGRESS + +The previous description of morality supposes it to be stationary, and +is like a section taken across the path of morality at any one time. It +gives us no idea of the process and progress of morality. We have yet to +show how the moral order is produced, and to examine the meaning and the +law of moral progress. + +As the moral organism may be compared to a species of which the various +moral individuals are the members, so the moral ideal may be regarded as +a species of which the various ideals in the minds of good men are the +different individuals. We should thus expect to find the origin and +growth of morality analogous to or, more strictly speaking, identical +with, the growth of natural species. + +"If an ultimate ideal were admissible, it would be impossible to assert +that morality is essentially progressive." Morality, in the sense of an +equilibrium, has at every stage a certain finality, in the sense that it +is, for that stage, the ideal adjustment. But we cannot conceive of any +ideal as final in the sense of stationary. The good is always ultimate +but always in motion. "Moral progress admits of only two degrees of +comparison, the superlative being identical with the positive." By +"best" we do not imply a greater rightness in the ultimate condition, +but only a highest development. Spencer's conception of the distinction +between Absolute and Relative Ethics involves the conception of an +ultimate "ideal congruity," or complete adaptation of man to his +conditions, a mobile equilibrium including perfection as well as +goodness, present choice being never between wrong and an absolute +right, but always between two wrongs, the lesser of which is to have the +preference. The picture is, in itself, perfectly legitimate; and in so +far as Spencer "conceives that the only ideal is the absolutely right +conduct, his conception is not only legitimate, but true." There is +always, however, an absolute right that may be chosen; and "using the +conception of a mobile equilibrium, we found it to be, not a goal of +progress, but the meaning of goodness at any time." "The distinction of +good and bad (right and wrong) arises within the limited range of +conditions that are to be met by good action." That, as Sidgwick +asserts, there is always some course of conduct which is right, the +moral consciousness declares with certainty, and is thus against the +relativity of morality. Mr. Spencer holds that any concomitant of pain +makes an action wrong, therefore it is natural for him to regard all +present morality as only relative. But to the good man the pleasure of +doing right exceeds the possible attendant pains of an action; and +except upon the understanding that, in a society of good men, every one +will adjust himself with equanimity to the needs of others, not even the +acts which are declared to be typical of absolutely right conduct can be +free from concomitant pain. "Will the ideal state exhibit no +competitions, such as rivalry in love, which can be ended indeed with +the contentment of all persons, but assuredly not without attendant +pain?" + +The general error in theory on this subject lies in a misconception of +the idea of "adjustment" to environment, the fact not being noted that +the environment is not itself fixed and permanent. What the environment +is depends upon the nature and faculties of the individual, the same +environment being a different one for amoeba and human being, for the +blind man and the man possessing sight; and what environment is and what +the individual does are settled at one and the same time, the process of +selection being one from both sides, and the variation of both. The +adaptation "wherever it exists and so far as it exists" is, hence, +perfect adaptation; if the lower organism is adapted to its environment, +its adaptation is as perfect as that of the higher organism to its +environment. + +Every successful life means adaptation. "Every animal which can maintain +its life is in adaptation to its environment." The bare formula of +adaptation means nothing more than the fact of existence. "Adaptation to +the conditions as such teaches us nothing as to the nature of the +organism; for all functions are reactions upon the conditions, and +therefore, so far, adaptations. But it points to something behind. It +means that _all_ the functions of the animal are adapted to the +conditions, and this means that its functions are adapted or adjusted to +one another under the conditions." + +"The moral ideal consists in a certain equilibrium established on the +basis of certain conditions--wants and sentiments in moral agents." It +involves advance just for this reason, because the act of adjustment +implied in good conduct itself alters the sentiments of the agent, and +creates new needs demanding a new satisfaction. The change is not always +in the same direction, however; for cultivation in one direction may +cause the individual to become aware of capacities or wants in quite +another direction, or the advocacy of one side of a question, persevered +in, may so open up the other side as to end in complete change of view. +In any case, however, there is an enlargement of experience, and the old +facts are themselves changed by it as well as are the individuals +subject to it. + +This change or adjustment leads to a maladjustment requiring a new +adjustment. This maladjustment is to be distinguished from the +reärrangements which are contemplated by the statical ideal and due to +the mere rotation of wants in society; the latter are within the moral +system as a system of mobile equilibrium. The maladjustment is of +another sort. "The good act ceases to be good by its performance. The +moral ideal ceases to satisfy." The two forms of change may be compared +respectively to a shifting of position on the same locus, and to such a +shifting of position as involves a shifting of locus. Thus, by change +after change of this sort, a new variety replaces its parent, and this +variety in time producing a fresh variety, there is finally reached a +new species. Progress thus becomes a necessary fact, and the difference +of so-called stationary societies from progressive ones can lie only in +the comparative slowness of change. + +"As there is a difference between different societies in rate of change, +so there is a similar difference as between different parts of conduct." +Law, a part of morality, lags behind in moral progress. However, there +is nevertheless always advancement, otherwise legislators would be +unnecessary. And the direct outward change of form is preceded by other +change, laws which fall into disfavor by means of moral progress being +modified, in application, within the possible limits of interpretation, +and less and less rigidly enforced. There is good reason why law should +have a certain permanence. + +The moral standard appears to have a similar more or less fixed +character, while morality itself is in continuous change. There are two +reasons for this appearance: (1) the changes in the moral order are +infinitesimal and not perceived by us except as accumulated through some +period of time; and, moreover, what is commonly called the moral +standard is only a kind of generalization from the extremely various +opinions of different persons as to what is right, and differs from the +real standard which "registers the conduct constituting equilibrium, and +is possessed by the good man. Perfectly good men are impossible. The +standard current is therefore nothing more than a common understanding, +which every one, even every good man, expresses differently; it is no +more an exact expression of the truth than is, let us say, a great +scientific conception (like development) which regulates all knowledge, +but is amongst the educated little more than the name of a general way +of thinking, while the thing itself is becoming, at the hands of men of +science, modified or even transformed." (2) The mistake is often made of +describing morality, not by institutions, but in terms of virtues, and +while the name applied to different virtues remains the same, their +content changes from age to age. + +This idea of variability affects the statical conception of order with +regard to habit--the moral requirement being that the fixed habits of +morality should not be so fixed as to be incapable of advancement; and +with regard to conscience, of which it might be said that, instead of +representing the moral order, it was more occupied in changing than in +maintaining it, but which in reality thus represents the moral order, to +which the ideal is a changing one. + +Two difficulties or objections may arise with regard to this idea of a +changing ideal. The progress has been represented by personifying the +ideal and supposing the person to change with each new ideal. Again, +"goodness consists, we saw, of a system of conduct in the individual +himself or in society, and this system forms a series in time. It would +seem to follow that, if goodness is always progressive, no second act +would be performed under the same law, although the very idea of the law +means a series of acts." But we are not to suppose that, if fifty good +men in a society act rightly, fifty new ideals are established, for the +ideal represents the equilibrium of the members of the society, and it +depends on whether the new ideals of the fifty men represent the new +equilibrium whether we shall call the persons good or bad. Again, the +ideal at any moment would be in fact realized in a series, supposing the +conditions did not alter meanwhile; and while the system of conduct is +serial, it is realized at any one moment in the mind of the man whose +sentiments correspond to its requirements. + +"In this process we see exhibited the interplay of the element of +goodness or rightness with that of perfection. In all actual goodness, +we have perfection attained as well; but in the statical notion of +goodness perfection is subordinate--only that exercise is perfect which +is legitimate. But in the notion of progressive goodness, perfection +regains its rights. For goodness, having secured perfection, creates new +materials which destroy the old equilibrium and call for a new one. +Goodness determines perfection, but change in perfection determines, +therefore, changes in goodness." Morality is the creation of a better; +this better is change from a lower to a higher development, not the +growth of a greater rightness. All good conduct is _absolutely_ good, +and the good man of former days was as good as the good man of to-day, +although he performed acts not allowable by the higher moral standard +attained as highest development. Accordingly, there is no such thing as +an absolute morality, in comparison with which other conduct is variable +and relative. The relativity of good conduct, instead of being a +reproach, is in reality its highest praise, for it implies that the +conduct takes account of exactly those conditions to which it is meant +to apply. This conception of morality as absolute runs into that of +morality as an eternal and identical law: eternal, for the morality of +given conditions remains eternally true for those conditions; identical, +for although it cannot be called identical in the sense that virtues do +not change with institutions, it is identical in form,--as an +equilibrium of social forces in an order of conduct. The more important +conception of the moral law is its unity in which, as the stages of one +continuous law, its identity consists. "Progress is not mere destruction +of the lower, but fulfilment." + +In considering how morality arises, it would be erroneous to suppose +that it comes into existence by an actual compromise. It arises through +a process of continuous change, parts of which may be an insensible +growth, parts the self-conscious adoption of a proposed new scheme. In +the latter case, a slight reform may be adopted with but little +opposition from members of the society other than the proposer, as +meeting a recognized, common want; or, in the case of a more extended +reform, the idea as first proposed may be long contended against, and +only finally adopted after much alteration by reason of contact with +such opposition. In its acceptance innumerable forces are combined, +innumerable different motives determine its acceptation by different +persons. Whatever the motive, however, the conduct of the person +accepting it alters in accordance with its acceptation. + +The chief importance of pleasure and pain lies in the part they take in +such choice. They are "the tests of the act being suitable or the +reverse to the character (in the widest sense) of the agent." If a +reform does not suit the character, it will cause pain and urge to +removal of the pain by resistance; and on the other hand, when the +reform is accepted, it must be that it gives pleasure to the persons +concerned. But in saying this we have to remember the distinction +between ethical (or effective) and pathological (or incidental) +pleasures and pains. The total reaction of character on a stimulus may +be pleasurable, but this pleasure results from a mixture of pleasures +and pains weighed against one another. This balancing of pleasures and +pains is not reflective, but takes place by a kind of intuitive act in +which only subsequent reflection may be able to distinguish the +elements. The pleasure or pain involved in acceptance or rejection is +not the ground of acceptance or rejection. The cause of the acceptance +or rejection is the nature of the reform itself, its congruity or +incongruity with the natures of the persons accepting or rejecting it. +"When the new ideal is definitely established, those who do not obey it +are bad, those who do are good." Those who were good under the old may +thus be bad under the new ideal, and _vice versa_. + +The gradual reform through the choice of individuals who act upon their +feelings without knowing the whole aim or bearing of their conduct is +similar to that where a definite reform is the end in view. It is a +gradual adjustment of wills under new conditions and represents the +position of equilibrium which would be completely realized if all the +society were good. + +The new ideal is not to be defined as merely the will of the majority, +the possession of a majority being nothing but the fact of its +prevalence. The ground of prevalence is that it represents the +equilibrium. "There is no virtue in mere preponderance; it is not that +reforms follow the majority, but that a majority is attracted by a +suitable reform." + +A new ideal arises by a struggle of varieties analogous to that in the +organic world,--the word "struggle" being metaphorical in both cases, +since actual conflict is not necessary to either. "The distinction of +good and bad corresponds to the domination of one variety... which has +come to prevail in virtue of its being a social equilibrium," and thus +representing suitability to all the conditions of life. Evil is simply +that which has been rejected and defeated in the struggle with the good. + +The reformer, as not representing the predominating ideal and so the +social equilibrium, and the man who turns out to be bad by the new +ideal, thus stand originally upon the same level. "Each is an instance +of a variety of the original species, but the former is the successful +variety"; his ideal "represents the real forces of society and can be +adopted by the whole." The struggle is one of character and conduct, and +results not necessarily in the extinction of life, but in the extinction +of unsuitable ideals. + +"The distinction of the _formally_ bad from the _materially_ good rests +upon the transition from the old ideal to the new, though sometimes we +use those terms as describing what is only legally wrong though morally +approved. A reformer, until his reform is established, is formally +wrong. He can be considered materially right only prospectively;... time +only can prove whether he had really forecast the movement of his +society." "Sometimes a society may be so divided, as in our civil war, +that neither variety is predominant. In such a case we must say, not +that there was no rule of right, but that there was a different rule for +each of the two halves of the nation." "There does not arise any need +for the distinction of formally and materially right conduct, until the +limits have been overstepped, within which it is in any age considered +right for a man to act upon his own conviction. These limits are placed +very differently in different ages." + +Does good action, then, depend on the bad man as well as on the good? +"Good and evil arise together, and good is therefore always relative to +evil, but we do not therefore take our morality from the bad. We cannot, +in fact, know who is bad until the standard is created, but once +created, we maintain it against bad men by punishment. But, on the other +hand, the moral standard does depend upon the forces which, when allowed +free play, are distinguished as bad.... A large part of conduct consists +of precautions which it is not only legitimate but incumbent to take, +but which we should dispense with under happier conditions.... And in a +second way, morality depends on 'badness,' for when a habit of action +which we dislike and call bad comes to be strong enough to make itself +felt, we seek to satisfy its claims as reasonable. There is... no +external standard by which we can settle once and for all what claims +are legitimate and what are not. We derive our conception of the +reasonableness of things from our experience of their vitality and +effective powers. A wise man who thinks the feelings and beliefs of his +neighbors ridiculous will, by persuasion or force, resist them with all +his energies, but when he finds them persist in spite of all his +efforts, he will recognize that there are more things in human nature +than stir within the narrow limits of his own breast. If what we now +call bad conduct, murder, adultery, theft, could be conceived to become +predominant under greatly changed and of course impossible conditions, +it would cease to be bad and would be the ideal of life." + +From the view that morality depends upon victory, misconceptions may +arise. The question may be asked: Should one, in case of doubt, follow +one's own conviction, or join the side it is thought will prevail? But +that good is created by predominance is a theory of the means by which +ideals come into existence, not a statement of the motive of those who +participate in the struggle. The struggle is between characters and +their forces, and not victory is the end, but the assertion of certain +principles. + +"Interest or good in general is a different conception from the right or +the morally good. Interest means what is good for an individual +considered from his own point of view, and without regard to similar +claims of other individuals. It is the maximum of happiness or +satisfaction which he can secure under his conditions. By 'maximum +happiness' is meant that distribution of satisfactions or of the +energies which produce them, any deviation from which on either side +implies a less fulness of life." It refers, however, to his good as a +social, not as an isolated individual. + +As a general rule, interest is in agreement with goodness; misdeeds are +unprofitable. But there are instances where goodness and interest do not +coincide, though not in the case of the good man. That virtue and +interest are in general identical means, statically, that morality is a +reconciliation of interests by which wants are satisfied, and is +established by the creation of a new type of character, which has wants +of only certain kinds; and, dynamically, it represents the fact that +forces are arrayed on the side of the good which are too powerful for +the bad. "Good is the victorious ideal"; and though we may say that it +would really be to the bad man's interest to be bad, if circumstances +were such that his variety could maintain itself, we may add that such +hypothetical interests cannot be secured. However, interest does not +coincide with morality-- + +(1) Where the individual does not care for punishments and social +censures. (2) Where a man, by reason of certain superiorities of force +over others with whom he is more directly in contact, is able to obtain +power and suppress their resistance, or where the moral weakness of +others leaves him unpunished. In these exceptional cases, we have the +contradictory phenomenon that an ideal which can maintain its existence +is yet declared to be bad. "Such cases mark a stage of transition in the +process by which the distinction of good or bad is established." In the +struggle of animal species, the same phenomenon may be found; an +exceptional individual of a vanishing variety maintains his existence +for a time by reason of his exceptional endowment or of coming in +contact merely with the weaker members of the successful variety. + +There are two ways in which the moral ideal is maintained,--by education +and by punishment. Punishment is the condemnation of wrong-doing by +censure or by legal penalties. The unpleasant consequences of neglect of +the self-regarding virtues are not punishment; but the reaction of the +good forces of society against wrong-doing is as natural as the +unpleasant physical effects of imprudence. + +"If the question as to what moral sanction is means, 'What reason is +there why morality exists?' the answer lies not in enumerating the +penalties of wrong-doing, but in tracing the origin of morality as an +equilibrium of the forces of society.... But the question, 'Why should I +be moral?' means, most naturally and usually, What inducements are there +to me to do right?" The answer is that motives differ for different +individuals. With some, outer social inducements, with others, the +approbation and disapprobation of conscience are stronger. These latter +ethical pains and pleasures which are felt at the idea of an action +stand on a different footing from feelings having regard to external +rewards and punishments and also the prospective pleasures and pains of +conscience. The man who does right because he shrinks from prospective +pains of conscience is not a good man, but intermediate morally between +the bad man who seeks only to escape legal punishment and the good man +whose pains of conscience felt at the idea of a wrong act prevent his +performing it. + +Punishment wears different shapes according to the point of view from +which it is regarded, but, in the distinctively moral view, is +reformatory. All punishment is retribution, but not in the sense that it +is personal vengeance. The value of this idea of retribution lies in the +fact that it places punishment on a line with the process of +self-assertion by which species maintain their life; it is a part of the +reaction of the organism against anything which impedes its vitality. +If, however, punishment avenges the evil deed, it is a confusion to say +that it is for the sake of vengeance. The purpose in the mind of those +punishing is not necessarily vengeance, and the idea of mere retribution +is repugnant to the good man. From the juridic point of view, the object +of punishment is prevention; from the moral point of view, reformation. +The reformation seeks to destroy a bad ideal, and does not necessarily +destroy the individual in whom it is found; but in some cases the +wrong-doer's mind is so perverted that only death, it is judged, will +suffice. "Here, too, paradoxical as it may seem, though perhaps the +chief object of our punishment is the indirect one of bettering others, +we punish with death in order to make him a good man and to bring him +within the ideal of society.... The penalty of death is thought +necessary to bring home to him the enormity of his guilt." + +The object of punishment is not always achieved, but this matters not +for its moral character, which lies in its conscious object. The idea of +punishment as reconciling the criminal with society includes the aspect +of retribution or expiation, under which punishment may be viewed from +without; but it is only when the suffering is attended by reformation +that it can be considered in a proper sense expiation or atonement. + +Responsibility differs from obligation by introduction of the element of +punishment. Obligation is the necessity of good conduct which arises out +of the relation of the act to the order of which it forms a part. +"Responsibility is the negative aspect of this relation. When I think of +conduct as required of me, I think of it as my duty; when I think of it +as conduct which if I do not perform, I shall be rightly punished, I +have the sense of responsibility." The sense of responsibility is thus a +knowledge of the requirements of the law, and it is only as we have +law-abiding instincts that we feel it; and we feel it differently +according as we think of the authority of the law as derived from its +mere enactment or as founded upon the social good, or as established in +our own conscience and self-respect, which represent the social good. As +including recognition of certain conduct as right, the sense of +responsibility is more than the mere knowledge and fear of punishment. +"It is only those who can appreciate that punishment will be deserved to +whom the idea of responsibility applies. There is, therefore, no +difference between the fact of responsibility and the sense of +responsibility, any more than there is between goodness and the feeling +of approbation, or duty and the sense of duty. When we declare a bad +man responsible, we mean that the good man holds him to be justly +punished." + +Responsibility depends, then, on two things,--that a man is capable of +being influenced by what is right, and that whatever he does is +determined by his character. This capacity depends on his being aware of +the meaning of his acts, and so of their connection with other acts, and +contains thus an element not present in the relations of animals. + +"Except for the authority of one or two great names, there seems to be a +general agreement that the will is determined by character." If +character means the principle of volition, as it is regarded in our +analyses, the assertion is a truism. It is no less true if character is +defined as disposition; all our dealings with our fellow-men reckon on +their acting in accordance with their character. The distinction made by +Green that the mind acts from its own nature (the motive and the whole +process of willing being within the mind) is no more and no less true of +the action of other bodies. The emergence of new sentiments in character +might be urged as an argument for free will; but this is of no more +significance than the budding of trees in springtime. The sense of +freedom is the sense of choice between two motives; but this merely +depends upon the intellectual property that the object willed is present +to consciousness,--in case of choice two objects being present to the +mind. "So far is the consciousness of freedom from being a ground for +assuming an arbitrary or undetermined power of volition that it is +exactly what would be expected to accompany the process of determination +when the object concerned was a conscious mind. Pull a body to the right +with a force of twelve pounds and to the left with a force of eight; it +moves to the right. Imagine that body a mind aware of the forces which +act upon it; it will move in the direction of that which, for whatever +reason, appeals to it most; and in doing so it will, just because it is +conscious, act of itself, and will have the consciousness of freedom." +But which motive is chosen is fixed and dependent upon character, that +cannot choose otherwise than it does; and the sense of freedom is a +sheer delusion. The feeling that one ought to have acted otherwise +implies another sort of freedom, according to which he only is truly +free who chooses the right; in such choice it is, however, the +character which acts, and though a man is free, in this sense, _if he +chooses_, his choice is determined. The argument of free will in regard +to punishment does not explain punishment, but renders it inexplicable. +It would be senseless to punish except as, by so doing, we can influence +a man's character. Determinism does not make punishment wrong; it is not +cruelty, but kindness to punish: it saves a man from worse, from +degradation of character, enabling him to change his ideal, and thus +bringing himself into equilibrium with his kind. The reason of certain +doubts which are beginning to be felt to-day with regard to punishment +is the larger knowledge of the dependence of men on their surroundings, +hence of the culpability of society as a whole; it is not an objection +to responsibility as such, but to the distribution of responsibility. + +Education, the second means by which the moral ideal is defended, is not +identical with social progress, by which the moral ideal is itself +changed, but is the individual progress included within each definite +moral ideal. Education and progress are, however, inseparably bound +together, in that education goes hand in hand with punishment, and in +that it leads to the discovery of new ideals. If we take only the +irregular line which includes the good, and discard the ideals which are +exterminated or left behind, the movement of ideals is continuous with +education, and progress may therefore be described as an education of +society. The education of children has to put them in possession of the +present moral achievement, and to make them independent individuals,--so +to penetrate them with the moral order that it shall appear in them as +spontaneous character. It is an evolving of an ideal already present; +for, to be capable of education, a person must have already set foot on +the right path. + +As in the physical world, so in the moral, we have the survival of many +different genera and species,--various ideals of conduct or institutions +of life, some of which may be grouped together by strong resemblances, +others of which stand to each other in the relation of lower to higher +organisms; the survival of archaic institutions in the higher as well as +their history of progress showing their affinities with the lower. +"History is the palæontology of moral ideals," and provides us with a +better means of studying the growth of morality than exists for the +study of the growth of species. As in the organic world, varieties +develop from species by a gradual and continuous movement of sentiment, +each successful variation forming the basis of a new variation, and the +differences of the varieties from each other and from the original +species increasing with their distance from the original species, until +the difference amounts to a difference of species. We may call these +modifications "accidental," but, as in the physical world, they are so +only as we regard them from the position occupied by a person before the +event; they have their causes if we can find them. These causes are to +be found in the contact of different minds. Variability depends to a +considerable extent on the size of a genus, but only in so far as +greater size involves greater complexity and variety of interests; the +vast but homogeneous societies of the East being less progressive than +the smaller but more complex ones of the West. "Where freer scope is +left to individual inclinations or aptitudes, there the friction of mind +against mind is more intense. New ideas are generated in the more vivid +consciousness of the people, and life becomes more inventive." + +Species developed from a common genus will show some common traits and +some rules of mutual observance, savage peoples which have divided into +tribes being an exception to the latter part of the statement, for the +reason that lower societies have very little moral cohesion; they may be +compared to lower organisms which reproduce themselves by fission, or to +homogeneous colonies of animals, like sponges. Under the generic +institutions we must not include those which arise merely as the result +of similar circumstances. Ideals once formed advance at very different +rates, though the tendency to divergence is always being corrected by +the diffusion of ideas. But where one nation takes ideas from another, +these ideas are not borrowed, in the sense that they come wholly from +the other nation; there must have been, in the borrowing nation, a +development of ideas up to the point that makes the borrowing +possible,--a similar development to that of the nation from which the +borrowing takes place, due to similar circumstances. The communication +of moral ideas does not depend upon race-community, as is shown by the +ready adoption of Western ideas by such nations as the Hindoos and +Japanese. + +In general language, we identify development and progress; and this is +true also in the case of morality. Goodness means progress; wickedness, +retrogression or else stagnation, which, compared with advance, is +retrogression. "In changing from one form to another, morality changes +from what is right under one set of conditions to what is right under +another set, and such change from good to good is what we mean by +becoming better. To deny this is to find some other standard of advance +than in the actual movement which has taken place, to put an _a priori_ +conception of development in place of the facts." "The moral ideal is +always, therefore, a progress, for either the society is single, and +goodness represents the law of its advance, or if the society is part of +a larger one, its ideal can be retrogressive only because the society is +so far bad." "And since goodness and badness exhaust the field of moral +possibilities, if the propositions that goodness means progress, and +badness regress, are both true, we must be able to convert them, and +maintain that all progress is due to goodness and all regress to +badness." To do this, we must distinguish between degradation and a mere +degeneration which involves a return to simpler conditions as an +adaptation to changed environment. Such degeneration as adaptation to +circumstances, in an individual or a society as a whole, is progress. +Fish who become blind by living in the dark become thus better fitted to +their circumstances, and the like is true of moral degeneration under +simpler conditions. Old age and death are characteristic of the higher +type of organism, in distinction from the lower types which, multiplying +by fission, are practically eternal; they are conditions of the +advantage of type, in which the individual is partaker. So a good +society under simpler conditions is on the side of progress, though it +may lie outside the main line of advance. + +It is true that bad persons often help on progress, but the good they do +lies in their representation of the will of society for progress, the +evil lies in their use of this will as means to their own ends. It may +be objected, too, that the good man is sometimes a hindrance to progress +through stupidity; but to this is to be answered that intellect itself +becomes morally characterized in action. + +All events and institutions are thus determined by their conditions; but +there is a movement forward distinguishable from the delay of stragglers +and the resistance of enemies, and this distinction is enforced by the +moral predicates of good and bad. + +Our theory does not imply that whatever is, is right; such a statement +involves the use of the word right in the sense of "correct," or +"intelligible," "accountable by reflection." Nor is the doctrine +fatalistic. Fatalism implies that men act at the impulse of some force +which they do not understand; "but the history of mankind is the history +of beings who, through their own gift of consciousness, subdue +circumstances to their own characters." In judging a nation's +development, we must not interpret it according to our own likings, as +progression or retrogression; nor must we imagine retrogression from +relaxation of duties in some certain directions, but must regard the +society and its institutions as a whole. + +The test of higher organization usually given is that of increasing +differentiation of parts with corresponding specialization of function. +But the main course of progress is not linear, or in one continuous +direction; apparent reversions to former types are only apparent; the +new type stands higher than the old. In other words, history moves in +cycles. It follows, from this, that mere differentiation is insufficient +for definition. While the differentiation advances, its significance +alters, or, let us say, the relative places of specialization and of +unity alter. Along with differentiation goes a process of integration. +Great revolutions simplify. The result of greater and greater +heterogeneity is to produce a new principle, which combines the warring +elements. The definition of progress by increased differentiation is +lacking in two ways: It tells us nothing of the forces by which progress +is produced, and it gives no connected view of the actual facts of +historical development. A general statement of progress in its formal +sense is found in the conception of a struggle of ideals. But as in this +struggle the survival of the fittest does not necessarily mean the +destruction of those who represented the defeated ideal, but the +supplanting of their ideal by another, the movement is one of +comprehension, and we should expect to find, and do find, the history of +morality exhibit the gradual development of a universal moral order, +good not for one group of men but for all. It would be a misapprehension +to regard this change as merely quantitative, as if the virtues were the +same whether they applied on a larger or a smaller scale. "The +quantitative extension is parallel with, and in reality proceeds from, a +change in the conception of the human person himself." In primitive +communities, the individual is so limited that he can hardly be called +an individual at all. First among the Greeks do we find the person the +embodiment of the social order, but in a limited sense. "When this +limitation breaks down, and the individual stands forth as independent +and self-conscious, the author of the laws he obeys, we have at the same +time the extension of the area of persons with whom he is in moral +relation." + +"It matters little that the Western ideal of a society of humanity is +realized to so slight an extent. The ideal exists and implies the +inclusion of mankind." The principle of democracy, which we are engaged +in working out, "continues, or perhaps supersedes, under much more +complex conditions and over a wider range of institutions, the same +principle as Christianity introduced." It is not merely an identical +element in many individual states, but a comprehensive ideal. The power +of naturalization, extradition laws, international action among the +working classes, etc., imply this. + +This "comprehension" is not merely one of breadth, but of depth as well: +the ideal includes not only the present of mankind, but its whole future +also. Duties have always been recognized to posterity, but the range of +generations to whom they applied was small, and the interests which it +was believed could be secured were limited also. _Après moi le déluge_ +describes a form of selfishness of all ages, but different ages have +understood the _après moi_ quite differently. At the present day, the +range of responsibility is extending indefinitely. + +A common political ideal does not mean a universal peace. Coarser forms +of dispute disappear, but, on the other hand, as nations grow more +refined in their ideals, they grow more susceptible. What a political +humanity, or a political community of Europe, would mean, is the +substitution of international punishment for the self-willed conflicts +of irresponsible nations. + +We cannot say what the future of society and of morality may +be,--whether mankind will be able to take mechanical means against a +period of ice, or whether human society may not, as a whole, be +destroyed, to be replaced by a higher type of existence, which may arise +on the earth from the development of humanity, or may, on some other +planet, take up the tale of human civilization as we take up that of the +civilization of Greece and Rome. + +Two things follow from the progressive character of the moral ideal: (1) +that the classification and description of duties will vary with each +age; (2) that, as the ideal changes from age to age, the highest moral +principle or sentiment will change with it. + +At the present time, a belief has gained great authority, that the sense +of duty is transitory and will finally disappear; but whether we, with +Spencer, identify obligation with coercion, or understand it as the +relation of a part of conduct to the rest, in neither sense is the +proposition true as it stands. If duty means constraint, it by no means +follows that constraint will cease with progress; for constraint arises +from confronting one inclination with a higher idea, and its +disappearance would mean that inclinations had become constant; this is, +however, impossible. The fiction of a final stage of mobile equilibrium +is an unwarranted conclusion from the fact that all morality involves a +cycle of conduct in mobile equilibrium. But the theory represents a +truth,--the truth that morality at no time implies in itself the sense +of duty. The sense of duty, as involving the hard feeling of compulsion, +of subjection to authority, and bound up with the sense of sin, a sense +stronger in proportion to merit or the interval between first +inclination and final moral willing, may and is giving place to a higher +conception. In the family, this may already be found, where +self-sacrifice and aid are matters of affection and rendered freely. In +the higher ideal, we have that love of man for a higher and larger order +than himself which morality represents as solidarity with society, a +continually progressive society of free individuals; which religion +represents as the love for and of God. + +And at the last two questions may be asked: (1) whether the difficulties +in which Christianity is placed at the present day do not arise from +absorption of its highest idea into the conceptions and the practice of +morality, so that the religious sentiment is starved; and (2) whether +the ideal of a free coöperation in the progress of humanity may not be +used to interpret the belief in immortality, putting in the place of +individual immortality the continuance of life in the persons whom the +individual may affect. In "The International Journal of Ethics" July, +1892, Alexander combats some misinterpretations of "Natural Selection in +Morals," which he says are partly due to Spencer's Individualism. +Natural Selection in social life does not mean necessarily destruction +of individuals, but is a struggle of ideals, such as that between +Individualism and Collectivism,--in which Selection seems to favor +Collectivism. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[82] The reference is here to Wundt, "Phys. Psych.," I. p. 485 (ed. +II.). + + + + +APPENDIX TO PART I + +PAUL REE + + +Dr. Paul Ree's "Source of the Moral Feelings" ("Ursprung der moralischen +Empfindungen," 1877), is written from a pessimistic and mechanical +standpoint. The connection of thought and feeling in the region of +morals is, according to Ree, a purely, or very nearly a purely, outward +one, moral judgments not being the result of sympathy or antipathy, or +related to these feelings in more than an external manner, but arising +from associations of ideas engendered by education; the Sense of Justice +being, in this manner, the effect of Punishment. A definite distinction +is likewise made by Ree, between vice, which affects the individual +only, and badness, which affects society, the profligate who satisfies +his lust in the most unrestrained manner being regarded as perhaps +unwise, but not bad, as long as he does not seduce the pure. The author +fails, however, to show us how vice can be practised without social +injury, and necessarily fails also--since his position takes into +account no organic relations of characteristics--to notice the +significance of profligacy as an inherent feature of character. He +touches at one or two points, only, on Habit, and at one point alone on +Heredity, where he raises the question of the hereditary character of +Vanity, but arrives at no conclusion. He also makes the division of +Egoism from Non-egoism a definite one, fully identifying the Good with +the Non-egoistic, the Bad with the Egoistic. The Non-egoistic really +exists; a man may relieve another's suffering in order to free himself +from the sight of it; or he may relieve it for the other's sake. +Nevertheless, non-egoistic action is rare; men are much more egoistic +than the apes, who are rivals only with regard to food and sexual +desire, while men are rivals not only with respect to these primitive +wants, but with respect to many others besides, especially since they +not only regard the present but provide for the future also. + +Vanity, according to Ree, gives rise to envy, hatred, and malignity. +But, the action of these passions being opposed to the safety of +society, some persons[83] introduced punishment for its protection, and +fear of punishment, and exchange of labor united men in peace. Deeds and +never motives were at first considered in the infliction of punishment, +but, outer compulsion not securing safety, the ideal of an inner +condition of character which should secure it arose. "Good" and "useful" +are synonyms, but men of later generations, receiving laws without +explanation of their origin, fail to understand that the Good was, in +its origin, simply the Useful, that the Bad was, in like manner, the +Harmful, and that Punishment is for the purpose of prevention and not in +the nature of a return for things done. The knowledge of this truth +takes from life some of its grandeur; but the truth remains the truth, +nevertheless. + +The will is not free; the mistake of regarding it as free is the result +of the failure to perceive that punishment looks to the future, not to +the past,--is a means of prevention, not a requital. The right to punish +does not rest, therefore, upon the Sense of Justice; but punishment is +justifiable as a means of prevention. Its choice, like that of other +evils as the alternatives of greater ones, is the practice of the +principle, The end justifies the means. Those who repudiate this +principle have not generally looked deeply into its meaning; moreover, +it has been misused. In putting it in practice, several things must be +observed:-- + +1. The end to be served must be a good one; + +2. The choice of means causing pain is permissible only when no other +means are possible; + +3. The pain must be reduced to the least possible; + +4. The pain must be less than would be involved in the omission of this +particular choice. + + * * * * * + +The doctrine of eternal punishment is untenable, because:-- + +1. It presupposes the existence of a God. + +2. Supposing a God to be existent, we cannot name him either good or +bad. "God is good" means "He does good to the world and its +inhabitants"; but of the world we know only the little earth, and of God +we know nothing. + +3. If we will, nevertheless, predicate goodness or badness of God, we +must call him bad, since all beings known to us suffer much pain and +have little pleasure. The gods of the savages, who are not yet led away +by theological hair-splitting, are evil. + +4. But if we still persist in naming God good, then we cannot suppose +him to be also cruel, and even more cruel than the hardest-hearted of +mortals. + +5. The doctrine of eternal punishment assumes the existence of a soul; +but the difference between human beings and the higher animals is not so +great that one can ascribe an especial soul to men. + +6. But if a soul exists, it cannot be tortured, since it is immaterial. + +7. And the deeds which God will thus punish deserve, on the theory of +punishment as prevention, no requital. + + * * * * * + +It is not immaterial to us whether men have a good or an evil opinion of +us. + +1. Because we hope for advantages from a good opinion. + +2. Because we are vain. + +Vanity arose, in the first place, because admiration was useful to men, +just as it is useful to the birds at pairing-time, and habit rendered it +agreeable in itself. Men therefore desire it, even when it has no +especial use, because "they know that all admiration is followed by a +strong feeling of pleasure."[84] The difference between man and the +peacock in respect to vanity is merely that he desires to be admired for +other things than outer appearance alone,--for courage, strength, +cleverness, the tools of battle, and many other things. Since, among +human beings, men and not women choose their mates, endeavoring to +obtain one or more of the most beautiful women possible, women endeavor +to render themselves beautiful, expending greater efforts as the stake +is greater in their case than in that of the peacock. They endeavor to +supplement their outward attractiveness by amiability, cleverness, +household industry, and, in our days, wealth; but beauty always makes +the strongest impression upon the man. Men desire to be admired rather +for other things than outward appearance, though for this, too, to some +extent. + +But vanity may be objected to (1) on the ground that it is a desire to +create envy, and envy is pain and gives rise to hatred; (2) on the +hedonistic ground that the vain man more often suffers pain from not +being admired than experiences pleasure from admiration; (3) on the +intellectual ground that vanity renders a man incapable of impersonal +interest in Nature, Art, Philosophy, and Science. Entire freedom from +vanity could, however, be attained only by a life of complete isolation. +Because of these reasons for blame, men do not confess that they act +from vanity, but give other reasons for deeds prompted by this +feeling.[85] + +Ambition may be blamed on grounds similar to those on which vanity is +blamed. However, this feeling urges to many useful acts, and without it +few would find interest for great effort. And since, because of its +usefulness, ambition is less blamed than vanity, men are more ready to +acknowledge that they possess it. + +We desire to appear well in the eyes of others, therefore we conceal our +envy and hatred, and affect high courage, great honesty, and charity. +Such hypocrisy is bad; but it is necessary. For if men were to show +themselves as they are, with hearts full of hostility, they could not at +all associate. In order to make frankness and peace both possible, men +must become what they now pretend to be; but this does not lie in their +power. + +Malignant pleasure in others' pain arises from a comparison with our own +more agreeable situation, or from the pleasure in our own superiority in +any respect. + +When a woman is seduced, it is in the interest of other women to +ostracise her, since, if marriage were to be abolished, women would lose +in position; the man who seduces her is blamed for bringing shame on +her, but not for unchastity, for men have no interest in maintaining +chastity in their own sex. + +Caprice arises, not from change of mood, but from the pleasure of power +experienced in now charming by amiability, now causing gloom by +coldness, and again inspiring fear through anger. + +If one desires anything from another, one should not say, "It is a +little thing," but "It is very much that I ask"; since he who is asked +gives more readily when he thinks he will appear very kind. + +Natural Selection does not prefer the individual as far as morals are +concerned, but only nations. Moral rules are variable, but not steadily +progressive. Man is by nature selfish; simply habit tames men and makes +them, by change in nerves and muscle, more amenable to rule. + +The good man is probably worse off than the bad man. Pain exceeds +pleasure in all beings. Everything, love included, becomes worthless +when attained, and labor begins again for new attainment. Man is, +moreover, the most unhappy of all beings, for he feels most strongly, +and in his complicated organism there is almost always something out of +order. For this reason, sympathy[86] brings more pain than pleasure. The +bad man has only pangs of conscience to disturb him, and, if he is +superstitious, the fear of punishment after death. It is difficult to +say whether the bad man or the good man is happier. In fact, happiness +depends rather on temperament, power of self-control, and health. +Possibly these truths may seem harmful; and if the good man is higher +than the bad man, and goodness should be sought, only so much of the +truth should be revealed as is not antagonistic to this end. But the +good man is not the higher, although, because goodness is useful, our +education has attempted to make us believe this. The animals may be +unselfish as well as man; on the other hand, the disinterested search +for truth is not found among the animals. The attainment of truth is, +moreover, pleasurable to the searcher, turning painful desire for truth +to pleasurable fulfilment. + +Dr. Ree's later book, "The Origin of Conscience" ("Die Entstehung des +Gewissens," 1885), does not add anything distinctly new in theory to +this first book; it is rather noticeable for what it omits of the +pessimism of the earlier book, for a more moderate, thoughtful, and less +assertive tone, than for additional theories or even much further +elaboration of the old theories, except as regards the derivation of the +Sense of Justice. It traces the savage custom of the revenge of death +through its displacement by the payment of blood-money, up to the final +substitution of state punishment. Punishment does not grow out of +revenge, but succeeds it. It is not revenge, though the desire that the +guilty may be punished and the desire for revenge may be mixed, in some +cases. Pain, not the Sense of Justice, drives the savage to revenge. +Punishment does not grow out of the Sense of Justice, but the latter out +of the former. The interference of the state with the revenge of the +individual is at first a mediation between the two parties for the +maintenance of peace in the interest of the community; later, the state +arrives at a method of punishment for the purpose of prevention. + +Hume's theory of the origin of religion has been confirmed by +Anthropology. The savage sees in natural phenomena the action of living +beings endowed with mental faculties like his own, and he gradually +comes to transfer this action to beings not in, but, according to his +new idea, behind, phenomena. The gods of primitive religions are moral +only as the peoples whose gods they are, are moral. As society +progresses, religion falls behind, and a new interpretation of old +doctrines must be introduced in order to bring it up to the later +standard. Then the gods, as moral with the morality of this later date, +are imagined as commanding the later standard, and to the fear of +punishment by the state is added, as a preventive force, that of the +punishment of the gods. The gods command what men command, forbid what +men forbid. The God of the Old Testament, Jahveh, was, like Zeus, a +nature-god, and took revenge as men did. When a later date demanded a +standard of greater humanity, Christ came, and he represented the God +of the Old Testament, no longer as revengeful and passionate, but as +possessing the attributes of sympathy which he felt in himself. The +later standard of the New Testament takes into consideration motives as +well as deeds, and commands positively as well as forbids. But the God +of the New Testament is not wholly love; if his love is unreturned, he +becomes angry, like men. + +The Categoric Imperative in the individual is merely the result of his +individual education. Conscience alone accomplishes little; other +motives than the desire to do right--fear of punishment, etc.--are +stronger. Nothing is, in itself, good or bad, but only so far as it is +useful or harmful. + +Sympathy is to some degree innate,--how it arose we cannot say; but it +has been preserved by natural selection. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[83] P. 46. + +[84] P. 78. + +[85] See, in contradistinction to Ree's theory of vanity, Sigwart's +admirable essay on this subject, contained in his "Kleine Schriften." + +[86] Dr. Ree appears to depart from his general theory here and identify +sympathy with morality. + + + + +A REVIEW OF EVOLUTIONAL ETHICS + +PART II + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +Twenty years ago, any one about to deal with moral science from the +standpoint of the Theory of Evolution, might have deemed it necessary to +preface his work with a statement of cogent reasons for the assumption +of such a standpoint. At a time when Theology saw in Darwinism only a +weapon of the anti-theological party, and when even many scientists were +not yet decided as to the worth of the new ideas, the right of the +student to make use of them in psychological and ethical investigations +might have been a subject for dispute. Yet even in the beginning the +attitude of apology was assumed oftener without, than within, +English-speaking countries, for the very reason that exactly among the +race from which Darwin sprang, the warfare of his conception of animate +nature with older systems was fiercest. At the present date, the +attitude of opinion is changed in all countries. The Theory of Evolution +has few, if it can be said to have any, enemies among the students of +science. "With Louis Agassiz died the last opponent of Darwinism +deserving scientific notice," says Haeckel.[87] Theology itself has +ceased from extreme hostilities, and many theologians have even found in +the idea of Evolution an argument with which to defend teleological +doctrine. The present opponents of Darwinism as applied to psychology +and ethics rather contest its special worth for these provinces than +deny its validity in them. Nevertheless, a universal acceptance cannot +be claimed for the theory; and since ethics is, above all other +sciences, the one that should most desire to persuade rather than to +alienate,--and this the more, the stronger its conviction of its own +truth,--it may be well to state or restate some of the reasons which +justify, from almost all modern standpoints, at least a tentative +application of the ideas of Evolution to ethical theory. Such a +statement, or restatement, must be an attempt to demonstrate the +validity of the theory in this province, and to give some good reasons +for supposing, _a priori_, that a survey of ethical questions from the +point of view it furnishes may be of ethical utility. The proof of such +utility can be found, ultimately, only in the results of the +investigation itself. + +There is but one phase of the theological doctrine of Creation with +which the mere idea of an evolution of life, by itself considered, is +directly at variance; this is the doctrine of Creation as taught by the +older Theology, which accepted the opening chapters of Genesis as +literal history, not as, by any possibility, an oriental allegory. +Between the theory of Evolution and the idea of Creation as a primal +formation of matter with force or motion in accordance with fixed laws, +between it and the idea of an initial application of force from +without,--an impulsion which set the universe in motion,--between it and +the conception of a transcendental guidance through natural law or of a +pantheistic order of development, there is no such necessary +contradiction as could justify the denial of Evolution from the +standpoint of any of these theories. It is, therefore, with the +defenders of the older theological doctrine of creation only that an _a +priori_ defence of Evolution has to deal. + +The argument which this doctrine has always regarded as one of its +strongest defences is that of the universality of the notion of a +Creating Spirit. But this defence is no longer available; modern +research has proved the idea to be by no means universal. Sir John +Lubbock says, "The lower races have no idea of a Creation; and among +those somewhat more advanced it is, at first, very incomplete." "The +lower savages regard their gods as scarcely more powerful than +themselves;... they are not creators; they are neither omniscient nor +all-powerful; far from conferring immortality on man, they are not even +in all cases immortal themselves."[88] "Stuhr, who was, as Müller says, +a good observer of such matters, reports that the Siberians had no idea +of a Creator. When Burchill suggested the idea of creation to the +Bachapin Kaffirs, these 'asserted that everything made itself,' and that +trees and herbage grew by their own will."[89] "As regards Tahiti, +Williams observes that the 'origin of the gods and their priority of +existence in comparison with the formation of the earth, being a matter +of uncertainty even among the native priests, involves the whole in the +greatest obscurity.'"[90] "When the Capuchin missionary, Merolla, asked +the queen of Singa in Western Africa who made the world, she, 'without +the least hesitation, readily answered, "My ancestors."'"[91] "The +Bongos of Sudan had no conception of there being a Creator,"[92] the +Adipones, the Californian Indians, before they came in contact with +white men, the Crees, the Zulu Kaffirs, the Hottentots, had no idea of a +creation. "Even in Sanscrit, there is no word for creation, nor does any +such appear in the Rigveda, the Zendavesta, or in Homer."[93] The idea +of a creation in any sense is not, then, universal, and cannot be +asserted to be innate, _a priori_, primordial, or essential to human +nature. Nor, assuming the standpoint of belief in a Creator, is there +any ground for supposing that he would have chosen the one rather than +any other method of creation. The internal as well as the external +difficulties in the way of a too literal exegesis of the Old Testament +are rapidly causing the abandonment of dogmatism with respect to this +point; and any other interpretation than a literal one cannot, as has +been said, logically object to a theory of Becoming based on scientific +grounds. + +It is in the nature of many of our greatest scientific theories that +their simplicity and naturalness in the explanation of facts fill us +with a sense of wonder that they had not long before suggested +themselves to scientists. If, for instance, we were to attempt, in a +Cartesian spirit, to free ourselves from all the prejudice of previous +dogma and regard only the general course of nature, we could not +logically avoid the conclusion, even from a superficial view, that a +theory of the gradual development of existing forms has far more +probability on its side than that of a creation from without which broke +in upon natural process, and placed ready-made suns and planets in the +heavens, and finished beasts and men upon the earth. Everywhere in the +organic world we behold the process of growth, the development of +germs, the passage of the inorganic into the organic, and of the organic +into the inorganic again,--change and transformation under natural law. + +The difficulty which difference of form and function in the various +species offers to a theory of Evolution is by no means so large as has +often been claimed; as great difference exists between the oak and the +acorn, from which we know it, nevertheless, to spring; as much contrast +is exhibited between the brown twigs of the trees and shrubs in winter +and the brilliant foliage and flowers which they put forth under the +warmer sun of spring; quite as great contrasts may be found, in the life +of every human being, between the single cell and the individual +completeness attained at birth, between infancy and morally +characterized manhood and womanhood, between the vigor of full maturity +and the deterioration of age. Even the chasm between the organic and the +inorganic is not logically impassable. The necessity of nourishment is +the natural bridge between the two, and the equivalence of conditions +and result, the indestructibility of matter and motion, establish at +once the necessity of the inference that the organic can exist only at +the ultimate expense of the inorganic, from which it is continually +renewed. Were our senses such that, having before been closed, they were +suddenly opened to the perception of the daily observable facts of +growth, these would probably appear to us very nearly as strange, +anomalous, and impossible as the changes which, according to the +Darwinian Theory, have resulted in the existence of different species; +and it is obvious that the public mind, becoming gradually accustomed to +the conception of the latter changes, does not now regard them as so +wonderful and anomalous as they appeared to it in the beginning. + +Processes involving complete change of form may be observed, at the +present time, everywhere in nature; but they are observable, everywhere +in the organic, as growth without breaches; even a primitive science has +always recognized the gradual character of motion, the absence of gaps +in the causal chain, at least outside of the initiative action of human +will. Such a natural hypothesis of creation as we have above supposed, +formed upon crude and superficial, but as far as it goes, logical +reasoning from facts of observation, could not regard the process as +other than a gradual one, in which simpler forms and conditions must be +supposed to have preceded more complex ones; in other words, it could +not logically conceive the process as other than an evolution. + +Traces of an idea of Evolution may be found in various crude forms in +nearly all the earlier Greek philosophers, especially in Anaximander, +Heraclitus, Democritus, Empedocles, and later in Aristotle. Such traces +may even be found in many heathen mythologies in contradistinction from +the Judaic. The progress of investigation, establishing the universality +of natural law and, in every province, the gradual character of change +was, before Darwin, as it has been since his work, in the direction of +such a theory, as was shown by the ready acceptance with which Darwinism +met, if not by the world at large, at least by the majority of +scientists. In England, France, and Germany, there were others at work +under the influence of thoughts similar to if not identical with those +that inspired the researches and experiments of Darwin; and the nebular +theory of Kant had already claimed in Astronomy what the Darwinian +claimed in Biology. "When Kant, in his Natural History of the Heavens, +which has become the fundament of modern Astronomy, says, 'Give me +matter and I will make you a world,' what he intended to express was +that the natural laws of matter are perfectly competent to render +comprehensible to us the development of our well-known solar +system."[94] + +In the very beginning, the theory of Evolution may be said to have had +three distinct branches, represented by the Nebular Theory in Astronomy, +Haeckel's Ontogeny, and the Biology of Lamarck, Darwin, Wallace, and +Huxley; and to these should properly be added the Sociological Ethics of +Spencer, which was not, however, worked out to a complete system. But Du +Prel says of later research: "In the progress of modern science, no +principle has proved so fruitful as that of evolution. All branches +compete with one another in its use, and have brought about by its aid +the most gratifying results. Geology interprets the significance of +superimposed, hardened strata of the earth's crust in the sense of a +history of the earth's development; Biology, in union with the study of +fossils, arranges the living and petrified specimens of plants and +animals in their order, and constructs a history of the evolution of +organic life; Philology prepares a genealogical tree of languages, and +finds in it signs which throw light on prehistoric times, and reveal +facts forgotten for thousands of years; Anthropology discovers in the +form and expression of human beings rudimentary signs that point to a +theory of development from lower forms; and, finally, History reveals +the evolution of civilization in far-distant historic times; and in all +these branches it becomes apparent that we only then understand +phenomena when we have comprehended their Becoming."[95] + +It is due to the gradual perception of the fact that some such theory as +that of Evolution is implied in the very conception of the constancy of +nature that there has been a continual decrease of that negative form of +criticism which has made much of the gaps in the direct proof. Modern +science has so grown to, and by, the theory of Evolution that the +overthrow of the latter means nothing more nor less than the destruction +of science itself in its highest results. Even those who reject the +conclusions of Evolution are found to make use of its methods, and must +do so perforce. As the breadth and depth and height of the theory come +to be perceived, it is seen that the demand for complete proof is +nothing more nor less than a demand for the perfection of all branches +of knowledge, the refusal of credit without such proof a refusal to +place any confidence in the first principles of scientific theory until +it has fully explored the universe and left nothing further to be +discovered. But science would have less ground for complaint, if the +opponents of Darwinism consistently refused, on the ground of the +incompleteness of our knowledge, to form any theory whatever on the +subject of man's nature and development, permitting the worth of the +evolutional theory to be determined by its future results in application +as hypothesis. But the peculiar spectacle is afforded us of a party +rejecting a theory supported by numberless facts in all branches, and +whose very breaches the direction of discovery continually tends to +bridge, in favor of a dogma which cannot point to one scientific fact in +its support,--a party demanding absolute perfection of proof as the +condition of its acceptance of one theory, while it at the same time +fiercely defends a conception of nature of which it cannot furnish the +most imperfect proof. It is true that mankind has not beheld the +evolution of the whole vegetable and animal kingdom. But neither had any +human eye ever yet beheld the planet Neptune when Le Verrier prophesied +its existence and calculated its size and position. The theory of +Evolution is a reasoning from the constancy of nature, as was that of Le +Verrier, only, in the case of the former, we have the observation and +calculations of not one scientist alone, but of thousands, on which to +rely. To demand of the scientist that he shall produce the organic from +the inorganic, and practically demonstrate the change of form and +function, and the process of separation of species, before the +possibility of such development is conceded, is on a par with demanding +of him an actual reproduction of the Glacial Period before the theory of +its previous existence shall be accepted. There is no reason for +supposing that, if spontaneous generation once took place, the peculiar +complication of conditions which produced it will ever again recur or +can be artificially constructed. + +But science has no desire to be dogmatic. It readily acknowledges the +total absence of direct and established proof at this particular +juncture of the beginning of life. It can only point to the indirect +testimony of Physiological Chemistry and Crystallogeny, to the +simplicity of structure and movement in certain forms of life, and +finally to the observed constancy of nature. But an exaggerated +significance has been given to this chief flaw in the theory of +Evolution, by those who, starting with the intention of defending +Theology or the dignity of the Human, have been driven back, step by +step, to this point, and fail to perceive that, arrived here, they have +already abandoned the ground on which contest was possible. What +significance a primal creation merely of lowest organisms can have, for +either a defence of human dignity or for Christian Theology, it is +difficult to perceive. As a matter of choice, it would seem to be more +consistent with the omnipotence and dignity of a Creator to suppose that +these very simple organisms arose, like other forms, under the action of +natural law than that special interference was necessary in just their +case. But, supposing such a special Creation, the following questions +immediately present themselves from the theological standpoint: Are +these special creations endowed with soul? If so, they must be immortal; +if not, then soul arises in the process of evolution; if it arises as do +all other things, qualities, functions, by growth,--that is, by the +addition of infinitesimal increments (as we must, indeed, suppose it to +arise if we regard it as "evolved")--then whence come these increments? +If they come direct from a Creator, then surely no special favor towards +man in the bestowment of soul can be alleged; and if they arise by +natural causes, out of nature, then why may not their first beginning, +their first infinitesimal appearance, also be supposed to be due to such +causes? + +The proof of an increase, a growth, of what have been called +distinctively the mental faculties, throughout the animal kingdom, is +every day stronger. No one believes, at the present date, with +Descartes, that the animals are automata. Differences of mental power +would seem to be but differences of degree; the facts all point to such +a theory. The more scientific theologians have, indeed, abandoned this +with the other minor points of contest above discussed, and devoted +their efforts to argument from the moral nature of man. Philology, +Anthropology, and Geology testify to mental progress, even in the human +species; and if such a progress is a fact, it cannot have been without +influence upon the moral nature of man, even supposing the latter to be +God-given. Indeed, a merely physical progress or change cannot have been +without such influence; for the most conservative theologians admit the +strong action of the body upon the mind. It would seem, then, for all +reasons, that an investigation of the process of mental evolution, or of +evolution in general, ought not to be without results significant for +any system of morality. If it is true that we learn wisdom and morality +from human history, this can be so only because history gives us +increased knowledge of the constancy of nature in those of its +manifestations which specially concern the human, and thus enables us +better to judge the present and predict the future. We should suppose +that a still wider knowledge of our mental and physical evolution must +be of yet greater worth to us in the same manner,--that the disclosure +of more extended fields of nature to our vision must afford us new and +valuable lessons with regard to ourselves; just as the telescope makes +no discovery in the most distant regions of space that does not prove to +have, in the end, its peculiar significance for our own planet. If our +investigations should prove fruitless, as all such investigations have +been said by some to be, the fact, established _a posteriori_, could not +be disputed. But, considering all the points above noticed, such a +result could not but astonish us; and we should even be inclined, after +all that has been said, to suspect that the fault lay rather in the +particular method than in the direction of our research. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[87] "Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte," 8th ed., p. 109. + +[88] "Origin of Civilization," p. 391. + +[89] "Origin of Civilization." + +[90] Ibid. + +[91] Ibid. + +[92] Ibid. + +[93] Ibid. + +[94] Du Prel: "Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls." + +[95] "Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls." + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE CONCEPTS OF EVOLUTION + + +The preceding considerations have made it evident that the idea of +Evolution has undergone a broadening process since Darwin first brought +it before the world. It is necessary to glance briefly at some of the +chief phases and the general significance of this process in order to +define the extent and intent of the concept as far as science has made +such definition possible. + +To Darwin himself the struggle for existence was always between the +unities represented by complete organisms whether as isolated +individuals, or in family, tribal, or national groups. Everywhere in his +calculations, appearing unchanged in his results, is found the unknown +quantity of variation from ancestral type, the known factors being +heredity, and natural and sexual selection in the struggle for +existence. Wallace's ideas as to color in birds deprive the theory of +sexual selection of one of its most important points of application in +Darwin's work. It is, in fact, easy to see that sexual selection cannot +neutralize natural selection, that any particular form of sexual +selection can arise and finally survive only by a harmony with the +direction of natural selection, and that the two must therefore appear, +even from any standpoint of freedom of the will, as continually +attaining coincidence. It has been said, above, that the struggle for +existence was, for Darwin, between the organisms as unities. This +consistent position of the specialist has been criticised, from a more +general point of view, by Lewes in his essay on the Nature of Life,[96] +in which he asserts that we must logically "extend our conception of the +struggle for existence beyond that of the competition and antagonism of +organisms--the external struggle; and include under it the competition +and antagonism of tissues and organs--the internal struggle." "Mr. +Darwin," he says, "has so patiently and profoundly meditated on the +whole subject, that we must be very slow in presuming him to have +overlooked any important point. I know that he has not altogether +overlooked this which we are now considering; but he is so preoccupied +with the tracing out of his splendid discovery in all its bearings, that +he has thrown the emphasis mainly on the external struggle, neglecting +the internal struggle; and has thus, in many passages, employed language +which implies a radical distinction where--as I conceive--no such +distinction can be recognized. 'Natural Selection,' he says, 'depends on +the survival, under various and complex circumstances, of the +best-fitted individuals, but has no relation whatever to the primary +cause of any modification of structure.'[97] On this we may remark, +first, that selection does not _depend_ on the survival, but _is_ that +survival; secondly, that the best-fitted individual survives because of +that modification of its structure which has given it the superiority; +therefore, if the primary cause of this modification is not due to +selection, the selection cannot be the cause of species. The facts which +are relied on in support of the idea of 'fixity of species' show, at any +rate, that a given superiority will remain stationary for thousands of +years; and no one supposes that the progeny of an organism will vary +unless some external or internal cause of variation accompanies the +inheritance. Mr. Darwin agrees with Mr. Spencer in admitting the +difficulty of distinguishing between the effects of some definite action +of external conditions, and the accumulation through natural selection +of inherited variations serviceable to the organism. But even in cases +where the distinction could be clearly established, I think we should +only see an _historical_ distinction, that is to say, one between +effects produced by particular causes now in operation and effects +produced by very complex and obscure causes in operation during +ancestral development.... Natural Selection is only the expression of +the results of obscure physiological processes." + +The last statement is one to which Darwin himself would certainly not +have objected. It is an extension of the principle implicitly involved +in all his work and explicitly stated in his later work, although the +chief emphasis is laid on outer conditions. The extension of the idea of +competition from the outer condition of organisms to the more ultimate +physiological unities of organ and tissue is a philosophic gain. It is +evident, however, that that for which Darwin is seeking is not a +philosophical generalization which shall include outer and inner change +under one highest law, but, first of all, the particular causes of +particular variation interesting to the specialist in biology. It is +made too clear for mistake in "The Variation of Animals and Plants under +Domestication" that the uncertainty with regard to such particular forms +of cause is the spring of his declaration of our ignorance as to +variation. The possibility of an inclusion of lower in higher +generalizations he would not deny; though the special laws first occupy +his attention. Doubtless, his work is not, as is no man's, wholly free +from inconsistencies and contradictions,--which are due, in part, to the +fact that every scientific theory is, even in the thought of the +individual, an evolution. But the declaration of mystery in the question +of variation is not equivalent to a theory of accident, of +transcendental mystery, or of some special organic or vital force, such +as Claude Bernard especially opposed; it is merely and simply a +statement of the mystery of present ignorance. This fact is expressly +stated in Darwin's later work. We find, for instance, in the +introduction to a letter to the editor of "Nature," written in 1873, the +origin of many instincts referred to "modifications or variations in the +brain, which we, in our ignorance, most improperly call spontaneous or +accidental;" and we have, in "The Variation of Animals and Plants under +Domestication,"[98] such passages as the following: "When we reflect on +the individual differences between organic beings in a state of nature, +as shown by every wild animal knowing its mate; and when we reflect on +the infinite diversity of many varieties of our domesticated +productions, we may well be inclined to exclaim, though falsely, as I +believe, that variability must be looked at as an ultimate fact, +necessarily contingent on reproduction. Those authors who adopt this +latter view would probably deny that each separate variation has its own +proper exciting cause. Although we can seldom trace the precise relation +between cause and effect, yet the considerations presently to be given +lead to the conclusion that each modification must have its own distinct +cause." It is "probable that variability of every kind is directly or +indirectly caused by changed conditions of life. Or, to put the case +under another point of view, if it were possible to expose all the +individuals of a species during many generations to absolutely uniform +conditions of life, there would be no variability.... The causes which +induce variability act on the mature organism, on the embryo, and, as we +have good reason to believe, on both sexual elements before impregnation +has been effected." Darwin further considers, in this same book, some of +the probable particular causes of variation, as given in climate and +food. And it may be remarked, in this connection, that Rolph's criticism +of the impossibility of progress under conditions of want is irrelevant +as applied to Darwin, since the latter himself says expressly: "Of all +causes which induce variability, excess of food, whether or not changed +in nature, is probably the most powerful";[99] again: "We have reason to +suspect that an habitual excess of highly nutritive food, or an excess +relatively to the wear and tear of the organization from exercise, is a +powerful exciting cause of variability."[100] Rolph's criticism is +probably due to forgetfulness of the fact that Darwin limited the +struggle for existence to that of complete organisms with one another, +and that, under such a limitation of the conception to external +struggle, a condition of want cannot be conceived as necessarily +precluding a monopoly of abundance by best-fitted individuals. + +Theories with regard to the special outer causes and resulting +physiological conditions of variation have been gradually added to, as +facts on this score have accumulated. But, as investigation advances, +the question is seen to involve all the problems of the intricate +chemical and mechanical nature of physiological structure in its +manifold forms and degrees of organization. The field stretches out in +this direction, under our contemplation, to an indefinite distance; and +science appears as yet to have passed only the outer limits of its +territory. + +It is certain that the comparatively recent science of Physiological +Chemistry will have many of the decisive words to say on this score, in +the future. "When we see the symmetrical and complex outgrowths caused +by a single atom of the poison of a gall-insect, we may believe that +slight changes in the chemical nature of the sap or blood would lead to +extraordinary modifications of structure," says the great seer of +evolution himself.[101] + +Among special theories of Evolution, a distinction may be made between: +(1) such special theories as aim at biological simplification by +reduction of all organic variation to one primary form of cellular +process; (2) such theories as are content with less ultimate laws, by +which the various ascertained forms of change are included in one +general statement not involving special physiological or physical theory +but applicable to all forms of life; (3) such theories as aim to give +distinctive philosophic expression to a generalization like the last +named, including in this statement both psychical and physiological +phenomena; and (4) such theories as aim at an ultimate expression of the +direction of evolution that shall include the phenomena of life, both +physiological and psychical, under one head with all other natural +phenomena. To the first class belong only "provisional" hypotheses, +among the best known of which are those of Pangenesis, Perigenesis, and +the Continuity of the Germ-Plasm. To the second, which are not merely +tentative but have a broad foundation in known fact, belongs Haeckel's +theory of Inheritance and Adaptation, a theory restated in substance, +from independent research, by Eimer, whose ultimate general factors of +analysis are the same with Haeckel's, though he deals, beyond these, +with special facts and special theories of his own. Phases of the second +class often entitle them to inclusion in the third. An example of the +third class is found in Spencer's definition, "Life is the continual +adjustment of inner relations to outer relations." The fourth and last +class includes Fechner's "Tendency to Stability" and Spencer's theory of +the rhythm of motion (see his "First Principles"), similar to which are +certain ideas of Zöllner, Du Prel, and others; and similar elements to +which are to be found in Haeckel's "Plastidule-Theory." In connection +with this class, reference may be made to an article by Dr. J. Petzoldt +in the "Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie" under the +title "Maxima, Minima, und Oekonomie," in which, among others, Fechner's +views especially are discussed with reference to an ultimate principle +of evolution. The first pages on the "Tendency to Stability" in +Fechner's "Ideas concerning the Evolution of the Organic" ("Einige Ideen +zur Schöpfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen") are as +follows:-- + +"For the sake of brevity I call relations of position and motions +recurring at regular periods, that is after like intervals, in the +particles forming a material system or in the centres of whole masses +conceived as forming a larger system, 'stable relations.' Among such +relations is to be reckoned the condition of rest of the particles or +masses in relation to each other, as the extreme case, which we may call +the state of 'absolute stability'; while a dissipation of the particles +or masses, to infinity, in different directions, constitutes the other +extreme of absolute instability. + +"We do not speak of 'absolute stability,' but of 'full stability,' in +cases where motion still takes place, but this brings continually, in +exactly the same periods of time, the same relations of particles or +masses, not only as regards position, but also as regards velocity and +direction of the motion and change of velocity and direction.... + +"To absolute and full stability may be added, as third case, that of +greater or less approach to full stability, which we may term briefly +'aproximate stability'... and of which we have an example in the chief +bodies of our solar system. + +"It may serve as a simplification of the consideration of stable +relations of motion to remark... that, in an isolated system or one +under constant outer conditions, exactly or very nearly the same +relations of velocity and direction recur when exactly or very nearly +the same relations in the position of the particles or masses return. As +regards the velocity, this follows directly from the principle of the +conservation of energy; as regards the direction, it is indisputably +possible to assume the connection of its recurrence with that of the +other relations, although I cannot remember that a direct general proof +of this has been found. + +"With these introductory specifications in mind, let us assume any +number of material particles to be restricted, by forces of some sort, +to motion within limited space, and the system either withdrawn from +outer influences or under such as are constant; let us, moreover, +suppose the system undisturbed by the interference of psychic freedom, +or the latter impossible. In such case, certain initial positions, +velocities, and directions of the parts of the system being assumed, all +following states will be determined by these. And now, if there are +among these conditions, either present at the beginning, or attained in +the course of the motion, any such as have for their result a return of +the same states after a given time, then the motion, and so also the +positions of the parts conceived as at first undergoing alteration in +form and velocity, will, unless they contain the immediate condition of +periodic recurrence, continue altering until those of all the possible +states are reached which contain the condition of recurrence; until this +point is attained, the system will, so to speak, know no rest. Has the +recurrence once taken place within a given time, then it must always +take place anew within the same time, because the same conditions are +there to determine it. And since these conditions are determinative of +the whole course of motion from one recurrence to the next, the same +course must be repeated; that is, in every like phase of the period a +like state of motion will exist. But this gives us full stability of the +system, a change, a deviation from the attained stability being possible +only through changes in outer influences, the assumed constancy of which +rendered the attainment of stability possible. + +"This principle appears at first purely _a priori_; but the assumption +should not be overlooked that there are among the conditions determining +the motion such as lead to their own recurrence, and this is to be taken +for granted, since it is necessary to assume that a system must continue +to change until, but only until, the conditions of full stability are +attained, in case it is attainable; and that this full stability, when +once reached, cannot be again destroyed by the action of the system +itself. The question presents itself as to how far calculation and +experience permit us to lay down a more general principle. + +"In a system in which only two particles or masses, withdrawn from outer +influences, are determined to motion by mutual attraction and the +influence of a primary impulse in another direction, calculation shows +us that, motion to infinity being excluded, the attainment, and indeed +the immediate attainment, of full stability is a necessity; and for +swinging pendula and vibrating strings it may be calculated, from the +nature of the moving forces, that they would remain in a condition of +fully stable motion if outer resistance were removed; for, such +obstacles present, they pass through an approximately stable condition +to one of absolute stability. The power of purely mathematical +calculation does not go beyond such comparatively simple cases.... + +"But if we call experience to our aid, it may be asserted, in accordance +with very general facts, that, in a system left to itself or under +constant outer conditions, and starting from any conceivable state, if +not full stability at least a greater or less approximation to it is +reached as final condition, from which no retrogression takes place +through the inner workings of the system itself. The tendency to +approximately stable conditions appears, or the actual state is +attained, according to the measure in which variable outer influences +are withdrawn. So that so little is lacking to our hypothesis, that, +although it has at this point to make up for the impossibility of +perfect demonstration, we are nevertheless justified in laying down the +following law or principle:-- + +"In every system of material parts left to itself or under constant +outer influences, so, then, in the material system of the universe, in +so far as we regard it as isolated, there takes place, motion to +infinity being excluded, a continuous progress from more unstable to +more stable conditions, up to the attainment of a final condition of +full or approximate stability." + +From the union of the principle thus stated and that of the conservation +of energy "it follows that no unlimited progress of the universe to +absolute stability, which consists in perfect rest of the parts, can +take place.... The energy manifested in the universe cannot be altered, +in general, in its amount, but only in the form in which it manifests +itself." "It cannot be asserted that the attainment of full stability in +the universe would be the attainment of an eternal rest, but only of the +most perfectly adjusted motions, and therefore such motions as would +give rise to no variations.... But a condition which brings with it +eternal repetition cannot be reached in finite time." + +"To elucidation of this principle of the Tendency to Stability," says +Dr. Petzoldt analyzing Fechner's work, "we have only to call to +remembrance a number of natural phenomena, such as the ebb and flow of +the tide, the circulation of moisture, periodic changes of temperature, +and so forth, which exhibit great periods of approximate stability and +in which we notice in general no retrogression. + +"Not less does the constitution of organisms which are, 'so to speak, +constituted dependent upon periodicity of their functions, and so upon +stable relations of their life,' serve to confirm the theory. Only the +concept of stability must be extended in their case, since not always +the same, but only substitutive parts of the organic systems tend +towards stability. + +"Experience never gives us an example of an isolated system; on the +contrary, every system is a part of higher systems. The inner relations +of its stability are not conditioned by its own parts only, but also, +more or less, by those of other systems, so that the destruction of one +part-system is always only in the direction towards the stability of a +higher, ultimately of the highest, system; that is, of the system of the +universe." + +"Thus the teleological principle coincides with the principle of the +Tendency to Stability, and at the same time the latter constitutes the +link between the former and the law of Causality. Though, in truth, this +manner of looking at the matter signifies a generalization of the +concept of 'end,' since it defines _all_ stable conditions as ends. The +view is justified, however, by the fact that the greatest possible +physical satisfaction--for us, the criterion of teleology--is always +bound up with the longest possible preservation or slow change of a +stable organic condition. The _physical_ Tendency to Stability 'bears +with it a _psychical_ tendency to the attainment and conservation of +just those conditions' towards which the physical tendency is directed." + +Of the fact that Lange "feels the lack of the proof of this 'Tendency to +Stability,'" Dr. Petzoldt says: "But how is there a need of proof here? +To prove is to refer back to known facts. But what is there in Fechner's +remarks that stands in need of such a reference? They simply draw our +attention to the result of evolution as a state which bears, in itself, +the guarantee of some continuance. Can any one contest this? Is there +anything further to prove? It is said that Gauss once remarked that +Lagrange's equations of motion are not proved, but only historically +stated. The case is exactly the same here. The fact is attested, merely, +that evolution ends in a stable condition; and herein lies the pith and +the great merit of the theory of the Tendency to Stability." + +Dr. Petzoldt criticises, among other things, especially Fechner's +concept of approximate stability, in that no distinction is made by the +author between three different cases. The first case comprises forms of +motion in which periodicity is only approximate, but in which, +nevertheless, no retrogression in stability takes place; this case is +illustrated by our solar system. The second case comprises forms of +motion in which the stability increases up to a certain point, but +beyond this, despite relative constancy in outer conditions, decreases +again until complete destruction of the system supervenes; an +illustration of this form of motion is found in all organisms. The +third case comprises forms of motion which we cannot concede to be +stable. "For, if we ascribe periodic motion to pendula and musical +strings which vibrate in a resisting medium, this is nevertheless a +periodicity, which continually changes _in the same sense_, and we +certainly cannot say that pendula and strings approach, in a resisting +medium, a condition of absolute, through a condition of approximate, +stability. We recognize in these vibrations, decreasing in amplitude, +merely unstable changes which tend toward a final stable +condition,--namely that of rest." + +The author finds a further ground of criticism in Fechner's assertion +that organisms are entirely dependent upon the periodicity of their +functions. Only a part of such functions are periodic. Periodicity is +not conceivable without stability, but stability is conceivable without +periodicity. + +In the process of evolution towards a stable form of movement, +Dr. Petzoldt recognizes briefly two factors, "Tendency and +Competition."[102] Tendency is defined, in general, as the direction, +actual or potential, of material parts or of mental or physical +function; competition, as the conflict of tendencies, from which a +tendency of a higher order results. "The concept of Competition is, like +that of Tendency, to be taken in a general significance. A number of +forces which act upon a single point compete. Different mental images, +observations, concepts, laws, come into competition, from which result +concepts and laws of lower and higher orders. The struggle for existence +is only a special case of competition. Though this often ends with the +immediate or gradual destruction of systems entering upon it, +nevertheless only a middle worth between all the competing tendencies +can be ascribed to the resultant. Even the conqueror is, after the +struggle, other than what he was before it; a part of the tendency +destroyed by him lives on in him, has combined with his original +tendency to a resultant. Tendencies can as little disappear without +compensation as can forces, whether the compensation consists in a +strengthening or in a weakening of others, and the _conservation of +competing tendencies_ might be regarded as a further qualitative +addition to the law of the conservation of force. Hence, in the +examination of the effects of the struggle for existence, the like +claim of all tendencies taking part in it is not to be left out of +consideration. Each makes its full force felt. But not all attain to +competition; of the numerous tendencies bound up in one organism, only a +few unite, in the single case, to a resultant, which has a direction +towards a definite issue." The less the opposition of competing +tendencies of concepts or laws, the less the deviation of the resultant +from its components, and the less the change these have to undergo. The +higher concepts and laws are, the less are the number of distinguishing +marks which they take from all single conceptions; for they are the +resultants of very strongly opposed components.[103] + +Fechner's views are related to, and, to some extent, dependent upon, +certain ones of Zöllner adduced in connection with a consideration of +sun-spots.[104] Du Prel, who also acknowledges special indebtedness to +Zöllner, attempted in his "Struggle for Existence in the Heavens" ("Der +Kampf ums Dasein am Himmel") to demonstrate the fact of a struggle and +selection among the heavenly bodies analogous to that claimed for life +upon the earth. The title of the book was afterwards changed to "The +History of the Evolution of the Universe,"[105] its scope having "grown +far beyond the limit of the former title." Du Prel finds one of the +chief advantages of an application of Darwinian ideas to astronomy in +the fact that, unlike our earth, the heavens in their immensity afford +us existing, or to our eye existing, examples of the various stages of +their evolution, in nebular mist, comets, suns, fixed stars, planets, +rings, and moons,--all subject to processes of development, which we may +to some extent observe. In the first chapter of this book, Du Prel says: +"The existing condition of the Cosmos with respect to all forms of the +Purposeful[106]--whether we regard the realm of the organic or the +inorganic--can be looked upon only as an attained, moving equilibrium of +forces. Immanent in Nature lies the capacity to develop from chaotic +conditions to teleologic forms; for, in the ceaseless play of forces, +all other than such combinations are by their nature given over to +destruction, while it lies, on the contrary, in the essence of all +purposeful combinations to be preserved. In every system of mechanical +forces an adjustment of the same must finally be arrived at through the +removal of all immanent oppositions." "_It is impossible_ for nature to +remain in chaotic conditions." "Every system of forces tends to a state +of equilibrium. This is as true of the conflict of images in a human +brain, from whose mutual accommodation the resultant of a unified theory +of the universe arises, as of oppositions in the social organism, of the +conditions of power and civilization of neighboring peoples, of the +meteorologic states of the earth, of the mechanical forces of a solar +system, or the atoms of a cosmic mist. Every war of the elements ends +with an adjustment of ideal justice, for every 'moment' of force has +influence proportioned to its power and the duration of its +activity."[107] + +There is one portion of Fechner's theory as above stated (its +metaphysical phases being beyond the scope of the present chapter have +not been touched upon) that raises a question which may perhaps appear +to have in itself no special significance, but which nevertheless opens +up, by its implications, new fields of inquiry, and may possibly lead to +further theory. The condition of stability which evolution in the +universe as a whole gradually approaches but can never attain to in +finite time is declared, namely, to be one not of rest, but of motion. A +question might be raised, here, as to the definition of the "infinite +time" asserted to be necessary to the attainment of such full +stability,--whether the phrase be used in the mathematical or the +philosophic sense; and the question would be found, I believe, to +involve the unanswerable problem of the finite or infinite character of +the universe in space. Of a universe conceived under the philosophic +concept of spatial infinitude, obviously no final state as the result of +evolution can be predicated, the evolution supposing a progress which, +as involving infinite matter, cannot be accomplished in finite time. If +we, however, conceive the universe as occupying finite space and +undergoing continual evolution as a whole in the direction of +equilibrium, it is a question whether the end must not be attained in +finite time. For a universe conceived as finite, however immense, there +must be a finite number, however great, representing the changes +necessary to the attainment of final equilibrium; and if progress in the +direction of such equilibrium is of necessity continual, the final +equilibrium must be attainable in finite time. The question of the +nature of such a state of final, universal stability is bound up with +the problem of motion through a perfect void, and of the possibility of +the formation of such a void through the concentration of matter. +Leaving out of consideration the problem in its metaphysical form, which +concerns the possibility of conceiving inter-material space, it may be +said that it is not now supposed that the heavenly bodies move through +an absolute void; and the existence of any medium opposing resistance, +however slight, is a condition rendering impossible the attainment of +absolute stability of motion or a full stability which suffers no +diminution and is, therefore, in effect, an absolute stability. It may +be questioned whether the very nature of motion is not coincident with +change, and this with action and reaction, or competition. Such a view +would reduce evolution to a single ultimate principle, in place of +Darwin's Variation and Selection through struggle, or Petzoldt's +Tendency and Competition. We should have left, instead of these, only +the final principle involved in moving matter considered in its ultimate +parts. The metaphysical problem of the infinite divisibility of matter +need not here concern us; the ultimate parts of an organism could not +be, however, its organs as Lewes defined them, but rather, from a +positive standpoint, the ultimate units recognized by science in cell +and cell-parts. We may, indeed, since we know no beginning of motion, +legitimately regard all tendency as itself resultant. Just as we cannot +separate matter and motion, except by abstraction from reality, so, too, +we cannot conceive of motion except as having definite direction; and +thus we arrive, by a final analysis, at the ultimate philosophic +principles of matter and its motion. I use these terms in no +metaphysical sense, but merely as generic terms including under one head +specific forms of material combination and the specific forms of motion +of their wholes or parts. + +The question of the character of a conceived state of final equilibrium +may be approached from a somewhat different side, though the emphasis +falls, as before, on the solidarity of the universe and the nature of +motion as change. We may, for instance, regard the earth as an isolated +system whose isolation makes possible the continual progress of the +evolution taking place on its surface. But this whole evolution is, on +the other hand, dependent upon the light and heat of the sun. Again, the +sun is undergoing an evolution whose continuous progress may be regarded +as in a certain sense dependent upon isolation; but we see, on +reflection, that this very process is the result of the cooling nature +of the sun's surroundings, and that it is sending its motion in every +direction through space. The moon, which has passed through both the +evolution that the sun is undergoing and that which is in progress upon +the earth, is now passing through another stage which the earth must +reach in time by diffusion of its atmosphere, in case its destruction is +not accomplished by some catastrophic event before the arrival of that +distant period. Suns and planets, all the heavenly bodies, are sending +their influence in every direction through the unfathomable depths of +space; and just as the capacity of the earth to be warmed by the +influence of the sun involves its reciprocal capacity to act as a +cooling medium for that body, so the conditions throughout the universe +must be regarded as everywhere interdependent and mutually implying one +another. Thus we again arrive finally at a universal action and reaction +among the parts of the universe, all motion implying change of the +direction of motion. Or, since we may and are, in fact, obliged to +regard every direction or form of motion as a resultant,--for of motion +as of matter we know no absolute beginning,--even this simple assumption +may supply us with the conclusion which we have reached in a more +roundabout way. We may regard motion in any direction as counterbalanced +by a resistance in every other direction sufficient to produce it in +this one; in other words, motion takes place at every instant, in the +direction of least resistance, even though this direction may represent, +in the next instant, through the action of new "moments" of force, the +greatest resistance. Any direction as well as any change of direction +implies, then, resistance; resistance is equivalent to the interference +of force, or, in other words, to competition; and competition may, at +any moment, become catastrophe. The difference between competition and +catastrophe is one merely of degree, or rather it is a subjective +difference depending upon the point of view of the observer. In other +words, all that we can testify to is a certain periodicity of motion, +all motion meeting with resistance, the accumulation of which finally +induces motion in another sense. Larger periodicities are made up of +smaller periodicities, and, according to the point of view taken, any +period of such motion may be regarded as an evolution, that which +Fechner terms "full" stability being only the maximum towards which +motion during that period tends. Absolute stability can be conceived +only as perfect rest, whether we conceive it as merely an abstraction, +its realization as rendered impossible by the conservation of energy, or +whether we conceive it as possible in a universe regarded as finite; an +absolute stability of motion is a self-contradiction, and a full +stability which knows no retrogression is equally a self-contradiction. +Periodicity is, then, all into which the Tendency to Stability resolves +itself for nature as we know it. + +We perceive, in the actual universe, the fact of a certain imperfect +periodicity. This wave form of movement in great and little plays, as +Spencer has shown far more elaborately than Fechner, a large part in the +universe. + +But the evident fact of a present periodicity of imperfect form suggests +another possible conception. We are under no necessity to regard the +universe as finite either in space or time. On the contrary. We tend +naturally to conceive of it as finite after the analogy of particular +things which we perceive continually to arise and perish; but as +concerns space, we have no knowledge of any limit, and, as concerns +time, the conception of any actual beginning or end to the universe as a +whole is only the ancient naïve idea which science has disproved in +showing that neither matter nor motion ever perish. An infinite universe +is conceivable, in which not exactly the same but very similar forms, or +forms of which the successive ones closely resemble each other though +those widely separated may be very dissimilar, continue to arise and be +destroyed to all eternity. The conception of a primal nebular mist is +not a necessary inference from astronomic phenomena; it is as easy and +as logical to regard the various phases of planetary development +revealed to us by the telescope as so many phases of an evolution and +dissolution continually recurring in different parts of the universe, +one extreme of which is represented by the nebular mist, the other by +the cold and lifeless remains of planets gradually suffering dissolution +as they revolve through space. The greater the immensity of the +universe is conceived to be, the nearer our conception of it must +approach to this type. But the term Tendency to Stability is misapplied +when applied to such infinite and imperfect periodicity--to the motion, +thus conceived, of the universe as a whole. + +The periodicity in the life of organic species may be compared to the +wave-motions of light and heat as distinguished from those of water, the +individual representing the single wave-length. The analogy is not, +however, intended--to speak with Bacon--as one of nature, but merely as +one of mind. And just here it may be questioned whether Fechner may not +have been right, after all, in his assertion of the dependency of the +organism upon periodicity of function, whether the periodic character of +the individual life, dependent, as it must be supposed to be, on +adaptation to a medium to some degree resisting, does not sacrifice its +stability in so far as the increments of resistance lack uniformity. +This is evidently the case in large relations; is it not logically +necessary to suppose it so in minute relations, though the fact may not +be so evident to the coarse measurement of the senses? Experience seems +to prove that an approximate periodicity in larger relations, is most +consistent with health; and it must be remembered that the non-periodic +relations are subordinated to periodic ones, that not only in the case +of waking and sleeping, working and eating, but also in those of rest +and labor, a certain uniformity is necessary to the best mental and +physical condition. A close observation will, I think, reveal a greater +periodicity than was at first suspected; since much of it is of +so-called "automatic," "unconscious," or "half-conscious" nature. It is +to be noticed, here, that the termination of individual lives is often +in the nature of a catastrophe, and a uniform periodicity of individual +development and decay cannot be assigned, except in the form of an +average that falls much below the figure attained by the thoroughly +healthy individual. There is every reason to believe that if we could +sleep, rise, eat, bathe, exercise, work, and rest with the regularity of +a clock, we should be the better for it physically. But the +irregularities outside the province of our will-power render it +impossible for us to order our lives in this manner. Nor do we desire to +do so. For these very irregularities, as representing greater or less +change to which adaptation is necessary, are, in many cases and within +certain lines, the conditions and signs of progress; though they may +constitute in other cases and beyond these lines--that is, where they +are of too great intensity or duration--conditions of retrogression, the +imperfection in periodicity becoming catastrophe, which may extend +beyond the individual to his offspring. We may thus infer that the final +destruction of the individual organism is conditioned by its own +progress and the progress of its species, but that on the other hand, +when the destruction of the individual is too abrupt, it may mean +catastrophe to the species also, or at least to a part of it, through +heredity. + +Our considerations so far have been of a nature to convince us that not +isolation, but a constancy in the continual action of like relatively +small increments of force in the same directions, is the condition of +steady evolution. The less constant and the larger the increments, the +nearer the changes involved resemble catastrophe, though the +catastrophes themselves may be regarded in another light as forming part +of an evolution of a higher order. The changes the sun is undergoing may +be regarded as evolution in so far as the influence of the cooling +medium is a constant one. The earth as a whole and in its parts may be +regarded as passing through a process of evolution towards full +stability in so far as the sun's heat is a constant quantity, the +periodic changes of seasons and of day and night the same. The relation +would seem, therefore, to be one of time--the time-relation involved in +the duration of outer conditions as constant with reference to the +period required for the attainment of stability. Thus the sun's +influence upon the earth might appear approximately constant to the +human individual, but might represent a rapid change in relation to some +stupendous and long-continued evolution in some other part of the +universe. Considerations which we have already noticed forbid our +regarding any conditions of "full" as distinguished from absolute +stability as anything other than peculiar states single in the system +and thus unenduring maxima succeeded by decrease, although the process +may be, with reference to any other particular process, so slow, the +retrogression from the culminating point so gradual, as to be, with +respect to this other process, inappreciable. + +And while we are busied with matters which involve the whole +multiplicity of relations in the universe, just a word with reference +to cause and effect. Which one of these myriad material parts +interacting at any moment shall we single out as the cause of the +succeeding state? The solidarity of the universe as far as the complete +interdependence of all its parts is concerned is clear to us. It is true +we cannot reckon with all factors of the universe at once; and the +concept of cause and effect is therefore a useful one. But the cause of +anything must be, from a positive point of view, just what the methods +prescribed for its discovery in any particular case shows it to be: +namely, a factor, merely, in the manifold conditions determining a +following state, the removal of which means the prevention of the +succession of exactly that state. Which, for instance, shall we regard +as the cause of an evil act--the character of a man or the temptation +offered by circumstances? The change or removal of either means the +change or removal of the act. Neither is complete without the other, and +both are involved in the whole complexity of the universe, through +heredity on the one hand and the action of nature external to life on +the other. + +And just here we may glance at Spencer's definition of life as "the +continual adjustment of inner relations to outer relations." Though +emphasizing an important side of evolution, it is evidently incomplete. +Evolution is not only the adjustment of inner relations to outer +relations, it is also the adjustment of outer relations to inner +relations as well as of inner relations among themselves; or it is a +process of mutual adjustment of all the parts engaged in it. + +Our analysis, though crude and imperfect, may now be regarded as +complete. Our scope will not allow of a more elaborate one. It is +fitting, therefore, that we proceed to synthesis. The first matter which +presents itself to us, in this connection, is the theory of Heredity and +Adaptation mentioned above. + +The theory is not a new one, wholly outside Darwin's conception of +evolution. The concept of Adaptation represents simply the +generalization of all those special causes with which Darwin more +particularly occupied himself, and is, in essence, only a proclamation +of that universal subjection to natural law which Darwin himself plainly +asserted. As such a. generalization it is, however, a useful one; it +furnishes us with an expression, for the organic world, of that +universal action and reaction through which opposing forces move towards +stability by mutual adjustment. + +The law of Heredity, again, may be regarded as an organic expression of +the more general principle according to which motion that, in the sense +defined above, suffers only a minimum of interference, that is, motion +which, by a certain equilibrium of mutual relations, is "approximately" +or "fully" stable, tends to continue to take place in nearly the same +directions, or nearly to repeat itself. It is thus apparent, also, that +Heredity is closely related to the more special principle of Habit, or +also of Use and Disuse, if only we remember that, whatever the +metaphysical truths of Freedom or Determination, the psychical is always +accompanied by what may be called equivalents of the physical under +natural law. The special laws of Heredity are still enveloped in +mystery; I refer, not to that mystery which may be regarded as +surrounding all ultimate facts, if we choose to conceive them as +expressing or concealing something further unknowable, but to the +scientific mystery of ignorance, which time may dissolve. Biologists +disagree on this question, the ultimate decision of which must be left +to them. Still some general criticism on the results of research in this +direction may be allowable from a philosophic standpoint. + +The chief point at issue between various theories of Heredity seems to +be the degree of importance to be attached to Adaptation: however we may +express the question, this is the ultimate form to which it is +reducible. Now it is obvious, from the foregoing analysis, that the form +of theory which would be most useful to us, if such were attainable, +would be one in which the degree of tendency to inheritance as well as +the strength of inherited tendency is expressed in terms of the +intensity and duration of exercise, use, function, habit, or form of +motion or action (however we may choose to term it); and variation is +regarded as the resultant of such tendency and change in the +environment, or, in other words, deviation from constancy of influence. +It may be useful to inquire to what extent such a general theory is +authorized by special ones. + +We have the testimony of two of the acknowledged greatest +authorities--Darwin and Haeckel--as well as that of a score of other +biologists, and specialists in related branches, to the inheritance of +peculiarities acquired during the life of the individual.[108] Eimer +lays especial stress on the fact, long witnessed to by one class of +specialists, of the hereditary character of brain-diseases, among which +may be reckoned some that are without doubt due to direct influence of +the environment.[109] Haeckel and Eimer even instance cases in which +mutilation has been inherited.[110] One such instance would be +sufficient, in overthrowing the general denial of the inheritance of +individual adaptation, to make probable the direct influence of the +environment in other cases, the uniformity discoverable in the workings +of natural law leading us to suppose that the one instance would not be +isolated. It must have weight, too, as an argument, in the judgment of +many doubtful cases. Not one such case alone is furnished us, however, +but many well-authenticated ones. And it is to be remarked that even +Weismann has gradually parted from his original theory, recognizing more +and more clearly the element of adaptation in inheritance. It seems open +to question, indeed, whether Weismann's theory, in withdrawing the +germ-plasm from the direct influence of the environment with which the +parent individual is in contact does not exempt it from the universal +law of action and reaction. Eimer designates such an opposition as +Weismann postulates of the germ-plasm to the rest of the organism as a +"physiological miracle," and the artificial line thus drawn between the +germ-cells before and after the beginning of development as "opposed to +that conformity to law shown in the morphological and physiological +unity of living beings."[111] Ancient ideas seldom conceived of a +universality of action and reaction; and ancient belief, isolating +phenomena, invested each with some special guiding power. This belief +was maintained as the conception of a special vital force long after the +increasing knowledge of nature had caused it to be abandoned with regard +to inorganic phenomena; and the theory of the continuity of the +germ-plasm seems to be a survival, with regard to the comparatively +unexplored province of Embryology, of the idea of such a force. + +The elements of which the organism is composed are not strange essences +or entities peculiar to the organic; they are the same with those of +inorganic matter, though their combinations differ somewhat from these, +both in chemical composition and in the morphological arrangement of the +composites. We can easily conceive these differences as coördinate with +differences of general form and function; but it is inconceivable that +the continual assimilation of matter in growth should be at any time +without result in function, however comparatively small this result may +be in higher forms representing an accumulation of energy from previous +conditions. The separation of form and function is an abstraction, as is +that of matter and motion; we cannot suppose the connection of +particular functions with particular forms,--particular +organization,--to be accidental, any more than we can suppose the +particular properties of particular inorganic composites and elements to +be accidental or these particular properties to be without result in the +organic matter into which the particular composites and elements are +taken up. + +The environment must contain complementary conditions of function in +order that the individual may even come into existence and survive at +all. The great question is, then, how much is to be allowed for original +tendency in primal organisms and how much is to be reckoned to the +account of the action of the environment in the course of evolution. +Even if we go back beyond the organic, assuming a development of the +organic from the inorganic, we must come, in the last analysis, to +irresolvable elements whose motion, as distinct and particular action +and reaction, must have definite form. If we begin with a supposititious +simple organism conceived as lowest,--the primal form to which the name +"organism" may be applied,--we must likewise conceive of this as +embodying motion distinctive as its form, which may be regarded as +concomitant and coördinate with that form,--or, that is, as function. +The ultimate elements of this organism represent positive factors and +the primal organism itself must be regarded as a positive factor (or +positive composite) without which the evolution of highest organisms +would be impossible. We may, therefore, regard it as in this sense +embracing the potentialities of evolution. But are we to regard it as +representing potentiality in a further sense--in the sense that, beyond +the particular life-motion coördinate with its particular composition +and form, it represents an independent force that prefigures the whole +animate evolution? To such an assumption the analogy--which is something +far more than a mere analogy--of Embryology logically reduces us, on +Weismann's theory, unless we assume a fixity of species that practically +does away with the whole theory of Evolution and returns to the original +darkness that on which Darwin threw light. Or, if we leave out of +account this analogy and begin with sexual propagation, the problem, on +Weismann's theory, is very nearly as difficult. Are we to look upon the +conditions involved in the environment as mere negatives and simply +developing the positive potentialities of the germ-plasm? If we resolve +the environment into its elements, even the ultimate analysis must show +it composed of positive factors of matter and motion, each one of which +has its full worth in any resultant of incidence. The positivity of +these elements takes from the primal germ-plasm any superiority of +potentiality; the potentiality lies also in the environment. That the +organism is in constant contact with the environment is evident; and +that this contact, involving incidence of force, cannot be without +result, and result representing a full equivalent of all the factors, is +also evident. It may seem as if we could understand human progress, or +progress in other species, in the limited province open to direct +observation, on Weismann's theory; but evolution as a whole becomes, on +this theory, a mystery, and indeed, as Eimer terms it, a miracle. +Logical consistency thus tells against the theory; and undeniable +exceptions to its fundamental conception, furnished by such authorities +as Darwin and Haeckel, raise a further presumption against it, that, +taken in connection with the logical inconsistencies noticed, +constitutes the strongest probability against its truth. + +The general experience of mankind has recognized, in a thousand ways, +that the individual is "a creature of habit." The strength of the +muscle, the cunning of hand or eye or ear, mental acuteness, and even +liability to temptation in any direction, or, on the other hand, moral +strength, all are coincident with exercise within the bounds set by the +normal of the organ,--that is, within its ability to repair its waste in +labor, an ability defined by the food-supply and its power of +assimilation; for even the moral struggle that is so great as to exhaust +physically ends in a weakness which may represent the very condition of +conquest by the temptation opposed, if this present itself again before +the system has had time to repair its loss. We may regard this weakness +as a lessening of force in one particular direction, the resultant of +action deviating in favor of the other of the opposing forces or +tendencies manifested in the struggle. In this connection I cannot do +better than refer to the "Kritik der reinen Erfahrung" already +mentioned, in which the influence of the environment on the individual +is minutely traced. The special feature of the work is its entire +freedom from the thousand metaphysical implications which have gradually +gathered about our philosophical vocabulary and which render it +well-nigh impossible to write from any new standpoint without danger of +misunderstanding. This perspicuity and exactness are secured by a new +vocabulary which may seem at first glance, on account of its +unfamiliarity, elaborate and incomprehensible, but which is, when +mastered, the greatest possible aid to understanding. Nevertheless, the +terminology of the book and the exceeding closeness of its analysis, +while rendering it peculiarly valuable to the expert in Philosophy, +place it beyond the grasp of the average reader; and Ethics is a science +which concerns, not the specialist in Philosophy alone, but all thinking +minds. + +The influence of exercise even beyond the individual has long been +recognized. Lamarck advanced the theory that the development of organs +and their force of action is in ratio to their employment. Darwin also +laid stress, particularly in his later works, on Use and Disuse, but he +often defined the term more specifically than many other authors, +Lamarck among them, seem to have done. The very mass and magnitude of +Darwin's knowledge made it, as Huxley has said, somewhat unwieldy, and, +in diverting the attention to minute features, sometimes prevented +distinctness in broad generalizations; the very virtue of Darwin's work +conditioned also its defect. If we begin with the general theory of use +and disuse, we may regard each present form of organic action or +function, whether conscious or unconscious, as in some manner the result +of exercise, the processes of food-taking, digestion, repair of waste, +being classed, not as, in any case, mere negative reactions, but as +positive organic functions. If we apply the term "habit" to all these, +it is evident that we must, in so doing, extend the significance of the +word beyond its ordinary interpretation. From our present point of view, +such an extension of meaning might be claimed to be legitimate; the +question here is, in reality, only one of expediency, namely, whether it +is not better to retain the more specific significance of the word. It +may be useful, at least, to indicate the relations of Habit to Use and +Disuse. In its ordinary interpretation, the term "habit" refers more +particularly to a form of action acquired during the life of the +individual, and may be used to imply the action of the will in its +formation, or may simply have in view the organic concomitants of +whatever mental action is included in such formation. Since our present +standpoint supposes a certain equivalence of the mental and physical, +that is, uniformity in their connection (without entering into the +question of their dependence or independence, or considering which, in +case of dependence, is to be regarded as dependent, which as fundamental +and independent), we may leave for the moment the mental side of +function out of account, to take it up later. Darwin's definition of +habit was, as we have seen, no distinct and invariable one, and while he +speaks of "inherited habit," referring both to forms of action acquired +during the life of the individual and to such acquired through use +favored by constancy of environment during several generations, it is +not always plain whether he has in mind the action of the will, or only +its organic equivalents. He inclines, like many other authors, to give +prominence to the physical side of action in lower species, to the +mental side in higher. If we use the term "habit" in the sense of +tendency to function acquired by use, we employ what is certainly a +useful terminology, yet we are in danger, if we do not carefully define +our terms, of elevating to the position of a reality an abstraction that +has none. Function and Tendency to Function are not separable; the +distinction is not an inner, but an outer one, of favorable or +unfavorable environment by which tendency to function becomes function +or _vice versa_. To habit, then, we can attach, from our present +standpoint, no distinctive implication beyond that of individual +acquirement,--an implication obviously not fundamental in a theory of +organic function. Use and disuse are rather the fundamental concepts +with which, in a consideration of function under Heredity and +Adaptation, we have to do. + +But, in this connection, it is also obvious that, when we, from our +point of view, distinguish between the organism as acted on by the +environment and the environment as acting, we make a distinction that +may be both useful and necessary for many purposes, but that is yet an +arbitrary one. The organism is not the dependent, passive, the +environment the independent, formative factor in the process of +development, the organism is not purely reactive, the environment +active, but the two are interactive; and from their interaction arises +change, as resultant, in both organism and environment. So, too, if we +return to Fechner's conception, the separation of function as effect +from use and disuse as cause is an arbitrary one. Every function, as +representing a state of more or less perfect, moving equilibrium, may be +regarded either as the final form issuing from a long process of action +and reaction or, as determined at present, by such a comparative +constancy of all its conditions as makes the line followed by the +resultant approximately a repetition of that which it has followed +before; and we may lay stress upon either the inferior resistance in +this line or the continual application of superior force, the +accumulation of energy, in its direction. Use or exercise is function; +long continuance of the same or approximately the same form of function +may be regarded as concomitant with a certain constancy of environment, +sufficient to furnish the complementary condition always necessary. The +present form of function may be regarded as the result of an evolution +of function in the sense that it is the end-form assumed by the same, +but not in a sense that separates it from previous forms of function by +a distinction of kind; since each of these may be regarded, in like +manner, as the result of the preceding evolution. As in the definition +of Habit, so in that of Use, the element of animal will or of a distinct +vital principle is likely to be consciously or unconsciously included, +lending it thus a superior significance to that of mere organic function +regarded as its result. Again it must be said, however, that, whatever +the metaphysical truth of freedom, will does not interfere with the +equivalence of physical conditions and results or prevent perfect +uniformity of relation between the physical and the psychical, and that +a special vital force cannot be demonstrated. Disuse may be defined +either as the mere discontinuance of Use or as Use in a sense opposed to +the form of function particularly under consideration. + +The idea of some special vital principle doubtless has its origin in the +mysterious tendency of every organic form to develop along certain +lines. The mystery involved is here, again, besides that of ultimate +fact on which the metaphysician lays stress, the lack of the ability of +present science to furnish such a description of the process as shall +resolve it into its elements and demonstrate the uniformities of +relation among these elements in this last analysis. But it is to be +remarked that the metaphysician is apt to confuse these two meanings of +the word "mystery," and regard the mystery of the organism as a greater +metaphysical one than that of simpler processes whose elements are +better known; and this in spite of the fact that he himself does not at +all deny the uniformity in natural process which we term Law, or expect +to find it less in an ultimate analysis than in a more superficial one. +We understand the simple parallelogram by which the physicist represents +to us the action of two forces at incidence, we may represent to +ourselves the motion of any one of the heavenly bodies as the resultant +of the centrifugal and centripetal forces, but when we come to consider +the formation of a crystal, and watch the regularity of shape and +grouping, this very uniformity which had been before an explanation now +seems all at once to represent an insoluble mystery separating the +process forever from those others. The more complicated the process +becomes, the more the mystery appears to increase, until we build up, +out of a negative ignorance, some positive new entity to baffle us. And +yet neither do we deny, as has been said, the constancy of nature in its +most final elements, nor can it at all be shown or supposed that those +simpler processes we seemed to understand were less along fixed lines +than the more complicated ones. If we grant, then, the insoluble mystery +of the transcendental meaning of things claimed by the metaphysician, we +cannot admit the presence of this mystery in the organic more than in +the inorganic, nor discover in the science of the former any further +element lacking than in that of the latter, except a remediable +ignorance which, when remedied, can only reveal in new particulars the +workings of natural law. It may be remarked, in this connection, that +those who are so ready to claim the workings of some special force or +power in the development of the organism make no assertion of such in +the so analogous growth of the crystal. The passage of the inorganic +into the organic and back into the inorganic is, in fact, no more (if +the metaphysician will, no less) mysterious than the evaporation of +water and its recondensation, the propagation of animal form no greater +mystery than the continued flowing of a stream in spite of evaporation, +or the growth of a crystal to the form of its kind. The propagation of +species is, in one sense, an isolated fact; but so, in like sense, is +the evaporation of water or the formation of the crystal of a +particular chemical: but none of these phenomena are isolated in any +other sense, as less or more than a part of a universal whole. We carry +our notion of human importance into all our science, and so invest with +greater weight and mystery ignorance that concerns our own life and that +of allied forms. As we have seen, a connection of use, or of duration +and intensity of function, with its strength is evident in the +individual, and we are compelled to suppose the connection a constant +one even where such constancy cannot be directly demonstrated. There is +evidently a relation likewise between degree, or duration and intensity, +of use or exercise of function, and strength of tendency in the species, +which we must also suppose to be constant. Darwin distinctly recognizes +this, everywhere in his work, in asserting that such function as is +favored by the environment for several generations is more likely to be +transmitted. But though the separation of organism and environment into +cause and effect may be useful in the solution of some problems, it is +yet to be kept in mind that the distinction is an arbitrary selection of +some factors as dependent, others as independent variables, while all +are, in fact, interdependent. Function may be regarded as at every +moment determined by the factors given in environment and organism, in +which either may seem the more important, according to the particular +case or the point of view from which it is regarded. The tendency of the +organism may represent such an accumulation of potential energy that a +slight favorable element in the environment may be like a spark in a +magazine of gunpowder, followed by results seemingly most +disproportionate to its own significance; yet the accumulation of energy +in the organism can have taken place only under previous favorable +circumstances of the environment; and if we regard the organism in its +relation to the whole environment, that is, to the universal conditions +outside it, the primary importance may seem to attach to these. But yet, +which is, in the last analysis, the more important to the explosion of +the magazine--spark or powder? Either is insufficient without the other; +the two are simply complementary and both indispensable to the result. +So too habit, use, or exercise of function and influence of the +environment cannot be held distinct; exercise of function is impossible +without a sufficient complementary factor in the environment, but this +is evidently sufficient only with the existence of that tendency in the +organism of which it is the complement. Regarding strong tendency as the +result of a long process of evolution in which the environment has +presented sufficient complementary elements to condition its +development, the strength of tendency being coördinate with the duration +and intensity of the process of evolution, we can understand that any +such change in the environment as shall prevent such function may be of +so much significance, the suppression of the function represent so great +departure from what was previous resultant, that even the destruction of +the organism may supervene in cases where longest exercised and +strongest functions are prevented; and we can understand, from the same +standpoint, the slight comparative importance of the experience of +individuals as influencing their descendants, except under especially +favorable conditions of the organism. + +All biologists make much of the mixture of types in sexual propagation; +and Rolph, perhaps, lays especial stress on it in connection with +progressive heredity. He calls attention to the intricacy of interaction +of forces at once introduced by it in its action and reaction with the +environment, and shows, in this connection, the extreme similarity of +the younger generation to the parent where propagation is non-sexual, +that is, does not involve such mixture of types. It may be said that +every new factor in development introduces a complexity greater as the +complexity of the conditions already attained by the organism is +greater, since its influence on the different elements and combinations +of elements varies; or (if we choose to put it thus) since the possible +chemical compounds and especially the possible combinations and +permutations of elements and parts increase enormously with the increase +of the latter in number. But the importance of the presence of any +particular new element in these complexities depends, further, on its +particular nature. + +The final decision of the principal question of progressive heredity +which our argument concerns must be left to Biology; but biologists +themselves have as yet discussed these questions chiefly from a +philosophical standpoint,--on general, as distinguished from specific, +grounds. All theory is at this point tentative. But if only for this +reason we have a right, in assuming a working theory, to select that +which seems best to accord with philosophic principles of universal +application as well as with general biological fact. For the rest, it +has at least been made evident, by all that has been said above +concerning the constant contact and interaction of organism and +environment, that the selection of one of these two factors as the +positive and one as the negative, one as the formative the other as the +formed, one as the active the other as the passive factor, one as +independent the other as dependent, one as invariable the other as alone +variable, is an arbitrary one. In dealing with the complexity of the +universe, whether mathematically or logically, we cannot grasp all +factors at once, and so are obliged to regard some sides to the +exclusion of others, to disregard the variable and dependent nature of +some factors in the consideration of that of others. The method is +useful as well as necessary, useful because necessary; but we are too +apt to forget that we are dealing with half-truths, devices of reason, +and come to regard them as whole truths. Thus the abstraction of Natural +Selection is too often elevated to a separate entity, a particular power +residing in the environment as such. It is, on the contrary, a mere +fiction, a device for assisting our comprehension of complex action and +reaction. Not only does the action of the environment alter the +organism, the action of the organism also alters the environment; or, to +put it more plainly, the state of organism and environment at any moment +is the result of the interaction of preceding states of organism and +environment. Material combinations, whether organic or inorganic, when +fitted to their environment, survive; those best fitted, where perfect +fitness does not exist, thrive best; this is only another method of +saying that absence of resistance is coördinate with the preservation of +form and its inherent motion to the extent of the non-interference. As +organic forms survive only to the extent to which they are in harmony +with each other and with inorganic conditions, so inorganic forms or +combinations survive unaltered only when they are in harmony with other +inorganic conditions and uninterfered with by organic forms. Matter and +motion in some form must survive, both being indestructible. Natural +Selection in this sense, as at each moment regulating inorganic +combinations and motions and organic form and function, is either +ultimately the origin of variation, or else it is not its preserver. It +is to be remembered that the organism is, from the physical point of +view, simply form (that is, organization) and function; when we have +subtracted these, we have subtracted the organism. + +The inability of the reason to grasp all sides of the complexity of +natural processes at once, even where these are known, is a thing to be +kept in mind in our future investigations; we are apt to take our +analyses for the syntheses of nature. + +In the preceding considerations, an "equivalence of the Physical and the +Psychical" has been assumed, which, though already in a measure defined, +should have been, perhaps, more fully explained. It may be repeated +that, in such equivalence, no materialistic assumption is made of the +dependence of the Psychical on the Physical; nor is the intention to +assert that the Psychical can be measured by the weights and measures of +the Physical. The assertion is intended in the sense that there is +always a physical function connected with the psychical, and that the +relation of the two is not an accidental or variable, but a constant +one. All that is claimed is, in other words, that, whatever the +metaphysical truth as to the freedom of the will, such freedom cannot +interfere with the constancy of nature. But, in fact, all that is +postulated by physical science in the assertion of the equivalence of +physical forces is such a uniformity or constancy of relation as we +postulate of the Psychical and Physical; for the different forms of +physical force can no more be measured by the same standards than can +thought and brain-process. + +It may be added, further, that by "force" as used in the above +arguments, no metaphysical entity is implied; the word simply serves as +the generic term embracing different forms of motion and the equivalent +of motion in resistance, and enables us to deal with motion regarded as +potential as well as with motion actually existent. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[96] "Problems of Life and Mind," second series, chap. on Evolution. + +[97] "The Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication," 1868, +II. 272. + +[98] Vol. II. Chap. XXII. + +[99] "Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication," II. p. 257. +See also "Origin of Species," 6th ed., I. pp. 7-9, etc. + +[100] "Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication," II. p. 418. + +[101] Ibid. + +[102] For elaboration of definition and theory, _vide_ the article in +question, "Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie," 1890. + +[103] As confirming this analysis of evolution, reference is made to +Mach: "Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklungen," p. 128, and "Beitrage zur +Analyse der Empfindungen," pp. 25, 154; also Avenarius: "Kritik der +reinen Erfahrung." + +[104] See above essay by Petzoldt. + +[105] "Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls," 1882. + +[106] "Gestaltungen des Zweckmässigen." + +[107] "Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls," chap. I. + +[108] See especially Darwin: "The Variation of Animals and Plants under +Domestication"; Haeckel: "Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte," 8th ed., +1889, p. 179 _et seq._ + +[109] "Die Entstehung der Arten auf Grund von Vererben erworbener +Eigenschaften," p. 204 _et seq._ + +[110] Ibid. p. 190 _et seq._ + +[111] "Entstehung der Arten," p. 15. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +INTELLIGENCE AND "END" + + +It is interesting to notice the opinions of different scientists and +philosophers as to the extent to which reason is diffused in the +universe, where the point lies at which the boundary line is to be drawn +between reason and an automatism of instinct or organic action, or +whether any such point can be found at all, whether reason, at least as +consciousness and will, is not inherent in all life, or at least in all +animal life, or whether it is not, indeed, to be regarded as the cause +of motion even outside life, in the inorganic as well as the organic. +There is no need to remind ourselves of the philosophic conception of +the World as Will, the Philosophy of the Unconscious, or the Theory of +Monads. The theories that specialists in physical science have arrived +at, through the results of wide-reaching investigations in their own +peculiar branch, are as various as those of philosophers. Darwin +carefully avoids drawing any distinct limit-line between reason and +instinct, but remarks that "A little dose of judgment or reason, as +Pierre Huber expresses it, often comes into play, even with animals low +in the scale of nature."[112] Haeckel says: "Unbiassed comparison and +unprejudiced test and observation place it beyond doubt that so-called +'instinct' is nothing else than a sum of soul-activities which, +originally acquired by adaptation, have been fixed by habit and carried +down from generation to generation by inheritance. Originally performed +with consciousness and reflection, many instinctive actions of the +animals have become, in the course of time, unconscious, exactly as is +the case with the habitual activities of human reason. These, too, may, +with like justice, be looked upon as the workings of innate instinct, +as, indeed, the impulse to self-preservation, maternal love, and the +social instinct often are regarded. Again, instinct is neither +distinctively an attribute of the brain of the animal, nor is the +reason an especial endowment of human beings. On the contrary, an +impartial doctrine of soul recognizes a long, long, descending scale of +gradual evolution in the life of the soul, which leads from higher to +lower human beings, from more perfect to more imperfect animals, step by +step, down to those forms whose simple nerve-ganglion furnishes the +starting-point of all the cell-less brain-forms of this scale."[113] The +lecture in which this passage occurs not only argues further that the +soul is composed of soul-activities as the brain is composed of cells, +but finds in all living cells, "all protoplasm, the first element of all +soul life, sensation in the simple forms of pain and pleasure, movement +in the simple forms of attraction and repulsion. Only the degrees of +development and combination of soul are different in different beings." +Du Prel, impressed with the evolution of order from disorder in the +heavens as on the earth, ascribes this to universal sensation as a +fundamental quality of all matter, which makes it continually tend +towards a state of equilibrium in which collision is reduced to a +minimum.[114] Some biologists ascribe sensation, or consciousness, to +animal life alone; some ascribe consciousness to such animals only as +possess a nervous system; some philosophers make a distinction between +sensation, consciousness, and self-consciousness, as shown in the scale +of animal life; some, again, approaching the problem from another side, +lay emphasis on the difference between automatic and organic action, +instinct, "blind impulse," and will. Carneri, as we have seen,[115] +holds that even the action of an animal so high in the scale as the +butterfly may be pure automatism, its fluttering when impaled merely the +motion of a continued attempt at flight. + +These differences in opinion seem to depend, in great measure, upon the +end of the scale of being chosen as the starting-point in the +development of theory. If we begin with man and assume intelligence to +be the cause of design,--of the purposeful, the self-preserving,--in his +action, we shall be likely to infer intelligence as the cause of +self-preserving function in all animals, and we shall find great +difficulty in drawing any distinct line between intelligence and +automatism. If we are not students of inorganic nature, the evolution to +be found also in it, up to the attainment of preservative forms of +motion, may escape our observation, preoccupation with man and the self- +or rather human-interested bias of observation blinding us to it; but if +we carry our considerations, in an unprejudiced spirit, on beyond the +province of life, we may, like Du Prel and others, arrive at a theory of +intelligence as a universal property of matter. On the other hand, if we +begin with inorganic matter and assume automatism to be the cause of its +motion, we are likely, ascending the scale of organic existence, to +interpret much of its function as due to material action and reaction, +and may again, from this side, find so great difficulty in drawing the +line where intelligence begins, that we may fall, as Carneri has done, +into the opposite extreme to that last noticed, and interpret nearly all +animal action as unintelligent or even insentient. + +Let us look at the dilemma a little more closely. Might it not seem, +from one point of view, as if the harmonious movements of the stars, by +which they avoid their own destruction, must be referred to desire and +will to avoid it? If all systems of material parts, without exception or +distinction, tend, as Fechner, Du Prel, and Petzoldt assert, towards +harmony of the parts such that the motion of these parts will become +self-preservative, does it not seem logically necessary to assume that +this self-preservation, arising in inorganic matter in the same manner +as in organic matter, must be due to the same causes as those +to which we ascribe action towards an end, action that involves +self-preservation, in the broadest sense of the word, in man? May not +the heavenly bodies, learning from experience in some way, as man does, +gradually come to choose, though still in accordance with natural laws +(as man also invariably chooses) that orbit which preserves them from +collision? True, they must finally suffer destruction, but so, also, +must the human individual, and the race of human beings. The difference +of evolution and dissolution in the two cases is only one of time. Among +different species of nervously organized beings, the duration of life +also differs. Or, if we deny the existence of intelligence in inorganic +nature, can we, at least, descending the scale of organic being, find +any point of which we can say, "Here intelligence ends and automatism +begins"? Shall we deny the existence of intelligence in plants, and if +so, how shall we find that dividing line between the plant and animal +kingdoms which the advancement of science in many directions is +rendering, not more distinct, but less and less so? G. Th. Schneider +says, in his book on "The Human Will": "The movements of touch and +locomotion in the search for food are the first movements in which the +specific animal-life may be recognized. In no plant is the groping +caused by hunger to be observed."[116] But is this true? The +insectivorous plants, for instance, open their leaves when their prey is +digested, waiting for fresh prey; and they close them again when prey +has again entered, thus practically grasping their victim and holding +him fast. Although the nature of the plant prevents its moving from the +spot where it grows, are these movements less a search for and capture +of food than those of the animal? To say that the closing of the leaves +depends upon the beginning of some chemical process in the plant +furnishes us with no mark of distinction between the two, for it is +equally true that chemical processes underlie animal motion; and to +object that the reopening of the leaves is the result of the completion +of assimilation gives us, also, no distinctive mark, since the animal's +search for food is likewise the result of hunger and so connected with a +particular state of the digestive organs. The action of insectivorous +plants draws our attention because the process of assimilation involved +so resembles animal digestion; but, as a point of fact, the opening of +petals to receive the air and sun is as much a search for food as the +opening of leaves to receive insect prey. + +Schneider adds to the passage above quoted, "A further difference +between psychical and physiological movements is this, that the latter +always remain the same, however the excitation changes, while the former +have, now the character of attraction, now that of repulsion." It may be +questioned whether this difference either can be demonstrated to be a +distinctive mark. We have only to go into a dark cellar where the +potatoes have begun to sprout, in order to see how plants that +ordinarily grow upward will take every curve and angle in order to reach +towards the light of some distant window. And if we turn one of the +tubers about, we may watch the pallid sprout again turn to grow towards +the far-away sunlight. Thomas A. Knight relates experiments in which +plants of the Virginia creeper (_Ampelopsis quinquefolia_) were removed +from one side of the house to the other, being, in each case, screened +from perpendicular rays of the sun, and records that, in all cases, the +tendrils turned in a few hours in a direction pointing to the centre of +the house. One plant after being thus experimented with, was "removed to +the centre of the house and fully exposed to the perpendicular light of +the sun; and a piece of dark-colored paper was placed upon one side of +it, just within reach of its tendrils; and to this substance they soon +appeared to be strongly attracted. The paper was then placed upon the +opposite side, under similar circumstances, and a piece of plate glass +was substituted; but to this substance the tendrils did not indicate any +disposition to approach. The position of the glass was then changed, and +care was taken to adjust its surface to the varying position of the sun, +so that the light reflected might continue to strike the tendrils; which +then receded from the glass, and appeared to be strongly repulsed by +it."[117] Darwin writes of the insectivorous _Drosera rotundifolia_: "If +young and active leaves are selected, inorganic particles not larger +than the head of a small pin, placed on the central glands, sometimes +cause the outer tentacles to bend inwards. But this follows much more +surely and quickly, if the object contains nitrogenous matter which can +be dissolved by the secretion. On one occasion, I observed the following +unusual circumstance. Small bits of raw meat (which acts more +energetically than any other substance), of paper, dried moss, and of +the quill of a pen, were placed on several leaves, and they were all +embraced equally well in about two hours. On other occasions the +above-named substances, or more commonly particles of glass, coal-cinder +(taken from the fire), stone, gold-leaf, dried grass, cork, blotting +paper, cotton-wool, and hair rolled into little balls, were used, and +these substances, though they were sometimes well embraced, often caused +no movement whatever in the outer tentacles, or an extremely slight and +slow movement. Yet these same leaves were proved to be in an active +condition, as they were excited to movement by substances yielding +nitrogenous matter, such as bits of raw or roast meat, the yolk or white +of boiled eggs, fragments of insects of all orders, spiders, etc. I will +give only two instances. + +"Minute flies were placed on the discs of several leaves, and on others +balls of paper, bits of moss and quill of about the same size as the +flies, and the latter were well embraced in a few hours; whereas after +twenty-five hours only a very few tentacles were inflected over the +other objects. The bits of paper, moss, and quill were then removed from +these leaves, and bits of raw meat placed on them; and now all the +tentacles were soon energetically inflected. + +"Again, particles of coal-cinder (weighing rather more than the flies +used in the last experiment) were placed on the centres of three leaves: +after an interval of nineteen hours, one of the particles was tolerably +well embraced; a second by a very few tentacles; and a third by none. I +then removed the particles from the two latter leaves, and put on them +recently killed flies. These were fairly well embraced in seven and +one-half hours, and thoroughly after twenty and one-half hours; the +tentacles remaining inflected for many subsequent days. On the other +hand, the one leaf which had in the course of nineteen hours embraced +the bit of cinder moderately well, and to which no fly was given, after +an additional thirty-three hours (_i.e._ in fifty-two hours from the +time when the cinder was put on) was completely reëxpanded and ready to +act again."[118] + +From these and many other experiments Darwin concludes that inorganic +and some organic substances not attacked by the secretion of the leaf +act much less quickly and efficiently than organic substances yielding +soluble matter, which is absorbed. + +He also writes of the curvature of radicles which come in contact with +obstacles at right angles:-- + +"The first and most obvious explanation of the curvature is that it +results merely from the mechanical resistance to the growth in its +original direction. Nevertheless, this explanation did not seem to us +satisfactory. The radicles did not present the appearance of having been +subjected to a sufficient pressure to account for their curvature. Sachs +has shown that the growing part is more rigid than the part immediately +above, which has ceased to grow, so that the latter might have been +expected to yield and become curved as soon as the apex encountered an +unyielding object; whereas it was the stiff, growing part which became +curved. Moreover, an object which yields with the greatest ease will +deflect a radicle: thus, as we have seen, when the apex of the radicle +of the bean encountered the polished surface of extremely thin tin-foil +on soft sand, no impression was left on it, yet the radicle became +deflected at right angles. A second explanation occurred to us, namely, +that even the gentlest pressure might check the growth of the apex, and +in this case growth could continue only on one side, and thus the +radicle would assume a rectangular form; but this view leaves wholly +unexplained the curvature of the upper part, extending for a length of +8-10 mm. + +"We were therefore led to suspect that the apex was sensitive to +contact, and that the effect was transmitted from it to the upper part +of the radicle, which was excited to bend away from the touching object. +As a little loop of fine thread, hung on a tendril or on the petiole of +a leaf-climbing plant, causes it to bend, we thought that any hard +object affixed to the tip of a radicle, freely suspended and growing in +damp air, might cause it to bend if it were sensitive, and yet would not +offer any mechanical resistance to its growth.... Sachs discovered that +the radicle a little above the apex is sensitive and bends like a +tendril _towards_ the touching object. But when one side of the apex is +pressed by any object, the growing part bends _away_ from the +object."[119] + +Acting on this idea, Darwin found, in many experiments, that the +radicles of plants freely suspended in bottles, when brought into +contact with the most yielding substances, bits of paper, etc., were +deflected, in a very few hours, from their original course, and often at +right angles to this. He says, further:-- + +"As the apex of a radicle in penetrating the ground must be pressed on +all sides, we wished to learn whether it could distinguish between +harder, or more resisting, and softer substances. A square of sanded +paper almost as stiff as card, and a square of extremely thin paper (too +thin for writing on) of exactly the same size (about one-twentieth of an +inch), were fixed with shellac on opposite sides of the apices of twelve +suspended radicles.... In eight out of the twelve cases, there could be +no doubt that the radicle was deflected from the side to which the +card-like paper was attached and towards the opposite side bearing the +very thin paper. + +"This occurred, in some instances, in nine hours, but in others not +until twenty-four hours had elapsed. Moreover, some of the four failures +can hardly be considered as really failures: thus, in one of them in +which the radicle remained quite straight, the square of thin paper was +found, when both were removed from the apex, to have been so thickly +coated with shellac that it was almost as stiff as the card; in the +second case, the radicle was bent upward into a semicircle, but the +deflection was not directly from the side bearing the card, and this was +explained by the two squares having become cemented laterally together, +forming a sort of stiff gable from which the radicle was deflected; in +the third case, the square of card had been fixed by mistake in front, +and though there was deflection, this might have been due to Sachs's +curvature; in the fourth case alone, no reason could be assigned why the +radicle had not been at all deflected." + +Darwin found, moreover, by experiment, that, when the tip of a radicle +is burnt or cut, "it transmits an influence to the upper adjoining part, +causing it to bend away from the affected side." This deflection +resembles, in a very striking manner, the avoidance of sources of injury +and pain on the part of animals. + +And at the end of his book on the Movements of Plants, which contains +very many other experiments bearing on the question of sensitivity in +plants, the author writes, "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the +tip of the radicle thus endowed, and having the power of directing the +movements of the adjoining parts, acts like the brain of one of the +lower animals." + +It is true that the plant does not react with the rapidity which +characterizes the animal; Darwin found that radicles are not sensitive +to temporary contact, but only to long, though to slight pressure. It is +also true that the physical basis of the movement is more simple, and so +more easily traceable in the plant than in the animal organism; yet why +lay such especial stress upon this side of plant-life, since it is +acknowledged that the physical basis is by no means peculiar to it, but +that, on the contrary, all life-processes, in the animal as well as in +the plant, have their physical side, although greater complexity of +organization may make this more difficult to follow in the one case than +in the other? + +But we may begin at the other end of the scale and examine the facts +presented from the opposite point of view. The physicist demonstrates +that force is indestructible; that is, that the sum of the motion and +resistance to motion residing in indestructible matter is also +imperishable, that all present motion must be regarded as the resultant +of previous conditions of motion and resistance, as far back as we may +go, until we reach some assumed primal state (which is only assumed and +cannot be proved to have existed) in which the matter composing the +universe is supposed to have been at complete rest; and that every +resultant bears relations to its component factors of force that are +constant, every component finding its full value in the resultant. What +evidence has the present state of our solar system and the other systems +of heavenly bodies revealed to us by the telescope to offer us in proof +of their consciousness or sentience? How are the whirl and concentration +of nebular mists, the crash and collision of elemental bodies, from +which, by simple action and reaction, after ages of disharmony, only a +comparative harmony is arrived at as inevitable result, evidence of aim, +intention, will, consciousness, in the matter subject to this evolution? +Do we find anything here except blind law? The movements of plants, +often directly favorable to self-preservation, may be explained by the +arrangement of the cells and their chemical action. Or, if sentience +must be assumed to be the cause of movement attaining ends of +self-preservation in plants, how are we to account for organic and +instinctive action in animals? How is it, for instance, that the +new-born infant sucks, and the chicken but a few hours old, even though +it has been hatched in an incubator apart from its kind, picks at the +food strewn before it, aiming, too, with considerable precision?[120] +How does it happen that the process of breathing and digestion, the +beating of the heart and the circulation of the blood, all so necessary +to life, go on with regularity, though not directed by reason? Has the +newly hatched chicken any experience to teach it what food is, and how +it is to be seized; or does the caterpillar, which spins itself a +cocoon, do this with the understanding that it is about to enter a new +phase of existence? Or, if such important and, at first view, seemingly +intelligent action can be explained as unreasoning instinct, why cannot +many other actions of the lower animals be thus explained? Why may not +nearly all, if not all of them, be thus explained, and consciousness be +regarded as the exclusive property of man? + +But how much of the action we term automatic, instinctive, or organic, +reflex or "merely functional," can be positively asserted to have no +admixture of consciousness? If we examine our own action closely we +shall often find that we were, in fact, conscious of much that seems, +at first glance, purely automatic. It may appear to us, for instance, +that reflection on the notes of a musical composition which we have +known for a long time "by heart" hinders rather than helps us, even +causing us sometimes to fail completely in our performance. But if we +examine our condition at the time of such a failure, do we not usually +find that, when we began to think about what we were playing, we were +suddenly seized with a fear of failing and that the fear confused us? Or +do we not find, at least, that withdrawal of our attention from the +music by conversation that requires any concentration of thought is as +likely to confuse us as too great attention to it? A friend of mine one +day related to me the following experience: Having a felon upon his +finger, he submitted to a surgical operation, for which the operator +preferred to administer an anæsthetic. When he awoke to consciousness +again, he was pleased to find the painful operation completely finished +and the hand newly dressed. Asked whether he had experienced any pain, +he answered, "Not a twinge," whereat the surgeon remarked that he had +screamed and groaned during the operation. To this he replied that his +action must have been merely reflex. An hour or so later, however, as he +was at work, a sudden recollection of the whole operation came to him. +Persons undergoing dental operations under the influence of laughing-gas +often scream and make convulsive movements as if in pain, though they +declare, afterwards, in like manner, that they have felt nothing; but +may not this be due, as in the case just cited, to a mere lapse of +memory? Why, indeed, should the patient scream if not in pain? Again, +there is a poison--curarine, the Indian arrow poison--which has power to +deprive its victim of all motion, while leaving him, as has been +ascertained in cases in which it has been used as a medicine, a +consciousness that is more or less dimmed. May not the seeming dimness, +however, be due to the incomplete function of memory when turned to +events that transpired under its influence? And may not the action of +so-called anæsthetics of all sorts involve simply a paralysis of action +similar to that caused by the Indian arrow poison, together with a more +complete lapse of memory than that ensuing upon the latter? To answer +that anæsthetics affect the brain, and that therefore consciousness is +not possible, is begging the question, for it is by just such +experiments and experience of the apparent mental effects of +anæsthetics in connection with peculiar brain conditions that theories +of non-sensibility under these conditions have been arrived at. States +of somnambulism generally used to be classed as outside the sphere of +memory and were therefore sometimes called unconscious; but recent +experiments in hypnotism have shown that similar states to these may be +remembered or not remembered according to the individual case, and that +persons who, when awakened, ordinarily recall nothing of that which has +passed in the hypnotic state may be made to recall all the events of +that state if commanded to do so before awakening. Pflüger has attempted +to demonstrate, by many experiments, that consciousness is not confined +to the brain but is also connected with the spinal cord;[121] why, +however, draw a line at the spinal cord? Is not nerve substance the same +with that from which the spinal cord and the brain develop, are not all +nerve cells primarily mere modifications of cells of the outer skin? + +Of unconsciousness in ourselves we can have no more an immediate and +direct knowledge than of unconsciousness outside ourselves, since, in +order to be immediately known, it would have to be present in +consciousness; and a conscious unconsciousness is a self-contradiction. +We can only witness to a failure of memory at certain points (which +failure has already been shown to be untrustworthy as evidence) or to +movements of our body to which we can supply no corresponding conscious +states as premeditation. But our inability to testify to such is merely +negative. A great deal has been made, in one way and another, of the +fact that there are links in premeditated action which do not come into +consciousness, there being no knowledge, for instance, of the processes +in nerve and muscle between the movement of the arm in writing and the +premeditation of such movement. As a fact, however, none of the +physiological processes which accompany the psychical are present to our +consciousness except as given through the senses or through +nerve-transmission similar to that of sense-perception. The conscious +elements of any present state of thought do not include the changes in +brain-matter concomitant with them. But the question may be raised, as +Haeckel raises it,--though perhaps somewhat differently,--in his essay +on Soul-cells and Cell-souls, as to whether the brain-cells themselves +are not endowed with consciousness; and any answer in the negative is, +evidently, an assumption, of which we can give no proof. Indeed, the +question may be asked, and has been asked, whether the remarkable white +blood corpuscles which traverse our body, and are so similar to certain +lower forms of life, are not to be regarded as distinct beings, or +whether, in fact, all the cells whose combined life and movement make up +our own are not endowed with distinct being and consciousness. Again an +answer in the negative is evidently a mere assumption. And why stop, in +this case, exactly with the cells of animal life; why not apply our +question to those of plant life also? Why not, indeed, suppose all forms +to be endowed with consciousness, all harmonious motion to be +accompanied by pleasure, all dissolution and conflict by pain? From +analogy we may conclude something, but from mere non-analogy nothing. +Our experience may entitle us to the assertion that all beings +possessing a nervous system are endowed with consciousness, but we +cannot conclude, therefore, that all beings not possessing a nervous +system are not endowed with consciousness. We have associated +consciousness with acts peculiar to man, and hence inferred its presence +in similar movements of animals similarly constructed. But if we could +examine the physiological accompaniments of our own thought and feeling +and their issue in action, if we could look on at all the details, the +chemical and mechanical changes of the physiological processes, what +hint should we find in these more than in any other physical processes, +from which to infer consciousness? They are not the less rigidly in +accordance with natural law than any other. But our observation of all +other processes than those of our own organism is a mere extraneous one, +like this we have imagined of the processes of our own body; if there +were consciousness in other forms we could not enter into it; and how +can we prove extraneously its non-existence? Our own "stability" of +function and the stability of all life-motion has been developed in a +perfectly similar manner to that by which the stability of the heavenly +bodies has been developed, the physical side of the process being just +as fully a matter of action and reaction, and our action towards ends +the slowly progressive result of this course of action and reaction, +just as is the case with the harmonious movements of the systems of the +heavens. It would, moreover, be perfectly easy to formulate a purely +physical and mechanical explanation of our action, as Carneri does of +the action of ants and other species,--to explain the plucking of a +rose, for instance, as mere reaction upon the sense of smell and sight, +or as the mere mechanical action of cell-matter. + +But, again, on the other hand: If it is true that the nervous system is +developed from cells of the outer covering of the body, it is, +nevertheless, not true that those primary cells are the nervous system, +any more than it is true that the lowest forms of life, from which man +has developed, are human beings. Rudimentary eyes exist in some animals +in the form of mere pigment spots, but we do not suppose these pigment +spots to endow the animal with sight as we understand it. Sight is not a +function of all forms of life, neither is hearing, and these powers have +developed out of forms of animal life in which they did not exist; why +then is it necessary to suppose consciousness to be a property of all +forms of life because we know it to appear in some higher developments +of life? Why may it not arise, as do sight and hearing, by gradual +evolution, as a function of special organisms? Have we any direct +knowledge of consciousness except in connection with certain normal +conditions of our own brain? And, this being said, have we any means +left by which we can prove the existence of consciousness, except in +connection with a brain similar to our own? + +What grounds have we for assuming the existence of consciousness where +the analogy of our own organization does not furnish us with an +argument? If we argue from the analogy of our own experience to the +existence of consciousness in animals whose organization is similar to +our own, and then, following down the scale of life, find no pause or +gap at which to draw an exact line, we must not the less forget that +with the diminishing analogy the force of our inference diminishes in +like degree. Or where is the logical necessity of inferring that +consciousness must exist in the inorganic either because the organic +originally developed from the inorganic, or because it suffers +continually a renewal by nourishment, which is, in effect, as much a +development from the inorganic as the supposed primal one? The pigment +spot from which the eye arises is not the eye, simple protoplasm is not +the organized human being; whence does the physical organization arise? +Are we to suppose it, too, as preëxistent, "in a weaker form," or in +any form, in the inorganic? Whence have we any grounds for assuming that +that which we know only in connection with a certain peculiar +organization exists elsewhere? Are we to suppose the color blue to be +present in certain chemical elements because their chemical compound is +blue? Or how is it that even isomeric compounds may exhibit different +qualities? Shall we regard the color as not essentially connected with +the chemical constitution of the supposed compound? As a matter of fact, +color is one of the chemist's means of recognition. Or shall we +"explain" the color by the length of light-waves or the construction of +the eye, correcting, thus, one part of our experience by another, and +assuming one as fundamental and essential, the other as non-essential? +We "explain" sound as wave-movement in some outer medium and in the ear, +correcting, thus, the hearing by sight or touch; does this mean that +that part of our experience given us through the eye or hand alone is +truth, and to be relied on and recognized as such, while the experience +given us through the other senses is non-essential and not to be +accepted or relied on? But if the eye gives us the truth, then why do +we, in the case of color, correct it again by another phase of our +experience? How are we to decide which is essential, the wave-movement +that is (or may be made) perceptible to our eye, or the sound heard by +our ear, the color directly seen or the length of the light-wave +concluded from experiment? As a matter of fact, we emphasize one or the +other according to the end we have in view in our experiment. Is it the +length of the wave which causes the color, or the color which causes the +particular wave-length? If we analyze brain-action as chemical action, +do we prove thereby that the consciousness concomitant with this +peculiar chemical action under these peculiar conditions must exist +elsewhere under other conditions? Are the characteristics of one +chemical compound the same as those of another because both compounds +are matter and motion? If we prove that the brain contains cells similar +to cells in other parts of the nervous system, that the whole nervous +system arises, in the first instance, from epithelium cells, that the +whole animal is descended from some primal protoplasmic cell, and that +the cells of plants are similar, in many ways, to those of animals, do +we thereby prove that consciousness exists except as coördinate with the +peculiar cells and arrangements of cells in the brain? We have no +precedent from which to argue, since consciousness is to us a unique +feature of the universe; we know it immediately only as existent in +ourselves, and in order to obtain any precedent must be guilty of +assuming it in order to prove it. + +The dilemma seems, thus, as we analyse and inquire into it more closely, +to increase rather than decrease in significance. How is any solution to +be arrived at? + +If we return to the beginning of our considerations on this point, we +shall find that, in coming at the question from either side, we have +made an assumption. Our first premises were as follows: Assuming that +consciousness is the cause of movement by which man attempts to arrive +at his ends, what reason have we for supposing consciousness to exist +outside man? and, on the other hand: Assuming mechanical action and +reaction to be the cause of movement in inorganic nature, what reason +have we for assuming this to be the cause of action in organic +existence? Let us examine these assumptions more closely. + +We may return to the theory of the gradual development of stable out of +unstable conditions as stated in different ways by Zöllner, Fechner, and +Du Prel. As has been shown, the principle applies to organic as well as +to inorganic nature, and is only a broader principle including that of +the Survival of the Fittest. There is a physical side to all psychical +functions, and everywhere our investigation shows us the physical +following unchanging laws. The development of the Stable from the +Unstable explains to us the evolution of function in the direction of +the preservation of the organic forms of which it is the function, as +well as the evolution of harmonious movement in the heavenly bodies. The +explanation of the natural and necessary elimination of the inharmonious +covers the whole ground, and seems to assign a cause for every form of +preservative action, for the harmonious conduct which preserves the +state or the family as a collection of individuals, as well as for the +harmony of function that preserves the individual. As long as reason can +change no smallest detail in the workings of the laws of nature, as long +as it can never render any motion other than the exact resultant of the +forces represented in it, what room remains for reason as a cause? Ought +we not rather, though from a much broader and therefore more convincing, +in fact from the broadest and hence most convincing view of the matter, +to regard consciousness, as do many physiologists on narrower grounds, +as the mere accompaniment of material processes? + +But this brings us again to a consideration of the concept of cause. +What do we mean by cause? Above, we spoke of the "cause of motion"; do +we designate by this term those factors of preceding motion which, +continued, produce it as composite resultant? If so, why not substitute +for the term "cause of motion," "component factors of motion"? But is +this, in fact, all we meant by cause? Was there not, in our mind, as we +made use of the term, a vague half-conception of some additional force +beyond those so exactly summed up in the resultant, which, in some +indefinable manner, guided the process? As has been sufficiently +demonstrated, no such additional force can be shown to exist, or be +logically assumed in theory, except in some transcendental sense; nature +gives us only perfect equivalence of forces. A cause of motion except as +the mere sum of its preceding components is, therefore, a natural +impossibility. Hence the reason or consciousness cannot be assumed to be +such a cause. But if consciousness cannot be regarded as such a cause +additional to the component factors of motion, neither can anything +outside consciousness be regarded as such a cause. Natural laws are +often treated as if they constituted a cause; but they are not entities +which control nature: they are merely forms by which we express nature's +constancy, uniformity. Neither is constancy or uniformity a controlling +entity: it is simply a generalization, if a universal one, whether we +regard it as _a priori_ or as _a posteriori_. It appears, then, that we +have no greater reason for regarding the constancy of nature or natural +law as cause than we have for asserting reason to be such. + +In this connection the question may be in order, as to why the student +of the natural sciences, who is in the habit of proclaiming, so loudly, +the necessity or at least the constancy of everything in nature, should +yet elect to assign to consciousness the character of the non-essential, +that is the accidental. Action and reaction are, according to him, +essential inherent properties of brain matter as such, but consciousness +is merely a dependent. But who shall decide what part or form of force, +what factors of the universe are accidental and what essential? If our +assertion of constancy in natural phenomena means anything at all, it +means that nothing is accidental, but that all factors of phenomena are +essential. Is the bell the less silver to my eye because it appeals to +my ear with sound, or the ball the less round to touch because my field +of vision is flat? Even if we suppose forms of matter, and organic +forms, to exist without consciousness, can we therefore assert +consciousness to be any the less essential, any the less inherent in the +nature of things, any the less existent and actual, where it appears? If +so, what physiological function can we call inherent and essential, +since these all also arise with evolution? Heat may exist without light, +but is light therefore less essential than heat, where it arises? The +very constancy which psychical phenomena exhibit would show their +essential character as factors of the universe. Perhaps it is the +attempt of the spiritualist to assign to consciousness something more +than such a character which has led his adversary into the opposite +error of asserting it to be something less; but the two extremes of +doctrine are quite equally far from that scientific method which holds +to given phenomena. Materialism is as much metaphysics as Spiritualism +is; and the materialist who condemns metaphysics condemns himself. +Consciousness belongs to the Actual; and the Materialism which assigns +it a place subordinate to that of other actual phenomena is as much +dogmatism as is any theory which subordinates the other phases of the +Actual to it. The fact that consciousness bears constant relation to +certain physiological phenomena is no ground for pronouncing it the +effect and the physiological phenomena the cause, it the dependent and +the physiological phenomena the independent factors; the relations of +all forms of force to each other are constant. Heat is constant in its +accompaniment of light; and yet who shall say the one is dependent, the +other independent, the one cause, the other merely effect? + +We have only to regard the theories of specialists in order to discover +how easily habitual occupation with one particular side, form, factor, +or phase of phenomena inclines one to regard that side as the only +essential one, and all others as non-essential, dependent upon it, mere +effect of which it is the cause. The physicist tends to interpret +everything by mechanical action and reaction; the chemist lays more +particular stress on the chemical properties of organic as of inorganic +matter; the physiologist emphasizes cellular structure and combination, +and makes much of brain cells, the spinal cord, the _nervus +sympathicus_, and the special sense-organs; the biologist often regards +the attraction and repulsion involved in the so-called sensibility of +all forms of living matter as the cause of all life phenomena; the +anatomist calls attention to the arrangement of organs with respect to +each other, the mechanical adjustment of parts for function, the size +and shape of bones as caused by weight and the angle of its incidence, +etc., etc.; while the psychologist on the other hand refers everything +to mental causality. For complete science, however, we need the aid of +every special science,--of Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Physiology, +Anatomy, Psychology, and all the other branches which can contribute to +any side of our knowledge of nature. The desire within us for unity is +strong, the impulse to simplify by referring everything to a single +principle almost irresistible; and in so far as we do this through a +conviction of the oneness of the universe as consisting of +interdependent parts we are in a certain sense justified; but until we +can grasp this unity in its totality, our one-sided reductions must +remain false in so far as they make claim to include the whole of truth. +It may be most useful to choose out that side or phase of phenomena for +any particular investigation which is most accessible to such +investigation; where the links of the psychical fail, it may be +necessary to scientific completeness or clearness to complete the chain +with the aid of the physical, but it should be borne in mind that this +is a device of reason for convenience' sake. It may be possible to +imagine two worlds, one in which the physical evolution alone takes +place and all phenomena peculiar to organic function arise through the +action and reaction of organic matter;[122] but the question is not what +we can imagine but what is: we can imagine many things which do not +exist and are impossible to nature. The human reason has also found it +possible to conceive of spirit unconnected with body. + +The materialist calls triumphant attention to the constancy of material +phenomena, and proves, by careful comparison with coördinate psychical +phenomena, the uniformities in the latter. Disease of every kind, but +particularly those forms of disease which attack especially the nervous +system--brain and spinal cord and the nerve endings--furnish the strong +points of his argument, which is thus based on facts no lover of truth +desires to gainsay; but when the materialist has shown us all these +facts, has he not proved, with regard to the psychical, exactly that +constancy which entitles it to consideration as a part of the actual +universe subject to natural law? + +The materialist objects that if the physical side of nature is the +essential one, the psychical cannot be essential. On what grounds is +this claim based? Is the color of an object not essential to it because +its shape is essential, or do the actual existence and change of color +according to natural law interfere with the actual existence and change +of shape according also to natural law? Does only one of our senses give +us truth? + +Logic is very ready with its definitions of "things" and their +"properties" and "accidents," as Physics is very ready with its analyses +of light and color and sound, and Physiology with its analyses of the +sense organs and their relations to color and sound. But shall we accept +only the physiological analysis of cell form and action, and reject the +sense-synthesis of sight or hearing as less important, less actual? Or +are we to believe that the sense-function alone is essential and not +also some actuality in its object, as of this or that color? Are we to +believe that any property or accident of a thing may change, and the +thing remain yet actually the same thing? What are our essences as +separated from their properties and accidents? As a matter of fact, we +know nothing except we know it as some particular thing, every change in +which leaves it something different from what it was before. Changes of +particular form or color are changes to some other particular form or +color, unless they are such changes as withdraw the object from the +reach of the special sense of sight before appealed to, as for instance +in the case of evaporation. That one form of force may accompany or pass +into another makes neither one of the concomitants and neither the +preceding nor the succeeding form less real. As a fact, however, much +superstition still remains with us as unconscious result of just such +withdrawals from the perception of one sense and analogous new appeals +to some hitherto unaffected sense, although we are accustomed to flatter +ourselves that science has long overcome this superstition. There is no +change that is not a particular change, that is not according to +constant laws of nature, and, as such, essential to nature. There is no +phase of nature that exact science can consistently regard as +non-essential. So that, even if reason does not exist in combination +with all matter, we have no ground for regarding it as non-essential +where it does exist, and no more reason for defining it as effect than +we have for defining it as cause. Result it may be, as physiological +function is result,--that is, an end-form of processes of change which +we call evolution. + +But we have found our disproof and also our proof of the existence of +reason outside the human species fail us wherever the direct evidence of +extreme analogy is wanting, as soon as we cease to regard reason as a +cause of physiological change. Perhaps it will be well for us to define +more closely the province of reason, before we proceed further in our +considerations. An exhaustive analysis is not necessary to our purpose +and it would be useless to attempt it at this point of our argument. The +relation of reason to action is what chiefly concerns us here, and in +this connection Mr. Leslie Stephen's definition of it as that faculty +which enables us to act with regard to the distant and future might seem +to designate its important function.[123] Simple reaction on the present +action of force belongs to all matter. However, when we consider +further, a certain doubt may rise as to the exact correctness of this +definition or description, for does not that which we call instinct +often perform the same office for the animal as that which we have +designated as the office of reason? Let us look into this question a +little more closely. We may take, for instance, the case of those +insects and other animals which, though never caring for or indeed +seeing their offspring after the hatching of the latter, make provision +at the laying of the eggs for their nourishment during the helplessness +of the first period of their life; are we to suppose that these animals +have any means of knowing that they are providing for their offspring? +Can they have learned the fact from their own parent whom they never +saw, or from others of their own species who are in the same predicament +as themselves? As Schneider points out,[124] the human infant must have +sucked before it could have had any ideas, as individual, of the act of +sucking. The newly hatched chickens of Eimer's experiments above +referred to could scarcely have had any conception of the act of eating +before they picked at their food. How happens it that the young of many +of the lower animals which give no care to eggs or offspring yet know +how to care for themselves after the peculiar manner of their kind? Once +it is admitted that any acts which attain results that constitute +desirable ends for the acting subject need not be regarded as caused by +knowledge of the ends, there is no reason to suppose that the principle +may not hold of many acts in which a distinct knowledge of the end seems +to play a part. But what do we mean by end? + +Let us take, for instance, the act of eating. The biologist and the +physiologist tell us that the end which eating serves is the +preservation of life; and the biologist may further add--not the life of +the individual, alone, but that of the species. The very consistent +physiologist may principally have in view, in eating, the preservation +of his own health, and may even take into consideration, in a degree, +his possible future offspring, guarding his own health with a view to +theirs. With a minority of other men these more general and distant +results may to some extent be kept in view as ends. But it is evident +that, with the majority of people, they are, where ends at all, +subordinate ones, the immediate satisfaction of hunger, the pleasure of +eating, or the relief of physical depression, appearing oftener as chief +end. And what is to be said of the new-born infant, which sucks when the +breast is placed between its lips? what is the end which it has in view +in taking nourishment? Shall we suppose it, as individual, to have any +definite conception of the contrast between states of hunger and states +of satisfaction, and to possess the knowledge that the act of sucking is +the proper means to the attainment of satisfaction as an end? As the +infant becomes the boy seating himself at table with a distinct +conception of pleasure to be attained by the gratification of a vigorous +appetite, so the boy may become the physiologist eating with a view +chiefly to his own health and to the further end of health in his +offspring. How does it happen that, thus, the same act, the significance +of which remains the same, may be performed and by the same individual +yet with quite different ends, or perhaps in some cases (that of the +infant) no end at all, in view? + +When we perceive the sphex providing its eggs, as is its wont, with +living and yet motionless and helpless insects, we can scarcely refrain +from believing that it is inspired by parental affection thus to provide +for its future young; and yet we might, with quite equal reason, +suppose that the act of copulation, in the case of the sphex, must have +in view the propagation of offspring and the preservation of the +species, since this is its result also; we refrain from so supposing, +simply because a common experience furnishes us with the knowledge that +the act of copulation, most necessary to the propagation of offspring +and the preservation of the species, may yet be performed with no direct +view to either of these ends, the birth of offspring being even +regarded, in many cases, as something to be avoided if possible. With +respect to all manner of acts, we continually fall into error by +imputing what would be our own end, in case we performed the act, to +another individual of our own species performing it; and the danger of +error is doubtless increased when we attempt to judge the ends of an +entirely different species by ends in a degree common to our own +species. There is no reason why we should not suppose that some less +ultimate end than that of the preservation of offspring may be present +to the consciousness of the sphex placing food about its eggs, just as +some nearer end than preservation of the species, health of offspring, +or even individual health may be present to the human individual in the +acts of copulation or of food-taking. And there remains still the +further question as to whether the care of the sphex for its eggs may +not be, and continue forever, on the plane of the first act of +food-taking in the human infant; and then the question again arises as +to what the nature of that plane of action may be. + +These questions must remain, I believe, in great part unanswered, +considerations such as those noticed above making the inference even of +like ends from like acts very untrustworthy, the inference of similar +ends from similar acts still more so, and the inference of the existence +of no end or consciousness at all a logical impossibility. However, a +certain general clew is given us in the constant coördination of our own +nervous system with psychical processes, from which we may infer +psychical processes in some manner and degree similar to our own in +species whose nervous system greatly resembles our own; the similarity +need not be that of ends, however. The decreasing similarity of nervous +organization as we descend the animal scale may be supposed to be +coördinate with some decrease of psychical similarity. _Wherein_ this +increasing dissimilarity consists, however, we have yet to inquire. + +If we return to the act of food-taking in the individual, we perceive +that, avoiding any exact assumption as to the definite nature of the act +in its first appearance in the infant, we may make the general assertion +that, as in the case of the supposed physiologist who finally comes to +eat with a direct view to the preservation of health in his offspring as +well as his own preservation and health, the act itself, while remaining +unchanged in nature, connects itself, in the process of development, +with various ends. As the individual becomes conscious of farther and +farther reaching and more and more complicated results of the act, he +postulates these as ends, not forgetting, however, important ends +earlier postulated. He may eat, as a boy, for the pleasure of eating, +later with his health and the capacity for useful work in view, and +finally to the end also, or perhaps primarily, of securing healthy +offspring; but he eats, in all these cases; and it is even supposable +that he may eat the same kinds of food, healthful food being, from the +beginning, agreeable to him. The widening of knowledge by experience, in +the case of the human individual, furnishes him with more distant and +more complex ends, which were earlier impossible to him, since he knew +nothing of them. + +Something similar appears to be the truth in the case of the mental +progress of the human species as a whole. The growth of knowledge is, in +fact, a growth of consciousness of the constant connection of particular +processes with particular results, and of human acts as affecting these; +with which increase of knowledge a further coördinate development in the +sense of a postulation of further and further and more and more complex +ends keeps pace. We are continually making "discoveries,"--performing or +observing operations some or all of the observed results of which are +unforeseen by us, though these very results may be later sought as ends. +We are often able to predict the results even of entirely new +experiments; but we foresee, and can therefore assume as end, no results +the elements of which in their connection with their conditions have not +first come, in some way, within our knowledge. Nothing is a discovery +which does not involve some new element or new combination of elements. +The growth of knowledge, in individual and species, and the increase in +distance and complexity of ends never attain completeness, not all +results become known; new discoveries are constantly being made which +show us that we have hitherto been blind to results continually before +our eyes, action in accordance with which would have been most +advantageous to us. + +With all these facts before us, how are we to decide as to the end in +view in any non-human act? How can we be sure whether the bird which +covers its eggs is acting with a view to the production of offspring or +merely, as some authors have assumed, to the more immediate end of +cooling its own breast.[125] How do we know whether any feeling which we +might term mother-love is active in the sphex's care for her eggs, +whether they are, as some authors have suggested, a part of her own ego +and therefore cared for, or whether the act of caring for them has not +finally come to have some immediate pleasure connected with it, such as +accompanies the satisfaction of hunger or the sexual instinct, the +pleasure itself being sought as an end? How do we know even whether the +impaled butterfly is endeavoring to escape pain or merely attempting to +continue its flight? + +There appear to be some general lines that we may draw. Thus, for +instance, all facts seem to justify the assumption that the possession +of a nervous system involves sensibility and susceptibility to pain and +pleasure; and thus it is hardly consistent to suppose that the struggle +of the impaled butterfly can be without pain. It might be at times more +agreeable to our selfishness to suppose animals insusceptible of pain, +but I think we can scarcely lay that flattering unction to our soul, and +must face the assumption of their sensibility and feeling. The question +as to whether the butterfly has any distinct idea of escape as an end to +be striven for is a different one and not so easily solved. Yet as +regards conscious ends, too, we may be able to arrive at some general +conclusions with respect to the acts of animals, even of those low in +the scale. Some such conclusions have already been reached in our +considerations. But it is to be noted that all these are purely +negative--exclusions not inclusions. We may be able to say, for +instance, after careful experiment and observation, that this or that +act takes place where there is no possibility of previous knowledge, on +the part of the animal performing it, of this or that result (which we +may, however, regard as an end that should especially be desired by the +animal), and that this particular result cannot, therefore, be an end +present to the animal mind, as such, in performing the act. Lubbock +believes that the passive state of the caterpillar in its cocoon during +its transformation to a butterfly is a necessary condition of its +preservation, since the mouth while undergoing change to an organ +adapted to sucking, and the digestive organs during their preparation +for the assimilation of honey, must be useless, and therefore the animal +in an active state must perish of starvation. It is scarcely to be +supposed, however, that the insect is aware of these ends of +self-preservation involved in the state of passivity in the cocoon and +knowingly seeks them as ends. Since the metamorphosis takes place but +once in the individual life, the insect has no means of learning +anything about it beforehand from his individual experience (though, +even if this were not true, there would still remain the first instance +of cocoon-spinning to be explained); and it is both difficult to suppose +that the caterpillar has always had opportunity to be instructed in some +way by butterflies of his kind, as well as unnecessary to suppose this, +since we see, in other cases, that acts useful to the individual may +take place without previous instruction or experience. In the case of +the sphex, too, as in that of many other lower species that provide for +offspring they will never see, it is not to be supposed that the welfare +of the offspring but rather some result nearer than this is the end in +view, if any end be present to consciousness. + +With regard to primary acts of instinct such as those of the newly +hatched chicken, and the new-born infant, it would seem as if an +argument like the following might hold; it is, in fact, often made use +of in a somewhat different form. We have seen that not only the progress +of the individual but also that of the human species as a whole has +involved an ever increasing knowledge of the connection of processes +with their results and the coördinate assumption of these increasingly +distant and complex results as ends. The ends which animals with a less +extensive knowledge of natural processes may postulate, must be nearer +and less complex than our own, the ends of those whose experience +affords them least extensive knowledge being nearest and simplest, until +we arrive thus at those lowest forms of animal life which cannot be +supposed to have any knowledge that may be termed such, whose action and +reaction, in its psychical aspect, can be figured only as vague +sensation. + +But first as to this vague sensation. Among our own acts, in which +"blind instinct" seems to play a rather larger part than reason, there +are those in which the gratification of the instinct involved is +attended with a peculiar pleasure, while the denial of gratification to +a sufficient degree is correspondingly painful; these are the acts +connected with the gratification of the primary appetites of hunger, +thirst, and sex. The strength of the appetites, the degree of emotion +involved in them, seems to be directly coördinate with their character +as connected with primary functions. This being the case, why may we not +suppose the functions of the simplest forms of life, which we believe to +have been passed on from generation to generation almost unchanged, for +the whole period of time occupied in the evolution of the human race, to +be connected with feelings equally as strong as any of our own, or even +stronger since function has been exercised on these few lines only? +Feeling changes direction with the growth of man's knowledge, with the +development of reason; it may be connected with new and more complex +processes; but it would be difficult to prove that strength of feeling +has increased except as connected with increased exercise of +_particular_ function--that is, it would be difficult to prove that the +whole sum of feeling has increased. And if we may assume that it has not +increased, then we must suppose as great a degree of feeling to be +possible in the lowest animals as in man; and no reason appears why we +should not suppose it to exist also in as great a degree in the plants +and in the inorganic matter from which both these forms of the organic +have sprung.[126] + +And we have to notice a second fact: If the ends present to human reason +are nearer ones according as the knowledge of the individual performing +them is narrower, these nearer ends and the means of their attainment +may yet be very clearly and thoroughly known, the narrower knowledge +including the minute, often the minutest particulars, as far as it goes; +and why may we not suppose the so-called "instinctive" movements of +animals very low in the scale of being, which exhibit a most perfect +adaptation as far as it reaches, to be connected with a like perfect, if +very narrow, action of reason? Or why should we draw a line here between +the movements of animals and all other movements? + +We are thus brought face to face with a dilemma to which there appears +to be no solution. If the solution is impossible, however, why attempt +it? In this case, anything we may term solution can be only dogmatic +assertion or else mere speculation. If the question is unanswerable, it +is unanswerable, and there is no use in further endeavor in this +direction. But, in reviewing our arguments, we shall find, I think, that +that which led us astray at every turn and induced us to hope for an +answer, now on this side, now on that, was the tendency to look for some +independent cause, some essence, effecting change rather than being +effected, or of which phenomena were only the properties. It was this +which made us believe that we had found the means to an answer in reason +as the cause of action towards ends, as also, again, that we had found +it in the development of the higher organism from the lower, and of the +organic from the inorganic. We know no such independent cause, no such +essence. We know only variables, preceding conditions and succeeding +conditions, all of which preceding and succeeding conditions we must +regard as equally essential since they are equally actual; and we know +in all variation a certain constancy of relations, which we, by +abstraction, term law. + +The argument which starts with the dependence of "ends" upon reason, +and so infers a necessary intervention of reason where motion is such as +to attain results regarded by the onlooker as ends to be desired, is +often applied in a still wider form in Theology. Of course if we start +with a definition of ends as results actually desired and premeditated, +then we may infer reason from the assumed existence of "ends" in any +case; but such a form of argument is evidently a gross case of _petitio +principii_; we assume that which is to be proved,--namely, the desire +and premeditation of the results attained. This fallacy ordinarily +escapes the eye through the double significance of the word "end" as it +is generally used; in the premises of the argument the use of the word +is justifiable if no implications of reason and will are associated with +it; but, with such a non-committal definition of the word, the +conclusion noticed could never be reached, we should find ourselves at +the end of the argument no nearer it than we were at the beginning. + +The gradual development of stability from instability, harmony from +disharmony, a state where collision is at a minimum from one where it +was at a maximum, may be regarded as furnishing the best phase possible +of a teleological argument. Even the dissolution of any system is part, +according to the theory, of the evolution of some higher system of +stability, that is, of one including more elements. This leads us, +however, to the question of the definition of "higher"; the friends of +theological Teleology are very ready to define the development of life +up to man as the development of higher from lower forms, but are they +willing to regard a succeeding stage of still greater stability, a state +of barren and lifeless rest like that of the moon's surface, which our +earth will probably one day attain, as a yet higher stage of +development, the destruction of man and of the earth as part of a higher +evolution? We have to consider, further, that, unless we assume some +final state of absolute stability for the universe, we can suppose only +an asymptotic evolution towards it, in which higher and higher systems +of stability are developed only to be again destroyed. We know nature +only as involving such processes of evolution and dissolution; we know +no enduring stability. If we regard merely the side of evolution in +these processes, we may seem to have a strong argument for design; but +if we give attention to the dissolution succeeding every evolution, the +argument loses its force. And, again, if we assume the continual order +of destruction, reconstruction, and re-destruction finally to give place +to a condition of absolute stability, the question may be recurred to +whether this state could be one of motion, whether it must not rather be +conceived as one of absolute rest, some frozen peace of which the moon's +is but an imperfect type. We may ask, then, whether the friends of the +teleological argument would agree to designate this state, which is +highest from a mathematical point of view since it includes all the +elements of the universe, as highest in any point of view favoring a +theological theory of design. The teleological argument is accustomed to +take into consideration only the evolution side of natural process; the +pessimistic argument lays emphasis, on the other hand, on all forms of +dissolution,--both views corresponding thus, as a matter of fact, to but +half the truth. Even if we do not look beyond the evolution upon the +earth, it is evident that each step in advance is marked by wide-spread +destruction, each survival of the few bought at the expense of the +slaughter of the many. We may overlook the slaughter, but it does not +the less exist; we may egoistically shut our eyes to the pain, when it +is not our pain, but it is not the less a fact. + +But further than this: Our previous investigations have shown us +difficulties on every side, when we have attempted to assume reason in +matter as the cause of stability or harmony, preservative action, or the +survival of the fittest. We may argue that mere matter and motion cannot +have produced such results as these; but how do we know this? How have +we such an intimate acquaintance with the nature of matter and motion +that we can assert this? Where were we at the origin of the universe (if +we suppose such) or where were we at the origin of life, that we should +be able to be assured of this? Or how do we know in any case, from an +origin, what might evolve with time? We obviously cannot argue from the +analogy of man's action, since he is a part of the problem itself, +included in the question, and such an analogy is a _petitio principii_. +If we have found it impossible to assume reason as cause in his case, +how can we, by the analogy of his action and by a universal +generalization, assume it as a Universal Cause? We have, in fact, +absolutely no precedent from which to argue, and may answer,--when +Wallace asserts that combinations of chemical compounds might produce +protoplasm, but that no such combinations could produce living or +conscious protoplasm,[127]--How do you know that they could not? We +have, indeed, no evidence to the contrary: we do not know. If we assume +the creation of protoplasm or the creation of the world to have been +analogous to any of the phenomena of our experience, in which we find +only certain constant results of the forces resident in matter, then +certainly we have no precedent for asserting the necessity of divine +creation; and if we assume the creation to have been essentially +different from any of the phenomena of our experience, then certainly we +have no data upon which to base any theory whatever concerning it. But +the assumption that the creation of protoplasm, of the earth, or of the +universe, was essentially different from any of the processes that we +know, is a mere assumption, without basis: we have no data from which to +argue in this direction; any hypothesis of such sort is made purely and +absolutely _a priori_. A first appearance of protoplasm upon the earth +we must infer from the facts furnished us by Geology and Astronomy; but +a creation of either matter or motion is a mere assumption. As we know +matter, it can neither be created nor destroyed. We cannot draw any +inference from man's will, for man creates nothing; his action is itself +a part of nature. Advanced theological doctrine tends more and more to +limit the creation to the first communication of motion to matter or to +assume some transcendental government of the universe, known, according +to the assumption, transcendentally, or inferred from the existence of +moral tendency or from desire for the transcendental in man. With +Transcendentalism we have, as yet, nothing to do; and with moral +principle in its bearings on this matter we cannot deal until later. But +as for the hypothesis of a first communication of motion to "dead" +matter, we may remark, as before, that this is a mere hypothesis with no +facts to support it. We know nothing of motion apart from matter, or of +matter except through motion; the two cannot be separated in fact, and +there is no reason for their separation in hypothesis or theory. Du Prel +says: "Whether causeless motion is scientifically conceivable, depends +on whether we have to regard rest or motion as the natural condition of +matter; for a motion that is not primary must, as newly appearing +change, be preceded by a cause. But though experience might incline us +to regard rest as the original condition of matter, and therefore to +seek a cause for every motion, this is, nevertheless, only the result +of an incomplete induction. For if it is true that we never see a +motionless body pass into a state of motion without a cause, on the +other hand, it is just as certain that a moving body can never pass into +a state of rest without cause; and if this axiom can never be directly +proved in processes on the earth, we can, nevertheless, show reason for +it: motion on the earth cannot be imagined without resistance from +obstacles, since the attraction of the earth and the moments of friction +can never be removed. But the axiom is indeed indirectly proved by the +fact that we see the velocity of a body decrease in proportion to the +resistance of obstacles; the body can only then attain to a condition of +rest when the moving force is consumed to the last remnant. Hence, if we +subtract the whole sum of resistance to the motion, we have again the +former condition, the motion with its original velocity.... Which +condition of matter is the original one, rest or motion, experience +cannot inform us. We have as good reason for regarding rest as arrested +motion, as for regarding motion as disturbed rest. The requirement of an +outer cause for the first impulsion of matter therefore has meaning only +in so far as rest is claimed to be the original, natural condition of +matter; but this claim cannot be substantiated, and the opposite is just +as conceivable, namely, that rest is only arrested motion, and that all +cosmic matter had motion from the beginning."[128] + +Wallace practically abandons his own ground, not only in his later works +in ascribing much to natural selection which he was at first inclined to +believe the effect of some supernatural cause, and omitting from his +chapters on the application of the conception of evolution to man +several arguments for supernatural intercession employed in his earlier +work, but even in his first book, by admitting that natural selection +takes advantage of mental superiority just as it does of physical +superiority. We may notice at this point, however, a consistent +inconsistency of his, in that, though he denies the existence of +consciousness in matter, he leaves no logical room for the opposite +theory of a gradual development of consciousness, since he asserts that +all instinctive actions were at first self-conscious. This position is +held by others also. + +We may note here an objection of Wallace's that "because man's physical +structure has been developed from an animal form by natural selection, +it does not necessarily follow that his mental nature, even though +developed _pari passu_ with it, has been developed by the same causes +only." The question may be again repeated as to what is meant by cause; +and it will be well to keep distinct, in our thought, transcendental +cause and cosmic conditions. We must admit that we have no proof of the +absence of transcendental causes. Neither the constancy of nature nor +the inseparability and indestructibility of matter and motion can prove +the absence of such causes, which might be entirely consistent with +these things; we have no data from which to argue that they are not so. + +But though the law of Excluded Middle must hold good here as elsewhere, +it is also to be noticed that the absence of proof in the natural order +of things, with respect to the non-existence of transcendental causes, +is not equivalent to the presence of proof of the opposite. We cannot +infer, from the fact that no proof can be given of the non-existence of +transcendental causes, that therefore proof can be given of the +existence of such causes; or, from the fact that transcendental causes +may be, that therefore transcendental causes are; they may also not be. +There is, in fact, absence of proof for either view. Of the +transcendental, if it exists, we can know by definition absolutely +nothing. The man who endeavors to prove its existence generally bases +his argument on this very fact in order to disprove the validity of any +argument of his opponent from natural facts; when he, therefore, after +legitimately silencing his opponent, goes on himself to prove the +transcendental, he is guilty of self-contradiction. When Fiske asserts +that there is no problem "in the simplest and most exact departments of +science which does not speedily lead us to a transcendental problem that +we can neither solve nor elude,"[129] we may admit the point, but surely +it does not follow, because we cannot solve it, that therefore we must +solve it, far less that we must solve it in one particular way. If we +cannot solve it, we cannot solve it, and there is an end to the matter, +unless we find new proof. We may not be able, as Fiske says, to elude +the problem, but we certainly are able to elude the answering of it, and +must do so perforce if the first part of the assertion,--namely, that we +cannot answer it,--be correct. When Fiske urges us to accept one view +because "the alternative view contains difficulties at least as great," +we fail to perceive any grounds in this position for such acceptance. To +Fiske's question as to whether we are to regard the work of the Creator +as like that of the child, who builds houses just for the pleasure of +knocking them down again, we may answer that the existence of a Creator +must first be proved before we, from a scientific basis, may make any +inference as to his purpose; and that we certainly cannot use an +assumption of his existence in order to protest against a theory of +Disteleology,--as Fiske seems to do,--if we use the teleological +argument to prove his existence. + +We may furthermore protest against the elevation of any negative term, +as, for instance, Spencer's "Unknowable," to a term signifying a +positive existence. We do not know whether there is any positive +Transcendental that is to us unknowable; this mere negative term is +admissible only on the assumption that it expresses such an absence of +knowledge. The Unknowable assumed as existent entity is the Unknowable +known,--a self-contradiction. + +A similar criticism may be applied to Spencer's use in his "First +Principles" of the word "Force," spelled with a capital, and defined as +designating "Absolute Force," an "Absolute, Unconditioned Reality," +"Unconditioned Cause,"[130] etc. The attribution of reality to a mere +mental abstraction is a survival of old conceptions repudiated by +Spencer in their older form. Of forces we know much, but of abstract +Force nothing,--except as an abstraction from reality; and the dangers +in the use of such a term are made manifest by Spencer's elevation of +this concept to the character assigned it by the other terms quoted. + +To sum up. We have found in nature only variables, no constant and +invariable factor, no independent one according to which the others +vary; we have found no cause that was not also an effect; that is, we +have discovered nothing but a chain of phenomena bearing constant +relations to each other, no causes except in this sense. We have no +precedent or data from which to assert that chemical combinations could +not have resulted in protoplasm and in living protoplasm, no data from +which to assert that mere evolution could not have produced +consciousness. As a matter of fact, however, we find the relations of +consciousness and physiological process as constant as those of the +different forms of material force, and while discovering no grounds upon +which to pronounce either consciousness or physiological process the +more essential, find none, either, for pronouncing one more than the +other independent of what we call natural law. The logic of all our +experience leads us to believe that neither protoplasm, nor the earth, +nor any of the parts of the universe, could have originated otherwise +than under natural law, that is, as the result of preceding natural +conditions which must have contained all the factors united in the +result, and would thus explain to us, if we knew them, in as far as any +process is explained by analysis, the results arising from them. We know +matter and motion only as united; we know no state of absolute rest, and +we have no grounds for supposing any initial state of such absolute +rest, or any state in which motion not previously existent in the +universe entered. On the other hand, we have no proof of the absence of +consciousness outside animal life, and no proof of the non-existence of +transcendental causes, though likewise no proof of their existence. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[112] "Origin of Species," 6th ed., Vol. I. p. 320. + +[113] "Lecture on Cell-souls and Soul-cells," 1878. + +[114] "Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls," p. 349 _et seq._ + +[115] See Part I. p. 161. + +[116] "Der menschliche Wille," p. 13. + +[117] On the Motions of the Tendrils of Plants; among the essays of +Knight published under the title, "A Selection from Physiological and +Horticultural Papers," 1841. + +[118] See "Insectivorous Plants," Chaps. I. and II. + +[119] "The Movements of Plants," Chap. III. + +[120] See experiments made by Eimer: "Entstehung der Arten," etc., p. +263 _et seq._ + +[121] E. Pflüger: "Die sensorischen Functionen des Rückenmarks der +Wirbelthiere," 1853. + +[122] See Lange: "Geschichte des Materialismus," II. Theil, p. 486. + +[123] "The Science of Ethics," p. 60. + +[124] "Der thierische Wille," p. 161. + +[125] See, for instance, Eimer: "Entstehung der Arten," p. 283. + +[126] Carneri's instance, cited in support of his theory of the +possibility of sensation without pleasure or pain, that certain nerves +connected with fine sense-perception, may yet be cut without special +pain to the owner, is a poor one, first, because highly developed +nerves, the media of fine perceptions, are especially inapt examples for +citation in support of any theory of primitive sensation in lower +organisms, and, second, because the problem of pain and pleasure in such +cases is very different from the problem of pain and pleasure in +connection with ordinary excitation of nerve endings or the outer +covering of the organism from which the nervous system has developed. +The fact that, in highly developed organisms, some parts are less +susceptible of pleasure and pain might as easily be construed into an +argument that corresponding parts of lower organisms differ, in the same +manner, in susceptibility. Furthermore, sensation being admitted, as +Carneri admits it, or rather asserts it, of all forms of animal life, it +is difficult to conceive how he can interpret the phenomena of +appetition and repulsion as devoid of feeling. Most authors have argued, +with much more reason, that pleasure and pain are primordial. Carneri's +further argument that he who conceives the lower species as feeling +pleasure and pain introduces an immense amount of pain into the world +(p. 113, "Grundlegung der Ethik") is quite aside from the question as to +the facts of the case. Nor can man create pain by his conception of its +existence, or destroy it, if it exists, by a refusal to acknowledge its +existence. + +[127] See Part I. pp. 19, 22. + +[128] "Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls", p. 350 _et seq._ + +[129] See Part I. p. 80. + +[130] Pp. 170, 192d. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE WILL + + +In any discussion of the will, we are met at the outset by the +difficulties of definition, on which whole chapters might be, and have +been, written. But one great difficulty has already been considered in +the discussions of the previous chapter, in the questions as to the +existence of consciousness in inorganic nature, in organisms which +differ from our own in not possessing a centralized nervous system, and +in connection with actions of our own body known to our centralized +consciousness only as results. Leaving these questions open, as we have +found it necessary to do, and confining ourselves, in speaking of +consciousness, to consciousness as we immediately know it, or as we may, +with some degree of probability, infer it in animals constituted +similarly to ourselves, we find one obstacle to our definition removed. +For by will is generally meant a psychical faculty; and to speak of +"unconscious will" is either a self-contradiction or a mere figure of +speech. + +We shall also find, I think, that the most essential characteristic of +the will as a psychical faculty is that it is connected with action +which has in view some end consciously sought; action to which there +corresponds no conscious end, whether a long premeditated end or an end +instantaneously comprehended and assumed in the moment of need, we term +reflex. The question may arise as to whether there are not acts which we +name merely "involuntary," which must be classified, from a +pyschological standpoint, as midway between the voluntary and the +reflex. But it may be answered that here, as everywhere in connection +with the organic, there is difficulty in drawing distinct lines; there +are psychical conditions in which some strong emotion, for instance, +terror, so takes possession of the mind as almost to exclude plan of +action, and the individual appears to act, as we say, "unconsciously"; +but I think this very adverb solves, for us, to all practical purposes, +the question we have put. When we analyze such psychical conditions, we +often find that, besides emotion, there was some degree of preconception +of action, though the emotion so absorbed our attention at the time that +the other appeared subordinate and was easily forgotten; but the fact +that we term action of this sort, where we fail to discover +preconception, "unconsciously" performed, would go to confirm the +definition with which we began, though we may have difficulty in +deciding whether or not a particular action comes under the head of +willed action, that is, action to a preconceived end. + +Another question which has been frequently asked, in analyses of the +will, is whether mere abstinence from action, the negation of action, +can be classed as an instance of willing, willing being, by definition, +an active, not a passive state. It may be answered that, from the +physiological point of view, a point of view not to be wholly +disregarded even by the conservative psychologist, the arresting action +of the will as the control of lower by higher centres, is its most +important function. And to this physiological fact corresponds the +psychological fact that no stronger exertion of will-power is known to +us than that sometimes necessary to the attainment of mere passivity. A +definition that would exclude such passive states from the province of +the will must exclude, on the same principle, all other willing not +issuing in muscular action, and so all voluntary control of thought. The +choice between activity and passivity may be as real and as difficult as +between two different forms of activity. + +We have here introduced the concept of choice, and it may be well to +define this, and its significance in our definition of will, more +exactly. Voluntary action is, we say, often preceded by long +deliberation and severe struggle, ending finally in the choice of one of +the many modes of action deliberated. We can conceive of this struggle +as not so long, as shorter and shorter, until it occupies so little time +and attention as to be scarcely perceptible. But we can conceive, also, +of a premeditation which includes no struggle, in which one motive +appears so strong as to exclude consideration of any but the one end, +and the deliberation has reference only to the best means of attaining +that end. The murderer, inspired by a desire for revenge, may seek his +end with the same directness, if not the same instantaneousness, or with +the same directness and instantaneousness, as the dog who snaps at a +piece of meat; yet we call his action voluntary, whatever we may think +of the dog's action, our conception of which may be rendered indistinct +by our uncertainty as to the nature of instinct and the part it plays in +the action of other species. We call the action of the murderer +voluntary because we conceive that he consciously sought the end +involved. We are even inclined to call it voluntary in cases where the +criminal is moved by momentary passion, since we conceive that he might +have exerted self-control. + +Our conception of will is, therefore, closely bound up with the +conception of conscious end, distant or near. Our association of choice +with the act is not always exact; we may conceive of the choice as +actually taking place between one of several ends deliberated upon, or +as involved in the conscious determination of any end, even though no +other was deliberated upon, even though all others were excluded from +consciousness by passion; since we conceive that as all definition is, +in fact, exclusion, so the determination of one end is in effect the +negation of others that might have been sought, if only in the form of +the contrary of action, inaction. + +We are thus brought, first of all, to a consideration of the meaning of +the term "end." As we have seen in the last chapter, an end is that part +of the results of an action which consciousness especially holds in view +in the performance of an act. The end in view has sometimes been called +the cause of the act, but it is evident, as both Gizycki and Stephen +have shown, that a future state, that is, something which at the time of +willing does not exist, cannot move the will; though the representation +of a hoped-for end is concerned in action,--in just what capacity we +have yet to determine. It has also been urged that nothing external can +act upon the will, but only internal states of consciousness. All +depends, here, upon the definition of external and internal. The +distinction between the two is a legitimate one where it calls attention +to the difference between that which is at present perceived and that +which is only remembered, or imagined from the elements given by memory. +But what _is_ an object, as present to me, beyond what it is to my +consciousness? My knowledge of a thing is made up of various elements +contributed through the different senses; and this assertion is exactly +the same as the statement that a thing is the sum of its qualities. My +idea of the fire, the lamp, or any other object as external, arises +from the fact that it appeals to more of my senses than one, that, if +withdrawn from one or from all but one, it may still be perceived by the +other or others, or that, if withdrawn from all of them for a time by +some obstacle, it may be perceived again when this obstacle is removed; +but beyond perception or memory of perception, in any case, I have no +consciousness of the object. The perception is not, however, something +distinct from consciousness, but _is_ consciousness. The error above +noticed arises from the conception of consciousness as a sort of place, +another space into which we cannot get objects from external space; the +conception is a crude one, yet it often enters into psychological +speculation. The perceived, that is the external, does, as a matter of +fact, affect our will. + +There may thus be two definitions of the term "internal" and two of +"external," as the words are generally used. Internal may mean either +within the body or within consciousness, external may mean external to +the body or external to consciousness. The two meanings are, in both +cases, commonly confused,--that is, consciousness is looked upon, as has +been said, as a sort of internal space within the body to which external +things cannot get admission. "External to consciousness" should refer +simply to that which the individual or individuals considered do not +perceive, of which they are unconscious. That of which we are conscious +is in consciousness. But all manner of ingenious jugglery is played with +the help of the metaphysical dualism implied in the other definition of +the terms. The objection of a possibility of this duality of meaning +applies to Barratt's use of the term "external" at the opening of his +book on Ethics, and the objection of a possibility of a similar duality +applies to many other expressions in the propositions and definitions +with which he begins,--to such expressions, for instance, as "relative +to our faculties," "state of consciousness," etc.[131] Objection may +also be taken to such quantification of the predicate as is found in +Cor. 1 of Prop. I. + +To return to the question of the will. The thought-image, memory or +perception, with its associations, has been termed the excitation or the +motive and said to move or determine the will to some end. Thus the +perception of the burning house is said to be that which leads me to +give an alarm, or the perception of the smoking lamp that which moves me +to turn it down. To this form of statement is often objected that mere +thought or perception can never move the will, but that feeling is +required to do this. A further discussion may arise as to whether it is +feeling in the form of pleasure or of pain which moves the will. Many +authors regard anticipated pleasure as a constant motive; Rolph, on the +contrary, as we have seen, inclines to the view that it is always some +present pain by which we are moved to action. And it is argued that, +since the direction of the will is determined by pleasure or by pain, +that is by motives, the will is not free. + +Again, the physiologist calls attention to the fact that the so-called +free action of the will has for its basis physiological processes, all +of which are in accordance with the strict uniformity of nature, all +subject to law, and all, as we must believe, capable of exact prediction +from the conditions which produce them, if we but comprehended these +conditions. There is no gap in these processes where free will might +interpose; the whole thought-process, the deliberation preceding +decision, the moral struggle if there is one, the decision itself, and +its realization in action, have for their foundation physiological +function, which is as much determined by necessity as any of the +processes in inorganic nature. The results of past experience, not of +the experience of the individual only but of that of the whole species +inherited as inborn tendency and capacity and modified by individual +circumstances, are stored up in the organism, the point of +centralization being the brain; any single excitation sets this whole +complicated machinery in motion and the result is the act. The +individual, not understanding this complicated process of reaction, not +being able to trace the results of experience to their source, to +descend the whole scale of being to the beginnings of life and note the +gradual development of tendency, and seeing the inadequacy of the +excitation in itself to account for the action following, attributes to +this a peculiar character, regarding that which is really result as +absolute beginning, independent cause. + +We may consider the matter from still another point of view. We may +inquire whether the freedom predicated of the human will is predicated +of that alone, or of will in the whole range of animal life. And if it +be predicated of the human will alone, we may ask at just what point of +the evolution this is supposed to arise, whether, in the gradual +development, any particular point can be found or assumed to exist, of +which we can say: Here the animal ceases and man begins. Or if freedom +is asserted of the whole range of animal will, not, however, of plant +movement or the motions of the inorganic, we may again inquire as to the +point of exact division between the animal and the plant. Evolution is, +by definition, a gradual process, a growth in which there are no gaps, +and of which our finest and most minute calculations by infinitesimals +can give us only a faint conception. Where is there any point of such a +process at which we can suppose the entrance of a totally new principle +that cannot be regarded as another expression of force or merely a new +form of animal function, but as directly opposed to developed function +and to the force that is subject to natural law? + +The Evolutionist may state the problem in still a new form, as follows: +The survival of any organism at a given period is determined by the +fitness of that organism for the conditions of the environment at that +period. The form and function of the animal are thus, at each moment, +determined by the environment. And since only functions in harmony with +the environment render the organism capable of survival under that +environment, the functions of surviving organisms are in a direction +favorable to the preservation of the form of which they are the +functions. Since, moreover, self-preservation in some form, whether as +preservation of the whole organism or as preservation of a part through +satisfaction of its function (rendered possible only through harmony +between the function and the environment), always constitutes the end +sought by the will, the individual appears to himself to will ends, +whereas these are all determined for him by the survival of the fittest, +whose function he inherits and carries out subject only to the +modification of the peculiar elements of his own environment. If we +suppose, at any point of development, an action not in accord with that +which the laws of nature necessitate decided upon by the will, such an +action cannot be carried out. But even a decision is impossible contrary +to natural law, since in preceding evolution there has been no point at +which nature has not in like manner determined action, and the present +decision, being the expression of function attained as the result of +evolution, must be as much determined as the action which follows. + +Or if we return to our conception of the development of stable from +unstable conditions, we may consider all evolution of higher function as +increased adaptation, that is, as harmony with an ever wider circle of +nature, the reason appearing as corresponding concomitant knowledge of +this widening circle, to which the function of the organism is adjusted. +The reflection preceding decision on an end consists in the imagination, +by aid of the memory of past experience, of some of the constant results +of particular function, to which function, however, the organism is +irresistibly moved. Thus that which is generally regarded as the +greatest independence of nature is, in reality, the greatest subjection +to nature considered as a whole, although this wider subjection means an +increasing independence of the mere excitation of the moment. The +ability to weigh all sides of a question, sometimes termed Freedom, is +rather the widest adaptation, which means the widest determination by +nature. The lower organisms may be, as Rolph and Alexander assert, as +well adapted to their particular environment as the higher; but the +higher are adapted to a wider environment, to more of the variations of +the conditions on the earth's surface. Man is the most widely adapted of +all animals. This is a fact which we express when we say that man's +power of adaptation is greatest,--that is, that there are latent +tendencies in him, the result of former adaptations, which may +correspond sufficiently to new environment, _i.e._ to environment +involving many new elements, to enable him to survive. This wider +adaptation expresses itself especially in the higher development of the +nervous centres, to which man's higher reason corresponds; it is through +the reason especially that his adaptiveness comes to light. + +The statistician often has considerable to say against a doctrine of +freedom of the will. He calls attention to the necessary character of +human action as evidenced by its uniformities under uniform +circumstances, in the various important relations of life. These +uniformities are not less than those which statistics reveal in disease +and death and other events classed as not under the control of the will. + +And to all this evidence we may add that of the history of the mental +life of the species, derived from the combined labors of the geologist, +the ethnologist, the philologist, and the historian. Everything goes to +prove an evolution in the mental life of man, as gradual, and as much +subject to the influence of the environment, as his physical evolution +has been. Carneri says, "The eternal laws of mind point out the way upon +which man has to proceed; it is the same way by which man has become +man, and by which mankind must go forward even if it does not will thus +to proceed."[132] + +And again, the authorities on mental disease demonstrate the constant +relations, not only of general health of brain to health of mind, and of +disease of brain to mental unsoundness, but also of particular physical +symptoms to particular mental symptoms. This constancy of relations is +revealed with more certainty and distinctness by every step in the +progress of medical knowledge. The specialist in mental disease inquires +with reason how we can acknowledge the physical processes of the body to +be governed by natural law, yet assert the emancipation from law of the +psychical processes which vary concomitantly with these in a manner that +science shows to be perfectly constant. To the testimony of Psychiatry +may be added that of the comparatively new science of Criminology. + +And, finally, Evolutional Ethics demonstrates the constancy of +character, the persistence of habit, and the uniformity of its change +under the influence of environment. If there is no persistence of +character and uniformity in its action, we have no reason, as various +authors have shown, for trust or distrust, for praise or blame; and, I +think we may add, none for love or dislike, reverence or contempt, +enthusiasm or coldness, in the contemplation of character or conduct. If +the fact that a man acts honorably, kindly, nobly, in one instance is +not a warranty that we may with reason expect him to act similarly again +under similar circumstances, allowance being made for error in our +interpretation of motive (which may have been merely self-interested +where we thought it disinterested) and for changes produced in character +by the environment between the first act and the opportunity of the +second, then character is merely a jumbled chaos of chance, and the name +"habit" a contradiction in terms. We may, perhaps, respect the single +act, but we have no reason for respecting the individual performing it, +since the "individual" cannot be regarded as coëxtensive with a single +act of his life, and least of all when the act gives no clew to a +permanent basis issuing in uniform action of which law can be +predicated. In this case, the noble deed, or any number of noble deeds, +afford us no security that the next act of the person performing them, +or all the rest of the acts of his life, may not be wholly ignoble, +base, and vile. + +In the face of all the considerations thus offered us, we cannot well +find reason for accrediting the will with a peculiar position in the +universe, as emancipated from the natural law which we discover in all +other phenomena. But it behooves us, in this connection, to inquire as +to just what is the significance of the term "natural law." It has +already been implicitly defined in our previous considerations. Lewes +and several other modern philosophical writers have given excellent +definitions of the expression. Lewes writes as follows: "Law is only one +of two conceptions, (1) a notation of the process observed in phenomena, +which process we mentally detach and generalize by extending it to all +similar phenomena; (2) an abstract Type, which, though originally +constructed from the observed Process, does nevertheless depart from +what is really observed, and substitutes an Ideal Process, constructing +what _would be_ the course of the process were the conditions different +from those actually present. The first conception is so far real that it +expresses the _observed series of positions_. It is the process of +phenomena, not an agent apart from them, not an agency _determining +them_, but simply the ideal _summation of their positions_.... +Phenomena, in so far as they are ruled, regulated, determined in this +direction rather than in that, and necessarily determined in the +direction taken,... are determined by no external agent corresponding to +Law, but by their coöperant factors internal and external; alter one of +these factors and the product will be differently determined. It is +owing to the very general misconception of the nature of Law, that there +arises the misconception of Necessity; the fact that events arrive +irresistibly when their conditions are present is confounded with the +conception that the events must arrive whether the conditions be present +or not, being fatally predetermined. Necessity simply says that whatever +is, is, and will vary with varying conditions."[133] Neither Natural Law +nor Necessity is an entity extraneous to phenomena which governs or +compels them; the two are generalizations merely by which we express a +certain uniformity that we find universal. + +Let us return to our analysis of the organic as matter and of function +as its motion. Go as far as we like in our analysis, and we still have +left positive entities of matter and force, or matter, motion, and the +equivalent of motion in resistance; moreover, we cannot suppose either +matter or force to decrease by our analysis. Here, therefore, we have +indestructible entities, and these, not Law and Necessity, are the +positive factors. But if the final divisions of matter leave us still +positive factors, then the combinations of these must be positive also; +not only the theoretical atoms of the chemist, or the organic cells with +their motions and functions, but the combinations of these in organisms, +must be positive. + +It is said that the organism answers to its environment "as the clay to +the mould"; that it is formed by the environment and adjusted to it. +Here we may inquire whether the adjustment referred to is present +adjustment or that of the whole development of the organism. If present +action of the environment is all that is had in view, it may be objected +that not anything in the environment, and not the whole environment, is +more positive than the organism. The one of the two factors cannot be +regarded as positive, the other as merely negative, the environment as +the active and formative, the organism as the passive and formed, the +environment as determining, the organism as determined. + +But we may also consider the organism in the process of development. In +this case, we seem to find reason for regarding it as purely the product +of the environment in which it has arisen. The product it certainly is +in one sense; that is, it is the end-form of a series of changes which +we may suppose originally inorganic matter, or (if we prefer to begin +with the lowest form of life) simplest forms of organic matter, to have +undergone. But the present forms of matter everywhere are, in like +manner, the products of the past changes of matter; if we trace these +changes which have produced present forms, in the case of the inorganic +as well as that of the organic, back to any point of time which we may +choose as a beginning, we shall find in neither case more matter or a +greater amount of force than at the present period; we shall find the +same matter in different combinations, the same force in other forms. +Present forms are not greater or less than past ones, but their exact +equivalents; the beginning was not greater than the end; the producing +forms and forces were not greater than are their products. By a backward +course of thought comprehending evolution we may bring unity into our +conception of the organic, but we find no new factors of force, and need +to avoid laying stress upon the process to the depreciation of the +importance of the product. We may be led to suspect that our search +after new and more important factors was only another form of the search +after an independent cause according to which all other phenomena may be +said to vary. Our mathematical habit of selecting some one side of +natural process as independent, in order to trace, by its variation, the +variation of the others, leads us to regard the one side, phase, or +portion, of phenomena as actually thus independent; although we forget, +in this assumption, that we may select any phase for our mathematical +independent, and are not confined to any particular one. The organism is +itself a part of the environment regarded as conditioning, when we +consider the development of other organisms, or change in inorganic +matter, with which it is in contact. Our minds are unable to comprehend +the whole of nature as variation only, and we fasten on some one part of +the process as independent of the general change or as holding a unique +position in it, from which to consider the variation of the rest. And +the conception of some one part of phenomena as cause disappointing us, +on closer investigation, as far as merely present phenomena are +concerned, we remove the conception farther back into a dim past which +we fail to analyze in thought with the same completeness with which we +analyze the present. We are not, however, in the habit of tracing back +any other than just the organic forms to an arbitrary point which we +call the beginning, and emphasizing this in distinction from present +conditions; in considering the inorganic, we simply notice present +conditions and mark the result of action and reaction between this and +that other form of matter with which it comes in contact. + +The action of the animal at any moment may be said to be determined by +the tendency or potential energy inherent in it at the moment, and the +influence exerted by a particular excitation; this is a matter of action +and reaction; but the force represented by both sides, by that of +organism and by that of environment, is equally positive and equally +represented again in the result. Particular emphasis has been laid, now +on the positive activity of the organism by one school of writers, now +on the activity of the environment as moving the organism to action by +another school; but both sides contribute to the result. Where action +and reaction in inorganic matter are considered, we do not regard either +of two incident forces as alone positive; nor do we regard one as +overcome by the other in the sense that it is not fully represented in +the result. + +Again, if we return to the dispute as to the importance of the +physiological "basis" of action, the remark may be repeated, that it is +mere dogmatism to select some one phase of phenomena as the only +essential phase, while all other phases are regarded as non-essential or +subordinate. The materialist who derides the idea of a "Ding-an-sich" is +himself assuming something very like it, when he endeavors to prove +matter to be the cause, essence, or independent, of which consciousness +is the mere effect, property, or dependent. + +Even if it could be said with truth that the brain secretes thought as +the liver secretes bile (and the analogy does not hold), it should be +borne in mind that the bile is no mere dependent creation of the liver, +but that, before it became bile, it existed in another form, was, in +fact, a part of the liver of which it is regarded as the dependent +creation. Matter and force have simply changed form; that is all. The +later form is not rendered secondary in importance or less positive by +the fact of its sequence upon the other form. The conditions equal the +result; they are not greater than it. Where is there, on closer +analysis, passivity as distinguished from activity? All force is, by +definition, active; and all matter represents force. We find simple +equivalence, that is, a uniformity of relation between preceding +conditions and succeeding conditions. Our "Natural Law" and "Necessity" +resolve themselves into this. Yet the conception of law as something +extraneous to things, something without them not included in their +primary nature but controlling them, is a very common conception. Thus +Du Prel, though rejecting other forms of teleological argument, bases a +whole course of teleological reasoning upon the mere fact of law.[134] +However, we know of natural law merely as an expression of +uniformities, a generalization from the relations of things; we have no +reason for treating it as extraneous to the nature of things themselves; +and nature itself furnishes us with no reason for supposing the +relations of things to be of more significance than things themselves; +relations are not entities. + +If man be part of nature, it is strange that the force within him should +be regarded as so shaped and compelled, the force without him, on the +other hand, as so compelling and mighty. No part of nature is, as a +matter of fact, compelled. All things act and react spontaneously from +their own nature, and man in the same manner acts from his. Law cannot +be defined as determining action and reaction, nor can Necessity; they +are not entities. Force is sometimes called the determining factor, but +an abstract Force we do not know; we know force only as motion or the +equivalent of motion in resistance, or as the conceived potentiality of +motion. The concept of potentiality of motion is, however, again only a +device of reason for bringing unity into our conception of things by +accounting for the appearance of motion where before it was not. +Potentiality is no existence, no reality; actual potentiality is a +contradiction in terms. Nature contains only actualities. Force is the +abstract term by which we include motion, resistance, and the conceived +potentiality of motion, under one head. Motion again is often defined as +the cause of movement; but such a conception makes the abstract notion +of a thing the cause of the thing itself, unless by motion as the cause +we understand the preceding motion, and by movement as the effect we +mean the succeeding motion, in which case we have to bear in mind the +equivalence of conditions and results. Nor do we know motion as +something apart from matter, moving it; we know no abstract motion; we +know only things as moving, changing, and resisting motion. There is no +outside cause given us in our experience as the mover, from which things +are to be distinguished as the passive moved. Things move. And in +correspondence with the activity of things is doubtless the sense of +freedom in the exertion of the will. Outer compulsion, resistance to the +carrying out of a course decided upon or desired, has sometimes been +interpreted as the negation of freedom of the will; but it has with +reason been objected to this definition that the very strongest sense of +inner freedom may exist in connection with such compulsion. It may be +supposed that, as long as there is action in the brain, the +corresponding sense of freedom will exist; or, lest this statement be +interpreted as materialistic, we may say instead: As long as +consciousness exists, it must by definition exist as activity, with +which the sense of freedom is indissolubly connected. + +But we may look at the matter from the more purely psychological side. +The opponents of a theory of freedom make much of the determination of +the will by motives. In their argument, the will is treated as if it +were some separate material thing, the motive another equally separate +thing which, when brought into contact with the will, sets it in motion +in somewhat the same manner as the powder in the gun drives the ball. +But the motive is not something external to consciousness, something +foreign, that, introduced, impels the will to action; nor can the will +be compared to an organ of the body, the motion of which is given us +through our senses as the motion of a part, not of the whole body. The +functions of the body are, in this sense, a part of the material world +to us. But the will is no material thing, no separate organ of +consciousness in this sense. In the will, consciousness expresses +itself; and we cannot say that it is only a part of consciousness that +thus expresses itself. The motive, as conscious, belongs to that +consciousness which finds expression in the will. + +A similar form of theory to that just noticed regards the will as +determined especially by feeling. But feeling belongs as evidently to +consciousness as does will, nor can we say that one part of +consciousness feels and another wills, the one part being the active +mover, the other the passive moved; the division into parts is a +material one applicable to things occupying space, but not to +consciousness. The notion here of mover and moved is very similar to +that noticed above, of motion as cause, movement as effect. + +It is sometimes said that the desirability of an object moves or +determines the will. Here arises the question as to whether the +desirability of an object lies in the object or is only dependent upon +consciousness as a quality of feeling. Thus we come, by closer analysis, +to the fundamental problem of the connection of consciousness with the +external world. It is often said that desirability is a mere predication +of consciousness and does not lie in the object or end itself. That +desirability is a predication of consciousness is true in a sense. And +yet it is evident that this predication corresponds to actualities +existing in the thing or end, on account of which it is pronounced +desirable or, under proper conditions, desired. When we analyze the +state of consciousness itself, we find it impossible to separate the +desirability as predicated by consciousness and the desirability as +predicated of the end, the excited feeling and the feeling as excited by +the object. From one point of view, excitation and consciousness are the +two sides of the conditions, both of which are essential to the result; +but, from another point of view, it is equally true that the desire of +the end is always a part of consciousness, which expresses itself in the +will according to its own inherent nature. + +The act of the will, as following excitation, is sometimes treated as +its mere result, hence subject to it, subordinate and passive; on this +principle, we could also define brain-action as subject to nerve-action +and passive in comparison, wherever it follows. The mere conception of +the conservation of force would make it impossible to suppose a result +of force to be less than preceding force of which it is the result. We +do not call the evolution of organic life on the earth subject or +subordinate to the motion of the nebular mists, or passive with respect +to them. The mere sequence of one event upon another in time does not +justify our pronouncing the one subordinate to the other or passive with +respect to it, the whole sum of matter and force remaining always the +same, and a resultant in any particular instance exactly representing +its factors. + +From our examination of the above arguments, we perceive that the +materialist uses both the concomitance of consciousness with material +processes, and, again, the sequence of particular conscious states upon +material processes, as proof of the subordination and passivity or +dependence of consciousness, as proof that the latter is effect of the +material as cause; indeed, we are not at all sure that he does not often +confuse the two arguments from sequence and from concomitance. On the +other hand, the argument of sequence is often used to prove the greater +importance and activity of consciousness in contrast to matter, +consciousness being regarded as antecedent to excitation in general or +to some particular excitation. But consciousness is not the "prius" of +its excitation in time, since its very definition includes activity and +this is not possible without excitation; consciousness is always the +consciousness of something. To regard consciousness as the "logical +prius" of matter or of excitation by matter may be possible, but the +standpoint is either a purely fanciful or a purely dogmatic one. With +regard to its priority in respect to a particular excitation, the +remarks made above hold good, that mere sequence does not prove +subordination or passivity as distinguished from activity. The fact of +concomitance is also sometimes treated as a part of theories of the +causal nature of consciousness, the brain being regarded as the mere +organ of mind, the passive instrument upon which it acts. In this case, +however, as in the opposite argument that consciousness is dependent +upon brain-action, there is probably some indistinct idea of sequence at +work. The argument applies equally well, indeed, in either direction, +the materialistic or its opposite, and merely this fact would lead us to +suspect that it can be conclusive in neither. + +Thus, in hunting for some cause and effect in the activity of the will, +we bring to light, in the end, only a certain concomitance and sequence. +That which we call "explanation" of natural process is, in fact, in all +cases, merely a finer analysis of concomitance or sequence, or the +analysis of some new phase of it. We have only the finer elements of the +process analyzed before us in any case, although we are often inclined +to treat these elements as if they were the essence and cause of the +process to which they belong. We explain, for instance, the green color +of the leaf by the continually renewed presence of a certain chemical +combination; yet the green color is not less real and essential than the +chemical composition which constantly accompanies it. The musical note +is not the less real to our ear because we can make the vibrations of +the string and the air perceptible to our eye, or because we can observe +to some extent, and infer further, vibrations of parts of the ear that +are the physiological accompaniment of the note heard. The light of the +fire is not the less real because of the heat that I feel from it, nor +is either less actual because I can analyze the process of combustion in +the case. The shape of the leaf to my touch does not make its greenness +of color the less real to my eye, nor does change of form prevent change +of color or prove it less essential in any case. The smell of the rose +does not render its color less real and essential, and, _vice versa_, +the color does not render the smell less an essential part of reality. +Neither does the activity of the brain render the activity of +consciousness less real, or interfere with its freedom, any more than +the activity of the consciousness renders that of the brain less actual +or interferes with its free action and reaction. My knowledge of a thing +given me through one sense is totally different from the knowledge of it +given me through other senses; yet I do not find this various knowledge +contradictory or irreconcilable. Why, then, do I find such great +difficulty in reconciling the simple facts of consciousness and +brain-activity? And why should there be such an inclination to give +greater prominence to physiological process than to mental process, to +regard the only method of reconciling the two that of proclaiming the +dependence of consciousness? + +The solution of the question is not so difficult to find. In the first +place, our knowledge of the concomitance of brain-process and +consciousness, or at least of the constant uniformity of this +concomitance, is only comparatively recent. Further, this knowledge is +not given us immediately, but is the conclusion of a process of +reasoning. While such concomitance as we immediately perceive--the +concomitance of certain impressions on one sense with certain other +impressions upon other senses--appears to us so natural as to need no +comment, the newness and mediate nature of our knowledge of this other +concomitance incline us to regard it as strange and needing some +especial "explanation." While the concomitant impressions upon the +senses, wherever they are constant, become united in our conception to a +single whole, we fail to unite the elements of this mediately known +concomitance to such a whole; doubtless, however, if a perception of all +the details of our own brain-activity were the invariable accompaniment +of thought, we should thus unite them. We can no more "explain" why the +two activities are concomitant, except as we show it to be a fact and +analyze it into its elements, than we can show why just Prussian blue +should be the characteristic of one chemical compound and the green of +plant-life of another, why the connection of the colors should not be +the reverse. The importance we accord the physiological accompaniments +of mental process is partly accounted for by the significance which +attaches to more recent knowledge as constituting scientific progress; +in the effort to bring together in our conception the two elements of +consciousness and brain-action, to whose association we are not +accustomed by immediate perception, we are led to lay especial weight +upon the facts of recent discovery, which are connected with so great +advance in science and have done away with so many superstitions. And, +finally, in the rebound from the old superstitions, the tendency is to +exaggerated views in the opposite direction. The attempt to correct +spiritualistic ideas of a soul superior to the rest of nature and no +part of it has resulted in materialism. And by the physiological basis +we now think to "explain" the facts of psychology. "Notable enough," +says Carlyle, "wilt thou find the potency of Names; Witchcraft, and all +manner of Spectre-work and Demonology, we have now named Madness, and +Diseases of the Nerves. Seldom reflecting that still the new question +comes upon us: What is Madness, what are Nerves? Ever, as before, does +Madness remain a mysterious-terrific, altogether infernal boiling-up of +the Nether Chaotic Deep, through this fair-painted Vision of Creation, +which swims thereon, which we name the Real. Was Luther's Picture of the +Devil less a Reality, whether it were formed within the bodily eye or +without it?" + +If the connection of physiological and psychological processes requires +"explanation," beyond that of analysis, why should we not feel ourselves +equally required to explain, in like manner, the connection of light +with heat and sound, and form with color? Why is it more comprehensible +that the ball can be at the same time round to my touch and red or gray +to my eye, and that the rose can both smell sweet and be yellow in tint? +Why should we, in this particular instance, make such a strenuous effort +to find reasons which can never be given in this case any more than in +the others, and which we do not, moreover, demand in the others? Why +cannot we accept the simple fact of concomitance in this case also? Our +attempts to show the reason of brain-activity by means of mind-activity, +or, _vice versa_, to explain mental activity as caused by, and dependent +upon, physiological activity, must end equally in failure, in a +one-sided dogmatism. It is the concomitance of the two, to the thought +of which we are not yet used, that thwarts us. And yet Zeno, the +sceptic, found as great difficulties in sequence, and proved, to his +satisfaction and that of his followers, the utter impossibility of many +things which we accept as simple facts without troubling ourselves to +solve his problems. + +We have seen that any explanation of facts beyond analysis, except as we +assume some transcendental intuition, is impossible. The search for some +further explanation embodies the last remnant of the idea of some +special separate agent behind each single event and process, with which +early superstition was animated. Driven by the gradual spread of +knowledge to more and more obscure details in concomitance, and to ever +greater distance of time in sequence, it has reached the final shadows +of the one, and the furthest ends of evolution, whither thought seldom +travels, in the other. That we expect other explanation than analysis, +or read into analysis more than its real worth, is the result of an +indistinctness and confusion in our thought, which has not yet lost the +habit of infusing into generalizations and abstractions a vitality of +their own apart from reality. We continually hope and strive for some +explanation that shall give us more than nature, and yet, strange to +say, we endeavor to found our theories in and on nature. We acknowledge +the scientific truth of the indestructibility of matter and force, the +constancy of their sum, and yet we nevertheless continue to construct +our many-storied theories of causes and essences, failing to notice that +we are bringing all our concepts from a time when the equivalence of +results and conditions, of results and their factors, was not yet +comprehended. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[131] See Part I. p. 107 _et seq._ + +[132] "Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus," p. 363. See also, however, the +"Grundlegung der Ethik," p. 289. + +[133] "Problems of Life and Mind," Ser. I. Vol. I. pp. 308, 309. + +[134] "Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls," pp. 352 _et seq._ + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THOUGHT, FEELING, AND WILL IN EVOLUTION + + +Hume, in his essay on the Passions, writes: "What is commonly, in a +popular sense, called reason, and is so much recommended in moral +discourses, is nothing but a general and calm passion which takes a +comprehensive and a distant view of its object, and actuates the will, +without exciting any sensible emotion. A man, we say, is diligent in his +profession from reason; that is, from a calm desire of riches and +fortune. A man adheres to justice from reason; that is, from a calm +regard to public good, or to a character with himself and others. The +same objects which recommend themselves to reason in this sense of the +word, are also the objects of passion, when they are brought near to us, +and acquire some other advantages, either of external situation, or +congruity to our internal temper; and by that means excite a turbulent +and sensible emotion. Evil at a great distance is avoided we say from +reason; evil near at hand produces aversion, horror, fear, and is the +object of passion." We know no state of consciousness from which +elements of thought are excluded; consciousness is not a state of rest, +but a continual passage from percept to concept, or from concept to +percept, or if from percept to percept even then with the intervention +of concepts. Judgment, exclusion and inclusion, has part in all +consciousness; and thus pleasure and pain must be regarded as always +accompanied by thought-elements, though the thought-factors may escape +notice because of the prominence of violent emotion, just as, in like +manner, feeling may draw less attention when of a less turbulent nature. +This is not equivalent to saying that emotion must always be accompanied +by a representation of its object. To this last statement might be +objected that emotion may not be, at first, connected with its proper +object, just as so-called purely physical pain may not be, in the +beginning, combined with any perception of the object producing it, may +not even be localized, in fact. But to this objection may be answered +that our conception of "its" object, in the case of emotion, is similar +to our conception of "the" end of any particular act; that which we +regard as "the" object of the emotion may be entirely different from the +object in the consciousness of the being subject to the emotion. That is +to say, emotion speedily connects itself with _some_ object, or even if +felt for some time as vague want is yet combined with thought, in that +we make mental search for its object or, where it is too faint to induce +this action, tend to turn to memories or imaginations sad or joyful, +according as the feeling tinges our mood with exhilaration or sadness; +but the objects with which it connects itself in thought may be quite +other than those which onlookers regard as its proper object. Into many +an emotion of childhood and growing adolescence, for instance, the adult +reads a meaning and object of which he is aware the individual subject +to the emotion has no thought. Physical feeling may not be connected +with any distinct perception of the object producing it (as, for +instance, when one bruises oneself in the dark), but it is never +unconnected with thought-images. The intermediate links between this +outwardly stimulated physical feeling and so-called purely mental +emotion are represented by localized organic feelings, passing by +imperceptible degrees into non-localized feeling experienced as mood. +But feeling on any plane is not, as conscious, uncombined with thought. + +It follows that, as connected with the human will, emotion is never +uncombined with thought. This fact is implied in the definition of will +as the conscious determination on some definite course of conduct which, +as definite, is an exclusion of other courses, and thus involves +judgment. Where action takes place without conscious predetermination, +we call it "organic," "automatic," "reflex," or "involuntary," the pain +or pleasure connected with the act rising into our individual, +centralized consciousness when the action has already taken place or +during its progress. In the latter case, part of the act rises into +consciousness as result, as already performed, and the will may then +interpose to check and prevent the elements not yet performed. + +The question as to whether thought is always accompanied by feeling, at +least by feeling as pleasure or pain, may appear more difficult than the +previous one. That thought is not always connected with violent emotion +as pleasure or pain is evident. But, as Höffding says, "feeling may be +strong and deep without being violent." If we examine carefully any +train even of abstract and apparently, at first glance, wholly +unemotional reasoning, we can generally trace a distinct vein of varying +feeling accompanying the thought,--perhaps extreme interest in the +problem involved and pleasure in its solution, hope as we seem to be on +the point of finding the key to it, disappointment when the hope proves +a delusive one, shame or impatience at our failure, or pride in our +readiness, and exultation when we have finished our work. All these +feelings may relate to the mere solution of the problem as end, or may +pass beyond it to ends more or less distant and complicated, to which +the solution of the problem then appears as means. Even if we could +suppose all other feeling to be excluded, we cannot conceive of a train +of thought untinged with mood,--interest or weariness, exhilaration or +depression,--the dim complex of perhaps many elements, but admitting of +general classification on the side of either the pleasurable or the +painful, the agreeable or the disagreeable. + +Is feeling the result of thought, or thought the result of feeling? +which of the two is to be accorded the greater importance with regard to +the will? and what is the significance of feeling as pleasure and of +feeling as pain with respect to the will? These are some of the +questions generally considered in one form or another in the discussion +of the relations of mental functions. The first question may be +interpreted in any one of several different ways. It may be regarded as +referring to particular excitations, objects, or ends, or to precedence +at the earliest beginning of consciousness in general, or to the initial +state of consciousness in the case of the individual organism. Since we +are not able to determine as to where consciousness does begin, either +absolutely in nature as a whole or relatively in the individual, whether +there is, indeed, any such thing as an initial state, and since we can +predicate nothing certainly as to the nature of such a state if there be +one, the interpretation of the question which has reference to this +relative or absolute beginning of consciousness cannot be answered. If +we regard the question, however, as having reference to particular +excitations, objects, or ends, it is evident that sometimes one, +sometimes the other of the two functions appears more prominent in the +beginning; pain or pleasurable excitation sometimes makes itself felt +before it is connected in consciousness with any distinct object, and +again perception may give us thought-images which only consideration +renders painful or pleasurable. But there is no real beginning in either +case; in consciousness as we know it, thought and feeling are +continually intermingled, and only their direction varies with varying +excitation, now thought, now feeling, assuming the greater prominence. + +This last consideration has important bearings on a question which we +have previously discussed and to which we may, at this point, revert for +a moment. The fact alone that we know nothing of a beginning of +consciousness, but only its variation, is sufficient to make us doubt +whether we are in possession of any data from which to pronounce +dogmatically on the absence of consciousness in the case of organisms +differing from our own, or even in the case of inorganic matter. Why may +we not equally well suppose merely a difference in the direction of +consciousness corresponding to differing organization and function in +the one case and differing composition or constitution and corresponding +motion in the other? Our error begins in assuming no ends possible in +action except such as we ourselves would set, and so in assuming no end +to be present in cases where no end would exist for the human being, or +where the end which would be involved for us cannot have come within the +experience of the organism performing the act. In the latter case, we +speak of "blind instinct" or of "automatism." We forget that an "end" is +merely some one of such constant results of function as are brought +within the circle of our experience; which end may come to lie farther +and farther away, for the same act, as the circle of experience widens +and varies in direction, even in beings as similar as individuals of the +human species. With the attainment of manhood and womanhood, whole +regions of thought and feeling, whole classes of motives, are opened up +which are wholly unknown to the child and would be incomprehensible to +him; the ends of the scientist, the man of letters, the idealist in +morals, the sensualist, and the boor, may differ radically in performing +the same or very similar acts. However, there is a certain community of +ends in human beings, due to common organization and experience, which +enables them to judge to some extent of each other's ends. But these +data of organization and experience fail us when we come to judge of +beings not human, and hence we are liable to error in their case. A +superior being of an entirely different species from our own might be +greatly puzzled to discern the motives which could govern some of our +acts,--those, for instance, which incite the miser to starve in misery +with a fortune hidden in the cellar. A superior being of another species +gifted with pessimistic views, if we can suppose such, regarding our +action externally as we regard brute-action and plant-function, might +imagine our whole action to be directed to the attainment of our own +death, since that is what we finally achieve as the result of action, +and sometimes with most purposeful rapidity; and he might suppose the +suicide, and the miser, and the opium-eater, and the drunkard, and the +glutton, to be only the more intelligent members of the species, the +others to be led chiefly by blind instinct. It is a fundamental mistake +to suppose that there can be no "ends" but those of which we are +conscious. + +The question as to the existence of any causal relations in the old +sense between thought and feeling has already been answered in previous +considerations; all we can assert is sequence or simultaneity. Indeed, +as psychology has rarely troubled itself with any direct question of +this sort, its introduction may appear foolish. Yet feeling is +sometimes, by imputation, treated as a mere attribute of thought, while +again, as we shall see, it is often considered as an independent, +directing, if not perception, at least the subsumption of percepts in +thought. And, indeed, it is difficult to perceive why, if feeling and +thought be regarded as two quite distinct yet simultaneous activities, +the same problem as to precedence might not arise, under the concepts of +cause and effect, as in the case of physiological process and +consciousness as a whole. + +But a question with which Psychology and Ethics have occupied themselves +as a most important one is that of the relation of pleasure and pain to +the will. A point around which strife particularly rages is the problem +as to whether it is the pleasurableness of the end which moves the will +to seek it; and on the view taken as to the truth on this point theories +of freedom or determination of the will are often based, the advocate of +free will arguing that the power of choosing the painful proves his +theory, the determinist declaring that the invariable might of the +pleasurable over the will shows the subordination of the latter. But I +cannot, for my own part, see how the demonstration of the fact that the +will may be moved by the imagination of a painful end rather than, or +as well as, by that of a pleasurable one is a proof of its freedom; as I +also fail to perceive how it is proved that the will is determined +because it invariably chooses the pleasurable rather than the painful +end. In either case, choice may be said equally to depend on motive, and +in either case the will may be said equally to choose. It is true in +either case that the strongest motive moves; it is true in either case +that the will decides upon the act with a feeling of its own spontaneity +and freedom, and guides the movement of the body in the performance of +the act. That which is shown in an invariable connection of the will +with pleasurable motives is a constancy which we find elsewhere in +nature and which forbids us to regard will as something outside and +above the rest of nature. As we have seen, however, the theory of a +compulsion of nature anywhere by constancy or law, or of the compulsion +of one particular part by the rest, is untenable. + +In speaking of the pleasurable and painful, we have introduced the +conception of ends into our considerations, and may emphasize, in +another form, the fact that we cannot consider indefinite feeling alone +as the mover of the will to an end. The pleasurableness or painfulness +is predicated of some definite object or event, and corresponds to +definite actualities perceived in the object or imagined with the help +of former experience. Thought and feeling are thus inextricably +commingled in the state of consciousness leading to choice, and the +nature of the acting individual and that of the external objects +concerned are equally essential to the result. + +We have hitherto treated thought, feeling, and will, as separate parts +of consciousness, defining each, by implication, much as we would define +wheel, tongue, and whiffletree, as parts of a wagon. But the three are +indissolubly connected in the act of the will, and thought and feeling +are not, as we have seen, ever disconnected. Nor can we say that it is +one part of consciousness that feels, another that thinks, and still +another that wills. Further, a closer analysis may render it doubtful +whether that which we call will is only an occasional act of +consciousness, or whether it is not rather involved in all operations of +consciousness as we have seen thought and feeling to be. The identity of +will and that which is often called involuntary attention has already +been asserted by some authors, and not the identity of will and outward +attention alone, but also of will and attention to the inner process of +consciousness. Here, however, the dividing line generally sought between +willed and unwilled, involuntary, or, as we say, drifting thought, +becomes dim and uncertain. But it is evident that attention is given to +that which interests us for one reason or another; and the question +logically presents itself as to whether thought ever follows a direction +wholly uninteresting to us, or whether it does not the rather always +turn from such direction to one which has for us at least some degree of +interest, whether, in short, the will does not in this manner, as the +innervation of attention, accompany and direct all mental process. The +sense of effort involved in choice, in the struggle of interfering +impulses, may bring into prominence mental activity at points where such +obstacles and interferences occur; but is not the mental force which we, +in this case, especially notice the same with that involved in all +processes of consciousness? Just as the physiological process in nerve +and muscle with which the limbs are moved in action, or eye or ear +innervated in the effort of attention, is only the outcome of the +processes which are constantly going on in the brain, so the concomitant +process of will or attention is but the expression, in another form, of +the activity involved in all consciousness. + +The division of consciousness into separate entities or parts has often +been carried much further than this threefold one; the division has +varied with the particular theory and fancy of the student, until some +one has suggested that we might, on the principle used, assume a +distinct faculty for dancing, for eating, sleeping, dressing, reading, +writing, and so on, _ad infinitum_,--the faculty, in each case, being +defined as the special activity that discharges the particular function +assigned to it by the name. Only by abstraction and by the investiture +of our abstractions with a life of their own do we arrive at a theory of +thought, feeling, and will, as separate entities, or parts; in the +mental process itself, they are indissolubly united. + +We have seen that thought acquires new directions with the evolution of +the individual, that pleasure and pain attach themselves to new objects, +and that will is directed to new ends. If we can discover in these +changes any uniformities of relation everywhere manifest as far as +experience extends, the constancy of nature may admit of our conclusion +that the relation is fundamental, and we may be able to formulate thus +a general law of evolution with respect to the mental processes. Such a +law must, of course, be interpreted, not as governing the changes which +it regards, but simply as the expression of general facts of their +development. Our considerations on this point are in a line with those +of Chapter I; indeed, they are only a more special application and more +careful derivation and expansion of points there noticed. + +If we begin with our own experience, and study the growth of this or +that particular habit gradually acquired, we notice that it not only +becomes stronger with time, acquiring an intensity less and less easy to +check, but also that this increasing strength of tendency is accompanied +with a corresponding increase of pleasure in the performance of the act. +The drunkard may have derived no especial pleasure from his first glass; +he may, indeed, have found the taste little to his liking, and the +slight succeeding dizziness disagreeable; but, with habituation, both +gradually become agreeable. The first fit of intoxication may be felt as +unpleasant, not only in the succeeding shame and physical depression, +but in itself; though it is also conceivable that the state of thorough +intoxication may have been led up to so slowly, by such imperceptible +degrees, that it may be combined, even in the first instance, with a +certain degree of pleasure. It is, however, evident that this pleasure +increases with further lapse of time. If we study the habits of +individuals, we shall find a thousand little peculiarities of habit in +which others than their performers would be puzzled to discover anything +attractive, and in which, indeed, the latter themselves would find +difficulty in pointing out the source of the gratification that they +nevertheless experience. Our habits are things we are loth to break +with; and we grow more loth as time passes, until finally no +consideration, no shame of scorn or pain of punishment in any form, can +suffice to counterbalance the craving of desire and the fierce pleasure +of satisfaction, or the less turbulent but not less strong impulse that +carries us steadily in the course which past custom has worn for us. +Customary acts are themselves agreeable to us, though their results may +bring with them disagreeable factors. + +Again, this same principle is directly traceable in heredity. We say, +for instance, of the drunkard whose father and grandfather were +drunkards before him, that he has inherited a "taste" for intoxicants, +meaning, not that he can feel their attraction before he has tasted them +and experienced their influence, but that the habit of drunkenness is +one more easily formed in him than in the average individual, +constitutional peculiarities corresponding to a pleasure derived from +the alcohol. We often notice striking resemblances, not only in general +appearance but also in mental characteristics and habits, extending even +to attitude and gesture, between children and parents deceased when the +children were yet infants. I have known very peculiar physical habits to +appear, in one instance in three, in another in four, generations, with +the avowal of satisfaction in their practice on the part of the persons +subject to them, although neither they could explain, nor onlookers +comprehend, the pleasure derived from them. Imitation is not always +possible in such cases; in one case of these two just cited, it was, in +the third generation at least, impossible; and even where there is +imitation, it is by no means proved that an innate tendency does not +lend readiness to the formation of the habit. It may here be objected +that we are venturing on too uncertain ground in endeavoring to +formulate any general law of the growth of habit in relation to +heredity, opinions differing so much as to the relative importance to be +accorded to environment and innate tendency in the formation of +character, and especially as to the possibility of the inheritance, by +succeeding generations, of new peculiarities not common to the species +as a whole but acquired by individual parents. As far as the former +question is concerned, it may be said that the whole development of +plant or animal in organization and corresponding functions must be +regarded as directly dependent upon present environment, never +independent of it; but that, while it must be conceded that the +environment is greatly concerned in the development of habit, and that +no innate tendency can manifest itself unless the complementary +conditions of its appearance are presented by circumstance, it may +likewise be claimed that the influence of environment no more excludes +heredity than heredity excludes the influence of the individual +environment. We tend, generally, to emphasize heredity in the case of +the plant and the animal, and environment in the case of the human +being. This is because our knowledge of species other than our own is +merely an outward one, while the ideas of heredity in our own case are +confused by our consciousness of the influence that even minute +circumstances may have upon our inner life and character. And yet just +those who are inclined to lay most stress upon the power of good +influences are generally, strange to say, the very ones who would most +protest at the assertion of the superiority of outer conditions over +inner ones. It can scarcely be supposed that any law of heredity which +applies to the rest of the animal kingdom does not apply to man also. +With respect to the second of the two questions noticed above, something +has already been said from one point of view, and more will be said +later from another. At present it will be sufficient for our purpose to +notice some generally admitted facts. Darwin uses a certain caution when +he comes to the consideration of the conditions of inheritance, and +makes the general statement that the tendency to inheritance of any +function is increased by the continuation of the action of the inducing +conditions of environment for several generations. But it may be +questioned whether an innate tendency may not have favored and assisted +the action of the environment in the later of these generations, +whether, indeed, the continuity everywhere supposed in evolution does +not compel us to assume, between the first appearance of any function, +trait, or habit, and its attainment, after several generations, of +sufficient strength to render its hereditary character noticeable, +intermediate degrees of strength in the intermediate generations. On the +same principle on which we accept the theory of evolution as a logical +necessity, despite the gaps in the proof, we must also, I believe, +consider development of any sort to be continuous increase. + +But even the theory of the increased probability of the inheritance of +any mark, function, trait, or habit, after several generations of +inducing environment, is sufficient for our present purpose. It still +remains true, if we regard the development of function or habit in its +broad features, that the tendency to inheritance, the organic +significance of any function or habit is increased with increased +exercise. Merely in the one case we regard the increments of increase as +infinitesimal, while, in the other case, we regard them as of much +greater than infinitesimal value. Even the theory of Weismann, which +regards everything as present in the germ, must formulate some such +theory as this of the environment as the condition of the development of +germinal possibilities. + +Not only are the strongest and most infallibly recurring functions those +which have been most strongly and longest exercised, but these strongest +functions, those to which, as we say, the tendency is strongest, are +connected with the strongest pleasures of gratification and the most +extreme pain of denial. The sexual appetite is an example of such a +function fundamental to all the higher forms of animal life. Hunger and +thirst, if long unsatisfied, are connected with intensest suffering and, +if not dulled by general ill-health or too great satiety, involve a keen +pleasure of satisfaction. Muscular exercise is a source of keen +enjoyment, and physical inaction results in general depression that may +become extreme if the inaction be long continued. + +In this pain of inaction, a new conception has been introduced into our +considerations. The converse of this pain is that involved in the +over-exercise of any function. We thus perceive that the pleasure +involved in the exercise of function lies between two extremes, beyond +either of which is pain, discomfort. Such pain is connected with the +vacillations in the relations of food-assimilation to the use of +accumulated energy. These two general processes or functions of all +organic matter are reciprocal or complementary, and the too much or too +little on either side which involves pain may be looked upon as a +disturbance of equilibrium. Excess on either side means want on the +other.[135] + +And this brings us again to the conception of normal function as a +stable form of motion. Long-exercised function, fundamental functions of +animal or plant life are forms of motion that for a very long period +have found their sufficient complementary conditions in the environment, +have met with but little interference in this environment. And thus we +attain a conception of pleasure as that form of feeling accompanying +forms of physiological motion with which there is a minimum of +interference. Pleasure appears as the accompaniment of unimpaired and +unimpeded function everywhere as far as our knowledge extends. Function +and habit are essentially the same; habit is merely function. The +functions of the species furnish the foundation of the habits of the +individual, which vary according to individual surroundings and the +family peculiarities acquired through peculiar circumstances. The degree +of pleasure in the exercise of any function or habit bears constant +relations to the strength of the acquired function, while this again +bears constant relations to degree of exercise, in which the time +relation plays a prominent part. Here we have, too, by implication, the +explanation of the disagreeable character of the strange and new except +as it corresponds to some tendency of the organism, some capability not +yet exercised, in which case it appears as nothing strictly new but only +as pleasing variety. From a physiological point of view, the new appears +as that which demands a readjustment involving the fresh action of +natural selection, and the possible destruction of the organism in case +the readjustment demanded is too great. From the physical and mechanical +view, the new may be regarded as a disturber of equilibrium. + +To this analysis the objection may possibly be urged that obstacles +often increase pleasure. If, however, a definition of obstacle be +demanded, it will soon appear that what is meant by an obstacle that +increases pleasure is not anything that interferes with function but +rather that which is exactly its occasion and opportunity. To a man in +health and vigor who sets off for a walk through the fields, a hedge or +fence in the way is no real obstacle, but furnishes rather an agreeable +diversion, a new method of trying his strength and getting rid of +superfluous muscular secretions; it adds but the spice of some slight +variety to his exercise. That which is an interruption of one function, +may be the opportunity of another; and if the demands of the first +function for satisfaction are not too imperative, the interruption of +too great duration, the obstacle may not be felt to be disagreeable. But +pain and pleasure are often mixed, since the satisfaction of one +function may be the prevention of another. If, in this case, the +function which is satisfied is a fundamental one, the function which is +prevented a subordinate one, the pleasure exceeds the pain. If, on the +other hand, the function prevented is a fundamental one, the function +satisfied a merely subordinate one, the pain exceeds the pleasure. + +With the ideas of unimpaired and unimpeded function as pleasurable, and +of the new as demanding readjustment, we arrive at the consideration of +health and disease. The free performance of any particular function is +the first condition of the health of the organ of which it is the +function, the regular performance of all physical functions according to +the mutual adjustment of the organs of the body the condition of the +health of the organism as a whole. And thus again we come round to the +conception of pleasure as connected with the action that accords with +the health of the organism. And this leads us to some remarks concerning +the act of food-taking which may answer a possible objection to the +statements made above with regard to the pleasure involved in the act. +The moralist and idealist are wont to protest against any theory that +may seem to give prominence to "the purely animal" side of human life. +But first, we have to do, at present, merely with facts on which ethical +theory may be founded, not as yet with such theory itself. Furthermore, +the selection of the appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex, as +illustrating the general theory of the relations of pleasure and pain to +function is not made in order to lay special stress upon these appetites +but because they afford, as fundamental, especially good examples. And, +finally, it may be noticed that the pleasure connected with the stilling +of hunger and thirst is not that of taste alone, though doubtless there +are many with whom this pleasure is one of the most important of life; +on the taking of sufficient and proper nourishment depends the pleasure +involved in the general health of the body; the pain of non-satisfaction +in this case is not simply that of a single organ but that of the whole +organism. Even the deferment of a single meal beyond the usual hour +often lowers the "tone" of the whole body, and the variations of too +much or too little strongly influence the mood and general happiness of +the individual. On the right use of nourishment depend, in great +measure, the ability to cope with circumstances and the moral power of +cheerfulness. + +In connection with the idea of a certain equilibrium between exercise +and nourishment, waste and repair, as normal, healthful, and +pleasurable, Rolph's principle of the Insatiability of life may be +considered. Evidently the facts of evolution demonstrate the power of +the organism to advance by slow degrees beyond its original normal. But +the progress is an exceedingly slow one, and the power of advance in the +individual organism, at any particular point, by no means limitless, but +very definitely limited. The limitations of the power of assimilation +are evidenced by the evil results of over-eating, of over-satiety of +function in any direction. Even at an early period of life, when growth +is most marked, the capacity for assimilation is by no means limitless. +The idea of insatiability is advanced by Lewes[136] in a somewhat +different form. It may possibly be an aid to the comprehension of the +process of growth to regard one factor, namely the organism, as the +active side of the development tending to indefinite growth in all +directions, and the other factor, the environment, as the regulating, +resisting factor, limiting such growth; the conception may, perhaps, be +legitimately resorted to as we resort to various other devices which +bring into prominence some one side of a process to the neglect of +others but to the simplification of our concepts and calculations. A +similar device is used by Zöllner in his consideration of +sun-spots.[137] But these representations should not be mistaken for +actuality. The limitless expansion of the organism is as much a fiction +as a theory of the limitless coercion of the environment resisted by the +organism would be. The latter fiction is involved in one interpretation +of the Struggle for Existence. Either view is one-sided; environment and +organism both alike represent active forces, of both which combined, +growth is, at each moment, the exactly conditioned resultant. + +We may notice another assertion of Rolph's, namely, that growth is +produced by increase of nourishment rather than that it demands[138] +increase of nourishment as the Darwinians state. I do not know how the +Darwinians come to be accredited with this statement in the sense which +is evidently criticised by Rolph. In so far as the statement may be +interpreted as meaning that growth takes place first, and without +nourishment, and that the demand for nourishment then ensues on this +growth, the criticism is evidently valid. But the word "demands" may be +interpreted in quite a different way as designating the need of growth +for its conditions, or rather (for this is the ultimate significance of +the word in this sense) the logical demand of the reason, which cannot +suppose anything to take place in the absence of its conditions. Any +other signification of the word is contrary to the whole spirit of +Darwinism, and would accord much better with a theory of Insatiability +or with other forms of theory that imply a special vital principle of +some sort. If, when Rolph makes the assertion that increase of +nourishment produces growth, he refers, by "increase of nourishment," +to the mere act of mastication, it is true that growth must be regarded +as following upon this as its condition; but growth and the assimilation +of nourishment are identical. And, in fact, assimilation begins in the +action of the saliva in the act of mastication. Analysis of assimilation +gives us sequence in one sense, since the parts of the act follow upon +one another; but any interpretation which tends to draw a distinct line +at any point in the physiological process, or to distinguish between +assimilation as active, performed, and growth as passive, suffered, +should be avoided. + +We may return to the consideration of pleasure and pain as connected +with function in general, with a view to a solution, if possible, of the +problem of its especial connection with the will. The brain may be +defined, from the point of view of the theory of evolution, as the organ +of centralization through which the unity of the organism is +established, and the adaptation of parts or the development of special +function becomes the adaptation or function of the whole. With this +physiological adaptation, an increasing breadth of knowledge by +experience, the deviation of feeling from old into new channels, and the +attainment of new ends of action, are associated. Just as past +adaptations must have their physiological representation in +brain-organization, so psychical experience is stored up to be +remembered on sufficient suggestion, and finds, thus, its expression in +conscious will, just as its physiological concomitants must be supposed +to find their expression in nervous and muscular action. As we have +seen, pleasure follows the line of evolution of function, strongest +pleasure appearing in the direction of most strongly developed function, +so that, just as any conflict of tendencies to function in the brain +must result in conquest by the strongest tendency, the line of action +must always correspond with that of the greatest pleasure. And just as +the most strongly inherent function is combined with the greatest +pleasure, so the representation of the performance of this most strongly +inherent function is, in the conflict of tendencies before action, +combined with the greatest pleasure of anticipation. This statement +coincides with Stephen's remark that it is not the representation of the +greatest pleasure, but the pleasantest representation, which furnishes +the decisive motive to will. Contingent circumstances may introduce into +the actual carrying out of the act determined upon an element of pain +not before experienced, in which the wish may arise that the act had not +been performed; and the strength of the tendency to action in this +direction is thus diminished. + +With regard to this analysis, several things are to be noted. (1) It is +no more claimed that the strongest pleasure of anticipation is +unmitigated pleasure than that the pleasure involved in the attainment +of the end is necessarily unmitigated. Wherever there is interference, +there is also pain. Where any struggle is involved, where any conflict +of tendencies and wishes precedes choice, the struggle itself and the +relinquishment of one or more courses in favor of the one chosen involve +disagreeable elements, and the fiercer the struggle the greater the +pain. Where two extremely strong tendencies thus come into collision, +the pain involved may amount to agony. Our statement that the more +pleasurable end or rather the one the imagination of which is the more +pleasurable is the one sought by will needs therefore to be put into a +somewhat different form, since, among all the methods of action open to +choice in any case, there may be none the thought of which involves any +positive pleasure, though there is in all or most cases some one which +promises at least a negative excess of pleasure, that is, least pain. +(2) No assumption is made as to the particular kind of representation or +the particular kind of end with which the greatest pleasure of +anticipation or of realization is combined, whether these are "higher" +or "lower," sensual or intellectual, moral or immoral. It is not by any +means asserted that the most moral end may not be that which is chosen. +(3) It is not asserted that any direct calculation of the pleasure to +self involved in any course of action necessarily contributes to choice. +(4) The pleasure or pain connected with the imagination of a future +event is not to be confused with the actual pleasure or pain of the +event itself. The feeling experienced in the event may be wholly +different from that of anticipation. + +In connection with the second point, reference may be made to an +assertion of Sidgwick's in his attack upon Hedonism. He writes as +follows, "We have to observe that men may and do judge remote as well as +immediate results to be in themselves desirable, without considering +them in relation to the feelings of sentient beings."[139] The question +for us here is, first, whether the emphasis of the assertion is on the +word "considering,"--a question the context does not answer. It is +certainly true that decisions are reached, judgments pronounced, without +introspection and self-analysis, and without long reflection of any +sort. It is true that, even where reflection does take place, there is +not necessarily any distinct attachment of the concept "pleasurable" to +results considered, whether with relation to self or to others. The dog +who snatches at a piece of meat does not probably waste any time in +reflecting on the pleasure he will experience in eating it; and yet we +do not the less believe that if the act were not pleasurable to him he +would not perform it. It may also be true that a man often pronounces +results to be desirable without noting or caring for their relations to +other sentient beings; but if these results are regarded by him as +desirable, then they must be in some way desirable to himself, that is, +must have a pleasurable relation to his own feelings. Desire appertains +to sentient beings and to sentient beings as such; a thing which is +desirable must be desirable to a sentient being; the desirable which is +not desirable to a sentient being is the desirable which is +not-desirable, a self-contradiction. + +In connection with the third of the points above noticed, Rolph's +assertion that not pleasure but pain is the motive to action, may be +considered. The author does not mean anything else than that action is +in the direction from "want," "hunger," "pain," to ends involving +pleasure, so that this theory does not, when analyzed, differ +fundamentally from theories which assume the motive to will to be +furnished by the most pleasurable end or by the most pleasurable +representation of an end. The chief point of difference is the +conception of the state of consciousness preceding will as invariably +one of pain, the want of the end willed as invariably painful. Now it is +evident that the satisfaction of a function may be so long deferred as +to involve the severest pain; hunger, thirst, may reach a degree of +intensity that is frenzy, muscular inaction, in an ordinarily active +individual, if long persevered in, may be combined with extreme +discomfort and depression. And it is also true that all desire involves +want in the sense that an end is sought because its absence is felt as +undesirable. But want in this sense means merely desire, and is not +necessarily combined with any real pain of deprivation. The state of +consciousness preceding action may be, on the contrary, one of +exhilaration, of exceeding joy of anticipation; the gratification of a +desire may take place so soon after the first appearance of the desire, +or the gratification of the desire become so certain so soon after the +desire is first felt, that no pain of want is felt at all. Rolph, +indeed, finds great difficulty in demonstrating his theory, and finally +resorts to the definition of the pain which, as he asserts, furnishes +the motive to action as "the pain of the absence of pleasure." He says, +moreover, that not all pain is felt as such, since much feeling is below +the threshold of consciousness.[140] But "unconscious pain" and "feeling +below consciousness" are mere self-contradictions. Specification of that +of which, as unconscious, we know nothing is a very easy way of +delivering oneself from the necessity of positive proof, but it is a +very unscientific one. With respect to Rolph's assertion that pain can +not be dispensed with, since it is everywhere the motive to action, it +may be remarked that this statement seems to accord ill with Rolph's +other theory that never the struggle for existence but always states of +plenty and comfort are the conditions of growth, and the lengthy +demonstration that periods of want must condition decline, +retrogression, and finally the extinction of the species suffering the +want. From the standpoint of Darwin, the struggle for existence is not +inconsistent with the possession of plenty on the part of favored +individuals and species, but Rolph expressly denies the compatibility of +the two principles. + +In his theory of want as the universal motive to action, Rolph cites +suicide as an extreme case of this want. Our analysis has already taken +into consideration some of the cases of mental struggle and postponement +of the satisfaction of desire involving pain. But where one end greatly +desired is unattainable, choice may yet be possible of another end +affording partial satisfaction of the function corresponding to the +desire, and, in cases where choice is necessary between two or more +conflicting ends, the gratification of one may be attended with a +sufficient degree of pleasure to cause partial forgetfulness of the +disappointment in the necessary relinquishment of the other ends. Where, +however, the function denied is one of the most fundamental of the +organism, its denial may be combined with intensest pain and a gradual +physical degeneration, or even a sudden collapse of the organism, ending +in death; or it may induce an act that secures this end through the +mediation of self-conscious will. What is true, in this case, of the +denial of some one fundamental function, is true also of an accumulation +of coincident denials of a number of lesser ones. Our desires are, +indeed, in all cases, more or less complex, and involve the fulfilment +of various functions; but we can easily imagine such an accumulation of +small ills as to lead to desperation. Where no choice of action seems +left us by which we may attain some one end deeply desired, or where a +coincidence of obstacles makes it appear as if there were no choice of +action towards any desirable ends, death may be chosen as a lesser evil +than life, the equivalent of a lesser pain in the absence of feeling +altogether. It may be noted, however, that where suicide is prevented in +the first moment of desperation, the individual planning it may not only +never again attempt it, but may afterwards even find much pleasure in +life. As there is a high degree of pleasure connected with the +performance of deeply rooted function or habit, so the performance of +all function is attended with some modicum of pleasure, except in such +isolated moments as render suicide possible. Every end desired is one of +function, and all function furnishes ends to the will. The pessimist +lays emphasis upon the fact of the speedy loss of pleasure in ends +attained. But herein lies the higher pleasure of life, that it is not +rest but progress. The pleasures we attain may be continually renewed if +rightly sought, but they cannot be unintermittently sustained. We cannot +rest at ends attained and find unlessened rapture in them. Rest is not +an attribute of life; life is essentially motion, that phase of it which +we term rest being mere change of function for a time. The intimate +relation, between pleasure and an equilibrium of waste and repair +renders it impossible to obtain pleasure except as occupation is varied +in order to afford opportunity of recuperation to organs and cells +before used. Proper variation, however, may enable us to return to old +pleasures with ever renewed and even increased enjoyment. But it is +conceivable that the pleasures of gratification and the pains of +disappointment may be so nearly balanced as to make life possible and +yet endow it, at least for a period, with but little joy. It is to be +noticed, however, that intense pain cannot endure, unmodified, for any +great length of time. As pleasure follows the line of customary action, +so pain diminishes with long-continued lack in any direction, unless +this direction be that of too fundamental function, in which case the +organism succumbs entirely and perishes. Either we grow gradually used +to our disappointment and forget it to a great degree in other +gratification, or we die under it. Certainly there are losses the pain +of which is never entirely forgotten, after which life is never quite +the same again; but the first agony of such losses is materially +modified with time; and many of the losses which have seemed worst to us +at the time they occurred are later looked back upon without regret. We +progress to another stage, and the ends we desire to gain are changed. +The habitual misanthrope, indeed, generally derives a great deal of +satisfaction from his own misery; and this leads us to the apparently +anomalous remark that even pain as function may come to be combined with +pleasure; we feel a satisfaction in our own capacity of emotion. The +sensitivity of the poet to pain as well as his sensitivity to pleasure +is a source of often very keen gratification and pride to him. Of the +weak and aged who have no especial pleasure in life, it may be said that +they have also, in general, no fierce pains, at least seldom such as +bring desperation in youth. Having learned from experience, they are not +subject to such exaggerated expectations, and hence disappointments, as +accompany youth, vigor, and ignorance of the realities of life; and +often they derive enjoyment from things which would have no attraction +for the young. + +The old question as to the relation between health and happiness may be +answered by the statement that the two coincide. The statement is not +meant, however, in the sense that the happiness which we at present +attain is coincident with health in an absolute sense or that, _vice +versa_, perfect happiness is, or can be, coincident with that which we +ordinarily term health. The two terms are generally very ill-defined; +sometimes the one, sometimes the other, is used in an absolute sense in +connection with the discussion of the parallel term in a comparative +sense. Perfect happiness must coincide with perfect health; for perfect +health must coincide with perfect fulfilment of all function, and this +coincides with the gratification of all desire. At present desires +conflict, and the gratification of one is bought at the expense of +others. This partial gratification corresponds to a partial health; but +we too often forget, in the discussion of health and happiness, that +health is no more perfect than is happiness. The individual is not yet +in harmony with himself. But this means that he also is not in harmony +with the environment. + +In the development of thought, feeling, and will, we have noticed a +certain parallelism, the attainment of new knowledge, the deviation of +feeling into new channels, and the direction of will to new ends; +indeed, our analysis must bring us to regard this development as +something more than a parallelism, since, as we have seen, thought, +feeling, and will, cannot be defined as separate organs of mind. And we +are here led to notice a theory sometimes advanced, that the feelings of +one individual can never be changed by another. You may present a man +with arguments, say the advocates of this theory, but this is all; you +cannot bring him to act on the arguments unless his feeling is already +of the right sort before you present your arguments; if it is not, you +cannot in any way alter it. Now a certain general foundation of +character, of fundamental feeling, must always be conceded; but this is +not what these theorists mean when they say that arguments can never +alter feeling. "Of what use would it be to argue with my child and tell +her that this or that act of hers is selfish," said a man to me not long +ago of his three-year-old daughter; "if she is selfish, arguing with her +will not make her less so; showing her that she is selfish will never +have any effect upon her selfishness; you may change opinions by +argument, but not feelings." The theory reminds us of the old idea of +the will as something above other phases of nature and so supreme above +their influence; it replaces this theory of the uncaused nature of the +will by one of the like absolute independence of feeling. And yet, +strange to say, this theory is oftenest advanced by just those who +assert the variability of will in accordance with law, under the +influence of the environment, and unite with these already incongruous +theories the wholly contradictory one that it is feeling which furnishes +the motive to will. To appeal to any one except through the medium of +thought is certainly impossible; the feelings cannot be influenced +except by representation and argument. Feeling cannot be taken by itself +and so influenced. But the person endeavoring to convince does not +desire to arouse indefinite feeling; he invariably wishes to excite it +with regard to some definite end. To change opinion is also to change +feeling in some degree. Whether an appeal to another is successful or +not depends on the nature of the appeal and upon the consciousness of +the individual to whom the appeal is made; but this means that not the +nature of consciousness alone decides the result. In any excitation by +the environment, the result is conditioned, not by the one factor alone +but by both; and no excitation can leave the individual entirely +unchanged; the multiplication of infinitesimal single excitations +constitutes the whole of evolution. A first appeal or argument may be +felt only as disagreeable interference; but an accumulation of appeals +at first disagreeable and met only with rebuffs may eventually result in +total change of both ends and feelings. The amount of appeal necessary +differs with the person appealed to; it may be large or small, +excessively large or excessively small, but the general fact remains, +that feelings vary as thought widens, and that an accompanying change of +ends takes place. Thought and feeling are not two separate and +independent things, but are, on the contrary, vitally united. + +We may put our old familiar question with regard to cause and effect in +a new form in respect to the development of thought, feeling, and will. +In considering the process of evolution, will, and, therefore, the +conscious exercise of function, is ordinarily treated as the effect of +pleasure; but our course of analysis identifies function and its +exercise and rather brings function into the foreground, though the +assertion of precedence in importance has been avoided. The course was +chosen partly because it affords an opportunity of propounding the +following questions: Is lapse of time, amount of exercise, or pleasure, +the cause of habit? Or is habit the cause of function? Or is pleasure +the cause of continued exercise of function? Or is function the cause of +pleasure? Or is a minimum of interference the cause of pleasure and of +function in a particular direction? Or is not, rather, continued +exercise of function the cause of the absence of interference wherever +and as far as it exists? We find all these various suggested theories +advocated, by direct statement or by implication, in the treatment of +the evolution of function by different authors, and indeed we frequently +find several of the theories included, by implication, in the work of +the same author. The vital connection of unimpeded function and pleasure +is apparent, and the necessity of the time element in the development of +function may also be asserted; but there is not, according to our +theory, any reason for introducing the concept of cause into the +relations. + +Our analysis of the development of thought, feeling, and will, has an +important bearing on the teleological argument. If all habit comes, in +time, to be pleasurable, if pleasure merely follows the line of +exercise of function, _whatever that line may be_, and ends are thus +mere matters of habit, and habit, exercise, is a matter of the action +and reaction of all conditions, then it is evident that the force of the +teleological argument is at once destroyed. We cannot pass beyond +nature, by this route, to the inference of a transcendental cause. Man's +action being a part of nature and the result of all conditions as much +as is the motion of the wind or the waves, the results he produces, like +theirs, only change and never creation, the only inference we could make +from his will to other will must be an inference to will that is a part +of nature, a result if also a condition, a link in the chain of nature, +its ends coördinate with habit but not the cause of it, and no more +determining than determined. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[135] See Avenarius' formulæ of "complete vital maintenance": +f(R) = -f(S); f(R) + f(S) = o, "Kritik der reinen Erfahrung." + +[136] "Problems of Life and Mind," Ser. II. p. 103. + +[137] See essay by Petzoldt above considered. + +[138] "Biologische Probleme," p. 96; "erfordern." + +[139] "Methods of Ethics," 4th ed. p. 97. + +[140] "Biologische Probleme," p. 177 _et seq._ + + + + +CHAPTER V + +EGOISM AND ALTRUISM IN EVOLUTION + + +Carneri, in consistency with his scepticism as to feeling in animals, +remarks that, with man, the struggle for happiness is added to the +struggle for existence. Wallace and others regard man as comparatively +withdrawn from the struggle for existence and the operation of natural +selection. Much depends on definition in any statement; but it may be +repeated that the analogy of nervous organization does not permit us to +suppose the absence of pleasure and pain in many species, and that man +is no exception to the rule that the disharmonious is the unstable, and +doomed, by its nature, to destruction. + +However, analogy does not, as we have seen, carry us far in deciding +upon the presence or absence of consciousness, or in determining the +exact nature of the ends it posits even where we may suppose it to be +present and conscious of ends. If, then, we apply the terms "egoism" and +"altruism" to the action of plants or even of other animal species, +meaning, by these terms, that, in the action referred to, such ends are +sought and willed as render human conduct what we call altruistic, we +may be falling into error. However, in considering egoism and altruism +in their relations to human development, it may be useful to note their +prototypes, as far as external form is concerned, in life on lower +planes, without making any assumption as to the internal meaning of +these prototypes, except in so far as, in special instances, we may be +warranted by further particular examination of facts. + +It is evident that the action of animals is of a sort that has as its +immediate and most prominent result their own protection and +preservation, and that they show themselves generally hostile to other +kinds and even, in many cases, if not hostile, at least indifferent, +under most circumstances, to their own kind. Yet a certain amount of +mutual support may occasionally be observed even among lower species. +One of the forms of such aid most common in the whole range of animal +species is the care of the parent animal for its offspring. This care is +more usual on the part of the female than on that of the male, and where +it is exercised it is not the exception, but rather the rule, that the +mother will sacrifice life itself in the defence of her young. Such care +and self-sacrifice, especially marked in mammals and birds, are too well +known to need illustration here. + +Mutual aid between the sexes is not so common or so strongly marked as +the care of parent animals for their young. There is often no +companionship at all between the sexes, and even at the time of mating +male and female may show themselves hostile to each other. It often +happens with certain _Epeiridae_ the males of whom are smaller than the +females, that, after copulation or sometimes even before, the female +seizes upon the male and makes a meal of him. Sometimes, also, during +the battle of two males for the possession of a female, the latter +throws her web about both and devours them.[141] Female deer wandering +in the company of a male have been observed to watch with indifference +the contest of the latter with some newly arrived male, and on his death +to lick the wounds of their new suitor and follow him as they before +followed his predecessor. The relations of male and female among the +birds, especially among some sorts of birds, have, on the other hand, +often been made the theme of the poet. + +But mutual aid among the animals is not confined to the relations of +parents and offspring, and male and female. Whether or not we explain +the societies of animals as merely huge families, as some authors are +inclined to do, the fact of the association remains, and it continues to +be true that, in this association, much mutual assistance is given. In +this connection, however, may be cited the experiments of Lubbock, +showing the exceeding irregularity and apparent caprice with which such +assistance is rendered among even such creatures as the ants, with whom +organization is generally regarded as having arrived at an unusual +degree of development. Lubbock found that, wherever a regular battle was +in progress, the ants gave aid to each other, but that where a single +ant was attacked by an enemy, the others of the nest generally took no +part in the matter. In many cases, they passed by wounded or helpless +members of their own colony, leaving them to perish where a very small +amount of help would have saved them. In some cases, they cared for the +slightly wounded; but those who were severely wounded they threw from +the nest. In their hostility to their enemies, they were merciless and +more persistent than in their help of friends.[142] Lubbock, arguing +from such facts as these, differs in opinion from Grote, who regards it +as necessary to the maintenance of any society that some moral feeling +should exist. Indeed, that which Carneri asserts with regard to the care +of offspring might be claimed in this case, namely, that the assistance +reaches exactly so far as is necessary for the preservation of species. +The implication is that all this apparent altruism is mere automatism. + +In support of a view similar to this, Benno Scheitz quotes the following +case,[143] "which Dr. Altum relates from his own experience": "'In the +Gens d'Armes Market in Berlin, I saw several larks and a robin in a +cage; the former cowered sorrowfully, with somewhat roughened feathers, +in a corner, but the robin was in full activity. It ran to the food-cup, +seized as many ant-larvæ as it could grasp in its bill, and hastened +with these to the nearest lark. The latter, however, did not honor the +solicitous robin and its food with as much as a look. But scarcely had +the robin offered its disdained food than it let this fall and hastened +after fresh food, offered this, let it fall, fetched fresh again,--only +to begin the same performance anew. As long as I watched this +interesting spectacle, the robin was thus employed, and very soon the +greater portion of the ant-larvæ had been carried from the food-vessel +and lay scattered before the different larks. And what was here the +motive of the redbreast in permitting itself no nourishment (I did not +see that it ate a single one of the ant-larvæ itself), but carrying it +all to its fellow-prisoners,--sympathy and love for the larks, who +disdained all food, and who could have taken the same food for +themselves, in the same manner, and with exactly the same amount of +trouble? The redbreast had been caught and carried away from its young; +the impulse to feed was strongly awakened and had before been strongly +active, but not satisfied; the bird was obliged, therefore, to continue +to bring food, although there was no longer anything to feed.'" The care +which female animals of many species, when deprived of their young, +often show for the young of other animals of the same or other species +that come in their way is well known. Among domestic animals, the cat +appears particularly susceptible in this respect, though comparisons +here are perhaps scarcely fair, since, of all domestic animals that are +habitually deprived of their young, the cat is about the only one that +has the chance of coming in contact with young animals near the size of +its own kind. The cat has been known to adopt young rats, chickens, +puppies, ducks, and will generally, during the time of suckling, take up +readily with kittens of another litter. Galton, in his "Inquiry into +Human Faculty," mentions that the records of many nations have legends +like that of Romulus and Remus, these being surprisingly confirmed by +General Sleeman's narrative of six cases where children were nurtured +for many years by wolves, in Oude. The working ants of certain species +show as great care for the slave-larvæ robbed from other nests as do +many parent animals for their own offspring. Again, the care for their +eggs shown by many animals who give no care to their young may be cited +as evidence in favor of the theory of automatism. In the vegetable world +also, similar protection is afforded flower and fruit, the most +wonderful instances of such protection being, perhaps, those of the +insectivorous plants. + +But to all these arguments in favor of automatism may be answered: (1) +that functions which are preserved and inherited must evidently be, not +only in animals and plants, but also and equally in man, such as favor +the preservation of the species; those which do not so favor it must +perish with the individuals or species to which they belong; (2) that it +cannot, indeed, be assumed that a result which has never come within the +experience of the species can be willed as an end, although, with the +species, function securing results which, from a human point of view, +might be regarded as ends, may be preserved; but (3) that, as far as we +assume the existence of consciousness at all in any species or +individual, we must assume pleasure and pain, pleasure in customary +function, pain in its hindrance; and (4) that, as far as we can assume +memory, we may also feel authorized to assume that a remembered action +may be associated with remembered results that come within the +experience of the animal, some phases of which may thus become, as +combined with pleasure or pain, ends to seek or consequences to avoid. +There is no reason to be given why care for the young should be more +pleasurable than care for eggs; the one may be as pleasurable to some +species as the other is to other species. If we assume consciousness in +Dr. Altum's robin, we may assume pleasure in the care of its young and +also, as a possibility, pleasure in the results of such care, the +preservation and prosperity of the young; whether the consciousness of +the robin includes abstract concepts of preservation and prosperity, is +another question. The human mother, too, is wont to be peculiarly tender +to children in general, but we do not for that reason infer that her +kindness towards them is mere automatism. There is no necessary +opposition between reason and instinct, and certainly none between +emotion and instinct. To the very functions from which we derive the +most pleasure we are impelled by an irresistible innate tendency. In any +particular case, it may be very difficult to determine the amount of +reasoning power possessed by the animal, the exact relation of ends to +means in its consciousness; but it may be remarked that there are human +mothers who reason little with regard to the preservation of the species +or other so-called ends secured by the care they give their offspring; +the care is spontaneous, but may not be the less a matter of warm +affection. It appears strange, therefore, that exactly that constancy +and strength of tendency, with need of satisfaction by other channels if +the usual ones fail, which we use as proof of extreme mother-tenderness +in the case of human beings should, in the case of other species, be +turned into an argument to disprove the existence of this feeling. + +It is sometimes argued that the feeling of the parent animal in the care +of its young is, in any case, merely one of pleasure in the activity, +and has no connection with the good of the offspring. In such a case as +that of the robin, where the effects of the care come within the +experience of the mother, this is a mere arbitrary assumption, although +direct proof of the contrary may be impossible. Naturally, in the case +of an animal which cares for its eggs, but never comes in contact with +the offspring that are hatched from them, it would be impossible to +suppose any affection for the offspring as such; their existence does +not come within the range of the animal's experience. With regard to an +animal whose connection with its young is constant, the theory that +pleasure in their care has no reference to their welfare, has no +evidence to support it and is unjustifiable. If we cannot directly +disprove it, we have, at least, the evidence of many facts unfavorable +to it. The distress manifested not only by many mammals (who might be +supposed to find physical discomfort merely in the absence of the means +of relief of the milk-glands), but also by other animals and notably +birds, in the loss of their young and even in any danger that threatens +them,--the indescribably mournful sounds at deprivation, the after +depression, and the capacity for self-sacrifice in their defence, would +lead us naturally, from an unprejudiced standpoint, to a belief in +something very like what we term mother-love in human beings. From +Letourneau's "Sociology based upon Ethnography,"[144] I quote the +following: "A female wren, observed by Montagu, spent sixteen hours a +day in looking for food for her little ones. At Delft, when there was a +fire raging, a female white stork, not being able to carry away her +young ones, allowed herself to be burnt with them.... J. J. Hayes tells +us of a female white bear forgetting the Esquimaux dogs, the huntsmen, +and her own wounds, in order to hide her own little bear with her body, +to lick her and to protect her. In Central Africa, a female elephant, +all covered and pierced with javelins, hurled at her by the escort of +black men attending upon Livingstone, was all the while protecting her +young one with her trunk which her own large body enabled her to +cover.... In Sumatra, a female orang-outang, pursued with her little one +by Captain Hall and wounded by a gunshot, threw her infant on to the +highest branches of the tree on to which she had climbed, and continued, +until she died, exhorting her young one to escape. In Brazil, Sphix saw +a female of the stentor niger who, wounded by a gunshot, collected her +last remaining strength to throw her young one on to one of the branches +close by; when she had performed this last act of duty, she fell from +the tree and died." In Romanes' "Animal Intelligence," occurs the +following quotation from Dr. Franklin:[145] "'I have known two parrots,' +said he, 'which had lived together four years, when the female became +weak and her legs swelled. These were symptoms of gout, a disease to +which all birds of this family are very subject in England. It became +impossible for her to descend from the perch, or to take her food as +formerly, but the male was most assiduous in carrying it to her in his +beak. He continued feeding her in this manner during four months, but +the infirmities of his companion increased from day to day, so that at +last she was unable to support herself on the perch. She remained at the +bottom of the cage, making, from time to time, ineffectual efforts to +regain the perch. The male was always near her, and with all his +strength aided the attempts of his dear better half. Seizing the poor +invalid by the beak or the upper part of the wing, he tried to raise +her, and renewed his efforts several times. His constancy, his gestures, +and his continued solicitude, all showed in this affectionate bird the +most ardent desire to relieve the sufferings and assist the weakness of +his companion. But the scene became still more interesting when the +female was dying. Her unhappy spouse moved around her incessantly, his +attention and tender cares redoubled. He even tried to open her beak to +give her some nourishment. He ran to her, then returned with a troubled +and agitated look. At intervals, he uttered the most plaintive cries; +then, with his eyes fixed on her, kept a mournful silence. At length his +companion breathed her last; from that moment he pined away, and died in +the course of a few weeks.'" + +Moreover, care of animals for other animals shows itself often where +neither the relation of parent to offspring, nor the relation of sex, +nor even that of species, furnishes the basis. Aside from the friendship +and self-sacrifice of domestic animals for man, friendships, under +domestication, between individuals of all manner of ordinarily most +hostile species are reported. Such friendship is not at all infrequent +between dog and cat. In the family of a relative of my own were once a +quail and cat who were most devoted to each other. They would spend +hours playing together, and were often left alone together for long +periods. The cat never manifested any tendency to regard the bird in the +light of food; she seemed, however, well aware of the danger it might be +under from other cats, and invariably drove these away when they +endeavored to approach the house. This cat was also friendly to a tame +robin which preceded the quail as pet in the same family. + +And furthermore, assistance is frequently given spontaneously where +there has been no association before the act. There are a number of +instances on record, and supported by good authority, where dogs have +brought suffering individuals of their own kind to places where they had +themselves received aid. Romanes cites from Mr. Oswald Fitch the story +of a domestic cat who "was observed to take out some fish-bones from the +house to the garden, and, being followed, was seen to have placed them +in front of a miserably thin and evidently hungry stranger cat, who was +devouring them; not satisfied with that, our cat returned, procured a +fresh supply, and repeated its charitable offer, which was apparently as +gratefully accepted. This act of benevolence over, our cat returned to +its customary dining-place, the scullery, and ate its own dinner off the +remainder of the bones."[146] Romanes says further: "An almost precisely +similar case has been independently communicated to me by Dr. Allen +Thomson, F.R.S. The only difference was that Dr. Thomson's cat drew the +attention of the cook to the famishing stranger outside by pulling her +dress and leading her to the place. When the cook supplied the hungry +cat with some food, the other one paraded round and round while the meal +was being discussed, purring loudly." "Mr. H. A. Macpherson writes me +that in 1876 he had an old male cat and a kitten aged a few months. The +cat, who had long been a favorite, was jealous of the kitten and 'showed +considerable aversion to it.' One day the floor of a room in the +basement of the house was taken up in order to repair some pipes. The +day after the boards had been replaced, the cat 'entered the kitchen (he +lived almost wholly on the drawing-room floor above), rubbed against the +cook, and mewed without ceasing until he had engaged her attention. He +then, by running to and fro, drew her to the room in which the work had +taken place. The servant was puzzled until she heard a faint mew from +beneath her feet. On the boards being lifted, the kitten emerged safe +and sound, though half-starved. The cat watched the proceedings with the +greatest interest until the kitten was released; but, on ascertaining +that it was safe, he at once left the room, without evincing any +pleasure at its return. Nor did he subsequently become really friendly +with it.'" + +I cite still one other instance of animal affection from Romanes: "One +of a shooting-party under a banian tree killed a female monkey, and +carried it to his tent, which was soon surrounded by forty or fifty of +the tribe, who made a great noise and seemed disposed to attack the +aggressor. They retreated when he presented his fowling-piece, the +dreadful effect of which they had witnessed, and appeared perfectly to +understand. The head of the troop, however, stood his ground, chattering +furiously; the sportsman, who perhaps felt some little degree of +compunction for having killed one of the family, did not like to fire at +the creature, and nothing short of firing would suffice to drive him +off. At length he came to the door of the tent, and finding threats of +no avail, began a lamentable moaning and by the most expressive gesture +seemed to beg for the dead body. It was given him; he took it +sorrowfully in his arms and bore it away to his expecting companions. +They who were witnesses of this extraordinary scene resolved never again +to fire at one of the monkey race."[147] + +As to the changeable and capricious appearance of the assistance +rendered in animal associations, by one member to another, it may be +said that any being of a different species who could look into our towns +and cities might easily find as great problems of caprice here as among +the ants and bees. We, too, leave our fellows to perish unaided; we, +too, kill off, by neglect and hard usage, often not only or chiefly our +drones, but even some of our most industrious, useful members of +society. With us, too, there is very often greater hostility towards +enemies than kindness towards friends. Many savage tribes, that we +certainly concede to be endowed with intelligence, could learn of the +ants, rather than teach them, with regard to the duties of mutual aid. +With regard to other species than his own, even so-called civilized man +is often eminently selfish and cruel. Among the savages the most extreme +cruelty is often shown. Bain, in an essay entitled "Is there Such a +Thing as Pure Malevolence?" cites from a book, "Siberian Pictures," +together with mention of the pleasure shown by onlookers in the drowning +of a man, an instance where boys seemed to find a genuine and peculiar +delight in slowly roasting a dog to death.[148] And Bruce describes in +his travels the feasts of the Abyssinians, where the flesh was cut from +an ox alive and bellowing with pain. But our police courts frequently +bear witness to the possibility of the most wanton cruelty performed by +people within our own most enlightened societies, although we may claim +that cruelty is not so general in civilized societies. I personally have +known of a case where, a horse becoming suddenly ill and falling upon +the road, it was prodded by its owner with a pitchfork until it died of +its wounds; and of another case where a man fastened to a tree a +harmless kitten that had wandered into his yard, and deliberately stoned +it to death. Surely we have very little right to criticise the slaughter +of animals by other species, while we ourselves name the taking of life +"sport." Our criticism of the play of the cat with the mouse as "cruel" +is humorous--if there can be any humor connected with cruelty--as long +as we ourselves find delight in the prolonged struggle of the trout and +the torture of the fox-chase. Perhaps the cat may be under the +impression that the mouse takes pleasure in being played with; certainly +we can believe that this is possible, when beings who claim to possess +so much higher intelligence can gravely assert that the fox enjoys the +chase. + +Amongst so-called civilized human beings, too, the care of parents for +offspring is by no means universal, and mothers are known whom not even +the fear of the law can hinder from sacrificing their children by the +slow torture of starvation for the gain of a few pounds or for even +simple relief from the trouble of their rearing. The reports of the +Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children show that not +strangers but parents are the most frequent sinners against the child. +Nor is infanticide and neglect confined to the poorer classes. I repeat, +if a being of some other species enabled to obtain only such external +knowledge of us as we have of other species, some being beholding us, +for instance, from distant planets, should endeavor to form a theory of +our inner egoism and altruism, of sentiment and motive, he might be as +puzzled as we are when we study the conduct of bees and ants. Even the +helplessness of the ant species, _Polyergus rufescens_, at which we +often wonder as stupidity, has its parallel in some of the former +slave-owners of the southern states of North America, who live in the +utmost poverty and ignorance because they have lost the habits of +industry and consider work beneath them. Mother-love is certainly the +rule amongst us; but it is not more constant or self-sacrificing than +with some other species, though it, in general, accompanies the child +farther in his career. This rule is not, however, universal. Human +mothers of a lower type, who show fondness for their children when they +are little, often exhibit little or none for them after they have grown +out of arms. + +It is claimed that altruism was, in its origin, egoism. Everything +depends, in theory on this point, on our definition of the terms +"origin" and "altruism." If we regard the life of animals in general or +the life of any particular species as having been non-social before it +was social, and as having become social through increase of numbers, the +"chance" association which arose naturally in this way being favored by +natural selection, we must assume function fundamentally advantageous to +self without regard to the results to other beings to have been primary, +whether or not we call this function egoism. With regard to animal life +in general, we cannot avoid adopting some such view as this, since we +find few species forming lasting bonds of association, a large number +forming only exceedingly short ones, and some forming none at all, and +since we must furthermore suppose a scarcity of living individuals to +have preceded their multiplicity. Moreover, we cannot suppose +consciousness to have been absent, in the case of many of the animal +species, during the whole of this development. And where there is +consciousness, pleasure must be a concomitant along the line of +development, and customary forms of action come to present ends, whether +or not the individual has the abstract concept of "ends." + +But we need to remember that even the human race has not yet arrived at +perfection, and that even moral altruism (for not all altruism is +necessarily moral) is not yet absolutely attained in any species. Our +ordinary use of the term is progressive; that which is altruistic at one +period of history is often looked upon, at a later period, as merely a +higher form of egoism. This fact should be borne in mind when, in Ethics +or Political Economy, we inquire whether man was, in the beginning, +altruistic. What do we mean here by "altruism," and what by "beginning"? +A similar criticism may be made on the rather more usual question as to +whether man was, in the beginning, social; what is the beginning of our +species, and what degree of association is necessary in order that the +individuals associating may be termed "social"? The question is a +difficult one to answer from any point of view. While the majority of +human beings, even the most savage, show some degree of gregariousness, +there appear to be some tribes that are even less social in their habits +than the most of our ape-cousins. Mr. Dalton says of the savages of +Inner Borneo that they live in the most perfect state of nature, do not +cultivate the earth or live in huts, do not eat either rice or salt, and +do not associate with each other, but wander like wild animals in the +forest. "The sexes meet in the jungle, or the man carries away a woman +from some campong. When the children are old enough to shift for +themselves, they usually separate, neither one afterwards thinking of +the other."[149] + +As to just what form the development of altruism from egoism may have +assumed in the case of any particular species, or how the individuals of +the species may first have been led to association, the state of science +does not, at present, enable us to say. Most authors, indeed, incline to +class all social development as having its origin in some one form of +family relation. Rolph, for instance, refers it to the necessary +association of the sexes, at certain times, for the purpose of +copulation. Others regard the care of the female for its young as the +primary form from which all social organization has developed. Inasmuch, +however, as the line of ascent from primitive protoplasm to man cannot +be regarded as straight, but has very many branches, it is quite +conceivable that the development may have taken place in different ways +in different branches or different species; and the very various forms +which social organization shows in different species is direct evidence +in favor of such a supposition. Thus it is not, for instance, in some +species, the mother animal, but the male, who cares for the young, and +again, in other cases, affectionate relations of the sexes are not a +prominent feature of the social structure. The attitude of a swarm of +bees towards the queen, her progeny, and the drones, presents aspects +entirely different from those of ant-nests or human tribal or state +organization. In some species where the female exhibits considerable +care and concern for her eggs or offspring, there is no especial +friendliness between the sexes, and in other cases, where no care is +given to offspring, there is still apparently some degree of +friendliness, or at least of physical attraction, between male and +female. It is not only conceivable that the habit of association may +have been developed by different means in different species, but it is +also conceivable that, in some cases, several forms of family relation +may have assisted equally, and in other cases have united, even if not +in equal measure, in producing the result. The association of parent +with offspring, for instance, is in most cases impossible without some +degree of association between the offspring. + +However we may suppose social relations to have originated in the case +of any particular species, whether through the sexual or the parental +relations or through both combined, and whether we trace these relations +themselves back, in the one instance, to the original union of the sexes +in the individual, and propagation as self-division, in the other to the +unity of mother and offspring before the individual life commences, or +whether we simply begin with some non-hostile contact of individuals as +already existent, it is evident that, with increasing competition, +coöperation must be to the advantage of those coöperating. Those +individuals whose single strength is supplemented by the aid of others +must succeed best in the struggle for existence. Moreover, with the +exercise of altruistic forms of action, we must suppose pleasure in its +exercise to increase, in so far as we suppose any consciousness at all +in the animal performing the action. The greater the degree of exercise, +the greater the pleasure connected with the action, and the more readily +the organism will respond to conditions permitting its accomplishment; +while repetition, again, must increase tendency to repetition. This is +true not only of exactly the same form of action, but also of similar +forms, that is, of forms having some like elements. The conditions of +action are never exactly the same; the environment is continually +changing; but the animal tends to choose, among possible forms of +action, that which corresponds most nearly to most exercised and +pleasurable forms. + +At just what period we are to regard the altruistic forms of action as +becoming in spirit altruistic depends, as has already been said, on our +definition of the degree of disinterested feeling necessary to altruism +proper, aside from our theories of the existence and form of +consciousness in the case of any particular species at any particular +point of development. In the case of even disinterested human action, +the altruism is not generally, or at least in very many cases, wholly +unmixed with _any_ thought of self, though this thought may not hold +first place. If self-sacrifice be the test of altruistic feeling, then +we must suppose the latter to exist, in some relations, even far down in +the scale of being. In this case, just as in other cases where choice is +necessary, the stronger tendency conquers even with the result of pain +of disappointment in some other direction. The case of altruistic action +is hence not unique in this respect, and it might perhaps be argued that +such self-sacrifice would therefore be possible without any +consideration or consciousness of the good accruing to others through +its performance. But if we analyze the development of any habit, we find +that the pleasure of the act speedily connects itself with all the +constant results of the act that come within the experience of the +performer of the act and are recognized as its results. Any result at +first unpleasant must, if it is constant, either lead to the +discontinuance of the act or else, with time, lose much of its quality +of unpleasantness. Either the expected pain of this one factor is +sufficient to counterbalance the pleasure awaited in the act, and a +repetition of the act is thus avoided, or, as in all other cases of +habitual experience, the pain or discomfort gradually diminishes, until, +if the habit be long enough continued, pleasure takes its place. The +pleasure of others must be a constant result of action that secures +their welfare, and if this result comes within the conscious experience +of the performer of the action, we can scarcely avoid supposing that, +even if his action is in the beginning purely selfish, the pleasure of +those benefited must come in time to play a part in the pleasure of the +performer. The part it plays will not be, in the beginning, naturally, a +very important one, but its importance will increase with time. If this +is true in a measure even of the individual, it is doubly true of the +species. Wherever, therefore, we may suppose the existence of sufficient +intelligence for the inference of pleasure from its outer signs in +others, it must be admitted to be possible and even probable that +constant habits of self-sacrifice and helpfulness to others will be +accompanied by some measure of altruistic feeling. And even if we +suppose an insufficiency of intelligence for such inference, it is still +possible and even probable that the constant symptoms of pleasure in +others will come to be a part of the conditions of the pleasure of the +individual or the species in whom habits of self-sacrifice have become +constant, although their inner significance is not recognized. It may be +objected that, if actual altruistic feeling were present in animals +which show a certain amount of helpfulness towards others of their +kind, this altruism would not desert these others at the very time of +their greatest need or when any great peril to self is involved, or that +it would show itself in many other acts than just those which, as in the +case of the ants, secure the preservation of a society, or in that of +some other species give a certain protection to the female during +breeding time. The argument is wholly inconclusive, and has already been +answered. The action of natural selection in the preservation of those +forms of tendency that secure the preservation of the species does not +annul the action of the will or render the presence of strong emotion in +the direction of the tendency thus preserved impossible; on the +contrary, we must suppose all tendency, in man equally with other animal +species, to be the result of natural selection. And in man, too, +altruism that is sufficient for some degree of sacrifice is insufficient +for a greater. In man, as in other species, altruistic feeling and +altruistic action vary according to the particular directions in which +habit in the species and in the individual has been cultivated. Men and +women who are not kind to each other will frequently be kind to little +children. The average Englishman is kind to his dog in spite of his +total indifference to the pain inflicted on the very nearly if not quite +as intelligent fox; and he will grow indignant to the verge of tears +over abuse of a horse, while he will regard the like abuse with little +or no emotion when it is inflicted on a miserable donkey. I doubt if the +average Englishman would shoot horses or dogs, even if they were good +for food and useless otherwise, and abounded wild in Great Britain. But +this is merely because association and habit have made him acquainted +with the capacity of feeling in the horse and dog, and have accustomed +him to humane treatment of them. + +An argument sometimes advanced against the theory of a derivation of +altruism from egoism is that such altruism has no premises or reasons; +if, say the advocates of this argument, a man performs an apparently +altruistic act to-day from selfish motives, and performs the same act +to-morrow without calculation of the benefit to self to be gained from +it,--if such a change were possible,--then this man must simply have +forgotten his motives for the act. But this is not altruism proper. Such +action is the result of a logical confusion, but it can never be +altruism. Altruism proper has a motive, and this motive is the desire to +do good to others. With regard to this argument it may simply be said +that it is wholly untenable from any evolutionist standpoint; it +destroys at once the possibility of any moral progress. Intended to +defend altruism and moral principle in general from what is designated +as degradation, it is itself degrading in its denial of the +compatibility of natural and moral advance. It posits the assertion that +nothing can ever become that which it was not from the beginning, an +assertion utterly inconsistent with any theory of growth, whether +evolutional or otherwise. It is contradictory, too, of the directly +observed every-day facts of individual experience. The ends with which +we perform our acts, and the same acts, certainly change from day to +day. The adult would have reason for shame were the ends with which he +performs certain acts the same with those with which he performed those +same acts when he was a child. The emotions with which we regard life +and its various relations alter every day. If the change from egoism to +altruism could be pronounced logical confusion, then all mental +evolution must constitute an increase of intellectual disorder, a +continuous progress towards less instead of greater intelligence. Where +is the beginning of feeling and what was feeling in the beginning? Of +what nature were the motives of our ape-like progenitors, and of what +nature the first motive that appeared in the universe? and how have we +ever arrived at the possession of other motives than these? What a +confusion worse confounded must be our present motives, and of what a +chaos of thought and emotion must the human intellect consist! The +origin of any such argument as this, intended to disprove the theory of +a derivation of altruism from egoism, is probably in the failure to +distinguish the fact that both altruism and egoism, as we know them, are +comparative, not absolute. Naturally, absolute altruism could not +develop immediately from absolute egoism, that is, the one could not +change immediately into the other. But there are very few human beings +in whom some degree of altruism does not exist; and all we may note +directly of change of motive in ourselves, as well as all we ever could +note of change in external action in other species, is gradual increase +in this direction. In the individual case it is quite possible for +change to take place in the opposite direction of the development of +greater egoism. + +In connection with the discussion of the development of motives, we may +inquire what is the final end of action; I refer not to the ideal end +but the actual end, although the two are not always distinguished in the +answer to this question. The confusion of the two generally arises from +forgetfulness of the fact that an end is the part of the result of an +act particularly willed by the performer. The concept is again a +teleological one, although often advanced, in some form, by persons of +materialistic views. Thus some authors, looking at the process of +evolution as continual survival of the fittest, and observing that +natural selection thus tends continually towards health, so that the +action of existing species is, in a large and ever increasing measure, +favorable to health, assert that the latter is the end of action. +Others, in like manner and from similar premises, argue that the +preservation of the species is the end of action; or sometimes the +logical inaccuracy involved in making health or the preservation of +species the universal end of action is partly concealed by giving the +assertion the form that one or the other of these is "the end attained" +by action. To these statements may be answered: The health of the +individual, although it sometimes appears as the end willed, is by no +means the constant and universal end, but, on the contrary, rather an +infrequent end. As to the preservation of the species, the concept has +never been heard of by a majority of human beings, and a thing cannot be +an end to those who have not heard of it. It is doubtful, moreover, +whether even those to whom it is familiar often, if ever, make it the +end of action. With regard to pleasure, it has already been said that +special calculation of the pleasure to accrue to self is by no means a +necessary part of the motive to action. Attention may again be called to +the fact that it is not the future pleasure that decides the will to +action in the case of struggle of conflicting tendencies, but that it is +the more pleasurable representation, and that it is present pleasure +which decides in any case. Or, rather, it is not the pleasure, the +feeling alone, that decides, for feeling is never found alone; it is +always combined with thought-images. The strength of pleasurable feeling +is the "tone" in which the intensity of the function manifests itself, +and according to which it tends to further expression in action. In the +imagination of action and its results, or the thought of it, reflection +may linger especially on any one of its elements,--on any part of the +action or its results as inferred from the analogy of past experience; +the pleasure to self is not necessarily the element on which the mind +lays stress, and the pleasure to others may be the element with which +thought is particularly occupied and which turns the scale of choice; +just as, also, in the actual action and its results, the pleasure in +pleasure or benefit accruing to others may more than counterbalance the +pain which some other inevitable phase of the action or its results +brings with it. + +Much that has been said of the development of egoism from altruism still +holds true of the individual, even if the idea of a progress in altruism +through heredity be surrendered. The consideration of the question of +heredity is, however, necessary to any complete or wide-reaching theory +of moral progress. Hitherto, the actuality of the inheritance of +altruistic tendency has been assumed on the strength of previous +considerations with regard to heredity in general, according to which we +could not conceive all the multifarious differences which appear in all +the species and varieties of animal nature to have been present in +simplest primal organisms, or all the differences of the different +species and varieties which have arisen through sexual propagation from +common ancestors to have been present as inherent potentialities in the +germ-plasm, as such, of their common ancestors, and so cannot consider +the lesser variations which go to make up the larger ones as due merely +to the germ-plasm. It remains for us to examine the facts more +particularly with respect to this special form of tendency. Stephen +says: "An unreasoning animal can only adapt itself to new circumstances, +except within a very narrow range, by acquiring a new organization; or, +in other words, by becoming a different animal. Its habits and instincts +may therefore remain fixed through countless generations. But man, by +accumulating experiences, can virtually alter both his faculties and his +surroundings without altering his organization. When this accumulation +extends beyond the individual, it implies a social development, and +explains the enormous changes wrought within historical times, and which +define the difference between the savage and the civilized man."[150] +"Briefly, society exists as it exists in virtue of this organization, +which is as real as the organization of any material instrument, though +it depends upon habits and instincts instead of arrangements of tangible +and visible objects."[151] "Children, no doubt, start with infinitely +varying aptitudes for moral culture, as they start with stomachs of +varying strength of digestion; but, in every case, the action of the +social medium is an essential factor of the result."[152] Now, in the +first place, objection may be made to the term "unreasoning animal," in +that, whatever we may think with regard to inorganic matter and +plant-life or even with regard to the lower forms of animal-life, the +whole theory of evolution is opposed to the supposition that reason +suddenly arises in man; and in that we have, moreover, in the case of +many of the higher species, very conclusive evidence of the presence of +some degree of reason. Mr. Stephen does not elsewhere make any positive +assertion of the entire absence of reason in animals; yet to his remark +that "It may be that germs of this capacity [_i.e._ the capacity to +learn by experience and impart this knowledge to others] are to be found +in the lower animals" he adds, "but we shall make no sensible error if +we regard it, as it has always been regarded, as the exclusive +prerogative of humanity."[153] That is, we make no sensible error if we +regard the progress of other animal species than our own to be wholly +"organic," that of our own species, on the other hand, to be wholly an +accumulation of common knowledge. The division between man and the rest +of the animal kingdom is thus made a very distinct and absolute line. It +may be noticed, second, that the third quotation of the three cited +consecutively above contains a very different statement from that of the +first quotation. And it may be said, third, that the second quotation, +while seeming to bear out the first, is in reality a contradiction of +it, since it makes social organization dependent upon "habits" and +"instincts." + +Exactly what is it that is meant by the alteration of organization which +is pronounced unnecessary to the "virtual" alteration of human +faculties? From the modern spiritualistic, the materialistic, the +positivistic, or any modern standpoint at all, it is difficult to +perceive how mental alteration can be supposed without the assumption of +an exactly corresponding physiological change. In view of the +exceedingly minute structure of the nervous system, which is chiefly +affected by such change, we may suppose this change to be so fine as to +be imperceptible to sense-perception, but, since it must, in any case, +be exactly coördinate with the psychical change, I fail to see how we +can scientifically regard the one and at the same time ignore the other +and pronounce it of no significance. And if we suppose any fixation of +psychical alteration, we cannot avoid likewise supposing an exactly +coördinate fixation of physiological alteration. Of course the question +remains as to the extent to which fixation takes place in either case, +and this question we have yet to consider. The weakness of Mr. Stephen's +position lies in his assumption of fixation on the one side and his +denial of it on the other. + +How far are the moral qualities acquired in one generation inherited by +the next? Inasmuch as all development is by inappreciable increments, +all change of organization gradual, or, in psychical terms, inasmuch as +character varies only slowly from the grooves of established habit, +there is a general truth in the statement that all habit prominent +enough to be noticed as such can generally be traced farther back than +the next generation only. Nevertheless, here are a few cases for the +Weismannites:-- + +"Gall speaks of a Russian family in which the father and grandfather had +died prematurely, the victims of taste for strong drink. The grandson, +at the age of five, manifested the same liking in the highest degree." + +"Trélat, in his work 'Folie Lucide,' states that a lady of regular life +and economical habits was subject to fits of uncontrollable dipsomania. +Loathing her state, she called herself a miserable drunkard, and mixed +the most disgusting substances with her wine, but all in vain; the +passion was stronger than her will. The mother and the uncle of this +lady had also been subject to dipsomania." + +"Charles X----, son of an eccentric and intemperate father, manifested +instincts of great cruelty from infancy. He was sent at an early age to +various schools, but was expelled from them all. Being forced to enlist +in the army, he sold his uniform for drink and only escaped a sentence +of death on the testimony of physicians, who declared that he was the +victim of an irresistible appetite. He was placed under restraint, and +died of general paralysis." + +"A man belonging to the educated class, and charged with important +functions, succeeded for a long time in concealing his alcoholic habits +from the eyes of the public; his family were the only sufferers by it. +He had five children, only one of whom lived to maturity. Instincts of +cruelty were manifested in this child, and from an early age its sole +delight was to torture animals in every conceivable way. He was sent to +school, but could not learn. In the proportions of the head he +presented the character of microcephalism, and in the field of +intellectual acquisition he could only reach a certain low stage, beyond +which further progress was impossible. At the age of nineteen he had to +be sent to an asylum for the insane." + +"A man of an excellent family of laboring people was early addicted to +drink, and died of chronic alcoholism, leaving seven children. The first +two of these died, at an early age, of convulsions. The third became +insane at twenty-two, and died an idiot. The fourth, after various +attempts at suicide, fell into the lowest grade of idiocy. The fifth, of +passionate and misanthropic temper, broke off all relations with his +family. His sister suffers from nervous disorder, which chiefly takes +the form of hysteria, with intermittent attacks of insanity. The +seventh, a very intelligent workman, but of nervous temperament, freely +gives expression to the gloomiest forebodings as to his intellectual +future." + +"Dr. Morel gives the history of a family living in the Vosges, in which +the great-grandfather was a drunkard, and died from the effects of +intoxication; and the grandfather, subject to the same passion, died a +maniac. He had a son far more sober than himself, but subject to +hypochondria and of homicidal tendencies; the son of this latter was +stupid, idiotic. Here we see, in the first generation, alcoholic excess; +in the second, hereditary dipsomania; in the third, hypochondria; and in +the fourth, idiocy and probable extinction of the race."[154] + +It is the general testimony of authorities that mental disease may thus +appear in one generation as general tendency to excess, in another as +homicidal mania, in another as microcephalism, etc. Here we have +examples of the hereditary character of what we recognize as nervous +disease, which yet has its moral as well as its intellectual side. There +are few who do not recognize the power of the parent, through injury to +his own health, to affect the health of his children; and yet that which +we call disease is not more physical than that which we call moral +characteristic. However, the physical side of that which we call normal +moral characteristic is more withdrawn from observation; that which is +recognized as mental disease forms, in this respect, a link between what +we term ill-health and mental characteristic. The physical features of +what we term ill-health attract our attention especially because of the +weakness and incapacity or the distinct physical pain involved; the +physical side of insanity comes also more or less distinctly to our +notice, but the physical accompaniments of normal characteristic attract +less attention. And yet all these three conditions have each a psychical +and each a physiological side. It is therefore difficult to understand +how the possibility of the inheritance of ill-health from want or excess +can be acknowledged and yet the possibility of the inheritance of +psychical characteristic acquired by the parent be doubted; the latter +has its organic side as much as the former. And no better illustration +of this fact can be found than in just such cases as those above cited, +where that which appears in the first place as mere excess, that is, +moral characteristic as we ordinarily term it, takes finally the form of +microcephalism, idiocy, or insanity. + +Man's early existence as an individual is distinguished by the length of +duration of a condition of helplessness, at the beginning of which, +beyond the fundamental so-called organic action, only a few simple +activities manifest themselves. The human being is born with almost +everything to acquire, and the earlier years, during which habits are +slowly accumulating, appear peculiarly adaptive or formative. The human +child is peculiarly susceptible, as regards mental and moral +acquirements, to the nature of his surroundings. But this fact does not +necessarily mean any more than what Stephen asserts in the last of the +three quotations above cited, namely, that the social medium is an +essential factor of the result; it does not necessarily exclude the +inheritance of moral or immoral tendency acquired under civilization or +even by near ancestors. Even in cases of the inheritance of the most +extreme passion for alcohol, we cannot suppose that the taste would ever +have manifested itself, had alcohol never come within the reach of the +inheriting individual. The young kitten that has never tasted meat will +snatch at a piece as soon as it scents it; but we cannot suppose that +the evidently inherited taste for flesh would ever appear, did flesh +never come within the range of its sense-perception. Since a suitable +environment must always be conceived as essential to the development +even of the most inveterate inherited qualities, and since man's mental +and especially his moral superiority has been developed in connection +with social conditions, it is conceivable that, these conditions +failing, his mental and moral development may show a lack coördinate +with the degree of such failure. And here is an answer to those who, in +contesting the theory of any moral inheritance, state their views in the +final form that if any inheritance at all can be claimed, it can only be +as a certain degree of readiness in responding to the conditions of +civilization; _no_ inheritance can ever be anything more than this; the +existence, to a sufficient degree, of complementary conditions in the +environment is always necessary to the development of tendency. It is, +therefore, conceivable that the child of civilized parents of a higher +type of morality, if carried off, in infancy, by savages, might fail to +exhibit the high character of its parents, just as it is conceivable and +more than probable that it would fail to exhibit their higher +intellectual gifts. It is also conceivable that the child of moral +parentage may inherit the capacity of high moral development and yet +fall into crime, if circumstances afford him no education save that of +association with hardened criminals. We might only with reason expect to +find, in the case of the supposed child abducted by savages, a certain +mental acuteness applied to savage affairs and some greater degree of +humane feeling, dominated, however, by savage conceptions; as also +greater ease in the acquirement of civilized ideas and customs in case +of a return to higher surroundings before maturity; and we might only +expect to find, in the case of the child brought up among criminals, a +greater degree of that primitive honor and faithfulness which may exist +among criminals. Modern reformatories have testified to the possibility +of the redemption of a large number of criminals from their evil life, +but they have shown, nevertheless, that there is a lust of cupidity, a +love of meanness, and an animality from which rescue is almost if not +quite impossible. The reaction of men whose past opportunities have been +about equal, upon effort for their reform, exhibits also very different +degrees of readiness. The testimony of reformatories for the young is +especially of worth on this point; and I once heard Mrs. Mary A. +Livermore, whose interest in reformatories and prisons is well known, +describe the faces of many of the children to be found in a certain +institution of this sort, as bearing fearful witness to the fact that +they had been "mortgaged to the devil before they were born." I remember +a number of cases cited by the matron of a certain orphan asylum showing +that children taken from their home at too early an age to have learned +the sins of their parents by imitation may yet repeat those sins. Out of +three children of the same parents, the one of whom was a drunkard and +prostitute, the other a thief, one developed, at a very early age, a +tendency to dishonesty, another an extreme morbid eroticism, and the +third child appeared to have escaped the evil inheritance; but he was +still very young when I last heard of him. The two children did not +exhibit these evil traits at their entrance to the home, but developed +them later. + +And here it may be noticed that the fact of the unformed character of +the infant does not prove that the tendencies which make their +appearance in later life are wholly the result of the environment. It +has been remarked by biologists and pathologists that inherited +characteristics tend to appear at an age corresponding to that at which +they appeared in the progenitor. The caterpillar does not undergo +metamorphosis with a less regularity because it is not, in the +beginning, a butterfly, and the beard does not the less appear in the +adult human male because he was not born bearded. Diseases of the brain +often develop, for several generations, at nearly the same age, and +there seems to be no reason why we should not suppose the like to be +true in the case of many normal characteristics. Ribot cites from +Voltaire the following case: "'I have with my own eyes,' he writes, +'seen a suicide that is worthy of the attention of physicians. A +thoughtful professional man, of mature age, of regular habits, having no +strong passions, and beyond the reach of want, committed suicide on the +17th of October, 1769, leaving behind him, addressed to the council of +his native city, an apology for his voluntary death, which it was not +thought advisable to publish, lest men should be encouraged to quit a +life whereof so much evil is spoken. So far there is nothing +extraordinary, since instances of this kind are everywhere to be found; +but here is the astonishing feature of the case: his father and his +brother had committed suicide at the same age as himself. What hidden +disposition of mind, what sympathy, what concurrence of physical laws, +caused this father and his two sons to perish by their own hand and by +the same form of death, just when they had acquired the same year of +their age?'"[155] Ribot continues:-- + +"Since Voltaire's day, the history of mental disease has registered a +great number of similar facts. They abound in Gall, Esquirol, Moreau of +Tours, and in all the writers on insanity. Esquirol knew a family in +which the grandmother, mother, daughter, and grandson, committed +suicide. 'A father of taciturn disposition,' says Falret, 'had five +sons. The eldest, at the age of forty, threw himself out of a +third-story window; the second strangled himself at the age of +thirty-five; the third threw himself out of a window; the fourth shot +himself; a cousin of theirs drowned himself for a trifling cause. In the +Oroten family, the oldest in Teneriffe, two sisters were affected with +suicidal mania, and their brother, grandfather, and two uncles, put an +end to their own lives.'... The point which excited Voltaire's surprise, +viz. the heredity of suicide at a definite age, has been often noticed: +'M. L----, a monomaniac,' says Moreau of Tours, 'put an end to his life +at the age of thirty. His son had hardly attained the same age when he +was attacked with the same monomania, and made two attempts at suicide. +Another man, in the prime of life, fell into a melancholy state and +drowned himself; his son, of good constitution, wealthy, and the father +of two gifted children, drowned himself at the same age. A wine-taster +who had made a mistake as to the quality of a wine threw himself into +the water in a fit of desperation. He was rescued, but afterwards +accomplished his purpose. The physician who had attended him ascertained +that this man's father and one of his brothers had committed suicide at +the same age and in the same way.'... + +"A woman named Olhaven fell ill of a serious disorder, which obliged her +to wean her daughter, six weeks old. This complaint of the mother began +by an irresistible desire to kill her child. This purpose was discovered +in season to prevent it. She was next seized with a violent fever which +utterly blotted the fact from her memory, and she afterwards proved a +most devoted mother to her daughter. This daughter, become a mother in +her turn, took two children to nurse. For some days she had suffered +from fatigue and from 'movements in the stomach,' when one evening as +she was in her room with the infants, one of them on her lap, she was +suddenly seized by a strong desire to cut its throat. Alarmed by the +horrible temptation, she ran from the spot with the knife in her hand, +and sought in singing, dancing, and sleep, a refuge from the thoughts +that haunted her. Hardly had she fallen asleep when she started up, her +mind filled with the same idea, which now was irresistible. She was, +however, controlled, and in a measure calmed. The homicidal delirium +recurred, and finally gave way, only after many remedies had been +employed." + +These are only a few out of the many instances that might be given of +recurrence, at the same age or under the stimulation of similar +conditions, of so-called pathological states. Science has hitherto given +more study to such cases than to the inheritance of healthful +conditions, though the line between healthful mental conditions and +mental disease is very difficult to draw, and the assumption that all +suicides are more insane than many of the people who are regarded as +sane is unwarranted; of course if one starts with the premise that +suicide is always a symptom of insanity, then the conclusion follows +naturally that all suicides are insane; but this is a mere argument in a +circle. As far as the inheritance of healthy or normal mental +characteristics is concerned, we do know at least, from general +observation, that a child often exhibits, as it develops, more and more +rather than less and less the characteristics of some progenitor; and +this, moreover, in many cases where the possibility of imitation is +excluded. Observations might possibly be made here in a line with former +reflections on man's adaptability and Haeckel's theory of the prenatal +existence of the individual as repeating the history of his species. In +the case of postnatal as well as in that of prenatal existence, the +action of the environment can no more be left out of account than can +that of heredity; and the influence of favorable or of unfavorable +conditions at corresponding periods of development may explain the +exaggerated growth or, on the other hand, the dwarfed character or +non-appearance of tendencies associated in their development with these +periods. But at present such observations can be little more than +speculation. We may at least say, however, that Mr. Leslie Stephen's +statement of the case, namely, that children "start with infinitely +varying capacities" but that the environment of civilization is that +which finally makes them what they become morally and mentally, should +rather be reversed; for it is rather true that children are born into +the world on about the same level mentally and morally (for we observe +but little difference in the faculties of new-born babes), but that they +by no means react, in development, upon the same or a similar +environment in a similar manner. The case of the Athenian baby, whose +probable equality with the modern infant is used by Mr. Stephen as an +argument that the human race has made no progress as far as innate +qualities are concerned, would therefore scarcely be a case in point, +even if it were capable of proof,--as it is not. But it cannot be called +a case in point in any sense, the English baby with which Mr. Stephen +compares the Athenian infant not being of Athenian descent. Any +comparison of this sort, to be of worth in the discussion of the element +of heredity in human progress, must be between the baby of the primitive +savage Briton and the modern British infant. The Athenians arrived at a +high degree of social development; but the very fact that neither their +civilization nor even that of Rome was acquired by the less civilized +races who were their conquerors is rather testimony in favor of the +theory of the hereditary, organic character of the habits and capacities +acquired in the course of civilization. Nor have the Athenians +transmitted their type unmixed; there is no pure Athenian or Greek race +at the present day with which we could compare the ancient Greeks, even +if we desired to affirm so great an independence of circumstances as +would assure to such a race the unimpaired faculties of their ancestors +in spite of all the changes in their environment which history records. +Not only the environment was changed and mixed; the stock, also, of that +race which once regarded all strangers as barbarians became equally +impure. And assuredly the comparison of the "average child of to-day" +with an Archimedes or a Themistocles is anything but a fair one.[156] +Taken with the qualification of the predicate which Mr. Stephen +cautiously introduces in asserting that the innate qualities of the +average modern child are not "radically" superior to those of the +greatest ancients, it leads us to suspect that Mr. Stephen is not, +himself, very thoroughly convinced of what he attempts to prove. We may +agree with Mr. Stephen that "If Homer or Plato had been born amongst the +Hottentots, they could no more have composed the 'Iliad' or the +'Dialogues' than Beethoven could have composed his music, however fine +his ear or delicate his organization, in the days when the only musical +instrument was the tom-tom"[157]; for certainly no one can reach the +same heights under an unfavorable environment that he might have +attained under a favorable one; and that Homer could have expressed, in +the ruder poetry which he might still have composed among Hottentots, +the sentiments of the "Iliad," or Beethoven have produced his sonatas +with the assistance of the tom-tom (provided that remained the only +instrument after the appearance of an individual of such musical +capacity as a Beethoven), cannot be conceived. But it is also +inconceivable that a Beethoven, a Homer, or a Plato, could be born among +the Hottentots, if "to be born among them" means to be born of their +stock. + +In order to make any direct comparison between the capacities of the +descendants of civilized parents and those of uncivilized progenitors, +we ought to be able to compare average results obtained in savage +infants removed, in earliest infancy, to the advantages of civilization, +with the average mental and moral acquirements of individuals born under +those influences. We need to compare averages, I say, and not one or two +individual cases alone; for, in order to assert the organic and +hereditary character of human progress up to and under civilization, we +are by no means compelled to prove a like advance in all parts of a +nation or people, or even advance at all in every part. It is +conceivable, and wholly in accordance with the general course of +evolution, that types should remain stationary while other types are +advancing, that lower types should continue to exist side by side with +higher ones that have developed out of them, and even that, in some +lines of descent, retrogression should take place while the species or a +society as a whole is progressing. But our data for comparison of +averages are not, by any means, as satisfactory as could be wished; for +nowhere are the direct descendants of uncivilized races given equal +advantages with those of the descendants of peoples already civilized. +Galton's comparison of the negro with the white man is, for this reason, +too extreme in its conclusions as to the hereditary character of +intellect. Yet some general facts may be noted. And perhaps no better +field for comparison is afforded us than the United States, where the +white population is not the mere offshoot and tributary of a nation the +great majority of whose better representatives inhabit a distant land, +but an independent and successful nation, and where the negro race, +while yet untutored, was suddenly endowed with a liberty nominally as +great as that of the white man, together with a part in the government +and a right to state education. This liberty may be, indeed is, in many +parts of the South, a mere pretence, though even there toleration is +gradually being acquired; but in the North the negro is treated on very +nearly the same footing with the white man, the indignities offered him +having their origin, for the most part, with former slave-holders, not +with the born and bred Northerner. Negro children have free access to +the northern schools, where they may often be seen sitting side by side +with white children; and the best of American universities are open to +negro students. If, then, the average of opinion, even in the North, +maintains a certain amount of condescension towards the African, this +condescension is no greater in degree than that maintained by the +aristocracy of Europe towards the so-called lower (not the lowest) +classes, and in spite of which many have risen to prominence from those +classes. Indeed, the measure of condescension is rather less than the +average manifested by master to underling in many European countries not +so democratic as England; it would compare favorably with the attitude +of the petty German officials to the ordinary citizen of the less +well-to-do classes. It may mean discouragement, but there is no reason +why it should, in all cases, mean failure. Yet, as a fact, very few of +pure negro blood have risen to any prominence whatever, and the average +of intelligence appears comparatively low; the large majority of those +who have risen to eminence have had some admixture of the blood of the +white race. The American Indian appears to be more capable of +cultivation; but he has enjoyed fewer advantages than the negro. The +Indian children at the schools provided for them do not, however, appear +to exhibit the degree of intelligence possessed by white children. On +the other hand, the mixture of white and Indian blood seems to produce, +sometimes, rather more than the average of intelligence. The writer is +acquainted with two cases of this kind. The first was that of the +daughter of an ignorant Indian father, who lived entirely by hunting and +fishing, and of an almost as ignorant white mother. The child, who had +at first no advantages save those afforded by a primitive district +school, nevertheless early developed an insatiable love of study, +gained access to a higher school, and finally to what was, in her time, +the highest school for women in the country. Here she did housework, +during a course of four years, in order partly to pay her expenses, +supplying the remaining sum for tuition afterwards out of her earnings +as a teacher. By clothing herself, summer and winter, in cheap prints, +she also saved enough to buy the time of a sister who had been bound +out, assisted in the education of the rest of the family, and taught a +school whose excellence is remembered and praised to this day. But the +Indian is commonly supposed to be of higher stock than the African +negro; he certainly exhibits, even in his uncivilized state, a cunning, +a courage, and a persistence, of a higher type than that of the African; +and the superiority of a mixture between this alert type and the +intelligence of the white man is thus explained. I repeat, though the +subtle results of many minute accumulating influences of individual +environment must undoubtedly be taken into consideration in our judgment +of different races, the difference of opportunity does not seem to +account fully for the great difference of attainment. + +It must be noticed, too, that, in comparing the negro with the white man +in the United States, we have not compared a wholly savage people with a +civilized one; for the negro has been, for several generations, in +contact with civilization, and must have gained something from this +contact. It is to be greatly doubted whether the infants of those +Siberians of whose pleasure in the suffering of other beings an instance +was given above would, even under the best of influences, develop into +individuals of much real benevolence. The average child of civilized +society is somewhat callous to the sufferings of animals, partly because +he does not realize the reality of those sufferings; yet I have seen +lost kittens tenderly cared for by ragged little street urchins; and I +have more than once heard small boys, playing in the gutter, exclaim at +the beating of a donkey or a horse. The child repeats, perhaps, to some +extent, the history of his race's origin in savagery. Yet it is to be +seriously doubted whether the children of the savages described as +delighting in cutting their meat from living animals would attain, even +under the most careful training, the average spontaneous humanity of the +lad of civilized progenitors, or would ever become truly humane men and +women. It is conceivable that superior mental and moral capacity may +remain comparatively undeveloped, proper environment lacking, but we +begin to see the fallacy of concluding, from such cases, the +non-hereditary character of capacity when we suppose such cases as those +above, of the rearing of savage infants under civilization. It must be +added of the very isolated cases--of which much is often made--in which +the children of civilized parents have been stolen by savages, at an +early age, (1) that it is not, and cannot be, maintained that all the +descendants of civilized progenitors are endowed with superior mental +and moral tendency; and (2) that such instances are too few in number to +furnish, alone, the basis of any theory. The evidence furnished us by +the general results of neglect in the midst of civilization is more to +the point; but, even in these cases, it must be shown that the children +came of good parentage in order that the evidence may be admitted as +telling against the theory of heredity. Every breeder of animals counts +with the greatest confidence upon the action of the laws of heredity; +and no reason can be given why these laws should not work in the case of +man, why he should be the one species exempt from them. It is impossible +to cross the dog with the wolf without perceiving the result of the +crossing, in the mental as well as the physical characteristics of the +offspring; and the dog does not differ more from the wolf than does +civilized man, in the most advanced nations, from the savage. Even his +physical characteristics, the contour of the head and face especially, +the form of the features as well as the expression, are different and +imply a higher type. + +And, in discussing lower types in the midst of civilization, we cannot +do better than give some consideration to Dugdale's remarkable book on +the Jukes, which has already been mentioned. In this book is traced the +history of five hundred and forty persons belonging to seven generations +of descendants of five sisters, there being much intermarrying among +them. Out of two hundred and fifty-two Juke women, whose history is +traced, thirty-three were illegitimate, eighteen were mothers of +bastards before marriage, twelve the mothers of bastards after marriage, +fifty-three were prostitutes (the cases of eight being unascertained), +thirteen were barren, eleven kept brothels, thirty-seven had syphilis, +forty-five received, at some time, outdoor relief, the total number of +years amounting to two hundred and forty-two, twenty-four received +almshouse relief, the time reaching a total of thirty-five years, and +sixteen were committed for crimes for a total of one and three-fourths +years, the number of offences being twenty-four. Out of two hundred and +twenty-five Juke men, forty-nine were illegitimate, twenty were +prostitutes, one kept a brothel, fourteen were afflicted with syphilis, +fifty received outdoor relief, the time being, in total, two hundred and +seventy years, twenty-nine were in the almshouse for a total of +forty-six years, and thirty-three were committed for crime for a total +of eighty-nine and a half years, the number of offences being +fifty-nine. The lines with which the Jukes cohabited or intermarried +were naturally of a low moral type, but they do not show nearly as high +a percentage of crime and pauperism; thus among the marriageable women +of the Jukes, we find the percentage of harlotry to be 52.40, among +those of the intermarrying or cohabiting lines only 41.76. Of the stock +of Ada Juke, known to the police as "Margaret, the mother of criminals," +nine offenders were sent to prison for a total of sixty years, their +crimes constituting fifty-four per cent of all the crimes against +property recorded of the Jukes, and including burglary, grand larceny, +and highway robbery; besides one murder and three attempts at rape. +Dugdale thus describes his first acquaintance with the "Jukes." "In +July, 1874, the New York Prison Association having deputed me to visit +thirteen of the county jails of this state and report thereupon, I made +a tour of inspection in pursuance of that appointment. No specially +striking cases of criminal careers, traceable through several +generations, presented themselves till ---- County was reached. Here, +however, were found six persons, under four family names, who turned out +to be blood relations in some degree. The oldest, a man of forty-five, +was waiting trial for receiving stolen goods; his daughter, aged +eighteen, held as witness against him; her uncle, aged forty-two, +burglary in the first degree; the illegitimate daughter of the latter's +wife, aged twelve years, upon which child the latter had attempted rape, +to be sent to the reformatory for vagrancy; and two brothers in another +branch of the family, aged respectively nineteen and fourteen, accused +of an assault with intent to kill, they having maliciously pushed a +child over a high cliff and nearly killed him. Upon trial, the oldest +was acquitted, though the goods stolen were found in his house, his +previous good character saving him; the guilt belonged to his +brother-in-law, the man aged forty-two above-mentioned, who was living +in the house. This brother-in-law is an illegitimate child, an habitual +criminal, and the son of an unpunished and cautious thief. He had two +brothers and one sister, all of whom are thieves, the sister being the +contriver of crime, they its executors. The daughter of this woman, the +girl aged eighteen above-mentioned, testified, at the trial which +resulted in convicting her uncle and procuring his sentence for twenty +years to state prison, that she was forced to join him in his last +foray, that he had loaded her with the booty and beat her on the journey +home, over two miles, because she lagged under the load. When this girl +was released, her family in jail, and thus left without a home, she was +forced to make her lodging in a brothel on the outskirts of the city. +Next morning she applied to the judge to be recommitted to prison 'for +protection' against certain specified carnal outrages required of her +and submitted to. She has since been sent to the house of refuge. Of the +two boys, one was discharged by the grand jury; the other was tried and +received five years' imprisonment in Sing Sing. + +"These six persons belonged to a long lineage, reaching back to the +early colonists, and had intermarried so slightly with the emigrant +population of the Old World that they may be called a strictly American +family. They had lived in the same locality for generations, and were so +despised by the respectable community that their family name _had come +to be used generically as a term of reproach_. + +"That this was deserved became manifest on slight inquiry. It was found +that out of twenty-nine males, in ages ranging from fifteen to +seventy-five, the immediate blood-relations of these six persons, +seventeen of them were criminals, or fifty-eight per cent; while fifteen +were convicted of some degree of offence, and received seventy-one years +of sentence.... The crimes and misdemeanors they committed were assault +and battery, assault with intent to kill, murder, attempt at rape, petit +larceny, grand larceny, burglary, forgery, cruelty to animals." + +But this book of Dugdale's, which traces so clearly and thoroughly long +lines of criminal descent, makes manifest, also, the influence of +environment. We find, for instance, in the line of the illegitimate +posterity of Ada Juke, generation five, the case of a male descendant, +who was sentenced to Sing Sing for three years at the age of twenty-two, +but who, leaving prison at the expiration of his sentence, abandoned +crime and settled down to steady employment. A second case is that of +another male descendant of Ada, who assisted his brother in burglary at +the age of twelve, and served probably some thirteen or fourteen years +in prison, but later reformed and took to stone-quarrying, having +learned, says Dugdale, industrious habits in prison. A brother of this +man, who had also served sentences in jail for assault and battery, and +a term of two years at Sing Sing for burglary (the term beginning at the +age of twenty-two), moved at the age of thirty-one into the same county +as his brother, and went into the business of quarrying. A female +descendant in the illegitimate line of Ada, generation five, who seems +to have followed a dissolute life up to the age of fifteen, at this +point married a German, a "steady, industrious, plodding man," and +settled down into a reputable woman. In the legitimate line of Ada, +again, generation five, we find the case of a girl "said to have been +born in the poorhouse," who "was adopted out from there into a wealthy +family, and is doing well." In all these cases, the reform was the +result of contact, during the earlier period of life, with new elements +inducing industry and sobriety. Such cases might lead us to doubt the +conclusions we should otherwise feel justified in drawing with regard to +the action of heredity, and must certainly render us cautious not to +impute the whole character of the individual to heredity alone. But the +complicated nature of _all_ social relations should restrain us from +laying all stress upon any one element in those relations, in any case. +Here, again, we recur to the conception of conditions and results in +distinction from that of cause and effect. If statistics such as these +of the Jukes included minute and careful statements as to mental and +physical characteristics and resemblances, they would undeniably be much +more reliable basis for conclusions as to the hereditary nature of +character. Nevertheless, incomplete though this evidence be, it is by no +means such that it can be logically disregarded. It is to be said of +such cases of reform and respectability as those noticed under favorable +influences (1) that we are not informed as to its exact extent and +motive and have no means of knowing what these were; (2) that, if +reversion to ancestral types is possible in the sense of deterioration, +there is no reason why it should not be possible in the opposite sense +also,--no reason why better characters should not, through, perhaps, +some favorable prenatal influence at exactly the right period of +development, occasionally crop out in a line of general baseness;[158] +and (3) that the admixture of a strain of somewhat better blood may +produce, or some especial crossing be favorable to, the development of +higher character in a part, though not necessarily all, of the +offspring. "When the domestic pig and the wild boar or the wolf and the +dog are crossed," says Ribot,[159] "some of the progeny inherit the +savage, and others the domestic instincts. Similar facts have been +observed by Girou in the crossing of different races of dogs and cats." +We know quite well that the same law governs the transmission of +character in human beings. In a family of children, some will inherit +the characteristics of the father, some those of the mother. Mr. Jenkins +of the Bureau of Police of Brooklyn, N.Y., related to me a case that had +come under his notice. Of a family consisting of father, mother, two +sons, and a daughter, the mother was a hard-working, honest washerwoman, +while the father was depraved in his tendencies; and of the three +children the daughter resembled the mother in character, the sons, on +the other hand, their father. One of the sons was sentenced to prison +for a bad case of burglary, and was shot while attempting to escape; and +on the same day on which his picture was removed from the rogues' +gallery, his brother's was hung in its place, the latter having, with +calm deliberation and preparation, murdered a girl with whom he had some +relation. A similar case is recorded by Gall, where the mother +represented the good, the father the evil stock, and of five children +three were condemned to severe penalties for thieving, the other two +lived correct lives. It is to be noticed that, of the three cases of +better character among the Jukes cited above, the two reformed +characters were brothers. It is by no means proved by these cases that +all or a majority of the Jukes were capable, even under the best of +influences, of a like betterment of character. On the contrary: the +general characteristics of extreme licentiousness attaching to the whole +family, on which Dugdale lays special stress,--a licentiousness +extending even to cohabitation and marriage with the negroes at a time +when the latter were yet in slavery and regarded as little more than +animals,--as well as the exceeding viciousness and inhumanity exhibited +in some of the crimes (witness the attempted rape on the niece of twelve +and the pushing of the child over the cliff), show a tendency of +character much below the average. Nor was the prison discipline which +accomplished the reform of the two brothers the only opportunity of +steady industry, or the prison the only reformatory environment +afforded. Dugdale mentions an "extensive employer of labor, located near +the original settlement of the Jukes," who "employs several members of +it," treating them "with firmness and unvaryingly scrupulous fairness," +interposing his authority and checking them in incipient crime. He acts +as their banker and, as school trustee, arranges, "where widows depend +upon their boys for support, that they shall work for him and go to +school alternate weeks." If, indeed, the family is located, as it seems +to be, in the rather sparsely settled districts of northern New York, it +is scarcely likely to suffer great isolation, as it might in the midst +of a city, or to be excluded from means of honest livelihood. Dugdale +mentions, indeed, that this employer "has not taken up this work as a +'mission,' but strictly as a business man, who, finding himself placed +where he must employ the rude laborers of his locality, deals with them +on the sound and healthy basis of commercial contract, honestly carried +out and rigidly enforced." Unfortunately, Dugdale does not furnish us +with any exact information as to the result of this very humane course +of treatment. We can only revert to his remark that, though the Jukes +had lived in this neighborhood for generations where work was evidently +not lacking nor kind and judicious treatment absent, their name was used +generically, by the reputable community, as a term of reproach. + +We have already noticed some inconsistencies in Stephen's theory of +human progress as merely that of an accumulation of knowledge. But he +practically contradicts, elsewhere in his work, this view of +advancement. On page 201 of the "Science of Ethics," he says distinctly: +"As men become more intellectual, sympathetic, and so forth, they gain +fresh sensibilities, which are not simple judgments of consequences +hitherto improved, but as direct, imperative, and substantial as any of +the primitive sensibilities." Even if this statement were meant to apply +to the individual alone, a great difficulty must lie in the way of any +theory that sensibilities so inherent, sensibilities "as direct, +imperative, and substantial as any of the primitive sensibilities," will +not affect the character of descendants through inheritance, in the same +manner as these primitive sensibilities are acknowledged to affect it. +But elsewhere Stephen remarks: "An instinct grows and decays not on +account of its effects on the individual, but on account of its effects +upon the race. The animal which, on the whole, is better adapted for +continuing its species, will have an advantage in the struggle, even +though it may not be so well adapted for pursuing its own happiness." He +is careful to use the word "happiness" here, but the division under +which the sentence appears is headed, "Social and Individual Utility," +and he distinctly states, on the preceding page, that the social +instincts may be a disadvantage to the individual in the struggle for +existence. He writes, in this connection: "The process by which the +correlation of pernicious and painful states is worked out is one which, +by its very nature, must take a number of generations. Races survive in +virtue of the completeness of this correlation."[160] This is Darwinism +applied to humanity; and, surely, since the human race has existed in +the social state for very many generations, we must suppose, according +to the theory thus stated, continuous organic advance, even if we did +not consider the passage in connection with the assertion of the gain, +with increasing intelligence and sympathy, of sensibilities as direct, +imperative, and substantial as any primitive ones. Again Mr. Stephen +writes: "It is true, generally, that each man has certain capacities for +moral as for every other kind of development, and capacities which vary +from the top to the bottom of the scale. No process of education or +discipline _whatever_ would convert a Judas Iscariot into a Paul or +John."[161] Then education, the environment of civilization, is not the +only factor in the production of character. Nor is it, according to Mr. +Stephen's own words, the only important factor. If capacities vary from +the top to the bottom of the scale, then surely this variation cannot be +an unimportant element of development. As a matter of fact, Mr. Stephen +himself lays especial stress upon inherited characteristic as the basis +of character. He says, for example: "The character is determined for +each individual by its original constitution, though the character is +modified as the reason acts.... But, after all, we start with a certain +balance of feeling, with certain fixed relations between our various +instincts; and, however these may change afterwards, our character is so +far determined from the start. Again, it is plain that this varies +greatly with different peoples and gives rise to different types."[162] +Surely the formation of types at least cannot be a matter of the +individual alone. Furthermore, Mr. Stephen distinctly asserts a growth +of intelligence in the savage--which we cannot suppose to stop short +with the beginning of civilization--while he especially emphasizes the +fact that the emotions develop concomitantly with the intellect. He says +also: "We assume an organic change to occur--no matter how--in certain +individuals of a species, and that change to be inherited by their +descendants; and thus two competing varieties to arise, one of which may +be supplanted by the other, or each of which may supplant the other in a +certain part of the common domain. Some such process is clearly +occurring in the case of human variations. Everywhere we see a +competition between different races, and the more savage vanishing under +the approach of the more civilized. Certain races seem to possess +enormous expansive powers, whilst others remain limited within fixed +regions or are slowly passing out of existence. So far as human +development supposes an organic change in the individual [?], we may +suppose that this process is actually going on and that, for example, +the white man may be slowly pushing savage races out of existence. I do +not ask whether this is the fact, because for my purpose it is +irrelevant. We are considering the changes which take place without such +organic development, not as denying the existence of organic +developments, but simply because they are so slow and their influence so +gradual that they do not come within our sphere. They belong, as +astronomers say, to the secular, not to the periodic changes. Confining +ourselves, therefore, to the changes which are, in my phrase, products +of the 'social factor,' and which assume the constancy of the individual +organism,"[163] etc. The passage is of importance as acknowledging the +reality of organic progress; but it is full of the self-contradictions +which we have already noticed. It starts with the Darwinian assumption +that organic change occurring in _individuals_ is directly inheritable +by their descendants; this assumption, having done its office, however, +is discarded, and we are told that any organic change cannot be that of +individuals but must be that of societies, or at least that it must be +of such sort that we have not only no need to consider it with regard to +the individual life, but even no need to consider it in the study of the +whole development of a society under civilization, or rather that we +have no need to study it at all as soon as we have the "social medium" +to fall back upon for an explanation of progress; and finally, in direct +contradiction to the assumption first made, a constancy of the +individual organism is asserted. This assertion is also in direct +contradiction to the assertion before noticed that character is +determined by original constitution and that original capacity differs +"infinitely"[164] in different individuals. We are indebted to Mr. +Stephen for a very minute analysis of the influence of even smallest +details of circumstance upon character; surely, while we are thus +emphasizing the delicacy of nervous organization that answers, with the +sensibility of a gold-leaf electroscope, to the slightest variations in +the environment, we cannot logically leave out of account the results of +such variation in inheritance because these, too, are minute. And surely +we cannot conceive that an organism so sensitive to the influence of +environment is yet so inflexible and unalterable as far as the +transmission of its changes to offspring is concerned. On any sound +physiological theory, we cannot avoid supposing that all these minute +changes in character which Stephen refers to the action of the social +environment are accompanied by exact physiological equivalents. Then +either these changes of organization are not inheritable,--in which case +the organism does not propagate itself but something different from +itself, and we have no alternative but to resort to some such theory as +that of Weismann,--or else these changes are inheritable (subject, of +course, to all the variations which individual circumstances of +development must induce), in which case their inheritance must be of +quite as much importance as their origin to any theory of social +progress. As we have said, Weismann has gradually come to admit _some_ +influence of the environment on the germ-plasm. We can indeed conceive +of the representation of all previous development of the species in the +individual, and of the determination of the degree of importance +assumed, in the organism, by any particular acquirement or tendency by +the coincidence of circumstance, but we can scarcely conceive logically +of a propagation of organization that does not represent all the +influences which have made that organization what it is. Even from +Stephen's standpoint, it is difficult to understand how the organization +of society, which he admits to be no organization on the plane of the +higher animal, but of a much lower type, can be of so much importance in +the advance of mankind, its variations the condition of progress, and +yet the much more interdependent organization of the animal body be +supposed to remain constant and take no part in this progress. It is +difficult to comprehend how so much stress can be laid on the mere +external influence of the units of society on each other, and, at the +same time, the far more intimate and direct influence of parents on +their offspring can be deemed of so little importance as to warrant our +disregarding it altogether. It is especially difficult to understand how +it is that heredity can be disregarded, not merely in its influence on +the individual or even on the generation, but in all its manifold, +intricate, and prolonged workings since man first extended family life +to tribal organization; and this, too, in spite of the acknowledgment +that progress through heredity is real if slow. It is strange that there +should always be a tendency to draw a distinct line between social man +and all the rest of the animal kingdom, as if, when society began, all +former laws ceased from operation. Thus it is sometimes said that +natural selection no longer acts on the individual because it acts on +societies as wholes also; as well say that it cannot act on inner +organization because it acts on the organism as a whole. As a matter of +fact, it affects society through individuals, and the individual +through, or rather in, his organization. If it is true, as Stephen +asserts, that change of social tissue is primary and fundamental to all +external social change, it is not the less true that change of +individual organization is fundamental to all change of external action. +No theory of development which goes beyond the individual life and +considers the progress of society as a whole can scientifically +disregard the element of heredity in this progress. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[141] I am indebted for these facts to Dr. Auguste Forel. + +[142] "Ants, Wasps, and Bees," Chap. V. + +[143] "Zur psychologischen Würdigung der darwin'schen Theorie." + +[144] Pp. 141, 142, translation by Henry M. Trollope. + +[145] Eng. ed. Internat. Scientific Ser., p. 276; quoted from "The +Zoölogist." + +[146] "Mental Evolution in Animals," p. 345; cited from an article in +"Nature," 1883. + +[147] "Animal Intelligence," p. 472. + +[148] "Mind," Vol. VIII. + +[149] Lubbock: "The Origin of Civilisation," pp. 9, 10. + +[150] "The Science of Ethics," pp. 103, 104. + +[151] Ibid. p. 109. + +[152] "The Science of Ethics," p. 419. + +[153] Ibid. p. 103. + +[154] Ribot: "Heredity." Here we have examples which show that disease, +as well as healthful organization and function, are subject to +variation; and it may occur to us to wonder that no one has thought of +referring these variations to some supernatural interference or special +inner spontaneity; that theories which assume some transcendental agency +or some spontaneously acting vital principle as the cause of normal, +healthful variation have yet either left the variations of disease out +of consideration or else simply referred them to influence of the +environment. The reason for this, as far as transcendental interference +is concerned, is evident; any theory of teleology in such cases must +point to malevolent not benevolent design. + +[155] "Heredity," pp. 124, 125. Quoted from the "Dictionnaire +Philosophique," article "Caton." + +[156] "The Science of Ethics," pp. 102, 103. + +[157] "The Science of Ethics," p. 107. + +[158] See previous observations on this subject, p. 408. + +[159] "Heredity," Engl. trans., p. 84. + +[160] "The Science of Ethics," pp. 91, 92. + +[161] Ibid., p. 432. The italics are mine. + +[162] Ibid., pp. 72, 73. + +[163] P. 121. + +[164] See above, p. 400. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +CONSCIENCE + + +The exact circumstances which led, in any particular line of descent, to +the final production of self-conscious altruism we cannot know. We may, +perhaps, as has been hinted, trace the whole development to the original +union of the sexes in lower, asexual species, and of mother and +offspring; and we may suppose the final self-conscious altruism to have +been led up to gradually by habit, in any case, the history of all +function being gradual evolution. Thus we may suppose it possible that, +in some cases, the care of offspring may have been preceded by a habit +of care, on the part of the female animal, for her eggs, which, as +habit, was pleasurable, but was connected with no consciousness of the +offspring produced from the eggs until some new circumstance of +environment brought them within ken. Of the development of habit in +general and of pleasure in it, we have plenty of illustrations in our +own individual experience, and we can even watch, in our own case, the +process of the increase of altruism along old lines as well as its +growth in new directions; and we may thus gain a conception of what must +have been the general nature of its earliest development, in any case. + +In Volume III of "Mind," Paul Friedmann has an interesting essay on "The +Genesis of Disinterested Benevolence," in which he relates the +following: "A man had to throw away some water and, stepping out of his +house, threw it upon a heap of rubbish, where some faded plants were +nearly dying. At that moment, he paid no attention to them, took no +interest in their pitiable state. The next day, having again some water +to throw away, the man stepped out at the same place, when he remarked +that the plants had raised their stems and regained some life. He +understood that this was the result of his act of the day before, his +interest was awakened, and as he held a jar with water in his hand, he +again threw its contents over the plants. On the following day the same +took place; the benevolent feeling, the interest in the recovery and +welfare of the plants augmented, and the man tended the plants with +increasing care. When he found, one day, that the rubbish and plants had +been carted away, he felt a real annoyance. The feeling of the man was +in this case real disinterested benevolence. The plants were neither +fine nor useful, and the place where they stood was ugly and out of the +way, so that the man had no advantage from their growth. Nor had the man +a general wish to rear plants, for there were a number of other plants +sorely in want of care, but to which the man did not transfer his +affections. He had loved these individual plants." Friedmann says +further: "Formerly rather hostile to dogs, now that I have a dog myself, +I feel well inclined towards the whole canine species, but most to that +part of it which has some characteristic feature in common with my +favorite." Features of the first quotation may remind us of some former +considerations of ours in which attention and interest were found to run +parallel. We may take exception, however, to Friedmann's definition of +the extension of benevolent feeling from an individual of a class to the +whole of the class or to beings resembling them in any way as "a sort of +logical confusion." This view has already been criticised. The adult +being at least does not confuse individuals, or even if he may +occasionally do so, such confusion is not at all the distinguishing +feature of progress in altruism; it is merely an accident, not anything +that is characteristic. The recognition of old features in new objects +is the opposite of confusion; it would rather indicate a logical +confusion, a lack of intelligence, if we failed to remember that which +has formerly given us pleasure, and to find, in similar objects, some +renewal of that pleasure. It would have been just as logical, for +instance, and more truly benevolent, if the man who tended the plants +had cared also for the other plants mentioned as "sorely in want of +care," and which he seems to have left to perish. + +We may often notice the growth of altruistic from egoistic as well as of +egoistic from altruistic motives, in ourselves; for retrogression as +well as progression in altruism is possible with the individual. If we +feel bitterly towards some human being, for instance, the best and +surest remedy is to perform some act of kindness towards him. We may +contemplate and carry out the deed with merely a sense of gratification +and egoistic elation at our own generosity, but we are more than likely +to experience some degree of change of feeling before we have finished. +On the other hand, our heart often seems to harden and fill with greater +animosity towards those we have injured, the longer we continue this +course of injurious action and the more positive the injury inflicted. A +certain degree of generosity must, it is true, already exist in order +that we may be able to show kindness to an enemy, just as hostility must +also be present in order that we may be able to commence a course of +injury or unkindness; but both kindly feeling and animosity increase +constantly with their exercise. We are never exactly the same after our +deeds that we are before them. + +Says George Eliot: "It would be a poor result of all our anguish and our +wrestling if we won nothing but our old selves at the end of it--if we +could return to the same blind loves, the same self-confident blame, the +same light thoughts of human suffering, the same frivolous gossip over +blighted human lives."[165] And again: "The creature we help to save, +though only a half-reared linnet, bruised and lost by the wayside--how +we watch and fence it, and dote on its signs of recovery."[166] + +Whatever the particular circumstances that led, in the particular line +of animal descent by which the species we distinctively term human +finally came into existence, to the extension of temporary to life-long +association, and whether this life-long association began only with man, +or earlier with his ape-like progenitors, certain it is that increase of +numbers must finally condition society. The internal, like the external +process, is a gradual one, an evolution; and we cannot, therefore, +suppose society as life-long association to have begun with the +existence of no altruistic feeling whatever. In so far, Darwin's +assertion that the social instinct led men to society contains a measure +of truth; but it is to be remembered that the social instinct at the +beginning of social life cannot have been the same with the social +instinct of present civilization, which is the product of long +development; pleasure in function, its ends, and objects, increases +_concomitantly with_ exercise. Darwin's statement is, hence, liable to +misconstruction. There is a similar truth in Rolph's criticism of +Spencer's theory that men adopted social life because they found it +advantageous, on the ground that men must first have had experience of +the advantages of association before they could have been aware of them. +But the experience which continually leads to a step in advance may not +be, at every point, for every step, the experience of the individual or +individuals taking the step; it is quite possible that some steps may be +taken from the observance of the experience of others; at least this is +possible if we suppose any degree of intelligence and reason in the +individuals taking the step. The introduction of the idea of a +calculation of advantages is, furthermore, exceedingly useful. For, +while the "social instinct," the desire for and pleasure in all the +various function connected with association with other beings, may be of +assistance in bringing about any advance in association, the selfish +instinct, already in existence before the evolution of any considerable +degree of altruistic impulse, may influence and induce the advance, +where the social instinct is not, alone, of sufficient strength. At the +beginning of social life, as at every later point of advancement, +motives are mixed, and selfishness may prepare the way for +unselfishness. + +At any point of evolution, there must be, among contending species or +individuals, some who are stronger or who have, through some +circumstance, the advantage over the others; given even a moderate +number of individuals, and it is hardly possible that all should be +defeated and destroyed in any struggle, like the famous cats of +Kilkenny. This being the case, and change of organization being +continually conditioned by contact with new elements of environment, +advancement, evolution, becomes a necessity, no natural catastrophe +occurring to destroy all life. There is no mystery about evolution in +this sense. Advancement in society is still more comprehensible to us by +the fact of the element of reason involved in it; from the beginning of +life-association among human beings or their immediate progenitors, the +existence of some more intelligent individuals than the rest, who will +perceive the advantages of association, may be assumed. And thus at each +step, as the growing density of population continually renders +increasing coöperation increasingly advantageous, we may suppose the +vanguard to be composed of the more intelligent and the more social. + +Sympathy prompts not only to the conferring of pleasure, it prompts also +to the prevention of injurious conduct, on the part of others, towards +the being or beings with whom sympathy is felt. A conception of the +advantage of mutual aid may assist as a motive in this. The earliest +mutual aid was, to a great extent, one of coöperation against enemies. +In one way and another, this mutual defence must have extended to the +compulsion of positive beneficial conduct, on the part of others, +towards the being or beings with whom sympathy was felt. Such compulsion +may be exerted by different tribes, or by different members of the same +tribe, on each other; the means of compulsion are revenges of different +sorts, benefit, assistance of some sort, being, on the other hand, often +the reward of ready compliance. This compulsion may be felt as greater +or less according to the degree of reluctance to perform any form of +action required under pain of the penalty. If the thoughts are occupied +with the possible reward, and not with the punishment, then no outer +compulsion is felt, but a choice of advantage is made. This choice again +may not be wholly one of selfish calculation; some altruistic feeling +may be involved. A form of action at first chosen with reluctance, and +merely because of the fear of punishment or revenge, may come to be +performed later without hesitation, and more under the hope of reward +than the fear of punishment; and this same form of action may come to be +performed finally with sympathy as the prominent feeling, the hope of +reward becoming more and more secondary. Each increase of sympathy, +again, reacts upon the environment as represented by other individuals, +and thus the relations and influence of men on each other become more +and more complicated. Any habit of cruelty or hostility which has been, +at former stages, united with prosperity may thus become, through the +action and reaction of increasing altruism, a disadvantage to the +individual member of any society; or it is also conceivable that a +formerly advantageous egoistic form of action may become disadvantageous +through the advent of some new influence from outside the particular +society in which it is practised. Father Phil, in Lover's story of +"Handy Andy," relates an anecdote of an engagement in Spain, in which +the dragoons of a regiment, retreating under hot fire, paused at the +crossing of a river to take up behind them some women of the +camp-followers, who had difficulty in crossing, and thereupon found +themselves followed by cheers, instead of shots, from their French foes. +I do not intend to intimate that the motive for the deed was +self-interest; but it is easy to conceive similar instances in which +humanity might become an advantage and be practised at first from +self-interest, not by individuals merely but by a whole tribe; this must +be frequently the case when less civilized peoples come in contact with +more civilized peoples. And this leads us to remark that habits of +sympathy and justice exercised within a people will be likely to +manifest themselves in relations with other peoples also, in degree as +the sympathy is real and the benevolence inward. But the attitudes of +different peoples towards each other remain long hostile, since the +partial surrender of tribal or national interests necessary to compact +often involves too great sacrifices to be acquiesced in at an early +stage of development. And the individual is necessarily influenced, to a +great extent, by the feelings of those among whom he is born, with +regard to the hostile nation. But this is retracing our analysis. + +Altruism is thus increased directly by the perception and choice of +coöperation as advantageous, by the spread of altruistic feeling and the +compulsion of the social environment, as well as by the higher means of +persuasion and affection, in which altruism itself affects the increase +of altruism; and it is also increased indirectly by the aid of natural +selection between individuals, families, neighborhoods, and groups of +all sorts, coöperation becoming more and more advantageous with the +increased density of population. + +It is scarcely necessary to remark that natural selection acts also with +regard to the egoistic or personal virtues; for these have regard, +primarily, to the preservation of the individual in the best condition +for labor and cheerfulness. It is evident that in this direction also +the moral must continually gain the advantage. Either the injurious is +perceived and avoided, or the individual failing to perceive and avoid +it suffers physical injury and deterioration, and, unless a different +course is adopted in time, brings at last destruction to himself or to +his stock. But our analysis goes further; for the egoistic virtues are +evidently not purely egoistic; and society will come with time to insist +on this fact, and to render these virtues still more advantageous and +their neglect still more disadvantageous; while the growth of the +altruistic feelings will infuse the individual with the desire to +perform his duty to others in this respect also. The purely egoistic +character of so-called personal virtues, for the assertion of which so +much has been written, is a myth. No man can make a sot of himself or +indeed injure himself in any way without reducing his power to benefit +society and harming those nearest to him. Self-preservation and the +preservation of one's own health may conflict with altruistic virtues at +times; that is to say, virtues both of which are altruistic, though the +altruistic character of one is more direct than the other, may conflict; +in which case, choice is necessary. And it is strange to note, at this +point, that just those systems which lay most stress on individual +welfare, that is, emphasize the fact that the preservation of individual +health and the development of individual capacity are advantageous to +society, are the very ones that also defend the freedom of the +individual to practise so-called personal vice. The two theories do not +well accord; surely, if the individual is of so much importance to +society, his vice cannot be without injurious results to it. Only when +egoistic care for health has become infused with the higher altruism, +does it become truly virtue; then care for self ceases to be the mere +means to isolated pleasure, and becomes the means to the happiness of +others where it was often, before, the means to their misery, and even +their destruction. + +In the evolution of higher animal forms from lower, the lower do not +necessarily pass out of existence with the development of the higher; in +society, however, the contact is close and continuous, and the +competition unremitting; there is, therefore, some elimination, though a +very gradual one, of lower types. The lower forms may exist for a long +time beside the higher; in other words, society as a whole progresses +slowly on account of the immense complication of relations within it. We +find it including many grades of altruistic and egoistic virtue, and can +testify only to a progress that renders the extremes of vice and cruelty +less and less the rule and more and more the exception. + +And this brings us to the further consideration of a point not long ago +touched upon, namely, the high degree of civilization attained by +certain ancient peoples. Not the whole race of man, it is evident, +advances together to higher grades of civilization, as not all +individuals or all lines of descent in the same society fall under the +same influences and advance at a like rate. At the present date, the +greater part of Africa as well as portions of other countries are +inhabited by rude and savage tribes, the rest of the world, not classed +as savage, representing very many different grades and phases of +progress. After the conquest of Greece by Rome and of Rome by the tribes +from the North, the higher degree of civilization of the conquered +nations was partly lost by them and partly acquired by their conquerors; +that is, nothing was really lost, but two different forces met and +partly neutralized each other; the resultant represented, in this case +as in all others, the complication, the algebraic sum, of the two. In +the essay before referred to, Dr. Petzoldt calls attention to the +extremely unique character of the productions of Inner-African tribes +before they have come in contact with white men, and cites Bastian's +testimony that even one short visit from a white man is often enough to +destroy the peculiarity of the type. "New tendencies are introduced, and +the stability is immediately diminished, though only to progress +gradually to a newer, higher form." The comparative sparsity of the +human race in ancient times rendered it possible for single isolated +peoples to attain to a high degree of culture while the greater part of +the earth was inhabited by the uncivilized; and the increase of the +species since that time, though necessitating wider contact and closer +relations, and so rendering the newer civilization necessarily a wider +one, has yet not been sufficient to make isolated savagery in lands not +reached by the spreading circle, impossible. The ancient civilization +was lost, but not lost in the sense that its force ever perished; it +found its full representation--but no more--in the result that arose +from blending with a lower grade. The same process is being repeated +wherever civilized man, on the borders of civilization, comes in contact +with savage or half-civilized man. The two races may dwell side by side, +separated from intimate association, but their contiguity is yet marked +by a certain amount of change on both sides,--a change the greater the +greater the degree of association and the greater the isolation of those +on the border-lands from the rest of the civilized world, and the longer +this state of things persists. We are here reminded particularly of +Fechner's formula of the process of evolution, in which the concepts of +isolation as favoring the steady advancement of the process on its own +peculiar lines, and of new contact as new disturbance from which issues +new development, are most prominent. If we regard especially the ethical +features of this contact at the borders, it may be remarked both that +savages gain gradually more humanity from contact with civilized +nations, and that white men, on the other hand, lose, in constant +contact with savages, some of the humanity which they have displayed in +the midst of their own nation. They grow used to sights of cruelty, much +of which it is impossible for them to prevent; they are roused to anger, +hatred, and retaliation by acts of deception, treachery, and cruelty, +and they find, moreover, that kindness is often mistaken for weakness by +the bloody and revengeful people with whom they have to do, who are +often used to respect only or chiefly the brute force which can compel +obedience. I do not intend here to represent the white man as the +incarnation of sympathy and humanity; even in the midst of society, as +we have already sufficiently noticed, his apparent altruism may be, to a +large degree, the outcome of selfish motives, natural tendency being +restrained through fear of punishment or hope of gain of some sort. +There are grades within societies as well as grades represented by +societies as wholes. But several things are to be taken into account in +the comparison of the white man with the savage under circumstances of +contact. In the first place, we have to remember that, while the white +man is, to a great extent, withdrawn from the control of the society to +which he belongs, secure from their judgment for the time being and with +the prospect, often, of probable security from it for all time, since +reports of his actions may never reach the ears of more civilized +societies, the individual savage is still restrained by whatever of law +and moral sentiment exists in his own tribe; his vengeance, whatever it +is, is to a great extent under the control of his chiefs. Again, the +power of the savage to inflict injury is not so great as that of the +white man, who has all the implements of advanced coöperation at his +disposal. The mere love of power always presents a temptation, and +pleasure in demonstrating superiority is a common human emotion. +Furthermore, it must be considered that the opportunities for +selfishness afforded on the borders of civilization are likely to +attract, in the majority, just those men whose social ties and social +instinct are weakest, whose greed perceives here the opportunity of +unscrupulous gratification, and is drawn by it. And lastly, it is to be +noticed that not by any means all the individuals belonging to more +advanced societies who come in contact with savages use them with +inhumanity, or even retaliate on treachery and injury. The great +differences exhibited, under such circumstances, by persons whose +opportunities have been very similar is a strong argument in favor of +inherent, innate grades of altruism, and so of hereditary character. The +same is true of the fact that the Greeks and Romans did retain much of +their culture even in contact with lower grades of civilization, handing +it down, in a degree, to this day; and that their conquerors only in the +lapse of many generations pulled themselves up to this level, which was +attained, at last, rather in countries removed from direct contact with +it and so, we may argue, to a great extent, through their own natural +evolution. The general analysis of the amalgamation at the borders of +civilization still remains true in the long run, however individual +savages and individual white men may represent exceptions to it. + +Mr. Stephen's analysis of the development of altruism from egoism, while +in the main true and one of the most minute analyses on this subject +that we possess, opens, through its ambiguity of terms, the way to +inaccuracy of thought and to errors of theory into which I am not at all +sure that the author does not himself fall at some points. Starting with +an implied definition of sympathy as actual "feeling with" other +sentient beings through the intellectual comprehension of their +emotions, and acknowledging that sympathy in this sense may not lead +directly to altruism, he uses the same word also, later in the analysis, +in the higher sense, and at some points appears to confound the two +meanings; so that, as there is a similar ambiguity in the use of the +word "idiot," or "moral idiot," in the same connection, his theory seems +to fall into the mistake of asserting the normal association of +intellectual comprehension with altruism. He writes:-- + +"It is not more true that to think of a fire is to revive the sensations +of warmth than it is true that to think of a man is to revive the +emotions and thoughts which we attribute to him. To think of him in any +other sense is to think of the mere doll or statue, the outside +framework, not of the organized mass of consciousness which determines +all the relations in which he is most deeply interesting to us." "The +primary sympathy is, of course, modified in a thousand ways--by the ease +or difficulty with which we can adopt his feelings; by the +attractiveness or repulsiveness of the feelings revealed; by the degree +in which circumstances force us into coöperation or antagonism; and by +innumerable incidental associations which make it pleasant or painful to +share his feelings. _If by sympathy we mean this power of vicarious +emotion, it may give rise to antipathy, to hatred, rivalry, and +jealousy, and even to the diabolical perversion of pleasure in +another's pain._"[167] "The pain given by your pain may simply induce me +to shut my eyes. The Pharisee who passed by on the other side may have +disliked the sight of the wounded traveller as much as the good +Samaritan. Indeed, the sight of suffering often directs irritation +against the sufferer. Dives is often angry with Lazarus for exposing his +sores before a respectable mansion, and sometimes goes so far as to +think, illogically perhaps, that the beggar must have cultivated his +misery in order to irritate the nerves of his neighbors. To give the +order: 'Take away that damned Lazarus,' may be as natural an impulse as +to say: 'Give him the means of curing his ailments.'"[168] "To believe +in the existence of a sentient being is to believe that it has feelings +which may persist when I am not aware of them. A real belief, again, +implies that, at the moment of belief, I have representative sensations +or emotions corresponding to those which imply the actual presence of +the object. Again, a material object has an interest only so far as it +is a condition of some kind of feeling, and, when the sympathies are not +concerned, of some feeling of my own, whether implying or not implying +any foretaste of the future. To take any interest in any material +object, except in this relation, is unreasonable, as it is unreasonable +to desire food which cannot nourish or fire which cannot warm. I want +something which has by hypothesis no relation to my wants. The same is +true of the sentient object so long, and only so long, as I do not take +its sentience into account. But to take the sentience into account is to +sympathize, or at least the sympathy is implied in the normal _or only +possible_ case. The only condition necessary for the sympathy to exist +and to be capable therefore of becoming a motive, is that I should +really believe in the object, and have, therefore, representative +feelings. To believe in it is to feel for it, to have sympathies which +correspond to my representations, less vivid as the object is more +distant and further from the sphere of my possible influence, but still +real and therefore effective motives. Systematically to ignore these +relations, then, is to act as if I were an egoist in the extremest +sense, and held that there was no consciousness in the world except my +own. But really to carry out this principle is to be an idiot, for an +essential part of the world as interesting to me is constituted by the +feelings of other conscious agents, and I can only ignore their +existence at the cost of losing all the intelligence which distinguishes +me from the lower animal."[169] A similar use of the word "idiot" occurs +in the following passage with regard to the relations of moral action to +conviction: "It is a simple 'objective' fact that a man acts rightly or +wrongly in a given case, and a fact which may be proved to him; and, +further, though the proof will be thrown away if he is a moral idiot, +that is, entirely without the capacities upon which morality is founded, +the proof is one which must always affect his character if we suppose +the truth to be assimilated, and not the verbal formula to be merely +learned by rote."[170] "_To learn really to appreciate the general +bearings of moral conduct is to learn to be moral in the normally +constituted man._" Here the author adds, however, "though we must always +make the condition that a certain aptitude of character exists."[171] +Again he writes: "But it remains to be admitted that there is apparently +such a thing as pleasure in the pain of others--pure malignity--which we +call 'devilish' _to mark that it is abnormal and significant of a +perverted nature_."[172] And in the same connection--where he is, at +first, seemingly intent on proving only the normal connection of pain +with the sight of suffering, admitting that this sympathetic pain may +lead to brutality instead of altruistic action towards the sufferer--he +says: "Sympathy is the natural and fundamental fact. Even the most +brutal of mankind are generally sympathetic so far as to feel rather +pain than pleasure at the sight of suffering. The scum of a civilized +population gathered to pick pockets on a race-course would be pained at +the sight of a child in danger of being run over or brutally assaulted +by a ruffian, and would be disposed to rescue it, or at least to cheer a +rescuer, unless their spontaneous emotion were overpowered by some +extrinsic sentiment."[173] And finally: "_The direct and normal case is +that in which sympathy leads to genuine altruism, or feeling in +accordance with that which it reflects_."[174] + +The terms in these passages are thus evidently very loosely used, and +the charge above made is, I think, substantiated,--that the author +himself finally falls into the error following upon a confusion of the +various meanings, and comes to assert what he elsewhere distinctly +denies, namely, the normal connection of intellect and morality, of the +comprehension of suffering with that form of sympathy which issues in +altruistic action. The problem is an interesting one, and it may be well +for us to look into it a little further. + +During the last few years a number of books have been written in which +the attempt has been made to prove the general physical, and especially +the cerebral, and so the intellectual inferiority of a large number of +criminals. There may be a difference of opinion as to the value of exact +weights and measures except in so far as they demonstrate an actual +nervous deformity of some sort; and it may be said that the cases +examined for distinctly cerebral defect are too few to admit of the +formation of any universal, definite, theory or law. But some degree of +importance must assuredly be attached, by the unprejudiced reader, to +the more purely psychological evidence obtained in many cases, as well +as to the evidence of the tendency to brain-disease often found in the +direct line of descent. Indeed, in the case of some of the photographs +issued with Lombroso's "L'Homme Criminel," not more than a glance is +needed to convince one that the possessors of such heads and faces +cannot be normal men and women. To this testimony from the +criminologists may be added that of many eminent specialists in mental +diseases, whose evidence goes to show the degeneration of the moral +sense in cases of brain-disease. Maudesley says, for instance, of moral +feeling: "Whoever is destitute of it is, to that extent, a defective +being; he marks the beginning of race-degeneracy; and if propitious +influence do not chance to check or to neutralize the morbid tendency, +his children will exhibit a further degree of degeneracy, and be actual +morbid varieties. Whether the particular outcome of the morbid strain +shall be vice, or madness, or crime, will depend much on the +circumstances of life." "When we make a scientific study of the +fundamental meaning of those deviations from the sound type which issue +in insanity and crime, by searching inquiry into the laws of their +genesis, it appears that these forms of human degeneracy do not lie so +far asunder as they are commonly supposed to do. Moreover, theory is +here confirmed by observation; for it has been pointed out by those who +have made criminals their study, that they oftentimes spring from +families in which insanity, epilepsy, or some allied neurosis exists, +that many of them are weak-minded, epileptic, or actually insane, and +that they are apt to die from diseases of the nervous system and from +tubercular diseases."[175] To the history proper of the Jukes, Dugdale +has appended a series of tables giving further information as to the +stock, environment, and present condition of some two hundred and +thirty-three criminals committed for various crimes, each of which +crimes heads a separate list. These lists are decidedly interesting, +particularly as affording us some considerable information with regard +to psychological characteristics and environment, under the headings: +"Neglected Children," "Orphans," "Habitual Criminals," "First +Offenders," "Reformable," "Hopeless," etc. From the table of percentages +we remark that, in the "Neurotic Stock," the highest percentage (40·47) +is reached in arson and the crimes against persons, or crimes of +impulse, as Dugdale terms them, while 23·03 is the percentage of +neurotic stock in the whole number of criminals examined. "This close +relationship between nervous disorders and crime," says Dugdale, "runs +parallel with the experience of England, where 'the ratio of insane to +sane criminals is thirty-four times as great as the ratio of lunatics to +the whole population of England, or, if we take half the population to +represent the adults which supply the convict prisons, we shall have the +criminal lunatics in excess in the high proportion of seventeen to +one.'" Dugdale further quotes from Dr. Bruce Thomson, surgeon to the +General Prison of Scotland, the following words: "On a close +acquaintance with criminals, of eighteen years' standing, I consider +that nine in ten are of inferior intellect, but that all are excessively +cunning." Dr. Thomson says also: "In all my experience, I have never +seen such an accumulation of morbid appearances as I witness in the +post-mortem examinations of the prisoners who die here. Scarcely one of +them can be said to die of one disease, for almost every organ of the +body is more or less diseased; and the wonder to me is that life could +have been supported in such a diseased frame." + +But with regard to this last quotation, it may be remarked that, +although many modern students of crime tend to look upon the general +diseased condition of body among criminals as the cause of their +criminality, it is generally, as a matter of fact, a cumulative growth, +vicious acts appearing now as condition, now as result, in its increase. +Vice is directly connected with disease, and crime against others, even +where it does not itself directly involve vice, is still likely to be +connected with it, since the man who is immoral in one direction is not +likely to be restrained from immorality in what is ordinarily considered +a direction of lesser wrong; and the self-gratification of vice always +presents a temptation to the man of coarser fibre. Dugdale notices that +pauperism often appears in the younger members of a family where crime +appears in the elder branches, his explanation being that crime is a +sign of comparative vigor, pauperism of greater physical weakness. + +We have found some connection between intellectual incapacity and moral +lack in the shape of crime, but the cases are extreme ones. The question +is not: Are the extremes of criminality connected with mental +incapacity? but, Is the power of intellectual comprehension, is +intelligence, always associated with sympathy and altruism? Is the +connection of these two general? Or, conversely: Is lack of sympathy and +altruism in general a sign of mental incapacity, of the power of +comprehension for another's suffering? + +The individual may be supposed to be naturally endowed with a certain +basis of tendency, which, as coördinate with a nervous organization +that, as organization, is of definite nature, is also definite. I do not +intend, here or elsewhere, to lay especial stress on the physical, as +distinguished from the psychical; merely, it is convenient for +reference. The individual character and life must be the continual +progressive issue of this basis of tendency or capacity and the +developing and modifying factors of environment. Individuals will, +therefore, _but in very different degrees and manners_, reflect the +moral standard of the society as organization, the class, and the +family, to which they belong, the importance assumed by the class or +family relations being according to the closeness and duration of +association, and the natural aptitude of the individual for one or +another sort of influence. Aside from altruistic considerations, the +individual will find it to his advantage to conform to the standards of +these environments, at least in a considerable degree. The standards +may, however, conflict, so that there is also a conflict of advantages. +Moreover, circumstances may arise such that conformity to all or any of +these standards presents much greater disadvantage than advantage, +involving great sacrifice, which may reach even to personal destruction. +But while a single anti-social act to avert personal destruction may +involve greater advantage to the individual, as life represents an +advantage over death, and while such an act is more an advantage and +less a disadvantage as it involves less conflict with social standards +(if it is the theft of food, for instance, rather than murder), any +continued course of crime in so-called civilized society must be +attended with many risks to the evil-doer, and present gain may mean +future loss of a much higher degree. Deeds conflicting with general +social standards are punished by penalties which are larger as the +conflict is greater in the eye of the state. The individual who lays +himself liable to legal punishment or social ostracism is foolish as +well as, in very many cases, bad; of course, it is possible that his +conduct may rise above the moral standards as well as that it may fall +below them. But we are now considering cases where it is, by the +assumption, supposed to fall below them. It is easy to perceive, from +this standpoint, that great and persistent criminals are likely to be of +inferior intellect, as well as wanting in moral aptitude, although, +whatever reasoning capacity they possess being developed in the line of +their own interest in their accustomed occupation, they may appear to +the more moral, who are not practised in this direction, to possess a +high degree of cunning. + +The honest man has generally a better chance than the habitual criminal, +however small his chance may be. Further, education of any sort, which +is also intellectual elevation, gives the individual better chances of +earning his own living honestly, and so renders the advantages on this +side greater, and also endows with the power of perceiving these +advantages. But these are only general truths, applying, again, to +extreme cases. There may be cases in which there seems, at least, to be +no choice left between crime and a life continually on the verge of +starvation; and though the crime means also continual risk, and higher +risk as the crime is greater and so, in general, more lucrative, the +advantage may still be reckoned by the individual as on its side. In +this case, the individual may discover, in the end, that his calculation +was mistaken; but the mistake may not be so great, the balance of +disadvantage on the side of conformity with social standards so +excessive, as to prove him below the average of intellect in his +mistaking. The wisest men make many mistakes in calculating the results +of their action. Again, the cleverer a man is, the greater is his power +to cope with the risk of detection and to avoid it. It may be objected +that the single individual cannot hope to compete continually with the +organized action of all society, and that the criminal must, at times, +submit to some degree of punishment, even if escaping its worst phases. +But if he feels no shame at the disgrace of the punishment, it may not +mean to him the greater disadvantage. + +But here we come round to the altruistic and moral emotions, for shame +is present only where the individual has a desire to please, and is +pained at the disapproval of others; that is, shame implies and +requires, in the degree in which it exists, social and altruistic +capacity. Furthermore, when we come to examine the concept of +"advantage," we find that it is as relative as that of "end," and will +be judged according to the individual predilections; to the +non-sympathetic, shameless man it is an advantage to "get on" at +whatever cost to others; to the moral man no gain appears an advantage +at the expense of principle. And, as there are all degrees of altruism +in the bases of character of different individuals, so the advantage, in +any particular case, will lie at very different points according to the +individual mind reflecting on it. Only the general truths may be +asserted, that, even to the man of less than the average moral aptitude, +great punishment must appear a disadvantage, while even to the man of +considerable moral principle death for the sake of his convictions is a +thing to be hesitated at. + +We may return to view the question in the light of the general facts of +social evolution. We found that only the general assertion could be +made, that the advantages of coöperation, the disadvantages of strife +and discord, increase with the closer relations of men, and that the +adoption of coöperation follows this line of advantage by individual +choice, and by the disadvantage under which the less social as the less +fit, labor, the latter tending gradually to disappear leaving the field +to the more social. Thus the whole progress is the result of the will of +the human being, as well as of the other forces of nature; it is only as +the individual chooses, that progress is possible. But lower types +survive long beside the more progressive, higher ones. The individual is +not so reasonable that he always perceives his own more enduring +advantage, or always chooses it even when he perceives it; he may choose +momentary gratification at the acknowledged risk, and even with the +certainty, of great future loss. Nor can it be averred that the +individual always suffers seriously from action at variance with even +the average standard; simply, the line of survival gradually changes in +favor of altruism, so that escape is less frequent and less probable; +and the lines of greatest deviation from the altruism demanded at any +period by the line of advance tend to disappear; but the altruism +demanded by any line of advance is not, up to the present time, an +absolute altruism, nor do all deviations from it result in destruction +to the individual even in extreme cases. The fact of the growing +disadvantage of selfishness, and its destructive tendency, remains, +nevertheless. It may be expressed in another form in the statement that +power of all sorts is increased by civilization, and where a coördinate +increase of self-restraint does not accompany the increased power, it +must lead to destruction, either in the case of the individual, or if +not so abruptly, then in the case of his descendants. The closer contact +of human beings and increased knowledge and coöperation mean growing +opportunity of good or evil, to self and others. The destructive forces +lie as well in the workings of social organization, in the will of man, +as in nature outside man. Legal justice, public opinion, and the opinion +of the smaller circle of personal friends and acquaintances, all have +their part. Any degree of social instinct developed in the course of +social evolution only assists in rendering social punishments of all +sorts the more felt; and thus each increment of advance assists in +further advance. Men who persist in action antagonistic to social +demands, action which they themselves acknowledge to be immoral, may yet +feel the condemnation of society so much, that, even while yet +persisting, they destroy their vitality by alcoholism or other excesses +to drown regret and remorse; habit chains them, in many cases, where the +condemnation of others reaches them only late. But the whole process of +social evolution is one of very gradual assimilation, and neither in the +world as a whole, in the nation or race, or in the tribe, clan, family, +locality, or class, is it one of equal advance on all sides. The +coöperation adopted may be, at different points, that of individuals +against individuals, of tribes against tribes, of nations against +nations, or of classes against classes. + +From still another point of view, we may look upon the evolution of man +as an intellectual as well as a moral one. We may count the continual +gain of new experience, and the variation of thought, feeling, and will +in accordance with knowledge, as adjustment to new elements of the +environment, and so, as organic progress. Since, indeed, knowledge and +the application of knowledge to more and more distant and more and more +complex and general ends is just what we designate as higher reason in +man as compared with other animal species, we cannot logically regard +the further progress of this same sort in the human species itself as +other than an increase of reason. Here, again, it is strange that an +exact line of division between the human species and the rest of life +should so often be drawn; that, although we acknowledge the necessity of +an intellectual evolution having taken place from the lower species up +to man, and recognize this intellectual evolution as the concomitant of +wider adaptation, and although we recognize also man's continuing +adaptation or experience as coördinate with progress in knowledge, we +yet should be able to regard the human race as stationary as far as +reason, intellect, is concerned. Evolution no more stands still in man +than it did before his "advent" (if we may still use a word denoting a +definite beginning, of the evolution of a species). And the reality of +an intellectual evolution at the same time with the moral evolution +being acknowledged, it follows that the two must to some extent +coincide.[176] But we have again to remember that the evolution is not +on exactly the same lines in all individuals or parts of society, that +not all lines of descent may be called also those of progress. Sympathy +is a progressive term; there are numberless degrees of it represented by +the different individuals who form society, at their different periods +of development and in their different moods. Nor can we distinguish +between natural sympathy and "extrinsic sentiment" which may interfere +with it; since feelings are no separate entities, all sentiment that +bears on a subject is intrinsic, and the final sympathy or +non-sympathetic feeling is a fusion and not a mere mixture of the +various emotions which go to make it. We cannot assert that "genuine +altruism" is the normal case, even of the present period of social +development, and certainly not when we are considering morality as an +evolution. We may hope that the standard of future generations will come +to be as much superior to our present standard as that standard is +superior to the savage standard; but it is scarcely to be expected that +the men of that better time, although they may look back at this age +with as much horror as that with which we regard the savage children +roasting their dog for sport, will pronounce it one of general idiocy or +even of "moral idiocy." The virtue of Stephen's analysis lies in the +especial notice it takes of the different degrees and phases of that +which we term "sympathy"; its fault lies in not sufficiently +distinguishing between these phases, by definition, throughout the +argument; and this fault leads, as we have seen, to a final confusion of +the different meanings, the substitution of the one for the other, and +so the proving of the higher meaning by the lower. It is scarcely true, +even in civilized society, that a comprehension of the feelings of +others is naturally associated with a "feeling with" them, even in the +lower sense; and it is certainly not true that it is naturally +associated with genuine altruism. + +The assertion that, in ignoring the sentience of living beings in +thought about them, a man is ignoring a thing of importance to himself, +is coördinate with the assertion that, in so doing, he is ignoring "an +essential part of the world as interesting" to him; for that which +appears of importance to a man is that which interests him; and it is +true that interest and attention are coördinate. But one thing may +appear to one man important, another to another. We generally consider a +thing in the relations and phases which interest us, but not all its +relations or phases always interest us. We do not follow out all the +possible lines of thought connected with a thing, we do not regard it in +all its aspects every time we think about it; we think more or less by +symbols or parts; and Stephen says that we feel by symbols also.[177] It +is by no means true of all men, or true of any man at all times, that +others are most deeply interesting to him in their relations of thought +and feeling; there are many cases where they would be quite as +interesting if they were mere automata, provided only that they could be +depended on to perform the same actions. And it is perfectly possible to +regard them in the light of their actions and the significance of these +for us, leaving quite out of account the psychical meaning of the +actions, and this also without at all "losing all the intelligence which +distinguishes one from the lower animal." Nor is sympathy coördinate +with interest in the thoughts and emotions of others; revenge is very +normal, yet it rejoices in just the fact that the living being can be +made to suffer. + +The irritation noticed by Stephen, as sometimes directed against others +whose suffering is a source of pain, is of especial interest as bearing +on the habit of some animals--wild cattle, for instance--of setting with +fury on a wounded comrade, and putting him to a violent death. A recent +writer has attempted to explain this habit as a frantic and +unintelligent endeavor to render some assistance to a suffering friend; +but the explanation seems improbable, especially as we find a +corresponding impulse to cruelty even in human society of a higher type. +In the action of the animal, there is the possibility and even the +probability of still another impulse--that excitement and exhilaration +which seems to possess many species at the sight and smell of blood, and +which finds its counterpart in the peculiar pleasure that many men of +coarser sensibilities derive from bull-fights, prize-fights, +cock-fights, etc., and that doubtless comes down to us from a time when +the struggle for existence was continually a bloody one. Just how the +two instincts may be related in the animal, it is difficult, from a +human standpoint, to say. + +Our analysis has hitherto omitted all definition of morality and +conscience. The words should properly, for some reasons, have been +defined before this. But any definition must have assumed that which +could logically be asserted only at the end of the preceding +considerations. The definitions are involved in these considerations. It +is evident that morality, as we ordinarily define it, has a very +intimate connection with the relations of individuals to each other; and +though we may conceive of a morality of the individual passing an entire +existence in solitude on a desert island devoid of animal-life, we +become aware, when we reflect on the condition of such an imaginary +personage, that many of the ordinary grounds of moral action, and moral +judgment of action, are wanting in his case. Such a person cannot, by +our assumption, beget others who may inherit his psychical and physical +qualities, and cannot injure man or beast directly or indirectly. He has +only his own welfare to consider, and if he chooses rather an animal +indulgence in such pleasures as may be within his reach, we may possibly +disapprove of his conduct, but we cannot find especial grounds for +asserting that he has not a right to his choice. It may be said that +this case is only imaginary, and that, in all actual cases of such +isolation there is no certainty that the individual may not, at some +future time, come in contact with other living animals or with human +beings. But this being admitted, we immediately come back again to the +conception of morality as dependent upon our relations to others. In +spite of all that has been said in favor of egoistic morality, of duties +to self as the source and reason of morality, it becomes evident that +altruism is a most important element of even that which we term egoistic +or personal morality. In fact, we find difficulty in distinguishing, on +a higher plane, between the duties of egoism and those of altruism; in +both we have to consider others as well as ourselves. And we begin to +suspect that we are making a mistake in separating, in a definition, +things which must be indissolubly united in actual practice; and we +surmise that such a mistake may lie at the root of the many +disagreements as to whether the preference is to be given to egoism or +to altruism in Ethics. In all evolution, the results of former +adaptation are not lost in new; merely the old assumes a higher form. So +egoism is not lost in altruism, but assumes a higher form; the care for +self becomes identical, according to the degree of altruism, with the +care for others. This fact has been utilized for the assertion that all +altruism is merely egoism. The argument commits the fallacy of using the +word "egoism" in two senses, the one of which, the higher sense, is used +to prove the other. We need to remember that the fact of development +implies degrees, and that neither egoism nor altruism is an absolute +term. A certain care of self, physically and mentally, is necessary to +cheerfulness, health, sympathy, and the due performance of labor and +kindnesses; just as, conversely, in society, the health and happiness of +the individual are dependent upon the aid of others. The antagonistic +character of the two principles is gradually modified in evolution and +disappears altogether in some cases of action; in the contemplation of +the ideal, it vanishes completely. Care for self gains a new +significance in the light of love or affection for any other being, and +in the action and reaction of character in human society, this newer +significance gradually spreads, leavening the whole of mankind. Our +analysis is unable to trace its workings and significance in all the +complicated relations of men. In like manner it is difficult to decide, +in any particular case, what the exact course is, which, in view of the +far-reaching results of an act through the action and reaction of these +relations, is the right one. The moral decision must be reached through +a consideration which should be nearer the ideal, the nearer it comes to +a consideration of all results, a due allowance being made for the +uncertainty of distant results. This uncertainty must, other things +being equal, diminish the influence of considerations of the far future +on the decision, and should properly do so; although relative importance +may, again, render the mere possibility of some one result a sufficient +reason for choosing or abstaining from an act in the face of all other +certainties and probabilities. Again, the power of calculating distant +results is increased with the growth of knowledge, and man comes, thus, +to obtain greater and greater power to shape the world about him and +mould his own life to the attainment of his ends. With this power +responsibility is also increased; the adult thief who rears children to +theft bears the chief responsibility in the beginning of their career, +and a very large share of it later on; the experienced man of the world, +who understands whither he is tending, is much more responsible than the +ignorant girl whom he seduces. + +The highest morality demands, therefore, careful judgment. The factors +to be considered are the complicated relations of men in the society of +which the judge and actor himself is a member; morality may thus be +identified with justice in the highest sense of the word. The decision +is always a difficult one on account of the great complexity of the +factors concerned; this every man perceives who endeavors, with +unbiassed mind, to discover exactly what the most moral course is in any +particular case. Some one course may be evidently immoral; but that does +not necessarily decide what the moral course is, for there may be very +many courses open to choice, or there may be at least more than one +other as alternative to the manifestly immoral one. Moreover, the +necessity for action forbids that we spend all our time in reflection +and choice. Moral responsibility demands, however, that we never cease +from the endeavor to discover where justice lies. + +A certain constancy in the constitution of society, and the necessity +for constancy or consistency in the action of the individual, give rise +to certain general rules of conduct that develop and change somewhat as +society changes; special rules of conduct which supplement these general +rules change constantly. In the societies of a primitive sort, held +together by only the loosest of bonds, personal retaliation is in vogue +and is considered moral. Revenge is a duty. In societies of a higher +sort retaliation is taken from the hands of the individual in all +matters of importance, at least as far as the revenge consists in +definite action, the motive of which can be demonstrated. The Englishman +may still knock down the man who insults him, but he may not avenge a +murder. Not only the negative morality of abstinence from violence is +demanded of the citizen of a so-called civilized society, a certain +reliability in the relations of coöperation is also necessary for the +general welfare, and thus honesty comes to be encouraged and dishonesty +to be discouraged by legal punishment and social contempt. Dishonesty in +word is not so often punished directly by law as dishonesty of act, but +there are many cases where it is impossible to distinguish between the +two, and other cases where the lie is directly punishable because of the +consequences which it involves. Beyond this, society begins early to +discourage lying in some sort, though the love of and respect for truth +obviously grows with social development. Coördinately with the +development of coöperation and mutual dependence, constancy in all the +multifarious directions and complex relations of that coöperation and +dependence, becomes more and more desirable. + +But constancy is not to be secured as an outward fact except as it +becomes a part of the inward character of men, a constant habit. The man +who lies occasionally is in at least some danger of developing a habit +in the direction of lying, as he is also in danger of destroying the +confidence of others if they discover that he sometimes lies; for they +have no means of knowing to exactly what extent untruthfulness is, or is +becoming, a habit in his case, or in what instances it may manifest +itself, in what not. Moreover, the distrust so engendered may lead to +anticipatory deception on their side, and so the circle of distrust and +untruthfulness spreads until it is met somewhere by determined truth +that demands truth in return. Thus, in spite of all that is said in +favor of the occasional lie, we instinctively feel the danger of it, +though we may not be able, until after much consideration, to assign +the exact reason for our feeling. We may admit that there are occasions +when the lie may be justifiable; but we feel that these occasions must, +then, be very exceptional. In general, it is desirable to discipline +ourselves to as close an approach to the truth as possible. If I lie in +a dozen instances, in what I consider a good cause, I am very likely to +lie again when the temptation of some merely personal gain presents +itself. The habit of truth or falsehood is, further than this, one of +the most subtle and intricate relations in our character: nothing is +more difficult than the facing of the exact truth with regard to +ourselves; cowardice and self-deception with regard to our own traits +and motives are very common, and only the most earnest and constant +effort can enable us to gain that moral courage that is the first +requisite of self-knowledge and so self-control. Any weakening of the +will in the contrary direction is dangerous. Truth is not an easy thing; +it is as difficult as justice; in fact, that which is justice in action +and the judgment which leads to action, is truth in the premises of +which the judgment is the issue. We have most of us known persons who +had so accustomed themselves to lying that they seemed no longer able to +distinguish between truth and falsehood, facts and mere impressions. +Certainly where matters of high importance which deeply concern the +public welfare are at stake, we cannot admit falsehood to be desirable +for the sake of any personal gain; and even though we may find excuses +for the failure of human courage in the face of mortal danger, there are +those of us who will still continue to think a Bruno's defiance of death +for the sake of his conviction the nobler and better choice. I have +heard it argued that this philosopher might have contributed more to the +world through a continuation of his life than he did through his death. +But surely it was one of the highest services that he could do mankind +to show a superstitious and dogmatic age that high moral purpose and +steadfastness were not necessarily associated with this or that +religious dogma. His death drew the attention of thoughtful and good men +as nothing else could have drawn it. But beyond this consideration, and +even leaving out of account the desirability of the habit of truth and +the necessity of its action in the single instance, it is doubtful +whether there is any other benefit we can confer on our fellow-men so +great as just the assurance that they can rely on us. The bitter cry of +human nature everywhere repeats the faithlessness of those on whom +trust has been staked; and the rescue of many a man from despair and +waste of life has been through the discovery of some one soul whose +truth and constancy were steadfast and unchangeable. Belief in others is +belief in our own possibilities; and distrust of others is distrust of +self, at least for the most thoughtful and introspective men. The +examples of such men as Socrates and Bruno stand to the world as pledges +of the power of faithfulness in humanity. They are the rocks on which +pessimism must shatter, and the betrayed and sorrowful may build their +faith. This is, I believe, the secret of our veneration for such men as +these, who died, not in an ecstasy of religious emotion or under the +hope of especial glory as a reward for martyrdom, but faithful to a calm +conviction, and sustained only by the love of truth and their +fellow-men. + +And this brings us to a consideration of the sacrifice of the +individual. The cases may be few where the highest standard can demand +of a man such entire and final sacrifice as the instances we have just +noted, even though it may look upon this sacrifice as the highest. But +it is evident that some degree of self-sacrifice is often necessary to +the welfare of society, and however important we may consider the +welfare of the individual, it cannot be regarded as more important than +the welfare of the whole of society as an aggregate of many individuals, +or even as more important than the welfare of a large number of other +individuals, a considerable portion of society. The legitimate degree of +sacrifice, where interests conflict and choice is necessary between the +sacrifice of the single individual and the sacrifice of many, is a +question that can be decided only according to the particular +circumstances of the case. Everything depends upon the number of +individuals on both sides, whose interests conflict, on the nature of +the sacrifices necessary, and the results of these sacrifices to the +society as a whole, as well as, in some cases, on the character of the +individuals concerned. It is often denied that the nature of the +individuals whose interests conflict, between whom choice must be made, +can ever affect that choice if it is made under principles of justice. +And in general, doubtless, there is danger of injustice in distinctions +between individuals; but it is scarcely to be doubted that, if it were +necessary to choose between the life of a great philanthropist and that +of a persistent and hardened criminal, if, for instance, both were +drowning and it were possible to save only one, the choice of most +would fall, and fall rightly, on the philanthropist. The fact that moral +choice must take different directions under different circumstances is +sometimes construed into an argument against any fixity of moral +commandments, an argument for a narrow expediency. It certainly +establishes the rule that obedience to any rule of action should never +be blind. Nevertheless, if our preceding considerations be correct, the +uniformities in social relations admit of the establishment of certain +general rules which the moral man will follow under most circumstances. + +We come finally to the definition of conscience. In humanity as a whole, +and in the single societies of which it is composed, a certain moral +evolution may be perceived which we have found reasons for believing to +be internal as well as external, a matter of heredity as well as of +instruction. In this internal sense, conscience, as innate capacity, or +tendency, may be said to be an instinct. We may not be able to explain +how the inheritance takes place in this case any more than we are able +to explain how it is possible that the chicken just from the shell may +pick at his food without instruction, and just what psychical process, +if any, accompanies the first performance of the act; or to explain how +it is that the sexual instinct appears in later life as an inheritance +of species, and why it acts uniformly. We can only say that, the proper +conditions of stimulation (which are always necessary in the case of any +instinct) being present, the action takes place. We are unable to +analyze the earliest appearance of sympathy, benevolence, and the sense +of obligation, in our individual experience, the power of self-analysis +appearing much later in life. That which, when we become capable of +reflection, we term conscience, consists in pleasure in forms of action +furthering the welfare of society--forms gradually moulded to habit with +the development of social relations,--and in a corresponding pain at the +realization of having failed of such action; the knowledge of the +demand, by society as a whole or by a part of society, of action in +accord with the general welfare, and the sense of the justice of this +demand, constituting the feeling of obligation and duty. This feeling is +early nourished in the family, the obligation we acknowledge being +towards our parents first and foremost. We have found motives to be +often of a mixed character; and this is often also the case with +remorse, the pain we experience at having failed in our duty. It may +contain an egoistic element of regret or dread at having rendered +ourselves liable to punishment or loss of some sort. + +Our whole analysis of the course by which conscience is developed tends +to show the truth of that which Darwin claimed, namely, that the moral +instinct is a development and organization of many special instincts. +But there are those who claim conscience to be a special sense, and who +generally mean much more than merely that it is, at present, an +organization of subordinate instincts. A dim analogy of the special +sense organs generally has part in their conception, and religious +reference is often made to "the original constitution of man." But +evolution knows nothing of an original constitution of man; it knows +only of a gradual development of the human. And it must be remembered +that, in evolution, that may become inherent which was not so before. +Any theory which regards even an organization of special instincts as a +special sense may, moreover, be objected to on the same grounds on which +the old idea of special faculties of thought, feeling, and will was +criticized. The old argument, used to prop the belief in conscience as +an original, higher gift, and so, in the original creation of fixed +species,--the argument that the same fundamental rules of moral conduct +are to be found in all societies,--has already been answered in the +demonstration that uniformities of human nature and necessary +similarities in all social constitution render the fundamental rules of +forbearance, aid, honesty, and truth necessary to all societies alike; +while our analysis of the course of development by which social +organization grows more and more complex, shows the necessity as well as +the reality of progress in outward and inward observance of these rules. +Du Prel argues that even life on any of the heavenly bodies, supposing +such to exist, must have some points of resemblance to our own, although +the differences due to different planetary conditions may be great; but +resemblances must assuredly be considerable where there is a common +basis of species. + +The Utilitarians are doubtless right in asserting that all rules of +morality may be traced to utility. However, there is considerable +ambiguity about the word "utility." Mr. Spencer's earlier objections to +Utilitarianism, given in "Social Statics,"--namely, that we cannot make +the greatest good of the greatest number our object because it is +impossible to perceive, without omniscience, where the greatest good +lies, and because the standard of utility is a changing one, cannot be +regarded as apposite, for we might as well say that a man cannot +endeavor to secure his own health, or that it is not well for him to do +so, because he does not possess a knowledge of all the intricate +workings of the organs of his body and so may make mistakes, or that he +cannot seek it to-day because the conditions necessary to secure it will +have changed by to-morrow; but Mr. Spencer's later objections to +Utilitarianism touch an important truth. He says, for instance, in his +"Recent Discussions in Science, Philosophy, and Morals": "Utility, +convenient a word as it is from its comprehensiveness, has very +inconvenient and misleading implications. It vividly suggests uses and +means and proximate ends; but very faintly suggests the pleasures, +positive or negative, which are the ultimate ends, and which, in the +ethical meaning of the word, are alone considered." Stephen has another +pertinent criticism of Utilitarianism, namely that the utilitarian, in +his anxiety to have his feet on solid earth, and to assign definite and +tangible grounds for every conclusion, is likely to favor the prosaic +rather than the poetical, and to leave out of account, or rank as of +little importance, finer sorts of pleasure.[178] The utilitarian is, in +fact, liable to fall into a similar error to that already noticed on the +part of those who claim that egoism is the foundation of all morality, +present as past. While accepting the theory of evolution, the +utilitarian fails to perceive, in many cases, that this lends to his +terms a progressive and increasingly complex meaning. The error has its +source, doubtless, in the fact that the utilitarian school represents a +recoil from the older, superstitious Intuitionalism, which not only +defended a doctrine of conscience as a sort of supernatural or +half-supernatural instinct, on a plane above ordinary instinct, but, +relying upon it as of such character, practically denied to reason any +authority in matters of morality. In the strong reaction from these +ideas, and under the fear of ceding any ground of advantage to the +enemy, Utilitarianism has gone to an equally inadmissible extreme of +disregarding "mere impulses" of sympathy, and has tended to reject all +conceptions of morality where it was not possible to unravel, beyond the +criticism of opponents, the intricate web of social conditions. It is +for this reason also that Utilitarianism is often egoistic; in the +endeavor to analyze back to tangible grounds of action, it was much +easier to adopt the evidently original basis of sympathy and +altruism--that is, egoism--as the present basis also, than to trace out +later developments in the many-sided organization of society. In +rejecting instinct, it was but consistent and natural to overlook also +the significance of habit in matters of morality; and thus the poet, the +moral enthusiast, the martyr, and the rigid adherent of truth, came to +be looked at askance. I do not mean to aver that all Utilitarianism has +fallen into these errors, though the tendency is distinctly in this +direction; neither the connection of a theory of utility with a +disregard of the finer sorts of happiness, and the more distant and +complex workings of social forces, nor the connection of a theory of +moral instinct with superstition, is a necessary one. + +A re-reaction against this bald Utilitarianism has set in; but some of +the forms which it takes on can no more be indorsed by the consistent +evolutionist than can the system from which it is a revolt. When +Sidgwick defends Intuitionalism with the argument that the rightness of +some kinds of action is known without consideration of ulterior +consequences, we may answer that it is true that tradition furnishes us +with many rules that we may follow without consideration of the +consequences of our acts, but that it is very doubtful whether we act +with the highest degree of morality in so doing. As to the "knowing" of +the rightness of the acts, this is surely a matter of judgment, must, +therefore, involve the considerations of consequences in some form, +though the course of reasoning followed to the attainment of what is +often termed "knowledge" in this sense may not be elaborate, and may, +indeed, go no farther than a reflection on the approval and disapproval +of society. + +The terms "higher" and "lower" have been used in our previous +considerations with regard to pleasures. The legitimacy of their use in +this connection has often been questioned. From an evolutional +standpoint, however, either they are legitimate here, or else objection +may be made, on similar grounds, to their application to man as +distinguished from the brutes or even from the original protoplasmic +cell with which evolution began. The later developments of the desires, +the newer social ends, are as much higher as the human species is higher +than the species from which it has been evolved through continued +adaptation. As, in the attainment of altruism, egoism is not lost in +the sense that the individual no longer seeks that which is most +pleasurable to him, but simply reaches a higher plane, so the +fundamental animal desires and instincts still move us, but in a quite +different form, being closely interwoven, in their later development, +with all the ideals and aspirations with which social life has supplied +us. The advocates of a "return to nature" make, therefore, a fundamental +mistake in theory. Human development is also natural. The same mistake +is made when we are told that we must be animals in practice because we +are animals by nature, or that we must "copy nature" because we are a +part of it. The former assertion ordinarily commits the fallacy of using +the word "animal" in two senses. The latter assertion involves the +fallacy of first making man a part of the nature, which he is to copy, +in order, then, to prove that he must regard himself as something +outside nature and must, therefore, slavishly follow. But if man is +himself a part of the nature he must copy, one may question why he may +not simply copy himself rather than any other part; for obviously he is +unable to copy all parts, there being many antagonisms in nature. I have +heard the argument used in defence of cruelty to animals; nature is +cruel, therefore man must be cruel. But as a matter of fact, there is no +more reason why man should copy any other part of nature, than there is +reason why the horse should imitate the habits of the hog, or +turtle-doves take example by the tiger. Necessity may sometime compel a +choice between two cruelties, to which there is no third alternative; +but this is a different argument; let us say, in this case, that we are +so compelled (if, indeed, there is no other alternative; for this +argument, like the other, is often used as a convenient excuse for mere +selfishness, where there are alternatives); let us not employ a wholly +fallacious and misleading argument which opens the way to the free +exercise of selfish disposition. + +Objections are often made to theories of the development of higher moral +qualities from egoism, on the ground that such a derivation is degrading +to that which is best in man. Some color is lent to this view by +arguments like that just noticed. But we may question whether facts can +be logically chosen or rejected according to their agreeableness, or +even their moral utility, in any case. And, again, some of us may fail +to discover any degradation in this theory of evolution. The flower may +grow from carrion, but we do not find it the less beautiful, the less +pleasing to our various senses. And we should have exactly as good +reason to regard the carrion as elevated by its office as to regard the +flower as degraded by the source of its life. As a matter of fact, we +merely find the flower pleasing and the carrion abhorrent. We are used +to this particular connection of the pleasing with the abhorrent, and +accept it as we accept much that may be to us disagreeable in our own +physical organization; but we have not yet accustomed ourselves to the +ideas of mental and moral evolution, and our recoil from them is an +illustration of the displeasing character of the wholly New. The same +argument of degradation was at first brought forward also against the +theory of an evolution of the human form from that of lower species, and +of the "purely intellectual faculties" from the animal mind. + +The question as to whether struggle is an essential element of virtue +has been so thoroughly answered by Gizycki, Stephen, and others, that it +would be superfluous to say much about it here; however, our analysis +would not be complete without some consideration of it. "The man is the +strongest," writes Stephen, "who can lift the heaviest weight or who can +lift a given weight with the greatest ease. But (and it is a proof of +the loose argument which has often been accepted in ethical disputes) +the two cases have sometimes been confounded. It would plainly be absurd +to say, 'The man is strongest who lifts the greatest weight, therefore +the man who makes the greatest effort; therefore the man who makes the +greatest struggle to lift a given weight.' But it has occasionally been +said that a man is most virtuous who resists the greatest temptation; +therefore the man who has the greatest struggle; therefore the man who +has the greatest difficulty in resisting a given temptation. Though the +fallacy does not occur in this bare form, it is not infrequently implied +in the assumption that the effort, taken absolutely, is the measure of +merit.... We are thus led to excuse a man for the very qualities which +make him wicked. True, he committed a murder, but he was so spiteful +that he could not help it; or he was exceedingly kind, but he is so +good-natured that it cost him no effort."[179] + +The difficulty lies in the fact that the struggle arising in any +particular case may result from any one of several general conditions of +character, between which it is often difficult to distinguish. An +absence of struggle may mean simply a general weakness of character +which makes a man ready to yield to any and almost all momentary +influences, good or evil; the agreement with another's argument may +signify absence of the power to reason for oneself; but, on the other +hand, it may mean the highest intellectual power of unbiassed judgment; +the act that follows such agreement as its result may mean will-power, +or it may mean vacillating weakness that, if led by a good influence at +the present moment, will be as easily or nearly as easily swayed by an +evil one, the next. We are all acquainted with persons who invariably +agree with all sides, and shilly-shally in a corresponding manner in +their action, accomplishing little or no positive good in any direction, +though often positive evil. For the reason of this frequent weakness of +character in what we call the "good-natured" person, the term +"good-natured" has come to have a certain idea of mental and moral +inferiority connected with it. In a similar manner, some men who are +generally called "good" are swayed to a greater extent by tradition and +lack of courage to act for themselves than by strong desire to know and +do the right, and thus, very unfortunately, the excellent word "good" +even comes to be looked upon with a certain degree of disdain. On the +other hand, a man may find much difficulty in doing right in a certain +instance, because of the strength of emotions that would be, under +ordinary circumstances, morally desirable and are, in themselves, +admirable even in the moment of his temptation, although a yielding to +this temptation would, nevertheless, involve great wrong. No one could +blame the agony and struggle of the switchman who, in the moment when he +is about to rescue a passenger-train from imminent collision by +switching it to another track, suddenly perceives his baby-girl seated +upon the rails. Strong and ennobling love between man and woman may +involve, under certain conditions, temptation and struggle; even the +best of our impulses may not always be followed, if we desire to act +morally. Few, if any persons could refuse admiration and respect to the +love between Phillip Tredennis and Mrs. Amory in Mrs. Burnett's "Through +one Administration." But not all strong feeling is of an admirable +nature; the revengefulness of the murderer, the vicious lust of a Joseph +Phillippe, the impatience of the constitutionally belligerent man, are +not to be praised, but condemned. Stephen's argument, therefore, that +struggle is adjudged an element of virtuous character in many cases +because its absence would show "a defect in some faculty of enjoyment," +includes too much; for Jack the Ripper, and others who especially +delight in crime, possess faculties of enjoyment the entire absence of +which in other men we do not look upon as a defect.[180] Stephen +restates his position in another form, saying that "If a man resists any +inducement because it has no charms for him, his act does not prove +virtue unless the inducement be such as to appeal only to the wicked." +It is only because, incidentally, those qualities moulded in human +society, and therefore fundamentally good, may come into conflict with +each other, that we fall into the habit of connecting the idea of +struggle with morality; in face of the fact that readier response to +moral stimulus must constitute all moral advancement. + +And these reflections lead us to remark on the common fallacy that +strength of emotion means necessarily a lack of the moral direction of +emotion, and that conversely moral self-direction argues weakness of +emotional capacity. The direction of emotion is changed with evolution, +as we have seen, but this does not mean that emotion is lessened in +force. In the man of highest morality, the emotions are merely moulded +to a greater harmony with social needs, a harmony that is not weakness +but strength, not mere narrow reaction upon momentary impulse or +one-sided sympathy with a few to the exclusion of the many, but, in +contrast to this lower impulsiveness, an all-sidedness that is the +result of reflection and choice. I say this all-sidedness is "the +result" of reflection; for I do not mean to intimate that the moral man +is less impulsive than the immoral man, or that he is obliged to +consider long before every act. Merely his impulsiveness is of a higher +sort; in it both racial and individual adjustments to social needs find +expression; and reason always stands, figuratively speaking, in the +background, ready to suppress the spontaneity where the conditions are +such that it ceases to be moral. It has been part of our whole analysis +to show that reason and instinct, thought and feeling, are by no means +antagonistic. Simply, feeling may take one direction in one man, another +in another; in the criminal, it is developed in the direction of +anti-social acts; in the profligate, it takes the same direction, but in +a less degree; the original savage is stronger in him than in the moral +man, who belongs to a later and higher type, and finds his pleasure in +acts in accordance with the welfare of his fellow-men and fellow-women. +As the human being is a higher development than other species because he +is adapted to a wider circle of nature, so just as truly the moral man +is a higher human development, because function is, in him, adjusted to +a wider circle of conditions--to complex social requirements which +represent the happiness of his fellow-men. Altruism is not, because a +later development, "artificial," as Barratt calls it, any more than man +is artificial in comparison with the ape, or the ape is artificial in +comparison with original protoplasm. Nor can virtue consist, as Barratt +conceives, in a yielding to all emotions,[181] as long as man has not +yet attained the highest summit of morality where all emotions follow +moral directions, without conflicts and without constraint. But neither +can morality be distinguished as "a constraining power opposed to +instinct and emotion in general,"[182] as Stephen at one point defines +it. Struggle and constraint are not necessarily elements of moral +action; kind and moral action often follows upon impulse with no effort +whatever; and, on the other hand, the basest characters may know +struggle of an extreme nature when the directions of self-interest +conflict. + +We have already noticed the origin of punishment in revenge, which is +the outcome of a fundamental, egoistic instinct of self-defence; and we +have traced its development up to the monopolization of its extremer +forms by society as a whole through state organization. It is impossible +for analysis to give any adequate representation of the workings of +Reward and Punishment in society, except as we draw an exact line +between legal and other forms. But such a distinction, however +convenient for particular purposes, is obviously scientifically +injustifiable in a general theory of social morals. The constraint of +family disinheritance and social ostracism, of threats of all sorts, of +vituperation, of disapproval and coldness, are only higher forms of +revenge or punishment, by which men influence each other's action, as +savages influence each other through physical suffering and the fear of +it, in a more primitive and less humane manner; and state reward for +services, praise, and approval, are all forms of encouragement, by which +men similarly incite each other not merely to a negative abstention from +undesirable acts, but to a positive performance of desirable acts. With +the development of sympathy, punishment tends to become less brutal on +the one side, while, on the other, the less brutal forms come to have as +great influence as the more brutal ones formerly had. Furthermore, the +distinct calculation of the attainment of egoistic ends gives place to +the impulsive reaction of the sense of justice on the one hand, and, on +the other, to the readier response to disapproval and to the desires of +others, through social predispositions and affections which are more +altruistic than egoistic. + +But there are two diametrically opposed schools, neither of which +perfectly agrees with the theory of will as stated in a preceding +chapter of this work, and both of which may therefore take exception to +the theory of recompense which follows naturally upon that theory. The +one, the school which asserts Free Will not in a natural, but in a +supernatural, or half supernatural sense, may object to the grounds for +punishment assumed in our analysis; this school is answered by the +demonstration of the actual course of development taken by reward and +punishment. The other school maintains, on the ground that man is a part +of nature, that there is no merit in conscientiousness, and that +evil-doing, being as much dependent upon organization and social +environment as disease, cannot, on scientific grounds, be punishable. It +is to be noticed, however, that many of the advocates of the theory that +state punishment is injustifiable yet inflict punishment upon their own +children; and we may remind them, in this connection, that they can +scarcely claim the will of the child to be freer or less the result of +general social conditions than that of the adult, and that, moreover, +they themselves are the most immediate links in the chain of conditions +producing this will. Furthermore, they are inconsistent in their +practice if they visit any blame on evil-doers or criminals; they are +logically restricted to, at most, an "I differ with you in opinion," to +Jack-the-Ripper, to the cruelest of slave hunters, or to the Chinese who +are said to have regarded with indifference the burning of their +fellow-men on the ship "Shanghai," while they exerted themselves to +secure the wreckage. Nor, if punishment and blame are inadmissible, on +the ground of the determination of the will, can they consistently show +greater consideration to benevolent than to malevolent men, no matter +how great the public benefits these men have conferred, or what aid they +have given to the advancement of society? If it is unjust to punish +criminals because their acts are determined, then it is also wholly +unjust to the rest of mankind to praise a Bruno, or a dying Sir Philip +Sidney giving the cup of water offered him to another. If good men might +be criminals, had they the criminal organization, it is equally true +that ordinary and selfish men might be Brunos and Sir Philip Sidneys if +they had the organization of Brunos and Sir Philip Sidneys; why then do +ordinary men the injustice of praising and admiring such nobility of +character? Nor can a theory of determinism which refuses to blame the +individual consistently lay the blame of crime and badness on society as +a whole, as it often does; for society as a whole is composed of +individuals, all of whom are equally determined in their action. Or, if +we choose to regard society as a unit, then it may be said that it is as +much the product of nature as a whole as the individual is its product. +If it be objected that we do not blame nature as a whole because it is +soulless, we may inquire what is meant by soulless; society has no +composite soul, no soul except in its individuals. The real significance +of the objection is that we cannot influence nature, by our blame, to +the production of better characters; but it is also true that we cannot +influence society except through the individuals composing it; and here +we have, again, in a nutshell, the real reason and justification of +punishment and blame. + +The Socialists have been prominent of late in disclaiming the right of +the state to punish, on the ground that society as a whole is +responsible for the evil of individual characters. But it is not +noticeable that all Socialists refrain from blaming non-socialistic and +conservative individuals, although it is obviously true that these are +quite as much determined, and as irresponsible from a deterministic +point of view, as are the criminals. Moreover, even the mildest +Socialists advocate the measure of denying food to the man who can work +but will not do so. By what right do these determinists make use of the +expression "can but will not"? And what right have they, on their own +showing, to administer this chastisement to the lazy man? Surely sloth +cannot be interpreted as preëminently a power of will, which no other +man possesses; and surely sloth is, as much as criminality, the product +of social conditions. If it be objected that this denial of food is no +punishment but merely a letting alone, we may inquire whether the +starvation which used to be inflicted on prisoners for some offences was +not a positive form of punishment. And if it be said that the slothful +man has it in his power, at any time, to escape starvation by beginning +to work, we may answer that the state says to the criminal, also, that +he has nothing to do with its penalties as long as he abstains from the +acts for which they are imposed. Why should the vindictive man, the +Joseph Phillippes, the Jukes, and Eyrauds of the future receive +sustenance, care, and kindness, in homes set apart for their especial +use, while the man who is merely indolent is driven to solitude and the +roots and herbs of the forest for the support of existence? Perhaps, in +such case, the indolent man may claim society's greater indulgence by +taking to crime. + +These determinists are sometimes heard to make the assertion that the +punishment of criminals is wrong, but that punishment of children must +still be resorted to for their own sake as well as for that of society, +since their character can be disciplined and bettered by it. When we +arrive at this inconsistency, we get at the root of the whole objection +to state punishment of criminals. There is a growing dissatisfaction +with present methods of punishment, and this dissatisfaction, +insufficiently analyzed, takes the form of objection to punishment +altogether. Benevolence is progressing beyond present laws, and demands +their change; that is the gist of the whole matter. + +In the light of our analysis of the evolution of morality, we may repeat +the inquiry, left unanswered at the beginning of this work, as to +whether, in the province of morals more than in other provinces, we find +a supernatural element or an element which, in any way, gives us an +intimation of the supernatural or transcendental. The question must be +replied to in the negative. If it be objected that we must not expect to +find the supernatural in the natural, we may reply that that is just +what we have not expected to do. The fallacy of such an expectation does +not lie with us. Nature gives us no intimation of a supernature, when we +cease to see it with the uncomprehending eye of the untutored savage. +Nor can the gross, cruel, and superstitious savage be regarded as, in +contrast to more social and humane man, better fitted to be the medium +of spiritual truth. + +And this brings us to the discussion of the presence or absence of +conscience in lower animal species. We have found that some species have +social organization quite as elaborate as that of many savage tribes, +and even more elaborate than that of some tribes. We are able to view +these organizations only in their external features; we cannot, however, +in most cases, suppose the species to be devoid of consciousness of some +sort, and consciousness involves, in any case, pleasure in accustomed +function and in its constantly experienced results; the two, action and +experience of its results, are, in fact, both functional. The argument +of inconstancy, and of inconstancy at points at which it is not found +among men, has been shown to be absolutely valueless as directed against +any theory of the existence of sympathy and "social instinct" among +other animal species. We too are inconstant in our altruism; and habits +of altruistic action do not necessarily take the same course with other +species that they do with us, differences in social organization +rendering differences of habit necessary. If other species fall below us +in self-sacrifice for the community in some respects, they often surpass +us in others. We may conclude, then, that habits of mutual assistance, +habits which we perceive to be externally altruistic, must also be +supposed to be connected in many cases with some internal corresponding +feelings of the same nature as those which we term, in man, altruistic +and social. I do not see how we can avoid this conclusion unless we deny +all consciousness to other species; for consciousness must involve, on +any plane, feeling as pleasure and pain. And on the supposition of +memory, and of the connection in memory of those things and events which +are constantly connected in experience, we must suppose the seeking of +ends, also, though they are, probably, in most cases, much nearer ends +than our human ones. It may be true, as Professor Morgan thinks, that +animals have no general concept of ends and means; but a general concept +of ends and means is not necessary to the recognition of the fact that +this or that particular form of action will have this or that particular +result. It is not necessary to apply the terms "ends" and "means" to +events in order to understand their connection as following upon each +other with constancy. Moreover, we are accustomed to count only our own +ends as ends proper, and so, only our own wisdom as wisdom; and thus we +term other species stupid for not understanding just our wisdom and +acting on a line with us; but certainly there are plenty of human beings +whom we do not term wanting in reasoning powers who seek their own +destruction or harm much more stupidly than many animals; and, on the +other hand, there are many animals who act much more consistently for +their own and others' welfare than a large number of mankind do. If the +failure of other species to comprehend our language and understand our +action is to be termed stupid, then what shall we term our failure to +understand their methods of communication and motives of action? It is +time for us to emancipate ourselves from this narrow anthropomorphism in +which we are accustomed to live, and to realize and acknowledge that +there may be other consciousness than our own, with quite other +thoughts, feelings, habits, ends, and motives. It is a part of our +customary egoism that we prefer to exalt ourselves; it is more +gratifying to our vanity, as well as more convenient to our conscience, +to regard other species as half-automatic and beneath our sympathy; we +thus have excuse for using them as we like. So we call the tiger cruel +because he is carnivorous as we ourselves are; we call the fox cunning +and sly for lying in ambush for his prey; but when we go out to take, by +similar means, our special prey, we call our action a triumph of +superior reason. We term the fox a thief, too, when he takes again from +us what we are continually taking, and what we took originally, from the +beasts. What we regard as right and justifiable and even admirable in +ourselves we regard as wrong, cruel, mean, selfish, underhanded, +abhorrent, and worthy of all punishment in the animals. As for the +faithfulness unto death displayed by many animals, we do not regard that +as heroism or worthy our admiration, although we might often take +pattern from it. How should we understand other species? We are not +accustomed to associate this or that feeling of pleasure in ourselves +with a pricking up of ears or a wagging of tail, or our deepest +despondency and pain at repulse with this or that peculiar posture or +animal cry. A faint trembling of the human hand from fear or pain will +stir us with the most profound sympathy; but the sensitive quiver of the +whole body in some helpless, hopeless animal, that cannot speak its fear +or crave for mercy in the human tongue, touches but seldom an answering +chord in our hearts. Shame on our vanity and our hard-heartedness! + +The whole of our analysis has tended to lay emphasis on habit. And this +leads us to comment on a certain disdain and contempt for habit and +custom which is continually arising in some quarters. The whole history +of mankind is the history of the formation, gradual change, and spread +of the change, of habit, and of custom as the social form of the latter. +With the progress of society, habits and customs grow old and must be +discarded; but only careful consideration can show us when change is +desirable. It is, therefore, both stupid and foolish to inveigh against +a habit merely because it is habit or because it is of long standing. +Originality, intellectual superiority, does not consist in a contempt +for custom merely as custom, but in the power to weigh all sides, to +view a matter in all lights, without regard to its age or newness, and +to decide on its worth according to its inherent merits or defects. In +the rebellion from the slavery to tradition as such, the opposite, +equally unreasonable extreme of denunciation of all existing custom is +often reached. Thus, some followers of Socrates, adhering slavishly to +the word of their master but failing to comprehend its inner meaning, +dispensed with all the social usages of their nation, and despised its +laws. Of late patriotism is denounced as mere race-prejudice founded on +habit and association. But all our affections are matters of habit and +association. Doubtless, patriotism may often involve narrowness and +injustice; so also may a mother's love for her child, or any other of +the forms of the preference of affection. However, it does not follow, +therefore, that mother-love is to be denounced and rejected; what we +need is not less mother-love, or father-love, but a counterbalancing +sympathy for other human beings outside the family, also. And so too we +do not want less love of country, but the infusion of it with a broader +humanity and justice. The love of a mother need not render her less, but +may, on the contrary, render her more, sympathetic; and the love of +country may be combined with a wide-reaching regard for the welfare of +other men outside the nation to which the patriot belongs. In fact, the +mother who is incapable of peculiar love for her own child is not likely +to be capable of deep sympathy with other human beings; and I am +inclined to believe that there must be something lacking in a man's +general moral constitution when he feels no peculiar regard for the land +to which he belongs. If it is foolish, as is sometimes asserted, to love +one country more than another, simply because we happen to have been +born in it, then it is also equally foolish to love our mother simply +because she happens to be our mother. There may be other lands as good +as ours, and possibly there may be other mothers as good as ours; but +affection does not reason thus. + +Is social development the cause of an increase in sympathy, or is the +increase of sympathy the cause of social progress and prosperity? Or is +increase of population the cause of both by forcing men to +companionship? Or is not, rather, increase of population the effect of +prosperity? In his work on "Recent Discussions in Science, Philosophy, +and Morals," Herbert Spencer writes of the altruistic sentiments: "The +development of these has gone on only as fast as society has advanced to +a state in which the activities are mainly peaceful. The root of all the +altruistic sentiments is sympathy, and sympathy could have become +dominant only when the mode of life, instead of being one that +habitually inflicted direct pain, became one which conferred direct and +indirect benefits; the pains inflicted being mainly incidental and +indirect;" and in an essay on "Progress," the author writes: "Social +progress is supposed to consist in the produce of a greater quantity and +variety of the articles required for satisfying men's wants; in the +increasing security of person and property; in widening freedom of +action; whereas, rightly understood, social progress consists in those +changes of structure in the social organism which have entailed these +consequences." The two paragraphs appear contradictory of each other, +the first laying emphasis upon outer conditions as cause of inner +change, the second seeming to emphasize inner conditions as cause; but +the terms of the second quotation are somewhat ambiguous. As to the +first, to do Mr. Spencer full justice, he corrects this a little farther +down, where he says that "sympathy is the concomitant of gregariousness, +the two having all along increased by reciprocal aid." + +The root of the whole difficulty, with regard to our theories of cause +and effect in social development, as with regard to our theories of +cause and effect in other parts of nature, lies in our desire for unity +and simplicity. Instead of attempting to unravel the intricate web of +the conditions, we fix our attention on some one feature or side of the +process, and regard the whole development as revolving round this pivot. + +It is easy to find examples, in the history of science and opinion, of +the errors into which the concepts of cause and effect have led men, +and of the repeated recurrence of uncertainty to which the unveiling of +these errors in the further march of knowledge, has led. For instance, +we find some writers on nervous diseases adhering to the view that +insanity is sometimes the effect of a weak yielding to a violent +disposition; more contending that the violence is itself the effect of +incipient insanity; and still others opining that both violence of +disposition and insanity are the effect of a general diseased state of +the system. Ancient schools of medicine traced all diseases to the +blood, and so drained off the fluid; and the patent medicines of to-day +generally select some one organ as the source of all disease. I once +heard the assertion that a certain woman had died with grief contested +by a physician on the ground that the cause of her death was +consumption; he added that deaths from sudden mental shock were known to +medicine, but the cases were rare; another medical man suggested that +the system might not have been in a perfectly healthy condition at the +time of the shock, in those cases; and the first man seemed a little +puzzled when a third person suggested that there was doubtless a +physical basis in every case. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[165] "Adam Bede." + +[166] "Daniel Deronda." + +[167] "The Science of Ethics," pp. 238, 239. The italics are mine. + +[168] Ibid. pp. 242, 243. + +[169] As above, pp. 255, 256. The italics are mine. + +[170] Ibid. p. 443. + +[171] Ibid. p. 441. The italics are mine. + +[172] Ibid. p. 236. The italics are mine. + +[173] Ibid. p. 237. + +[174] Ibid. p. 239. The italics are here also mine. + +[175] "The Pathology of Mind," 102 _et seq._ + +[176] In this general and limited sense, but only in this general and +limited sense, does Spencer's assertion that more moral conduct shows a +greater adjustment of means to ends, correspond to the facts. + +[177] See "The Science of Ethics," p. 62. + +[178] "The Science of Ethics," pp. 375, 376. + +[179] "The Science of Ethics," p. 300. + +[180] "The Science of Ethics," p. 301. + +[181] See Part I, this book, p. 117. + +[182] "The Science of Ethics," p. 310. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE MORAL PROGRESS OF THE RACE AS SHOWN BY HISTORY + + +The necessity of the constant assimilation of savage tribes, of the +peopling of thinly inhabited areas, renders social evolution as a whole +exceedingly slow. Nor can there be, even in isolated peoples, any sudden +leap from savagery to civilization; in other words the term +"civilization" is not of absolute but of comparative, progressive, +import. Nor can we suppose the social evolution to have been only +outward; we cannot suppose that our cave-dwelling, man-eating, rude +ancestors, if they could have been suddenly transported, in infancy +even, into the midst of modern civilization by means of a Carlylean +wishing-cap, or by some method of projection in time similar to that by +which men promise to "knock each other into the middle of next week," +would have been able to equal modern men in mental and moral attainment. +We may gain some idea of the gentle manners and moral character of our +early progenitors from the customs of savage peoples of the present day; +although a very large number of these stand upon a higher plane than did +the ancient savages known to geology. I insert a few extracts from +Lubbock:-- + +"Mr. Galbraith, who lived for many years, as Indian agent, among the +Sioux (North America), thus describes them: 'They are bigoted, +barbarous, and exceedingly superstitious. They regard most of the vices +as virtues. Theft, arson, rape, and murder, are among them regarded as +the means of distinction; and the young Indian from childhood is taught +to regard killing as the highest of virtues. In their dances and at +their feasts, the warriors recite their deeds of theft, pillage, and +slaughter, as precious things; and the highest, indeed the only, +ambition of a young brave is to secure "the feather," which is but a +record of his having murdered or participated in the murder, of some +human being--whether man, woman, or child, it is immaterial; and after +he has secured his first "feather," appetite is whetted to increase the +number in his cap, as an Indian brave is estimated by the number of his +feathers.'"[183] + +"'Conscience,' says Burton, 'does not exist in Eastern Africa, and +"repentance" expresses regret for missed opportunities of mortal crime. +Robbery constitutes an honorable man; murder--the more atrocious the +midnight crime the better--makes the hero.'"[184] + +"In Tahiti, the missionaries considered that 'not less than two-thirds +of the children were murdered by their parents.' Mr. Ellis adds, 'I do +not recollect having met with a female in the islands, during the whole +period of my residence there, who had been a mother while idolatry +prevailed, who had not imbrued her hands in the blood of her offspring.' +Mr. Nott also makes the same assertion. Girls were more often killed +than boys, because they were of less use in fishing and in war."[185] + +"Williams tells us that 'offences, in Fijian estimation, are light or +grave according to the rank of the offender. Murder by a chief is less +heinous than a petty larceny committed by a man of low rank.'"[186] + +"Among the Khonds of Central India, human sacrifices prevailed until +quite lately. 'A stout stake is driven into the soil and to it the +victim is fastened, seated, and anointed with ghee, oil, and turmeric, +decorated with flowers, and _worshipped_ during the day by the assembly. +At nightfall the licentious revelry is resumed, and on the third morning +the victim gets some milk to drink, when the presiding priest implores +the goddess to shower her blessings on the people. After the mock +ceremony, nevertheless, the victim is taken to the grove where the +sacrifice is to be carried out; and to prevent resistance, the bones of +the arms and legs are broken, or the victim drugged with opium or +datura, when the janni wounds his victim with the axe. This act is +followed up by the crowd. A number now press forward to obtain a piece +of his flesh, and in a moment he is stripped to the bones.' + +"An almost identical custom prevails among the Marimos, a tribe of South +Africa much resembling the Bechuanas.... Schoolcraft mentions a... +sacrifice to the 'Spirit of Corn' among the Pawnees. The victim was +first tortured by being suspended over a fire. 'At a given signal, a +hundred arrows were let fly, and her whole body was pierced. These were +immediately withdrawn, and her flesh cut from her bones in small pieces +which were put into baskets and carried into the cornfield, where the +grain was being planted, and the blood squeezed out on each hill.'"[187] +"Human sacrifices occurred in Guinea, and Burton saw 'at Benin City a +young woman lashed to a scaffolding upon the summit of a tall blasted +tree, and being devoured by the turkey-buzzards. The people declared it +to be a "fetich" or charm for bringing rain.'... + +"Captain Cook describes human sacrifices as prevalent among the +islanders of the Pacific, and especially in the Sandwich group.... War +captives were frequently sacrificed in Brazil."[188] + +"The lowest races have no institution of marriage. True love is almost +unknown among them, and marriage in its lowest phases is by no means a +matter of affection and companionship.... In North America, the Tinné +Indians had no word for 'dear' and 'beloved'; and the Algonquin language +is stated to have contained no verb meaning 'to love,' so that when the +Bible was translated by the missionaries into that language it was +necessary to invent a word for the purpose."[189] + +"The position of women in Australia seems, indeed, to be wretched in the +extreme. They are treated with the utmost brutality, beaten and speared +in the limbs on the most trivial provocation. 'Few women,' says Eyre, +'will be found, upon examination, to be free from frightful scars upon +the head or the marks of spear-wounds upon the body. I have seen a young +woman who, from the number of these marks, appeared to have been almost +riddled with spear-wounds.'"[190] + +"Collins thus describes the manner in which the natives about Sydney +used to procure wives: 'The poor wretch is stolen upon in the absence of +her protectors. Being first stupefied with blows, inflicted with clubs +or wooden swords, on the head, back, and shoulders, every one of which +is followed by a stream of blood, she is then dragged through the woods +by one arm, with a perseverance and violence that it might be supposed +would displace it from its socket. This outrage is not resented by the +relations of the female, who only retaliate by a similar outrage when +they find an opportunity.'"[191] + +"Indeed," says Lubbock, "I do not remember a single instance in which a +savage is recorded as having shown any symptoms of remorse; and almost +the only case I can call to mind, in which a man belonging to one of the +lower races has accounted for an act by saying explicitly that it was +right, was when Mr. Hunt asked a young Fijian why he had killed his +mother."[192] + +We have direct evidence, in many present or recent customs, of so-called +civilized or half-civilized nations, that the barbarous customs +described in "The Origin of Civilization," and in the books of many +travellers, are not the original and special inventions of modern +savages merely, but that similar customs prevailed among our +progenitors. Lubbock notices many of these. The marriage ceremonies of +many peoples are particularly suggestive of a time when violent capture +was the means of obtaining a wife, and cruelty of treatment was her +usual portion.[193] Human sacrifices were common among many peoples of +ancient Europe; and the cancellation of responsibility for murder with +fines (often nominal in the case of the murder of a man of lower rank) +was a widely spread custom. "In Russia," writes Lubbock, "as in +Scandinavia, human sacrifices continued down to the introduction of +Christianity. In Mexico and Peru they seem to have been peculiarly +numerous. Müller has suggested that this may have partly arisen from the +fact that these nations were not softened by the possession of domestic +animals.[194] Various estimates have been made of the number of human +victims annually sacrificed in the Mexican temples. Müller thinks 2500 +is a moderate estimate; and in one year it appears to have exceeded +100,000." "In Northern Europe, human sacrifices were not uncommon. The +Yarl of the Orkneys is recorded to have sacrificed the son of the King +of Norway to Odin in the year 893. In 993, Hakon Yarl sacrificed his own +son to the gods. Donald, King of Sweden, was burnt by his people as a +sacrifice to Odin, in consequence of a severe famine. At Upsala was a +celebrated temple, round which an eye-witness assured Adam of Bremen +that he had seen the corpses of seventy-two victims hanging up at one +time."[195] + +A peculiar confusion as to the definition of morality sometimes gives +rise to such vagaries of theory as the defence of murder committed by +savages, and other cruelties practised, on the ground that these things +are not considered sins in the moral code of the peoples among which +they are practised; murder is thus excused on the plea that _wrecking is +also looked upon as permissible_;[196] and Wallace thinks that savages +live up to their "simple moral code" as well as civilized human beings +to their elaborate one, so that they are, in reality, as moral as these +latter. It should not be forgotten, however, that the moral code is +itself the product of the tribe and represents its moral sentiment. +Lubbock remarks that if a man's simple moral code permits him to rob and +murder, the code is at least an unfortunate one for the victims.[197] On +the other hand, Lubbock himself defends human sacrifice as the result of +"deep and earnest religious feeling."[198] But if sympathy were strong, +such sacrifices would be impossible, and the religious code would be +altered just as the religious code of Christians is altered to keep up +with social progress. Opinion and feeling are not two separable things, +one of which may advance while the other remains behind; when feeling +becomes strong enough, the opinion arises that this or that custom +before practised is wrong. As long as man is cruel by nature, however, +conscience will not torment him for cruelty, and it is possible for him +to regard it as wholly justifiable. + +But I am of the opinion that moral progress has been made not only since +the time of our savage ancestors, but even also since the time of the +great ancients, in spite of the obstacles to such advancement presented +in the necessity of the moral assimilation of immense races of +savages,--the leavening of the whole of Europe. I believe that modern +civilization has caught up to and surpassed the ancient. The knowledge +we have of ancient peoples is necessarily most imperfect; nevertheless, +we may, I believe, discover considerable evidence of general moral +inferiority to the present day. Any advance that has been made will be +likely to be most observable in those general virtues which lie at the +foundation of all social coöperation--truthfulness in word and honesty +in act, and the gradual widening of concepts of justice from individual +and class privilege and race prejudice, to the inclusion of mankind as a +whole. And the growth of sympathy will be most noticeable in the +treatment of those classes of beings which possess least physical means +of compelling respect for their rights--animals, children, women, the +poor, and ignorant, and sick, and aged. + +We may begin with the children. The Lacedemonian custom of giving over +the weak and defective children to destruction is familiar to us all. +Before Solon, children were often sold by Athenian parents for debt; and +even during the ages of greatest culture, the exposure of children seems +to have been a common Athenian practice, regarded with little or no +disapproval by the general public. Mahaffy writes: "The cool way in +which Plato in his Republic speaks of exposing children, shows that, as +we should expect, with the increase of luxury, and the decay of the +means of satisfying it, the destruction of infants came more and more +into the fashion. What can be more painfully affecting than the practice +implied by Socrates, when he is comparing himself to a midwife (Theæt. +151 B.). 'And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I +discover that the conception you have formed is a vain shadow, do not +quarrel with me, _as the manner of women is, when their first children +are taken from them_. For I have actually known some men ready to bite +me when first I have deprived them of a darling folly.'"[199] That the +exposure of children is generally mentioned only incidentally by Greek +writers, is perhaps the strongest argument of all that the custom was +regarded with indifference by the majority. A considerable number of the +exposed children seem to have been rescued to be brought up as +prostitutes, but many must have perished miserably. We have reason for +doubting whether the average Greek would have shown an equal sympathy to +that of Mr. Stephen's modern pickpockets, in the supposed case of danger +to a child on the race-course;[200]--unless, indeed, the child were an +especially fine bit of animal flesh. + +The same narrow sort of expediency in morals which permitted the +exposure of children is exhibited, again, in the lack of regard for the +aged shown by the Athenians at all periods of their history;--in Sparta +the old men were treated with some considerable respect. Says Mahaffy: +"The strongest case against the Periclean Greeks, and one which marks +their parentage most clearly from their Homeric ancestors, is the +treatment of their old men. For here it is no inferior class, but their +equals, nay even those to whom they directly owed their greatness, whom +they cast aside with contempt when their days of usefulness had passed +by.... The Greek lawgivers were accordingly most explicit in enjoining +upon children the nurture and support of aged parents who could +otherwise expect little from the younger generation. The Attic law alone +added a qualification, that the children were to be without +responsibility if their parents had neglected to educate them." +Aristophanes describes the treatment of the aged in his "Wasps,"--"where +he declares that the only chance of respect or even safety is to retain +the power of acting as a juryman, so extorting homage from the accused +and supporting himself by his pay without depending on his children. +When he comes home with his fee, they are glad to see him, in fact he is +able to support a second wife and younger children, as the passage +plainly implies, whereas otherwise the father must look towards his son +and his son's steward to give him his daily bread, 'uttering +imprecations and mutterings lest he knead me a deadly cake,' a dark +insinuation which opens to us terrible suspicions."[201] + +The women of Greece were comparatively well cared for, as might be +expected in a nation and country peculiarly susceptible to the influence +of grace and beauty; they were consequently of a comparatively admirable +type. However, we are fond, I think, of indulging in this respect, our +preference for believing the romantic; so that we usually select +carefully the best instances and infer that the standard of all Greece +was on this plane. The reasons for this are manifold. We have the habit +of imagining, from Greek art, that all Greek women were beautiful; and +it is unpleasant to associate moral inferiority with great beauty, or to +imagine its being treated with unkindness or disrespect. Again, we are +pleased at discovering examples of love and faithfulness even in the +far-away ages, and the pleasure of the discovery exalts the few +instances with which Greek literature provides us to a disproportionate +importance and significance. Disappointed at not finding their perfect +ideal in their own age and nation, men have pleased themselves with the +imagination of perfection in an object belonging to another age, with +regard to which no sordid reality of every-day relation and common, +vulgar needs could intervene to check enthusiasm. Furthermore, it is +safer to admire those distant from us in time and place, since we are +secure from any demand of faithfulness and self-sacrifice from their +side. Poets and artists have assisted us in this license of agreeable +fancy. So we dwell, with special emphasis, on the beauty of Penelope's +character, which is not at all exceptionally faithful as measured by +modern standards; we warm over the story of Antigone while we pass by, +without special enthusiasm, a thousand instances as admirable in our own +day and within our own observation; and we read, with delight, the tale +of the Greek who encouraged his ignorant child-wife by gentle treatment +until she overcame her timidity, became "tame and docile," and was +persuaded to discard cosmetics and high-heeled shoes and devote herself +to her household duties; though the most of us would regard the forced +marriage of such a child, if it occurred in our own day, as no more than +child-barter, and the conduct of the husband (doubtless not worsened by +his representation of it) as but a moderate exhibition of common +decency. Mahaffy says of the Greeks of the Homeric age: "There is ample +evidence that the lower-class women, the slaves and even the free +servants, were subjected to the hardest and most distressing sorts of +work, the carrying of water, and the grinding of hand-mills; in fact we +see them standing to men-servants nearly in the same relation that the +North-American squaw stands to her husband--over-taxed, slave-driven, +worn out even with field-work, while he is idling, or smoking, or +sleeping."[202] The wives of Athens of all periods were little more than +a higher class of household servants, with almost no share, by +education, in either the science or the art that was the delight of +their nation and made its superiority. The position of the hetairai was +better in some respects; but the apparently widely spread preference of +the Greeks of the cultured classes for what we term unnatural crime +argues against any considerable degree of education even in their case. +Women were sometimes found in the Greek schools of philosophy, but these +were evidently isolated cases. The passage from the Theætetus above +quoted shows us the unhappy and subservient position of Athenian women +in one respect; and many other passages of Plato throw an unfavorable +light upon their lot; though we have, perhaps, to remember that the +central figure of the Dialogues had some personal reason for being a +woman-hater. "The outcasts from society as we call them were not the +immoral and the profligate, but the honorable and virtuous. +Accordingly, when we consult the literature of the day, we find women +treated either with contemptuous ridicule in comedy, or with still more +contemptuous silence in history."[203] + +Human sacrifices were not unknown to the earlier Greeks. Of the later +days, of Athenian culture, Mahaffy says: "Plutarch tells us that +Themistocles was forced by the acclamations of the army to sacrifice +three Persian prisoners of distinction brought in just before the battle +of Salamis, though he was greatly affected at the terrible nature of the +sacrifice, so that it appears to have been then unusual. But +Aristophanes, long after, makes allusions to what he calls [Greek: +pharmakoi], as still remembered at Athens, if not still in use (Ran. +732), and which the scholiasts explain, chiefly from Hipponax, as a sort +of human scapegoat, chosen for ugliness or deformity (a very Greek +standpoint) and sacrificed for the expiation of the state in days of +famine and pestilence, or of other public disaster. I think that +Aristophanes alludes to the custom as bygone, though the scholiasts do +not think so; but its very familiarity to his audience shows a disregard +of human life strange enough in so advanced a legal system as that of +democratic Athens."[204] + +Mahaffy calls attention to the exceeding cruelty practised by the Greeks +in the Peloponnesian war, and adds: "It was not merely among Corcyreans, +or among Thracian mercenaries, but among the leaders of Greece that we +find this disgusting feature. The Spartans put to death in cold blood +225 prisoners whom they took in Platæa after a long and heroic +defence.... But this is a mere trifle when we hear from Plutarch that +Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami, put to death 3000 prisoners +(_Alcib._ c. 37 cp. the details in his _Lysander_, c. 13),... Athenians, +men of education and of culture.... The unfortunate Athenian general, +according to Theophrastus (Plut. _Lys._ 13), submits with dignified +resignation to a fate which he confesses would have attended the +Lacedemonians had they been vanquished. + +"For the Athenians, with their boasted clemency and culture, were very +nearly as cruel as their enemies. In the celebrated affair of the +Mitylenæans, which Thucydides tells at length in his third book, the +first decree of the Athenians was to massacre the whole male population +of the captured city. They repented of this decree, because Diodotus +proved to them, not that it was inhuman, but that it was inexpedient." +Mahaffy argues, in opposition to Grote, that there was no real sentiment +of sympathy in the repentance of the Athenians in this affair, for "how +could the _imagined details_ of the massacre of 6000 men in _Lesbos_ +have been a motive, when the Athenians did, at the same time, have the +ringleaders executed _at Athens_, and _they were more than 1000 men_ +(Thuc. III. 30)." These were "_executed together, by the hands of +Athenians_, not with fire-arms but with swords and knives. A few years +after, the inhabitants of Melos, many hundreds in number, were put to +the sword, when conquered after a brave resistance (Thuc. V. 116), and +here, I fear, merely for the purpose of making way for a colony of +Athenian citizens, who went out to occupy the houses and lands of their +victims."[205] + +The practice of torturing witnesses in court was common in Periclean +Athens. On this point, Mahaffy writes: "Our best authorities on this +question are, of course, the early orators, especially Antiphon, in +whose speeches on cases of homicide this feature constantly recurs. It +is well known that in such cases the accused might offer his own slaves +to be tortured, in order to challenge evidence against himself; and it +was thought a weak point in his case if he refused to do so when +challenged. It is also well known that the accusers were bound to make +good any permanent injury, such as maiming, done to these slaves. + +"But there were both restrictions and extensions of this practice as yet +but little noticed. It was not the custom to torture slaves who gave +evidence to a fact, but only if they denied any knowledge, or appeared +to suppress it in the interest of their master (Antiphon, Tetral. A, +[Greek: g]). On the other hand, _it was common enough to torture female +slaves and also free men_.... + +... "Almost all the orators speak of it as an infallible means of +ascertaining the truth. Demosthenes says it has never been known to +fail."[206] The restrictions on certain extremities of torture in court +diminish in importance when we consider that the poor slave stood, in +reality, in all cases, between two alternatives of suffering, that +inflicted by the court and that likely to be inflicted by his master in +case his evidence displeased the latter. That he was a piece of +property of some value was doubtless no more a safeguard to the Greek +slave under the hands of his master than it has been in any modern +slave-holding country; the Greek was doubtless at least as liable as the +man of to-day to forget ultimate loss in the rage of present anger and +the malevolent pleasure of revenge. + +The condition of slaves among the Greeks furnishes us, indeed, with one +of our strongest arguments against their moral code. We do not need to +mention the Helots, whose name has become a synonym of degradation and +misery. Slaves formed the greater part of the working population of +Athens, and were much more numerous than the freemen. Nor were they +necessarily even of inferior race or education. Not only did all +prisoners taken in war become slaves, with their descendants forever, +except as their masters chose to emancipate them (and the possession of +such a superfluity sometimes rendered the Athenians generous in this +respect), but, until the time of Solon, freemen might be sold into +bondage for debt,--and not alone for a large debt, but also for a small +one, and not merely until the debt was paid, but for all time. Nor have +we reason to suppose that freemen were treated, even in the days of +Athens' greatest culture, with great humanity. "At the opening of the +Euthryphro there is a story told which is not intended to be anything +exceptional, and which shows that the free laborer, or dependent, had +not bettered his position since the days when Achilles cited him as the +most miserable creature upon earth. 'Now the man who is dead,' says +Euthryphro, 'was a poor dependent of mine who worked for us as a [free] +field-laborer at Naxos, and one day, in a fit of drunken passion, he got +into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants [slaves] and slew him. +My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then +sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. Meantime, +he had no care or thought of him, deeming him a murderer, and that even +if he did die, there would be no great harm. And this was just what +happened. _For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon +him_ that before the messenger returned from the diviner he was dead. +And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the +murderer and prosecuting my father.'"[207] + +We have not much evidence as to the treatment of animals in ancient +Greece. Race-horses are likely to have been well cared for,--as long as +they were young and swift or beautiful. But it does not appear probable, +from what we know of the Greek attitude towards slaves and dependents, +women and children, that a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to +Animals would have flourished in Greece. + +When we come to inquire as to the moral status of the Greeks with regard +to honesty, truthfulness, and reliability in general, we find them +particularly lacking. Their failure to come up with modern standards in +this respect "every schoolboy knows." Ulysses is called the "man of many +wiles," with evident intent to compliment. In the poems of Theognis, +favorites with the Greek nobility, "it was openly recommended to fawn +upon your enemy, to deceive him till he was in your power, and then +wreak vengeance upon him. It is usual, among critics, to speak of this +as the attitude of Theognis, and of the special aristocracy to which he +belonged. They forget that we find the same attitude in the moral Pindar +(_Pyth._ ii. 84). It is expounded by Hesiod as proximate (*[Greek: Erg]. +165 sqq.), by Thucydides as universal, at a later epoch."[208] Mahaffy +says of the Greeks up to the time of Thucydides, that they "had been +often treacherous and cruel, generally dishonest and selfish; but, +withal, often generous and gentlemanly, always clever and agreeable, and +always carried away by a love of beauty more than by a respect for +truth."[209] At the time of Darius, the Milesians, who had involved that +king in a bloody and expensive war, and burned his Lydian capital, were +yet treated kindly by him when taken prisoners, and settled in his own +country. In return they were always trying to beg or embezzle the +treasure of the king at Susa. "There was, indeed, a single exception, +Scythes, tyrant of Zancle--who asked leave to visit Sicily, and returned +to die in Persia. 'Him Darius considered to be the most righteous of all +those who had gone up to him from Greece, in that he kept his promise to +the great king.'" + +"What an evidence of Greek dishonesty. We can well fancy the Aryan +barons of Darius' court speaking in the tone of the Roman Juvenal. To +them, too, the _Græculus esuriens_ was but too well known,--with his +fascination, his cleverness, and, withal, his mean and selfish knavery. +I need hardly remind the Greek scholar," continues Mahaffy, "that all +through the Ionic revolt, and through the Persian wars, this treachery +and this selfishness were the mainstays of the Persians; in fact, had +they depended upon these more completely, the subjugation of Greece +would have been a mere question of time."[210] + +"There was a certain Glaucus at Sparta, celebrated for justice, as well +as in other respects, to whom a Milesian, who had heard of his fame, +came and entrusted a treasure, wishing as he said, to get the benefit of +his justice, since Ionia was disturbed. Of course, such a temptation was +too much even for this paragon of Greek honesty. When the heirs of the +Milesian came with their tokens and claimed the treasure, he professed +to know nothing of the affair," though when they had gone away, he +consulted the oracle as to whether he might spend the money, and was so +strongly rebuked, that he finally gave it back.[211] This Mahaffy +mentions as an instance where the influence of the oracle was a moral +one. + +There remains one general and especially significant criticism to be +made on Greek morals as a whole; the great mass of the people were +little cared for and in a state of unfreedom. Professor Robiou of Rennes +aptly remarks that the democracy of ancient times, and that of Athens in +particular, had little in common with modern democracy. "The very large +majority of the working population were slaves, and had, consequently, +no rights of any sort, so that the 'laborers,' at whose political rights +Xenophon and Aristophanes jest, were generally what we call +_patrons_.... + +"As for the laborers and the inhabitants of the environs and villages, +since political rights could be exercised only at the Athenian Pnyx and +there was no idea of a representative system, it is clear that the +presence of many of them in the assembly could be only an exception, in +spite of the modest indemnity which was offered them; among the country +people the large and middle-class proprietors alone were in a condition +to take part regularly. That is to say, one has no difficulty in +concluding that, in comparison with other times and other countries, +_the Athenian democracy was an aristocracy_."[212] And we may add that, +all things considered, the great mass of the people had less of liberty +and privilege, were far more subject to the despotism and caprice of +the few, than in most modern monarchies. In what modern country not +inhabited by savages would a man be permitted, at the present day, to +throw even a murderer into a ditch and leave him to perish of hunger and +cold? The carelessness of the Greeks in regard to the inner spirit of +morals is often excused on the ground that it was at least combined with +a large degree of tolerance; but this tolerance appears to be, to a +great extent, mythical. The politics of Athens ostracized men whose +opinion was feared by the state, or rather by a certain number of +citizens, and the Greek religion stained its records with the death of +Socrates and the persecution of other philosophers. Stilpo was exiled +for doubting whether the Athene of Phidias was a goddess and the books +of Anaxagoras and Protagoras were publicly burned. There was, moreover, +an inquisitorial bureau at Athens.[213] However, it is true that the +Greeks were, as a people, too little in earnest and too superstitious to +fall into doubt of the national mythology. + +We have less difficulty in showing the superiority of modern to Roman +civilization, and for the reason, partly, that we know more about Roman, +than we do about Greek civilization. + +The Romans were, from the beginning, a robust and warlike people, and +the military discipline which made them conquerors extended into their +social relations and even into their family life. The exposure of +children appears to have been a common practice, and looked upon +leniently even after direct infanticide was visited with some degree of +general disapproval. Parents were the absolute masters of their +children, having the power to put them to death, or to sell them as +slaves; and this was not only true of children in their younger years, +but during the whole life of the father. Livy and Valerius Maximus give +numerous instances of parents who had put their children to death. It is +recorded, however, that Hadrian banished a man who had killed his son, +and decreed that whatever a son might earn in military service should +belong to himself; while Alexander Severus forbade the killing of adult +sons, and Diocletian rendered the sale of children illegal.[214] Lecky +however remarks that "the sale of children in case of great necessity, +though denounced by the Fathers, continued long after the time of +Theodosius, nor does any Christian emperor appear to have enforced the +humane enactments of Diocletian."[215] + +Human sacrifices occurred among the Romans far more frequently than +among the Greeks, and continued even down to a late date, says Mahaffy. +"In the year 46 B.C., Cæsar sacrificed two soldiers on the altar in the +Campus Martius. Augustus is said to have sacrificed a maiden named +Gregoria. Even Trajan, when Antioch was rebuilt, sacrificed Calliope, +and placed her statue in the theatre. Under Commodus, and later +emperors, human sacrifices appear to have been more common; and a +gladiator appears to have been sacrificed to Jupiter Latialis even in +the time of Constantine. Yet these awful rites had been expressly +forbidden B.C. 95; and Pliny asserts that in his time they were never +openly solemnized."[216] + +If, however, the direct sacrifice of human victims came in time to be +forbidden, there grew out of it, at a comparatively early period, a +custom very nearly if not quite as barbarous, which was practised on an +immense scale and down to a late date; namely, the gladiatorial +contests. The men who took part in these contests were either slaves, +criminals, military captives, or men especially trained for the +"profession." Many of these last were exposed children who had been +rescued for the purpose; their number being also recruited from other +ranks. Lecky seems to excuse the condemnation of military captives to +these shows, saying that their fate "could not strike the early Romans +with the horror it would now inspire, for the right of the conquerors to +massacre their prisoners was almost universally admitted."[217] The +argument is similar to that noticed and criticised above--one bad +principle cannot be an excuse for another, though the two are, +doubtless, in this case, coördinate. Every criminal can give us a reason +for his crime out of the uniformity of his own character. The question +is, simply, whether we are considering the facts from a purely +indifferent standpoint, as historical, or from an ethical standpoint; +and if from the latter, then we must have some standard of measurement. +We may choose to make this, in all cases, the average of the period and +nation; though there will be, in that case, considerable difficulty in +determining the average. Or we may use some ideal standard, which, as +ideal, does not vary with all variations of the society considered, but +is constant. But we have no logical right, having assumed the one +standard, to confuse it with the other, treating the two as +interchangeable. The standard of any age by which men judged their deeds +is also part of the morality of the age, by which we may judge it. As +for the criminals who fought in the arena, they were sometimes pardoned, +when victorious, so that society received back again its most muscular, +or skilful and alert criminals. Of all Roman authors and rulers, Lecky +mentions only Seneca, Plutarch, Petronius, Junius Mauricus, and Marcus +Aurelius, who condemn the games.[218] Cicero is undecided on the +subject; rather in favor of them. The great satirist, Juvenal, though he +repeatedly mentions, does not condemn them. And "of all the great +historians who recorded them not one seems to have been conscious that +he was recording a barbarity, not one appears to have seen in them any +greater evils than an increasing tendency to pleasure and an excessive +multiplication of a dangerous class." On the other hand, the attempt to +introduce them into Athens was unsuccessful.[219] + +An immense increase of gladiators and gladiatorial shows took place in +the earlier days of the empire, when the increase of slavery freed a +large portion of the Roman population from the necessity of labor, and +men came to occupy themselves with amusements, on the one hand as a +profession, on the other as means of passing the time. In the days of +the Republic, the slaves were comparatively few in number and probably +treated with more care, though scarcely with much consideration; all +things were permitted the master by law, says Lecky, though probably the +censor might interfere in extreme cases. "The elder Cato speaks of +slaves simply as instruments for obtaining wealth, and he encouraged +masters, both by his precept and his example, to sell them as useless +when aged and infirm."[220] Under Titus and Trajan probably occurred the +greatest number of shows that "were compressed into a short time,... and +no Roman seems to have imagined that the fact of 3000 men having been +compelled to fight under the one, and 10,000 under the other, cast the +faintest shadow upon their characters."[221] Moreover, "the mere desire +for novelty impelled the people to every excess or refinement of +barbarity. The simple combat became at last insipid, and every variety +of atrocity was devised to stimulate the flagging interest. At one time +a bear and a bull, chained together, rolled in fierce contest along the +sand; at another, criminals dressed in the skins of wild beasts were +thrown to bulls, which were maddened by red-hot irons, or by darts +tipped with burning pitch. Four hundred bears were killed on a single +day under Caligula; three hundred on another day under Claudius. Under +Nero, four hundred tigers fought with bulls and elephants; four hundred +bears and three hundred lions were slaughtered by his soldiers. In a +single day, at the dedication of the Colosseum by Titus, five thousand +animals perished.... Lions, tigers, elephants, rhinoceroses, +hippopotami, giraffes, bulls, stags, even crocodiles and serpents, were +employed to give novelty to the spectacle. Nor was any form of human +suffering wanting. The first Gordian, when edile, gave twelve +spectacles, in each of which from one hundred and fifty to five hundred +pair of gladiators appeared. Eight hundred pair fought at the triumph of +Aurelian. Ten thousand men fought during the games of Trajan.... Under +Domitian, an army of feeble dwarfs was compelled to fight, and more than +once female gladiators descended to fight in the arena. A criminal +personating a fictitious character was nailed to a cross, and there torn +by a bear. Another, representing Scævola, was compelled to hold his hand +in a real flame. A third, as Hercules, was burnt alive upon the pile. So +intense was the craving for blood, that a prince was less unpopular if +he neglected the distribution of corn than if he neglected the games; +and Nero himself, on account of his munificence in this respect, was +probably the sovereign who was most beloved by the Roman multitude. +Heliogabalus and Galerius are reported, when dining, to have regaled +themselves with the sight of criminals torn by wild beasts. It was said +of the latter that 'he never supped without human blood.'" Moreover, the +prince was most popular who, at the show of thumbs, "permitted no +consideration of economy to make him hesitate to sanction the popular +award."[222] "Even in the closing years of the fourth century, the +prefect Symmachus, who was regarded as one of the most estimable pagans +of his age, collected some Saxon prisoners to fight in honor of his son. +They strangled themselves in prison, and Symmachus lamented the +misfortune that had befallen him from their 'impious hands,' but +endeavored to calm his feelings by recalling the patience of Socrates +and the precepts of philosophy."[223] + +The conquest of Greece is alleged to have bettered somewhat the position +of Roman slaves, since it involved the introduction of many slaves who +were the intellectual superiors of their masters. But whatever good this +may have effected seems to have been counteracted by the increase in +number of the slaves and the consequent diminution in value of the +individual slave as a piece of property. On the whole, the position of +the slaves of North America, before the war of emancipation, bad as it +was in some cases, seems to have been, on the average, quite +paradisiacal when compared with that of their Roman forerunners. It has +already been mentioned that Cato urged his compatriots to sell their +aged slaves. Old and infirm slaves were constantly exposed to perish on +an island in the Tiber. It was also customary, in case of the murder of +the master, to put all the slaves of the household to death who were not +in chains or helpless at the time of the murder. The testimony of the +slave was generally received only under torture; he might be tortured in +the attempt to compel evidence against his master; but, if he, of his +own free will, accused his master of any crime, except treason, he was +condemned to the arena. There were different punishments for slaves and +for men of rank. "Numerous acts of the most odious barbarity were +committed. The well-known anecdotes of Flaminius ordering a slave to be +killed to gratify, by the spectacle, the curiosity of a guest; of Vedius +Pollio feeding his fish on the flesh of slaves; and of Augustus +sentencing a slave who had killed and eaten a favorite quail, to +crucifixion, are the extreme examples that are recorded; for we need [!] +not regard as an historical fact the famous picture in Juvenal of a +Roman lady in a moment of caprice, ordering her unoffending servant to +be crucified. We have, however, many other very horrible glimpses of +slave life at the close of the Republic and in the early days of the +Empire. The marriage of slaves was entirely unrecognized by law, and, in +their case, the words adultery, incest, or polygamy had no legal +meaning.... When executed for a crime, their deaths were of a most +hideous kind. The ergastula, or private prisons of the masters, were +frequently their only sleeping places.... We read of slaves chained as +porters to the doors, and cultivating the fields in chains. Ovid and +Juvenal describe the fierce Roman ladies tearing their servants' faces, +and thrusting the long pins of their brooches into their flesh. The +master, at the close of the Republic, had full power to sell his slave +as a gladiator or as a combatant with wild beasts."[224] + +Lecky admonishes us that we should not judge the whole institution of +Roman slavery by this one side of the picture. He calls attention to the +respect in which learned Greek slaves were often held, as showing a +better phase of the system; but it is quite possible that certain slaves +or classes of slaves should be held in respect and that the rest of the +slaves should be treated, nevertheless, with anything but respect or +kindness. The great wonder to the modern mind is that the Romans felt at +liberty to hold learned Greeks slaves at all. Lecky points out that +slaves were emancipated in great numbers; but we must remember, first, +that slaves were very plentiful, further, that freedmen and their +descendants remained bound, by a sort of feudal tie, to their former +masters until the third generation, and moreover that it was considered +an honor to have many freedmen in one's following; so that the advantage +of manumission was often, as Lecky himself says, on the side of the +master. Slaves were sometimes emancipated to prevent their revealing +crimes of their masters under torture, and many slaves were given their +liberty especially in order that they might make a show in the funeral +train. Augustus, indeed, found it necessary to restrict emancipation by +will to _one hundred slaves_.[225] Seneca mentions that masters who +ill-treated their slaves were the object of public odium; but then it +may occur to us to inquire what the Romans considered ill-treatment; +some of the laws which Lecky cites in evidence of the improvement of the +slave's position in the third or last of the periods under which he +considers this position may appear to his readers as much evidence +against, as in favor of, kindness on the part of the masters. "The +Petronian law," he says, "which was issued by Augustus, or more probably +by Nero, forbade the master to condemn his slave to combat with wild +beasts without a sentence from a judge." We may inquire as to how +difficult it was to obtain such a sentence. "Under Claudius some +citizens exposed their sick slaves on the island of Æsculapius in the +Tiber to avoid the trouble of tending them, and the emperor decreed that +if [!] the slave so exposed recovered from his sickness, he should +become free, and also that masters who killed their slaves _instead of +exposing them_ should be punished as murderers.... Under Nero, a judge +was appointed to hear their complaints, and was instructed to punish +masters who treated them with barbarity, made them the instruments of +lust, or withheld from them a sufficient quantity of the necessaries of +life.... Domitian made a law, which was afterwards reiterated, +forbidding the Oriental custom of mutilating slaves for sensual +purposes, and the reforms were renewed with great energy in the period +of the Antonines.[226] Hadrian and his two successors formally deprived +masters of the right of killing their slaves; forbade them to sell +slaves to the lanistæ or speculators in gladiators; destroyed the +ergastula or private prisons; ordered that, when a master was murdered, +those slaves only should be tortured who were within hearing; appointed +officers through all the provinces to hear the complaints of slaves; +enjoined that no master should treat slaves with excessive [?] severity; +and commanded that, when such severity was proved, the master should be +compelled to sell the slave he had ill-treated."[227] The humanity of +the last law is open to dispute. Moreover, Lecky does not notice, here, +that Constantine nevertheless felt it necessary to limit the punishment +of slaves by prohibiting its administration with a cudgel, though not +with the lash, and forbidding poison, mortal wounds, various kinds of +torture, stoning, hanging, mutilation, or throwing from a height.[228] +But he mentions two facts which indicate some degree of humanity in +certain directions, and namely: that, though the law did not recognize +the marriage of a slave, "it appears not to have been common to separate +his family;" also, that the private property of slaves was recognized by +their masters, though part or all of it usually reverted to the master +on the death of the slave. The great mass of evidence goes to show, +however, that what the Romans termed humanity to slaves would have been, +in the eyes of modern "civilized" peoples, extreme barbarity. + +Women, among the Romans, were, like their children, under the control of +the head of the family--father or husband. "The father disposed +absolutely of the hand of his daughter and sometimes even possessed the +power of breaking off marriages that had been actually contracted. In +the forms of marriage, however, which were usual in the earlier periods +of Rome, the absolute power passed into the hands of the husband, and he +had the right, in some cases, of putting her to death." "The power +appears to have become quite obsolete during the Empire; but the first +legal act (which was rather of the nature of an exhortation than of a +command) against it was issued by Antoninus Pius, and it was only +definitely abolished under Diocletian."[229] Roman women had, at first, +no share by law in the heritage of their fathers; but public opinion +revolted, in some cases, from the law, and gradually this was +considerably altered. When marriage became, under the Empire, a mere +matter of mutual consent, divorce a mere matter of repudiation, the +daughter, though married, often remained in her father's house, having +full control over her own property. Practically, if not always legally, +the position of women among the Romans seems to have been considerably +better than among the Greeks; Roman wives became, gradually, far more +nearly the equals of their husbands than Greek wives ever were, and +appear to have received a proportionately greater degree of love. Their +position, however, falls far behind that of even German women at the +present day, and certainly much behind that of every other civilized +nation. + +After recording the use of animals in the public games, there is little +need of considering the subject of their treatment specially; there can +be no doubt as to its probable nature; though certain famous Romans had +their brute favorites. + +It is sometimes argued that, though we are morally superior to the +Greeks and Romans in some respects, we fall short of their standard in +other respects. Doubtless new forms of evil may arise in later periods, +which were impossible under old forms of government and the social +relations of earlier peoples. Each period and nation will, according to +its circumstances, have its own peculiar forms of vice and misery. But +the question which we are considering is not whether or not we have some +forms of evil which the ancients did not possess, but whether the +particular forms which prevail among us are or are not worse than those +which prevailed in Greece and Rome, and, in general, whether the average +of sympathy and altruistic action in modern times and among the foremost +peoples is greater than the average among the Greeks and Romans. And it +must be recollected, moreover, in considering the question, that while +the evil in our midst is brought very vividly before our eyes through +the medium of our many methods of news-carrying and of wide personal +observation,--through our railways, our telegraphs, our many newspapers +and periodicals,--we have, in reality, when all is told, very scanty +knowledge of the daily life of the common people, of the ordinary, +every-day miseries and sufferings, among the Greeks and Romans. But +there are some features of these facts that tell in favor of modern +times; for the ancients were but little impressed by the miseries of the +poorer classes; and just the spirit that notes and makes much of our +modern inhumanity is evidence of a broader sympathy peculiar to our +later times. + +Of Europe as a whole in the centuries after Rome's decline and its loss +of power, it is not necessary to say much, in order to prove the moral +superiority of modern times. We are all acquainted with the fierce +contests between Christianity and its opponents, with the mutual +persecutions, the martyrdoms of Christians and the retaliation of +Christians upon "heretics," with the license and bigotry of the clergy, +the robbery and oppression of the poor and dependent by these as well as +by the titled castle-owners, the burning of "witches," the general +intellectual and moral darkness which spread and covered even the lands +of former comparative civilization and was lifted only as Europe as a +whole advanced to a higher stage. + +But without entering into any extended discussion of this complicated +process of development as a whole, after the disturbance of the old +equilibrium, it may not be undesirable to note the general course of +events in some one country as typical, not in its special features, but +in its general moral import, of the course of development in the other +countries of Europe also. + +The manner of the growth of state and social recompense for evil out of +individual and tribal vengeance has already been touched upon. The enemy +within, and the enemy without the tribe, the foe of the battle-field and +the criminal were regarded, at many stages, with much the same feeling +of animosity, the advantage being rather in favor of the criminal. To +the Greek all those who were not Greeks were barbarians, against whom +but little justice or mercy was necessary; and, as we have seen, the +Romans condemned to the arena their war-captives equally with their +criminals, together with slaves who were also, originally, war-captives. +Crime is, in ruder societies, hardly distinguished from other forms of +aggression that are, later, not included under this head. The definition +of crime differs greatly in different periods of a people's history, +changing as the conceptions of morality as duty to society as a whole +emerge from the crude conceptions of individual and tribal constraint +through revenge. It is for this reason that the history of criminal law +and the administration of "justice" constitute, in reality, a history of +moral evolution. There is nothing that is a clearer index of the moral +status of a people than its treatment of those considered to be +malefactors. + +Cæsar and Tacitus both mention human sacrifices as taking place in +England before the Roman conquest; but little is known certainly on the +subject. The Romans, of course, introduced their own laws and customs, +which existed side by side with many ancient ones not wholly abolished. +The torture and burning of slaves for various offences was customary. +These penalties were gradually mitigated. But the invasion of the +Teutonic tribes seems to have introduced many new barbarities. In the +first half of the tenth century, for instance, appears a law which +condemned to the stake female slaves who had stolen from any but their +masters, the wood to be piled about them by eighty other slaves of their +own sex; this last office being designed, doubtless, to impress the +lesson upon the minds of the eighty attendants. Later, many heretics +were burned, and the writ for the burning of heretics was not abolished +until the reign of Charles II., though it was practically annulled by +the laws of 1648. However, in 1649, a number of women were burned for +witchcraft in Berwickshire, and burning continued to be practised, much +later, in cases of heresy and witchcraft; still later in cases of high +and petty treason, and up to the time of George III., for murder. In the +thirtieth year of the latter's reign, a statute was passed substituting +hanging for burning. In 1784, a woman was burnt at Portsmouth for the +murder of her husband. During the last years, however, in which the +sentence was carried out, it seems to have been customary for the +executioner to wring the malefactor's neck before the burning. But +comparatively trivial offences, among these false coining, were classed +as treason, and it is noticeable also that the stake seems to have been +a favorite punishment in the case of women-offenders, even in later +days.[230] In the year 1530, two persons of the household of the Bishop +of Rochester having died from poison thrown into some porridge by the +cook, an "Act of Poisoning" was passed, according to which offenders +coming under its definition were to be boiled to death. The statute was +shortly afterwards repealed, but the bishop's cook was publicly executed +in accordance with its provision.[231] + +But simple burning or hanging was, for the most part, considered much +too good for the man who had committed high treason; he was given the +mere mockery of a trial, and, if convicted, was hanged, was taken down +while yet alive, disembowelled, and his entrails burnt, was beheaded, +and quartered. Law modifying this penalty first comes into prominence in +the reign of William III.[232] When Richard I. sailed with his army for +the Holy Land, it was ordained that whoever killed a man on board ship +was to be tied to the corpse and thrown into the sea, whosoever killed a +man on shore was to be burnt alive with the corpse, while simply drawing +blood with a knife was to be punished with the loss of a hand, and a +thief was to be shaved, treated to a head-bath of boiling pitch and +feathers, and put ashore at the first place the vessel touched at.[233] + +The payment of blood-money was a common custom among the Teutons, and +so little distinction was made between greater and lesser crime that, +while a murderer could commonly buy off the relatives of his victim, the +petty thief often suffered death or mutilation for his offence. Pike +says of these punishments in the early history of Britain: "It was for +the free man of low estate, for the slave, and for women, that the +greatest atrocities were reserved. Men branded on the forehead, without +hands, without feet, without tongues, lived as an example of the danger +which attended the commission of petty crimes, and as a warning to all +who had the misfortune of holding no higher position than that of a +churl. The horrors of the Danish invasions had no tendency to mitigate +these severities; and those who were chastised with whips before were +chastised with scorpions afterwards. New ingenuity was brought to bear +upon the art of mutilation, which was practised in every form. The eyes +were plucked out; the nose, the ears, and the upper lip were cut off; +the scalp was torn away; and sometimes even, there is reason to believe, +the whole body was flayed alive."[234] The law of the tenth century, +according to which a female slave who had committed theft was burnt +alive by eighty women-executioners, has already been mentioned; parallel +to this law was the law that a male slave who was a thief was to be +stoned to death by eighty slaves, any one of whom, who missed the mark +three times, was to be whipped three times. "If a thief was a free +woman, she was to be thrown down a precipice or drowned."[235] The law +did not favor women. + +The dividing line between mutilation and torture is a difficult one to +draw. One of the earlier forms of "trial" was by ordeal. The accused, +with his hand bound in cloth, was compelled to snatch a stone from elbow +or wrist-depth in a caldron of boiling water, or to lift a weight of +heated metal. If, at the end of three days, when the cloth which bound +the arm was removed, no scald or burn was visible, the accused was +pronounced innocent. These ordeals took place in the church with much +sprinkling of holy water and other ceremony. The clergy themselves seem +to have had less trying substitutes for these ordeals, often being +compelled only to take oath on the sacrament, or to partake of +consecrated bread or cheese which was supposed to produce evil results +in case of guilt. As Pike suggests, it is quite possible that, as +priests had the preparing of this bread or cheese, it may sometimes have +come up to expectations in this respect; as it is also possible that the +cloths bound on the arm of the layman who was to undergo the ordeal of +fire or water may have been differently arranged in different +cases.[236] As late as the reign of King John, trial was made by ordeal, +and mention is also made of it in the reign of Henry II. It was not +formally abolished until the year 1219.[237] For remaining mute before +accusers in court, the dire penalty of imprisonment with starvation was +inflicted, in the reign of Edward I., and to this punishment was added, +about the time of Henry IV., torture by the press.[238] In 1570, a man +found guilty of forging warrants for the arrest of two persons was +sentenced to the pillory for two days, on the first of which one ear, on +the second the other, was to be nailed to the pillory in such a manner +that he must "by his own proper motion" tear it away.[239] The rack is +supposed to have been introduced into England in the reign of Henry VI., +and in the reign of Henry VIII. was added "Skevington's Daughter," an +instrument by which offenders were compressed rather than extended until +"the miserable human being lost all form but that of a globe." Blood was +forced from fingers, toes, nostrils, and mouth, and ribs and breast-bone +were commonly broken in. The thumb-screw was also in use, and there was +a "Dungeon among Rats," and a chamber in the Tower called "Little Ease," +in which it was impossible either to stand upright or to lie at full +length.[240] The press was not abolished until the reign of George +III.[241] It is recorded of the case of Burnworth, tried for murder in +1726, that he bore pressure of nearly four hundred weight, for an hour +and three-quarters, before begging for mercy and pleading Not Guilty. He +was, however, found guilty and hanged.[242] In 1630, Alexander Leighton +was punished for "framing, publishing, and dispensing a scandalous book +against kings, peers, and prelates," in the following manner: he was +whipped, put in the pillory, had one of his ears cut off and one side of +his nose slit, was branded on one cheek with a red-hot iron, was +afterwards returned to the Fleet to be kept in close custody, and seven +days later was whipped again at the pillory, had the other ear cut off, +his other nostril slit, and his other cheek branded.[243] As late as +1734, John Durant, who "either was, or pretended to be, deaf and unable +to read," had his thumbs tied and the knot drawn hard because he did not +answer the accusation of the court; he was also threatened with the +press.[244] Excepting in cases where the press was used, torture was +not, according to Pike, practised in England after the first part of the +seventeenth century; but the case just cited is a contradiction of so +broad an assertion. + +The introductions of customs of penance did much towards rendering the +differences in the punishment and general treatment of the poor and +rich, the humble and noble, more conspicuous. As for the clergy, they +had special benefits given them, and were accustomed, in the early days +of Britain, to murder, rob, and indulge their passions very nearly as +they chose, without interference from the state.[245] But the Benefit of +Clergy, which rendered any one subject to it, "practically exempt from +the ordinary punishments for most of the greater crimes," was +applicable, in later centuries, not only to clergymen proper, but also +to all clerks, the term including every one who had been married and +could read.[246] The position of the slave after the Teutonic invasion +has been noticed. The position of the churl was nearly as bad. "The +infliction of a penalty which he could not pay, and which none would pay +for him, rendered him utterly bankrupt in freedom.... If he left the +place assigned to him it was held that he had stolen his own body. He +could be summarily hanged when caught, and his life was worth nothing to +his lord, or even to his kindred, unless they redeemed him. This was the +fate which was continually impending over the free man of low estate if +he had the misfortune to make enemies among those who had the power to +save or condemn him."[247] In the reign of Edward I., "a statute was +passed which made it a grave offence to devise or tell any false news of +prelates, dukes, earls, barons, or nobles of the realm. Others, too, +were enumerated as being within the meaning of the act--the Chancellor, +the Justices of either Bench, and all the great officers of state." +Under Richard II., the statute was reënacted and made more +stringent.[248] + +For most trivial offences of all sorts, extreme punishment was meted +out. Mutilation was often inflicted merely for the killing of game +belonging to the King's forests, and though the Forest Charter of Henry +III. provided that no one should, in future, lose life or limb for the +sake of the King's deer, the penalty does not seem to have gone out of +use at this period, for other offences. In the reign of Edward III., a +tailor was sentenced, for brawling in court, to imprisonment in the +Tower of London for life and the loss of his right hand; "and the rolls +of Gaol Delivery of this period show conclusively that the ordinary +punishments were hanging, the pillory, and the tumbrel or +dung-cart."[249] Late in the reign of Henry VIII., an act was passed +condemning any person who struck another so that blood was drawn, within +the limits of the King's house, to the loss of his right hand. The +pillory was in use up to the reign of Queen Victoria; "it could be +applied to perjurers and suborners of perjury until the year 1837. It +was even applied to women for no greater crime than fortune-telling, +late in the eighteenth century."[250] "Of the other punishments +associated with the old spirit of violence, and inflicted in public, the +chief was whipping. It was commonly awarded to men guilty of petty +thefts.... Instances in which women were whipped were by no means +uncommon at the very end of the eighteenth century." Until 1808, +pocket-picking, until 1811, stealing from bleaching-grounds, were +punished with death. In 1813, 1816, and 1818, a bill was introduced to +abolish capital punishment for a theft of five shillings from shops; but +it was defeated in the House of Lords. In 1820, the amount necessary to +the death-sentence was raised to £15. Until 1832, horse, cattle, and +sheep stealing, theft from a dwelling-house, and forgery, were capital +offences. In 1833, house-breaking; in 1834, returning from +transportation before expiration of the sentence; and, in 1835, +sacrilege and letter-stealing ceased to be punished with death. But it +was not until 1861 that hanging was limited by law to cases of murder +and treason.[251] + +The worst element of the punishment by pillory or in any manner in +public did not lie so much in the punishment itself, as in the violence +of the mob, which appears to have been regarded as a legitimate part of +the ceremony, and against which the criminal seldom received any +protection. Sometimes, the man or woman sentenced to the pillory for a +petty offence died of stoning at the hands of the onlookers; and Pike +writes of the burning of a woman in 1721, for coining: "Her last wish +was that she might say a prayer in peace. But the mob which had come out +to take its ease and its pleasure had no mind to sacrifice its rights +for the comfort of a criminal. A woman at the stake was a good butt for +filthy missiles and ribald jests; the yelling rabble would not permit +the poor wretch to collect her thoughts, or to hear her own words, and +instead of sympathy they gave her stones. When the fire was kindled, +even the consuming flames must have seemed less cruel than the men and +women standing around."[252] + +We all know the condition in which Howard found the prisons of his day; +and if we possess strong powers of imagination, we may perchance be able +partly to conceive what must have been their state in days when the +people knew but very little of what passed within prison-walls, and the +keepers wielded an almost absolute power over the prisoners. If the +abuses which were common even two centuries ago were to occur in only a +few instances to-day, the whole English nation would flame with +indignation. In the fourteenth century, jail-breaking was frequent in +cases where the prisoner could afford to pay for his escape; judges were +often bribed; a "clerk" who was delivered over to the bishop before or +after sentence, according to the Benefit of Clergy, could still be +acquitted by the bishop in case the requisite number of compurgators +were found to swear to belief in his innocence; and, moreover, clerks +who had been convicted could not afterwards be tried for any offence +committed before their conviction. On the other hand, if a woman +attempted to obtain sentence against the murderer of a relative, she had +not only to fear the revenge of the man's allies, who seem to have had +things very much their own way; but in case courage deserted her at the +last, and she failed to appear against the accused, she was "waived" or +outlawed; again it may be remarked that the laws of England did not +favor women.[253] Writs were forged, juries were packed, judges, +justices, and sheriffs bribed. In the reign of James I., the young +countess of Essex, who, having fallen in love with Lord Rochester during +the absence of her husband, had obtained a divorce to marry him, became +angry with a friend of her lover who counselled him against the +marriage, caused him to be imprisoned in the Tower, had the Lieutenant +and under-keeper of the Tower replaced by friends of hers, and through +the aid of these administered poison to him. The countess and her +husband were arrested on charge of causing the death, and the former +pleaded, the latter was proved, guilty. Yet the two were pardoned, +_though some of their accomplices were executed_.[254] + +It is impossible that such customs should exist, in legal relations, in +connection with great justice and sympathy in other relations. Some +allowance may be made for idiosyncrasy, for individual and national +peculiarities; it is possible that a bloody-minded and cruel ruler may +find pleasure in petting pigeons, but his pleasure will be likely to be +rather of an egoistic order, and his apparent kindness easily turned to +cruelty if anger comes upon him. So, too, the cruel potentate may prove +a kind husband and friend, as long as his own interests coincide, and do +not conflict, with those of his friends or his family. But the man who +is consistently treacherous and unfeeling in any one relation will not, +as a rule, show consideration and tenderness in other relations, except +in so far as these other relations subserve his own ends of gain or +vanity; the point where they part company with such ends is the point +where he will resort to another mode of action. The same is true of +nations. Accordingly, we find brigandage and open robbery common even +down to the end of the last century, and not only on the part of the +poorer classes, or rather not so much on their part as on that of +princes, nobles, and even the clergy; we find pirating and wreckage +common on the sea; we find intrigue upon intrigue at court, nobles and +members of the royal family continually plotting each other's murder, +but nevertheless escaping punishment and received with adulation; we +find the much-praised heroes of the Crusades devasting the lands through +which they passed, violating wives and daughters of their hosts, and +deserting to the enemy for bribes; we find wholesale massacres of +unoffending Jews; we find perjury a profession, station an excuse for +nearly every crime, religion a cloak for extortion and vice, and +oppression of the poor and lowly universal. And yet we weep over modern +deterioration! + +We forget, when we read--perhaps with an exclamation that man is as much +a savage as ever--how the onlookers at the burning of the Shanghai made +no effort to save lives but only to secure spoil, that it is only a +short time since such scenes must have been common enough on all the +shores of Europe; we forget, when we shudder with horror at an +exceptional case of unjust or brutal punishment on the borders of our +civilization, that it is not long since torture and mutilation, +barbarities of every sort, were practised among the foremost nations of +the world, and for the most trivial offences. Nor do we always remember, +when we grow indignant at the hard case of our poor, that there was a +time when the excess of indigent population was prevented only by +famines and pestilences which killed their thousands upon thousands, and +of which we very seldom see the like in modern times; we forget that +there was a time when the desperate rising of the continental peasantry +against the bitter oppression of the landowners drew from even the +reformer Luther the exclamation that the revolters ought to be throttled +collectively. I have no intention to underrate present evils or to +excuse them by past ones. I see no reason for believing that the present +age should rest upon its laurels; on the contrary, I believe that we are +only at the beginning of civilization; but I see no need for denying +past evolution in order to make this assertion. Starvation is not easier +to a man to-day, because it is proved to him that many more men died of +hunger in the past than die of it in the present century. But just for +this reason, I fail to understand why there should be so much effort +expended by certain reformers in the attempt to disprove what history +and observation yet so plainly show,--namely, that the condition of the +masses at present, taken for all in all, is much better than it has ever +been before; that misery is not so extreme or proportionately so widely +spread; that the worst sorts of crime are decreasing; that justice is +more general, and that sympathy is warmer, than in any previous age. It +is true that we have new methods of exploiting the poor; but we need to +consider how our ancestors would have used those opportunities had they +possessed them; and we need also to remember, with regard to a +particular form of evil, that some time is necessary for society as a +whole to grow to a comprehension of its increase and importance, and to +reach unanimity of opinion as to action for its removal. As forms of +evil change, some one particular form may increase for a time, +swallowing up in itself, as the larger wave accumulates several small +ones, various other forms, until the slowly gathered resistance of +public opinion brings the reaction. + +We may gather valuable evidence as to our progress, even in comparison +with recent times, by reference to our artistic literature. True, the +great writers have often been far ahead of their times. But if we regard +the average, we shall soon perceive the signs to which I refer. The +stilted mannerisms of the ancient novel mark the absence of democratic +feeling, and witness to the less general diffusion of true kindness, +which, wherever it appears, tends to simplicity, having no need of +mannerisms. Nothing, too, is more indicative of our advancement than the +change in conceptions of humor; for to know what a nation laughs about +is to know what are its ideals and shortcomings. Earlier humor is often +mere vulgarity or brutality, or a mixture of the two; obscenity, vice, +and the heartless torture of the weak and helpless are its favorite +themes, and appear in the characters of its heroes and ideals. The +truthfulness of Victor Hugo's description of earlier British "fun," in +his "L'Homme qui rit," is borne witness to by English literature. + +All modern literature marks the progress of the democratic idea. Our +history and our art are full of the people. The very unrest and +dissatisfaction of the time are signs of a more general and a better +education, an increase of sympathy in degree and extent, and, I believe, +of better nourishment and a more energetic physique. The higher ideals +which were once the property of the few are become the property of the +many. Our institutions are grown more democratic and humane. We have our +free hospitals and dispensaries, our soup-kitchens and cheap +lodging-houses, our asylums for the deaf, the dumb, the blind, old +people and orphans, the weak and afflicted of all kinds, our guilds, +"Settlements," and "Open-air" charities, our crêches, our refuges and +reformatories, our societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children +and to Animals, our "Open Doors," and "Midnight Missions," our trade and +industrial schools, and our free schools and scholarships and free +libraries. In times of famine, disease, and disaster, we band together +to aid, and funds for the distressed pour in from every side, and not +only from people of the nation to which the sufferers belong, but often +also from those of distant parts of the world. Fancy the Greeks +subscribing to a fund in aid of cholera-stricken barbarians; imagine the +Romans, even, clubbing together, in every part of the world to which +they had wandered, to succour the sufferers by a Johnstown flood; or +conceive of the wealthy classes of the Middle Ages furnishing fires and +food as did the Parisians during the unusual winter cold of 1890-91! + +Not only has sympathy become more wildly diffused within the state; it +has spread outside it also. National narrowness is slowly disappearing. +The federation of the states of Europe and of the civilized world is no +longer looked upon as a mad-man's fancy but as a sober possibility or +even a probability. It is now agreed that war between the +English-speaking nations of the earth,--between England and her +colonies, or England and the United States, is very nearly, if not +quite, an impossibility. The union of three of the most powerful nations +of Europe, not for war but for peace, is assuredly of great political +importance in itself; but of even more importance in the influence +insensibly exerted by its continuance upon the opinions of the world. +The masses of the people themselves are becoming more and more +cosmopolitan, and we have an ever-increasing number of international +unions and congresses, political, scientific, artistic, and ethical. + +On the whole, it is, perhaps, as much a lack of imagination as anything +which makes us fall into the mistake of underestimating our own age and +overestimating all others. The crimes and abuses far away in times +different from our own are difficult to conceive, and stir our blood +even less than those distant in space; the sufferings of the Middle +Ages, or even of one or two centuries ago, are more difficult to realize +and move us less than a famine or flood in China or a murder in the +heart of Africa. The things immediately before our eyes affect us most; +and it is well, for many reasons, that this is so. Nevertheless, +idealization of the past is evil in its consequences. For, if present +progress is to some men an excuse for easy-going inactivity, the extent +of existing evil is even more often an excuse for the same selfish +course. + +Man has had, in all periods, the tendency, in his discontent with the +present, to invest with ideal attributes of every sort some past period +in which the special evils he deplores did not, perhaps, exist; the +dissatisfied of all times have imagined a golden age somewhere in the +past. The old, who look on the innovations of a younger generation with +distrust, and are likely to mistake, in remembrance, the gold of their +own life's morning for an outer radiance independent of their youth, add +to our delusion; while the young confuse their increasing knowledge of +the evil of the world with an increase of the evil itself. But the more +science progresses, and the greater our acquaintance with the facts of +history becomes, the more these delusions tend to disappear. The +much-praised simplicity of our ancestors was, in truth, a half-savagery, +where the higher forms of justice were not practised, that finer tact +and consideration which makes life best worth living was unknown, and +many of the faults which we most deplore in our own day were considered +rather virtues than otherwise. It is a moral pity that poets and +philosophers have lent the beauty of their verse and the dignity of +their eloquence to the idealization of the past. Indeed, + + "I do distrust the poet who discerns + No character or glory in his times, + And trundles back his soul five hundred years, + Past moat and drawbridge, into a castle-court, + To sing--oh, not of lizard or of toad + Alive i' the ditch there,--'twere excusable, + But of some black chief, half knight, half sheep-lifter, + Some beauteous dame, half chattel and half queen, + As dead as must be, for the greater part, + The poems made on their chivalric bones."[255] + +It is an especial pity that the reformer should ever devote his effort +to the upholding of the old idea of the inferiority of the present to +the past. Not in the past, but in the future, lies the Golden Age of +man. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[183] "The Origin of Civilization," pp. 397, 398. + +[184] Ibid. pp. 402, 403. + +[185] Ibid. p. 398. + +[186] Ibid. p. 407. + +[187] See, as above, pp. 368, 369. + +[188] Ibid. p. 371. + +[189] Ibid. p. 69. + +[190] Ibid. p. 72. + +[191] Ibid. pp. 112, 113. + +[192] See, as above, p. 405. + +[193] See Lubbock, "Prehistoric Times," also especially Chaps. III. and +IV. of "The Origin of Civilization." + +[194] Cause or effect, which? Mexico is not a country poor in animal +life. + +[195] "The Origin of Civilization," pp. 372, 373. + +[196] See "The Origin of Civilization," p. 396. + +[197] Ibid. p. 398. + +[198] Ibid. p. 371. + +[199] "Social Life in Greece," 3d ed. p. 272. + +[200] "The Science of Ethics," p. 237. + +[201] "Social Life in Greece," p. 243 _et seq._ + +[202] "Lectures on Primitive Civilization," p. 219 _et seq._ + +[203] Mahaffy: "Three Epochs in the Social Development of the Ancient +Greeks," pp. 31, 32. + +[204] "Social Life in Greece," p. 238. + +[205] "Social Life in Greece," p. 234 _et seq._ + +[206] Ibid. p. 239 _et seq._ The italics are mine. + +[207] "Social Life in Greece," p. 272 _et seq._ + +[208] "Social Life in Greece," p. 97 _et seq._ + +[209] Ibid. p. 157. + +[210] "Social Life in Greece," p. 160 _et seq._ + +[211] Ibid. p. 162 _et seq._ + +[212] "Les Institutions de la Grèce," p. 47 _et seq._ + +[213] Lecky, "History of European Morals," I. p. 398. + +[214] Ibid. p. 299 _et seq._ + +[215] Lecky, "History of European Morals," II. p. 31. + +[216] "The Origin of Civilization," p. 372. + +[217] "History of European Morals," I. p. 285. + +[218] "History of European Morals," I. p. 286 _et seq._ + +[219] Ibid. p. 276. + +[220] Ibid. p. 301. + +[221] "History of European Morals," I. p. 287 _et seq._ + +[222] Ibid. p. 280 _et seq._ + +[223] "History of European Morals," I. p. 287. + +[224] "History of European Morals," I. p. 302 _et seq._ + +[225] Ibid. p. 236. + +[226] Compare, however, "History of European Morals," I. p. 263: "Ionian +slaves of a surpassing beauty, Alexandrian slaves, famous for their +subtle skill in stimulating the jaded senses of the confirmed and sated +libertine, became the ornaments of every patrician house, the companions +and instructors of the young.... The slave population was itself a +hotbed of vice, and it contaminated all with which it came in contact." + +[227] "History of European Morals," I. p. 303 _et seq._ The italics are +mine. + +[228] L. O. Pike, "Crime in England," I. p. 20. + +[229] "History of European Morals," II. p. 299. + +[230] L. O. Pike, "A History of Crime in England," I. pp. 51, 344 _et +seq._; II. pp. 138, 176, 177, 287, 379 _et seq._ + +[231] Ibid. II. pp. 81, 82. + +[232] Ibid. I. p. 226; II. pp. 85, 86, 174 _et seq._, 324 _et seq._ + +[233] Ibid. I. pp. 168, 169. + +[234] "History of Crime," I. p. 50. + +[235] Ibid. p. 51. + +[236] "History of Crime," I. p. 52 _et seq._ + +[237] Ibid. I. pp. 204, 210. + +[238] Ibid. I. p. 210 _et seq._ + +[239] Ibid. II. p. 85. + +[240] Ibid. II. pp. 87-89. + +[241] Ibid. II. p. 346. + +[242] Ibid. II. p. 283. + +[243] "History of Crime," II. pp. 162, 163. + +[244] Ibid. II. p. 284. + +[245] Ibid. I. p. 52 _et seq._, p. 146 _et seq._ + +[246] Ibid. I. p. 297 _et seq._ + +[247] Ibid I. p. 89 _et seq._ + +[248] "History of Crime," II. p. 398 _et seq._ + +[249] Ibid. I. p. 213. + +[250] Ibid. II. pp. 82, 83, 377 _et seq._ + +[251] Ibid. II. p. 450 _et seq._ + +[252] See as above, II. p. 288. + +[253] As above, I. p. 270 _et seq._ + +[254] Ibid. II. p. 145 _et seq._ + +[255] Mrs. Browning, "Aurora Leigh." + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE RESULTS OF ETHICAL INQUIRY ON AN EVOLUTIONAL BASIS + + +In Professor Alexander's statement that "the good man of former days was +as good as the good man of to-day,"[256] the standard applied to the two +cases compared is not the same; the comparison is not a direct one +between the two men, according to some common rule, but resembles a +mathematical statement of proportion, or comparison of ratios; the man +named good according to the standard of one age stands to the social +conditions of that age as the man named good by the standard of a later +age to the social conditions of his age. The implication of this double +standard is, however, easily overlooked, so that the statement stands in +danger of the reproach of misleading as a begging of the question; in +"the good man of former days," the moral verdict is already delivered. A +question of moral expediency arises here. How are we to define "the good +man of former days"? Shall we declare, for instance, that that cannibal +who fulfilled the ideal of pity in his society by sparing his conquered +foe to abject and miserable slavery, instead of cooking him for dinner, +was good, and as good as the man of highest benevolence of the present +day? Or suppose an Australian savage who varies the tribal custom of +wooing by carefully carrying home his victim after reducing her to +unconsciousness, instead of dragging her over the ground at risk of life +and limb, thus fulfilling a high tribal ideal; shall we compare such a +man with lovers like Mill or Browning and pronounce him as good as the +latter? Or, to take less extreme cases, shall we compare the Spartan of +one period, with his ideal of successful theft, with a Socrates or a +Bruno dying for sake of what they believed to be the truth, and +pronounce one no better than the other? No one denies the right of the +individual to fix the significance of his own terms, provided he adheres +to this significance consistently; but mankind thinks slowly and +painfully, and the double purpose of language, in the communication of +thought to others and the registration of it as a stepping-stone to our +own further reasoning, is likely to be frustrated by a too peculiar use +of terms. In Ethics, this question of expediency takes on a moral +aspect; and Alexander's definition of absolute right and wrong as action +in accordance with, or opposition to, a standard fixed by the age and +nation is likely to lead to moral as well as intellectual confusion--to +the excuse of wrong-doing because of circumstances, on the one hand, and +the dogmatic assertion of infallibility on the other, or at least to the +confusion of the ideal standard with the easy-going standard of the +average man of his age. + +But it is true that this criticism is scarcely conclusive alone. For the +definitions criticised are on a line with the idea of progress as at +each moment establishing the equilibrium of the society, and fulfil the +demand for self-consistency. A criticism of the use, in ethical theory, +of a continually changing standard of moral judgment, must concern the +more fundamental idea of a continually established equilibrium. + +To the practical considerations of the possible confusion of the ideal +with the average standard through Alexander's idea of the judgment of an +age by its own standard, it might be objected that the moral standard +implied in his theory is not at all the average standard, but the +standard as represented by the ideal in the mind of the good man of his +age.[257] + +To this may be answered that he whom we regard as the good man of his +age is by no means necessarily in harmony with his age, as is proved by +the persecution that many good men endure; and the statement that the +good man is not in harmony with his age means that he does not represent +the character of his society as a whole, and cannot, therefore, be said +to express an attained equilibrium of the society. His sentiments and +ideal are not the sentiments and ideal of the society as a whole +considered as an adjustment of sentiments and ideals. If it be replied, +to this, that the good men of their age who undergo persecution must be +regarded, according to Alexander's theory, as only prospectively +good,--as representing an ideal that has not yet been proved to be the +victorious variety,[258] then we are driven to return to the conclusion +that, by the good man of his age who represents the social equilibrium, +Alexander designates, not the man who leads the moral van, or he who +plans an advance, but he who is carried on by it, the man who represents +the preponderating mass of opinion, the ideal of the majority or the +average ideal; and the practical criticisms above made hold good. +Whatever may be said of our judgment of a past age by present standards, +the standard by which we judge present action is not at all the average +standard, but the highest moral ideal we can discover; and in this fact +lies the whole significance of Ethics. + +Or there is another form in which Alexander combines his idea of the +good man and that of a social equilibrium. According to this +interpretation, the equilibrium the good man represents is not an +actually attained equilibrium, but merely one that would be secured were +his ideal universally carried out,--an equilibrium realized only in so +far as men are good.[259] In this case, indeed, the ideal may be rescued +from the reproach of representing only the average, easy-going morality; +but, at the same time, all the remarks that make present morality +absolute because it represents and maintains a present social +equilibrium, and the argument in a line with such remarks that all +maintenance of existence means adjustment to the conditions, or +equilibrium, become inapplicable. It might be contended that the whole +dilemma is avoided by Alexander in the assertion that wickedness has but +little share in the life of society[260]--that is, that goodness +prevails; but such a statement may be disputed, except as morality is +judged by the average standard; and, in this case, the argument begs the +question, and the old problem recurs. It may further be added that the +action of the good man in any other sense cannot represent the course +that would be followed by every man, were all men good like himself, for +his action takes into consideration the fact that all men are not good +like himself and is a compromise with inideal conditions. + +There is, in fact, and has been up to the present time, no "full" +equilibrium of any society as a whole, and certainly no absolute +equilibrium such as must coexist with an absolute right, which would be +its expression. Du Prel, to illustrate his conception of the evolution +of the systems of the heavens, imagines a group of dancers, each of +whom sets out to dance a figure of her own without reference to the +movements of the others; and he points out that if, in all cases of +collision, the colliding parties either withdraw from the group or else +move from this point together, a harmony of movement must finally be +attained.[261] We may conceive of momentary equilibrium of small +portions of a society, just as, in the case of such a group of dancers, +we may conceive of any moment as possibly representing an absence of +collision in some one part of the company, although, in other parts, +many collisions are taking place. But there is, at present, no general +equilibrium of ideals, no common ideal for any society as a whole, but, +on the contrary, a mass of conflicting ideals continually at war with +one another; although, of course, there may be calculated an average +ideal made up from all extremes, and there may be discerned a +preponderating ideal in smaller portions of a society that form a body +by themselves. The isolation of such portions is, however, only +relative, and any equilibrium that can be spoken of as attained by them +is most imperfect. The "good man," in so far as we regard his goodness +as inherited, may be said to represent an equilibrium; but it is only +the equilibrium of some one favored line of descent, and not an +absolute, but a relative, equilibrium. In so far as we regard the "good +man's" goodness as the further result of especial association with good +men, it may be, to a large extent, in harmony with their ideals, and may +hence represent a certain equilibrium among men who preserve themselves +from intimacy with individuals of low ideals or only average morality, +thus forming a partly isolated body; but this equilibrium, again, is +only a relative equilibrium, just as the isolation of the group is only +partial. If our definition of morality is progressive and not statical, +the good man must be he who leads the advance. But such a man is not +representative of his society as a whole. + +Alexander regards the infliction of incidental pains as of little +consequence for the absolute rightness of conduct. But the necessity of +these pains has a reactive influence on character. That, in order to do +the work which I can do best and which, therefore, I ought to do for +society, I must pass many beggars in the street without inquiry into +their cases, and much misery of all sorts without materially lessening +it, has a certain detrimental result to myself. All pain, the sight of +which is endured without the taking of active measures for its +alleviation, vitiates the sympathies; and, on the other hand, a certain +hardness of heart is necessary to the endurance of mere existence, at +the present time; a certain selfishness to the enjoyment even of a life +spent in moral effort; for perfect sympathy would make life unbearable +in sight and hearing of the suffering of many of our fellow-creatures. +The need for self-defence has been felt at all stages of the world's +progress--in olden times for self-defence of a brutal sort, in modern +days for a less and less brutal self-defence; such self-defence is at +present imperative, lest the yielding to one person result not only in a +lack of fulfilment of our own duties to others than the one, but also in +the strengthening, in that one, of a selfishness and dogmatism which may +issue in further evil to others. And yet all resistance, where and in so +far as carried out, vitiates temper and benevolence. + +Alexander's position is positivistic in that it aims not to go beyond +the facts; and this position might seem to lead naturally to the +judgment of each age by a standard possible to the individuals of that +age, that is, existent, in some form, in the society judged; and it +might seem to lead, also, to the assertion of an absolute right where +the existence of wrong is unfelt. But to this might be answered that, as +soon as the higher standard does exist, the wrong may be judged by it; +and that the judgment of a right as yet including elements of wrong +implies the existence of another and higher standard as one of the +facts. If Du Prel's company of dancers were automata, incapable of +forecasting collisions, we might regard a momentary absence of collision +in some one part of the company, from the standpoint of the automata +concerned, as absolute equilibrium, since our judgment would have no +regard to the rest of the company or the next move of the figures at +present in equilibrium. But human beings are not automata, and the +theory which regards the moral evolution from the standpoint of the +ideals actually existent in society must take into consideration the +actual realization which enters into the practical ideals of a large +part of society, of the contrast of those ideals with a conceived higher +standard at present impracticable. It is true that the consciousness of +past ages, not comprehending in so great a degree the complexity of +human interests, or looking so far into the future to distant results +as does present mankind, had not so strong a sense of this contrast. But +the contrast has arisen, was vaguely conceived even in far-distant +times, and has continually grown more definite and pronounced in human +thought. So far from its being true, as Professor Alexander conceives, +that conscience always asserts the possibility of an absolutely right +course,[262] it may be said that, although doubtless the mind always +conceives, amongst the courses open to choice, some best course, there +is a growing realization of the evil to conduct and character, of self +and others, involved in any course possible under present conditions. +The assertion of an absolute right, with an exact boundary-line dividing +it from wrong, belongs to past Ethics; the appreciation of present evil +doubtless differs in degree in different persons; but it is increasing +both in extent and in intent, and is the explanation of the tendency to +believe the present age worse than all past ages. It is not the sign of +growing evil, but is, on the contrary, a part of a growing good; +nevertheless, it registers the existence of present evil. There are few +men of the present date, excepting the very young and exceptionally +healthy and happy, who would agree with Alexander, that "it is +ridiculous to suppose that wickedness occupies a considerable space in +the life of a society." + +Professor Alexander himself acknowledges the progress of society towards +a state of good that shall be good not for a part of the human race +merely but for the whole; and he recognizes also the fact that this +extension of the ideal to the whole race means a progress in intent +also. Such an ultimate state is certainly not ultimate in the sense that +it is eternal; but it may be considered permanent in the same sense as +the equilibrium of the solar system is permanent--in the sense that it +remains practically the same for a period long to human thought. It +expresses a perfect, though not an absolute, equilibrium. As such, it +does not involve absolute happiness any more than absolute preservation +of existence, immortality: it implies only the reduction of pain to a +minimum through increasing wisdom and sympathy; through the endeavor, on +the one hand, of a far-seeing and sympathetic society to protect the +individual from disappointment, and through such increase, on the other, +of the ethical pleasures that what Alexander terms "incidental pains" +become inappreciable by contrast. + +The evolution of human society is not an evolution of one state or +country alone but of the habitable globe; a condition of full +equilibrium can be reached only when, in one way or another, all +countries are gathered into the circle of civilization and sympathy. +Until this happens, the isolation of single societies must be repeatedly +broken in upon and the process of equilibration disturbed by the +introduction of new elements to which adjustment must take place; the +new adjustment being in the sense of progress towards a higher system of +equilibrium, that is, one of more elements, and the whole process +constituting a continual progress in the direction of a full stability +of Life upon the earth. While despotisms exist to pour into other, freer +countries their hunted and miserable subjects, unused to the +responsibilities of self-government, and often as unfit for peace as is +the dog who has been always chained and tormented, democracy must feel +the evils of tyranny even in her own system. While uncivilized, or +mentally, morally, and physically degraded human beings exist in one +country, men in other parts of the world are not secure from contact +either directly with these lowest orders, or, at least, with those who +have been rendered less honorable or more callous to suffering by their +influence or habituation to their suffering. And while war rouses +hatred, and hatred results in war, there will also be, in societies, +internal fluctuations, jealousies, hatreds. Lack of sympathy, violence, +or indifference to suffering in one respect or direction is likely to be +accompanied by lack of sympathy, violence, indifference, in other +respects: while, again, violence is likely to beget violence, +indifference indifference, between individuals, classes, parties, or +nations. Different degrees of progress may be visible in different +countries; but the more facilities of communication increase, the more +inevitable it will become that the evils existing in any one nation will +affect all, as also that the progress of any one nation will affect all; +in other words, progress must tend, more and more, to equalization in +all countries. Fechner's ideas of the Tendency to Stability thus explain +the loss of Greek and Roman civilization, as well as the insoluble +mystery which Wallace finds in the fact of the attainment of greatness +among earlier peoples, there being "no agency at work, then or now,[263] +calculated to do more than weed out the lower types."[264] + +Increasing sympathy is a continual accompaniment of the increasingly +close relations of men to each other through the gradual peopling of all +parts of the earth, but especially through the increasing facilities of +communication by which the distant is brought into contact with us; but +the sympathy is of gradual growth, and the continual renewal of the +struggle for existence induces renewed evils, so that it might seem, at +first glance, as if the evil must continue indefinitely and +undiminished, only changing its form. As long as no absolute equilibrium +has been attained, doubtless evil of some sort must exist; change is +inevitably accompanied by disadvantages as well as advantages, +everywhere. But several facts are to be noticed. First: The statement +which has often been made, that the severity of the struggle for +existence is increased in the social state and grows with the growth of +society, is erroneous. That is to say, more is doubtless continually +demanded of the individual, but it is no abstract "principle" or "law" +outside man which makes this demand: it is the increased power of the +average of society which makes it; or, that is, the increased +requirements of the age are met with increased capacity, and this would +still remain true if we reckoned capacity as merely dependent upon the +inheritance of knowledge and implements. Coöperation increases +resources; and the average length of life is shown to increase with the +progress of civilization. There is a lagging minority who suffer, for +one reason or another, in the advance; these represent the inherently +inferior types, or the types which suffer temporarily from outer +disadvantage. The evils of competition in human society are not greater, +they are simply more evident to human beings than the evils elsewhere in +nature. The tragedies of the woods are bloody but short; death puts a +speedy end to sufferings, and the earth quickly hides the victims. In +society, on the other hand, coöperation preserves not only the aged and +feeble, the deformed and idiotic, of the more privileged classes; it +even suffices to enable the most miserable to drag out a forlorn +existence somewhat longer. It forbids the mother who finds her child a +burden simply to leave it by the roadside as the savage mother does, and +it will give a penny or two against starvation where it will not bestow +enough for comfort. This prolongation of suffering is thus the sign of +an increased but not yet sufficient sympathy; in other words, evil not +only changes its form with social evolution; it also gradually loses +its force. To suppose, indeed, that renewed progress must always be +attended with as great evils as to-day attend it, is to make the +erroneous supposition that character has no constancy, and the sympathy +for one's fellow-men gained in one relation will wholly fail to act in +others. + +Again, it might possibly be thought that increase in density of +population, even as condition of the closer contact necessary to +increase of sympathy, must go on _ad infinitum_, with ever-increasing, +or at least ever-renewed, misery, until the individual be left with +barely standing-room; indeed, the picture of such a _denouement_ has +occasionally been drawn. But it is to be remembered that the conditions +of mutual comprehension, dependence, and sympathy, come to lie, in later +social stages, less and less in mere density of population and more and +more in those many devices of modern life which we have termed means of +communication. The increase of the human species must tend, in time, to +self-correction; the only alternative is the extinction of the race +through growing unhealthfulness of conditions. But this alternative is +an impossibility; the human species cannot be annihilated as a whole +except through some catastrophic event which interferes with the present +course of evolution by the destruction of the earth--or through that +final gradual decay which must accompany the earth's decline in power of +nourishment. From internal causes we cannot expect the species to +perish; for again in this case it is impossible that a struggle should +be continued until the last individuals are destroyed. Indeed, the idea +of destruction through insanitary crowding gives us at once a +contradiction of the supposition of limitless increase, and a partial +solution of the question. But the later and higher solution of the +question is another. The fittest will survive; and the fittest will be +those who perceive the evils of overcrowding and take active measures to +avoid it. The fittest will be those who perceive that they are acting +for the good of their children, and that of society as a whole, if they +do not bring into the world more offspring than they can furnish with a +healthy constitution, good moral training, and a sufficient education +for self-support and comfort under conditions of normal labor. The term +"health" is not an absolute one; but if we once suppose a start made in +the direction of the decrease of pressure, we must suppose, other things +being equal, that those lines of descent and parts of society in which +it arises will be favored in the struggle for existence, and will come +to supplant other parts. To suppose that the increase of pressure can go +on _ad infinitum_ is, indeed, to reckon--if we look at the matter from +the purely psychological side--without man's reason. Social development +and moral theory have not favored any limitation of progeny as long as +population was sparse. But certain facts are beginning to be recognized: +(1) that the propagation of their kind by the criminally constituted and +by the hopelessly diseased is immoral; (2) that the propagation of +offspring to such poverty and ignorance as stunts them physically, and +makes their entrance into the criminal or pauper classes a probability, +is also immoral; and (3) that duty does not demand of men and women that +they shall sacrifice health and happiness, and drag out a miserable, +overworked, joyless existence in illy rearing an over-large and probably +weakly family. The greatest favor, privilege, and luxury that parents +can confer upon children is that of health, and the next greatest is +that of healthy parents, neither ill-tempered with care nor morbid and +dull with overwork, but alert to perceive and ready to sympathize in all +their trials and aspirations, and endowed with sufficient leisure +to give some attention to that quite as important duty as +child-bearing--the character-training of children. Selfishness is, of +course, possible in the direction of limitation of increase as in every +other direction, and in this case it must defeat the end to a great +extent; but such selfishness must tend to correct itself as sympathy +develops and society, in its approval, recognizes and demands more and +more what is for the good of all. + +The course of our reasoning does not pretend to predict an absolute +social equilibrium, which must include the immortality of man on the +earth, together with the prevention of every accident and of every +disappointment whatsoever. A word has already been said as to the +probable necessity of the death of the individual; and with death are +given also disease and age and their attendant mental evils. We may +suppose, however, under an increased healthfulness of general +conditions, an increase of vitality which shall make death, in an ever +greater proportion of cases, rather the issue of a gradual failure of +the powers than the result of violent illness. That the tendency is in +this direction is demonstrated by the gradual increase of the length of +life. A high degree of mental, moral, and physical harmony in human +society is no more "wonderful" or inconceivable than the high degree of +harmony already attained in the movements of our own solar system. On +the one hand, social progress means the attainment of results which call +less and less for reform; and, on the other hand, we are accustoming +ourselves to social change; reforms, the like of which would once have +convulsed the world are now accomplished with little inconvenience, and +we are able to go forward with a rapidity of which no former age was +capable. + +We may look at social development from still another point of view, as a +process by which the preservation of the individual gradually becomes +coördinate with the preservation and welfare of the species. Darwin +surmises that the work of the benevolent or intellectually great man for +his people may be as important for its welfare and the determination of +its conquest in the struggle for existence as is the propagation of +offspring. As social organization progresses, and the relations of men +become more intimate and complex, all the acts of the individual grow to +be of greater and greater significance for his kind, while, +reciprocally, the health and happiness of the individual increase in +importance for his kind. And thus, from both sides, virtue and health, +virtue and happiness, also tend towards coincidence in the individual +life, and environment comes more and more to favor the virtuous. +Sympathy, which is for the general good in many relations, increases in +strength as inward characteristic and acts with more and more certainty +and universality, so that the society which has been merciful and +helpful in a degree towards many individuals comes to show mercy and +helpfulness in a greater degree, and with more uniformity, towards more +and more individuals; while, at the same time, the welfare and the +happiness of the individual become more and more coördinate with the +welfare of society as a whole, and the latter is accordingly more +universally sought. This does not necessarily mean that it is sought +from motives of self-interest; on the contrary, as society progresses, +the individual is more and more moulded to such harmony with its needs +that he finds his happiness in seeking its welfare. + +The earlier punishments of offenders were extreme and cruel; the +majority, in endeavoring to protect itself, had little regard for the +individual, as the individual also had little regard for the welfare of +the majority. With social progress, however, the majority become more +humane even towards their enemy, the criminal. The checks which the fear +of extreme physical punishment alone could impose at an earlier period +are gradually succeeded by the checks furnished in the approval and +disapproval of society as a whole, and of those to whom the individual +is bound by ties of affection and of respect. That is, in the +sympathetic feelings themselves a dependence on others is developed +which acts as an effectual preventive and stimulus, and must become more +and more effectual as society advances and the range of sympathy widens. +This increasingly altruistic form of even the checks to evil is taken no +account of by the pessimist. As the necessity for severity decreases, +severity even in social disapproval must lessen; as the individual comes +to yield more readily and promptly to a slight spur, extremer methods +will be discarded. Thus fear will be, by degrees, replaced by hope. This +development is seen not only in sectarian matters but also in the +history of religious thought; nearly every religion has had its heaven +and its hell, but with social progress and the broadening of sympathy, +the hell falls more and more into disrepute, the motive of heavenly +reward being rather emphasized. + +As sympathy broadens, we come to feel, not alone pain at the pain of +others, but in an increased degree and with regard to ever wider +circles, pleasure also in their pleasure. The altruistic pleasure +afforded by the relief of pain, as the more necessary to the +preservation of existence, has been the earliest developed. A great good +in its province, it may contain, nevertheless, an element of vanity that +opposes itself to a further evolution. There is no doubt that a certain +kind of benevolence would greatly miss the gratification and +self-aggrandizement experienced in the relief of poverty and suffering. +The higher but not yet so universal capacity is that of rejoicing in +others' good and happiness as well as sympathizing in their sorrow. This +capacity shows itself as yet chiefly in the more intimate relations of +love and friendship. In these, too, the influence of approval and +disapproval is powerful, and the pleasure we give a friend in being +worthy of his esteem may make our best happiness. Here we have a hint of +an increasing union of love for the individual and love for the ideal +which must tend to raise friendship itself to the highest plane. + +As a result of our considerations, we may deny the truth of Rolph's +assertion that the stimulus of want will be forever necessary in order +to secure exertion--that is, if by want is meant misery or great pain of +any sort; if merely desire is meant, which the anticipation and early +accomplishment of satisfaction may prevent from becoming pain, we may +admit the statement. In this case, however, the argument which Rolph +deduces against the possibility of a final state of social harmony is +invalid. + +But it is not the intention of our argument to assert that all desires +without exception will be fulfilled in any future condition of society. +What may be said is that, in an increasing degree, sympathy will +endeavor to satisfy the wants of the individual, while, on the other +hand, the approval and fellow-feeling of society, and the consciousness +of having performed his duty, will come to represent to the individual, +in a greater and greater degree, recompense for personal loss. This +change of direction in desire and gratification is no weakening of it: +it is no more necessarily true that the man of perfect principle is +poorer in emotion than the man whose passions lead him to sacrifice his +fellow men than it is true that the average man of civilized society is +poorer in emotion than the brutal savage. Merely, human evolution is a +continual development of higher and more complex emotions, which rise +into force on the proper occasion to modify the more primitive ones, or, +more accurately speaking, the lower emotions of the savage themselves +take on a higher form through organization with later ones. + +Spencer, in criticising theories of altruistic morals, endeavors to show +that time and energy are lost in the distribution, through others, of +the happiness or means of happiness which might with more profit, +because a better understanding of need, be sought by the individual +himself; and he remarks, that it is a question how much of the happiness +which means also vitality the individual may rightly sacrifice to +society. But the refusal of individuals to sacrifice anything of +personal gratification must lead, under present conditions of desire, to +extreme sacrifice on the part of other individuals; so that the +principle of the illegitimacy of sacrifice logically contradicts itself. +It is not perfectly clear what is meant by a "division and +redistribution" of happiness, or the means of happiness, against which +Spencer directs his argument. It is probable that the author has in +mind, and is especially opposing, a particular school of theorists whose +ideas we will consider later on. Suffice it to say, at this point, that +social harmony can never be reached by the stubborn continuance of each +in his line of inharmonious conduct, but can only be attained by such +gradual moulding of habit and desire that by natural organization +individuals will come to be in harmony with each other. It is the +history of social evolution that the individual, though always +determining what are his own needs, as it is obvious that he can best +do, is increasingly aided in satisfying them by coöperation, while he +also gives increasing aid in return. Against the list of the advantages +of egoism enumerated by Spencer and others, I would muster the +advantages of altruism, for by coöperation alone can the individual +attain the pleasures which now so often lie beyond his reach; by it +alone can society attain a higher plane; and the pleasures of altruism +are the highest and the most unfailing. The selfish man will suffer +disappointment and loss as well as the benevolent man, and he will lack +the refuge of sympathy and of the power to find happiness in the +happiness of others. What man who has felt the joys of sympathy would +exchange even the hardships it brings for the brutal liberty and unmoved +selfishness of the savage! what man who has known the joys of the +higher, the more unselfish love, would exchange them for the ungoverned +and quickly-palling pleasures of the profligate! These joys first lend +life worth and meaning; through association and altruism, coöperation in +action and feeling, man first becomes a power in the world. Yet the man +who is capable of the higher sympathy is incapable of a selfish +calculation of its personal advantages to him. + +Wundt has an objection to Evolutional Ethics as it is understood by this +treatise, on the score of the assumptions with regard to moral +inheritance involved. "How, out of tendencies stored up in the nervous +system, moral conceptions arise, is, and remains, a mystery," he +says.[265] The problem is nothing more or less than that of the +connection of brain-function and psychical process, in inheritance; and +we may say again that we no more perceive the necessity of explaining +the "how" of this before accepting the evident facts, than we see the +necessity of explaining, in the same sense, the connection between light +and heat, or between the seen vibrations and the heard note. Moreover, +the "mystery" belongs as much to the conservation of character in the +individual life as to its conservation in the race; if an explanation be +necessary before acceptance of the facts in the one case, it is +assuredly necessary in the other also; and its necessity must be fatal +to Physiological Psychology. It is time that that ancient scarecrow of +superstition, "a mystery," were removed from the field of science. When +Wundt further proceeds to interpret Spencer's theory of heredity as one +of the inheritance of distinct and definite ideas in their original +form, he reads into the theory what Spencer himself, with his +conceptions of instinct and reflex action, never put there, and what, +moreover, no modern writer on philosophy has distinctly asserted. This +present treatise is much more open to Wundt's criticism than is +Spencer's work, though it makes no positive assertion as to the nature +of "instinct" and so-called "automatism," but leaves the question as to +their unconscious character open. The appearance of common psychical +phenomena at the period of puberty, and with characteristics peculiar, +moreover, to the particular lines of descent, would be enough to +establish the fact of heredity, if no other testimony were forthcoming; +and yet no one can "explain" the sudden appearance of these phenomena at +a certain age. + +But the most of the objections to Evolutional Ethics are not on such +score as this. A while ago, the conservatives in Ethics declared that +the theory of Evolution, even if true, had nothing to do with morals, +which occupied a region far above the plane of science. Now, the most of +the conservative schools content themselves with merely asserting that +evolution may be true even in application to Ethics, but that it is +useless in this province, since it adds nothing of value to theory or +practice. It may be well to examine into this assertion. _A priori_, we +could scarcely suppose that increased knowledge in any branch could fail +to be of importance to that branch and to affect it in some manner. +Knowledge is power, and we should presume not less so in Ethics than in +any other science. + +The assertion that Evolution adds nothing to theory would indeed be as +just with regard to other sciences as with regard to Ethics; or, rather, +it would be more just with regard to the natural sciences. For they at +least recognized, before the appearance of the theory of Evolution, the +element of constancy ordinarily called law, and attempted to formulate +this constancy as a basis of thought and action. To these concepts of +constancy and the predictions founded upon them, the theory of Evolution +merely added greater certainty and a more extended range, supplying the +bond of union between various branches, and showing the inner relation +of many before disconnected theories; its whole force was one of +clarification. But the work of Evolution for Ethics, though of a similar +nature, has been of even greater degree and significance; it has unified +and clarified the attempts made to discover a basis for moral principles +and has rendered that foundation for the first time secure; it has +cleared away, with one sweep, the rubbish of ancient superstition, made +exact methods possible, and raised Ethics to the plane of a Science. If +it had added anything absolutely new and entirely unconnected with +previous theory, it would be as unintelligible to us as Calculus to a +Fiji-Islander; if it had no intimate and vital connection with foregoing +ideas, it would meet with no comprehension or acceptance. Science, too, +is an evolution, not a creation. The value of the theory of Evolution +lies in the very fact that it is simply an addition, though a large one, +to previous thought, a higher phase of conception which rises naturally +out of the old. But the cavillers say on the one hand: "It teaches a +theory of conscience as instinct, therefore we may still cling to the +old and unaltered doctrine of the veiled and sacred 'mystery of +Feeling'"; and on the other hand: "We already accepted a basis of reason +and Utility, therefore our theory, not being overthrown, needs no +alteration." Both schools forget that, in science as elsewhere, the new +develops from the old, but evolution brings with it, nevertheless, a +difference of degree that finally issues in difference of kind. It has +been said even by one belonging to the advanced school of Ethics, that, +if the course of Evolution could be shown to prescribe immoral conduct, +the duty of the moral man would be to oppose evolution even if he +perished in the attempt. The conception which lies at the basis of this +assertion is as erroneous as that which asserts that man must go forward +on the path taken by evolution whether he will or no.[266] To suppose +the will of society opposing the course of Evolution is to suppose a +self-contradiction. Nature and man's will are not two different things +in this process; man _is_ the part of nature which is involved in the +evolution considered. Our prediction of the direction of social +development is a prediction of his will; he _will_ will in certain ways +constant in the broad sense in which all nature is constant, constant as +character and reason are constant. The individual has assuredly the +power to oppose himself to all other individuals, if he so wills; and +his influence will not be lost; _but it is exactly this willing and the +mutual influence of individuals upon each other which the theory of +Evolution, as applied to Ethics, endeavors to take into account_. The +result in prediction cannot be properly likened, as it is likened by +Stephen,[267] to the inference of the future of an organic whole from +its present parts. It does not define the progress in society as a whole +from a study of the individual; it is, on the contrary, an inference of +the future of the whole from its past and present considered in the +light of general natural laws, and is as legitimate as the computation +of the future position of heavenly bodies from their observed past +movements and present position; though we can doubtless make only +general predictions from general observations. Or, if we approach the +question from another side, we may say that the science of Ethics +endeavors to ascertain the ideal by which the welfare of all may be +attained, and that the solution of this problem cannot be given +otherwise than through rules for the attainment of the general health in +the broadest sense of the word; for this corresponds to a final harmony +of desires through survival of the fittest. + +The power of prediction is, thus, evidently not to be interpreted as if +the evolution of morality would go on except through the human will, and +through this will in individuals. In any assertion to the contrary, the +same old contradictory division is assumed, of nature as active opposed +to nature as passive; man is first regarded as a part of nature and then +again as outside nature and compelled by it. We divide him into two +parts: the one necessarily coincident with the nature in himself, the +other antagonistic to it; the one absolutely passive, the other active; +and yet these two are the same, and we regard them as the same from +other points of view. Nor does prediction impose any "laws" upon the +will from without; it is simply inference from the observed relations in +the action of individuals: it does not create or alter those relations. +It reckons, not from man as compelled by "Necessity," but from man as +possessing will and acting from reason. If man is reasonable, he will +perceive that it is for the good of himself as well as for that of the +rest of his race to attain a state of harmony; as he is reasonable, he +will perceive that social progress is for his benefit as well as for +that of others. The increasing solidarity of society continually +rendering progress desirable, and the line of the fittest, that is, of +those who will in a manner that best fits them for social conditions, +continually tending to coincidence with the line of moral progress, the +final triumph of the moral is assured. It is not in any way denied that +man chooses this course of advancement. On the contrary, wherever we +begin in our analysis, we come round finally to the variation of reason, +emotion, and will. + +As above noticed, the false interpretation of the significance of +Evolutional Ethics on the subject of man's will in relation to progress +sometimes gives rise to the opposite erroneous impression to that just +noticed, to the impression, namely, that progress will go on whether men +strive for it or not, and that it is of no particular consequence what +the individual does, or at least that Evolutional Ethics can furnish +nothing but statistics and predictions, never motives to right-doing. +This confusion has caused much self-contradiction, has given rise to the +most of the discussion on the subject of Absolute and Relative Ethics, +and has impelled certain authors to close their books with something +very like a half doubt of the efficacy of their own method except as one +of observation. But the value of Evolutional Ethics lies not only in the +fact that it goes deeper than any other system and analyzes more clearly +the ground of moral conduct,--thus removing doubt with those who are +open to conviction, and furnishing a less fallible criterion to those +who desire to perceive where right lies in order to perform it,--but in +that it also renders obvious the fact that conduct opposed to the +welfare of society becomes, with time, more and more disadvantageous. +The individual may escape punishment for his misdeeds: but the chances +against him are greater, the greater these misdeeds and the longer they +are persisted in; it is the "average of the line of moral progress" that +is favored by natural selection. A system of Ethics is a part of the +environment which acts on the individual; its force is no more lost than +is that of any other part of the environment, although the result in the +particular case will depend, also, on the character of the individual +appealed to. But if Evolutional Ethics cannot bring any such force to +bear on the individual as will change his character in an instant, +rendering him apt and ready to act according to the ideal, whatever may +have been his previous character, there is neither any other system of +Ethics which can do this, and there has seldom been one so sanguine as +to hope to do it. Theological Ethics, or rather, Theology, has asserted +the possibility of such instant transformation, and the doctrine of +Socrates that the knowledge of right will secure its performance is a +much less extreme instance of a similar idea. But Evolutional Ethics, +while rendering manifest the necessity of unceasing endeavor, affords us +encouragement by its assurance of the possibility of progress, and its +demonstration of the fact that the force of endeavor can no more be lost +than any other force. It adds dignity to the smallest acts, and lends +earnestness and worth to life. It neither contains any excuses for +inaction nor leaves any reason open to pessimism except a selfish one; +to the man to whom his own selfish gratification is all in all, the +knowledge of social evolution is not a matter of encouragement and +rejoicing; but to the lover of his kind it must be. Evolutional Ethics +admonishes us to labor, yet teaches us the necessity of patience, since, +however the individual will, nothing arises all at once, and the +evolution of morals in society as a whole must, like all other +evolutions, be a gradual, because a many-sided one. It admonishes us, +too,--and this is well,--that we cannot sin without leaving ineffaceable +stains upon our own character. The past is never dead, either in its +results outside ourselves or in our habit; and it is not the drunkard +only who one day awakens to find himself irrevocably moulded, by steps +of habit so slight as to have been almost imperceptible, to that which +he once loathed and detested. "Our deeds are like children that are born +to us; they live and act apart from our own will. Nay, children may be +strangled, but deeds never; they have an indestructible life both in and +out of our consciousness."[268] We may not be a mere spectator of the +struggle for existence even if we will; the dead weight of inaction is +itself a force opposed to other force. Willy, nilly, so long as we live +we must bear the responsibility of taking a part for or against the +progress and welfare of the world. + +But there is, as I have said, a system which asserts the possibility of +instant entire change of character, as well as of the forgiveness and +obliteration of past sins. What manner of obliteration is this? Not the +obliteration of the consequences of the acts, since that is impossible, +but an obliteration of responsibility for them such that the doer may +erase them from his conscience. The innocent on whom the evil results +fall are, then, according to this view, the only ones who shall suffer +for them. The doctrine of the Atonement takes away that sense of +personal responsibility which is most essential to morality, and this +removal of responsibility explains the ease with which Christians of all +ages have combined a fervid religiosity with vice and crime. Christian +theories of morals of the present day forbid the issue of indulgences; +but the consciousness that full and free forgiveness is always waiting +to receive the offender whenever he gets ready to repent, even if it is +not until his death-bed, is most pernicious in its results. So we learn, +for instance, that the "Mollie Maguires," a league formed in the mines +of Pennsylvania a few years ago, for the express purpose of murder by +coöperation, were in the habit of opening their meetings with prayer, +and of withdrawing regularly from the society, for one quarter of the +year, to attend church, in order then to murder with an easy conscience +for the other three quarters. The senior member of Conan Doyle's "Firm +of Girdlestone" is no mere fiction of the imagination. I have no desire +to join with those who pronounce all Christians, or everything in +Christian doctrine, morally unsound; I only maintain that the doctrine +of the Atonement is in itself pernicious, and is shown to be so by its +easy reconciliation with evil action. + +Theological Ethics is defective in other respects also. A system which +represents God as accomplishing his own will in the world in "mysterious +ways," to question which is sacrilege, has necessarily led to the +excusing of much evil as punishment or discipline, and so to inaction +against it. "Men can do so little themselves to make the world better," +said a fervent Christian to me not long since; "we must leave these +things to God." So, poverty has been held to be a mysterious +dispensation of Providence which it was not necessary to do away with +even if its abolishment were possible, but the slight alleviation of +which was counted among the means of atonement for other sin. Thus it +has been in other ways than in itself a curse to mankind, furnishing a +sort of indulgence for the immoralities of the rich. Poverty has even +been represented as a blessing, since it was to be compensated with +double joy in the hereafter. The Christian, pointing the miserable and +starving to Heaven as a recompense for pain, experienced, without +largely inconveniencing himself, a sense of his own piety and desert, +and exerting himself to no radical cure but only to a meagre dole of +charity, shifted all responsibility of the cure or its omission, by +prayer, to God. So Salter is led to exclaim: "If we must pray, let us +pray to men; for there all the trouble lies. Could you, O churches, but +open the hearts of your worshippers as you seek to move the heart of +God, the need for all other prayer would soon be gone."[269] + +Again, Theology has continually taught that man's first duty was to save +his own soul from hell, and in this doctrine, ideas of repentance and +redemption, faith and worship, have played a larger part than "mere +morality." The tendency has, therefore, been towards an +"other-worldliness," an egoism of the Hereafter, rather than a +fulfilment of the commandment of love. Faith has been exalted above love +of Truth, and blind obedience above reasoning morality. Thus it was that +Christians entered, with such zeal, into the persecution of heretics. +Had the commandment of justice: "do unto others as ye would that they +should do unto you," been followed, the Inquisition could never have +taken place. But Christians forget, when they point to this commandment +in evidence of the superiority of Christian Ethics, that it is not the +only command or doctrine that the Bible contains. Nor is this conception +of love to others, which Christians have continually cited as testimony +of the divine origin of their religion, confined to Christianity or even +original with it. Many other religions contain it. The Buddhist religion +enjoins towards all creatures such love as that with which a mother +"watches over her own child, her only child." + +It is true that the majority of the objectionable points of Christian +Ethics are found in the Old Testament. This testament is, however, +accepted as the exponent of divine truth, though the authority it now +possesses is slight in comparison with that which it formerly held. Yet +Christ himself says: "Think not I am come to destroy the Law (_i.e._, +the Pentateuch),[270] or the Prophets, I come not to destroy, but to +fulfil. For, verily, I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot +or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the Law till all be fulfilled. +Whosoever, therefore, shall break one of these least commandments and +shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of +heaven; but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called +great in the kingdom of heaven." Repeatedly, Christ shows himself a +strict conformant to the Jewish code. But if we examine the Pentateuch, +the Jewish Law, we shall easily find on what grounds the burning of +heretics and witches, and all the other cruelties of the Middle Ages +were committed in the name of Christianity. Lubbock writes, for +instance:[271] "Among the Jews, we find a system of animal sacrifice on +a great scale, and symbols of human sacrifice which can, I think, only +be understood on the hypothesis that the latter were once usual. The +case of Jephthah's daughter is generally looked upon as exceptional; but +the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth verses of the twenty-seventh chapter +of Leviticus appear to indicate that human sacrifices were at one time +habitual, among the Jews." See also 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 5-9, 14. In Lev. xx. +27; Ex. xxii. 18, the stoning of witches is commanded. In Ex. xxii. 20; +Deut. xiii. 1-5, 6-10, 14, 15; xvii. 1-5; xviii. 20, it was commanded +that men be put to death for idolatry or heresy or for "dreaming dreams" +in the service of another god, and that idolatrous cities should be +utterly destroyed even to the cattle within them. Superstition and +insanity must have fared ill among the Jews. Ex. xxxi. 14, 15; xxxv. 2, +3; sentence of death is pronounced on any who shall perform even so much +labor as the kindling of a fire on the Sabbath; and Num. xv. 32-36, +describe how a man was put to death, by God's command to Moses, for +gathering sticks on that day. Death was also commanded for murmuring and +for all sorts of ceremonial offences; see, for instance, Ex. xii. 15, +19; xxx. 33-38; Lev. vii. 20-27; xvii. 8-10, 13-16; xix. 5-8; xxiii. 29, +30; xxiv. 10-16, 23; Num. i. 51; iii. 10, 38; iv. 15, 18-20; xi. 1; +xvii. 13; xviii. 3, 7, 22; see also especially Deut. xxviii. 15-68; +xxxii. 22-42. Command of subjection to the priesthood on pain of death +is found in Deut. xvii. 8-12, and examples of fearful punishment for +protest against its supremacy are given in Num. xvi. 3-15, 20, 21, +26-35, 41-47, 49. It may be noticed, that here the children are +represented as perishing with the parents by God's express command and +miracle. Many instances of the stoning and putting to death of whole +families for the sins of some member or members of the family are +recorded in the Old Testament, and prove that the expression "visiting +the sins of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's +children, unto the third and to the fourth generation," is not to be +interpreted as a mere reference to heredity, as many have endeavored to +prove it to be. See on this point Is. xiv. 21; also Ps. cix. 7-20; +cxxxvii. 9. The origin of ordeals may be traced to Num. v. 11-31. + +The Old Testament also sanctions slavery, and makes no protest against +the selling of children into slavery; see Ex. xxi. 2-6, 7; Lev. xxv. +44-47; although the Israelites were to treat slaves and servants of +their own nation with much greater kindness than that used towards those +of other nations. Ex. xxi. 20, 21, prescribes that a man shall not be +punished for beating his servant to death, provided the servant does not +die directly under his hand, but linger a day or two; "for he is his +money." Christians have often protested that their religion cannot be +held responsible for the sins of the prophets,--for David's murder of +Uriah in order to obtain the wife with whom he had already committed +adultery; for his torture of the Ammonites with saws and axes and +harrows and fire, and his houghing of the horses of a thousand Moabitish +chariots; for Solomon's concubinage and his slaughter of Joab according +to David's last orders; for Elijah's wholesale slaughter of the priests +of Baal; or for the thousand other vices, crimes, and atrocities +described in the Old Testament as committed by God's chosen men, +generally without punishment or protest from him. However, the case is +not so easily dismissed when we find just as great cruelties and +atrocities directly ascribed to God's express command or miraculous +interposition. A large number of such are included in the passages +already noticed; and we further find descriptions of a destruction from +God for the crime of census-taking[272]--1 Chron. xxi. 1, 11-15--for +touching the ark in the endeavor to save it from a fall--2 Sam. vi. 6, +7,--and for many other trifling offences. God is always represented as +favoring the Israelites in their wars and massacres, and often as +commanding the slaughter of thousands; so that we can easily understand +how it happened that the cowardly murderers of the Duke of Gloucester, +in the time of Richard II., swore "upon the Body of Christ before a +certain chaplain of St. George in the church of Our Lady of Calais, that +they would not disclose the murder they were about to perpetrate,"[273] +as also, on what precedent Russia, at the present day, has her +war-engines blessed by priests of the "God of Battles." Deut. xx. 10-15, +commands the slaughter of males captured in a siege, but the sparing +alive of women and children as booty; and Num. xxxi. describes a case in +which the command was carried out, with the reservation of a certain +portion of young girls for the priests. See also Deut. xxi. 10-14. +Furthermore, a religion that makes man absolute ruler of the earth and +all living things, and sanctions animal sacrifice, cannot conduce to a +sense of the duty of self-restraint towards other species, and is, in +fact, often used as an excuse for the autocracy and cruelty of man. + +It is, indeed, strange to see civilized peoples of the nineteenth +century proclaiming the divine origin of laws and beliefs like +these--laws and beliefs at least as barbarous as those of the Greeks and +Romans whose gods the Christians deride, and far behind the Ethics of +some philosophical systems produced among those "heathen" peoples. As +has been said, various attempts have been made to explain away these +barbarities, or to withdraw all responsibility for them from God, to +whom the Old Testament often directly ascribes them. But in the light of +what we know of other primitive peoples the customs of the Jews are only +too easily comprehensible; the same barbarities of human and animal +sacrifice, slavery, murder without pity, and unscrupulous cruelty of +every sort, were to be found, as we have seen, among many other ancient +peoples. As for withdrawing the responsibility from the God of the Jews, +Christians forget that, in denying the divine origin of the cruel, +brutal, and obscene laws ascribed to God together with other laws of +less barbarity but of organic growth with these, they are forever +destroying the grounds of belief in any assertion of divine supervision, +and throwing doubt, by implication, on the New Testament as well, since +Christ and his followers were believers in the Law and the Prophets, +and often refer to their assertions and accounts of divine direction. +But most religions have claimed, and do claim, the divine origin and +ratification of their laws, as a means of enforcing them. + +The God of the Jews, Jehovah, was originally a nature-god, the god of +the heavens, like Zeus, Jupiter, and many other of the greatest gods of +other peoples. Science has exploded ancient ideas of the sky; but the +Christians still cling to the old terms brought into use at a time when +men believed in a flat earth and a region of spirits above floored by an +opaque heaven. The God of the Jews was, like the gods of all primitive +peoples, a "jealous" and revengeful god, rather to be "feared" than +loved; for to such peoples, possessing few resources against the powers +of nature and ignorant of their character, the destructive forces of the +elements appeared at first rather evil than good, and therefore to be +conciliated and appeased; the gods take on their friendly character only +as man comes to learn how the forces of nature may be employed for his +benefit, and as he slowly attains, in himself, to sympathetic and moral +feeling. Accordingly, the Jews were continually occupied with all manner +of propitiatory offerings of their most valuable possessions--their +herds and the fruits of the earth; and these were burnt under the +impression common to nearly all primitive and savage tribes, that they +suffered by fire a sort of death and entered the spiritual world. +Gradually, the Jews became more civilized, and took on the higher ideals +of Eastern religions with which they came in contact; but even to very +recent date, the "fear" of God was regarded as the chief essential +emotion on the part of the worshipper. Of late, as social ideals have +become higher, and sympathy more general, the idea of love, lost for a +time through the mixture of Eastern peoples with more barbaric ones, has +come to the fore. That a doctrine of polytheism is clearly taught in +Gen. iii. 22; vi. 1-4, Christians do not generally even notice. The idea +of demigods, found in the latter verse, is called by them, when they +meet with it in the Greek or Roman religion, a "myth"; and the idea of +sexual intercourse between men and gods, also taught in these verses, is +held worthy of all abhorrence, when these "heathen" religions are under +consideration. The fact is, that exegesis, forced to advance by +progressing civilization, has left far behind the simple original +meaning of bible-texts,--such obvious meaning as Christians find in the +Buddhist, Persian, or Egyptian Scriptures, when they peruse them. This +is true of the New Testament as well as of the Old. The Christian +religion has indeed developed into a system of Christian philosophy as +different from the Christianity warranted by the Old and New Testaments +as were the later Buddhist philosophies from original Buddhism. + +When Christ conferred upon his Apostles the power to forgive sins, he +laid the foundation for papal authority, and confirmed the ancient +authority of the priesthood, preparing the way for that organization of +priestcraft which figured so prominently in all the sorrowful history of +the Middle Ages. Moreover, the vein of sadness and the subordination of +natural modes of life which mark his teaching as they mark only in a +greater degree those of the Buddha, easily led to the celibacy and +mortification of the flesh which so long condemned the most aspiring +from a moral point of view, the most gentle and conscientious, to a life +of loneliness, and peopled the world with the progeny of the less moral. +Indeed, if we read Matt. xix. 12 correctly, Christ distinctly taught +emasculation as a high religious virtue. + +The New Testament tolerated the slavery upheld by the Old Testament, and +we not only find no protest whatever against it, but we even find Paul +returning a runaway slave to his master. Not only Paul, but John also, +taught both predestination and hell-fire for idolaters and unbelievers, +as well as for the fearful and doubtful, equally with murderers, +whoremongers, and liars: Rev. xvii. 8; xx. 15. Christ himself plainly +proclaims the damnation of unbelievers--Matt. xxii. 13, 14; xxiii. 14, +33; Mark xvi. 16; etc.--and he at the same time asserts a very positive +doctrine of predestination, avowing that he himself takes special pains +that many of those to whom he preaches shall not be able to understand +him, believe, and be saved: Mark iv. 11, 12; John xii. 39, 40. His +language on these subjects is very clear, and bears no sign of being +intended as figurative, though modern Christians prefer to regard it as +such rather than to relinquish a religion the morals of which would, by +other interpretation, be proved inadequate to the demands of the +standards of higher civilization; the same method of exegesis applied to +the sacred books of Confucianism or of Buddhism, from which it now +appears probable that very many of the Christian ideas were derived, +would suit them ill. But even if Christ's language were figurative, it +must have some meaning; the wrath and vengeance of God are continually +spoken of in the New Testament as well as in the Old. Such expressions +were not looked upon, until of late, as figurative, and they doubtless +did much to justify, to the minds of earlier Christians, the burning of +heretics. The justification of all sin in God's elect, a permanent +indulgence, is plainly taught by Paul, Rom. viii. 33; iv. 5-8; 1 Cor. +vi. 12. Let us take the Buddhist Scriptures, and, in the light of the +better passages, or in the light of Siddhartha's devotion to truth and +to his fellow men, interpret the passages which, morally, we find +wanting, and we shall find this religion as beautiful as the Christian. + +A chief reason often advanced by Christians for continued faith in their +religion, is the comfort conferred by a belief in immortality and the +forgiveness of sins through Christ; that is, the rescue of men from the +"wrath of God" through the offering of an innocent being, a "human +sacrifice," which was to bear this wrath, and appease it, according to +the old Jewish idea of the scapegoat. The morality of the last doctrine +we have already condemned; there is no real making atonement in this +world; we should recognize this fact, bear the responsibility of our +deeds, and in the light of past experience, avoid the repetition of our +old sins. And the moral question as to mortality or immortality is not: +"What is the pleasanter to believe?" but "What is the truth?" In this +recommendation of the pleasant in belief, we have but an illustration of +one of the chief defects of Christian theory, which lays most stress +upon faith and far less upon a love of the Truth at all costs. The peace +of the Christian's death-bed is often made one of the chief arguments in +favor of the Christian religion. But the mind in which there exists the +noble love of truth will seek this only at the cost of all peace and +blind content. + +On the general connection of faith and morals, Clifford writes: "Belief +in God and in a future life is a source of refined and elevated pleasure +to those who can hold it. But the foregoing of a refined and elevated +pleasure, because it appears that we have no right to indulge in it, is +not in itself, and cannot produce as its consequences, a decline of +morality."[274] Indeed, Christianity, as has been already remarked, and +as is conclusively shown by any conscientious and unprejudiced +examination of the Bible itself, leaves room for an ease of conscience +and a self-excuse in even very great sins, which no high standard of +morals can tolerate. How many of those who attend church regularly, on +Sunday, are restrained by their religion from practising vice and +injustice on week-days, under the consolation, if their conscience +troubles them at all, that their prayers for forgiveness and the +bestowal of charity, or even, in extremity, a death-bed "repentance" +will make their peace with God? In place of an attempt at reparation +towards men, against whom sin is really done, Christians are taught to +seek the "forgiveness" of God. Some there are, indeed, who remember only +the law of love and endeavor to follow it. All honor to them. But they +are adherents of a modern Christian Philosophy, the product of many good +men who have winnowed out the wheat of their religion and left the +chaff; they are not followers of the Bible, or even of the New +Testament, as a whole. Many there are who are perceiving this, and the +old system needs replacement with a newer and higher--with a system +which affords clear and evident grounds for moral action, leaves no room +for mysticism, self-justification, or inaction, offers no opiate to +conscience. Such a system must be founded on the solid rock of +scientific Truth; not on any doctrine of blind obedience to traditions; +it must take into account man's evolution, that it may progress with his +progress. + +Many term the Ethics of science dry and uninspiring, and turn, with +preference, to religions which, if they give us mysticism or pessimism, +give us poetry also; for man is an emotional as well as an intellectual +being; and there may be much poetry in pessimism. But again, it may be +said that the Truth is that which we should first seek. And especially +let it be remembered that, if poetry is lacking, it may be that the +deficiency is in ourselves. It is a history many times repeated, that +men call their age and its ideas dry and uninteresting, and seek their +ideals and inspirations in the past, until the master-mind arises, who +boldly faces and interprets the realities about him; and then men +exclaim and wonder, and find that their own blindness, and not the age, +was at fault. We cling by habit to the old and fear the new; and so we +have yet to inspire these new ideals with the beauty gained by +association and habit; in themselves, they do not lack beauty. In +truth, as I believe that there is more of poetry in the gray wires +strung across our streets and guiding the swift, silent, fearful forces +in which lies power to light a city or destroy a life, than ever was in +any feeble-flamed Grecian lamp, so I believe also that, in the dry, +hard, cold-seeming facts of modern science there lurks more poetry than +all the ages gone have known; though we may need the poet to interpret +it to us. The highest poetry is that of love; and it is the realization +of this poetry that the Ethics of Evolution teaches, promises, and +enjoins. Certainly the superficial Utilitarianism which looks only at +external forms of government and customs and the arithmetically +calculated relations of men, not at their inner character and the +organic complexity of moral questions, cannot satisfy in the long run. +Nor can the bald Materialism satisfy which, standing by its analysis in +physical terms like the physiologist in the dissecting-room with his +chemicals about him and the dead nerves and muscles in his hand, +exclaims with a triumph that is half a sneer: "This is all." It is not +all. The synthesis of nature and of life cannot be represented by its +parts merely; the bond of organization wanting, all is wanting. Nor is +the action in the brain more real, more forceful, more spontaneous, or +freer, than the love for a friend, the thought of him, or the will to do +him a kindness. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[256] "Moral Order and Progress," p. 292; Part I., this book, pp. 250, +251. + +[257] "Moral Order and Progress," p. 287, etc.; Part I. p. 249, this +book. + +[258] "Moral Order and Progress," pp. 307, 312; Part I. pp. 250, 252, +253, this book. + +[259] "Moral Order and Progress," Book I. Chap. II.; Part I. pp. 231, +232, this book. + +[260] "Moral Order and Progress," p. 332. + +[261] See "Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls." + +[262] "Moral Order and Progress," p. 270; Part I., this book, p. 247. + +[263] On the theory of Weismann. + +[264] "Human Progress, Past and Present," "The Arena" for Jan., 1892. + +[265] "Ethik," p. 344. + +[266] See Part I. p. 147. + +[267] "The Science of Ethics," pp. 32-34. + +[268] George Eliot, "Romola." + +[269] Salter, "Ethical Religion." + +[270] It is strange that even enlightened Christians often, without +thinking, interpret the "Scriptures" referred to by Christ as if they, +in some way, included the New Testament, which was not written till long +after his death. + +[271] "The Origin of Civilization," p. 373. + +[272] Superstitious fears are often awakened in savage tribes, and among +the ignorant of our own more advanced societies, by attempts at +census-taking. + +[273] Pike, "History of Crime," I. p. 405. + +[274] Essays and Lectures, "The Influence upon Morality of a Decline in +Religious Belief." + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE IDEAL AND THE WAY OF ITS ATTAINMENT + + +Mr. Stephen questions the possibility of our determining at all what a +state of ideal morality should be. I should contend, on the contrary, +that there would be little disagreement in opinions as to what the ideal +should be, but that rather our chief difficulties must lie in the +determination of the course to be pursued in order to attain to the +ideal. The profligate, it is true, will not be likely to acknowledge +that self-control and faithfulness are parts of an ideal condition if he +thinks that the acknowledgment binds him in any way to faithfulness and +self-control in his own conduct; and the dishonest man will be chary of +admitting that honesty is desirable if his consciousness suggests that +he ought therefore to practise unvarying honesty himself. But the +dishonest man is generally very thoroughly convinced of the desirability +of honor and uprightness in every one else; and the profligate also is +generally both among the loudest in his denunciation of unfaithfulness +in those he feels should be true to him, and sufficiently ready to +acknowledge the social advantages of principles opposite to his own, if +you can but convince him that it is only a matter of pure theory you are +discussing, which will doubtless never be put in practice by society as +a whole, and which in no way interferes with your thorough approval of +his own action. So, too, the cruel, the rough, and the rude, will easily +confess that unselfishness, unfailing kindness, tact, and consideration +in the rest of society, are what the world needs. Did these virtues +exist, there would be no need of the choice between evils now necessary. +That which really troubles us is this choice, the difficulty of +ascertaining just what course is the best, which brings us nearest to +our ideal, assists most effectually in hastening development towards +that goal. For there is no course, under existing conditions, which is +wholly advantageous to society, none which does not involve some evil. +It follows, from this, that it is insufficient to show that any +particular course involves some advantage to some one in order to +demonstrate that it is the right one, as also that it is insufficient to +show that a course involves evil to some one in order to demonstrate +that it is wrong. It is not proved that, because the restraint of any +particular desire or passion is attended with pain to the individual, it +is wrong. The argument has often been, and is still, advanced--seemingly +with the idea that it is conclusive--that the indulgence of physical +passion in youth tends to sobriety and steadiness in later years; and, +with a similar idea apparently, a dramatic critic falls into a rhapsody +over the manner in which the characters in a recent play come out +"purified by the evil" they have wrought or endured.[275] But even if +this argument were scientifically sound, it would not prove the +desirability of self-indulgence, since not the individual alone is to be +considered. The argument is, however, erroneous. With advancing years +comes in general, in any case, a diminution of passion, or at least a +greater admixture of reason; but apart from this, indulgence tends to +increase desire and tendency, except as excess may lead to morbid +conditions, or the disregard of higher instincts to disappointment and +cynicism. When we are told, in another play than the one mentioned +above, and apparently with the idea that the statement is an excuse, +that the hero could find no other outlet for the exuberance of his youth +than the seduction of an innocent girl, we may see no reason to doubt +the assertion, but we may question whether society has not a right, +nevertheless, to suppress a little of such exuberance or turn it into +other channels. The man born with fierce and ungovernable fury in his +disposition may likewise feel a strong propensity to express the +exuberance of his youth in a murder or two; but I see no reason why +society should permit him to do so. The passion of anger is also a +perfectly natural one, and the ungovernable fury which led to murder was +not an exception with our ancestors of the savage plane, but the rule. +Not all natural passion is to be indulged simply because it is natural; +and even the fact that a tendency is good in moderation and under +certain restrictions is no proof that it is good or to be indulged in +immoderation, or without these restrictions. It can have been only by +restriction of the natural savage fury that this fury grew less +prominent in character. The cannibal transported into civilized society +may still have a strong and perfectly natural hunger for my spareribs, +but that is no sufficient reason why he should get them. Jack the Ripper +is endowed, evidently, with a very passionate love for his human +vivisection, and finds it an outlet for an exuberance which also bubbles +out otherwise in many ways; yet I think society will be justified in +putting a peremptory end to that exuberance, when it gets the +opportunity. + +Morality is indeed a matter of welfare, and so, of the gratification of +desire and tendency; but neither the present alone, nor the single +individual in preference to all the rest of society, is to be +considered. Effort should be exerted continually for the reduction of +pain to a minimum, in every respect possible, with regard to the +individual and the minority as well as with regard to the majority, +though the greater good and the greater number must always take +precedence. The rule of the majority may be asserted to be moral in that +it is the best possible expedient where there is disagreement of +desires. The necessity for choice between evils is the origin of the +principle of the Greatest Good to the Greatest Number, and this, as has +been said, covers all the ground, _if rightly applied_. But it offers a +temptation to stop with the mere comparison of two sums of individuals +and degrees of happiness for the time being, without taking into the +problem the wider results of a particular choice to society as a whole, +through habit and personal influence. The consideration of these last +important factors has led, on the other hand, to such rules as that of +Kant,--"Act so that the maxims of thy will might be taken as the +principle of universal action"; and this rule, because it goes deeper, +is less likely to lead to error. The moral requirement of continual +effort to find the best method of reducing the evil still remaining, of +recompensing the individual and the minority for the good of which they +are necessarily deprived, needs especial emphasis; for the continual +direction of attention to effort for progress, even where no outward +change is, for the moment, possible, constitutes an inward progress in +character which is ever ready to issue in external progress the instant +opportunity presents itself. Present pain to individuals is the sign of +imperfection in those permitting it and those suffering it, and must +result in increase of tendency in this direction of imperfection unless +it takes place only in spite of the most vigorous effort for its +prevention. Even the reformer must choose that to which he would chiefly +apply his endeavor, with some necessary withdrawal of effort from other +directions. Yet the neglect of any present opportunity of reform or +benefit, though it may sometimes be necessitated for the gain of some +more important future good, is still an outer, and also, especially, an +inner evil, which can be compensated only by a high degree of +superiority in the future good to be obtained. As the man who, perhaps +from the fear of failing in thoroughness, leaves all original work until +middle age, is likely to find his power of originality much deteriorated +by that time, so the man who is cruel to-day, in order to be kind in +some wider respect later on, is likely to find, on the final arrival of +opportunity, if the period through which the unkindness is exercised be +a long one, that his capacity for kindness has diminished. Every neglect +of present opportunity is a loss to character as well as an external +loss. When the present good passed over for the sake of the future +includes the welfare of whole lives, the question of choice and the +postponement of good becomes still graver; when it includes generations, +we need to consider earnestly before we take on ourselves the +responsibility of a choice that shall prefer the future. I cannot agree +with those who believe or practically live out the idea that the present +generation is only or chiefly for the sake of the future generation, the +parents only for the sake of their children, or the individual only for +the sake of society as a whole. We need to remember that the race +includes present and future, and parents and children, and has no +existence outside the individuals that compose it. It is difficult to +reconcile the many conflicting principles; and thus it appears that +morality is not easy, even where earnest desire for it exists, and that +different views with regard to it may be conscientiously held. The +difficulty only increases the duty of continual endeavor to reconcile +the many different conditions of happiness and welfare. + +We come thus naturally to a question of the day,--the contest between +the Individualist and the Socialist. + +What has already been said makes it sufficiently evident that, if +Individualism is to be maintained at all, it cannot be upheld on the +ground that the doings of the individual are of no importance to +society, and his sins may therefore not be interfered with by society. +In "Social Statics," Mr. Spencer secures freedom for "personal vice" by +turning his principle that a man has a right to seek his own ends as +long as he does not prevent others from the pursuit of their ends, into +the entirely different one, that a man has a right to seek a certain end +if he does not prevent others from seeking the same end.[276] The +argument in this form is applied to drunkenness, but it could as well be +used to prove the moral rightness of murder or any other crime, the sole +condition being that the murderer did not prevent others from committing +the crime also. + +Nor is the Individualism less self-contradictory which bases its theory +on the principle that it is the office of civil law to guard the rights +of the individual. What individual? All individuals? If so, then +assuredly it is the duty of the State to see that the laborer is paid a +fair price for his work. + +Nor can it be shown, as Höffding asserts, that intellectual labor +benefits the whole of society, while manual labor is less valuable +because it is for a few. The intellectual laborer knows well of what +value to him and his ilk is the manual labor which feeds him, clothes +him, and manufactures the thousand and one things necessary for his +comfort, leaving him leisure to pursue his studies with all material +wants provided for. The satisfaction of our material wants is the very +first requisite of life, without which intellectual labor would be an +impossibility. + +There are, however, many degrees and shades of Individualism. As +Höffding says, Individualism may be identical with Egoism, but it need +not be so. And, moreover, as has been noticed, the adherents of theories +of Egoistic Morals are not necessarily adherents of any theory of +selfishness. + +The theories bearing the name of Socialism are also very various,--quite +as much so as those included under the head of Individualism. It is, +therefore, both confusing to consider Socialism without some notice of +the distinction between these various phases of theory, and is likely to +lead to protest from one side or the other. But no single party of +Socialists can be treated exclusively as "the" Socialists; a minority of +the party cannot expect to be regarded as anything but a minority. + +Of the tendency to represent the whole of the present order of society +as utterly bad,--a tendency not confined to the Socialist party, but +nevertheless strongly developed in many parts of it,--considerable has +already been said. As Höffding remarks, it is difficult to perceive how, +in an utterly corrupt society, any foundation may be found on which to +build the almost flawless society the Socialist proposes to institute. +If the course of evolution has hitherto been propitious to the increase +of evil, it is difficult to find any scientific grounds for a belief +that evolution will now proceed to favor the good. If man, as a being +possessing reason, has hitherto chosen, in increasing degree, injustice +towards his fellow-man, it is scarcely possible for any one who proceeds +upon the supposition of constancy in the action of man as a part of +nature to hope that future events will exhibit exactly opposite +characters. Assuredly, we are far enough from the goal yet, but in order +to demonstrate this fact it is not necessary to prove that we are worse +than any previous age has been. The tendency to lay stress, by every +means, on present evil, in the endeavor to impress its reality and +undesirability upon the mind of society, is comprehensible; and +doubtless, too, as the troubles of the individual are likely to appear +to himself among the hardest possible, so to those on whom the evils of +the age press most severely these are likely to seem greater than the +evils of any other times. But this method of regarding history is not +the less erroneous. "In the age of chivalry men had at least a common +ideal," said a Socialist to me, not long since. But what an ideal! And +unity of purpose is not by any means necessarily a sign of a high plane. +It may, on the contrary, signify stupidity, lack of the power of +independent thought. The first result of thought on any particular +subject is sure to be a division of opinion, although mutual criticism +gradually evolves harmony from the strife, and brings about a degree of +unity again, on a higher plane; for the mutual criticism is sure to have +been of intellectual use. The Socialists themselves have demonstrated +the fact that division of opinion necessarily arises when men begin to +think upon any question, for with the development of their party many +different phases of socialistic theory have appeared. The history of the +division of the Church into sects, and of the mutual criticism of these +sects, has been the history of religious progress. + +With some Socialists, again, the already criticised idea of a "return to +nature" plays a conspicuous part. But we have never departed from +nature; we are as much a part of nature, as natural, as we ever were. +Or, if we are to return, who shall tell us at just what point we leave +the "artificial" and arrive at the "natural"? There are no +stopping-places, no stations or pauses, in the scale of evolution. There +is only continual change by inappreciable increments. The theory of +evolution carries with it no significance which could authorize us to +consider that we had arrived at our goal at one point rather than at +another. And, again, if we are to give up the artificial customs of +later development and return to earlier habits, then customs of +altruistic action, as the most distinctive and characteristic of later +forms of conduct, must be chiefly affected. If, however, by a return to +nature is meant the adoption of a simpler mode of life in some classes +in order that a less simple but more healthful one may become possible +in other classes, the question of the desirability of such a change is, +of course, open to discussion; but let us consider it under these terms +then. To designate the proposed mode of life as a return to the natural, +thus making present modes of life artificial, is to smuggle in an +illegitimate assumption against the latter. + +It is the habit of a portion of the Socialist party to represent the +laborer as the epitome of all the virtues, the capitalist as his moral +opposite. This view cannot be other than erroneous, considered from any +standpoint. Moral evil cannot affect one part of a closely united +society without affecting the other parts also, though it may assume +different forms in different parts. This should be, in reality, the +Socialist's strongest argument, and is, indeed, one which he constantly +makes use of in other connections. If the steady labor of one class is +often associated with certain virtues, there are many elements of its +surroundings which tend to develop and encourage certain vices also; and +if, on the other hand, excessive wealth is often the condition, as well +as the result, of selfishness, still the relief from material anxieties +may be used, on the other hand, as opportunity for other useful labor, +and leaves room, indeed, for a development of finer intellectual and +moral qualities. To reply that much greater good would accompany other +conditions is irrelevant; for we are not now comparing actualities with +ideals, but one class of people with another under existing +circumstances. + +A somewhat similar phase of idea to that just considered is found in the +agitation against machinery. This agitation is not of recent date, +however; it began over two centuries ago, and would, if it had +succeeded, have deprived the world of nearly all the comforts and +conveniences which have, since then, become possible. Doubtless the +abolishment of machinery would temporarily furnish labor to all the +unemployed. Indeed, it has been computed, from facts supplied by the +statistical bureau of Berlin, that it would require about double the +number of inhabitants now on the face of the globe to perform the labor +accomplished by the steam works of the principal civilized lands. But +the increase of the earth's inhabitants depends, to a great extent, on +the favorable or unfavorable circumstances of the environment; and we +cannot suppose otherwise than that the sudden accession of abundant +means of livelihood would cause a very great acceleration of the rate of +increase and so a speedy return of the old problem. Even supposing that +a certain recklessness of sexual indulgence would be done away with +under better circumstances which afforded access to other means of +pleasure than the purely physical, this over-indulgence leads quite as +often to sterility and disease as to excess of offspring. Habit and +opinion not being matters of instantaneous or even rapid change, the new +order of society would very largely depend upon the character and ideas +acquired under the old order, and population must increase with a +rapidity fostered by an immense multiplication of regular marriages, and +by more healthful surroundings for offspring at all ages. Unchecked, as +hitherto, by the excessive mortality due to famine, filth, and neglect, +it must soon arrive at a point where the questions of competition again +present themselves. But machinery is a relative term. Every tool and +device for lightening labor is, in fact, a machine, and takes, by +definition, from the labor of the world. When, therefore, we should find +ourselves face to face with the former conditions, I do not see that any +consistent course would lie before us but the doing away with our more +complicated tools, and, later, with our less complicated ones, and so +on, as the increase of the world's inhabitants brought again and again +the recurrence of questions of competition, until we should arrive, at +length, at that ancient state of things where all transport would be +made by porters, land ploughed by the pointed stick, and clothes--if we +consented to withdraw labor from the cultivation of the earth for the +manufacture of such luxuries--would require for the preparation of each +garment several weeks, months, or even years of work. I do not see where +else the theory of the abolishment of machinery for the sake of +supplying labor to the unemployed can logically and practically lead, +especially as the withdrawal of machinery must mean, in the end, the +withdrawal of those opportunities for cultivating the arts and sciences +which the leisure from merely mechanical pursuits alone can give. Under +more primitive conditions of labor, the ignorance of the masses must +spread more and more, until its widening circle must take in the great +majority of men, as was the case when these primitive conditions +prevailed. In other words, the abolishment of machinery means social +retrogression, and, if affording temporary relief, leaves the race, in +the end, on a lower plane of evolution, with the work of advancement to +its former plane all to do over again. + +And this brings us to the consideration of another point, namely, the +agitation against luxury,--an agitation carried on not, like that +against machinery, by only a portion, if a considerable portion, of the +Socialist party, but by that party as a whole. We may inquire, then, as +to what luxury is. The Socialists find considerable trouble in defining +it; they generally content themselves with the word alone, leaving it +undefined or referring, with a general indefiniteness, to "velvets, +jewels, and laces," or "diamonds and silks"; the German Socialists have +sometimes shown particular antipathy to the glacé glove; and a society +of English Socialists listened, not long ago, to a lecture in which, as +an example of the reforms proposed by Socialism, it was prophesied that +the evening-dresses of the future would be made of more lasting though +not less delicate and beautiful material. This last would assuredly be +desirable, if it could be carried out; but it remains to be seen in how +far it is practicable. The things which are the most delicate, whether +they be clothing or other articles, are ordinarily likewise the most +perishable; the union of delicacy of texture with endurance is a problem +that can be solved only by gradual improvement if at all; and it is +probable that it can be solved only relatively in some cases and not at +all in others; yet there are few people who will not find delicacy an +attribute of beauty. Few will disagree with M. de Laveleye that beauty +of costume must consist rather in harmony of colors and purity of line +than in the mere costliness of the goods; however, in a large number of +cases, excess of price corresponds to some actual superiority of color, +durability, or texture, in the goods. Doubtless it is true that some +things (M. de Laveleye instances opium) may cost much money and yet be +useless or even harmful; but this very limited assertion cannot, by any +logical method, be converted into an assertion that the price of an +article is an argument against it. Even the extra price demanded and +paid for novelties corresponds to an actual, general desire for variety, +and if this is often carried too far, the fact still remains that the +want is inherent in all human nature, indeed, in all life, and cannot be +entirely disregarded. The proposal of M. de Laveleye to reinstitute a +national dress is, for this reason, a foolish and inartistic one. No two +people are suited to exactly the same costume; and the more society +develops the more the individual shows a desire for individuality in +dress. No nation with a sense of beauty will ever consent to eternal +sameness. + +Luxury is relative, as M. de Laveleye himself acknowledges. We might +define it, as he does at one point,[277] by excess of price or labor +expended. In that case, such articles as those African dresses which it +takes several years to manufacture would assuredly come under the head +of luxuries, and must, as such, be condemned from the standpoint of the +tribal plane of advancement; though they are not equal in texture or +taste of ornamentation to many of the cheapest of English goods, within +the reach of all but the very poorest. What are, with Europeans, the +bare necessities, or comforts of lowest grade, represent the extreme of +luxury to the Africans on whose plane our ancestors once stood. Many of +the things which are regarded by the average individual of to-day as +indispensable--every-day comforts--were within the reach of only the +wealthy few, a century ago, and could be had only as rare and choice +articles, to be preserved with the greatest care. The comforts of a +century ago represent, again, the luxuries of a preceding age, and so +on. Almost all products of labor are costly and rare before they can +become cheap and abundant. Had our ancestors entertained a socialistic +prejudice against the luxuries of their age, and resolved, with one +accord, to forego their manufacture as supplying only artificial needs, +we should not have had them to-day; but it is doubtful whether the +social problem would be any nearer solution than it is. The agitation +against machinery, at least, is ill combined with an agitation against +luxury; for every removal of machinery must make luxuries out of what +were, before, mere comforts, and advance the things now regarded as +necessities to the plane of the present comforts, as far as expenditure +of labor is regarded. M. de Laveleye distinguishes between rational and +primitive needs and irrational, "superfluous," or "spurious," ones; and +he defines the rational ones as those which reason asserts and hygiene +determines.[278] But from the merely hygienic point of view, every need +bears with it, by its very existence, a title to some consideration, +health and the gratification of desires being most intimately connected. +Certainly luxury is not necessarily inconsistent with the most healthy +physique, or the longest life. Many of the things ordinarily looked upon +as luxuries present unusually favorable conditions for health. Nor can +the question be decided by arbitrarily pronouncing all desires for +luxury "spurious." To M. de Laveleye and a minority of others they may +appear so; but what right has the individual to the assumption that all +needs beyond his own are spurious? Even the poorer classes of society +would, for the most part, be very glad to possess the luxuries of the +rich, and find them desirable; in other words, those desires which M. de +Laveleye pronounces spurious appertain to very nearly all human beings +who have at all formed a conception of their possibility. The savage +does not desire what we term luxury in as far as he knows nothing of it. +The argument that luxury is wrong or irrational simply because men once +were able to do without it is by no means conclusive. The conditions of +life, the employments of human beings, are far different now from those +of the time when men "lived in houses of osier." "Primitive" the desire +for luxury may not be; but if we attempt to determine what is primitive +in man, we shall meet with excessive difficulties. And again, if we +decide the question on the basis of any assumption against the +non-primitive, we must, in all consistency, exclude, as has already been +said, all higher ethical emotion and the love of art and science; none +of these can be pronounced primitive. Possibly we might define hunger, +thirst, sexual appetite, and the desire for a comfortable degree of +warmth, as the most primitive human needs; and these, indeed, are soon +satisfied; but the man who has no needs beyond these can not represent +the social ideal. The whole history of civilization from century to +century is the history of the formation of new needs and the gradual +satisfaction of these in larger and larger circles, until their objects, +from costly and hardly obtainable rarities, have become articles of +common use. With this course of development, coarseness has decreased, +refinement and taste have become more general. Nor can we, as has before +been stated, divide the human being into his separate desires and +functions, and assume that he can get rid of this or that one without +influencing all. The desires of the human being are of organic growth, +and the desire for luxury has an organic connection with the taste and +refinement with which it has grown. It is impossible that the love of +beauty in general should develop without the appearance of a desire for +beauty in the details of every-day life,--in utensils, clothing, +surroundings of every sort; as it is impossible, also, that this desire +for beauty in particulars should be dispensed with without a +corresponding retrogression in refinement and love of beauty in general. +One of the chief expenses of American entertainments is the profusion of +flowers used in decoration, and often most artistically arranged; and +whatever else may be said on the subject, the pleasure derived from them +can scarcely be termed spurious or irrational. Not all large sums spent +by the rich are given for mere display or for sensuality; they may be +spent for scientific experiments on a large scale, like those of Edison, +for travel, for books, for statuary and fine pictures, for fine +architecture, for rich tapestries and carpets, and even in great measure +for appliances and methods that secure greater cleanliness and more +healthful ways of living altogether. Nor are the appliances of art and +culture as desirable in huge museums or draughty and ill-ventilated +libraries, or anywhere else where the individual is forced into the +noise and numerous other annoyances of a promiscuous crowd, as in his +own home, arranged according to his own peculiarities of taste, and +associated with all the joys of love and domestic freedom. When sympathy +has become so general and so strong that not only men but women also can +find their best intellectual enjoyment in public places, these reasons +will cease to be of any force, but at present they have even moral +force; and since inherent character is a matter of evolution, a +condition of general sympathy and mutual consideration, and even of +universal common decency, must be of slow growth. It may further be +said, in particular, that there is no material more used by artists than +the so-much-decried velvet; again, many people of taste, who otherwise +spend money for little more than the necessities of life, find a +peculiar delight in the delicacy of fine laces, and are willing to +forego many other pleasures in order to possess them. George Eliot's +Dorothea, otherwise simple of habit, content with her plain wool gown, +found a peculiar fascination in the colors of an emerald bracelet, and +numerous persons confess to a similar pleasure in the changing rainbow +of the diamond, or the clear blue of the sapphire. These desires and +pleasures exist; they exist in people of comparative taste; they exist +as the result of human progress; they are not confined to a few +individuals; and they cannot be dismissed with a mere arbitrary +definition of them as "artificial," "superfluous," "irrational," or +"spurious." + +The more cultivated Socialist complains of the lack of taste in society; +and an artist who is also a Socialist not long ago expressed his regret +that art was at present "unable to prevent" the wearing of unbecoming +forms of dress, etc. But we trust that this is not a hint that +socialistic government would undertake to decree what forms of dress +should be adopted; and we scarcely think that it could supply taste +itself to all people, or render differences of taste impossible. Taste +is, like everything else, a matter of evolution; it must make its +experiments, and undergo many failures for every step in advance. The +modern average of taste is as much in advance upon the average of our +savage ancestors as the modern average of morals is an advance upon +savage morals. The ideal of taste is, by definition, above the average; +and it may be doubted whether the time will ever come when there will +not be both degrees and differences of taste, and also an æsthetic +superiority of taste among those who devote their lives to art that will +render the average "poor" to them. + +If, then, we are to condemn luxury on any tenable scientific grounds, we +must face the fact that it is an organic feature of the progress of +human society in intellectual and moral character, and a part of human +happiness; and we must show, over against these undeniable facts, +outweighing reasons for condemning it. The matter is more difficult than +a superficial Utilitarianism perceives. + +The question seems to be one of the relinquishment of certain things on +the part of one class, in order that another may be elevated to a higher +plane. Certainly, no one can deny that the present misery and +degradation in society is a moral wrong, and that it is our duty to +seek some method by which it may be removed as speedily as possible. But +what is the degree of relinquishment which will suffice to raise all the +poor to a plane of comfort? Without defining the tastes for the +refinements or elegancies of life as "spurious," or, except as they are +personally injurious or associated with idleness, as in themselves bad, +we must admit that there are many exaggerations of expenditure for the +mere pleasure of the moment to a very small minority of individuals, +which, in view of the joys the same sums might secure for multitudes, +cannot be justified. But suppose that we do away with the spending of +immense sums for the entertainment of princes and potentates, with the +lavishing of wealth on a single dinner, on a single reception, on +carriages built for the mere purpose of carrying a single millionaire +bride to the church-door, and with the other expenses of this order; +shall we be able, as a result, to supply all the destitute with +comforts? Or to what length must we go, to what grade of luxury must we +descend in our reforms, in order to secure this? It would certainly not +be for the general good that society as a whole should relinquish all +the refinements that it has won in its evolution and be reduced to a +mere bread-and-butter level in the equalizing process. Beyond the +superficial utilitarian comparison of the two classes we have to +consider also the welfare of society as a whole. If we cannot morally +defend the sacrifice of the general good to one class, neither can we +defend its sacrifice to another class. + +And here we come again to the population question. It is foolish to +suppose that character, as already formed, at any period, in adults, as +inherited correlative with physical organization, and as further +influenced by the contact of children with parents, husbands with wives, +friends with friends, and classes with classes, could be changed in the +twinkling of an eye. It is foolish to suppose that men would become all +at once, with the accession of comfort, wise, prudent, self-controlled, +and unselfish. On the contrary, those unused to prosperity are generally +the ones who use it least well when their lot is suddenly changed. Many +would not perceive or realize what results their action would have on +the condition of future generations, and many would not care as long as +they themselves escaped those results. We cannot, therefore, conceive +otherwise than that the rate of increase of population would suffer an +immense acceleration, were prosperity to be all at once secured to all +classes. Supposing, then, that the equalization of wealth, or that even +comfort to the poorer classes, were possible without a return to too +primitive a standard of life for all society, would the reform be a +permanent one? + +The population question is one that the majority of Socialists +systematically avoid. But however avoided theoretically, it cannot be +avoided when we come to practice; and for this reason practical men are +likely to steer clear of theories that take no account of it. There is a +reason for this almost universal avoidance of the population question by +Socialists; it is, in fact, a question which stands in the way of the +very large majority of socialistic projects. But even the more advanced +of Socialists take but little notice of its importance. At a recent +meeting of the London Fabian Society, a large number present seemed to +agree with a member who argued that population might be left to take its +own course since "there is only a tendency" to too rapid increase. +Naturally, there is only a tendency to increase beyond the food supply, +since beyond this limit comes--death from privation and disease; and +since even beyond the limit of comfort come morbid conditions which +gradually bring death. If the theory of the Fabian in question is not +_laisser faire_, then I do not know what is. But the population question +never has solved itself and never will; it can only be solved by +definite intention. + +At the same discussion mentioned above, another debater objected to any +decrease in the size of the families of laborers, on the ground that +such decrease would tend to lower wages and so also to lower the +standard of life. But the payment of higher wages, either on an average +to correspond with an actual average of larger families, or in +particular cases in view of the size of family in these cases, can never +constitute a raising of the standard of life; on the contrary, the wages +would be paid on the old standard for the individual, and competition +would be increased by the actual increase of population. The standard of +life is, and can be, raised only as a higher standard for the individual +is demanded and obtained. + +But to these various arguments may be objected by the Socialists that +under socialistic government the whole environment of human society +would be changed, and so the old rules would be of no force. And this +brings us to another point. + +A word continually in the mouth of certain of the Socialists is +"environment." Man is what he is, say they, by virtue of his +environment. Change the environment, and he must change. The present bad +condition of things is due to the environment; crime is the effect of +poverty, selfishness of competition; therefore, we have but to introduce +the socialistic form of government in order to do away with poverty and +crime at the same time with competition. The argument is attractive and +seems to solve the question as easily and indisputably as if it were a +mere elementary problem in Geometry. But the solution does not at all +harmonize with the course of analysis followed in this essay. From the +idea of an individual introduced into social conditions where poverty is +absent, it generalizes to the whole of society introduced to a new set +of laws. It forgets, in its definition of environment, that _men +themselves are the most important factor of the environment_, and that, +_in order to_ change the environment, one must change the moral +character of men with respect to each other. The whole argument makes +the mistake of choosing the one of two concomitants as alone cause and +regarding the other as alone effect. It is perfectly true that, if you +can abolish poverty, you will also have abolished crime and sin; and, +without looking farther, the Socialist regards this as conclusive +evidence that the system he proposes is logically demonstrated to be the +right and sure cure for present evil; but it may be added that _it is +quite equally true_ that, if you can abolish crime and sin, you will +have abolished poverty, also; and then it may be further said that +neither can be abolished, as a whole, first, in order that the other may +be gotten rid of through its disappearance. Competition is no more the +cause of selfishness, than selfishness is the cause of competition; the +present legal system, the present form of government is no more the +cause of the evils in society than the other evils in society are the +cause of the defects in the present form of government. Man's nature is +no more the effect of the social environment than the social conditions +are the effect of his nature. Extreme poverty and crime or vice work +reciprocally for each other's increase, or they increase and decrease +with what may be termed oscillations; poverty results in vice and vice +in poverty, or vice in poverty, and poverty again in vice; in the +individual, either may be primary, may precede the other. It is as true +that you must change men's characters in order to change all the outer +evils of the environment as it is that you must change the outer evils +in order to change men's characters. It is as true that you must get rid +of crime and vice in order to get rid of poverty as it is that you must +get rid of poverty in order to get rid of crime and vice. Here is the +new version of the serpent with its tail in its mouth; but here it is +not a symbol of eternity, but of evolution. _There is no one cause of +the evils in society, but all existing things are interdependent +conditions._ There is, therefore, no possibility of getting rid of any +one of them at one stroke, its abolishment to be followed by the +disappearance of the others; as they increase, so they must +decrease,--by reciprocal action, or complex action and reaction. + +If we imagine, for a moment, a whole society of savages suddenly +introduced to a set of ideal laws by--we will say--some one individual +from out an ideal society, who proclaims these laws and then returns to +his own land, we shall not be able to imagine such laws remaining in +force for any great length of time. If we suppose our own ancestors of +the stone age introduced to our own laws by some one from out the +present century returning to them as Mark Twain's Yankee returned to the +court of King Arthur, we shall not imagine those laws as very long +binding; and nothing could be truer to facts of psychology than the +gigantic tragedy with which Mr. Clemens' book closes. No set of ideal +laws introduced to an inideal society can be regarded as the +"environment" of that society, which shall render it ideal. The more +democratic a country, the more the passing, even, of a law or measure +depends on the general sentiment; but many laws have been passed and +many measures of government projected which have failed completely in +administration because they were too far in advance of the general moral +status. External morality of institutions and internal morality of +character in society as a union of many individuals can only increase +together, and gradually, by reciprocal action. In other words, the +evolution necessary to the attainment of any ideal condition where +poverty and crime are eliminated must be internal as well as external; +and this is a fact that few Socialists recognize, at least practically, +and that even the Fabians, accepting as they do the theory of evolution, +continually fail to take account of in the application of their +theories. They have indeed received the theory of evolution as regards +external institutions; but, with perhaps a few exceptions, they have not +regarded it in its inner, psychical significance. This is made evident +by the continual recurrence of such references and remarks as we have +criticised, which trace all evil to our "artificial system," refer to +character as bad because "saturated with immoral principles by our +commercial system,"[279] and reckon upon a change in this "artificial +system" which, first accomplished, will cause a revolution in character. +The acknowledgment of the necessity of evolution is, for the most part, +forgotten in practical discussion; and the reason of this forgetfulness +is easily understood from just the fact noticed--that the evolution, the +necessity of which is recognized, is the mere external one of state +institutions. Character is regarded in any case as a dependent, an +effect; and this is in accordance with the old theory of the will as +passive and as determined by the rest of nature, never as the active and +independent factor determining and instituting. Thus, even a Fabian is +likely to look with only half-approval at institutions like the Society +for Ethical Culture, which has for its first object the cultivation of +character; and many Socialists, until very lately the great majority, +have regarded all improvements which did not bear directly towards +Socialism as mere temporizing. The socialistic government was to be +first established, and this would perform all the reforms necessary; or, +rather, evils would disappear of themselves when once it was +established. Fortunately, Socialism is itself undergoing an evolution. + +But again, even those Socialists who talk of an evolution up to +"socialistic forms" are continually found representing the ease with +which government might, at present, take over the business of the +nation. This is the natural result of the fact that the evolution +recognized as necessary is only that of institutions, not that of +character. The perception, on the other hand, that character is not, at +present, capable of receiving or administering a socialistic form of +government, is the reason of much of the resistance opposed to a party +which, whatever a very small minority may claim as to theory, is +practically endeavoring to force a system of government upon peoples not +prepared for carrying it out with success. There are few governments, as +yet, where even the democratic idea has sufficiently taken root to +render the people at all used to self-government; and where they exist, +the good they confer is not unmixed. I am not advancing an argument +against democracy; but the defects of human nature which render its +benefits of a mixed character must hinder in an incomparably greater +measure a scheme which would place all power, even to the control of all +wealth, in the hands of the administration; in other words, Socialism, +if introduced to-day, could no more get rid of poverty and crime than +democracy can get rid of them; and the gulf between the old and the new +order being so great a one, the danger attending the new institutions +would be particularly great. As Höffding remarks, it is not proved, +because we intrust many things to state-government (with mixed good and +evil) that it would be well to intrust the management of _all_ matters +to it. The Socialists propose to secure the perfection of system by +making the government responsible to the people and the executive +responsible to the government; but in democratic governments this +principle is already carried out. Are we to suppose that the possession +of still greater power and so still larger opportunities for fraud would +afford the people greater security? Or how could the responsibility of +the legislative and administrative functions to the people be still +better secured than it is anywhere at present? The power of the people +might be extended to include interference with both functions. But the +socialistic government must, in any case, be excessively complicated; +even Bellamy, whose government is much simplified by the supposition of +the immediate attainment of an ideal character through the action of the +social "environment," designates the scheme as "very elaborate." The +difficulties of direct interference with the legislative functions in +countries larger than Switzerland (where the referendum is occasionally +resorted to), the difficulties of deciding on evidence before the court +of the whole country in cases where the power of deposition might be +used, the labor of arriving at a general verdict about which there +should be no dispute, the strife and party feeling which must be thus +continually engendered in the contest of opinions as long as men have +not attained to an ideal character, would be likely, if such powers of +national interference were often exercised, to keep the country in a +state of continual uproar; while, on the other hand, if peace were +purchased at the sacrifice of the power of direct interference, the +machinery of state would no more than at present secure the nation from +fraud, which must be greater as the power in the hands of a socialistic +government would be larger. To the man of principle, it would doubtless +appear foolish as well as wrong to sacrifice position, comparative +comfort, and the esteem of fellow-citizens, for mere gain in wealth by +dishonest means; but as long as there are many men by whom temporary +gratification is often preferred even at the sacrifice of more lasting +pleasure, and selfish pleasure is of more account than public esteem, as +long as there are men to whom the element of excitement in crime is an +attraction, as long as women are often unscrupulous and men the slaves +of passion, as long as there are those who find the power to command by +means of wealth more desirable than security in moderation, and as long +as there remain others who will bow down to wealth fraudulently +acquired, as long, too, as there are countries anywhere upon the earth +in which malefactors may find refuge, the chances of fraud under a +socialistic government are large. They must be particularly large where +"inordinate luxury and the hope of it" are abolished; for, leaving out +of account all question as to the morality of luxury, there are +undoubtedly many men who desire as much of it as they can obtain. +Bellamy discreetly supposes his ideal government to be adopted at once +by all nations, thus paying no attention to the obviously very different +degrees of social development represented by those different nations. +But as long as any communication of trade whatever existed with nations +still under the old régime, ingenuity could devise ways of theft, and +foreign lands would constitute a goal for the enjoyment of the spoil. +There are, and will be for very many years yet, plenty of places of +refuge for the clever thief. Moreover, communication and commerce with +other lands not only being necessary but becoming daily more and more +desirable, a law excluding all foreigners would be difficult to +establish; and this being the case, the social equilibrium must be +continually disturbed, and inner character affected by the influx from +other nations. + +There is another general objection to socialistic schemes which bears on +the point of their application to present conditions, namely, their +arbitrary nature, the manner in which they would decide summarily many +questions on which society is at present most at variance and different +individuals entertain the most conflicting opinions, the comparative +value of which can be tested only by experiment. This feature of +Socialism is inseparable from the general condition of things. Many +feel, therefore, and feel with reason, that sympathy is not yet +sufficiently general and strong to warrant the entrusting of all +interests of the individual to a majority of his fellow-men. It is even +a question whether free scientific investigation would not be imperilled +if some Socialists had their way. It is not long since that I heard an +"evolutionary" Socialist expressing his opinion emphatically that the +waste of time and energy in the pursuit of ambitions never to be +realized was so undesirable that he questioned whether the individual +ought to be permitted to choose a vocation in which it is believed he +will fail. But the element of interest that causes a man to choose a +given occupation is the very factor which most often results in +efficient labor; and it is the testimony of many that the perseverance +possible through love of their work has prevailed in direct opposition +to the predictions of onlookers. Thousands of men have succeeded against +all expectations. It is by no means those who apparently possess most +ability who succeed best or profit the world most by their work. There +are projects of arbitrariness very similar in sort and nearly as great +in degree in all the Socialistic schemes in which the questions of the +day are furnished with cut and dried answers. It is strange, for +instance, that American advocates of women's right to a free choice of a +vocation have failed to discover with what dexterity Bellamy avoids the +whole question of women's capacity, by the discreetly blind remark that +they are not only inferior to men in strength, but "further disqualified +in special ways" (a formula which the author finds so successful that he +repeats the words in a subsequent essay), while he appears practically +to side with the Conservatives in thought on the matter. The government +of Bellamy provides, furthermore, that one can change his vocation only +up to the age of thirty-five, and even to this date only "under proper +restrictions"; the experience of mankind has shown, however, that a +man's best inspirations may come to him after this age, and lead to a +development of talents heretofore unsuspected even by himself. The "aids +to choice" in a state may be as numerous as you like; but they can never +give a man of thirty the experience and mental development of the man of +thirty-five, thirty-seven, or forty. The assistance which the judgment +of others can give in the choice of a vocation is, for the most part, of +little use to the adult; and whatever the minor advantages of an +elimination of the certain amount of disturbance consequent on changes +of occupation, the harm to society of restriction on efforts in any +direction of useful labor must more than counterbalance these. + +The method of newspaper-editing in Bellamy's state is also peculiar. The +people who desire any special interest to be brought before the public +choose an editor, establish a newspaper "reflecting their opinions and +devoted especially to their locality, trade, or profession," and when +the editor fails to give satisfaction in his publications, simply +"remove him." This method would, I fear, scarcely meet the desires of +any editor possessed with a brain, and to whom his profession was +something more than a matter of mere automatism. + +Indeed, the whole order of Bellamy's state is of too military and +automatic a character; though it is easy, in a work of fiction, to +represent the members of his industrial army as universally content and +universally virtuous. + +It is in consequence of the more or less distinct perception that, for +all these reasons, human nature of the present time is unsuited to the +absolute coöperation involved in Socialism, that many Individualists +advocate a continuation of the system of competition. From ancient +savagery up to our present half-civilization has been a gradual +evolution, not of government with character as its effect, but of +government and character as coördinates, or (if we view them in another +light) as advancing by mutual action and reaction; and our future must +constitute a like gradual evolution (though with continual acceleration +of velocity) of character and government as coördinates; the attempt of +individuals or parties to force one of these coördinates before the +other must always result in failure. It is true, as Mr. Grant Allen +stated in a lecture before the London Fabians--designed as refutation of +the Individualistic theory that competition is necessary for the best +social evolution--that natural selection favors coöperation,[280] that +is, that those societies in which the efforts of individuals are most +supplemented by the aid of others, have the best chance of life and +health both as wholes and in their individual units; but this fact does +not do away with the necessity of the evolution of coöperation +_coördinate with character_. "We know now," says another Fabian, "that +in natural selection at the stage of development where the existence of +civilized man is at stake, the units selected from are not individuals +but societies."[281] This, however, we do not know. Natural selection +acts on cell, on individual, and on all the various social units to +which men combine, in their multiplicity of relations. It does not cease +to act on individuals because it acts also on social organizations, any +more than it ceases to act on cells in acting on organisms as wholes; it +is only true that the line of the preservation of the individual and +that of the preservation of the whole of society approach each other +more and more nearly with social progress. The tendency of the whole of +social evolution has been one of increasing coöperation coördinate with +increasing social instinct or sympathy in all its complex relations and +dependences; and with the attainment of the maximum of sympathy we can +not well imagine or suppose anything else than the maximum of +coöperation. On the other hand, the gradual nature of social evolution +up to this maximum, and the contest of differing opinions, secures a +sufficient experiment, and so the protection of the people from tyranny +under another name; for it is not the emotional nature of man alone +which must grow to greater harmony, it is also his intellectual nature; +as opinions are brought nearer and nearer to each other by mutual +criticism, men become more capable of coöperation; and this intellectual +agreement represents the line of adjustment or natural selection, since +it is the conclusion reached by means of experience--the common +knowledge bought through the practical application of various +principles. A tribe of savages would be incapable of administration of +the government of our so-called civilized states, as also of obedience +to it:--both because the individual would rebel in opinion and in +emotion at the barriers imposed by it, and because the functions of +administration in the hands of savages would tend to injustice that +would be greater as the sphere of government exceeded that to which the +tribe had been used; and for similar reasons, the present age is +incapable of that maximum of coöperation in all relations which is +involved in Socialism. Even the æsthetic use of wealth, moderation and +taste in enjoyment, must be learned by degrees; it cannot be infused by +any government. The savage envies, in our more civilized states, chiefly +the opportunities for the gorging of good things and for self-adornment +which they afford; and the savage lack of self-control where alcohol is +concerned, is proverbial; the average of more civilized societies shows +a much greater self-control and moderation in the face of opportunities +of purely sensual gratification, and a much greater love of more +æsthetic and more moral pleasures. Or rather, we should perhaps say, as +before, the sensuality becomes more refined, and is gratified in more +moral ways, through its organization with higher instincts. It is not +among the wealthier classes, who have had the use of wealth, that taste +is poorest; on the contrary, the average of taste is smaller, the outlay +for foolish ornament of all sorts larger in proportion to means, in the +poorer classes; and were these classes to come without change of +character into possession of considerable means of enjoyment, it is to +be suspected that expenditure for tasteless adornments would, in many +cases, and especially among the women, precede and exceed expenditure +for higher things. + +And this brings me to a more especial consideration of that very large +portion of the Socialist party who acknowledge no necessity for an +evolution up to Socialism in any sense, but desire a revolution. Bellamy +distinctly denies the necessity of an evolution, and many of his +followers agree with him on this point; but the revolution he believes +in and hopes for is a bloodless and peaceful one. To this conception the +preceding objections sufficiently apply. + +A revolution in the ordinary sense of the word is always, however, the +sign of powerful opposition between two parties, of which one may gain +the immediate ascendancy by force; but will surely be exposed, +afterwards, to the long-enduring hatred, opposition, and revenge of a +strong minority, that will make itself felt with an energy greatly +increased by the vindictiveness which naturally follows on war and +defeat. France is still suffering from her revolutions even at this +length of time after their occurrence. Where the people have no vote and +real influence upon the government, and even the expression of opinion +is restricted by law, so that to gain an influence is practically +impossible, a political revolution may take place; but its results, both +immediate and remote, must contain a very large modicum of evil even if +some advance is accomplished by it. A revolution to obtain the +establishment of absolute coöperation would be self-contradictory, and +the self-contradiction of character implied in it would result in its +failure; it could not happen in a country at all prepared for absolute +coöperation, or even for a very high degree of coöperation. A revolution +in any country at the present time would have to reckon with all sorts +of depraved tastes and vicious characters, matters of organization and +inheritance which neither in the individual, nor in the line of descent, +could be gotten rid of in a day; which must, indeed, affect society for +many generations, and before they could be eradicated would do away with +Socialism or destroy its success. Poverty and crime cannot be banished +by any device of mere legislation; only with time and by gradual means +can they be gotten rid of. + +Socialism is, then, as a whole, too impetuous, if Individualism is, as a +whole, too reluctant. But Socialism is undergoing an evolution, as has +been said. Arising as the voice of the poor, the oppressed, the +miserable, the hungry, it has made itself heard and has materially +modified public opinion, while it has, at the same time, been itself +modified, according to the universal law of the equilibration of forces. +Forced by necessity practically, and gradually altered by criticism as +to theory, it is coming to give its energies less and less to a +consideration of the final socialistic government which should do away +with the necessity of further reforms because accomplishing an immediate +and universal one, and devoting them more and more to present measures +of reform, many of which are simply liberal measures proposed by +non-Socialists and such as would have had no meaning to the majority of +Socialists of a few years past, or would have been regarded by them as +useless temporizing. In its mutual action and reaction with +Individualism, it will doubtless still more modify and be modified, so +that more and more ground for united action will be won. The cause of +the laborer is the most urgent of our times; but increase of wages will +be of very little use except as it is steadily accompanied by aids to +knowledge and self-direction, aids in the formation of character, in the +use of self and of the means of enjoyment; otherwise, the laborer must +continually defeat his own cause, and renew the old problems. + +The education of self-control must begin with the child. The education +of the child is never to be considered by itself; the child is not one +individual and the adult another, neither is there any dividing line +between childhood and maturity; and that which the individual is to +become in later life he must grow towards as a child. The habits which +the man would exercise the child must learn. In Germany, where the +military spirit prevails, implicit obedience to authority is ranked +among the highest virtues, and habits of strict military discipline are +carried into the family as well as exercised in all public relations. In +countries where more democratic ideas are strong, the older methods are +giving way to milder ones. These sometimes degenerate into the opposite +extreme of careless indulgence, with bad results; but taken on the +average, their beneficial influence is seen in the greater alertness, +originality, and openness of the children brought up under them. +Frankness and originality are on the average incompatible with harsh or +stern treatment; the latter is more likely to generate craftiness, +fawning hypocrisy, or an unloving and unlovable rigidity of character; +and any of these qualities is compatible with secret self-indulgence in +any form, wherever this is possible. Only an education in freedom can +teach the use of freedom. The old, hard, religious idea of "breaking the +will" (the natural outcome of a religion based on blind faith, "fear," +and unquestioning obedience) was a sad blunder; what we need is not less +but more will, with better direction of it. True, the wisdom of +experience must always guide the young; but its guidance, to attain the +best results, should make itself as little felt as authority as +possible, and should withdraw into the background as early as possible. +Not that it should degenerate into slipshod yielding to importunities, +but that it should endeavor to give reasons rather than mere rules of +conduct, to instil principles and ideas rather than laws, and so to +develop the power of self-direction. It is often objected that the young +child is incapable of comprehending principles; but so is the infant +incapable of comprehending speech, and yet it is through the use of +speech to the infant that comprehension is gradually attained; as sounds +are fixed in the receptive memory of the infant, and slowly acquire +meaning, so ethical principles, simply stated, may be communicated, and +will be better and better understood as the child develops. This method +of instruction is, rightly understood, as far from weakness as it is +from tyranny and dogmatism; indeed, no method demands in the instructor +so much care, thought, and patience. It must be judicious and +consistent, never capricious, and its fundamental principle must be the +cultivation of justice through justice, and so of kindness through +kindness. Especially should the young be prepared in the home, by +self-knowledge, for the trials and temptations which menace in the world +outside, through the passions of maturity. To the earnest man or woman, +nothing appears more trivial than the false shame which hinders, even in +the home and between parents and children, the moral discussion of some +of the most important of human relations for good or evil. To the pure +all things are pure; but, unfortunately, it is also true that to the +impure all things are impure. Nothing is more injurious to children than +the morbid curiosity stimulated through the secrecy and deception which +are ordinarily practised, and which inspires them with the sense of a +mystery that is half criminal, half sacred. Curiosity grows under such +tuition, a disproportionate interest is awakened and often comes to be +satisfied from sources outside the home, with an admixture of deplorable +vulgarity, the influence of which is not soon lost. Such a tuition +tends, not to purity of thought, but to impurity, and often directly to +vice. The mystery with which natural, and what may be perfectly moral, +relations is thus invested, is often the source of a fatal attraction to +ignorant youth. What we need to make out of our children is not puppets +of which the world as well as ourselves may pull the wires, but earnest +and self-comprehending men and women, self-reliant and fearless because +life is no strange country filled with unknown shadows and pitfalls, but +a pleasant land, whose dangers, known, may be avoided, and the road +through which leads to a comprehended and desirable goal. + +Parental power was once held sacred and beyond interference; +nevertheless the use made of it does not seem to have been always a +sacred one. The Roman law allowed parents to put their children to +death. The modern state has tended, on the other hand, to take away more +and more power from the parents, extending its protection to the +helpless child. And this is well; the child, as well as the adult, +should have the right of protection against abuse. Nevertheless, the +theories which would relegate the whole education and care of the child +to the state must be regarded as too extreme. Whatever disadvantages +there may be in the government of parents, especially at the present day +when the education of women is still so inadequate, there is yet nothing +which the child cannot better miss out of his education than the +influence of parental love, the lack of which no state institution can +ever supply. Granted that parental government is of a most mistaken sort +in some cases, and that it is not perfect in any case, it still remains +true that family affection furnishes one of mankind's greatest joys, +and that the love of the parent should, and even does, on the average, +make the best protection and educator weak and clinging childhood can +have. No one who has at all studied the condition of children in orphan +asylums and other institutions under the care of the state, can have +failed to notice, even in those institutions managed with the greatest +kindness, the immense difference in happiness and attractiveness between +their inmates and the children used to family love and mother's +caresses. The lack of love makes the child unlovable. The fundamental +method of reform lies, not in the withdrawal of all power from parents, +but rather in the better preparation of men, and especially of women, to +fulfil the duties of parentage. Such a preparation must consist, +however, less in any particular study than in such general physical, +intellectual, and moral discipline and education as shall expand all the +powers in health and harmony, thus securing to children a good physical +inheritance and an early guidance both wise and moral. A higher morality +must particularly emphasize the fact that not self alone or even merely +the two parties to a marriage are to be considered; that the welfare of +possible offspring must be regarded; and that, therefore, marriage with +the morally unfit is a crime against future generations as well as +against self, and marriage of the physically unfit, where offspring are +permitted, is equally a wrong. The old idea, encouraged in women, that +it was a good and noble use of life to "marry a man in order to reform +him," is beginning to go out of vogue; and future standards will not +tolerate the present social dogma that, however much of a profligate a +man may have been, whatever associates he may have affected, however he +may have betrayed the innocent and debauched his own moral sense, he is +still fit to mate with any pure and good woman. + +The necessity of a better physical and intellectual education for the +mothers of the race, as a preparation for the adequate performance of +their duties, must be, at the present time, especially emphasized. The +task of the mother in the early training of children is one that +requires practical knowledge of the world, broad views, and that power +of judgment which is possible only through mental discipline. +Superstition, narrowness, subjection to tradition and dogma, are +incompatible with efficient motherhood. The education must, then, be +real, no cramming with stale facts and staler theories; it must advance +with the science of the day, and deal with its vital questions. + +But the standpoint which regards women only as means to ends outside +themselves, which calculates all the advantages to be permitted them by +the measure alone of their usefulness to husbands or children, is a poor +one. To afford to all individuals the full and free development of +capacity must be the ideal of society. The ancient conceptions which +laid little emphasis practically, whatever they might do theoretically, +upon the woman's right to opportunities for her own sake, which made +meekness and self-abnegation her chief virtues, and fixed its regard +always upon future generations in her case, is one that cannot be +defended from a higher ethical standpoint. If no man lives unto himself +alone, neither should any man, or woman either, be expected to spend his +life merely as a means to others and having no end in himself. Every +human being has a right to a share in the general privileges and +pleasures. For their own sake, and that of society as a whole, as well +as for that of their immediate friends and family, women should share +equally with men the benefits of mental culture, its æsthetic +enjoyments, its consolations and distractions, and the calm and +self-poise bestowed by its broad outlook. To women as well as to men +applies what has already been said of the folly and sin of ignorance of +the world. We have only to look at France in order to perceive the evils +of a system which brings girls to maturity in a condition of seclusion, +ignorance, and dependence, and then suddenly launches them upon society +wholly unprepared to withstand the temptations it presents. The evil +results of a less degree of the same system are visible all over the +world. On the other hand, it is in just that country--America--where +women have had the most freedom, that they are also most capable of +enduring freedom, and that their civilizing influence is most visible. +They are not the less womanly for this liberty, and society is very much +the better for it. Indeed, their attractiveness and the power they wield +through it is not equalled in any other country. "I wonder," writes +George Eliot, "whether the subtle measuring of forces will ever come to +measure the force there would be in one beautiful woman whose mind was +as noble as her face was beautiful--who made a man's passion for her +rush in one current with all the great aims of his life." "It is +terrible--the keen, bright eye of a woman when it has once been turned +with admiration on what is severely true; but then the severely true +rarely comes within its range of vision." + +The questions of marriage and prostitution may be reduced to the single +question of the desirability of monogamy. No one can well deny the evils +attending the existence of a class of prostitutes isolated from moral +associations, despised and ill-treated, daily sinking lower and lower +through this isolation, and contaminating, by their influence, those who +come in contact with them. The practical question is, then, would it be +well for society as a whole to assume another attitude, of open +approval, towards prostitution, to admit those who are now outcasts to a +position on a par with faithful wives and pure maidens. This was the +position of Athenian prostitutes, and it existed together with, we may +suppose, comparative chastity on the part of maidens and faithfulness on +the part of wives. These, however, did not take part in the social life +of the men, but lived in seclusion in their homes; it would be +impossible to accord a similar position to prostitutes in modern society +unless with the practical surrender of any demand or expectancy of +faithfulness on the part of wives, or of chastity on the part of +maidens. Even in France, where the position of prostitutes most nearly +approximates the Athenian, a very distinct dividing-line is drawn +between the _demi-monde_ and the rest of society; and, indeed, special +precautions are taken to secure the chastity of girls. In like manner, +purity might perhaps still be secured in girls, after the admission of +prostitutes to a position of equality with other women, by a convent +education and the greatest watchfulness; but the lack of self-dependence +would be likely to be followed, as it now so often is in France, only in +far greater degree, by excesses after the attainment of comparative +self-direction with marriage. The profligate soon tires of the +prostitute, and desires higher game; unbridled license begets morbid +passion; the sense of honor is blunted; the pure cease to be safe except +as far as they are able, by self-control and self-defence, to protect +themselves; and for such self-poise only an education of freedom, of +knowledge of the world and of self, can prepare. Nor could even such a +system of seclusion as we have imagined exist for any length of time +side by side with the full acceptance of prostitution as perfectly +honorable and right; the two things are self-contradictory and +incompatible; in France, faithfulness is not less desired of wives than +in other countries. Indeed, the majority of men in civilized countries +would never consent to a system of general promiscuity; they desire +women, that is, a large number of women, a sufficient number to supply +them with wives, to remain pure, whatever liberty they demand for +themselves. The whole progress of society has been in the direction of +monogamy, and the reason of this is obvious: as reason and taste +develop, man ceases to be satisfied with the mere enjoyments of the +animal; he develops higher powers and instincts which also demand their +satisfaction; these powers, too, are not separate entities, but are +organized with the more primitive capacities and the whole organization +becomes another through their appearance. As the social instinct grows, +and intellect comes to take a higher place, the mere or chiefly physical +passion felt between the sexes of lower species becomes the higher human +love, an organized instinct in which all the moral and intellectual +desires, the highest aims and emotions of the individual are fused to a +whole. Moreover, momentary pleasure becomes, with social progress, +indeed with all evolution, less and less the ruling power; man, above +all creatures, comes to demand enduring sources of satisfaction. +Faithfulness in love is as necessary to perfect satisfaction as is +faithfulness in friendship; and the long as well as the close +companionship of congenial natures is now, and must more and more +become, the spring of our highest human joys. Disappointment in marriage +may incline the individual to doubt, by a universalization from his own +case,--to which disappointment is prone,--whether life-long love and +faithfulness are possible; but he still must feel that this is the +ideal. It has been said that men are naturally polygamous, women +monogamous; but this statement is obviously erroneous, since men by no +means favor general polygamy; even the savage is capable of jealousy, +and men have continually used the superior power they have possessed in +law and public opinion to emphasize the exclusive claim they have upon +the women they take to wife. It is only true that, having also had the +power in their hands of refusing a like faithfulness to that which they +demand from women, they have used this power to their own advantage. +Women desire faithful love on the part of men quite as much as men +desire it on the part of women; and women are quite as capable of +physical excesses and of fickleness as are men, when the restraints of +public opinion and social law are once broken over. + +A condition of promiscuity is impossible in an ideal society, and can +never be the goal towards which we tend. Men would not submit to it in +the women they loved; and if it is not possible for wives, then we have +left us only the alternative of prostitution in its present form, +increasingly worse in character as the ideal of faithfulness is more +universally demanded and more completely carried out in wives, and the +necessary coördinate social ostracism and disgrace of the prostitute +increases. But this also cannot assuredly be our ideal; the increasing +misery of the class of prostitutes is not a thing to be sought. The +whole theory which tolerates prostitution is, in fact, illogical and +only devised as a prop for the selfishness of men, who are content to +take their pleasure at the expense of so much misery. The same thing +cannot be, as some one has said, at once right for the man to demand and +infamous for the woman to permit. Where the act is one to which both +sexes are necessary, it must, if it be right at all, be right for both, +and if it is wrong, then wrong for both. And this would remain true even +if it were proved that, because of greater strength or for any other +reason, the sexual passion of men ought not to be restrained; for, the +responsibility of the prostitute's misery is thus laid at the door of +men; if the women who ply this traffic are prompted by no passion, but +only compelled by destitution, then the blame of their unhappy +compulsion to such a traffic rests more than ever on the heads of those +who furnish the demand to which their supply answers. In any case, the +man is an accessory before the fact to a thing which he acknowledges +wrong on the part of its performer. + +But the plea that passion is stronger in the man for an act which dates +back to the point in evolution where sexual propagation first began, and +which has been performed equally by both sexes through all the range of +species up to man, and even equally by both sexes of the human species +except during the comparatively short period of higher civilization, is +absurd. The difference between the sexes in degree of sexual +gratification is, _among those who transmit their instincts to +offspring_, not great even under civilization. There is probably more +excess in marriage than outside it. But apart from this fact, the fact +of cross-heredity is to be taken into consideration. The sexual is no +more than any other instinct a separate part of the individual +character; it is organically interwoven with all other instincts and +tendencies; and it is scarcely supposable that thus fused with the rest +of character, it would not be subject, as all other traits, to +cross-inheritance from father to daughter as well as from mother to +son,--that the father's life would not, in many cases, affect his +daughter's propensities, and the mother's life her son's. This _a +priori_ reasoning is supported by facts of observation, among which +those of pathology and criminology are naturally the most marked. Man is +an animal; but, as we have said before, he is not a beast, nor does he +need to imitate the beasts. He has his own social organization and must +determine his own moral laws. The old theory, that any restraint at all +of sexual passion is a crime against nature, and likely to result in +great physical evil, is now exploded. Even if it were true that some +evil to the individual was always the result of any restraint, the good +of the individual is not the absolute criterion of right, and cannot +stand against the claim of society as a whole; the unrestrained +indulgence of sexual passion could no more be justified on this ground, +and because of the fact that it is a natural instinct, than the absolute +indulgence of anger can be justified because anger is a natural passion, +and its expression doubtless a great satisfaction and relief to the +individual. But very many medical men, and among them such men as +Professor Krafft-Ebbing, the German authority on nervous diseases, are +now denying that self-restraint has such evil results as have been +attributed to it. Krafft-Ebbing says, on the contrary, that while +physical excess is very often the precursor of harm, self-restraint is +seldom so, except in cases of abnormal and morbid appetite.[282] + +In other countries than the United States and England, the plea of +"poetry" or "romance" is often heard in defence of prostitution, and as +an excuse for the seduction of pure women. But if this is poetry, which +must so end in the bitter misery, the shame, degradation, despair, and +even often the utter destruction of its heroines, then, in the name of +pity, let us have less of poetry and more of common humanity. To a man +of anything but selfish instincts, "poetry" or "romance" could never be +an excuse for connivance at such misery, either by direct act or in any +way by influence. Nor is the poetry or romance of the highest order, in +any case. There is no romance so powerful, no poetry so thrilling, nor +any passion so strong, as that to which all the springs of intellectual +aspiration and moral aim converge, and which draws its sweetness and +force from a purity tainted by no degradation of ideals, galled by no +bitter and humiliating recollections, checked by no self-consciousness +of concealment and deceit. Compared with such a feeling, the romance of +the "man of the world" is tame and flat, his poetry but the doggerel +jingle of the third-rate variety-show. Physical passion the human being +shares with every dog and other brute down to nearly the lowest forms of +animal life; love is as truly of higher species as the æsthetic sense of +the artist is of higher nature than the delight of the savage in gauds. +The old idea that strong emotion of any kind was incompatible with +perfect morality has already been sufficiently discussed. But this +delusion has been the excuse of many a life of profound selfishness. It +has led to the theory that the artistic nature must necessarily be +unrestrained in the gratification of its impulses, and has furnished the +libertine with a fine sense of kinship with the poet through the +imitation of his sins. Perhaps the poetry of the lives of Robert and +Elizabeth Barrett Browning has been to the world as great a +gratification and of as high worth as any that they ever wrote on paper. +It has dispelled once and forever the false theory of the necessities of +the artistic temperament, and has enabled us to perceive the higher +beauty of enduring love. + +It is often urged in defence of the sexual sins of the poet or the +musician, that they are natural to his temperament and that, moreover, +he must be acquainted with all phases of life. But why is it not also +urged, then, that he ought to be at liberty to give way to ungoverned +fury, if he has inherited a tendency in that direction, or that he is +justified in committing murder, arson, and all the other crimes in the +catalogue for the sake of the experience and the greater power of +portrayal thus gained? If the excuse suffices for one crime against the +welfare of human beings, it should suffice also for others. Dickens +might possibly have been able to draw the character of Bill Sykes, to +depict his crime and the succeeding emotions with greater power and +faithfulness, had he himself experienced all that which he wished to +portray; nevertheless, society cannot concede that he would have been +justified in killing for the sake of his art; and neither can it +concede, from a higher ethical standpoint, that any other act in direct +opposition to the general welfare is justifiable for the sake of art. It +may be possible for the artist, by torturing a slave to death, to paint +a more realistic picture of dying agony; but however glorious the art, +the man of finer sense and stronger sympathies must be revolted by it. +Society can even better miss a little of its art than take it at the +price of human misery. + +But it is to be questioned whether the artist does not lose as much as +he gains, or even more, by an immoral license of any sort. True, the +artist must know human nature; but the best portrayers of criminal +characters have not themselves been criminals; and if ever we should +have a murderer-poet, we should in all probability feel the lack, in his +verse, of various things, among these of the higher realism which +comprehends higher as well as lower types. It is impossible to be merely +the spectator of one's own life even if one is an artist; and especially +is this true where passion is concerned. The emotions one feels, the +acts one performs, must mould one's character, one's thought, opinion, +the mental world in which one lives, and so one's creative genius. +Nature is by no means all dunghill or reptile-haunted swamp, or even +common kitchen; she has also her seas and mountains, and skies, her +fields and woods, and even her sunny gardens and dainty parlors. The +snow-mountain glowing under the flush of dawn is as real as the reeking +dunghill; but the power to appreciate and portray the one may be lost by +too close association with the other, as the fine sense of smell is +dulled by sojourning in foul odors. To the rake, the character of the +self-controlled and virtuous becomes incomprehensible and chimerical; +and his attempts to represent it are likely to be tinged with an +atmosphere of unreality. Of this we have much evidence in literature. To +raise oneself to the higher standard in practice and comprehension +requires an effort; but it is comparatively easy to allow oneself to +sink to a level for which generations of one's ancestors has prepared +innate if latent tendencies. On the other hand, though we desire to know +men and things through art, we desire to keep with us through its aid, +above all, that which most pleases us in the actual world--the beautiful +in form, coloring, and idea, in nature outside man and in man himself; +the good, if it is the truly good, and not cant or hypocrisy, is also +the beautiful, and the loss of the power to portray it is a large one. +And beyond the more easily definable loss which we have noticed, there +is a still further one, felt in a subtle tone, a shade, an atmosphere; +and which, if closely knit with our moral perceptions, is still an +æsthetic as well as a moral one. The evolution of morality, could, +indeed, no more take place without leaving its impress on art than +without leaving it on humor. The higher sense of humor, in very +proportion to its keenness, experiences a revulsion at the grotesque and +gross vulgarity which passes for humor among the savage and +half-civilized; and with time, the immoral comes to revolt too much to +permit of æsthetic enjoyment. Had Dickens been a murderer himself, +instead of the tender-hearted man he was, the world would doubtless have +lost in every way æsthetically as well as morally by the fact. The old +theory of the total emancipation of art from all claims of morality +cannot be maintained from even the æsthetic standpoint, and certainly +not from the ethical standpoint. Art has every right to be non-moral (if +that which delights innocently is ever anything but positively moral), +but it has none to be immoral,--to use the mighty power it possesses in +the cause of evil of any sort. + +Nor is it even true that all nature belongs to art. In all its history, +sculpture has never, except in a few isolated cases, reproduced the +forms of the withered and decrepit. The painter of the extreme realistic +school may occasionally portray the scenes of the dissecting-room, but +pictures of sores and ulcers are left to adorn the pages of medical +works or patent-medicine advertisements. There are moral sores and +ulcers as little suited to artistic literature, and belonging properly +to works on social healing alone. The depiction of evil in due +proportion and with such limitations belongs to the accurate +representation of human character. But let its portrayal include no sin +against man; let not the artist dip his hands in the dunghill, for +humanity's sake and also for his art's sake; lest his picture reek of +it, and we find the offal mixed with the colors. + +The cant and superstition with which marriage has often been invested +has doubtless been the source of the rebellion of many vigorous and +original minds from the old morality; the morality founded on tradition +and not on reason and sympathy has always this disadvantage. +Undoubtedly, the sale of human flesh for gold or any other sordid +consideration, is evil, whether done under the sanction of the +marriage-law or without it. Undoubtedly also, the marriage-rite performs +no miracle or magic spell, as the superstition of the past has imagined. +Nevertheless, it is of importance as a civil contract, a public +acknowledgment, which furnishes data to the state, and places it in a +position to protect any injured party, and to fix the responsibility for +the maintenance and education of offspring. Considering the number of +individuals whose welfare is seriously concerned in these most intimate +relations of life, with all their passions, the state cannot relinquish +this right of arbitration, which should especially be employed for the +protection of the weaker individuals concerned--the wife and children. +Unfortunately, it has, as yet, too often been used rather in securing +the power of tyranny and abuse than in protecting. This fact is +perceptible even in modern law, as, for instance, in the unequal +divorce-laws of England, and in the fact that wife-beaters are often +treated with great leniency by English magistrates, while the man who +abuses his mistress is liable to relatively severe punishment as having +no especial power over the latter. It is, undoubtedly, the result of +such laws, together with other evils incidental to the average of +marriages under the present conditions of human character, that on some +sides a theory has grown up in favor of the total abolition of marriage. +But neither in its general application, nor in this particular instance, +is the Anarchistic conception which finds the source of all evil in law, +scientifically justifiable. The conditions of the evil lie in human +nature itself, in the incompleteness of its evolution; of the present +stage the injustice of present law is a part. The remedy lies, +therefore, as far as the law is concerned, in its correction, not in its +abolishment. + +The ideal of love is enduring faithfulness. But when that ideal is not +only unfulfilled, but marriage brings, instead of happiness, only +misery, shall the bond be indissoluble, difficult, or easy to loose? + +In countries where women are wholly dependent upon men, perfect facility +of divorce means substantially the power of repudiation on the part of +men. As long as women are incapable of efficient self-support, the +advantage of very easy divorce lies largely on the side of the husband. +Marriage concerns, in any case, the welfare, not of one person alone but +that of husband, wife, and children, and society as a whole must place +some restrictions on the selfish action of the individual which may be +to the lasting disadvantage of all others concerned. But as society +advances, as the education and social independence of women increase, +too great stringency becomes undesirable, its advantages continually +diminish in comparison with its disadvantages. Forced family relations +where all the affection that might render them for the good of those +thus related is lacking, are obviously in themselves undesirable, and in +most cases where wife and children can be provided for independently of +such relations, an evil to be avoided. Assuredly, it is undesirable that +the moral should be tied indissolubly, or practically so, to the +immoral,--that a mother, for instance, should not only be forced to +bring forth children to a father whose evil qualities they may inherit, +but be compelled to endure the further ruin of their character through +his influence, besides bearing the personal agony of the enforced +companionship with a man whose principles she can but despise. But all +character is at present faulty; and a desire for perfection in husband +or wife therefore certain to disappointment; hence, the relinquishment +of all divorce-restrictions whatsoever is too likely to lead to +promiscuity; and unless such appears desirable to society, neither +public opinion nor state-law can place the power of repudiation in the +hands of individuals. It is a choice of evils; the state must take human +nature as it finds it, and deal with it on this basis. It has sometimes +been proposed to make some substitution for the old form of marriage, +as, for instance, by the adoption of a period of probation, of two, +three, or five years' marriage before the signing of the final +life-contract; by this method, it was proposed to obviate the necessity +for divorce. As far as this last proposal is concerned, it may be +remarked that applications for divorce are by no means always made in +the earlier period of married life, and that, furthermore, any such +arrangement would offer the very best opportunities for the unscrupulous +libertine. + +But beyond this, it may be repeated that, as Höffding has said, it is +not in the nature of love worthy the name to calculate the possibility +of its own ending, and that the highest form of love is enduring. +Enduring relation must, then, form the ideal on which we must fix our +eyes, even while failing to attain it; divorce, while given in cases +where union seems no longer desirable, must be looked upon as indicating +a failure of marriage to fulfil its end. The influence of an ideal held +in mind is the continual moulding of reality to a form more nearly +resembling it. But to descend to a form of contract which starts with +the assumption of separation as possible or probable is to lose sight of +the ideal, to relinquish it from imagination, and to do away with its +influence upon public opinion, and so upon the evolution of institutions +and habits. We certainly need better divorce-laws and the wider +recognition of the desirability of divorce in many cases, but not the +practical acceptance of an ideal of promiscuity. + +The plan of such short contracts could never be carried out practically +for any length of time, in any modern civilized society. Even if adopted +for a time, it would speedily be abolished. Man naturally desires and +takes means of enforcing, at first with the lower means of compulsion, +then with the higher through the sympathies themselves, faithfulness in +woman; woman also, and equally, desires faithfulness in man, but is not +able to secure it. The gradual growth of woman's social independence +must, however, place her more and more in a position to know of the life +of men and to enforce the faithfulness she desires; that is, to punish +unfaithfulness with the same penalties of disability for marriage by +which men have hitherto enforced faithfulness in women. We may easily +perceive that this is the direction of development. In countries where +women are wholly dependent upon men, the character of a suitor in any +respect is a thing little inquired into, the chief object of the +parents, who ordinarily have the most to say about the matter, being to +secure a husband for the girl at any cost. With the progress of society, +women become less and less ready to accept the known drunkard or the +confessed libertine, and it is only the seclusion of women and their +consequent ignorance of the lives of men that makes marriage, at +present, still comparatively easy to the discreet and clever profligate. +The coördinate increase of regard for purity in wives with the +aggravation of the character of prostitution, supposed above for the +sake of the discussion, is possible only up to a certain point, as an +oscillation in one direction resistance to which is continually +accumulating, and must result in reaction in the opposite direction. The +two principles are mutually contradictory, incompatible, and impossible +as enduring factors in the same society. The growth of a more widely +diffused and stronger sentiment against prostitution and in favor of +faithfulness has, indeed, as yet led chiefly to the greater exclusion of +prostitutes from association with the rest of society, and made +profligacy more and more secret; but, at the same time, the gradually +increasing sympathy has formed an accumulating resistance which is +rapidly taking shape in the realization that the prostitute is not more +guilty in furnishing the supply than is the man whose demand makes +self-profanation a source of income, that the misery of prostitution is +immoral, and that the only remedy is prevention. There is no alternative +to this remedy that progress can realize except, as has been shown, +general promiscuity. It is best, then, that we should make up our minds +between these two and act accordingly; for the action of every +individual tells, for good or ill, upon society as a whole. What is the +ideal? I think the answer is plain; no man who has any conception of the +higher joys of love which is also friendship, intellectual +companionship, can hesitate; and if this is so, then duty is plain also. +No man has a right to deplore the evil by word who encourages it in any +way by his act. + +It is sometimes averred by those who oppose the economic independence +and educational equality of women with men, that women can mingle with +the world on a plane of equality with men only at the sacrifice of all +the chivalry and admiration which men now give to women. But this +objection opposes every step of women's progress, from the harem +upwards, and every step has proved its falseness. True, in the lands +where women are freest, they are less favored with insincere and fulsome +compliments, with vows and protestations which, when put to the test, +mean nothing, or worse than nothing. The case is, however, far otherwise +with the attentions which mark sincere regard, and the consideration +paid by physical strength to comparative weakness. It would, indeed, be +peculiar if higher intellectual powers, a clearer insight into the +"severely true," the cultivation of that nobility of character which +results from self-knowledge through knowledge of others and the habit of +self-reliance, should render women less attractive. The pioneers in any +cause need to be the hardier individuals, and so are often those who +please little æsthetically; and the kicks and scoffs of the world may +take from the disposition what little grace it at first possessed; but +this does not prove the moral rightness of the kicks and scoffs, or the +moral culpability of those who dare to adhere to their purpose in spite +of them. In the countries where excessive difficulties are placed in the +way of women's work in the higher professions (there are very few placed +in the way of her overwork in other directions), these have resulted +naturally in the suppression of effort on the part of the majority of +the more finely constituted and more sensitive, and have left the field +to the hardier and less fine; but in the United States, where women are +freest in every way, they have lost neither in natural grace nor in the +attention and regard of men; on the contrary, they have gained in both, +and they have, furthermore, left the mark of their refining influence on +the whole civilization of the country. As long as women are weaker than +men physically, a higher moral standard must have regard for this +weakness. When, through a more healthful life, women become more nearly +equal to men in endurance, certain forms of attention will be less +necessary, and will, doubtless, fall off somewhat, only to make room for +a higher plane of mutual helpfulness. Yet I doubt whether the time will +ever come when the grace and beauty of women, the associations of love +and the memories of family affection, will not stir men of finer fibre +to peculiar kindness, repaid as the appreciation of women can well +repay. + +There is another protest--which comes especially from the party that +most exclaims against the evils of competition--against the +"superstitious" respect for age. The reason is, obviously, that age +tends by nature to conservatism. But the evils of the struggle for +existence are not those alone of outward conditions; these are often far +less hard than the bitter spirit of mental antagonism that sears and +saddens the heart. Youth is daring and originative; middle age is less +venturesome, but it possesses, on the other hand, a wider range of +experience. Between youth and youth, or youth and middle age, the battle +is more equal. But age no longer possesses the power to cope with the +world physically or mentally; it is fixed in habit, and apt to follow +one accustomed round of thought; we are certainly not likely to convince +it by violence. It has borne its share of violence and has done its part +in the battle. It has advanced with its generation, though it may not be +able to advance any longer with ours. Our ideal should certainly be that +of forbearance, not of intolerance towards it. + +Modern opinion is becoming dissatisfied with the old methods of dealing +with criminals--with the methods which continually return the criminal +to society not bettered by incarceration, and ready to commit all manner +of crimes again. Both the protection of society and the welfare of the +criminal would be better served by a course of discipline that should +only then give him back to society when he is fitted to live in harmony +with it and to enjoy the advantages conferred by such harmony. Recent +experiments in reformatories have demonstrated the immense advantage of +methods which attempt something like this. Among the improved +reformatories for children, many of them without walls, bolts, or bars, +some have sent out cured from eighty to eighty-five per cent of the +offenders committed to them. The Elmira reformatory deals especially +with offenders sentenced for their first state's prison offence, and its +method is at once eminently humane and remarkably successful. Offenders +may be sent to it at the discretion of the judges. It contains three +grades. Members of the first of these wear better clothing, eat better +food, enjoy various special privileges, and are used, to some extent, as +officers and monitors for the other grades. Members of the second grade +are less well provided for and honored than those of the first; and +members of the third grade are worst clothed and fed, and have the +fewest privileges. Every man who enters the prison is submitted to a +minute examination as to his antecedents, his mental, moral, and +physical condition and capabilities. He is then placed in the second +grade, from which he may go up or down, according to his work and +conduct. Eight hours' work a day are required, and compulsory school is +held in the evening, at which the common English branches are taught, +and elementary instruction given in Law, Political Economy, Ethics, etc. +Discussion and thought on the subjects taught are encouraged, and +everything possible is done to awaken interest. "Perfect" work and +conduct for six months--the standard of "perfection" is high--and a mark +of 75 in a scale of 100 in the school secure a man advance into the next +higher grade; and the same standard maintained for six months in the +highest grade entitle a man to release on parole; so that the term of +imprisonment need not exceed a year. The man must be willing, +industrious, good-tempered, obedient, energetic, who gets release in +this time. Work is found for every man released; he is closely watched +for six months more, and if his conduct does not keep up the standard +required, he is returned to the reformatory and must begin over again; +if, on the other hand, his conduct and work, an attested report of which +must be handed in each month, is satisfactory for these six months, he +is honorably discharged. The obdurate malefactors serve out their full +sentence, as they would in state's prison. Of those who go out from the +institution, eighty per cent return to society reformed; and the +superintendent is of the opinion that this percentage could still be +raised were the time of detention made indeterminate and wholly +dependent upon reform. All prison reformers are coming to recognize the +desirability of such indeterminate sentences. The work of the men at +Elmira pays over two-thirds of the expenses of the institution, and even +if we consider only dollars and cents, this method of dealing with crime +is evidently the cheapest; for under the old method we have to take into +account the expenses of the later crimes of the men released without +improvement of character. The method of parole of first offenders, newly +introduced into France, and in use to some extent in other countries +also, seems to have rather less to recommend it, except in special +cases; since the moral, intellectual, and industrial discipline of the +reformatory are lacking. + +In all such reformatory work it may be remarked that hard labor and +stringent discipline, as well as consistent kindness, are found +absolutely necessary; and it is to be noted that the disinclination of +criminals for labor and regularity of life is one of the greatest +obstacles in the way of their reform.[283] Judge Green quotes from Mr. +Hough on this point: "Those who are in control of penal institutions +meet with no more pernicious influence than that exerted by certain +well-meaning but mistaken philanthropists who are impelled by kindly +hearts to slop over with sentiment. No criminal is so hard to reach as +the one who fancies himself injured or has a grievance against society. +Aside from treatment that compels him to feel resentment, there is no +one thing that will so quickly bring this feeling as to have some +tender-hearted, benevolent person tell him that they think his penalty +is far more severe than his offence warrants, especially now that he has +promised to pray regularly and abandon his wicked ways."[284] In +connection with this point, we may notice Bellamy's theory of crime as +Atavism, to be treated in the hospitals. Whether or not we regard crime +as disease, a distinction must be drawn between the disease that may be +regarded as physical weakness and that which does not necessarily imply +such weakness, though it may imply some physical defect in the sense +that the psychical characteristic has always its physical coördinate. +We may call the places where our criminals are treated prisons, or we +may call them hospitals; but the name will not alter the fact that +crime, and even the crime the tendency to which manifests itself early +in life and is most incorrigible, needs, for the most part, a wholly +different treatment from that pursued with the sick or the insane. +Discipline and labor may come into play in the insane asylum, and +medicine and hygiene in the prison; but the methods are, nevertheless, +widely separated, and need to be so in order to attain any success. +Bellamy's conception of the character of the criminal by nature--such as +he imagines as alone existing under the conditions of his ideal +state--as rarely untruthful, does not at all accord with the facts of +Psychology and Criminology. Total unreliability is one of the chief +characteristics of the criminal by nature. He lies even where there is +nothing to be gained by lying and often much to be lost; he lies +apparently for the mere pleasure of lying; or he is crafty and cunning, +and the smallest gain suffices to furnish him with a motive for +falsehood. In mankind, as a whole, the love of truth, one of the latest +developments of the moral sense, is likewise one of those earliest lost +in any moral deterioration; and to suppose men, as a rule, strictly +truthful and yet capable of committing crimes of any sort, especially in +a general ideal state of society and morals, is to suppose a +psychological contradiction. Moreover, the antipathy of the criminal to +undergoing the penalty of his crime would still remain as long as the +discipline and labor of the places for criminal treatment were not +abolished; and even the restrictions of incarceration would render the +penalty disagreeable, since liberty is always preferable to confinement. +And if we consider the indefinite sentence, which all prison reformers +now regard as the first condition of the successful treatment of crime, +to be introduced, the reasons for pleading "Not Guilty" would by no +means be removed. But I doubt whether a society of high moral +development would sanction the doubling of the penalty which Bellamy +conceives, as the punishment of simply a lie to escape it. + +The question of capital punishment is more difficult than at first +glance appears. One of the arguments often advanced in opposition to +this form of punishment is that the fear of it is no preventive of the +crime of murder (for which alone, in times of peace, it is still imposed +in civilized countries), since murder still takes place. But the +argument in this form is practically worthless; we might as well say +that art exhibitions do nothing to form taste, since many people who +visit them are still lacking in æsthetic feeling. The fact that men have +gone away from public executions and committed murder is more to the +purpose, as an indication that the influence of the spectacle is +probably a bad one. As to the private execution within prison-walls, it +is difficult to suppose that the mere knowledge of it could arouse a +desire for blood, as the sight of it may be imagined to do. If we +abandon capital punishment on this ground merely, ought we not, in +consistency, to do away with all representations of violent death on the +stage and all description of it in fiction, since these things must +affect the imagination full as vividly. The gladiatorial shows of Rome +were doubtless undesirable from a humanitarian point of view, not only +in themselves, but also in their results; and it might be undesirable +for most individuals to accustom themselves to the spectacle of the +butchering of their meat; but, whether or not we agree with the +vegetarians as to the social significance and influence of the use of +animal-food (necessarily, of course, we must concede that every fact has +an influence of some sort, and in some degree, upon the mind), it can +scarcely be claimed that the mere knowledge that beeves are slaughtered +somewhere is likely to influence the mind to such an extent as to lead +to a morbid desire to imitate the deed; nor, the stimulating excitement +of the actual spectacle of execution lacking, is it likely that the mere +knowledge of its actuality should incite to the taking of human life. On +the contrary, it appears far more likely that the would-be murderer +should connect the thought of it with the possibilities of his own +future in case of detection and arrest, and that he should, thus, be +rather deterred from crime by it. + +The vital questions appear to be whether we have a right thus to +sacrifice life, and whether the evil which the murderer brings upon +society may not be better prevented in some other way. Leaving out of +consideration, for a moment, a point which will be considered later, the +two questions will be seen to resolve themselves into one. If I should +perceive an innocent man about to be murdered by a villain, who was on +the point of plunging his knife into his victim's heart, and I had in my +hand at the time a loaded revolver, my duty would be plain. I should +have no choice as to the responsibility for one man's life; only the +choice would be left me as to which life I would be responsible for; +and to spare the murderer would be to make myself an accomplice in the +murder. The responsibility lies with every society to do the utmost in +its power to prevent the murder of citizens who are, in the majority of +cases, better men than their murderer; and the life, even, of the +murderer cannot stand out against the life of better men. If, then, the +death sentence is the best preventive of murder, and society refuses to +inflict it nevertheless, it makes itself the accomplice of the murderer +as much as is the man who stands by and permits the knife to be plunged +into the victim's heart, rather than shoot down its wielder. It is not +mercy that spares the guilty to sacrifice the innocent. If, then, we +must be responsible for the death of any man, let it be for that of the +murderer rather than for that of his victims. It is easy enough to say, +as do some on this point, that it should never become a principle of +society to do evil in order that good may come; but as long as there are +conflicting conditions in society, there can be no choice of absolute +good; the only choice is between lesser and greater evils. Forgetting +this, and looking only on the one side of the question on which their +sympathy has especially been excited, reformers are sometimes guilty of +choosing the greater evil in order that a lesser good may come. It is, +therefore, not sufficient to brand capital punishment "a relic of +barbarism," in order to prove that it should be abolished. + +The problem of prevention of murder includes various elements: it +includes the question of the possible repetition of the crime by the +individual on trial, the question of his influence by precept and +example, and that of his possible propagation of offspring who may +inherit his evil propensities; and it also includes the question of the +check of fear in other would-be murderers. + +It has been claimed that imprisonment for life would act as an effectual +preventive in all these respects. There may be, however, various +objections to this penalty. In the first place, an unconditional +life-sentence without hope of pardon is difficult to establish, +especially in democratic countries; and its justice is doubtful, in case +it were possible. Even if sentences of this sort were to be passed, pity +would be likely to interfere later with their execution. And then the +momentous question arises as to whether it would always be well-directed +pity. The men in whom the right of pardon is vested are not always wise +in their use of it, and in democratic countries they are guided to a +considerable extent by the will of importunate portions of society which +is often still less wise. The sentimentality which now vents itself in +loading down violent criminals with flowers, fruit, gifts of all sorts, +letters, photographs, commiserations for their "misfortune," and even +offers of marriage, is likely to stand in the way of the safety of +society in case the murderer lives. This sentimentality, which in many +countries exalts the criminal into a hero, and in France turns the +police court into a fashionable place of amusement, were it not to be +followed by the dread ending which the sterner members of society exact, +and were the hope of pardon still open, might invest arrest with even +some attractions to the murderer, who is frequently a hero in his own +eyes. The prominence of a desire for notoriety is evident in criminals +of the Jack-the-Ripper and other types. The sentimentality which is +unable to distinguish between a legitimate mercy, and the mercy to the +individual which amounts to the worst of cruelty to many others, is, +indeed, a continual danger to society and a hindrance to useful reforms. + +Again, if the criminal be condemned to life-imprisonment, there is +always the possibility of his escape to be considered, and the fact that +he will probably stick at nothing to accomplish his escape. The dangers +of ultimate success may not be so large; our prisons are nowadays +strongly built, the warders and other officers are very seldom open to +bribes, and the proportion of escapes is extremely small. Nevertheless, +the hopelessness of a life-sentence must constitute a strong motive for +the stimulation of effort and ingenuity; and it can scarcely be hoped +that a man who has not before hesitated at murder, and who has no +greater penalty to fear in case of any number of repetitions of the +crime, will hesitate when his liberty and all it means to him of freedom +from irksome discipline and restraint of vice, is at stake. And in case +of escape society has to fear, not only repetitions of the crime, but +also the numberless and complex workings of the criminal's influence on +others, and the propagation of offspring who may inherit his evil +propensities. + +And, furthermore, if the sentence of life-imprisonment is carried out, +the murderer's influence on the other tenants of the prison is to be +considered, in case he is not kept in solitary confinement. The +preservation of a large number of desperate criminals, in contact with +the less corrupt ones whose reform is being attempted, has many +objections. Criminals have more than once stated that they learned their +worst principles from companions in prison, and many of our prisons and +many of our reformatories have been called mere schools of vice. +Moreover, in maintaining our desperate criminals, we are spending large +sums for their comfort while hundreds of better men are left to starve, +and thousands are more poorly clothed and fed. + +The fact that murder has not increased in some countries where the +death-sentence has been abolished may be admitted as evidence in the +matter, but cannot be regarded, alone, as conclusive. For, first, that +which is for the general good in one country may not be so in another, +the national temperament, form of government, and general habits of +which are different. And, furthermore, it may be said that, although +statistics undoubtedly must have some meaning in all cases, the +complication of social conditions renders it often difficult to say just +what the significance may be in the particular case. In the diminution +of murders, other circumstances may have been at work which would have +lessened the number even if the death-sentence had not been abolished. +At least, experiments with regard to the abolition of the death-penalty +have been too few to render any categorical assertion on the subject +possible. + +But some of the above-stated objections to the abolition of capital +punishment might be removed by the provision of separate prisons for +malefactors condemned to life-imprisonment, with separate wards +according to the moral condition of the prisoners, little communication +being allowed between even those in the same ward, or communication only +under supervision, and such instruction being given as would enable the +individual to occupy the hours not devoted to labor in study, reading, +or other mental recreation. + +Green, in his book on crime, calls attention to the very undesirable +vindictiveness sometimes aroused, by sentence of death, in the minds of +the condemned and of his friends, and notices the general evil of the +feeling in the minds of criminals that the state is their deadly foe, +defiance of the laws being thus raised to the plane of legitimate +warfare upon an enemy. The Hon. John J. Wheeler, in a paper quoted by +Green, lays especial stress on the desirability of convincing the +criminal that not revenge but the protection of society is aimed at in +state-punishment. + +Again, the question may be asked whether the sentimental +tendency to regard the criminal as a hero is not fostered by the +death-sentence--whether the pity aroused at so extreme a fate would not +be inclined to take a less harmful form if the treatment of the criminal +were at once firm and humane but less sensational. Doubtless, the glory +of crime and half its attractiveness for a large class of morbid +criminals would be departed, if we could come to regard the latter with +commiseration as of a lower and abnormal type of humanity and to treat +them as such. But it must be remembered that society, as a whole, is yet +far from so scientific a conception; and that combined firmness and +kindness of treatment is difficult to secure, both in prison-officials +and in those officers who have the power of pardon at present placed in +their hands. We need obviously many reforms in our system of sentence +and pardon, as well as in the management of our prisons. We need more +men like Mr. Brockway of Elmira, Mr. Wardwell of Virginia, and those +other modern reformers of prison-life whose office is to them a matter +of humanity and not merely of business. And especially, we need more +firmness in society as a whole; sympathy and mercy may be evils in the +path of human progress when they deteriorate into a weakness which +sacrifices the innocent in a mistaken humanity towards the guilty. In +order to be well directed, sympathy must consider all men, and not the +individual alone; only then is it an unmitigated good. + +But as for the argument noticed above with regard to the employment of +large sums of money for the maintenance of the criminal classes while +the class of honest laborers is yet in destitution, it cannot be +considered, on close inspection, as of great weight. Certainly it would +not be well to maintain the criminal in luxury while other reforms were +waiting. But if we act on the principle of deferring all less important +reforms until all the more important ones are accomplished, we shall be +in danger of not reforming at all. Any reform that is well-timed and +possible is important; for the complication of social relations makes +all reforms of weight in their wider significance. No reforms can or +should be made in a lump; improvement must come from all sides and +little by little; sympathy must be consistent and influence social +conditions in every direction gradually as it gradually increases. It is +the superficial Utilitarianism which bids us wait such a reform as this, +though possible, for another,--the same sort of Utilitarianism which +advocates the introduction of the Spartan custom of preserving only +well-formed and vigorous infants, and advises the administration of +painless poisons to those hopelessly ill and suffering. All these things +have their relation to character, and, therefore, to other social evils, +or reforms. + +And here we are brought finally to the consideration of the point +hitherto left out of account,--a point which bears, however, a strong +argument; namely, the fact of the possible condemnation of innocent men +to death. Even since the limitation of capital punishment to cases of +murder the innocent have been hung or guillotined in mistake for the +guilty. And for such mistakes there is no reparation; the grave never +gives up its dead. Men have sometimes been discovered to be innocent in +spite of the strongest evidence against them; human observation is +defective, human memory fallible, human character--especially such as +often appears in evidence against the murderer--by no means always +strictly honorable and honest. Even confessions of guilt have sometimes +been proved false. As with regard to other propositions to place the +power of the life or death of individuals in the hands of their fellow +men, the question presents itself as to whether the use of so great +power is not dangerous. And this appears to me the decisive point of our +inquiry. + +Societies are being formed for the abolition of capital punishment, and +feeling is growing strong in its favor. Let us hope, however, that the +reformers will adopt a policy stringent and judicious as well as +merciful;--that they will not forget that, in order to render the +preservation of the murderer harmless to society we need other reforms +in law and prison management. + +In general, it may be said of all questions, that the conflict between +the principles of justice and mercy, known to theological Ethics, +resolves itself, from a higher point of view, into the question of +justice only. The mercy which is not justice, is either mercy to one at +the expense of others, or mercy that spares the offender in one respect +to his own greater disadvantage in another. The ideal character is thus +at once gentle and strong. + +We have followed the development of altruism from egoism up to the point +where the thought of punishment ensuing upon the non-performance of duty +ceases to play a large part in the motive to action, the reward of the +pleasure of others and of their gratitude and love forming a complex +motive. But beyond even the incentives of love there lies still a higher +motive which, in cases of conflict, must figure as the highest morally. +In an ideal state, the social sanction could not conflict with duty; but +until we reach such a state, the independence of moral motive must be +observed, the moral man must do what appears to him right, in spite of +public opinion. The course has its dangers, and the principle must be +carried out with caution, the questions involving such a course be +carefully considered from all sides and in all lights. But when this has +been done, the sense of duty remains supreme. In the ideal man, the +consciousness of duty performed should constitute the strongest +pleasure, the consciousness of failure in duty the severest pain. This +is the solution of the problem Ibsen gives us in "Rosmersholm"; society +has not advanced from savagery by permitting all pleasures which the +individual desires; nor can it advance further towards the ideal by +permitting the individual to choose those pleasures which the future +shall regard as evidence of our present semi-barbarous state, since they +are pleasures inimical to the peace of others and the general good of +society; as in the past, so in the present and future, the harmony +between pleasure and duty (that is between the conflicting pleasures of +individuals) can be attained only by habit which shall bring the desires +of the individual into harmony with duty. Thus only can all desires, the +happiness of all individuals, attain to harmony,--to "full" equilibrium. + +And this leads me to remark that we have reason to doubt the moral +conviction of very many who protest against the "immoral" and +"superstitious" restriction of personal pleasure in certain directions. +Were such individuals morally convinced, were duty to their fellow men +really uppermost in their minds, they would not choose darkness and +secrecy for their deeds, but after careful and thorough statement of +their opinions and reasons would show the earnestness of their belief by +open act. The man whose moral conviction is to him the highest duty does +not fear public opinion, but dares to follow that which seems to him +right, in the face of slander; therefore, we suspect the man who hides +his deeds, of seeking his own pleasure and not that of society as a +whole. + + "Conscience is harder than our enemies, + Knows more, accuses with more nicety, + Nor needs to question Rumor if we fall + Below the perfect level of our thought. + I fear no outward arbiter," + +says Don Silva in "The Spanish Gypsy." + +But for our encouragement, let us contemplate the heroic characters +which progress has developed. From these we may take hope and courage, +in these we may find the best results of the moral evolution of our +race, and the promise of the better future which man alone can work out +by ever-renewed effort. The love of such characters, and even the +knowledge that they exist, is the highest joy of human association, a +joy which the present age may feel in a degree that no former age has +known; and herein lies the greater beauty of the present time over all +others. The thought of such characters can sustain us even in our own +self-doubt. What man has done, man can do. Nay, he shall do more, much +more. + +The question as to the final destruction of the human race, whether by +sudden catastrophe or slow decay, can little affect happiness, at +present, or for very many ages to come. As yet, evolution is in the +direction of a greater harmony that means continually greater pleasure +to life. We have not reached our maximum, we are evolving upwards +towards it. The pessimist is fond of making much of the final end of our +planet; but the healthy and successful will be happy in spite of future +ages, and the extent and degree of happiness will continue to increase +for such an immense period of time that there is no reason for +considering the destruction of our race as exerting any important +influence on ethical theory. The loss of our faith in individual +immortality is a far greater source of present pain. It leaves death a +harder sorrow;--but it lends life new meaning. The good we strive for +lies no longer in a world of dreams on the other side the grave; it is +brought down to earth and waits to be realized by human hands, through +human labor. We are called on to forsake the finer egoism that centred +all its care on self-salvation, for a love of our own kind that shall +triumph over death, and leave its impress on the joy of generations to +come. There is something lost in the dissolution of the old faith to us +who were reared in it. The hope of restitution, to the individual, from +supernatural cause, here or hereafter, is forever done away with. There +is no restitution. In our favorite novel, when the doors are closed and +the lights extinguished, that some unspeakable sorrow may hide itself in +darkness and silence, we can always turn back the leaves till we are +again in the midst of light and music and dancing, and the heart for +which the tragic knife is pitilessly sharpening in the hand of Destiny, +is yet untouched. But in the book of Reality, there is no turning back; +the pages are burned before our eyes as we read. Sooner or later, we all +of us reach the point where that which made life most worth living has +passed away from us forever. There is no help save the knowledge of the +fact, that shall make us all draw closer in sympathy and by mutual +kindness render loss less bitter. As we accept the Truth, and bow our +head to the Inevitable, we may learn a less narrow happiness for this +life and for the Hereafter, from the great pioneers of Scientific Doubt +and pure Humanitarianism, one of whom has written:-- + + "Oh, may I join the choir invisible + Of those immortal dead who live again + In minds made better by their presence; live + In pulses stirred to generosity, + In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn + For miserable aims that end with self, + In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars, + And with their mild persistence urge man's search + To vaster issues. + So to live is heaven: + To make undying music in the world, + Breathing as beauteous order that controls + With growing sway the growing life of man. + + *....*....*....* + + This is life to come, + Which martyred men have made more glorious + For us who strive to follow. May I reach + That purest heaven, be to other souls + The cup of strength in some great agony, + Enkindle generous ardor, feed pure love, + Beget the smiles that have no cruelty,-- + Be the sweet presence of a good diffused, + And in diffusion ever more intense. + So shall I join the choir invisible, + Whose music is the gladness of the world." + +FOOTNOTES: + +[275] It should be said, in justice to the play in question, that the +idea of purification by evil was evidently not present to its author. + +[276] See Part I. p. 33, this book; "Social Statics," 87-89. + +[277] "Le Luxe," p. 2. + +[278] "Le Luxe," p. 12. + +[279] "Fabian Essays in Socialism," pp. 27, 145, etc. + +[280] I have used the word here as elsewhere in its more general, not in +its specific, technical sense. + +[281] "Fabian Essays," p. 57. + +[282] See "Jahrbücher für Psychiatrie," 1889, "Ueber Neurosen und +Psychosen durch sexuelle Abstinenz." + +[283] See essay by Charles Dudley Warner in the "North American Review" +for April, 1885. + +[284] S. 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