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+      <title>The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 1 of 3)</title>
+      <author><name reg="Schopenhauer, Arthur">Arthur Schopenhauer</name></author>
+      <respStmt><resp>Translated by</resp> <name>R. B. Haldane</name> <resp>and</resp>
+        <name>J. Kemp</name></respStmt>
+    </titleStmt>
+    <editionStmt>
+      <edition n="7">Edition 7</edition>
+    </editionStmt>
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+      <publisher>Project Gutenberg</publisher>
+      <date>December 27, 2011</date>
+      <idno type="etext-no">38427</idno>
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+    <div rend="page-break-before: always">
+      <p rend="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center">The World As Will And Idea</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">By</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">Arthur Schopenhauer</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Translated From The German By</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">R. B. Haldane, M.A.</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">And</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">J. Kemp, M.A.</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: x-large; text-align: center">Vol. I.</p>
+      <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Containing Four Books.</p>
+      <p rend="text-align: center"><q>Ob nicht Natur zuletzt sich doch ergünde?</q>&mdash;<hi rend='smallcaps'>Goethe</hi></p>
+      <p rend="font-size: large; text-align: center">Seventh Edition</p>
+      <p rend="text-align: center">London</p>
+      <p rend="text-align: center">Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner &amp; Co.</p>
+      <p rend="text-align: center">1909</p>
+    </div>
+    <div rend="page-break-before: always">
+      <head>Contents</head>
+      <divGen type="toc" />
+    </div>
+
+  </front>
+<body>
+
+<pb n='v'/><anchor id='Pgv'/>
+
+<div rend='page-break-before: always'>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Translators' Preface.</head>
+
+<p>
+The style of <q>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</q> is
+sometimes loose and involved, as is so often the case in
+German philosophical treatises. The translation of the
+book has consequently been a matter of no little difficulty.
+It was found that extensive alteration of the
+long and occasionally involved sentences, however likely
+to prove conducive to a satisfactory English style, tended
+not only to obliterate the form of the original but even
+to imperil the meaning. Where a choice has had to be
+made, the alternative of a somewhat slavish adherence to
+Schopenhauer's <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ipsissima verba</foreign> has accordingly been preferred
+to that of inaccuracy. The result is a piece of
+work which leaves much to be desired, but which has
+yet consistently sought to reproduce faithfully the spirit
+as well as the letter of the original.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As regards the rendering of the technical terms about
+which there has been so much controversy, the equivalents
+used have only been adopted after careful consideration
+of their meaning in the theory of knowledge. For
+example, <q>Vorstellung</q> has been rendered by <q>idea,</q> in
+preference to <q>representation,</q> which is neither accurate,
+intelligible, nor elegant. <q>Idee,</q> is translated by the
+<pb n='vi'/><anchor id='Pgvi'/>
+same word, but spelled with a capital,&mdash;<q>Idea.</q> Again,
+<q>Anschauung</q> has been rendered according to the context,
+either by <q>perception</q> simply, or by <q>intuition or
+perception.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Notwithstanding statements to the contrary in the text,
+the book is probably quite intelligible in itself, apart from
+the treatise <q>On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of
+Sufficient Reason.</q> It has, however, been considered
+desirable to add an abstract of the latter work in an
+appendix to the third volume of this translation.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+R. B. H.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+J. K.
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<pb n='vii'/><anchor id='Pgvii'/>
+
+<div rend='page-break-before: always'>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Preface To The First Edition.</head>
+
+<p>
+I propose to point out here how this book must be read
+in order to be thoroughly understood. By means of it
+I only intend to impart a single thought. Yet, notwithstanding
+all my endeavours, I could find no shorter way
+of imparting it than this whole book. I hold this thought
+to be that which has very long been sought for under
+the name of philosophy, and the discovery of which is
+therefore regarded by those who are familiar with history
+as quite as impossible as the discovery of the philosopher's
+stone, although it was already said by Pliny: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Quam
+multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur?</foreign>
+(Hist. nat. 7, 1.)
+</p>
+
+<p>
+According as we consider the different aspects of this
+one thought which I am about to impart, it exhibits
+itself as that which we call metaphysics, that which we
+call ethics, and that which we call æsthetics; and certainly
+it must be all this if it is what I have already
+acknowledged I take it to be.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A <emph>system of thought</emph> must always have an architectonic
+connection or coherence, that is, a connection in which
+one part always supports the other, though the latter
+does not support the former, in which ultimately the
+foundation supports all the rest without being supported
+by it, and the apex is supported without supporting.
+On the other hand, a <emph>single thought</emph>, however comprehensive
+<pb n='viii'/><anchor id='Pgviii'/>
+it may be, must preserve the most perfect unity.
+If it admits of being broken up into parts to facilitate
+its communication, the connection of these parts must
+yet be organic, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, it must be a connection in which
+every part supports the whole just as much as it is
+supported by it, a connection in which there is no first
+and no last, in which the whole thought gains distinctness
+through every part, and even the smallest part
+cannot be completely understood unless the whole has
+already been grasped. A book, however, must always
+have a first and a last line, and in this respect will
+always remain very unlike an organism, however like
+one its content may be: thus form and matter are here
+in contradiction.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is self-evident that under these circumstances no
+other advice can be given as to how one may enter into
+the thought explained in this work than <emph>to read the book
+twice</emph>, and the first time with great patience, a patience
+which is only to be derived from the belief, voluntarily
+accorded, that the beginning presupposes the end almost
+as much as the end presupposes the beginning, and that
+all the earlier parts presuppose the later almost as much
+as the later presuppose the earlier. I say <q>almost;</q>
+for this is by no means absolutely the case, and I have
+honestly and conscientiously done all that was possible
+to give priority to that which stands least in need of
+explanation from what follows, as indeed generally to
+everything that can help to make the thought as easy
+to comprehend and as distinct as possible. This might
+indeed to a certain extent be achieved if it were not that
+the reader, as is very natural, thinks, as he reads, not
+merely of what is actually said, but also of its possible
+consequences, and thus besides the many contradictions
+<pb n='ix'/><anchor id='Pgix'/>
+actually given of the opinions of the time, and presumably
+of the reader, there may be added as many more
+which are anticipated and imaginary. That, then, which
+is really only misunderstanding, must take the form of
+active disapproval, and it is all the more difficult to
+recognise that it is misunderstanding, because although
+the laboriously-attained clearness of the explanation and
+distinctness of the expression never leaves the immediate
+sense of what is said doubtful, it cannot at the same
+time express its relations to all that remains to be said.
+Therefore, as we have said, the first perusal demands
+patience, founded on confidence that on a second perusal
+much, or all, will appear in an entirely different light.
+Further, the earnest endeavour to be more completely
+and even more easily comprehended in the case of a
+very difficult subject, must justify occasional repetition.
+Indeed the structure of the whole, which is organic, not
+a mere chain, makes it necessary sometimes to touch on
+the same point twice. Moreover this construction, and
+the very close connection of all the parts, has not left
+open to me the division into chapters and paragraphs
+which I should otherwise have regarded as very important,
+but has obliged me to rest satisfied with four
+principal divisions, as it were four aspects of one thought.
+In each of these four books it is especially important to
+guard against losing sight, in the details which must
+necessarily be discussed, of the principal thought to
+which they belong, and the progress of the whole exposition.
+I have thus expressed the first, and like those
+which follow, unavoidable demand upon the reader, who
+holds the philosopher in small favour just because he
+himself is a philosopher.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The second demand is this, that the introduction be
+<pb n='x'/><anchor id='Pgx'/>
+read before the book itself, although it is not contained
+in the book, but appeared five years earlier under the
+title, <q><hi rend='italic'>Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden
+Grunde: eine philosophische Abhandlung</hi></q> (On the
+fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason: a philosophical
+essay). Without an acquaintance with this
+introduction and propadeutic it is absolutely impossible
+to understand the present work properly, and the content
+of that essay will always be presupposed in this work
+just as if it were given with it. Besides, even if it had
+not preceded this book by several years, it would not
+properly have been placed before it as an introduction,
+but would have been incorporated in the first book. As
+it is, the first book does not contain what was said in
+the earlier essay, and it therefore exhibits a certain
+incompleteness on account of these deficiencies, which
+must always be supplied by reference to it. However,
+my disinclination was so great either to quote myself or
+laboriously to state again in other words what I had
+already said once in an adequate manner, that I preferred
+this course, notwithstanding the fact that I might now
+be able to give the content of that essay a somewhat
+better expression, chiefly by freeing it from several
+conceptions which resulted from the excessive influence
+which the Kantian philosophy had over me at the time,
+such as&mdash;categories, outer and inner sense, and the like.
+But even there these conceptions only occur because
+as yet I had never really entered deeply into them, therefore
+only by the way and quite out of connection with
+the principal matter. The correction of such passages in
+that essay will consequently take place of its own accord
+in the mind of the reader through his acquaintance with
+the present work. But only if we have fully recognised
+<pb n='xi'/><anchor id='Pgxi'/>
+by means of that essay what the principle of sufficient
+reason is and signifies, what its validity extends to, and
+what it does not extend to, and that that principle is not
+before all things, and the whole world merely in consequence
+of it, and in conformity to it, a corollary, as it
+were, of it; but rather that it is merely the form in
+which the object, of whatever kind it may be, which is
+always conditioned by the subject, is invariably known
+so far as the subject is a knowing individual: only then
+will it be possible to enter into the method of philosophy
+which is here attempted for the first time, and which is
+completely different from all previous methods.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But the same disinclination to repeat myself word for
+word, or to say the same thing a second time in other
+and worse words, after I have deprived myself of the
+better, has occasioned another defect in the first book of
+this work. For I have omitted all that is said in the
+first chapter of my essay <q>On Sight and Colour,</q> which
+would otherwise have found its place here, word for
+word. Therefore the knowledge of this short, earlier
+work is also presupposed.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Finally, the third demand I have to make on the
+reader might indeed be tacitly assumed, for it is nothing
+but an acquaintance with the most important phenomenon
+that has appeared in philosophy for two thousand years,
+and that lies so near us: I mean the principal writings
+of Kant. It seems to me, in fact, as indeed has already
+been said by others, that the effect these writings produce
+in the mind to which they truly speak is very like that
+of the operation for cataract on a blind man: and if we
+wish to pursue the simile further, the aim of my own
+work may be described by saying that I have sought to
+put into the hands of those upon whom that operation
+<pb n='xii'/><anchor id='Pgxii'/>
+has been successfully performed a pair of spectacles
+suitable to eyes that have recovered their sight&mdash;spectacles
+of whose use that operation is the absolutely necessary
+condition. Starting then, as I do to a large extent, from
+what has been accomplished by the great Kant, I have
+yet been enabled, just on account of my earnest study of
+his writings, to discover important errors in them. These
+I have been obliged to separate from the rest and prove
+to be false, in order that I might be able to presuppose
+and apply what is true and excellent in his doctrine,
+pure and freed from error. But not to interrupt and
+complicate my own exposition by a constant polemic
+against Kant, I have relegated this to a special appendix.
+It follows then, from what has been said, that my work
+presupposes a knowledge of this appendix just as much
+as it presupposes a knowledge of the philosophy of Kant;
+and in this respect it would therefore be advisable to
+read the appendix first, all the more as its content is
+specially related to the first book of the present work.
+On the other hand, it could not be avoided, from the
+nature of the case, that here and there the appendix also
+should refer to the text of the work; and the only
+result of this is, that the appendix, as well as the
+principal part of the work, must be read twice.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The philosophy of Kant, then, is the only philosophy
+with which a thorough acquaintance is directly presupposed
+in what we have to say here. But if, besides this,
+the reader has lingered in the school of the divine Plato,
+he will be so much the better prepared to hear me, and
+susceptible to what I say. And if, indeed, in addition to
+this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the
+Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the
+Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which
+<pb n='xiii'/><anchor id='Pgxiii'/>
+this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because
+I believe that the influence of the Sanscrit literature
+will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival
+of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say,
+the reader has also already received and assimilated the
+sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best of all
+prepared to hear what I have to say to him. My work
+will not speak to him, as to many others, in a strange
+and even hostile tongue; for, if it does not sound too vain,
+I might express the opinion that each one of the individual
+and disconnected aphorisms which make up the
+Upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the
+thought I am going to impart, though the converse, that
+my thought is to be found in the Upanishads, is by no
+means the case.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But most readers have already grown angry with impatience,
+and burst into reproaches with difficulty kept
+back so long. How can I venture to present a book to
+the public under conditions and demands the first two
+of which are presumptuous and altogether immodest,
+and this at a time when there is such a general wealth
+of special ideas, that in Germany alone they are made
+common property through the press, in three thousand
+valuable, original, and absolutely indispensable works
+every year, besides innumerable periodicals, and even
+daily papers; at a time when especially there is not
+the least deficiency of entirely original and profound
+philosophers, but in Germany alone there are more of
+them alive at the same time, than several centuries
+could formerly boast of in succession to each other?
+How is one ever to come to the end, asks the indignant
+reader, if one must set to work upon a book in such a
+fashion?
+</p>
+
+<pb n='xiv'/><anchor id='Pgxiv'/>
+
+<p>
+As I have absolutely nothing to advance against these
+reproaches, I only hope for some small thanks from such
+readers for having warned them in time, so that they may
+not lose an hour over a book which it would be useless
+to read without complying with the demands that have
+been made, and which should therefore be left alone,
+particularly as apart from this we might wager a great
+deal that it can say nothing to them, but rather that it
+will always be only <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>pancorum hominum</foreign>, and must therefore
+quietly and modestly wait for the few whose unusual
+mode of thought may find it enjoyable. For apart from
+the difficulties and the effort which it requires from the
+reader, what cultured man of this age, whose knowledge
+has almost reached the august point at which the paradoxical
+and the false are all one to it, could bear to meet thoughts
+almost on every page that directly contradict that which
+he has yet himself established once for all as true and
+undeniable? And then, how disagreeably disappointed
+will many a one be if he finds no mention here of what
+he believes it is precisely here he ought to look for, because
+his method of speculation agrees with that of a
+great living philosopher,<note place='foot'>F. H. Jacobi.</note> who has certainly written
+pathetic books, and who only has the trifling weakness
+that he takes all he learned and approved before his
+fifteenth year for inborn ideas of the human mind. Who
+could stand all this? Therefore my advice is simply to
+lay down the book.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But I fear I shall not escape even thus. The reader
+who has got as far as the preface and been stopped by
+it, has bought the book for cash, and asks how he is
+to be indemnified. My last refuge is now to remind
+him that he knows how to make use of a book in several
+<pb n='xv'/><anchor id='Pgxv'/>
+ways, without exactly reading it. It may fill a gap in his
+library as well as many another, where, neatly bound, it
+will certainly look well. Or he can lay it on the toilet-table
+or the tea-table of some learned lady friend. Or,
+finally, what certainly is best of all, and I specially advise
+it, he can review it.
+</p>
+
+<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/>
+
+<p>
+And now that I have allowed myself the jest to
+which in this two-sided life hardly any page can be too
+serious to grant a place, I part with the book with deep
+seriousness, in the sure hope that sooner or later it will
+reach those to whom alone it can be addressed; and for
+the rest, patiently resigned that the same fate should, in
+full measure, befall it, that in all ages has, to some
+extent, befallen all knowledge, and especially the
+weightiest knowledge of the truth, to which only a brief
+triumph is allotted between the two long periods in
+which it is condemned as paradoxical or disparaged as
+trivial. The former fate is also wont to befall its author.
+But life is short, and truth works far and lives long: let
+us speak the truth.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<hi rend='italic'>Written at Dresden in August 1818.</hi>
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<pb n='xvii'/><anchor id='Pgxvii'/>
+
+<div rend='page-break-before: always'>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Preface To The Second Edition.</head>
+
+<p>
+Not to my contemporaries, not to my compatriots&mdash;to
+mankind I commit my now completed work in the confidence
+that it will not be without value for them, even
+if this should be late recognised, as is commonly the lot
+of what is good. For it cannot have been for the passing
+generation, engrossed with the delusion of the moment,
+that my mind, almost against my will, has uninterruptedly
+stuck to its work through the course of a long life. And
+while the lapse of time has not been able to make me
+doubt the worth of my work, neither has the lack of
+sympathy; for I constantly saw the false and the bad,
+and finally the absurd and senseless,<note place='foot'>The Hegelian Philosophy.</note> stand in universal
+admiration and honour, and I bethought myself that if
+it were not the case those who are capable of recognising
+the genuine and right are so rare that we may look
+for them in vain for some twenty years, then those who
+are capable of producing it could not be so few that
+their works afterwards form an exception to the perishableness
+of earthly things; and thus would be lost the
+reviving prospect of posterity which every one who sets
+before himself a high aim requires to strengthen him.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Whoever seriously takes up and pursues an object that
+does not lead to material advantages, must not count on
+<pb n='xviii'/><anchor id='Pgxviii'/>
+the sympathy of his contemporaries. For the most part
+he will see, however, that in the meantime the superficial
+aspect of that object becomes current in the world, and
+enjoys its day; and this is as it should be. The object
+itself must be pursued for its own sake, otherwise it
+cannot be attained; for any design or intention is always
+dangerous to insight. Accordingly, as the whole history
+of literature proves, everything of real value required a
+long time to gain acceptance, especially if it belonged to
+the class of instructive, not entertaining, works; and
+meanwhile the false flourished. For to combine the
+object with its superficial appearance is difficult, when it
+is not impossible. Indeed that is just the curse of this
+world of want and need, that everything must serve and
+slave for these; and therefore it is not so constituted
+that any noble and sublime effort, like the endeavour
+after light and truth, can prosper unhindered and exist
+for its own sake. But even if such an endeavour has
+once succeeded in asserting itself, and the conception of
+it has thus been introduced, material interests and personal
+aims will immediately take possession of it, in
+order to make it their tool or their mask. Accordingly,
+when Kant brought philosophy again into repute, it had
+soon to become the tool of political aims from above, and
+personal aims from below; although, strictly speaking,
+not philosophy itself, but its ghost, that passes for it.
+This should not really astonish us; for the incredibly
+large majority of men are by nature quite incapable of
+any but material aims, indeed they can conceive no
+others. Thus the pursuit of truth alone is far too lofty
+and eccentric an endeavour for us to expect all or many,
+or indeed even a few, faithfully to take part in. If
+yet we see, as for example at present in Germany, a
+<pb n='xix'/><anchor id='Pgxix'/>
+remarkable activity, a general moving, writing, and talking
+with reference to philosophical subjects, we may
+confidently assume that, in spite of solemn looks and
+assurances, only real, not ideal aims, are the actual
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>primum mobile</foreign>, the concealed motive of such a movement;
+that it is personal, official, ecclesiastical, political,
+in short, material ends that are really kept in view, and
+consequently that mere party ends set the pens of so many
+pretended philosophers in such rapid motion. Thus some
+design or intention, not the desire of insight, is the guiding
+star of these disturbers of the peace, and truth is certainly
+the last thing that is thought of in the matter. It finds
+no partisans; rather, it may pursue its way as silently
+and unheeded through such a philosophical riot as
+through the winter night of the darkest century bound
+in the rigid faith of the church, when it was communicated
+only to a few alchemists as esoteric learning, or entrusted
+it may be only to the parchment. Indeed I might say
+that no time can be more unfavourable to philosophy
+than that in which it is shamefully misused, on the one
+hand to further political objects, on the other as a means
+of livelihood. Or is it believed that somehow, with such
+effort and such a turmoil, the truth, at which it by no
+means aims, will also be brought to light? Truth is no
+prostitute, that throws herself away upon those who do
+not desire her; she is rather so coy a beauty that he who
+sacrifices everything to her cannot even then be sure of
+her favour.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If Governments make philosophy a means of furthering
+political ends, learned men see in philosophical professorships
+a trade that nourishes the outer man just like
+any other; therefore they crowd after them in the assurance
+of their good intentions, that is, the purpose of subserving
+<pb n='xx'/><anchor id='Pgxx'/>
+these ends. And they keep their word: not
+truth, not clearness, not Plato, not Aristotle, but the ends
+they were appointed to serve are their guiding star, and
+become at once the criterion of what is true, valuable,
+and to be respected, and of the opposites of these. Whatever,
+therefore, does not answer these ends, even if it were
+the most important and extraordinary things in their
+department, is either condemned, or, when this seems
+hazardous, suppressed by being unanimously ignored.
+Look only at their zeal against pantheism; will any simpleton
+believe that it proceeds from conviction? And, in
+general, how is it possible that philosophy, degraded to
+the position of a means of making one's bread, can fail
+to degenerate into sophistry? Just because this is infallibly
+the case, and the rule, <q>I sing the song of him
+whose bread I eat,</q> has always held good, the making of
+money by philosophy was regarded by the ancients as
+the characteristic of the sophists. But we have still to
+add this, that since throughout this world nothing is to
+be expected, can be demanded, or is to be had for gold
+but mediocrity, we must be contented with it here also.
+Consequently we see in all the German universities the
+cherished mediocrity striving to produce the philosophy
+which as yet is not there to produce, at its own expense
+and indeed in accordance with a predetermined standard
+and aim, a spectacle at which it would be almost cruel
+to mock.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+While thus philosophy has long been obliged to serve
+entirely as a means to public ends on the one side and
+private ends on the other, I have pursued the course of
+my thought, undisturbed by them, for more than thirty
+years, and simply because I was obliged to do so and
+could not help myself, from an instinctive impulse, which
+<pb n='xxi'/><anchor id='Pgxxi'/>
+was, however, supported by the confidence that anything
+true one may have thought, and anything obscure one
+may have thrown light upon, will appeal to any thinking
+mind, no matter when it comprehends it, and will
+rejoice and comfort it. To such an one we speak as
+those who are like us have spoken to us, and have so
+become our comfort in the wilderness of this life. Meanwhile
+the object is pursued on its own account and for its
+own sake. Now it happens curiously enough with philosophical
+meditations, that precisely that which one has
+thought out and investigated for oneself, is afterwards of
+benefit to others; not that, however, which was originally
+intended for others. The former is confessedly nearest
+in character to perfect honesty; for a man does not seek
+to deceive himself, nor does he offer himself empty husks;
+so that all sophistication and all mere talk is omitted,
+and consequently every sentence that is written at once
+repays the trouble of reading it. Thus my writings bear
+the stamp of honesty and openness so distinctly on the
+face of them, that by this alone they are a glaring contrast
+to those of three celebrated sophists of the post-Kantian
+period. I am always to be found at the standpoint
+of <emph>reflection</emph>, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, rational deliberation and honest
+statement, never at that of <emph>inspiration</emph>, called intellectual
+intuition, or absolute thought; though, if it received its
+proper name, it would be called empty bombast and charlatanism.
+Working then in this spirit, and always seeing
+the false and bad in universal acceptance, yea, bombast<note place='foot'>Fichte and Schelling.</note>
+and charlatanism<note place='foot'>Hegel.</note> in the highest honour, I have
+long renounced the approbation of my contemporaries. It
+is impossible that an age which for twenty years has
+applauded a Hegel, that intellectual Caliban, as the
+<pb n='xxii'/><anchor id='Pgxxii'/>
+greatest of the philosophers, so loudly that it echoes
+through the whole of Europe, could make him who has
+looked on at that desirous of its approbation. It has no
+more crowns of honour to bestow; its applause is prostituted,
+and its censure has no significance. That I mean
+what I say is attested by the fact that if I had in any
+way sought the approbation of my contemporaries, I
+would have had to strike out a score of passages which
+entirely contradict all their opinions, and indeed must in
+part be offensive to them. But I would count it a crime
+to sacrifice a single syllable to that approbation. My
+guiding star has, in all seriousness, been truth. Following
+it, I could first aspire only to my own approbation, entirely
+averted from an age deeply degraded as regards all higher
+intellectual efforts, and a national literature demoralised
+even to the exceptions, a literature in which the art of
+combining lofty words with paltry significance has reached
+its height. I can certainly never escape from the errors
+and weaknesses which, in my case as in every one else's,
+necessarily belong to my nature; but I will not increase
+them by unworthy accommodations.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As regards this second edition, first of all I am glad
+to say that after five and twenty years I find nothing to
+retract; so that my fundamental convictions have only
+been confirmed, as far as concerns myself at least. The
+alterations in the first volume therefore, which contains
+the whole text of the first edition, nowhere touch what
+is essential. Sometimes they concern things of merely
+secondary importance, and more often consist of very
+short explanatory additions inserted here and there.
+Only the criticism of the Kantian philosophy has received
+important corrections and large additions, for these
+could not be put into a supplementary book, such as
+<pb n='xxiii'/><anchor id='Pgxxiii'/>
+those which are given in the second volume, and which
+correspond to each of the four books that contain the
+exposition of my own doctrine. In the case of the latter,
+I have chosen this form of enlarging and improving them,
+because the five and twenty years that have passed since
+they were composed have produced so marked a change
+in my method of exposition and in my style, that it would
+not have done to combine the content of the second volume
+with that of the first, as both must have suffered by the
+fusion. I therefore give both works separately, and in
+the earlier exposition, even in many places where I would
+now express myself quite differently, I have changed
+nothing, because I desired to guard against spoiling the
+work of my earlier years through the carping criticism of
+age. What in this regard might need correction will
+correct itself in the mind of the reader with the help of
+the second volume. Both volumes have, in the full sense
+of the word, a supplementary relation to each other, so far
+as this rests on the fact that one age of human life is,
+intellectually, the supplement of another. It will therefore
+be found, not only that each volume contains what
+the other lacks, but that the merits of the one consist
+peculiarly in that which is wanting in the other. Thus,
+if the first half of my work surpasses the second in what
+can only be supplied by the fire of youth and the energy
+of first conceptions, the second will surpass the first by
+the ripeness and complete elaboration of the thought
+which can only belong to the fruit of the labour of a long
+life. For when I had the strength originally to grasp
+the fundamental thought of my system, to follow it at
+once into its four branches, to return from them to the
+unity of their origin, and then to explain the whole distinctly,
+I could not yet be in a position to work out all
+<pb n='xxiv'/><anchor id='Pgxxiv'/>
+the branches of the system with the fulness, thoroughness,
+and elaborateness which is only reached by the
+meditation of many years&mdash;meditation which is required
+to test and illustrate the system by innumerable facts, to
+support it by the most different kinds of proof, to throw
+light on it from all sides, and then to place the different
+points of view boldly in contrast, to separate thoroughly
+the multifarious materials, and present them in a well-arranged
+whole. Therefore, although it would, no doubt,
+have been more agreeable to the reader to have my whole
+work in one piece, instead of consisting, as it now does,
+of two halves, which must be combined in using them, he
+must reflect that this would have demanded that I should
+accomplish at one period of life what it is only possible
+to accomplish in two, for I would have had to possess
+the qualities at one period of life that nature has divided
+between two quite different ones. Hence the necessity
+of presenting my work in two halves supplementary to
+each other may be compared to the necessity in consequence
+of which a chromatic object-glass, which cannot
+be made out of one piece, is produced by joining together
+a convex lens of flint glass and a concave lens of crown
+glass, the combined effect of which is what was sought.
+Yet, on the other hand, the reader will find some compensation
+for the inconvenience of using two volumes at
+once, in the variety and the relief which is afforded by
+the handling of the same subject, by the same mind, in
+the same spirit, but in very different years. However, it
+is very advisable that those who are not yet acquainted
+with my philosophy should first of all read the first
+volume without using the supplementary books, and
+should make use of these only on a second perusal;
+otherwise it would be too difficult for them to grasp the
+<pb n='xxv'/><anchor id='Pgxxv'/>
+system in its connection. For it is only thus explained
+in the first volume, while the second is devoted to a more
+detailed investigation and a complete development of the
+individual doctrines. Even those who should not make
+up their minds to a second reading of the first volume had
+better not read the second volume till after the first, and
+then for itself, in the ordinary sequence of its chapters,
+which, at any rate, stand in some kind of connection,
+though a somewhat looser one, the gaps of which they
+will fully supply by the recollection of the first volume,
+if they have thoroughly comprehended it. Besides, they
+will find everywhere the reference to the corresponding
+passages of the first volume, the paragraphs of which I
+have numbered in the second edition for this purpose,
+though in the first edition they were only divided by
+lines.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I have already explained in the preface to the first
+edition, that my philosophy is founded on that of Kant,
+and therefore presupposes a thorough knowledge of it.
+I repeat this here. For Kant's teaching produces in the
+mind of every one who has comprehended it a fundamental
+change which is so great that it may be regarded
+as an intellectual new-birth. It alone is able really to
+remove the inborn realism which proceeds from the
+original character of the intellect, which neither Berkeley
+nor Malebranche succeed in doing, for they remain too
+much in the universal, while Kant goes into the particular,
+and indeed in a way that is quite unexampled
+both before and after him, and which has quite a peculiar,
+and, we might say, immediate effect upon the mind in
+consequence of which it undergoes a complete undeception,
+and forthwith looks at all things in another light.
+Only in this way can any one become susceptible to the
+<pb n='xxvi'/><anchor id='Pgxxvi'/>
+more positive expositions which I have to give. On the
+other hand, he who has not mastered the Kantian philosophy,
+whatever else he may have studied, is, as it were,
+in a state of innocence; that is to say, he remains in the
+grasp of that natural and childish realism in which we
+are all born, and which fits us for everything possible,
+with the single exception of philosophy. Such a man
+then stands to the man who knows the Kantian philosophy
+as a minor to a man of full age. That this truth
+should nowadays sound paradoxical, which would not
+have been the case in the first thirty years after the
+appearance of the Critique of Reason, is due to the fact
+that a generation has grown up that does not know Kant
+properly, because it has never heard more of him than a
+hasty, impatient lecture, or an account at second-hand;
+and this again is due to the fact that in consequence of
+bad guidance, this generation has wasted its time with
+the philosophemes of vulgar, uncalled men, or even
+of bombastic sophists, which are unwarrantably commended
+to it. Hence the confusion of fundamental
+conceptions, and in general the unspeakable crudeness
+and awkwardness that appears from under the covering
+of affectation and pretentiousness in the philosophical
+attempts of the generation thus brought up. But whoever
+thinks he can learn Kant's philosophy from the exposition
+of others makes a terrible mistake. Nay, rather
+I must earnestly warn against such accounts, especially
+the more recent ones; and indeed in the years just past
+I have met with expositions of the Kantian philosophy
+in the writings of the Hegelians which actually reach the
+incredible. How should the minds that in the freshness
+of youth have been strained and ruined by the nonsense
+of Hegelism, be still capable of following Kant's profound
+<pb n='xxvii'/><anchor id='Pgxxvii'/>
+investigations? They are early accustomed to take the
+hollowest jingle of words for philosophical thoughts, the
+most miserable sophisms for acuteness, and silly conceits
+for dialectic, and their minds are disorganised through
+the admission of mad combinations of words to which
+the mind torments and exhausts itself in vain to attach
+some thought. No Critique of Reason can avail them, no
+philosophy, they need a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>medicina mentis</foreign>, first as a sort of
+purgative, <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>un petit cours de senscommunologie</foreign>, and then one
+must further see whether, in their case, there can even
+be any talk of philosophy. The Kantian doctrine then
+will be sought for in vain anywhere else but in Kant's
+own works; but these are throughout instructive, even
+where he errs, even where he fails. In consequence of
+his originality, it holds good of him in the highest degree,
+as indeed of all true philosophers, that one can only
+come to know them from their own works, not from the
+accounts of others. For the thoughts of any extraordinary
+intellect cannot stand being filtered through the
+vulgar mind. Born behind the broad, high, finely-arched
+brow, from under which shine beaming eyes, they lose
+all power and life, and appear no longer like themselves,
+when removed to the narrow lodging and low roofing of
+the confined, contracted, thick-walled skull from which
+dull glances steal directed to personal ends. Indeed we
+may say that minds of this kind act like an uneven glass,
+in which everything is twisted and distorted, loses the
+regularity of its beauty, and becomes a caricature. Only
+from their authors themselves can we receive philosophical
+thoughts; therefore whoever feels himself drawn
+to philosophy must himself seek out its immortal teachers
+in the still sanctuary of their works. The principal
+chapters of any one of these true philosophers will afford
+<pb n='xxviii'/><anchor id='Pgxxviii'/>
+a thousand times more insight into their doctrines than
+the heavy and distorted accounts of them that everyday
+men produce, who are still for the most part deeply entangled
+in the fashionable philosophy of the time, or in
+the sentiments of their own minds. But it is astonishing
+how decidedly the public seizes by preference on
+these expositions at second-hand. It seems really as if
+elective affinities were at work here, by virtue of which
+the common nature is drawn to its like, and therefore will
+rather hear what a great man has said from one of its
+own kind. Perhaps this rests on the same principle as
+that of mutual instruction, according to which children
+learn best from children.
+</p>
+
+<milestone unit='tb' rend='rule: 50%'/>
+
+<p>
+One word more for the professors of philosophy. I
+have always been compelled to admire not merely the
+sagacity, the true and fine tact with which, immediately
+on its appearance, they recognised my philosophy as
+something altogether different from and indeed dangerous
+to their own attempts, or, in popular language, something
+that would not suit their turn; but also the sure and
+astute policy by virtue of which they at once discovered
+the proper procedure with regard to it, the complete harmony
+with which they applied it, and the persistency
+with which they have remained faithful to it. This procedure,
+which further commended itself by the great ease
+of carrying it out, consists, as is well known, in altogether
+ignoring and thus in secreting&mdash;according to Goethe's
+malicious phrase, which just means the appropriating of
+what is of weight and significance. The efficiency of
+this quiet means is increased by the Corybantic shouts
+with which those who are at one reciprocally greet the
+birth of their own spiritual children&mdash;shouts which compel
+<pb n='xxix'/><anchor id='Pgxxix'/>
+the public to look and note the air of importance
+with which they congratulate themselves on the event.
+Who can mistake the object of such proceedings? Is
+there then nothing to oppose to the maxim, <foreign rend='italic'>primum
+vivere, deinde philosophari</foreign>? These gentlemen desire to
+live, and indeed to live by philosophy. To philosophy
+they are assigned with their wives and children, and in
+spite of Petrarch's <foreign rend='italic'>povera e nuda vai filosofia</foreign>, they have
+staked everything upon it. Now my philosophy is by
+no means so constituted that any one can live by it. It
+lacks the first indispensable requisite of a well-paid professional
+philosophy, a speculative theology, which&mdash;in
+spite of the troublesome Kant with his Critique of Reason&mdash;should
+and must, it is supposed, be the chief theme
+of all philosophy, even if it thus takes on itself the task
+of talking straight on of that of which it can know absolutely
+nothing. Indeed my philosophy does not permit
+to the professors the fiction they have so cunningly
+devised, and which has become so indispensable to them,
+of a reason that knows, perceives, or apprehends immediately
+and absolutely. This is a doctrine which it is only
+necessary to impose upon the reader at starting, in order
+to pass in the most comfortable manner in the world, as
+it were in a chariot and four, into that region beyond
+the possibility of all experience, which Kant has wholly
+and for ever shut out from our knowledge, and in which
+are found immediately revealed and most beautifully
+arranged the fundamental dogmas of modern, Judaising,
+optimistic Christianity. Now what in the world has my
+subtle philosophy, deficient as it is in these essential
+requisites, with no intentional aim, and unable to afford
+a means of subsistence, whose pole star is truth alone
+<pb n='xxx'/><anchor id='Pgxxx'/>
+the naked, unrewarded, unbefriended, often persecuted
+truth, and which steers straight for it without looking to
+the right hand or the left,&mdash;what, I say, has this to do
+with that <foreign rend='italic'>alma mater</foreign>, the good, well-to-do university
+philosophy which, burdened with a hundred aims and a
+thousand motives, comes on its course cautiously tacking,
+while it keeps before its eyes at all times the fear of the
+Lord, the will of the ministry, the laws of the established
+church, the wishes of the publisher, the attendance of the
+students, the goodwill of colleagues, the course of current
+politics, the momentary tendency of the public, and Heaven
+knows what besides? Or what has my quiet, earnest search
+for truth in common with the noisy scholastic disputations
+of the chair and the benches, the inmost motives of
+which are always personal aims. The two kinds of
+philosophy are, indeed, radically different. Thus it is
+that with me there is no compromise and no fellowship,
+that no one reaps any benefit from my works but the
+man who seeks the truth alone, and therefore none of the
+philosophical parties of the day; for they all follow their
+own aims, while I have only insight into truth to offer,
+which suits none of these aims, because it is not modelled
+after any of them. If my philosophy is to become
+susceptible of professorial exposition, the times must
+entirely change. What a pretty thing it would be if a
+philosophy by which nobody could live were to gain for
+itself light and air, not to speak of the general ear!
+This must be guarded against, and all must oppose it as
+one man. But it is not just such an easy game to controvert
+and refute; and, moreover, these are mistaken
+means to employ, because they just direct the attention
+of the public to the matter, and its taste for the lucubrations
+<pb n='xxxi'/><anchor id='Pgxxxi'/>
+of the professors of philosophy might be destroyed
+by the perusal of my writings. For whoever has tasted
+of earnest will not relish jest, especially when it is tiresome.
+Therefore the silent system, so unanimously
+adopted, is the only right one, and I can only advise
+them to stick to it and go on with it as long as it will
+answer, that is, until to ignore is taken to imply ignorance;
+then there will just be time to turn back. Meanwhile
+it remains open to every one to pluck out a small
+feather here and there for his own use, for the superfluity
+of thoughts at home should not be very oppressive. Thus
+the ignoring and silent system may hold out a good
+while, at least the span of time I may have yet to live,
+whereby much is already won. And if, in the meantime,
+here and there an indiscreet voice has let itself be
+heard, it is soon drowned by the loud talking of the professors,
+who, with important airs, know how to entertain
+the public with very different things. I advise, however,
+that the unanimity of procedure should be somewhat
+more strictly observed, and especially that the
+young men should be looked after, for they are sometimes
+so fearfully indiscreet. For even so I cannot guarantee
+that the commended procedure will last for ever, and
+cannot answer for the final issue. It is a nice question
+as to the steering of the public, which, on the whole, is
+good and tractable. Although we nearly at all times see
+the Gorgiases and the Hippiases uppermost, although the
+absurd, as a rule, predominates, and it seems impossible
+that the voice of the individual can ever penetrate
+through the chorus of the befooling and the befooled,
+there yet remains to the genuine works of every age a
+quite peculiar, silent, slow, and powerful influence; and,
+<pb n='xxxii'/><anchor id='Pgxxxii'/>
+as if by a miracle, we see them rise at last out of the
+turmoil like a balloon that floats up out of the thick
+atmosphere of this globe into purer regions, where, having
+once arrived, it remains at rest, and no one can draw
+it down again.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<hi rend='italic'>Written at Frankfort-on-the-Maine
+in February 1844.</hi>
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<pb n='001'/><anchor id='Pg001'/>
+
+<div rend='page-break-before: always'>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>First Book. The World As Idea.</head>
+
+<div>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient
+Reason: The Object Of Experience And Science.</head>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l>Sors de l'enfance, ami réveille toi!</l>
+</lg>
+
+<lg>
+<l>&mdash;<hi rend='italic'>Jean Jacques Rousseau.</hi></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<pb n='003'/><anchor id='Pg003'/>
+
+<p>
+§ 1. <q>The world is my idea:</q>&mdash;this is a truth
+which holds good for everything that lives and knows,
+though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract
+consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to
+philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain
+to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth,
+but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an
+earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only
+as idea, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, only in relation to something else, the consciousness,
+which is himself. If any truth can be asserted
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, it is this: for it is the expression of the most
+general form of all possible and thinkable experience:
+a form which is more general than time, or space, or
+causality, for they all presuppose it; and each of these,
+which we have seen to be just so many modes of the
+principle of sufficient reason, is valid only for a particular
+class of ideas; whereas the antithesis of object and
+subject is the common form of all these classes, is that
+form under which alone any idea of whatever kind it
+may be, abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is possible
+and thinkable. No truth therefore is more certain, more
+independent of all others, and less in need of proof than
+this, that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore
+this whole world, is only object in relation to subject,
+perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea. This is
+obviously true of the past and the future, as well as of
+the present, of what is farthest off, as of what is near;
+for it is true of time and space themselves, in which
+alone these distinctions arise. All that in any way
+<pb n='004'/><anchor id='Pg004'/>
+belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus
+conditioned through the subject, and exists only for the
+subject. The world is idea.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This truth is by no means new. It was implicitly
+involved in the sceptical reflections from which Descartes
+started. Berkeley, however, was the first who distinctly
+enunciated it, and by this he has rendered a permanent
+service to philosophy, even though the rest of his teaching
+should not endure. Kant's primary mistake was the
+neglect of this principle, as is shown in the appendix.
+How early again this truth was recognised by the wise
+men of India, appearing indeed as the fundamental tenet
+of the Vedânta philosophy ascribed to Vyasa, is pointed
+out by Sir William Jones in the last of his essays: <q>On
+the philosophy of the Asiatics</q> (Asiatic Researches, vol.
+iv. p. 164), where he says, <q>The fundamental tenet of
+the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence
+of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability, and
+extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in
+correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending
+that it has no essence independent of mental perception;
+that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms.</q>
+These words adequately express the compatibility of
+empirical reality and transcendental ideality.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In this first book, then, we consider the world only
+from this side, only so far as it is idea. The inward
+reluctance with which any one accepts the world as
+merely his idea, warns him that this view of it, however
+true it may be, is nevertheless one-sided, adopted in
+consequence of some arbitrary abstraction. And yet it
+is a conception from which he can never free himself.
+The defectiveness of this view will be corrected in the
+next book by means of a truth which is not so immediately
+certain as that from which we start here; a
+truth at which we can arrive only by deeper research
+and more severe abstraction, by the separation of what
+is different and the union of what is identical. This
+<pb n='005'/><anchor id='Pg005'/>
+truth, which must be very serious and impressive if not
+awful to every one, is that a man can also say and must
+say, <q>the world is my will.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In this book, however, we must consider separately
+that aspect of the world from which we start, its aspect
+as knowable, and therefore, in the meantime, we must,
+without reserve, regard all presented objects, even our
+own bodies (as we shall presently show more fully),
+merely as ideas, and call them merely ideas. By so
+doing we always abstract from will (as we hope to make
+clear to every one further on), which by itself constitutes
+the other aspect of the world. For as the world is in
+one aspect entirely <emph>idea</emph>, so in another it is entirely <emph>will</emph>.
+A reality which is neither of these two, but an object in
+itself (into which the thing in itself has unfortunately
+dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the phantom of a
+dream, and its acceptance is an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ignis fatuus</foreign> in philosophy.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 2. That which knows all things and is known by
+none is the subject. Thus it is the supporter of the
+world, that condition of all phenomena, of all objects
+which is always pre-supposed throughout experience; for
+all that exists, exists only for the subject. Every one
+finds himself to be subject, yet only in so far as he
+knows, not in so far as he is an object of knowledge.
+But his body is object, and therefore from this point of
+view we call it idea. For the body is an object among
+objects, and is conditioned by the laws of objects, although
+it is an immediate object. Like all objects of perception,
+it lies within the universal forms of knowledge, time and
+space, which are the conditions of multiplicity. The
+subject, on the contrary, which is always the knower,
+never the known, does not come under these forms, but
+is presupposed by them; it has therefore neither multiplicity
+nor its opposite unity. We never know it, but it
+is always the knower wherever there is knowledge.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+So then the world as idea, the only aspect in which
+<pb n='006'/><anchor id='Pg006'/>
+we consider it at present, has two fundamental, necessary,
+and inseparable halves. The one half is the object, the
+forms of which are space and time, and through these
+multiplicity. The other half is the subject, which is not
+in space and time, for it is present, entire and undivided,
+in every percipient being. So that any one percipient
+being, with the object, constitutes the whole world as
+idea just as fully as the existing millions could do; but
+if this one were to disappear, then the whole world as
+idea would cease to be. These halves are therefore inseparable
+even for thought, for each of the two has
+meaning and existence only through and for the other,
+each appears with the other and vanishes with it. They
+limit each other immediately; where the object begins
+the subject ends. The universality of this limitation is
+shown by the fact that the essential and hence universal
+forms of all objects, space, time, and causality, may,
+without knowledge of the object, be discovered and fully
+known from a consideration of the subject, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in Kantian
+language, they lie <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> in our consciousness.
+That he discovered this is one of Kant's principal merits,
+and it is a great one. I however go beyond this, and
+maintain that the principle of sufficient reason is the
+general expression for all these forms of the object of
+which we are <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> conscious; and that therefore all
+that we know purely <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, is merely the content of
+that principle and what follows from it; in it all our
+certain <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> knowledge is expressed. In my essay on
+the principle of sufficient reason I have shown in detail
+how every possible object comes under it; that is, stands
+in a necessary relation to other objects, on the one side
+as determined, on the other side as determining: this is
+of such wide application, that the whole existence of all
+objects, so far as they are objects, ideas and nothing
+more, may be entirely traced to this their necessary
+relation to each other, rests only in it, is in fact merely
+relative; but of this more presently. I have further
+<pb n='007'/><anchor id='Pg007'/>
+shown, that the necessary relation which the principle
+of sufficient reason expresses generally, appears in other
+forms corresponding to the classes into which objects are
+divided, according to their possibility; and again that by
+these forms the proper division of the classes is tested.
+I take it for granted that what I said in this earlier
+essay is known and present to the reader, for if it had
+not been already said it would necessarily find its place
+here.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 3. The chief distinction among our ideas is that
+between ideas of perception and abstract ideas. The
+latter form just one class of ideas, namely concepts, and
+these are the possession of man alone of all creatures
+upon earth. The capacity for these, which distinguishes
+him from all the lower animals, has always been called
+reason.<note place='foot'>Kant is the only writer who
+has confused this idea of reason,
+and in this connection I refer the
+reader to the Appendix, and also to
+my <q>Grundprobleme der Ethik</q>:
+Grundl. dd. Moral. § 6, pp. 148-154,
+first and second editions.</note> We shall consider these abstract ideas by
+themselves later, but, in the first place, we shall speak
+exclusively of the <emph>ideas of perception</emph>. These comprehend
+the whole visible world, or the sum total of experience,
+with the conditions of its possibility. We have already
+observed that it is a highly important discovery of Kant's,
+that these very conditions, these forms of the visible world,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the absolutely universal element in its perception,
+the common property of all its phenomena, space and time,
+even when taken by themselves and apart from their content,
+can, not only be thought in the abstract, but also
+be directly perceived; and that this perception or intuition
+is not some kind of phantasm arising from constant recurrence
+in experience, but is so entirely independent of
+experience that we must rather regard the latter as dependent
+on it, inasmuch as the qualities of space and
+time, as they are known in <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> perception or intuition,
+are valid for all possible experience, as rules to
+which it must invariably conform. Accordingly, in my
+<pb n='008'/><anchor id='Pg008'/>
+essay on the principle of sufficient reason, I have treated
+space and time, because they are perceived as pure and
+empty of content, as a special and independent class of
+ideas. This quality of the universal forms of intuition,
+which was discovered by Kant, that they may be perceived
+in themselves and apart from experience, and that
+they may be known as exhibiting those laws on which is
+founded the infallible science of mathematics, is certainly
+very important. Not less worthy of remark, however, is
+this other quality of time and space, that the principle of
+sufficient reason, which conditions experience as the law
+of causation and of motive, and thought as the law of the
+basis of judgment, appears here in quite a special form,
+to which I have given the name of the ground of being.
+In time, this is the succession of its moments, and in
+space the position of its parts, which reciprocally determine
+each other <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Any one who has fully understood from the introductory
+essay the complete identity of the content of the
+principle of sufficient reason in all its different forms,
+must also be convinced of the importance of the knowledge
+of the simplest of these forms, as affording him
+insight into his own inmost nature. This simplest form
+of the principle we have found to be time. In it each
+instant is, only in so far as it has effaced the preceding
+one, its generator, to be itself in turn as quickly effaced.
+The past and the future (considered apart from the consequences
+of their content) are empty as a dream, and the
+present is only the indivisible and unenduring boundary
+between them. And in all the other forms of the principle
+of sufficient reason, we shall find the same emptiness,
+and shall see that not time only but also space, and
+the whole content of both of them, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, all that proceeds
+from causes and motives, has a merely relative existence,
+is only through and for another like to itself, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, not
+more enduring. The substance of this doctrine is old:
+it appears in Heraclitus when he laments the eternal
+<pb n='009'/><anchor id='Pg009'/>
+flux of things; in Plato when he degrades the object to
+that which is ever becoming, but never being; in Spinoza
+as the doctrine of the mere accidents of the one substance
+which is and endures. Kant opposes what is
+thus known as the mere phenomenon to the thing in itself.
+Lastly, the ancient wisdom of the Indian philosophers
+declares, <q>It is Mâyâ, the veil of deception, which
+blinds the eyes of mortals, and makes them behold a
+world of which they cannot say either that it is or that it
+is not: for it is like a dream; it is like the sunshine
+on the sand which the traveller takes from afar for
+water, or the stray piece of rope he mistakes for a snake.</q>
+(These similes are repeated in innumerable passages of
+the Vedas and the Puranas.) But what all these mean,
+and that of which they all speak, is nothing more than
+what we have just considered&mdash;the world as idea subject
+to the principle of sufficient reason.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 4. Whoever has recognised the form of the principle
+of sufficient reason, which appears in pure time as such,
+and on which all counting and arithmetical calculation
+rests, has completely mastered the nature of time. Time
+is nothing more than that form of the principle of sufficient
+reason, and has no further significance. Succession
+is the form of the principle of sufficient reason in time,
+and succession is the whole nature of time. Further,
+whoever has recognised the principle of sufficient reason
+as it appears in the presentation of pure space, has
+exhausted the whole nature of space, which is absolutely
+nothing more than that possibility of the reciprocal determination
+of its parts by each other, which is called position.
+The detailed treatment of this, and the formulation
+in abstract conceptions of the results which flow from
+it, so that they may be more conveniently used, is the
+subject of the science of geometry. Thus also, whoever
+has recognised the law of causation, the aspect of the
+principle of sufficient reason which appears in what fills
+these forms (space and time) as objects of perception,
+<pb n='010'/><anchor id='Pg010'/>
+that is to say matter, has completely mastered the nature
+of matter as such, for matter is nothing more than causation,
+as any one will see at once if he reflects. Its true
+being is its action, nor can we possibly conceive it as
+having any other meaning. Only as active does it fill
+space and time; its action upon the immediate object
+(which is itself matter) determines that perception in
+which alone it exists. The consequence of the action of
+any material object upon any other, is known only in so
+far as the latter acts upon the immediate object in a
+different way from that in which it acted before; it
+consists only of this. Cause and effect thus constitute
+the whole nature of matter; its true being is its action.
+(A fuller treatment of this will be found in the essay on
+the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 21, p. 77.) The
+nature of all material things is therefore very appropriately
+called in German <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Wirklichkeit</foreign>,<note place='foot'>Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum
+proprietas est, et consuetudo
+sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis
+notis signat. <hi rend='italic'>Seneca</hi>, epist. 81.</note> a word which is
+far more expressive than <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Realität</foreign>. Again, that which is
+acted upon is always matter, and thus the whole being
+and essence of matter consists in the orderly change,
+which one part of it brings about in another part. The
+existence of matter is therefore entirely relative, according
+to a relation which is valid only within its limits, as
+in the case of time and space.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But time and space, each for itself, can be mentally
+presented apart from matter, whereas matter cannot be
+so presented apart from time and space. The form
+which is inseparable from it presupposes space, and the
+action in which its very existence consists, always imports
+some change, in other words a determination in
+time. But space and time are not only, each for itself,
+presupposed by matter, but a union of the two constitutes
+its essence, for this, as we have seen, consists in action,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in causation. All the innumerable conceivable
+phenomena and conditions of things, might be coexistent
+<pb n='011'/><anchor id='Pg011'/>
+in boundless space, without limiting each other, or might
+be successive in endless time without interfering with
+each other: thus a necessary relation of these phenomena
+to each other, and a law which should regulate them
+according to such a relation, is by no means needful,
+would not, indeed, be applicable: it therefore follows
+that in the case of all co-existence in space and change
+in time, so long as each of these forms preserves for
+itself its condition and its course without any connection
+with the other, there can be no causation, and since
+causation constitutes the essential nature of matter, there
+can be no matter. But the law of causation receives its
+meaning and necessity only from this, that the essence
+of change does not consist simply in the mere variation
+of things, but rather in the fact that at the <emph>same part of
+space</emph> there is now <emph>one thing</emph> and then <emph>another</emph>, and at <emph>one</emph>
+and the same point of time there is <emph>here</emph> one thing and
+there <emph>another</emph>: only this reciprocal limitation of space
+and time by each other gives meaning, and at the same
+time necessity, to a law, according to which change must
+take place. What is determined by the law of causality
+is therefore not merely a succession of things in time,
+but this succession with reference to a definite space,
+and not merely existence of things in a particular place,
+but in this place at a different point of time. Change,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, variation which takes place according to the law of
+causality, implies always a determined part of space and
+a determined part of time together and in union. Thus
+causality unites space with time. But we found that
+the whole essence of matter consisted in action, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in
+causation, consequently space and time must also be
+united in matter, that is to say, matter must take to
+itself at once the distinguishing qualities both of space
+and time, however much these may be opposed to each
+other, and must unite in itself what is impossible for
+each of these independently, that is, the fleeting course
+of time, with the rigid unchangeable perduration of
+<pb n='012'/><anchor id='Pg012'/>
+space: infinite divisibility it receives from both. It is
+for this reason that we find that co-existence, which
+could neither be in time alone, for time has no contiguity,
+nor in space alone, for space has no before, after, or now,
+is first established through matter. But the co-existence
+of many things constitutes, in fact, the essence of reality,
+for through it permanence first becomes possible; for
+permanence is only knowable in the change of something
+which is present along with what is permanent,
+while on the other hand it is only because something
+permanent is present along with what changes, that the
+latter gains the special character of change, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the mutation
+of quality and form in the permanence of substance,
+that is to say, in matter.<note place='foot'>It is shown in the Appendix
+that matter and substance are one.</note> If the world were in space
+alone, it would be rigid and immovable, without succession,
+without change, without action; but we know that
+with action, the idea of matter first appears. Again, if
+the world were in time alone, all would be fleeting, without
+persistence, without contiguity, hence without co-existence,
+and consequently without permanence; so
+that in this case also there would be no matter. Only
+through the union of space and time do we reach matter,
+and matter is the possibility of co-existence, and, through
+that, of permanence; through permanence again matter
+is the possibility of the persistence of substance in the
+change of its states.<note place='foot'>This shows the ground of the
+Kantian explanation of matter, that
+it is <q>that which is movable in
+space,</q> for motion consists simply
+in the union of space and time.</note> As matter consists in the union
+of space and time, it bears throughout the stamp of both.
+It manifests its origin in space, partly through the form
+which is inseparable from it, but especially through its
+persistence (substance), the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> certainty of which
+is therefore wholly deducible from that of space<note place='foot'>Not, as Kant holds, from the
+knowledge of time, as will be explained
+in the Appendix.</note> (for
+variation belongs to time alone, but in it alone and for
+itself nothing is persistent). Matter shows that it springs
+<pb n='013'/><anchor id='Pg013'/>
+from time by quality (accidents), without which it never
+exists, and which is plainly always causality, action upon
+other matter, and therefore change (a time concept). The
+law of this action, however, always depends upon space
+and time together, and only thus obtains meaning. The
+regulative function of causality is confined entirely to
+the determination of what must occupy <hi rend='italic'>this time and this
+space</hi>. The fact that we know <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> the unalterable
+characteristics of matter, depends upon this derivation of
+its essential nature from the forms of our knowledge of
+which we are conscious <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>. These unalterable
+characteristics are space-occupation, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, impenetrability,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, causal action, consequently, extension, infinite divisibility,
+persistence, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, indestructibility, and lastly mobility:
+weight, on the other hand, notwithstanding its
+universality, must be attributed to <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> knowledge,
+although Kant, in his <q>Metaphysical Introduction to
+Natural Philosophy,</q> p. 71 (p. 372 of Rosenkranz's
+edition), treats it as knowable <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But as the object in general is only for the subject, as
+its idea, so every special class of ideas is only for an
+equally special quality in the subject, which is called a
+faculty of perception. This subjective correlative of
+time and space in themselves as empty forms, has been
+named by Kant pure sensibility; and we may retain this
+expression, as Kant was the first to treat of the subject,
+though it is not exact, for sensibility presupposes matter.
+The subjective correlative of matter or of causation, for
+these two are the same, is understanding, which is nothing
+more than this. To know causality is its one
+function, its only power; and it is a great one, embracing
+much, of manifold application, yet of unmistakable identity
+in all its manifestations. Conversely all causation,
+that is to say, all matter, or the whole of reality, is only
+for the understanding, through the understanding, and in
+the understanding. The first, simplest, and ever-present
+example of understanding is the perception of the actual
+<pb n='014'/><anchor id='Pg014'/>
+world. This is throughout knowledge of the cause from
+the effect, and therefore all perception is intellectual.
+The understanding could never arrive at this perception,
+however, if some effect did not become known immediately,
+and thus serve as a starting-point. But this is the
+affection of the animal body. So far, then, the animal
+body is the <emph>immediate object</emph> of the subject; the perception
+of all other objects becomes possible through it.
+The changes which every animal body experiences, are
+immediately known, that is, felt; and as these effects are
+at once referred to their causes, the perception of the
+latter as <emph>objects</emph> arises. This relation is no conclusion in
+abstract conceptions; it does not arise from reflection,
+nor is it arbitrary, but immediate, necessary, and certain.
+It is the method of knowing of the pure understanding,
+without which there could be no perception; there would
+only remain a dull plant-like consciousness of the
+changes of the immediate object, which would succeed
+each other in an utterly unmeaning way, except in so
+far as they might have a meaning for the will either as
+pain or pleasure. But as with the rising of the sun the
+visible world appears, so at one stroke, the understanding,
+by means of its one simple function, changes the
+dull, meaningless sensation into perception. What the
+eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception; it is
+merely its data. By the understanding passing from the
+effect to the cause, the world first appears as perception
+extended in space, varying in respect of form, persistent
+through all time in respect of matter; for the understanding
+unites space and time in the idea of matter, that is,
+causal action. As the world as idea exists only through
+the understanding, so also it exists only for the understanding.
+In the first chapter of my essay on <q>Light
+and Colour,</q> I have already explained how the understanding
+constructs perceptions out of the data supplied
+by the senses; how by comparison of the impressions
+which the various senses receive from the object, a child
+<pb n='015'/><anchor id='Pg015'/>
+arrives at perceptions; how this alone affords the solution
+of so many phenomena of the senses; the single
+vision of two eyes, the double vision in the case of a
+squint, or when we try to look at once at objects
+which lie at unequal distances behind each other; and
+all illusion which is produced by a sudden alteration in
+the organs of sense. But I have treated this important
+subject much more fully and thoroughly in the second
+edition of the essay on <q>The Principle of Sufficient
+Reason,</q> § 21. All that is said there would find its
+proper place here, and would therefore have to be said
+again; but as I have almost as much disinclination to
+quote myself as to quote others, and as I am unable to
+explain the subject better than it is explained there, I
+refer the reader to it, instead of quoting it, and take for
+granted that it is known.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The process by which children, and persons born
+blind who have been operated upon, learn to see, the
+single vision of the double sensation of two eyes, the
+double vision and double touch which occur when the
+organs of sense have been displaced from their usual
+position, the upright appearance of objects while the
+picture on the retina is upside down, the attributing of
+colour to the outward objects, whereas it is merely an
+inner function, a division through polarisation, of the
+activity of the eye, and lastly the stereoscope,&mdash;all
+these are sure and incontrovertible evidence that perception
+is not merely of the senses, but intellectual&mdash;that
+is, <emph>pure knowledge through the understanding of the
+cause from the effect</emph>, and that, consequently, it presupposes
+the law of causality, in a knowledge of which
+all perception&mdash;that is to say all experience, by virtue
+of its primary and only possibility, depends. The contrary
+doctrine that the law of causality results from
+experience, which was the scepticism of Hume, is first
+refuted by this. For the independence of the knowledge
+of causality of all experience,&mdash;that is, its <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>
+<pb n='016'/><anchor id='Pg016'/>
+character&mdash;can only be deduced from the dependence of
+all experience upon it; and this deduction can only be
+accomplished by proving, in the manner here indicated,
+and explained in the passages referred to above, that
+the knowledge of causality is included in perception in
+general, to which all experience belongs, and therefore
+in respect of experience is completely <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, does not
+presuppose it, but is presupposed by it as a condition.
+This, however, cannot be deduced in the manner attempted
+by Kant, which I have criticised in the essay
+on <q>The Principle of Sufficient Reason,</q> § 23.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 5. It is needful to guard against the grave error of
+supposing that because perception arises through the
+knowledge of causality, the relation of subject and object
+is that of cause and effect. For this relation subsists
+only between the immediate object and objects known
+indirectly, thus always between objects alone. It is this
+false supposition that has given rise to the foolish controversy
+about the reality of the outer world; a controversy
+in which dogmatism and scepticism oppose each
+other, and the former appears, now as realism, now as
+idealism. Realism treats the object as cause, and the
+subject as its effect. The idealism of Fichte reduces the
+object to the effect of the subject. Since however, and
+this cannot be too much emphasised, there is absolutely
+no relation according to the principle of sufficient reason
+between subject and object, neither of these views could
+be proved, and therefore scepticism attacked them both
+with success. Now, just as the law of causality precedes
+perception and experience as their condition, and
+therefore cannot (as Hume thought) be derived from
+them, so object and subject precede all knowledge, and
+hence the principle of sufficient reason in general, as its
+first condition; for this principle is merely the form of
+all objects, the whole nature and possibility of their
+existence as phenomena: but the object always presupposes
+the subject; and therefore between these two
+<pb n='017'/><anchor id='Pg017'/>
+there can be no relation of reason and consequent. My
+essay on the principle of sufficient reason accomplishes
+just this: it explains the content of that principle as the
+essential form of every object&mdash;that is to say, as the
+universal nature of all objective existence, as something
+which pertains to the object as such; but the object as
+such always presupposes the subject as its necessary
+correlative; and therefore the subject remains always
+outside the province in which the principle of sufficient
+reason is valid. The controversy as to the reality of the
+outer world rests upon this false extension of the validity
+of the principle of sufficient reason to the subject also,
+and starting with this mistake it can never understand
+itself. On the one side realistic dogmatism, looking
+upon the idea as the effect of the object, desires to
+separate these two, idea and object, which are really one,
+and to assume a cause quite different from the idea, an
+object in itself, independent of the subject, a thing which
+is quite inconceivable; for even as object it presupposes
+subject, and so remains its idea. Opposed to this doctrine
+is scepticism, which makes the same false presupposition
+that in the idea we have only the effect,
+never the cause, therefore never real being; that we
+always know merely the action of the object. But this
+object, it supposes, may perhaps have no resemblance
+whatever to its effect, may indeed have been quite
+erroneously received as the cause, for the law of causality
+is first to be gathered from experience, and the reality of
+experience is then made to rest upon it. Thus both of
+these views are open to the correction, firstly, that object
+and idea are the same; secondly, that the true being of
+the object of perception is its action, that the reality of
+the thing consists in this, and the demand for an existence
+of the object outside the idea of the subject, and
+also for an essence of the actual thing different from its
+action, has absolutely no meaning, and is a contradiction:
+and that the knowledge of the nature of the effect of any
+<pb n='018'/><anchor id='Pg018'/>
+perceived object, exhausts such an object itself, so far as
+it is object, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, idea, for beyond this there is nothing
+more to be known. So far then, the perceived world in
+space and time, which makes itself known as causation
+alone, is entirely real, and is throughout simply what it
+appears to be, and it appears wholly and without reserve
+as idea, bound together according to the law of causality.
+This is its empirical reality. On the other hand, all
+causality is in the understanding alone, and for the
+understanding. The whole actual, that is, active world
+is determined as such through the understanding, and
+apart from it is nothing. This, however, is not the only
+reason for altogether denying such a reality of the outer
+world as is taught by the dogmatist, who explains its
+reality as its independence of the subject. We also
+deny it, because no object apart from a subject can be
+conceived without contradiction. The whole world of
+objects is and remains idea, and therefore wholly and for
+ever determined by the subject; that is to say, it has
+transcendental ideality. But it is not therefore illusion
+or mere appearance; it presents itself as that which it is,
+idea, and indeed as a series of ideas of which the common
+bond is the principle of sufficient reason. It is according
+to its inmost meaning quite comprehensible to the
+healthy understanding, and speaks a language quite
+intelligible to it. To dispute about its reality can only
+occur to a mind perverted by over-subtilty, and such
+discussion always arises from a false application of the
+principle of sufficient reason, which binds all ideas
+together of whatever kind they may be, but by no means
+connects them with the subject, nor yet with a something
+which is neither subject nor object, but only the ground
+of the object; an absurdity, for only objects can be and
+always are the ground of objects. If we examine more
+closely the source of this question as to the reality of the
+outer world, we find that besides the false application
+of the principle of sufficient reason generally to what lies
+<pb n='019'/><anchor id='Pg019'/>
+beyond its province, a special confusion of its forms is
+also involved; for that form which it has only in reference
+to concepts or abstract ideas, is applied to perceived
+ideas, real objects; and a ground of knowing is demanded
+of objects, whereas they can have nothing but a
+ground of being. Among the abstract ideas, the concepts
+united in the judgment, the principle of sufficient reason
+appears in such a way that each of these has its worth,
+its validity, and its whole existence, here called <emph>truth</emph>,
+simply and solely through the relation of the judgment
+to something outside of it, its ground of knowledge, to
+which there must consequently always be a return.
+Among real objects, ideas of perception, on the other
+hand, the principle of sufficient reason appears not as the
+principle of the ground of <emph>knowing</emph>, but of <emph>being</emph>, as the
+law of causality: every real object has paid its debt to
+it, inasmuch as it has come to be, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, has appeared as
+the effect of a cause. The demand for a ground of knowing
+has therefore here no application and no meaning,
+but belongs to quite another class of things. Thus the
+world of perception raises in the observer no question or
+doubt so long as he remains in contact with it: there is
+here neither error nor truth, for these are confined to
+the province of the abstract&mdash;the province of reflection.
+But here the world lies open for sense and understanding;
+presents itself with naive truth as that which it really
+is&mdash;ideas of perception which develop themselves according
+to the law of causality.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+So far as we have considered the question of the
+reality of the outer world, it arises from a confusion
+which amounts even to a misunderstanding of reason
+itself, and therefore thus far, the question could be
+answered only by explaining its meaning. After examination
+of the whole nature of the principle of sufficient
+reason, of the relation of subject and object, and the
+special conditions of sense perception, the question itself
+disappeared because it had no longer any meaning. There
+<pb n='020'/><anchor id='Pg020'/>
+is, however, one other possible origin of this question,
+quite different from the purely speculative one which we
+have considered, a specially empirical origin, though the
+question is always raised from a speculative point of view,
+and in this form it has a much more comprehensible meaning
+than it had in the first. We have dreams; may not
+our whole life be a dream? or more exactly: is there a
+sure criterion of the distinction between dreams and reality?
+between phantasms and real objects? The assertion that
+what is dreamt is less vivid and distinct than what we actually
+perceive is not to the point, because no one has ever
+been able to make a fair comparison of the two; for we
+can only compare the recollection of a dream with the
+present reality. Kant answers the question thus: <q>The
+connection of ideas among themselves, according to the
+law of causality, constitutes the difference between real
+life and dreams.</q> But in dreams, as well as in real life,
+everything is connected individually at any rate, in
+accordance with the principle of sufficient reason in all
+its forms, and this connection is broken only between
+life and dreams, or between one dream and another.
+Kant's answer therefore could only run thus:&mdash;the <emph>long</emph>
+dream (life) has throughout complete connection according
+to the principle of sufficient reason; it has not this
+connection, however, with <emph>short</emph> dreams, although each of
+these has in itself the same connection: the bridge is
+therefore broken between the former and the latter, and
+on this account we distinguish them.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But to institute an inquiry according to this criterion,
+as to whether something was dreamt or seen, would
+always be difficult and often impossible. For we are by
+no means in a position to trace link by link the causal
+connection between any experienced event and the present
+moment, but we do not on that account explain it as
+dreamt. Therefore in real life we do not commonly
+employ that method of distinguishing between dreams
+and reality. The only sure criterion by which to distinguish
+<pb n='021'/><anchor id='Pg021'/>
+them is in fact the entirely empirical one of
+awaking, through which at any rate the causal connection
+between dreamed events and those of waking life, is
+distinctly and sensibly broken off. This is strongly
+supported by the remark of Hobbes in the second chapter
+of Leviathan, that we easily mistake dreams for reality
+if we have unintentionally fallen asleep without taking
+off our clothes, and much more so when it also happens
+that some undertaking or design fills all our thoughts,
+and occupies our dreams as well as our waking moments.
+We then observe the awaking just as little as the falling
+asleep, dream and reality run together and become confounded.
+In such a case there is nothing for it but the
+application of Kant's criterion; but if, as often happens,
+we fail to establish by means of this criterion, either the
+existence of causal connection with the present, or the
+absence of such connection, then it must for ever remain
+uncertain whether an event was dreamt or really happened.
+Here, in fact, the intimate relationship between
+life and dreams is brought out very clearly, and we need
+not be ashamed to confess it, as it has been recognised
+and spoken of by many great men. The Vedas and
+Puranas have no better simile than a dream for the
+whole knowledge of the actual world, which they call
+the web of Mâyâ, and they use none more frequently.
+Plato often says that men live only in a dream; the
+philosopher alone strives to awake himself. Pindar
+says (ii. η. 135): σκιας οναρ ανθρωπος (umbræ somnium
+homo), and Sophocles:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l>Ὀνω γυν ἡμας ουδεν οντας αλλο, πλην</l>
+<l>Σιδωλ᾽ ὁσοιπερ ζωμεν, ὴ κουφην σκιαν.&mdash;Ajax, 125.</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+(Nos enim, quicunque vivimus, nihil aliud esse comperio
+quam simulacra et levem umbram.) Beside which most
+worthily stands Shakespeare:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l rend='margin-left: 6'><q rend='pre'>We are such stuff</q></l>
+<l>As dreams are made on, and our little life</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Is rounded with a sleep.</q>&mdash;<hi rend='italic'>Tempest</hi>, Act iv. Sc. 1.</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<pb n='022'/><anchor id='Pg022'/>
+
+<p>
+Lastly, Calderon was so deeply impressed with this view
+of life that he sought to embody it in a kind of metaphysical
+drama&mdash;<q>Life a Dream.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+After these numerous quotations from the poets, perhaps
+I also may be allowed to express myself by a
+metaphor. Life and dreams are leaves of the same book.
+The systematic reading of this book is real life, but when
+the reading hours (that is, the day) are over, we often
+continue idly to turn over the leaves, and read a page
+here and there without method or connection: often one
+we have read before, sometimes one that is new to us,
+but always in the same book. Such an isolated page is
+indeed out of connection with the systematic study of
+the book, but it does not seem so very different when
+we remember that the whole continuous perusal begins
+and ends just as abruptly, and may therefore be regarded
+as merely a larger single page.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus although individual dreams are distinguished from
+real life by the fact that they do not fit into that continuity
+which runs through the whole of experience, and
+the act of awaking brings this into consciousness, yet that
+very continuity of experience belongs to real life as its
+form, and the dream on its part can point to a similar
+continuity in itself. If, therefore, we consider the question
+from a point of view external to both, there is no
+distinct difference in their nature, and we are forced to
+concede to the poets that life is a long dream.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Let us turn back now from this quite independent
+empirical origin of the question of the reality of the outer
+world, to its speculative origin. We found that this consisted,
+first, in the false application of the principle of
+sufficient reason to the relation of subject and object;
+and secondly, in the confusion of its forms, inasmuch
+as the principle of sufficient reason of knowing was
+extended to a province in which the principle of sufficient
+reason of being is valid. But the question could
+hardly have occupied philosophers so constantly if it
+<pb n='023'/><anchor id='Pg023'/>
+were entirely devoid of all real content, and if some true
+thought and meaning did not lie at its heart as its real
+source. Accordingly, we must assume that when the
+element of truth that lies at the bottom of the question
+first came into reflection and sought its expression, it became
+involved in these confused and meaningless forms
+and problems. This at least is my opinion, and I think
+that the true expression of that inmost meaning of the
+question, which it failed to find, is this:&mdash;What is this
+world of perception besides being my idea? Is that of
+which I am conscious only as idea, exactly like my own
+body, of which I am doubly conscious, in one aspect as
+<emph>idea</emph>, in another aspect as <emph>will</emph>? The fuller explanation
+of this question and its answer in the affirmative, will
+form the content of the second book, and its consequences
+will occupy the remaining portion of this work.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 6. For the present, however, in this first book we
+consider everything merely as idea, as object for the subject.
+And our own body, which is the starting-point for
+each of us in our perception of the world, we consider,
+like all other real objects, from the side of its knowableness,
+and in this regard it is simply an idea. Now the
+consciousness of every one is in general opposed to the
+explanation of objects as mere ideas, and more especially
+to the explanation of our bodies as such; for the thing in
+itself is known to each of us immediately in so far as it
+appears as our own body; but in so far as it objectifies
+itself in the other objects of perception, it is known only
+indirectly. But this abstraction, this one-sided treatment,
+this forcible separation of what is essentially and
+necessarily united, is only adopted to meet the demands
+of our argument; and therefore the disinclination to it
+must, in the meantime, be suppressed and silenced by the
+expectation that the subsequent treatment will correct
+the one-sidedness of the present one, and complete our
+knowledge of the nature of the world.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+At present therefore the body is for us immediate
+<pb n='024'/><anchor id='Pg024'/>
+object; that is to say, that idea which forms the
+starting-point of the subject's knowledge; because the
+body, with its immediately known changes, precedes the
+application of the law of causality, and thus supplies it
+with its first data. The whole nature of matter consists,
+as we have seen, in its causal action. But cause and
+effect exist only for the understanding, which is nothing but
+their subjective correlative. The understanding, however,
+could never come into operation if there were not something
+else from which it starts. This is simple sensation&mdash;the
+immediate consciousness of the changes of the
+body, by virtue of which it is immediate object. Thus
+the possibility of knowing the world of perception depends
+upon two conditions; the first, <emph>objectively expressed</emph>,
+is the power of material things to act upon each other, to
+produce changes in each other, without which common
+quality of all bodies no perception would be possible,
+even by means of the sensibility of the animal body.
+And if we wish to express this condition <emph>subjectively</emph> we
+say: The understanding first makes perception possible;
+for the law of causality, the possibility of effect and
+cause, springs only from the understanding, and is valid
+only for it, and therefore the world of perception exists
+only through and for it. The second condition is the
+sensibility of animal bodies, or the quality of being immediate
+objects of the subject which certain bodies possess.
+The mere modification which the organs of sense
+sustain from without through their specific affections,
+may here be called ideas, so far as these affections produce
+neither pain nor pleasure, that is, have no immediate
+significance for the will, and are yet perceived, exist
+therefore only for <emph>knowledge</emph>. Thus far, then, I say that
+the body is immediately <emph>known</emph>, is <emph>immediate object</emph>. But
+the conception of object is not to be taken here in its
+fullest sense, for through this immediate knowledge of
+the body, which precedes the operation of the understanding,
+and is mere sensation, our own body does not exist
+<pb n='025'/><anchor id='Pg025'/>
+specifically as <emph>object</emph>, but first the material things which
+affect it: for all knowledge of an object proper, of an idea
+perceived in space, exists only through and for the understanding;
+therefore not before, but only subsequently to
+its operation. Therefore the body as object proper, that
+is, as an idea perceived in space, is first known indirectly,
+like all other objects, through the application of the
+law of causality to the action of one of its parts upon
+another, as, for example, when the eye sees the body or
+the hand touches it. Consequently the form of our
+body does not become known to us through mere feeling,
+but only through knowledge, only in idea; that is to
+say, only in the brain does our own body first come to
+appear as extended, articulate, organic. A man born
+blind receives this idea only little by little from the data
+afforded by touch. A blind man without hands could
+never come to know his own form; or at the most could
+infer and construct it little by little from the effects of
+other bodies upon him. If, then, we call the body an
+immediate object, we are to be understood with these
+reservations.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In other respects, then, according to what has been
+said, all animal bodies are immediate objects; that is,
+starting-points for the subject which always knows
+and therefore is never known in its perception of the
+world. Thus the distinctive characteristic of animal
+life is knowledge, with movement following on motives,
+which are determined by knowledge, just as movement
+following on stimuli is the distinctive characteristic of
+plant-life. Unorganised matter, however, has no movement
+except such as is produced by causes properly so
+called, using the term in its narrowest sense. All this I
+have thoroughly discussed in my essay on the principle
+of sufficient reason, § 20, in the <q>Ethics,</q> first essay, iii.,
+and in my work on Sight and Colour, § 1, to which I
+therefore refer.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It follows from what has been said, that all animals,
+<pb n='026'/><anchor id='Pg026'/>
+even the least developed, have understanding; for they
+all know objects, and this knowledge determines their
+movements as motive. Understanding is the same in all
+animals and in all men; it has everywhere the same
+simple form; knowledge of causality, transition from
+effect to cause, and from cause to effect, nothing more;
+but the degree of its acuteness, and the extension of the
+sphere of its knowledge varies enormously, with innumerable
+gradations from the lowest form, which is
+only conscious of the causal connection between the immediate
+object and objects affecting it&mdash;that is to say,
+perceives a cause as an object in space by passing to
+it from the affection which the body feels, to the higher
+grades of knowledge of the causal connection among
+objects known indirectly, which extends to the understanding
+of the most complicated system of cause and
+effect in nature. For even this high degree of knowledge
+is still the work of the understanding, not of the reason.
+The abstract concepts of the reason can only serve to
+take up the objective connections which are immediately
+known by the understanding, to make them permanent
+for thought, and to relate them to each other; but
+reason never gives us immediate knowledge. Every
+force and law of nature, every example of such forces
+and laws, must first be immediately known by the understanding,
+must be apprehended through perception before
+it can pass into abstract consciousness for reason. Hooke's
+discovery of the law of gravitation, and the reference of
+so many important phenomena to this one law, was the
+work of immediate apprehension by the understanding;
+and such also was the proof of Newton's calculations, and
+Lavoisier's discovery of acids and their important function
+in nature, and also Goethe's discovery of the origin of
+physical colours. All these discoveries are nothing more
+than a correct immediate passage from the effect to the
+cause, which is at once followed by the recognition of the
+ideality of the force of nature which expresses itself in all
+<pb n='027'/><anchor id='Pg027'/>
+causes of the same kind; and this complete insight is
+just an example of that single function of the understanding,
+by which an animal perceives as an object in space
+the cause which affects its body, and differs from such a
+perception only in degree. Every one of these great
+discoveries is therefore, just like perception, an operation
+of the understanding, an immediate intuition, and as such
+the work of an instant, an <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>apperçu</foreign>, a flash of insight.
+They are not the result of a process of abstract reasoning,
+which only serves to make the immediate knowledge of
+the understanding permanent for thought by bringing it
+under abstract concepts, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, it makes knowledge distinct,
+it puts us in a position to impart it and explain it to
+others. The keenness of the understanding in apprehending
+the causal relations of objects which are known
+indirectly, does not find its only application in the sphere
+of natural science (though all the discoveries in that
+sphere are due to it), but it also appears in practical life.
+It is then called good sense or prudence, as in its other
+application it is better called acuteness, penetration,
+sagacity. More exactly, good sense or prudence signifies
+exclusively understanding at the command of the will.
+But the limits of these conceptions must not be too
+sharply defined, for it is always that one function of the
+understanding by means of which all animals perceive
+objects in space, which, in its keenest form, appears now
+in the phenomena of nature, correctly inferring the unknown
+causes from the given effects, and providing the
+material from which the reason frames general rules as
+laws of nature; now inventing complicated and ingenious
+machines by adapting known causes to desired effects;
+now in the sphere of motives, seeing through and frustrating
+intrigues and machinations, or fitly disposing the
+motives and the men who are susceptible to them, setting
+them in motion, as machines are moved by levers and
+wheels, and directing them at will to the accomplishment
+of its ends. Deficiency of understanding is called
+<pb n='028'/><anchor id='Pg028'/>
+<emph>stupidity</emph>. It is just <emph>dulness in applying the law of
+causality</emph>, incapacity for the immediate apprehension of
+the concatenations of causes and effects, motives and
+actions. A stupid person has no insight into the connection
+of natural phenomena, either when they follow
+their own course, or when they are intentionally combined,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, are applied to machinery. Such a man readily
+believes in magic and miracles. A stupid man does not
+observe that persons, who apparently act independently
+of each other, are really in collusion; he is therefore
+easily mystified, and outwitted; he does not discern the
+hidden motives of proffered advice or expressions of
+opinion, &amp;c. But it is always just one thing that he
+lacks&mdash;keenness, rapidity, ease in applying the law of
+causality, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, power of understanding. The greatest,
+and, in this reference, the most instructive example of
+stupidity I ever met with, was the case of a totally
+imbecile boy of about eleven years of age, in an asylum.
+He had reason, because he spoke and comprehended, but
+in respect of understanding he was inferior to many of
+the lower animals. Whenever I visited him he noticed
+an eye-glass which I wore round my neck, and in which
+the window of the room and the tops of the trees beyond
+were reflected: on every occasion he was greatly surprised
+and delighted with this, and was never tired of looking
+at it with astonishment, because he did not understand
+the immediate causation of reflection.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+While the difference in degree of the acuteness of the
+understanding, is very great between man and man, it is
+even greater between one species of animal and another.
+In all species of animals, even those which are nearest
+to plants, there is at least as much understanding as
+suffices for the inference from the effect on the immediate
+object, to the indirectly known object as its cause, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+sufficient for perception, for the apprehension of an object.
+For it is this that constitutes them animals, as it gives
+them the power of movement following on motives, and
+<pb n='029'/><anchor id='Pg029'/>
+thereby the power of seeking for food, or at least of seizing
+it; whereas plants have only movement following on
+stimuli, whose direct influence they must await, or else
+decay, for they cannot seek after them nor appropriate
+them. We marvel at the great sagacity of the most
+developed species of animals, such as the dog, the
+elephant, the monkey or the fox, whose cleverness has
+been so admirably sketched by Buffon. From these
+most sagacious animals, we can pretty accurately determine
+how far understanding can go without reason, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+abstract knowledge embodied in concepts. We could not
+find this out from ourselves, for in us understanding and
+reason always reciprocally support each other. We find
+that the manifestation of understanding in animals is
+sometimes above our expectation, and sometimes below
+it. On the one hand, we are surprised at the sagacity of
+the elephant, who, after crossing many bridges during his
+journey in Europe, once refused to go upon one, because
+he thought it was not strong enough to bear his weight,
+though he saw the rest of the party, consisting of men
+and horses, go upon it as usual. On the other hand, we
+wonder that the intelligent Orang-outangs, who warm
+themselves at a fire they have found, do not keep it
+alight by throwing wood on it; a proof that this requires
+a deliberation which is not possible without abstract concepts.
+It is clear that the knowledge of cause and effect,
+as the universal form of understanding, belongs to all
+animals <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, because to them as to us it is the prior
+condition of all perception of the outer world. If any
+one desires additional proof of this, let him observe, for
+example, how a young dog is afraid to jump down from
+a table, however much he may wish to do so, because he
+foresees the effect of the weight of his body, though he
+has not been taught this by experience. In judging of
+the understanding of animals, we must guard against
+ascribing to it the manifestations of instinct, a faculty
+which is quite distinct both from understanding and
+<pb n='030'/><anchor id='Pg030'/>
+reason, but the action of which is often very analogous
+to the combined action of the two. We cannot, however,
+discuss this here; it will find its proper place in
+the second book, when we consider the harmony or so-called
+teleology of nature: and the 27th chapter of the
+supplementary volume is expressly devoted to it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Deficiency of <emph>understanding</emph> we call <emph>stupidity</emph>: deficiency
+in the application of <emph>reason</emph> to practice we shall recognise
+later as <emph>foolishness</emph>: deficiency of judgment as <emph>silliness</emph>,
+and lastly, partial or entire deficiency of <emph>memory</emph>
+as <emph>madness</emph>. But each of these will be considered in
+its own place. That which is correctly known by <emph>reason</emph>
+is <emph>truth</emph>, that is, an abstract judgment on sufficient
+grounds (Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason,
+§ 29 and following paragraphs); that which is correctly
+known by <emph>understanding</emph> is <emph>reality</emph>, that is correct inference
+from effect on the immediate object to its cause.
+<emph>Error</emph> is opposed to <emph>truth</emph>, as deception of the <emph>reason</emph>:
+<emph>illusion</emph> is opposed to <emph>reality</emph>, as deception of the <emph>understanding</emph>.
+The full discussion of all this will be found
+in the first chapter of my essay on Light and Colour.
+Illusion takes place when the same effect may be attributed
+to two causes, of which one occurs very frequently,
+the other very seldom; the understanding having no
+data to decide which of these two causes operates in any
+particular case,&mdash;for their effects are exactly alike,&mdash;always
+assumes the presence of the commoner cause, and as the
+activity of the understanding is not reflective and discursive,
+but direct and immediate, this false cause appears
+before us as a perceived object, whereas it is merely
+illusion. I have explained in the essay referred to, how
+in this way double sight and double feeling take place if
+the organs of sense are brought into an unusual position;
+and have thus given an incontrovertible proof that perception
+exists only through and for the understanding.
+As additional examples of such illusions or deceptions of
+the understanding, we may mention the broken appearance
+<pb n='031'/><anchor id='Pg031'/>
+of a stick dipped in water; the reflections in spherical
+mirrors, which, when the surface is convex appear somewhat
+behind it, and when the surface is concave appear
+a long way in front of it. To this class also belongs the
+apparently greater extension of the moon at the horizon
+than at the zenith. This appearance is not optical, for
+as the micrometre proves, the eye receives the image of
+the moon at the zenith, at an even greater angle of vision
+than at the horizon. The mistake is due to the understanding,
+which assumes that the cause of the feebler light
+of the moon and of all stars at the horizon is that they
+are further off, thus treating them as earthly objects,
+according to the laws of atmospheric perspective, and
+therefore it takes the moon to be much larger at the
+horizon than at the zenith, and also regards the vault of
+heaven as more extended or flattened out at the horizon.
+The same false application of the laws of atmospheric
+perspective leads us to suppose that very high mountains,
+whose summits alone are visible in pure transparent air,
+are much nearer than they really are, and therefore not
+so high as they are; for example, Mont Blanc seen from
+Salenche. All such illusions are immediately present to
+us as perceptions, and cannot be dispelled by any arguments
+of the reason. Reason can only prevent error,
+that is, a judgment on insufficient grounds, by opposing
+to it a truth; as for example, the abstract knowledge
+that the cause of the weaker light of the moon and the
+stars at the horizon is not greater distance, but the denser
+atmosphere; but in all the cases we have referred to, the
+illusion remains in spite of every abstract explanation.
+For the understanding is in itself, even in the case of
+man, irrational, and is completely and sharply distinguished
+from the reason, which is a faculty of knowledge
+that belongs to man alone. The reason can only
+<emph>know</emph>; perception remains free from its influence and
+belongs to the understanding alone.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 7. With reference to our exposition up to this point,
+<pb n='032'/><anchor id='Pg032'/>
+it must be observed that we did not start either from
+the object or the subject, but from the idea, which contains
+and presupposes them both; for the antithesis of
+object and subject is its primary, universal and essential
+form. We have therefore first considered this form as
+such; then (though in this respect reference has for the
+most part been made to the introductory essay) the subordinate
+forms of time, space and causality. The latter
+belong exclusively to the <emph>object</emph>, and yet, as they are
+essential to the object <emph>as such</emph>, and as the object again
+is essential to the subject <emph>as such</emph>, they may be discovered
+from the subject, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, they may be known <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>,
+and so far they are to be regarded as the common limits
+of both. But all these forms may be referred to one
+general expression, the principle of sufficient reason, as
+we have explained in the introductory essay.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This procedure distinguishes our philosophical method
+from that of all former systems. For they all start either
+from the object or from the subject, and therefore seek to
+explain the one from the other, and this according to
+the principle of sufficient reason. We, on the contrary,
+deny the validity of this principle with reference to the
+relation of subject and object, and confine it to the object.
+It may be thought that the philosophy of identity, which
+has appeared and become generally known in our own
+day, does not come under either of the alternatives we
+have named, for it does not start either from the subject
+or from the object, but from the absolute, known through
+<q>intellectual intuition,</q> which is neither object nor subject,
+but the identity of the two. I will not venture to speak
+of this revered identity, and this absolute, for I find myself
+entirely devoid of all <q>intellectual intuition.</q> But
+as I take my stand merely on those manifestoes of the
+<q>intellectual intuiter</q> which are open to all, even to profane
+persons like myself, I must yet observe that this
+philosophy is not to be excepted from the alternative
+errors mentioned above. For it does not escape these
+<pb n='033'/><anchor id='Pg033'/>
+two opposite errors in spite of its identity of subject and
+object, which is not thinkable, but only <q>intellectually
+intuitable,</q> or to be experienced by a losing of oneself in
+it. On the contrary, it combines them both in itself;
+for it is divided into two parts, firstly, transcendental
+idealism, which is just Fichte's doctrine of the <emph>ego</emph>, and
+therefore teaches that the object is produced by the subject,
+or evolved out of it in accordance with the principle
+of sufficient reason; secondly, the philosophy of nature,
+which teaches that the subject is produced little by little
+from the object, by means of a method called construction,
+about which I understand very little, yet enough to
+know that it is a process according to various forms of
+the principle of sufficient reason. The deep wisdom itself
+which that construction contains, I renounce; for as I
+entirely lack <q>intellectual intuition,</q> all those expositions
+which presuppose it must for me remain as a book sealed
+with seven seals. This is so truly the case that, strange
+to say, I have always been unable to find anything at all
+in this doctrine of profound wisdom but atrocious and
+wearisome bombast.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The systems starting from the object had always the
+whole world of perception and its constitution as
+their problem; yet the object which they take as their
+starting-point is not always this whole world of perception,
+nor its fundamental element, matter. On the
+contrary, a division of these systems may be made, based
+on the four classes of possible objects set forth in the
+introductory essay. Thus Thales and the Ionic school,
+Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno, and the French
+materialists, may be said to have started from the first
+class of objects, the real world: Spinoza (on account of
+his conception of substance, which is purely abstract, and
+exists only in his definition) and, earlier, the Eleatics, from
+the second class, the abstract conception: the Pythagoreans
+and Chinese philosophy in Y-King, from the
+third class, time, and consequently number: and, lastly,
+<pb n='034'/><anchor id='Pg034'/>
+the schoolmen, who teach a creation out of nothing by
+the act of will of an extra-mundane personal being,
+started from the fourth class of objects, the act of will
+directed by knowledge.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Of all systems of philosophy which start from the
+object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried
+furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and
+with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores
+the relation to the subject in which alone all this really
+exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a
+guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent
+order (or arrangement) of things, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>veritas aeterna</foreign>, and so
+fails to take account of the understanding, in which and
+for which alone causality is. It seeks the primary and
+most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all
+the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to
+chemism, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal
+kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done,
+the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility&mdash;that
+is knowledge&mdash;which would consequently now
+appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced
+by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus
+far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point
+we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable
+laughter of the Olympians. As if waking
+from a dream, we would all at once become aware that
+its final result&mdash;knowledge, which it reached so laboriously,
+was presupposed as the indispensable condition of
+its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we
+imagined that we thought matter, we really thought only
+the subject that perceives matter; the eye that sees it,
+the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it.
+Thus the tremendous <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>petitio principii</foreign> reveals itself unexpectedly;
+for suddenly the last link is seen to be the
+starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is
+like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water
+on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs,
+<pb n='035'/><anchor id='Pg035'/>
+and himself also by his cue. The fundamental absurdity
+of materialism is that it starts from the <emph>objective</emph>, and
+takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something
+<emph>objective</emph>, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as
+it is <emph>thought</emph>, or after it has taken form, is empirically
+given&mdash;that is to say, is <emph>substance</emph>, the chemical element
+with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes,
+as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may
+evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject
+from it, and explain them adequately by means of it;
+whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined
+as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject
+through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and
+consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject
+away. Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what
+is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly.
+All that is objective, extended, active&mdash;that is to say, all
+that is material&mdash;is regarded by materialism as affording
+so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of
+everything to this can leave nothing to be desired
+(especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should
+resolve itself into action and reaction). But we have
+shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest
+degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively
+present object, for it has passed through the machinery
+and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under
+the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which
+it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever
+active in time. From such an indirectly given object,
+materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given,
+the idea (in which alone the object that materialism
+starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all
+those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under
+the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law,
+are in truth to be explained. To the assertion that
+thought is a modification of matter we may always,
+with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that all
+<pb n='036'/><anchor id='Pg036'/>
+matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject,
+as its idea. Yet the aim and ideal of all natural science
+is at bottom a consistent materialism. The recognition
+here of the obvious impossibility of such a system
+establishes another truth which will appear in the course
+of our exposition, the truth that all science properly so
+called, by which I understand systematic knowledge
+under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason,
+can never reach its final goal, nor give a complete and
+adequate explanation: for it is not concerned with the
+inmost nature of the world, it cannot get beyond the idea;
+indeed, it really teaches nothing more than the relation
+of one idea to another.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Every science must start from two principal data.
+One of these is always the principle of sufficient reason
+in some form or another, as organon; the other is its
+special object as problem. Thus, for example, geometry
+has space as problem, and the ground of existence in
+space as organon. Arithmetic has time as problem, and
+the ground of existence in time as organon. Logic has
+the combination of concepts as such as problem, and the
+ground of knowledge as organon. History has the past
+acts of men treated as a whole as problem, and the law
+of human motives as organon. Natural science has
+matter as problem, and the law of causality as organon.
+Its end and aim is therefore, by the guidance of causality,
+to refer all possible states of matter to other states, and
+ultimately to one single state; and again to deduce these
+states from each other, and ultimately from one single
+state. Thus two states of matter stand over against each
+other in natural science as extremes: that state in which
+matter is furthest from being the immediate object of the
+subject, and that state in which it is most completely
+such an immediate object, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the most dead and crude
+matter, the primary element, as the one extreme, and the
+human organism as the other. Natural science as
+chemistry seeks for the first, as physiology for the second.
+<pb n='037'/><anchor id='Pg037'/>
+But as yet neither extreme has been reached, and it is
+only in the intermediate ground that something has been
+won. The prospect is indeed somewhat hopeless. The
+chemists, under the presupposition that the qualitative
+division of matter is not, like quantitative division, an
+endless process, are always trying to decrease the number
+of the elements, of which there are still about
+sixty; and if they were to succeed in reducing them to
+two, they would still try to find the common root of
+these. For, on the one hand, the law of homogeneity
+leads to the assumption of a primary chemical state of
+matter, which alone belongs to matter as such, and precedes
+all others which are not essentially matter as such,
+but merely contingent forms and qualities. On the other
+hand, we cannot understand how this one state could
+ever experience a chemical change, if there did not exist
+a second state to affect it. Thus the same difficulty
+appears in chemistry which Epicurus met with in
+mechanics. For he had to show how the first atom departed
+from the original direction of its motion. Indeed
+this contradiction, which develops entirely of itself and
+can neither be escaped nor solved, might quite properly
+be set up as a chemical <emph>antinomy</emph>. Thus an antinomy
+appears in the one extreme of natural science, and a
+corresponding one will appear in the other. There is just
+as little hope of reaching this opposite extreme of natural
+science, for we see ever more clearly that what is chemical
+can never be referred to what is mechanical, nor what
+is organic to what is chemical or electrical. Those who
+in our own day are entering anew on this old, misleading
+path, will soon slink back silent and ashamed, as all their
+predecessors have done before them. We shall consider
+this more fully in the second book. Natural science encounters
+the difficulties which we have cursorily mentioned,
+in its own province. Regarded as philosophy, it
+would further be materialism; but this, as we have seen,
+even at its birth, has death in its heart, because it ignores
+<pb n='038'/><anchor id='Pg038'/>
+the subject and the forms of knowledge, which are
+presupposed, just as much in the case of the crudest
+matter, from which it desires to start, as in that of the
+organism, at which it desires to arrive. For, <q>no object
+without a subject,</q> is the principle which renders all
+materialism for ever impossible. Suns and planets
+without an eye that sees them, and an understanding
+that knows them, may indeed be spoken of in words, but
+for the idea, these words are absolutely meaningless. On
+the other hand, the law of causality and the treatment
+and investigation of nature which is based upon it, lead us
+necessarily to the conclusion that, in time, each more highly
+organised state of matter has succeeded a cruder state: so
+that the lower animals existed before men, fishes before
+land animals, plants before fishes, and the unorganised
+before all that is organised; that, consequently, the original
+mass had to pass through a long series of changes
+before the first eye could be opened. And yet, the existence
+of this whole world remains ever dependent upon
+the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect.
+For such an eye is a necessary condition of the
+possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only
+in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable.
+The world is entirely idea, and as such demands
+the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence.
+This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable
+changes, through which matter rose from form to form
+till at last the first percipient creature appeared,&mdash;this
+whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a
+consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of
+knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning
+and is nothing at all. Thus we see, on the one hand, the
+existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon
+the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be;
+on the other hand, this conscious being just as necessarily
+entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and
+effects which have preceded it, and in which it itself
+<pb n='039'/><anchor id='Pg039'/>
+appears as a small link. These two contradictory points
+of view, to each of which we are led with the same necessity,
+we might again call an <emph>antinomy</emph> in our faculty of
+knowledge, and set it up as the counterpart of that which
+we found in the first extreme of natural science. The
+fourfold antinomy of Kant will be shown, in the criticism
+of his philosophy appended to this volume, to be a
+groundless delusion. But the necessary contradiction
+which at last presents itself to us here, finds its solution
+in the fact that, to use Kant's phraseology, time, space,
+and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but
+only to its phenomena, of which they are the form; which
+in my language means this: The objective world, the
+world as idea, is not the only side of the world, but merely
+its outward side; and it has an entirely different side&mdash;the
+side of its inmost nature&mdash;its kernel&mdash;the thing-in-itself.
+This we shall consider in the second book,
+calling it after the most immediate of its objective manifestations&mdash;will.
+But the world as idea, with which
+alone we are here concerned, only appears with the opening
+of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge
+it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But
+without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge,
+there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning,
+but all beginning is in time. Since, however, it is
+the most universal form of the knowable, in which all
+phenomena are united together through causality, time,
+with its infinity of past and future, is present in the beginning
+of knowledge. The phenomenon which fills the
+first present must at once be known as causally bound
+up with and dependent upon a sequence of phenomena
+which stretches infinitely into the past, and this past itself
+is just as truly conditioned by this first present, as
+conversely the present is by the past. Accordingly the
+past out of which the first present arises, is, like it, dependent
+upon the knowing subject, without which it is
+nothing. It necessarily happens, however, that this first
+<pb n='040'/><anchor id='Pg040'/>
+present does not manifest itself as the first, that is, as
+having no past for its parent, but as being the beginning
+of time. It manifests itself rather as the consequence of
+the past, according to the principle of existence in time.
+In the same way, the phenomena which fill this first present
+appear as the effects of earlier phenomena which filled
+the past, in accordance with the law of causality. Those
+who like mythological interpretations may take the birth
+of Kronos (χρονος), the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol
+of the moment here referred to at which time appears,
+though, indeed it has no beginning; for with him, since
+he ate his father, the crude productions of heaven and
+earth cease, and the races of gods and men appear upon
+the scene.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This explanation at which we have arrived by following
+the most consistent of the philosophical systems
+which start from the object, materialism, has brought out
+clearly the inseparable and reciprocal dependence of subject
+and object, and at the same time the inevitable
+antithesis between them. And this knowledge leads us
+to seek for the inner nature of the world, the thing-in-itself,
+not in either of the two elements of the idea, but
+in something quite distinct from it, and which is not
+encumbered with such a fundamental and insoluble
+antithesis.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Opposed to the system we have explained, which starts
+from the object in order to derive the subject from it, is
+the system which starts from the subject and tries to
+derive the object from it. The first of these has been of
+frequent and common occurrence throughout the history
+of philosophy, but of the second we find only one example,
+and that a very recent one; the <q>philosophy of
+appearance</q> of J. G. Fichte. In this respect, therefore,
+it must be considered; little real worth or inner meaning
+as the doctrine itself had. It was indeed for the most
+part merely a delusion, but it was delivered with an air
+of the deepest earnestness, with sustained loftiness of
+<pb n='041'/><anchor id='Pg041'/>
+tone and zealous ardour, and was defended with eloquent
+polemic against weak opponents, so that it was able to
+present a brilliant exterior and seemed to be something.
+But the genuine earnestness which keeps truth always
+steadfastly before it as its goal, and is unaffected by any
+external influences, was entirely wanting to Fichte, as it
+is to all philosophers who, like him, concern themselves
+with questions of the day. In his case, indeed, it could
+not have been otherwise. A man becomes a philosopher
+by reason of a certain perplexity, from which he seeks
+to free himself. This is Plato's θαυμαξειν, which he
+calls a μαλα φιλοσοφικον παθος. But what distinguishes
+the false philosopher from the true is this: the perplexity
+of the latter arises from the contemplation of the world
+itself, while that of the former results from some book,
+some system of philosophy which is before him. Now
+Fichte belongs to the class of the false philosophers.
+He was made a philosopher by Kant's doctrine of the
+thing-in-itself, and if it had not been for this he would
+probably have pursued entirely different ends, with far
+better results, for he certainly possessed remarkable
+rhetorical talent. If he had only penetrated somewhat
+deeply into the meaning of the book that made him a
+philosopher, <q>The Critique of Pure Reason,</q> he would
+have understood that its principal teaching about mind
+is this. The principle of sufficient reason is not, as all
+scholastic philosophy maintains, a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>veritas aeterna</foreign>&mdash;that is
+to say, it does not possess an unconditioned validity before,
+outside of, and above the world. It is relative and conditioned,
+and valid only in the sphere of phenomena, and
+thus it may appear as the necessary nexus of space and
+time, or as the law of causality, or as the law of the
+ground of knowledge. The inner nature of the world,
+the thing-in-itself can never be found by the guidance of
+this principle, for all that it leads to will be found to be
+dependent and relative and merely phenomenal, not the
+thing-in-itself. Further, it does not concern the subject,
+<pb n='042'/><anchor id='Pg042'/>
+but is only the form of objects, which are therefore not
+things-in-themselves. The subject must exist along with
+the object, and the object along with the subject, so that
+it is impossible that subject and object can stand to each
+other in a relation of reason and consequent. But Fichte
+did not take up the smallest fragment of all this. All
+that interested him about the matter was that the system
+started from the subject. Now Kant had chosen this
+procedure in order to show the fallacy of the prevalent
+systems, which started from the object, and through
+which the object had come, to be regarded as a thing-in-itself.
+Fichte, however, took this departure from the
+subject for the really important matter, and like all imitators,
+he imagined that in going further than Kant he was
+surpassing him. Thus he repeated the fallacy with
+regard to the subject, which all the previous dogmatism
+had perpetrated with regard to the object, and which
+had been the occasion of Kant's <q>Critique</q>. Fichte
+then made no material change, and the fundamental
+fallacy, the assumption of a relation of reason and consequent
+between object and subject, remained after him
+as it was before him. The principle of sufficient reason
+possessed as before an unconditioned validity, and the
+only difference was that the thing-in-itself was now
+placed in the subject instead of, as formerly, in the
+object. The entire relativity of both subject and object,
+which proves that the thing-in-itself, or the inner nature
+of the world, is not to be sought in them at all, but
+outside of them, and outside everything else that exists
+merely relatively, still remained unknown. Just as if
+Kant had never existed, the principle of sufficient reason
+is to Fichte precisely what it was to all the schoolmen, a
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>veritas aeterna</foreign>. As an eternal fate reigned over the gods
+of old, so these <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>aeternæ veritates</foreign>, these metaphysical,
+mathematical and metalogical truths, and in the case of
+some, the validity of the moral law also, reigned over the
+God of the schoolmen. These <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>veritates</foreign> alone were independent
+<pb n='043'/><anchor id='Pg043'/>
+of everything, and through their necessity both
+God and the world existed. According to the principle
+of sufficient reason, as such a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>veritas aeterna</foreign>, the <emph>ego</emph> is
+for Fichte the ground of the world, or of the <emph>non-ego</emph>, the
+object, which is just its consequent, its creation. He
+has therefore taken good care to avoid examining further
+or limiting the principle of sufficient reason. If, however,
+it is thought I should specify the form of the
+principle of sufficient reason under the guidance of which
+Fichte derives the <emph>non-ego</emph> from the <emph>ego</emph>, as a spider spins its
+web out of itself, I find that it is the principle of sufficient
+reason of existence in space: for it is only as referred to
+this that some kind of meaning and sense can be attached
+to the laboured deductions of the way in which the <emph>ego</emph>
+produces and fabricates the <emph>non-ego</emph> from itself, which form
+the content of the most senseless, and consequently the
+most wearisome book that was ever written. This
+philosophy of Fichte, otherwise not worth mentioning, is
+interesting to us only as the tardy expression of the converse
+of the old materialism. For materialism was the
+most consistent system starting from the object, as this
+is the most consistent system starting from the subject.
+Materialism overlooked the fact that, with the simplest
+object, it assumed the subject also; and Fichte overlooked
+the fact that with the subject (whatever he may
+call it) he assumed the object also, for no subject is
+thinkable without an object. Besides this he forgot
+that all <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> deduction, indeed all demonstration in
+general, must rest upon some necessity, and that all
+necessity is based on the principle of sufficient reason,
+because to be necessary, and to follow from given grounds
+are convertible conceptions.<note place='foot'>On this see <q>The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,</q>
+§ 49.</note> But the principle of sufficient
+reason is just the universal form of the object
+as such. Thus it is in the object, but is not valid before
+<pb n='044'/><anchor id='Pg044'/>
+and outside of it; it first produces the object and makes
+it appear in conformity with its regulative principle.
+We see then that the system which starts from the subject
+contains the same fallacy as the system, explained
+above, which starts from the object; it begins by assuming
+what it proposes to deduce, the necessary correlative
+of its starting-point.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The method of our own system is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto genere</foreign> distinct
+from these two opposite misconceptions, for we start
+neither from the object nor from the subject, but from
+the <emph>idea</emph>, as the first fact of consciousness. Its first
+essential, fundamental form is the antithesis of subject
+and object. The form of the object again is the principle
+of sufficient reason in its various forms. Each of
+these reigns so absolutely in its own class of ideas that,
+as we have seen, when the special form of the principle
+of sufficient reason which governs any class of ideas is
+known, the nature of the whole class is known also: for
+the whole class, as idea, is no more than this form of the
+principle of sufficient reason itself; so that time itself is
+nothing but the principle of existence in it, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, succession;
+space is nothing but the principle of existence in it, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+position; matter is nothing but causality; the concept
+(as will appear immediately) is nothing but relation to a
+ground of knowledge. This thorough and consistent
+relativity of the world as idea, both according to its
+universal form (subject and object), and according to the
+form which is subordinate to this (the principle of sufficient
+reason) warns us, as we said before, to seek the
+inner nature of the world in an aspect of it which is
+<emph>quite different and quite distinct from the idea</emph>; and in
+the next book we shall find this in a fact which is just
+as immediate to every living being as the idea.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But we must first consider that class of ideas which
+belongs to man alone. The matter of these is the concept,
+and the subjective correlative is reason, just as the
+subjective correlative of the ideas we have already considered
+<pb n='045'/><anchor id='Pg045'/>
+was understanding and sensibility, which are also
+to be attributed to all the lower animals.<note place='foot'>The first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books belong
+to these seven paragraphs.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 8. As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed
+light of the moon, we pass from the immediate idea of
+perception, which stands by itself and is its own warrant,
+to reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of the
+reason, which obtain their whole content from knowledge
+of perception, and in relation to it. As long as
+we continue simply to perceive, all is clear, firm, and
+certain. There are neither questions nor doubts nor
+errors; we desire to go no further, can go no further;
+we find rest in perceiving, and satisfaction in the present.
+Perception suffices for itself, and therefore what springs
+purely from it, and remains true to it, for example, a
+genuine work of art, can never be false, nor can it be
+discredited through the lapse of time, for it does not
+present an opinion but the thing itself. But with
+abstract knowledge, with reason, doubt and error appear
+in the theoretical, care and sorrow in the practical. In
+the idea of perception, illusion may at moments take the
+place of the real; but in the sphere of abstract thought,
+error may reign for a thousand years, impose its yoke
+upon whole nations, extend to the noblest impulses of
+humanity, and, by the help of its slaves and its dupes,
+may chain and fetter those whom it cannot deceive. It
+is the enemy against which the wisest men of all times
+have waged unequal war, and only what they have won
+from it has become the possession of mankind. Therefore
+it is well to draw attention to it at once, as we
+already tread the ground to which its province belongs.
+It has often been said that we ought to follow truth even
+although no utility can be seen in it, because it may have
+indirect utility which may appear when it is least expected;
+and I would add to this, that we ought to be
+just as anxious to discover and to root out all error even
+<pb n='046'/><anchor id='Pg046'/>
+when no harm is anticipated from it, because its mischief
+may be very indirect, and may suddenly appear when
+we do not expect it, for all error has poison at its heart.
+If it is mind, if it is knowledge, that makes man the lord
+of creation, there can be no such thing as harmless error,
+still less venerable and holy error. And for the consolation
+of those who in any way and at any time may have
+devoted strength and life to the noble and hard battle
+against error, I cannot refrain from adding that, so long
+as truth is absent, error will have free play, as owls and
+bats in the night; but sooner would we expect to see
+the owls and the bats drive back the sun in the eastern
+heavens, than that any truth which has once been known
+and distinctly and fully expressed, can ever again be so
+utterly vanquished and overcome that the old error shall
+once more reign undisturbed over its wide kingdom. This
+is the power of truth; its conquest is slow and laborious,
+but if once the victory be gained it can never be wrested
+back again.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Besides the ideas we have as yet considered, which,
+according to their construction, could be referred to time,
+space, and matter, if we consider them with reference to
+the object, or to pure sensibility and understanding (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+knowledge of causality), if we consider them with
+reference to the subject, another faculty of knowledge
+has appeared in man alone of all earthly creatures, an
+entirely new consciousness, which, with very appropriate
+and significant exactness, is called <emph>reflection</emph>. For it is in
+fact derived from the knowledge of perception, and is a
+reflected appearance of it. But it has assumed a nature
+fundamentally different. The forms of perception do not
+affect it, and even the principle of sufficient reason which
+reigns over all objects has an entirely different aspect with
+regard to it. It is just this new, more highly endowed,
+consciousness, this abstract reflex of all that belongs to
+perception in that conception of the reason which has
+nothing to do with perception, that gives to man that
+<pb n='047'/><anchor id='Pg047'/>
+thoughtfulness which distinguishes his consciousness so
+entirely from that of the lower animals, and through
+which his whole behaviour upon earth is so different from
+that of his irrational fellow-creatures. He far surpasses
+them in power and also in suffering. They live in the
+present alone, he lives also in the future and the past.
+They satisfy the needs of the moment, he provides by the
+most ingenious preparations for the future, yea for days
+that he shall never see. They are entirely dependent on the
+impression of the moment, on the effect of the perceptible
+motive; he is determined by abstract conceptions independent
+of the present. Therefore he follows predetermined
+plans, he acts from maxims, without reference to
+his surroundings or the accidental impression of the
+moment. Thus, for example, he can make with composure
+deliberate preparations for his own death, he can
+dissemble past finding out, and can carry his secret with
+him to the grave; lastly, he has an actual choice between
+several motives; for only in the abstract can such
+motives, present together in consciousness, afford the
+knowledge with regard to themselves, that the one excludes
+the other, and can thus measure themselves
+against each other with reference to their power over the
+will. The motive that overcomes, in that it decides the
+question at issue, is the deliberate determinant of the
+will, and is a sure indication of its character. The brute,
+on the other hand, is determined by the present impression;
+only the fear of present compulsion can
+constrain its desires, until at last this fear has become
+custom, and as such continues to determine it; this is
+called training. The brute feels and perceives; man, in
+addition to this, <emph>thinks</emph> and <emph>knows</emph>: both <emph>will</emph>. The brute
+expresses its feelings and dispositions by gestures and
+sounds; man communicates his thought to others, or, if
+he wishes, he conceals it, by means of speech. Speech
+is the first production, and also the necessary organ of
+his reason. Therefore in Greek and Italian, speech and
+<pb n='048'/><anchor id='Pg048'/>
+reason are expressed by the same word; ὁ λογος, <foreign lang='it' rend='italic'>il
+discorso</foreign>. <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>Vernunft</foreign> is derived from <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>vernehmen</foreign>, which
+is not a synonym for the verb to hear, but signifies
+the consciousness of the meaning of thoughts communicated
+in words. It is by the help of language alone
+that reason accomplishes its most important achievements,&mdash;the
+united action of several individuals, the
+planned co-operation of many thousands, civilisation, the
+state; also science, the storing up of experience, the
+uniting of common properties in one concept, the communication
+of truth, the spread of error, thoughts and
+poems, dogmas and superstitions. The brute first knows
+death when it dies, but man draws consciously nearer to
+it every hour that he lives; and this makes life at times
+a questionable good even to him who has not recognised
+this character of constant annihilation in the whole of
+life. Principally on this account man has philosophies
+and religions, though it is uncertain whether the qualities
+we admire most in his conduct, voluntary rectitude and
+nobility of feeling, were ever the fruit of either of them.
+As results which certainly belong only to them, and as
+productions of reason in this sphere, we may refer to
+the marvellous and monstrous opinions of philosophers of
+various schools, and the extraordinary and sometimes
+cruel customs of the priests of different religions.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is the universal opinion of all times and of all
+nations that these manifold and far-reaching achievements
+spring from a common principle, from that peculiar
+intellectual power which belongs distinctively to man
+and which has been called reason, ὁ λογος, το λογιστικον,
+το λογιμον, <foreign rend='italic'>ratio</foreign>. Besides this, no one finds any difficulty
+in recognising the manifestations of this faculty,
+and in saying what is rational and what is irrational,
+where reason appears as distinguished from the other
+faculties and qualities of man, or lastly, in pointing out
+what, on account of the want of reason, we must never
+expect even from the most sensible brute. The philosophers
+<pb n='049'/><anchor id='Pg049'/>
+of all ages may be said to be on the whole at one
+about this general knowledge of reason, and they have
+also given prominence to several very important manifestations
+of it; such as, the control of the emotions
+and passions, the capacity for drawing conclusions and
+formulating general principles, even such as are true
+prior to all experience, and so forth. Still all their explanations
+of the peculiar nature of reason are wavering,
+not clearly defined, discursive, without unity and concentration;
+now laying stress on one manifestation, now
+on another, and therefore often at variance with each
+other. Besides this, many start from the opposition
+between reason and revelation, a distinction which is
+unknown to philosophy, and which only increases confusion.
+It is very remarkable that up till now no
+philosopher has referred these manifold expressions of
+reason to one simple function which would be recognised
+in them all, from which they would all be explained, and
+which would therefore constitute the real inner nature
+of reason. It is true that the excellent Locke in the
+<q>Essay on the Human Understanding</q> (Book II., ch. xi.,
+§§ 10 and 11), very rightly refers to general concepts as
+the characteristic which distinguishes man from the
+brutes, and Leibnitz quotes this with full approval in the
+<q>Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humaine</q> (Book
+II., ch. xi., §§ 10 and 11.) But when Locke (in Book IV.,
+ch. xvii., §§ 2 and 3) comes to the special explanation of
+reason he entirely loses sight of this simple, primary
+characteristic, and he also falls into a wavering, undetermined,
+incomplete account of mangled and derivative
+manifestations of it. Leibnitz also, in the corresponding
+part of his work, behaves in a similar manner, only with
+more confusion and indistinctness. In the Appendix, I
+have fully considered how Kant confused and falsified
+the conception of the nature of reason. But whoever
+will take the trouble to go through in this reference the
+mass of philosophical writing which has appeared since
+<pb n='050'/><anchor id='Pg050'/>
+Kant, will find out, that just as the faults of princes
+must be expiated by whole nations, the errors of great
+minds extend their influence over whole generations, and
+even over centuries; they grow and propagate themselves,
+and finally degenerate into monstrosities. All this
+arises from the fact that, as Berkeley says, <q>Few men
+think; yet all will have opinions.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The understanding has only one function&mdash;immediate
+knowledge of the relation of cause and effect. Yet the
+perception of the real world, and all common sense,
+sagacity, and inventiveness, however multifarious their
+applications may be, are quite clearly seen to be nothing
+more than manifestations of that one function. So
+also the reason has one function; and from it all the
+manifestations of reason we have mentioned, which distinguish
+the life of man from that of the brutes, may
+easily be explained. The application or the non-application
+of this function is all that is meant by what
+men have everywhere and always called rational and
+irrational.<note place='foot'>Compare with this paragraph §§
+26 and 27 of the third edition of the
+essay on the principle of sufficient
+reason.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 9. Concepts form a distinct class of ideas, existing
+only in the mind of man, and entirely different from the
+ideas of perception which we have considered up till
+now. We can therefore never attain to a sensuous and,
+properly speaking, evident knowledge of their nature,
+but only to a knowledge which is abstract and discursive.
+It would, therefore, be absurd to demand that they should
+be verified in experience, if by experience is meant the
+real external world, which consists of ideas of perception,
+or that they should be brought before the eyes or the
+imagination like objects of perception. They can only
+be thought, not perceived, and only the effects which
+men accomplish through them are properly objects of experience.
+Such effects are language, preconceived and
+planned action and science, and all that results from these.
+<pb n='051'/><anchor id='Pg051'/>
+Speech, as an object of outer experience, is obviously nothing
+more than a very complete telegraph, which communicates
+arbitrary signs with the greatest rapidity
+and the finest distinctions of difference. But what do
+these signs mean? How are they interpreted? When
+some one speaks, do we at once translate his words into
+pictures of the fancy, which instantaneously flash upon
+us, arrange and link themselves together, and assume
+form and colour according to the words that are poured
+forth, and their grammatical inflections? What a
+tumult there would be in our brains while we listened
+to a speech, or to the reading of a book? But what
+actually happens is not this at all. The meaning of
+a speech is, as a rule, immediately grasped, accurately
+and distinctly taken in, without the imagination being
+brought into play. It is reason which speaks to reason,
+keeping within its own province. It communicates and
+receives abstract conceptions, ideas that cannot be presented
+in perceptions, which are framed once for all, and
+are relatively few in number, but which yet encompass,
+contain, and represent all the innumerable objects of the
+actual world. This itself is sufficient to prove that the
+lower animals can never learn to speak or comprehend,
+although they have the organs of speech and ideas of
+perception in common with us. But because words
+represent this perfectly distinct class of ideas, whose
+subjective correlative is reason, they are without sense
+and meaning for the brutes. Thus language, like every
+other manifestation which we ascribe to reason, and like
+everything which distinguishes man from the brutes, is to
+be explained from this as its one simple source&mdash;conceptions,
+abstract ideas which cannot be presented in perception,
+but are general, and have no individual existence
+in space and time. Only in single cases do we pass
+from the conception to the perception, do we construct
+images as <emph>representatives of concepts</emph> in perception, to
+which, however, they are never adequate. These cases
+<pb n='052'/><anchor id='Pg052'/>
+are fully discussed in the essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason, § 28, and therefore I shall not repeat
+my explanation here. It may be compared, however,
+with what is said by Hume in the twelfth of his <q>Philosophical
+Essays,</q> p. 244, and by Herder in the <q>Metacritik,</q>
+pt. i. p. 274 (an otherwise worthless book). The
+Platonic idea, the possibility of which depends upon the
+union of imagination and reason, is the principal subject
+of the third book of this work.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Although concepts are fundamentally different from
+ideas of perception, they stand in a necessary relation
+to them, without which they would be nothing. This
+relation therefore constitutes the whole nature and existence
+of concepts. Reflection is the necessary copy or
+repetition of the originally presented world of perception,
+but it is a special kind of copy in an entirely different
+material. Thus concepts may quite properly be called
+ideas of ideas. The principle of sufficient reason has
+here also a special form. Now we have seen that the
+form under which the principle of sufficient reason
+appears in a class of ideas always constitutes and exhausts
+the whole nature of the class, so far as it consists
+of ideas, so that time is throughout succession, and
+nothing more; space is throughout position, and nothing
+more; matter is throughout causation, and nothing more.
+In the same way the whole nature of concepts, or the
+class of abstract ideas, consists simply in the relation
+which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in them;
+and as this is the relation to the ground of knowledge,
+the whole nature of the abstract idea is simply and solely
+its relation to another idea, which is its ground of knowledge.
+This, indeed, may, in the first instance, be a
+concept, an abstract idea, and this again may have only
+a similar abstract ground of knowledge; but the chain
+of grounds of knowledge does not extend <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>;
+it must end at last in a concept which has its ground in
+knowledge of perception; for the whole world of reflection
+<pb n='053'/><anchor id='Pg053'/>
+rests on the world of perception as its ground of
+knowledge. Hence the class of abstract ideas is in this
+respect distinguished from other classes; in the latter
+the principle of sufficient reason always demands merely
+a relation to another idea of the <emph>same</emph> class, but in the
+case of abstract ideas, it at last demands a relation to an
+idea of <emph>another</emph> class.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Those concepts which, as has just been pointed out,
+are not immediately related to the world of perception,
+but only through the medium of one, or it may be several
+other concepts, have been called by preference <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>abstracta</foreign>,
+and those which have their ground immediately in the
+world of perception have been called <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>concreta</foreign>. But this
+last name is only loosely applicable to the concepts
+denoted by it, for they are always merely <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>abstracta</foreign>, and
+not ideas of perception. These names, which have
+originated in a very dim consciousness of the distinctions
+they imply, may yet, with this explanation, be retained.
+As examples of the first kind of concepts, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>abstracta</foreign>
+in the fullest sense, we may take <q>relation,</q> <q>virtue,</q>
+<q>investigation,</q> <q>beginning,</q> and so on. As examples of
+the second kind, loosely called <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>concreta</foreign>, we may take
+such concepts as <q>man,</q> <q>stone,</q> <q>horse,</q> &amp;c. If it were
+not a somewhat too pictorial and therefore absurd simile,
+we might very appropriately call the latter the ground
+floor, and the former the upper stories of the building of
+reflection.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is not, as is commonly supposed, an essential characteristic
+of a concept that it should contain much under
+it, that is to say, that many ideas of perception, or it
+may be other abstract ideas, should stand to it in the
+relation of its ground of knowledge, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, be thought
+through it. This is merely a derived and secondary
+characteristic, and, as a matter of fact, does not always
+exist, though it must always exist potentially. This
+characteristic arises from the fact that a concept is an
+<pb n='054'/><anchor id='Pg054'/>
+idea of an idea, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, its whole nature consists in its relation
+to another idea; but as it is not this idea itself,
+which is generally an idea of perception and therefore
+belongs to quite a different class, the latter may have
+temporal, spacial, and other determinations, and in general
+many relations which are not thought along with it in
+the concept. Thus we see that several ideas which are
+different in unessential particulars may be thought by
+means of one concept, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, may be brought under it.
+Yet this power of embracing several things is not an
+essential but merely an accidental characteristic of the
+concept. There may be concepts through which only one
+real object is thought, but which are nevertheless abstract
+and general, by no means capable of presentation individually
+and as perceptions. Such, for example, is the
+conception which any one may have of a particular town
+which he only knows from geography; although only
+this one town is thought under it, it might yet be applied
+to several towns differing in certain respects. We see
+then that a concept is not general because of being
+abstracted from several objects; but conversely, because
+generality, that is to say, non-determination of the particular,
+belongs to the concept as an abstract idea of the
+reason, different things can be thought by means of the
+same one.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It follows from what has been said that every concept,
+just because it is abstract and incapable of
+presentation in perception, and is therefore not a completely
+determined idea, has what is called extension or
+sphere, even in the case in which only one real object
+exists that corresponds to it. Now we always find that
+the sphere of one concept has something in common with
+the sphere of other concepts. That is to say, part of
+what is thought under one concept is the same as what
+is thought under other concepts; and conversely, part of
+what is thought under these concepts is the same as
+what is thought under the first; although, if they are
+<pb n='055'/><anchor id='Pg055'/>
+really different concepts, each of them, or at least one of
+them, contains something which the other does not contain;
+this is the relation in which every subject stands
+to its predicate. The recognition of this relation is called
+judgment. The representation of these spheres by means
+of figures in space, is an exceedingly happy idea. It
+first occurred to Gottfried Plouquet, who used squares for
+the purpose. Lambert, although later than him, used
+only lines, which he placed under each other. Euler
+carried out the idea completely with circles. Upon
+what this complete analogy between the relations of
+concepts, and those of figures in space, ultimately rests, I
+am unable to say. It is, however, a very fortunate
+circumstance for logic that all the relations of concepts,
+according to their possibility, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, may be made
+plain in perception by the use of such figures, in the
+following way:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<p>
+(1.) The spheres of two concepts coincide: for example
+the concept of necessity and the concept of
+following from given grounds, in the same way the
+concepts of <foreign rend='italic'>Ruminantia</foreign> and <foreign rend='italic'>Bisulca</foreign> (ruminating and
+cloven-hoofed animals), also those of vertebrate and red-blooded
+animals (although there might be some doubt
+about this on account of the annelida): they are convertible
+concepts. Such concepts are represented by a
+single circle which stands for either of them.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+(2.) The sphere of one concept includes that of the
+other.
+</p>
+
+<p rend='text-align: center'>
+  <figure url='images/illus_091.png' rend='width: 50%'>
+    <figDesc>Illustration: Category "horse" within category "animal".</figDesc>
+  </figure>
+</p>
+
+<pb n='056'/><anchor id='Pg056'/>
+
+<p>
+(3.) A sphere includes two or more spheres which
+exclude each other and fill it.
+</p>
+
+<p rend='text-align: center'>
+  <figure url='images/illus_092_a.png' rend='width: 50%'>
+    <figDesc>Illustration: Circle divided into thirds "right", "acute", and "obtuse".</figDesc>
+  </figure>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+(4.) Two spheres include each a part of the other.
+</p>
+
+<p rend='text-align: center'>
+  <figure url='images/illus_092_b.png' rend='width: 50%'>
+    <figDesc>Illustration: Two overlapping circles, one "flower" and one "red".</figDesc>
+  </figure>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+(5.) Two spheres lie in a third, but do not fill it.
+</p>
+
+<p rend='text-align: center'>
+  <figure url='images/illus_092_c.png' rend='width: 50%'>
+    <figDesc>Illustration: A large circle, "matter", within which are two other circles, "water" and "earth".</figDesc>
+  </figure>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This last case applies to all concepts whose spheres
+have nothing immediately in common, for there is always
+a third sphere, often a much wider one, which includes
+both.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+To these cases all combinations of concepts may be
+referred, and from them the entire doctrine of the judgment,
+its conversion, contraposition, equipollence, disjunction
+(this according to the third figure) may be deduced.
+<pb n='057'/><anchor id='Pg057'/>
+From these also may be derived the properties of the
+judgment, upon which Kant based his pretended categories
+of the understanding, with the exception however
+of the hypothetical form, which is not a combination of
+concepts, but of judgments. A full account is given in
+the Appendix of <q>Modality,</q> and indeed of every property
+of judgments on which the categories are founded.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+With regard to the possible combinations of concepts
+which we have given, it has only further to be remarked
+that they may also be combined with each other in many
+ways. For example, the fourth figure with the second.
+Only if one sphere, which partly or wholly contains
+another, is itself contained in a third sphere, do these
+together exemplify the syllogism in the first figure, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+that combination of judgments, by means of which it is
+known that a concept which is partly or wholly contained
+in another concept, is also contained in a third
+concept, which again contains the first: and also, conversely,
+the negation; the pictorial representation of
+which can, of course, only be two connected spheres
+which do not lie within a third sphere. If many spheres
+are brought together in this way we get a long train of
+syllogisms. This schematism of concepts, which has
+already been fairly well explained in more than one textbook,
+may be used as the foundation of the doctrine of
+the judgment, and indeed of the whole syllogistic theory,
+and in this way the treatment of both becomes very
+easy and simple. Because, through it, all syllogistic rules
+may be seen in their origin, and may be deduced and
+explained. It is not necessary, however, to load the
+memory with these rules, as logic is never of practical
+use, but has only a theoretical interest for philosophy.
+For although it may be said that logic is related to
+rational thinking as thorough-bass is to music, or less
+exactly, as ethics is to virtue, or æsthetics to art; we
+must yet remember that no one ever became an artist by
+the study of æsthetics; that a noble character was never
+<pb n='058'/><anchor id='Pg058'/>
+formed by the study of ethics; that long before Rameau,
+men composed correctly and beautifully, and that we do
+not need to know thorough-bass in order to detect discords:
+and just as little do we need to know logic in
+order to avoid being misled by fallacies. Yet it must be
+conceded that thorough-bass is of the greatest use in
+the practice of musical composition, although it may
+not be necessary for the understanding of it; and indeed
+æsthetics and even ethics, though in a much less degree,
+and for the most part negatively, may be of some use
+in practice, so that we cannot deny them all practical
+worth, but of logic even this much cannot be conceded.
+It is nothing more than the knowledge in the abstract of
+what every one knows in the concrete. Therefore we
+call in the aid of logical rules, just as little to enable us
+to construct a correct argument as to prevent us from
+consenting to a false one, and the most learned logician
+lays aside the rules of logic altogether in his actual
+thought. This may be explained in the following way.
+Every science is a system of general and therefore abstract
+truths, laws, and rules with reference to a special
+class of objects. The individual case coming under these
+laws is determined in accordance with this general knowledge,
+which is valid once for all; because such application
+of the general principle is far easier than the
+exhaustive investigation of the particular case; for the
+general abstract knowledge which has once been obtained
+is always more within our reach than the empirical investigation
+of the particular case. With logic, however, it
+is just the other way. It is the general knowledge of
+the mode of procedure of the reason expressed in the
+form of rules. It is reached by the introspection of
+reason, and by abstraction from all content. But this
+mode of procedure is necessary and essential to reason,
+so that it will never depart from it if left to itself. It
+is, therefore, easier and surer to let it proceed itself
+according to its nature in each particular case, than to
+<pb n='059'/><anchor id='Pg059'/>
+present to it the knowledge abstracted from this procedure
+in the form of a foreign and externally given
+law. It is easier, because, while in the case of all other
+sciences, the general rule is more within our reach than
+the investigation of the particular case taken by itself;
+with the use of reason, on the contrary, its necessary procedure
+in a given case is always more within our reach
+than the general rule abstracted from it; for that
+which thinks in us is reason itself. It is surer, because a
+mistake may more easily occur in such abstract knowledge,
+or in its application, than that a process of
+reason should take place which would run contrary to
+its essence and nature. Hence arises the remarkable
+fact, that while in other sciences the particular case is
+always proved by the rule, in logic, on the contrary, the
+rule must always be proved from the particular case;
+and even the most practised logician, if he remark that in
+some particular case he concludes otherwise than the rule
+prescribes, will always expect to find a mistake in the rule
+rather than in his own conclusion. To desire to make
+practical use of logic means, therefore, to desire to derive
+with unspeakable trouble, from general rules, that which
+is immediately known with the greatest certainty in the
+particular case. It is just as if a man were to consult
+mechanics as to the motion of his body, and physiology as
+to his digestion; and whoever has learnt logic for practical
+purposes is like him who would teach a beaver to
+make its own dam. Logic is, therefore, without practical
+utility; but it must nevertheless be retained, because it
+has philosophical interest as the special knowledge of the
+organisation and action of reason. It is rightly regarded
+as a definite, self-subsisting, self-contained, complete, and
+thoroughly safe discipline; to be treated scientifically
+for itself alone and independently of everything else, and
+therefore to be studied at the universities. But it has
+its real value, in relation to philosophy as a whole, in the
+inquiry into the nature of knowledge, and indeed of
+<pb n='060'/><anchor id='Pg060'/>
+rational and abstract knowledge. Therefore the exposition
+of logic should not have so much the form of a practical
+science, should not contain merely naked arbitrary
+rules for the correct formation of the judgment, the syllogism,
+&amp;c., but should rather be directed to the knowledge
+of the nature of reason and the concept, and to the detailed
+investigation of the principle of sufficient reason
+of knowing. For logic is only a paraphrase of this principle,
+and, more exactly, only of that exemplification of
+it in which the ground that gives truth to the judgment
+is neither empirical nor metaphysical, but logical or metalogical.
+Besides the principle of sufficient reason of
+knowing, it is necessary to take account of the three remaining
+fundamental laws of thought, or judgments of
+metalogical truth, so nearly related to it; and out of these
+the whole science of reason grows. The nature of
+thought proper, that is to say, of the judgment and the
+syllogism, must be exhibited in the combination of the
+spheres of concepts, according to the analogy of the
+special schema, in the way shown above; and from all
+this the rules of the judgment and the syllogism are to
+be deduced by construction. The only practical use we
+can make of logic is in a debate, when we can convict our
+antagonist of his intentional fallacies, rather than of his
+actual mistakes, by giving them their technical names.
+By thus throwing into the background the practical aim
+of logic, and bringing out its connection with the whole
+scheme of philosophy as one of its chapters, we do not
+think that we shall make the study of it less prevalent
+than it is just now. For at the present day every one
+who does not wish to remain uncultured, and to be
+numbered with the ignorant and incompetent multitude,
+must study speculative philosophy. For the nineteenth
+century is a philosophical age, though by this we do not
+mean either that it has philosophy, or that philosophy
+governs it, but rather that it is ripe for philosophy, and,
+therefore, stands in need of it. This is a sign of a high
+<pb n='061'/><anchor id='Pg061'/>
+degree of civilisation, and indeed, is a definite stage in
+the culture of the ages.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Though logic is of so little practical use, it cannot be
+denied that it was invented for practical purposes. It
+appears to me to have originated in the following way:&mdash;As
+the love of debating developed among the Eleatics,
+the Megarics, and the Sophists, and by degrees became
+almost a passion, the confusion in which nearly every
+debate ended must have made them feel the necessity
+of a method of procedure as a guide; and for this a
+scientific dialectic had to be sought. The first thing
+which would have to be observed would be that both
+the disputing parties should always be agreed on some
+one proposition, to which the disputed points might be
+referred. The beginning of the methodical procedure
+consisted in this, that the propositions admitted on both
+sides were formally stated to be so, and placed at the
+head of the inquiry. But these propositions were at
+first concerned only with the material of the inquiry.
+It was soon observed that in the process of going back
+to the truth admitted on both sides, and of deducing
+their assertions from it, each party followed certain forms
+and laws about which, without any express agreement,
+there was no difference of opinion. And from this it
+became evident that these must constitute the peculiar
+and natural procedure of reason itself, the form of
+investigation. Although this was not exposed to any
+doubt or difference of opinion, some pedantically
+systematic philosopher hit upon the idea that it would
+look well, and be the completion of the method of
+dialectic, if this formal part of all discussion, this regular
+procedure of reason itself, were to be expressed in abstract
+propositions, just like the substantial propositions admitted
+on both sides, and placed at the beginning of every
+investigation, as the fixed canon of debate to which
+reference and appeal must always be made. In this
+<pb n='062'/><anchor id='Pg062'/>
+way what had formerly been followed only by tacit
+agreement, and instinctively, would be consciously recognised
+and formally expressed. By degrees, more or
+less perfect expressions were found for the fundamental
+principles of logic, such as the principles of contradiction,
+sufficient reason, excluded middle, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>dictum de omni et
+nullo</foreign>, as well as the special rules of the syllogism, as for
+example, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ex meris particularibus aut negativis nihil sequitur,
+a rationato ad rationem non valet consequentia</foreign>, and
+so on. That all this was only brought about slowly, and
+with great pains, and up till the time of Aristotle remained
+very incomplete, is evident from the awkward
+and tedious way in which logical truths are brought out
+in many of the Platonic dialogues, and still more from
+what Sextus Empiricus tells us of the controversies of
+the Megarics, about the easiest and simplest logical rules,
+and the laborious way in which they were brought into
+a definite form (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. 8, p. 112).
+But Aristotle collected, arranged, and corrected all that
+had been discovered before his time, and brought it to
+an incomparably greater state of perfection. If we thus
+observe how the course of Greek culture had prepared
+the way for, and led up to the work of Aristotle, we
+shall be little inclined to believe the assertion of the
+Persian author, quoted by Sir William Jones with much
+approval, that Kallisthenes found a complete system of
+logic among the Indians, and sent it to his uncle Aristotle
+(Asiatic Researches, vol. iv. p. 163). It is easy to
+understand that in the dreary middle ages the Aristotelian
+logic would be very acceptable to the controversial
+spirit of the schoolmen, which, in the absence of all real
+knowledge, spent its energy upon mere formulas and
+words, and that it would be eagerly adopted even in its
+mutilated Arabian form, and presently established as the
+centre of all knowledge. Though its authority has since
+declined, yet up to our own time logic has retained the
+credit of a self-contained, practical, and highly important
+<pb n='063'/><anchor id='Pg063'/>
+science. Indeed, in our own day, the Kantian philosophy,
+the foundation-stone of which is taken from logic,
+has excited a new interest in it; which, in this respect,
+at any rate, that is, as the means of the knowledge of
+the nature of reason, it deserves.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Correct and accurate conclusions may be arrived at
+if we carefully observe the relation of the spheres of
+concepts, and only conclude that one sphere is contained
+in a third sphere, when we have clearly seen that this
+first sphere is contained in a second, which in its turn is
+contained in the third. On the other hand, the art of
+sophistry lies in casting only a superficial glance at the
+relations of the spheres of the concepts, and then manipulating
+these relations to suit our purposes, generally
+in the following way:&mdash;When the sphere of an observed
+concept lies partly within that of another concept, and
+partly within a third altogether different sphere, we treat
+it as if it lay entirely within the one or the other, as
+may suit our purpose. For example, in speaking of
+passion, we may subsume it under the concept of the
+greatest force, the mightiest agency in the world, or
+under the concept of the irrational, and this again under
+the concept of impotency or weakness. We may then
+repeat the process, and start anew with each concept to
+which the argument leads us. A concept has almost
+always several others, which partially come under it,
+and each of these contains part of the sphere of the first,
+but also includes in its own sphere something more,
+which is not in the first. But we draw attention only
+to that one of these latter concepts, under which we
+wish to subsume the first, and let the others remain unobserved,
+or keep them concealed. On the possession of
+this skill depends the whole art of sophistry and all finer
+fallacies; for logical fallacies such as <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>mentiens</foreign>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>velatus</foreign>,
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>cornatus</foreign>, &amp;c., are clearly too clumsy for actual use. I
+am not aware that hitherto any one has traced the
+nature of all sophistry and persuasion back to this last
+<pb n='064'/><anchor id='Pg064'/>
+possible ground of its existence, and referred it to the
+peculiar character of concepts, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, to the procedure of
+reason itself. Therefore, as my exposition has led me to
+it, though it is very easily understood, I will illustrate it
+in the following table by means of a schema. This table
+is intended to show how the spheres of concepts overlap
+each other at many points, and so leave room for a passage
+from each concept to whichever one we please of several
+other concepts. I hope, however, that no one will be led
+by this table to attach more importance to this little
+explanation, which I have merely given in passing, than
+ought to belong to it, from the nature of the subject. I
+have chosen as an illustration the concept of travelling.
+Its sphere partially includes four others, to any of which
+the sophist may pass at will; these again partly include
+other spheres, several of them two or more at once, and
+through these the sophist takes whichever way he chooses,
+always as if it were the only way, till at last he reaches,
+in good or evil, whatever end he may have in view. In
+passing from one sphere to another, it is only necessary
+always to follow the direction from the centre (the given
+chief concept) to the circumference, and never to reverse
+this process. Such a piece of sophistry may be either
+an unbroken speech, or it may assume the strict syllogistic
+form, according to what is the weak side of the
+hearer. Most scientific arguments, and especially philosophical
+demonstrations, are at bottom not much more
+than this, for how else would it be possible, that so
+much, in different ages, has not only been falsely apprehended
+(for error itself has a different source), but
+demonstrated and proved, and has yet afterwards been
+found to be fundamentally wrong, for example, the
+Leibnitz-Wolfian Philosophy, Ptolemaic Astronomy,
+Stahl's Chemistry, Newton's Theory of Colours, &amp;c. &amp;c.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 10. Through all this, the question presses ever more
+upon us, how <emph>certainty</emph> is to be attained, how <emph>judgments
+<pb n='065'/><anchor id='Pg065'/>
+are to be established</emph>, what constitutes <emph>rational knowledge</emph>,
+(<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>), and <emph>science</emph>, which we rank with language and
+deliberate action as the third great benefit conferred by
+reason.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Reason is feminine in nature; it can only give after
+it has received. Of itself it has nothing but the empty
+forms of its operation. There is no absolutely pure
+rational knowledge except the four principles to which
+I have attributed metalogical truth; the principles of
+identity, contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient
+reason of knowledge. For even the rest of logic is not
+absolutely pure rational knowledge. It presupposes the
+relations and the combinations of the spheres of concepts.
+But concepts in general only exist after experience of
+ideas of perception, and as their whole nature consists
+in their relation to these, it is clear that they presuppose
+them. No special content, however, is presupposed, but
+merely the existence of a content generally, and so logic
+as a whole may fairly pass for pure rational science.
+In all other sciences reason has received its content from
+ideas of perception; in mathematics from the relations
+of space and time, presented in intuition or perception
+prior to all experience; in pure natural science, that is,
+in what we know of the course of nature prior to any
+experience, the content of the science proceeds from the
+pure understanding, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, from the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> knowledge of
+the law of causality and its connection with those pure
+intuitions or perceptions of space and time. In all other
+sciences everything that is not derived from the sources
+we have just referred to belongs to experience. Speaking
+generally, <emph>to know rationally</emph> (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>) means to have in
+the power of the mind, and capable of being reproduced
+at will, such judgments as have their sufficient ground of
+knowledge in something outside themselves, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, are true.
+Thus only abstract cognition is <emph>rational knowledge</emph> (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>),
+which is therefore the result of reason, so that we cannot
+accurately say of the lower animals that they <emph>rationally
+<pb n='066'/><anchor id='Pg066'/>
+know</emph> (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>) anything, although they have apprehension
+of what is presented in perception, and memory of this,
+and consequently imagination, which is further proved
+by the circumstance that they dream. We attribute
+consciousness to them, and therefore although the word
+(<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>bewusstsein</foreign>) is derived from the verb to know rationally
+(<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>), the conception of consciousness corresponds generally
+with that of idea of whatever kind it may be. Thus
+we attribute life to plants, but not consciousness. <emph>Rational
+knowledge</emph> (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>) is therefore abstract consciousness,
+the permanent possession in concepts of the reason,
+of what has become known in another way.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 11. In this regard the direct opposite of <emph>rational
+knowledge</emph> is feeling, and therefore we must insert the
+explanation of feeling here. The concept which the
+word feeling denotes has merely a negative content,
+which is this, that something which is present in consciousness,
+<emph>is not a concept</emph>, <emph>is not abstract rational
+knowledge</emph>. Except this, whatever it may be, it comes
+under the concept of <emph>feeling</emph>. Thus the immeasurably
+wide sphere of the concept of feeling includes the most
+different kinds of objects, and no one can ever understand
+how they come together until he has recognised that
+they all agree in this negative respect, that they are not
+<emph>abstract concepts</emph>. For the most diverse and even antagonistic
+elements lie quietly side by side in this concept;
+for example, religious feeling, feeling of sensual pleasure,
+moral feeling, bodily feeling, as touch, pain, sense of
+colour, of sounds and their harmonies and discords,
+feeling of hate, of disgust, of self-satisfaction, of honour,
+of disgrace, of right, of wrong, sense of truth, æsthetic
+feeling, feeling of power, weakness, health, friendship,
+love, &amp;c. &amp;c. There is absolutely nothing in common
+among them except the negative quality that they are
+not abstract rational knowledge. But this diversity
+becomes more striking when the apprehension of space
+relations presented <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> in perception, and also the
+<pb n='067'/><anchor id='Pg067'/>
+knowledge of the pure understanding is brought under
+this concept, and when we say of all knowledge and all
+truth, of which we are first conscious only intuitively,
+and have not yet formulated in abstract concepts, we
+<emph>feel</emph> it. I should like, for the sake of illustration, to
+give some examples of this taken from recent books,
+as they are striking proofs of my theory. I remember
+reading in the introduction to a German translation of
+Euclid, that we ought to make beginners in geometry
+draw the figures before proceeding to demonstrate, for
+in this way they would already feel geometrical
+truth before the demonstration brought them complete
+knowledge. In the same way Schleiermacher speaks in
+his <q>Critique of Ethics</q> of logical and mathematical
+feeling (p. 339), and also of the feeling of the sameness
+or difference of two formulas (p. 342). Again Tennemann
+in his <q>History of Philosophy</q> (vol. I., p. 361)
+says, <q>One <emph>felt</emph> that the fallacies were not right, but
+could not point out the mistakes.</q> Now, so long as we
+do not regard this concept <q><emph>feeling</emph></q> from the right point
+of view, and do not recognise that one negative characteristic
+which alone is essential to it, it must constantly
+give occasion for misunderstanding and controversy, on
+account of the excessive wideness of its sphere, and its
+entirely negative and very limited content which is determined
+in a purely one-sided manner. Since then we
+have in German the nearly synonymous word <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>empfindung</foreign>
+(sensation), it would be convenient to make use of it for
+bodily feeling, as a sub-species. This concept <q>feeling,</q>
+which is quite out of proportion to all others, doubtless
+originated in the following manner. All concepts, and
+concepts alone, are denoted by words; they exist only
+for the reason, and proceed from it. With concepts,
+therefore, we are already at a one-sided point of view;
+but from such a point of view what is near appears
+distinct and is set down as positive, what is farther off
+becomes mixed up and is soon regarded as merely
+<pb n='068'/><anchor id='Pg068'/>
+negative. Thus each nation calls all others foreign: to
+the Greek all others are barbarians; to the Englishman
+all that is not England or English is continent or continental;
+to the believer all others are heretics, or
+heathens; to the noble all others are <foreign rend='italic'>roturiers</foreign>; to the
+student all others are Philistines, and so forth. Now,
+reason itself, strange as it may seem, is guilty of the
+same one-sidedness, indeed one might say of the same
+crude ignorance arising from vanity, for it classes under
+the one concept, <q><emph>feeling</emph>,</q> every modification of consciousness
+which does not immediately belong to its own
+mode of apprehension, that is to say, which is <emph>not an
+abstract concept</emph>. It has had to pay the penalty of this
+hitherto in misunderstanding and confusion in its own
+province, because its own procedure had not become
+clear to it through thorough self-knowledge, for a special
+faculty of feeling has been set up, and new theories of
+it are constructed.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 12. <emph>Rational knowledge</emph> (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>) is then all abstract
+knowledge,&mdash;that is, the knowledge which is peculiar to
+the reason as distinguished from the understanding. Its
+contradictory opposite has just been explained to be the
+concept <q>feeling.</q> Now, as reason only reproduces, for
+knowledge, what has been received in another way, it
+does not actually extend our knowledge, but only gives it
+another form. It enables us to know in the abstract
+and generally, what first became known in sense-perception,
+in the concrete. But this is much more important
+than it appears at first sight when so expressed. For it
+depends entirely upon the fact that knowledge has
+become rational or abstract knowledge (<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>wissen</foreign>), that it
+can be safely preserved, that it is communicable and
+susceptible of certain and wide-reaching application to
+practice. Knowledge in the form of sense-perception is
+valid only of the particular case, extends only to what is
+nearest, and ends with it, for sensibility and understanding
+can only comprehend one object at a time. Every
+<pb n='069'/><anchor id='Pg069'/>
+enduring, arranged, and planned activity must therefore
+proceed from principles,&mdash;that is, from abstract knowledge,
+and it must be conducted in accordance with
+them. Thus, for example, the knowledge of the relation
+of cause and effect arrived at by the understanding, is in
+itself far completer, deeper and more exhaustive than
+anything that can be thought about it in the abstract;
+the understanding alone knows in perception directly
+and completely the nature of the effect of a lever, of a
+pulley, or a cog-wheel, the stability of an arch, and so
+forth. But on account of the peculiarity of the knowledge
+of perception just referred to, that it only extends
+to what is immediately present, the mere understanding
+can never enable us to construct machines and buildings.
+Here reason must come in; it must substitute abstract
+concepts for ideas of perception, and take them as the
+guide of action; and if they are right, the anticipated
+result will happen. In the same way we have perfect
+knowledge in pure perception of the nature and constitution
+of the parabola, hyperbola, and spiral; but if we are
+to make trustworthy application of this knowledge to the
+real, it must first become abstract knowledge, and by this
+it certainly loses its character of intuition or perception,
+but on the other hand it gains the certainty and preciseness
+of abstract knowledge. The differential calculus
+does not really extend our knowledge of the curve, it contains
+nothing that was not already in the mere pure
+perception of the curve; but it alters the kind of knowledge,
+it changes the intuitive into an abstract knowledge,
+which is so valuable for application. But here we must
+refer to another peculiarity of our faculty of knowledge,
+which could not be observed until the distinction between
+the knowledge of the senses and understanding and
+abstract knowledge had been made quite clear. It is
+this, that relations of space cannot as such be directly
+translated into abstract knowledge, but only temporal
+quantities,&mdash;that is, numbers, are suitable for this.
+<pb n='070'/><anchor id='Pg070'/>
+Numbers alone can be expressed in abstract concepts
+which accurately correspond to them, not spacial quantities.
+The concept <q>thousand</q> is just as different from
+the concept <q>ten,</q> as both these temporal quantities are
+in perception. We think of a thousand as a distinct
+multiple of ten, into which we can resolve it at pleasure
+for perception in time,&mdash;that is to say, we can count it.
+But between the abstract concept of a mile and that of a
+foot, apart from any concrete perception of either, and
+without the help of number, there is no accurate distinction
+corresponding to the quantities themselves. In
+both we only think of a spacial quantity in general, and if
+they must be completely distinguished we are compelled
+either to call in the assistance of intuition or perception
+in space, which would be a departure from abstract
+knowledge, or we must think the difference in <emph>numbers</emph>.
+If then we wish to have abstract knowledge of space-relations
+we must first translate them into time-relations,&mdash;that
+is, into numbers; therefore only arithmetic, and
+not geometry, is the universal science of quantity, and
+geometry must be translated into arithmetic if it is to
+be communicable, accurately precise and applicable in
+practice. It is true that a space-relation as such may
+also be thought in the abstract; for example, <q>the
+sine increases as the angle,</q> but if the quantity of this
+relation is to be given, it requires number for its expression.
+This necessity, that if we wish to have abstract
+knowledge of space-relations (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, rational knowledge,
+not mere intuition or perception), space with its three
+dimensions must be translated into time which has only
+one dimension, this necessity it is, which makes mathematics
+so difficult. This becomes very clear if we
+compare the perception of curves with their analytical
+calculation, or the table of logarithms of the trigonometrical
+functions with the perception of the changing
+relations of the parts of a triangle, which are expressed by
+them. What vast mazes of figures, what laborious calculations
+<pb n='071'/><anchor id='Pg071'/>
+it would require to express in the abstract what
+perception here apprehends at a glance completely and
+with perfect accuracy, namely, how the co-sine diminishes
+as the sine increases, how the co-sine of one angle is the
+sine of another, the inverse relation of the increase and
+decrease of the two angles, and so forth. How time, we
+might say, must complain, that with its one dimension it
+should be compelled to express the three dimensions of
+space! Yet this is necessary if we wish to possess, for
+application, an expression, in abstract concepts, of space-relations.
+They could not be translated directly into
+abstract concepts, but only through the medium of the
+pure temporal quantity, number, which alone is directly
+related to abstract knowledge. Yet it is worthy of remark,
+that as space adapts itself so well to perception,
+and by means of its three dimensions, even its complicated
+relations are easily apprehended, while it eludes
+the grasp of abstract knowledge; time, on the contrary,
+passes easily into abstract knowledge, but gives very little
+to perception. Our perceptions of numbers in their
+proper element, mere time, without the help of space,
+scarcely extends as far as ten, and beyond that we have
+only abstract concepts of numbers, no knowledge of them
+which can be presented in perception. On the other hand,
+we connect with every numeral, and with all algebraical
+symbols, accurately defined abstract concepts.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We may further remark here that some minds only
+find full satisfaction in what is known through perception.
+What they seek is the reason and consequent of
+being in space, sensuously expressed; a demonstration
+after the manner of Euclid, or an arithmetical solution of
+spacial problems, does not please them. Other minds,
+on the contrary, seek merely the abstract concepts which
+are needful for applying and communicating knowledge.
+They have patience and memory for abstract principles,
+formulas, demonstrations in long trains of reasoning, and
+calculations, in which the symbols represent the most
+<pb n='072'/><anchor id='Pg072'/>
+complicated abstractions. The latter seek preciseness,
+the former sensible perception. The difference is characteristic.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The greatest value of rational or abstract knowledge is
+that it can be communicated and permanently retained.
+It is principally on this account that it is so inestimably
+important for practice. Any one may have a direct
+perceptive knowledge through the understanding alone,
+of the causal connection, of the changes and motions of
+natural bodies, and he may find entire satisfaction in
+it; but he cannot communicate this knowledge to others
+until it has been made permanent for thought in concepts.
+Knowledge of the first kind is even sufficient for practice,
+if a man puts his knowledge into practice himself, in an
+action which can be accomplished while the perception is
+still vivid; but it is not sufficient if the help of others
+is required, or even if the action is his own but must
+be carried out at different times, and therefore requires
+a pre-conceived plan. Thus, for example, a practised
+billiard-player may have a perfect knowledge of the laws
+of the impact of elastic bodies upon each other, merely
+in the understanding, merely for direct perception; and
+for him it is quite sufficient; but on the other hand it
+is only the man who has studied the science of mechanics,
+who has, properly speaking, a rational knowledge
+of these laws, that is, a knowledge of them in the
+abstract. Such knowledge of the understanding in perception
+is sufficient even for the construction of machines,
+when the inventor of the machine executes the work
+himself; as we often see in the case of talented workmen,
+who have no scientific knowledge. But whenever a
+number of men, and their united action taking place at
+different times, is required for the completion of a mechanical
+work, of a machine, or a building, then he who conducts
+it must have thought out the plan in the abstract, and
+such co-operative activity is only possible through the
+assistance of reason. It is, however, remarkable that in
+<pb n='073'/><anchor id='Pg073'/>
+the first kind of activity, in which we have supposed
+that one man alone, in an uninterrupted course of action,
+accomplishes something, abstract knowledge, the application
+of reason or reflection, may often be a hindrance
+to him; for example, in the case of billiard-playing, of
+fighting, of tuning an instrument, or in the case of singing.
+Here perceptive knowledge must directly guide
+action; its passage through reflection makes it uncertain,
+for it divides the attention and confuses the man. Thus
+savages and untaught men, who are little accustomed
+to think, perform certain physical exercises, fight with
+beasts, shoot with bows and arrows and the like, with a
+certainty and rapidity which the reflecting European
+never attains to, just because his deliberation makes him
+hesitate and delay. For he tries, for example, to hit the
+right position or the right point of time, by finding out
+the mean between two false extremes; while the savage
+hits it directly without thinking of the false courses open
+to him. In the same way it is of no use to me to know
+in the abstract the exact angle, in degrees and minutes,
+at which I must apply a razor, if I do not know it intuitively,
+that is, if I have not got it in my touch. The
+knowledge of physiognomy also, is interfered with by the
+application of reason. This knowledge must be gained
+directly through the understanding. We say that the
+expression, the meaning of the features, can only be
+<emph>felt</emph>, that is, it cannot be put into abstract concepts.
+Every man has his direct intuitive method of physiognomy
+and pathognomy, yet one man understands more
+clearly than another these <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>signatura rerum</foreign>. But an
+abstract science of physiognomy to be taught and learned
+is not possible; for the distinctions of difference are here
+so fine that concepts cannot reach them; therefore abstract
+knowledge is related to them as a mosaic is to a
+painting by a Van der Werft or a Denner. In mosaics,
+however fine they may be, the limits of the stones are
+always there, and therefore no continuous passage from
+<pb n='074'/><anchor id='Pg074'/>
+one colour to another is possible, and this is also the
+case with regard to concepts, with their rigidity and
+sharp delineation; however finely we may divide them
+by exact definition, they are still incapable of reaching
+the finer modifications of the perceptible, and this is just
+what happens in the example we have taken, knowledge
+of physiognomy.<note place='foot'>I am therefore of opinion that
+a science of physiognomy cannot,
+with certainty, go further than to
+lay down a few quite general rules.
+For example, the intellectual qualities
+are to be read in the forehead
+and the eyes; the moral qualities,
+the expression of will, in the mouth
+and lower part of the face. The
+forehead and the eyes interpret each
+other; either of them seen alone
+can only be half understood. Genius
+is never without a high, broad, finely-arched
+brow; but such a brow often
+occurs where there is no genius. A
+clever-looking person may the more
+certainly be judged to be so the
+uglier the face is; and a stupid-looking
+person may the more certainly
+be judged to be stupid the
+more beautiful the face is; for
+beauty, as the approximation to the
+type of humanity, carries in and for
+itself the expression of mental clearness;
+the opposite is the case with
+ugliness, and so forth.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This quality of concepts by which they resemble the
+stones of a mosaic, and on account of which perception
+always remains their asymptote, is also the reason why
+nothing good is produced in art by their means. If the
+singer or the virtuoso attempts to guide his execution
+by reflection he remains silent. And this is equally
+true of the composer, the painter, and the poet. The
+concept always remains unfruitful in art; it can only
+direct the technical part of it, its sphere is science. We
+shall consider more fully in the third book, why all true
+art proceeds from sensuous knowledge, never from the
+concept. Indeed, with regard to behaviour also, and
+personal agreeableness in society, the concept has only a
+negative value in restraining the grosser manifestations
+of egotism and brutality; so that a polished manner is
+its commendable production. But all that is attractive,
+gracious, charming in behaviour, all affectionateness and
+friendliness, must not proceed from the concepts, for if it
+does, <q>we feel intention, and are put out of tune.</q> All
+dissimulation is the work of reflection; but it cannot
+be maintained constantly and without interruption: <q><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nemo
+<pb n='075'/><anchor id='Pg075'/>
+potest personam diu ferre fictum</foreign>,</q> says Seneca in his book
+<foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>de clementia</foreign>; and so it is generally found out and loses
+its effect. Reason is needed in the full stress of life,
+where quick conclusions, bold action, rapid and sure
+comprehension are required, but it may easily spoil all if
+it gains the upper hand, and by perplexing hinders the
+intuitive, direct discovery, and grasp of the right by
+simple understanding, and thus induces irresolution.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Lastly, virtue and holiness do not proceed from
+reflection, but from the inner depths of the will, and its
+relation to knowledge. The exposition of this belongs to
+another part of our work; this, however, I may remark
+here, that the dogmas relating to ethics may be the same
+in the reason of whole nations, but the action of every
+individual different; and the converse also holds good;
+action, we say, is guided by <emph>feelings</emph>,&mdash;that is, simply not
+by concepts, but as a matter of fact by the ethical
+character. Dogmas occupy the idle reason; but action
+in the end pursues its own course independently of
+them, generally not according to abstract rules, but
+according to unspoken maxims, the expression of which
+is the whole man himself. Therefore, however different
+the religious dogmas of nations may be, yet in the case
+of all of them, a good action is accompanied by unspeakable
+satisfaction, and a bad action by endless
+remorse. No mockery can shake the former; no priest's
+absolution can deliver from the latter. Notwithstanding
+this, we must allow, that for the pursuit of a virtuous
+life, the application of reason is needful; only it is not
+its source, but has the subordinate function of preserving
+resolutions which have been made, of providing maxims
+to withstand the weakness of the moment, and give consistency
+to action. It plays the same part ultimately
+in art also, where it has just as little to do with the
+essential matter, but assists in carrying it out, for genius
+is not always at call, and yet the work must be completed
+in all its parts and rounded off to a whole.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<pb n='076'/><anchor id='Pg076'/>
+
+<p>
+§ 13. All these discussions of the advantages and disadvantages
+of the application of reason are intended to
+show, that although abstract rational knowledge is the
+reflex of ideas of perception, and is founded on them, it
+is by no means in such entire congruity with them that
+it could everywhere take their place: indeed it never
+corresponds to them quite accurately. And thus, as we
+have seen, many human actions can only be performed
+by the help of reason and deliberation, and yet there are
+some which are better performed without its assistance.
+This very incongruity of sensuous and abstract knowledge,
+on account of which the latter always merely
+approximates to the former, as mosaic approximates to
+painting, is the cause of a very remarkable phenomenon
+which, like reason itself, is peculiar to human nature,
+and of which the explanations that have ever anew been
+attempted, are insufficient: I mean <emph>laughter</emph>. On account
+of the source of this phenomenon, we cannot avoid giving
+the explanation of it here, though it again interrupts the
+course of our work to do so. The cause of laughter in
+every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity
+between a concept and the real objects which
+have been thought through it in some relation, and
+laughter itself is just the expression of this incongruity.
+It often occurs in this way: two or more real objects are
+thought through <emph>one</emph> concept, and the identity of the concept
+is transferred to the objects; it then becomes
+strikingly apparent from the entire difference of the
+objects in other respects, that the concept was only
+applicable to them from a one-sided point of view. It
+occurs just as often, however, that the incongruity between
+a single real object and the concept under which, from
+one point of view, it has rightly been subsumed, is
+suddenly felt. Now the more correct the subsumption
+of such objects under a concept may be from one point
+of view, and the greater and more glaring their incongruity
+with it, from another point of view, the greater is
+<pb n='077'/><anchor id='Pg077'/>
+the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast.
+All laughter then is occasioned by a paradox, and
+therefore by unexpected subsumption, whether this is
+expressed in words or in actions. This, briefly stated, is
+the true explanation of the ludicrous.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I shall not pause here to relate anecdotes as examples
+to illustrate my theory; for it is so simple and comprehensible
+that it does not require them, and everything
+ludicrous which the reader may remember is equally
+valuable as a proof of it. But the theory is confirmed
+and illustrated by distinguishing two species into which
+the ludicrous is divided, and which result from the
+theory. Either, we have previously known two or more
+very different real objects, ideas of sense-perception, and
+have intentionally identified them through the unity of a
+concept which comprehends them both; this species of
+the ludicrous is called <emph>wit</emph>. Or, conversely, the concept
+is first present in knowledge, and we pass from it to
+reality, and to operation upon it, to action: objects
+which in other respects are fundamentally different, but
+which are all thought in that one concept, are now
+regarded and treated in the same way, till, to the surprise
+and astonishment of the person acting, the great
+difference of their other aspects appears: this species of the
+ludicrous is called <emph>folly</emph>. Therefore everything ludicrous
+is either a flash of wit or a foolish action, according as
+the procedure has been from the discrepancy of the
+objects to the identity of the concept, or the converse;
+the former always intentional, the latter always unintentional,
+and from without. To seem to reverse the
+starting-point, and to conceal wit with the mask of folly,
+is the art of the jester and the clown. Being quite aware
+of the diversity of the objects, the jester unites them,
+with secret wit, under one concept, and then starting
+from this concept he receives from the subsequently
+discovered diversity of the objects the surprise which
+he himself prepared. It follows from this short but
+<pb n='078'/><anchor id='Pg078'/>
+sufficient theory of the ludicrous, that, if we set aside the
+last case, that of the jester, wit must always show itself
+in words, folly generally in actions, though also in words,
+when it only expresses an intention and does not actually
+carry it out, or when it shows itself merely in judgments
+and opinions.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<emph>Pedantry</emph> is a form of folly. It arises in this way: a
+man lacks confidence in his own understanding, and,
+therefore, does not wish to trust to it, to recognise what
+is right directly in the particular case. He, therefore,
+puts it entirely under the control of the reason, and
+seeks to be guided by reason in everything; that is to
+say, he tries always to proceed from general concepts,
+rules, and maxims, and to confine himself strictly to
+them in life, in art, and even in moral conduct. Hence
+that clinging to the form, to the manner, to the expression
+and word which is characteristic of pedantry,
+and which with it takes the place of the real nature of
+the matter. The incongruity then between the concept
+and reality soon shows itself here, and it becomes
+evident that the former never condescends to the particular
+case, and that with its generality and rigid
+definiteness it can never accurately apply to the fine
+distinctions of difference and innumerable modifications
+of the actual. Therefore, the pedant, with his general
+maxims, almost always misses the mark in life, shows
+himself to be foolish, awkward, useless. In art, in
+which the concept is unfruitful, he produces lifeless, stiff,
+abortive mannerisms. Even with regard to ethics, the
+purpose to act rightly or nobly cannot always be carried
+out in accordance with abstract maxims; for in many
+cases the excessively nice distinctions in the nature of
+the circumstances necessitate a choice of the right proceeding
+directly from the character; for the application
+of mere abstract maxims sometimes gives false results,
+because the maxims only half apply; and sometimes
+cannot be carried out, because they are foreign to the
+<pb n='079'/><anchor id='Pg079'/>
+individual character of the actor, and this never allows
+itself to be entirely discovered; therefore, inconsistencies
+arise. Since then Kant makes it a condition of the
+moral worth of an action, that it shall proceed from pure
+rational abstract maxims, without any inclination or
+momentary emotion, we cannot entirely absolve him
+from the reproach of encouraging moral pedantry.
+This reproach is the significance of Schiller's epigram,
+entitled <q>Scruples of Conscience.</q> When we speak,
+especially in connection with politics, of doctrinaires,
+theorists, savants, and so forth, we mean pedants, that is,
+persons who know the things well in the abstract, but not
+in the concrete. Abstraction consists in thinking away
+the less general predicates; but it is precisely upon these
+that so much depends in practice.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+To complete our theory it remains for us to mention a
+spurious kind of wit, the play upon words, the <foreign rend='italic'>calembourg</foreign>,
+the pun, to which may be added the equivocation, the
+<emph>double entendre</emph>, the chief use of which is the expression
+of what is obscene. Just as the witticism brings two
+very different real objects under one concept, the pun
+brings two different concepts, by the assistance of
+accident, under one word. The same contrast appears,
+only familiar and more superficial, because it does not
+spring from the nature of things, but merely from the
+accident of nomenclature. In the case of the witticism
+the identity is in the concept, the difference in the
+reality, but in the case of the pun the difference is in
+the concepts and the identity in the reality, for the
+terminology is here the reality. It would only be a somewhat
+far-fetched comparison if we were to say that the
+pun is related to the witticism as the parabola (<foreign rend='italic'>sic</foreign>) of
+the upper inverted cone to that of the lower. The misunderstanding
+of the word or the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>quid pro quo</foreign> is the
+unintentional pun, and is related to it exactly as folly is
+to wit. Thus the deaf man often affords occasion for
+laughter, just as much as the fool, and inferior writers
+<pb n='080'/><anchor id='Pg080'/>
+of comedy often use the former for the latter to raise a
+laugh.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I have treated laughter here only from the psychical
+side; with regard to the physical side, I refer to what is
+said on the subject in the <q>Parerga,</q> vol. II. ch. vi., § 98.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 14. By means of these various discussions it is
+hoped that both the difference and the relation between
+the process of knowledge that belongs to the reason,
+rational knowledge, the concept on the one hand, and the
+direct knowledge in purely sensuous, mathematical intuition
+or perception, and apprehension by the understanding
+on the other hand, has been clearly brought out.
+This remarkable relation of our kinds of knowledge led
+us almost inevitably to give, in passing, explanations of
+feeling and of laughter, but from all this we now turn back
+to the further consideration of science as the third great
+benefit which reason confers on man, the other two being
+speech and deliberate action. The general discussion of
+science which now devolves upon us, will be concerned
+partly with its form, partly with the foundation of its
+judgments, and lastly with its content.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We have seen that, with the exception of the basis of
+pure logic, rational knowledge in general has not its
+source in the reason itself; but having been otherwise
+obtained as knowledge of perception, it is stored up in
+the reason, for through reason it has entirely changed its
+character, and has become abstract knowledge. All
+rational knowledge, that is, knowledge that has been
+raised to consciousness in the abstract, is related to
+science strictly so called, as a fragment to the whole.
+Every one has gained a rational knowledge of many
+different things through experience, through consideration
+of the individual objects presented to him, but only
+he who sets himself the task of acquiring a complete
+knowledge in the abstract of a particular class of objects,
+strives after science. This class can only be marked off
+<pb n='081'/><anchor id='Pg081'/>
+by means of a concept; therefore, at the beginning of
+every science there stands a concept, and by means of
+it the class of objects concerning which this science
+promises a complete knowledge in the abstract, is separated
+in thought from the whole world of things. For
+example, the concept of space-relations, or of the action
+of unorganised bodies upon each other, or of the nature
+of plants, or of animals, or of the successive changes of
+the surface of the globe, or of the changes of the human
+race as a whole, or of the construction of a language,
+and so forth. If science sought to obtain the knowledge
+of its object, by investigating each individual thing
+that is thought through the concept, till by degrees
+it had learned the whole, no human memory would be
+equal to the task, and no certainty of completeness would
+be obtainable. Therefore, it makes use of that property
+of concept-spheres explained above, that they include
+each other, and it concerns itself mainly with the wider
+spheres which lie within the concept of its object in
+general. When the relations of these spheres to each
+other have been determined, all that is thought in them
+is also generally determined, and can now be more and
+more accurately determined by the separation of smaller
+and smaller concept-spheres. In this way it is possible
+for a science to comprehend its object completely. This
+path which it follows to knowledge, the path from the
+general to the particular, distinguishes it from ordinary
+rational knowledge; therefore, systematic form is an
+essential and characteristic feature of science. The
+combination of the most general concept-spheres of every
+science, that is, the knowledge of its first principles, is
+the indispensable condition of mastering it; how far we
+advance from these to the more special propositions is a
+matter of choice, and does not increase the thoroughness
+but only the extent of our knowledge of the science.
+The number of the first principles to which all the rest
+are subordinated, varies greatly in the different sciences,
+<pb n='082'/><anchor id='Pg082'/>
+so that in some there is more subordination, in others
+more co-ordination; and in this respect, the former make
+greater claims upon the judgment, the latter upon the
+memory. It was known to the schoolmen,<note place='foot'>Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.</note> that, as the
+syllogism requires two premises, no science can proceed
+from a single first principle which cannot be the subject
+of further deduction, but must have several, at least two.
+The specially classifying sciences: Zoology, Botany, and
+also Physics and Chemistry, inasmuch as they refer all
+inorganic action to a few fundamental forces, have most
+subordination; history, on the other hand, has really none
+at all; for the general in it consists merely in the survey
+of the principal periods, from which, however, the particular
+events cannot be deduced, and are only subordinated
+to them according to time, but according to the concept
+are co-ordinate with them. Therefore, history, strictly
+speaking, is certainly rational knowledge, but is not
+science. In mathematics, according to Euclid's treatment,
+the axioms alone are indemonstrable first principles,
+and all demonstrations are in gradation strictly subordinated
+to them. But this method of treatment is not
+essential to mathematics, and in fact each proposition
+introduces quite a new space construction, which in itself
+is independent of those which precede it, and indeed can
+be completely comprehended from itself, quite independently
+of them, in the pure intuition or perception of
+space, in which the most complicated construction is just
+as directly evident as the axiom; but of this more fully
+hereafter. Meanwhile every mathematical proposition remains
+always a universal truth, which is valid for innumerable
+particular cases; and a graduated process from the
+simple to the complicated propositions which are to be
+deduced from them, is also essential to mathematics; therefore,
+in every respect mathematics is a science. The completeness
+of a science as such, that is, in respect of form,
+consists in there being as much subordination and as little
+<pb n='083'/><anchor id='Pg083'/>
+co-ordination of the principles as possible. Scientific
+talent in general is, therefore, the faculty of subordinating
+the concept-spheres according to their different determinations,
+so that, as Plato repeatedly counsels, a science shall
+not be constituted by a general concept and an indefinite
+multiplicity immediately under it, but that knowledge
+shall descend by degrees from the general to the particular,
+through intermediate concepts and divisions,
+according to closer and closer definitions. In Kantian
+language this is called satisfying equally the law of
+homogeneity and that of specification. It arises from
+this peculiar nature of scientific completeness, that the
+aim of science is not greater certainty&mdash;for certainty
+may be possessed in just as high a degree by the most
+disconnected particular knowledge&mdash;but its aim is rather
+the facilitating of rational knowledge by means of its
+form, and the possibility of the completeness of rational
+knowledge which this form affords. It is therefore a
+very prevalent but perverted opinion that the scientific
+character of knowledge consists in its greater certainty,
+and just as false is the conclusion following from this,
+that, strictly speaking, the only sciences are mathematics
+and logic, because only in them, on account of their
+purely <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> character, is there unassailable certainty
+of knowledge. This advantage cannot be denied them,
+but it gives them no special claim to be regarded as
+sciences; for the special characteristic of science does
+not lie in certainty but in the systematic form of knowledge,
+based on the gradual descent from the general
+to the particular. The process of knowledge from the
+general to the particular, which is peculiar to the sciences,
+involves the necessity that in the sciences much should
+be established by deduction from preceding propositions,
+that is to say, by demonstration; and this has given rise
+to the old mistake that only what has been demonstrated is
+absolutely true, and that every truth requires a demonstration;
+whereas, on the contrary, every demonstration
+<pb n='084'/><anchor id='Pg084'/>
+requires an undemonstrated truth, which ultimately supports
+it, or it may be, its own demonstration. Therefore
+a directly established truth is as much to be preferred to
+a truth established by demonstration as water from the
+spring is to water from the aqueduct. Perception, partly
+pure <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, as it forms the basis of mathematics, partly
+empirical <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign>, as it forms the basis of all the other
+sciences, is the source of all truth and the foundation of
+all science. (Logic alone is to be excepted, which is not
+founded upon perception but yet upon <emph>direct</emph> knowledge
+by the reason of its own laws.) Not the demonstrated
+judgments nor their demonstrations, but judgments which
+are created directly out of perception, and founded upon
+it rather than on any demonstrations, are to science what
+the sun is to the world; for all light proceeds from them,
+and lighted by their light the others give light also. To
+establish the truth of such primary judgments directly
+from perception, to raise such strongholds of science from
+the innumerable multitude of real objects, that is the
+work of the <emph>faculty of judgment</emph>, which consists in the
+power of rightly and accurately carrying over into abstract
+consciousness what is known in perception, and judgment
+is consequently the mediator between understanding and
+reason. Only extraordinary and exceptional strength of
+judgment in the individual can actually advance science;
+but every one who is possessed of a healthy reason is able
+to deduce propositions from propositions, to demonstrate,
+to draw conclusions. To lay down and make permanent
+for reflection, in suitable concepts, what is known through
+perception, so that, on the one hand, what is common to
+many real objects is thought through <emph>one</emph> concept, and,
+on the other hand, their points of difference are each
+thought through one concept, so that the different shall
+be known and thought as different in spite of a partial
+agreement, and the identical shall be known and thought
+as identical in spite of a partial difference, all in accordance
+with the end and intention which in each case
+<pb n='085'/><anchor id='Pg085'/>
+is in view; all this is done by the <emph>faculty of judgment</emph>.
+Deficiency in judgment is <emph>silliness</emph>. The silly man fails
+to grasp, now the partial or relative difference of concepts
+which in one aspect are identical, now the identity
+of concepts which are relatively or partially different. To
+this explanation of the faculty of judgment, moreover,
+Kant's division of it into reflecting and subsuming judgment
+may be applied, according as it passes from the
+perceived objects to the concepts, or from the latter to
+the former; in both cases always mediating between empirical
+knowledge of the understanding and the reflective
+knowledge of the reason. There can be no truth which
+could be brought out by means of syllogisms alone;
+and the necessity of establishing truth by means of
+syllogisms is merely relative, indeed subjective. Since all
+demonstration is syllogistic, in the case of a new truth
+we must first seek, not for a demonstration, but for direct
+evidence, and only in the absence of such evidence is a
+demonstration to be temporarily made use of. No science
+is susceptible of demonstration throughout any more than
+a building can stand in the air; all its demonstrations
+must ultimately rest upon what is perceived, and consequently
+cannot be demonstrated, for the whole world
+of reflection rests upon and is rooted in the world of
+perception. All primal, that is, original, <emph>evidence</emph> is a
+<emph>perception</emph>, as the word itself indicates. Therefore it
+is either empirical or founded upon the perception <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a
+priori</foreign> of the conditions of possible experience. In both
+cases it affords only immanent, not transcendent knowledge.
+Every concept has its worth and its existence
+only in its relation, sometimes very indirect, to an idea
+of perception; what is true of the concepts is also true
+of the judgments constructed out of them, and of all
+science. Therefore it must in some way be possible to
+know directly without demonstrations or syllogisms every
+truth that is arrived at through syllogisms and communicated
+by demonstrations. This is most difficult in the
+<pb n='086'/><anchor id='Pg086'/>
+case of certain complicated mathematical propositions
+at which we only arrive by chains of syllogisms; for
+example, the calculation of the chords and tangents to
+all arcs by deduction from the proposition of Pythagoras.
+But even such a truth as this cannot essentially and
+solely rest upon abstract principles, and the space-relations
+which lie at its foundation also must be capable of
+being so presented <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> in pure intuition or perception
+that the truth of their abstract expression is directly
+established. But of mathematical demonstration we shall
+speak more fully shortly.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is true we often hear men speak in a lofty strain
+of sciences which rest entirely upon correct conclusions
+drawn from sure premises, and which are consequently
+unassailable. But through pure logical reasoning, however
+true the premises may be, we shall never receive
+more than an articulate expression and exposition of
+what lies already complete in the premises; thus we
+shall only <emph>explicitly</emph> expound what was already <emph>implicitly</emph>
+understood. The esteemed sciences referred to are,
+however, specially the mathematical sciences, particularly
+astronomy. But the certainty of astronomy arises from
+the fact that it has for its basis the intuition or perception
+of space, which is given <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, and is therefore
+infallible. All space-relations, however, follow from
+each other with a necessity (ground of being) which
+affords <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> certainty, and they can therefore be
+safely deduced from each other. To these mathematical
+properties we have only to add one force of nature,
+gravity, which acts precisely in relation to the masses
+and the square of the distance; and, lastly, the law of
+inertia, which follows from the law of causality and is
+therefore true <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, and with it the empirical datum
+of the motion impressed, once for all, upon each of these
+masses. This is the whole material of astronomy, which
+both by its simplicity and its certainty leads to definite
+results, which are highly interesting on account of the
+<pb n='087'/><anchor id='Pg087'/>
+vastness and importance of the objects. For example, if
+I know the mass of a planet and the distance of its
+satellite from it, I can tell with certainty the period of
+the revolution of the latter according to Kepler's second
+law. But the ground of this law is, that with this
+distance only this velocity will both chain the satellite to
+the planet and prevent it from falling into it. Thus it is
+only upon such a geometrical basis, that is, by means of
+an intuition or perception <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, and also under the
+application of a law of nature, that much can be arrived
+at by means of syllogisms, for here they are merely like
+bridges from <emph>one</emph> sensuous apprehension to others; but it
+is not so with mere pure syllogistic reasoning in the
+exclusively logical method. The source of the first
+fundamental truths of astronomy is, however, properly
+induction, that is, the comprehension of what is given
+in many perceptions in one true and directly founded
+judgment. From this, hypotheses are afterwards constructed,
+and their confirmation by experience, as induction
+approaching to completeness, affords the proof of the
+first judgment. For example, the apparent motion of
+the planets is known empirically; after many false
+hypotheses with regard to the spacial connection of this
+motion (planetary course) the right one was at last found,
+then the laws which it obeyed (the laws of Kepler), and,
+lastly, the cause of these laws (universal gravitation),
+and the empirically known agreement of all observed
+cases with the whole of the hypotheses, and with their
+consequences, that is to say, induction, established them
+with complete certainty. The invention of the hypotheses
+was the work of the judgment, which rightly
+comprehended the given facts and expressed them
+accordingly; but induction, that is, a multitude of perceptions,
+confirmed their truth. But their truth could
+also be known directly, and by a single empirical perception,
+if we could pass freely through space and had
+telescopic eyes. Therefore, here also syllogisms are not
+<pb n='088'/><anchor id='Pg088'/>
+the essential and only source of knowledge, but really
+only a makeshift.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As a third example taken from a different sphere we
+may mention that the so-called metaphysical truths, that
+is, such truths as those to which Kant assigns the
+position of the metaphysical first principles of natural
+science, do not owe their evidence to demonstration.
+What is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> certain we know directly; as the form
+of all knowledge, it is known to us with the most complete
+necessity. For example, that matter is permanent, that is,
+can neither come into being nor pass away, we know directly
+as negative truth; for our pure intuition or perception of
+space and time gives the possibility of motion; in the
+law of causality the understanding affords us the possibility
+of change of form and quality, but we lack powers
+of the imagination for conceiving the coming into being
+or passing away of matter. Therefore that truth has at
+all times been evident to all men everywhere, nor has
+it ever been seriously doubted; and this could not be the
+case if it had no other ground of knowledge than the
+abstruse and exceedingly subtle proof of Kant. But
+besides this, I have found Kant's proof to be false (as is
+explained in the Appendix), and have shown above that
+the permanence of matter is to be deduced, not from
+the share which time has in the possibility of experience,
+but from the share which belongs to space. The true
+foundation of all truths which in this sense are called
+metaphysical, that is, abstract expressions of the necessary
+and universal forms of knowledge, cannot itself lie
+in abstract principles; but only in the immediate consciousness
+of the forms of the idea communicating itself
+in apodictic assertions <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, and fearing no refutation.
+But if we yet desire to give a proof of them, it can only
+consist in showing that what is to be proved is contained
+in some truth about which there is no doubt, either as a
+part of it or as a presupposition. Thus, for example,
+I have shown that all empirical perception implies the
+<pb n='089'/><anchor id='Pg089'/>
+application of the law of causality, the knowledge of
+which is hence a condition of all experience, and therefore
+cannot be first given and conditioned through experience
+as Hume thought. Demonstrations in general
+are not so much for those who wish to learn as for those
+who wish to dispute. Such persons stubbornly deny
+directly established insight; now only the truth can be
+consistent in all directions, and therefore we must show
+such persons that they admit under <emph>one</emph> form and
+indirectly, what they deny under another form and
+directly; that is, the logically necessary connection
+between what is denied and what is admitted.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is also a consequence of the scientific form, the
+subordination of everything particular under a general,
+and so on always to what is more general, that the truth
+of many propositions is only logically proved,&mdash;that is,
+through their dependence upon other propositions, through
+syllogisms, which at the same time appear as proofs.
+But we must never forget that this whole form of science
+is merely a means of rendering knowledge more easy, not
+a means to greater certainty. It is easier to discover the
+nature of an animal, by means of the species to which
+it belongs, and so on through the genus, family, order,
+and class, than to examine on every occasion the animal
+presented to us: but the truth of all propositions arrived
+at syllogistically is always conditioned by and ultimately
+dependent upon some truth which rests not upon reasoning
+but upon perception. If this perception were always
+as much within our reach as a deduction through syllogisms,
+then it would be in every respect preferable. For
+every deduction from concepts is exposed to great danger
+of error, on account of the fact we have considered above,
+that so many spheres lie partly within each other, and
+that their content is often vague or uncertain. This is
+illustrated by a multitude of demonstrations of false
+doctrines and sophisms of every kind. Syllogisms are
+indeed perfectly certain as regards form, but they are
+<pb n='090'/><anchor id='Pg090'/>
+very uncertain on account of their matter, the concepts.
+For, on the one hand, the spheres of these are not
+sufficiently sharply defined, and, on the other hand, they
+intersect each other in so many ways that one sphere is
+in part contained in many others, and we may pass at
+will from it to one or another of these, and from this
+sphere again to others, as we have already shown. Or,
+in other words, the minor term and also the middle
+can always be subordinated to different concepts, from
+which we may choose at will the major and the middle,
+and the nature of the conclusion depends on this choice.
+Consequently immediate evidence is always much to be
+preferred to reasoned truth, and the latter is only to be
+accepted when the former is too remote, and not when
+it is as near or indeed nearer than the latter. Accordingly
+we saw above that, as a matter of fact, in the case
+of logic, in which the immediate knowledge in each
+individual case lies nearer to hand than deduced scientific
+knowledge, we always conduct our thought according to
+our immediate knowledge of the laws of thought, and
+leave logic unused.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 15. If now with our conviction that perception is the
+primary source of all evidence, and that only direct or
+indirect connection with it is absolute truth; and further,
+that the shortest way to this is always the surest, as
+every interposition of concepts means exposure to many
+deceptions; if, I say, we now turn with this conviction
+to mathematics, as it was established as a science by
+Euclid, and has remained as a whole to our own day, we
+cannot help regarding the method it adopts, as strange
+and indeed perverted. We ask that every logical proof
+shall be traced back to an origin in perception; but
+mathematics, on the contrary, is at great pains deliberately
+to throw away the evidence of perception which is
+peculiar to it, and always at hand, that it may substitute
+for it a logical demonstration. This must seem to us
+<pb n='091'/><anchor id='Pg091'/>
+like the action of a man who cuts off his legs in order to
+go on crutches, or like that of the prince in the <q><hi rend='italic'>Triumph
+der Empfindsamkeit</hi></q> who flees from the beautiful reality
+of nature, to delight in a stage scene that imitates it. I
+must here refer to what I have said in the sixth chapter
+of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, and
+take for granted that it is fresh and present in the
+memory of the reader; so that I may link my observations
+on to it without explaining again the difference
+between the mere ground of knowledge of a mathematical
+truth, which can be given logically, and the ground of
+being, which is the immediate connection of the parts of
+space and time, known only in perception. It is only
+insight into the ground of being that secures satisfaction
+and thorough knowledge. The mere ground of knowledge
+must always remain superficial; it can afford us
+indeed rational knowledge <emph>that</emph> a thing is as it is, but it
+cannot tell <emph>why</emph> it is so. Euclid chose the latter way to
+the obvious detriment of the science. For just at the
+beginning, for example, when he ought to show once for
+all how in a triangle the angles and sides reciprocally
+determine each other, and stand to each other in
+the relation of reason and consequent, in accordance
+with the form which the principle of sufficient reason
+has in pure space, and which there, as in every other
+sphere, always affords the necessity that a thing is as it
+is, because something quite different from it, is as it is;
+instead of in this way giving a thorough insight into the
+nature of the triangle, he sets up certain disconnected
+arbitrarily chosen propositions concerning the triangle,
+and gives a logical ground of knowledge of them, through
+a laborious logical demonstration, based upon the
+principle of contradiction. Instead of an exhaustive
+knowledge of these space-relations we therefore receive
+merely certain results of them, imparted to us at
+pleasure, and in fact we are very much in the position
+of a man to whom the different effects of an ingenious
+<pb n='092'/><anchor id='Pg092'/>
+machine are shown, but from whom its inner connection
+and construction are withheld. We are compelled by
+the principle of contradiction to admit that what Euclid
+demonstrates is true, but we do not comprehend <emph>why</emph> it
+is so. We have therefore almost the same uncomfortable
+feeling that we experience after a juggling trick, and, in
+fact, most of Euclid's demonstrations are remarkably like
+such feats. The truth almost always enters by the back
+door, for it manifests itself <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per accidens</foreign> through some
+contingent circumstance. Often a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>reductio ad absurdum</foreign>
+shuts all the doors one after another, until only one is
+left through which we are therefore compelled to enter.
+Often, as in the proposition of Pythagoras, lines are
+drawn, we don't know why, and it afterwards appears
+that they were traps which close unexpectedly and take
+prisoner the assent of the astonished learner, who must
+now admit what remains wholly inconceivable in its inner
+connection, so much so, that he may study the whole of
+Euclid through and through without gaining a real insight
+into the laws of space-relations, but instead of them he
+only learns by heart certain results which follow from
+them. This specially empirical and unscientific knowledge
+is like that of the doctor who knows both the
+disease and the cure for it, but does not know the connection
+between them. But all this is the necessary
+consequence if we capriciously reject the special kind of
+proof and evidence of one species of knowledge, and
+forcibly introduce in its stead a kind which is quite
+foreign to its nature. However, in other respects the
+manner in which this has been accomplished by Euclid
+deserves all the praise which has been bestowed on him
+through so many centuries, and which has been carried
+so far that his method of treating mathematics has been
+set up as the pattern of all scientific exposition. Men
+tried indeed to model all the sciences after it, but later
+they gave up the attempt without quite knowing why.
+Yet in our eyes this method of Euclid in mathematics
+<pb n='093'/><anchor id='Pg093'/>
+can appear only as a very brilliant piece of perversity.
+But when a great error in life or in science has been
+intentionally and methodically carried out with universal
+applause, it is always possible to discover its source in
+the philosophy which prevailed at the time. The Eleatics
+first brought out the difference, and indeed often the
+conflict, that exists between what is perceived, φαινομενον,<note place='foot'>The reader must not think here
+of Kant's misuse of these Greek
+terms, which is condemned in the
+Appendix.</note>
+and what is thought, νουμενον, and used it in many ways
+in their philosophical epigrams, and also in sophisms.
+They were followed later by the Megarics, the Dialecticians,
+the Sophists, the New-Academy, and the Sceptics;
+these drew attention to the illusion, that is to say, to the
+deception of the senses, or rather of the understanding
+which transforms the data of the senses into perception,
+and which often causes us to see things to which the
+reason unhesitatingly denies reality; for example, a stick
+broken in water, and such like. It came to be known
+that sense-perception was not to be trusted unconditionally,
+and it was therefore hastily concluded that only
+rational, logical thought could establish truth; although
+Plato (in the Parmenides), the Megarics, Pyrrho, and
+the New-Academy, showed by examples (in the manner
+which was afterwards adopted by Sextus Empiricus) how
+syllogisms and concepts were also sometimes misleading,
+and indeed produced paralogisms and sophisms which
+arise much more easily and are far harder to explain
+than the illusion of sense-perception. However, this
+rationalism, which arose in opposition to empiricism, kept
+the upper hand, and Euclid constructed the science of
+mathematics in accordance with it. He was compelled
+by necessity to found the axioms upon evidence of perception
+(φαινομενον), but all the rest he based upon
+reasoning (νουμενον). His method reigned supreme
+through all the succeeding centuries, and it could not
+but do so as long as pure intuition or perception, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>,
+<pb n='094'/><anchor id='Pg094'/>
+was not distinguished from empirical perception. Certain
+passages from the works of Proclus, the commentator of
+Euclid, which Kepler translated into Latin in his book,
+<q>De Harmonia Mundi,</q> seem to show that he fully
+recognised this distinction. But Proclus did not attach
+enough importance to the matter; he merely mentioned
+it by the way, so that he remained unnoticed and accomplished
+nothing. Therefore, not till two thousand years
+later will the doctrine of Kant, which is destined to make
+such great changes in all the knowledge, thought, and
+action of European nations, produce this change in
+mathematics also. For it is only after we have learned
+from this great man that the intuitions or perceptions of
+space and time are quite different from empirical perceptions,
+entirely independent of any impression of the
+senses, conditioning it, not conditioned by it, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, are <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a
+priori</foreign>, and therefore are not exposed to the illusions of
+sense; only after we have learned this, I say, can we
+comprehend that Euclid's logical method of treating
+mathematics is a useless precaution, a crutch for sound
+legs, that it is like a wanderer who during the night
+mistakes a bright, firm road for water, and carefully
+avoiding it, toils over the broken ground beside it, content
+to keep from point to point along the edge of the
+supposed water. Only now can we affirm with certainty
+that what presents itself to us as necessary in the perception
+of a figure, does not come from the figure on the
+paper, which is perhaps very defectively drawn, nor from
+the abstract concept under which we think it, but immediately
+from the form of all knowledge of which we are
+conscious <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>. This is always the principle of
+sufficient reason; here as the form of perception, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+space, it is the principle of the ground of being, the
+evidence and validity of which is, however, just as great
+and as immediate as that of the principle of the ground
+of knowing, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, logical certainty. Thus we need not and
+ought not to leave the peculiar province of mathematics
+<pb n='095'/><anchor id='Pg095'/>
+in order to put our trust only in logical proof, and seek
+to authenticate mathematics in a sphere which is quite
+foreign to it, that of concepts. If we confine ourselves to
+the ground peculiar to mathematics, we gain the great
+advantage that in it the rational knowledge <emph>that</emph> something
+is, is one with the knowledge <emph>why</emph> it is so, whereas the
+method of Euclid entirely separates these two, and lets
+us know only the first, not the second. Aristotle says
+admirably in the Analyt., post. i. 27: <q>Ακριβεστερα δ᾽
+επιστημη επιστημης και προτερα, ἡτε του ὁτι και του
+διοτι ἡ αυτη, αλλα μη χωρις του ὁτι, της του διοτι</q>
+(<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Subtilior autem et praestantior ea est scientia, quâ</foreign> <hi rend='smallcaps'>quod</hi>
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>aliquid sit, et</foreign> <hi rend='smallcaps'>cur</hi> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sit una simulque intelligimus non
+separatim</foreign> <hi rend='smallcaps'>quod</hi>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>et</foreign> <hi rend='smallcaps'>cur</hi> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sit</foreign>). In physics we are only
+satisfied when the knowledge that a thing is as it is
+is combined with the knowledge why it is so. To
+know that the mercury in the Torricellian tube stands
+thirty inches high is not really rational knowledge if
+we do not know that it is sustained at this height by the
+counterbalancing weight of the atmosphere. Shall we
+then be satisfied in mathematics with the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitas occulta</foreign>
+of the circle that the segments of any two intersecting
+chords always contain equal rectangles? That it is so
+Euclid certainly demonstrates in the 35th Prop. of the
+Third Book; <emph>why</emph> it is so remains doubtful. In the same
+way the proposition of Pythagoras teaches us a <foreign rend='italic'>qualitas
+occulta</foreign> of the right-angled triangle; the stilted and indeed
+fallacious demonstration of Euclid forsakes us at the <emph>why</emph>,
+and a simple figure, which we already know, and which
+is present to us, gives at a glance far more insight into
+the matter, and firm inner conviction of that necessity, and
+of the dependence of that quality upon the right angle:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<p rend='text-align: center'>
+  <figure url='images/illus_131.png' rend='width: 50%'>
+    <figDesc>Illustration</figDesc>
+  </figure>
+</p>
+
+<pb n='096'/><anchor id='Pg096'/>
+
+<p>
+In the case of unequal catheti also, and indeed generally
+in the case of every possible geometrical truth, it is quite
+possible to obtain such a conviction based on perception,
+because these truths were always discovered by such an
+empirically known necessity, and their demonstration was
+only thought out afterwards in addition. Thus we only
+require an analysis of the process of thought in the first
+discovery of a geometrical truth in order to know its
+necessity empirically. It is the analytical method in
+general that I wish for the exposition of mathematics,
+instead of the synthetical method which Euclid made
+use of. Yet this would have very great, though not
+insuperable, difficulties in the case of complicated mathematical
+truths. Here and there in Germany men are
+beginning to alter the exposition of mathematics, and to
+proceed more in this analytical way. The greatest effort
+in this direction has been made by Herr Kosack, teacher
+of mathematics and physics in the Gymnasium at Nordhausen,
+who added a thorough attempt to teach geometry
+according to my principles to the programme of the school
+examination on the 6th of April 1852.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In order to improve the method of mathematics, it is
+especially necessary to overcome the prejudice that
+demonstrated truth has any superiority over what is
+known through perception, or that logical truth founded
+upon the principle of contradiction has any superiority
+over metaphysical truth, which is immediately evident, and
+to which belongs the pure intuition or perception of space.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+That which is most certain, and yet always inexplicable,
+is what is involved in the principle of sufficient reason,
+for this principle, in its different aspects, expresses the
+universal form of all our ideas and knowledge. All
+explanation consists of reduction to it, exemplification in
+the particular case of the connection of ideas expressed
+generally through it. It is thus the principle of all
+explanation, and therefore it is neither susceptible of an
+explanation itself, nor does it stand in need of it; for
+<pb n='097'/><anchor id='Pg097'/>
+every explanation presupposes it, and only obtains meaning
+through it. Now, none of its forms are superior to
+the rest; it is equally certain and incapable of demonstration
+as the principle of the ground of being, or of
+change, or of action, or of knowing. The relation of reason
+and consequent is a necessity in all its forms, and indeed
+it is, in general, the source of the concept of necessity,
+for necessity has no other meaning. If the reason is given
+there is no other necessity than that of the consequent,
+and there is no reason that does not involve the necessity
+of the consequent. Just as surely then as the consequent
+expressed in the conclusion follows from the
+ground of knowledge given in the premises, does the
+ground of being in space determine its consequent in
+space: if I know through perception the relation of
+these two, this certainty is just as great as any logical
+certainty. But every geometrical proposition is just as
+good an expression of such a relation as one of the
+twelve axioms; it is a metaphysical truth, and as such,
+just as certain as the principle of contradiction itself,
+which is a metalogical truth, and the common foundation
+of all logical demonstration. Whoever denies the
+necessity, exhibited for intuition or perception, of the
+space-relations expressed in any proposition, may just as
+well deny the axioms, or that the conclusion follows from
+the premises, or, indeed, he may as well deny the
+principle of contradiction itself, for all these relations
+are equally undemonstrable, immediately evident and
+known <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>. For any one to wish to derive the
+necessity of space-relations, known in intuition or perception,
+from the principle of contradiction by means of
+a logical demonstration is just the same as for the feudal
+superior of an estate to wish to hold it as the vassal of
+another. Yet this is what Euclid has done. His
+axioms only, he is compelled to leave resting upon
+immediate evidence; all the geometrical truths which
+follow are demonstrated logically, that is to say, from
+<pb n='098'/><anchor id='Pg098'/>
+the agreement of the assumptions made in the proposition
+with the axioms which are presupposed, or with
+some earlier proposition; or from the contradiction between
+the opposite of the proposition and the assumptions made
+in it, or the axioms, or earlier propositions, or even itself.
+But the axioms themselves have no more immediate
+evidence than any other geometrical problem, but only
+more simplicity on account of their smaller content.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+When a criminal is examined, a <foreign rend='italic'>procès-verbal</foreign> is made
+of his statement in order that we may judge of its truth
+from its consistency. But this is only a makeshift, and
+we are not satisfied with it if it is possible to investigate
+the truth of each of his answers for itself; especially
+as he might lie consistently from the beginning. But
+Euclid investigated space according to this first method.
+He set about it, indeed, under the correct assumption
+that nature must everywhere be consistent, and that
+therefore it must also be so in space, its fundamental
+form. Since then the parts of space stand to each other
+in a relation of reason and consequent, no single property
+of space can be different from what it is without being
+in contradiction with all the others. But this is a very
+troublesome, unsatisfactory, and roundabout way to
+follow. It prefers indirect knowledge to direct, which is
+just as certain, and it separates the knowledge that a
+thing is from the knowledge why it is, to the great disadvantage
+of the science; and lastly, it entirely withholds
+from the beginner insight into the laws of space, and
+indeed renders him unaccustomed to the special investigation
+of the ground and inner connection of things,
+inclining him to be satisfied with a mere historical
+knowledge that a thing is as it is. The exercise of
+acuteness which this method is unceasingly extolled as
+affording consists merely in this, that the pupil practises
+drawing conclusions, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, he practises applying the principle
+of contradiction, but specially he exerts his memory
+to retain all those data whose agreement is to be tested.
+<pb n='099'/><anchor id='Pg099'/>
+Moreover, it is worth noticing that this method of
+proof was applied only to geometry and not to arithmetic.
+In arithmetic the truth is really allowed to come home
+to us through perception alone, which in it consists
+simply in counting. As the perception of numbers is
+in <emph>time alone</emph>, and therefore cannot be represented by a
+sensuous schema like the geometrical figure, the suspicion
+that perception is merely empirical, and possibly illusive,
+disappeared in arithmetic, and the introduction of the
+logical method of proof into geometry was entirely due
+to this suspicion. As time has only one dimension,
+counting is the only arithmetical operation, to which all
+others may be reduced; and yet counting is just intuition
+or perception <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, to which there is no hesitation
+in appealing here, and through which alone everything else,
+every sum and every equation, is ultimately proved. We
+prove, for example, not that (7 + 9 × 8 - 2)/3 = 42; but we refer to
+the pure perception in time, counting thus makes each
+individual problem an axiom. Instead of the demonstrations
+that fill geometry, the whole content of arithmetic
+and algebra is thus simply a method of abbreviating
+counting. We mentioned above that our immediate
+perception of numbers in time extends only to about
+ten. Beyond this an abstract concept of the numbers,
+fixed by a word, must take the place of the perception;
+which does not therefore actually occur any longer, but
+is only indicated in a thoroughly definite manner. Yet
+even so, by the important assistance of the system of
+figures which enables us to represent all larger numbers
+by the same small ones, intuitive or perceptive evidence
+of every sum is made possible, even where we make
+such use of abstraction that not only the numbers, but
+indefinite quantities and whole operations are thought
+only in the abstract and indicated as so thought, as [sqrt](r^b)
+so that we do not perform them, but merely symbolise
+them.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We might establish truth in geometry also, through
+<pb n='100'/><anchor id='Pg100'/>
+pure <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> perception, with the same right and
+certainty as in arithmetic. It is in fact always this
+necessity, known through perception in accordance with
+the principle of sufficient reason of being, which gives to
+geometry its principal evidence, and upon which in the
+consciousness of every one, the certainty of its propositions
+rests. The stilted logical demonstration is always foreign
+to the matter, and is generally soon forgotten, without
+weakening our conviction. It might indeed be dispensed
+with altogether without diminishing the evidence of
+geometry, for this is always quite independent of such
+demonstration, which never proves anything we are not
+convinced of already, through another kind of knowledge.
+So far then it is like a cowardly soldier, who adds a
+wound to an enemy slain by another, and then boasts
+that he slew him himself.<note place='foot'>Spinoza, who always boasts that
+he proceeds <foreign rend='italic'>more geometrico</foreign>, has
+actually done so more than he himself
+was aware. For what he knew
+with certainty and decision from the
+immediate, perceptive apprehension
+of the nature of the world, he seeks
+to demonstrate logically without
+reference to this knowledge. He
+only arrives at the intended and predetermined
+result by starting from
+arbitrary concepts framed by himself
+(<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>substantia causa sui</foreign>, &amp;c.), and
+in the demonstrations he allows
+himself all the freedom of choice for
+which the nature of the wide concept-spheres
+afford such convenient
+opportunity. That his doctrine is
+true and excellent is therefore in
+his case, as in that of geometry,
+quite independent of the demonstrations
+of it. Cf. ch. 13 of supplementary
+volume.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+After all this we hope there will be no doubt that
+the evidence of mathematics, which has become the
+pattern and symbol of all evidence, rests essentially not
+upon demonstration, but upon immediate perception,
+which is thus here, as everywhere else, the ultimate
+ground and source of truth. Yet the perception which
+lies at the basis of mathematics has a great advantage
+over all other perception, and therefore over empirical
+perception. It is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, and therefore independent of
+experience, which is always given only in successive
+parts; therefore everything is equally near to it, and we
+can start either from the reason or from the consequent,
+as we please. Now this makes it absolutely reliable,
+<pb n='101'/><anchor id='Pg101'/>
+for in it the consequent is known from the reason,
+and this is the only kind of knowledge that has
+necessity; for example, the equality of the sides is
+known as established by the equality of the angles. All
+empirical perception, on the other hand, and the greater
+part of experience, proceeds conversely from the consequent
+to the reason, and this kind of knowledge is not
+infallible, for necessity only attaches to the consequent
+on account of the reason being given, and no necessity
+attaches to the knowledge of the reason from the consequent,
+for the same consequent may follow from different
+reasons. The latter kind of knowledge is simply induction,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, from many consequents which point to one
+reason, the reason is accepted as certain; but as the
+cases can never be all before us, the truth here is not
+unconditionally certain. But all knowledge through
+sense-perception, and the great bulk of experience, has
+only this kind of truth. The affection of one of the
+senses induces the understanding to infer a cause of the
+effect, but, as a conclusion from the consequent to the
+reason is never certain, illusion, which is deception of
+the senses, is possible, and indeed often occurs, as was
+pointed out above. Only when several of the senses, or
+it may be all the five, receive impressions which point to
+the same cause, the possibility of illusion is reduced to a
+minimum; but yet it still exists, for there are cases, for
+example, the case of counterfeit money, in which all the
+senses are deceived. All empirical knowledge, and consequently
+the whole of natural science, is in the same
+position, except only the pure, or as Kant calls it, metaphysical
+part of it. Here also the causes are known
+from the effects, consequently all natural philosophy
+rests upon hypotheses, which are often false, and must
+then gradually give place to more correct ones. Only
+in the case of purposely arranged experiments, knowledge
+proceeds from the cause to the effect, that is, it follows
+the method that affords certainty; but these experiments
+<pb n='102'/><anchor id='Pg102'/>
+themselves are undertaken in consequence of hypotheses.
+Therefore, no branch of natural science, such as physics,
+or astronomy, or physiology could be discovered all at
+once, as was the case with mathematics and logic, but
+required and requires the collected and compared experiences
+of many centuries. In the first place, repeated
+confirmation in experience brings the induction, upon
+which the hypothesis rests, so near completeness that in
+practice it takes the place of certainty, and is regarded
+as diminishing the value of the hypothesis, its source,
+just as little as the incommensurability of straight and
+curved lines diminishes the value of the application of
+geometry, or that perfect exactness of the logarithm,
+which is not attainable, diminishes the value of arithmetic.
+For as the logarithm, or the squaring of the
+circle, approaches infinitely near to correctness through
+infinite fractions, so, through manifold experience, the
+induction, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the knowledge of the cause from the
+effects, approaches, not infinitely indeed, but yet so near
+mathematical evidence, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, knowledge of the effects from
+the cause, that the possibility of mistake is small enough
+to be neglected, but yet the possibility exists; for example,
+a conclusion from an indefinite number of cases
+to all cases, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, to the unknown ground on which all
+depend, is an induction. What conclusion of this kind
+seems more certain than that all men have the heart on
+the left side? Yet there are extremely rare and quite
+isolated exceptions of men who have the heart upon the
+right side. Sense-perception and empirical science have,
+therefore, the same kind of evidence. The advantage
+which mathematics, pure natural science, and logic have
+over them, as <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> knowledge, rests merely upon this,
+that the formal element in knowledge upon which all
+that is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> is based, is given as a whole and at once,
+and therefore in it we can always proceed from the cause
+to the effect, while in the former kind of knowledge we
+are generally obliged to proceed from the effect to the
+<pb n='103'/><anchor id='Pg103'/>
+cause. In other respects, the law of causality, or the
+principle of sufficient reason of change, which guides
+empirical knowledge, is in itself just as certain as the
+other forms of the principle of sufficient reason which
+are followed by the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> sciences referred to above.
+Logical demonstrations from concepts or syllogisms have
+the advantage of proceeding from the reason to the consequent,
+just as much as knowledge through perception <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a
+priori</foreign>, and therefore in themselves, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, according to their
+form, they are infallible. This has greatly assisted to
+bring demonstration in general into such esteem. But
+this infallibility is merely relative; the demonstration
+merely subsumes under the first principles of the science,
+and it is these which contain the whole material truth of
+science, and they must not themselves be demonstrated,
+but must be founded on perception. In the few <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>
+sciences we have named above, this perception is pure,
+but everywhere else it is empirical, and is only raised
+to universality through induction. If, then, in the empirical
+sciences also, the particular is proved from the
+general, yet the general, on the other hand, has received
+its truth from the particular; it is only a store of collected
+material, not a self-constituted foundation.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+So much for the foundation of truth. Of the source
+and possibility of error many explanations have been
+tried since Plato's metaphorical solution of the dove-cot
+where the wrong pigeons are caught, &amp;c. (Theætetus, p.
+167, <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>) Kant's vague, indefinite explanation of the
+source of error by means of the diagram of diagonal
+motion, will be found in the <q>Critique of Pure Reason,</q>
+p. 294 of the first edition, and p. 350 of the fifth. As
+truth is the relation of a judgment to its ground of knowledge,
+it is always a problem how the person judging can
+believe that he has such a ground of knowledge and yet
+not have it; that is to say, how error, the deception of
+reason, is possible. I find this possibility quite analogous
+to that of illusion, or the deception of the understanding,
+<pb n='104'/><anchor id='Pg104'/>
+which has been explained above. My opinion is (and
+this is what gives this explanation its proper place here)
+that <emph>every error is an inference from the consequent to the
+reason</emph>, which indeed is valid when we know that the
+consequent has that reason and can have no other; but
+otherwise is not valid. The person who falls into error,
+either attributes to a consequent a reason which it cannot
+have, in which case he shows actual deficiency of
+understanding, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, deficiency in the capacity for immediate
+knowledge of the connection between the cause and
+the effect, or, as more frequently happens, he attributes
+to the effect a cause which is possible, but he adds to the
+major proposition of the syllogism, in which he infers
+the cause from the effect, that this effect <emph>always</emph> results
+only from this cause. Now he could only be assured
+of this by a complete induction, which, however, he
+assumes without having made it. This <q>always</q> is therefore
+too wide a concept, and instead of it he ought to
+have used <q>sometimes</q> or <q>generally.</q> The conclusion
+would then be problematical, and therefore not erroneous.
+That the man who errs should proceed in this way is
+due either to haste, or to insufficient knowledge of what
+is possible, on account of which he does not know the
+necessity of the induction that ought to be made. Error
+then is quite analogous to illusion. Both are inferences
+from the effect to the cause; the illusion brought about
+always in accordance with the law of causality, and by
+the understanding alone, thus directly, in perception
+itself; the error in accordance with all the forms of the
+principle of sufficient reason, and by the reason, thus in
+thought itself; yet most commonly in accordance with
+the law of causality, as will appear from the three
+following examples, which may be taken as types or
+representatives of the three kinds of error. (1.) The
+illusion of the senses (deception of the understanding)
+induces error (deception of the reason); for example, if
+one mistakes a painting for an alto-relief, and actually
+<pb n='105'/><anchor id='Pg105'/>
+takes it for such; the error results from a conclusion
+from the following major premise: <q>If dark grey passes
+regularly through all shades to white; the cause is <emph>always</emph>
+the light, which strikes differently upon projections and
+depressions, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ergo</foreign>&mdash;.</q> (2.) <q>If there is no money in my
+safe, the cause is <emph>always</emph> that my servant has got a key
+for it: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ergo</foreign>&mdash;.</q> (3.) <q>If a ray of sunlight, broken
+through a prism, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, bent up or down, appears as a
+coloured band instead of round and white as before, the
+cause must always be that light consists of homogeneous
+rays, differently coloured and refrangible to different
+degrees, which, when forced asunder on account of the
+difference of their refrangibility, give an elongated and
+variously-coloured spectrum: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ergo&mdash;bibamus!</foreign></q>&mdash;It must
+be possible to trace every error to such a conclusion,
+drawn from a major premise which is often only falsely
+generalised, hypothetical, and founded on the assumption
+that some particular cause is that of a certain effect.
+Only certain mistakes in counting are to be excepted,
+and they are not really errors, but merely mistakes.
+The operation prescribed by the concepts of the numbers
+has not been carried out in pure intuition or perception,
+in counting, but some other operation instead of it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As regards the <emph>content</emph> of the sciences generally, it is,
+in fact, always the relation of the phenomena of the
+world to each other, according to the principle of sufficient
+reason, under the guidance of the <emph>why</emph>, which has validity
+and meaning only through this principle. <emph>Explanation</emph> is
+the establishment of this relation. Therefore explanation
+can never go further than to show two ideas standing to
+each other in the relation peculiar to that form of the
+principle of sufficient reason which reigns in the class to
+which they belong. If this is done we cannot further be
+asked the question, <emph>why</emph>: for the relation proved is that
+one which absolutely cannot be imagined as other than it
+is, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, it is the form of all knowledge. Therefore we do
+not ask why 2 + 2 = 4; or why the equality of the
+<pb n='106'/><anchor id='Pg106'/>
+angles of a triangle determines the equality of the sides;
+or why its effect follows any given cause; or why the
+truth of the conclusion is evident from the truth of the
+premises. Every explanation which does not ultimately
+lead to a relation of which no <q>why</q> can further be
+demanded, stops at an accepted <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitas occulta</foreign>; but this
+is the character of every original force of nature. Every
+explanation in natural science must ultimately end with
+such a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitas occulta</foreign>, and thus with complete obscurity.
+It must leave the inner nature of a stone just as much
+unexplained as that of a human being; it can give as
+little account of the weight, the cohesion, the chemical
+qualities, &amp;c., of the former, as of the knowing and acting
+of the latter. Thus, for example, weight is a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitas
+occulta</foreign>, for it can be thought away, and does not proceed
+as a necessity from the form of knowledge; which, on the
+contrary, is not the case with the law of inertia, for it
+follows from the law of causality, and is therefore
+sufficiently explained if it is referred to that law. There
+are two things which are altogether inexplicable,&mdash;that
+is to say, do not ultimately lead to the relation which the
+principle of sufficient reason expresses. These are, first,
+the principle of sufficient reason itself in all its four
+forms, because it is the principle of all explanation, which
+has meaning only in relation to it; secondly, that to
+which this principle does not extend, but which is the
+original source of all phenomena; the thing-in-itself, the
+knowledge of which is not subject to the principle of
+sufficient reason. We must be content for the present
+not to understand this thing-in-itself, for it can only be
+made intelligible by means of the following book, in
+which we shall resume this consideration of the possible
+achievements of the sciences. But at the point at which
+natural science, and indeed every science, leaves things,
+because not only its explanation of them, but even the
+principle of this explanation, the principle of sufficient
+reason, does not extend beyond this point; there philosophy
+<pb n='107'/><anchor id='Pg107'/>
+takes them up and treats them after its own method,
+which is quite distinct from the method of science. In
+my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 51, I
+have shown how in the different sciences the chief guiding
+clue is one or other form of that principle; and, in fact,
+perhaps the most appropriate classification of the sciences
+might be based upon this circumstance. Every explanation
+arrived at by the help of this clue is, as we have
+said, merely relative; it explains things in relation to
+each other, but something which indeed is presupposed is
+always left unexplained. In mathematics, for example,
+this is space and time; in mechanics, physics, and
+chemistry it is matter, qualities, original forces and laws
+of nature; in botany and zoology it is the difference of
+species, and life itself; in history it is the human race
+with all its properties of thought and will: in all it is
+that form of the principle of sufficient reason which is
+respectively applicable. It is peculiar to <emph>philosophy</emph> that
+it presupposes nothing as known, but treats everything as
+equally external and a problem; not merely the relations
+of phenomena, but also the phenomena themselves, and
+even the principle of sufficient reason to which the other
+sciences are content to refer everything. In philosophy
+nothing would be gained by such a reference, as one
+member of the series is just as external to it as another;
+and, moreover, that kind of connection is just as much a
+problem for philosophy as what is joined together by it,
+and the latter again is just as much a problem after its
+combination has been explained as before it. For, as we
+have said, just what the sciences presuppose and lay down
+as the basis and the limits of their explanation, is precisely
+and peculiarly the problem of philosophy, which
+may therefore be said to begin where science ends. It
+cannot be founded upon demonstrations, for they lead
+from known principles to unknown, but everything is
+equally unknown and external to philosophy. There can
+be no principle in consequence of which the world with
+<pb n='108'/><anchor id='Pg108'/>
+all its phenomena first came into existence, and therefore
+it is not possible to construct, as Spinoza wished,
+a philosophy which demonstrates <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ex firmis principiis</foreign>.
+Philosophy is the most general rational knowledge, the
+first principles of which cannot therefore be derived from
+another principle still more general. The principle of contradiction
+establishes merely the agreement of concepts,
+but does not itself produce concepts. The principle of
+sufficient reason explains the connections of phenomena,
+but not the phenomena themselves; therefore philosophy
+cannot proceed upon these principles to seek a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>causa
+efficiens</foreign> or a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>causa finalis</foreign> of the whole world. My philosophy,
+at least, does not by any means seek to know
+<emph>whence</emph> or <emph>wherefore</emph> the world exists, but merely <emph>what</emph> the
+world is. But the <emph>why</emph> is here subordinated to the
+<emph>what</emph>, for it already belongs to the world, as it arises and
+has meaning and validity only through the form of its
+phenomena, the principle of sufficient reason. We might
+indeed say that every one knows what the world is without
+help, for he is himself that subject of knowledge of
+which the world is the idea; and so far this would be
+true. But that knowledge is empirical, is in the concrete;
+the task of philosophy is to reproduce this in
+the abstract to raise to permanent rational knowledge
+the successive changing perceptions, and in general, all
+that is contained under the wide concept of feeling and
+merely negatively defined as not abstract, distinct, rational
+knowledge. It must therefore consist of a statement in
+the abstract, of the nature of the whole world, of the
+whole, and of all the parts. In order then that it may
+not lose itself in the endless multitude of particular judgments,
+it must make use of abstraction and think everything
+individual in the universal, and its differences also
+in the universal. It must therefore partly separate and
+partly unite, in order to present to rational knowledge
+the whole manifold of the world generally, according to
+its nature, comprehended in a few abstract concepts.
+<pb n='109'/><anchor id='Pg109'/>
+Through these concepts, in which it fixes the nature of
+the world, the whole individual must be known as well
+as the universal, the knowledge of both therefore must
+be bound together to the minutest point. Therefore the
+capacity for philosophy consists just in that in which
+Plato placed it, the knowledge of the one in the many,
+and the many in the one. Philosophy will therefore be
+a sum-total of general judgments, whose ground of knowledge
+is immediately the world itself in its entirety, without
+excepting anything; thus all that is to be found in
+human consciousness; it will be <emph>a complete recapitulation,
+as it were, a reflection, of the world in abstract concepts</emph>,
+which is only possible by the union of the essentially
+identical in <emph>one</emph> concept and the relegation of the different
+to another. This task was already prescribed to philosophy
+by Bacon of Verulam when he said: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ea demum vera est
+philosophia, quae mundi ipsius voces fidelissime reddit, et
+veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, et nihil aliud est,
+quam ejusdem</foreign> <hi rend='smallcaps'>simulacrum et reflectio</hi>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>neque addit quidquam
+de proprio, sed tantum iterat et resonat</foreign> (De Augm.
+Scient., L. 2, c. 13). But we take this in a wider sense
+than Bacon could then conceive.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The agreement which all the sides and parts of the
+world have with each other, just because they belong to
+a whole, must also be found in this abstract copy of it.
+Therefore the judgments in this sum-total could to a
+certain extent be deduced from each other, and indeed
+always reciprocally so deduced. Yet to make the first
+judgment possible, they must all be present, and thus
+implied as prior to it in the knowledge of the world in
+the concrete, especially as all direct proof is more certain
+than indirect proof; their harmony with each other by
+virtue of which they come together into the unity of <emph>one</emph>
+thought, and which arises from the harmony and unity of
+the world of perception itself, which is their common
+ground of knowledge, is not therefore to be made use
+of to establish them, as that which is prior to them,
+<pb n='110'/><anchor id='Pg110'/>
+but is only added as a confirmation of their truth.
+This problem itself can only become quite clear in being
+solved.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 16. After this full consideration of reason as a special
+faculty of knowledge belonging to man alone, and the
+results and phenomena peculiar to human nature brought
+about by it, it still remains for me to speak of reason, so
+far as it is the guide of human action, and in this respect
+may be called <emph>practical</emph>. But what there is to say upon
+this point has found its place elsewhere in the appendix
+to this work, where I controvert the existence of the so-called
+practical reason of Kant, which he (certainly very
+conveniently) explained as the immediate source of virtue,
+and as the seat of an absolute (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, fallen from heaven)
+imperative. The detailed and thorough refutation of this
+Kantian principle of morality I have given later in the
+<q>Fundamental Problems of Ethics.</q> There remains,
+therefore, but little for me to say here about the actual
+influence of reason, in the true sense of the word, upon
+action. At the commencement of our treatment of
+reason we remarked, in general terms, how much the
+action and behaviour of men differs from that of brutes,
+and that this difference is to be regarded as entirely due
+to the presence of abstract concepts in consciousness.
+The influence of these upon our whole existence is so
+penetrating and significant that, on account of them, we
+are related to the lower animals very much as those
+animals that see are related to those that have no eyes
+(certain larvae, worms, and zoophytes). Animals without
+eyes know only by touch what is immediately present
+to them in space, what comes into contact with them;
+those which see, on the contrary, know a wide circle of
+near and distant objects. In the same way the absence
+of reason confines the lower animals to the ideas of perception,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the real objects which are immediately present
+to them in time; we, on the contrary, on account
+<pb n='111'/><anchor id='Pg111'/>
+of knowledge in the abstract, comprehend not only the
+narrow actual present, but also the whole past and
+future, and the wide sphere of the possible; we view
+life freely on all its sides, and go far beyond the
+present and the actual. Thus what the eye is in space
+and for sensuous knowledge, reason is, to a certain
+extent, in time and for inner knowledge. But as the
+visibility of objects has its worth and meaning only in
+the fact that it informs us of their tangibility, so the
+whole worth of abstract knowledge always consists in its
+relation to what is perceived. Therefore men naturally
+attach far more worth to immediate and perceived knowledge
+than to abstract concepts, to that which is merely
+thought; they place empirical knowledge before logical.
+But this is not the opinion of men who live more in
+words than in deeds, who have seen more on paper and
+in books than in actual life, and who in their greatest
+degeneracy become pedants and lovers of the mere letter.
+Thus only is it conceivable that Leibnitz and Wolf and
+all their successors could go so far astray as to explain
+knowledge of perception, after the example of Duns
+Scotus, as merely confused abstract knowledge! To the
+honour of Spinoza, I must mention that his truer sense
+led him, on the contrary, to explain all general concepts
+as having arisen from the confusion of that which was
+known in perception (Eth. II., prop. 40, Schol. 1).
+It is also a result of perverted opinion that in mathematics
+the evidence proper to it was rejected, and
+logical evidence alone accepted; that everything in
+general which was not abstract knowledge was comprehended
+under the wide name of feeling, and consequently
+was little valued; and lastly that the Kantian ethics
+regarded the good will which immediately asserts itself
+upon knowledge of the circumstances, and guides to
+right and good action as mere feeling and emotion, and
+consequently as worthless and without merit, and would
+<pb n='112'/><anchor id='Pg112'/>
+only recognise actions which proceed from abstract
+maxims as having moral worth.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The many-sided view of life as a whole which man,
+as distinguished from the lower animals, possesses through
+reason, may be compared to a geometrical, colourless,
+abstract, reduced plan of his actual life. He, therefore,
+stands to the lower animals as the navigator who, by
+means of chart, compass, and quadrant, knows accurately
+his course and his position at any time upon the sea,
+stands to the uneducated sailors who see only the waves
+and the heavens. Thus it is worth noticing, and indeed
+wonderful, how, besides his life in the concrete, man
+always lives another life in the abstract. In the former
+he is given as a prey to all the storms of actual life, and
+to the influence of the present; he must struggle, suffer,
+and die like the brute. But his life in the abstract, as
+it lies before his rational consciousness, is the still
+reflection of the former, and of the world in which he
+lives; it is just that reduced chart or plan to which we
+have referred. Here in the sphere of quiet deliberation,
+what completely possessed him and moved him intensely
+before, appears to him cold, colourless, and for the
+moment external to him; he is merely the spectator, the
+observer. In respect of this withdrawal into reflection
+he may be compared to an actor who has played his part
+in one scene, and who takes his place among the audience
+till it is time for him to go upon the stage again, and
+quietly looks on at whatever may happen, even though
+it be the preparation for his own death (in the piece),
+but afterwards he again goes on the stage and acts and
+suffers as he must. From this double life proceeds that
+quietness peculiar to human beings, so very different
+from the thoughtlessness of the brutes, and with which,
+in accordance with previous reflection, or a formed determination,
+or a recognised necessity, a man suffers or
+accomplishes in cold blood, what is of the utmost and
+often terrible importance to him; suicide, execution, the
+<pb n='113'/><anchor id='Pg113'/>
+duel, enterprises of every kind fraught with danger to life,
+and, in general, things against which his whole animal
+nature rebels. Under such circumstances we see to what
+an extent reason has mastered the animal nature, and we
+say to the strong: σιδηρειον νυ τοι ἡτορ! (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ferreum certe
+tibi cor</foreign>), Il. 24, 521. Here we can say truly that reason
+manifests itself practically, and thus wherever action is
+guided by reason, where the motives are abstract concepts,
+wherever we are not determined by particular ideas of
+perception, nor by the impression of the moment which
+guides the brutes, there <emph>practical reason</emph> shows itself. But
+I have fully explained in the Appendix, and illustrated by
+examples, that this is entirely different from and unrelated
+to the ethical worth of actions; that rational action
+and virtuous action are two entirely different things; that
+reason may just as well find itself in connection with
+great evil as with great good, and by its assistance may
+give great power to the one as well as to the other; that
+it is equally ready and valuable for the methodical and
+consistent carrying out of the noble and of the bad intention,
+of the wise as of the foolish maxim; which all
+results from the constitution of its nature, which is
+feminine, receptive, retentive, and not spontaneous; all
+this I have shown in detail in the Appendix, and illustrated
+by examples. What is said there would have been
+placed here, but on account of my polemic against Kant's
+pretended practical reason I have been obliged to relegate
+it to the Appendix, to which I therefore refer.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The ideal explained in the <emph>Stoical philosophy</emph> is the
+most complete development of <emph>practical reason</emph> in the true
+and genuine sense of the word; it is the highest summit to
+which man can attain by the mere use of his reason, and
+in it his difference from the brutes shows itself most distinctly.
+For the ethics of Stoicism are originally and
+essentially, not a doctrine of virtue, but merely a guide
+to a rational life, the end and aim of which is happiness
+through peace of mind. Virtuous conduct appears in it
+<pb n='114'/><anchor id='Pg114'/>
+as it were merely by accident, as the means, not as the
+end. Therefore the ethical theory of Stoicism is in its
+whole nature and point of view fundamentally different
+from the ethical systems which lay stress directly upon
+virtue, such as the doctrines of the Vedas, of Plato, of
+Christianity, and of Kant. The aim of Stoical ethics is
+happiness: τελος το ευδαι μονειν (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>virtutes omnes finem
+habere beatitudinem</foreign>) it is called in the account of the Stoa
+by Stobæus (Ecl., L. ii. c. 7, p. 114, and also p. 138).
+Yet the ethics of Stoicism teach that happiness can only
+be attained with certainty through inward peace and
+quietness of spirit (αταραξια), and that this again can
+only be reached through virtue; this is the whole meaning
+of the saying that virtue is the highest good. But if
+indeed by degrees the end is lost sight of in the means,
+and virtue is inculcated in a way which discloses an
+interest entirely different from that of one's own happiness,
+for it contradicts this too distinctly; this is just one
+of those inconsistencies by means of which, in every
+system, the immediately known, or, as it is called, felt
+truth leads us back to the right way in defiance of
+syllogistic reasoning; as, for example, we see clearly in the
+ethical teaching of Spinoza, which deduces a pure doctrine
+of virtue from the egoistical <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>suum utile quærere</foreign> by means
+of palpable sophisms. According to this, as I conceive the
+spirit of the Stoical ethics, their source lies in the question
+whether the great prerogative of man, reason, which, by
+means of planned action and its results, relieves life and
+its burdens so much, might not also be capable of freeing
+him at once, directly, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, through mere knowledge, completely,
+or nearly so, of the sorrows and miseries of every
+kind of which his life is full. They held that it was not in
+keeping with the prerogative of reason that the nature
+given with it, which by means of it comprehends and
+contemplates an infinity of things and circumstances,
+should yet, through the present, and the accidents that
+can be contained in the few years of a life that is short,
+<pb n='115'/><anchor id='Pg115'/>
+fleeting, and uncertain, be exposed to such intense pain,
+to such great anxiety and suffering, as arise from the
+tempestuous strain of the desires and the antipathies;
+and they believed that the due application of reason
+must raise men above them, and can make them invulnerable.
+Therefore Antisthenes says: Δει κτασθαι νουν,
+η βροχον (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>aut mentem parandam, aut laqueum.</foreign> Plut. de
+stoic. repugn., c. 14), <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, life is so full of troubles and
+vexations, that one must either rise above it by means of
+corrected thoughts, or leave it. It was seen that want
+and suffering did not directly and of necessity spring
+from not having, but from desiring to have and not
+having; that therefore this desire to have is the necessary
+condition under which alone it becomes a privation
+not to have and begets pain. Ου πενια λυπην εργαζεται,
+αλλα επιθυμια (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>non paupertas dolorem efficit, sed cupiditas</foreign>),
+Epict., fragm. 25. Men learned also from experience that
+it is only the hope of what is claimed that begets and
+nourishes the wish; therefore neither the many unavoidable
+evils which are common to all, nor unattainable
+blessings, disquiet or trouble us, but only the trifling
+more or less of those things which we can avoid or attain;
+indeed, not only what is absolutely unavoidable or unattainable,
+but also what is merely relatively so, leaves
+us quite undisturbed; therefore the ills that have once
+become joined to our individuality, or the good things
+that must of necessity always be denied us, are treated
+with indifference, in accordance with the peculiarity of
+human nature that every wish soon dies and can no more
+beget pain if it is not nourished by hope. It followed
+from all this that happiness always depends upon the
+proportion between our claims and what we receive. It
+is all one whether the quantities thus related be great or
+small, and the proportion can be established just as well
+by diminishing the amount of the first as by increasing
+the amount of the second; and in the same way it also
+follows that all suffering proceeds from the want of proportion
+<pb n='116'/><anchor id='Pg116'/>
+between what we demand and expect and what
+we get. Now this want of proportion obviously lies
+only in knowledge, and it could be entirely abolished
+through fuller insight.<note place='foot'>Omnes perturbationes judicio
+censent fieri et opinione. Cic.
+Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους
+ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των
+πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant
+homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus
+opiniones). Epictet., c. v.</note> Therefore Chrysippus says: δει
+ζῃν κατ᾽ εμπειριαν των φυσει συμβαινοντων (Stob. Ecl., L.
+ii. c. 7, p. 134), that is, one ought to live with a due
+knowledge of the transitory nature of the things of the
+world. For as often as a man loses self-command, or is
+struck down by a misfortune, or grows angry, or becomes
+faint-hearted, he shows that he finds things different from
+what he expected, consequently that he was caught in
+error, and did not know the world and life, did not know
+that the will of the individual is crossed at every step by
+the chance of inanimate nature and the antagonism of
+aims and the wickedness of other individuals: he has
+therefore either not made use of his reason in order to
+arrive at a general knowledge of this characteristic of
+life, or he lacks judgment, in that he does not recognise
+in the particular what he knows in general, and is
+therefore surprised by it and loses his self-command.<note place='foot'>Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις
+ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας
+προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι
+εφαρμοξειν ταις επι μερους (Hæc
+est causa mortalibus omnium malorum,
+non posse communes notiones
+aptare singularibus). Epict. dissert.,
+ii., 26.</note>
+Thus also every keen pleasure is an error and an illusion,
+for no attained wish can give lasting satisfaction; and,
+moreover, every possession and every happiness is but
+lent by chance for an uncertain time, and may therefore
+be demanded back the next hour. All pain rests on the
+passing away of such an illusion; thus both arise from
+defective knowledge; the wise man therefore holds himself
+equally aloof from joy and sorrow, and no event
+disturbs his αταραξια.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In accordance with this spirit and aim of the Stoa,
+Epictetus began and ended with the doctrine as the kernel
+<pb n='117'/><anchor id='Pg117'/>
+of his philosophy, that we should consider well and distinguish
+what depends upon us and what does not, and
+therefore entirely avoid counting upon the latter, whereby
+we shall certainly remain free from all pain, sorrow, and
+anxiety. But that which alone is dependent upon us is
+the will; and here a transition gradually takes place to
+a doctrine of virtue, for it is observed that as the outer
+world, which is independent of us, determines good and
+bad fortune, so inner contentment with ourselves, or the
+absence of it, proceeds from the will. But it was then
+asked whether we ought to apply the words <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>bonum</foreign> and
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>malum</foreign> to the two former or to the two latter? This was
+indeed arbitrary and a matter of choice, and did not
+make any real difference, but yet the Stoics disputed
+everlastingly with the Peripatetics and Epicureans about
+it, and amused themselves with the inadmissible comparison
+of two entirely incommensurable quantities, and
+the antithetical, paradoxical judgments which proceeded
+from them, and which they flung at each other. The
+<hi rend='italic'>Paradoxa</hi> of Cicero afford us an interesting collection of
+these from the Stoical side.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Zeno, the founder, seems originally to have followed a
+somewhat different path. The starting-point with him
+was that for the attainment of the highest good, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+blessedness and spiritual peace, one must live in harmony
+with oneself (ὁμολογουμενους ξῃν; δ᾽ εστι καθ᾽ ἑνα
+λογον και συμφωνον ξῃν.&mdash;<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Consonanter vivere: hoc est
+secundum unam rationem et concordem sibi vivere.</foreign> Stob.
+Ecl. eth. L. ii., c. 7, p. 132. Also: Αρετην διαθεσιν ειναι
+ψυχης συμφωνον ἑαυτῃ περι ὁλον τον βιον. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Virtutem
+esse animi affectiomem secum per totam vitam consentientem</foreign>,
+<hi rend='italic'>ibid.</hi>, p. 104.) Now this was only possible for a man if
+he determined himself entirely rationally, according to
+concepts, not according to changing impressions and
+moods; since, however, only the maxims of our conduct,
+not the consequences nor the outward circumstances, are
+in our power, in order to be always consistent we must set
+<pb n='118'/><anchor id='Pg118'/>
+before us as our aim only the maxims and not the consequences
+and circumstances, and thus again a doctrine
+of virtue is introduced.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But the ethical principle of Zeno&mdash;to live in harmony
+with oneself&mdash;appeared even to his immediate successors
+to be too formal and empty. They therefore gave it
+material content by the addition&mdash;<q>to live in harmony
+with nature</q> (ὁμολογουμενως τῃ φυσει ζῃν), which, as
+Stobæus mentions in another place, was first added by
+Kleanthes, and extended the matter very much on account
+of the wide sphere of the concept and the vagueness of
+the expression. For Kleanthes meant the whole of
+nature in general, while Chrysippus meant human nature
+in particular (Diog. Laert., 7, 89). It followed that
+what alone was adapted to the latter was virtue, just as
+the satisfaction of animal desires was adapted to animal
+natures; and thus ethics had again to be forcibly united
+to a doctrine of virtue, and in some way or other established
+through physics. For the Stoics always aimed at
+unity of principle, as for them God and the world were
+not dissevered.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The ethical system of Stoicism, regarded as a whole, is
+in fact a very valuable and estimable attempt to use the
+great prerogative of man, reason, for an important and
+salutary end; to raise him above the suffering and pain
+to which all life is exposed, by means of a maxim&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Qua ratione queas traducere leniter œvum:</foreign></q></l>
+<l><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido,</foreign></l>
+<l><q rend='post'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Ne pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes,</foreign></q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+and thus to make him partake, in the highest degree, of
+the dignity which belongs to him as a rational being,
+as distinguished from the brutes; a dignity of which,
+in this sense at any rate, we can speak, though not
+in any other. It is a consequence of my view of the
+ethical system of Stoicism that it must be explained
+at the part of my work at which I consider what
+<pb n='119'/><anchor id='Pg119'/>
+reason is and what it can do. But although it may to
+a certain extent be possible to attain that end through
+the application of reason, and through a purely rational
+system of ethics, and although experience shows that the
+happiest men are those purely rational characters commonly
+called practical philosophers,&mdash;and rightly so, because
+just as the true, that is, the theoretical philosopher
+carries life into the concept, they carry the concept into
+life,&mdash;yet it is far from the case that perfection can be
+attained in this way, and that the reason, rightly used,
+can really free us from the burden and sorrow of life, and
+lead us to happiness. Rather, there lies an absolute contradiction
+in wishing to live without suffering, and this
+contradiction is also implied in the commonly used expression,
+<q>blessed life.</q> This will become perfectly clear
+to whoever comprehends the whole of the following exposition.
+In this purely rational system of ethics the contradiction
+reveals itself thus, the Stoic is obliged in his
+doctrine of the way to the blessed life (for that is what his
+ethical system always remains) to insert a recommendation
+of suicide (as among the magnificent ornaments and
+apparel of Eastern despots there is always a costly vial
+of poison) for the case in which the sufferings of the body,
+which cannot be philosophised away by any principles or
+syllogistic reasonings, are paramount and incurable; thus
+its one aim, blessedness, is rendered vain, and nothing
+remains as a mode of escape from suffering except death;
+in such a case then death must be voluntarily accepted,
+just as we would take any other medicine. Here then a
+marked antagonism is brought out between the ethical
+system of Stoicism and all those systems referred to above
+which make virtue in itself directly, and accompanied by
+the most grievous sorrows, their aim, and will not allow
+a man to end his life in order to escape from suffering.
+Not one of them, however, was able to give the true
+reason for the rejection of suicide, but they laboriously
+collected illusory explanations from all sides: the true
+<pb n='120'/><anchor id='Pg120'/>
+reason will appear in the Fourth Book in the course of the
+development of our system. But the antagonism referred
+to reveals and establishes the essential difference in fundamental
+principle between Stoicism, which is just a special
+form of endæmonism, and those doctrines we have mentioned,
+although both are often at one in their results,
+and are apparently related. And the inner contradiction
+referred to above, with which the ethical system of
+Stoicism is affected even in its fundamental thought,
+shows itself further in the circumstance that its ideal,
+the Stoic philosopher, as the system itself represents him,
+could never obtain life or inner poetic truth, but remains
+a wooden, stiff lay-figure of which nothing can be made.
+He cannot himself make use of his wisdom, and his
+perfect peace, contentment, and blessedness directly contradict
+the nature of man, and preclude us from forming
+any concrete idea of him. When compared with him, how
+entirely different appear the overcomers of the world, and
+voluntary hermits that Indian philosophy presents to us,
+and has actually produced; or indeed, the holy man of
+Christianity, that excellent form full of deep life, of the
+greatest poetic truth, and the highest significance, which
+stands before us in perfect virtue, holiness, and sublimity,
+yet in a state of supreme suffering.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. 16 of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<pb n='121'/><anchor id='Pg121'/>
+
+<div rend='page-break-before: always'>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Second Book. The World As Will.</head>
+
+<div>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>First Aspect. The Objectification Of The Will.</head>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l>Nos habitat, non tartara, sed nec sidera coeli:</l>
+<l>Spiritus, in nobis qui viget, illa facit.</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<pb n='123'/><anchor id='Pg123'/>
+
+<p>
+§ 17. In the first book we considered the idea
+merely as such, that is, only according to its general
+form. It is true that as far as the abstract idea, the
+concept, is concerned, we obtained a knowledge of it in
+respect of its content also, because it has content and
+meaning only in relation to the idea of perception, without
+which it would be worthless and empty. Accordingly,
+directing our attention exclusively to the idea of perception,
+we shall now endeavour to arrive at a knowledge
+of its content, its more exact definition, and the forms
+which it presents to us. And it will specially interest
+us to find an explanation of its peculiar significance,
+that significance which is otherwise merely felt, but on
+account of which it is that these pictures do not pass by
+us entirely strange and meaningless, as they must otherwise
+do, but speak to us directly, are understood, and
+obtain an interest which concerns our whole nature.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We direct our attention to mathematics, natural
+science, and philosophy, for each of these holds out the
+hope that it will afford us a part of the explanation we
+desire. Now, taking philosophy first, we find that it is
+like a monster with many heads, each of which speaks a
+different language. They are not, indeed, all at variance
+on the point we are here considering, the significance of
+the idea of perception. For, with the exception of the
+Sceptics and the Idealists, the others, for the most part, speak
+very much in the same way of an <emph>object</emph> which constitutes
+the <emph>basis</emph> of the idea, and which is indeed different in its
+whole being and nature from the idea, but yet is in all
+<pb n='124'/><anchor id='Pg124'/>
+points as like it as one egg is to another. But this does
+not help us, for we are quite unable to distinguish such
+an object from the idea; we find that they are one and
+the same; for every object always and for ever presupposes
+a subject, and therefore remains idea, so that we
+recognised objectivity as belonging to the most universal
+form of the idea, which is the division into subject and
+object. Further, the principle of sufficient reason, which
+is referred to in support of this doctrine, is for us merely
+the form of the idea, the orderly combination of one idea
+with another, but not the combination of the whole finite
+or infinite series of ideas with something which is not
+idea at all, and which cannot therefore be presented in
+perception. Of the Sceptics and Idealists we spoke
+above, in examining the controversy about the reality of
+the outer world.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If we turn to mathematics to look for the fuller
+knowledge we desire of the idea of perception, which we
+have, as yet, only understood generally, merely in its
+form, we find that mathematics only treats of these
+ideas so far as they fill time and space, that is, so
+far as they are quantities. It will tell us with the
+greatest accuracy the how-many and the how-much;
+but as this is always merely relative, that is to say,
+merely a comparison of one idea with others, and a comparison
+only in the one respect of quantity, this also is
+not the information we are principally in search of.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Lastly, if we turn to the wide province of natural
+science, which is divided into many fields, we may, in the
+first place, make a general division of it into two parts.
+It is either the description of forms, which I call <emph>Morphology</emph>,
+or the explanation of changes, which I call
+<emph>Etiology</emph>. The first treats of the permanent forms, the
+second of the changing matter, according to the laws of
+its transition from one form to another. The first is
+the whole extent of what is generally called natural
+history. It teaches us, especially in the sciences of
+<pb n='125'/><anchor id='Pg125'/>
+botany and zoology, the various permanent, organised,
+and therefore definitely determined forms in the constant
+change of individuals; and these forms constitute a great
+part of the content of the idea of perception. In natural
+history they are classified, separated, united, arranged
+according to natural and artificial systems, and brought
+under concepts which make a general view and knowledge
+of the whole of them possible. Further, an
+infinitely fine analogy both in the whole and in the
+parts of these forms, and running through them all
+(<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>unité de plan</foreign>), is established, and thus they may be compared
+to innumerable variations on a theme which is not
+given. The passage of matter into these forms, that is to
+say, the origin of individuals, is not a special part of
+natural science, for every individual springs from its like
+by generation, which is everywhere equally mysterious,
+and has as yet evaded definite knowledge. The little that
+is known on the subject finds its place in physiology,
+which belongs to that part of natural science I have called
+etiology. Mineralogy also, especially where it becomes
+geology, inclines towards etiology, though it principally
+belongs to morphology. Etiology proper comprehends all
+those branches of natural science in which the chief concern
+is the knowledge of cause and effect. The sciences
+teach how, according to an invariable rule, one condition
+of matter is necessarily followed by a certain other condition;
+how one change necessarily conditions and brings
+about a certain other change; this sort of teaching is called
+<emph>explanation</emph>. The principal sciences in this department
+are mechanics, physics, chemistry, and physiology.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If, however, we surrender ourselves to its teaching, we
+soon become convinced that etiology cannot afford us the
+information we chiefly desire, any more than morphology.
+The latter presents to us innumerable and infinitely
+varied forms, which are yet related by an unmistakable
+family likeness. These are for us ideas, and when only
+treated in this way, they remain always strange to us,
+<pb n='126'/><anchor id='Pg126'/>
+and stand before us like hieroglyphics which we do not
+understand. Etiology, on the other hand, teaches us that,
+according to the law of cause and effect, this particular
+condition of matter brings about that other particular
+condition, and thus it has explained it and performed its
+part. However, it really does nothing more than indicate
+the orderly arrangement according to which the
+states of matter appear in space and time, and teach in
+all cases what phenomenon must necessarily appear at a
+particular time in a particular place. It thus determines
+the position of phenomena in time and space, according
+to a law whose special content is derived from experience,
+but whose universal form and necessity is yet known to
+us independently of experience. But it affords us absolutely
+no information about the inner nature of any one
+of these phenomena: this is called a <emph>force of nature</emph>, and
+it lies outside the province of causal explanation, which
+calls the constant uniformity with which manifestations
+of such a force appear whenever their known conditions
+are present, a <emph>law of nature</emph>. But this law of nature,
+these conditions, and this appearance in a particular
+place at a particular time, are all that it knows or ever
+can know. The force itself which manifests itself, the
+inner nature of the phenomena which appear in accordance
+with these laws, remains always a secret to it,
+something entirely strange and unknown in the case of
+the simplest as well as of the most complex phenomena.
+For although as yet etiology has most completely
+achieved its aim in mechanics, and least completely in
+physiology, still the force on account of which a stone
+falls to the ground or one body repels another is, in its
+inner nature, not less strange and mysterious than that
+which produces the movements and the growth of an
+animal. The science of mechanics presupposes matter,
+weight, impenetrability, the possibility of communicating
+motion by impact, inertia and so forth as ultimate facts,
+calls them forces of nature, and their necessary and
+<pb n='127'/><anchor id='Pg127'/>
+orderly appearance under certain conditions a law of
+nature. Only after this does its explanation begin, and
+it consists in indicating truly and with mathematical
+exactness, how, where and when each force manifests
+itself, and in referring every phenomenon which presents
+itself to the operation of one of these forces. Physics,
+chemistry, and physiology proceed in the same way in
+their province, only they presuppose more and accomplish
+less. Consequently the most complete etiological
+explanation of the whole of nature can never be more
+than an enumeration of forces which cannot be explained,
+and a reliable statement of the rule according to which
+phenomena appear in time and space, succeed, and make
+way for each other. But the inner nature of the forces
+which thus appear remains unexplained by such an explanation,
+which must confine itself to phenomena and
+their arrangement, because the law which it follows does
+not extend further. In this respect it may be compared
+to a section of a piece of marble which shows many veins
+beside each other, but does not allow us to trace the
+course of the veins from the interior of the marble to its
+surface. Or, if I may use an absurd but more striking
+comparison, the philosophical investigator must always
+have the same feeling towards the complete etiology of
+the whole of nature, as a man who, without knowing how,
+has been brought into a company quite unknown to him,
+each member of which in turn presents another to him
+as his friend and cousin, and therefore as quite well
+known, and yet the man himself, while at each introduction
+he expresses himself gratified, has always the
+question on his lips: <q>But how the deuce do I stand to
+the whole company?</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus we see that, with regard to those phenomena
+which we know only as our ideas, etiology can never
+give us the desired information that shall carry us beyond
+this point. For, after all its explanations, they still
+remain quite strange to us, as mere ideas whose significance
+<pb n='128'/><anchor id='Pg128'/>
+we do not understand. The causal connection
+merely gives us the rule and the relative order of their
+appearance in space and time, but affords us no further
+knowledge of that which so appears. Moreover, the law
+of causality itself has only validity for ideas, for objects
+of a definite class, and it has meaning only in so far as it
+presupposes them. Thus, like these objects themselves,
+it always exists only in relation to a subject, that is, conditionally;
+and so it is known just as well if we
+start from the subject, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, as if we start from
+the object, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign>. Kant indeed has taught us
+this.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But what now impels us to inquiry is just that we are
+not satisfied with knowing that we have ideas, that they
+are such and such, and that they are connected according
+to certain laws, the general expression of which is the
+principle of sufficient reason. We wish to know the
+significance of these ideas; we ask whether this world is
+merely idea; in which case it would pass by us like an
+empty dream or a baseless vision, not worth our notice;
+or whether it is also something else, something more than
+idea, and if so, what. Thus much is certain, that this
+something we seek for must be completely and in its
+whole nature different from the idea; that the forms and
+laws of the idea must therefore be completely foreign to
+it; further, that we cannot arrive at it from the idea
+under the guidance of the laws which merely combine
+objects, ideas, among themselves, and which are the forms
+of the principle of sufficient reason.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus we see already that we can never arrive at the
+real nature of things from without. However much we
+investigate, we can never reach anything but images and
+names. We are like a man who goes round a castle
+seeking in vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching
+the façades. And yet this is the method that has been
+followed by all philosophers before me.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 18. In fact, the meaning for which we seek of that
+<pb n='129'/><anchor id='Pg129'/>
+world which is present to us only as our idea, or the
+transition from the world as mere idea of the knowing
+subject to whatever it may be besides this, would never be
+found if the investigator himself were nothing more than
+the pure knowing subject (a winged cherub without a
+body). But he is himself rooted in that world; he finds
+himself in it as an <emph>individual</emph>, that is to say, his knowledge,
+which is the necessary supporter of the whole
+world as idea, is yet always given through the medium of
+a body, whose affections are, as we have shown, the starting-point
+for the understanding in the perception of that
+world. His body is, for the pure knowing subject, an
+idea like every other idea, an object among objects. Its
+movements and actions are so far known to him in precisely
+the same way as the changes of all other perceived
+objects, and would be just as strange and incomprehensible
+to him if their meaning were not explained for
+him in an entirely different way. Otherwise he would
+see his actions follow upon given motives with the constancy
+of a law of nature, just as the changes of other
+objects follow upon causes, stimuli, or motives. But he
+would not understand the influence of the motives any
+more than the connection between every other effect
+which he sees and its cause. He would then call the
+inner nature of these manifestations and actions of his
+body which he did not understand a force, a quality, or
+a character, as he pleased, but he would have no further
+insight into it. But all this is not the case; indeed the
+answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge
+who appears as an individual, and the answer is
+<emph>will</emph>. This and this alone gives him the key to his own
+existence, reveals to him the significance, shows him the
+inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his movements.
+The body is given in two entirely different ways
+to the subject of knowledge, who becomes an individual
+only through his identity with it. It is given as an idea
+in intelligent perception, as an object among objects and
+<pb n='130'/><anchor id='Pg130'/>
+subject to the laws of objects. And it is also given in
+quite a different way as that which is immediately known
+to every one, and is signified by the word <emph>will</emph>. Every
+true act of his will is also at once and without
+exception a movement of his body. The act of will and
+the movement of the body are not two different things
+objectively known, which the bond of causality unites;
+they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect;
+they are one and the same, but they are given in
+entirely different ways,&mdash;immediately, and again in
+perception for the understanding. The action of the
+body is nothing but the act of the will objectified, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+passed into perception. It will appear later that this is
+true of every movement of the body, not merely those
+which follow upon motives, but also involuntary movements
+which follow upon mere stimuli, and, indeed, that
+the whole body is nothing but objectified will, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, will
+become idea. All this will be proved and made quite
+clear in the course of this work. In one respect, therefore,
+I shall call the body the <emph>objectivity of will</emph>; as in
+the previous book, and in the essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason, in accordance with the one-sided point
+of view intentionally adopted there (that of the idea), I
+called it <emph>the immediate object</emph>. Thus in a certain sense
+we may also say that will is the knowledge <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> of
+the body, and the body is the knowledge <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> of
+the will. Resolutions of the will which relate to the
+future are merely deliberations of the reason about what
+we shall will at a particular time, not real acts of will.
+Only the carrying out of the resolve stamps it as will, for
+till then it is never more than an intention that may be
+changed, and that exists only in the reason <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign>.
+It is only in reflection that to will and to act are different;
+in reality they are one. Every true, genuine, immediate
+act of will is also, at once and immediately, a visible act
+of the body. And, corresponding to this, every impression
+upon the body is also, on the other hand, at once
+<pb n='131'/><anchor id='Pg131'/>
+and immediately an impression upon the will. As such
+it is called pain when it is opposed to the will; gratification
+or pleasure when it is in accordance with it. The
+degrees of both are widely different. It is quite wrong,
+however, to call pain and pleasure ideas, for they are by
+no means ideas, but immediate affections of the will in
+its manifestation, the body; compulsory, instantaneous
+willing or not-willing of the impression which the body
+sustains. There are only a few impressions of the body
+which do not touch the will, and it is through these alone
+that the body is an immediate object of knowledge, for,
+as perceived by the understanding, it is already an indirect
+object like all others. These impressions are, therefore,
+to be treated directly as mere ideas, and excepted
+from what has been said. The impressions we refer to
+are the affections of the purely objective senses of sight,
+hearing, and touch, though only so far as these organs are
+affected in the way which is specially peculiar to their
+specific nature. This affection of them is so excessively
+weak an excitement of the heightened and specifically
+modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect
+the will, but only furnishes the understanding with the
+data out of which the perception arises, undisturbed by
+any excitement of the will. But every stronger or different
+kind of affection of these organs of sense is painful,
+that is to say, against the will, and thus they also belong
+to its objectivity. Weakness of the nerves shows itself
+in this, that the impressions which have only such a
+degree of strength as would usually be sufficient to make
+them data for the understanding reach the higher degree
+at which they influence the will, that is to say, give pain
+or pleasure, though more often pain, which is, however,
+to some extent deadened and inarticulate, so that not only
+particular tones and strong light are painful to us, but
+there ensues a generally unhealthy and hypochondriacal
+disposition which is not distinctly understood. The
+identity of the body and the will shows itself further,
+<pb n='132'/><anchor id='Pg132'/>
+among other ways, in the circumstance that every vehement
+and excessive movement of the will, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, every
+emotion, agitates the body and its inner constitution
+directly, and disturbs the course of its vital functions.
+This is shown in detail in <q>Will in Nature,</q> p. 27 of the
+second edition and p. 28 of the third.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Lastly, the knowledge which I have of my will, though
+it is immediate, cannot be separated from that which I
+have of my body. I know my will, not as a whole, not
+as a unity, not completely, according to its nature, but I
+know it only in its particular acts, and therefore in time,
+which is the form of the phenomenal aspect of my body,
+as of every object. Therefore the body is a condition of
+the knowledge of my will. Thus, I cannot really imagine
+this will apart from my body. In the essay on the
+principle of sufficient reason, the will, or rather the subject
+of willing, is treated as a special class of ideas or
+objects. But even there we saw this object become one
+with the subject; that is, we saw it cease to be an
+object. We there called this union the miracle κατ᾽
+εξοχην, and the whole of the present work is to a certain
+extent an explanation of this. So far as I know my
+will specially as object, I know it as body. But then I
+am again at the first class of ideas laid down in that
+essay, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, real objects. As we proceed we shall see
+always more clearly that these ideas of the first class
+obtain their explanation and solution from those of the
+fourth class given in the essay, which could no longer be
+properly opposed to the subject as object, and that, therefore,
+we must learn to understand the inner nature of the
+law of causality which is valid in the first class, and of
+all that happens in accordance with it from the law of
+motivation which governs the fourth class.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The identity of the will and the body, of which we
+have now given a cursory explanation, can only be proved in
+the manner we have adopted here. We have proved
+this identity for the first time, and shall do so more and
+<pb n='133'/><anchor id='Pg133'/>
+more fully in the course of this work. By <q>proved</q>
+we mean raised from the immediate consciousness, from
+knowledge in the concrete to abstract knowledge of the
+reason, or carried over into abstract knowledge. On the
+other hand, from its very nature it can never be demonstrated,
+that is, deduced as indirect knowledge from some
+other more direct knowledge, just because it is itself the
+most direct knowledge; and if we do not apprehend it and
+stick to it as such, we shall expect in vain to receive it
+again in some indirect way as derivative knowledge. It
+is knowledge of quite a special kind, whose truth cannot
+therefore properly be brought under any of the four
+rubrics under which I have classified all truth in the
+essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29, the
+logical, the empirical, the metaphysical, and the metalogical,
+for it is not, like all these, the relation of an
+abstract idea to another idea, or to the necessary form
+of perceptive or of abstract ideation, but it is the relation
+of a judgment to the connection which an idea of perception,
+the body, has to that which is not an idea at
+all, but something <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto genere</foreign> different, will. I should
+like therefore to distinguish this from all other truth,
+and call it κατ᾽ εξοχην <emph>philosophical truth</emph>. We can
+turn the expression of this truth in different ways and
+say: My body and my will are one;&mdash;or, What as an idea
+of perception I call my body, I call my will, so far as I am
+conscious of it in an entirely different way which cannot
+be compared to any other;&mdash;or, My body is the <emph>objectivity</emph>
+of my will;&mdash;or, My body considered apart from the fact
+that it is my idea is still my will, and so forth.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xviii. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 19. In the first book we were reluctantly driven to
+explain the human body as merely idea of the subject
+which knows it, like all the other objects of this world
+of perception. But it has now become clear that what
+enables us consciously to distinguish our own body from
+all other objects which in other respects are precisely the
+<pb n='134'/><anchor id='Pg134'/>
+same, is that our body appears in consciousness in quite
+another way <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto genere</foreign> different from idea, and this we
+denote by the word <emph>will</emph>; and that it is just this double
+knowledge which we have of our own body that affords
+us information about it, about its action and movement
+following on motives, and also about what it experiences
+by means of external impressions; in a word, about what
+it is, not as idea, but as more than idea; that is to say,
+what it is <emph>in itself</emph>. None of this information have we
+got directly with regard to the nature, action, and experience
+of other real objects.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is just because of this special relation to one body
+that the knowing subject is an individual. For regarded
+apart from this relation, his body is for him only an idea
+like all other ideas. But the relation through which the
+knowing subject is an <emph>individual</emph>, is just on that account
+a relation which subsists only between him and one particular
+idea of all those which he has. Therefore he is
+conscious of this <emph>one</emph> idea, not merely as an idea, but in
+quite a different way as a will. If, however, he abstracts
+from that special relation, from that twofold and completely
+heterogeneous knowledge of what is one and the
+same, then that <emph>one</emph>, the body, is an idea like all other
+ideas. Therefore, in order to understand the matter, the
+individual who knows must either assume that what
+distinguishes that one idea from others is merely the
+fact that his knowledge stands in this double relation to it
+alone; that insight in two ways at the same time is open
+to him only in the case of this one object of perception,
+and that this is to be explained not by the difference of this
+object from all others, but only by the difference between
+the relation of his knowledge to this one object, and its relation
+to all other objects. Or else he must assume that
+this object is essentially different from all others; that it
+alone of all objects is at once both will and idea, while
+the rest are only ideas, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, only phantoms. Thus he
+must assume that his body is the only real individual in
+<pb n='135'/><anchor id='Pg135'/>
+the world, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the only phenomenon of will and the only
+immediate object of the subject. That other objects,
+considered merely as <emph>ideas</emph>, are like his body, that is, like
+it, fill space (which itself can only be present as idea),
+and also, like it, are causally active in space, is indeed
+demonstrably certain from the law of causality which is
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> valid for ideas, and which admits of no effect
+without a cause; but apart from the fact that we can
+only reason from an effect to a cause generally, and not
+to a similar cause, we are still in the sphere of mere
+ideas, in which alone the law of causality is valid, and
+beyond which it can never take us. But whether the
+objects known to the individual only as ideas are yet,
+like his own body, manifestations of a will, is, as was
+said in the First Book, the proper meaning of the question
+as to the reality of the external world. To deny this is
+<emph>theoretical egoism</emph>, which on that account regards all
+phenomena that are outside its own will as phantoms, just
+as in a practical reference exactly the same thing is done
+by practical egoism. For in it a man regards and treats
+himself alone as a person, and all other persons as mere
+phantoms. Theoretical egoism can never be demonstrably
+refuted, yet in philosophy it has never been used
+otherwise than as a sceptical sophism, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, a pretence.
+As a serious conviction, on the other hand, it could only
+be found in a madhouse, and as such it stands in need
+of a cure rather than a refutation. We do not therefore
+combat it any further in this regard, but treat it as
+merely the last stronghold of scepticism, which is always
+polemical. Thus our knowledge, which is always bound
+to individuality and is limited by this circumstance,
+brings with it the necessity that each of us can only <emph>be
+one</emph>, while, on the other hand, each of us can <emph>know all</emph>;
+and it is this limitation that creates the need for philosophy.
+We therefore who, for this very reason, are striving
+to extend the limits of our knowledge through philosophy,
+will treat this sceptical argument of theoretical egoism
+<pb n='136'/><anchor id='Pg136'/>
+which meets us, as an army would treat a small frontier
+fortress. The fortress cannot indeed be taken, but the
+garrison can never sally forth from it, and therefore we
+pass it by without danger, and are not afraid to have it
+in our rear.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The double knowledge which each of us has of the
+nature and activity of his own body, and which is given
+in two completely different ways, has now been clearly
+brought out. We shall accordingly make further use of
+it as a key to the nature of every phenomenon in nature,
+and shall judge of all objects which are not our own
+bodies, and are consequently not given to our consciousness
+in a double way but only as ideas, according to the
+analogy of our own bodies, and shall therefore assume
+that as in one aspect they are idea, just like our bodies,
+and in this respect are analogous to them, so in another
+aspect, what remains of objects when we set aside their
+existence as idea of the subject, must in its inner nature
+be the same as that in us which we call <emph>will</emph>. For what
+other kind of existence or reality should we attribute to
+the rest of the material world? Whence should we take
+the elements out of which we construct such a world?
+Besides will and idea nothing is known to us or thinkable.
+If we wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the
+material world which exists immediately only in our
+idea, we give it the reality which our own body has for
+each of us; for that is the most real thing for every one.
+But if we now analyse the reality of this body and its
+actions, beyond the fact that it is idea, we find nothing
+in it except the will; with this its reality is exhausted.
+Therefore we can nowhere find another kind of reality
+which we can attribute to the material world. Thus if
+we hold that the material world is something more than
+merely our idea, we must say that besides being idea, that
+is, in itself and according to its inmost nature, it is that
+which we find immediately in ourselves as <emph>will</emph>. I say
+according to its inmost nature; but we must first come
+<pb n='137'/><anchor id='Pg137'/>
+to know more accurately this real nature of the will, in
+order that we may be able to distinguish from it what
+does not belong to itself, but to its manifestation, which
+has many grades. Such, for example, is the circumstance
+of its being accompanied by knowledge, and the
+determination by motives which is conditioned by this
+knowledge. As we shall see farther on, this does not
+belong to the real nature of will, but merely to its distinct
+manifestation as an animal or a human being. If,
+therefore, I say,&mdash;the force which attracts a stone to the
+earth is according to its nature, in itself, and apart from
+all idea, will, I shall not be supposed to express in this
+proposition the insane opinion that the stone moves itself
+in accordance with a known motive, merely because this
+is the way in which will appears in man.<note place='foot'>We can thus by no means agree
+with Bacon if he (De Augm. Scient.,
+L. iv. in fine.) thinks that all mechanical
+and physical movement of
+bodies has always been preceded
+by perception in these bodies; though
+a glimmering of truth lies at the
+bottom of this false proposition.
+This is also the case with Kepler's
+opinion, expressed in his essay <hi rend='italic'>De
+Planeta Martis</hi>, that the planets
+must have knowledge in order to
+keep their elliptical courses so correctly,
+and to regulate the velocity
+of their motion so that the triangle
+of the plane of their course always
+remains proportional to the time in
+which they pass through its base.</note> We shall
+now proceed more clearly and in detail to prove, establish,
+and develop to its full extent what as yet has only
+been provisionally and generally explained.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xix. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 20. As we have said, the will proclaims itself primarily
+in the voluntary movements of our own body, as the
+inmost nature of this body, as that which it is besides
+being object of perception, idea. For these voluntary
+movements are nothing else than the visible aspect of the
+individual acts of will, with which they are directly coincident
+and identical, and only distinguished through the
+form of knowledge into which they have passed, and in
+which alone they can be known, the form of idea.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But these acts of will have always a ground or reason
+outside themselves in motives. Yet these motives never
+determine more than what I will at <emph>this</emph> time, in <emph>this</emph>
+<pb n='138'/><anchor id='Pg138'/>
+place, and under <emph>these</emph> circumstances, not <emph>that</emph> I will in
+general, or <emph>what</emph> I will in general, that is, the maxims
+which characterise my volition generally. Therefore the
+inner nature of my volition cannot be explained from these
+motives; but they merely determine its manifestation at
+a given point of time: they are merely the occasion of
+my will showing itself; but the will itself lies outside
+the province of the law of motivation, which determines
+nothing but its appearance at each point of time. It is
+only under the presupposition of my empirical character
+that the motive is a sufficient ground of explanation of
+my action. But if I abstract from my character, and
+then ask, why, in general, I will this and not that, no
+answer is possible, because it is only the manifestation of
+the will that is subject to the principle of sufficient
+reason, and not the will itself, which in this respect is to
+be called <emph>groundless</emph>. At this point I presuppose Kant's
+doctrine of the empirical and intelligible character, and
+also my own treatment of the subject in <q>The Fundamental
+Problems of Ethics,</q> pp. 48, 58, and 178, <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>,
+of first edition (p. 174, <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>, of second edition). I
+shall also have to speak more fully on the question in
+the Fourth Book. For the present, I have only to draw
+attention to this, that the fact of one manifestation being
+established through another, as here the deed through the
+motive, does not at all conflict with the fact that its real
+nature is will, which itself has no <emph>ground</emph>; for as the
+principle of sufficient reason in all its aspects is only the
+form of knowledge, its validity extends only to the idea,
+to the phenomena, to the visibility of the will, but not to
+the will itself, which becomes visible.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If now every action of my body is the manifestation of
+an act of will in which my will itself in general, and as
+a whole, thus my character, expresses itself under given
+motives, manifestation of the will must be the inevitable
+condition and presupposition of every action. For the
+fact of its manifestation cannot depend upon something
+<pb n='139'/><anchor id='Pg139'/>
+which does not exist directly and only through it, which
+consequently is for it merely accidental, and through
+which its manifestation itself would be merely accidental.
+Now that condition is just the whole body itself. Thus
+the body itself must be manifestation of the will, and it
+must be related to my will as a whole, that is, to my
+intelligible character, whose phenomenal appearance in
+time is my empirical character, as the particular action
+of the body is related to the particular act of the
+will. The whole body, then, must be simply my will
+become visible, must be my will itself, so far as this is
+object of perception, an idea of the first class. It has
+already been advanced in confirmation of this that every
+impression upon my body also affects my will at once
+and immediately, and in this respect is called pain or
+pleasure, or, in its lower degrees, agreeable or disagreeable
+sensation; and also, conversely, that every violent
+movement of the will, every emotion or passion, convulses
+the body and disturbs the course of its functions. Indeed
+we can also give an etiological account, though a very
+incomplete one, of the origin of my body, and a somewhat
+better account of its development and conservation,
+and this is the substance of physiology. But physiology
+merely explains its theme in precisely the same way as
+motives explain action. Thus the physiological explanation
+of the functions of the body detracts just as little
+from the philosophical truth that the whole existence of
+this body and the sum total of its functions are merely
+the objectification of that will which appears in its
+outward actions in accordance with a motive, as the
+establishment of the individual action through the motive
+and the necessary sequence of the action from the motive
+conflicts with the fact that action in general, and according
+to its nature, is only the manifestation of a will which
+itself has no ground. If, however, physiology tries to
+refer even these outward actions, the immediate voluntary
+movements, to causes in the organism,&mdash;for example, if it
+<pb n='140'/><anchor id='Pg140'/>
+explains the movement of the muscles as resulting from
+the presence of fluids (<q>like the contraction of a cord
+when it is wet,</q> says Reil in his <q>Archiv für Physiologie,</q>
+vol. vi. p. 153), even supposing it really could
+give a thorough explanation of this kind, yet this would
+never invalidate the immediately certain truth that every
+voluntary motion (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>functiones animales</foreign>) is the manifestation
+of an act of will. Now, just as little can the
+physiological explanation of vegetative life (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>functiones
+naturales vitales</foreign>), however far it may advance, ever
+invalidate the truth that the whole animal life which
+thus develops itself is the manifestation of will. In
+general, then, as we have shown above, no etiological
+explanation can ever give us more than the necessarily
+determined position in time and space of a particular
+manifestation, its necessary appearance there, according to
+a fixed law; but the inner nature of everything that
+appears in this way remains wholly inexplicable, and is
+presupposed by every etiological explanation, and merely
+indicated by the names, force, or law of nature, or, if we
+are speaking of action, character or will. Thus, although
+every particular action, under the presupposition of the
+definite character, necessarily follows from the given
+motive, and although growth, the process of nourishment,
+and all the changes of the animal body take place
+according to necessarily acting causes (stimuli), yet the
+whole series of actions, and consequently every individual
+act, and also its condition, the whole body itself which
+accomplishes it, and therefore also the process through
+which and in which it exists, are nothing but the manifestation
+of the will, the becoming visible, <emph>the objectification
+of the will</emph>. Upon this rests the perfect suitableness
+of the human and animal body to the human and animal
+will in general, resembling, though far surpassing, the
+correspondence between an instrument made for a purpose
+and the will of the maker, and on this account
+appearing as design, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the teleological explanation of
+<pb n='141'/><anchor id='Pg141'/>
+the body. The parts of the body must, therefore, completely
+correspond to the principal desires through which
+the will manifests itself; they must be the visible expression
+of these desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are
+objectified hunger; the organs of generation are objectified
+sexual desire; the grasping hand, the hurrying feet,
+correspond to the more indirect desires of the will which
+they express. As the human form generally corresponds
+to the human will generally, so the individual bodily
+structure corresponds to the individually modified will,
+the character of the individual, and therefore it is throughout
+and in all its parts characteristic and full of expression.
+It is very remarkable that Parmenides already
+gave expression to this in the following verses, quoted by
+Aristotle (Metaph. iii. 5):&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l>Ὁς γαρ ἑκαστος εχει κρασιν μελεων πολυκαμπτων</l>
+<l>Τως νοος ανθρωποισι παρεστηκεν; το γαρ αυτο</l>
+<l>Εστιν, ὁπερ φρονεει, μελεων φυσις ανθρωποισι</l>
+<l>Και πασιν και παντι; το γαρ πλεον εστι νοημα.</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+(Ut enim cuique complexio membrorum flexibilium se
+habet, ita mens hominibus adest: idem namque est, quod
+sapit, membrorum natura hominibus, et omnibus et omni:
+quod enim plus est, intelligentia est.)<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xx. of the Supplement,
+and also in my work, <q><hi rend='italic'>Ueber den
+Willen in der Natur</hi>,</q> the chapters on
+Physiology and Comparative Anatomy,
+where the subject I have only
+touched upon here is fully discussed.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 21. Whoever has now gained from all these expositions
+a knowledge <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign>, and therefore clear and certain,
+of what every one knows directly <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in concreto</foreign>, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, as feeling,
+a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his
+phenomenal being, which manifests itself to him as idea,
+both in his actions and in their permanent substratum,
+his body, and that his will is that which is most immediate
+in his consciousness, though it has not as such
+completely passed into the form of idea in which object
+and subject stand over against each other, but makes
+<pb n='142'/><anchor id='Pg142'/>
+itself known to him in a direct manner, in which he does
+not quite clearly distinguish subject and object, yet is
+not known as a whole to the individual himself, but only
+in its particular acts,&mdash;whoever, I say, has with me
+gained this conviction will find that of itself it affords
+him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the
+whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all those
+phenomena which are not given to him, like his own
+phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect
+knowledge, but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly
+as <emph>idea</emph> alone. He will recognise this will of
+which we are speaking not only in those phenomenal
+existences which exactly resemble his own, in men
+and animals as their inmost nature, but the course of
+reflection will lead him to recognise the force which
+germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the
+force through which the crystal is formed, that by which
+the magnet turns to the north pole, the force whose
+shock he experiences from the contact of two different
+kinds of metals, the force which appears in the elective
+affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, decomposition
+and combination, and, lastly, even gravitation,
+which acts so powerfully throughout matter, draws the
+stone to the earth and the earth to the sun,&mdash;all these, I
+say, he will recognise as different only in their phenomenal
+existence, but in their inner nature as identical,
+as that which is directly known to him so intimately
+and so much better than anything else, and
+which in its most distinct manifestation is called <emph>will</emph>.
+It is this application of reflection alone that prevents us
+from remaining any longer at the phenomenon, and leads us
+to the <emph>thing in itself</emph>. Phenomenal existence is idea and
+nothing more. All idea, of whatever kind it may be, all
+<emph>object</emph>, is <emph>phenomenal</emph> existence, but the <emph>will</emph> alone is a
+<emph>thing in itself</emph>. As such, it is throughout not idea, but
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto genere</foreign> different from it; it is that of which all idea,
+all object, is the phenomenal appearance, the visibility,
+<pb n='143'/><anchor id='Pg143'/>
+the objectification. It is the inmost nature, the kernel,
+of every particular thing, and also of the whole. It
+appears in every blind force of nature and also in the
+preconsidered action of man; and the great difference
+between these two is merely in the degree of the manifestation,
+not in the nature of what manifests itself.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 22. Now, if we are to think as an object this thing-in-itself
+(we wish to retain the Kantian expression as a
+standing formula), which, as such, is never object, because
+all object is its mere manifestation, and therefore cannot
+be it itself, we must borrow for it the name and concept
+of an object, of something in some way objectively given,
+consequently of one of its own manifestations. But in
+order to serve as a clue for the understanding, this can be
+no other than the most complete of all its manifestations,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the most distinct, the most developed, and directly
+enlightened by knowledge. Now this is the human will.
+It is, however, well to observe that here, at any rate, we
+only make use of a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>denominatio a potiori</foreign>, through which,
+therefore, the concept of will receives a greater extension
+than it has hitherto had. Knowledge of the identical
+in different phenomena, and of difference in similar
+phenomena, is, as Plato so often remarks, a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sine qua non</foreign>
+of philosophy. But hitherto it was not recognised that
+every kind of active and operating force in nature is
+essentially identical with will, and therefore the multifarious
+kinds of phenomena were not seen to be merely
+different species of the same genus, but were treated as
+heterogeneous. Consequently there could be no word to
+denote the concept of this genus. I therefore name the
+genus after its most important species, the direct knowledge
+of which lies nearer to us and guides us to the indirect
+knowledge of all other species. But whoever is
+incapable of carrying out the required extension of the
+concept will remain involved in a permanent misunderstanding.
+For by the word <emph>will</emph> he understands only
+that species of it which has hitherto been exclusively
+<pb n='144'/><anchor id='Pg144'/>
+denoted by it, the will which is guided by knowledge,
+and whose manifestation follows only upon motives, and
+indeed merely abstract motives, and thus takes place under
+the guidance of the reason. This, we have said, is only
+the most prominent example of the manifestation of will.
+We must now distinctly separate in thought the inmost
+essence of this manifestation which is known to us
+directly, and then transfer it to all the weaker, less distinct
+manifestations of the same nature, and thus we
+shall accomplish the desired extension of the concept of
+will. From another point of view I should be equally
+misunderstood by any one who should think that it is
+all the same in the end whether we denote this inner
+nature of all phenomena by the word <emph>will</emph> or by any
+other. This would be the case if the thing-in-itself were
+something whose existence we merely <emph>inferred</emph>, and thus
+knew indirectly and only in the abstract. Then, indeed,
+we might call it what we pleased; the name would stand
+merely as the symbol of an unknown quantity. But the
+word <emph>will</emph>, which, like a magic spell, discloses to us the
+inmost being of everything in nature, is by no means an
+unknown quantity, something arrived at only by inference,
+but is fully and immediately comprehended, and is
+so familiar to us that we know and understand what will
+is far better than anything else whatever. The concept
+of will has hitherto commonly been subordinated to that
+of force, but I reverse the matter entirely, and desire that
+every force in nature should be thought as will. It must
+not be supposed that this is mere verbal quibbling or of
+no consequence; rather, it is of the greatest significance
+and importance. For at the foundation of the concept
+of force, as of all other concepts, there ultimately lies
+the knowledge in sense-perception of the objective world,
+that is to say, the phenomenon, the idea; and the concept
+is constructed out of this. It is an abstraction from
+the province in which cause and effect reign, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, from
+ideas of perception, and means just the causal nature of
+<pb n='145'/><anchor id='Pg145'/>
+causes at the point at which this causal nature is no
+further etiologically explicable, but is the necessary presupposition
+of all etiological explanation. The concept
+will, on the other hand, is of all possible concepts the
+only one which has its source <emph>not</emph> in the phenomenal, <emph>not</emph> in
+the mere idea of perception, but comes from within, and
+proceeds from the most immediate consciousness of each
+of us, in which each of us knows his own individuality,
+according to its nature, immediately, apart from all form,
+even that of subject and object, and which at the same
+time is this individuality, for here the subject and the
+object of knowledge are one. If, therefore, we refer
+the concept of <emph>force</emph> to that of <emph>will</emph>, we have in fact
+referred the less known to what is infinitely better
+known; indeed, to the one thing that is really immediately
+and fully known to us, and have very greatly extended
+our knowledge. If, on the contrary, we subsume the
+concept of will under that of force, as has hitherto
+always been done, we renounce the only immediate
+knowledge which we have of the inner nature of the
+world, for we allow it to disappear in a concept which is
+abstracted from the phenomenal, and with which we can
+therefore never go beyond the phenomenal.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 23. The <emph>will</emph> as a thing in itself is quite different from
+its phenomenal appearance, and entirely free from all the
+forms of the phenomenal, into which it first passes when
+it manifests itself, and which therefore only concern its
+<emph>objectivity</emph>, and are foreign to the will itself. Even the
+most universal form of all idea, that of being object for a
+subject, does not concern it; still less the forms which
+are subordinate to this and which collectively have their
+common expression in the principle of sufficient reason,
+to which we know that time and space belong, and consequently
+multiplicity also, which exists and is possible
+only through these. In this last regard I shall call time
+and space the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, borrowing an
+expression from the old schoolmen, and I beg to draw
+<pb n='146'/><anchor id='Pg146'/>
+attention to this, once for all. For it is only through
+the medium of time and space that what is one and the
+same, both according to its nature and to its concept, yet
+appears as different, as a multiplicity of co-existent and
+successive phenomena. Thus time and space are the
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, the subject of so many subtleties
+and disputes among the schoolmen, which may be
+found collected in Suarez (Disp. 5, Sect. 3). According
+to what has been said, the will as a thing-in-itself lies
+outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason
+in all its forms, and is consequently completely groundless,
+although all its manifestations are entirely subordinated
+to the principle of sufficient reason. Further, it is
+free from all <emph>multiplicity</emph>, although its manifestations in
+time and space are innumerable. It is itself one, though
+not in the sense in which an object is one, for the unity
+of an object can only be known in opposition to a possible
+multiplicity; nor yet in the sense in which a concept is
+one, for the unity of a concept originates only in abstraction
+from a multiplicity; but it is one as that which lies
+outside time and space, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the possibility of multiplicity. Only when all this
+has become quite clear to us through the subsequent
+examination of the phenomena and different manifestations
+of the will, shall we fully understand the meaning
+of the Kantian doctrine that time, space and causality do
+not belong to the thing-in-itself, but are only forms of
+knowing.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The uncaused nature of will has been actually recognised,
+where it manifests itself most distinctly, as the
+will of man, and this has been called free, independent.
+But on account of the uncaused nature of the will itself,
+the necessity to which its manifestation is everywhere
+subjected has been overlooked, and actions are treated as
+free, which they are not. For every individual action
+follows with strict necessity from the effect of the motive
+upon the character. All necessity is, as we have already
+<pb n='147'/><anchor id='Pg147'/>
+said, the relation of the consequent to the reason, and
+nothing more. The principle of sufficient reason is the
+universal form of all phenomena, and man in his action
+must be subordinated to it like every other phenomenon.
+But because in self-consciousness the will is known
+directly and in itself, in this consciousness lies also the
+consciousness of freedom. The fact is, however, overlooked
+that the individual, the person, is not will as a
+thing-in-itself, but is a <emph>phenomenon</emph> of will, is already
+determined as such, and has come under the form of the
+phenomenal, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence
+arises the strange fact that every one believes himself <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a
+priori</foreign> to be perfectly free, even in his individual actions,
+and thinks that at every moment he can commence
+another manner of life, which just means that he can
+become another person. But <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign>, through experience,
+he finds to his astonishment that he is not free,
+but subjected to necessity; that in spite of all his
+resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct,
+and that from the beginning of his life to the end of it,
+he must carry out the very character which he himself
+condemns, and as it were play the part he has undertaken
+to the end. I cannot pursue this subject further
+at present, for it belongs, as ethical, to another part of
+this work. In the meantime, I only wish to point out
+here that the <emph>phenomenon</emph> of the will which in itself is
+uncaused, is yet as such subordinated to the law of
+necessity, that is, the principle of sufficient reason, so
+that in the necessity with which the phenomena of
+nature follow each other, we may find nothing to hinder
+us from recognising in them the manifestations of will.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Only those changes which have no other ground than
+a motive, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, an idea, have hitherto been regarded
+as manifestations of will. Therefore in nature a will
+has only been attributed to man, or at the most to
+animals; for knowledge, the idea, is of course, as I have
+said elsewhere, the true and exclusive characteristic of
+<pb n='148'/><anchor id='Pg148'/>
+animal life. But that the will is also active where no
+knowledge guides it, we see at once in the instinct and
+the mechanical skill of animals.<note place='foot'>This is specially treated in the 27th Ch. of the Supplement.</note> That they have ideas
+and knowledge is here not to the point, for the end
+towards which they strive as definitely as if it were a
+known motive, is yet entirely unknown to them. Therefore
+in such cases their action takes place without
+motive, is not guided by the idea, and shows us first and
+most distinctly how the will may be active entirely
+without knowledge. The bird of a year old has no idea
+of the eggs for which it builds a nest; the young spider
+has no idea of the prey for which it spins a web; nor
+has the ant-lion any idea of the ants for which he digs a
+trench for the first time. The larva of the stag-beetle
+makes the hole in the wood, in which it is to await its
+metamorphosis, twice as big if it is going to be a male
+beetle as if it is going to be a female, so that if it is a
+male there may be room for the horns, of which, however,
+it has no idea. In such actions of these creatures the
+will is clearly operative as in their other actions, but it
+is in blind activity, which is indeed accompanied by
+knowledge but not guided by it. If now we have once
+gained insight into the fact, that idea as motive is not a
+necessary and essential condition of the activity of the
+will, we shall more easily recognise the activity of will
+where it is less apparent. For example, we shall see
+that the house of the snail is no more made by a will
+which is foreign to the snail itself, than the house which
+we build is produced through another will than our own;
+but we shall recognise in both houses the work of a will
+which objectifies itself in both the phenomena&mdash;a will
+which works in us according to motives, but in the snail
+still blindly as formative impulse directed outwards. In
+us also the same will is in many ways only blindly
+active: in all the functions of our body which are not
+guided by knowledge, in all its vital and vegetative processes,
+<pb n='149'/><anchor id='Pg149'/>
+digestion, circulation, secretion, growth, reproduction.
+Not only the actions of the body, but the
+whole body itself is, as we have shown above, phenomenon
+of the will, objectified will, concrete will. All that
+goes on in it must therefore proceed through will,
+although here this will is not guided by knowledge, but
+acts blindly according to causes, which in this case are
+called <emph>stimuli</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I call a <emph>cause</emph>, in the narrowest sense of the word,
+that state of matter, which, while it introduces another
+state with necessity, yet suffers just as great a change
+itself as that which it causes; which is expressed in the
+rule, <q>action and reaction are equal.</q> Further, in the
+case of what is properly speaking a cause, the effect
+increases directly in proportion to the cause, and therefore
+also the reaction. So that, if once the mode of
+operation be known, the degree of the effect may be
+measured and calculated from the degree of the intensity
+of the cause; and conversely the degree of the intensity
+of the cause may be calculated from the degree of the
+effect. Such causes, properly so called, operate in all
+the phenomena of mechanics, chemistry, and so forth;
+in short, in all the changes of unorganised bodies. On
+the other hand, I call a <emph>stimulus</emph>, such a cause as sustains
+no reaction proportional to its effect, and the intensity
+of which does not vary directly in proportion to the
+intensity of its effect, so that the effect cannot be
+measured by it. On the contrary, a small increase of
+the stimulus may cause a very great increase of the
+effect, or conversely, it may eliminate the previous effect
+altogether, and so forth. All effects upon organised
+bodies as such are of this kind. All properly organic
+and vegetative changes of the animal body must therefore
+be referred to stimuli, not to mere causes. But the
+stimulus, like every cause and motive generally, never
+determines more than the point of time and space at
+<pb n='150'/><anchor id='Pg150'/>
+which the manifestation of every force is to take place,
+and does not determine the inner nature of the force
+itself which is manifested. This inner nature we know,
+from our previous investigation, is will, to which therefore
+we ascribe both the unconscious and the conscious
+changes of the body. The stimulus holds the mean,
+forms the transition between the motive, which is
+causality accompanied throughout by knowledge, and the
+cause in the narrowest sense. In particular cases it is
+sometimes nearer a motive, sometimes nearer a cause, but
+yet it can always be distinguished from both. Thus, for
+example, the rising of the sap in a plant follows upon
+stimuli, and cannot be explained from mere causes,
+according to the laws of hydraulics or capillary attraction;
+yet it is certainly assisted by these, and altogether
+approaches very near to a purely causal change. On the
+other hand, the movements of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Hedysarum gyrans</foreign> and
+the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Mimosa pudica</foreign>, although still following upon mere
+stimuli, are yet very like movements which follow upon
+motives, and seem almost to wish to make the transition.
+The contraction of the pupils of the eyes as the light is
+increased is due to stimuli, but it passes into movement
+which is due to motive; for it takes place, because too
+strong lights would affect the retina painfully, and to
+avoid this we contract the pupils. The occasion of an
+erection is a motive, because it is an idea, yet it operates
+with the necessity of a stimulus, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, it cannot be resisted,
+but we must put the idea away in order to make
+it cease to affect us. This is also the case with disgusting
+things, which excite the desire to vomit. Thus
+we have treated the instinct of animals as an actual
+link, of quite a distinct kind, between movement following
+upon stimuli, and action following upon a known
+motive. Now we might be asked to regard breathing as
+another link of this kind. It has been disputed whether
+it belongs to the voluntary or the involuntary movements,
+that is to say, whether it follows upon motive or stimulus,
+<pb n='151'/><anchor id='Pg151'/>
+and perhaps it may be explained as something which
+is between the two. Marshall Hall (<q>On the Diseases
+of the Nervous System,</q> § 293 sq.) explains it as a mixed
+function, for it is partly under the influence of the cerebral
+(voluntary), and partly under that of the spinal (non-voluntary)
+nerves. However, we are finally obliged to number
+it with the expressions of will which result from motives.
+For other motives, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, mere ideas, can determine the will
+to check it or accelerate it, and, as is the case with every
+other voluntary action, it seems to us that we could give
+up breathing altogether and voluntarily suffocate. And
+in fact we could do so if any other motive influenced the
+will sufficiently strongly to overcome the pressing desire
+for air. According to some accounts Diogenes actually
+put an end to his life in this way (Diog. Laert. VI. 76).
+Certain negroes also are said to have done this (F. B.
+Osiander <q>On Suicide</q> [1813] pp. 170-180). If this
+be true, it affords us a good example of the influence
+of abstract motives, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, of the victory of distinctively
+rational over merely animal will. For, that breathing
+is at least partially conditioned by cerebral activity
+is shown by the fact that the primary cause of death
+from prussic acid is that it paralyses the brain, and so,
+indirectly, restricts the breathing; but if the breathing
+be artificially maintained till the stupefaction of the
+brain has passed away, death will not ensue. We may
+also observe in passing that breathing affords us the most
+obvious example of the fact that motives act with just as
+much necessity as stimuli, or as causes in the narrowest
+sense of the word, and their operation can only be
+neutralised by antagonistic motives, as action is neutralised
+by re-action. For, in the case of breathing, the illusion
+that we can stop when we like is much weaker than
+in the case of other movements which follow upon
+motives; because in breathing the motive is very powerful,
+very near to us, and its satisfaction is very easy, for
+the muscles which accomplish it are never tired, nothing,
+<pb n='152'/><anchor id='Pg152'/>
+as a rule, obstructs it, and the whole process is supported
+by the most inveterate habit of the individual. And yet
+all motives act with the same necessity. The knowledge
+that necessity is common to movements following upon
+motives, and those following upon stimuli, makes it easier
+for us to understand that that also which takes place in
+our bodily organism in accordance with stimuli and in
+obedience to law, is yet, according to its inner nature&mdash;will,
+which in all its manifestations, though never in
+itself, is subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason,
+that is, to necessity.<note place='foot'>This subject is fully worked out in
+my prize essay on the freedom of the
+will, in which therefore (pp. 29-44 of
+the <q>Grundprobleme der Ethik</q>) the
+relation of <emph>cause</emph>, <emph>stimulus</emph>, and <emph>motive</emph>
+has also been fully explained.</note> Accordingly, we shall not rest
+contented with recognising that animals, both in their
+actions and also in their whole existence, bodily structure
+and organisation, are manifestations of will; but we
+shall extend to plants also this immediate knowledge
+of the essential nature of things which is given to us
+alone. Now all the movements of plants follow upon
+stimuli; for the absence of knowledge, and the movement
+following upon motives which is conditioned by
+knowledge, constitutes the only essential difference between
+animals and plants. Therefore, what appears for
+the idea as plant life, as mere vegetation, as blindly impelling
+force, we shall claim, according to its inner nature,
+for will, and recognise it as just that which constitutes
+the basis of our own phenomenal being, as it expresses
+itself in our actions, and also in the whole existence
+of our body itself.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It only remains for us to take the final step, the extension
+of our way of looking at things to all those forces
+which act in nature in accordance with universal, unchangeable
+laws, in conformity with which the movements
+of all those bodies take place, which are wholly without
+organs, and have therefore no susceptibility for stimuli,
+and have no knowledge, which is the necessary condition
+<pb n='153'/><anchor id='Pg153'/>
+of motives. Thus we must also apply the key to the
+understanding of the inner nature of things, which the
+immediate knowledge of our own existence alone can
+give us, to those phenomena of the unorganised world
+which are most remote from us. And if we consider
+them attentively, if we observe the strong and unceasing
+impulse with which the waters hurry to the ocean, the
+persistency with which the magnet turns ever to the
+north pole, the readiness with which iron flies to the
+magnet, the eagerness with which the electric poles seek
+to be re-united, and which, just like human desire, is
+increased by obstacles; if we see the crystal quickly and
+suddenly take form with such wonderful regularity of
+construction, which is clearly only a perfectly definite
+and accurately determined impulse in different directions,
+seized and retained by crystallisation; if we observe the
+choice with which bodies repel and attract each other,
+combine and separate, when they are set free in a fluid
+state, and emancipated from the bonds of rigidness;
+lastly, if we feel directly how a burden which hampers
+our body by its gravitation towards the earth, unceasingly
+presses and strains upon it in pursuit of its one
+tendency; if we observe all this, I say, it will require no
+great effort of the imagination to recognise, even at so
+great a distance, our own nature. That which in us pursues
+its ends by the light of knowledge; but here, in
+the weakest of its manifestations, only strives blindly
+and dumbly in a one-sided and unchangeable manner,
+must yet in both cases come under the name of will, as
+it is everywhere one and the same&mdash;just as the first dim
+light of dawn must share the name of sunlight with the
+rays of the full mid-day. For the name <emph>will</emph> denotes
+that which is the inner nature of everything in the world,
+and the one kernel of every phenomenon.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Yet the remoteness, and indeed the appearance of
+absolute difference between the phenomena of unorganised
+nature and the will which we know as the
+<pb n='154'/><anchor id='Pg154'/>
+inner reality of our own being, arises chiefly from the
+contrast between the completely determined conformity
+to law of the one species of phenomena, and the apparently
+unfettered freedom of the other. For in man,
+individuality makes itself powerfully felt. Every one
+has a character of his own; and therefore the same
+motive has not the same influence over all, and a
+thousand circumstances which exist in the wide sphere
+of the knowledge of the individual, but are unknown to
+others, modify its effect. Therefore action cannot be predetermined
+from the motive alone, for the other factor is
+wanting, the accurate acquaintance with the individual
+character, and with the knowledge which accompanies it.
+On the other hand, the phenomena of the forces of
+nature illustrate the opposite extreme. They act according
+to universal laws, without variation, without individuality
+in accordance with openly manifest circumstances,
+subject to the most exact predetermination; and the same
+force of nature appears in its million phenomena in
+precisely the same way. In order to explain this point
+and prove the identity of the <emph>one</emph> indivisible will in
+all its different phenomena, in the weakest as in the
+strongest, we must first of all consider the relation of
+the will as thing-in-itself to its phenomena, that is, the
+relation of the world as will to the world as idea; for
+this will open to us the best way to a more thorough
+investigation of the whole subject we are considering in
+this second book.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xxiii. of the Supplement,
+and also the Ch. on the physiology
+of plants in my work <q>Ueber den
+Willen in der Natur,</q> and the Ch.
+on physical astronomy, which is of
+great importance with regard to the
+kernel of my metaphysic.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 24. We have learnt from the great Kant that time,
+space, and causality, with their entire constitution, and
+the possibility of all their forms, are present in our
+consciousness quite independently of the objects which
+appear in them, and which constitute their content; or,
+in other words, they can be arrived at just as well if we
+<pb n='155'/><anchor id='Pg155'/>
+start from the subject as if we start from the object. Therefore,
+with equal accuracy, we may call them either forms of
+intuition or perception of the subject, or qualities of the
+object <emph>as object</emph> (with Kant, phenomenon), <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <emph>idea</emph>. We
+may also regard these forms as the irreducible boundary
+between object and subject. All objects must therefore
+exist in them, yet the subject, independently of the
+phenomenal object, possesses and surveys them completely.
+But if the objects appearing in these forms
+are not to be empty phantoms, but are to have a meaning,
+they must refer to something, must be the expression
+of something which is not, like themselves, object, idea, a
+merely relative existence for a subject, but which exists
+without such dependence upon something which stands
+over against it as a condition of its being, and independent
+of the forms of such a thing, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <emph>is not idea</emph>, but
+a <emph>thing-in-itself</emph>. Consequently it may at least be asked:
+Are these ideas, these objects, something more than or
+apart from the fact that they are ideas, objects of the
+subject? And what would they be in this sense? What
+is that other side of them which is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto genere</foreign> different
+from idea? What is the thing-in-itself? <emph>The will</emph>, we
+have answered, but for the present I set that answer
+aside.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Whatever the thing-in-itself may be, Kant is right in
+his conclusion that time, space, and causality (which we
+afterwards found to be forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, the general expression of the forms of the phenomenon)
+are not its properties, but come to it only after,
+and so far as, it has become idea. That is, they belong
+only to its phenomenal existence, not to itself. For since
+the subject fully understands and constructs them out of
+itself, independently of all object, they must be dependent
+upon <emph>existence as idea</emph> as such, not upon that which becomes
+idea. They must be the form of the idea as such; but
+not qualities of that which has assumed this form. They
+must be already given with the mere antithesis of subject
+<pb n='156'/><anchor id='Pg156'/>
+and object (not as concepts but as facts), and consequently
+they must be only the more exact determination of the
+form of knowledge in general, whose most universal determination
+is that antithesis itself. Now, that in the
+phenomenon, in the object, which is in its turn conditioned
+by time, space and causality, inasmuch as it
+can only become idea by means of them, namely <emph>multiplicity</emph>,
+through co-existence and succession, <emph>change</emph> and
+<emph>permanence</emph> through the law of causality, <emph>matter</emph> which
+can only become idea under the presupposition of causality,
+and lastly, all that becomes idea only by means
+of these,&mdash;all this, I say, as a whole, does not in reality belong
+to that which appears, to that which has passed into
+the form of idea, but belongs merely to this form itself.
+And conversely, that in the phenomenon which is not
+conditioned through time, space and causality, and which
+cannot be referred to them, nor explained in accordance
+with them, is precisely that in which the thing manifested,
+the thing-in-itself, directly reveals itself. It follows
+from this that the most complete capacity for being known,
+that is to say, the greatest clearness, distinctness, and susceptibility
+of exhaustive explanation, will necessarily belong
+to that which pertains to knowledge <emph>as such</emph>, and thus to
+the <emph>form</emph> of knowledge; but not to that which in itself is
+not idea, not object, but which has become knowledge
+only through entering these forms; in other words, has
+become idea, object. Thus only that which depends entirely
+upon being an object of knowledge, upon existing
+as idea in general and <emph>as such</emph> (not upon that which
+<emph>becomes</emph> known, and has only <emph>become</emph> idea), which
+therefore belongs without distinction to everything that
+is known, and which, on that account, is found just as
+well if we start from the subject as if we start from the
+object,&mdash;this alone can afford us without reserve a sufficient,
+exhaustive knowledge, a knowledge which is clear
+to the very foundation. But this consists of nothing but
+those forms of all phenomena of which we are conscious
+<pb n='157'/><anchor id='Pg157'/>
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, and which may be generally expressed as the
+principle of sufficient reason. Now, the forms of this principle
+which occur in knowledge of perception (with which
+alone we are here concerned) are time, space, and causality.
+The whole of pure mathematics and pure natural science
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> is based entirely upon these. Therefore it is
+only in these sciences that knowledge finds no obscurity,
+does not rest upon what is incomprehensible (groundless,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, will), upon what cannot be further deduced. It is on
+this account that Kant wanted, as we have said, to apply
+the name science specially and even exclusively to these
+branches of knowledge together with logic. But, on
+the other hand, these branches of knowledge show us
+nothing more than mere connections, relations of one
+idea to another, form devoid of all content. All content
+which they receive, every phenomenon which fills these
+forms, contains something which is no longer completely
+knowable in its whole nature, something which can no
+longer be entirely explained through something else,
+something then which is groundless, through which
+consequently the knowledge loses its evidence and
+ceases to be completely lucid. This that withholds
+itself from investigation, however, is the thing-in-itself,
+is that which is essentially not idea, not object of knowledge,
+but has only become knowable by entering that
+form. The form is originally foreign to it, and the thing-in-itself
+can never become entirely one with it, can never
+be referred to mere form, and, since this form is the
+principle of sufficient reason, can never be completely
+explained. If therefore all mathematics affords us an
+exhaustive knowledge of that which in the phenomena
+is quantity, position, number, in a word, spatial and
+temporal relations; if all etiology gives us a complete
+account of the regular conditions under which phenomena,
+with all their determinations, appear in time and
+space, but, with it all, teaches us nothing more than why
+in each case this particular phenomenon must appear
+<pb n='158'/><anchor id='Pg158'/>
+just at this time here, and at this place now; it is clear
+that with their assistance we can never penetrate to the
+inner nature of things. There always remains something
+which no explanation can venture to attack, but which
+it always presupposes; the forces of nature, the definite
+mode of operation of things, the quality and character of
+every phenomenon, that which is without ground, that
+which does not depend upon the form of the phenomenal,
+the principle of sufficient reason, but is something to which
+this form in itself is foreign, something which has yet
+entered this form, and now appears according to its law,
+a law, however, which only determines the appearance,
+not that which appears, only the how, not the what,
+only the form, not the content. Mechanics, physics, and
+chemistry teach the rules and laws according to which
+the forces of impenetrability, gravitation, rigidity, fluidity,
+cohesion, elasticity, heat, light, affinity, magnetism, electricity,
+&amp;c., operate; that is to say, the law, the rule
+which these forces observe whenever they enter time and
+space. But do what we will, the forces themselves
+remain <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitates occultæ</foreign>. For it is just the thing-in-itself,
+which, because it is manifested, exhibits these
+phenomena, which are entirely different from itself. In
+its manifestation, indeed, it is completely subordinated
+to the principle of sufficient reason as the form of the
+idea, but it can never itself be referred to this form, and
+therefore cannot be fully explained etiologically, can
+never be completely fathomed. It is certainly perfectly
+comprehensible so far as it has assumed that form, that
+is, so far as it is phenomenon, but its inner nature is not
+in the least explained by the fact that it can thus be
+comprehended. Therefore the more necessity any
+knowledge carries with it, the more there is in it of that
+which cannot be otherwise thought or presented in perception&mdash;as,
+for example, space-relations&mdash;the clearer
+and more sufficing then it is, the less pure objective
+content it has, or the less reality, properly so called, is
+<pb n='159'/><anchor id='Pg159'/>
+given in it. And conversely, the more there is in it
+which must be conceived as mere chance, and the more
+it impresses us as given merely empirically, the more
+proper objectivity and true reality is there in such
+knowledge, and at the same time, the more that is inexplicable,
+that is, that cannot be deduced from anything
+else.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is true that at all times an etiology, unmindful of
+its real aim, has striven to reduce all organised life to
+chemism or electricity; all chemism, that is to say
+quality, again to mechanism (action determined by the
+shape of the atom), this again sometimes to the object
+of phoronomy, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the combination of time and space,
+which makes motion possible, sometimes to the object of
+mere geometry, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, position in space (much in the same
+way as we rightly deduce the diminution of an effect
+from the square of the distance, and the theory of the lever
+in a purely geometrical manner): geometry may finally
+be reduced to arithmetic, which, on account of its one
+dimension, is of all the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, the most intelligible, comprehensible, and completely
+susceptible of investigation. As instances of the
+method generally indicated here, we may refer to the
+atoms of Democritus, the vortex of Descartes, the
+mechanical physics of Lesage, which towards the end of
+last century tried to explain both chemical affinities and
+gravitation mechanically by impact and pressure, as may
+be seen in detail in <q><hi rend='italic'>Lucrèce Neutonien</hi>;</q> Reil's form
+and combination as the cause of animal life, also tends
+in this direction. Finally, the crude materialism which
+even now in the middle of the nineteenth century has
+been served up again under the ignorant delusion that it
+is original, belongs distinctly to this class. It stupidly
+denies vital force, and first of all tries to explain the
+phenomena of life from physical and chemical forces, and
+those again from the mechanical effects of the matter,
+position, form, and motion of imagined atoms, and thus
+<pb n='160'/><anchor id='Pg160'/>
+seeks to reduce all the forces of nature to action and reaction
+as its thing-in-itself. According to this teaching,
+light is the mechanical vibration or undulation of an imaginary
+ether, postulated for this end. This ether, if it reaches
+the eye, beats rapidly upon the retina, and gives us the
+knowledge of colour. Thus, for example, four hundred
+and eighty-three billion beats in a second give red, and
+seven hundred and twenty-seven billion beats in a second
+give violet. Upon this theory, persons who are colour-blind
+must be those who are unable to count the beats,
+must they not? Such crass, mechanical, clumsy, and
+certainly knotty theories, which remind one of Democritus,
+are quite worthy of those who, fifty years after the appearance
+of Goethe's doctrine of colour, still believe in Newton's
+homogeneous light, and are not ashamed to say so.
+They will find that what is overlooked in the child
+(Democritus) will not be forgiven to the man. They
+might indeed, some day, come to an ignominious end;
+but then every one would slink away and pretend that
+he never had anything to do with them. We shall soon
+have to speak again of this false reduction of the forces
+of nature to each other; so much for the present. Supposing
+this theory were possible, all would certainly
+be explained and established and finally reduced to an
+arithmetical problem, which would then be the holiest
+thing in the temple of wisdom, to which the principle of
+sufficient reason would at last have happily conducted
+us. But all content of the phenomenon would have disappeared,
+and the mere form would remain. The <q>what
+appears</q> would be referred to the <q>how it appears,</q> and
+this <q>how</q> would be what is <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> knowable, therefore
+entirely dependent on the subject, therefore only for
+the subject, therefore, lastly, mere phantom, idea and
+form of idea, through and through: no thing-in-itself
+could be demanded. Supposing, then, that this were
+possible, the whole world would be derived from the
+subject, and in fact, that would be accomplished which
+<pb n='161'/><anchor id='Pg161'/>
+Fichte wanted to <emph>seem</emph> to accomplish by his empty
+bombast. But it is not possible: phantasies, sophisms,
+castles in the air, have been constructed in this way, but
+science never. The many and multifarious phenomena
+in nature have been successfully referred to particular
+original forces, and as often as this has been done, a real
+advance has been made. Several forces and qualities,
+which were at first regarded as different, have been
+derived from each other, and thus their number has been
+curtailed. (For example, magnetism from electricity.)
+Etiology will have reached its goal when it has recognised
+and exhibited as such all the original forces of
+nature, and established their mode of operation, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the
+law according to which, under the guidance of causality,
+their phenomena appear in time and space, and determine
+their position with regard to each other. But certain original
+forces will always remain over; there will always remain
+as an insoluble residuum a content of phenomena which
+cannot be referred to their form, and thus cannot be explained
+from something else in accordance with the principle
+of sufficient reason. For in everything in nature there is
+something of which no ground can ever be assigned, of
+which no explanation is possible, and no ulterior cause
+is to be sought. This is the specific nature of its action,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the nature of its existence, its being. Of each particular
+effect of the thing a cause may be certainly
+indicated, from which it follows that it must act just
+at this time and in this place; but no cause can
+ever be found from which it follows that a thing acts in
+general, and precisely in the way it does. If it has no
+other qualities, if it is merely a mote in a sunbeam, it yet
+exhibits this unfathomable something, at least as weight
+and impenetrability. But this, I say, is to the mote what
+his will is to a man; and, like the human will, it is, according
+to its inner nature, not subject to explanation;
+nay, more&mdash;it is in itself identical with this will. It is
+true that a motive may be given for every manifestation
+<pb n='162'/><anchor id='Pg162'/>
+of will, for every act of will at a particular time and in
+a particular place, upon which it must necessarily follow,
+under the presupposition of the character of the man.
+But no reason can ever be given that the man has this
+character; that he wills at all; that, of several motives,
+just this one and no other, or indeed that any motive at
+all, moves his will. That which in the case of man is
+the unfathomable character which is presupposed in every
+explanation of his actions from motives is, in the case of
+every unorganised body, its definitive quality&mdash;the mode of
+its action, the manifestations of which are occasioned by
+impressions from without, while it itself, on the contrary,
+is determined by nothing outside itself, and thus is also
+inexplicable. Its particular manifestations, through which
+alone it becomes visible, are subordinated to the principle
+of sufficient reason; it itself is groundless. This was in
+substance rightly understood by the schoolmen, who called
+it <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>forma substantialis</foreign>. (Cf. Suarez, Disput. Metaph., disp.
+xv. sect. 1.)
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is a greater and a commoner error that the phenomena
+which we best understand are those which are of
+most frequent occurrence, and which are most universal
+and simple; for, on the contrary, these are just the phenomena
+that we are most accustomed to see about us,
+and to be ignorant of. It is just as inexplicable to us
+that a stone should fall to the earth as that an animal
+should move itself. It has been supposed, as we have
+remarked above, that, starting from the most universal
+forces of nature (gravitation, cohesion, impenetrability), it
+was possible to explain from them the rarer forces, which
+only operate under a combination of circumstances (for
+example, chemical quality, electricity, magnetism), and,
+lastly, from these to understand the organism and the life
+of animals, and even the nature of human knowing and
+willing. Men resigned themselves without a word to
+starting from mere <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitates occultæ</foreign>, the elucidation of
+which was entirely given up, for they intended to build
+<pb n='163'/><anchor id='Pg163'/>
+upon them, not to investigate them. Such an intention
+cannot, as we have already said, be carried out. But
+apart from this, such structures would always stand in
+the air. What is the use of explanations which ultimately
+refer us to something which is quite as unknown as the
+problem with which we started? Do we in the end
+understand more of the inner nature of these universal
+natural forces than of the inner nature of an animal?
+Is not the one as much a sealed book to us as the other?
+Unfathomable because it is without ground, because it is
+the content, that which the phenomenon is, and which
+can never be referred to the form, to the how, to the
+principle of sufficient reason. But we, who have in view
+not etiology but philosophy, that is, not relative but unconditioned
+knowledge of the real nature of the world,
+take the opposite course, and start from that which is
+immediately and most completely known to us, and fully
+and entirely trusted by us&mdash;that which lies nearest to us,
+in order to understand that which is known to us only
+at a distance, one-sidedly and indirectly. From the most
+powerful, most significant, and most distinct phenomenon
+we seek to arrive at an understanding of those that are
+less complete and weaker. With the exception of my
+own body, all things are known to me only on <emph>one</emph> side,
+that of the idea. Their inner nature remains hidden
+from me and a profound secret, even if I know all the
+causes from which their changes follow. Only by comparison
+with that which goes on in me if my body performs
+an action when I am influenced by a motive&mdash;only
+by comparison, I say, with what is the inner nature of
+my own changes determined by external reasons, can I
+obtain insight into the way in which these lifeless bodies
+change under the influence of causes, and so understand
+what is their inner nature. For the knowledge of the
+causes of the manifestation of this inner nature affords
+me merely the rule of its appearance in time and space,
+and nothing more. I can make this comparison because
+<pb n='164'/><anchor id='Pg164'/>
+my body is the only object of which I know not merely
+the <emph>one</emph> side, that of the idea, but also the other side
+which is called will. Thus, instead of believing that I
+would better understand my own organisation, and then
+my own knowing and willing, and my movements following
+upon motives, if I could only refer them to movements
+due to electrical, chemical, and mechanical causes, I must,
+seeing that I seek philosophy and not etiology, learn to
+understand from my own movements following upon
+motives the inner nature of the simplest and commonest
+movements of an unorganised body which I see following
+upon causes. I must recognise the inscrutable forces
+which manifest themselves in all natural bodies as identical
+in kind with that which in me is the will, and as
+differing from it only in degree. That is to say, the fourth
+class of ideas given in the Essay on the Principle of Sufficient
+Reason must be the key to the knowledge of the
+inner nature of the first class, and by means of the law
+of motivation I must come to understand the inner meaning
+of the law of causation.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Spinoza (Epist. 62) says that if a stone which has
+been projected through the air had consciousness, it would
+believe that it was moving of its own will. I add to this
+only that the stone would be right. The impulse given
+it is for the stone what the motive is for me, and what
+in the case of the stone appears as cohesion, gravitation,
+rigidity, is in its inner nature the same as that which I
+recognise in myself as will, and what the stone also, if
+knowledge were given to it, would recognise as will. In
+the passage referred to, Spinoza had in view the necessity
+with which the stone flies, and he rightly desires to
+transfer this necessity to that of the particular act of will
+of a person. I, on the other hand, consider the inner
+being, which alone imparts meaning and validity to all
+real necessity (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, effect following upon a cause) as its
+presupposition. In the case of men this is called character;
+in the case of a stone it is called quality, but it is
+<pb n='165'/><anchor id='Pg165'/>
+the same in both. When it is immediately known it
+is called will. In the stone it has the weakest, and in
+man the strongest degree of visibility, of objectivity. St.
+Augustine recognises, with a true instinct, this identity
+of the tendencies of all things with our own willing, and
+I cannot refrain from quoting his naïve account of the
+matter:&mdash;<q><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Si pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum
+sensum ejusdem est amaremus, idque esset sufficiens
+bonum nostrum, et secundum hoc si esset nobis bene, nihil
+aliud quæreremus. Item, si arbores essemus, nihil quidem
+sentientes motu amare possemus: verumtamen id quasi appetere
+videremur, quo feracius essemus, uberiusque fructuosæ.
+Si essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel
+quid ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen
+nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis
+appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum,
+sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur:
+ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur quocunque
+fertur</foreign></q> (De Civ. Dei, xi. 28).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It ought further to be mentioned that Euler saw that
+the inner nature of gravitation must ultimately be referred
+to an <q>inclination and desire</q> (thus will) peculiar to
+material bodies (in the 68th letter to the Princess). Indeed,
+it is just this that makes him averse to the conception
+of gravitation as it existed for Newton, and he is inclined
+to try a modification of it in accordance with the
+earlier Cartesian theory, and so to derive gravitation from
+the impact of an ether upon the bodies, as being <q>more
+rational and more suitable for persons who like clear and
+intelligible principles.</q> He wishes to banish attraction
+from physics as a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitas occulta</foreign>. This is only in keeping
+with the dead view of nature which prevailed at
+Euler's time as the correlative of the immaterial soul.
+It is only worth noticing because of its bearing upon the
+fundamental truth established by me, which even at that
+time this fine intellect saw glimmering in the distance.
+He hastened to turn in time, and then, in his anxiety at
+<pb n='166'/><anchor id='Pg166'/>
+seeing all the prevalent fundamental views endangered, he
+sought safety in the old and already exploded absurdities.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We know that <emph>multiplicity</emph> in general is necessarily
+conditioned by space and time, and is only thinkable in
+them. In this respect they are called the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign>. But we have found that space and
+time are forms of the principle of sufficient reason. In
+this principle all our knowledge <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> is expressed,
+but, as we showed above, this <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> knowledge, as such,
+only applies to the knowableness of things, not to the
+things themselves, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, it is only our form of knowledge,
+it is not a property of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself
+is, as such, free from all forms of knowledge, even
+the most universal, that of being an object for the subject.
+In other words, the thing-in-itself is something
+altogether different from the idea. If, now, this thing-in-itself
+is <emph>the will</emph>, as I believe I have fully and convincingly
+proved it to be, then, regarded as such and
+apart from its manifestation, it lies outside time and
+space, and therefore knows no multiplicity, and is consequently
+<emph>one</emph>. Yet, as I have said, it is not one in the
+sense in which an individual or a concept is one, but as
+something to which the condition of the possibility of
+multiplicity, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, is foreign.
+The multiplicity of things in space and time, which
+collectively constitute the objectification of will, does not
+affect the will itself, which remains indivisible notwithstanding
+it. It is not the case that, in some way or
+other, a smaller part of will is in the stone and a larger
+part in the man, for the relation of part and whole
+belongs exclusively to space, and has no longer any
+meaning when we go beyond this form of intuition or
+perception. The more and the less have application
+only to the phenomenon of will, that is, its visibility, its
+objectification. Of this there is a higher grade in the plant
+than in the stone; in the animal a higher grade than in
+the plant: indeed, the passage of will into visibility, its
+<pb n='167'/><anchor id='Pg167'/>
+objectification, has grades as innumerable as exist between
+the dimmest twilight and the brightest sunshine,
+the loudest sound and the faintest echo. We shall
+return later to the consideration of these grades of visibility
+which belong to the objectification of the will, to
+the reflection of its nature. But as the grades of its
+objectification do not directly concern the will itself,
+still less is it concerned by the multiplicity of the
+phenomena of these different grades, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the multitude
+of individuals of each form, or the particular manifestations
+of each force. For this multiplicity is directly
+conditioned by time and space, into which the will itself
+never enters. The will reveals itself as completely and
+as much in <emph>one</emph> oak as in millions. Their number and
+multiplication in space and time has no meaning with
+regard to it, but only with regard to the multiplicity of
+individuals who know in space and time, and who are
+themselves multiplied and dispersed in these. The multiplicity
+of these individuals itself belongs not to the will,
+but only to its manifestation. We may therefore say
+that if, <foreign rend='italic'>per impossibile</foreign>, a single real existence, even the
+most insignificant, were to be entirely annihilated, the
+whole world would necessarily perish with it. The
+great mystic Angelus Silesius feels this when he says&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>I know God cannot live an instant without me,</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>He must give up the ghost if I should cease to be.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Men have tried in various ways to bring the immeasurable
+greatness of the material universe nearer to the comprehension
+of us all, and then they have seized the opportunity
+to make edifying remarks. They have referred
+perhaps to the relative smallness of the earth, and indeed
+of man; or, on the contrary, they have pointed out the
+greatness of the mind of this man who is so insignificant&mdash;the
+mind that can solve, comprehend, and even measure
+the greatness of the universe, and so forth. Now, all
+this is very well, but to me, when I consider the vastness
+<pb n='168'/><anchor id='Pg168'/>
+of the world, the most important point is this, that
+the thing-in-itself, whose manifestation is the world&mdash;whatever
+else it may be&mdash;cannot have its true self spread
+out and dispersed after this fashion in boundless space,
+but that this endless extension belongs only to its manifestation.
+The thing-in-itself, on the contrary, is present
+entire and undivided in every object of nature and in every
+living being. Therefore we lose nothing by standing still
+beside any single individual thing, and true wisdom is
+not to be gained by measuring out the boundless world,
+or, what would be more to the purpose, by actually
+traversing endless space. It is rather to be attained by
+the thorough investigation of any individual thing, for
+thus we seek to arrive at a full knowledge and understanding
+of its true and peculiar nature.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The subject which will therefore be fully considered
+in the next book, and which has, doubtless, already presented
+itself to the mind of every student of Plato, is,
+that these different grades of the objectification of will
+which are manifested in innumerable individuals, and
+exist as their unattained types or as the eternal forms of
+things, not entering themselves into time and space,
+which are the medium of individual things, but remaining
+fixed, subject to no change, always being, never
+becoming, while the particular things arise and pass
+away, always become and never are,&mdash;that these <emph>grades
+of the objectification of will</emph> are, I say, simply <emph>Plato's
+Ideas</emph>. I make this passing reference to the matter here
+in order that I may be able in future to use the word
+<emph>Idea</emph> in this sense. In my writings, therefore, the word
+is always to be understood in its true and original meaning
+given to it by Plato, and has absolutely no reference
+to those abstract productions of dogmatising scholastic
+reason, which Kant has inaptly and illegitimately used
+this word to denote, though Plato had already appropriated
+and used it most fitly. By Idea, then, I understand
+every definite and fixed grade of the objectification
+<pb n='169'/><anchor id='Pg169'/>
+of will, so far as it is thing-in-itself, and therefore has
+no multiplicity. These grades are related to individual
+things as their eternal forms or prototypes. The shortest
+and most concise statement of this famous Platonic
+doctrine is given us by Diogenes Laertes (iii. 12): <q>ὁ
+Πλατων φησι, εν τῃ φυσει τας ιδεας ἑσταναι, καθαπερ
+παραδειγματα, τα δ᾽ αλλα ταυταις εοικεναι, τουτων ὁμοιωματα
+καθεστωτα</q>&mdash;(<q><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Plato ideas in natura velut exemplaria
+dixit subsistere; cetera his esse similia, ad istarum
+similitudinem consistentia</foreign></q>). Of Kant's misuse of the
+word I take no further notice; what it is needful to say
+about it will be found in the Appendix.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 26. The lowest grades of the objectification of will are
+to be found in those most universal forces of nature which
+partly appear in all matter without exception, as gravity
+and impenetrability, and partly have shared the given matter
+among them, so that certain of them reign in one species
+of matter and others in another species, constituting its
+specific difference, as rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, electricity,
+magnetism, chemical properties and qualities of every kind.
+They are in themselves immediate manifestations of will,
+just as much as human action; and as such they are
+groundless, like human character. Only their particular
+manifestations are subordinated to the principle of
+sufficient reason, like the particular actions of men. They
+themselves, on the other hand, can never be called either
+effect or cause, but are the prior and presupposed conditions
+of all causes and effects through which their real
+nature unfolds and reveals itself. It is therefore senseless
+to demand a cause of gravity or electricity, for they
+are original forces. Their expressions, indeed, take place
+in accordance with the law of cause and effect, so that
+every one of their particular manifestations has a cause,
+which is itself again just a similar particular manifestation
+which determines that this force must express itself
+here, must appear in space and time; but the force itself
+is by no means the effect of a cause, nor the cause of an
+<pb n='170'/><anchor id='Pg170'/>
+effect. It is therefore a mistake to say <q>gravity is the
+cause of a stone falling;</q> for the cause in this case is
+rather the nearness of the earth, because it attracts the
+stone. Take the earth away and the stone will not fall,
+although gravity remains. The force itself lies quite
+outside the chain of causes and effects, which presupposes
+time, because it only has meaning in relation to it; but
+the force lies outside time. The individual change always
+has for its cause another change just as individual as
+itself, and not the force of which it is the expression.
+For that which always gives its efficiency to a cause,
+however many times it may appear, is a force of nature.
+As such, it is groundless, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, it lies outside the chain of
+causes and outside the province of the principle of sufficient
+reason in general, and is philosophically known as
+the immediate objectivity of will, which is the <q>in-itself</q>
+of the whole of nature; but in etiology, which in this
+reference is physics, it is set down as an original force,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitas occulta</foreign>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In the higher grades of the objectivity of will we see
+individuality occupy a prominent position, especially in
+the case of man, where it appears as the great difference
+of individual characters, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, as complete personality, outwardly
+expressed in strongly marked individual physiognomy,
+which influences the whole bodily form. None
+of the brutes have this individuality in anything like so
+high a degree, though the higher species of them have a
+trace of it; but the character of the species completely
+predominates over it, and therefore they have little
+individual physiognomy. The farther down we go, the
+more completely is every trace of the individual character
+lost in the common character of the species, and the
+physiognomy of the species alone remains. We know
+the physiological character of the species, and from that
+we know exactly what is to be expected from the individual;
+while, on the contrary, in the human species
+every individual has to be studied and fathomed for
+<pb n='171'/><anchor id='Pg171'/>
+himself, which, if we wish to forecast his action with
+some degree of certainty, is, on account of the possibility
+of concealment that first appears with reason, a matter
+of the greatest difficulty. It is probably connected with
+this difference of the human species from all others, that
+the folds and convolutions of the brain, which are entirely
+wanting in birds, and very weakly marked in
+rodents, are even in the case of the higher animals far more
+symmetrical on both sides, and more constantly the same
+in each individual, than in the case of human beings.<note place='foot'>Wenzel, De Structura Cerebri
+Hominis et Brutorum, 1812, ch. iii.;
+Cuvier, Leçons d'Anat., comp. leçon
+9, arts. 4 and 5; Vic. d'Azyr, Hist.
+de l'Acad. de Sc. de Paris, 1783, pp.
+470 and 483.</note>
+It is further to be regarded as a phenomenon of this
+peculiar individual character which distinguishes men
+from all the lower animals, that in the case of the brutes
+the sexual instinct seeks its satisfaction without observable
+choice of objects, while in the case of man this choice is,
+in a purely instinctive manner and independent of all
+reflection, carried so far that it rises into a powerful
+passion. While then every man is to be regarded as a
+specially determined and characterised phenomenon of
+will, and indeed to a certain extent as a special Idea,
+in the case of the brutes this individual character as a
+whole is wanting, because only the species has a special
+significance. And the farther we go from man, the
+fainter becomes the trace of this individual character, so
+that plants have no individual qualities left, except such
+as may be fully explained from the favourable or unfavourable
+external influences of soil, climate, and other
+accidents. Finally, in the inorganic kingdom of nature
+all individuality disappears. The crystal alone is to be
+regarded as to a certain extent individual. It is a unity
+of the tendency in definite directions, fixed by crystallisation,
+which makes the trace of this tendency permanent.
+It is at the same time a cumulative repetition of its
+primitive form, bound into unity by an idea, just as the
+<pb n='172'/><anchor id='Pg172'/>
+tree is an aggregate of the single germinating fibre which
+shows itself in every rib of the leaves, in every leaf, in
+every branch; which repeats itself, and to some extent
+makes each of these appear as a separate growth,
+nourishing itself from the greater as a parasite, so that
+the tree, resembling the crystal, is a systematic aggregate
+of small plants, although only the whole is the complete
+expression of an individual Idea, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, of this particular
+grade of the objectification of will. But the individuals
+of the same species of crystal can have no other difference
+than such as is produced by external accidents; indeed
+we can make at pleasure large or small crystals of every
+species. The individual, however, as such, that is, with
+traces of an individual character, does not exist further
+in unorganised nature. All its phenomena are expressions
+of general forces of nature, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, of those grades
+of the objectification of will which do not objectify
+themselves (as is the case in organised nature), by means
+of the difference of the individualities which collectively
+express the whole of the Idea, but show themselves only
+in the species, and as a whole, without any variation in
+each particular example of it. Time, space, multiplicity,
+and existence conditioned by causes, do not belong to
+the will or to the Idea (the grade of the objectification of
+will), but only to their particular phenomena. Therefore
+such a force of nature as, for example, gravity
+or electricity, must show itself as such in precisely
+the same way in all its million phenomena, and only
+external circumstances can modify these. This unity
+of its being in all its phenomena, this unchangeable
+constancy of the appearance of these, whenever, under
+the guidance of causality, the necessary conditions are
+present, is called a <emph>law of nature</emph>. If such a law is
+once learned from experience, then the phenomenon of
+that force of nature, the character of which is expressed and
+laid down in it, may be accurately forecast and counted
+upon. But it is just this conformity to law of the
+<pb n='173'/><anchor id='Pg173'/>
+phenomena of the lower grades of the objectification of
+will which gives them such a different aspect from the
+phenomena of the same will in the higher, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the more
+distinct, grades of its objectification, in animals, and in
+men and their actions, where the stronger or weaker
+influence of the individual character and the susceptibility
+to motives which often remain hidden from the
+spectator, because they lie in knowledge, has had the
+result that the identity of the inner nature of the two
+kinds of phenomena has hitherto been entirely overlooked.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If we start from the knowledge of the particular, and
+not from that of the Idea, there is something astonishing,
+and sometimes even terrible, in the absolute uniformity
+of the laws of nature. It might astonish us
+that nature never once forgets her laws; that if, for
+example, it has once been according to a law of nature
+that where certain materials are brought together under
+given conditions, a chemical combination will take place,
+or gas will be evolved, or they will go on fire; if these
+conditions are fulfilled, whether by our interposition or
+entirely by chance (and in this case the accuracy is the
+more astonishing because unexpected), to-day just as
+well as a thousand years ago, the determined phenomenon
+will take place at once and without delay. We
+are most vividly impressed with the marvellousness of
+this fact in the case of rare phenomena, which only
+occur under very complex circumstances, but which we
+are previously informed will take place if these conditions
+are fulfilled. For example, when we are told
+that if certain metals, when arranged alternately in
+fluid with which an acid has been mixed, are brought
+into contact, silver leaf brought between the extremities
+of this combination will suddenly be consumed in a
+green flame; or that under certain conditions the hard
+diamond turns into carbonic acid. It is the ghostly
+omnipresence of natural forces that astonishes us in such
+<pb n='174'/><anchor id='Pg174'/>
+cases, and we remark here what in the case of phenomena
+which happen daily no longer strikes us, how
+the connection between cause and effect is really as
+mysterious as that which is imagined between a magic
+formula and a spirit that must appear when invoked
+by it. On the other hand, if we have attained to the
+philosophical knowledge that a force of nature is a
+definite grade of the objectification of will, that is to
+say, a definite grade of that which we recognise as our
+own inmost nature, and that this will, in itself, and
+distinguished from its phenomena and their forms, lies
+outside time and space, and that, therefore, the multiplicity,
+which is conditioned by time and space, does not
+belong to it, nor directly to the grade of its objectification,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the Idea, but only to the phenomena of the
+Idea; and if we remember that the law of causality has
+significance only in relation to time and space, inasmuch
+as it determines the position of the multitude of phenomena
+of the different Ideas in which the will reveals
+itself, governing the order in which they must appear;
+if, I say, in this knowledge the inner meaning of the
+great doctrine of Kant has been fully grasped, the
+doctrine that time, space, and causality do not belong to
+the thing-in-itself, but merely to the phenomenon, that
+they are only the forms of our knowledge, not qualities
+of things in themselves; then we shall understand that
+this astonishment at the conformity to law and accurate
+operation of a force of nature, this astonishment at the
+complete sameness of all its million phenomena and the
+infallibility of their occurrence, is really like that of a
+child or a savage who looks for the first time through a
+glass with many facets at a flower, and marvels at the
+complete similarity of the innumerable flowers which
+he sees, and counts the leaves of each of them separately.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus every universal, original force of nature is nothing
+but a low grade of the objectification of will, and we call
+<pb n='175'/><anchor id='Pg175'/>
+every such grade an eternal <emph>Idea</emph> in Plato's sense. But
+a <emph>law of nature</emph> is the relation of the Idea to the form of
+its manifestation. This form is time, space, and causality,
+which are necessarily and inseparably connected and related
+to each other. Through time and space the Idea
+multiplies itself in innumerable phenomena, but the
+order according to which it enters these forms of multiplicity
+is definitely determined by the law of causality; this
+law is as it were the norm of the limit of these phenomena
+of different Ideas, in accordance with which time, space,
+and matter are assigned to them. This norm is therefore
+necessarily related to the identity of the aggregate of
+existing matter, which is the common substratum of all
+those different phenomena. If all these were not directed
+to that common matter in the possession of which they
+must be divided, there would be no need for such a law
+to decide their claims. They might all at once and together
+fill a boundless space throughout an endless time.
+Therefore, because all these phenomena of the eternal
+Ideas are directed to one and the same matter, must
+there be a rule for their appearance and disappearance;
+for if there were not, they would not make way for each
+other. Thus the law of causality is essentially bound up
+with that of the permanence of substance; they reciprocally
+derive significance from each other. Time and
+space, again, are related to them in the same way. For
+time is merely the possibility of conflicting states of the
+same matter, and space is merely the possibility of the
+permanence of the same matter under all sorts of conflicting
+states. Accordingly, in the preceding book we
+explained matter as the union of space and time, and
+this union shows itself as change of the accidents in
+the permanence of the substance, of which causality or
+becoming is the universal possibility. And accordingly,
+we said that matter is through and through causality.
+We explained the understanding as the subjective correlative
+of causality, and said matter (and thus the whole
+<pb n='176'/><anchor id='Pg176'/>
+world as idea) exists only for the understanding; the
+understanding is its condition, its supporter as its necessary
+correlative. I repeat all this in passing, merely to
+call to mind what was demonstrated in the First Book,
+for it is necessary for the complete understanding of
+these two books that their inner agreement should be
+observed, since what is inseparably united in the actual
+world as its two sides, will and idea, has, in order that
+we might understand each of them more clearly in isolation,
+been dissevered in these two books.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It may not perhaps be superfluous to elucidate further
+by an example how the law of causality has meaning
+only in relation to time and space, and the matter which
+consists in the union of the two. For it determines the
+limits in accordance with which the phenomena of the
+forces of nature divide themselves in the possession of
+matter, while the original forces of nature, as the immediate
+objectification of will, which, as a thing in itself, is
+not subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason, lie
+outside these forms, within which alone all etiological
+explanation has validity and meaning, and just on that
+account can never lead us to the inner reality of nature.
+For this purpose let us think of some kind of machine
+constructed according to the laws of mechanics. Iron
+weights begin the motion by their gravity; copper wheels
+resist by their rigidity, affect and raise each other and
+the lever by their impenetrability, and so on. Here
+gravity, rigidity, and impenetrability are original unexplained
+forces; mechanics only gives us the condition
+under which, and the manner in which, they manifest
+themselves, appear, and govern a definite matter, time,
+and place. If, now, a strong magnet is made to attract
+the iron of the weight, and overcome its gravity, the
+movement of the machine stops, and the matter becomes
+forthwith the scene of quite a different force of nature&mdash;magnetism,
+of which etiology again gives no further
+explanation than the condition under which it appears.
+<pb n='177'/><anchor id='Pg177'/>
+Or let us suppose that the copper discs of such a machine
+are laid upon zinc plates, and an acid solution introduced
+between them. At once the same matter of the machine
+has become subject to another original force, galvanism,
+which now governs it according to its own laws, and
+reveals itself in it through its phenomena; and etiology
+can again tell us nothing about this force except the
+conditions under which, and the laws in accordance with
+which, it manifests itself. Let us now raise the temperature
+and add pure acid; the whole machine burns;
+that is to say, once more an entirely different force of
+nature, chemical energy, asserts at this time and in this
+place irresistible claims to this particular matter, and
+reveals itself in it as Idea, as a definite grade of the
+objectification of will. The calcined metal thus produced
+now unites with an acid, and a salt is obtained which
+forms itself into crystals. These are the phenomena
+of another Idea, which in itself is again quite inexplicable,
+while the appearance of its phenomena is
+dependent upon certain conditions which etiology can
+give us. The crystals dissolve, mix with other materials,
+and vegetation springs up from them&mdash;a new phenomenon
+of will: and so the same permanent matter may
+be followed <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>, to observe how now this and
+now that natural force obtains a right to it and temporarily
+takes possession of it, in order to appear and reveal its
+own nature. The condition of this right, the point of
+time and space at which it becomes valid, is given by
+causality, but the explanation founded upon this law only
+extends thus far. The force itself is a manifestation of
+will, and as such is not subject to the forms of the principle
+of sufficient reason, that is, it is groundless. It lies
+outside all time, is omnipresent, and seems as it were to
+wait constantly till the circumstances occur under which
+it can appear and take possession of a definite matter,
+supplanting the forces which have reigned in it till then.
+All time exists only for the phenomena of such a force,
+<pb n='178'/><anchor id='Pg178'/>
+and is without significance for the force itself. Through
+thousands of years chemical forces slumber in matter till
+the contact with the reagents sets them free; then they
+appear; but time exists only for the phenomena, not for
+the forces themselves. For thousands of years galvanism
+slumbered in copper and zinc, and they lay quietly beside
+silver, which must be consumed in flame as soon as all
+three are brought together under the required conditions.
+Even in the organic kingdom we see a dry seed preserve
+the slumbering force through three thousand years, and
+when at last the favourable circumstances occur, grow up
+as a plant.<note place='foot'>On the 16th of September 1840,
+at a lecture upon Egyptian Archæology
+delivered by Mr. Pettigrew at
+the Literary and Scientific Institute
+of London, he showed some corns of
+wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had
+found in a grave at Thebes, in which
+they must have lain for three thousand
+years. They were found in an
+hermetically sealed vase. Mr. Pettigrew
+had sowed twelve grains, and
+obtained a plant which grew five feet
+high, and the seeds of which were
+now quite ripe.&mdash;<hi rend='italic'>Times</hi>, 21st September
+1840. In the same way in 1830
+Mr. Haulton produced in the Medical
+Botanical Society of London a bulbous
+root which was found in the
+hand of an Egyptian mummy, in
+which it was probably put in observance
+of some religious rite, and which
+must have been at least two thousand
+years old. He had planted it in a
+flower-pot, in which it grew up and
+flourished. This is quoted from the
+Medical Journal of 1830 in the Journal
+of the Royal Institute of Great
+Britain, October 1830, p. 196.&mdash;<q>In
+the garden of Mr. Grimstone of the
+Herbarium, Highgate, London, is a
+pea in full fruit, which has sprung
+from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and
+the officials of the British Museum
+took out of a vase which had been
+found in an Egyptian sarcophagus,
+where it must have lain 2844 years.</q>&mdash;<hi rend='italic'>Times</hi>,
+16th August 1844. Indeed,
+the living toads found in limestone
+lead to the conclusion that even animal
+life is capable of such a suspension
+for thousands of years, if this
+is begun in the dormant period
+and maintained by special circumstances.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If by this exposition the difference between a force of
+nature and all its phenomena has been made quite distinct;
+if we have seen clearly that the former is the will
+itself at this particular grade of its objectification, but
+that multiplicity comes to phenomena only through time
+and space, and that the law of causality is nothing but
+the determination of the position of these phenomena in
+time and space; then we shall recognise the complete
+truth and the deep meaning of Malebranche's doctrine of
+occasional causes (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>causes occasionelles</foreign>). It is well worth
+<pb n='179'/><anchor id='Pg179'/>
+while comparing this doctrine of his, as he explains it in
+the <q><hi rend='italic'>Recherches de la Vérite</hi>,</q> both in the 3rd Chapter of
+the second part of the 6th Book, and in the <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>éclaircissements</foreign>
+appended to this chapter, with this exposition of
+mine, and observing the complete agreement of the two
+doctrines in the case of such different systems of thought.
+Indeed I cannot help admiring how Malebranche, though
+thoroughly involved in the positive dogmas which his age
+inevitably forced upon him, yet, in such bonds and under
+such a burden, hit the truth so happily, so correctly, and
+even knew how to combine it with these dogmas, at all
+events verbally.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+For the power of truth is incredibly great and of unspeakable
+endurance. We find constant traces of it in
+all, even the most eccentric and absurd dogmas, of different
+times and different lands,&mdash;often indeed in strange
+company, curiously mixed up with other things, but still
+recognisable. It is like a plant that germinates under a
+heap of great stones, but still struggles up to the light,
+working itself through with many deviations and windings,
+disfigured, worn out, stunted in its growth,&mdash;but yet, to
+the light.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In any case Malebranche is right: every natural cause
+is only an occasional cause. It only gives opportunity
+or occasion for the manifestation of the one indivisible
+will which is the <q>in-itself</q> of all things, and whose
+graduated objectification is the whole visible world. Only
+the appearance, the becoming visible, in this place, at
+this time, is brought about by the cause and is so far
+dependent on it, but not the whole of the phenomenon,
+nor its inner nature. This is the will itself, to which
+the principle of sufficient reason has not application, and
+which is therefore groundless. Nothing in the world has
+a sufficient cause of its existence generally, but only a
+cause of existence just here and just now. That a
+stone exhibits now gravity, now rigidity, now electricity,
+now chemical qualities, depends upon causes,
+<pb n='180'/><anchor id='Pg180'/>
+upon impressions upon it from without, and is to be
+explained from these. But these qualities themselves,
+and thus the whole inner nature of the stone which consists
+in them, and therefore manifests itself in all the
+ways referred to; thus, in general, that the stone is such
+as it is, that it exists generally&mdash;all this, I say, has no
+ground, but is the visible appearance of the groundless
+will. Every cause is thus an occasional cause. We have
+found it to be so in nature, which is without knowledge,
+and it is also precisely the same when motives and not
+causes or stimuli determine the point at which the phenomena
+are to appear, that is to say, in the actions of
+animals and human beings. For in both cases it is one
+and the same will which appears; very different in the
+grades of its manifestation, multiplied in the phenomena
+of these grades, and, in respect of these, subordinated to
+the principle of sufficient reason, but in itself free from
+all this. Motives do not determine the character of man,
+but only the phenomena of his character, that is, his
+actions; the outward fashion of his life, not its inner
+meaning and content. These proceed from the character
+which is the immediate manifestation of the will, and is
+therefore groundless. That one man is bad and another
+good, does not depend upon motives or outward influences,
+such as teaching and preaching, and is in this
+sense quite inexplicable. But whether a bad man shows
+his badness in petty acts of injustice, cowardly tricks,
+and low knavery which he practises in the narrow sphere
+of his circumstances, or whether as a conqueror he oppresses
+nations, throws a world into lamentation, and
+sheds the blood of millions; this is the outward form
+of his manifestation, that which is unessential to it, and
+depends upon the circumstances in which fate has placed
+him, upon his surroundings, upon external influences,
+upon motives; but his decision upon these motives can
+never be explained from them; it proceeds from the will,
+of which this man is a manifestation. Of this we shall
+<pb n='181'/><anchor id='Pg181'/>
+speak in the Fourth Book. The manner in which the
+character discloses its qualities is quite analogous to the
+way in which those of every material body in unconscious
+nature are disclosed. Water remains water with its
+intrinsic qualities, whether as a still lake it reflects its
+banks, or leaps in foam from the cliffs, or, artificially confined,
+spouts in a long jet into the air. All that depends
+upon external causes; the one form is as natural to it as
+the other, but it will always show the same form in the
+same circumstances; it is equally ready for any, but in
+every case true to its character, and at all times revealing
+this alone. So will every human character under
+all circumstances reveal itself, but the phenomena which
+proceed from it will always be in accordance with the
+circumstances.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 27. If, from the foregoing consideration of the
+forces of nature and their phenomena, we have come to
+see clearly how far an explanation from causes can go,
+and where it must stop if it is not to degenerate into the
+vain attempt to reduce the content of all phenomena to
+their mere form, in which case there would ultimately
+remain nothing but form, we shall be able to settle in
+general terms what is to be demanded of etiology as a
+whole. It must seek out the causes of all phenomena
+in nature, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the circumstances under which they invariably
+appear. Then it must refer the multitude of
+phenomena which have various forms in various circumstances
+to what is active in every phenomenon, and is
+presupposed in the cause,&mdash;original forces of nature. It
+must correctly distinguish between a difference of the
+phenomenon which arises from a difference of the force,
+and one which results merely from a difference of the
+circumstances under which the force expresses itself;
+and with equal care it must guard against taking the
+expressions of one and the same force under different
+circumstances for the manifestations of different forces,
+and conversely against taking for manifestations of one
+<pb n='182'/><anchor id='Pg182'/>
+and the same force what originally belongs to different
+forces. Now this is the direct work of the faculty of
+judgment, and that is why so few men are capable of
+increasing our insight in physics, while all are able to
+enlarge experience. Indolence and ignorance make us
+disposed to appeal too soon to original forces. This is
+exemplified with an exaggeration that savours of irony
+in the entities and quidities of the schoolmen. Nothing
+is further from my desire than to favour their resuscitation.
+We have just as little right to appeal to the
+objectification of will, instead of giving a physical explanation,
+as we have to appeal to the creative power of
+God. For physics demands causes, and the will is never
+a cause. Its whole relation to the phenomenon is not in
+accordance with the principle of sufficient reason. But
+that which in itself is the will exists in another aspect
+as idea; that is to say, is phenomenon. As such, it
+obeys the laws which constitute the form of the phenomenon.
+Every movement, for example, although it is
+always a manifestation of will, must yet have a cause
+from which it is to be explained in relation to a particular
+time and space; that is, not in general in its
+inner nature, but as a <emph>particular</emph> phenomenon. In the
+case of the stone, this is a mechanical cause; in that of
+the movement of a man, it is a motive; but in no case
+can it be wanting. On the other hand, the universal
+common nature of all phenomena of one particular kind,
+that which must be presupposed if the explanation from
+causes is to have any sense and meaning, is the general
+force of nature, which, in physics, must remain a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>qualitas
+occulta</foreign>, because with it the etiological explanation ends
+and the metaphysical begins. But the chain of causes
+and effects is never broken by an original force to which
+it has been necessary to appeal. It does not run back
+to such a force as if it were its first link, but the nearest
+link, as well as the remotest, presupposes the original
+force, and could otherwise explain nothing. A series of
+<pb n='183'/><anchor id='Pg183'/>
+causes and effects may be the manifestation of the most
+different kinds of forces, whose successive visible appearances
+are conducted through it, as I have illustrated above
+by the example of a metal machine. But the difference
+of these original forces, which cannot be referred to each
+other, by no means breaks the unity of that chain of causes,
+and the connection between all its links. The etiology
+and the philosophy of nature never do violence to
+each other, but go hand in hand, regarding the same
+object from different points of view. Etiology gives an
+account of the causes which necessarily produce the particular
+phenomenon to be explained. It exhibits, as the
+foundation of all its explanations, the universal forces
+which are active in all these causes and effects. It
+accurately defines, enumerates, and distinguishes these
+forces, and then indicates all the different effects in which
+each force appears, regulated by the difference of the
+circumstances, always in accordance with its own peculiar
+character, which it discloses in obedience to an invariable
+rule, called <emph>a law of nature</emph>. When all this has been
+thoroughly accomplished by physics in every particular,
+it will be complete, and its work will be done. There
+will then remain no unknown force in unorganised nature,
+nor any effect, which has not been proved to be the manifestation
+of one of these forces under definite circumstances,
+in accordance with a law of nature. Yet a law
+of nature remains merely the observed rule according to
+which nature invariably proceeds whenever certain definite
+circumstances occur. Therefore a law of nature may be
+defined as a fact expressed generally&mdash;<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>un fait généralisé</foreign>&mdash;and
+thus a complete enumeration of all the laws of nature
+would only be a complete register of facts. The consideration
+of nature as a whole is thus completed in
+<emph>morphology</emph>, which enumerates, compares, and arranges all
+the enduring forms of organised nature. Of the causes
+of the appearance of the individual creature it has little
+to say, for in all cases this is procreation (the theory of
+<pb n='184'/><anchor id='Pg184'/>
+which is a separate matter), and in rare cases the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>generatio
+æquivoca</foreign>. But to this last belongs, strictly speaking, the
+manner in which all the lower grades of the objectification
+of will, that is to say, physical and chemical phenomena,
+appear as individual, and it is precisely the task
+of etiology to point out the conditions of this appearance.
+Philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself only with
+the universal, in nature as everywhere else. The original
+forces themselves are here its object, and it recognises in
+them the different grades of the objectivity of will, which
+is the inner nature, the <q>in-itself</q> of this world; and
+when it regards the world apart from will, it explains it
+as merely the idea of the subject. But if etiology, instead
+of preparing the way for philosophy, and supplying
+its doctrines with practical application by means of
+instances, supposes that its aim is rather to deny the
+existence of all original forces, except perhaps <emph>one</emph>, the
+most general, for example, impenetrability, which it
+imagines it thoroughly understands, and consequently
+seeks forcibly to refer all the others to it&mdash;it forsakes its
+own province and can only give us error instead of
+truth. The content of nature is supplanted by its form,
+everything is ascribed to the circumstances which work
+from without, and nothing to the inner nature of the
+thing. Now if it were possible to succeed by this method,
+a problem in arithmetic would ultimately, as we have
+already remarked, solve the riddle of the universe. But
+this is the method adopted by those, referred to above,
+who think that all physiological effects ought to be reduced
+to form and combination, this, perhaps, to electricity, and
+this again to chemism, and chemism to mechanism. The
+mistake of Descartes, for example, and of all the Atomists,
+was of this last description. They referred the movements
+of the globe to the impact of a fluid, and the
+qualities of matter to the connection and form of the
+atoms, and hence they laboured to explain all the phenomena
+of nature as merely manifestations of impenetrability
+<pb n='185'/><anchor id='Pg185'/>
+and cohesion. Although this has been given up,
+precisely the same error is committed in our own day by
+the electrical, chemical, and mechanical physiologists, who
+obstinately attempt to explain the whole of life and all the
+functions of the organism from <q>form and combination.</q>
+In Meckel's <q>Archiv für Physiologie</q> (1820, vol. v. p.
+185) we still find it stated that the aim of physiological
+explanation is the reduction of organic life to the universal
+forces with which physics deals. Lamarck also, in his
+<q><hi rend='italic'>Philosophie Zoologique</hi>,</q> explains life as merely the
+effect of warmth and electricity: <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>le calorique et la matière
+électrique suffisent parfaitement pour composer ensemble cette
+cause essentielle de la vie</foreign> (p. 16). According to this, warmth
+and electricity would be the <q>thing-in-itself,</q> and the
+world of animals and plants its phenomenal appearance.
+The absurdity of this opinion becomes glaringly apparent
+at the 306th and following pages of that work. It is
+well known that all these opinions, that have been so
+often refuted, have reappeared quite recently with renewed
+confidence. If we carefully examine the foundation
+of these views, we shall find that they ultimately
+involve the presupposition that the organism is merely
+an aggregate of phenomena of physical, chemical, and mechanical
+forces, which have come together here by chance,
+and produced the organism as a freak of nature without
+further significance. The organism of an animal or of a
+human being would therefore be, if considered philosophically,
+not the exhibition of a special Idea, that is, not itself
+immediate objectivity of the will at a definite higher
+grade, but in it would appear only those Ideas which
+objectify the will in electricity, in chemism, and in
+mechanism. Thus the organism would be as fortuitously
+constructed by the concurrence of these forces as the
+forms of men and beasts in clouds and stalactites, and
+would therefore in itself be no more interesting than they
+are. However, we shall see immediately how far the
+application of physical and chemical modes of explanation
+<pb n='186'/><anchor id='Pg186'/>
+to the organism may yet, within certain limits, be
+allowable and useful; for I shall explain that the vital
+force certainly avails itself of and uses the forces of
+unorganised nature; yet these forces no more constitute
+the vital force than a hammer and anvil make a blacksmith.
+Therefore even the most simple example of plant
+life can never be explained from these forces by any
+theory of capillary attraction and endosmose, much less
+animal life. The following observations will prepare the
+way for this somewhat difficult discussion.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It follows from all that has been said that it is
+certainly an error on the part of natural science to seek
+to refer the higher grades of the objectification of will to
+the lower; for the failure to recognise, or the denial of,
+original and self-existing forces of nature is just as wrong
+as the groundless assumption of special forces when what
+occurs is merely a peculiar kind of manifestation of what
+is already known. Thus Kant rightly says that it would
+be absurd to hope for a blade of grass from a Newton,
+that is, from one who reduced the blade of grass to the
+manifestations of physical and chemical forces, of which it
+was the chance product, and therefore a mere freak of
+nature, in which no special Idea appeared, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the will
+did not directly reveal itself in it in a higher and
+specific grade, but just as in the phenomena of unorganised
+nature and by chance in this form. The schoolmen,
+who certainly would not have allowed such a
+doctrine, would rightly have said that it was a complete
+denial of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>forma substantialis</foreign>, and a degradation of it
+to the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>forma accidentalis</foreign>. For the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>forma substantialis</foreign> of
+Aristotle denotes exactly what I call the grade of the
+objectification of will in a thing. On the other hand,
+it is not to be overlooked that in all Ideas, that is, in all
+forces of unorganised, and all forms of organised nature,
+it is <emph>one and the same</emph> will that reveals itself, that is to
+say, which enters the form of the idea and passes into <emph>objectivity</emph>.
+Its unity must therefore be also recognisable
+<pb n='187'/><anchor id='Pg187'/>
+through an inner relationship between all its phenomena.
+Now this reveals itself in the higher grades of the objectification
+of will, where the whole phenomenon is more
+distinct, thus in the vegetable and animal kingdoms,
+through the universally prevailing analogy of all forms,
+the fundamental type which recurs in all phenomena.
+This has, therefore, become the guiding principle of the
+admirable zoological system which was originated
+by the French in this century, and it is most completely
+established in comparative anatomy as <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>l'unité
+de plan</foreign>, <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>l'uniformité de l'élément anatomique</foreign>. To discover
+this fundamental type has been the chief concern,
+or at any rate the praiseworthy endeavour, of
+the natural philosophers of the school of Schelling, who
+have in this respect considerable merit, although in
+many cases their hunt after analogies in nature degenerated
+into mere conceits. They have, however, rightly
+shown that that general relationship and family likeness
+exists also in the Ideas of unorganised nature; for
+example, between electricity and magnetism, the identity
+of which was afterwards established; between chemical
+attraction and gravitation, and so forth. They
+specially called attention to the fact that <emph>polarity</emph>, that
+is, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different
+and opposed activities striving after reunion,
+which also shows itself for the most part in space as a
+dispersion in opposite directions, is a fundamental type
+of almost all the phenomena of nature, from the magnet
+and the crystal to man himself. Yet this knowledge
+has been current in China from the earliest times, in the
+doctrine of opposition of Yin and Yang. Indeed, since
+all things in the world are the objectification of one and
+the same will, and therefore in their inner nature identical,
+it must not only be the case that there is that
+unmistakable analogy between them, and that in every
+phenomenon the trace, intimation, and plan of the
+higher phenomenon that lies next to it in point of
+<pb n='188'/><anchor id='Pg188'/>
+development shows itself, but also because all these
+forms belong to the world as <emph>idea</emph>, it is indeed conceivable
+that even in the most universal forms of the idea,
+in that peculiar framework of the phenomenal world
+space and time, it may be possible to discern and establish
+the fundamental type, intimation, and plan of what
+fills the forms. It seems to have been a dim notion of
+this that was the origin of the Cabala and all the mathematical
+philosophy of the Pythagoreans, and also of the
+Chinese in Y-king. In the school of Schelling also, to
+which we have already referred, we find, among their
+efforts to bring to light the similarity among the phenomena
+of nature, several attempts (though rather unfortunate
+ones) to deduce laws of nature from the laws
+of pure space and time. However, one can never tell to
+what extent a man of genius will realise both endeavours.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now, although the difference between phenomenon
+and thing-in-itself is never lost sight of, and therefore
+the identity of the will which objectifies itself in all
+Ideas can never (because it has different grades of its
+objectification) be distorted to mean identity of the
+particular Ideas themselves in which it appears, so that,
+for example, chemical or electrical attraction can never be
+reduced to the attraction of gravitation, although this
+inner analogy is known, and the former may be regarded
+as, so to speak, higher powers of the latter, just as
+little does the similarity of the construction of all
+animals warrant us in mixing and identifying the
+species and explaining the more developed as mere
+variations of the less developed; and although, finally,
+the physiological functions are never to be reduced to
+chemical or physical processes, yet, in justification of this
+procedure, within certain limits, we may accept the following
+observations as highly probable.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If several of the phenomena of will in the lower
+grades of its objectification&mdash;that is, in unorganised nature&mdash;come
+into conflict because each of them, under the
+<pb n='189'/><anchor id='Pg189'/>
+guidance of causality, seeks to possess a given portion of
+matter, there arises from the conflict the phenomenon of
+a higher Idea which prevails over all the less developed
+phenomena previously there, yet in such a way that it
+allows the essence of these to continue to exist in a
+subordinate manner, in that it takes up into itself from
+them something which is analogous to them. This
+process is only intelligible from the identity of the will
+which manifests itself in all the Ideas, and which is
+always striving after higher objectification. We thus
+see, for example, in the hardening of the bones, an
+unmistakable analogy to crystallisation, as the force
+which originally had possession of the chalk, although
+ossification is never to be reduced to crystallisation.
+The analogy shows itself in a weaker degree in the flesh
+becoming firm. The combination of humours in the
+animal body and secretion are also analogous to chemical
+combination and separation. Indeed, the laws of
+chemistry are still strongly operative in this case, but
+subordinated, very much modified, and mastered by a
+higher Idea; therefore mere chemical forces outside the
+organism will never afford us such humours; but
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Encheiresin naturæ nennt es die Chemie,</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Spottet ihrer selbst und weiss nicht wie.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+The more developed Idea resulting from this victory over
+several lower Ideas or objectifications of will, gains an
+entirely new character by taking up into itself from every
+Idea over which it has prevailed a strengthened analogy.
+The will objectifies itself in a new, more distinct way.
+It originally appears in <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>generatio æquivoca</foreign>; afterwards in
+assimilation to the given germ, organic moisture, plant,
+animal, man. Thus from the strife of lower phenomena
+the higher arise, swallowing them all up, but yet realising
+in the higher grade the tendency of all the lower.
+Here, then, already the law applies&mdash;<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Serpens nisi serpentem
+comederit non fit draco.</foreign>
+</p>
+
+<pb n='190'/><anchor id='Pg190'/>
+
+<p>
+I wish it had been possible for me to dispel by clearness
+of explanation the obscurity which clings to the
+subject of these thoughts; but I see very well that the
+reader's own consideration of the matter must materially
+aid me if I am not to remain uncomprehended or misunderstood.
+According to the view I have expressed,
+the traces of chemical and physical modes of operation
+will indeed be found in the organism, but it can never
+be explained from them; because it is by no means a
+phenomenon even accidentally brought about through the
+united actions of such forces, but a higher Idea which
+has overcome these lower ideas by <emph>subduing assimilation</emph>;
+for the <emph>one</emph> will which objectifies itself in all Ideas always
+seeks the highest possible objectification, and has therefore
+in this case given up the lower grades of its
+manifestation after a conflict, in order to appear in a
+higher grade, and one so much the more powerful. No
+victory without conflict: since the higher Idea or objectification
+of will can only appear through the conquest
+of the lower, it endures the opposition of these lower
+Ideas, which, although brought into subjection, still constantly
+strive to obtain an independent and complete
+expression of their being. The magnet that has attracted
+a piece of iron carries on a perpetual conflict with gravitation,
+which, as the lower objectification of will, has a
+prior right to the matter of the iron; and in this constant
+battle the magnet indeed grows stronger, for the opposition
+excites it, as it were, to greater effort. In the same
+way every manifestation of the will, including that which
+expresses itself in the human organism, wages a constant
+war against the many physical and chemical forces
+which, as lower Ideas, have a prior right to that matter.
+Thus the arm falls which for a while, overcoming gravity,
+we have held stretched out; thus the pleasing sensation
+of health, which proclaims the victory of the Idea
+of the self-conscious organism over the physical and
+chemical laws, which originally governed the humours of
+<pb n='191'/><anchor id='Pg191'/>
+the body, is so often interrupted, and is indeed always
+accompanied by greater or less discomfort, which arises
+from the resistance of these forces, and on account of
+which the vegetative part of our life is constantly attended
+by slight pain. Thus also digestion weakens all the animal
+functions, because it requires the whole vital force to
+overcome the chemical forces of nature by assimilation.
+Hence also in general the burden of physical life, the
+necessity of sleep, and, finally, of death; for at last these
+subdued forces of nature, assisted by circumstances, win
+back from the organism, wearied even by the constant
+victory, the matter it took from them, and attain to an
+unimpeded expression of their being. We may therefore
+say that every organism expresses the Idea of which it is
+the image, only after we have subtracted the part of its
+force which is expended in subduing the lower Ideas that
+strive with it for matter. This seems to have been
+running in the mind of Jacob Böhm when he says somewhere
+that all the bodies of men and animals, and even
+all plants, are really half dead. According as the subjection
+in the organism of these forces of nature, which
+express the lower grades of the objectification of will, is
+more or less successful, the more or the less completely
+does it attain to the expression of its Idea; that is to
+say, the nearer it is to the <emph>ideal</emph> or the further from it&mdash;the
+<emph>ideal</emph> of beauty in its species.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus everywhere in nature we see strife, conflict, and
+alternation of victory, and in it we shall come to recognise
+more distinctly that variance with itself which is essential
+to the will. Every grade of the objectification of will
+fights for the matter, the space, and the time of the others.
+The permanent matter must constantly change its form;
+for under the guidance of causality, mechanical, physical,
+chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly striving to appear,
+wrest the matter from each other, for each desires
+to reveal its own Idea. This strife may be followed through
+the whole of nature; indeed nature exists only through it:
+<pb n='192'/><anchor id='Pg192'/>
+ει γαρ μη ην το νεικος εν τοις πραγμασιν, ἑν αν ην ἁπαντα,
+ὡς φησιν Εμπεδοκλης; (nam si non inesset in rebus contentio,
+unum omnia essent, ut ait Empedocles. Aris.
+Metaph., B. 5). Yet this strife itself is only the revelation
+of that variance with itself which is essential to the
+will. This universal conflict becomes most distinctly
+visible in the animal kingdom. For animals have the
+whole of the vegetable kingdom for their food, and even
+within the animal kingdom every beast is the prey and
+the food of another; that is, the matter in which its Idea
+expresses itself must yield itself to the expression of
+another Idea, for each animal can only maintain its existence
+by the constant destruction of some other. Thus
+the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different
+forms is its own nourishment, till finally the human
+race, because it subdues all the others, regards nature as
+a manufactory for its use. Yet even the human race, as
+we shall see in the Fourth Book, reveals in itself with
+most terrible distinctness this conflict, this variance with
+itself of the will, and we find <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>homo homini lupus</foreign>. Meanwhile
+we can recognise this strife, this subjugation, just
+as well in the lower grades of the objectification of will.
+Many insects (especially ichneumon-flies) lay their eggs
+on the skin, and even in the body of the larvæ of other
+insects, whose slow destruction is the first work of the
+newly hatched brood. The young hydra, which grows
+like a bud out of the old one, and afterwards separates
+itself from it, fights while it is still joined to the old one
+for the prey that offers itself, so that the one snatches
+it out of the mouth of the other (Trembley, Polypod., ii.
+p. 110, and iii. p. 165). But the bulldog-ant of Australia
+affords us the most extraordinary example of this
+kind; for if it is cut in two, a battle begins between the
+head and the tail. The head seizes the tail with its teeth,
+and the tail defends itself bravely by stinging the head:
+the battle may last for half an hour, until they die or are
+dragged away by other ants. This contest takes place
+<pb n='193'/><anchor id='Pg193'/>
+every time the experiment is tried. (From a letter by
+Howitt in the W. Journal, reprinted in Galignani's Messenger,
+17th November 1855.) On the banks of the
+Missouri one sometimes sees a mighty oak the stem and
+branches of which are so encircled, fettered, and interlaced
+by a gigantic wild vine, that it withers as if choked. The
+same thing shows itself in the lowest grades; for example,
+when water and carbon are changed into vegetable sap, or
+vegetables or bread into blood by organic assimilation;
+and so also in every case in which animal secretion takes
+place, along with the restriction of chemical forces to a
+subordinate mode of activity. This also occurs in unorganised
+nature, when, for example, crystals in process of
+formation meet, cross, and mutually disturb each other to
+such an extent that they are unable to assume the pure
+crystalline form, so that almost every cluster of crystals
+is an image of such a conflict of will at this low grade of
+its objectification; or again, when a magnet forces its
+magnetism upon iron, in order to express its Idea in it;
+or when galvanism overcomes chemical affinity, decomposes
+the closest combinations, and so entirely suspends
+the laws of chemistry that the acid of a decomposed salt
+at the negative pole must pass to the positive pole without
+combining with the alkalies through which it goes
+on its way, or turning red the litmus paper that touches
+it. On a large scale it shows itself in the relation between
+the central body and the planet, for although the planet
+is in absolute dependence, yet it always resists, just like
+the chemical forces in the organism; hence arises the
+constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal force,
+which keeps the globe in motion, and is itself an example
+of that universal essential conflict of the manifestation of
+will which we are considering. For as every body must
+be regarded as the manifestation of a will, and as will
+necessarily expresses itself as a struggle, the original condition
+of every world that is formed into a globe cannot
+be rest, but motion, a striving forward in boundless space
+<pb n='194'/><anchor id='Pg194'/>
+without rest and without end. Neither the law of inertia
+nor that of causality is opposed to this: for as, according
+to the former, matter as such is alike indifferent
+to rest and motion, its original condition may just as
+well be the one as the other, therefore if we first find
+it in motion, we have just as little right to assume
+that this was preceded by a condition of rest, and to
+inquire into the cause of the origin of the motion, as,
+conversely, if we found it at rest, we would have to
+assume a previous motion and inquire into the cause of
+its suspension. It is, therefore, not needful to seek for a
+first impulse for centrifugal force, for, according to the
+hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, it is, in the case of the
+planets, the residue of the original rotation of the central
+body, from which the planets have separated themselves
+as it contracted. But to this central body itself motion
+is essential; it always continues its rotation, and at the
+same time rushes forward in endless space, or perhaps circulates
+round a greater central body invisible to us. This
+view entirely agrees with the conjecture of astronomers that
+there is a central sun, and also with the observed advance
+of our whole solar system, and perhaps of the whole
+stellar system to which our sun belongs. From this we
+are finally led to assume a general advance of fixed stars,
+together with the central sun, and this certainly loses all
+meaning in boundless space (for motion in absolute space
+cannot be distinguished from rest), and becomes, as is
+already the case from its striving and aimless flight, an
+expression of that nothingness, that failure of all aim,
+which, at the close of this book, we shall be obliged to
+recognise in the striving of will in all its phenomena.
+Thus boundless space and endless time must be the most
+universal and essential forms of the collective phenomena
+of will, which exist for the expression of its whole being.
+Lastly, we can recognise that conflict which we are considering
+of all phenomena of will against each other in
+simple matter regarded as such; for the real characteristic
+<pb n='195'/><anchor id='Pg195'/>
+of matter is correctly expressed by Kant as repulsive
+and attractive force; so that even crude matter has its
+existence only in the strife of conflicting forces. If we
+abstract from all chemical differences in matter, or go so
+far back in the chain of causes and effects that as yet
+there is no chemical difference, there remains mere
+matter,&mdash;the world rounded to a globe, whose life, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+objectification of will, is now constituted by the conflict
+between attractive and repulsive forces, the former as
+gravitation pressing from all sides towards the centre,
+the latter as impenetrability always opposing the former
+either as rigidity or elasticity; and this constant pressure
+and resistance may be regarded as the objectivity of will
+in its very lowest grade, and even there it expresses its
+character.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We should see the will express itself here in the
+lowest grade as blind striving, an obscure, inarticulate
+impulse, far from susceptible of being directly known.
+It is the simplest and the weakest mode of its objectification.
+But it appears as this blind and unconscious
+striving in the whole of unorganised nature, in all those
+original forces of which it is the work of physics and
+chemistry to discover and to study the laws, and each of
+which manifests itself to us in millions of phenomena
+which are exactly similar and regular, and show no
+trace of individual character, but are mere multiplicity
+through space and time, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+as a picture is multiplied through the facets of
+a glass.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+From grade to grade objectifying itself more distinctly,
+yet still completely without consciousness as an obscure
+striving force, the will acts in the vegetable kingdom
+also, in which the bond of its phenomena consists no
+longer properly of causes, but of stimuli; and, finally,
+also in the vegetative part of the animal phenomenon, in
+the production and maturing of the animal, and in sustaining
+its inner economy, in which the manifestation of
+<pb n='196'/><anchor id='Pg196'/>
+will is still always necessarily determined by stimuli.
+The ever-ascending grades of the objectification of will
+bring us at last to the point at which the individual that
+expresses the Idea could no longer receive food for its
+assimilation through mere movement following upon
+stimuli. For such a stimulus must be waited for, but
+the food has now come to be of a more special and definite
+kind, and with the ever-increasing multiplicity of the
+individual phenomena, the crowd and confusion has become
+so great that they interfere with each other, and
+the chance of the individual that is moved merely by
+stimuli and must wait for its food would be too unfavourable.
+From the point, therefore, at which the
+animal has delivered itself from the egg or the womb in
+which it vegetated without consciousness, its food must
+be sought out and selected. For this purpose movement
+following upon motives, and therefore consciousness, becomes
+necessary, and consequently it appears as an agent,
+μηχανη, called in at this stage of the objectification of will
+for the conservation of the individual and the propagation
+of the species. It appears represented by the brain or a
+large ganglion, just as every other effort or determination
+of the will which objectifies itself is represented by an
+organ, that is to say, manifests itself for the idea as an
+organ.<note place='foot'>Cf. Chap. xxii. of the Supplement,
+and also my work <q>Ueber den Willen
+in der Natur,</q> p. 54 <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>, and
+pp. 70-79 of the first edition, or p.
+46 <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>, and pp. 63-72 of the
+second, or p. 48 <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>, and pp.
+69-77 of the third edition.</note> But with this means of assistance, this μηχανη,
+the <emph>world as idea</emph> comes into existence at a stroke, with
+all its forms, object and subject, time, space, multiplicity,
+and causality. The world now shows its second side.
+Till now <emph>mere will</emph>, it becomes also <emph>idea</emph>, object of the
+knowing subject. The will, which up to this point
+followed its tendency in the dark with unerring certainty,
+has at this grade kindled for itself a light as a means
+which became necessary for getting rid of the disadvantage
+which arose from the throng and the complicated
+<pb n='197'/><anchor id='Pg197'/>
+nature of its manifestations, and which would have
+accrued precisely to the most perfect of them. The
+hitherto infallible certainty and regularity with which
+it worked in unorganised and merely vegetative nature,
+rested upon the fact that it alone was active in its
+original nature, as blind impulse, will, without assistance,
+and also without interruption, from a second and entirely
+different world, the world as idea, which is indeed only the
+image of its own inner being, but is yet of quite another
+nature, and now encroaches on the connected whole of its
+phenomena. Hence its infallible certainty comes to an
+end. Animals are already exposed to illusion, to deception.
+They have, however, merely ideas of perception, no conceptions,
+no reflection, and they are therefore bound to
+the present; they cannot have regard for the future. It
+seems as if this knowledge without reason was not in all
+cases sufficient for its end, and at times required, as it were,
+some assistance. For the very remarkable phenomenon
+presents itself, that the blind working of the will and the
+activity enlightened by knowledge encroach in a most
+astonishing manner upon each other's spheres in two kinds
+of phenomena. In the one case we find in the very midst
+of those actions of animals which are guided by perceptive
+knowledge and its motives one kind of action
+which is accomplished apart from these, and thus through
+the necessity of the blindly acting will. I refer to those
+mechanical instincts which are guided by no motive or
+knowledge, and which yet have the appearance of performing
+their work from abstract rational motives. The
+other case, which is opposed to this, is that in which, on
+the contrary, the light of knowledge penetrates into the
+workshop of the blindly active will, and illuminates the
+vegetative functions of the human organism. I mean
+clairvoyance. Finally, when the will has attained to the
+highest grade of its objectification, that knowledge of the
+understanding given to brutes to which the senses supply
+the data, out of which there arises mere perception confined
+<pb n='198'/><anchor id='Pg198'/>
+to what is immediately present, does not suffice.
+That complicated, many-sided, imaginative being, man,
+with his many needs, and exposed as he is to innumerable
+dangers, must, in order to exist, be lighted by a double
+knowledge; a higher power, as it were, of perceptive
+knowledge must be given him, and also reason, as the
+faculty of framing abstract conceptions. With this there
+has appeared reflection, surveying the future and the past,
+and, as a consequence, deliberation, care, the power of
+premeditated action independent of the present, and
+finally, the full and distinct consciousness of one's own
+deliberate volition as such. Now if with mere knowledge
+of perception there arose the possibility of illusion
+and deception, by which the previous infallibility of the
+blind striving of will was done away with, so that mechanical
+and other instincts, as expressions of unconscious
+will, had to lend their help in the midst of those that
+were conscious, with the entrance of reason that certainty
+and infallibility of the expressions of will (which
+at the other extreme in unorganised nature appeared as
+strict conformity to law) is almost entirely lost; instinct
+disappears altogether; deliberation, which is supposed to
+take the place of everything else, begets (as was shown
+in the First Book) irresolution and uncertainty; then
+error becomes possible, and in many cases obstructs the
+adequate objectification of the will in action. For although
+in the character the will has already taken its definite
+and unchangeable bent or direction, in accordance with
+which volition, when occasioned by the presence of a motive,
+invariably takes place, yet error can falsify its expressions,
+for it introduces illusive motives that take the place of
+the real ones which they resemble;<note place='foot'>The Scholastics therefore said
+very truly: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Causa finalis movet non
+secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum
+esse cognitum.</foreign> Cf. Suarez, Disp.
+Metaph. disp. xxiii., sec. 7 and 8.</note> as, for example,
+when superstition forces on a man imaginary motives
+which impel him to a course of action directly opposed
+<pb n='199'/><anchor id='Pg199'/>
+to the way in which the will would otherwise express
+itself in the given circumstances. Agamemnon slays his
+daughter; a miser dispenses alms, out of pure egotism, in
+the hope that he will some day receive an hundred-fold;
+and so on.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus knowledge generally, rational as well as merely
+sensuous, proceeds originally from the will itself, belongs
+to the inner being of the higher grades of its objectification
+as a mere μηχανη, a means of supporting the individual
+and the species, just like any organ of the body.
+Originally destined for the service of the will for the
+accomplishment of its aims, it remains almost throughout
+entirely subjected to its service: it is so in all brutes and
+in almost all men. Yet we shall see in the Third Book
+how in certain individual men knowledge can deliver
+itself from this bondage, throw off its yoke, and, free from
+all the aims of will, exist purely for itself, simply as a
+clear mirror of the world, which is the source of art.
+Finally, in the Fourth Book, we shall see how, if this
+kind of knowledge reacts on the will, it can bring about
+self-surrender, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, resignation, which is the final goal, and
+indeed the inmost nature of all virtue and holiness, and
+is deliverance from the world.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 28. We have considered the great multiplicity and
+diversity of the phenomena in which the will objectifies
+itself, and we have seen their endless and implacable
+strife with each other. Yet, according to the whole discussion
+up to this point, the will itself, as thing-in-itself,
+is by no means included in that multiplicity and change.
+The diversity of the (Platonic) Ideas, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, grades of
+objectification, the multitude of individuals in which
+each of these expresses itself, the struggle of forms for
+matter,&mdash;all this does not concern it, but is only the
+manner of its objectification, and only through this has
+an indirect relation to it, by virtue of which it belongs
+to the expression of the nature of will for the idea. As
+the magic-lantern shows many different pictures, which
+<pb n='200'/><anchor id='Pg200'/>
+are all made visible by one and the same light, so in
+all the multifarious phenomena which fill the world together
+or throng after each other as events, only <emph>one will</emph>
+manifests itself, of which everything is the visibility, the
+objectivity, and which remains unmoved in the midst of
+this change; it alone is thing-in-itself; all objects are
+manifestations, or, to speak the language of Kant, phenomena.
+Although in man, as (Platonic) Idea, the will
+finds its clearest and fullest objectification, yet man
+alone could not express its being. In order to manifest
+the full significance of the will, the Idea of man would
+need to appear, not alone and sundered from everything
+else, but accompanied by the whole series of grades,
+down through all the forms of animals, through the
+vegetable kingdom to unorganised nature. All these
+supplement each other in the complete objectification of
+will; they are as much presupposed by the Idea of man
+as the blossoms of a tree presuppose leaves, branches,
+stem, and root; they form a pyramid, of which man is
+the apex. If fond of similes, one might also say that
+their manifestations accompany that of man as necessarily
+as the full daylight is accompanied by all the
+gradations of twilight, through which, little by little, it
+loses itself in darkness; or one might call them the echo
+of man, and say: Animal and plant are the descending
+fifth and third of man, the inorganic kingdom is the lower
+octave. The full truth of this last comparison will only
+become clear to us when, in the following book, we
+attempt to fathom the deep significance of music, and see
+how a connected, progressive melody, made up of high,
+quick notes, may be regarded as in some sense expressing
+the life and efforts of man connected by reflection,
+while the unconnected complemental notes and the slow
+bass, which make up the harmony necessary to perfect
+the music, represent the rest of the animal kingdom and
+the whole of nature that is without knowledge. But of
+this in its own place, where it will not sound so paradoxical.
+<pb n='201'/><anchor id='Pg201'/>
+We find, however, that the <emph>inner necessity</emph> of
+the gradation of its manifestations, which is inseparable
+from the adequate objectification of the will, is expressed
+by an <emph>outer necessity</emph> in the whole of these manifestations
+themselves, by reason of which man has need of the
+beasts for his support, the beasts in their grades have
+need of each other as well as of plants, which in their
+turn require the ground, water, chemical elements and
+their combinations, the planet, the sun, rotation and
+motion round the sun, the curve of the ellipse, &amp;c., &amp;c.
+At bottom this results from the fact that the will must
+live on itself, for there exists nothing beside it, and it is
+a hungry will. Hence arise eager pursuit, anxiety, and
+suffering.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is only the knowledge of the unity of will as
+thing-in-itself, in the endless diversity and multiplicity
+of the phenomena, that can afford us the true explanation
+of that wonderful, unmistakable analogy of all the
+productions of nature, that family likeness on account of
+which we may regard them as variations on the same
+ungiven theme. So in like measure, through the distinct
+and thoroughly comprehended knowledge of that harmony,
+that essential connection of all the parts of the
+world, that necessity of their gradation which we have
+just been considering, we shall obtain a true and sufficient
+insight into the inner nature and meaning of the
+undeniable <emph>teleology</emph> of all organised productions of nature,
+which, indeed, we presupposed <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, when considering
+and investigating them.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This <emph>teleology</emph> is of a twofold description; sometimes
+an <emph>inner teleology</emph>, that is, an agreement of all the parts
+of a particular organism, so ordered that the sustenance
+of the individual and the species results from it, and
+therefore presents itself as the end of that disposition or
+arrangement. Sometimes, however, there is an <emph>outward
+teleology</emph>, a relation of unorganised to organised nature in
+general, or of particular parts of organised nature to each
+<pb n='202'/><anchor id='Pg202'/>
+other, which makes the maintenance of the whole of
+organised nature, or of the particular animal species,
+possible, and therefore presents itself to our judgment as
+the means to this end.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<emph>Inner teleology</emph> is connected with the scheme of our
+work in the following way. If, in accordance with what
+has been said, all variations of form in nature, and all
+multiplicity of individuals, belong not to the will itself,
+but merely to its objectivity and the form of this objectivity,
+it necessarily follows that the will is indivisible
+and is present as a whole in every manifestation, although
+the grades of its objectification, the (Platonic) Ideas, are
+very different from each other. We may, for the sake of
+simplicity, regard these different Ideas as in themselves
+individual and simple acts of the will, in which it expresses
+its nature more or less. Individuals, however, are
+again manifestations of the Ideas, thus of these acts, in
+time, space, and multiplicity. Now, in the lowest grades
+of objectivity, such an act (or an Idea) retains its unity
+in the manifestation; while, in order to appear in higher
+grades, it requires a whole series of conditions and developments
+in time, which only collectively express its
+nature completely. Thus, for example the Idea that
+reveals itself in any general force of nature has always
+one single expression, although it presents itself differently
+according to the external relations that are present:
+otherwise its identity could not be proved, for this is
+done by abstracting the diversity that arises merely from
+external relations. In the same way the crystal has only
+<emph>one</emph> manifestation of life, crystallisation, which afterwards
+has its fully adequate and exhaustive expression in the
+rigid form, the corpse of that momentary life. The plant,
+however, does not express the Idea, whose phenomenon
+it is, at once and through a single manifestation, but in a
+succession of developments of its organs in time. The
+animal not only develops its organism in the same manner,
+in a succession of forms which are often very different
+<pb n='203'/><anchor id='Pg203'/>
+(metamorphosis), but this form itself, although it is already
+objectivity of will at this grade, does not attain to
+a full expression of its Idea. This expression must be
+completed through the actions of the animal, in which
+its empirical character, common to the whole species,
+manifests itself, and only then does it become the full
+revelation of the Idea, a revelation which presupposes
+the particular organism as its first condition. In the case
+of man, the empirical character is peculiar to every individual
+(indeed, as we shall see in the Fourth Book, even to
+the extent of supplanting entirely the character of the
+species, through the self-surrender of the whole will).
+That which is known as the empirical character, through
+the necessary development in time, and the division into
+particular actions that is conditioned by it, is, when we
+abstract from this temporal form of the manifestation the
+<emph>intelligible character</emph>, according to the expression of Kant,
+who shows his undying merit especially in establishing
+this distinction and explaining the relation between
+freedom and necessity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, between the will as thing-in-itself
+and its manifestations in time.<note place='foot'>Cf. <q>Critique of Pure Reason.
+Solution of the Cosmological Ideas
+of the Totality of the Deduction of
+the Events in the Universe,</q> pp.
+560-586 of the fifth, and p. 532 and
+following of first edition; and <q>Critique
+of Practical Reason,</q> fourth
+edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz'
+edition, p. 224 and following. Cf.
+my Essay on the Principle of Sufficient
+Reason, § 43.</note> Thus the
+intelligible character coincides with the Idea, or, more
+accurately, with the original act of will which reveals
+itself in it. So far then, not only the empirical
+character of every man, but also that of every species
+of animal and plant, and even of every original force
+of unorganised nature, is to be regarded as the manifestation
+of an intelligible character, that is, of a timeless,
+indivisible act of will. I should like here to draw
+attention in passing to the naïveté with which every
+plant expresses and lays open its whole character in its
+mere form, reveals its whole being and will. This is
+<pb n='204'/><anchor id='Pg204'/>
+why the physiognomy of plants is so interesting; while
+in order to know an animal in its Idea, it is necessary
+to observe the course of its action. As for man, he
+must be fully investigated and tested, for reason makes
+him capable of a high degree of dissimulation. The
+beast is as much more naïve than the man as the plant
+is more naïve than the beast. In the beast we see the
+will to live more naked, as it were, than in the man, in
+whom it is clothed with so much knowledge, and is,
+moreover, so veiled through the capacity for dissimulation,
+that it is almost only by chance, and here and
+there, that its true nature becomes apparent. In the
+plant it shows itself quite naked, but also much weaker,
+as mere blind striving for existence without end or
+aim. For the plant reveals its whole being at the first
+glance, and with complete innocence, which does not
+suffer from the fact that it carries its organs of generation
+exposed to view on its upper surface, though in all
+animals they have been assigned to the most hidden
+part. This innocence of the plant results from its complete
+want of knowledge. Guilt does not lie in willing,
+but in willing with knowledge. Every plant speaks to
+us first of all of its home, of the climate, and the nature
+of the ground in which it has grown. Therefore, even
+those who have had little practice easily tell whether
+an exotic plant belongs to the tropical or the temperate
+zone, and whether it grows in water, in marshes, on
+mountain, or on moorland. Besides this, however, every
+plant expresses the special will of its species, and says
+something that cannot be uttered in any other tongue.
+But we must now apply what has been said to the
+teleological consideration of the organism, so far as it
+concerns its inner design. If in unorganised nature
+the Idea, which is everywhere to be regarded as a single
+act of will, reveals itself also in a single manifestation
+which is always the same, and thus one may say that
+here the empirical character directly partakes of the
+<pb n='205'/><anchor id='Pg205'/>
+unity of the intelligible, coincides, as it were, with it, so
+that no inner design can show itself here; if, on the
+contrary, all organisms express their Ideas through a
+series of successive developments, conditioned by a
+multiplicity of co-existing parts, and thus only the
+sum of the manifestations of the empirical character
+collectively constitute the expression of the intelligible
+character; this necessary co-existence of the
+parts and succession of the stages of development
+does not destroy the unity of the appearing Idea, the
+act of will which expresses itself; nay, rather this
+unity finds its expression in the necessary relation
+and connection of the parts and stages of development
+with each other, in accordance with the law of causality.
+Since it is the will which is one, indivisible, and therefore
+entirely in harmony with itself, that reveals itself
+in the whole Idea as in act, its manifestation, although
+broken up into a number of different parts and conditions,
+must yet show this unity again in the thorough
+agreement of all of these. This is effected by a necessary
+relation and dependence of all the parts upon each other,
+by means of which the unity of the Idea is re-established
+in the manifestation. In accordance with this, we now
+recognise these different parts and functions of the
+organism as related to each other reciprocally as means
+and end, but the organism itself as the final end of all.
+Consequently, neither the breaking up of the Idea, which
+in itself is simple, into the multiplicity of the parts and
+conditions of the organism, on the one hand, nor, on the
+other hand, the re-establishment of its unity through the
+necessary connection of the parts and functions which
+arises from the fact that they are the cause and effect, the
+means and end, of each other, is peculiar and essential
+to the appearing will as such, to the thing-in-itself, but
+only to its manifestation in space, time, and causality
+(mere modes of the principle of sufficient reason, the
+form of the phenomenon). They belong to the world as
+<pb n='206'/><anchor id='Pg206'/>
+idea, not to the world as will; they belong to the way
+in which the will becomes object, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, idea at this grade
+of its objectivity. Every one who has grasped the meaning
+of this discussion&mdash;a discussion which is perhaps
+somewhat difficult&mdash;will now fully understand the doctrine
+of Kant, which follows from it, that both the design of
+organised and the conformity to law of unorganised
+nature are only introduced by our understanding, and
+therefore both belong only to the phenomenon, not to the
+thing-in-itself. The surprise, which was referred to
+above, at the infallible constancy of the conformity to
+law of unorganised nature, is essentially the same as the
+surprise that is excited by design in organised nature;
+for in both cases what we wonder at is only the sight of
+the original unity of the Idea, which, for the phenomenon,
+has assumed the form of multiplicity and diversity.<note place='foot'>Cf. <q>Ueber den Willen in der Natur,</q> at the end of the section on
+Comparative Anatomy.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As regards the second kind of teleology, according to
+the division made above, the <emph>outer</emph> design, which shows
+itself, not in the inner economy of the organisms, but in
+the support and assistance they receive from without,
+both from unorganised nature and from each other; its
+general explanation is to be found in the exposition we
+have just given. For the whole world, with all its phenomena,
+is the objectivity of the one indivisible will, the
+Idea, which is related to all other Ideas as harmony is
+related to the single voice. Therefore that unity of the
+will must show itself also in the agreement of all its
+manifestations. But we can very much increase the
+clearness of this insight if we go somewhat more closely
+into the manifestations of that outer teleology and agreement
+of the different parts of nature with each other, an
+inquiry which will also throw some light on the foregoing
+exposition. We shall best attain this end by considering
+the following analogy.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The character of each individual man, so far as it is
+<pb n='207'/><anchor id='Pg207'/>
+thoroughly individual, and not entirely included in that
+of the species, may be regarded as a special Idea, corresponding
+to a special act of the objectification of will.
+This act itself would then be his intelligible character,
+and his empirical character would be the manifestation of
+it. The empirical character is entirely determined through
+the intelligible, which is without ground, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, as thing-in-itself
+is not subordinated to the principle of sufficient
+reason (the form of the phenomenon). The empirical character
+must in the course of life afford us the express image
+of the intelligible, and can only become what the nature of
+the latter demands. But this property extends only to the
+essential, not to the unessential in the course of life to
+which it applies. To this unessential belong the detailed
+events and actions which are the material in which
+the empirical character shows itself. These are determined
+by outward circumstances, which present the
+motives upon which the character reacts according to its
+nature; and as they may be very different, the outward
+form of the manifestation of the empirical character, that
+is, the definite actual or historical form of the course of
+life, will have to accommodate itself to their influence.
+Now this form may be very different, although what is
+essential to the manifestation, its content, remains the
+same. Thus, for example it is immaterial whether a man
+plays for nuts or for crowns; but whether a man cheats
+or plays fairly, that is the real matter; the latter is determined
+by the intelligible character, the former by
+outward circumstances. As the same theme may be
+expressed in a hundred different variations, so the same
+character may be expressed in a hundred very different lives.
+But various as the outward influence may be, the empirical
+character which expresses itself in the course of life
+must yet, whatever form it takes, accurately objectify
+the intelligible character, for the latter adapts its objectification
+to the given material of actual circumstances.
+We have now to assume something analogous to the
+<pb n='208'/><anchor id='Pg208'/>
+influence of outward circumstances upon the life that is
+determined in essential matters by the character, if we
+desire to understand how the will, in the original act of
+its objectification, determines the various Ideas in which
+it objectifies itself, that is, the different forms of natural
+existence of every kind, among which it distributes its
+objectification, and which must therefore necessarily have
+a relation to each other in the manifestation. We must
+assume that between all these manifestations of the <emph>one</emph>
+will there existed a universal and reciprocal adaptation
+and accommodation of themselves to each other, by which,
+however, as we shall soon see more clearly, all time-determination
+is to be excluded, for the Idea lies outside
+time. In accordance with this, every manifestation must
+have adapted itself to the surroundings into which it entered,
+and these again must have adapted themselves to it,
+although it occupied a much later position in time; and we
+see this <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>consensus naturæ</foreign> everywhere. Every plant is therefore
+adapted to its soil and climate, every animal to its
+element and the prey that will be its food, and is also in
+some way protected, to a certain extent, against its natural
+enemy: the eye is adapted to the light and its refrangibility,
+the lungs and the blood to the air, the air-bladder
+of fish to water, the eye of the seal to the change of the
+medium in which it must see, the water-pouch in the
+stomach of the camel to the drought of the African
+deserts, the sail of the nautilus to the wind that is to
+drive its little bark, and so on down to the most special
+and astonishing outward adaptations.<note place='foot'>Cf. <q>Ueber den Willen in der Natur,</q> the section on Comparative
+Anatomy.</note> We must abstract
+however here from all temporal relations, for these can
+only concern the manifestation of the Idea, not the Idea
+itself. Accordingly this kind of explanation must also
+be used retrospectively, and we must not merely admit
+that every species accommodated itself to the given environment,
+but also that this environment itself, which
+preceded it in time, had just as much regard for the being
+<pb n='209'/><anchor id='Pg209'/>
+that would some time come into it. For it is one and
+the same will that objectifies itself in the whole world;
+it knows no time, for this form of the principle of sufficient
+reason does not belong to it, nor to its original
+objectivity, the Ideas, but only to the way in which
+these are known by the individuals who themselves are
+transitory, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, to the manifestation of the Ideas. Thus,
+time has no significance for our present examination of
+the manner in which the objectification of the will distributes
+itself among the Ideas, and the Ideas whose
+<emph>manifestations</emph> entered into the course of time earlier,
+according to the law of causality, to which as phenomena
+they are subject, have no advantage over those whose
+manifestation entered later; nay rather, these last are the
+completest objectifications of the will, to which the earlier
+manifestations must adapt themselves just as much as
+they must adapt themselves to the earlier. Thus the
+course of the planets, the tendency to the ellipse, the
+rotation of the earth, the division of land and sea, the
+atmosphere, light, warmth, and all such phenomena,
+which are in nature what bass is in harmony, adapted
+themselves in anticipation of the coming species of
+living creatures of which they were to become the
+supporter and sustainer. In the same way the ground
+adapted itself to the nutrition of plants, plants adapted
+themselves to the nutrition of animals, animals to that
+of other animals, and conversely they all adapted themselves
+to the nutrition of the ground. All the parts of
+nature correspond to each other, for it is <emph>one</emph> will that
+appears in them all, but the course of time is quite
+foreign to its original and only <emph>adequate objectification</emph>
+(this expression will be explained in the following book),
+the Ideas. Even now, when the species have only to
+sustain themselves, no longer to come into existence, we
+see here and there some such forethought of nature extending
+to the future, and abstracting as it were from
+the process of time, a self-adaptation of what is to what
+<pb n='210'/><anchor id='Pg210'/>
+is yet to come. The bird builds the nest for the young
+which it does not yet know; the beaver constructs a
+dam the object of which is unknown to it; ants, marmots,
+and bees lay in provision for the winter they have
+never experienced; the spider and the ant-lion make
+snares, as if with deliberate cunning, for future unknown
+prey; insects deposit their eggs where the coming brood
+finds future nourishment. In the spring-time the female
+flower of the diœcian valisneria unwinds the spirals of its
+stalk, by which till now it was held at the bottom of the
+water, and thus rises to the surface. Just then the male
+flower, which grows on a short stalk from the bottom,
+breaks away, and so, at the sacrifice of its life, reaches
+the surface, where it swims about in search of the female.
+The latter is fructified, and then draws itself down again
+to the bottom by contracting its spirals, and there the
+fruit grows.<note place='foot'>Chatin, Sur la Valisneria Spiralis, in the Comptes Rendus de l'Acad.
+de Sc., No. 13, 1855.</note> I must again refer here to the larva of the
+male stag-beetle, which makes the hole in the wood for
+its metamorphosis as big again as the female does, in
+order to have room for its future horns. The instinct of
+animals in general gives us the best illustration of what
+remains of teleology in nature. For as instinct is an
+action, like that which is guided by the conception of an
+end, and yet is entirely without this; so all construction
+of nature resembles that which is guided by the conception
+of an end, and yet is entirely without it. For in
+the outer as in the inner teleology of nature, what we
+are obliged to think as means and end is, in every case,
+<emph>the manifestation of the unity of the one will so thoroughly
+agreeing with itself</emph>, which has assumed multiplicity in
+space and time for our manner of knowing.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The reciprocal adaptation and self-accommodation of
+phenomena that springs from this unity cannot, however,
+annul the inner contradiction which appears in the
+universal conflict of nature described above, and which
+<pb n='211'/><anchor id='Pg211'/>
+is essential to the will. That harmony goes only so far
+as to render possible the duration of the world and the
+different kinds of existences in it, which without it
+would long since have perished. Therefore it only extends
+to the continuance of the species, and the general
+conditions of life, but not to that of the individual. If,
+then, by reason of that harmony and accommodation, the
+<emph>species</emph> in organised nature and the <emph>universal forces</emph> in
+unorganised nature continue to exist beside each other,
+and indeed support each other reciprocally, on the other
+hand, the inner contradiction of the will which objectifies
+itself in all these ideas shows itself in the ceaseless internecine
+war of the <emph>individuals</emph> of these species, and in the
+constant struggle of the <emph>manifestations</emph> of these natural forces
+with each other, as we pointed out above. The scene and
+the object of this conflict is matter, which they try to wrest
+from each other, and also space and time, the combination
+of which through the form of causality is, in fact, matter,
+as was explained in the First Book.<note place='foot'>Cf. Chaps. xxvi. and xxvii. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 29. I here conclude the second principal division of
+my exposition, in the hope that, so far as is possible in
+the case of an entirely new thought, which cannot be
+quite free from traces of the individuality in which it
+originated, I have succeeded in conveying to the reader
+the complete certainty that this world in which we live
+and have our being is in its whole nature through and
+through <emph>will</emph>, and at the same time through and through
+<emph>idea</emph>: that this idea, as such, already presupposes a form,
+object and subject, is therefore relative; and if we ask
+what remains if we take away this form, and all those
+forms which are subordinate to it, and which express the
+principle of sufficient reason, the answer must be that as
+something <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>toto genere</foreign> different from idea, this can be
+nothing but <emph>will</emph>, which is thus properly the <emph>thing-in-itself</emph>.
+Every one finds that he himself is this will, in
+which the real nature of the world consists, and he also
+<pb n='212'/><anchor id='Pg212'/>
+finds that he is the knowing subject, whose idea the
+whole world is, the world which exists only in relation
+to his consciousness, as its necessary supporter. Every
+one is thus himself in a double aspect the whole world,
+the microcosm; finds both sides whole and complete
+in himself. And what he thus recognises as his own
+real being also exhausts the being of the whole world&mdash;the
+macrocosm; thus the world, like man, is through
+and through <emph>will</emph>, and through and through <emph>idea</emph>, and
+nothing more than this. So we see the philosophy of
+Thales, which concerned the macrocosm, unite at this
+point with that of Socrates, which dealt with the microcosm,
+for the object of both is found to be the same. But
+all the knowledge that has been communicated in the
+two first books will gain greater completeness, and consequently
+greater certainty, from the two following books,
+in which I hope that several questions that have more
+or less distinctly arisen in the course of our work will
+also be sufficiently answered.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In the meantime <emph>one</emph> such question may be more particularly
+considered, for it can only properly arise so long as
+one has not fully penetrated the meaning of the foregoing
+exposition, and may so far serve as an illustration of it.
+It is this: Every will is a will towards something, has
+an object, an end of its willing; what then is the final
+end, or towards what is that will striving that is exhibited
+to us as the being-in-itself of the world? This
+question rests, like so many others, upon the confusion
+of the thing-in-itself with the manifestation. The principle
+of sufficient reason, of which the law of motivation
+is also a form, extends only to the latter, not to the
+former. It is only of phenomena, of individual things,
+that a ground can be given, never of the will itself, nor
+of the Idea in which it adequately objectifies itself. So
+then of every particular movement or change of any
+kind in nature, a cause is to be sought, that is, a condition
+that of necessity produced it, but never of the
+<pb n='213'/><anchor id='Pg213'/>
+natural force itself which is revealed in this and innumerable
+similar phenomena; and it is therefore simple
+misunderstanding, arising from want of consideration, to
+ask for a cause of gravity, electricity, and so on. Only
+if one had somehow shown that gravity and electricity were
+not original special forces of nature, but only the manifestations
+of a more general force already known, would
+it be allowable to ask for the cause which made this force
+produce the phenomena of gravity or of electricity here.
+All this has been explained at length above. In the
+same way every particular act of will of a knowing
+individual (which is itself only a manifestation of will as
+the thing-in-itself) has necessarily a motive without which
+that act would never have occurred; but just as material
+causes contain merely the determination that at this time,
+in this place, and in this matter, a manifestation of this or
+that natural force must take place, so the motive determines
+only the act of will of a knowing being, at this
+time, in this place, and under these circumstances, as a
+particular act, but by no means determines that that
+being wills in general or wills in this manner; this is
+the expression of his intelligible character, which, as will
+itself, the thing-in-itself, is without ground, for it lies
+outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason.
+Therefore every man has permanent aims and motives by
+which he guides his conduct, and he can always give an
+account of his particular actions; but if he were asked
+why he wills at all, or why in general he wills to exist,
+he would have no answer, and the question would indeed
+seem to him meaningless; and this would be just the expression
+of his consciousness that he himself is nothing
+but will, whose willing stands by itself and requires more
+particular determination by motives only in its individual
+acts at each point of time.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In fact, freedom from all aim, from all limits, belongs
+to the nature of the will, which is an endless striving.
+This was already touched on above in the reference to
+<pb n='214'/><anchor id='Pg214'/>
+centrifugal force. It also discloses itself in its simplest
+form in the lowest grade of the objectification of will, in
+gravitation, which we see constantly exerting itself,
+though a final goal is obviously impossible for it. For
+if, according to its will, all existing matter were collected
+in one mass, yet within this mass gravity, ever striving
+towards the centre, would still wage war with impenetrability
+as rigidity or elasticity. The tendency of
+matter can therefore only be confined, never completed
+or appeased. But this is precisely the case with all
+tendencies of all phenomena of will. Every attained
+end is also the beginning of a new course, and so on <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad
+infinitum</foreign>. The plant raises its manifestation from the
+seed through the stem and the leaf to the blossom and the
+fruit, which again is the beginning of a new seed, a new
+individual, that runs through the old course, and so on
+through endless time. Such also is the life of the
+animal; procreation is its highest point, and after attaining
+to it, the life of the first individual quickly or
+slowly sinks, while a new life ensures to nature the
+endurance of the species and repeats the same phenomena.
+Indeed, the constant renewal of the matter of
+every organism is also to be regarded as merely the
+manifestation of this continual pressure and change, and
+physiologists are now ceasing to hold that it is the necessary
+reparation of the matter wasted in motion, for the
+possible wearing out of the machine can by no means
+be equivalent to the support it is constantly receiving
+through nourishment. Eternal becoming, endless flux,
+characterises the revelation of the inner nature of will.
+Finally, the same thing shows itself in human endeavours
+and desires, which always delude us by presenting their
+satisfaction as the final end of will. As soon as we
+attain to them they no longer appear the same, and
+therefore they soon grow stale, are forgotten, and though
+not openly disowned, are yet always thrown aside as
+vanished illusions. We are fortunate enough if there
+<pb n='215'/><anchor id='Pg215'/>
+still remains something to wish for and to strive after,
+that the game may be kept up of constant transition
+from desire to satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a
+new desire, the rapid course of which is called happiness,
+and the slow course sorrow, and does not sink into that
+stagnation that shows itself in fearful ennui that paralyses
+life, vain yearning without a definite object, deadening
+languor. According to all this, when the will is enlightened
+by knowledge, it always knows what it wills
+now and here, never what it wills in general; every
+particular act of will has its end, the whole will has
+none; just as every particular phenomenon of nature is
+determined by a sufficient cause so far as concerns its
+appearance in this place at this time, but the force which
+manifests itself in it has no general cause, for it belongs
+to the thing-in-itself, to the groundless will. The single
+example of self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the
+idea as a whole, the whole world of perception. It is
+the objectification, the revelation, the mirror of the will.
+What the will expresses in it will be the subject of our
+further consideration.<note place='foot'>Cf. Chap. xxviii. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<pb n='217'/><anchor id='Pg217'/>
+
+<div rend='page-break-before: always'>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Third Book. The World As Idea.</head>
+
+<div>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Second Aspect. The Idea Independent Of The Principle Of Sufficient
+Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object Of Art.</head>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<p>
+Τί τὸ ὄν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον; καὶ τί τό γιγνόμενον μὲν καὶ
+ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δε οὐδέποτε ὄν.&mdash;&mdash;ΠΛΑΤΩΝ.
+</p>
+</quote>
+
+<pb n='219'/><anchor id='Pg219'/>
+
+<p>
+§ 30. In the First Book the world was explained as
+mere <emph>idea</emph>, object for a subject. In the Second Book we
+considered it from its other side, and found that in this
+aspect it is <emph>will</emph>, which proved to be simply that which
+this world is besides being idea. In accordance with
+this knowledge we called the world as idea, both as a
+whole and in its parts, the <emph>objectification of will</emph>, which
+therefore means the will become object, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, idea.
+Further, we remember that this objectification of will
+was found to have many definite grades, in which, with
+gradually increasing distinctness and completeness, the
+nature of will appears in the idea, that is to say, presents
+itself as object. In these grades we already recognised
+the Platonic Ideas, for the grades are just the determined
+species, or the original unchanging forms and qualities of
+all natural bodies, both organised and unorganised, and
+also the general forces which reveal themselves according
+to natural laws. These Ideas, then, as a whole express
+themselves in innumerable individuals and particulars,
+and are related to these as archetypes to their copies.
+The multiplicity of such individuals is only conceivable
+through time and space, their appearing and passing
+away through causality, and in all these forms we recognise
+merely the different modes of the principle of
+sufficient reason, which is the ultimate principle of all
+that is finite, of all individual existence, and the universal
+form of the idea as it appears in the knowledge of
+the individual as such. The Platonic Idea, on the other
+<pb n='220'/><anchor id='Pg220'/>
+hand, does not come under this principle, and has therefore
+neither multiplicity nor change. While the individuals
+in which it expresses itself are innumerable, and
+unceasingly come into being and pass away, it remains
+unchanged as one and the same, and the principle of
+sufficient reason has for it no meaning. As, however,
+this is the form under which all knowledge of the subject
+comes, so far as the subject knows as an <emph>individual</emph>, the
+Ideas lie quite outside the sphere of its knowledge. If,
+therefore, the Ideas are to become objects of knowledge,
+this can only happen by transcending the individuality
+of the knowing subject. The more exact and detailed
+explanation of this is what will now occupy our attention.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 31. First, however, the following very essential
+remark. I hope that in the preceding book I have
+succeeded in producing the conviction that what is called
+in the Kantian philosophy the <emph>thing-in-itself</emph>, and appears
+there as so significant, and yet so obscure and paradoxical
+a doctrine, and especially on account of the manner
+in which Kant introduced it as an inference from the
+caused to the cause, was considered a stumbling-stone,
+and, in fact, the weak side of his philosophy,&mdash;that this, I
+say, if it is reached by the entirely different way by
+which we have arrived at it, is nothing but the <emph>will</emph>
+when the sphere of that conception is extended and
+defined in the way I have shown. I hope, further, that
+after what has been said there will be no hesitation in
+recognising the definite grades of the objectification of
+the will, which is the inner reality of the world, to be
+what Plato called the <emph>eternal Ideas</emph> or unchangeable forms
+(ειδῆ); a doctrine which is regarded as the principal, but
+at the same time the most obscure and paradoxical
+dogma of his system, and has been the subject of reflection
+and controversy of ridicule and of reverence to so
+many and such differently endowed minds in the course
+of many centuries.
+</p>
+
+<pb n='221'/><anchor id='Pg221'/>
+
+<p>
+If now the will is for us the <emph>thing-in-itself</emph>, and the Idea
+is the immediate objectivity of that will at a definite grade,
+we find that Kant's thing-in-itself, and Plato's Idea, which
+to him is the only οντως ον, these two great obscure paradoxes
+of the two greatest philosophers of the West are not
+indeed identical, but yet very closely related, and only
+distinguished by a single circumstance. The purport of
+these two great paradoxes, with all inner harmony and
+relationship, is yet so very different on account of the
+remarkable diversity of the individuality of their authors,
+that they are the best commentary on each other, for
+they are like two entirely different roads that conduct us
+to the same goal. This is easily made clear. What
+Kant says is in substance this:&mdash;<q>Time, space, and
+causality are not determinations of the thing-in-itself, but
+belong only to its phenomenal existence, for they are
+nothing but the forms of our knowledge. Since, however,
+all multiplicity, and all coming into being and
+passing away, are only possible through time, space, and
+causality, it follows that they also belong only to the
+phenomenon, not to the thing-in-itself. But as our
+knowledge is conditioned by these forms, the whole of
+experience is only knowledge of the phenomenon, not of
+the thing-in-itself; therefore its laws cannot be made
+valid for the thing-in-itself. This extends even to
+our own <emph>ego</emph>, and we know it only as phenomenon, and
+not according to what it may be in itself.</q> This is
+the meaning and content of the doctrine of Kant in the
+important respect we are considering. What Plato says
+is this:&mdash;<q>The things of this world which our senses
+perceive have no true being; <emph>they always become, they
+never are:</emph> they have only a relative being; they all
+exist merely in and through their relations to each other;
+their whole being may, therefore, quite as well be called
+a non-being. They are consequently not objects of a true
+knowledge (επιστημη), for such a knowledge can only be
+of what exists for itself, and always in the same way;
+<pb n='222'/><anchor id='Pg222'/>
+they, on the contrary, are only the objects of an opinion
+based on sensation (δοξα μετ᾽ αισθησεως αλογου). So
+long as we are confined to the perception of these, we are
+like men who sit in a dark cave, bound so fast that they
+cannot turn their heads, and who see nothing but the
+shadows of real things which pass between them and a
+fire burning behind them, the light of which casts the
+shadows on the wall opposite them; and even of themselves
+and of each other they see only the shadows on
+the wall. Their wisdom would thus consist in predicting
+the order of the shadows learned from experience. The
+real archetypes, on the other hand, to which these
+shadows correspond, the eternal Ideas, the original forms
+of all things, can alone be said to have true being (οντως
+ον), because they <emph>always are, but never become nor pass
+away</emph>. To them belongs <emph>no multiplicity</emph>; for each of
+them is according to its nature only one, for it is the
+archetype itself, of which all particular transitory
+things of the same kind which are named after it are
+copies or shadows. They have also <emph>no coming into being
+nor passing away</emph>, for they are truly being, never becoming
+nor vanishing, like their fleeting shadows. (It is
+necessarily presupposed, however, in these two negative
+definitions, that time, space, and causality have no significance
+or validity for these Ideas, and that they do not
+exist in them.) Of these only can there be true knowledge,
+for the object of such knowledge can only be that
+which always and in every respect (thus in-itself) is; not
+that which is and again is not, according as we look at
+it.</q> This is Plato's doctrine. It is clear, and requires
+no further proof that the inner meaning of both doctrines
+is entirely the same; that both explain the visible world
+as a manifestation, which in itself is nothing, and which
+only has meaning and a borrowed reality through that
+which expresses itself in it (in the one case the thing-in-itself,
+in the other the Idea). To this last, which has true
+being, all the forms of that phenomenal existence, even
+<pb n='223'/><anchor id='Pg223'/>
+the most universal and essential, are, according to both
+doctrines, entirely foreign. In order to disown these
+forms Kant has directly expressed them even in abstract
+terms, and distinctly refused time, space, and causality as
+mere forms of the phenomenon to the thing-in-itself.
+Plato, on the other hand, did not attain to the fullest
+expression, and has only distinctly refused these forms to
+his Ideas in that he denies of the Ideas what is only
+possible through these forms, multiplicity of similar
+things, coming into being and passing away. Though
+it is perhaps superfluous, I should like to illustrate this
+remarkable and important agreement by an example.
+There stands before us, let us suppose, an animal in the
+full activity of life. Plato would say, <q>This animal has
+no true existence, but merely an apparent existence, a
+constant becoming, a relative existence which may just
+as well be called non-being as being. Only the Idea
+which expresses itself in that animal is truly <q>being,</q> or
+the animal in-itself (αυτο το θηριον), which is dependent
+upon nothing, but is in and for itself (καθ᾽ ἑαυτο, αει ὡς
+αυτως); it has not become, it will not end, but always is
+in the same way (αει ον, και μηδεποτε ουτε γυγνομενον
+ουτε απολλυμενον). If now we recognise its Idea in this
+animal, it is all one and of no importance whether we
+have this animal now before us or its progenitor of a
+thousand years ago, whether it is here or in a distant
+land, whether it presents itself in this or that manner,
+position, or action; whether, lastly, it is this or any other
+individual of the same species; all this is nothing, and
+only concerns the phenomenon; the Idea of the animal
+alone has true being, and is the object of real knowledge.</q>
+So Plato; Kant would say something of this kind, <q>This
+animal is a phenomenon in time, space, and causality,
+which are collectively the conditions <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> of the possibility
+of experience, lying in our faculty of knowledge,
+not determinations of the thing-in-itself. Therefore this
+animal as we perceive it at this definite point of time, in
+<pb n='224'/><anchor id='Pg224'/>
+this particular place, as an individual in the connection
+of experience (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in the chain of causes and effects),
+which has come into being, and will just as necessarily
+pass away, is not a thing-in-itself, but a phenomenon
+which only exists in relation to our knowledge. To
+know it as what it may be in itself, that is to say, independent
+of all the determinations which lie in time, space,
+and causality, would demand another kind of knowledge
+than that which is possible for us through the senses and
+the understanding.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In order to bring Kant's mode of expression nearer
+the Platonic, we might say: Time, space, and causality are
+that arrangement of our intellect by virtue of which the
+<emph>one</emph> being of each kind which alone really is, manifests
+itself to us as a multiplicity of similar beings, constantly
+appearing and disappearing in endless succession. The
+apprehension of things by means of and in accordance
+with this arrangement is <emph>immanent</emph> knowledge; that, on
+the other hand, which is conscious of the true state of
+the case, is <emph>transcendental</emph> knowledge. The latter is
+obtained <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign> through the criticism of pure reason,
+but in exceptional cases it may also appear intuitively.
+This last is an addition of my own, which I am endeavouring
+in this Third Book to explain.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If the doctrine of Kant had ever been properly understood
+and grasped, and since Kant's time that of Plato,
+if men had truly and earnestly reflected on the inner
+meaning and content of the teaching of these two great
+masters, instead of involving themselves in the technicalities
+of the one and writing parodies of the style of
+the other, they could not have failed to discern long
+ago to what an extent these two great philosophers
+agree, and that the true meaning, the aim of both
+systems, is the same. Not only would they have
+refrained from constantly comparing Plato to Leibnitz,
+on whom his spirit certainly did not rest, or indeed to a
+<pb n='225'/><anchor id='Pg225'/>
+well-known gentleman who is still alive,<note place='foot'>F. H. Jacobi.</note> as if they wanted
+to mock the manes of the great thinker of the past; but
+they would have advanced much farther in general, or
+rather they would not have fallen so disgracefully far
+behind as they have in the last forty years. They
+would not have let themselves be led by the nose, to-day
+by one vain boaster and to-morrow by another, nor would
+they have opened the nineteenth century, which promised
+so much in Germany, with the philosophical farces that
+were performed over the grave of Kant (as the ancients
+sometimes did at the funeral obsequies of their dead),
+and which deservedly called forth the derision of other
+nations, for such things least become the earnest and
+strait-laced German. But so small is the chosen public
+of true philosophers, that even students who understand
+are but scantily brought them by the centuries&mdash;Εισι δη
+ναρθηκοφοροι μεν πολλοι, βακχοι δε γε παυροι (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Thyrsigeri
+quidem multi, Baachi vero pauci</foreign>). Ἡ ατιμια φιλοσοφιᾳ
+δια ταυτα προσπεπτωκεν, ὁτι ου κατ αξιαν αυτης ἁπτονται;
+ου γαρ νοθους εδει ἁπτεσθαι, αλλα γνησιους (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Eam ob rem
+philosophia in infamiam incidit, quad non pro dignitate
+ipsam attingunt: neque enim a spuriis, sad a legitimis erat
+attrectanda</foreign>).&mdash;Plato.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Men followed the words,&mdash;such words as <q><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>
+ideas,</q> <q>forms of perception and thought existing in consciousness
+independently of experience,</q> <q>fundamental
+conceptions of the pure understanding,</q> &amp;c., &amp;c.,&mdash;and
+asked whether Plato's Ideas, which were also original
+conceptions, and besides this were supposed to be reminiscences
+of a perception before life of the truly real
+things, were in some way the same as Kant's forms of
+perception and thought, which lie <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> in our consciousness.
+On account of some slight resemblance in the expression
+of these two entirely different doctrines, the Kantian
+doctrine of the forms which limit the knowledge of the
+individual to the phenomenon, and the Platonic doctrine
+<pb n='226'/><anchor id='Pg226'/>
+of Ideas, the knowledge of which these very forms expressly
+deny, these so far diametrically opposed doctrines
+were carefully compared, and men deliberated and disputed
+as to whether they were identical, found at last
+that they were not the same, and concluded that Plato's
+doctrine of Ideas and Kant's <q>Critique of Reason</q> had
+nothing in common. But enough of this.<note place='foot'>See for example, <q>Immanuel
+Kant, a Reminiscence, by Fr. Bouterweck,</q>
+pg. 49, and Buhle's <q>History
+of Philosophy,</q> vol. vi. pp. 802-815
+and 823.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 32. It follows from our consideration of the subject,
+that, for us, Idea and thing-in-itself are not entirely
+one and the same, in spite of the inner agreement between
+Kant and Plato, and the identity of the aim they
+had before them, or the conception of the world which
+roused them and led them to philosophise. The Idea is
+for us rather the direct, and therefore adequate, objectivity
+of the thing-in-itself, which is, however, itself the
+<emph>will</emph>&mdash;the will as not yet objectified, not yet become idea.
+For the thing-in-itself must, even according to Kant, be
+free from all the forms connected with knowing as such;
+and it is merely an error on his part (as is shown in the
+Appendix) that he did not count among these forms,
+before all others, that of being object for a subject, for
+it is the first and most universal form of all phenomena,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, of all idea; he should therefore have distinctly
+denied objective existence to his thing-in-itself, which
+would have saved him from a great inconsistency that
+was soon discovered. The Platonic Idea, on the other
+hand, is necessarily object, something known, an idea,
+and in that respect is different from the thing-in-itself,
+but in that respect only. It has merely laid aside the
+subordinate forms of the phenomenon, all of which we
+include in the principle of sufficient reason, or rather
+it has not yet assumed them; but it has retained the
+first and most universal form, that of the idea in general,
+the form of being object for a subject. It is the forms
+<pb n='227'/><anchor id='Pg227'/>
+which are subordinate to this (whose general expression
+is the principle of sufficient reason) that multiply the
+Idea in particular transitory individuals, whose number
+is a matter of complete indifference to the Idea. The
+principle of sufficient reason is thus again the form into
+which the Idea enters when it appears in the knowledge
+of the subject as individual. The particular thing that
+manifests itself in accordance with the principle of sufficient
+reason is thus only an indirect objectification of
+the thing-in-itself (which is the will), for between it and
+the thing-in-itself stands the Idea as the only direct
+objectivity of the will, because it has assumed none of
+the special forms of knowledge as such, except that of
+the idea in general, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the form of being object for a
+subject. Therefore it alone is the most <emph>adequate objectivity</emph>
+of the will or thing-in-itself which is possible; indeed it
+is the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of the
+idea; and here lies the ground of the great agreement
+between Plato and Kant, although, in strict accuracy,
+that of which they speak is not the same. But the particular
+things are no really adequate objectivity of the
+will, for in them it is obscured by those forms whose
+general expression is the principle of sufficient reason,
+but which are conditions of the knowledge which belongs
+to the individual as such. If it is allowable to draw
+conclusions from an impossible presupposition, we would,
+in fact, no longer know particular things, nor events, nor
+change, nor multiplicity, but would comprehend only
+Ideas,&mdash;only the grades of the objectification of that one
+will, of the thing-in-itself, in pure unclouded knowledge.
+Consequently our world would be a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nunc stans</foreign>, if it
+were not that, as knowing subjects, we are also individuals,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, our perceptions come to us through the medium
+of a body, from the affections of which they proceed, and
+which is itself only concrete willing, objectivity of the
+will, and thus is an object among objects, and as such
+comes into the knowing consciousness in the only way in
+<pb n='228'/><anchor id='Pg228'/>
+which an object can, through the forms of the principle
+of sufficient reason, and consequently already presupposes,
+and therefore brings in, time, and all other forms which that
+principle expresses. Time is only the broken and piecemeal
+view which the individual being has of the Ideas, which
+are outside time, and consequently <emph>eternal</emph>. Therefore
+Plato says time is the moving picture of eternity: αιωνος
+εικων κινητη ὁ χρονος.<note place='foot'>Cf. Chap. xxix. of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 33. Since now, as individuals, we have no other
+knowledge than that which is subject to the principle of
+sufficient reason, and this form of knowledge excludes
+the Ideas, it is certain that if it is possible for us to
+raise ourselves from the knowledge of particular things
+to that of the Ideas, this can only happen by an alteration
+taking place in the subject which is analogous and
+corresponds to the great change of the whole nature of
+the object, and by virtue of which the subject, so far as
+it knows an Idea, is no more individual.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It will be remembered from the preceding book that
+knowledge in general belongs to the objectification of
+will at its higher grades, and sensibility, nerves, and
+brain, just like the other parts of the organised being,
+are the expression of the will at this stage of its objectivity,
+and therefore the idea which appears through
+them is also in the same way bound to the service of
+will as a means (μηχανη) for the attainment of its now
+complicated (πολυτελεστερα) aims for sustaining a being
+of manifold requirements. Thus originally and according
+to its nature, knowledge is completely subject to the will,
+and, like the immediate object, which, by means of the
+application of the law of causality, is its starting-point,
+all knowledge which proceeds in accordance with the
+principle of sufficient reason remains in a closer or
+more distant relation to the will. For the individual
+finds his body as an object among objects, to all of which
+it is related and connected according to the principle
+<pb n='229'/><anchor id='Pg229'/>
+of sufficient reason. Thus all investigations of these
+relations and connections lead back to his body, and
+consequently to his will. Since it is the principle of
+sufficient reason which places the objects in this relation
+to the body, and, through it, to the will, the one endeavour
+of the knowledge which is subject to this principle
+will be to find out the relations in which objects are
+placed to each other through this principle, and thus to
+trace their innumerable connections in space, time, and
+causality. For only through these is the object <emph>interesting</emph>
+to the individual, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, related to the will. Therefore
+the knowledge which is subject to the will knows nothing
+further of objects than their relations, knows the objects
+only so far as they exist at this time, in this place, under
+these circumstances, from these causes, and with these
+effects&mdash;in a word, as particular things; and if all these
+relations were to be taken away, the objects would also
+have disappeared for it, because it knew nothing more
+about them. We must not disguise the fact that what
+the sciences consider in things is also in reality nothing
+more than this; their relations, the connections of time
+and space, the causes of natural changes, the resemblance
+of forms, the motives of actions,&mdash;thus merely relations.
+What distinguishes science from ordinary knowledge is
+merely its systematic form, the facilitating of knowledge
+by the comprehension of all particulars in the universal,
+by means of the subordination of concepts, and the completeness
+of knowledge which is thereby attained. All
+relation has itself only a relative existence; for example,
+all being in time is also non-being; for time is only that
+by means of which opposite determinations can belong
+to the same thing; therefore every phenomenon which
+is in time again is not, for what separates its beginning
+from its end is only time, which is essentially a fleeting,
+inconstant, and relative thing, here called duration. But
+time is the most universal form of all objects of the
+<pb n='230'/><anchor id='Pg230'/>
+knowledge which is subject to the will, and the prototype
+of its other forms.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Knowledge now, as a rule, remains always subordinate
+to the service of the will, as indeed it originated for
+this service, and grew, so to speak, to the will, as the
+head to the body. In the case of the brutes this subjection
+of knowledge to the will can never be abolished. In
+the case of men it can be abolished only in exceptional
+cases, which we shall presently consider more closely.
+This distinction between man and brute is outwardly
+expressed by the difference of the relation of the head to
+the body. In the case of the lower brutes both are
+deformed: in all brutes the head is directed towards the
+earth, where the objects of its will lie; even in the
+higher species the head and the body are still far more
+one than in the case of man, whose head seems freely
+set upon his body, as if only carried by and not serving
+it. This human excellence is exhibited in the highest
+degree by the Apollo of Belvedere; the head of the god
+of the Muses, with eyes fixed on the far distance, stands
+so freely on his shoulders that it seems wholly delivered
+from the body, and no more subject to its cares.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 34. The transition which we have referred to as
+possible, but yet to be regarded as only exceptional, from
+the common knowledge of particular things to the knowledge
+of the Idea, takes place suddenly; for knowledge
+breaks free from the service of the will, by the subject
+ceasing to be merely individual, and thus becoming the
+pure will-less subject of knowledge, which no longer traces
+relations in accordance with the principle of sufficient
+reason, but rests in fixed contemplation of the object
+presented to it, out of its connection with all others, and
+rises into it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A full explanation is necessary to make this clear, and
+the reader must suspend his surprise for a while, till he
+has grasped the whole thought expressed in this work,
+and then it will vanish of itself.
+</p>
+
+<pb n='231'/><anchor id='Pg231'/>
+
+<p>
+If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes
+the common way of looking at things, gives up tracing,
+under the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, their relations to each other, the final goal of which
+is always a relation to his own will; if he thus ceases to
+consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither
+of things, and looks simply and solely at the <emph>what</emph>; if,
+further, he does not allow abstract thought, the concepts
+of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness,
+but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind
+to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his
+whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation
+of the natural object actually present, whether a
+landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or whatever it
+may be; inasmuch as he <emph>loses</emph> himself in this object (to use
+a pregnant German idiom), <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, forgets even his individuality,
+his will, and only continues to exist as the pure
+subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if
+the object alone were there, without any one to perceive
+it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the
+perception, but both have become one, because the whole
+consciousness is filled and occupied with one single sensuous
+picture; if thus the object has to such an extent
+passed out of all relation to something outside it, and the
+subject out of all relation to the will, then that which is
+so known is no longer the particular thing as such; but
+it is the <emph>Idea</emph>, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity
+of the will at this grade; and, therefore, he who is sunk
+in this perception is no longer individual, for in such
+perception the individual has lost himself; but he is
+<emph>pure</emph>, will-less, painless, timeless <emph>subject of knowledge</emph>.
+This, which in itself is so remarkable (which I well know
+confirms the saying that originated with Thomas Paine,
+<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas</foreign>), will by degrees
+become clearer and less surprising from what follows.
+It was this that was running in Spinoza's mind when he
+wrote: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Meus æterna est, quatenus res sub æternitatis specie
+<pb n='232'/><anchor id='Pg232'/>
+concipit</foreign> (Eth. V. pr. 31, Schol.)<note place='foot'>I also recommend the perusal of
+what Spinoza says in his Ethics
+(Book II., Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and
+Book V., Props. 25-38), concerning
+the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>cognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva</foreign>,
+in illustration of the kind of
+knowledge we are considering, and
+very specially Prop. 29, Schol.; prop.
+36, Schol., and Prop. 38, Demonst. et
+Schol.</note> In such contemplation
+the particular thing becomes at once the <emph>Idea</emph> of its
+species, and the perceiving individual becomes <emph>pure subject
+of knowledge</emph>. The individual, as such, knows only
+particular things; the pure subject of knowledge knows
+only Ideas. For the individual is the subject of knowledge
+in its relation to a definite particular manifestation
+of will, and in subjection to this. This particular manifestation
+of will is, as such, subordinated to the principle
+of sufficient reason in all its forms; therefore, all knowledge
+which relates itself to it also follows the principle
+of sufficient reason, and no other kind of knowledge is
+fitted to be of use to the will but this, which always consists
+merely of relations to the object. The knowing
+individual as such, and the particular things known by
+him, are always in some place, at some time, and are links
+in the chain of causes and effects. The pure subject of
+knowledge and his correlative, the Idea, have passed out
+of all these forms of the principle of sufficient reason:
+time, place, the individual that knows, and the individual
+that is known, have for them no meaning. When an
+individual knower has raised himself in the manner
+described to be pure subject of knowledge, and at the same
+time has raised the observed object to the Platonic Idea,
+the <emph>world as idea</emph> appears complete and pure, and the full
+objectification of the will takes place, for the Platonic
+Idea alone is its <emph>adequate objectivity</emph>. The Idea includes
+object and subject in like manner in itself, for they are
+its one form; but in it they are absolutely of equal importance;
+for as the object is here, as elsewhere, simply
+the idea of the subject, the subject, which passes entirely
+into the perceived object has thus become this object
+itself, for the whole consciousness is nothing but its perfectly
+<pb n='233'/><anchor id='Pg233'/>
+distinct picture. Now this consciousness constitutes
+the whole <emph>world as idea</emph>, for one imagines the whole
+of the Platonic Ideas, or grades of the objectivity of will,
+in their series passing through it. The particular things
+of all time and space are nothing but Ideas multiplied
+through the principle of sufficient reason (the form of the
+knowledge of the individual as such), and thus obscured
+as regards their pure objectivity. When the Platonic
+Idea appears, in it subject and object are no longer to be
+distinguished, for the Platonic Idea, the adequate objectivity
+of will, the true world as idea, arises only when
+the subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate
+each other completely; and in the same way the knowing
+and the known individuals, as things in themselves,
+are not to be distinguished. For if we look entirely
+away from the true <emph>world as idea</emph>, there remains nothing
+but the <emph>world as will</emph>. The will is the <q>in-itself</q> of the
+Platonic Idea, which fully objectifies it; it is also the
+<q>in-itself</q> of the particular thing and of the individual
+that knows it, which objectify it incompletely. As will,
+outside the idea and all its forms, it is one and the same
+in the object contemplated and in the individual, who
+soars aloft in this contemplation, and becomes conscious
+of himself as pure subject. These two are, therefore, in
+themselves not different, for in themselves they are will,
+which here knows itself; and multiplicity and difference
+exist only as the way in which this knowledge comes to
+the will, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, only in the phenomenon, on account of its
+form, the principle of sufficient reason.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now the known thing, without me as the subject of
+knowledge, is just as little an object, and not mere will,
+blind effort, as without the object, without the idea, I
+am a knowing subject and not mere blind will. This
+will is in itself, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, outside the idea, one and the same
+with mine: only in the world as idea, whose form is
+always at least that of subject and object, we are separated
+as the known and the knowing individual. As
+<pb n='234'/><anchor id='Pg234'/>
+soon as knowledge, the world as idea, is abolished, there
+remains nothing but mere will, blind effort. That it
+should receive objectivity, become idea, supposes at once
+both subject and object; but that this should be pure,
+complete, and adequate objectivity of the will, supposes
+the object as Platonic Idea, free from the forms of the
+principle of sufficient reason, and the subject as the pure
+subject of knowledge, free from individuality and subjection
+to the will.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Whoever now, has, after the manner referred to, become
+so absorbed and lost in the perception of nature
+that he only continues to exist as the pure knowing subject,
+becomes in this way directly conscious that, as such,
+he is the condition, that is, the supporter, of the world
+and all objective existence; for this now shows itself as
+dependent upon his existence. Thus he draws nature
+into himself, so that he sees it to be merely an accident
+of his own being. In this sense Byron says&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Are not the mountains, waves, and skies, a part</q></l>
+<l rend='margin-left: 2'><q rend='post'>Of me and of my soul, as I of them?</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+But how shall he who feels this, regard himself as absolutely
+transitory, in contrast to imperishable nature?
+Such a man will rather be filled with the consciousness,
+which the Upanishad of the Veda expresses: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Hæ omnes
+creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter me aliud ens non est</foreign>
+(Oupnek'hat, i. 122).<note place='foot'>Cf. Chap. xxx. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 35. In order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of
+the world, it is absolutely necessary that we should learn
+to distinguish the will as thing-in-itself from its adequate
+objectivity, and also the different grades in which
+this appears more and more distinctly and fully, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the
+Ideas themselves, from the merely phenomenal existence
+of these Ideas in the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, the restricted method of knowledge of the individual.
+We shall then agree with Plato when he
+<pb n='235'/><anchor id='Pg235'/>
+attributes actual being only to the Ideas, and allows only
+an illusive, dream-like existence to things in space and
+time, the real world for the individual. Then we shall
+understand how one and the same Idea reveals itself in
+so many phenomena, and presents its nature only bit by
+bit to the individual, one side after another. Then we
+shall also distinguish the Idea itself from the way in
+which its manifestation appears in the observation of
+the individual, and recognise the former as essential and
+the latter as unessential. Let us consider this with the
+help of examples taken from the most insignificant things,
+and also from the greatest. When the clouds move, the
+figures which they form are not essential, but indifferent
+to them; but that as elastic vapour they are pressed together,
+drifted along, spread out, or torn asunder by the
+force of the wind: this is their nature, the essence of the
+forces which objectify themselves in them, the Idea;
+their actual forms are only for the individual observer.
+To the brook that flows over stones, the eddies, the waves,
+the foam-flakes which it forms are indifferent and unessential;
+but that it follows the attraction of gravity, and
+behaves as inelastic, perfectly mobile, formless, transparent
+fluid: this is its nature; this, <emph>if known through perception</emph>,
+is its Idea; these accidental forms are only for
+us so long as we know as individuals. The ice on the
+window-pane forms itself into crystals according to the
+laws of crystallisation, which reveal the essence of the
+force of nature that appears here, exhibit the Idea; but
+the trees and flowers which it traces on the pane are
+unessential, and are only there for us. What appears in
+the clouds, the brook, and the crystal is the weakest echo
+of that will which appears more fully in the plant, more
+fully still in the beast, and most fully in man. But only
+the essential in all these grades of its objectification constitutes
+the Idea; on the other hand, its unfolding or
+development, because broken up in the forms of the
+principle of sufficient reason into a multiplicity of many-sided
+<pb n='236'/><anchor id='Pg236'/>
+phenomena, is unessential to the Idea, lies merely
+in the kind of knowledge that belongs to the individual
+and has reality only for this. The same thing necessarily
+holds good of the unfolding of that Idea which is the
+completest objectivity of will. Therefore, the history of
+the human race, the throng of events, the change of
+times, the multifarious forms of human life in different
+lands and countries, all this is only the accidental form
+of the manifestation of the Idea, does not belong to the
+Idea itself, in which alone lies the adequate objectivity
+of the will, but only to the phenomenon which appears
+in the knowledge of the individual, and is just as foreign,
+unessential, and indifferent to the Idea itself as the
+figures which they assume are to the clouds, the form of
+its eddies and foam-flakes to the brook, or its trees and
+flowers to the ice.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+To him who has thoroughly grasped this, and can distinguish
+between the will and the Idea, and between the
+Idea and its manifestation, the events of the world will
+have significance only so far as they are the letters out
+of which we may read the Idea of man, but not in and
+for themselves. He will not believe with the vulgar
+that time may produce something actually new and
+significant; that through it, or in it, something absolutely
+real may attain to existence, or indeed that it itself as a
+whole has beginning and end, plan and development, and
+in some way has for its final aim the highest perfection
+(according to their conception) of the last generation of
+man, whose life is a brief thirty years. Therefore he
+will just as little, with Homer, people a whole Olympus
+with gods to guide the events of time, as, with Ossian, he
+will take the forms of the clouds for individual beings;
+for, as we have said, both have just as much meaning as
+regards the Idea which appears in them. In the manifold
+forms of human life and in the unceasing change of
+events, he will regard the Idea only as the abiding and
+essential, in which the will to live has its fullest objectivity,
+<pb n='237'/><anchor id='Pg237'/>
+and which shows its different sides in the capacities,
+the passions, the errors and the excellences of the human
+race; in self-interest, hatred, love, fear, boldness, frivolity,
+stupidity, slyness, wit, genius, and so forth, all of which
+crowding together and combining in thousands of forms
+(individuals), continually create the history of the great
+and the little world, in which it is all the same whether
+they are set in motion by nuts or by crowns. Finally,
+he will find that in the world it is the same as in the
+dramas of Gozzi, in all of which the same persons
+appear, with like intention, and with a like fate; the
+motives and incidents are certainly different in each
+piece, but the spirit of the incidents is the same; the
+actors in one piece know nothing of the incidents of
+another, although they performed in it themselves;
+therefore, after all experience of former pieces, Pantaloon
+has become no more agile or generous, Tartaglia no more
+conscientious, Brighella no more courageous, and Columbine
+no more modest.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Suppose we were allowed for once a clearer glance
+into the kingdom of the possible, and over the whole
+chain of causes and effects; if the earth-spirit appeared
+and showed us in a picture all the greatest men, enlighteners
+of the world, and heroes, that chance destroyed
+before they were ripe for their work; then the great
+events that would have changed the history of the world
+and brought in periods of the highest culture and enlightenment,
+but which the blindest chance, the most
+insignificant accident, hindered at the outset; lastly, the
+splendid powers of great men, that would have enriched
+whole ages of the world, but which, either misled by
+error or passion, or compelled by necessity, they squandered
+uselessly on unworthy or unfruitful objects, or even wasted
+in play. If we saw all this, we would shudder and lament
+at the thought of the lost treasures of whole periods of
+the world. But the earth-spirit would smile and say,
+<q>The source from which the individuals and their powers
+<pb n='238'/><anchor id='Pg238'/>
+proceed is inexhaustible and unending as time and space;
+for, like these forms of all phenomena, they also are only
+phenomena, visibility of the will. No finite measure
+can exhaust that infinite source; therefore an undiminished
+eternity is always open for the return of any
+event or work that was nipped in the bud. In this world
+of phenomena true loss is just as little possible as true
+gain. The will alone is; it is the thing in-itself, and the
+source of all these phenomena. Its self-knowledge and
+its assertion or denial, which is then decided upon, is the
+only event in-itself.</q><note place='foot'>This last sentence cannot be understood without some acquaintance
+with the next book.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 36. History follows the thread of events; it is pragmatic
+so far as it deduces them in accordance with the
+law of motivation, a law that determines the self-manifesting
+will wherever it is enlightened by knowledge.
+At the lowest grades of its objectivity, where it still acts
+without knowledge, natural science, in the form of etiology,
+treats of the laws of the changes of its phenomena, and,
+in the form of morphology, of what is permanent in them.
+This almost endless task is lightened by the aid of concepts,
+which comprehend what is general in order that
+we may deduce what is particular from it. Lastly,
+mathematics treats of the mere forms, time and space, in
+which the Ideas, broken up into multiplicity, appear for
+the knowledge of the subject as individual. All these,
+of which the common name is science, proceed according
+to the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms,
+and their theme is always the phenomenon, its laws, connections,
+and the relations which result from them. But
+what kind of knowledge is concerned with that which is
+outside and independent of all relations, that which alone
+is really essential to the world, the true content of its
+phenomena, that which is subject to no change, and
+therefore is known with equal truth for all time, in a
+word, the <emph>Ideas</emph>, which are the direct and adequate objectivity
+<pb n='239'/><anchor id='Pg239'/>
+of the thing in-itself, the will? We answer, <emph>Art</emph>,
+the work of genius. It repeats or reproduces the eternal
+Ideas grasped through pure contemplation, the essential
+and abiding in all the phenomena of the world; and
+according to what the material is in which it reproduces,
+it is sculpture or painting, poetry or music. Its one
+source is the knowledge of Ideas; its one aim the communication
+of this knowledge. While science, following
+the unresting and inconstant stream of the fourfold forms
+of reason and consequent, with each end attained sees
+further, and can never reach a final goal nor attain full
+satisfaction, any more than by running we can reach the
+place where the clouds touch the horizon; art, on the
+contrary, is everywhere at its goal. For it plucks the
+object of its contemplation out of the stream of the
+world's course, and has it isolated before it. And this
+particular thing, which in that stream was a small perishing
+part, becomes to art the representative of the whole,
+an equivalent of the endless multitude in space and
+time. It therefore pauses at this particular thing; the
+course of time stops; the relations vanish for it; only
+the essential, the Idea, is its object. We may, therefore,
+accurately define it as the <emph>way of viewing things independent
+of the principle of sufficient reason</emph>, in opposition
+to the way of viewing them which proceeds in accordance
+with that principle, and which is the method of experience
+and of science. This last method of considering
+things may be compared to a line infinitely extended in
+a horizontal direction, and the former to a vertical line
+which cuts it at any point. The method of viewing
+things which proceeds in accordance with the principle
+of sufficient reason is the rational method, and it alone is
+valid and of use in practical life and in science. The
+method which looks away from the content of this principle
+is the method of genius, which is only valid and of
+use in art. The first is the method of Aristotle; the
+second is, on the whole, that of Plato. The first is like
+<pb n='240'/><anchor id='Pg240'/>
+the mighty storm, that rushes along without beginning
+and without aim, bending, agitating, and carrying away
+everything before it; the second is like the silent sunbeam,
+that pierces through the storm quite unaffected by
+it. The first is like the innumerable showering drops of
+the waterfall, which, constantly changing, never rest for
+an instant; the second is like the rainbow, quietly resting
+on this raging torrent. Only through the pure contemplation
+described above, which ends entirely in the object,
+can Ideas be comprehended; and the nature of <emph>genius</emph>
+consists in pre-eminent capacity for such contemplation.
+Now, as this requires that a man should entirely forget
+himself and the relations in which he stands, <emph>genius</emph> is
+simply the completest <emph>objectivity</emph>, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the objective tendency
+of the mind, as opposed to the subjective, which is
+directed to one's own self&mdash;in other words, to the will.
+Thus genius is the faculty of continuing in the state of
+pure perception, of losing oneself in perception, and of
+enlisting in this service the knowledge which originally
+existed only for the service of the will; that is to say,
+genius is the power of leaving one's own interests, wishes,
+and aims entirely out of sight, thus of entirely renouncing
+one's own personality for a time, so as to remain <emph>pure
+knowing subject</emph>, clear vision of the world; and this not
+merely at moments, but for a sufficient length of time,
+and with sufficient consciousness, to enable one to reproduce
+by deliberate art what has thus been apprehended,
+and <q>to fix in lasting thoughts the wavering images that
+float before the mind.</q> It is as if, when genius appears
+in an individual, a far larger measure of the power of
+knowledge falls to his lot than is necessary for the service
+of an individual will; and this superfluity of knowledge,
+being free, now becomes subject purified from will,
+a clear mirror of the inner nature of the world. This
+explains the activity, amounting even to disquietude, of
+men of genius, for the present can seldom satisfy them,
+because it does not fill their consciousness. This gives
+<pb n='241'/><anchor id='Pg241'/>
+them that restless aspiration, that unceasing desire for new
+things, and for the contemplation of lofty things, and
+also that longing that is hardly ever satisfied, for men
+of similar nature and of like stature, to whom they might
+communicate themselves; whilst the common mortal,
+entirely filled and satisfied by the common present, ends
+in it, and finding everywhere his like, enjoys that peculiar
+satisfaction in daily life that is denied to genius.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Imagination has rightly been recognised as an essential
+element of genius; it has sometimes even been regarded
+as identical with it; but this is a mistake. As the objects
+of genius are the eternal Ideas, the permanent, essential
+forms of the world and all its phenomena, and as the
+knowledge of the Idea is necessarily knowledge through
+perception, is not abstract, the knowledge of the genius
+would be limited to the Ideas of the objects actually
+present to his person, and dependent upon the chain of
+circumstances that brought these objects to him, if his
+imagination did not extend his horizon far beyond the
+limits of his actual personal existence, and thus enable
+him to construct the whole out of the little that comes
+into his own actual apperception, and so to let almost all
+possible scenes of life pass before him in his own consciousness.
+Further, the actual objects are almost always
+very imperfect copies of the Ideas expressed in them;
+therefore the man of genius requires imagination in order
+to see in things, not that which Nature has actually made,
+but that which she endeavoured to make, yet could not
+because of that conflict of her forms among themselves
+which we referred to in the last book. We shall return
+to this farther on in treating of sculpture. The imagination
+then extends the intellectual horizon of the man of
+genius beyond the objects which actually present themselves
+to him, both as regards quality and quantity.
+Therefore extraordinary strength of imagination accompanies,
+and is indeed a necessary condition of genius.
+But the converse does not hold, for strength of imagination
+<pb n='242'/><anchor id='Pg242'/>
+does not indicate genius; on the contrary, men who
+have no touch of genius may have much imagination.
+For as it is possible to consider a real object in two
+opposite ways, purely objectively, the way of genius
+grasping its Idea, or in the common way, merely in the
+relations in which it stands to other objects and to one's
+own will, in accordance with the principle of sufficient
+reason, it is also possible to perceive an imaginary object
+in both of these ways. Regarded in the first way, it is a
+means to the knowledge of the Idea, the communication
+of which is the work of art; in the second case, the
+imaginary object is used to build castles in the air
+congenial to egotism and the individual humour, and
+which for the moment delude and gratify; thus only the
+relations of the phantasies so linked together are known.
+The man who indulges in such an amusement is a
+dreamer; he will easily mingle those fancies that delight
+his solitude with reality, and so unfit himself for real
+life: perhaps he will write them down, and then we
+shall have the ordinary novel of every description, which
+entertains those who are like him and the public at large,
+for the readers imagine themselves in the place of the
+hero, and then find the story very agreeable.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The common mortal, that manufacture of Nature which
+she produces by the thousand every day, is, as we have
+said, not capable, at least not continuously so, of observation
+that in every sense is wholly disinterested, as
+sensuous contemplation, strictly so called, is. He can
+turn his attention to things only so far as they have
+some relation to his will, however indirect it may be.
+Since in this respect, which never demands anything but
+the knowledge of relations, the abstract conception of the
+thing is sufficient, and for the most part even better
+adapted for use; the ordinary man does not linger long
+over the mere perception, does not fix his attention long
+on one object, but in all that is presented to him hastily
+seeks merely the concept under which it is to be brought,
+<pb n='243'/><anchor id='Pg243'/>
+as the lazy man seeks a chair, and then it interests him
+no further. This is why he is so soon done with everything,
+with works of art, objects of natural beauty, and
+indeed everywhere with the truly significant contemplation
+of all the scenes of life. He does not linger; only
+seeks to know his own way in life, together with all that
+might at any time become his way. Thus he makes topographical
+notes in the widest sense; over the consideration
+of life itself as such he wastes no time. The man
+of genius, on the other hand, whose excessive power of
+knowledge frees it at times from the service of will,
+dwells on the consideration of life itself, strives to comprehend
+the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other
+things; and in doing this he often forgets to consider his
+own path in life, and therefore for the most part pursues
+it awkwardly enough. While to the ordinary man his
+faculty of knowledge is a lamp to lighten his path, to the
+man of genius it is the sun which reveals the world.
+This great diversity in their way of looking at life soon
+becomes visible in the outward appearance both of the
+man of genius and of the ordinary mortal. The man in
+whom genius lives and works is easily distinguished by
+his glance, which is both keen and steady, and bears the
+stamp of perception, of contemplation. This is easily seen
+from the likenesses of the few men of genius whom Nature
+has produced here and there among countless millions.
+On the other hand, in the case of an ordinary man, the
+true object of his contemplation, what he is prying into,
+can be easily seen from his glance, if indeed it is not
+quite stupid and vacant, as is generally the case. Therefore
+the expression of genius in a face consists in this,
+that in it a decided predominance of knowledge over will
+is visible, and consequently there also shows itself in it
+a knowledge that is entirely devoid of relation to will,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <emph>pure knowing</emph>. On the contrary, in ordinary countenances
+there is a predominant expression of will; and
+we see that knowledge only comes into activity under
+<pb n='244'/><anchor id='Pg244'/>
+the impulse of will, and thus is directed merely by
+motives.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Since the knowledge that pertains to genius, or the
+knowledge of Ideas, is that knowledge which does not
+follow the principle of sufficient reason, so, on the other
+hand, the knowledge which does follow that principle is
+that which gives us prudence and rationality in life, and
+which creates the sciences. Thus men of genius are
+affected with the deficiencies entailed in the neglect of
+this latter kind of knowledge. Yet what I say in this
+regard is subject to the limitation that it only concerns
+them in so far as and while they are actually engaged
+in that kind of knowledge which is peculiar to genius;
+and this is by no means at every moment of their lives,
+for the great though spontaneous exertion which is demanded
+for the comprehension of Ideas free from will
+must necessarily relax, and there are long intervals during
+which men of genius are placed in very much the same
+position as ordinary mortals, both as regards advantages
+and deficiencies. On this account the action of genius
+has always been regarded as an inspiration, as indeed the
+name indicates, as the action of a superhuman being
+distinct from the individual himself, and which takes
+possession of him only periodically. The disinclination
+of men of genius to direct their attention to the content
+of the principle of sufficient reason will first show itself,
+with regard to the ground of being, as dislike of mathematics;
+for its procedure is based upon the most universal
+forms of the phenomenon space and time, which are
+themselves merely modes of the principle of sufficient
+reason, and is consequently precisely the opposite of that
+method of thought which seeks merely the content of
+the phenomenon, the Idea which expresses itself in it
+apart from all relations. The logical method of mathematics
+is also antagonistic to genius, for it does not
+satisfy but obstructs true insight, and presents merely a
+chain of conclusions in accordance with the principle of
+<pb n='245'/><anchor id='Pg245'/>
+the ground of knowing. The mental faculty upon which
+it makes the greatest claim is memory, for it is necessary
+to recollect all the earlier propositions which are referred
+to. Experience has also proved that men of great artistic
+genius have no faculty for mathematics; no man was
+ever very distinguished for both. Alfieri relates that
+he was never able to understand the fourth proposition
+of Euclid. Goethe was constantly reproached with his
+want of mathematical knowledge by the ignorant opponents
+of his theory of colours. Here certainly, where it
+was not a question of calculation and measurement upon
+hypothetical data, but of direct knowledge by the understanding
+of causes and effects, this reproach was so
+utterly absurd and inappropriate, that by making it they
+have exposed their entire want of judgment, just as much
+as by the rest of their ridiculous arguments. The fact
+that up to the present day, nearly half a century after
+the appearance of Goethe's theory of colours, even in
+Germany the Newtonian fallacies still have undisturbed
+possession of the professorial chair, and men continue to
+speak quite seriously of the seven homogeneous rays of
+light and their different refrangibility, will some day be
+numbered among the great intellectual peculiarities of
+men generally, and especially of Germans. From the
+same cause as we have referred to above, may be explained
+the equally well-known fact that, conversely,
+admirable mathematicians have very little susceptibility
+for works of fine art. This is very naïvely expressed in
+the well-known anecdote of the French mathematician,
+who, after having read Racine's <q>Iphigenia,</q> shrugged his
+shoulders and asked, <q><foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>Qu'est ce que cela prouve?</foreign></q> Further,
+as quick comprehension of relations in accordance
+with the laws of causality and motivation is what specially
+constitutes prudence or sagacity, a prudent man,
+so far as and while he is so, will not be a genius, and a
+man of genius, so far as and while he is so, will not be
+a prudent man. Lastly, perceptive knowledge generally,
+<pb n='246'/><anchor id='Pg246'/>
+in the province of which the Idea always lies, is directly
+opposed to rational or abstract knowledge, which is
+guided by the principle of the ground of knowing. It is
+also well known that we seldom find great genius united
+with pre-eminent reasonableness; on the contrary, persons
+of genius are often subject to violent emotions and
+irrational passions. But the ground of this is not weakness
+of reason, but partly unwonted energy of that whole
+phenomenon of will&mdash;the man of genius&mdash;which expresses
+itself through the violence of all his acts of will,
+and partly preponderance of the knowledge of perception
+through the senses and understanding over abstract
+knowledge, producing a decided tendency to the perceptible,
+the exceedingly lively impressions of which so
+far outshine colourless concepts, that they take their
+place in the guidance of action, which consequently
+becomes irrational. Accordingly the impression of the
+present moment is very strong with such persons, and
+carries them away into unconsidered action, violent
+emotions and passions. Moreover, since, in general, the
+knowledge of persons of genius has to some extent freed
+itself from the service of will, they will not in conversation
+think so much of the person they are addressing as
+of the thing they are speaking about, which is vividly
+present to them; and therefore they are likely to judge
+or narrate things too objectively for their own interests;
+they will not pass over in silence what would more
+prudently be concealed, and so forth. Finally, they are
+given to soliloquising, and in general may exhibit certain
+weaknesses which are actually akin to madness. It has
+often been remarked that there is a side at which genius
+and madness touch, and even pass over into each other,
+and indeed poetical inspiration has been called a kind of
+madness: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>amabilis insania</foreign>, Horace calls it (Od. iii. 4),
+and Wieland in the introduction to <q>Oberon</q> speaks of
+it as <q>amiable madness.</q> Even Aristotle, as quoted by
+Seneca (De Tranq. Animi, 15, 16), is reported to have
+<pb n='247'/><anchor id='Pg247'/>
+said: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiæ
+fuit</foreign>. Plato expresses it in the figure of the dark cave,
+referred to above (De Rep. 7), when he says: <q>Those who,
+outside the cave, have seen the true sunlight and the
+things that have true being (Ideas), cannot afterwards see
+properly down in the cave, because their eyes are not
+accustomed to the darkness; they cannot distinguish the
+shadows, and are jeered at for their mistakes by those
+who have never left the cave and its shadows.</q> In the
+<q>Phædrus</q> also (p. 317), he distinctly says that there
+can be no true poet without a certain madness; in fact,
+(p. 327), that every one appears mad who recognises the
+eternal Ideas in fleeting things. Cicero also quotes:
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Negat enim sine furore, Democritus, quemquam poetam
+magnum esse posse; quod idem dicit Plato</foreign> (De Divin., i.
+37). And, lastly, Pope says&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Great wits to madness sure are near allied,</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>And thin partitions do their bounds divide.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Especially instructive in this respect is Goethe's <q>Torquato
+Tasso,</q> in which he shows us not only the suffering, the
+martyrdom of genius as such, but also how it constantly
+passes into madness. Finally, the fact of the direct connection
+of genius and madness is established by the biographies
+of great men of genius, such as Rousseau, Byron, and Alfieri,
+and by anecdotes from the lives of others. On the other
+hand, I must mention that, by a diligent search in lunatic
+asylums, I have found individual cases of patients who
+were unquestionably endowed with great talents, and
+whose genius distinctly appeared through their madness,
+which, however, had completely gained the upper hand.
+Now this cannot be ascribed to chance, for on the one
+hand the number of mad persons is relatively very small,
+and on the other hand a person of genius is a phenomenon
+which is rare beyond all ordinary estimation, and
+only appears in nature as the greatest exception. It will
+be sufficient to convince us of this if we compare the
+<pb n='248'/><anchor id='Pg248'/>
+number of really great men of genius that the whole of
+civilised Europe has produced, both in ancient and modern
+times, with the two hundred and fifty millions who are
+always living in Europe, and who change entirely every
+thirty years. In estimating the number of men of outstanding
+genius, we must of course only count those who
+have produced works which have retained through all time
+an enduring value for mankind. I shall not refrain from
+mentioning, that I have known some persons of decided,
+though not remarkable, mental superiority, who also
+showed a slight trace of insanity. It might seem from
+this that every advance of intellect beyond the ordinary
+measure, as an abnormal development, disposes to madness.
+In the meantime, however, I will explain as
+briefly as possible my view of the purely intellectual
+ground of the relation between genius and madness, for
+this will certainly assist the explanation of the real
+nature of genius, that is to say, of that mental endowment
+which alone can produce genuine works of art.
+But this necessitates a brief explanation of madness
+itself.<note place='foot'>Cf. Chap. xxxi. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A clear and complete insight into the nature of madness,
+a correct and distinct conception of what constitutes
+the difference between the sane and the insane, has, as
+far as I know, not as yet been found. Neither reason
+nor understanding can be denied to madmen, for they
+talk and understand, and often draw very accurate conclusions;
+they also, as a rule, perceive what is present
+quite correctly, and apprehend the connection between
+cause and effect. Visions, like the phantasies of delirium,
+are no ordinary symptom of madness: delirium falsifies
+perception, madness the thoughts. For the most part,
+madmen do not err in the knowledge of what is immediately
+<emph>present</emph>; their raving always relates to what is
+<emph>absent</emph> and <emph>past</emph>, and only through these to their connection
+with what is present. Therefore it seems to me that
+<pb n='249'/><anchor id='Pg249'/>
+their malady specially concerns the memory; not indeed
+that memory fails them entirely, for many of them know
+a great deal by heart, and sometimes recognise persons
+whom they have not seen for a long time; but rather
+that the thread of memory is broken, the continuity of
+its connection destroyed, and no uniformly connected
+recollection of the past is possible. Particular scenes of
+the past are known correctly, just like the particular
+present; but there are gaps in their recollection which
+they fill up with fictions, and these are either always the
+same, in which case they become fixed ideas, and the
+madness that results is called monomania or melancholy;
+or they are always different, momentary fancies, and then
+it is called folly, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>fatuitas</foreign>. This is why it is so difficult
+to find out their former life from lunatics when they
+enter an asylum. The true and the false are always
+mixed up in their memory. Although the immediate
+present is correctly known, it becomes falsified through
+its fictitious connection with an imaginary past; they
+therefore regard themselves and others as identical with
+persons who exist only in their imaginary past; they do
+not recognise some of their acquaintances at all, and thus
+while they perceive correctly what is actually present,
+they have only false conceptions of its relations to what
+is absent. If the madness reaches a high degree, there
+is complete absence of memory, so that the madman is
+quite incapable of any reference to what is absent or past,
+and is only determined by the caprice of the moment in
+connection with the fictions which, in his mind, fill the
+past. In such a case, we are never for a moment safe
+from violence or murder, unless we constantly make the
+madman aware of the presence of superior force. The
+knowledge of the madman has this in common with that
+of the brute, both are confined to the present. What
+distinguishes them is that the brute has really no idea of
+the past as such, though the past acts upon it through
+the medium of custom, so that, for example, the dog
+<pb n='250'/><anchor id='Pg250'/>
+recognises its former master even after years, that is to say,
+it receives the wonted impression at the sight of him;
+but of the time that has passed since it saw him it has
+no recollection. The madman, on the other hand, always
+carries about in his reason an abstract past, but it is a
+false past, which exists only for him, and that either constantly,
+or only for the moment. The influence of this
+false past prevents the use of the true knowledge of
+the present which the brute is able to make. The fact
+that violent mental suffering or unexpected and terrible
+calamities should often produce madness, I explain in
+the following manner. All such suffering is as an actual
+event confined to the present. It is thus merely transitory,
+and is consequently never excessively heavy; it only
+becomes unendurably great when it is lasting pain; but
+as such it exists only in thought, and therefore lies in
+the <emph>memory</emph>. If now such a sorrow, such painful knowledge
+or reflection, is so bitter that it becomes altogether
+unbearable, and the individual is prostrated under it,
+then, terrified Nature seizes upon <emph>madness</emph> as the last
+resource of life; the mind so fearfully tortured at once
+destroys the thread of its memory, fills up the gaps with
+fictions, and thus seeks refuge in madness from the mental
+suffering that exceeds its strength, just as we cut off
+a mortified limb and replace it with a wooden one. The
+distracted Ajax, King Lear, and Ophelia may be taken
+as examples; for the creations of true genius, to which
+alone we can refer here, as universally known, are equal
+in truth to real persons; besides, in this case, frequent
+actual experience shows the same thing. A faint analogy
+of this kind of transition from pain to madness is to be
+found in the way in which all of us often seek, as it were
+mechanically, to drive away a painful thought that suddenly
+occurs to us by some loud exclamation or quick
+movement&mdash;to turn ourselves from it, to distract our
+minds by force.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We see, from what has been said, that the madman has
+<pb n='251'/><anchor id='Pg251'/>
+a true knowledge of what is actually present, and also of
+certain particulars of the past, but that he mistakes the
+connection, the relations, and therefore falls into error
+and talks nonsense. Now this is exactly the point at
+which he comes into contact with the man of genius;
+for he also leaves out of sight the knowledge of the
+connection of things, since he neglects that knowledge
+of relations which conforms to the principle of sufficient
+reason, in order to see in things only their Ideas, and to
+seek to comprehend their true nature, which manifests
+itself to perception, and in regard to which <emph>one thing</emph>
+represents its whole species, in which way, as Goethe
+says, one case is valid for a thousand. The particular
+object of his contemplation, or the present which is perceived
+by him with extraordinary vividness, appear in so
+strong a light that the other links of the chain to which
+they belong are at once thrown into the shade, and this
+gives rise to phenomena which have long been recognised
+as resembling those of madness. That which in particular
+given things exists only incompletely and weakened by
+modifications, is raised by the man of genius, through his
+way of contemplating it, to the Idea of the thing, to completeness:
+he therefore sees everywhere extremes, and
+therefore his own action tends to extremes; he cannot
+hit the mean, he lacks soberness, and the result is what
+we have said. He knows the Ideas completely but not
+the individuals. Therefore it has been said that a poet
+may know mankind deeply and thoroughly, and may yet
+have a very imperfect knowledge of men. He is easily
+deceived, and is a tool in the hands of the crafty.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 37. Genius, then, consists, according to our explanation,
+in the capacity for knowing, independently of the
+principle of sufficient reason, not individual things, which
+have their existence only in their relations, but the Ideas
+of such things, and of being oneself the correlative of the
+Idea, and thus no longer an individual, but the pure subject
+of knowledge. Yet this faculty must exist in all
+<pb n='252'/><anchor id='Pg252'/>
+men in a smaller and different degree; for if not, they
+would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art as of
+producing them; they would have no susceptibility for
+the beautiful or the sublime; indeed, these words could
+have no meaning for them. We must therefore assume
+that there exists in all men this power of knowing the
+Ideas in things, and consequently of transcending their
+personality for the moment, unless indeed there are some
+men who are capable of no æsthetic pleasure at all. The
+man of genius excels ordinary men only by possessing
+this kind of knowledge in a far higher degree and more
+continuously. Thus, while under its influence he retains
+the presence of mind which is necessary to enable him to
+repeat in a voluntary and intentional work what he has
+learned in this manner; and this repetition is the work
+of art. Through this he communicates to others the Idea
+he has grasped. This Idea remains unchanged and the
+same, so that æsthetic pleasure is one and the same
+whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly
+by the contemplation of nature and life. The work of
+art is only a means of facilitating the knowledge in which
+this pleasure consists. That the Idea comes to us more
+easily from the work of art than directly from nature and
+the real world, arises from the fact that the artist, who
+knew only the Idea, no longer the actual, has reproduced
+in his work the pure Idea, has abstracted it from the
+actual, omitting all disturbing accidents. The artist lets
+us see the world through his eyes. That he has these
+eyes, that he knows the inner nature of things apart from
+all their relations, is the gift of genius, is inborn; but
+that he is able to lend us this gift, to let us see with his
+eyes, is acquired, and is the technical side of art. Therefore,
+after the account which I have given in the preceding
+pages of the inner nature of æsthetical knowledge in
+its most general outlines, the following more exact philosophical
+treatment of the beautiful and the sublime will
+explain them both, in nature and in art, without separating
+<pb n='253'/><anchor id='Pg253'/>
+them further. First of all we shall consider what takes
+place in a man when he is affected by the beautiful and
+the sublime; whether he derives this emotion directly
+from nature, from life, or partakes of it only through the
+medium of art, does not make any essential, but merely
+an external, difference.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<anchor id='Section_38'/>
+§ 38. In the æsthetical mode of contemplation we
+have found <emph>two inseparable constituent parts</emph>&mdash;the knowledge
+of the object, not as individual thing but as
+Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole
+species of things; and the self-consciousness of the knowing
+person, not as individual, but as <emph>pure will-less subject
+of knowledge</emph>. The condition under which both these
+constituent parts appear always united was found to
+be the abandonment of the method of knowing which is
+bound to the principle of sufficient reason, and which, on
+the other hand, is the only kind of knowledge that is of
+value for the service of the will and also for science.
+Moreover, we shall see that the pleasure which is produced
+by the contemplation of the beautiful arises from
+these two constituent parts, sometimes more from the
+one, sometimes more from the other, according to what
+the object of the æsthetical contemplation may be.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+All <emph>willing</emph> arises from want, therefore from deficiency,
+and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish
+ends it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain
+at least ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts
+long, the demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short
+and scantily measured out. But even the final satisfaction
+is itself only apparent; every satisfied wish at once
+makes room for a new one; both are illusions; the one
+is known to be so, the other not yet. No attained
+object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but merely
+a fleeting gratification; it is like the alms thrown to the
+beggar, that keeps him alive to-day that his misery may
+be prolonged till the morrow. Therefore, so long as our
+consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are
+<pb n='254'/><anchor id='Pg254'/>
+given up to the throng of desires with their constant
+hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing,
+we can never have lasting happiness nor peace. It is
+essentially all the same whether we pursue or flee, fear
+injury or seek enjoyment; the care for the constant
+demands of the will, in whatever form it may be, continually
+occupies and sways the consciousness; but
+without peace no true well-being is possible. The subject
+of willing is thus constantly stretched on the
+revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of
+the Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But when some external cause or inward disposition
+lifts us suddenly out of the endless stream of willing,
+delivers knowledge from the slavery of the will, the attention
+is no longer directed to the motives of willing,
+but comprehends things free from their relation to the
+will, and thus observes them without personal interest,
+without subjectivity, purely objectively, gives itself entirely
+up to them so far as they are ideas, but not in so
+far as they are motives. Then all at once the peace
+which we were always seeking, but which always fled
+from us on the former path of the desires, comes to us
+of its own accord, and it is well with us. It is the painless
+state which Epicurus prized as the highest good and
+as the state of the gods; for we are for the moment set
+free from the miserable striving of the will; we keep the
+Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of
+Ixion stands still.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But this is just the state which I described above as
+necessary for the knowledge of the Idea, as pure contemplation,
+as sinking oneself in perception, losing oneself in
+the object, forgetting all individuality, surrendering that
+kind of knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient
+reason, and comprehends only relations; the state
+by means of which at once and inseparably the perceived
+particular thing is raised to the Idea of its whole species,
+and the knowing individual to the pure subject of will-less
+<pb n='255'/><anchor id='Pg255'/>
+knowledge, and as such they are both taken out of
+the stream of time and all other relations. It is then all
+one whether we see the sun set from the prison or from
+the palace.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Inward disposition, the predominance of knowing over
+willing, can produce this state under any circumstances.
+This is shown by those admirable Dutch artists who
+directed this purely objective perception to the most
+insignificant objects, and established a lasting monument
+of their objectivity and spiritual peace in their pictures
+of <emph>still life</emph>, which the æsthetic beholder does not look on
+without emotion; for they present to him the peaceful,
+still, frame of mind of the artist, free from will, which
+was needed to contemplate such insignificant things so
+objectively, to observe them so attentively, and to repeat
+this perception so intelligently; and as the picture enables
+the onlooker to participate in this state, his emotion is
+often increased by the contrast between it and the unquiet
+frame of mind, disturbed by vehement willing, in
+which he finds himself. In the same spirit, landscape-painters,
+and particularly Ruisdael, have often painted
+very insignificant country scenes, which produce the same
+effect even more agreeably.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+All this is accomplished by the inner power of an
+artistic nature alone; but that purely objective disposition
+is facilitated and assisted from without by suitable
+objects, by the abundance of natural beauty which invites
+contemplation, and even presses itself upon us. Whenever
+it discloses itself suddenly to our view, it almost
+always succeeds in delivering us, though it may be only
+for a moment, from subjectivity, from the slavery of the
+will, and in raising us to the state of pure knowing.
+This is why the man who is tormented by passion, or
+want, or care, is so suddenly revived, cheered, and restored
+by a single free glance into nature: the storm of passion,
+the pressure of desire and fear, and all the miseries of
+willing are then at once, and in a marvellous manner,
+<pb n='256'/><anchor id='Pg256'/>
+calmed and appeased. For at the moment at which,
+freed from the will, we give ourselves up to pure will-less
+knowing, we pass into a world from which everything
+is absent that influenced our will and moved us
+so violently through it. This freeing of knowledge lifts
+us as wholly and entirely away from all that, as do
+sleep and dreams; happiness and unhappiness have disappeared;
+we are no longer individual; the individual is
+forgotten; we are only pure subject of knowledge; we are
+only that <emph>one</emph> eye of the world which looks out from all
+knowing creatures, but which can become perfectly free
+from the service of will in man alone. Thus all difference
+of individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the
+same whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty
+king or to a wretched beggar; for neither joy nor complaining
+can pass that boundary with us. So near us
+always lies a sphere in which we escape from all our
+misery; but who has the strength to continue long in it?
+As soon as any single relation to our will, to our person,
+even of these objects of our pure contemplation, comes
+again into consciousness, the magic is at an end; we fall
+back into the knowledge which is governed by the principle
+of sufficient reason; we know no longer the Idea,
+but the particular thing, the link of a chain to which we
+also belong, and we are again abandoned to all our woe.
+Most men remain almost always at this standpoint
+because they entirely lack objectivity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, genius. Therefore
+they have no pleasure in being alone with nature;
+they need company, or at least a book. For their
+knowledge remains subject to their will; they seek, therefore,
+in objects, only some relation to their will, and whenever
+they see anything that has no such relation, there
+sounds within them, like a ground bass in music, the
+constant inconsolable cry, <q>It is of no use to me;</q> thus
+in solitude the most beautiful surroundings have for them
+a desolate, dark, strange, and hostile appearance.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Lastly, it is this blessedness of will-less perception
+<pb n='257'/><anchor id='Pg257'/>
+which casts an enchanting glamour over the past and
+distant, and presents them to us in so fair a light by
+means of self-deception. For as we think of days long
+gone by, days in which we lived in a distant place, it is
+only the objects which our fancy recalls, not the subject
+of will, which bore about with it then its incurable
+sorrows just as it bears them now; but they are forgotten,
+because since then they have often given place to others.
+Now, objective perception acts with regard to what is
+remembered just as it would in what is present, if we
+let it have influence over us, if we surrendered ourselves
+to it free from will. Hence it arises that, especially
+when we are more than ordinarily disturbed by some
+want, the remembrance of past and distant scenes
+suddenly flits across our minds like a lost paradise.
+The fancy recalls only what was objective, not what was
+individually subjective, and we imagine that that objective
+stood before us then just as pure and undisturbed
+by any relation to the will as its image stands in our
+fancy now; while in reality the relation of the objects
+to our will gave us pain then just as it does now. We
+can deliver ourselves from all suffering just as well
+through present objects as through distant ones whenever
+we raise ourselves to a purely objective contemplation
+of them, and so are able to bring about the illusion
+that only the objects are present and not we ourselves.
+Then, as the pure subject of knowledge, freed from the
+miserable self, we become entirely one with these objects,
+and, for the moment, our wants are as foreign to us as
+they are to them. The world as idea alone remains, and
+the world as will has disappeared.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In all these reflections it has been my object to bring
+out clearly the nature and the scope of the subjective
+element in æsthetic pleasure; the deliverance of knowledge
+from the service of the will, the forgetting of self
+as an individual, and the raising of the consciousness to
+the pure will-less, timeless, subject of knowledge, independent
+<pb n='258'/><anchor id='Pg258'/>
+of all relations. With this subjective side of
+æsthetic contemplation, there must always appear as its
+necessary correlative the objective side, the intuitive
+comprehension of the Platonic Idea. But before we
+turn to the closer consideration of this, and to the
+achievements of art in relation to it, it is better that we
+should pause for a little at the subjective side of æsthetic
+pleasure, in order to complete our treatment of this by
+explaining the impression of the <emph>sublime</emph> which depends
+altogether upon it, and arises from a modification of
+it. After that we shall complete our investigation of
+æsthetic pleasure by considering its objective side.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But we must first add the following remarks to what
+has been said. Light is the pleasantest and most gladdening
+of things; it has become the symbol of all that
+is good and salutary. In all religions it symbolises salvation,
+while darkness symbolises damnation. Ormuzd
+dwells in the purest light, Ahrimines in eternal night.
+Dante's Paradise would look very much like Vauxhall
+in London, for all the blessed spirits appear as points of
+light and arrange themselves in regular figures. The
+very absence of light makes us sad; its return cheers us.
+Colours excite directly a keen delight, which reaches its
+highest degree when they are transparent. All this depends
+entirely upon the fact that light is the correlative
+and condition of the most perfect kind of knowledge of
+perception, the only knowledge which does not in any
+way affect the will. For sight, unlike the affections of
+the other senses, cannot, in itself, directly and through its
+sensuous effect, make the <emph>sensation</emph> of the special organ
+agreeable or disagreeable; that is, it has no immediate
+connection with the will. Such a quality can only belong
+to the perception which arises in the understanding,
+and then it lies in the relation of the object to the will.
+In the case of hearing this is to some extent otherwise;
+sounds can give pain directly, and they may also be
+sensuously agreeable, directly and without regard to
+<pb n='259'/><anchor id='Pg259'/>
+harmony or melody. Touch, as one with the feeling of
+the whole body, is still more subordinated to this direct
+influence upon the will; and yet there is such a thing as
+a sensation of touch which is neither painful nor pleasant.
+But smells are always either agreeable or disagreeable,
+and tastes still more so. Thus the last two senses are
+most closely related to the will, and therefore they are
+always the most ignoble, and have been called by Kant
+the subjective senses. The pleasure which we experience
+from light is in fact only the pleasure which arises
+from the objective possibility of the purest and fullest
+perceptive knowledge, and as such it may be traced to the
+fact that pure knowledge, freed and delivered from all
+will, is in the highest degree pleasant, and of itself constitutes
+a large part of æsthetic enjoyment. Again, we
+must refer to this view of light the incredible beauty
+which we associate with the reflection of objects in water.
+That lightest, quickest, finest species of the action of
+bodies upon each other, that to which we owe by far the
+completest and purest of our perceptions, the action of
+reflected rays of light, is here brought clearly before our
+eyes, distinct and perfect, in cause and in effect, and
+indeed in its entirety, hence the æsthetic delight it gives
+us, which, in the most important aspect, is entirely based
+on the subjective ground of æsthetic pleasure, and is
+delight in pure knowing and its method.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 39. All these reflections are intended to bring out
+the subjective part of æsthetic pleasure; that is to say,
+that pleasure so far as it consists simply of delight in perceptive
+knowledge as such, in opposition to will. And as
+directly connected with this, there naturally follows the
+explanation of that disposition or frame of mind which
+has been called the sense of the <emph>sublime</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We have already remarked above that the transition to
+the state of pure perception takes place most easily when
+the objects bend themselves to it, that is, when by their
+manifold and yet definite and distinct form they easily
+<pb n='260'/><anchor id='Pg260'/>
+become representatives of their Ideas, in which beauty, in
+the objective sense, consists. This quality belongs pre-eminently
+to natural beauty, which thus affords even to
+the most insensible at least a fleeting æsthetic satisfaction:
+indeed it is so remarkable how especially the vegetable
+world invites æsthetic observation, and, as it were,
+presses itself upon it, that one might say, that these
+advances are connected with the fact that these organisms,
+unlike the bodies of animals, are not themselves immediate
+objects of knowledge, and therefore require the assistance
+of a foreign intelligent individual in order to rise out of
+the world of blind will and enter the world of idea, and
+that thus they long, as it were, for this entrance, that
+they may attain at least indirectly what is denied them
+directly. But I leave this suggestion which I have
+hazarded, and which borders perhaps upon extravagance,
+entirely undecided, for only a very intimate and devoted
+consideration of nature can raise or justify it.<note place='foot'>I am all the more delighted and
+astonished, forty years after I so
+timidly and hesitatingly advanced
+this thought, to discover that it
+has already been expressed by St.
+Augustine: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Arbusta formas suas
+varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis
+structura formosa est, sentiendas
+sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quod</foreign>
+<hi rend='smallcaps'>nosse</hi> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>non possunt, quasi</foreign> <hi rend='smallcaps'>innotescere</hi>
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>velle videantur</foreign>.&mdash;<hi rend='italic'>De civ. Dei,
+xi.</hi> 27.</note> As long as
+that which raises us from the knowledge of mere relations
+subject to the will, to æsthetic contemplation, and thereby
+exalts us to the position of the subject of knowledge free
+from will, is this fittingness of nature, this significance
+and distinctness of its forms, on account of which the
+Ideas individualised in them readily present themselves
+to us; so long is it merely <emph>beauty</emph> that affects us and the
+sense of the <emph>beautiful</emph> that is excited. But if these very
+objects whose significant forms invite us to pure contemplation,
+have a hostile relation to the human will in
+general, as it exhibits itself in its objectivity, the
+human body, if they are opposed to it, so that it is
+menaced by the irresistible predominance of their power,
+or sinks into insignificance before their immeasurable
+<pb n='261'/><anchor id='Pg261'/>
+greatness; if, nevertheless, the beholder does not direct
+his attention to this eminently hostile relation to his will,
+but, although perceiving and recognising it, turns consciously
+away from it, forcibly detaches himself from his
+will and its relations, and, giving himself up entirely to
+knowledge, quietly contemplates those very objects that
+are so terrible to the will, comprehends only their Idea,
+which is foreign to all relation, so that he lingers gladly
+over its contemplation, and is thereby raised above himself,
+his person, his will, and all will:&mdash;in that case he
+is filled with the sense of the <emph>sublime</emph>, he is in the state
+of spiritual exaltation, and therefore the object producing
+such a state is called <emph>sublime</emph>. Thus what distinguishes
+the sense of the sublime from that of the
+beautiful is this: in the case of the beautiful, pure
+knowledge has gained the upper hand without a struggle,
+for the beauty of the object, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, that property which
+facilitates the knowledge of its Idea, has removed from
+consciousness without resistance, and therefore imperceptibly,
+the will and the knowledge of relations which is
+subject to it, so that what is left is the pure subject of
+knowledge without even a remembrance of will. On the
+other hand, in the case of the sublime that state of pure
+knowledge is only attained by a conscious and forcible
+breaking away from the relations of the same object to
+the will, which are recognised as unfavourable, by a free
+and conscious transcending of the will and the knowledge
+related to it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This exaltation must not only be consciously won, but
+also consciously retained, and it is therefore accompanied
+by a constant remembrance of will; yet not of a single
+particular volition, such as fear or desire, but of human
+volition in general, so far as it is universally expressed
+in its objectivity the human body. If a single real act
+of will were to come into consciousness, through actual
+personal pressure and danger from the object, then the
+individual will thus actually influenced would at once
+<pb n='262'/><anchor id='Pg262'/>
+gain the upper hand, the peace of contemplation would
+become impossible, the impression of the sublime would
+be lost, because it yields to the anxiety, in which the
+effort of the individual to right itself has sunk every
+other thought. A few examples will help very much to
+elucidate this theory of the æsthetic sublime and remove
+all doubt with regard to it; at the same time they will
+bring out the different degrees of this sense of the
+sublime. It is in the main identical with that of the
+beautiful, with pure will-less knowing, and the knowledge,
+that necessarily accompanies it of Ideas out of all relation
+determined by the principle of sufficient reason, and it
+is distinguished from the sense of the beautiful only by
+the additional quality that it rises above the known
+hostile relation of the object contemplated to the will in
+general. Thus there come to be various degrees of the
+sublime, and transitions from the beautiful to the
+sublime, according as this additional quality is strong,
+bold, urgent, near, or weak, distant, and merely indicated.
+I think it is more in keeping with the plan of my
+treatise, first to give examples of these transitions, and
+of the weaker degrees of the impression of the sublime,
+although persons whose æsthetical susceptibility in general
+is not very great, and whose imagination is not very
+lively, will only understand the examples given later of
+the higher and more distinct grades of that impression;
+and they should therefore confine themselves to these,
+and pass over the examples of the very weak degrees of
+the sublime that are to be given first.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As man is at once impetuous and blind striving of
+will (whose pole or focus lies in the genital organs), and
+eternal, free, serene subject of pure knowing (whose pole
+is the brain); so, corresponding to this antithesis, the sun
+is both the source of <emph>light</emph>, the condition of the most perfect
+kind of knowledge, and therefore of the most delightful
+of things&mdash;and the source of <emph>warmth</emph>, the first condition
+of life, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, of all phenomena of will in its higher grades.
+<pb n='263'/><anchor id='Pg263'/>
+Therefore, what warmth is for the will, light is for knowledge.
+Light is the largest gem in the crown of beauty,
+and has the most marked influence on the knowledge of
+every beautiful object. Its presence is an indispensable
+condition of beauty; its favourable disposition increases
+the beauty of the most beautiful. Architectural beauty
+more than any other object is enhanced by favourable
+light, though even the most insignificant things become
+through its influence most beautiful. If, in the dead of
+winter, when all nature is frozen and stiff, we see the
+rays of the setting sun reflected by masses of stone,
+illuminating without warming, and thus favourable only
+to the purest kind of knowledge, not to the will; the
+contemplation of the beautiful effect of the light upon
+these masses lifts us, as does all beauty, into a state of
+pure knowing. But, in this case, a certain transcending
+of the interests of the will is needed to enable us to rise
+into the state of pure knowing, because there is a faint
+recollection of the lack of warmth from these rays, that
+is, an absence of the principle of life; there is a slight
+challenge to persist in pure knowing, and to refrain from
+all willing, and therefore it is an example of a transition
+from the sense of the beautiful to that of the
+sublime. It is the faintest trace of the sublime in
+the beautiful; and beauty itself is indeed present only
+in a slight degree. The following is almost as weak an
+example.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Let us imagine ourselves transported to a very lonely
+place, with unbroken horizon, under a cloudless sky,
+trees and plants in the perfectly motionless air, no
+animals, no men, no running water, the deepest silence.
+Such surroundings are, as it were, a call to seriousness
+and contemplation, apart from all will and its cravings;
+but this is just what imparts to such a scene of desolate
+stillness a touch of the sublime. For, because it affords
+no object, either favourable or unfavourable, for the will
+which is constantly in need of striving and attaining,
+<pb n='264'/><anchor id='Pg264'/>
+there only remains the state of pure contemplation, and
+whoever is incapable of this, is ignominiously abandoned
+to the vacancy of unoccupied will, and the misery of
+ennui. So far it is a test of our intellectual worth, of
+which, generally speaking, the degree of our power of
+enduring solitude, or our love of it, is a good criterion.
+The scene we have sketched affords us, then, an example
+of the sublime in a low degree, for in it, with the
+state of pure knowing in its peace and all-sufficiency,
+there is mingled, by way of contrast, the recollection of
+the dependence and poverty of the will which stands in
+need of constant action. This is the species of the sublime
+for which the sight of the boundless prairies of the
+interior of North America is celebrated.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But let us suppose such a scene, stripped also of vegetation,
+and showing only naked rocks; then from the
+entire absence of that organic life which is necessary
+for existence, the will at once becomes uneasy, the desert
+assumes a terrible aspect, our mood becomes more tragic;
+the elevation to the sphere of pure knowing takes place
+with a more decided tearing of ourselves away from the
+interests of the will; and because we persist in continuing
+in the state of pure knowing, the sense of the sublime
+distinctly appears.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The following situation may occasion this feeling in a
+still higher degree: Nature convulsed by a storm; the
+sky darkened by black threatening thunder-clouds; stupendous,
+naked, overhanging cliffs, completely shutting
+out the view; rushing, foaming torrents; absolute desert;
+the wail of the wind sweeping through the clefts of the
+rocks. Our dependence, our strife with hostile nature,
+our will broken in the conflict, now appears visibly before
+our eyes. Yet, so long as the personal pressure does not
+gain the upper hand, but we continue in æsthetic contemplation,
+the pure subject of knowing gazes unshaken
+and unconcerned through that strife of nature, through
+that picture of the broken will, and quietly comprehends
+<pb n='265'/><anchor id='Pg265'/>
+the Ideas even of those objects which are threatening
+and terrible to the will. In this contrast lies the sense
+of the sublime.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But the impression becomes still stronger, if, when we
+have before our eyes, on a large scale, the battle of the
+raging elements, in such a scene we are prevented from
+hearing the sound of our own voice by the noise of a
+falling stream; or, if we are abroad in the storm of
+tempestuous seas, where the mountainous waves rise and
+fall, dash themselves furiously against steep cliffs, and
+toss their spray high into the air; the storm howls, the
+sea boils, the lightning flashes from black clouds, and
+the peals of thunder drown the voice of storm and sea.
+Then, in the undismayed beholder, the two-fold nature of
+his consciousness reaches the highest degree of distinctness.
+He perceives himself, on the one hand, as an individual,
+as the frail phenomenon of will, which the
+slightest touch of these forces can utterly destroy, helpless
+against powerful nature, dependent, the victim of
+chance, a vanishing nothing in the presence of stupendous
+might; and, on the other hand, as the eternal, peaceful,
+knowing subject, the condition of the object, and, therefore,
+the supporter of this whole world; the terrific strife
+of nature only his idea; the subject itself free and apart
+from all desires and necessities, in the quiet comprehension
+of the Ideas. This is the complete impression of
+the sublime. Here he obtains a glimpse of a power
+beyond all comparison superior to the individual, threatening
+it with annihilation.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The impression of the sublime may be produced in
+quite another way, by presenting a mere immensity in
+space and time; its immeasurable greatness dwindles the
+individual to nothing. Adhering to Kant's nomenclature
+and his accurate division, we may call the first kind the
+dynamical, and the second the mathematical sublime,
+although we entirely dissent from his explanation of the
+inner nature of the impression, and can allow no share
+<pb n='266'/><anchor id='Pg266'/>
+in it either to moral reflections, or to hypostases from
+scholastic philosophy.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If we lose ourselves in the contemplation of the
+infinite greatness of the universe in space and time,
+meditate on the thousands of years that are past or to
+come, or if the heavens at night actually bring before
+our eyes innumerable worlds and so force upon our
+consciousness the immensity of the universe, we feel
+ourselves dwindle to nothing; as individuals, as living
+bodies, as transient phenomena of will, we feel ourselves
+pass away and vanish into nothing like drops in the
+ocean. But at once there rises against this ghost of our
+own nothingness, against such lying impossibility, the
+immediate consciousness that all these worlds exist only
+as our idea, only as modifications of the eternal subject
+of pure knowing, which we find ourselves to be as soon
+as we forget our individuality, and which is the necessary
+supporter of all worlds and all times the condition
+of their possibility. The vastness of the world which
+disquieted us before, rests now in us; our dependence
+upon it is annulled by its dependence upon us. All
+this, however, does not come at once into reflection,
+but shows itself merely as the felt consciousness that
+in some sense or other (which philosophy alone can
+explain) we are one with the world, and therefore not
+oppressed, but exalted by its immensity. It is the felt
+consciousness of this that the Upanishads of the Vedas
+repeatedly express in such a multitude of different ways;
+very admirably in the saying already quoted: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Hæ omnes
+creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter me aliud ens non est</foreign>
+(Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 122.) It is the transcending of
+our own individuality, the sense of the sublime.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We receive this impression of the mathematical-sublime,
+quite directly, by means of a space which is small indeed
+as compared with the world, but which has become
+directly perceptible to us, and affects us with its whole
+extent in all its three dimensions, so as to make our own
+<pb n='267'/><anchor id='Pg267'/>
+body seem almost infinitely small. An empty space can
+never be thus perceived, and therefore never an open
+space, but only space that is directly perceptible in all
+its dimensions by means of the limits which enclose it;
+thus for example a very high, vast dome, like that of St.
+Peter's at Rome, or St. Paul's in London. The sense of
+the sublime here arises through the consciousness of the
+vanishing nothingness of our own body in the presence
+of a vastness which, from another point of view, itself
+exists only in our idea, and of which we are as knowing
+subject, the supporter. Thus here as everywhere it arises
+from the contrast between the insignificance and dependence
+of ourselves as individuals, as phenomena of will,
+and the consciousness of ourselves as pure subject of
+knowing. Even the vault of the starry heaven produces
+this if it is contemplated without reflection; but just in
+the same way as the vault of stone, and only by its
+apparent, not its real extent. Some objects of our perception
+excite in us the feeling of the sublime because,
+not only on account of their spatial vastness, but also of
+their great age, that is, their temporal duration, we feel
+ourselves dwarfed to insignificance in their presence, and
+yet revel in the pleasure of contemplating them: of this
+kind are very high mountains, the Egyptian pyramids,
+and colossal ruins of great antiquity.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Our explanation of the sublime applies also to the
+ethical, to what is called the sublime character. Such a
+character arises from this, that the will is not excited by
+objects which are well calculated to excite it, but that
+knowledge retains the upper hand in their presence. A
+man of sublime character will accordingly consider men
+in a purely objective way, and not with reference to the
+relations which they might have to his will; he will, for
+example, observe their faults, even their hatred and
+injustice to himself, without being himself excited to
+hatred; he will behold their happiness without envy; he
+will recognise their good qualities without desiring any
+<pb n='268'/><anchor id='Pg268'/>
+closer relations with them; he will perceive the beauty
+of women, but he will not desire them. His personal
+happiness or unhappiness will not greatly affect him, he
+will rather be as Hamlet describes Horatio:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l rend='margin-left: 8'><q rend='pre'>... for thou hast been,</q></l>
+<l>As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing;</l>
+<l>A man that fortune's buffets and rewards</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Hast ta'en with equal thanks,</q> &amp;c. (A. 3. Sc. 2.)</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+For in the course of his own life and its misfortunes, he
+will consider less his individual lot than that of humanity
+in general, and will therefore conduct himself in its regard,
+rather as knowing than as suffering.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 40. Opposites throw light upon each other, and
+therefore the remark may be in place here, that the
+proper opposite of the sublime is something which would
+not at the first glance be recognised, as such: <emph>the charming</emph>
+or <emph>attractive</emph>. By this, however, I understand, that
+which excites the will by presenting to it directly its
+fulfilment, its satisfaction. We saw that the feeling of
+the sublime arises from the fact, that something entirely
+unfavourable to the will, becomes the object of pure contemplation,
+so that such contemplation can only be maintained
+by persistently turning away from the will, and
+transcending its interests; this constitutes the sublimity
+of the character. The charming or attractive, on the contrary,
+draws the beholder away from the pure contemplation
+which is demanded by all apprehension of the
+beautiful, because it necessarily excites this will, by
+objects which directly appeal to it, and thus he no longer
+remains pure subject of knowing, but becomes the needy
+and dependent subject of will. That every beautiful
+thing which is bright or cheering should be called charming,
+is the result of a too general concept, which arises
+from a want of accurate discrimination, and which I
+must entirely set aside, and indeed condemn. But in the
+sense of the word which has been given and explained, I
+<pb n='269'/><anchor id='Pg269'/>
+find only two species of the charming or attractive in the
+province of art, and both of them are unworthy of it.
+The one species, a very low one, is found in Dutch paintings
+of still life, when they err by representing articles
+of food, which by their deceptive likeness necessarily
+excite the appetite for the things they represent, and
+this is just an excitement of the will, which puts an end
+to all æsthetic contemplation of the object. Painted
+fruit is yet admissible, because we may regard it as the
+further development of the flower, and as a beautiful
+product of nature in form and colour, without being
+obliged to think of it as eatable; but unfortunately we
+often find, represented with deceptive naturalness, prepared
+and served dishes, oysters, herrings, crabs, bread
+and butter, beer, wine, and so forth, which is altogether
+to be condemned. In historical painting and in sculpture
+the charming consists in naked figures, whose
+position, drapery, and general treatment are calculated
+to excite the passions of the beholder, and thus pure
+æsthetical contemplation is at once annihilated, and the
+aim of art is defeated. This mistake corresponds exactly
+to that which we have just censured in the Dutch paintings.
+The ancients are almost always free from this
+fault in their representations of beauty and complete
+nakedness of form, because the artist himself created
+them in a purely objective spirit, filled with ideal beauty,
+not in the spirit of subjective, and base sensuality. The
+charming is thus everywhere to be avoided in art.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+There is also a negative species of the charming or
+exciting which is even more reprehensible than the positive
+form which has been discussed; this is the disgusting
+or the loathsome. It arouses the will of the beholder,
+just as what is properly speaking charming, and therefore
+disturbs pure æsthetic contemplation. But it is an active
+aversion and opposition which is excited by it; it arouses
+the will by presenting to it objects which it abhors.
+Therefore it has always been recognised that it is
+<pb n='270'/><anchor id='Pg270'/>
+altogether inadmissible in art, where even what is ugly,
+when it is not disgusting, is allowable in its proper place,
+as we shall see later.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 41. The course of the discussion has made it
+necessary to insert at this point the treatment of the
+sublime, though we have only half done with the beautiful,
+as we have considered its subjective side only. For
+it was merely a special modification of this subjective
+side that distinguished the beautiful from the sublime.
+This difference was found to depend upon whether the
+state of pure will-less knowing, which is presupposed
+and demanded by all æsthetic contemplation, was reached
+without opposition, by the mere disappearance of the will
+from consciousness, because the object invited and drew
+us towards it; or whether it was only attained through
+the free, conscious transcending of the will, to which the
+object contemplated had an unfavourable and even hostile
+relation, which would destroy contemplation altogether,
+if we were to give ourselves up to it. This is the distinction
+between the beautiful and the sublime. In the
+object they are not essentially different, for in every case
+the object of æsthetical contemplation is not the individual
+thing, but the Idea in it which is striving to reveal itself;
+that is to say, adequate objectivity of will at a particular
+grade. Its necessary correlative, independent, like itself
+of the principle of sufficient reason, is the pure subject
+of knowing; just as the correlative of the particular thing
+is the knowing individual, both of which lie within the
+province of the principle of sufficient reason.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+When we say that a thing is <emph>beautiful</emph>, we thereby
+assert that it is an object of our æsthetic contemplation,
+and this has a double meaning; on the one hand it
+means that the sight of the thing makes us <emph>objective</emph>, that
+is to say, that in contemplating it we are no longer conscious
+of ourselves as individuals, but as pure will-less
+subjects of knowledge; and on the other hand it means
+that we recognise in the object, not the particular thing,
+<pb n='271'/><anchor id='Pg271'/>
+but an Idea; and this can only happen, so far as our
+contemplation of it is not subordinated to the principle
+of sufficient reason, does not follow the relation of the
+object to anything outside it (which is always ultimately
+connected with relations to our own will), but rests in
+the object itself. For the Idea and the pure subject of
+knowledge always appear at once in consciousness as
+necessary correlatives, and on their appearance all distinction
+of time vanishes, for they are both entirely
+foreign to the principle of sufficient reason in all its
+forms, and lie outside the relations which are imposed
+by it; they may be compared to the rainbow and the
+sun, which have no part in the constant movement and
+succession of the falling drops. Therefore, if, for example,
+I contemplate a tree æsthetically, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, with artistic eyes,
+and thus recognise, not it, but its Idea, it becomes at once
+of no consequence whether it is this tree or its predecessor
+which flourished a thousand years ago, and whether the
+observer is this individual or any other that lived anywhere
+and at any time; the particular thing and the
+knowing individual are abolished with the principle of
+sufficient reason, and there remains nothing but the Idea
+and the pure subject of knowing, which together constitute
+the adequate objectivity of will at this grade. And
+the Idea dispenses not only with time, but also with
+space, for the Idea proper is not this special form which
+appears before me but its expression, its pure significance,
+its inner being, which discloses itself to me and appeals
+to me, and which may be quite the same though the
+spatial relations of its form be very different.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Since, on the one hand, every given thing may be
+observed in a. purely objective manner and apart from
+all relations; and since, on the other hand, the will
+manifests itself in everything at some grade of its objectivity,
+so that everything is the expression of an Idea;
+it follows that everything is also <emph>beautiful</emph>. That even
+the most insignificant things admit of pure objective and
+<pb n='272'/><anchor id='Pg272'/>
+will-less contemplation, and thus prove that they are
+beautiful, is shown by what was said above in this reference
+about the Dutch pictures of still-life (<ref target='Section_38'>§ 38</ref>). But
+one thing is more beautiful than another, because it
+makes this pure objective contemplation easier, it lends
+itself to it, and, so to speak, even compels it, and then
+we call it very beautiful. This is the case sometimes
+because, as an individual thing, it expresses in its purity
+the Idea of its species by the very distinct, clearly defined,
+and significant relation of its parts, and also fully
+reveals that Idea through the completeness of all the
+possible expressions of its species united in it, so that it
+makes the transition from the individual thing to the
+Idea, and therefore also the condition of pure contemplation,
+very easy for the beholder. Sometimes this possession
+of special beauty in an object lies in the fact
+that the Idea itself which appeals to us in it is a
+high grade of the objectivity of will, and therefore very
+significant and expressive. Therefore it is that man is
+more beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation
+of his nature is the highest aim of art. Human form
+and expression are the most important objects of plastic
+art, and human action the most important object of
+poetry. Yet each thing has its own peculiar beauty,
+not only every organism which expresses itself in the
+unity of an individual being, but also everything unorganised
+and formless, and even every manufactured article.
+For all these reveal the Ideas through which the will
+objectifies itself at its lowest grades, they give, as it were,
+the deepest resounding bass-notes of nature. Gravity,
+rigidity, fluidity, light, and so forth, are the Ideas
+which express themselves in rocks, in buildings, in
+waters. Landscape-gardening or architecture can do no
+more than assist them to unfold their qualities distinctly,
+fully, and variously; they can only give them the opportunity
+of expressing themselves purely, so that they lend
+themselves to æsthetic contemplation and make it easier.
+<pb n='273'/><anchor id='Pg273'/>
+Inferior buildings or ill-favoured localities, on the contrary,
+which nature has neglected or art has spoiled,
+perform this task in a very slight degree or not at all;
+yet even from them these universal, fundamental Ideas
+of nature cannot altogether disappear. To the careful
+observer they present themselves here also, and even bad
+buildings and the like are capable of being æsthetically
+considered; the Ideas of the most universal properties of
+their materials are still recognisable in them, only the
+artificial form which has been given them does not
+assist but hinders æsthetic contemplation. Manufactured
+articles also serve to express Ideas, only it is not the
+Idea of the manufactured article which speaks in them,
+but the Idea of the material to which this artificial form
+has been given. This may be very conveniently expressed
+in two words, in the language of the schoolmen,
+thus,&mdash;the manufactured article expresses the Idea of its
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>forma substantialis</foreign>, but not that of its <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>forma accidentalis</foreign>;
+the latter leads to no Idea, but only to a human conception
+of which it is the result. It is needless to say that
+by manufactured article no work of plastic art is meant.
+The schoolmen understand, in fact, by <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>forma substantialis</foreign>
+that which I call the grade of the objectification of will
+in a thing. We shall return immediately, when we treat
+of architecture, to the Idea of the material. Our view,
+then, cannot be reconciled with that of Plato if he is
+of opinion that a table or a chair express the Idea
+of a table or a chair (De Rep., x., pp. 284, 285, et
+Parmen., p. 79, ed. Bip.), but we say that they express
+the Ideas which are already expressed in their mere
+material as such. According to Aristotle (Metap. xi.,
+chap. 3), however, Plato himself only maintained Ideas
+of natural objects: ὁ Πλατων εφη, ὁτι ειδη εστιν ὁποσα
+φυσει (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Plato dixit, quod ideæ eorum sunt, quæ natura sunt</foreign>),
+and in chap. 5 he says that, according to the Platonists,
+there are no Ideas of house and ring. In any case,
+Plato's earliest disciples, as Alcinous informs us (<hi rend='italic'>Introductio
+<pb n='274'/><anchor id='Pg274'/>
+in Platonicam Philosophiam</hi>, chap. 9), denied that
+there were any ideas of manufactured articles. He says:
+Ὁριζονται δε την ιδεαν, παραδειγμα των κατα φυσιν
+αιωνιον. Ουτε γαρ τοις πλειστοις των απο Πλατωνος
+αρεσκει, των τεχνικων ειναι ιδεας, οἱον ασπιδος η λυρας,
+ουτε μην των παρα φυσιν, οἱον πυρετου και χολερας,
+ουτε των κατα μερος, οἱον Σωκρατους και Πλατωνος,
+αλλ᾽ ουτε των ευτελων τινος, οἱον ρυπου και καρφους,
+ουτε των προς τι, οἱον μειζονος και ὑπερεχοντος; ειναι
+γαρ τας ιδεας νοησεις θεου αιωνιους τε και αυτοτελεις
+(<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Definiunt autem</foreign> <hi rend='smallcaps'>ideam</hi> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>exemplar æternum eorum, quæ
+secundum naturam existunt. Nam plurimis ex iis, qui
+Platonem secuti sunt, minime placuit, arte factorum ideas
+esse, ut clypei atque lyræ; neque rursus eorum, quæ prætor
+naturam, ut febris et choleræ, neque particularium, ceu
+Socratis et Platonis; neque etiam rerum vilium, veluti
+sordium et festucæ; neque relationum, ut majoris et
+excedentis: esse namque ideas intellectiones dei æternas,
+ac seipsis perfectas</foreign>). We may take this opportunity of
+mentioning another point in which our doctrine of Ideas
+differs very much from that of Plato. He teaches (De
+Rep., x., p. 288) that the object which art tries to
+express, the ideal of painting and poetry, is not the Idea
+but the particular thing. Our whole exposition hitherto
+has maintained exactly the opposite, and Plato's opinion
+is the less likely to lead us astray, inasmuch as it is the
+source of one of the greatest and best known errors of
+this great man, his depreciation and rejection of art, and
+especially poetry; he directly connects his false judgment
+in reference to this with the passage quoted.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 42. I return to the exposition of the æsthetic
+impression. The knowledge of the beautiful always
+supposes at once and inseparably the pure knowing
+subject and the known Idea as object. Yet the source
+of æsthetic satisfaction will sometimes lie more in the
+comprehension of the known Idea, sometimes more in the
+blessedness and spiritual peace of the pure knowing subject
+<pb n='275'/><anchor id='Pg275'/>
+freed from all willing, and therefore from all individuality,
+and the pain that proceeds from it. And, indeed,
+this predominance of one or the other constituent part of
+æsthetic feeling will depend upon whether the intuitively
+grasped Idea is a higher or a lower grade of the objectivity
+of will. Thus in æsthetic contemplation (in the
+real, or through the medium of art) of the beauty of
+nature in the inorganic and vegetable worlds, or in works
+of architecture, the pleasure of pure will-less knowing
+will predominate, because the Ideas which are here
+apprehended are only low grades of the objectivity of
+will, and are therefore not manifestations of deep significance
+and rich content. On the other hand, if animals
+and man are the objects of æsthetic contemplation or
+representation, the pleasure will consist rather in the
+comprehension of these Ideas, which are the most distinct
+revelation of will; for they exhibit the greatest multiplicity
+of forms, the greatest richness and deep significance
+of phenomena, and reveal to us most completely the
+nature of will, whether in its violence, its terribleness, its
+satisfaction or its aberration (the latter in tragic situations),
+or finally in its change and self-surrender, which is the
+peculiar theme of christian painting; as the Idea of the
+will enlightened by full knowledge is the object of
+historical painting in general, and of the drama. We
+shall now go through the fine arts one by one, and this
+will give completeness and distinctness to the theory of
+the beautiful which we have advanced.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 43. Matter as such cannot be the expression of an
+Idea. For, as we found in the first book, it is throughout
+nothing but causality: its being consists in its casual
+action. But causality is a form of the principle of
+sufficient reason; knowledge of the Idea, on the other
+hand, absolutely excludes the content of that principle.
+We also found, in the second book, that matter is the
+common substratum of all particular phenomena of the
+Ideas, and consequently is the connecting link between
+<pb n='276'/><anchor id='Pg276'/>
+the Idea and the phenomenon, or the particular thing.
+Accordingly for both of these reasons it is impossible that
+matter can for itself express any Idea. This is confirmed
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> by the fact that it is impossible to have a perceptible
+idea of matter as such, but only an abstract
+conception; in the former, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in perceptible ideas are
+exhibited only the forms and qualities of which matter is
+the supporter, and in all of which Ideas reveal themselves.
+This corresponds also with the fact, that causality (the
+whole essence of matter) cannot for itself be presented
+perceptibly, but is merely a definite casual connection.
+On the other hand, <emph>every phenomenon</emph> of an Idea, because
+as such it has entered the form of the principle of
+sufficient reason, or the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, must
+exhibit itself in matter, as one of its qualities. So far
+then matter is, as we have said, the connecting link
+between the Idea and the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, which
+is the form of knowledge of the individual, or the principle
+of sufficient reason. Plato is therefore perfectly
+right in his enumeration, for after the Idea and the
+phenomenon, which include all other things in the
+world, he gives matter only, as a third thing which is
+different from both (Timaus, p. 345). The individual,
+as a phenomenon of the Idea, is always matter. Every
+quality of matter is also the phenomenon of an Idea, and
+as such it may always be an object of æsthetic contemplation,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the Idea expressed in it may always be recognised.
+This holds good of even the most universal
+qualities of matter, without which it never appears, and
+which are the weakest objectivity of will. Such are
+gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, sensitiveness to light,
+and so forth.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If now we consider <emph>architecture</emph> simply as a fine art
+and apart from its application to useful ends, in which it
+serves the will and not pure knowledge, and therefore
+ceases to be art in our sense; we can assign to it no
+other aim than that of bringing to greater distinctness
+<pb n='277'/><anchor id='Pg277'/>
+some of those ideas, which are the lowest grades of the
+objectivity of will; such as gravity, cohesion, rigidity,
+hardness, those universal qualities of stone, those first,
+simplest, most inarticulate manifestations of will; the bass
+notes of nature; and after these light, which in many
+respects is their opposite. Even at these low grades
+of the objectivity of will we see its nature revealing
+itself in discord; for properly speaking the conflict
+between gravity and rigidity is the sole æsthetic material
+of architecture; its problem is to make this conflict
+appear with perfect distinctness in a multitude of different
+ways. It solves it by depriving these indestructible
+forces of the shortest way to their satisfaction, and conducting
+them to it by a circuitous route, so that the conflict
+is lengthened and the inexhaustible efforts of both
+forces become visible in many different ways. The whole
+mass of the building, if left to its original tendency,
+would exhibit a mere heap or clump, bound as closely as
+possible to the earth, to which gravity, the form in which
+the will appears here, continually presses, while rigidity,
+also objectivity of will, resists. But this very tendency,
+this effort, is hindered by architecture from obtaining
+direct satisfaction, and only allowed to reach it indirectly
+and by roundabout ways. The roof, for example, can
+only press the earth through columns, the arch must support
+itself, and can only satisfy its tendency towards the
+earth through the medium of the pillars, and so forth.
+But just by these enforced digressions, just by these
+restrictions, the forces which reside in the crude mass of
+stone unfold themselves in the most distinct and multifarious
+ways; and the purely æsthetic aim of architecture
+can go no further than this. Therefore the beauty, at
+any rate, of a building lies in the obvious adaptation of
+every part, not to the outward arbitrary end of man (so
+far the work belongs to practical architecture), but
+directly to the stability of the whole, to which the position,
+dimensions, and form of every part must have so
+<pb n='278'/><anchor id='Pg278'/>
+necessary a relation that, where it is possible, if any one
+part were taken away, the whole would fall to pieces.
+For just because each part bears just as much as it
+conveniently can, and each is supported just where it
+requires to be and just to the necessary extent, this
+opposition unfolds itself, this conflict between rigidity and
+gravity, which constitutes the life, the manifestation of will,
+in the stone, becomes completely visible, and these lowest
+grades of the objectivity of will reveal themselves distinctly.
+In the same way the form of each part must not
+be determined arbitrarily, but by its end, and its relation
+to the whole. The column is the simplest form of support,
+determined simply by its end: the twisted column is tasteless;
+the four-cornered pillar is in fact not so simple as
+the round column, though it happens that it is easier to
+make it. The forms also of frieze, rafter, roof, and dome
+are entirely determined by their immediate end, and
+explain themselves from it. The decoration of capitals,
+&amp;c., belongs to sculpture, not to architecture, which
+admits it merely as extraneous ornament, and could
+dispense with it. According to what has been said, it is
+absolutely necessary, in order to understand the æsthetic
+satisfaction afforded by a work of architecture, to have
+immediate knowledge through perception of its matter as
+regards its weight, rigidity, and cohesion, and our pleasure
+in such a work would suddenly be very much diminished
+by the discovery that the material used was pumice-stone;
+for then it would appear to us as a kind of sham building.
+We would be affected in almost the same way if
+we were told that it was made of wood, when we had
+supposed it to be of stone, just because this alters and
+destroys the relation between rigidity and gravity, and
+consequently the significance and necessity of all the
+parts, for these natural forces reveal themselves in a far
+weaker degree in a wooden building. Therefore no real
+work of architecture as a fine art can be made of wood,
+although it assumes all forms so easily; this can only be
+<pb n='279'/><anchor id='Pg279'/>
+explained by our theory. If we were distinctly told that
+a building, the sight of which gave us pleasure, was
+made of different kinds of material of very unequal
+weight and consistency, but not distinguishable to the
+eye, the whole building would become as utterly incapable
+of affording us pleasure as a poem in an unknown
+language. All this proves that architecture does not
+affect us mathematically, but also dynamically, and that
+what speaks to us through it, is not mere form and
+symmetry, but rather those fundamental forces of nature,
+those first Ideas, those lowest grades of the objectivity
+of will. The regularity of the building and its parts is
+partly produced by the direct adaptation of each member
+to the stability of the whole, partly it serves to facilitate
+the survey and comprehension of the whole, and finally,
+regular figures to some extent enhance the beauty because
+they reveal the constitution of space as such. But
+all this is of subordinate value and necessity, and by no
+means the chief concern; indeed, symmetry is not invariably
+demanded, as ruins are still beautiful.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Works of architecture have further quite a special
+relation to light; they gain a double beauty in the full
+sunshine, with the blue sky as a background, and again
+they have quite a different effect by moonlight. Therefore,
+when a beautiful work of architecture is to be
+erected, special attention is always paid to the effects of
+the light and to the climate. The reason of all this is,
+indeed, principally that all the parts and their relations
+are only made clearly visible by a bright, strong light;
+but besides this I am of opinion that it is the function
+of architecture to reveal the nature of light just as it
+reveals that of things so opposite to it as gravity and
+rigidity. For the light is intercepted, confined, and
+reflected by the great opaque, sharply outlined, and
+variously formed masses of stone, and thus it unfolds
+its nature and qualities in the purest and clearest way,
+to the great pleasure of the beholders, for light is the
+<pb n='280'/><anchor id='Pg280'/>
+most joy-giving of things, as the condition and the
+objective correlative of the most perfect kind of knowledge
+of perception.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now, because the Ideas which architecture brings to
+clear perception, are the lowest grades of the objectivity
+of will, and consequently their objective significance,
+which architecture reveals to us, is comparatively small;
+the æsthetic pleasure of looking at a beautiful building
+in a good light will lie, not so much in the comprehension
+of the Idea, as in the subjective correlative which
+accompanies this comprehension; it will consist pre-eminently
+in the fact that the beholder, set free from the
+kind of knowledge that belongs to the individual, and
+which serves the will and follows the principle of sufficient
+reason, is raised to that of the pure subject of
+knowing free from will. It will consist then principally
+in pure contemplation itself, free from all the suffering of
+will and of individuality. In this respect the opposite
+of architecture, and the other extreme of the series of
+the fine arts, is the drama, which brings to knowledge
+the most significant Ideas. Therefore in the æsthetic
+pleasure afforded by the drama the objective side is
+throughout predominant.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Architecture has this distinction from plastic art and
+poetry: it does not give us a copy but the thing itself.
+It does not repeat, as they do, the known Idea, so that
+the artist lends his eyes to the beholder, but in it the artist
+merely presents the object to the beholder, and facilitates
+for him the comprehension of the Idea by bringing the
+actual, individual object to a distinct and complete expression
+of its nature.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Unlike the works of the other arts, those of architecture
+are very seldom executed for purely æsthetic ends.
+These are generally subordinated to other useful ends
+which are foreign to art itself. Thus the great merit of
+the architect consists in achieving and attaining the pure
+æsthetic ends, in spite of their subordination to other
+<pb n='281'/><anchor id='Pg281'/>
+ends which are foreign to them. This he does by
+cleverly adapting them in a variety of ways to the
+arbitrary ends in view, and by rightly judging which form
+of æsthetical architectonic beauty is compatible and may
+be associated with a temple, which with a palace, which
+with a prison, and so forth. The more a harsh climate
+increases these demands of necessity and utility, determines
+them definitely, and prescribes them more inevitably,
+the less free play has beauty in architecture. In
+the mild climate of India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome,
+where the demands of necessity were fewer and less
+definite, architecture could follow its æsthetic ends with
+the greatest freedom. But under a northern sky this
+was sorely hindered. Here, when caissons, pointed roofs
+and towers were what was demanded, architecture could
+only unfold its own beauty within very narrow limits,
+and therefore it was obliged to make amends by resorting
+all the more to the borrowed ornaments of sculpture, as
+is seen in Gothic architecture.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We thus see that architecture is greatly restricted by
+the demands of necessity and utility; but on the other
+hand it has in them a very powerful support, for, on
+account of the magnitude and costliness of its works, and
+the narrow sphere of its æsthetic effect, it could not continue
+to exist merely as a fine art, if it had not also, as a
+useful and necessary profession, a firm and honourable
+place among the occupations of men. It is the want
+of this that prevents another art from taking its place
+beside architecture as a sister art, although in an
+æsthetical point of view it is quite properly to be classed
+along with it as its counterpart; I mean artistic arrangements
+of water. For what architecture accomplishes
+for the Idea of gravity when it appears in connection
+with that of rigidity, hydraulics accomplishes for the
+same Idea, when it is connected with fluidity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+formlessness, the greatest mobility and transparency.
+Leaping waterfalls foaming and tumbling over rocks,
+<pb n='282'/><anchor id='Pg282'/>
+cataracts dispersed into floating spray, springs gushing
+up as high columns of water, and clear reflecting lakes,
+reveal the Ideas of fluid and heavy matter, in precisely
+the same way as the works of architecture unfold the
+Ideas of rigid matter. Artistic hydraulics, however,
+obtains no support from practical hydraulics, for, as a
+rule, their ends cannot be combined; yet, in exceptional
+cases, this happens; for example, in the Cascata di Trevi
+at Rome.<note place='foot'>Cf. Chap. 35 of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 44. What the two arts we have spoken of accomplish
+for these lowest grades of the objectivity of will,
+is performed for the higher grades of vegetable nature
+by artistic horticulture. The landscape beauty of a
+scene consists, for the most part, in the multiplicity of
+natural objects which are present in it, and then in the
+fact that they are clearly separated, appear distinctly,
+and yet exhibit a fitting connection and alternation.
+These two conditions are assisted and promoted by landscape-gardening,
+but it has by no means such a mastery
+over its material as architecture, and therefore its effect
+is limited. The beauty with which it is concerned
+belongs almost exclusively to nature; it has done little
+for it; and, on the other hand, it can do little against
+unfavourable nature, and when nature works, not for it,
+but against it, its achievements are small.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The vegetable world offers itself everywhere for æsthetic
+enjoyment without the medium of art; but so far as
+it is an object of art, it belongs principally to landscape-painting;
+to the province of which all the rest of unconscious
+nature also belongs. In paintings of still life, and
+of mere architecture, ruins, interiors of churches, &amp;c., the
+subjective side of æsthetic pleasure is predominant, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+our satisfaction does not lie principally in the direct comprehension
+of the represented Ideas, but rather in the
+subjective correlative of this comprehension, pure, will-less
+knowing. For, because the painter lets us see these
+<pb n='283'/><anchor id='Pg283'/>
+things through his eyes, we at once receive a sympathetic
+and reflected sense of the deep spiritual peace and
+absolute silence of the will, which were necessary in
+order to enter with knowledge so entirely into these lifeless
+objects, and comprehend them with such love, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+in this case with such a degree of objectivity. The effect
+of landscape-painting proper is indeed, as a whole, of this
+kind; but because the Ideas expressed are more distinct
+and significant, as higher grades of the objectivity of
+will, the objective side of æsthetic pleasure already comes
+more to the front and assumes as much importance as the
+subjective side. Pure knowing as such is no longer the
+paramount consideration, for we are equally affected by
+the known Platonic Idea, the world as idea at an important
+grade of the objectification of will.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But a far higher grade is revealed by animal painting
+and sculpture. Of the latter we have some important
+antique remains; for example, horses at Venice, on Monte
+Cavallo, and on the Elgin Marbles, also at Florence in
+bronze and marble; the ancient boar, howling wolves,
+the lions in the arsenal at Venice, also in the Vatican a
+whole room almost filled with ancient animals, &amp;c. In
+these representations the objective side of æsthetic pleasure
+obtains a marked predominance over the subjective.
+The peace of the subject which knows these Ideas, which
+has silenced its own will, is indeed present, as it is in all
+æsthetic contemplation; but its effect is not felt, for we
+are occupied with the restlessness and impetuosity of the
+will represented. It is that very will, which constitutes
+our own nature, that here appears to us in forms, in
+which its manifestation is not, as in us, controlled and
+tempered by intellect, but exhibits itself in stronger
+traits, and with a distinctness that borders on the
+grotesque and monstrous. For this very reason there is
+no concealment; it is free, naïve, open as the day, and
+this is the cause of our interest in animals. The characteristics
+of species appeared already in the representation
+<pb n='284'/><anchor id='Pg284'/>
+of plants, but showed itself only in the forms; here it
+becomes much more distinct, and expresses itself not only
+in the form, but in the action, position, and mien, yet
+always merely as the character of the species, not of
+the individual. This knowledge of the Ideas of higher
+grades, which in painting we receive through extraneous
+means, we may gain directly by the pure contemplative
+perception of plants, and observation of beasts, and indeed
+of the latter in their free, natural, and unrestrained state.
+The objective contemplation of their manifold and marvellous
+forms, and of their actions and behaviour, is an
+instructive lesson from the great book of nature, it is a
+deciphering of the true <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>signatura rerum</foreign>.<note place='foot'>Jakob Böhm in his book, <q>de
+Signatura Rerum,</q> ch. i., § 13-15,
+says, <q>There is nothing in nature
+that does not manifest its internal
+form externally; for the internal
+continually labours to manifest itself....
+Everything has its language
+by which to reveal itself.... And
+this is the language of nature when
+everything speaks out of its own
+property, and continually manifests
+and declares itself, ... for each
+thing reveals its mother, which thus
+gives <emph>the essence and the will</emph> to the
+form.</q></note> We see in
+them the manifold grades and modes of the manifestation
+of will, which in all beings of one and the same grade,
+wills always in the same way, which objectifies itself as
+life, as existence in such endless variety, and such different
+forms, which are all adaptations to the different
+external circumstances, and may be compared to many
+variations on the same theme. But if we had to communicate
+to the observer, for reflection, and in a word,
+the explanation of their inner nature, it would be best to
+make use of that Sanscrit formula which occurs so often
+in the sacred books of the Hindoos, and is called Mahavakya,
+i.e., the great word: <q><foreign lang='sa' rend='italic'>Tat twam asi</foreign>,</q> which means,
+<q>this living thing art thou.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 45. The great problem of historical painting and
+sculpture is to express directly and for perception the
+Idea in which the will reaches the highest grade of its
+objectification. The objective side of the pleasure
+afforded by the beautiful is here always predominant,
+<pb n='285'/><anchor id='Pg285'/>
+and the subjective side has retired into the background.
+It is further to be observed that at the next grade below
+this, animal painting, the characteristic is entirely one
+with the beautiful; the most characteristic lion, wolf,
+horse, sheep, or ox, was always the most beautiful also.
+The reason of this is that animals have only the character
+of their species, no individual character. In the representation
+of men the character of the species is separated
+from that of the individual; the former is now called
+beauty (entirely in the objective sense), but the latter
+retains the name, character, or expression, and the new
+difficulty arises of representing both, at once and completely,
+in the same individual.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<emph>Human beauty</emph> is an objective expression, which means
+the fullest objectification of will at the highest grade at
+which it is knowable, the Idea of man in general, completely
+expressed in the sensible form. But however
+much the objective side of the beautiful appears here,
+the subjective side still always accompanies it. And just
+because no object transports us so quickly into pure
+æsthetic contemplation, as the most beautiful human
+countenance and form, at the sight of which we are
+instantly filled with unspeakable satisfaction, and raised
+above ourselves and all that troubles us; this is only
+possible because this most distinct and purest knowledge
+of will raises us most easily and quickly to the state of
+pure knowing, in which our personality, our will with its
+constant pain, disappears, so long as the pure æsthetic
+pleasure lasts. Therefore it is that Goethe says: <q>No
+evil can touch him who looks on human beauty; he feels
+himself at one with himself and with the world.</q> That
+a beautiful human form is produced by nature must be
+explained in this way. At this its highest grade the will
+objectifies itself in an individual; and therefore through
+circumstances and its own power it completely overcomes
+all the hindrances and opposition which the phenomena
+of the lower grades present to it. Such are the forces
+<pb n='286'/><anchor id='Pg286'/>
+of nature, from which the will must always first extort
+and win back the matter that belongs to all its manifestations.
+Further, the phenomenon of will at its
+higher grades always has multiplicity in its form. Even
+the tree is only a systematic aggregate of innumerably
+repeated sprouting fibres. This combination assumes
+greater complexity in higher forms, and the human body
+is an exceedingly complex system of different parts, each
+of which has a peculiar life of its own, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vita propria</foreign>, subordinate
+to the whole. Now that all these parts are in
+the proper fashion subordinate to the whole, and co-ordinate
+to each other, that they all work together
+harmoniously for the expression of the whole, nothing
+superfluous, nothing restricted; all these are the rare
+conditions, whose result is beauty, the completely expressed
+character of the species. So is it in nature.
+But how in art? One would suppose that art achieved
+the beautiful by imitating nature. But how is the artist
+to recognise the perfect work which is to be imitated,
+and distinguish it from the failures, if he does not anticipate
+the beautiful <emph>before experience</emph>? And besides this,
+has nature ever produced a human being perfectly
+beautiful in all his parts? It has accordingly been
+thought that the artist must seek out the beautiful parts,
+distributed among a number of different human beings,
+and out of them construct a beautiful whole; a perverse
+and foolish opinion. For it will be asked, how is he to
+know that just these forms and not others are beautiful?
+We also see what kind of success attended the efforts
+of the old German painters to achieve the beautiful by
+imitating nature. Observe their naked figures. No
+knowledge of the beautiful is possible purely <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign>,
+and from mere experience; it is always, at least
+in part, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, although quite different in kind, from
+the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, of which
+we are conscious <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>. These concern the universal
+form of phenomena as such, as it constitutes the possibility
+<pb n='287'/><anchor id='Pg287'/>
+of knowledge in general, the universal <emph>how</emph> of all
+phenomena, and from this knowledge proceed mathematics
+and pure natural science. But this other kind of
+knowledge <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, which makes it possible to express
+the beautiful, concerns, not the form but the content of
+phenomena, not the <emph>how</emph> but the <emph>what</emph> of the phenomenon.
+That we all recognise human beauty when we see it, but
+that in the true artist this takes place with such clearness
+that he shows it as he has never seen it, and surpasses
+nature in his representation; this is only possible
+because <emph>we ourselves are</emph> the will whose adequate objectification
+at its highest grade is here to be judged and
+discovered. Thus alone have we in fact an anticipation
+of that which nature (which is just the will that constitutes
+our own being) strives to express. And in the true
+genius this anticipation is accompanied by so great a
+degree of intelligence that he recognises the Idea in the
+particular thing, and thus, as it were, <emph>understands the
+half-uttered speech of nature</emph>, and articulates clearly what
+she only stammered forth. He expresses in the hard
+marble that beauty of form which in a thousand attempts
+she failed to produce, he presents it to nature, saying, as
+it were, to her, <q>That is what you wanted to say!</q> And
+whoever is able to judge replies, <q>Yes, that is it.</q> Only
+in this way was it possible for the genius of the Greeks
+to find the type of human beauty and establish it as a
+canon for the school of sculpture; and only by virtue of
+such an anticipation is it possible for all of us to recognise
+beauty, when it has actually been achieved by nature
+in the particular case. This anticipation is the <emph>Ideal</emph>.
+It is the <emph>Idea</emph> so far as it is known <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, at least half,
+and it becomes practical for art, because it corresponds
+to and completes what is given <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> through
+nature. The possibility of such an anticipation of the
+beautiful <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> in the artist, and of its recognition <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a
+posteriori</foreign> by the critic, lies in the fact that the artist and
+the critic are themselves the <q>in-itself</q> of nature, the
+<pb n='288'/><anchor id='Pg288'/>
+will which objectifies itself. For, as Empedocles said,
+like can only be known by like: only nature can understand
+itself: only nature can fathom itself: but only
+spirit also can understand spirit.<note place='foot'>The last sentence is the German
+of the <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente
+l'esprit</foreign>, of Helvetius. In the first
+edition there was no occasion to
+point this out, but since then the
+age has become so degraded and
+ignorant through the stupefying influence
+of the Hegelian sophistry,
+that some might quite likely say that
+an antithesis was intended here between
+<q>spirit and nature.</q> I am
+therefore obliged to guard myself in
+express terms against the suspicion
+of such vulgar sophisms.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The opinion, which is absurd, although expressed by
+the Socrates of Xenophon (Stobæi Floril, vol. ii. p. 384)
+that the Greeks discovered the established ideal of human
+beauty empirically, by collecting particular beautiful parts,
+uncovering and noting here a knee, there an arm, has an
+exact parallel in the art of poetry. The view is entertained,
+that Shakespeare, for example, observed, and then
+gave forth from his own experience of life, the innumerable
+variety of the characters in his dramas, so true,
+so sustained, so profoundly worked out. The impossibility
+and absurdity of such an assumption need not
+be dwelt upon. It is obvious that the man of genius
+produces the works of poetic art by means of an
+anticipation of what is characteristic, just as he produces
+the works of plastic and pictorial art by means
+of a prophetic anticipation of the beautiful; yet both
+require experience as a pattern or model, for thus alone
+can that which is dimly known <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> be called into
+clear consciousness, and an intelligent representation of
+it becomes possible.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Human beauty was explained above as the fullest
+objectification of will at the highest grade at which it
+is knowable. It expresses itself through the form; and
+this lies in space alone, and has no necessary connection
+with time, as, for example, motion has. Thus far then
+we may say: the adequate objectification of will through
+a merely spatial phenomenon is beauty, in the objective
+sense. A plant is nothing but such a merely spatial
+<pb n='289'/><anchor id='Pg289'/>
+phenomenon of will; for no motion, and consequently
+no relation to time (regarded apart from its development),
+belongs to the expression of its nature; its mere form
+expresses its whole being and displays it openly. But
+brutes and men require, further, for the full revelation of
+the will which is manifested in them, a series of actions,
+and thus the manifestation in them takes on a direct
+relation to time. All this has already been explained in
+the preceding book; it is related to what we are considering
+at present in the following way. As the merely
+spatial manifestation of will can objectify it fully or
+defectively at each definite grade,&mdash;and it is this which
+constitutes beauty or ugliness,&mdash;so the temporal objectification
+of will, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the action, and indeed the direct
+action, the movement, may correspond to the will, which
+objectifies itself in it, purely and fully without foreign
+admixture, without superfluity, without defect, only expressing
+exactly the act of will determined in each case;&mdash;or
+the converse of all this may occur. In the first
+case the movement is made with <emph>grace</emph>, in the second
+case without it. Thus as beauty is the adequate representation
+of will generally, through its merely spatial
+manifestation; <emph>grace</emph> is the adequate representation of will
+through its temporal manifestation, that is to say, the
+perfectly accurate and fitting expression of each act of
+will, through the movement and position which objectify
+it. Since movement and position presuppose the body,
+Winckelmann's expression is very true and suitable,
+when he says, <q>Grace is the proper relation of the acting
+person to the action</q> (Works, vol. i. p. 258). It is
+thus evident that beauty may be attributed to a plant,
+but no grace, unless in a figurative sense; but to brutes
+and men, both beauty and grace. Grace consists, according
+to what has been said, in every movement being
+performed, and every position assumed, in the easiest,
+most appropriate and convenient way, and therefore
+being the pure, adequate expression of its intention, or of
+<pb n='290'/><anchor id='Pg290'/>
+the act of will, without any superfluity, which exhibits
+itself as aimless, meaningless bustle, or as wooden stiffness.
+Grace presupposes as its condition a true proportion
+of all the limbs, and a symmetrical, harmonious
+figure; for complete ease and evident appropriateness of
+all positions and movements are only possible by means
+of these. Grace is therefore never without a certain
+degree of beauty of person. The two, complete and united,
+are the most distinct manifestation of will at the highest
+grade of its objectification.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It was mentioned above that in order rightly to portray
+man, it is necessary to separate the character of the
+species from that of the individual, so that to a certain
+extent every man expresses an Idea peculiar to himself,
+as was said in the last book. Therefore the arts whose
+aim is the representation of the Idea of man, have as
+their problem, not only beauty, the character of the
+species, but also the character of the individual, which is
+called, <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>par excellence</foreign>, <emph>character</emph>. But this is only the case
+in so far as this character is to be regarded, not as something
+accidental and quite peculiar to the man as a
+single individual, but as a side of the Idea of humanity
+which is specially apparent in this individual, and the
+representation of which is therefore of assistance in
+revealing this Idea. Thus the character, although as
+such it is individual, must yet be Ideal, that is, its significance
+in relation to the Idea of humanity generally (the
+objectifying of which it assists in its own way) must be
+comprehended and expressed with special prominence.
+Apart from this the representation is a portrait, a copy of
+the individual as such, with all his accidental qualities.
+And even the portrait ought to be, as Winckelmann says,
+the ideal of the individual.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+That <emph>character</emph> which is to be ideally comprehended,
+as the prominence of a special side of the Idea of humanity,
+expresses itself visibly, partly through permanent
+physiognomy and bodily form, partly through passing
+<pb n='291'/><anchor id='Pg291'/>
+emotion and passion, the reciprocal modification of knowing
+and willing by each other, which is all exhibited in
+the mien and movements. Since the individual always
+belongs to humanity, and, on the other hand, humanity
+always reveals itself in the individual with what is
+indeed peculiar ideal significance, beauty must not be
+destroyed by character nor character by beauty. For if
+the character of the species is annulled by that of the
+individual, the result is caricature; and if the character of
+the individual is annulled by that of the species, the
+result is an absence of meaning. Therefore the representation
+which aims at beauty, as sculpture principally
+does, will yet always modify this (the character of the
+species), in some respect, by the individual character, and
+will always express the Idea of man in a definite individual
+manner, giving prominence to a special side of it.
+For the human individual as such has to a certain extent
+the dignity of a special Idea, and it is essential to the
+Idea of man that it should express itself in individuals
+of special significance. Therefore we find in the works
+of the ancients, that the beauty distinctly comprehended
+by them, is not expressed in one form, but in many
+forms of different character. It is always apprehended,
+as it were, from a different side, and expressed in one
+way in Apollo, in another way in Bacchus, in another in
+Hercules, in another in Antinous; indeed the characteristic
+may limit the beautiful, and finally extend even to
+hideousness, in the drunken Silenus, in the Faun, &amp;c.
+If the characteristic goes so far as actually to annul the
+character of the species, if it extends to the unnatural, it
+becomes caricature. But we can far less afford to allow
+grace to be interfered with by what is characteristic than
+even beauty, for graceful position and movement are
+demanded for the expression of the character also; but
+yet it must be achieved in the way which is most fitting,
+appropriate, and easy for the person. This will be
+observed, not only by the sculptor and the painter, but
+<pb n='292'/><anchor id='Pg292'/>
+also by every good actor; otherwise caricature will appear
+here also as grimace or distortion.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In sculpture, beauty and grace are the principal concern.
+The special character of the mind, appearing in emotion,
+passion, alternations of knowing and willing, which can
+only be represented by the expression of the countenance
+and the gestures, is the peculiar sphere of <emph>painting</emph>. For
+although eyes and colour, which lie outside the province
+of sculpture, contribute much to beauty, they are yet far
+more essential to character. Further, beauty unfolds itself
+more completely when it is contemplated from various
+points of view; but the expression, the character, can only
+be completely comprehended from <emph>one</emph> point of view.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Because beauty is obviously the chief aim of sculpture,
+Lessing tried to explain the fact that the <emph>Laocoon does not
+cry out</emph>, by saying that crying out is incompatible with
+beauty. The Laocoon formed for Lessing the theme, or
+at least the text of a work of his own, and both before
+and after him a great deal has been written on the subject.
+I may therefore be allowed to express my views
+about it in passing, although so special a discussion does
+not properly belong to the scheme of this work, which is
+throughout concerned with what is general.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 46. That Laocoon, in the celebrated group, does not
+cry out is obvious, and the universal and ever-renewed
+surprise at this must be occasioned by the fact that any
+of us would cry out if we were in his place. And nature
+demands that it should be so; for in the case of the
+acutest physical pain, and the sudden seizure by the
+greatest bodily fear, all reflection, that might have
+inculcated silent endurance, is entirely expelled from
+consciousness, and nature relieves itself by crying out,
+thus expressing both the pain and the fear, summoning
+the deliverer and terrifying the assailer. Thus Winckelmann
+missed the expression of crying out; but as he
+wished to justify the artist he turned Laocoon into a
+Stoic, who considered it beneath his dignity to cry out
+<pb n='293'/><anchor id='Pg293'/>
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>secundum naturam</foreign>, but added to his pain the useless
+constraint of suppressing all utterance of it. Winckelmann
+therefore sees in him <q>the tried spirit of a great
+man, who writhes in agony, and yet seeks to suppress
+the utterance of his feeling, and to lock it up in himself.
+He does not break forth into loud cries, as in Virgil, but
+only anxious sighs escape him,</q> &amp;c. (Works, vol. vii.
+p. 98, and at greater length in vol. vi. p. 104). Now
+Lessing criticised this opinion of Winckelmann's in his
+Laocoon, and improved it in the way mentioned above.
+In place of the psychological he gave the purely æsthetic
+reason that beauty, the principle of ancient art, does not
+admit of the expression of crying out. Another argument
+which he added to this, that a merely passing state
+incapable of duration ought not to be represented in
+motionless works of art, has a hundred examples of most
+excellent figures against it, which are fixed in merely
+transitory movements, dancing, wrestling, catching, &amp;c.
+Indeed Goethe, in the essay on the Laocoon, which
+opens the Propylaen (p. 8), holds that the choice of
+such a merely fleeting movement is absolutely necessary.
+In our own day Hirt (Horen, 1797, tenth St.) finally
+decided the point, deducing everything from the highest
+truth of expression, that Laocoon does not cry out,
+because he can no longer do so, as he is at the point
+of death from choking. Lastly, Fernow (<q>Römische
+Studien,</q> vol. i. p. 246) expounded and weighed all
+these opinions; he added, however, no new one of his
+own, but combined these three eclectically.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I cannot but wonder that such thoughtful and acute
+men should laboriously bring far-fetched and insufficient
+reasons, should resort to psychological and physiological
+arguments, to explain a matter the reason of which lies
+so near at hand, and is obvious at once to the unprejudiced;
+and especially I wonder that Lessing, who came
+so near the true explanation, should yet have entirely
+missed the real point.
+</p>
+
+<pb n='294'/><anchor id='Pg294'/>
+
+<p>
+Before all psychological and physiological inquiries as
+to whether Laocoon would cry out in his position or not
+(and I certainly affirm that he would), it must be decided
+as regards the group in question, that crying out ought
+not to be expressed in it, for the simple reason that its
+expression lies quite outside the province of sculpture.
+A shrieking Laocoon could not be produced in marble,
+but only a figure with the mouth open vainly endeavouring
+to shriek; a Laocoon whose voice has stuck in his
+throat, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vox faucibus haesit</foreign>. The essence of shrieking,
+and consequently its effect upon the onlooker, lies entirely
+in sound; not in the distortion of the mouth. This
+phenomenon, which necessarily accompanies shrieking,
+derives motive and justification only from the sound
+produced by means of it; then it is permissible and
+indeed necessary, as characteristic of the action, even
+though it interferes with beauty. But in plastic art, to
+which the representation of shrieking is quite foreign and
+impossible, it would be actual folly to represent the
+medium of violent shrieking, the distorted mouth, which
+would disturb all the features and the remainder of the
+expression; for thus at the sacrifice of many other things
+the means would be represented, while its end, the
+shrieking itself, and its effect upon our feelings, would
+be left out. Nay more, there would be produced the
+spectacle of a continuous effort without effect, which is
+always ridiculous, and may really be compared to what
+happened when some one for a joke stopped the horn of
+a night watchman with wax while he was asleep, and
+then awoke him with the cry of fire, and amused himself
+by watching his vain endeavours to blow the horn.
+When, on the other hand, the expression of shrieking lies
+in the province of poetic or histrionic art, it is quite
+admissible, because it helps to express the truth, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the
+complete expression of the Idea. Thus it is with poetry,
+which claims the assistance of the imagination of the
+reader, in order to enable it to represent things perceptibly.
+<pb n='295'/><anchor id='Pg295'/>
+Therefore Virgil makes Laocoon cry out like the
+bellowing of an ox that has broken loose after being
+struck by the axe; and Homer (Il. xx. 48-53) makes
+Mars and Minerva shriek horribly, without derogating
+from their divine dignity or beauty. The same with
+acting; Laocoon on the stage would certainly have to
+shriek. Sophocles makes Philoctetus cry out, and, on
+the ancient stage at any rate, he must actually have
+done so. As a case in point, I remember having seen in
+London the great actor Kemble play in a piece called
+Pizarro, translated from the German. He took the part
+of the American, a half-savage, but of very noble character.
+When he was wounded he cried out loudly and
+wildly, which had a great and admirable effect, for it was
+exceedingly characteristic and therefore assisted the truth
+of the representation very much. On the other hand, a
+painted or sculptured model of a man shrieking, would
+be much more absurd than the painted music which is
+censured in Goethe's Propylaen. For shrieking does far
+more injury to the expression and beauty of the whole
+than music, which at the most only occupies the hands
+and arms, and is to be looked upon as an occupation
+characteristic of the person; indeed thus far it may quite
+rightly be painted, as long as it demands no violent
+movement of the body, or distortion of the mouth: for
+example, St. Cecilia at the organ, Raphael's violin-player
+in the Sciarra Gallery at Rome, and others. Since then,
+on account of the limits of the art, the pain of Laocoon
+must not be expressed by shrieking, the artist was
+obliged to employ every other expression of pain; this
+he has done in the most perfect manner, as is ably described
+by Winckelmann (Works, vol. vi. p. 104), whose
+admirable account thus retains its full value and truth, as
+soon as we abstract from the stoical view which underlies
+it.<note place='foot'>This digression is worked out more fully in the 36th Chapter of the
+Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<pb n='296'/><anchor id='Pg296'/>
+
+<p>
+§ 47. Because beauty accompanied with grace is the
+principal object of sculpture, it loves nakedness, and
+allows clothing only so far as it does not conceal the
+form. It makes use of drapery, not as a covering, but as
+a means of exhibiting the form, a method of exposition
+that gives much exercise to the understanding, for it
+can only arrive at a perception of the cause, the form
+of the body, through the only directly given effect,
+the drapery. Thus to a certain extent drapery is in
+sculpture what fore-shortening is in painting. Both are
+suggestions, yet not symbolical, but such that, if they
+are successful, they force the understanding directly to
+perceive what is suggested, just as if it were actually
+given.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I may be allowed, in passing, to insert here a comparison
+that is very pertinent to the arts we are discussing.
+It is this: as the beautiful bodily form is seen to
+the greatest advantage when clothed in the lightest way,
+or indeed without any clothing at all, and therefore a
+very handsome man, if he had also taste and the courage
+to follow it, would go about almost naked, clothed only
+after the manner of the ancients; so every one who possesses
+a beautiful and rich mind will always express
+himself in the most natural, direct, and simple way, concerned,
+if it be possible, to communicate his thoughts to
+others, and thus relieve the loneliness that he must feel
+in such a world as this. And conversely, poverty of
+mind, confusion, and perversity of thought, will clothe
+itself in the most far-fetched expressions and the
+obscurest forms of speech, in order to wrap up in difficult
+and pompous phraseology small, trifling, insipid, or
+commonplace thoughts; like a man who has lost the
+majesty of beauty, and trying to make up for the
+deficiency by means of clothing, seeks to hide the
+insignificance or ugliness of his person under barbaric
+finery, tinsel, feathers, ruffles, cuffs, and mantles. Many
+an author, if compelled to translate his pompous and
+<pb n='297'/><anchor id='Pg297'/>
+obscure book into its little clear content, would be as
+utterly spoilt as this man if he had to go naked.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 48. <emph>Historical painting</emph> has for its principal object,
+besides beauty and grace, character. By character we
+mean generally, the representation of will at the highest
+grade of its objectification, when the individual, as giving
+prominence to a particular side of the Idea of humanity,
+has special significance, and shows this not merely by his
+form, but makes it visible in his bearing and occupation,
+by action of every kind, and the modifications of knowing
+and willing that occasion and accompany it. The Idea
+of man must be exhibited in these circumstances, and
+therefore the unfolding of its many-sidedness must be
+brought before our eyes by means of representative
+individuals, and these individuals can only be made
+visible in their significance through various scenes, events,
+and actions. This is the endless problem of the historical
+painter, and he solves it by placing before us scenes
+of life of every kind, of greater or less significance. No
+individual and no action can be without significance; in
+all and through all the Idea of man unfolds itself more
+and more. Therefore no event of human life is excluded
+from the sphere of painting. It is thus a great injustice
+to the excellent painters of the Dutch school, to prize
+merely their technical skill, and to look down upon them
+in other respects, because, for the most part, they represent
+objects of common life, whereas it is assumed that
+only the events of the history of the world, or the incidents
+of biblical story, have significance. We ought first
+to bethink ourselves that the inward significance of an
+action is quite different from its outward significance, and
+that these are often separated from each other. The
+outward significance is the importance of an action in
+relation to its result for and in the actual world; thus
+according to the principle of sufficient reason. The
+inward significance is the depth of the insight into
+the Idea of man which it reveals, in that it brings
+<pb n='298'/><anchor id='Pg298'/>
+to light sides of that Idea which rarely appear, by
+making individuals who assert themselves distinctly
+and decidedly, disclose their peculiar characteristics by
+means of appropriately arranged circumstances. Only
+the inward significance concerns art; the outward belongs
+to history. They are both completely independent
+of each other; they may appear together, but may each
+appear alone. An action which is of the highest significance
+for history may in inward significance be a very
+ordinary and common one; and conversely, a scene of
+ordinary daily life may be of great inward significance, if
+human individuals, and the inmost recesses of human
+action and will, appear in it in a clear and distinct light.
+Further, the outward and the inward significance of a
+scene may be equal and yet very different. Thus, for
+example, it is all the same, as far as inward significance
+is concerned, whether ministers discuss the fate of countries
+and nations over a map, or boors wrangle in a beer-house
+over cards and dice, just as it is all the same
+whether we play chess with golden or wooden pieces.
+But apart from this, the scenes and events that make up
+the life of so many millions of men, their actions, their
+sorrows, their joys, are on that account important enough
+to be the object of art, and by their rich variety they
+must afford material enough for unfolding the many-sided
+Idea of man. Indeed the very transitoriness of the moment
+which art has fixed in such a picture (now called <emph>genre</emph>-painting)
+excites a slight and peculiar sensation; for
+to fix the fleeting, ever-changing world in the enduring
+picture of a single event, which yet represents the whole,
+is an achievement of the art of painting by which it
+seems to bring time itself to a standstill, for it raises the
+individual to the Idea of its species. Finally, the historical
+and outwardly significant subjects of painting have
+often the disadvantage that just what is significant in
+them cannot be presented to perception, but must be
+arrived at by thought. In this respect the nominal
+<pb n='299'/><anchor id='Pg299'/>
+significance of the picture must be distinguished from its
+real significance. The former is the outward significance,
+which, however, can only be reached as a conception; the
+latter is that side of the Idea of man which is made
+visible to the onlooker in the picture. For example,
+Moses found by the Egyptian princess is the nominal
+significance of a painting; it represents a moment of the
+greatest importance in history; the real significance, on
+the other hand, that which is really given to the onlooker,
+is a foundling child rescued from its floating cradle by a
+great lady, an incident which may have happened more
+than once. The costume alone can here indicate the
+particular historical case to the learned; but the costume
+is only of importance to the nominal significance, and is a
+matter of indifference to the real significance; for the
+latter knows only the human being as such, not the
+arbitrary forms. Subjects taken from history have no
+advantage over those which are taken from mere possibility,
+and which are therefore to be called, not individual,
+but merely general. For what is peculiarly
+significant in the former is not the individual, not the
+particular event as such, but the universal in it, the side
+of the Idea of humanity which expresses itself through
+it. But, on the other hand, definite historical subjects
+are not on this account to be rejected, only the really
+artistic view of such subjects, both in the painter and
+in the beholder, is never directed to the individual particulars
+in them, which properly constitute the historical,
+but to the universal which expresses itself in them, to
+the Idea. And only those historical subjects are to be
+chosen the chief point of which can actually be represented,
+and not merely arrived at by thought, otherwise
+the nominal significance is too remote from the real;
+what is merely thought in connection with the picture
+becomes of most importance, and interferes with what is
+perceived. If even on the stage it is not right that the
+chief incident of the plot should take place behind the
+<pb n='300'/><anchor id='Pg300'/>
+scenes (as in French tragedies), it is clearly a far greater
+fault in a picture. Historical subjects are distinctly
+disadvantageous only when they confine the painter to
+a field which has not been chosen for artistic but for
+other reasons, and especially when this field is poor in
+picturesque and significant objects&mdash;if, for example, it is
+the history of a small, isolated, capricious, hierarchical
+(<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, ruled by error), obscure people, like the Jews, despised
+by the great contemporary nations of the East and the
+West. Since the wandering of the tribes lies between us
+and all ancient nations, as the change of the bed of the
+ocean lies between the earth's surface as it is to-day and
+as it was when those organisations existed which we only
+know from fossil remains, it is to be regarded generally as
+a great misfortune that the people whose culture was to
+be the principal basis of our own were not the Indians or
+the Greeks, or even the Romans, but these very Jews.
+But it was especially a great misfortune for the Italian
+painters of genius in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
+that, in the narrow sphere to which they were arbitrarily
+driven for the choice of subjects, they were obliged to have
+recourse to miserable beings of every kind. For the New
+Testament, as regards its historical part, is almost more
+unsuitable for painting than the Old, and the subsequent
+history of martyrs and doctors of the church is a very
+unfortunate subject. Yet of the pictures, whose subject
+is the history or mythology of Judaism and Christianity,
+we must carefully distinguish those in which the peculiar,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the ethical spirit of Christianity is revealed for perception,
+by the representation of men who are full of
+this spirit. These representations are in fact the highest
+and most admirable achievements of the art of painting;
+and only the greatest masters of this art succeeded in
+this, particularly Raphael and Correggio, and especially
+in their earlier pictures. Pictures of this kind are not
+properly to be classed as historical: for, as a rule, they
+represent no event, no action; but are merely groups of
+<pb n='301'/><anchor id='Pg301'/>
+saints, with the Saviour himself, often still a child, with His
+mother, angels, &amp;c. In their countenances, and especially
+in the eyes, we see the expression, the reflection, of the
+completest knowledge, that which is not directed to particular
+things, but has fully grasped the Ideas, and thus
+the whole nature of the world and life. And this knowledge
+in them, reacting upon the will, does not, like other
+knowledge, convey <emph>motives</emph> to it, but on the contrary has
+become a <emph>quieter</emph> of all will, from which proceeded the
+complete resignation, which is the innermost spirit of
+Christianity, as of the Indian philosophy; the surrender
+of all volition, conversion, the suppression of will, and
+with it of the whole inner being of this world, that is to
+say, salvation. Thus these masters of art, worthy of
+eternal praise, expressed perceptibly in their works the
+highest wisdom. And this is the summit of all art. It
+has followed the will in its adequate objectivity, the
+Ideas, through all its grades, in which it is affected and
+its nature unfolded in so many ways, first by causes,
+then by stimuli, and finally by motives. And now art
+ends with the representation of the free self-suppression
+of will, by means of the great peace which it gains from
+the perfect knowledge of its own nature.<note place='foot'>In order to understand this passage it is necessary to have read the
+whole of the next book.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 49. The truth which lies at the foundation of all
+that we have hitherto said about art, is that the object of
+art, the representation of which is the aim of the artist,
+and the knowledge of which must therefore precede his
+work as its germ and source, is an Idea in Plato's sense,
+and never anything else; not the particular thing, the
+object of common apprehension, and not the concept, the
+object of rational thought and of science. Although the
+Idea and the concept have something in common, because
+both represent as unity a multiplicity of real things; yet
+the great difference between them has no doubt been
+made clear and evident enough by what we have said
+<pb n='302'/><anchor id='Pg302'/>
+about concepts in the first book, and about Ideas in this
+book. I by no means wish to assert, however, that Plato
+really distinctly comprehended this difference; indeed many
+of his examples of Ideas, and his discussions of them, are
+applicable only to concepts. Meanwhile we leave this
+question alone and go on our own way, glad when we
+come upon traces of any great and noble mind, yet not
+following his footsteps but our own aim. The <emph>concept</emph> is
+abstract, discursive, undetermined within its own sphere,
+only determined by its limits, attainable and comprehensible
+by him who has only reason, communicable by
+words without any other assistance, entirely exhausted
+by its definition. The <emph>Idea</emph> on the contrary, although
+defined as the adequate representative of the concept, is
+always object of perception, and although representing
+an infinite number of particular things, is yet thoroughly
+determined. It is never known by the individual as
+such, but only by him who has raised himself above all
+willing and all individuality to the pure subject of knowing.
+Thus it is only attainable by the man of genius,
+and by him who, for the most part through the assistance
+of the works of genius, has reached an exalted frame of
+mind, by increasing his power of pure knowing. It is
+therefore not absolutely but only conditionally communicable,
+because the Idea, comprehended and repeated in
+the work of art, appeals to every one only according to
+the measure of his own intellectual worth. So that just
+the most excellent works of every art, the noblest productions
+of genius, must always remain sealed books to
+the dull majority of men, inaccessible to them, separated
+from them by a wide gulf, just as the society of princes
+is inaccessible to the common people. It is true that
+even the dullest of them accept on authority recognisedly
+great works, lest otherwise they should argue their
+own incompetence; but they wait in silence, always
+ready to express their condemnation, as soon as they are
+allowed to hope that they may do so without being left
+<pb n='303'/><anchor id='Pg303'/>
+to stand alone; and then their long-restrained hatred
+against all that is great and beautiful, and against the
+authors of it, gladly relieves itself; for such things never
+appealed to them, and for that very reason were humiliating
+to them. For as a rule a man must have worth in
+himself in order to recognise it and believe in it willingly
+and freely in others. On this rests the necessity of
+modesty in all merit, and the disproportionately loud
+praise of this virtue, which alone of all its sisters is
+always included in the eulogy of every one who ventures
+to praise any distinguished man, in order to appease and
+quiet the wrath of the unworthy. What then is modesty
+but hypocritical humility, by means of which, in a world
+swelling with base envy, a man seeks to obtain pardon
+for excellences and merits from those who have none?
+For whoever attributes to himself no merits, because he
+actually has none, is not modest but merely honest.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The <emph>Idea</emph> is the unity that falls into multiplicity on
+account of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive
+apprehension; the <emph>concept</emph>, on the contrary, is the unity
+reconstructed out of multiplicity by the abstraction of
+our reason; the latter may be defined as <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>unitas post rem</foreign>,
+the former as <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>unitas ante rem</foreign>. Finally, we may express
+the distinction between the Idea and the concept, by a
+comparison, thus: the <emph>concept</emph> is like a dead receptacle,
+in which, whatever has been put, actually lies side by
+side, but out of which no more can be taken (by analytical
+judgment) than was put in (by synthetical reflection);
+the (Platonic) <emph>Idea</emph>, on the other hand, develops,
+in him who has comprehended it, ideas which are new as
+regards the concept of the same name; it resembles a
+living organism, developing itself and possessed of the
+power of reproduction, which brings forth what was not
+put into it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It follows from all that has been said, that the
+concept, useful as it is in life, and serviceable, necessary
+and productive as it is in science, is yet always barren
+<pb n='304'/><anchor id='Pg304'/>
+and unfruitful in art. The comprehended Idea, on the
+contrary, is the true and only source of every work of
+art. In its powerful originality it is only derived from
+life itself, from nature, from the world, and that only
+by the true genius, or by him whose momentary inspiration
+reaches the point of genius. Genuine and immortal
+works of art spring only from such direct apprehension.
+Just because the Idea is and remains object of perception,
+the artist is not conscious in the abstract of the
+intention and aim of his work; not a concept, but an
+Idea floats before his mind; therefore he can give no
+justification of what he does. He works, as people say,
+from pure feeling, and unconsciously, indeed instinctively.
+On the contrary, imitators, mannerists, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>imitatores, servum
+pecus</foreign>, start, in art, from the concept; they observe what
+pleases and affects us in true works of art; understand
+it clearly, fix it in a concept, and thus abstractly, and
+then imitate it, openly or disguisedly, with dexterity
+and intentionally. They suck their nourishment, like
+parasite plants, from the works of others, and like polypi,
+they become the colour of their food. We might carry
+comparison further, and say that they are like machines
+which mince fine and mingle together whatever is put
+into them, but can never digest it, so that the different
+constituent parts may always be found again if they are
+sought out and separated from the mixture; the man of
+genius alone resembles the organised, assimilating, transforming
+and reproducing body. For he is indeed educated
+and cultured by his predecessors and their works;
+but he is really fructified only by life and the world
+directly, through the impression of what he perceives;
+therefore the highest culture never interferes with his
+originality. All imitators, all mannerists, apprehend in
+concepts the nature of representative works of art; but
+concepts can never impart inner life to a work. The
+age, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the dull multitude of every time, knows only
+concepts, and sticks to them, and therefore receives
+<pb n='305'/><anchor id='Pg305'/>
+mannered works of art with ready and loud applause:
+but after a few years these works become insipid, because
+the spirit of the age, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the prevailing concepts, in which
+alone they could take root, have changed. Only true
+works of art, which are drawn directly from nature and
+life, have eternal youth and enduring power, like nature
+and life themselves. For they belong to no age, but to
+humanity, and as on that account they are coldly received
+by their own age, to which they disdain to link themselves
+closely, and because indirectly and negatively they
+expose the existing errors, they are slowly and unwillingly
+recognised; on the other hand, they cannot grow old, but
+appear to us ever fresh and new down to the latest ages.
+Then they are no longer exposed to neglect and ignorance,
+for they are crowned and sanctioned by the praise of the
+few men capable of judging, who appear singly and rarely
+in the course of ages,<note place='foot'><foreign rend='italic'>Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto.</foreign></note> and give in their votes, whose
+slowly growing number constitutes the authority, which
+alone is the judgment-seat we mean when we appeal to
+posterity. It is these successively appearing individuals,
+for the mass of posterity will always be and remain just
+as perverse and dull as the mass of contemporaries always
+was and always is. We read the complaints of great men
+in every century about the customs of their age. They
+always sound as if they referred to our own age, for the
+race is always the same. At every time and in every
+art, mannerisms have taken the place of the spirit, which
+was always the possession of a few individuals, but
+mannerisms are just the old cast-off garments of the last
+manifestation of the spirit that existed and was recognised.
+From all this it appears that, as a rule, the praise of
+posterity can only be gained at the cost of the praise of
+one's contemporaries, and <hi rend='italic'>vice versa</hi>.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xxxiv. of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 50. If the aim of all art is the communication of the
+comprehended Idea, which through the mind of the artist
+<pb n='306'/><anchor id='Pg306'/>
+appears in such a form that it is purged and isolated from
+all that is foreign to it, and may now be grasped by the
+man of weaker comprehension and no productive faculty;
+if further, it is forbidden in art to start from the concept,
+we shall not be able to consent to the intentional and
+avowed employment of a work of art for the expression
+of a concept; this is the case in the <emph>Allegory</emph>. An allegory
+is a work of art which means something different
+from what it represents. But the object of perception,
+and consequently also the Idea, expresses itself directly
+and completely, and does not require the medium of
+something else which implies or indicates it. Thus,
+that which in this way is indicated and represented by
+something entirely different, because it cannot itself be
+made object of perception, is always a concept. Therefore
+through the allegory a conception has always to be
+signified, and consequently the mind of the beholder has
+to be drawn away from the expressed perceptible idea to
+one which is entirely different, abstract and not perceptible,
+and which lies quite outside the work of art.
+The picture or statue is intended to accomplish here
+what is accomplished far more fully by a book. Now,
+what we hold is the end of art, representation of a
+perceivable, comprehensible Idea, is not here the end.
+No great completeness in the work of art is demanded
+for what is aimed at here. It is only necessary that we
+should see what the thing is meant to be, for, as soon as
+this has been discovered, the end is reached, and the mind
+is now led away to quite a different kind of idea to
+an abstract conception, which is the end that was in
+view. Allegories in plastic and pictorial art are, therefore,
+nothing but hieroglyphics; the artistic value which they
+may have as perceptible representations, belongs to them
+not as allegories, but otherwise. That the <q>Night</q> of
+Correggio, the <q>Genius of Fame</q> of Hannibal Caracci,
+and the <q>Hours</q> of Poussin, are very beautiful pictures,
+is to be separated altogether from the fact that they are
+<pb n='307'/><anchor id='Pg307'/>
+allegories. As allegories they do not accomplish more
+than a legend, indeed rather less. We are here again
+reminded of the distinction drawn above between the
+real and the nominal significance of a picture. The
+nominal is here the allegorical as such, for example, the
+<q>Genius of Fame.</q> The real is what is actually represented,
+in this case a beautiful winged youth, surrounded
+by beautiful boys; this expresses an Idea. But this real
+significance affects us only so long as we forget the nominal,
+allegorical significance; if we think of the latter, we
+forsake the perception, and the mind is occupied with an
+abstract conception; but the transition from the Idea to
+the conception is always a fall. Indeed, that nominal
+significance, that allegorical intention, often injures the
+real significance, the perceptible truth. For example,
+the unnatural light in the <q>Night</q> of Correggio, which,
+though beautifully executed, has yet a merely allegorical
+motive, and is really impossible. If then an allegorical
+picture has artistic value, it is quite separate from and
+independent of what it accomplishes as allegory. Such
+a work of art serves two ends at once, the expression of
+a conception and the expression of an Idea. Only the
+latter can be an end of art; the other is a foreign end,
+the trifling amusement of making a picture also do
+service as a legend, as a hieroglyphic, invented for the
+pleasure of those to whom the true nature of art can
+never appeal. It is the same thing as when a work of
+art is also a useful implement of some kind, in which
+case it also serves two ends; for example, a statue which
+is at the same time a candelabrum or a caryatide; or a
+bas-relief, which is also the shield of Achilles. True
+lovers of art will allow neither the one nor the other.
+It is true that an allegorical picture may, because of this
+quality, produce a vivid impression upon the feelings;
+but when this is the case, a legend would under the
+same circumstances produce the same effect. For example,
+if the desire of fame were firmly and lastingly
+<pb n='308'/><anchor id='Pg308'/>
+rooted in the heart of a man, because he regarded it as
+his rightful possession, which is only withheld from
+him so long as he has not produced the charter of his
+ownership; and if the Genius of Fame, with his laurel
+crown, were to appear to such a man, his whole mind
+would be excited, and his powers called into activity;
+but the same effect would be produced if he were suddenly
+to see the word <q>fame,</q> in large distinct letters on
+the wall. Or if a man has made known a truth, which
+is of importance either as a maxim for practical life, or
+as insight for science, but it has not been believed; an
+allegorical picture representing time as it lifts the veil,
+and discloses the naked figure of Truth, will affect him
+powerfully; but the same effect would be produced by
+the legend: <q><foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>Le temps découvre la vérité.</foreign></q> For what
+really produces the effect here is the abstract thought,
+not the object of perception.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If then, in accordance with what has been said, allegory
+in plastic and pictorial art is a mistaken effort, serving
+an end which is entirely foreign to art, it becomes quite
+unbearable when it leads so far astray that the representation
+of forced and violently introduced subtilties
+degenerates into absurdity. Such, for example, is a
+tortoise, to represent feminine seclusion; the downward
+glance of Nemesis into the drapery of her bosom, signifying
+that she can see into what is hidden; the explanation
+of Bellori that Hannibal Carracci represents voluptuousness
+clothed in a yellow robe, because he wishes
+to indicate that her lovers soon fade and become yellow
+as straw. If there is absolutely no connection between
+the representation and the conception signified by it,
+founded on subsumption under the concept, or association
+of Ideas; but the signs and the things signified are
+combined in a purely conventional manner, by positive,
+accidentally introduced laws; then I call this degenerate
+kind of allegory <emph>Symbolism</emph>. Thus the rose is the symbol
+of secrecy, the laurel is the symbol of fame, the palm is
+<pb n='309'/><anchor id='Pg309'/>
+the symbol of peace, the scallop-shell is the symbol
+of pilgrimage, the cross is the symbol of the Christian
+religion. To this class also belongs all significance of
+mere colour, as yellow is the colour of falseness, and blue
+is the colour of fidelity. Such symbols may often be of
+use in life, but their value is foreign to art. They are
+simply to be regarded as hieroglyphics, or like Chinese
+word-writing, and really belong to the same class as
+armorial bearings, the bush that indicates a public-house,
+the key of the chamberlain, or the leather of the mountaineer.
+If, finally, certain historical or mythical persons,
+or personified conceptions, are represented by certain
+fixed symbols, these are properly called <emph>emblems</emph>. Such
+are the beasts of the Evangelist, the owl of Minerva, the
+apple of Paris, the Anchor of Hope, &amp;c. For the most
+part, however, we understand by emblems those simple
+allegorical representations explained by a motto, which
+are meant to express a moral truth, and of which large
+collections have been made by J. Camerarius, Alciatus,
+and others. They form the transition to poetical allegory,
+of which we shall have more to say later. Greek
+sculpture devotes itself to the perception, and therefore
+it is <emph>æsthetical</emph>; Indian sculpture devotes itself to the
+conception, and therefore it is merely <emph>symbolical</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This conclusion in regard to allegory, which is founded
+on our consideration of the nature of art and quite consistent
+with it, is directly opposed to the opinion of
+Winckelmann, who, far from explaining allegory, as we
+do, as something quite foreign to the end of art, and
+often interfering with it, always speaks in favour of it,
+and indeed (Works, vol. i. p. 55) places the highest aim
+of art in the <q>representation of universal conceptions,
+and non-sensuous things.</q> We leave it to every one to
+adhere to whichever view he pleases. Only the truth
+became very clear to me from these and similar views
+of Winckelmann connected with his peculiar metaphysic
+of the beautiful, that one may have the greatest susceptibility
+<pb n='310'/><anchor id='Pg310'/>
+for artistic beauty, and the soundest judgment in
+regard to it, without being able to give an abstract and
+strictly philosophical justification of the nature of the
+beautiful; just as one may be very noble and virtuous,
+and may have a tender conscience, which decides with
+perfect accuracy in particular cases, without on that
+account being in a position to investigate and explain in
+the abstract the ethical significance of action.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Allegory has an entirely different relation to poetry
+from that which it has to plastic and pictorial art, and
+although it is to be rejected in the latter, it is not only
+permissible, but very serviceable to the former. For in
+plastic and pictorial art it leads away from what is perceptibly
+given, the proper object of all art, to abstract
+thoughts; but in poetry the relation is reversed; for here
+what is directly given in words is the concept, and the
+first aim is to lead from this to the object of perception,
+the representation of which must be undertaken by the
+imagination of the hearer. If in plastic and pictorial art
+we are led from what is immediately given to something
+else, this must always be a conception, because here only
+the abstract cannot be given directly; but a conception
+must never be the source, and its communication must
+never be the end of a work of art. In poetry, on the
+contrary, the conception is the material, the immediately
+given, and therefore we may very well leave it, in order
+to call up perceptions which are quite different, and in
+which the end is reached. Many a conception or abstract
+thought may be quite indispensable to the connection of
+a poem, which is yet, in itself and directly, quite incapable
+of being perceived; and then it is often made perceptible
+by means of some example which is subsumed under it.
+This takes place in every trope, every metaphor, simile,
+parable, and allegory, all of which differ only in the length
+and completeness of their expression. Therefore, in the
+arts which employ language as their medium, similes and
+allegories are of striking effect. How beautifully Cervantes
+<pb n='311'/><anchor id='Pg311'/>
+says of sleep in order to express the fact that it
+frees us from all spiritual and bodily suffering, <q>It is a
+mantle that covers all mankind.</q> How beautifully
+Kleist expresses allegorically the thought that philosophers
+and men of science enlighten mankind, in the line,
+<q>Those whose midnight lamp lights the world.</q> How
+strongly and sensuously Homer describes the harmful
+Ate when he says: <q>She has tender feet, for she walks
+not on the hard earth, but treads on the heads of men</q>
+(Il. xix. 91.) How forcibly we are struck by Menenius
+Agrippa's fable of the belly and the limbs, addressed to
+the people of Rome when they seceded. How beautifully
+Plato's figure of the Cave, at the beginning of the seventh
+book of the <q>Republic</q> to which we have already referred,
+expresses a very abstract philosophical dogma. The fable
+of Persephone is also to be regarded as a deeply significant
+allegory of philosophical tendency, for she became
+subject to the nether world by tasting a pomegranate.
+This becomes peculiarly enlightening from Goethe's treatment
+of the fable, as an episode in the <hi rend='italic'>Triumph der
+Empfindsamkeit</hi>, which is beyond all praise. Three detailed
+allegorical works are known to me, one, open and
+avowed, is the incomparable <q>Criticon</q> of Balthasar
+Gracian. It consists of a great rich web of connected
+and highly ingenious allegories, that serve here as the fair
+clothing of moral truths, to which he thus imparts the
+most perceptible form, and astonishes us by the richness
+of his invention. The two others are concealed allegories,
+<q>Don Quixote</q> and <q>Gulliver's Travels.</q> The first is an
+allegory of the life of every man, who will not, like others,
+be careful, merely for his own welfare, but follows some
+objective, ideal end, which has taken possession of his
+thoughts and will; and certainly, in this world, he has
+then a strange appearance. In the case of Gulliver we
+have only to take everything physical as spiritual or
+intellectual, in order to see what the <q>satirical rogue,</q> as
+Hamlet would call him, meant by it. Such, then, in the
+<pb n='312'/><anchor id='Pg312'/>
+poetical allegory, the conception is always the given,
+which it tries to make perceptible by means of a picture;
+it may sometimes be expressed or assisted by a painted
+picture. Such a picture will not be regarded as a work
+of art, but only as a significant symbol, and it makes no
+claim to pictorial, but only to poetical worth. Such is
+that beautiful allegorical vignette of Lavater's, which must
+be so heartening to every defender of truth: a hand
+holding a light is stung by a wasp, while gnats are burning
+themselves in the flame above; underneath is the
+motto:
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>And although it singes the wings of the gnats,</q></l>
+<l>Destroys their heads and all their little brains,</l>
+<l rend='margin-left: 14'>Light is still light;</l>
+<l>And although I am stung by the angriest wasp,</l>
+<l rend='margin-left: 14'><q rend='post'>I will not let it go.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+To this class also belongs the gravestone with the burnt-out,
+smoking candle, and the inscription&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>When it is out, it becomes clear</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Whether the candle was tallow or wax.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Finally, of this kind is an old German genealogical tree,
+in which the last representative of a very ancient family
+thus expresses his determination to live his life to the
+end in abstinence and perfect chastity, and therefore to
+let his race die out; he represents himself at the root
+of the high-branching tree cutting it over himself with
+shears. In general all those symbols referred to above,
+commonly called emblems, which might also be defined
+as short painted fables with obvious morals, belong to
+this class. Allegories of this kind are always to be regarded
+as belonging to poetry, not to painting, and as
+justified thereby; moreover, the pictorial execution is here
+always a matter of secondary importance, and no more is
+demanded of it than that it shall represent the thing so
+that we can recognise it. But in poetry, as in plastic
+art, the allegory passes into the symbol if there is merely
+<pb n='313'/><anchor id='Pg313'/>
+an arbitrary connection between what it presented to
+perception and the abstract significance of it. For as all
+symbolism rests, at bottom, on an agreement, the symbol
+has this among other disadvantages, that in time its
+meaning is forgotten, and then it is dumb. Who would
+guess why the fish is a symbol of Christianity if he did
+not know? Only a Champollion; for it is entirely a
+phonetic hieroglyphic. Therefore, as a poetical allegory,
+the Revelation of John stands much in the same position
+as the reliefs with <hi rend='italic'>Magnus Deus sol Mithra</hi>, which are
+still constantly being explained.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 51. If now, with the exposition which has been
+given of art in general, we turn from plastic and pictorial
+art to poetry, we shall have no doubt that its aim also
+is the revelation of the Ideas, the grades of the objectification
+of will, and the communication of them to the
+hearer with the distinctness and vividness with which the
+poetical sense comprehends them. Ideas are essentially
+perceptible; if, therefore, in poetry only abstract conceptions
+are directly communicated through words, it is
+yet clearly the intention to make the hearer perceive the
+Ideas of life in the representatives of these conceptions,
+and this can only take place through the assistance of
+his own imagination. But in order to set the imagination
+to work for the accomplishment of this end, the abstract
+conceptions, which are the immediate material of poetry
+as of dry prose, must be so arranged that their spheres
+intersect each other in such a way that none of them can
+remain in its abstract universality; but, instead of it, a
+perceptible representative appears to the imagination;
+and this is always further modified by the words of the
+poet according to what his intention may be. As the
+chemist obtains solid precipitates by combining perfectly
+clear and transparent fluids; the poet understands how
+to precipitate, as it were, the concrete, the individual, the
+perceptible idea, out of the abstract and transparent
+universality of the concepts by the manner in which he
+<pb n='314'/><anchor id='Pg314'/>
+combines them. For the Idea can only be known by
+perception; and knowledge of the Idea is the end of art.
+The skill of a master, in poetry as in chemistry, enables
+us always to obtain the precise precipitate we intended.
+This end is assisted by the numerous epithets in poetry,
+by means of which the universality of every concept is
+narrowed more and more till we reach the perceptible.
+Homer attaches to almost every substantive an adjective,
+whose concept intersects and considerably diminishes
+the sphere of the concept of the substantive, which is
+thus brought so much the nearer to perception: for
+example&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Εν δ᾽ επεσ᾽ Ωκεανῳ λαμπρον φαος ἡελιοιο,</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Ἑλκον νυκτα μελαιναν επι ζειδωρον αρουραν.</q></l>
+</lg>
+
+<lg>
+<l>(<q rend='pre'>Occidit vero in Oceanum splendidum lumen solis,</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Trahens noctem nigram super almam terram.</q>)</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+And&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Where gentle winds from the blue heavens sigh,</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>There stand the myrtles still, the laurel high,</q>&mdash;</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+calls up before the imagination by means of a few concepts
+the whole delight of a southern clime.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Rhythm and rhyme are quite peculiar aids to poetry.
+I can give no other explanation of their incredibly powerful
+effect than that our faculties of perception have
+received from time, to which they are essentially bound,
+some quality on account of which we inwardly follow,
+and, as it were, consent to each regularly recurring
+sound. In this way rhythm and rhyme are partly a
+means of holding our attention, because we willingly
+follow the poem read, and partly they produce in us a
+blind consent to what is read prior to any judgment, and
+this gives the poem a certain emphatic power of convincing
+independent of all reasons.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+From the general nature of the material, that is, the
+concepts, which poetry uses to communicate the Ideas,
+the extent of its province is very great. The whole of
+<pb n='315'/><anchor id='Pg315'/>
+nature, the Ideas of all grades, can be represented by
+means of it, for it proceeds according to the Idea it has
+to impart, so that its representations are sometimes descriptive,
+sometimes narrative, and sometimes directly
+dramatic. If, in the representation of the lower grades
+of the objectivity of will, plastic and pictorial art generally
+surpass it, because lifeless nature, and even brute
+nature, reveals almost its whole being in a single well-chosen
+moment; man, on the contrary, so far as he does
+not express himself by the mere form and expression of
+his person, but through a series of actions and the accompanying
+thoughts and emotions, is the principal object of
+poetry, in which no other art can compete with it, for
+here the progress or movement which cannot be represented
+in plastic or pictorial art just suits its purpose.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The revelation of the Idea, which is the highest grade
+of the objectivity of will, the representation of man in
+the connected series of his efforts and actions, is thus the
+great problem of poetry. It is true that both experience
+and history teach us to know man; yet oftener men than
+man, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, they give us empirical notes of the behaviour
+of men to each other, from which we may frame rules
+for our own conduct, oftener than they afford us deep
+glimpses of the inner nature of man. The latter function,
+however, is by no means entirely denied them; but
+as often as it is the nature of mankind itself that discloses
+itself to us in history or in our own experience,
+we have comprehended our experience, and the historian
+has comprehended history, with artistic eyes, poetically,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, according to the Idea, not the phenomenon, in its inner
+nature, not in its relations. Our own experience is the
+indispensable condition of understanding poetry as of
+understanding history; for it is, so to speak, the dictionary
+of the language that both speak. But history is related
+to poetry as portrait-painting is related to historical
+painting; the one gives us the true in the individual,
+the other the true in the universal; the one has the
+<pb n='316'/><anchor id='Pg316'/>
+truth of the phenomenon, and can therefore verify it
+from the phenomenal, the other has the truth of the
+Idea, which can be found in no particular phenomenon, but
+yet speaks to us from them all. The poet from deliberate
+choice represents significant characters in significant situations;
+the historian takes both as they come. Indeed,
+he must regard and select the circumstances and the
+persons, not with reference to their inward and true
+significance, which expresses the Idea, but according to
+the outward, apparent, and relatively important significance
+with regard to the connection and the consequences.
+He must consider nothing in and for itself in its essential
+character and expression, but must look at everything in
+its relations, in its connection, in its influence upon what
+follows, and especially upon its own age. Therefore he
+will not overlook an action of a king, though of little
+significance, and in itself quite common, because it has
+results and influence. And, on the other hand, actions
+of the highest significance of particular and very
+eminent individuals are not to be recorded by him if
+they have no consequences. For his treatment follows
+the principle of sufficient reason, and apprehends the
+phenomenon, of which this principle is the form. But
+the poet comprehends the Idea, the inner nature of man
+apart from all relations, outside all time, the adequate
+objectivity of the thing-in-itself, at its highest grade.
+Even in that method of treatment which is necessary
+for the historian, the inner nature and significance of the
+phenomena, the kernel of all these shells, can never be
+entirely lost. He who seeks for it, at any rate, may find
+it and recognise it. Yet that which is significant in
+itself, not in its relations, the real unfolding of the Idea,
+will be found far more accurately and distinctly in poetry
+than in history, and, therefore, however paradoxical it
+may sound, far more really genuine inner truth is to be
+attributed to poetry than to history. For the historian
+must accurately follow the particular event according to
+<pb n='317'/><anchor id='Pg317'/>
+life, as it develops itself in time in the manifold tangled
+chains of causes and effects. It is, however, impossible
+that he can have all the data for this; he cannot have
+seen all and discovered all. He is forsaken at every
+moment by the original of his picture, or a false one
+substitutes itself for it, and this so constantly that I
+think I may assume that in all history the false outweighs
+the true. The poet, on the contrary, has comprehended
+the Idea of man from some definite side which
+is to be represented; thus it is the nature of his own
+self that objectifies itself in it for him. His knowledge,
+as we explained above when speaking of sculpture, is
+half <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>; his ideal stands before his mind firm,
+distinct, brightly illuminated, and cannot forsake him;
+therefore he shows us, in the mirror of his mind, the
+Idea pure and distinct, and his delineation of it
+down to the minutest particular is true as life itself.<note place='foot'><p>It is scarcely necessary to say
+that wherever I speak of poets I
+refer exclusively to that rare phenomenon
+the great true poet. I mean
+no one else; least of all that dull
+insipid tribe, the mediocre poets,
+rhymsters, and inventors of fables,
+that flourishes so luxuriantly at the
+present day in Germany. They
+ought rather to have the words
+shouted in their ears unceasingly
+from all sides&mdash;
+</p>
+<p>
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Mediocribus esse poëtis<lb/>
+Non homines, non Dî, non concessere columnæ.</foreign>
+</p>
+<p>
+It is worthy of serious consideration
+what an amount of time&mdash;both their
+own and other people's&mdash;and paper
+is lost by this swarm of mediocre
+poets, and how injurious is their
+influence. For the public always
+seizes on what is new, and has naturally
+a greater proneness to what is
+perverse and dull as akin to itself.
+Therefore these works of the mediocre
+poets draw it away and hold it back
+from the true masterpieces and the
+education they afford, and thus working
+in direct antagonism to the benign
+influence of genius, they ruin
+taste more and more, and retard the
+progress of the age. Such poets
+should therefore be scourged with
+criticism and satire without indulgence
+or sympathy till they are induced,
+for their own good, to apply
+their muse rather to reading what
+is good than to writing what is bad.
+For if the bungling of the incompetent
+so raised the wrath of the
+gentle Apollo that he could flay
+Marsyas, I do not see on what the
+mediocre poets will base their claim
+to tolerance.</p></note>
+The great ancient historians are, therefore, in those
+particulars in which their data fail them, for example,
+in the speeches of their heroes&mdash;poets; indeed their
+whole manner of handling their material approaches
+<pb n='318'/><anchor id='Pg318'/>
+to the epic. But this gives their representations unity,
+and enables them to retain inner truth, even when
+outward truth was not accessible, or indeed was falsified.
+And as we compared history to portrait-painting, in
+contradistinction to poetry, which corresponds to historical
+painting, we find that Winckelmann's maxim,
+that the portrait ought to be the ideal of the individual,
+was followed by the ancient historians, for they represent
+the individual in such a way as to bring out
+that side of the Idea of man which is expressed in it.
+Modern historians, on the contrary, with few exceptions,
+give us in general only <q>a dust-bin and a lumber-room,
+and at the most a chronicle of the principal political
+events.</q> Therefore, whoever desires to know man in his
+inner nature, identical in all its phenomena and developments,
+to know him according to the Idea, will find that
+the works of the great, immortal poet present a far
+truer, more distinct picture, than the historians can ever
+give. For even the best of the historians are, as poets,
+far from the first; and moreover their hands are tied.
+In this aspect the relation between the historian and the
+poet may be illustrated by the following comparison.
+The mere, pure historian, who works only according to
+data, is like a man, who without any knowledge of
+mathematics, has investigated the relations of certain
+figures, which he has accidentally found, by measuring
+them; and the problem thus empirically solved is
+affected of course by all the errors of the drawn figure.
+The poet, on the other hand, is like the mathematician,
+who constructs these relations <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> in pure perception,
+and expresses them not as they actually are in the
+drawn figure, but as they are in the Idea, which the
+drawing is intended to render for the senses. Therefore
+Schiller says:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>What has never anywhere come to pass,</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>That alone never grows old.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<pb n='319'/><anchor id='Pg319'/>
+
+<p>
+Indeed I must attribute greater value to biographies, and
+especially to autobiographies, in relation to the knowledge
+of the nature of man, than to history proper, at
+least as it is commonly handled. Partly because in the
+former the data can be collected more accurately and
+completely than in the latter; partly, because in history
+proper, it is not so much men as nations and heroes that
+act, and the individuals who do appear, seem so far off,
+surrounded with such pomp and circumstance, clothed in
+the stiff robes of state, or heavy, inflexible armour, that
+it is really hard through all this to recognise the human
+movements. On the other hand, the life of the individual
+when described with truth, in a narrow sphere, shows
+the conduct of men in all its forms and subtilties, the
+excellence, the virtue, and even holiness of a few, the
+perversity, meanness, and knavery of most, the dissolute
+profligacy of some. Besides, in the only aspect we are
+considering here, that of the inner significance of the
+phenomenal, it is quite the same whether the objects
+with which the action is concerned, are, relatively considered,
+trifling or important, farm-houses or kingdoms:
+for all these things in themselves are without significance,
+and obtain it only in so far as the will is moved by
+them. The motive has significance only through its
+relation to the will, while the relation which it has
+as a thing to other things like itself, does not concern
+us here. As a circle of one inch in diameter, and a
+circle of forty million miles in diameter, have precisely
+the same geometrical properties, so are the events and
+the history of a village and a kingdom essentially the
+same; and we may study and learn to know mankind
+as well in the one as in the other. It is also a mistake
+to suppose that autobiographies are full of deceit and
+dissimulation. On the contrary, lying (though always
+possible) is perhaps more difficult there than elsewhere.
+Dissimulation is easiest in mere conversation; indeed,
+though it may sound paradoxical, it is really more
+<pb n='320'/><anchor id='Pg320'/>
+difficult even in a letter. For in the case of a letter the
+writer is alone, and looks into himself, and not out on
+the world, so that what is strange and distant does not
+easily approach him; and he has not the test of the
+impression made upon another before his eyes. But the
+receiver of the letter peruses it quietly in a mood
+unknown to the writer, reads it repeatedly and at
+different times, and thus easily finds out the concealed
+intention. We also get to know an author as a man
+most easily from his books, because all these circumstances
+act here still more strongly and permanently. And in
+an autobiography it is so difficult to dissimulate, that
+perhaps there does not exist a single one that is not, as
+a whole, more true, than any history that ever was
+written. The man who writes his own life surveys it as
+a whole, the particular becomes small, the near becomes
+distant, the distant becomes near again, the motives that
+influenced him shrink; he seats himself at the confessional,
+and has done so of his own free will; the
+spirit of lying does not so easily take hold of him here,
+for there is also in every man an inclination to truth
+which has first to be overcome whenever he lies, and
+which here has taken up a specially strong position.
+The relation between biography and the history of nations
+may be made clear for perception by means of the
+following comparison: History shows us mankind as a
+view from a high mountain shows us nature; we see
+much at a time, wide stretches, great masses, but nothing
+is distinct nor recognisable in all the details of its own
+peculiar nature. On the other hand, the representation
+of the life of the individual shows us the man, as we
+see nature if we go about among her trees, plants, rocks,
+and waters. But in landscape-painting, in which the
+artist lets us look at nature with his eyes, the knowledge
+of the Ideas, and the condition of pure will-less knowing,
+which is demanded by these, is made much easier for us;
+and, in the same way, poetry is far superior both to
+<pb n='321'/><anchor id='Pg321'/>
+history and biography, in the representation of the Ideas
+which may be looked for in all three. For here also
+genius holds up to us the magic glass, in which all that
+is essential and significant appears before us collected
+and placed in the clearest light, and what is accidental
+and foreign is left out.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xxxviii. of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The representation of the Idea of man, which is the
+work of the poet, may be performed, so that what is
+represented is also the representer. This is the case in
+lyrical poetry, in songs, properly so called, in which the
+poet only perceives vividly his own state and describes
+it. Thus a certain subjectivity is essential to this kind
+of poetry from the nature of its object. Again, what is
+to be represented may be entirely different from him who
+represents it, as is the case in all other kinds of poetry,
+in which the poet more or less conceals himself behind
+his representation, and at last disappears altogether. In
+the ballad the poet still expresses to some extent his own
+state through the tone and proportion of the whole;
+therefore, though much more objective than the lyric, it
+has yet something subjective. This becomes less in the
+idyll, still less in the romantic poem, almost entirely
+disappears in the true epic, and even to the last vestige
+in the drama, which is the most objective and, in more
+than one respect, the completest and most difficult form
+of poetry. The lyrical form of poetry is consequently
+the easiest, and although art, as a whole, belongs only to
+the true man of genius, who so rarely appears, even a man
+who is not in general very remarkable may produce a
+beautiful song if, by actual strong excitement from without,
+some inspiration raises his mental powers; for all that is
+required for this is a lively perception of his own state
+at a moment of emotional excitement. This is proved
+by the existence of many single songs by individuals who
+have otherwise remained unknown; especially the German
+national songs, of which we have an exquisite collection
+<pb n='322'/><anchor id='Pg322'/>
+in the <q>Wunderhorn;</q> and also by innumerable love-songs
+and other songs of the people in all languages;&mdash;for
+to seize the mood of a moment and embody it in a
+song is the whole achievement of this kind of poetry. Yet
+in the lyrics of true poets the inner nature of all mankind
+is reflected, and all that millions of past, present,
+and future men have found, or will find, in the same
+situations, which are constantly recurring, finds its exact
+expression in them. And because these situations, by
+constant recurrence, are permanent as man himself and
+always call up the same sensations, the lyrical productions
+of genuine poets remain through thousands of years
+true, powerful, and fresh. But if the poet is always the
+universal man, then all that has ever moved a human
+heart, all that human nature in any situation has ever
+produced from itself, all that dwells and broods in any
+human breast&mdash;is his theme and his material, and also
+all the rest of nature. Therefore the poet may just as
+well sing of voluptuousness as of mysticism, be Anacreon
+or Angelus Silesius, write tragedies or comedies, represent
+the sublime or the common mind&mdash;according to humour
+or vocation. And no one has the right to prescribe to
+the poet what he ought to be&mdash;noble and sublime, moral,
+pious, Christian, one thing or another, still less to reproach
+him because he is one thing and not another.
+He is the mirror of mankind, and brings to its consciousness
+what it feels and does.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If we now consider more closely the nature of the lyric
+proper, and select as examples exquisite and pure models,
+not those that approach in any way to some other form
+of poetry, such as the ballad, the elegy, the hymn, the
+epigram, &amp;c., we shall find that the peculiar nature of
+the lyric, in the narrowest sense, is this: It is the subject
+of will, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, his own volition, which the consciousness
+of the singer feels; often as a released and satisfied
+desire (joy), but still oftener as a restricted desire (grief),
+always as an emotion, a passion, a moved frame of mind.
+<pb n='323'/><anchor id='Pg323'/>
+Besides this, however, and along with it, by the sight of
+surrounding nature, the singer becomes conscious of himself
+as the subject of pure, will-less knowing, whose
+unbroken blissful peace now appears, in contrast to the
+stress of desire which is always restricted and always
+needy. The feeling of this contrast, this alternation, is
+really what the lyric as a whole expresses, and what
+principally constitutes the lyrical state of mind. In it
+pure knowing comes to us, as it were, to deliver us from
+desire and its stain; we follow, but only for an instant;
+desire, the remembrance of our own personal ends, tears
+us anew from peaceful contemplation; yet ever again
+the next beautiful surrounding in which the pure will-less
+knowledge presents itself to us, allures us away from
+desire. Therefore, in the lyric and the lyrical mood, desire
+(the personal interest of the ends), and pure perception
+of the surrounding presented, are wonderfully mingled
+with each other; connections between them are sought for
+and imagined; the subjective disposition, the affection of
+the will, imparts its own hue to the perceived surrounding,
+and conversely, the surroundings communicate the reflex
+of their colour to the will. The true lyric is the expression
+of the whole of this mingled and divided state of
+mind. In order to make clear by examples this abstract
+analysis of a frame of mind that is very far from all
+abstraction, any of the immortal songs of Goethe may be
+taken. As specially adapted for this end I shall recommend
+only a few: <q>The Shepherd's Lament,</q> <q>Welcome
+and Farewell,</q> <q>To the Moon,</q> <q>On the Lake,</q> <q>Autumn;</q>
+also the songs in the <q>Wunderhorn</q> are excellent examples;
+particularly the one which begins, <q>O Bremen,
+I must now leave thee.</q> As a comical and happy
+parody of the lyrical character a song of Voss strikes me
+as remarkable. It describes the feeling of a drunk
+plumber falling from a tower, who observes in passing
+that the clock on the tower is at half-past eleven, a
+remark which is quite foreign to his condition, and thus
+<pb n='324'/><anchor id='Pg324'/>
+belongs to knowledge free from will. Whoever accepts
+the view that has been expressed of the lyrical frame of
+mind, will also allow, that it is the sensuous and poetical
+knowledge of the principle which I established in my
+essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and have also
+referred to in this work, that the identity of the subject
+of knowing with that of willing may be called the
+miracle κατ᾽ εξοχην; so that the poetical effect of the
+lyric rests finally on the truth of that principle. In the
+course of life these two subjects, or, in popular language,
+head and heart, are ever becoming further apart; men
+are always separating more between their subjective
+feeling and their objective knowledge. In the child the
+two are still entirely blended together; it scarcely knows
+how to distinguish itself from its surroundings, it is
+at one with them. In the young man all perception
+chiefly affects feeling and mood, and even mingles with
+it, as Byron very beautifully expresses&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>I live not in myself, but I become</q></l>
+<l>Portion of that around me; and to me</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>High mountains are a feeling.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+This is why the youth clings so closely to the perceptible
+and outward side of things; this is why he is
+only fit for lyrical poetry, and only the full-grown man
+is capable of the drama. The old man we can think of
+as at the most an epic poet, like Ossian, and Homer,
+for narration is characteristic of old age.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In the more objective kinds of poetry, especially in the
+romance, the epic, and the drama, the end, the revelation
+of the Idea of man, is principally attained by two means,
+by true and profound representation of significant characters,
+and by the invention of pregnant situations in which
+they disclose themselves. For as it is incumbent upon
+the chemist not only to exhibit the simple elements, pure
+and genuine, and their principal compounds, but also to
+expose them to the influence of such reagents as will
+<pb n='325'/><anchor id='Pg325'/>
+clearly and strikingly bring out their peculiar qualities,
+so is it incumbent on the poet not only to present to us
+significant characters truly and faithfully as nature itself;
+but, in order that we may get to know them, he must
+place them in those situations in which their peculiar
+qualities will fully unfold themselves, and appear distinctly
+in sharp outline; situations which are therefore
+called significant. In real life, and in history, situations
+of this kind are rarely brought about by chance, and
+they stand alone, lost and concealed in the multitude of
+those which are insignificant. The complete significance
+of the situations ought to distinguish the romance, the
+epic, and the drama from real life as completely as the
+arrangement and selection of significant characters. In
+both, however, absolute truth is a necessary condition of
+their effect, and want of unity in the characters, contradiction
+either of themselves or of the nature of humanity
+in general, as well as impossibility, or very great improbability
+in the events, even in mere accessories, offend
+just as much in poetry as badly drawn figures, false perspective,
+or wrong lighting in painting. For both in
+poetry and painting we demand the faithful mirror of life,
+of man, of the world, only made more clear by the representation,
+and more significant by the arrangement.
+For there is only one end of all the arts, the representation
+of the Ideas; and their essential difference lies
+simply in the different grades of the objectification of will
+to which the Ideas that are to be represented belong.
+This also determines the material of the representation.
+Thus the arts which are most widely separated may yet
+throw light on each other. For example, in order to
+comprehend fully the Ideas of water it is not sufficient to
+see it in the quiet pond or in the evenly-flowing stream;
+but these Ideas disclose themselves fully only when the
+water appears under all circumstances and exposed to all
+kinds of obstacles. The effects of the varied circumstances
+and obstacles give it the opportunity of fully
+<pb n='326'/><anchor id='Pg326'/>
+exhibiting all its qualities. This is why we find it
+beautiful when it tumbles, rushes, and foams, or leaps
+into the air, or falls in a cataract of spray; or, lastly, if
+artificially confined it springs up in a fountain. Thus
+showing itself different under different circumstances, it
+yet always faithfully asserts its character; it is just as
+natural to it to spout up as to lie in glassy stillness; it
+is as ready for the one as for the other as soon as the
+circumstances appear. Now, what the engineer achieves
+with the fluid matter of water, the architect achieves with
+the rigid matter of stone, and just this the epic or dramatic
+poet achieves with the Idea of man. Unfolding
+and rendering distinct the Idea expressing itself in the
+object of every art, the Idea of the will which objectifies
+itself at each grade, is the common end of all the arts.
+The life of man, as it shows itself for the most part in
+the real world, is like the water, as it is generally seen in
+the pond and the river; but in the epic, the romance, the
+tragedy, selected characters are placed in those circumstances
+in which all their special qualities unfold themselves,
+the depths of the human heart are revealed, and
+become visible in extraordinary and very significant
+actions. Thus poetry objectifies the Idea of man, an Idea
+which has the peculiarity of expressing itself in highly
+individual characters.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Tragedy is to be regarded, and is recognised as the
+summit of poetical art, both on account of the greatness
+of its effect and the difficulty of its achievement. It is
+very significant for our whole system, and well worthy
+of observation, that the end of this highest poetical
+achievement is the representation of the terrible side of
+life. The unspeakable pain, the wail of humanity, the
+triumph of evil, the scornful mastery of chance, and the
+irretrievable fall of the just and innocent, is here presented
+to us; and in this lies a significant hint of the
+nature of the world and of existence. It is the strife of
+will with itself, which here, completely unfolded at the
+<pb n='327'/><anchor id='Pg327'/>
+highest grade of its objectivity, comes into fearful prominence.
+It becomes visible in the suffering of men,
+which is now introduced, partly through chance and
+error, which appear as the rulers of the world, personified
+as fate, on account of their insidiousness, which even
+reaches the appearance of design; partly it proceeds
+from man himself, through the self-mortifying efforts of
+a few, through the wickedness and perversity of most.
+It is one and the same will that lives and appears in
+them all, but whose phenomena fight against each other
+and destroy each other. In one individual it appears
+powerfully, in another more weakly; in one more subject
+to reason, and softened by the light of knowledge, in
+another less so, till at last, in some single case, this
+knowledge, purified and heightened by suffering itself,
+reaches the point at which the phenomenon, the veil of
+Mâya, no longer deceives it. It sees through the form
+of the phenomenon, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>. The
+egoism which rests on this perishes with it, so that now
+the <emph>motives</emph> that were so powerful before have lost their
+might, and instead of them the complete knowledge of
+the nature of the world, which has a <emph>quieting</emph> effect on
+the will, produces resignation, the surrender not merely
+of life, but of the very will to live. Thus we see in
+tragedies the noblest men, after long conflict and suffering,
+at last renounce the ends they have so keenly
+followed, and all the pleasures of life for ever, or else
+freely and joyfully surrender life itself. So is it with
+the steadfast prince of Calderon; with Gretchen in
+<q>Faust;</q> with Hamlet, whom his friend Horatio would
+willingly follow, but is bade remain a while, and in
+this harsh world draw his breath in pain, to tell the
+story of Hamlet, and clear his memory; so also is it
+with the Maid of Orleans, the Bride of Messina; they
+all die purified by suffering, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, after the will to live
+which was formerly in them is dead. In the <q>Mohammed</q>
+of Voltaire this is actually expressed in the concluding
+<pb n='328'/><anchor id='Pg328'/>
+words which the dying Palmira addresses to
+Mohammad: <q>The world is for tyrants: live!</q> On the
+other hand, the demand for so-called poetical justice rests
+on entire misconception of the nature of tragedy, and,
+indeed, of the nature of the world itself. It boldly
+appears in all its dulness in the criticisms which Dr.
+Samuel Johnson made on particular plays of Shakespeare,
+for he very naïvely laments its entire absence. And its
+absence is certainly obvious, for in what has Ophelia,
+Desdemona, or Cordelia offended? But only the dull,
+optimistic, Protestant-rationalistic, or peculiarly Jewish
+view of life will make the demand for poetical justice,
+and find satisfaction in it. The true sense of tragedy is
+the deeper insight, that it is not his own individual sins
+that the hero atones for, but original sin, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the crime
+of existence itself:
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Pues el delito mayor</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Del hombre es haber nacido;</q></l>
+</lg>
+
+<lg>
+<l>(<q rend='pre'>For the greatest crime of man</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Is that he was born;</q>)</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+as Calderon exactly expresses it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I shall allow myself only one remark, more closely
+concerning the treatment of tragedy. The representation
+of a great misfortune is alone essential to tragedy.
+But the many different ways in which this is introduced
+by the poet may be brought under three specific conceptions.
+It may happen by means of a character of
+extraordinary wickedness, touching the utmost limits of
+possibility, who becomes the author of the misfortune;
+examples of this kind are Richard III., Iago in <q>Othello,</q>
+Shylock in <q>The Merchant of Venice,</q> Franz Moor,
+Phædra of Euripides, Creon in the <q>Antigone,</q> &amp;c.,
+&amp;c. Secondly, it may happen through blind fate, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+chance and error; a true pattern of this kind is the
+Œdipus Rex of Sophocles, the <q>Trachiniæ</q> also; and
+in general most of the tragedies of the ancients belong
+<pb n='329'/><anchor id='Pg329'/>
+to this class. Among modern tragedies, <q>Romeo and
+Juliet,</q> <q>Tancred</q> by Voltaire, and <q>The Bride of
+Messina,</q> are examples. Lastly, the misfortune may be
+brought about by the mere position of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>dramatis
+personæ</foreign> with regard to each other, through their relations;
+so that there is no need either for a tremendous error or
+an unheard-of accident, nor yet for a character whose
+wickedness reaches the limits of human possibility; but
+characters of ordinary morality, under circumstances such
+as often occur, are so situated with regard to each other
+that their position compels them, knowingly and with
+their eyes open, to do each other the greatest injury,
+without any one of them being entirely in the wrong.
+This last kind of tragedy seems to me far to surpass
+the other two, for it shows us the greatest misfortune,
+not as an exception, not as something occasioned
+by rare circumstances or monstrous characters, but as
+arising easily and of itself out of the actions and
+characters of men, indeed almost as essential to them,
+and thus brings it terribly near to us. In the other
+two kinds we may look on the prodigious fate and the
+horrible wickedness as terrible powers which certainly
+threaten us, but only from afar, which we may very well
+escape without taking refuge in renunciation. But in the
+last kind of tragedy we see that those powers which
+destroy happiness and life are such that their path to us
+also is open at every moment; we see the greatest
+sufferings brought about by entanglements that our fate
+might also partake of, and through actions that perhaps
+we also are capable of performing, and so could not
+complain of injustice; then shuddering we feel ourselves
+already in the midst of hell. This last kind of tragedy
+is also the most difficult of achievement; for the greatest
+effect has to be produced in it with the least use of
+means and causes of movement, merely through the
+position and distribution of the characters; therefore
+even in many of the best tragedies this difficulty is
+<pb n='330'/><anchor id='Pg330'/>
+evaded. Yet one tragedy may be referred to as a perfect
+model of this kind, a tragedy which in other respects is
+far surpassed by more than one work of the same great
+master; it is <q>Clavigo.</q> <q>Hamlet</q> belongs to a certain
+extent to this class, as far as the relation of Hamlet to
+Laertes and Ophelia is concerned. <q>Wallenstein</q> has also
+this excellence. <q>Faust</q> belongs entirely to this class, if
+we regard the events connected with Gretchen and her
+brother as the principal action; also the <q>Cid</q> of Corneille,
+only that it lacks the tragic conclusion, while on
+the contrary the analogous relation of Max to Thecla
+has it.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xxxvii. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 52. Now that we have considered all the fine arts
+in the general way that is suitable to our point of view,
+beginning with architecture, the peculiar end of which is
+to elucidate the objectification of will at the lowest grades
+of its visibility, in which it shows itself as the dumb
+unconscious tendency of the mass in accordance with
+laws, and yet already reveals a breach of the unity of
+will with itself in a conflict between gravity and rigidity&mdash;and
+ending with the consideration of tragedy, which
+presents to us at the highest grades of the objectification
+of will this very conflict with itself in terrible magnitude
+and distinctness; we find that there is still another
+fine art which has been excluded from our consideration,
+and had to be excluded, for in the systematic connection
+of our exposition there was no fitting place for it&mdash;I
+mean <emph>music</emph>. It stands alone, quite cut off from all the
+other arts. In it we do not recognise the copy or
+repetition of any Idea of existence in the world. Yet it
+is such a great and exceedingly noble art, its effect on
+the inmost nature of man is so powerful, and it is so
+entirely and deeply understood by him in his inmost
+consciousness as a perfectly universal language, the
+distinctness of which surpasses even that of the perceptible
+world itself, that we certainly have more to
+<pb n='331'/><anchor id='Pg331'/>
+look for in it than an <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>exercitum arithmeticæ occultum
+nescientis se numerare animi</foreign>,<note place='foot'>Leibnitii epistolæ, collectio Kortholti, ep. 154.</note> which Leibnitz called
+it. Yet he was perfectly right, as he considered
+only its immediate external significance, its form. But
+if it were nothing more, the satisfaction which it
+affords would be like that which we feel when
+a sum in arithmetic comes out right, and could not
+be that intense pleasure with which we see the deepest
+recesses of our nature find utterance. From our standpoint,
+therefore, at which the æsthetic effect is the
+criterion, we must attribute to music a far more serious
+and deep significance, connected with the inmost nature
+of the world and our own self, and in reference to which
+the arithmetical proportions, to which it may be reduced,
+are related, not as the thing signified, but merely as the
+sign. That in some sense music must be related to the
+world as the representation to the thing represented, as
+the copy to the original, we may conclude from the
+analogy of the other arts, all of which possess this
+character, and affect us on the whole in the same way
+as it does, only that the effect of music is stronger,
+quicker, more necessary and infallible. Further, its
+representative relation to the world must be very deep,
+absolutely true, and strikingly accurate, because it is
+instantly understood by every one, and has the appearance
+of a certain infallibility, because its form may be
+reduced to perfectly definite rules expressed in numbers,
+from which it cannot free itself without entirely ceasing
+to be music. Yet the point of comparison between
+music and the world, the respect in which it stands to
+the world in the relation of a copy or repetition, is very
+obscure. Men have practised music in all ages without
+being able to account for this; content to understand it
+directly, they renounce all claim to an abstract conception
+of this direct understanding itself.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I gave my mind entirely up to the impression of music
+<pb n='332'/><anchor id='Pg332'/>
+in all its forms, and then returned to reflection and the
+system of thought expressed in the present work, and
+thus I arrived at an explanation of the inner nature of
+music and of the nature of its imitative relation to the
+world&mdash;which from analogy had necessarily to be presupposed&mdash;an
+explanation which is quite sufficient for
+myself, and satisfactory to my investigation, and which
+will doubtless be equally evident to any one who has
+followed me thus far and has agreed with my view of
+the world. Yet I recognise the fact that it is essentially
+impossible to prove this explanation, for it assumes and
+establishes a relation of music, as idea, to that which
+from its nature can never be idea, and music will have
+to be regarded as the copy of an original which can
+never itself be directly presented as idea. I can therefore
+do no more than state here, at the conclusion of this
+third book, which has been principally devoted to the
+consideration of the arts, the explanation of the marvellous
+art of music which satisfies myself, and I must leave the
+acceptance or denial of my view to the effect produced upon
+each of my readers both by music itself and by the whole
+system of thought communicated in this work. Moreover,
+I regard it as necessary, in order to be able to assent
+with full conviction to the exposition of the significance
+of music I am about to give, that one should often listen
+to music with constant reflection upon my theory concerning
+it, and for this again it is necessary to be very
+familiar with the whole of my system of thought.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The (Platonic) Ideas are the adequate objectification of
+will. To excite or suggest the knowledge of these by
+means of the representation of particular things (for
+works of art themselves are always representations of
+particular things) is the end of all the other arts, which
+can only be attained by a corresponding change in the
+knowing subject. Thus all these arts objectify the will
+indirectly only by means of the Ideas; and since our
+world is nothing but the manifestation of the Ideas in
+<pb n='333'/><anchor id='Pg333'/>
+multiplicity, though their entrance into the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign> (the form of the knowledge possible for
+the individual as such), music also, since it passes over
+the Ideas, is entirely independent of the phenomenal
+world, ignores it altogether, could to a certain extent exist
+if there was no world at all, which cannot be said of the
+other arts. Music is as <emph>direct</emph> an objectification and copy of
+the whole <emph>will</emph> as the world itself, nay, even as the Ideas,
+whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the world of
+individual things. Music is thus by no means like the
+other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but the <emph>copy of the will
+itself</emph>, whose objectivity the Ideas are. This is why the
+effect of music is so much more powerful and penetrating
+than that of the other arts, for they speak only of shadows,
+but it speaks of the thing itself. Since, however, it is the
+same will which objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in
+music, though in quite different ways, there must be, not
+indeed a direct likeness, but yet a parallel, an analogy,
+between music and the Ideas whose manifestation in
+multiplicity and incompleteness is the visible world. The
+establishing of this analogy will facilitate, as an illustration,
+the understanding of this exposition, which is so
+difficult on account of the obscurity of the subject.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I recognise in the deepest tones of harmony, in the
+bass, the lowest grades of the objectification of will,
+unorganised nature, the mass of the planet. It is well
+known that all the high notes which are easily sounded,
+and die away more quickly, are produced by the vibration
+in their vicinity of the deep bass-notes. When, also, the
+low notes sound, the high notes always sound faintly,
+and it is a law of harmony that only those high notes
+may accompany a bass-note which actually already
+sound along with it of themselves (its <foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>sons harmoniques</foreign>)
+on account of its vibration. This is analogous to the fact
+that the whole of the bodies and organisations of nature
+must be regarded as having come into existence through
+gradual development out of the mass of the planet; this
+<pb n='334'/><anchor id='Pg334'/>
+is both their supporter and their source, and the same
+relation subsists between the high notes and the bass.
+There is a limit of depth, below which no sound is
+audible. This corresponds to the fact that no matter
+can be perceived without form and quality, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, without
+the manifestation of a force which cannot be further explained,
+in which an Idea expresses itself, and, more
+generally, that no matter can be entirely without will.
+Thus, as a certain pitch is inseparable from the note as
+such, so a certain grade of the manifestation of will is
+inseparable from matter. Bass is thus, for us, in harmony
+what unorganised nature, the crudest mass, upon
+which all rests, and from which everything originates and
+develops, is in the world. Now, further, in the whole of
+the complemental parts which make up the harmony between
+the bass and the leading voice singing the melody,
+I recognise the whole gradation of the Ideas in which the
+will objectifies itself. Those nearer to the bass are the
+lower of these grades, the still unorganised, but yet manifold
+phenomenal things; the higher represent to me the
+world of plants and beasts. The definite intervals of the
+scale are parallel to the definite grades of the objectification
+of will, the definite species in nature. The departure
+from the arithmetical correctness of the intervals,
+through some temperament, or produced by the key
+selected, is analogous to the departure of the individual
+from the type of the species. Indeed, even the impure
+discords, which give no definite interval, may be compared
+to the monstrous abortions produced by beasts of
+two species, or by man and beast. But to all these bass
+and complemental parts which make up the <emph>harmony</emph>
+there is wanting that connected progress which belongs
+only to the high voice singing the melody, and it alone
+moves quickly and lightly in modulations and runs, while
+all these others have only a slower movement without a
+connection in each part for itself. The deep bass moves
+most slowly, the representative of the crudest mass. Its
+<pb n='335'/><anchor id='Pg335'/>
+rising and falling occurs only by large intervals, in thirds,
+fourths, fifths, never by <emph>one</emph> tone, unless it is a base inverted
+by double counterpoint. This slow movement is
+also physically essential to it; a quick run or shake in
+the low notes cannot even be imagined. The higher
+complemental parts, which are parallel to animal life,
+move more quickly, but yet without melodious connection
+and significant progress. The disconnected course of
+all the complemental parts, and their regulation by
+definite laws, is analogous to the fact that in the whole
+irrational world, from the crystal to the most perfect
+animal, no being has a connected consciousness of its own
+which would make its life into a significant whole, and
+none experiences a succession of mental developments,
+none perfects itself by culture, but everything exists
+always in the same way according to its kind, determined
+by fixed law. Lastly, in the <emph>melody</emph>, in the high, singing,
+principal voice leading the whole and progressing with
+unrestrained freedom, in the unbroken significant connection
+of <emph>one</emph> thought from beginning to end representing a
+whole, I recognise the highest grade of the objectification
+of will, the intellectual life and effort of man. As he
+alone, because endowed with reason, constantly looks
+before and after on the path of his actual life and its
+innumerable possibilities, and so achieves a course of life
+which is intellectual, and therefore connected as a whole;
+corresponding to this, I say, the <emph>melody</emph> has significant
+intentional connection from beginning to end. It records,
+therefore, the history of the intellectually enlightened
+will. This will expresses itself in the actual world as
+the series of its deeds; but melody says more, it records
+the most secret history of this intellectually-enlightened
+will, pictures every excitement, every effort, every movement
+of it, all that which the reason collects under the
+wide and negative concept of feeling, and which it
+cannot apprehend further through its abstract concepts.
+Therefore it has always been said that music
+<pb n='336'/><anchor id='Pg336'/>
+is the language of feeling and of passion, as words are
+the language of reason. Plato explains it as ἡ των
+μελων κινησις μεμιμημενη, εν τοις παθημασιν ὁταν ψυχη
+γινηται (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>melodiarum motus, animi affectus imitans</foreign>), De
+Leg. vii.; and also Aristotle says: δια τι οἱ ρυθμοι και τα
+μελη, φωνη ουσα, ηθεσιν εοικε (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>cur numeri musici et modi,
+qui voces sunt, moribus similes sese exhibent?</foreign>): Probl. c. 19.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now the nature of man consists in this, that his will
+strives, is satisfied and strives anew, and so on for ever.
+Indeed, his happiness and well-being consist simply in
+the quick transition from wish to satisfaction, and from
+satisfaction to a new wish. For the absence of satisfaction
+is suffering, the empty longing for a new wish,
+languor, <emph>ennui</emph>. And corresponding to this the nature
+of melody is a constant digression and deviation from
+the key-note in a thousand ways, not only to the harmonious
+intervals to the third and dominant, but to
+every tone, to the dissonant sevenths and to the superfluous
+degrees; yet there always follows a constant
+return to the key-note. In all these deviations melody
+expresses the multifarious efforts of will, but always its
+satisfaction also by the final return to an harmonious
+interval, and still more, to the key-note. The composition
+of melody, the disclosure in it of all the deepest
+secrets of human willing and feeling, is the work of
+genius, whose action, which is more apparent here than
+anywhere else, lies far from all reflection and conscious
+intention, and may be called an inspiration. The conception
+is here, as everywhere in art, unfruitful. The
+composer reveals the inner nature of the world, and
+expresses the deepest wisdom in a language which his
+reason does not understand; as a person under the
+influence of mesmerism tells things of which he has no
+conception when he awakes. Therefore in the composer,
+more than in any other artist, the man is entirely separated
+and distinct from the artist. Even in the explanation
+of this wonderful art, the concept shows its poverty
+<pb n='337'/><anchor id='Pg337'/>
+and limitation. I shall try, however, to complete our
+analogy. As quick transition from wish to satisfaction,
+and from satisfaction to a new wish, is happiness and
+well-being, so quick melodies without great deviations
+are cheerful; slow melodies, striking painful discords,
+and only winding back through many bars to the keynote
+are, as analogous to the delayed and hardly won
+satisfaction, sad. The delay of the new excitement of
+will, languor, could have no other expression than the
+sustained keynote, the effect of which would soon be
+unbearable; very monotonous and unmeaning melodies
+approach this effect. The short intelligible subjects of
+quick dance-music seem to speak only of easily attained
+common pleasure. On the other hand, the <foreign lang='it' rend='italic'>Allegro maestoso</foreign>,
+in elaborate movements, long passages, and wide
+deviations, signifies a greater, nobler effort towards a
+more distant end, and its final attainment. The <foreign lang='it' rend='italic'>Adagio</foreign>
+speaks of the pain of a great and noble effort which
+despises all trifling happiness. But how wonderful is
+the effect of the <emph>minor</emph> and <emph>major</emph>! How astounding
+that the change of half a tone, the entrance of a minor
+third instead of a major, at once and inevitably forces
+upon us an anxious painful feeling, from which again we
+are just as instantaneously delivered by the major. The
+<foreign lang='it' rend='italic'>Adagio</foreign> lengthens in the minor the expression of the
+keenest pain, and becomes even a convulsive wail.
+Dance-music in the minor seems to indicate the failure
+of that trifling happiness which we ought rather to
+despise, seems to speak of the attainment of a lower end
+with toil and trouble. The inexhaustibleness of possible
+melodies corresponds to the inexhaustibleness of Nature
+in difference of individuals, physiognomies, and courses
+of life. The transition from one key to an entirely
+different one, since it altogether breaks the connection
+with what went before, is like death, for the individual
+ends in it; but the will which appeared in this individual
+lives after him as before him, appearing in other
+<pb n='338'/><anchor id='Pg338'/>
+individuals, whose consciousness, however, has no connection
+with his.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But it must never be forgotten, in the investigation of
+all these analogies I have pointed out, that music has no
+direct, but merely an indirect relation to them, for it
+never expresses the phenomenon, but only the inner
+nature, the in-itself of all phenomena, the will itself.
+It does not therefore express this or that particular and
+definite joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or
+delight, or merriment, or peace of mind; but joy, sorrow,
+pain, horror, delight, merriment, peace of mind
+<emph>themselves</emph>, to a certain extent in the abstract, their
+essential nature, without accessories, and therefore without
+their motives. Yet we completely understand them
+in this extracted quintessence. Hence it arises that our
+imagination is so easily excited by music, and now seeks
+to give form to that invisible yet actively moved spirit-world
+which speaks to us directly, and clothe it with
+flesh and blood, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, to embody it in an analogous
+example. This is the origin of the song with words,
+and finally of the opera, the text of which should therefore
+never forsake that subordinate position in order to
+make itself the chief thing and the music a mere means
+of expressing it, which is a great misconception and a
+piece of utter perversity; for music always expresses
+only the quintessence of life and its events, never these
+themselves, and therefore their differences do not always
+affect it. It is precisely this universality, which belongs
+exclusively to it, together with the greatest determinateness,
+that gives music the high worth which it has as the
+panacea for all our woes. Thus, if music is too closely
+united to the words, and tries to form itself according to
+the events, it is striving to speak a language which is
+not its own. No one has kept so free from this mistake
+as Rossini; therefore his music speaks <emph>its own language</emph>
+so distinctly and purely that it requires no words, and
+produces its full effect when rendered by instruments alone.
+</p>
+
+<pb n='339'/><anchor id='Pg339'/>
+
+<p>
+According to all this, we may regard the phenomenal
+world, or nature, and music as two different expressions
+of the same thing, which is therefore itself the only
+medium of their analogy, so that a knowledge of it is
+demanded in order to understand that analogy. Music,
+therefore, if regarded as an expression of the world, is in
+the highest degree a universal language, which is related
+indeed to the universality of concepts, much as they are
+related to the particular things. Its universality, however,
+is by no means that empty universality of abstraction,
+but quite of a different kind, and is united with
+thorough and distinct definiteness. In this respect it
+resembles geometrical figures and numbers, which are the
+universal forms of all possible objects of experience and
+applicable to them all <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, and yet are not abstract
+but perceptible and thoroughly determined. All possible
+efforts, excitements, and manifestations of will, all that
+goes on in the heart of man and that reason includes in
+the wide, negative concept of feeling, may be expressed
+by the infinite number of possible melodies, but always
+in the universal, in the mere form, without the material,
+always according to the thing-in-itself, not the phenomenon,
+the inmost soul, as it were, of the phenomenon,
+without the body. This deep relation which music has to
+the true nature of all things also explains the fact that
+suitable music played to any scene, action, event, or surrounding
+seems to disclose to us its most secret meaning,
+and appears as the most accurate and distinct commentary
+upon it. This is so truly the case, that whoever
+gives himself up entirely to the impression of a symphony,
+seems to see all the possible events of life and the world
+take place in himself, yet if he reflects, he can find no
+likeness between the music and the things that passed
+before his mind. For, as we have said, music is distinguished
+from all the other arts by the fact that it is
+not a copy of the phenomenon, or, more accurately, the
+adequate objectivity of will, but is the direct copy of the
+<pb n='340'/><anchor id='Pg340'/>
+will itself, and therefore exhibits itself as the metaphysical
+to everything physical in the world, and as the
+thing-in-itself to every phenomenon. We might, therefore,
+just as well call the world embodied music as
+embodied will; and this is the reason why music makes
+every picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of
+the world, at once appear with higher significance, certainly
+all the more in proportion as its melody is
+analogous to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon.
+It rests upon this that we are able to set a poem to
+music as a song, or a perceptible representation as a pantomime,
+or both as an opera. Such particular pictures of
+human life, set to the universal language of music, are never
+bound to it or correspond to it with stringent necessity; but
+they stand to it only in the relation of an example chosen
+at will to a general concept. In the determinateness
+of the real, they represent that which music expresses in
+the universality of mere form. For melodies are to a
+certain extent, like general concepts, an abstraction from
+the actual. This actual world, then, the world of particular
+things, affords the object of perception, the special
+and individual, the particular case, both to the universality
+of the concepts and to the universality of the melodies.
+But these two universalities are in a certain respect
+opposed to each other; for the concepts contain particulars
+only as the first forms abstracted from perception, as it
+were, the separated shell of things; thus they are, strictly
+speaking, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>abstracta</foreign>; music, on the other hand, gives the
+inmost kernel which precedes all forms, or the heart of
+things. This relation may be very well expressed in the
+language of the schoolmen by saying the concepts are
+the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>universalia post rem</foreign>, but music gives the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>universalia
+ante rem</foreign>, and the real world the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>universalia in re</foreign>. To the
+universal significance of a melody to which a poem has
+been set, it is quite possible to set other equally arbitrarily
+selected examples of the universal expressed in this poem
+corresponding to the significance of the melody in the
+<pb n='341'/><anchor id='Pg341'/>
+same degree. This is why the same composition is suitable
+to many verses; and this is also what makes the
+<emph>vaudeville</emph> possible. But that in general a relation is
+possible between a composition and a perceptible representation
+rests, as we have said, upon the fact that both
+are simply different expressions of the same inner being
+of the world. When now, in the particular case, such a
+relation is actually given, that is to say, when the composer
+has been able to express in the universal language
+of music the emotions of will which constitute the heart
+of an event, then the melody of the song, the music of
+the opera, is expressive. But the analogy discovered by
+the composer between the two must have proceeded from
+the direct knowledge of the nature of the world unknown
+to his reason, and must not be an imitation produced
+with conscious intention by means of conceptions, otherwise
+the music does not express the inner nature of the
+will itself, but merely gives an inadequate imitation of
+its phenomenon. All specially imitative music does this;
+for example, <q>The Seasons,</q> by Haydn; also many passages
+of his <q>Creation,</q> in which phenomena of the external
+world are directly imitated; also all battle-pieces.
+Such music is entirely to be rejected.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The unutterable depth of all music by virtue of which
+it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a
+paradise firmly believed in yet ever distant from us, and
+by which also it is so fully understood and yet so inexplicable,
+rests on the fact that it restores to us all the
+emotions of our inmost nature, but entirely without
+reality and far removed from their pain. So also the
+seriousness which is essential to it, which excludes the
+absurd from its direct and peculiar province, is to be
+explained by the fact that its object is not the idea, with
+reference to which alone deception and absurdity are
+possible; but its object is directly the will, and this is
+essentially the most serious of all things, for it is that on
+which all depends. How rich in content and full of
+<pb n='342'/><anchor id='Pg342'/>
+significance the language of music is, we see from the
+repetitions, as well as the <foreign lang='it' rend='italic'>Da capo</foreign>, the like of which
+would be unbearable in works composed in a language
+of words, but in music are very appropriate and beneficial,
+for, in order to comprehend it fully, we must hear it
+twice.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In the whole of this exposition of music I have been
+trying to bring out clearly that it expresses in a perfectly
+universal language, in a homogeneous material, mere tones,
+and with the greatest determinateness and truth, the inner
+nature, the in-itself of the world, which we think under
+the concept of will, because will is its most distinct
+manifestation. Further, according to my view and contention,
+philosophy is nothing but a complete and accurate
+repetition or expression of the nature of the world in
+very general concepts, for only in such is it possible to
+get a view of that whole nature which will everywhere
+be adequate and applicable. Thus, whoever has followed
+me and entered into my mode of thought, will not think
+it so very paradoxical if I say, that supposing it were
+possible to give a perfectly accurate, complete explanation
+of music, extending even to particulars, that is to
+say, a detailed repetition in concepts of what it expresses,
+this would also be a sufficient repetition and explanation
+of the world in concepts, or at least entirely parallel to
+such an explanation, and thus it would be the true
+philosophy. Consequently the saying of Leibnitz quoted
+above, which is quite accurate from a lower standpoint,
+may be parodied in the following way to suit our higher
+view of music: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum
+nescientis se philosophari animi</foreign>; for <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>scire</foreign>, to know,
+always means to have fixed in abstract concepts. But
+further, on account of the truth of the saying of Leibnitz,
+which is confirmed in various ways, music, regarded apart
+from its æsthetic or inner significance, and looked at
+merely externally and purely empirically, is simply the
+means of comprehending directly and in the concrete
+<pb n='343'/><anchor id='Pg343'/>
+large numbers and complex relations of numbers, which
+otherwise we could only know indirectly by fixing them
+in concepts. Therefore by the union of these two very
+different but correct views of music we may arrive at a
+conception of the possibility of a philosophy of number,
+such as that of Pythagoras and of the Chinese in Y-King,
+and then interpret in this sense the saying of the Pythagoreans
+which Sextus Empiricus quotes (adv. Math., L.
+vii.): τῳ αριθμῳ δε τα παντ᾽ επεοικεν (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>numero cuncta
+assimilantur</foreign>). And if, finally, we apply this view to the
+interpretation of harmony and melody given above, we
+shall find that a mere moral philosophy without an
+explanation of Nature, such as Socrates wanted to introduce,
+is precisely analogous to a mere melody without
+harmony, which Rousseau exclusively desired; and, in
+opposition to this mere physics and metaphysics without
+ethics, will correspond to mere harmony without melody.
+Allow me to add to these cursory observations a few more
+remarks concerning the analogy of music with the phenomenal
+world. We found in the second book that the
+highest grade of the objectification of will, man, could not
+appear alone and isolated, but presupposed the grades
+below him, as these again presupposed the grades lower
+still. In the same way music, which directly objectifies
+the will, just as the world does, is complete only in full
+harmony. In order to achieve its full effect, the high
+leading voice of the melody requires the accompaniment
+of all the other voices, even to the lowest bass, which is
+to be regarded as the origin of all. The melody itself
+enters as an integral part into the harmony, as the harmony
+enters into it, and only thus, in the full harmonious
+whole, music expresses what it aims at expressing. Thus
+also the one will outside of time finds its full objectification
+only in the complete union of all the steps which
+reveal its nature in the innumerable ascending grades of
+distinctness. The following analogy is also very remarkable.
+We have seen in the preceding book that notwithstanding
+<pb n='344'/><anchor id='Pg344'/>
+the self-adaptation of all the phenomena of
+will to each other as regards their species, which constitutes
+their teleological aspect, there yet remains an
+unceasing conflict between those phenomena as individuals,
+which is visible at every grade, and makes the
+world a constant battle-field of all those manifestations
+of one and the same will, whose inner contradiction with
+itself becomes visible through it. In music also there
+is something corresponding to this. A complete, pure,
+harmonious system of tones is not only physically but
+arithmetically impossible. The numbers themselves by
+which the tones are expressed have inextricable irrationality.
+There is no scale in which, when it is counted,
+every fifth will be related to the keynote as 2 to 3,
+every major third as 4 to 5, every minor third as 5 to 6,
+and so on. For if they are correctly related to the keynote,
+they can no longer be so to each other; because,
+for example, the fifth must be the minor third to the
+third, &amp;c. For the notes of the scale may be compared
+to actors who must play now one part, now another.
+Therefore a perfectly accurate system of music cannot
+even be thought, far less worked out; and on this
+account all possible music deviates from perfect purity;
+it can only conceal the discords essential to it by dividing
+them among all the notes, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, by temperament. On this
+see Chladni's <q>Akustik,</q> § 30, and his <q>Kurze Uebersicht
+der Schall- und Klanglehre.</q><note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xxxix. of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I might still have something to say about the way in
+which music is perceived, namely, in and through time
+alone, with absolute exclusion of space, and also apart
+from the influence of the knowledge of causality, thus
+without understanding; for the tones make the æsthetic
+impression as effect, and without obliging us to go back
+to their causes, as in the case of perception. I do not
+wish, however, to lengthen this discussion, as I have perhaps
+already gone too much into detail with regard to
+<pb n='345'/><anchor id='Pg345'/>
+some things in this Third Book, or have dwelt too much
+on particulars. But my aim made it necessary, and it
+will be the less disapproved if the importance and high
+worth of art, which is seldom sufficiently recognised, be
+kept in mind. For if, according to our view, the whole
+visible world is just the objectification, the mirror, of the
+will, conducting it to knowledge of itself, and, indeed, as
+we shall soon see, to the possibility of its deliverance;
+and if, at the same time, the world as idea, if we regard
+it in isolation, and, freeing ourselves from all volition,
+allow it alone to take possession of our consciousness, is
+the most joy-giving and the only innocent side of life; we
+must regard art as the higher ascent, the more complete
+development of all this, for it achieves essentially just
+what is achieved by the visible world itself, only with
+greater concentration, more perfectly, with intention and
+intelligence, and therefore may be called, in the full
+significance of the word, the flower of life. If the whole
+world as idea is only the visibility of will, the work of
+art is to render this visibility more distinct. It is the
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>camera obscura</foreign> which shows the objects more purely, and
+enables us to survey them and comprehend them better.
+It is the play within the play, the stage upon the stage
+in <q>Hamlet.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The pleasure we receive from all beauty, the consolation
+which art affords, the enthusiasm of the artist, which
+enables him to forget the cares of life,&mdash;the latter an
+advantage of the man of genius over other men, which
+alone repays him for the suffering that increases in proportion
+to the clearness of consciousness, and for the
+desert loneliness among men of a different race,&mdash;all this
+rests on the fact that the in-itself of life, the will, existence
+itself, is, as we shall see farther on, a constant
+sorrow, partly miserable, partly terrible; while, on the
+contrary, as idea alone, purely contemplated, or copied
+by art, free from pain, it presents to us a drama full of
+significance. This purely knowable side of the world,
+<pb n='346'/><anchor id='Pg346'/>
+and the copy of it in any art, is the element of the
+artist. He is chained to the contemplation of the play,
+the objectification of will; he remains beside it, does
+not get tired of contemplating it and representing it in
+copies; and meanwhile he bears himself the cost of the
+production of that play, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, he himself is the will which
+objectifies itself, and remains in constant suffering. That
+pure, true, and deep knowledge of the inner nature of
+the world becomes now for him an end in itself: he stops
+there. Therefore it does not become to him a quieter of
+the will, as, we shall see in the next book, it does in the
+case of the saint who has attained to resignation; it does
+not deliver him for ever from life, but only at moments,
+and is therefore not for him a path out of life, but only
+an occasional consolation in it, till his power, increased
+by this contemplation and at last tired of the play, lays
+hold on the real. The St. Cecilia of Raphael may be
+regarded as a representation of this transition. To the
+real, then, we now turn in the following book.
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<pb n='347'/><anchor id='Pg347'/>
+
+<div rend='page-break-before: always'>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Fourth Book. The World As Will.</head>
+
+<div>
+<index index='toc'/>
+<index index='pdf'/>
+<head>Second Aspect. The Assertion And Denial Of The Will To Live, When
+Self-Consciousness Has Been Attained.</head>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l>Tempore quo cognitio simul advenit, amor e medio supersurrexit.&mdash;<hi rend='italic'>Oupnek'hat,</hi></l>
+<l><hi rend='italic'>Studio Anquetil Duperron</hi>, vol. ii. p. 216.</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<pb n='349'/><anchor id='Pg349'/>
+
+<p>
+§ 53. The last part of our work presents itself as the
+most serious, for it relates to the action of men, the
+matter which concerns every one directly and can be
+foreign or indifferent to none. It is indeed so characteristic
+of the nature of man to relate everything else to
+action, that in every systematic investigation he will
+always treat the part that has to do with action as the
+result or outcome of the whole work, so far, at least, as
+it interests him, and will therefore give his most serious
+attention to this part, even if to no other. In this
+respect the following part of our work would, in ordinary
+language, be called practical philosophy, in opposition to
+the theoretical, which has occupied us hitherto. But, in
+my opinion, all philosophy is theoretical, because it is
+essential to it that it should retain a purely contemplative
+attitude, and should investigate, not prescribe. To
+become, on the contrary, practical, to guide conduct, to
+transform character, are old claims, which with fuller
+insight it ought finally to give up. For here, where the
+worth or worthlessness of an existence, where salvation
+or damnation are in question, the dead conceptions of
+philosophy do not decide the matter, but the inmost
+nature of man himself, the Dæmon that guides him and
+that has not chosen him, but been chosen by him, as
+Plato would say; his intelligible character, as Kant
+expresses himself. Virtue cannot be taught any more
+than genius; indeed, for it the concept is just as unfruitful
+as it is in art, and in both cases can only be used as
+<pb n='350'/><anchor id='Pg350'/>
+an instrument. It would, therefore, be just as absurd to
+expect that our moral systems and ethics will produce
+virtuous, noble, and holy men, as that our æsthetics will
+produce poets, painters, and musicians.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Philosophy can never do more than interpret and
+explain what is given. It can only bring to distinct
+abstract knowledge of the reason the nature of the world
+which in the concrete, that is, as feeling, expresses itself
+comprehensibly to every one. This, however, it does in
+every possible reference and from every point of view.
+Now, as this attempt has been made from other points of
+view in the three preceding books with the generality
+that is proper to philosophy, in this book the action of
+men will be considered in the same way; and this side
+of the world might, indeed, be considered the most important
+of all, not only subjectively, as I remarked above,
+but also objectively. In considering it I shall faithfully
+adhere to the method I have hitherto followed, and shall
+support myself by presupposing all that has already been
+advanced. There is, indeed, just one thought which forms
+the content of this whole work. I have endeavoured to
+work it out in all other spheres, and I shall now do so
+with regard to human action. I shall then have done
+all that is in my power to communicate it as fully as
+possible.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The given point of view, and the method of treatment
+announced, are themselves sufficient to indicate that in
+this ethical book no precepts, no doctrine of duty must
+be looked for; still less will a general moral principle
+be given, an universal receipt, as it were, for the production
+of all the virtues. Neither shall we talk of an
+<q><emph>absolute ought</emph>,</q> for this contains a contradiction, as is
+explained in the Appendix; nor yet of a <q><emph>law of freedom</emph>,</q>
+which is in the same position. In general, we shall not
+speak at all of <q>ought,</q> for this is how one speaks to
+children and to nations still in their childhood, but not
+to those who have appropriated all the culture of a full-grown
+<pb n='351'/><anchor id='Pg351'/>
+age. It is a palpable contradiction to call the
+will free, and yet to prescribe laws for it according to
+which it ought to will. <q>Ought to will!</q>&mdash;wooden iron!
+But it follows from the point of view of our system that
+the will is not only free, but almighty. From it proceeds
+not only its action, but also its world; and as the will
+is, so does its action and its world become. Both are
+the self-knowledge of the will and nothing more. The
+will determines itself, and at the same time both its
+action and its world; for besides it there is nothing, and
+these are the will itself. Only thus is the will truly
+autonomous, and from every other point of view it is
+heteronomous. Our philosophical endeavours can only
+extend to exhibiting and explaining the action of men
+in its inner nature and content, the various and even
+opposite maxims, whose living expression it is. This we
+shall do in connection with the preceding portion of our
+work, and in precisely the same way as we have hitherto
+explained the other phenomena of the world, and have
+sought to bring their inmost nature to distinct abstract
+knowledge. Our philosophy will maintain the same
+<emph>immanency</emph> in the case of action, as in all that we have
+hitherto considered. Notwithstanding Kant's great doctrine,
+it will not attempt to use the forms of the phenomenon,
+the universal expression of which is the principle
+of sufficient reason, as a leaping-pole to jump over the
+phenomenon itself, which alone gives meaning to these
+forms, and land in the boundless sphere of empty fictions.
+But this actual world of experience, in which we are, and
+which is in us, remains both the material and the limits
+of our consideration: a world which is so rich in content
+that even the most searching investigation of which the
+human mind is capable could not exhaust it. Since then
+the real world of experience will never fail to afford
+material and reality to our ethical investigations, any more
+than to those we have already conducted, nothing will be
+less needful than to take refuge in negative conceptions
+<pb n='352'/><anchor id='Pg352'/>
+void of content, and then somehow or other make even
+ourselves believe that we are saying something when we
+speak with lifted eyebrows of <q>absolutes,</q> <q>infinites,</q>
+<q>supersensibles,</q> and whatever other mere negations of
+this sort there may be (ουδεν εστι, η το της στερησεως
+ονομα, μετα αμυδρας επινοιας&mdash;<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil est, nisi negationis
+nomen, cum obscura notione</foreign>.&mdash;Jul. or. 5), instead of which
+it would be shorter to say at once cloud-cuckoo-town
+(νεφελοκοκκυγια): we shall not require to serve up covered
+empty dishes of this kind. Finally, we shall not in this
+book, any more than in those which have preceded it,
+narrate histories and give them out as philosophy. For
+we are of opinion that whoever supposes that the inner
+nature of the world can in any way, however plausibly
+disguised, be <emph>historically</emph> comprehended, is infinitely far
+from a philosophical knowledge of the world. Yet this is
+what is supposed whenever a <q>becoming,</q> or a <q>having
+become,</q> or an <q>about to become</q> enters into a theory of
+the nature of the world, whenever an earlier or a later has
+the least place in it; and in this way a beginning and an
+end of the world, and the path it pursues between them, is,
+either openly or disguisedly, both sought for and found,
+and the individual who philosophises even recognises his
+own position on that path. Such <emph>historical philosophising</emph>
+in most cases produces a cosmogony which admits
+of many varieties, or else a system of emanations, a doctrine
+of successive disengagements from one being; or,
+finally, driven in despair from fruitless efforts upon these
+paths to the last path of all, it takes refuge in the converse
+doctrine of a constant becoming, springing up, arising,
+coming to light out of darkness, out of the hidden
+ground source or groundlessness, or whatever other nonsense
+of this sort there may be, which is most shortly
+disposed of with the remark that at the present moment a
+whole eternity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, an endless time, has already passed, so
+that everything that can or ought to become must have
+already done so. For all such historical philosophy, whatever
+<pb n='353'/><anchor id='Pg353'/>
+airs it may give itself, regards <emph>time</emph> just as if Kant
+had never lived, as a quality of the thing-in-itself, and thus
+stops at that which Kant calls the phenomenon in opposition
+to the thing-in-itself; which Plato calls the becoming
+and never being, in opposition to the being and never
+becoming; and which, finally, is called in the Indian
+philosophy the web of Mâya. It is just the knowledge
+which belongs to the principle of sufficient reason, with
+which no one can penetrate to the inner nature of
+things, but endlessly pursues phenomena, moving without
+end or aim, like a squirrel in its wheel, till, tired out
+at last, he stops at some point or other arbitrarily
+chosen, and now desires to extort respect for it from
+others also. The genuine philosophical consideration
+of the world, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the consideration that affords us a
+knowledge of its inner nature, and so leads us beyond
+the phenomenon, is precisely that method which does
+not concern itself with the whence, the whither, and
+the why of the world, but always and everywhere
+demands only the what; the method which considers
+things not according to any relation, not as becoming
+and passing away, in short, not according to one of the
+four forms of the principle of sufficient reason; but, on
+the contrary, just that which remains when all that
+belongs to the form of knowledge proper to that principle
+has been abstracted, the inner nature of the world,
+which always appears unchanged in all the relations,
+but is itself never subject to them, and has the Ideas of
+the world as its object or material. From such knowledge
+as this proceeds philosophy, like art, and also, as we
+shall see in this book, that disposition of mind which
+alone leads to true holiness and to deliverance from the
+world.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 54. The first three books will, it is hoped, have
+conveyed the distinct and certain knowledge that the
+world as idea is the complete mirror of the will, in
+which it knows itself in ascending grades of distinctness
+<pb n='354'/><anchor id='Pg354'/>
+and completeness, the highest of which is man, whose
+nature, however, receives its complete expression only
+through the whole connected series of his actions. The
+self-conscious connection of these actions is made possible
+by reason, which enables a man constantly to survey
+the whole in the abstract.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The will, which, considered purely in itself, is without
+knowledge, and is merely a blind incessant impulse, as
+we see it appear in unorganised and vegetable nature
+and their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our
+own life, receives through the addition of the world as
+idea, which is developed in subjection to it, the knowledge
+of its own willing and of what it is that it wills.
+And this is nothing else than the world as idea, life,
+precisely as it exists. Therefore we called the phenomenal
+world the mirror of the will, its objectivity.
+And since what the will wills is always life, just because
+life is nothing but the representation of that willing
+for the idea, it is all one and a mere pleonism if,
+instead of simply saying <q>the will,</q> we say <q>the will to
+live.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the
+essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the
+phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will. Therefore
+life accompanies the will as inseparably as the shadow
+accompanies the body; and if will exists, so will life, the
+world, exist. Life is, therefore, assured to the will to
+live; and so long as we are filled with the will to live we
+need have no fear for our existence, even in the presence
+of death. It is true we see the individual come into
+being and pass away; but the individual is only phenomenal,
+exists only for the knowledge which is bound to
+the principle of sufficient reason, to the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principio individuationis</foreign>.
+Certainly, for this kind of knowledge, the
+individual receives his life as a gift, rises out of nothing,
+then suffers the loss of this gift through death, and
+returns again to nothing. But we desire to consider life
+<pb n='355'/><anchor id='Pg355'/>
+philosophically, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, according to its Ideas, and in this
+sphere we shall find that neither the will, the thing-in-itself
+in all phenomena, nor the subject of knowing,
+that which perceives all phenomena, is affected at all by
+birth or by death. Birth and death belong merely to the
+phenomenon of will, thus to life; and it is essential to
+this to exhibit itself in individuals which come into being
+and pass away, as fleeting phenomena appearing in the
+form of time&mdash;phenomena of that which in itself knows
+no time, but must exhibit itself precisely in the way we
+have said, in order to objectify its peculiar nature. Birth
+and death belong in like manner to life, and hold the
+balance as reciprocal conditions of each other, or, if one
+likes the expression, as poles of the whole phenomenon
+of life. The wisest of all mythologies, the Indian, expresses
+this by giving to the very god that symbolises
+destruction, death (as Brahma, the most sinful and the
+lowest god of the Trimurti, symbolises generation, coming
+into being, and Vishnu maintaining or preserving), by
+giving, I say, to Siva as an attribute not only the necklace
+of skulls, but also the lingam, the symbol of generation,
+which appears here as the counterpart of death, thus
+signifying that generation and death are essentially correlatives,
+which reciprocally neutralise and annul each
+other. It was precisely the same sentiment that led the
+Greeks and Romans to adorn their costly sarcophagi, just
+as we see them now, with feasts, dances, marriages, the
+chase, fights of wild beasts, bacchanalians, &amp;c.; thus with
+representations of the full ardour of life, which they place
+before us not only in such revels and sports, but also in
+sensual groups, and even go so far as to represent the
+sexual intercourse of satyrs and goats. Clearly the aim
+was to point in the most impressive manner away from
+the death of the mourned individual to the immortal life
+of nature, and thus to indicate, though without abstract
+knowledge, that the whole of nature is the phenomenon
+and also the fulfilment of the will to live. The form of
+<pb n='356'/><anchor id='Pg356'/>
+this phenomenon is time, space, and causality, and by
+means of these individuation, which carries with it that
+the individual must come into being and pass away. But
+this no more affects the will to live, of whose manifestation
+the individual is, as it were, only a particular example
+or specimen, than the death of an individual injures
+the whole of nature. For it is not the individual, but
+only the species that Nature cares for, and for the preservation
+of which she so earnestly strives, providing for it
+with the utmost prodigality through the vast surplus of
+the seed and the great strength of the fructifying impulse.
+The individual, on the contrary, neither has nor
+can have any value for Nature, for her kingdom is infinite
+time and infinite space, and in these infinite multiplicity
+of possible individuals. Therefore she is always
+ready to let the individual fall, and hence it is not only
+exposed to destruction in a thousand ways by the most
+insignificant accident, but originally destined for it, and
+conducted towards it by Nature herself from the moment
+it has served its end of maintaining the species. Thus
+Nature naïvely expresses the great truth that only the
+Ideas, not the individuals, have, properly speaking, reality,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, are complete objectivity of the will. Now, since
+man is Nature itself, and indeed Nature at the highest
+grade of its self-consciousness, but Nature is only the
+objectified will to live, the man who has comprehended
+and retained this point of view may well console himself,
+when contemplating his own death and that of his friends,
+by turning his eyes to the immortal life of Nature, which
+he himself is. This is the significance of Siva with the
+lingam, and of those ancient sarcophagi with their pictures
+of glowing life, which say to the mourning beholder,
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Natura non contristatur</foreign>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+That generation and death are to be regarded as something
+belonging to life, and essential to this phenomenon
+of the will, arises also from the fact that they both exhibit
+themselves merely as higher powers of the expression
+<pb n='357'/><anchor id='Pg357'/>
+of that in which all the rest of life consists. This
+is through and through nothing else than the constant
+change of matter in the fixed permanence of form; and
+this is what constitutes the transitoriness of the individual
+and the permanence of the species. Constant nourishment
+and renewal differ from generation only in degree,
+and constant excretion differs only in degree from death.
+The first shows itself most simply and distinctly in the
+plant. The plant is throughout a constant recurrence of
+the same impulse of its simplest fibre, which groups
+itself into leaf and branch. It is a systematic aggregate
+of similar plants supporting each other, whose constant
+reproduction is its single impulse. It ascends to the full
+satisfaction of this tendency through the grades of its
+metamorphosis, finally to the blossom and fruit, that
+compendium of its existence and effort in which it now
+attains, by a short way, to that which is its single aim,
+and at a stroke produces a thousand-fold what, up till
+then, it effected only in the particular case&mdash;the repetition
+of itself. Its earlier growth and development
+stands in the same relation to its fruit as writing stands
+to printing. With the animal it is clearly quite the
+same. The process of nourishing is a constant reproduction;
+the process of reproduction is a higher power
+of nourishing. The pleasure which accompanies the act
+of procreation is a higher power of the agreeableness of
+the sense of life. On the other hand, excretion, the constant
+exhalation and throwing off of matter, is the same
+as that which, at a higher power, death, is the contrary
+of generation. And if here we are always content to
+retain the form without lamenting the discarded matter,
+we ought to bear ourselves in the same way if in death
+the same thing happens, in a higher degree and to the
+whole, as takes place daily and hourly in a partial
+manner in excretion: if we are indifferent to the one,
+we ought not to shrink from the other. Therefore, from
+this point of view, it appears just as perverse to desire
+<pb n='358'/><anchor id='Pg358'/>
+the continuance of an individuality which will be replaced
+by other individuals as to desire the permanence
+of matter which will be replaced by other matter. It
+appears just as foolish to embalm the body as it would
+be carefully to preserve its excrement. As to the individual
+consciousness which is bound to the individual
+body, it is absolutely interrupted every day by sleep.
+Deep sleep is, while it lasts, in no way different from
+death, into which, in fact, it often passes continuously, as
+in the case of freezing to death. It differs only with
+regard to the future, the awaking. Death is a sleep in
+which individuality is forgotten; everything else wakes
+again, or rather never slept.<note place='foot'>The following remark may assist
+those for whom it is not too subtle
+to understand clearly that the individual
+is only the phenomenon, not
+the thing in itself. Every individual
+is, on the one hand, the
+subject of knowing, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the complemental
+condition of the possibility
+of the whole objective world, and,
+on the other hand, a particular
+phenomenon of will, the same will
+which objectifies itself in everything.
+But this double nature of
+our being does not rest upon a self-existing
+unity, otherwise it would
+be possible for us to be conscious of
+ourselves <emph>in ourselves, and independent
+of the objects of knowledge and
+will</emph>. Now this is by no means
+possible, for as soon as we turn into
+ourselves to make the attempt, and
+seek for once to know ourselves fully
+by means of introspective reflection,
+we are lost in a bottomless void; we
+find ourselves like the hollow glass
+globe, from out of which a voice
+speaks whose cause is not to be
+found in it, and whereas we desired
+to comprehend ourselves, we find,
+with a shudder, nothing but a
+vanishing spectre.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Above all things, we must distinctly recognise that
+the form of the phenomenon of will, the form of life or
+reality, is really only the <emph>present</emph>, not the future nor the
+past. The latter are only in the conception, exist only
+in the connection of knowledge, so far as it follows the
+principle of sufficient reason. No man has ever lived in
+the past, and none will live in the future; the <emph>present</emph>
+alone is the form of all life, and is its sure possession
+which can never be taken from it. The present always
+exists, together with its content. Both remain fixed
+without wavering, like the rainbow on the waterfall.
+For life is firm and certain in the will, and the present
+is firm and certain in life. Certainly, if we reflect on
+<pb n='359'/><anchor id='Pg359'/>
+the thousands of years that are past, of the millions of
+men who lived in them, we ask, What were they?
+what has become of them? But, on the other hand, we
+need only recall our own past life and renew its scenes
+vividly in our imagination, and then ask again, What
+was all this? what has become of it? As it is with it,
+so is it with the life of those millions. Or should we
+suppose that the past could receive a new existence because
+it has been sealed by death? Our own past, the
+most recent part of it, and even yesterday, is now no
+more than an empty dream of the fancy, and such is the
+past of all those millions. What was? What is? The
+will, of which life is the mirror, and knowledge free from
+will, which beholds it clearly in that mirror. Whoever
+has not yet recognised this, or will not recognise it, must
+add to the question asked above as to the fate of past
+generations of men this question also: Why he, the
+questioner, is so fortunate as to be conscious of this costly,
+fleeting, and only real present, while those hundreds of
+generations of men, even the heroes and philosophers of
+those ages, have sunk into the night of the past, and
+have thus become nothing; but he, his insignificant
+ego, actually exists? or more shortly, though somewhat
+strangely: Why this now, his now, <emph>is</emph> just now and <emph>was</emph>
+not long ago? Since he asks such strange questions, he
+regards his existence and his time as independent of each
+other, and the former as projected into the latter. He
+assumes indeed two nows&mdash;one which belongs to the
+object, the other which belongs to the subject, and
+marvels at the happy accident of their coincidence. But
+in truth, only the point of contact of the object, the form
+of which is time, with the subject, which has no mode of
+the principle of sufficient reason as its form, constitutes
+the present, as is shown in the essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason. Now all object is the will so far as it
+has become idea, and the subject is the necessary correlative
+of the object. But real objects are only in the
+<pb n='360'/><anchor id='Pg360'/>
+present; the past and the future contain only conceptions
+and fancies, therefore the present is the essential form
+of the phenomenon of the will, and inseparable from it.
+The present alone is that which always exists and remains
+immovable. That which, empirically apprehended,
+is the most transitory of all, presents itself to the metaphysical
+vision, which sees beyond the forms of empirical
+perception, as that which alone endures, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nunc stans</foreign>
+of the schoolmen. The source and the supporter of
+its content is the will to live or the thing-in-itself,&mdash;which
+we are. That which constantly becomes and
+passes away, in that it has either already been or is
+still to be, belongs to the phenomenon as such on
+account of its forms, which make coming into being
+and passing away possible. Accordingly, we must
+think:&mdash;<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Quid fuit?</foreign>&mdash;<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Quod est.</foreign> <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Quid erit?</foreign>&mdash;<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Quod fuit;</foreign>
+and take it in the strict meaning of the words; thus
+understand not <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>simile</foreign> but <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>idem</foreign>. For life is certain to
+the will, and the present is certain to life. Thus it
+is that every one can say, <q>I am once for all lord of
+the present, and through all eternity it will accompany
+me as my shadow: therefore I do not wonder where it
+has come from, and how it happens that it is exactly
+now.</q> We might compare time to a constantly revolving
+sphere; the half that was always sinking would
+be the past, that which was always rising would be the
+future; but the indivisible point at the top, where the
+tangent touches, would be the extensionless present.
+As the tangent does not revolve with the sphere, neither
+does the present, the point of contact of the object, the
+form of which is time, with the subject, which has no
+form, because it does not belong to the knowable, but
+is the condition of all that is knowable. Or, time is
+like an unceasing stream, and the present a rock on
+which the stream breaks itself, but does not carry
+away with it. The will, as thing-in-itself, is just as
+little subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason
+<pb n='361'/><anchor id='Pg361'/>
+as the subject of knowledge, which, finally, in a certain
+regard is the will itself or its expression. And as life,
+its own phenomenon, is assured to the will, so is the
+present, the single form of real life. Therefore we
+have not to investigate the past before life, nor the
+future after death: we have rather to know the <emph>present</emph>,
+the one form in which the will manifests itself.<note place='foot'><q>Scholastici docuerunt, quod
+æternitas non sit temporis sine fine
+aut principio successio; sed <emph>Nunc
+stans</emph>, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, idem nobis <emph>Nunc esse</emph>,
+quod erat <emph>Nunc Adamo</emph>, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, inter
+<emph>nunc</emph> et <emph>tunc</emph> nullam esse differentiam.</q>&mdash;Hobbes,
+Leviathan, c. 46.</note> It
+will not escape from the will, but neither will the will
+escape from it. If, therefore, life as it is satisfies,
+whoever affirms it in every way may regard it with
+confidence as endless, and banish the fear of death as
+an illusion that inspires him with the foolish dread that
+he can ever be robbed of the present, and foreshadows
+a time in which there is no present; an illusion with
+regard to time analogous to the illusion with regard to
+space through which every one imagines the position on
+the globe he happens to occupy as above, and all other
+places as below. In the same way every one links the
+present to his own individuality, and imagines that all
+present is extinguished with it; that then past and
+future might be without a present. But as on the surface
+of the globe every place is above, so the form of all
+life is the <emph>present</emph>, and to fear death because it robs us of
+the present, is just as foolish as to fear that we may slip
+down from the round globe upon which we have now the
+good fortune to occupy the upper surface. The present is
+the form essential to the objectification of the will. It
+cuts time, which extends infinitely in both directions, as
+a mathematical point, and stands immovably fixed, like
+an everlasting mid-day with no cool evening, as the
+actual sun burns without intermission, while it only
+seems to sink into the bosom of night. Therefore, if
+a man fears death as his annihilation, it is just as if he
+were to think that the sun cries out at evening, <q>Woe is
+<pb n='362'/><anchor id='Pg362'/>
+me! for I go down into eternal night.</q><note place='foot'>In Eckermann's <q>Conversations
+of Goethe</q> (vol. i. p. 161), Goethe
+says: <q>Our spirit is a being of a
+nature quite indestructible, and its
+activity continues from eternity to
+eternity. It is like the sun, which
+seems to set only to our earthly
+eyes, but which, in reality, never
+sets, but shines on unceasingly.</q>
+Goethe has taken the simile from
+me; not I from him. Without
+doubt he used it in this conversation,
+which was held in 1824, in
+consequence of a (possibly unconscious)
+reminiscence of the above
+passage, for it occurs in the first
+edition, p. 401, in exactly the same
+words, and it is also repeated at
+p. 528 of that edition, as at the
+close of § 65 of the present work.
+The first edition was sent to him in
+December 1818, and in March 1819,
+when I was at Naples, he sent me
+his congratulations by letter, through
+my sister, and enclosed a piece of
+paper upon which he had noted the
+places of certain passages which had
+specially pleased him. Thus he had
+read my book.</note> And conversely,
+whoever is oppressed with the burden of life, whoever
+desires life and affirms it, but abhors its torments, and
+especially can no longer endure the hard lot that has
+fallen to himself, such a man has no deliverance to hope
+for from death, and cannot right himself by suicide. The
+cool shades of Orcus allure him only with the false appearance
+of a haven of rest. The earth rolls from day into
+night, the individual dies, but the sun itself shines without
+intermission, an eternal noon. Life is assured to the
+will to live; the form of life is an endless present, no
+matter how the individuals, the phenomena of the Idea,
+arise and pass away in time, like fleeting dreams. Thus
+even already suicide appears to us as a vain and therefore
+a foolish action; when we have carried our investigation
+further it will appear to us in a still less favourable light.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Dogmas change and our knowledge is deceptive; but
+Nature never errs, her procedure is sure, and she never
+conceals it. Everything is entirely in Nature, and Nature
+is entire in everything. She has her centre in every
+brute. It has surely found its way into existence, and
+it will surely find its way out of it. In the meantime it
+lives, fearless and without care, in the presence of annihilation,
+supported by the consciousness that it is Nature
+herself, and imperishable as she is. Man alone carries
+about with him, in abstract conceptions, the certainty of
+his death; yet this can only trouble him very rarely,
+<pb n='363'/><anchor id='Pg363'/>
+when for a single moment some occasion calls it up to his
+imagination. Against the mighty voice of Nature reflection
+can do little. In man, as in the brute which does
+not think, the certainty that springs from his inmost consciousness
+that he himself is Nature, the world, predominates
+as a lasting frame of mind; and on account of this
+no man is observably disturbed by the thought of certain
+and never-distant death, but lives as if he would live for
+ever. Indeed this is carried so far that we may say that
+no one has really a lively conviction of the certainty of
+his death, otherwise there would be no great difference
+between his frame of mind and that of a condemned criminal.
+Every one recognises that certainty in the abstract
+and theoretically, but lays it aside like other theoretical
+truths which are not applicable to practice, without really
+receiving it into his living consciousness. Whoever carefully
+considers this peculiarity of human character will
+see that the psychological explanations of it, from habit
+and acquiescence in the inevitable, are by no means sufficient,
+and that its true explanation lies in the deeper
+ground we have given. The same fact explains the circumstance
+that at all times and among all peoples dogmas
+of some kind or other relating to the continued
+existence of the individual after death arise, and are
+believed in, although the evidence in support of them must
+always be very insufficient, and the evidence against them
+forcible and varied. But, in truth, this really requires
+no proof, but is recognised by the healthy understanding
+as a fact, and confirmed by the confidence that Nature
+never lies any more than she errs, but openly exhibits
+and naïvely expresses her action and her nature, while
+only we ourselves obscure it by our folly, in order to
+establish what is agreeable to our limited point of view.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But this that we have brought to clearest consciousness,
+that although the particular phenomenon of the will
+has a temporal beginning and end, the will itself as thing-in-itself
+is not affected by it, nor yet the correlative of
+<pb n='364'/><anchor id='Pg364'/>
+all object, the knowing but never known subject, and
+that life is always assured to the will to live&mdash;this is not
+to be numbered with the doctrines of immortality. For
+permanence has no more to do with the will or with the
+pure subject of knowing, the eternal eye of the world,
+than transitoriness, for both are predicates that are only
+valid in time, and the will and the pure subject of knowing
+lie outside time. Therefore the egoism of the individual
+(this particular phenomenon of will enlightened
+by the subject of knowing) can extract as little nourishment
+and consolation for his wish to endure through
+endless time from the view we have expressed, as he
+could from the knowledge that after his death the rest
+of the eternal world would continue to exist, which is
+just the expression of the same view considered objectively,
+and therefore temporally. For every individual is
+transitory only as phenomenon, but as thing-in-itself is
+timeless, and therefore endless. But it is also only as
+phenomenon that an individual is distinguished from the
+other things of the world; as thing-in-itself he is the
+will which appears in all, and death destroys the illusion
+which separates his consciousness from that of the
+rest: this is immortality. His exemption from death,
+which belongs to him only as thing-in-itself, is for
+the phenomenon one with the immortality of the rest
+of the external world.<note place='foot'>This is expressed in the Veda
+by saying, that when a man dies his
+sight becomes one with the sun, his
+smell with the earth, his taste with
+water, his hearing with the air, his
+speech with fire, &amp;c., &amp;c. (Oupnek'hat,
+vol. i. p. 249 <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>) And
+also by the fact that, in a special
+ceremony, the dying man gives over
+his senses and all his faculties singly
+to his son, in whom they are now
+supposed to live on (Oupnek'hat,
+vol. ii. p. 82 <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>)</note> Hence also, it arises that
+although the inward and merely felt consciousness of that
+which we have raised to distinct knowledge is indeed, as
+we have said, sufficient to prevent the thought of death
+from poisoning the life of the rational being, because
+this consciousness is the basis of that love of life which
+maintains everything living, and enables it to live on
+<pb n='365'/><anchor id='Pg365'/>
+at ease as if there were no such thing as death, so
+long as it is face to face with life, and turns its
+attention to it, yet it will not prevent the individual
+from being seized with the fear of death, and trying
+in every way to escape from it, when it presents itself
+to him in some particular real case, or even only in
+his imagination, and he is compelled to contemplate it.
+For just as, so long as his knowledge was directed
+to life as such, he was obliged to recognise immortality
+in it, so when death is brought before his eyes, he is
+obliged to recognise it as that which it is, the temporal
+end of the particular temporal phenomenon. What we
+fear in death is by no means the pain, for it lies clearly
+on this side of death, and, moreover, we often take refuge
+in death from pain, just as, on the contrary, we sometimes
+endure the most fearful suffering merely to escape death
+for a while, although it would be quick and easy. Thus
+we distinguish pain and death as two entirely different
+evils. What we fear in death is the end of the individual,
+which it openly professes itself to be, and since the
+individual is a particular objectification of the will to
+live itself, its whole nature struggles against death. Now
+when feeling thus exposes us helpless, reason can yet
+step in and for the most part overcome its adverse influence,
+for it places us upon a higher standpoint, from
+which we no longer contemplate the particular but the
+whole. Therefore a philosophical knowledge of the nature
+of the world, which extended to the point we have now
+reached in this work but went no farther, could even at
+this point of view overcome the terror of death in the
+measure in which reflection had power over direct feeling
+in the given individual. A man who had thoroughly
+assimilated the truths we have already advanced, but had
+not come to know, either from his own experience or
+from a deeper insight, that constant suffering is essential
+to life, who found satisfaction and all that he wished in
+life, and could calmly and deliberately desire that his
+<pb n='366'/><anchor id='Pg366'/>
+life, as he had hitherto known it, should endure for ever
+or repeat itself ever anew, and whose love of life was so
+great that he willingly and gladly accepted all the hardships
+and miseries to which it is exposed for the sake of
+its pleasures,&mdash;such a man would stand <q>with firm-knit
+bones on the well-rounded, enduring earth,</q> and would
+have nothing to fear. Armed with the knowledge we
+have given him, he would await with indifference the
+death that hastens towards him on the wings of time.
+He would regard it as a false illusion, an impotent spectre,
+which frightens the weak but has no power over him
+who knows that he is himself the will of which the whole
+world is the objectification or copy, and that therefore he
+is always certain of life, and also of the present, the
+peculiar and only form of the phenomenon of the will.
+He could not be terrified by an endless past or future in
+which he would not be, for this he would regard as the
+empty delusion of the web of Mâya. Thus he would no
+more fear death than the sun fears the night. In the
+<q>Bhagavad-Gita</q> Krishna thus raises the mind of his young
+pupil Arjuna, when, seized with compunction at the sight
+of the arrayed hosts (somewhat as Xerxes was), he loses
+heart and desires to give up the battle in order to avert
+the death of so many thousands. Krishna leads him to
+this point of view, and the death of those thousands can
+no longer restrain him; he gives the sign for battle. This
+point of view is also expressed by Goethe's Prometheus,
+especially when he says&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Here sit I, form mankind</q></l>
+<l>In my own image,</l>
+<l>A race like to myself,</l>
+<l>To suffer and to weep,</l>
+<l>Rejoice, enjoy,</l>
+<l>And heed thee not,</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>As I.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+The philosophy of Bruno and that of Spinoza might also
+lead any one to this point of view whose conviction was
+<pb n='367'/><anchor id='Pg367'/>
+not shaken and weakened by their errors and imperfections.
+That of Bruno has properly no ethical theory at
+all, and the theory contained in the philosophy of Spinoza
+does not really proceed from the inner nature of his doctrine,
+but is merely tacked on to it by means of weak and
+palpable sophisms, though in itself it is praiseworthy and
+beautiful. Finally, there are many men who would occupy
+this point of view if their knowledge kept pace with
+their will, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, if, free from all illusion, they were in
+a position to become clearly and distinctly themselves.
+For this is, for knowledge, the point of view of the complete
+<emph>assertion of the will to live</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+That the will asserts itself means, that while in its
+objectivity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in the world and life, its own nature is
+completely and distinctly given it as idea, this knowledge
+does not by any means check its volition; but this very
+life, so known, is willed as such by the will with knowledge,
+consciously and deliberately, just as up to this
+point it willed it as blind effort without knowledge. The
+opposite of this, the <emph>denial of the will to live</emph>, shows itself
+if, when that knowledge is attained, volition ends, because
+the particular known phenomena no longer act as <emph>motives</emph>
+for willing, but the whole knowledge of the nature of the
+world, the mirror of the will, which has grown up through
+the comprehension of the <emph>Ideas</emph>, becomes a <emph>quieter</emph> of the
+will; and thus free, the will suppresses itself. These quite
+unfamiliar conceptions are difficult to understand when
+expressed in this general way, but it is hoped they will
+become clear through the exposition we shall give presently,
+with special reference to action, of the phenomena
+in which, on the one hand, the assertion in its different
+grades, and, on the other hand, the denial, expresses itself.
+For both proceed from knowledge, yet not from abstract
+knowledge, which is expressed in words, but from living
+knowledge, which is expressed in action and behaviour
+alone, and is independent of the dogmas which at the
+same time occupy the reason as abstract knowledge. To
+<pb n='368'/><anchor id='Pg368'/>
+exhibit them both, and bring them to distinct knowledge
+of the reason, can alone be my aim, and not to prescribe
+or recommend the one or the other, which would be as
+foolish as it would be useless; for the will in itself is
+absolutely free and entirely self-determining, and for it
+there is no law. But before we go on to the exposition
+referred to, we must first explain and more exactly define
+this <emph>freedom</emph> and its relation to necessity. And also, with
+regard to the life, the assertion and denial of which is
+our problem, we must insert a few general remarks connected
+with the will and its objects. Through all this
+we shall facilitate the apprehension of the inmost nature
+of the knowledge we are aiming at, of the ethical significance
+of methods of action.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Since, as has been said, this whole work is only the
+unfolding of a single thought, it follows that all its parts
+have the most intimate connection with each other. Not
+merely that each part stands in a necessary relation to
+what immediately precedes it, and only presupposes a
+recollection of that by the reader, as is the case with all
+philosophies which consist merely of a series of inferences,
+but that every part of the whole work is related to every
+other part and presupposes it. It is, therefore, necessary
+that the reader should remember not only what has just
+been said, but all the earlier parts of the work, so that
+he may be able to connect them with what he is reading,
+however much may have intervened. Plato also makes
+this demand upon his readers through the intricate digressions
+of his dialogues, in which he only returns to the
+leading thought after long episodes, which illustrate and
+explain it. In our case this demand is necessary; for
+the breaking up of our one single thought into its many
+aspects is indeed the only means of imparting it, though
+not essential to the thought itself, but merely an artificial
+form. The division of four principal points of view into
+four books, and the most careful bringing together of all
+that is related and homogeneous, assists the exposition
+<pb n='369'/><anchor id='Pg369'/>
+and its comprehension; yet the material absolutely does
+not admit of an advance in a straight line, such as the
+progress of history, but necessitates a more complicated
+exposition. This again makes a repeated study of the
+book necessary, for thus alone does the connection of all
+the parts with each other become distinct, and only then
+do they all mutually throw light upon each other and
+become quite clear.<note place='foot'>Cf. Chap. xli.-xliv. of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 55. That the will as such is <emph>free</emph>, follows from the
+fact that, according to our view, it is the thing-in-itself,
+the content of all phenomena. The phenomena, on the
+other hand, we recognise as absolutely subordinate to
+the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms.
+And since we know that necessity is throughout identical
+with following from given grounds, and that these
+are convertible conceptions, all that belongs to the
+phenomenon, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, all that is object for the knowing
+subject as individual, is in one aspect reason, and in
+another aspect consequent; and in this last capacity is
+determined with absolute necessity, and can, therefore, in
+no respect be other than it is. The whole content of
+Nature, the collective sum of its phenomena, is thus
+throughout necessary, and the necessity of every part,
+of every phenomenon, of every event, can always be
+proved, because it must be possible to find the reason
+from which it follows as a consequent. This admits
+of no exception: it follows from the unrestricted validity
+of the principle of sufficient reason. In another
+aspect, however, the same world is for us, in all its
+phenomena, objectivity of will. And the will, since it
+is not phenomenon, is not idea or object, but thing-in-itself,
+and is not subordinate to the principle of sufficient
+reason, the form of all object; thus is not determined
+as a consequent through any reason, knows no
+necessity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, is <emph>free</emph>. The concept of freedom is thus
+<pb n='370'/><anchor id='Pg370'/>
+properly a negative concept, for its content is merely
+the denial of necessity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the relation of consequent
+to its reason, according to the principle of sufficient
+reason. Now here lies before us in its most distinct
+form the solution of that great contradiction, the union
+of freedom with necessity, which has so often been
+discussed in recent times, yet, so far as I know, never
+clearly and adequately. Everything is as phenomenon,
+as object, absolutely necessary: <emph>in itself</emph> it is will, which
+is perfectly free to all eternity. The phenomenon, the
+object, is necessarily and unalterably determined in that
+chain of causes and effects which admits of no interruption.
+But the existence in general of this object,
+and its specific nature, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the Idea which reveals
+itself in it, or, in other words, its character, is a direct
+manifestation of will. Thus, in conformity with the
+freedom of this will, the object might not be at all, or
+it might be originally and essentially something quite
+different from what it is, in which case, however, the
+whole chain of which it is a link, and which is itself a
+manifestation of the same will, would be quite different
+also. But once there and existing, it has entered the
+chain of causes and effects, is always necessarily
+determined in it, and can, therefore, neither become something
+else, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, change itself, nor yet escape from the
+chain, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, vanish. Man, like every other part of Nature,
+is objectivity of the will; therefore all that has been said
+holds good of him. As everything in Nature has its
+forces and qualities, which react in a definite way when
+definitely affected, and constitute its character, man also
+has his <emph>character</emph>, from which the motives call forth his
+actions with necessity. In this manner of conduct his
+empirical character reveals itself, but in this again his
+intelligible character, the will in itself, whose determined
+phenomenon he is. But man is the most complete phenomenon
+of will, and, as we explained in the Second Book, he
+had to be enlightened with so high a degree of knowledge
+<pb n='371'/><anchor id='Pg371'/>
+in order to maintain himself in existence, that in it a perfectly
+adequate copy or repetition of the nature of the world
+under the form of the idea became possible: this is the comprehension
+of the Ideas, the pure mirror of the world, as we
+learnt in the Third Book. Thus in man the will can attain
+to full self-consciousness, to distinct and exhaustive knowledge
+of its own nature, as it mirrors itself in the whole world.
+We saw in the preceding book that art springs from the
+actual presence of this degree of knowledge; and at the
+end of our whole work it will further appear that, through
+the same knowledge, in that the will relates it to itself, a
+suppression and self-denial of the will in its most perfect
+manifestation is possible. So that the freedom which
+otherwise, as belonging to the thing-in-itself, can never
+show itself in the phenomenon, in such a case does also
+appear in it, and, by abolishing the nature which lies at
+the foundation of the phenomenon, while the latter itself
+still continues to exist in time, it brings about a contradiction
+of the phenomenon with itself, and in this way
+exhibits the phenomena of holiness and self-renunciation.
+But all this can only be fully understood at
+the end of this book. What has just been said
+merely affords a preliminary and general indication of
+how man is distinguished from all the other phenomena
+of will by the fact that freedom, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, independence of
+the principle of sufficient reason, which only belongs
+to the will as thing-in-itself, and contradicts the
+phenomenon, may yet possibly, in his case, appear in the
+phenomenon also, where, however, it necessarily exhibits
+itself as a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself.
+In this sense, not only the will in itself, but man also
+may certainly be called free, and thus distinguished from
+all other beings. But how this is to be understood can
+only become clear through all that is to follow, and for
+the present we must turn away from it altogether. For,
+in the first place, we must beware of the error that the
+action of the individual definite man is subject to no
+<pb n='372'/><anchor id='Pg372'/>
+necessity, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, that the power of the motive is less certain
+than the power of the cause, or the following of the conclusion
+from the premises. The freedom of the will as
+thing-in-itself, if, as has been said, we abstract from the
+entirely exceptional case mentioned above, by no means
+extends directly to its phenomenon, not even in the case
+in which this reaches the highest made of its visibility,
+and thus does not extend to the rational animal endowed
+with individual character, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the person. The person is
+never free although he is the phenomenon of a free will;
+for he is already the determined phenomenon of the free
+volition of this will, and, because he enters the form of
+every object, the principle of sufficient reason, he develops
+indeed the unity of that will in a multiplicity of actions,
+but on account of the timeless unity of that volition in
+itself, this multiplicity exhibits in itself the regular conformity
+to law of a force of Nature. Since, however, it is
+that free volition that becomes visible in the person and
+the whole of his conduct, relating itself to him as the
+concept to the definition, every individual action of the
+person is to be ascribed to the free will, and directly proclaims
+itself as such in consciousness. Therefore, as was
+said in the Second Book, every one regards himself <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a
+priori</foreign> (<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, here in this original feeling) as free in his
+individual actions, in the sense that in every given case
+every action is possible for him, and he only recognises
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> from experience and reflection upon experience
+that his actions take place with absolute necessity
+from the coincidence of his character with his motives.
+Hence it arises that every uncultured man, following his
+feeling, ardently defends complete freedom in particular
+actions, while the great thinkers of all ages, and indeed
+the more profound systems of religion, have denied it.
+But whoever has come to see clearly that the whole
+nature of man is will, and he himself only a phenomenon
+of this will, and that such a phenomenon has, even from
+the subject itself, the principle of sufficient reason as its
+<pb n='373'/><anchor id='Pg373'/>
+necessary form, which here appears as the law of motivation,&mdash;such
+a man will regard it as just as absurd to
+doubt the inevitable nature of an action when the motive
+is presented to a given character, as to doubt that the
+three angles of any triangle are together equal to two
+right angles. Priestley has very sufficiently proved the
+necessity of the individual action in his <q>Doctrine of
+Philosophical Necessity;</q> but Kant, whose merit in this
+respect is specially great, first proved the coexistence
+of this necessity with the freedom of the will in itself,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, apart from the phenomenon,<note place='foot'><q>Critique of Pure Reason,</q> first
+edition, pp. 532-558; fifth edition,
+pp. 560-586; and <q>Critique of Practical
+Reason,</q> fourth edition, pp.
+169-179; Rosenkranz's edition, pp.
+224-231.</note> by establishing the distinction
+between the intelligible and the empirical character.
+I entirely adhere to this distinction, for the former is the
+will as thing-in-itself so far as it appears in a definite individual
+in a definite grade, and the latter is this phenomenon
+itself as it exhibits itself in time in the mode of action, and
+in space in the physical structure. In order to make the
+relation of the two comprehensible, the best expression is
+that which I have already used in the introductory essay,
+that the intelligible character of every man is to be regarded
+as an act of will outside time, and therefore
+indivisible and unchangeable, and the manifestation of
+this act of will developed and broken up in time and
+space and all the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason is the empirical character as it exhibits itself for
+experience in the whole conduct and life of this man.
+As the whole tree is only the constantly repeated manifestation
+of one and the same tendency, which exhibits
+itself in its simplest form in the fibre, and recurs and is
+easily recognised in the construction of the leaf, shoot,
+branch, and trunk, so all a man's deeds are merely the
+constantly repeated expression, somewhat varied in form,
+of his intelligible character, and the induction based on
+the sum of all these expressions gives us his empirical
+<pb n='374'/><anchor id='Pg374'/>
+character. For the rest, I shall not at this point repeat
+in my own words Kant's masterly exposition, but presuppose
+it as known.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In the year 1840 I dealt with the important chapter
+on the freedom of the will, thoroughly and in detail, in
+my crowned prize-essay upon the subject, and exposed
+the reason of the delusion which led men to imagine that
+they found an empirically given absolute freedom of the
+will, that is to say, a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ</foreign>, as a
+fact in self-consciousness; for the question propounded
+for the essay was with great insight directed to this
+point. Therefore, as I refer the reader to that work,
+and also to the tenth paragraph of the prize-essay on
+the basis of morals, which was published along with it
+under the title <q>The Two Fundamental Problems of
+Ethics,</q> I now omit the incomplete exposition of the
+necessity of the act of will, which was given at this place
+in the first edition. Instead of it I shall explain the
+delusion mentioned above in a brief discussion which is
+presupposed in the nineteenth chapter of the supplement
+to the present work, and therefore could not be
+given in the prize-essay referred to.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Apart from the fact that the will as the true thing-in-itself
+is actually original and independent, and that the
+feeling of its originality and absoluteness must accompany
+its acts in self-consciousness, though here they are already
+determined, there arises the illusion of an empirical freedom
+of the will (instead of the transcendental freedom
+which alone is to be attributed to it), and thus a freedom
+of its particular actions, from that attitude of the intellect
+towards the will which is explained, separated, and subordinated
+in the nineteenth chapter of the supplement,
+especially under No. 3. The intellect knows the conclusions
+of the will only <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> and empirically;
+therefore when a choice is presented, it has no data as to
+how the will is to decide. For the intelligible character,
+by virtue of which, when motives are given, only <emph>one</emph>
+<pb n='375'/><anchor id='Pg375'/>
+decision is possible and is therefore necessary, does not
+come within the knowledge of the intellect, but merely
+the empirical character is known to it through the succession
+of its particular acts. Therefore it seems to the
+intellect that in a given case two opposite decisions are
+possible for the will. But this is just the same thing
+as if we were to say of a perpendicular beam that
+has lost its balance, and is hesitating which way to
+fall, <q>It can fall either to the right hand or the left.</q>
+This <emph>can</emph> has merely a subjective significance, and really
+means <q>as far as the data known to us are concerned.</q>
+Objectively, the direction of the fall is necessarily determined
+as soon as the equilibrium is lost. Accordingly,
+the decision of one's own will is undetermined only to
+the beholder, one's own intellect, and thus merely relatively
+and subjectively for the subject of knowing. In
+itself and objectively, on the other hand, in every choice
+presented to it, its decision is at once determined and
+necessary. But this determination only comes into consciousness
+through the decision that follows upon it.
+Indeed, we receive an empirical proof of this when any
+difficult and important choice lies before us, but only
+under a condition which is not yet present, but merely
+hoped for, so that in the meanwhile we can do nothing,
+but must remain passive. Now we consider how we shall
+decide when the circumstances occur that will give us
+a free activity and choice. Generally the foresight of
+rational deliberation recommends one decision, while direct
+inclination leans rather to the other. So long as we are
+compelled to remain passive, the side of reason seems to
+wish to keep the upper hand; but we see beforehand how
+strongly the other side will influence us when the opportunity
+for action arises. Till then we are eagerly concerned
+to place the motives on both sides in the clearest
+light, by calm meditation on the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>pro et contra</foreign>, so that
+every motive may exert its full influence upon the will
+when the time arrives, and it may not be misled by a
+<pb n='376'/><anchor id='Pg376'/>
+mistake on the part of the intellect to decide otherwise
+than it would have done if all the motives had their due
+influence upon it. But this distinct unfolding of the motives
+on both sides is all that the intellect can do to assist
+the choice. It awaits the real decision just as passively and
+with the same intense curiosity as if it were that of a
+foreign will. Therefore from its point of view both decisions
+must seem to it equally possible; and this is just
+the illusion of the empirical freedom of the will. Certainly
+the decision enters the sphere of the intellect altogether
+empirically, as the final conclusion of the matter;
+but yet it proceeded from the inner nature, the intelligible
+character, of the individual will in its conflict with
+given motives, and therefore with complete necessity.
+The intellect can do nothing more than bring out clearly
+and fully the nature of the motives; it cannot determine
+the will itself; for the will is quite inaccessible to it, and,
+as we have seen, cannot be investigated.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If, under the same circumstances, a man could act now
+one way and now another, it would be necessary that
+his will itself should have changed in the meantime, and
+thus that it should lie in time, for change is only possible
+in time; but then either the will would be a mere
+phenomenon, or time would be a condition of the thing-in-itself.
+Accordingly the dispute as to the freedom of
+the particular action, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ</foreign>,
+really turns on the question whether the will lies in time
+or not. If, as both Kant's doctrine and the whole of my
+system necessitates, the will is the thing-in-itself outside
+time and outside every form of the principle of sufficient
+reason, not only must the individual act in the same way
+in the same circumstances, and not only must every bad
+action be the sure warrant of innumerable others, which
+the individual <emph>must</emph> perform and <emph>cannot</emph> leave, but, as Kant
+said, if only the empirical character and the motives were
+completely given, it would be possible to calculate the
+future conduct of a man just as we can calculate an
+<pb n='377'/><anchor id='Pg377'/>
+eclipse of the sun or moon. As Nature is consistent, so
+is the character; every action must take place in accordance
+with it, just as every phenomenon takes place according
+to a law of Nature: the causes in the latter case
+and the motives in the former are merely the occasional
+causes, as was shown in the Second Book. The will,
+whose phenomenon is the whole being and life of man,
+cannot deny itself in the particular case, and what the
+man wills on the whole, that will he also will in the
+particular case.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The assertion of an empirical freedom of the will, a
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ</foreign>, agrees precisely with the
+doctrine that places the inner nature of man in a <emph>soul</emph>,
+which is originally a <emph>knowing</emph>, and indeed really an
+abstract <emph>thinking</emph> nature, and only in consequence of this
+a <emph>willing</emph> nature&mdash;a doctrine which thus regards the
+will as of a secondary or derivative nature, instead of
+knowledge which is really so. The will indeed came to
+be regarded as an act of thought, and to be identified
+with the judgment, especially by Descartes and Spinoza.
+According to this doctrine every man must become
+what he is only through his knowledge; he must enter
+the world as a moral cipher come to know the things in
+it, and thereupon determine to be this or that, to act
+thus or thus, and may also through new knowledge
+achieve a new course of action, that is to say, become
+another person. Further, he must first know a thing
+to be <emph>good</emph>, and in consequence of this will it, instead of
+first <emph>willing</emph> it, and in consequence of this calling it <emph>good</emph>.
+According to my fundamental point of view, all this is a
+reversal of the true relation. Will is first and original;
+knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument belonging
+to the phenomenon of will. Therefore every
+man is what he is through his will, and his character is
+original, for willing is the basis of his nature. Through
+the knowledge which is added to it he comes to know in
+the course of experience <emph>what he is</emph>, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, he learns his
+<pb n='378'/><anchor id='Pg378'/>
+character. Thus he <emph>knows</emph> himself in consequence of and
+in accordance with the nature of his will, instead of
+<emph>willing</emph> in consequence of and in accordance with his
+knowing. According to the latter view, he would only
+require to consider how he would like best to be, and he
+would be it; that is its doctrine of the freedom of the
+will. Thus it consists really in this, that a man is his
+own work guided by the light of knowledge. I, on the
+contrary, say that he is his own work before all knowledge,
+and knowledge is merely added to it to enlighten
+it. Therefore he cannot resolve to be this or that, nor
+can he become other than he is; but he <emph>is</emph> once for all,
+and he knows in the course of experience <emph>what</emph> he is.
+According to one doctrine he <emph>wills</emph> what he knows, and
+according to the other he <emph>knows</emph> what he wills.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The Greeks called the character ηθος, and its expression,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, morals, ηθη. But this word comes from εθος,
+custom; they chose it in order to express metaphorically
+the constancy of character through the constancy of
+custom. Το γαρ ηθος απο του εθους εχει την επωνυμιαν.
+ηθικε γαρ καλειται δια το εθιζεσθαι (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a voce</foreign> ηθος, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>consuetudo</foreign>
+ηθος <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>est appellatum: ethica ergo dicta est</foreign> απο του
+εθιζεσθαι, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sivi ab assuescendo</foreign>) says Aristotle (Eth. Magna,
+i. 6, p. 1186, and Eth. Eud., p. 1220, and Eth. Nic., p.
+1103, ed. Ber.) Stobæus quotes: οἱ δε κατα Ζηνωνα
+τροπικως; ηθος εστι πηγη βιου αφ᾽ ἡς αἱ κατα μερος
+πραξεις ρεουσι (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Stoici autem, Zenonis castra sequentes, metaphorice
+ethos definiunt vitæ fontem, e quo singulæ manant
+actiones</foreign>), ii. ch. 7. In Christian theology we find the
+dogma of predestination in consequence of election and
+non-election (Rom. ix. 11-24), clearly originating from
+the knowledge that man does not change himself, but
+his life and conduct, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, his empirical character, is only
+the unfolding of his intelligible character, the development
+of decided and unchangeable natural dispositions
+recognisable even in the child; therefore, as it were,
+even at his birth his conduct is firmly determined, and
+<pb n='379'/><anchor id='Pg379'/>
+remains essentially the same to the end. This we
+entirely agree with; but certainly the consequences
+which followed from the union of this perfectly correct
+insight with the dogmas that already existed in Jewish
+theology, and which now gave rise to the great difficulty,
+the Gordian knot upon which most of the controversies
+of the Church turned, I do not undertake to defend, for
+even the Apostle Paul scarcely succeeded in doing so
+by means of his simile of the potter's vessels which he
+invented for the purpose, for the result he finally arrived
+at was nothing else than this:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Let mankind</q></l>
+<l>Fear the gods!</l>
+<l>They hold the power</l>
+<l>In everlasting hands:</l>
+<l>And they can use it</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>As seems good to them.</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Such considerations, however, are really foreign to our
+subject. Some explanation as to the relation between
+the character and the knowledge in which all its motives
+lie, will now be more to the point.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The motives which determine the manifestation of
+the character or conduct influence it through the medium
+of knowledge. But knowledge is changeable, and often
+vacillates between truth and error, yet, as a rule, is rectified
+more and more in the course of life, though certainly in
+very different degrees. Therefore the conduct of a man
+may be observably altered without justifying us in concluding
+that his character has been changed. What the
+man really and in general wills, the striving of his inmost
+nature, and the end he pursues in accordance with it,
+this we can never change by influence upon him from
+without by instruction, otherwise we could transform
+him. Seneca says admirably, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>velle non discitur</foreign>; whereby
+he preferred truth to his Stoic philosophers, who taught
+διδακτην ειναι την αρετην (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>doceri posse virtutem</foreign>). From
+without the will can only be affected by motives. But
+<pb n='380'/><anchor id='Pg380'/>
+these can never change the will itself; for they have power
+over it only under the presupposition that it is precisely
+such as it is. All that they can do is thus to alter the
+direction of its effort, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, bring it about that it shall seek
+in another way than it has hitherto done that which it
+invariably seeks. Therefore instruction, improved knowledge,
+in other words, influence from without, may indeed
+teach the will that it erred in the means it employed,
+and can therefore bring it about that the end after
+which it strives once for all according to its inner nature
+shall be pursued on an entirely different path and in
+an entirely different object from what has hitherto
+been the case. But it can never bring about that the
+will shall will something actually different from what it
+has hitherto willed; this remains unchangeable, for the
+will is simply this willing itself, which would have to
+be abolished. The former, however, the possible modification
+of knowledge, and through knowledge of conduct,
+extends so far that the will seeks to attain its unalterable
+end, for example, Mohammed's paradise, at one time
+in the real world, at another time in a world of imagination,
+adapting the means to each, and thus in the first
+case applying prudence, might, and fraud, and in the
+second case, abstinence, justice, alms, and pilgrimages to
+Mecca. But its effort itself has not therefore changed,
+still less the will itself. Thus, although its action certainly
+shows itself very different at different times, its
+willing has yet remained precisely the same. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Velle non
+discitur.</foreign>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+For motives to act, it is necessary not only that they
+should be present, but that they should be known; for,
+according to a very good expression of the schoolmen,
+which we referred to once before, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>causa finalis movet non
+secundum suum esse reale; sed secundum esse cognitum</foreign>.
+For example, in order that the relation may appear
+that exists in a given man between egoism and sympathy,
+it is not sufficient that he should possess wealth
+<pb n='381'/><anchor id='Pg381'/>
+and see others in want, but he must also know what
+he can do with his wealth, both for himself and for
+others: not only must the suffering of others be presented
+to him, but he must know both what suffering
+and also what pleasure is. Perhaps, on a first occasion,
+he did not know all this so well as on a second; and
+if, on a similar occasion, he acts differently, this arises
+simply from the fact that the circumstances were really
+different, as regards the part of them that depends on
+his knowing them, although they seem to be the same.
+As ignorance of actually existing circumstances robs
+them of their influence, so, on the other hand, entirely
+imaginary circumstances may act as if they were real,
+not only in the case of a particular deception, but also
+in general and continuously. For example, if a man
+is firmly persuaded that every good action will be
+repaid him a hundredfold in a future life, such a conviction
+affects him in precisely the same way as a
+good bill of exchange at a very long date, and he can
+give from mere egoism, as from another point of view
+he would take from egoism. He has not changed
+himself: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>velle non discitur.</foreign> It is on account of this
+great influence of knowledge upon action, while the
+will remains unchangeable, that the character develops
+and its different features appear only little by little.
+Therefore it shows itself different at every period of
+life, and an impetuous, wild youth may be succeeded
+by a staid, sober, manly age. Especially what is bad
+in the character will always come out more strongly
+with time, yet sometimes it occurs that passions which
+a man gave way to in his youth are afterwards voluntarily
+restrained, simply because the motives opposed
+to them have only then come into knowledge. Hence,
+also, we are all innocent to begin with, and this merely
+means that neither we nor others know the evil of our
+own nature; it only appears with the motives, and
+only in time do the motives appear in knowledge.
+<pb n='382'/><anchor id='Pg382'/>
+Finally we come to know ourselves as quite different
+from what <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> we supposed ourselves to be, and
+then we are often terrified at ourselves.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Repentance never proceeds from a change of the will
+(which is impossible), but from a change of knowledge.
+The essential and peculiar in what I have always willed
+I must still continue to will; for I myself am this will
+which lies outside time and change. I can therefore
+never repent of what I have willed, though I can repent
+of what I have done; because, led by false conceptions,
+I did something that was not in conformity
+with my will. The discovery of this through fuller
+knowledge is <emph>repentance</emph>. This extends not merely to
+worldly wisdom, to the choice of the means, and the
+judgment of the appropriateness of the end to my own
+will, but also to what is properly ethical. For example,
+I may have acted more egotistically than is in accordance
+with my character, led astray by exaggerated ideas of
+the need in which I myself stood, or of the craft, falseness,
+and wickedness of others, or because I hurried too
+much, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, acted without deliberation, determined not by
+motives distinctly known <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign>, but by merely perceived
+motives, by the present and the emotion which it
+excited, and which was so strong that I had not properly
+the use of my reason; but the return of reflection is thus
+here also merely corrected knowledge, and from this repentance
+may proceed, which always proclaims itself by
+making amends for the past, as far as is possible. Yet
+it must be observed that, in order to deceive themselves,
+men prearrange what seem to be hasty errors, but are
+really secretly considered actions. For we deceive and
+flatter no one through such fine devices as ourselves. The
+converse of the case we have given may also occur. I may
+be misled by too good an opinion of others, or want of
+knowledge of the relative value of the good things of
+life, or some abstract dogma in which I have since lost
+faith, and thus I may act less egotistically than is in
+<pb n='383'/><anchor id='Pg383'/>
+keeping with my character, and lay up for myself repentance
+of another kind. Thus repentance is always corrected
+knowledge of the relation of an act to its special
+intention. When the will reveals its Ideas in space alone,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, through mere form, the matter in which other Ideas&mdash;in
+this case natural forces&mdash;already reign, resists the will,
+and seldom allows the form that is striving after visibility
+to appear in perfect purity and distinctness, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in
+perfect beauty. And there is an analogous hindrance to
+the will as it reveals itself in time alone, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, through
+actions, in the knowledge which seldom gives it the data
+quite correctly, so that the action which takes place does
+not accurately correspond to the will, and leads to
+repentance. Repentance thus always proceeds from
+corrected knowledge, not from the change of the will,
+which is impossible. Anguish of conscience for past
+deeds is anything but repentance. It is pain at the
+knowledge of oneself in one's inmost nature, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, as will.
+It rests precisely on the certainty that we have still the
+same will. If the will were changed, and therefore the
+anguish of conscience mere repentance, it would cease to
+exist. The past could then no longer give us pain, for
+it exhibited the expressions of a will which is no longer
+that of him who has repented. We shall explain the
+significance of anguish of conscience in detail farther on.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The influence which knowledge, as the medium of
+motives, exerts, not indeed upon the will itself, but upon
+its appearance in actions, is also the source of the principal
+distinction between the action of men and that of
+brutes, for their methods of knowledge are different.
+The brute has only knowledge of perception, the man,
+through reason, has also abstract ideas, conceptions.
+Now, although man and brute are with equal necessity
+determined by their motives, yet man, as distinguished
+from the brute, has a complete <emph>choice</emph>, which has often
+been regarded as a freedom of the will in particular
+actions, although it is nothing but the possibility of a
+<pb n='384'/><anchor id='Pg384'/>
+thoroughly-fought-out battle between several motives,
+the strongest of which then determines it with necessity.
+For this the motives must have assumed the form of
+abstract thoughts, because it is really only by means of
+these that deliberation, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, a weighing of opposite
+reasons for action, is possible. In the case of the brute
+there can only be a choice between perceptible motives
+presented to it, so that the choice is limited to the narrow
+sphere of its present sensuous perception. Therefore the
+necessity of the determination of the will by the motive,
+which is like that of the effect by the cause, can be
+exhibited perceptibly and directly only in the case of the
+brutes, because here the spectator has the motives just
+as directly before his eyes as their effect; while in the
+case of man the motives are almost always abstract ideas,
+which are not communicated to the spectator, and even
+for the actor himself the necessity of their effect is hidden
+behind their conflict. For only <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign> can several
+ideas, as judgments and chains of conclusions, lie beside
+each other in consciousness, and then, free from all determination
+of time, work against each other till the stronger
+overcomes the rest and determines the will. This is the
+complete <emph>choice</emph> or power of deliberation which man has
+as distinguished from the brutes, and on account of
+which freedom of the will has been attributed to him, in
+the belief that his willing is a mere result of the operations
+of his intellect, without a definite tendency which
+serves as its basis; while, in truth, the motives only work
+on the foundation and under the presupposition of his
+definite tendency, which in his case is individual, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, a
+character. A fuller exposition of this power of deliberation,
+and the difference between human and brute choice
+which is introduced by it, will be found in the <q>Two
+Fundamental Problems of Ethics</q> (1st edition, p. 35,
+<hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>; 2d edition, p. 34, <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi>), to which I therefore
+refer. For the rest, this power of deliberation which
+man possesses is one of those things that makes his
+<pb n='385'/><anchor id='Pg385'/>
+existence so much more miserable than that of the brute.
+For in general our greatest sufferings do not lie in the
+present as ideas of perception or as immediate feelings;
+but in the reason, as abstract conceptions, painful
+thoughts, from which the brute, which lives only in the
+present, and therefore in enviable carelessness, is entirely
+free.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It seems to have been the dependence, which we have
+shown, of the human power of deliberation upon the
+faculty of abstract thinking, and thus also of judging and
+drawing conclusions also, that led both Descartes and
+Spinoza to identify the decisions of the will with the
+faculty of asserting and denying (the faculty of judgment).
+From this Descartes deduced the doctrine that the will,
+which, according to him, is indifferently free, is the source
+of sin, and also of all theoretical error. And Spinoza, on
+the other hand, concluded that the will is necessarily
+determined by the motives, as the judgment is by the
+reasons.<note place='foot'>Cart. Medit. 4.&mdash;Spin. Eth., pt. ii. prop. 48 et 49, cæt.</note> The latter doctrine is in a sense true, but it
+appears as a true conclusion from false premises.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The distinction we have established between the ways
+in which the brutes and man are respectively moved by
+motives exerts a very wide influence upon the nature of
+both, and has most to do with the complete and obvious
+differences of their existence. While an idea of perception
+is in every case the motive which determines the
+brute, the man strives to exclude this kind of motivation
+altogether, and to determine himself entirely by abstract
+ideas. Thus he uses his prerogative of reason to the
+greatest possible advantage. Independent of the present,
+he neither chooses nor avoids the passing pleasure or pain,
+but reflects on the consequences of both. In most cases,
+setting aside quite insignificant actions, we are determined
+by abstract, thought motives, not present impressions.
+Therefore all particular privation for the moment
+is for us comparatively light, but all renunciation is terribly
+<pb n='386'/><anchor id='Pg386'/>
+hard; for the former only concerns the fleeting
+present, but the latter concerns the future, and includes
+in itself innumerable privations, of which it is the equivalent.
+The causes of our pain, as of our pleasure, lie
+for the most part, not in the real present, but merely in
+abstract thoughts. It is these which are often unbearable
+to us&mdash;inflict torments in comparison with which all the
+sufferings of the animal world are very small; for even
+our own physical pain is not felt at all when they are
+present. Indeed, in the case of keen mental suffering,
+we even inflict physical suffering on ourselves merely to
+distract our attention from the former to the latter. This
+is why, in great mental anguish, men tear their hair, beat
+their breasts, lacerate their faces, or roll on the floor, for
+all these are in reality only violent means of diverting
+the mind from an unbearable thought. Just because
+mental pain, being much greater, makes us insensible
+to physical pain, suicide is very easy to the person who
+is in despair, or who is consumed by morbid depression,
+even though formerly, in comfortable circumstances, he
+recoiled at the thought of it. In the same way care and
+passion (thus the play of thought) wear out the body
+oftener and more than physical hardships. And in
+accordance with this Epictetus rightly says: Ταρασσει
+τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των
+πραγματων δογματα (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Perturbant homines non res ipsæ,
+sed de rebus decreta</foreign>) (V.); and Seneca: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Plura sunt quæ
+nos terrent, quam quæ premunt, et sæpius opinione quam re
+laboramus</foreign> (Ep. 5). Eulenspiegel also admirably bantered
+human nature, for going uphill he laughed, and going
+downhill he wept. Indeed, children who have hurt
+themselves often cry, not at the pain, but at the thought
+of the pain which is awakened when some one condoles
+with them. Such great differences in conduct and in life
+arise from the diversity between the methods of knowledge
+of the brutes and man. Further, the appearance
+of the distinct and decided individual character, the
+<pb n='387'/><anchor id='Pg387'/>
+principal distinction between man and the brute, which
+has scarcely more than the character of the species, is
+conditioned by the choice between several motives, which
+is only possible through abstract conceptions. For only
+after a choice has been made are the resolutions, which
+vary in different individuals, an indication of the individual
+character which is different in each; while the
+action of the brute depends only upon the presence or
+absence of the impression, supposing this impression to
+be in general a motive for its species. And, finally, in
+the case of man, only the resolve, and not the mere wish,
+is a valid indication of his character both for himself
+and for others; but the resolve becomes for himself, as
+for others, a certain fact only through the deed. The
+wish is merely the necessary consequence of the present
+impression, whether of the outward stimulus, or the
+inward passing mood; and is therefore as immediately
+necessary and devoid of consideration as the action of
+the brutes. Therefore, like the action of the brutes, it
+merely expresses the character of the species, not that
+of the individual, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, it indicates merely what <emph>man in
+general</emph>, not what the individual who experiences the
+wish, is capable of doing. The deed alone,&mdash;because as
+human action it always requires a certain deliberation,
+and because as a rule a man has command of his reason,
+is considerate, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, decides in accordance with considered
+and abstract motives,&mdash;is the expression of the intelligible
+maxims of his conduct, the result of his inmost
+willing, and is related as a letter to the word that stands
+for his empirical character, itself merely the temporal
+expression of his intelligible character. In a healthy
+mind, therefore, only deeds oppress the conscience, not
+wishes and thoughts; for it is only our deeds that hold
+up to us the mirror of our will. The deed referred to
+above, that is entirely unconsidered and is really committed
+in blind passion, is to a certain extent an intermediate
+thing between the mere wish and the resolve.
+</p>
+
+<pb n='388'/><anchor id='Pg388'/>
+
+<p>
+Therefore, by true repentance, which, however, shows
+itself as action also, it can be obliterated, as a falsely
+drawn line, from that picture of our will which our
+course of life is. I may insert the remark here, as a
+very good comparison, that the relation between wish and
+deed has a purely accidental but accurate analogy with that
+between the accumulation and discharge of electricity.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As the result of the whole of this discussion of the
+freedom of the will and what relates to it, we find
+that although the will may, in itself and apart from the
+phenomenon, be called free and even omnipotent, yet in
+its particular phenomena enlightened by knowledge, as in
+men and brutes, it is determined by motives to which
+the special character regularly and necessarily responds,
+and always in the same way. We see that because of the
+possession on his part of abstract or rational knowledge,
+man, as distinguished from the brutes, has a <emph>choice</emph>, which
+only makes him the scene of the conflict of his motives,
+without withdrawing him from their control. This choice
+is therefore certainly the condition of the possibility of the
+complete expression of the individual character, but is by
+no means to be regarded as freedom of the particular volition,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, independence of the law of causality, the necessity
+of which extends to man as to every other phenomenon.
+Thus the difference between human volition
+and that of the brutes, which is introduced by reason or
+knowledge through concepts, extends to the point we
+have indicated, and no farther. But, what is quite a
+different thing, there may arise a phenomenon of the
+human will which is quite impossible in the brute
+creation, if man altogether lays aside the knowledge of
+particular things as such which is subordinate to the
+principle of sufficient reason, and by means of his knowledge
+of the Ideas sees through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>.
+Then an actual appearance of the real freedom
+of the will as a thing-in-itself is possible, by which
+the phenomenon comes into a sort of contradiction with
+<pb n='389'/><anchor id='Pg389'/>
+itself, as is indicated by the word self-renunciation; and,
+finally, the <q>in-itself</q> of its nature suppresses itself.
+But this, the one, real, and direct expression of the
+freedom of the will in itself in the phenomenon, cannot
+be distinctly explained here, but will form the subject
+of the concluding part of our work.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now that we have shown clearly in these pages the
+unalterable nature of the empirical character, which is
+just the unfolding of the intelligible character that lies
+outside time, together with the necessity with which
+actions follow upon its contact with motives, we hasten
+to anticipate an argument which may very easily be
+drawn from this in the interest of bad dispositions.
+Our character is to be regarded as the temporal unfolding
+of an extra-temporal, and therefore indivisible
+and unalterable, act of will, or an intelligible character.
+This necessarily determines all that is essential in our
+conduct in life, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, its ethical content, which must
+express itself in accordance with it in its phenomenal
+appearance, the empirical character; while only what
+is unessential in this, the outward form of our course
+of life, depends upon the forms in which the motives
+present themselves. It might, therefore, be inferred
+that it is a waste of trouble to endeavour to improve
+one's character, and that it is wiser to submit to the
+inevitable, and gratify every inclination at once, even
+if it is bad. But this is precisely the same thing as
+the theory of an inevitable fate which is called αργος
+λογος, and in more recent times Turkish faith. Its
+true refutation, as it is supposed to have been given by
+Chrysippus, is explained by Cicero in his book <hi rend='italic'>De Fato</hi>,
+ch. 12, 13.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Though everything may be regarded as irrevocably
+predetermined by fate, yet it is so only through the
+medium of the chain of causes; therefore in no case
+can it be determined that an effect shall appear without
+its cause. Thus it is not simply the event that is
+<pb n='390'/><anchor id='Pg390'/>
+predetermined, but the event as the consequence of
+preceding causes; so that fate does not decide the consequence
+alone, but also the means as the consequence
+of which it is destined to appear. Accordingly, if some
+means is not present, it is certain that the consequence
+also will not be present: each is always present in accordance
+with the determination of fate, but this is never
+known to us till afterwards.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As events always take place according to fate, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, according
+to the infinite concatenation of causes, so our actions
+always take place according to our intelligible character.
+But just as we do not know the former beforehand, so no
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> insight is given us into the latter, but we only
+come to know ourselves as we come to know other persons
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> through experience. If the intelligible
+character involved that we could only form a good resolution
+after a long conflict with a bad disposition, this conflict
+would have to come first and be waited for. Reflection
+on the unalterable nature of the character, on the
+unity of the source from which all our actions flow, must
+not mislead us into claiming the decision of the character
+in favour of one side or the other; it is in the resolve
+that follows that we shall see what manner of men we
+are, and mirror ourselves in our actions. This is the
+explanation of the satisfaction or the anguish of soul
+with which we look back on the course of our past life.
+Both are experienced, not because these past deeds have
+still an existence; they are past, they have been, and
+now are no more; but their great importance for us lies
+in their significance, lies in the fact that these deeds are
+the expression of the character, the mirror of the will, in
+which we look and recognise our inmost self, the kernel
+of our will. Because we experience this not before, but
+only after, it behoves us to strive and fight in time, in
+order that the picture we produce by our deeds may be
+such that the contemplation of it may calm us as much
+as possible, instead of harassing us. The significance of
+<pb n='391'/><anchor id='Pg391'/>
+this consolation or anguish of soul will, as we have said,
+be inquired into farther on; but to this place there belongs
+the inquiry which follows, and which stands by
+itself.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Besides the intelligible and the empirical character, we
+must mention a third which is different from them both,
+the <emph>acquired character</emph>, which one only receives in life
+through contact with the world, and which is referred to
+when one is praised as a man of character or censured as
+being without character. Certainly one might suppose
+that, since the empirical character, as the phenomenon of
+the intelligible, is unalterable, and, like every natural
+phenomenon, is consistent with itself, man would always
+have to appear like himself and consistent, and would
+therefore have no need to acquire a character artificially
+by experience and reflection. But the case is otherwise,
+and although a man is always the same, yet he does not
+always understand himself, but often mistakes himself, till
+he has in some degree acquired real self-knowledge. The
+empirical character, as a mere natural tendency, is in itself
+irrational; nay, more, its expressions are disturbed by reason,
+all the more so the more intellect and power of thought
+the man has; for these always keep before him what
+becomes <emph>man in general</emph> as the character of the species,
+and what is possible for him both in will and in deed.
+This makes it the more difficult for him to see how much
+his individuality enables him to will and to accomplish.
+He finds in himself the germs of all the various human
+pursuits and powers, but the difference of degree in which
+they exist in his individuality is not clear to him in the
+absence of experience; and if he now applies himself to
+the pursuits which alone correspond to his character, he
+yet feels, especially at particular moments and in particular
+moods, the inclination to directly opposite pursuits
+which cannot be combined with them, but must be entirely
+suppressed if he desires to follow the former undisturbed.
+For as our physical path upon earth is always
+<pb n='392'/><anchor id='Pg392'/>
+merely a line, not an extended surface, so in life, if we
+desire to grasp and possess one thing, we must renounce
+and leave innumerable others on the right hand and on
+the left. If we cannot make up our minds to this, but,
+like children at the fair, snatch at everything that attracts
+us in passing, we are making the perverse endeavour to
+change the line of our path into an extended surface; we
+run in a zigzag, skip about like a will o' the wisp, and
+attain to nothing. Or, to use another comparison, as,
+according to Hobbes' philosophy of law, every one has an
+original right to everything but an exclusive right to
+nothing, yet can obtain an exclusive right to particular
+things by renouncing his right to all the rest, while
+others, on their part, do likewise with regard to what he
+has chosen; so is it in life, in which some definite pursuit,
+whether it be pleasure, honour, wealth, science, art,
+or virtue, can only be followed with seriousness and
+success when all claims that are foreign to it are given
+up, when everything else is renounced. Accordingly, the
+mere will and the mere ability are not sufficient, but a
+man must also <emph>know</emph> what he wills, and <emph>know</emph> what he
+can do; only then will he show character, and only then
+can he accomplish something right. Until he attains to
+that, notwithstanding the natural consistency of the empirical
+character, he is without character. And although,
+on the whole, he must remain true to himself, and fulfil
+his course, led by his dæmon, yet his path will not be a
+straight line, but wavering and uneven. He will hesitate,
+deviate, turn back, lay up for himself repentance and
+pain. And all this is because, in great and small, he sees
+before him all that is possible and attainable for man in
+general, but does not know what part of all this is alone
+suitable for him, can be accomplished by him, and is
+alone enjoyable by him. He will, therefore, envy many
+men on account of a position and circumstances which
+are yet only suitable to their characters and not to his,
+and in which he would feel unhappy, if indeed he found
+<pb n='393'/><anchor id='Pg393'/>
+them endurable at all. For as a fish is only at home in
+water, a bird in the air, a mole in the earth, so every
+man is only at home in the atmosphere suitable to him.
+For example, not all men can breathe the air of court
+life. From deficiency of proper insight into all this,
+many a man will make all kinds of abortive attempts,
+will do violence to his character in particulars, and yet,
+on the whole, will have to yield to it again; and what
+he thus painfully attains will give him no pleasure; what
+he thus learns will remain dead; even in an ethical regard,
+a deed that is too noble for his character, that has
+not sprung from pure, direct impulse, but from a concept,
+a dogma, will lose all merit, even in his own eyes, through
+subsequent egoistical repentance. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Velle non discitur.</foreign>
+We only become conscious of the inflexibility of another
+person's character through experience, and till then we
+childishly believe that it is possible, by means of rational
+ideas, by prayers and entreaties, by example and noble-mindedness,
+ever to persuade any one to leave his own
+way, to change his course of conduct, to depart from his
+mode of thinking, or even to extend his capacities: so is
+it also with ourselves. We must first learn from experience
+what we desire and what we can do. Till then
+we know it not, we are without character, and must often
+be driven back to our own way by hard blows from without.
+But if we have finally learnt it, then we have
+attained to what in the world is called character, the
+<emph>acquired character</emph>. This is accordingly nothing but the
+most perfect knowledge possible of our own individuality.
+It is the abstract, and consequently distinct,
+knowledge of the unalterable qualities of our own empirical
+character, and of the measure and direction of
+our mental and physical powers, and thus of the whole
+strength and weakness of our own individuality. This
+places us in a position to carry out deliberately and
+methodically the rôle which belongs to our own person,
+and to fill up the gaps which caprices or weaknesses
+<pb n='394'/><anchor id='Pg394'/>
+produce in it, under the guidance of fixed conceptions.
+This rôle is in itself unchangeably determined once for
+all, but hitherto we have allowed it to follow its natural
+course without any rule. We have now brought to
+distinct conscious maxims which are always present to
+us the form of conduct which is necessarily determined
+by our own individual nature, and now we conduct it
+in accordance with them as deliberately as if we had
+learned it; without ever falling into error through the
+passing influence of the mood or the impression of the
+present, without being checked by the bitterness or
+sweetness of some particular thing we meet with on our
+path, without delay, without hesitation, without inconsistency.
+We shall now no longer, as novices, wait,
+attempt, and grope about in order to see what we really
+desire and are able to do, but we know this once for all,
+and in every choice we have only to apply general principles
+to particular cases, and arrive at once at a decision.
+We know our will in general, and do not allow
+ourselves to be led by the passing mood or by solicitations
+from without to resolve in particular cases what
+is contrary to it as a whole. We know in the same
+way the nature and the measure of our strength and our
+weakness, and thereby are spared much suffering. For
+we experience no real pleasure except in the use and
+feeling of our own powers, and the greatest pain is the
+conscious deficiency of our powers where we need
+them. If, now, we have discovered where our strength
+and our weakness lie, we will endeavour to cultivate,
+employ, and in every way make use of those talents
+which are naturally prominent in us. We will always
+turn to those occupations in which they are valuable and
+to the purpose, and entirely avoid, even with self-renunciation,
+those pursuits for which we have naturally
+little aptitude; we will beware of attempting that in
+which we have no chance of succeeding. Only he
+who has attained to this will constantly and with
+<pb n='395'/><anchor id='Pg395'/>
+full consciousness be completely himself, and will
+never fail himself at the critical moment, because he
+will always have known what he could expect from
+himself. He will often enjoy the satisfaction of feeling
+his strength, and seldom experience the pain of being
+reminded of his weakness. The latter is mortification,
+which causes perhaps the greatest of mental sufferings;
+therefore it is far more endurable to have our misfortune
+brought clearly before us than our incapacity. And,
+further, if we are thus fully acquainted with our strength
+and our weakness, we will not attempt to make a show
+of powers which we do not possess; we will not play
+with base coin, for all such dissimulation misses the
+mark in the end. For since the whole man is only the
+phenomenon of his will, nothing can be more perverse
+than to try, by means of reflection, to become something
+else than one is, for this is a direct contradiction of
+the will with itself. The imitation of the qualities
+and idiosyncrasies of others is much more shameful than
+to dress in other people's clothes; for it is the judgment
+of our own worthlessness pronounced by ourselves.
+Knowledge of our own mind and its capacities of every
+kind, and their unalterable limits, is in this respect the
+surest way to the attainment of the greatest possible
+contentment with ourselves. For it holds good of inward
+as of outward circumstances that there is for us no
+consolation so effective as the complete certainty of unalterable
+necessity. No evil that befalls us pains us so
+much as the thought of the circumstances by which it
+might have been warded off. Therefore nothing comforts
+us so effectually as the consideration of what has
+happened from the standpoint of necessity, from which
+all accidents appear as tools in the hand of an overruling
+fate, and we therefore recognise the evil that has
+come to us as inevitably produced by the conflict of
+inner and outer circumstances; in other words, fatalism.
+We really only complain and storm so long as we hope
+<pb n='396'/><anchor id='Pg396'/>
+either to affect others or to excite ourselves to unheard-of
+efforts. But children and grown-up people know very
+well to yield contentedly as soon as they clearly see
+that it absolutely cannot be otherwise:&mdash;Θυμὸν ἐνὶ
+στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσσαντες ἀνάγκη (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Animo in pectoribus
+nostro domito necessitate</foreign>). We are like the entrapped
+elephants, that rage and struggle for many days, till they
+see that it is useless, and then suddenly offer their necks
+quietly to the yoke, tamed for ever. We are like King
+David, who, as long as his son still lived, unceasingly
+importuned Jehovah with prayers, and behaved himself
+as if in despair; but as soon as his son was dead, thought
+no longer about it. Hence it arises that innumerable
+permanent ills, such as lameness, poverty, low estate,
+ugliness, a disagreeable dwelling-place, are borne with
+indifference by innumerable persons, and are no longer
+felt, like healed wounds, just because these persons know
+that inward or outward necessity renders it impossible
+that any change can take place in these things; while
+those who are more fortunate cannot understand how
+such misfortunes can be borne. Now as with outward
+necessity, so also with inward; nothing reconciles so
+thoroughly as a distinct knowledge of it. If we have
+once for all distinctly recognised not only our good
+qualities and our strength, but also our defects and
+weakness, established our aim accordingly, and rest satisfied
+concerning what cannot be attained, we thus escape
+in the surest way, as far as our individuality permits, the
+bitterest of all sorrows, discontentment with ourselves,
+which is the inevitable result of ignorance of our own
+individuality, of false conceit and the audacity that proceeds
+from it. To the bitter chapter of the self-knowledge
+here recommended the lines of Ovid admit of
+excellent application&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Optimus ille animi vindex lædentia pectus,</foreign></q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel.</foreign></q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<pb n='397'/><anchor id='Pg397'/>
+
+<p>
+So much with regard to the <emph>acquired character</emph>, which,
+indeed, is not of so much importance for ethics proper
+as for life in the world. But its investigation was
+related as that of a third species to the investigation of
+the intelligible and the empirical character, in regard to
+which we were obliged to enter upon a somewhat detailed
+inquiry in order to bring out clearly how in all its
+phenomena the will is subject to necessity, while yet in
+itself it may be called free and even omnipotent.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 56. This freedom, this omnipotence, as the expression
+of which the whole visible world exists and progressively
+develops in accordance with the laws which
+belong to the form of knowledge, can now, at the point
+at which in its most perfect manifestation it has attained
+to the completely adequate knowledge of its own nature,
+express itself anew in two ways. Either it wills here, at
+the summit of mental endowment and self-consciousness,
+simply what it willed before blindly and unconsciously,
+and if so, knowledge always remains its <emph>motive</emph> in the
+whole as in the particular case. Or, conversely, this knowledge
+becomes for it a <emph>quieter</emph>, which appeases and suppresses
+all willing. This is that assertion and denial of
+the will to live which was stated above in general terms.
+As, in the reference of individual conduct, a general, not
+a particular manifestation of will, it does not disturb and
+modify the development of the character, nor does it
+find its expression in particular actions; but, either by
+an ever more marked appearance of the whole method of
+action it has followed hitherto, or conversely by the
+entire suppression of it, it expresses in a living form the
+maxims which the will has freely adopted in accordance
+with the knowledge it has now attained to. By the
+explanations we have just given of freedom, necessity, and
+character, we have somewhat facilitated and prepared the
+way for the clearer development of all this, which is the
+principal subject of this last book. But we shall have
+done so still more when we have turned our attention to
+<pb n='398'/><anchor id='Pg398'/>
+life itself, the willing or not willing of which is the great
+question, and have endeavoured to find out generally
+what the will itself, which is everywhere the inmost
+nature of this life, will really attain by its assertion&mdash;in
+what way and to what extent this assertion satisfies or can
+satisfy the will; in short, what is generally and mainly to
+be regarded as its position in this its own world, which
+in every relation belongs to it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+First of all, I wish the reader to recall the passage
+with which we closed the Second Book,&mdash;a passage occasioned
+by the question, which met us then, as to the end
+and aim of the will. Instead of the answer to this question,
+it appeared clearly before us how, in all the grades
+of its manifestation, from the lowest to the highest, the
+will dispenses altogether with a final goal and aim. It
+always strives, for striving is its sole nature, which no
+attained goal can put an end to. Therefore it is not susceptible
+of any final satisfaction, but can only be restrained
+by hindrances, while in itself it goes on for ever. We
+see this in the simplest of all natural phenomena, gravity,
+which does not cease to strive and press towards a
+mathematical centre to reach which would be the annihilation
+both of itself and matter, and would not cease
+even if the whole universe were already rolled into one
+ball. We see it in the other simple natural phenomena.
+A solid tends towards fluidity either by melting or dissolving,
+for only so will its chemical forces be free;
+rigidity is the imprisonment in which it is held by cold.
+The fluid tends towards the gaseous state, into which it
+passes at once as soon as all pressure is removed from it.
+No body is without relationship, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, without tendency or
+without desire and longing, as Jacob Böhme would say.
+Electricity transmits its inner self-repulsion to infinity,
+though the mass of the earth absorbs the effect. Galvanism
+is certainly, so long as the pile is working, an
+aimless, unceasingly repeated act of repulsion and attraction.
+The existence of the plant is just such a restless,
+<pb n='399'/><anchor id='Pg399'/>
+never satisfied striving, a ceaseless tendency through ever-ascending
+forms, till the end, the seed, becomes a new
+starting-point; and this repeated <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ad infinitum</foreign>&mdash;nowhere
+an end, nowhere a final satisfaction, nowhere a resting-place.
+It will also be remembered, from the Second Book,
+that the multitude of natural forces and organised forms
+everywhere strive with each other for the matter in which
+they desire to appear, for each of them only possesses what
+it has wrested from the others; and thus a constant internecine
+war is waged, from which, for the most part, arises
+the resistance through which that striving, which constitutes
+the inner nature of everything, is at all points
+hindered; struggles in vain, yet, from its nature, cannot
+leave off; toils on laboriously till this phenomenon dies,
+when others eagerly seize its place and its matter.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We have long since recognised this striving, which
+constitutes the kernel and in-itself of everything, as identical
+with that which in us, where it manifests itself
+most distinctly in the light of the fullest consciousness,
+is called <emph>will</emph>. Its hindrance through an obstacle which
+places itself between it and its temporary aim we call
+<emph>suffering</emph>, and, on the other hand, its attainment of the
+end satisfaction, wellbeing, happiness. We may also transfer
+this terminology to the phenomena of the unconscious
+world, for though weaker in degree, they are identical
+in nature. Then we see them involved in constant suffering,
+and without any continuing happiness. For all effort
+springs from defect&mdash;from discontent with one's estate&mdash;is
+thus suffering so long as it is not satisfied; but no
+satisfaction is lasting, rather it is always merely the
+starting-point of a new effort. The striving we see
+everywhere hindered in many ways, everywhere in conflict,
+and therefore always under the form of suffering.
+Thus, if there is no final end of striving, there is no
+measure and end of suffering.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But what we only discover in unconscious Nature by
+sharpened observation, and with an effort, presents itself
+<pb n='400'/><anchor id='Pg400'/>
+distinctly to us in the intelligent world in the life of
+animals, whose constant suffering is easily proved. But
+without lingering over these intermediate grades, we shall
+turn to the life of man, in which all this appears with
+the greatest distinctness, illuminated by the clearest
+knowledge; for as the phenomenon of will becomes more
+complete, the suffering also becomes more and more apparent.
+In the plant there is as yet no sensibility, and
+therefore no pain. A certain very small degree of suffering
+is experienced by the lowest species of animal life&mdash;infusoria
+and radiata; even in insects the capacity to feel and
+suffer is still limited. It first appears in a high degree
+with the complete nervous system of vertebrate animals,
+and always in a higher degree the more intelligence
+develops. Thus, in proportion as knowledge attains to
+distinctness, as consciousness ascends, pain also increases,
+and therefore reaches its highest degree in man. And
+then, again, the more distinctly a man knows, the more
+intelligent he is, the more pain he has; the man who is
+gifted with genius suffers most of all. In this sense, that
+is, with reference to the degree of knowledge in general,
+not mere abstract rational knowledge, I understand and
+use here that saying of the Preacher: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Qui auget scientiam,
+auget at dolorem.</foreign> That philosophical painter or painting
+philosopher, Tischbein, has very beautifully expressed the
+accurate relation between the degree of consciousness and
+that of suffering by exhibiting it in a visible and clear
+form in a drawing. The upper half of his drawing represents
+women whose children have been stolen, and who
+in different groups and attitudes, express in many ways
+deep maternal pain, anguish, and despair. The lower half
+of the drawing represents sheep whose lambs have been
+taken away. They are arranged and grouped in precisely
+the same way; so that every human head, every human
+attitude of the upper half, has below a brute head and
+attitude corresponding to it. Thus we see distinctly how
+the pain which is possible in the dull brute consciousness
+<pb n='401'/><anchor id='Pg401'/>
+is related to the violent grief, which only becomes possible
+through distinctness of knowledge and clearness of consciousness.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We desire to consider in this way, in <emph>human existence</emph>,
+the inner and essential destiny of will. Every one will
+easily recognise that same destiny expressed in various
+degrees in the life of the brutes, only more weakly, and
+may also convince himself to his own satisfaction, from
+the suffering animal world, <emph>how essential to all life is
+suffering</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 57. At every grade that is enlightened by knowledge,
+the will appears as an individual. The human
+individual finds himself as finite in infinite space and
+time, and consequently as a vanishing quantity compared
+with them. He is projected into them, and, on account
+of their unlimited nature, he has always a merely relative,
+never absolute <emph>when</emph> and <emph>where</emph> of his existence;
+for his place and duration are finite parts of what is
+infinite and boundless. His real existence is only in
+the present, whose unchecked flight into the past is a
+constant transition into death, a constant dying. For
+his past life, apart from its possible consequences for
+the present, and the testimony regarding the will that
+is expressed in it, is now entirely done with, dead, and
+no longer anything; and, therefore, it must be, as a
+matter of reason, indifferent to him whether the content
+of that past was pain or pleasure. But the present is
+always passing through his hands into the past; the
+future is quite uncertain and always short. Thus his
+existence, even when we consider only its formal side,
+is a constant hurrying of the present into the dead past,
+a constant dying. But if we look at it from the
+physical side; it is clear that, as our walking is
+admittedly merely a constantly prevented falling, the
+life of our body is only a constantly prevented dying,
+an ever-postponed death: finally, in the same way, the
+activity of our mind is a constantly deferred ennui.
+<pb n='402'/><anchor id='Pg402'/>
+Every breath we draw wards off the death that is constantly
+intruding upon us. In this way we fight with
+it every moment, and again, at longer intervals, through
+every meal we eat, every sleep we take, every time we
+warm ourselves, &amp;c. In the end, death must conquer,
+for we became subject to him through birth,
+and he only plays for a little while with his prey before
+he swallows it up. We pursue our life, however, with
+great interest and much solicitude as long as possible,
+as we blow out a soap-bubble as long and as large as
+possible, although we know perfectly well that it will
+burst.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We saw that the inner being of unconscious nature
+is a constant striving without end and without rest.
+And this appears to us much more distinctly when we
+consider the nature of brutes and man. Willing and
+striving is its whole being, which may be very well
+compared to an unquenchable thirst. But the basis of
+all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently,
+the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain
+originally and through its very being. If, on the other
+hand, it lacks objects of desire, because it is at once
+deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction, a terrible
+void and ennui comes over it, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, its being and existence
+itself becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus
+its life swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards
+between pain and ennui. This has also had to express
+itself very oddly in this way; after man had transferred
+all pain and torments to hell, there then remained nothing
+over for heaven but ennui.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But the constant striving which constitutes the inner
+nature of every manifestation of will obtains its primary
+and most general foundation at the higher grades of
+objectification, from the fact that here the will manifests
+itself as a living body, with the iron command to nourish
+it; and what gives strength to this command is just
+that this body is nothing but the objectified will to live
+<pb n='403'/><anchor id='Pg403'/>
+itself. Man, as the most complete objectification of that
+will, is in like measure also the most necessitous of all
+beings: he is through and through concrete willing and
+needing; he is a concretion of a thousand necessities.
+With these he stands upon the earth, left to himself,
+uncertain about everything except his own need and
+misery. Consequently the care for the maintenance of
+that existence under exacting demands, which are renewed
+every day, occupies, as a rule, the whole of human life.
+To this is directly related the second claim, that of the
+propagation of the species. At the same time he is
+threatened from all sides by the most different kinds of
+dangers, from which it requires constant watchfulness to
+escape. With cautious steps and casting anxious glances
+round him he pursues his path, for a thousand accidents
+and a thousand enemies lie in wait for him. Thus he
+went while yet a savage, thus he goes in civilised life;
+there is no security for him.
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Qualibus in tenebris vitæ, quantisque periclis</foreign></q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Degitur hocc' ævi, quodcunque est!</foreign></q>&mdash;<hi rend='smallcaps'>Lucr.</hi> ii. 15.</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+The life of the great majority is only a constant struggle
+for this existence itself, with the certainty of losing it
+at last. But what enables them to endure this wearisome
+battle is not so much the love of life as the fear
+of death, which yet stands in the background as inevitable,
+and may come upon them at any moment. Life
+itself is a sea, full of rocks and whirlpools, which man
+avoids with the greatest care and solicitude, although he
+knows that even if he succeeds in getting through with
+all his efforts and skill, he yet by doing so comes nearer
+at every step to the greatest, the total, inevitable, and
+irremediable shipwreck, death; nay, even steers right
+upon it: this is the final goal of the laborious voyage,
+and worse for him than all the rocks from which he has
+escaped.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now it is well worth observing that, on the one hand,
+<pb n='404'/><anchor id='Pg404'/>
+the suffering and misery of life may easily increase to
+such an extent that death itself, in the flight from which
+the whole of life consists, becomes desirable, and we hasten
+towards it voluntarily; and again, on the other hand, that
+as soon as want and suffering permit rest to a man, ennui
+is at once so near that he necessarily requires diversion.
+The striving after existence is what occupies all living
+things and maintains them in motion. But when existence
+is assured, then they know not what to do with it;
+thus the second thing that sets them in motion is the
+effort to get free from the burden of existence, to make
+it cease to be felt, <q>to kill time,</q> <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, to escape from
+ennui. Accordingly we see that almost all men who are
+secure from want and care, now that at last they have
+thrown off all other burdens, become a burden to themselves,
+and regard as a gain every hour they succeed in
+getting through; and thus every diminution of the very
+life which, till then, they have employed all their powers to
+maintain as long as possible. Ennui is by no means an evil
+to be lightly esteemed; in the end it depicts on the countenance
+real despair. It makes beings who love each other
+so little as men do, seek each other eagerly, and thus becomes
+the source of social intercourse. Moreover, even
+from motives of policy, public precautions are everywhere
+taken against it, as against other universal calamities. For
+this evil may drive men to the greatest excesses, just as
+much as its opposite extreme, famine: the people require
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>panem et circenses</foreign>. The strict penitentiary system of
+Philadelphia makes use of ennui alone as a means of punishment,
+through solitary confinement and idleness, and
+it is found so terrible that it has even led prisoners to
+commit suicide. As want is the constant scourge of the
+people, so ennui is that of the fashionable world. In
+middle-class life ennui is represented by the Sunday, and
+want by the six week-days.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus between desiring and attaining all human life
+flows on throughout. The wish is, in its nature, pain;
+<pb n='405'/><anchor id='Pg405'/>
+the attainment soon begets satiety: the end was only
+apparent; possession takes away the charm; the wish,
+the need, presents itself under a new form; when it does
+not, then follows desolateness, emptiness, ennui, against
+which the conflict is just as painful as against want.
+That wish and satisfaction should follow each other
+neither too quickly nor too slowly reduces the suffering,
+which both occasion to the smallest amount, and constitutes
+the happiest life. For that which we might otherwise
+call the most beautiful part of life, its purest joy, if
+it were only because it lifts us out of real existence and
+transforms us into disinterested spectators of it&mdash;that
+is, pure knowledge, which is foreign to all willing, the
+pleasure of the beautiful, the true delight in art&mdash;this
+is granted only to a very few, because it demands rare
+talents, and to these few only as a passing dream. And
+then, even these few, on account of their higher intellectual
+power, are made susceptible of far greater suffering
+than duller minds can ever feel, and are also placed in
+lonely isolation by a nature which is obviously different
+from that of others; thus here also accounts are squared.
+But to the great majority of men purely intellectual
+pleasures are not accessible. They are almost quite incapable
+of the joys which lie in pure knowledge. They
+are entirely given up to willing. If, therefore, anything
+is to win their sympathy, to be <emph>interesting</emph> to them, it
+must (as is implied in the meaning of the word) in some
+way excite their <emph>will</emph>, even if it is only through a distant
+and merely problematical relation to it; the will must not
+be left altogether out of the question, for their existence
+lies far more in willing than in knowing,&mdash;action and
+reaction is their one element. We may find in trifles
+and everyday occurrences the naïve expressions of this
+quality. Thus, for example, at any place worth seeing
+they may visit, they write their names, in order thus to
+react, to affect the place since it does not affect them.
+Again, when they see a strange rare animal, they cannot
+<pb n='406'/><anchor id='Pg406'/>
+easily confine themselves to merely observing it; they
+must rouse it, tease it, play with it, merely to experience
+action and reaction; but this need for excitement
+of the will manifests itself very specially in the discovery
+and support of card-playing, which is quite peculiarly
+the expression of the miserable side of humanity.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But whatever nature and fortune may have done,
+whoever a man be and whatever he may possess, the
+pain which is essential to life cannot be thrown off:&mdash;Πηλειδης
+δ᾽ ῳμωξεν, ιδων εις ουρανον ευρυν (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Pelides autem
+ejulavit, intuitus in cælum latum</foreign>). And again:&mdash;Ζηνος
+μεν παις ηα Κρονιονος, αυταρ οιζυν ειχον απειρεσιην (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Jovis
+quidem filius eram Saturnii; verum ærumnam habebam
+infinitam</foreign>). The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering accomplish
+no more than to make it change its form. It
+is essentially deficiency, want, care for the maintenance
+of life. If we succeed, which is very difficult, in
+removing pain in this form, it immediately assumes a
+thousand others, varying according to age and circumstances,
+such as lust, passionate love, jealousy, envy,
+hatred, anxiety, ambition, covetousness, sickness, &amp;c., &amp;c.
+If at last it can find entrance in no other form, it comes
+in the sad, grey garments of tediousness and ennui,
+against which we then strive in various ways. If finally
+we succeed in driving this away, we shall hardly do so
+without letting pain enter in one of its earlier forms, and
+the dance begin again from the beginning; for all human
+life is tossed backwards and forwards between pain and
+ennui. Depressing as this view of life is, I will draw
+attention, by the way, to an aspect of it from which consolation
+may be drawn, and perhaps even a stoical indifference
+to one's own present ills may be attained. For
+our impatience at these arises for the most part from the
+fact that we regard them as brought about by a chain of
+causes which might easily be different. We do not generally
+grieve over ills which are directly necessary and
+quite universal; for example, the necessity of age and of
+<pb n='407'/><anchor id='Pg407'/>
+death, and many daily inconveniences. It is rather the
+consideration of the accidental nature of the circumstances
+that brought some sorrow just to us, that gives it
+its sting. But if we have recognised that pain, as such,
+is inevitable and essential to life, and that nothing depends
+upon chance but its mere fashion, the form under
+which it presents itself, that thus our present sorrow fills a
+place that, without it, would at once be occupied by another
+which now is excluded by it, and that therefore fate can
+affect us little in what is essential; such a reflection, if
+it were to become a living conviction, might produce a
+considerable degree of stoical equanimity, and very much
+lessen the anxious care for our own well-being. But, in
+fact, such a powerful control of reason over directly felt
+suffering seldom or never occurs.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Besides, through this view of the inevitableness of pain,
+of the supplanting of one pain by another, and the introduction
+of a new pain through the passing away of that
+which preceded it, one might be led to the paradoxical
+but not absurd hypothesis, that in every individual the
+measure of the pain essential to him was determined once
+for all by his nature, a measure which could neither
+remain empty, nor be more than filled, however much the
+form of the suffering might change. Thus his suffering
+and well-being would by no means be determined from
+without, but only through that measure, that natural disposition,
+which indeed might experience certain additions
+and diminutions from the physical condition at different
+times, but yet, on the whole, would remain the same,
+and would just be what is called the temperament, or,
+more accurately, the degree in which he might be ευκολος
+or δυσκολος, as Plato expresses it in the First Book of the
+Republic, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in an easy or difficult mood. This hypothesis
+is supported not only by the well-known experience
+that great suffering makes all lesser ills cease to be
+felt, and conversely that freedom from great suffering
+makes even the most trifling inconveniences torment us
+<pb n='408'/><anchor id='Pg408'/>
+and put us out of humour; but experience also teaches
+that if a great misfortune, at the mere thought of which
+we shuddered, actually befalls us, as soon as we have
+overcome the first pain of it, our disposition remains for
+the most part unchanged; and, conversely, that after the
+attainment of some happiness we have long desired, we
+do not feel ourselves on the whole and permanently very
+much better off and agreeably situated than before.
+Only the moment at which these changes occur affects
+us with unusual strength, as deep sorrow or exulting joy,
+but both soon pass away, for they are based upon illusion.
+For they do not spring from the immediately
+present pleasure or pain, but only from the opening up
+of a new future which is anticipated in them. Only by
+borrowing from the future could pain or pleasure be
+heightened so abnormally, and consequently not enduringly.
+It would follow, from the hypothesis advanced,
+that a large part of the feeling of suffering and of well-being
+would be subjective and determined <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>, as is
+the case with knowing; and we may add the following
+remarks as evidence in favour of it. Human cheerfulness
+or dejection are manifestly not determined by
+external circumstances, such as wealth and position, for
+we see at least as many glad faces among the poor as
+among the rich. Further, the motives which induce
+suicide are so very different, that we can assign no
+motive that is so great as to bring it about, even with
+great probability, in every character, and few that would
+be so small that the like of them had never caused it.
+Now although the degree of our serenity or sadness is
+not at all times the same, yet, in consequence of this
+view, we shall not attribute it to the change of
+outward circumstances, but to that of the inner
+condition, the physical state. For when an actual,
+though only temporary, increase of our serenity, even
+to the extent of joyfulness, takes place, it usually
+appears without any external occasion. It is true that
+<pb n='409'/><anchor id='Pg409'/>
+we often see our pain arise only from some definite external
+relation, and are visibly oppressed and saddened
+by this only. Then we believe that if only this were
+taken away, the greatest contentment would necessarily
+ensue. But this is illusion. The measure of our pain
+and our happiness is on the whole, according to our
+hypothesis, subjectively determined for each point of time,
+and the motive for sadness is related to that, just as a
+blister which draws to a head all the bad humours otherwise
+distributed is related to the body. The pain which
+is at that period of time essential to our nature, and
+therefore cannot be shaken off, would, without the definite
+external cause of our suffering, be divided at a hundred
+points, and appear in the form of a hundred little annoyances
+and cares about things which we now entirely overlook,
+because our capacity for pain is already filled by
+that chief evil which has concentrated in a point all the
+suffering otherwise dispersed. This corresponds also to
+the observation that if a great and pressing care is lifted
+from our breast by its fortunate issue, another immediately
+takes its place, the whole material of which was
+already there before, yet could not come into consciousness
+as care because there was no capacity left for it, and
+therefore this material of care remained indistinct and
+unobserved in a cloudy form on the farthest horizon of
+consciousness. But now that there is room, this prepared
+material at once comes forward and occupies the throne
+of the reigning care of the day (πρυτανευουσα). And if it
+is very much lighter in its matter than the material of the
+care which has vanished, it knows how to blow itself out
+so as apparently to equal it in size, and thus, as the chief
+care of the day, completely fills the throne.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Excessive joy and very keen suffering always occur in
+the same person, for they condition each other reciprocally,
+and are also in common conditioned by great activity
+of the mind. Both are produced, as we have just seen,
+not by what is really present, but by the anticipation of
+<pb n='410'/><anchor id='Pg410'/>
+the future. But since pain is essential to life, and its
+degree is also determined by the nature of the subject,
+sudden changes, because they are always external, cannot
+really alter its degree. Thus an error and delusion
+always lies at the foundation of immoderate joy or grief,
+and consequently both these excessive strainings of the
+mind can be avoided by knowledge. Every immoderate
+joy (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>exultatio, insolens lætitia</foreign>) always rests on the delusion
+that one has found in life what can never be found
+there&mdash;lasting satisfaction of the harassing desires and
+cares, which are constantly breeding new ones. From
+every particular delusion of this kind one must inevitably
+be brought back later, and then when it vanishes must
+pay for it with pain as bitter as the joy its entrance
+caused was keen. So far, then, it is precisely like a
+height from which one can come down only by a fall.
+Therefore one ought to avoid them; and every sudden
+excessive grief is just a fall from some such height, the
+vanishing of such a delusion, and so conditioned by it.
+Consequently we might avoid them both if we had sufficient
+control over ourselves to survey things always with
+perfect clearness as a whole and in their connection, and
+steadfastly to guard against really lending them the colours
+which we wish they had. The principal effort of the
+Stoical ethics was to free the mind from all such delusion
+and its consequences, and to give it instead an equanimity
+that could not be disturbed. It is this insight that
+inspires Horace in the well-known ode&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Æquam memento rebus in arduiis</foreign></q></l>
+<l>Servare mentem, non secus in bonis</l>
+<l rend='margin-left: 4'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Ab insolenti temperatam</foreign></l>
+<l rend='margin-left: 6'><q rend='post'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Lætitia.</foreign></q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+For the most part, however, we close our minds against
+the knowledge, which may be compared to a bitter medicine,
+that suffering is essential to life, and therefore does
+not flow in upon us from without, but that every one
+carries about with him its perennial source in his own
+<pb n='411'/><anchor id='Pg411'/>
+heart. We rather seek constantly for an external particular
+cause, as it were, a pretext for the pain which never
+leaves us, just as the free man makes himself an idol, in
+order to have a master. For we unweariedly strive from
+wish to wish; and although every satisfaction, however
+much it promised, when attained fails to satisfy us, but
+for the most part comes presently to be an error of which
+we are ashamed, yet we do not see that we draw water
+with the sieve of the Danaides, but ever hasten to new
+desires.
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'><foreign rend='italic'>Sed, dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur</foreign></q></l>
+<l><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Cætera; post aliud, quum contigit illud, avemus;</foreign></l>
+<l><q rend='post'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Et sitis æqua tenet vitai semper hiantes.</foreign></q>&mdash;<hi rend='smallcaps'>Lucr.</hi> iii. 1095.</l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Thus it either goes on for ever, or, what is more rare and
+presupposes a certain strength of character, till we reach
+a wish which is not satisfied and yet cannot be given up.
+In that case we have, as it were, found what we sought,
+something that we can always blame, instead of our own
+nature, as the source of our suffering. And thus, although
+we are now at variance with our fate, we are reconciled
+to our existence, for the knowledge is again put far from
+us that suffering is essential to this existence itself, and
+true satisfaction impossible. The result of this form of
+development is a somewhat melancholy disposition, the
+constant endurance of a single great pain, and the contempt
+for all lesser sorrows or joys that proceeds from it;
+consequently an already nobler phenomenon than that
+constant seizing upon ever-new forms of illusion, which is
+much more common.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 58. All satisfaction, or what is commonly called
+happiness, is always really and essentially only <emph>negative</emph>,
+and never positive. It is not an original gratification
+coming to us of itself, but must always be the satisfaction
+of a wish. The wish, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, some want, is the condition
+which precedes every pleasure. But with the satisfaction
+the wish and therefore the pleasure cease. Thus the
+satisfaction or the pleasing can never be more than the
+<pb n='412'/><anchor id='Pg412'/>
+deliverance from a pain, from a want; for such is not
+only every actual, open sorrow, but every desire, the
+importunity of which disturbs our peace, and, indeed, the
+deadening ennui also that makes life a burden to us. It
+is, however, so hard to attain or achieve anything; difficulties
+and troubles without end are opposed to every
+purpose, and at every step hindrances accumulate. But
+when finally everything is overcome and attained, nothing
+can ever be gained but deliverance from some sorrow or
+desire, so that we find ourselves just in the same position
+as we occupied before this sorrow or desire appeared.
+All that is even directly given us is merely the want, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+the pain. The satisfaction and the pleasure we can only
+know indirectly through the remembrance of the preceding
+suffering and want, which ceases with its appearance.
+Hence it arises that we are not properly conscious of the
+blessings and advantages we actually possess, nor do we
+prize them, but think of them merely as a matter of
+course, for they gratify us only negatively by restraining
+suffering. Only when we have lost them do we become
+sensible of their value; for the want, the privation, the
+sorrow, is the positive, communicating itself directly to
+us. Thus also we are pleased by the remembrance of
+past need, sickness, want, and such like, because this is
+the only means of enjoying the present blessings. And,
+further, it cannot be denied that in this respect, and from
+this standpoint of egoism, which is the form of the will
+to live, the sight or the description of the sufferings of
+others affords us satisfaction and pleasure in precisely the
+way Lucretius beautifully and frankly expresses it in the
+beginning of the Second Book&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Suave, mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis,</foreign></q></l>
+<l><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem:</foreign></l>
+<l><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Non, quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas;</foreign></l>
+<l><q rend='post'><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est.</foreign></q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Yet we shall see farther on that this kind of pleasure,
+<pb n='413'/><anchor id='Pg413'/>
+through knowledge of our own well-being obtained in
+this way, lies very near the source of real, positive
+wickedness.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+That all happiness is only of a negative not a positive
+nature, that just on this account it cannot be lasting
+satisfaction and gratification, but merely delivers us from
+some pain or want which must be followed either by a
+new pain, or by languor, empty longing, and ennui; this
+finds support in art, that true mirror of the world and
+life, and especially in poetry. Every epic and dramatic
+poem can only represent a struggle, an effort, and fight for
+happiness, never enduring and complete happiness itself.
+It conducts its heroes through a thousand difficulties and
+dangers to the goal; as soon as this is reached, it hastens
+to let the curtain fall; for now there would remain
+nothing for it to do but to show that the glittering goal
+in which the hero expected to find happiness had only
+disappointed him, and that after its attainment he was
+no better off than before. Because a genuine enduring
+happiness is not possible, it cannot be the subject of art.
+Certainly the aim of the idyll is the description of such
+a happiness, but one also sees that the idyll as such cannot
+continue. The poet always finds that it either
+becomes epical in his hands, and in this case it is a very
+insignificant epic, made up of trifling sorrows, trifling
+delights, and trifling efforts&mdash;this is the commonest case&mdash;or
+else it becomes a merely descriptive poem, describing
+the beauty of nature, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, pure knowing free from will,
+which certainly, as a matter of fact, is the only pure
+happiness, which is neither preceded by suffering or
+want, nor necessarily followed by repentance, sorrow,
+emptiness, or satiety; but this happiness cannot fill the
+whole life, but is only possible at moments. What we
+see in poetry we find again in music; in the melodies of
+which we have recognised the universal expression of
+the inmost history of the self-conscious will, the most
+secret life, longing, suffering, and delight; the ebb and
+<pb n='414'/><anchor id='Pg414'/>
+flow of the human heart. Melody is always a deviation
+from the keynote through a thousand capricious wanderings,
+even to the most painful discord, and then a final
+return to the keynote which expresses the satisfaction
+and appeasing of the will, but with which nothing more
+can then be done, and the continuance of which any
+longer would only be a wearisome and unmeaning monotony
+corresponding to ennui.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+All that we intend to bring out clearly through these
+investigations, the impossibility of attaining lasting
+satisfaction and the negative nature of all happiness,
+finds its explanation in what is shown at the conclusion
+of the Second Book: that the will, of which human life,
+like every phenomenon, is the objectification, is a striving
+without aim or end. We find the stamp of this endlessness
+imprinted upon all the parts of its whole manifestation,
+from its most universal form, endless time and
+space, up to the most perfect of all phenomena, the life
+and efforts of man. We may theoretically assume three
+extremes of human life, and treat them as elements of
+actual human life. First, the powerful will, the strong
+passions (Radscha-Guna). It appears in great historical
+characters; it is described in the epic and the drama.
+But it can also show itself in the little world, for the
+size of the objects is measured here by the degree in
+which they influence the will, not according to their
+external relations. Secondly, pure knowing, the comprehension
+of the Ideas, conditioned by the freeing of
+knowledge from the service of will: the life of genius
+(Satwa-Guna). Thirdly and lastly, the greatest lethargy
+of the will, and also of the knowledge attaching to it,
+empty longing, life-benumbing languor (Tama-Guna).
+The life of the individual, far from becoming permanently
+fixed in one of these extremes, seldom touches
+any of them, and is for the most part only a weak and
+wavering approach to one or the other side, a needy
+desiring of trifling objects, constantly recurring, and so
+<pb n='415'/><anchor id='Pg415'/>
+escaping ennui. It is really incredible how meaningless
+and void of significance when looked at from without,
+how dull and unenlightened by intellect when felt from
+within, is the course of the life of the great majority of
+men. It is a weary longing and complaining, a dream-like
+staggering through the four ages of life to death,
+accompanied by a series of trivial thoughts. Such men
+are like clockwork, which is wound up, and goes it knows
+not why; and every time a man is begotten and born,
+the clock of human life is wound up anew, to repeat the
+same old piece it has played innumerable times before,
+passage after passage, measure after measure, with insignificant
+variations. Every individual, every human
+being and his course of life, is but another short dream
+of the endless spirit of nature, of the persistent will to
+live; is only another fleeting form, which it carelessly
+sketches on its infinite page, space and time; allows to
+remain for a time so short that it vanishes into nothing
+in comparison with these, and then obliterates to make
+new room. And yet, and here lies the serious side of
+life, every one of these fleeting forms, these empty
+fancies, must be paid for by the whole will to live, in all
+its activity, with many and deep sufferings, and finally
+with a bitter death, long feared and coming at last.
+This is why the sight of a corpse makes us suddenly so
+serious.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The life of every individual, if we survey it as a whole
+and in general, and only lay stress upon its most significant
+features, is really always a tragedy, but gone through
+in detail, it has the character of a comedy. For the
+deeds and vexations of the day, the restless irritation of
+the moment, the desires and fears of the week, the
+mishaps of every hour, are all through chance, which is
+ever bent upon some jest, scenes of a comedy. But the
+never-satisfied wishes, the frustrated efforts, the hopes
+unmercifully crushed by fate, the unfortunate errors of
+the whole life, with increasing suffering and death at the
+<pb n='416'/><anchor id='Pg416'/>
+end, are always a tragedy. Thus, as if fate would add
+derision to the misery of our existence, our life must contain
+all the woes of tragedy, and yet we cannot even
+assert the dignity of tragic characters, but in the broad
+detail of life must inevitably be the foolish characters of
+a comedy.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But however much great and small trials may fill
+human life, they are not able to conceal its insufficiency
+to satisfy the spirit; they cannot hide the emptiness and
+superficiality of existence, nor exclude ennui, which is
+always ready to fill up every pause that care may allow.
+Hence it arises that the human mind, not content with
+the cares, anxieties, and occupations which the actual
+world lays upon it, creates for itself an imaginary world
+also in the form of a thousand different superstitions, then
+finds all manner of employment with this, and wastes
+time and strength upon it, as soon as the real world is
+willing to grant it the rest which it is quite incapable of
+enjoying. This is accordingly most markedly the case
+with nations for which life is made easy by the congenial
+nature of the climate and the soil, most of all with the
+Hindus, then with the Greeks, the Romans, and later
+with the Italians, the Spaniards, &amp;c. Demons, gods, and
+saints man creates in his own image; and to them he
+must then unceasingly bring offerings, prayers, temple
+decorations, vows and their fulfilment, pilgrimages, salutations,
+ornaments for their images, &amp;c. Their service
+mingles everywhere with the real, and, indeed, obscures
+it. Every event of life is regarded as the work of these
+beings; the intercourse with them occupies half the time
+of life, constantly sustains hope, and by the charm of
+illusion often becomes more interesting than intercourse
+with real beings. It is the expression and symptom
+of the actual need of mankind, partly for help and
+support, partly for occupation and diversion; and if it
+often works in direct opposition to the first need, because
+when accidents and dangers arise valuable time
+<pb n='417'/><anchor id='Pg417'/>
+and strength, instead of being directed to warding them
+off, are uselessly wasted on prayers and offerings; it
+serves the second end all the better by this imaginary
+converse with a visionary spirit world; and this is the
+by no means contemptible gain of all superstitions.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 59. If we have so far convinced ourselves <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>,
+by the most general consideration, by investigation of the
+primary and elemental features of human life, that in its
+whole plan it is capable of no true blessedness, but is in
+its very nature suffering in various forms, and throughout
+a state of misery, we might now awaken this conviction
+much more vividly within us if, proceeding more <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign>,
+we were to turn to more definite instances, call
+up pictures to the fancy, and illustrate by examples the
+unspeakable misery which experience and history present,
+wherever one may look and in whatever direction one
+may seek. But the chapter would have no end, and
+would carry us far from the standpoint of the universal,
+which is essential to philosophy; and, moreover, such a
+description might easily be taken for a mere declamation
+on human misery, such as has often been given, and, as
+such, might be charged with one-sidedness, because it
+started from particular facts. From such a reproach and
+suspicion our perfectly cold and philosophical investigation
+of the inevitable suffering which is founded in the
+nature of life is free, for it starts from the universal and
+is conducted <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign>. But confirmation <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a posteriori</foreign> is
+everywhere easily obtained. Every one who has awakened
+from the first dream of youth, who has considered his
+own experience and that of others, who has studied himself
+in life, in the history of the past and of his own time,
+and finally in the works of the great poets, will, if his
+judgment is not paralysed by some indelibly imprinted prejudice,
+certainly arrive at the conclusion that this human
+world is the kingdom of chance and error, which rule without
+mercy in great things and in small, and along with which
+folly and wickedness also wield the scourge. Hence it arises
+<pb n='418'/><anchor id='Pg418'/>
+that everything better only struggles through with difficulty;
+what is noble and wise seldom attains to expression,
+becomes effective and claims attention, but the absurd
+and the perverse in the sphere of thought, the dull and
+tasteless in the sphere of art, the wicked and deceitful in
+the sphere of action, really assert a supremacy, only disturbed
+by short interruptions. On the other hand, everything
+that is excellent is always a mere exception, one
+case in millions, and therefore, if it presents itself in
+a lasting work, this, when it has outlived the enmity of
+its contemporaries, exists in isolation, is preserved like a
+meteoric stone, sprung from an order of things different
+from that which prevails here. But as far as the life of
+the individual is concerned, every biography is the history
+of suffering, for every life is, as a rule, a continual series
+of great and small misfortunes, which each one conceals
+as much as possible, because he knows that others can
+seldom feel sympathy or compassion, but almost always
+satisfaction at the sight of the woes from which they are
+themselves for the moment exempt. But perhaps at the
+end of life, if a man is sincere and in full possession of
+his faculties, he will never wish to have it to live over
+again, but rather than this, he will much prefer absolute
+annihilation. The essential content of the famous soliloquy
+in <q>Hamlet</q> is briefly this: Our state is so wretched
+that absolute annihilation would be decidedly preferable.
+If suicide really offered us this, so that the alternative
+<q>to be or not to be,</q> in the full sense of the word, was
+placed before us, then it would be unconditionally to be
+chosen as <q>a consummation devoutly to be wished.</q> But
+there is something in us which tells us that this is not
+the case: suicide is not the end; death is not absolute
+annihilation. In like manner, what was said by the
+father of history<note place='foot'>Herodot. vii. 46.</note> has not since him been contradicted,
+that no man has ever lived who has not wished more
+than once that he had not to live the following day.
+<pb n='419'/><anchor id='Pg419'/>
+According to this, the brevity of life, which is so constantly
+lamented, may be the best quality it possesses.
+If, finally, we should bring clearly to a man's sight the
+terrible sufferings and miseries to which his life is constantly
+exposed, he would be seized with horror; and
+if we were to conduct the confirmed optimist through
+the hospitals, infirmaries, and surgical operating-rooms,
+through the prisons, torture-chambers, and slave-kennels,
+over battle-fields and places of execution; if we were to
+open to him all the dark abodes of misery, where it hides
+itself from the glance of cold curiosity, and, finally, allow
+him to glance into the starving dungeon of Ugolino, he,
+too, would understand at last the nature of this <q>best of
+possible worlds.</q> For whence did Dante take the materials
+for his hell but from this our actual world? And
+yet he made a very proper hell of it. And when, on
+the other hand, he came to the task of describing heaven
+and its delights, he had an insurmountable difficulty
+before him, for our world affords no materials at all for
+this. Therefore there remained nothing for him to do
+but, instead of describing the joys of paradise, to repeat
+to us the instruction given him there by his ancestor, by
+Beatrice, and by various saints. But from this it is
+sufficiently clear what manner of world it is. Certainly
+human life, like all bad ware, is covered over with a
+false lustre: what suffers always conceals itself; on
+the other hand, whatever pomp or splendour any one can
+get, he makes a show of openly, and the more inner contentment
+deserts him, the more he desires to exist as
+fortunate in the opinion of others: to such an extent
+does folly go, and the opinion of others is a chief aim of
+the efforts of every one, although the utter nothingness
+of it is expressed in the fact that in almost all languages
+vanity, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>vanitas</foreign>, originally signifies emptiness and nothingness.
+But under all this false show, the miseries of life
+can so increase&mdash;and this happens every day&mdash;that the
+death which hitherto has been feared above all things is
+<pb n='420'/><anchor id='Pg420'/>
+eagerly seized upon. Indeed, if fate will show its whole
+malice, even this refuge is denied to the sufferer, and, in
+the hands of enraged enemies, he may remain exposed to
+terrible and slow tortures without remedy. In vain the
+sufferer then calls on his gods for help; he remains
+exposed to his fate without grace. But this irremediableness
+is only the mirror of the invincible nature of his
+will, of which his person is the objectivity. As little as
+an external power can change or suppress this will, so
+little can a foreign power deliver it from the miseries
+which proceed from the life which is the phenomenal
+appearance of that will. In the principal matter, as in
+everything else, a man is always thrown back upon himself.
+In vain does he make to himself gods in order
+to get from them by prayers and flattery what can only
+be accomplished by his own will-power. The Old Testament
+made the world and man the work of a god, but the
+New Testament saw that, in order to teach that holiness
+and salvation from the sorrows of this world
+can only come from the world itself, it was necessary that
+this god should become man. It is and remains the
+will of man upon which everything depends for him. Fanatics,
+martyrs, saints of every faith and name, have voluntarily
+and gladly endured every torture, because in them
+the will to live had suppressed itself; and then even the
+slow destruction of its phenomenon was welcome to them.
+But I do not wish to anticipate the later exposition. For
+the rest, I cannot here avoid the statement that, to me,
+<emph>optimism</emph>, when it is not merely the thoughtless talk of
+such as harbour nothing but words under their low foreheads,
+appears not merely as an absurd, but also as a
+really <emph>wicked</emph> way of thinking, as a bitter mockery of the
+unspeakable suffering of humanity. Let no one think
+that Christianity is favourable to optimism; for, on the
+contrary, in the Gospels world and evil are used as almost
+synonymous.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xlvi. of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<pb n='421'/><anchor id='Pg421'/>
+
+<p>
+§ 60. We have now completed the two expositions it
+was necessary to insert; the exposition of the freedom of
+the will in itself together with the necessity of its phenomenon,
+and the exposition of its lot in the world which
+reflects its own nature, and upon the knowledge of which
+it has to assert or deny itself. Therefore we can now
+proceed to bring out more clearly the nature of this assertion
+and denial itself, which was referred to and explained
+in a merely general way above. This we shall do by
+exhibiting the conduct in which alone it finds its expression,
+and considering it in its inner significance.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The <emph>assertion of the will</emph> is the continuous willing itself,
+undisturbed by any knowledge, as it fills the life of man
+in general. For even the body of a man is the objectivity
+of the will, as it appears at this grade and in this individual.
+And thus his willing which develops itself in
+time is, as it were, a paraphrase of his body, an elucidation
+of the significance of the whole and its parts; it is
+another way of exhibiting the same thing-in-itself, of
+which the body is already the phenomenon. Therefore,
+instead of saying assertion of the will, we may say assertion
+of the body. The fundamental theme or subject of
+all the multifarious acts of will is the satisfaction of the
+wants which are inseparable from the existence of the
+body in health, they already have their expression in it,
+and may be referred to the maintenance of the individual
+and the propagation of the species. But indirectly
+the most different kinds of motives obtain in this way
+power over the will, and bring about the most multifarious
+acts of will. Each of these is only an example, an
+instance, of the will which here manifests itself generally.
+Of what nature this example may be, what form the
+motive may have and impart to it, is not essential; the
+important point here is that something is willed in
+general and the degree of intensity with which it is so
+willed. The will can only become visible in the motives,
+as the eye only manifests its power of seeing in the light.
+<pb n='422'/><anchor id='Pg422'/>
+The motive in general stands before the will in protean
+forms. It constantly promises complete satisfaction, the
+quenching of the thirst of will. But whenever it is
+attained it at once appears in another form, and thus
+influences the will anew, always according to the degree
+of the intensity of this will, and its relation to knowledge
+which are revealed as empirical character, in these very
+examples and instances.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+From the first appearance of consciousness, a man
+finds himself a willing being, and as a rule, his knowledge
+remains in constant relation to his will. He first
+seeks to know thoroughly the objects of his desire, and
+then the means of attaining them. Now he knows what
+he has to do, and, as a rule, he does not strive after other
+knowledge. He moves and acts; his consciousness keeps
+him always working directly and actively towards the
+aims of his will; his thought is concerned with the
+choice of motives. Such is life for almost all men; they
+wish, they know what they wish, and they strive after it,
+with sufficient success to keep them from despair, and
+sufficient failure to keep them from ennui and its consequences.
+From this proceeds a certain serenity, or at
+least indifference, which cannot be affected by wealth or
+poverty; for the rich and the poor do not enjoy what
+they have, for this, as we have shown, acts in a purely
+negative way, but what they hope to attain to by their
+efforts. They press forward with much earnestness, and
+indeed with an air of importance; thus children also pursue
+their play. It is always an exception if such a life
+suffers interruption from the fact that either the æsthetic
+demand for contemplation or the ethical demand for renunciation
+proceed from a knowledge which is independent
+of the service of the will, and directed to the nature
+of the world in general. Most men are pursued by want
+all through life, without ever being allowed to come to
+their senses. On the other hand, the will is often inflamed
+to a degree that far transcends the assertion of the
+<pb n='423'/><anchor id='Pg423'/>
+body, and then violent emotions and powerful passions
+show themselves, in which the individual not only asserts
+his own existence, but denies and seeks to suppress that
+of others when it stands in his way.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The maintenance of the body through its own powers
+is so small a degree of the assertion of will, that if it
+voluntarily remains at this degree, we might assume
+that, with the death of this body, the will also which
+appeared in it would be extinguished. But even the
+satisfaction of the sexual passions goes beyond the assertion
+of one's own existence, which fills so short a time,
+and asserts life for an indefinite time after the death
+of the individual. Nature, always true and consistent,
+here even naïve, exhibits to us openly the inner significance
+of the act of generation. Our own consciousness,
+the intensity of the impulse, teaches us that in this
+act the most decided <emph>assertion of the will to live</emph> expresses
+itself, pure and without further addition (any
+denial of other individuals); and now, as the consequence
+of this act, a new life appears in time and the
+causal series, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, in nature; the begotten appears before
+the begetter, different as regards the phenomenon, but in
+himself, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, according to the Idea, identical with him.
+Therefore it is this act through which every species of
+living creature binds itself to a whole and is perpetuated.
+Generation is, with reference to the begetter,
+only the expression, the symptom, of his decided assertion
+of the will to live: with reference to the begotten,
+it is not the cause of the will which appears in him, for
+the will in itself knows neither cause nor effect, but,
+like all causes, it is merely the occasional cause of the
+phenomenal appearance of this will at this time in this
+place. As thing-in-itself, the will of the begetter and that
+of the begotten are not different, for only the phenomenon,
+not the thing-in-itself, is subordinate to the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principim individuationis</foreign>.
+With that assertion beyond our own body
+and extending to the production of a new body, suffering
+<pb n='424'/><anchor id='Pg424'/>
+and death, as belonging to the phenomenon of life, have
+also been asserted anew, and the possibility of salvation,
+introduced by the completest capability of knowledge, has
+for this time been shown to be fruitless. Here lies the
+profound reason of the shame connected with the process
+of generation. This view is mythically expressed in the
+dogma of Christian theology that we are all partakers in
+Adam's first transgression (which is clearly just the satisfaction
+of sexual passion), and through it are guilty
+of suffering and death. In this theology goes beyond
+the consideration of things according to the principle of
+sufficient reason, and recognises the Idea of man, the
+unity of which is re-established out of its dispersion into
+innumerable individuals through the bond of generation
+which holds them all together. Accordingly it regards
+every individual as on one side identical with Adam,
+the representative of the assertion of life, and, so far, as
+subject to sin (original sin), suffering, and death; on the
+other side, the knowledge of the Idea of man enables it
+to regard every individual as identical with the saviour,
+the representative of the denial of the will to live, and, so
+far as a partaker of his sacrifice of himself, saved through
+his merits, and delivered from the bands of sin and
+death, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the world (Rom. v. 12-21).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Another mythical exposition of our view of sexual
+pleasure as the assertion of the will to live beyond the
+individual life, as an attainment to life which is brought
+about for the first time by this means, or as it were a
+renewed assignment of life, is the Greek myth of Proserpine,
+who might return from the lower world so long as
+she had not tasted its fruit, but who became subject
+to it altogether through eating the pomegranate. This
+meaning appears very clearly in Goethe's incomparable
+presentation of this myth, especially when, as soon as
+she has tasted the pomegranate, the invisible chorus of
+the Fates&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<pb n='425'/><anchor id='Pg425'/>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l rend='margin-left: 16'><q rend='pre'>Thou art ours!</q></l>
+<l>Fasting shouldest thou return:</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>And the bite of the apple makes thee ours!</q></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+It is worth noticing that Clement of Alexandria
+(Strom. iii. c. 15) illustrates the matter with the same
+image and the same expression: Οἱ μεν ευνουχισαντες
+ἑαυτους απο πασης ἁμαρτιας, δια την βασιλειαν, των
+ουρανων, μακαριοι οὑτοι εισιν, οἱ του κοσμου νηστευοντες;
+(<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Qui se castrarunt ab omni peccato propter regnum cœlorum,
+ii sunt beati, a mundo jejunantes</foreign>).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The sexual impulse also proves itself the decided and
+strongest assertion of life by the fact that to man in a
+state of nature, as to the brutes, it is the final end, the
+highest goal of life. Self-maintenance is his first effort,
+and as soon as he has made provision for that, he only
+strives after the propagation of the species: as a merely
+natural being he can attempt no more. Nature also, the
+inner being of which is the will to live itself, impels with
+all her power both man and the brute towards propagation.
+Then it has attained its end with the individual,
+and is quite indifferent to its death, for, as the will to live,
+it cares only for the preservation of the species, the individual
+is nothing to it. Because the will to live expresses
+itself most strongly in the sexual impulse, the inner being
+of nature, the old poets and philosophers&mdash;Hesiod and
+Parmenides&mdash;said very significantly that Eros is the first,
+the creator, the principle from which all things proceed.
+(Cf. Arist. Metaph., i. 4.) Pherecydes said: Εις ερωτα
+μεταβεβλησθαι τον Δια, μελλοντα δημιουργειν (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Jovem,
+cum mundum fabricare vellet, in cupidinem sese transformasse</foreign>).
+<hi rend='italic'>Proclus ad Plat. Tim.</hi>, l. iii. A complete treatment
+of this subject we have recently received from
+G. F. Schœmann, <q><hi rend='italic'>De Cupidine Cosmogonico</hi>,</q> 1852. The
+Mâya of the Hindus, whose work and web is the whole
+world of illusion, is also symbolised by love.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The genital organs are, far more than any other external
+member of the body, subject merely to the will, and
+<pb n='426'/><anchor id='Pg426'/>
+not at all to knowledge. Indeed, the will shows itself
+here almost as independent of knowledge, as in those parts
+which, acting merely in consequence of stimuli, are subservient
+to vegetative life and reproduction, in which the
+will works blindly as in unconscious nature. For generation
+is only reproduction passing over to a new individual,
+as it were reproduction at the second power, as death
+is only excretion at the second power. According to all
+this, the genitals are properly the <emph>focus</emph> of will, and consequently
+the opposite pole of the brain, the representative
+of knowledge, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the other side of the world, the world
+as idea. The former are the life-sustaining principle ensuring
+endless life to time. In this respect they were
+worshipped by the Greeks in the <foreign lang='el' rend='italic'>phallus</foreign>, and by the
+Hindus in the <foreign lang='sa' rend='italic'>lingam</foreign>, which are thus the symbol of the
+assertion of the will. Knowledge, on the other hand,
+affords the possibility of the suppression of willing, of salvation
+through freedom, of conquest and annihilation of
+the world.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We already considered fully at the beginning of this
+Fourth Book how the will to live in its assertion must
+regard its relation to death. We saw that death does
+not trouble it, because it exists as something included in
+life itself and belonging to it. Its opposite, generation,
+completely counterbalances it; and, in spite of the death
+of the individual, ensures and guarantees life to the will
+to live through all time. To express this the Hindus
+made the <foreign lang='sa' rend='italic'>lingam</foreign> an attribute of Siva, the god of death.
+We also fully explained there how he who with full consciousness
+occupies the standpoint of the decided assertion
+of life awaits death without fear. We shall therefore say
+nothing more about this here. Without clear consciousness
+most men occupy this standpoint and continually
+assert life. The world exists as the mirror of this assertion,
+with innumerable individuals in infinite time and
+space, in infinite suffering, between generation and death
+without end. Yet from no side is a complaint to be
+<pb n='427'/><anchor id='Pg427'/>
+further raised about this; for the will conducts the great
+tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and is also its
+own spectator. The world is just what it is because the
+will, whose manifestation it is, is what it is, because it
+so wills. The justification of suffering is, that in this
+phenomenon also the will asserts itself; and this assertion
+is justified and balanced by the fact that the will bears
+the suffering. Here we get a glimpse of <emph>eternal justice</emph> in
+the whole: we shall recognise it later more definitely and
+distinctly, and also in the particular. But first we must
+consider temporal or human justice.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xlv. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<anchor id='Section_61'/>
+§ 61. It may be remembered from the Second Book
+that in the whole of nature, at all the grades of the objectification
+of will, there was a necessary and constant conflict
+between the individuals of all species; and in this
+way was expressed the inner contradiction of the will to
+live with itself. At the highest grade of the objectification,
+this phenomenon, like all others, will exhibit itself
+with greater distinctness, and will therefore be more easily
+explained. With this aim we shall next attempt to trace
+the source of <emph>egoism</emph> as the starting-point of all conflict.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We have called time and space the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+because only through them and in them
+is multiplicity of the homogeneous possible. They are
+the essential forms of natural knowledge, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, knowledge
+springing from the will. Therefore the will
+everywhere manifests itself in the multiplicity of individuals.
+But this multiplicity does not concern the
+will as thing-in-itself, but only its phenomena. The will
+itself is present, whole and undivided, in every one of
+these, and beholds around it the innumerably repeated
+image of its own nature; but this nature itself, the
+actually real, it finds directly only in its inner self.
+Therefore every one desires everything for himself, desires
+to possess, or at least to control, everything, and whatever
+opposes it it would like to destroy. To this is added, in
+<pb n='428'/><anchor id='Pg428'/>
+the case of such beings as have knowledge, that the individual
+is the supporter of the knowing subject, and the
+knowing subject is the supporter of the world, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, that
+the whole of Nature outside the knowing subject, and
+thus also all other individuals, exist only in its idea; it
+is only conscious of them as its idea, thus merely indirectly
+as something which is dependent on its own nature
+and existence; for with its consciousness the world necessarily
+disappears for it, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, its being and non-being
+become synonymous and indistinguishable. Every knowing
+individual is thus in truth, and finds itself as the
+whole will to live, or the inner being of the world itself,
+and also as the complemental condition of the world as
+idea, consequently as a microcosm which is of equal value
+with the macrocosm. Nature itself, which is everywhere
+and always truthful, gives him this knowledge, originally
+and independently of all reflection, with simple and direct
+certainty. Now from these two necessary properties we
+have given the fact may be explained that every individual,
+though vanishing altogether and diminished to
+nothing in the boundless world, yet makes itself the
+centre of the world, has regard for its own existence
+and well-being before everything else; indeed, from the
+natural standpoint, is ready to sacrifice everything else for
+this&mdash;is ready to annihilate the world in order to maintain
+its own self, this drop in the ocean, a little longer. This
+disposition is <emph>egoism</emph>, which is essential to everything in
+Nature. Yet it is just through egoism that the inner
+conflict of the will with itself attains to such a terrible
+revelation; for this egoism has its continuance
+and being in that opposition of the microcosm and
+macrocosm, or in the fact that the objectification of
+will has the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign> for its form,
+through which the will manifests itself in the same way
+in innumerable individuals, and indeed entire and completely
+in both aspects (will and idea) in each. Thus,
+while each individual is given to itself directly as the
+<pb n='429'/><anchor id='Pg429'/>
+whole will and the whole subject of ideas, other individuals
+are only given it as ideas. Therefore its own
+being, and the maintenance of it, is of more importance
+to it than that of all others together. Every one looks
+upon his own death as upon the end of the world, while
+he accepts the death of his acquaintances as a matter of
+comparative indifference, if he is not in some way affected
+by it. In the consciousness that has reached the highest
+grade, that of man, egoism, as well as knowledge, pain
+and pleasure, must have reached its highest grade also,
+and the conflict of individuals which is conditioned by it
+must appear in its most terrible form. And indeed we
+see this everywhere before our eyes, in small things as in
+great. Now we see its terrible side in the lives of great
+tyrants and miscreants, and in world-desolating wars;
+now its absurd side, in which it is the theme of comedy, and
+very specially appears as self-conceit and vanity. Rochefoucault
+understood this better than any one else, and
+presented it in the abstract. We see it both in the history
+of the world and in our own experience. But it appears
+most distinctly of all when any mob of men is set free
+from all law and order; then there shows itself at once
+in the distinctest form the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>bellum omnium contra omnes</foreign>,
+which Hobbes has so admirably described in the first
+chapter <hi rend='italic'>De Cive</hi>. We see not only how every one tries to
+seize from the other what he wants himself, but how
+often one will destroy the whole happiness or life of another
+for the sake of an insignificant addition to his own
+happiness. This is the highest expression of egoism, the
+manifestations of which in this regard are only surpassed
+by those of actual wickedness, which seeks, quite disinterestedly,
+the hurt and suffering of others, without any
+advantage to itself. Of this we shall speak soon. With
+this exhibition of the source of egoism the reader should
+compare the presentation of it in my prize-essay on the
+basis of morals, § 14.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A chief source of that suffering which we found above
+<pb n='430'/><anchor id='Pg430'/>
+to be essential and inevitable to all life is, when it really
+appears in a definite form, that <foreign lang='el' rend='italic'>Eris</foreign>, the conflict of all
+individuals, the expression of the contradiction, with
+which the will to live is affected in its inner self, and
+which attains a visible form through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>.
+Wild-beast fights are the most cruel means
+of showing this directly and vividly. In this original
+discord lies an unquenchable source of suffering, in spite
+of the precautions that have been taken against it, and
+which we shall now consider more closely.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 62. It has already been explained that the first and
+simplest assertion of the will to live is only the assertion of
+one's own body, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the exhibition of the will through acts
+in time, so far as the body, in its form and design, exhibits
+the same will in space, and no further. This assertion
+shows itself as maintenance of the body, by means
+of the application of its own powers. To it is directly
+related the satisfaction of the sexual impulse; indeed this
+belongs to it, because the genitals belong to the body.
+Therefore <emph>voluntary</emph> renunciation of the satisfaction of
+that impulse, based upon no <emph>motive</emph>, is already a denial of
+the will to live, is a voluntary self-suppression of it, upon
+the entrance of knowledge which acts as a <emph>quieter</emph>. Accordingly
+such denial of one's own body exhibits itself as a
+contradiction by the will of its own phenomenon. For
+although here also the body objectifies in the genitals
+the will to perpetuate the species, yet this is not willed.
+Just on this account, because it is a denial or suppression
+of the will to live, such a renunciation is a hard and painful
+self-conquest; but of this later. But since the will
+exhibits that <emph>self-assertion</emph> of one's own body in innumerable
+individuals beside each other, it very easily extends
+in one individual, on account of the egoism peculiar to
+them all, beyond this assertion to the <emph>denial</emph> of the same
+will appearing in another individual. The will of the
+first breaks through the limits of the assertion of will of
+another, because the individual either destroys or injures
+<pb n='431'/><anchor id='Pg431'/>
+this other body itself, or else because it compels the
+powers of the other body to serve <emph>its own</emph> will, instead of
+the will which manifests itself in that other body. Thus
+if, from the will manifesting itself as another body, it withdraws
+the powers of this body, and so increases the power
+serving its own will beyond that of its own body, it consequently
+asserts its own will beyond its own body by means
+of the negation of the will appearing in another body.
+This breaking through the limits of the assertion of will
+of another has always been distinctly recognised, and its
+concept denoted by the word <emph>wrong</emph>. For both sides
+recognise the fact instantly, not, indeed, as we do here
+in distinct abstraction, but as feeling. He who suffers
+wrong feels the transgression into the sphere of the
+assertion of his own body, through the denial of it by
+another individual, as a direct and mental pain which is
+entirely separated and different from the accompanying
+physical suffering experienced from the act or the vexation
+at the loss. To the doer of wrong, on the other
+hand, the knowledge presents itself that he is in himself
+the same will which appears in that body also, and which
+asserts itself with such vehemence; the one phenomenon
+that, transgressing the limits of its own body and its
+powers, it extends to the denial of this very will in
+another phenomenon, and so, regarded as will in itself, it
+strives against itself by this vehemence and rends itself.
+Moreover, this knowledge presents itself to him instantly,
+not <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign>, but as an obscure feeling; and this is
+called remorse, or, more accurately in this case, the feeling
+of <emph>wrong committed</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+<emph>Wrong</emph>, the conception of which we have thus analysed
+in its most general and abstract form, expresses itself in
+the concrete most completely, peculiarly, and palpably in
+cannibalism. This is its most distinct and evident type,
+the terrible picture of the greatest conflict of the will
+with itself at the highest grade of its objectification, which
+is man. Next to this, it expresses itself most distinctly
+<pb n='432'/><anchor id='Pg432'/>
+in murder; and therefore the committal of murder is
+followed instantly and with fearful distinctness by remorse,
+the abstract and dry significance of which we have just
+given, which inflicts a wound on our peace of mind that
+a lifetime cannot heal. For our horror at the murder
+committed, as also our shrinking from the committal of
+it, corresponds to that infinite clinging to life with which
+everything living, as phenomenon of the will to live, is
+penetrated. (We shall analyse this feeling which accompanies
+the doing of wrong and evil, in other words, the
+pangs of conscience, more fully later on, and raise its
+concept to distinctness.) Mutilation, or mere injury of
+another body, indeed every blow, is to be regarded as in
+its nature the same as murder, and differing from it only
+in degree. Further, wrong shows itself in the subjugation
+of another individual, in forcing him into slavery, and,
+finally, in the seizure of another's goods, which, so far as
+these goods are regarded as the fruit of his labour, is just
+the same thing as making him a slave, and is related to
+this as mere injury is to murder.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+For <emph>property</emph>, which is not taken from a man without
+<emph>wrong</emph>, can, according to our explanation of wrong, only
+be that which has been produced by his own powers.
+Therefore by taking this we really take the powers of his
+body from the will objectified in it, to make them subject
+to the will objectified in another body. For only so
+does the wrong-doer, by seizing, not the body of another,
+but a lifeless thing quite different from it, break into the
+sphere of the assertion of will of another person, because
+the powers, the work of this other body, are, as it were,
+incorporated and identified with this thing. It follows
+from this that all true, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, moral, right of property is
+based simply and solely on work, as was pretty generally
+assumed before Kant, and is distinctly and beautifully
+expressed in the oldest of all codes of law: <q>Wise men
+who know the past explain that a cultured field is the
+property of him who cut down the wood and cleared and
+<pb n='433'/><anchor id='Pg433'/>
+ploughed it, as an antelope belongs to the first hunter
+who mortally wounds it</q> (Laws of Manu, ix. 44). Kant's
+philosophy of law is an extraordinary concatenation of
+errors all leading to each other, and he bases the right
+of property upon first occupation. To me this is only
+explicable on the supposition that his powers were failing
+through old age. For how should the mere avowal
+of my will to exclude others from the use of a thing at
+once give me a <emph>right</emph> to it? Clearly such an avowal
+itself requires a foundation of right, instead of being one,
+as Kant assumes. And how would he act unjustly <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in se</foreign>,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, morally, who does not respect that claim to the sole
+possession of a thing which is based upon nothing but
+its own avowal? How should his conscience trouble
+him about it? For it is so clear and easy to understand
+that there can be absolutely no such thing as a just seizure
+of anything, but only a just conversion or acquired possession
+of it, by spending our own original powers upon it.
+When, by any foreign labour, however little, a thing has
+been cultivated, improved, kept from harm or preserved,
+even if this labour were only the plucking or picking
+up from the ground of fruit that has grown wild; the
+person who forcibly seizes such a thing clearly deprives
+the other of the result of his labour expended upon it,
+makes the body of this other serve his will instead of
+its own, asserts his will beyond its own phenomenon to
+the denial of that of the other, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, does injustice or
+wrong.<note place='foot'>Thus the basis of natural right
+of property does not require the
+assumption of two grounds of right
+beside each other, that based on
+<emph>detention</emph> and that based on <emph>formation</emph>;
+but the latter is itself
+sufficient. Only the name <emph>formation</emph>
+is not very suitable, for the
+spending of any labour upon a thing
+does not need to be a forming or
+fashioning of it.</note> On the other hand, the mere enjoyment of a
+thing, without any cultivation or preservation of it from
+destruction, gives just as little right to it as the mere
+avowal of our desire for its sole possession. Therefore,
+though one family has hunted a district alone, even for a
+<pb n='434'/><anchor id='Pg434'/>
+hundred years, but has done nothing for its improvement;
+if a stranger comes and desires to hunt there, it
+cannot prevent him from doing so without moral injustice.
+Thus the so-called right of preoccupation,
+according to which, for the mere past enjoyment of a
+thing, there is demanded the further recompense of the
+exclusive right to its future enjoyment, is morally
+entirely without foundation. A new-comer might with
+far better right reply to him who was depending upon
+such a right, <q>Just because you have so long enjoyed,
+it is right that others should now enjoy also.</q> No
+moral right can be established to the sole possession of
+anything upon which labour cannot be expended, either
+in improving it or in preserving it from harm, unless
+it be through a voluntary surrender on the part of
+others, as a reward for other services. This, however,
+already presupposes a community regulated by agreement&mdash;the
+State. The morally established right of property,
+as we have deduced it above, gives, from its
+nature, to the owner of a thing, the same unlimited
+power over it which he has over his own body; and hence
+it follows that he can part with his possessions to others
+either in exchange or as a gift, and they then possess them
+with the same moral right as he did.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+As regards the doing of wrong generally, it occurs
+either through violence or through craft; it matters not
+which as far as what is morally essential is concerned.
+First, in the case of murder, it is a matter of indifference
+whether I make use of a dagger or of poison;
+and the case of every bodily injury is analogous. Other
+cases of wrong can all be reduced to the fact that I, as
+the doer of wrong, compel another individual to serve my
+will instead of his own, to act according to my will
+instead of according to his own. On the path of violence
+I attain this end through physical causality, but on the
+path of craft by means of motivation, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, by means of
+causality through knowledge; for I present to his will
+<pb n='435'/><anchor id='Pg435'/>
+illusive motives, on account of which he follows my will,
+while he believes he is following his own. Since the
+medium in which the motives lie is knowledge, I can
+only accomplish this by falsifying his knowledge, and
+this is the <emph>lie</emph>. The lie always aims at influencing
+another's will, not merely his knowledge, for itself and
+as such, but only as a means, so far as it determines his
+will. For my lying itself, inasmuch as it proceeds
+from my will, requires a motive; and only the will of
+another can be such a motive, not his knowledge in and
+for itself; for as such it can never have an influence
+upon <emph>my</emph> will, therefore it can never move it, can never
+be a motive of its aim. But only the willing and doing
+of another can be this, and his knowledge indirectly
+through it. This holds good not only of all lies that
+have manifestly sprung from self-interest, but also of
+those which proceed from pure wickedness, which seeks
+enjoyment in the painful consequences of the error into
+which it has led another. Indeed, mere empty boasting
+aims at influencing the will and action of others more or
+less, by increasing their respect or improving their opinion
+of the boaster. The mere refusal of a truth, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, of an
+assertion generally, is in itself no wrong, but every imposing
+of a lie is certainly a wrong. He who refuses to
+show the strayed traveller the right road does him no
+wrong, but he who directs him to a false road certainly
+does. It follows from what has been said, that every <emph>lie</emph>,
+like every act of violence, is as such <emph>wrong</emph>, because as
+such it has for its aim the extension of the authority of
+my will to other individuals, and so the assertion of my
+will through the denial of theirs, just as much as violence
+has. But the most complete lie is the <emph>broken
+contract</emph>, because here all the conditions mentioned are
+completely and distinctly present together. For when I
+enter into a contract, the promised performance of the
+other individual is directly and confessedly the motive
+for my reciprocal performance. The promises were deliberately
+<pb n='436'/><anchor id='Pg436'/>
+and formally exchanged. The fulfilment of
+the declarations made is, it is assumed, in the power of
+each. If the other breaks the covenant, he has deceived
+me, and by introducing merely illusory motives into my
+knowledge, he has bent my will according to his intention;
+he has extended the control of his will to another
+individual, and thus has committed a distinct wrong.
+On this is founded the moral lawfulness and validity of
+the <emph>contract</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Wrong through violence is not so <emph>shameful</emph> to the doer
+of it as wrong through craft; for the former arises from
+physical power, which under all circumstances impresses
+mankind; while the latter, by the use of subterfuge,
+betrays weakness, and lowers man at once as a physical
+and moral being. This is further the case because lying
+and deception can only succeed if he who employs them
+expresses at the same time horror and contempt of them
+in order to win confidence, and his victory rests on the
+fact that men credit him with honesty which he does not
+possess. The deep horror which is always excited by
+cunning, faithlessness, and treachery rests on the fact that
+good faith and honesty are the bond which externally
+binds into a unity the will which has been broken up
+into the multiplicity of individuals, and thereby limits
+the consequences of the egoism which results from that
+dispersion. Faithlessness and treachery break this outward
+bond asunder, and thus give boundless scope to the
+consequences of egoism.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In the connection of our system we have found that
+the content of the concept of <emph>wrong</emph> is that quality of the
+conduct of an individual in which he extends the assertion
+of the will appearing in his own body so far that it
+becomes the denial of the will appearing in the bodies of
+others. We have also laid down, by means of very
+general examples, the limits at which the province of
+wrong begins; for we have at once defined its gradations,
+from the highest degree to the lowest, by means of a few
+<pb n='437'/><anchor id='Pg437'/>
+leading conceptions. According to this, the concept of
+wrong is the original and positive, and the concept of
+right, which is opposed to it, is the derivative and negative;
+for we must keep to the concepts, and not to the
+words. As a matter of fact, there would be no talk of
+right if there were no such thing as wrong. The concept
+right contains merely the negation of wrong, and every
+action is subsumed under it which does not transgress the
+limit laid down above, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, is not a denial of the will of
+another for the stronger assertion of our own. That
+limit, therefore, divides, as regards a purely <emph>moral</emph> definition,
+the whole province of possible actions into such
+as are wrong or right. Whenever an action does not encroach,
+in the way explained above, on the sphere of the
+assertion of will of another, denying it, it is not wrong.
+Therefore, for example, the refusal of help to another in
+great need, the quiet contemplation of the death of another
+from starvation while we ourselves have more than enough,
+is certainly cruel and fiendish, but it is not wrong; only
+it can be affirmed with certainty that whoever is capable
+of carrying unkindness and hardness to such a degree will
+certainly also commit every wrong whenever his wishes
+demand it and no compulsion prevents it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But the conception of right as the negation of wrong
+finds its principal application, and no doubt its origin,
+in cases in which an attempted wrong by violence is
+warded off. This warding off cannot itself be wrong, and
+consequently is right, although the violence it requires,
+regarded in itself and in isolation, would be wrong, and
+is here only justified by the motive, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, becomes right.
+If an individual goes so far in the assertion of his
+own will that he encroaches upon the assertion of will
+which is essential to my person as such, and denies it,
+then my warding off of that encroachment is only the
+denial of that denial, and thus from my side is nothing
+more than the assertion of the will which essentially and
+originally appears in my body, and is already implicitly
+<pb n='438'/><anchor id='Pg438'/>
+expressed by the mere appearance of this body; consequently
+is not wrong, but right. That is to say: I have
+then a right to deny that denial of another with the
+force necessary to overcome it, and it is easy to see that
+this may extend to the killing of the other individual,
+whose encroachment as external violence pressing upon
+me may be warded off by a somewhat stronger counteraction,
+entirely without wrong, consequently with right.
+For all that happens from my side lies always within the
+sphere of the assertion of will essential to my person as
+such, and already expressed by it (which is the scene of
+the conflict), and does not encroach on that of the other,
+consequently is only negation of the negation, and thus
+affirmation, not itself negation. Thus if the will of
+another denies my will, as this appears in my body and
+the use of its powers for its maintenance, without denial
+of any foreign will which observes a like limitation, I
+can <emph>without wrong</emph> compel it to desist from such denial,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, I have so far a <emph>right of compulsion</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In all cases in which I have a right of compulsion, a
+complete right to use <emph>violence</emph> against another, I may,
+according to the circumstances, just as well oppose the
+violence of the other with <emph>craft</emph> without doing any wrong,
+and accordingly I have an actual <emph>right to lie precisely so
+far as I have a right of compulsion</emph>. Therefore a man acts
+with perfect right who assures a highway robber who is
+searching him that he has nothing more upon him; or, if
+a burglar has broken into his house by night, induces him
+by a lie to enter a cellar and then locks him in. A man who
+has been captured and carried off by robbers, for example
+by pirates, has the right to kill them not only by violence
+but also by craft, in order to regain his freedom. Thus,
+also, a promise is certainly not binding when it has been
+extorted by direct bodily violence, because he who suffers
+such compulsion may with full right free himself by
+killing, and, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a fortiori</foreign>, by deceiving his oppressor. Whoever
+cannot recover through force the property which has
+<pb n='439'/><anchor id='Pg439'/>
+been stolen from him, commits no wrong if he can accomplish
+it through craft. Indeed, if some one plays with
+me for money he has stolen from me, I have the right
+to use false dice against him, because all that I win from
+him already belongs to me. Whoever would deny this
+must still more deny the justifiableness of stratagem in
+war, which is just an acted lie, and is a proof of the saying
+of Queen Christina of Sweden, <q>The words of men
+are to be esteemed as nothing; scarcely are their deeds
+to be trusted.</q> So sharply does the limit of right border
+upon that of wrong. For the rest, I regard it as superfluous
+to show that all this completely agrees with what
+was said above about the unlawfulness of the lie and
+of violence. It may also serve to explain the peculiar
+theory of the lie told under pressure.<note place='foot'>The further exposition of the
+philosophy of law here laid down
+will be found in my prize-essay,
+<q>Ueber das Fundament der Moral,</q>
+§ 17, pp. 221-230 of 1st ed., pp. 216-226
+of 2d ed.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In accordance with what has been said, wrong and
+right are merely moral determinations, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, such as are
+valid with regard to the consideration of human action as
+such, and in relation <emph>to the inner significance of this action
+in itself</emph>. This asserts itself directly in consciousness
+through the fact that the doing of wrong is accompanied
+by an inward pain, which is the merely felt consciousness
+of the wrong-doer of the excessive strength of the assertion
+of will in itself, which extends even to the denial
+of the manifestation of the will of another, and also the
+consciousness that although he is different from the
+person suffering wrong as far as the manifestation is
+concerned, yet in himself he is identical with him. The
+further explanation of this inner significance of all pain
+of conscience cannot be given till later. He who suffers
+wrong is, on the other hand, painfully conscious of the
+denial of his will, as it is expressed through the body
+and its natural requirements, for the satisfaction of which
+nature refers him to the powers of his body; and at the
+<pb n='440'/><anchor id='Pg440'/>
+same time he is conscious that without doing wrong he
+might ward off that denial by every means unless he
+lacks the power. This purely moral significance is the
+only one which right and wrong have for men as men,
+not as members of the State, and which consequently
+remains even when man is in a state of nature without
+any positive law. It constitutes the basis and the content
+of all that has on this account been named <emph>natural
+law</emph>, though it is better called moral law, for its validity
+does not extend to suffering, to the external reality, but
+only to the action of man and the self-knowledge of his
+individual will which grows up in him from his action,
+and which is called <emph>conscience</emph>. It cannot, however, in a
+state of nature, assert itself in all cases, and outwardly
+upon other individuals, and prevent might from reigning
+instead of right. In a state of nature it depends upon
+every one merely to see that in every case he <emph>does</emph> no
+wrong, but by no means to see that in every case he
+<emph>suffers</emph> no wrong, for this depends on the accident of his
+outward power. Therefore the concepts right and wrong,
+even in a state of nature, are certainly valid and by no
+means conventional, but there they are valid merely as
+<emph>moral</emph> concepts, for the self-knowledge of one's own will in
+each. They are a fixed point in the scale of the very different
+degrees of strength with which the will to live asserts
+itself in human individuals, like the freezing-point on the
+thermometer; the point at which the assertion of one's
+own will becomes the denial of the will of another, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+specifies through wrong-doing the degree of its intensity,
+combined with the degree in which knowledge is involved
+in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign> (which is the form of all
+knowledge that is subject to the will). But whoever
+wants to set aside the purely moral consideration of
+human action, or denies it, and wishes to regard conduct
+merely in its outward effects and their consequences, may
+certainly, with Hobbes, explain right and wrong as conventional
+definitions arbitrarily assumed, and therefore
+<pb n='441'/><anchor id='Pg441'/>
+not existing outside positive law, and we can never show
+him through external experience what does not belong to
+such experience. Hobbes himself characterises his completely
+empirical method of thought very remarkably by
+the fact that in his book <q><hi rend='italic'>De Principiis Geometrarum</hi></q>
+he denies all pure mathematics properly so called, and
+obstinately maintains that the point has extension and
+the line has breadth, and we can never show him a point
+without extension or a line without breadth. Thus we
+can just as little impart to him the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> nature of
+mathematics as the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>a priori</foreign> nature of right, because
+he shuts himself out from all knowledge which is not
+empirical.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The pure doctrine of right is thus a chapter of ethics,
+and is directly related only to <emph>action</emph>, not to <emph>suffering</emph>;
+for only the former is the expression of will, and this
+alone is considered by ethics. Suffering is mere occurrence.
+Ethics can only have regard to suffering indirectly,
+merely to show that what takes place merely to
+avoid suffering wrong is itself no infliction of wrong.
+The working out of this chapter of ethics would contain
+the precise definition of the limits to which an individual
+may go in the assertion of the will already objectified in
+his body without denying the same will as it appears in
+another individual; and also the actions which transgress
+these limits, which consequently are wrong, and therefore
+in their turn may be warded off without wrong. Thus
+our own <emph>action</emph> always remains the point of view of the
+investigation.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But the <emph>suffering of wrong</emph> appears as an event in outward
+experience, and in it is manifested, as we have said, more
+distinctly than anywhere else, the phenomenon of the
+conflict of the will to live with itself, arising from the
+multiplicity of individuals and from egoism, both of which
+are conditioned through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+which is the form of the world as idea for the knowledge
+of the individual. We also saw above that a very large
+<pb n='442'/><anchor id='Pg442'/>
+part of the suffering essential to human life has its
+perennial source in that conflict of individuals.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The reason, however, which is common to all these
+individuals, and which enables them to know not merely
+the particular case, as the brutes do, but also the whole
+abstractly in its connection, has also taught them to discern
+the source of that suffering, and induced them to
+consider the means of diminishing it, or, when possible,
+of suppressing it by a common sacrifice, which is, however,
+more than counterbalanced by the common advantage
+that proceeds from it. However agreeable it is to
+the egoism of the individual to inflict wrong in particular
+cases, this has yet a necessary correlative in the suffering
+of wrong of another individual, to whom it is a great pain.
+And because the reason which surveys the whole left the
+one-sided point of view of the individual to which it belongs,
+and freed itself for the moment from its dependence
+upon it, it saw the pleasure of an individual in
+inflicting wrong always outweighed by the relatively
+greater pain of the other who suffered the wrong; and it
+found further, that because here everything was left to
+chance, every one had to fear that the pleasure of conveniently
+inflicting wrong would far more rarely fall to his
+lot than the pain of enduring it. From this reason recognised
+that both in order to diminish the suffering which
+is everywhere disseminated, and as far as possible to
+divide it equally, the best and only means was to spare
+all the pain of suffering wrong by renouncing all the
+pleasure to be obtained by inflicting it. This means is
+the <emph>contract of the state</emph> or <emph>law</emph>. It is easily conceived,
+and little by little carried out by the egoism, which,
+through the use of reason, proceeds methodically and forsakes
+its one-sided point of view. This origin of the state
+and of law I have indicated was already exhibited as such
+by Plato in the <q>Republic.</q> In fact, it is the essential
+and only origin, determined by the nature of the matter.
+Moreover, in no land can the state have ever had a
+<pb n='443'/><anchor id='Pg443'/>
+different origin, because it is just this mode of originating
+this aim that makes it a state. But it is a
+matter of indifference whether, in each particular nation,
+the condition which preceded it was that of a horde of
+savages independent of each other (anarchy), or that of
+a horde of slaves ruled at will by the stronger (despotism).
+In both cases there existed as yet no state; it
+first arose through that common agreement; and according
+as that agreement is more or less free from anarchy
+or despotism, the state is more or less perfect. Republics
+tend to anarchy, monarchies to despotism, and
+the mean of constitutional monarchy, which was therefore
+devised, tends to government by factions. In order
+to found a perfect state, we must begin by providing
+beings whose nature allows them always to sacrifice
+their own to the public good. Till then, however,
+something may be attained through the existence of <emph>one</emph>
+family whose good is quite inseparable from that of the
+country; so that, at least in matters of importance, it
+can never advance the one without the other. On this
+rests the power and the advantage of the hereditary
+monarchy.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now as ethics was concerned exclusively with right
+and wrong doing, and could accurately point out the
+limits of his action to whoever was resolved to do no
+wrong; politics, on the contrary, the theory of legislation,
+is exclusively concerned with the <emph>suffering</emph> of
+wrong, and would never trouble itself with wrong-doing
+at all if it were not on account of its ever-necessary
+correlative, the suffering of wrong, which it always keeps
+in view as the enemy it opposes. Indeed, if it were
+possible to conceive an infliction of wrong with which
+no suffering of wrong on the part of another was connected,
+the state would, consistently, by no means prohibit
+it. And because in ethics the will, the disposition,
+is the object of consideration, and the only real thing,
+the firm will to do wrong, which is only restrained
+<pb n='444'/><anchor id='Pg444'/>
+and rendered ineffective by external might, and the
+actually committed wrong, are to it quite the same,
+and it condemns him who so wills as unjust at its
+tribunal. On the other hand, will and disposition,
+merely as such, do not concern the state at all, but
+only the <emph>deed</emph> (whether it is merely attempted or carried
+out), on account of its correlative, the <emph>suffering</emph> on the
+part of another. Thus for the state the deed, the event,
+is the only real; the disposition, the intention, is only
+investigated so far as the significance of the deed
+becomes known through it. Therefore the state will forbid
+no one to carry about in his thought murder and
+poison against another, so long as it knows certainly that
+the fear of the sword and the wheel will always restrain
+the effects of that will. The state has also by no means
+to eradicate the foolish purpose, the inclination to wrong-doing,
+the wicked disposition; but merely always to place
+beside every possible motive for doing a wrong a more
+powerful motive for leaving it undone in the inevitable
+punishment that will ensue. Therefore the criminal code
+is as complete a register as possible of motives against
+every criminal action that can possibly be imagined&mdash;both
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in abstracto</foreign>, in order to make any case that occurs an
+application <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in concreto</foreign>. Politics or legislation will therefore
+for this end borrow from that chapter of ethics which
+is the doctrine of right, and which, besides the inner significance
+of right and wrong, determines the exact limits
+between them. Yet it will only do so for the purpose of
+making use of its reverse side, and regarding all the limits
+which ethics lays down as not to be transgressed, if we are
+to avoid <emph>doing</emph> wrong, from the other side, as the limits
+which we must not allow others to transgress if we do
+not wish to <emph>suffer</emph> wrong, and from which we have therefore
+a <emph>right</emph> to drive others back. Therefore these limits
+are, as much as possible, from the passive side, barricaded
+by laws. It is evident that as an historian has very
+wittily been called an inverted prophet, the professor of
+<pb n='445'/><anchor id='Pg445'/>
+law is an inverted moralist, and therefore law itself, in
+its proper sense, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the doctrine of the <emph>right</emph>, which we
+ought to maintain, is inverted ethics in that chapter of
+it in which the rights are laid down which we ought not
+to violate. The concept of wrong and its negation, that
+of right, which is originally <emph>ethical</emph>, becomes <emph>juridical</emph> by
+the transference of the starting-point from the active to the
+passive side, and thus by inversion. This, as well as Kant's
+theory of law, which very falsely deduces the institution
+of the state as a moral duty from his categorical imperative,
+has, even in the most recent times, repeatedly occasioned
+the very extraordinary error that the state is an institution
+for furthering morality; that it arises from the endeavour
+after this, and is, consequently, directed against egoism.
+As if the inward disposition, to which alone morality or
+immorality belongs, the externally free will, would allow itself
+to be modified from without and changed by influences
+exerted upon it! Still more perverse is the theory that
+the state is the condition of freedom in the moral sense,
+and in this way the condition of morality; for freedom
+lies beyond the phenomenon, and indeed beyond human
+arrangements. The state is, as we have said, so little
+directed against egoism in general and as such, that, on
+the contrary, it has sprung from egoism and exists only
+in its service&mdash;an egoism that well understands itself,
+proceeds methodically and forsakes the one-sided for the
+universal point of view, and so by addition is the common
+egoism of all. The state is thus instituted under the
+correct presupposition that pure morality, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, right action
+from moral grounds, is not to be expected; if this were
+not the case, it would itself be superfluous. Thus the
+state, which aims at well-being, is by no means directed
+against egoism, but only against the disadvantageous
+consequences which arise from the multiplicity of egoistic
+individuals, and reciprocally affect them all and disturb
+their well-being. Therefore it was already said by Aristotle
+(De. Rep. iii.): Τελος μεν ουν πολεως το ευ ζην;
+<pb n='446'/><anchor id='Pg446'/>
+τουτο δε εστιν το ζῃν ευδαιμονως και καλως (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Finis civitatis
+est bene vivere, hoc autem est beate et pulchre vivere</foreign>).
+Hobbes also has accurately and excellently expounded
+this origin and end of the state; and that old first principle
+of all state policy, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>salus publica prima lex esto</foreign>,
+indicates the same thing. If the state completely attains
+its end, it will produce the same outward result as if
+perfect justice of disposition prevailed everywhere. But
+the inner nature and origin of both phenomena will be
+the converse. Thus in the second case it would be that
+no one wished to <emph>do</emph> wrong, and in the first that no one
+wished to <emph>suffer</emph> wrong, and the means appropriate to this
+end had been fully employed. Thus the same line may
+be drawn from opposite directions, and a beast of prey
+with a muzzle is as harmless as a graminivorous animal.
+But beyond this point the state cannot go. It cannot
+exhibit a phenomenon such as would spring from universal
+mutual well-wishing and love. For just as we found that
+from its nature it would not forbid the doing of a wrong
+which involved no corresponding suffering of wrong on
+the part of another, and prohibits all wrong-doing only
+because this is impossible; so conversely, in accordance
+with its tendency towards the well-being of all, it would
+very gladly take care that every benevolent action and
+work of human love should be <emph>experienced</emph>, if it were not
+that these also have an inevitable correlative in the <emph>performance</emph>
+of acts of benevolence and works of love, and
+every member of the state would wish to assume the
+passive and none the active rôle, and there would be no
+reason for exacting the latter from one member of the
+state rather than from another. Accordingly only the
+negative, which is just the <emph>right</emph>, not the positive, which
+has been comprehended under the name of obligations of
+love, or, less completely, duties, <emph>can be exacted by force</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Legislation, as we have said, borrows the pure philosophy
+of right, or the doctrine of the nature and limits
+of right and wrong, from ethics, in order to apply it from
+<pb n='447'/><anchor id='Pg447'/>
+the reverse side to its own ends, which are different
+from those of ethics, and to institute positive legislation
+and the means of supporting it, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the state, in accordance
+with it. Positive legislation is thus the inverted
+application of the purely moral doctrine of right. This
+application may be made with reference to the peculiar
+relations and circumstances of a particular people. But
+only if the positive legislation is, in essential matters,
+throughout determined in accordance with the guidance
+of the pure theory of right, and for each of its propositions
+a ground can be established in the pure theory of
+right, is the legislation which has arisen a <emph>positive right</emph>
+and the state a community <emph>based upon right</emph>, a <emph>state</emph> in
+the proper meaning of the word, a morally permissible,
+not immoral institution. Otherwise the positive legislation
+is, on the contrary, the establishment of a <emph>positive
+wrong</emph>; it is itself an openly avowed enforced wrong.
+Such is every despotism, the constitution of most Mohammedan
+kingdoms; and indeed various parts of many
+constitutions are also of this kind; for example, serfdom,
+vassalage, and many such institutions. The pure theory
+of right or natural right&mdash;better, moral right&mdash;though
+always reversed, lies at the foundation of every just positive
+legislation, as pure mathematics lies at the foundation
+of every branch of applied mathematics. The most
+important points of the doctrine of right, as philosophy has
+to supply it for that end to legislation, are the following:
+1. The explanation of the inner and real significance
+both of the origin of the conceptions of wrong and right,
+and of their application and position in ethics. 2. The
+deduction of the law of property. 3. The deduction of
+the moral validity of contracts; for this is the moral
+basis of the contract of the state. 4. The explanation of
+the origin and the aim of the state, of the relation of this
+aim to ethics, and of the intentional transference of the
+ethical doctrine of right, by reversing it, to legislation, in
+consequence of this relation. 5. The deduction of the
+<pb n='448'/><anchor id='Pg448'/>
+right of punishment. The remaining content of the doctrine
+of right is mere application of these principles,
+mere accurate definition of the limits of right and wrong
+for all possible relations of life, which are consequently
+united and distributed under certain points of view and
+titles. In these special doctrines the books which treat
+of pure law are fairly at one; it is only in the principles
+that they differ much, for these are always connected
+with some philosophical system. In connection with our
+system, we have explained the first four of these principal
+points shortly and generally, yet definitely and distinctly,
+and it remains for us to speak in the same way of the
+right of punishment.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Kant makes the fundamentally false assertion that
+apart from the state there would be no complete right of
+property. It follows from our deduction, as given above,
+that even in a state of nature there is property with
+complete natural, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, moral right, which cannot be injured
+without wrong, but may without wrong be defended
+to the uttermost. On the other hand, it is certain that
+apart from the state there is no right of punishment.
+All right to punish is based upon the positive law alone,
+which <emph>before</emph> the offence has determined a punishment
+for it, the threat of which, as a counter-motive, is intended
+to outweigh all possible motives for the offence.
+This positive law is to be regarded as sanctioned and
+recognised by all the members of the state. It is
+thus based upon a common contract which the members
+of the state are in duty bound to fulfil, and thus,
+on the one hand, to inflict the punishment, and, on the
+other hand, to endure it; thus the endurance of the
+punishment may with right be enforced. Consequently
+the immediate <emph>end of punishment</emph> is, in the particular
+case, <emph>the fulfilment of the law as a contract</emph>. But the one
+end of the <emph>law</emph> is <emph>deterrence</emph> from the infringement of the
+rights of others. For, in order that every one may be
+protected from suffering wrong, men have combined to
+<pb n='449'/><anchor id='Pg449'/>
+form a state, have renounced the doing of wrong, and
+assumed the task of maintaining the state. Thus the
+law and the fulfilment of it, the punishment, are essentially
+directed to the <emph>future</emph>, not to the <emph>past</emph>. This distinguishes
+<emph>punishment</emph> from <emph>revenge</emph>; for the motives which
+instigate the latter are solely concerned with what has
+happened, and thus with the past as such. All requital
+of wrong by the infliction of pain, without any aim for
+the future, is revenge, and can have no other end than
+consolation for the suffering one has borne by the sight
+of the suffering one has inflicted upon another. This is
+wickedness and cruelty, and cannot be morally justified.
+Wrong which some one has inflicted upon me by no
+means entitles me to inflict wrong upon him. The requital
+of evil with evil without further intention is
+neither morally nor otherwise through any rational
+ground to be justified, and the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>jus talionis</foreign> set up as the
+absolute, final principle of the right of punishment, is
+meaningless. Therefore Kant's theory of punishment as
+mere requital for requital's sake is a completely groundless
+and perverse view. Yet it is always appearing in
+the writings of many jurists, under all kinds of lofty
+phrases, which amount to nothing but empty words, as:
+Through the punishment the crime is expiated or neutralised
+and abolished, and many such. But no man has
+the right to set himself up as a purely moral judge and
+requiter, and punish the misdeeds of another with pains
+which he inflicts upon him, and so to impose penance
+upon him for his sins. Nay, this would rather be the
+most presumptuous arrogance; and therefore the Bible
+says, <q>Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.</q>
+But man has the right to care for the safety of society;
+and this can only be done by interdicting all actions
+which are denoted by the word <q>criminal,</q> in order
+to prevent them by means of counter-motives, which
+are the threatened punishments. And this threat can
+only be made effective by carrying it out when a case
+<pb n='450'/><anchor id='Pg450'/>
+occurs in spite of it. Accordingly that the end of
+punishment, or more accurately of penal law, is the
+deterrence from crime, is a truth so generally recognised
+and indeed self-evident, that in England it is expressed
+in the very old form of indictment which is still served
+by the counsel for the Crown in criminal actions, for it
+concludes with the words, <q>If this be proved, you, the said
+N. N., ought to be punished with pains of law, to deter
+others from the like crimes in all time coming.</q> If a
+prince desires to extend mercy to a criminal who has
+justly been condemned, his Ministers will represent to him
+that, if he does, this crime will soon be repeated. An
+end for the future distinguishes punishment from revenge,
+and punishment only has this end when it is inflicted <emph>in
+fulfilment of a law</emph>. It thus announces itself as inevitable
+in every future case, and thus the law obtains the power
+to deter, in which its end really consists. Now here a
+Kantian would inevitably reply that certainly according
+to this view the punished criminal would be used <q>merely
+as a means.</q> This proposition, so unweariedly repeated
+by all the Kantians, <q>Man must always be treated as an
+end, never as a means,</q> certainly sounds significant, and
+is therefore a very suitable proposition for those who like
+to have a formula which saves them all further thought;
+but looked at in the light, it is an exceedingly vague,
+indefinite assertion, which reaches its aim quite indirectly,
+requires to be explained, defined, and modified in every
+case of its application, and, if taken generally, is insufficient,
+meagre, and moreover problematical. The murderer
+who has been condemned to the punishment of death
+according to law must now, at any rate, and with complete
+right, be used as a mere means. For public security,
+the chief end of the state, is disturbed by him; indeed it
+is abolished if the law is not carried out. The murderer,
+his life, his person, must now be the means of fulfilling
+the law, and thereby of re-establishing the public security.
+And he is made such a means with perfect right,
+<pb n='451'/><anchor id='Pg451'/>
+in fulfilment of the contract of the state, which was
+entered into by him because he was a citizen, and in
+accordance with which, in order to enjoy security for his
+life, freedom, and property, he has pledged his life, his
+freedom, and his property for the security of all, which
+pledge has now been forfeited.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This theory of punishment which we have established,
+the theory which is directly supported by sound
+reason, is certainly in the main no new thought; but it
+is a thought which was almost supplanted by new errors,
+and therefore it was necessary to exhibit it as distinctly
+as possible. The same thing is in its essence contained
+in what Puffendorf says on the subject, <q><hi rend='italic'>De Officio Hominis
+et Civis</hi></q> (Bk. ii. chap. 12). Hobbes also agrees with it,
+<q>Leviathan</q> (chaps. 15-28). In our own day Feurbach
+is well known to have maintained it. Indeed, it occurs
+even in the utterances of the ancient philosophers. Plato
+expresses it clearly in the <q>Protagoras</q> (p. 114, edit.
+Bip.), also in the <q>Gorgias</q> (p. 168), and lastly in the
+eleventh book of the <q>Laws</q> (p. 165). Seneca expresses
+Plato's opinion and the theory of all punishment
+in the short sentence, <q><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum
+est; sed ne peccetur</foreign></q> (De Ira, i. 16).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus we have come to recognise in the state the
+means by which egoism endowed with reason seeks to
+escape from its own evil consequences which turn against
+itself, and now each promotes the well-being of all
+because he sees that his own well-being is involved in it.
+If the state attained its end completely, then to a certain
+extent something approaching to an Utopia might finally,
+by the removal of all kinds of evil, be brought about.
+For by the human powers united in it, it is able to make
+the rest of nature more and more serviceable. But as
+yet the state has always remained very far from this
+goal. And even if it attained to it, innumerable evils
+essential to all life would still keep it in suffering; and
+finally, if they were all removed, ennui would at once occupy
+<pb n='452'/><anchor id='Pg452'/>
+every place they left. And besides, the strife of individuals
+is never completely abolished by the state, for it
+vexes in trifles when it is prohibited in greater things.
+Finally, Eris, happily expelled from within, turns to what
+is without; as the conflict of individuals, she is banished
+by the institution of the state; but she reappears from
+without as the war of nations, and now demands in bulk
+and at once, as an accumulated debt, the bloody sacrifice
+which by wise precautions has been denied her in the
+particular. And even supposing that all this were finally
+overcome and removed, by wisdom founded on the experience
+of thousands of years, at the end the result would
+be the actual over-population of the whole planet, the
+terrible evil of which only a bold imagination can now
+realise.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 63. We have recognised <emph>temporal justice</emph>, which has
+its seat in the state, as requiting and punishing, and
+have seen that this only becomes justice through a reference
+to the <emph>future</emph>. For without this reference all
+punishing and requiting would be an outrage without
+justification, and indeed merely the addition of another
+evil to that which has already occurred, without meaning
+or significance. But it is quite otherwise with <emph>eternal
+justice</emph>, which was referred to before, and which rules not
+the state but the world, is not dependent upon human
+institutions, is not subject to chance and deception, is not
+uncertain, wavering, and erring, but infallible, fixed, and
+sure. The conception of requital implies that of time;
+therefore <emph>eternal justice</emph> cannot be requital. Thus it
+cannot, like temporal justice, admit of respite and delay,
+and require time in order to triumph, equalising the evil
+deed by the evil consequences only by means of time.
+The punishment must here be so bound up with the
+offence that both are one.
+</p>
+
+<pb n='453'/><anchor id='Pg453'/>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+
+<lg>
+<l>Δοκειτε πηδᾳν τ᾽ αδικηματ᾽ εις θεους</l>
+<l>Πτεροισι, κἀπειτ᾽ εν Διος δελτου πτυχαις</l>
+<l>Γραφειν τιν᾽ αυτα, Ζηνα δ᾽ εισορωντα νιν</l>
+<l>Θνητοις δικαζειν? Ουδ᾽ ὁ παρ ουρανος,</l>
+<l>Διος γραφοντος ταρ βροτων ἁμαρτιας,</l>
+<l>Εξαρκεσειεν, ουδ᾽ εκεινος αν σκοπων</l>
+<l>Πεμπειν ἑκαστῳ ζημιαν; αλλ᾽ ἡ Δικη</l>
+<l>Ενταυθα που εστιν εγγυς, ει βουλεσθ᾽ ὁρᾳν.</l>
+</lg>
+
+<lg>
+<l>Eurip. ap. Stob. Ecl., i. c. 4.</l>
+</lg>
+
+<lg>
+<l>(<q rend='pre'>Volare pennis scelera ad ætherias domus</q></l>
+<l>Putatis, illic in Jovis tabularia</l>
+<l>Scripto referri; tum Jovem lectis super</l>
+<l>Sententiam proferre?&mdash;sed mortalium</l>
+<l>Facinora cœli, quantaquanta est, regia</l>
+<l>Nequit tenere: nec legendis Juppiter</l>
+<l>Et puniendis par est. Est tamen ultio,</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Et, si intuemur, illa nos habitat prope.</q>)</l>
+</lg>
+
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Now that such an eternal justice really lies in the nature
+of the world will soon become completely evident to
+whoever has grasped the whole of the thought which we
+have hitherto been developing.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The world, in all the multiplicity of its parts and
+forms, is the manifestation, the objectivity, of the one
+will to live. Existence itself, and the kind of existence,
+both as a collective whole and in every part, proceeds
+from the will alone. The will is free, the will is
+almighty. The will appears in everything, just as it
+determines itself in itself and outside time. The world
+is only the mirror of this willing; and all finitude, all
+suffering, all miseries, which it contains, belong to the
+expression of that which the will wills, are as they are
+because the will so wills. Accordingly with perfect right
+every being supports existence in general, and also the
+existence of its species and its peculiar individuality,
+entirely as it is and in circumstances as they are, in a
+world such as it is, swayed by chance and error, transient,
+ephemeral, and constantly suffering; and in all that it
+experiences, or indeed can experience, it always gets its
+<pb n='454'/><anchor id='Pg454'/>
+due. For the will belongs to it; and as the will is, so
+is the world. Only this world itself can bear the
+responsibility of its own existence and nature&mdash;no other;
+for by what means could another have assumed it? Do
+we desire to know what men, morally considered, are
+worth as a whole and in general, we have only to
+consider their fate as a whole and in general. This is
+want, wretchedness, affliction, misery, and death. Eternal
+justice reigns; if they were not, as a whole, worthless,
+their fate, as a whole, would not be so sad. In this
+sense we may say, the world itself is the judgment of
+the world. If we could lay all the misery of the world
+in one scale of the balance, and all the guilt of the world
+in the other, the needle would certainly point to the
+centre.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Certainly, however, the world does not exhibit itself
+to the knowledge of the individual as such, developed
+for the service of the will, as it finally reveals itself
+to the inquirer as the objectivity of the one and only
+will to live, which he himself is. But the sight of the
+uncultured individual is clouded, as the Hindus say, by
+the veil of Mâyâ. He sees not the thing-in-itself but the
+phenomenon in time and space, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+and in the other forms of the principle of
+sufficient reason. And in this form of his limited knowledge
+he sees not the inner nature of things, which is
+one, but its phenomena as separated, disunited, innumerable,
+very different, and indeed opposed. For to him
+pleasure appears as one thing and pain as quite another
+thing: one man as a tormentor and a murderer, another
+as a martyr and a victim; wickedness as one thing and
+evil as another. He sees one man live in joy, abundance,
+and pleasure, and even at his door another die
+miserably of want and cold. Then he asks, Where is
+the retribution? And he himself, in the vehement,
+pressure of will which is his origin and his nature,
+seizes upon the pleasures and enjoyments of life, firmly
+<pb n='455'/><anchor id='Pg455'/>
+embraces them, and knows not that by this very
+act of his will he seizes and hugs all those pains and
+sorrows at the sight of which he shudders. He sees
+the ills and he sees the wickedness in the world, but
+far from knowing that both of these are but different
+sides of the manifestation of the one will to live, he
+regards them as very different, and indeed quite opposed,
+and often seeks to escape by wickedness, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, by causing
+the suffering of another, from ills, from the suffering of
+his own individuality, for he is involved in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign>, deluded by the veil of Mâyâ.
+Just as a sailor sits in a boat trusting to his frail
+barque in a stormy sea, unbounded in every direction,
+rising and falling with the howling mountainous waves;
+so in the midst of a world of sorrows the individual
+man sits quietly, supported by and trusting to the
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, or the way in which the
+individual knows things as phenomena. The boundless
+world, everywhere full of suffering in the infinite past,
+in the infinite future, is strange to him, indeed is to him
+but a fable; his ephemeral person, his extensionless present,
+his momentary satisfaction, this alone has reality
+for him; and he does all to maintain this, so long as
+his eyes are not opened by a better knowledge. Till
+then, there lives only in the inmost depths of his consciousness
+a very obscure presentiment that all that is
+after all not really so strange to him, but has a connection
+with him, from which the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>
+cannot protect him. From this presentiment
+arises that ineradicable <emph>awe</emph> common to all men (and
+indeed perhaps even to the most sensible of the brutes)
+which suddenly seizes them if by any chance they
+become puzzled about the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+because the principle of sufficient reason in some one of
+its forms seems to admit of an exception. For example,
+if it seems as if some change took place without a cause,
+or some one who is dead appears again, or if in any
+<pb n='456'/><anchor id='Pg456'/>
+other way the past or the future becomes present or
+the distant becomes near. The fearful terror at anything
+of the kind is founded on the fact that they suddenly
+become puzzled about the forms of knowledge of
+the phenomenon, which alone separate their own individuality
+from the rest of the world. But even this
+separation lies only in the phenomenon, and not in the
+thing-in-itself; and on this rests eternal justice. In
+fact, all temporal happiness stands, and all prudence
+proceeds, upon ground that is undermined. They defend
+the person from accidents and supply its pleasures; but
+the person is merely phenomenon, and its difference from
+other individuals, and exemption from the sufferings which
+they endure, rests merely in the form of the phenomenon,
+the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>. According to the true
+nature of things, every one has all the suffering of the
+world as his own, and indeed has to regard all merely
+possible suffering as for him actual, so long as he is the
+fixed will to live, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, asserts life with all his power. For
+the knowledge that sees through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+a happy life in time, the gift of chance or won
+by prudence, amid the sorrows of innumerable others, is
+only the dream of a beggar in which he is a king, but
+from which he must awake and learn from experience
+that only a fleeting illusion had separated him from the
+suffering of his life.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Eternal justice withdraws itself from the vision that is
+involved in the knowledge which follows the principle of
+sufficient reason in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>; such
+vision misses it altogether unless it vindicates it in some
+way by fictions. It sees the bad, after misdeeds and
+cruelties of every kind, live in happiness and leave the
+world unpunished. It sees the oppressed drag out a life
+full of suffering to the end without an avenger, a requiter
+appearing. But that man only will grasp and comprehend
+eternal justice who raises himself above the knowledge
+that proceeds under the guidance of the principle of sufficient
+<pb n='457'/><anchor id='Pg457'/>
+reason, bound to the particular thing, and recognises
+the Ideas, sees through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+and becomes conscious that the forms of the phenomenon
+do not apply to the thing-in-itself. Moreover, he alone,
+by virtue of the same knowledge, can understand the true
+nature of virtue, as it will soon disclose itself to us in connection
+with the present inquiry, although for the practice
+of virtue this knowledge in the abstract is by no
+means demanded. Thus it becomes clear to whoever has
+attained to the knowledge referred to, that because the
+will is the in-itself of all phenomena, the misery which is
+awarded to others and that which he experiences himself,
+the bad and the evil, always concerns only that one inner
+being which is everywhere the same, although the phenomena
+in which the one and the other exhibits itself
+exist as quite different individuals, and are widely
+separated by time and space. He sees that the difference
+between him who inflicts the suffering and him
+who must bear it is only the phenomenon, and does
+not concern the thing-in-itself, for this is the will
+living in both, which here, deceived by the knowledge
+which is bound to its service, does not recognise itself,
+and seeking an increased happiness in <emph>one</emph> of its phenomena,
+produces great suffering in <emph>another</emph>, and thus, in
+the pressure of excitement, buries its teeth in its own
+flesh, not knowing that it always injures only itself, revealing
+in this form, through the medium of individuality,
+the conflict with itself which it bears in its inner nature.
+The inflicter of suffering and the sufferer are one. The
+former errs in that he believes he is not a partaker in
+the suffering; the latter, in that he believes he is not a
+partaker in the guilt. If the eyes of both were opened,
+the inflicter of suffering would see that he lives in all that
+suffers pain in the wide world, and which, if endowed with
+reason, in vain asks why it was called into existence for
+such great suffering, its desert of which it does not understand.
+And the sufferer would see that all the wickedness
+<pb n='458'/><anchor id='Pg458'/>
+which is or ever was committed in the world proceeds
+from that will which constitutes <emph>his</emph> own nature also,
+appears also in <emph>him</emph>, and that through this phenomenon
+and its assertion he has taken upon himself all the sufferings
+which proceed from such a will and bears them as
+his due, so long as he is this will. From this knowledge
+speaks the profound poet Calderon in <q>Life a Dream</q>&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>Pues el delito mayor</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Del hombre es haber nacido.</q></l>
+</lg>
+
+<lg>
+<l>(<q rend='pre'>For the greatest crime of man</q></l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Is that he ever was born.</q>)</l>
+</lg>
+
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+Why should it not be a crime, since, according to an
+eternal law, death follows upon it? Calderon has merely
+expressed in these lines the Christian dogma of original
+sin.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The living knowledge of eternal justice, of the balance
+that inseparably binds together the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>malum culpæ</foreign> with
+the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>malum pœnæ</foreign>, demands the complete transcending of
+individuality and the principle of its possibility. Therefore
+it will always remain unattainable to the majority of
+men, as will also be the case with the pure and distinct
+knowledge of the nature of all virtue, which is akin to it,
+and which we are about to explain. Accordingly the
+wise ancestors of the Hindu people have directly expressed
+it in the Vedas, which are only allowed to the
+three regenerate castes, or in their esoteric teaching, so
+far at any rate as conception and language comprehend
+it, and their method of exposition, which always remains
+pictorial and even rhapsodical, admits; but in the religion
+of the people, or exoteric teaching, they only
+communicate it by means of myths. The direct
+exposition we find in the Vedas, the fruit of the
+highest human knowledge and wisdom, the kernel of
+which has at last reached us in the Upanishads as the
+greatest gift of this century. It is expressed in various
+<pb n='459'/><anchor id='Pg459'/>
+ways, but especially by making all the beings in the
+world, living and lifeless, pass successively before the view
+of the student, and pronouncing over every one of them
+that word which has become a formula, and as such has
+been called the Mahavakya: Tatoumes,&mdash;more correctly,
+Tat twam asi,&mdash;which means, <q>This thou art.</q><note place='foot'>Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 60 et seq.</note> But
+for the people, that great truth, so far as in their limited
+condition they could comprehend it, was translated into
+the form of knowledge which follows the principle of
+sufficient reason. This form of knowledge is indeed,
+from its nature, quite incapable of apprehending that
+truth pure and in itself, and even stands in contradiction
+to it, yet in the form of a myth it received a substitute
+for it which was sufficient as a guide for conduct. For the
+myth enables the method of knowledge, in accordance
+with the principle of sufficient reason, to comprehend by
+figurative representation the ethical significance of conduct,
+which itself is ever foreign to it. This is the aim of
+all systems of religion, for as a whole they are the mythical
+clothing of the truth which is unattainable to the
+uncultured human intellect. In this sense this myth
+might, in Kant's language, be called a postulate of the
+practical reason; but regarded as such, it has the great
+advantage that it contains absolutely no elements but such
+as lie before our eyes in the course of actual experience,
+and can therefore support all its conceptions with perceptions.
+What is here referred to is the myth of the transmigration
+of souls. It teaches that all sufferings which
+in life one inflicts upon other beings must be expiated in
+a subsequent life in this world, through precisely the
+same sufferings; and this extends so far, that he who only
+kills a brute must, some time in endless time, be born as
+the same kind of brute and suffer the same death. It
+teaches that wicked conduct involves a future life in this
+world in suffering and despised creatures, and, accordingly,
+that one will then be born again in lower castes, or as
+<pb n='460'/><anchor id='Pg460'/>
+a woman, or as a brute, as Pariah or Tschandala, as a leper,
+or as a crocodile, and so forth. All the pains which the myth
+threatens it supports with perceptions from actual life,
+through suffering creatures which do not know how they
+have merited their misery, and it does not require to call
+in the assistance of any other hell. As a reward, on the
+other hand, it promises re-birth in better, nobler forms,
+as Brahmans, wise men, or saints. The highest reward,
+which awaits the noblest deeds and the completest resignation,
+which is also given to the woman who in seven
+successive lives has voluntarily died on the funeral pile
+of her husband, and not less to the man whose pure mouth
+has never uttered a single lie,&mdash;this reward the myth can
+only express negatively in the language of this world by
+the promise, which is so often repeated, that they shall
+never be born again, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Non adsumes iterum existentiam
+apparentem</foreign>; or, as the Buddhists, who recognise neither
+Vedas nor castes, express it, <q>Thou shalt attain to
+Nirvâna,</q> <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, to a state in which four things no longer
+exist&mdash;birth, age, sickness, and death.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Never has a myth entered, and never will one enter,
+more closely into the philosophical truth which is attainable
+to so few than this primitive doctrine of the noblest and
+most ancient nation. Broken up as this nation now is into
+many parts, this myth yet reigns as the universal belief
+of the people, and has the most decided influence upon
+life to-day, as four thousand years ago. Therefore Pythagoras
+and Plato have seized with admiration on that <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>ne
+plus ultra</foreign> of mythical representation, received it from
+India or Egypt, honoured it, made use of it, and, we know
+not how far, even believed it. We, on the contrary, now
+send the Brahmans English clergymen and evangelical
+linen-weavers to set them right out of sympathy, and
+to show them that they are created out of nothing, and
+ought thankfully to rejoice in the fact. But it is just
+the same as if we fired a bullet against a cliff. In
+India our religions will never take root. The ancient
+<pb n='461'/><anchor id='Pg461'/>
+wisdom of the human race will not be displaced by what
+happened in Galilee. On the contrary, Indian philosophy
+streams back to Europe, and will produce a fundamental
+change in our knowledge and thought.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 64. From our exposition of eternal justice, which is
+not mythical but philosophical, we will now proceed to
+the kindred investigation of the ethical significance of
+conduct and of conscience, which is the merely felt
+knowledge of that significance. But first I wish at this
+point to draw attention to two peculiarities of human
+nature, that might help to make clear how the nature of
+that eternal justice, and the unity and identity of the
+will in all its phenomena upon which it rests, is known
+to every one, at least as an obscure feeling.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+When a bad deed has been done, it affords satisfaction
+not only to the sufferer, who for the most part feels the
+desire of revenge, but also to the perfectly indifferent
+spectator, to see that he who caused another pain suffers
+himself a like measure of pain; and this quite independently
+of the end which we have shown the state has
+in view in punishment, and which is the foundation of
+penal law. It seems to me that what expresses itself
+here is nothing but the consciousness of that eternal
+justice, which is, nevertheless, at once misunderstood and
+falsified by the unenlightened mind, for, involved in the
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, it produces an amphiboly of
+the concepts and demands from the phenomenon what
+only belongs to the thing in itself. It does not see how
+far in themselves the offender and the offended are one,
+and that it is the same being which, not recognising
+itself in its own manifestation, bears both the pain and
+the guilt, but it desires rather to see the pain also in the
+particular individual to whom the guilt belongs. Therefore,
+most persons would demand that a man who had a
+very high degree of wickedness which might yet occur
+in many others, only not matched with other qualities
+such as are found in him, a man who also far surpassed
+<pb n='462'/><anchor id='Pg462'/>
+others by extraordinary intellectual powers, and who inflicted
+unspeakable sufferings upon millions of others&mdash;for
+example, as a conqueror,&mdash;most persons, I say, would
+demand that such a man should at some time and in some
+place expiate all these sufferings by a like amount of
+pain; for they do not recognise how in themselves the
+inflicter of suffering and the sufferers are one, and that
+it is the same will through which the latter exist and
+live which also appears in the former, and just through
+him attains to a distinct revelation of its nature, and
+which likewise suffers both in the oppressed and the
+oppressor; and indeed in the latter in a greater measure,
+as the consciousness has attained a higher degree of
+clearness and distinctness and the will has greater
+vehemence. But that the deeper knowledge, which is
+no longer involved in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+from which all virtue and nobleness proceed, no longer
+retains the disposition which demands requital, is shown
+by the Christian ethics, which absolutely forbids all
+requital of evil with evil, and allows eternal justice to
+proceed in the sphere of the thing-in-itself, which is
+different from that of the phenomenon. (<q>Vengeance is
+mine; I will repay, saith the Lord,</q>&mdash;Rom. xii. 19.)
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A much more striking, but also a much rarer, characteristic
+of human nature, which expresses that desire to
+draw eternal justice into the province of experience, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+of individuality, and at the same time indicates a felt consciousness
+that, as I have expressed it above, the will to live
+conducts at its own cost the great tragedy and comedy,
+and that the same one will lives in all manifestations,&mdash;such
+a characteristic, I say, is the following. We sometimes
+see a man so deeply moved by a great injury which
+he has experienced, or, it may be, only witnessed, that he
+deliberately and irretrievably stakes his own life in order
+to take vengeance on the perpetrator of that wrong. We
+see him seek for some mighty oppressor through long
+years, murder him at last, and then himself die on the
+<pb n='463'/><anchor id='Pg463'/>
+scaffold, as he had foreseen, and often, it may be, did not
+seek to avoid, for his life had value for him only as a
+means of vengeance. We find examples of this especially
+among the Spaniards.<note place='foot'>That Spanish bishop who, in the
+last war, poisoned both himself and
+the French generals at his own table,
+is an instance of this; and also various
+incidents in that war. Examples
+are also to be found in Montaigne,
+Bk. ii. ch. 12.</note> If, now, we consider the
+spirit of that desire for retribution carefully, we find
+that it is very different from common revenge, which seeks
+to mitigate the suffering, endured by the sight of the
+suffering inflicted; indeed, we find that what it aims at
+deserves to be called, not so much revenge as punishment.
+For in it there really lies the intention of an effect upon
+the future through the example, and that without any
+selfish aim, either for the avenging person, for it costs
+him his life, or for a society which secures its own safety
+by laws. For that punishment is carried out by individuals,
+not by the state, nor is it in fulfilment of a law, but,
+on the contrary, always concerns a deed which the state
+either would not or could not punish, and the punishment
+of which it condemns. It seems to me that the indignation
+which carries such a man so far beyond the limits of
+all self-love springs from the deepest consciousness that
+he himself is the whole will to live, which appears in all
+beings through all time, and that therefore the most distant
+future belongs to him just as the present, and cannot be
+indifferent to him. Asserting this will, he yet desires that
+in the drama which represents its nature no such fearful
+wrong shall ever appear again, and wishes to frighten
+ever future wrong-doer by the example of a vengeance
+against which there is no means of defence, since the
+avenger is not deterred by the fear of death. The will
+to live, though still asserting itself, does not here depend
+any longer upon the particular phenomenon, the individual,
+but comprehends the Idea of man, and wishes to keep
+its manifestation pure from such a fearful and shocking
+wrong. It is a rare, very significant, and even sublime
+<pb n='464'/><anchor id='Pg464'/>
+trait of character through which the individual sacrifices
+himself by striving to make himself the arm of eternal
+justice, of the true nature of which he is yet ignorant.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 65. In all the preceding investigations of human
+action, we have been leading up to the final investigation,
+and have to a considerable extent lightened the task of
+raising to abstract and philosophical clearness, and exhibiting
+as a branch of our central thought that special
+ethical significance of action which in life is with perfect
+understanding denoted by the words <emph>good</emph> and <emph>bad</emph>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+First, however, I wish to trace back to their real
+meaning those conceptions of <emph>good</emph> and <emph>bad</emph> which have
+been treated by the philosophical writers of the day, very
+extraordinarily, as simple conceptions, and thus incapable
+of analysis; so that the reader may not remain involved
+in the senseless delusion that they contain more than is
+actually the case, and express in and for themselves all
+that is here necessary. I am in a position to do this
+because in ethics I am no more disposed to take refuge
+behind the word <emph>good</emph> than formerly behind the words
+<emph>beautiful</emph> and <emph>true</emph>, in order that by the adding a <q>ness,</q>
+which at the present day is supposed to have a special
+σεμνοτης, and therefore to be of assistance in various
+cases, and by assuming an air of solemnity, I might
+induce the belief that by uttering three such words I
+had done more than denote three very wide and abstract,
+and consequently empty conceptions, of very different
+origin and significance. Who is there, indeed, who has
+made himself acquainted with the books of our own day
+to whom these three words, admirable as are the things
+to which they originally refer, have not become an aversion
+after he has seen for the thousandth time how those
+who are least capable of thinking believe that they have
+only to utter these three words with open mouth and the
+air of an intelligent sheep, in order to have spoken the
+greatest wisdom?
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The explanation of the concept <emph>true</emph> has already been
+<pb n='465'/><anchor id='Pg465'/>
+given in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason,
+chap. v. § 29 <hi rend='italic'>et seq.</hi> The content of the concept <emph>beautiful</emph>
+found for the first time its proper explanation through
+the whole of the Third Book of the present work. We
+now wish to discover the significance of the concept <emph>good</emph>,
+which can be done with very little trouble. This concept
+is essentially relative, and signifies <emph>the conformity of
+an object to any definite effort of the will</emph>. Accordingly
+everything that corresponds to the will in any of its
+expressions and fulfils its end is thought through the
+concept <emph>good</emph>, however different such things may be in
+other respects. Thus we speak of good eating, good
+roads, good weather, good weapons, good omens, and so
+on; in short, we call everything good that is just as we
+wish it to be; and therefore that may be good in the
+eyes of one man which is just the reverse in those of
+another. The conception of the good divides itself into
+two sub-species&mdash;that of the direct and present satisfaction
+of any volition, and that of its indirect satisfaction which
+has reference to the future, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the agreeable and the
+useful. The conception of the opposite, so long as we
+are speaking of unconscious existence, is expressed by the
+word <emph>bad</emph>, more rarely and abstractly by the word <emph>evil</emph>,
+which thus denotes everything that does not correspond
+to any effort of the will. Like all other things that can
+come into relation to the will, men who are favourable to
+the ends which happen to be desired, who further and
+befriend them, are called good, in the same sense, and
+always with that relative limitation, which shows itself,
+for example, in the expression, <q>I find this good, but
+you don't.</q> Those, however, who are naturally disposed
+not to hinder the endeavours of others, but rather to
+assist them, and who are thus consistently helpful, benevolent,
+friendly, and charitable, are called <emph>good</emph> men,
+on account of this relation of their conduct to the will of
+others in general. In the case of conscious beings (brutes
+and men) the contrary conception is denoted in German,
+<pb n='466'/><anchor id='Pg466'/>
+and, within the last hundred years or so, in French also,
+by a different word from that which is used in speaking
+of unconscious existence; in German, <foreign lang='de' rend='italic'>böse</foreign>; in French,
+<foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>méchant</foreign>; while in almost all other languages this distinction
+does not exist; and κακος, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>malus</foreign>, <foreign rend='italic'>cattivo</foreign>, <emph>bad</emph>,
+are used of men, as of lifeless things, which are opposed
+to the ends of a definite individual will. Thus, having
+started entirely from the passive element in the good, the
+inquiry could only proceed later to the active element,
+and investigate the conduct of the man who is called
+good, no longer with reference to others, but to himself;
+specially setting itself the task of explaining both the
+purely objective respect which such conduct produces in
+others, and the peculiar contentment with himself which
+it clearly produces in the man himself, since he purchases
+it with sacrifices of another kind; and also, on the other
+hand, the inner pain which accompanies the bad disposition,
+whatever outward advantages it brings to him who
+entertains it. It was from this source that the ethical
+systems, both the philosophical and those which are supported
+by systems of religion, took their rise. Both seek
+constantly in some way or other to connect happiness
+with virtue, the former either by means of the principle
+of contradiction or that of sufficient reason, and thus to
+make happiness either identical with or the consequence
+of virtue, always sophistically; the latter, by asserting
+the existence of other worlds than that which alone can
+be known to experience.<note place='foot'>Observe, in passing, that what
+gives every positive system of religion
+its great strength, the point of
+contact through which it takes possession
+of the soul, is entirely its
+ethical side. Not, however, the ethical
+side directly as such, but as it
+appears firmly united and interwoven
+with the element of mythical
+dogma which is present in every
+system of religion, and as intelligible
+only by means of this. So much is
+this the case, that although the ethical
+significance of action cannot be
+explained in accordance with the
+principle of sufficient reason, yet
+since every mythus follows this principle,
+believers regard the ethical
+significance of action as quite inseparable,
+and indeed as absolutely
+identical, and regard every attack
+upon the mythus as an attack upon
+right and virtue. This goes so far
+that among monotheistic nations
+atheism or godlessness has become
+synonymous with the absence of all
+morality. To the priests such confusions
+of conceptions are welcome,
+and only in consequence of them
+could that horrible monstrosity fanaticism
+arise and govern, not merely
+single individuals who happen to be
+specially perverse and bad, but whole
+nations, and finally embody itself in
+the Western world as the Inquisition
+(to the honour of mankind be it
+said that this only happened once
+in their history), which, according
+to the latest and most authentic
+accounts, in Madrid alone (in the
+rest of Spain there were many more
+such ecclesiastical dens of murderers)
+in 300 years put 300,000
+human beings to a painful death at
+the stake on theological grounds&mdash;a
+fact of which every zealot ought to
+be reminded whenever he begins to
+make himself heard.</note> In our system, on the contrary,
+<pb n='467'/><anchor id='Pg467'/>
+virtue will show itself, not as a striving after happiness,
+that is, well-being and life, but as an effort in
+quite an opposite direction.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It follows from what has been said above, that the <emph>good</emph>
+is, according to its concept, των πρως τι; thus every good is
+essentially relative, for its being consists in its relation
+to a desiring will. <emph>Absolute good</emph> is, therefore, a contradiction
+in terms; highest good, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>summum bonum</foreign>, really
+signifies the same thing&mdash;a final satisfaction of the will,
+after which no new desire could arise,&mdash;a last motive, the
+attainment of which would afford enduring satisfaction of
+the will. But, according to the investigations which
+have already been conducted in this Fourth Book, such a
+consummation is not even thinkable. The will can just
+as little cease from willing altogether on account of some
+particular satisfaction, as time can end or begin; for it
+there is no such thing as a permanent fulfilment which
+shall completely and for ever satisfy its craving. It is
+the vessel of the Danaides; for it there is no highest
+good, no absolute good, but always a merely temporary
+good. If, however, we wish to give an honorary position,
+as it were emeritus, to an old expression, which from
+custom we do not like to discard altogether, we may,
+metaphorically and figuratively, call the complete self-effacement
+and denial of the will, the true absence of will,
+which alone for ever stills and silences its struggle, alone
+gives that contentment which can never again be disturbed,
+alone redeems the world, and which we shall now
+soon consider at the close of our whole investigation&mdash;the
+<pb n='468'/><anchor id='Pg468'/>
+absolute good, the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>summum bonum</foreign>&mdash;and regard it as the
+only radical cure of the disease of which all other means
+are only palliations or anodynes. In this sense the Greek
+τελος and also <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>finis bonorum</foreign> correspond to the thing still
+better. So much for the words <emph>good</emph> and <emph>bad</emph>; now for
+the thing itself.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If a man is always disposed to do <emph>wrong</emph> whenever
+the opportunity presents itself, and there is no external
+power to restrain him, we call him <emph>bad</emph>. According to
+our doctrine of wrong, this means that such a man does
+not merely assert the will to live as it appears in his
+own body, but in this assertion goes so far that he
+denies the will which appears in other individuals. This
+is shown by the fact that he desires their powers for the
+service of his own will, and seeks to destroy their existence
+when they stand in the way of its efforts. The
+ultimate source of this is a high degree of egoism, the
+nature of which has been already explained. Two
+things are here apparent. In the first place, that in
+such a man an excessively vehement will to live expresses
+itself, extending far beyond the assertion of his
+own body; and, in the second place, that his knowledge,
+entirely given up to the principle of sufficient reason
+and involved in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, cannot
+get beyond the difference which this latter principle
+establishes between his own person and every one else.
+Therefore he seeks his own well-being alone, completely
+indifferent to that of all others, whose existence is to
+him altogether foreign and divided from his own by a
+wide gulf, and who are indeed regarded by him as
+mere masks with no reality behind them. And these
+two qualities are the constituent elements of the bad
+character.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This great intensity of will is in itself and directly
+a constant source of suffering. In the first place,
+because all volition as such arises from want; that is,
+suffering. (Therefore, as will be remembered, from the
+<pb n='469'/><anchor id='Pg469'/>
+Third Book, the momentary cessation of all volition,
+which takes place whenever we give ourselves up to
+æsthetic contemplation, as pure will-less subject of
+knowledge, the correlative of the Idea, is one of the
+principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful.)
+Secondly, because, through the causal connection of
+things, most of our desires must remain unfulfilled, and
+the will is oftener crossed than satisfied, and therefore
+much intense volition carries with it much intense
+suffering. For all suffering is simply unfulfilled and
+crossed volition; and even the pain of the body when
+it is injured or destroyed is as such only possible
+through the fact that the body is nothing but the will
+itself become object. Now on this account, because much
+intense suffering is inseparable from much intense volition,
+very bad men bear the stamp of inward suffering in
+the very expression of the countenance; even when they
+have attained every external happiness, they always look
+unhappy so long as they are not transported by some
+momentary ecstasy and are not dissembling. From this
+inward torment, which is absolutely and directly essential
+to them, there finally proceeds that delight in the suffering
+of others which does not spring from mere egoism,
+but is disinterested, and which constitutes <emph>wickedness</emph>
+proper, rising to the pitch of <emph>cruelty</emph>. For this the suffering
+of others is not a means for the attainment of the
+ends of its own will, but an end in itself. The more
+definite explanation of this phenomenon is as follows:&mdash;Since
+man is a manifestation of will illuminated by the
+clearest knowledge, he is always contrasting the actual
+and felt satisfaction of his will with the merely possible
+satisfaction of it which knowledge presents to him.
+Hence arises envy: every privation is infinitely increased
+by the enjoyment of others, and relieved by the knowledge
+that others also suffer the same privation. Those
+ills which are common to all and inseparable from human
+life trouble us little, just as those which belong to the
+<pb n='470'/><anchor id='Pg470'/>
+climate, to the whole country. The recollection of greater
+sufferings than our own stills our pain; the sight of the
+sufferings of others soothes our own. If, now, a man
+is filled with an exceptionally intense pressure of will,&mdash;if
+with burning eagerness he seeks to accumulate everything
+to slake the thirst of his egoism, and thus experiences,
+as he inevitably must, that all satisfaction is merely
+apparent, that the attained end never fulfils the promise
+of the desired object, the final appeasing of the fierce
+pressure of will, but that when fulfilled the wish only
+changes its form, and now torments him in a new one;
+and indeed that if at last all wishes are exhausted,
+the pressure of will itself remains without any conscious
+motive, and makes itself known to him with fearful
+pain as a feeling of terrible desolation and emptiness;
+if from all this, which in the case of the ordinary
+degrees of volition is only felt in a small measure, and
+only produces the ordinary degree of melancholy, in the
+case of him who is a manifestation of will reaching
+the point of extraordinary wickedness, there necessarily
+springs an excessive inward misery, an eternal unrest,
+an incurable pain; he seeks indirectly the alleviation
+which directly is denied him,&mdash;seeks to mitigate his
+own suffering by the sight of the suffering of others,
+which at the same time he recognises as an expression
+of his power. The suffering of others now becomes
+for him an end in itself, and is a spectacle in which
+he delights; and thus arises the phenomenon of pure
+cruelty, blood-thirstiness, which history exhibits so often
+in the Neros and Domitians, in the African Deis, in
+Robespierre, and the like.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The desire of revenge is closely related to wickedness.
+It recompenses evil with evil, not with reference to the
+future, which is the character of punishment, but merely
+on account of what has happened, what is past, as such,
+thus disinterestedly, not as a means, but as an end, in order
+to revel in the torment which the avenger himself has
+<pb n='471'/><anchor id='Pg471'/>
+inflicted on the offender. What distinguishes revenge
+from pure wickedness, and to some extent excuses it, is
+an appearance of justice. For if the same act, which is
+now revenge, were to be done legally, that is, according
+to a previously determined and known rule, and in a
+society which had sanctioned this rule, it would be
+punishment, and thus justice.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Besides the suffering which has been described, and
+which is inseparable from wickedness, because it springs
+from the same root, excessive vehemence of will, another
+specific pain quite different from this is connected with
+wickedness, which is felt in the case of every bad action,
+whether it be merely injustice proceeding from egoism
+or pure wickedness, and according to the length of its
+duration is called <emph>the sting of conscience</emph> or <emph>remorse</emph>. Now,
+whoever remembers and has present in his mind the
+content of the preceding portion of this Fourth Book, and
+especially the truth explained at the beginning of it, that
+life itself is always assured to the will to live, as its mere
+copy or mirror, and also the exposition of eternal justice,
+will find that the sting of conscience can have no other
+meaning than the following, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, its content, abstractly
+expressed, is what follows, in which two parts are distinguished,
+which again, however, entirely coincide, and
+must be thought as completely united.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+However closely the veil of Mâyâ may envelop the
+mind of the bad man, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, however firmly he may be
+involved in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, according to
+which he regards his person as absolutely different and
+separated by a wide gulf from all others, a knowledge to
+which he clings with all his might, as it alone suits and
+supports his egoism, so that knowledge is almost always
+corrupted by will, yet there arises in the inmost depths
+of his consciousness the secret presentiment that such
+an order of things is only phenomenal, and that their
+real constitution is quite different. He has a dim foreboding
+that, however much time and space may separate
+<pb n='472'/><anchor id='Pg472'/>
+him from other individuals and the innumerable miseries
+which they suffer, and even suffer through him, and may
+represent them as quite foreign to him, yet in themselves,
+and apart from the idea and its forms, it is the
+one will to live appearing in them all, which here failing
+to recognise itself, turns its weapons against itself, and,
+by seeking increased happiness in one of its phenomena,
+imposes the greatest suffering upon another. He dimly
+sees that he, the bad man, is himself this whole will;
+that consequently he is not only the inflicter of pain
+but also the endurer of it, from whose suffering he
+is only separated and exempted by an illusive dream,
+the form of which is space and time, which, however,
+vanishes away; that he must in reality pay for the pleasure
+with the pain, and that all suffering which he only
+knows as possible really concerns him as the will to live,
+inasmuch as the possible and actual, the near and the
+distant in time and space, are only different for the
+knowledge of the individual, only by means of the
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, not in themselves. This is
+the truth which mythically, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, adapted to the principle
+of sufficient reason, and so translated into the form of
+the phenomenal, is expressed in the transmigration of
+souls. Yet it has its purest expression, free from all
+foreign admixture, in that obscurely felt yet inconsolable
+misery called remorse. But this springs also from a
+second immediate knowledge, which is closely bound to
+the first&mdash;the knowledge of the strength with which the
+will to live asserts itself in the wicked individual, which
+extends far beyond his own individual phenomenon, to
+the absolute denial of the same will appearing in other
+individuals. Consequently the inward horror of the
+wicked man at his own deed, which he himself tries
+to conceal, contains, besides that presentment of the
+nothingness, the mere illusiveness of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign>, and of the distinction established by it
+between him and others; also the knowledge of the
+<pb n='473'/><anchor id='Pg473'/>
+vehemence of his own will, the intensity with which
+he has seized upon life and attached himself closely to
+it, even that life whose terrible side he sees before
+him in the misery of those who are oppressed by him,
+and with which he is yet so firmly united, that just on
+this account the greatest atrocity proceeds from him himself,
+as a means for the fuller assertion of his own will.
+He recognises himself as the concentrated manifestation
+of the will to live, feels to what degree he is given up to
+life, and with it also to innumerable sufferings which
+are essential to it, for it has infinite time and infinite
+space to abolish the distinction between the possible and
+the actual, and to change all the sufferings which as yet
+are merely <emph>known</emph> to him into sufferings he has <emph>experienced</emph>.
+The millions of years of constant rebirth certainly
+exist, like the whole past and future, only in
+conception; occupied time, the form of the phenomenon
+of the will, is only the present, and for the individual
+time is ever new: it seems to him always as if he had
+newly come into being. For life is inseparable from the
+will to live, and the only form of life is the present.
+Death (the repetition of the comparison must be excused)
+is like the setting of the sun, which is only apparently
+swallowed up by the night, but in reality, itself the
+source of all light, burns without intermission, brings
+new days to new worlds, is always rising and always
+setting. Beginning and end only concern the individual
+through time, the form of the phenomenon for the
+idea. Outside time lies only the will, Kant's thing-in-itself,
+and its adequate objectification, the Idea of Plato.
+Therefore suicide affords no escape; what every one in
+his inmost consciousness <emph>wills</emph>, that must he <emph>be</emph>; and what
+every one <emph>is</emph>, that he <emph>wills</emph>. Thus, besides the merely felt
+knowledge of the illusiveness and nothingness of the
+forms of the idea which separate individuals, it is the
+self-knowledge of one's own will and its degree that
+gives the sting to conscience. The course of life draws
+<pb n='474'/><anchor id='Pg474'/>
+the image of the empirical character, whose original is
+the intelligible character, and horrifies the wicked man
+by this image. He is horrified all the same whether the
+image is depicted in large characters, so that the world
+shares his horror, or in such small ones that he alone
+sees it, for it only concerns him directly. The past
+would be a matter of indifference, and could not pain the
+conscience if the character did not feel itself free from
+all time and unalterable by it, so long as it does not deny
+itself. Therefore things which are long past still weigh
+on the conscience. The prayer, <q>Lead me not into
+temptation,</q> means, <q>Let me not see what manner of
+person I am.</q> In the might with which the bad man
+asserts life, and which exhibits itself to him in the
+sufferings which he inflicts on others, he measures how
+far he is from the surrender and denial of that will, the
+only possible deliverance from the world and its miseries.
+He sees how far he belongs to it, and how firmly he is
+bound to it; the <emph>known</emph> suffering of others has no power
+to move him; he is given up to life and <emph>felt</emph> suffering.
+It remains hidden whether this will ever break and
+overcome the vehemence of his will.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This exposition of the significance and inner nature of
+the <emph>bad</emph>, which as mere feeling, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, not as distinct, abstract
+knowledge, is the content of <emph>remorse</emph>, will gain distinctness
+and completeness by the similar consideration of
+the <emph>good</emph> as a quality of human will, and finally of absolute
+resignation and holiness, which proceeds from it when
+it has attained its highest grade. For opposites always
+throw light upon each other, and the day at once reveals
+both itself and the night, as Spinoza admirably remarks.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 66. A theory of morals without proof, that is, mere
+moralising, can effect nothing, because it does not act as
+a motive. A theory of morals which does act as a
+motive can do so only by working on self-love. But
+what springs from this source has no moral worth. It
+follows from this that no genuine virtue can be produced
+<pb n='475'/><anchor id='Pg475'/>
+through moral theory or abstract knowledge in general,
+but that such virtue must spring from that intuitive
+knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others
+the same nature as in our own.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+For virtue certainly proceeds from knowledge, but not
+from the abstract knowledge that can be communicated
+through words. If it were so, virtue could be taught,
+and by here expressing in abstract language its nature
+and the knowledge which lies at its foundation, we should
+make every one who comprehends this even ethically
+better. But this is by no means the case. On the contrary,
+ethical discourses and preaching will just as little
+produce a virtuous man as all the systems of æsthetics
+from Aristotle downwards have succeeded in producing a
+poet. For the real inner nature of virtue the concept is
+unfruitful, just as it is in art, and it is only in a completely
+subordinate position that it can be of use as a
+tool in the elaboration and preserving of what has been
+ascertained and inferred by other means. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Velle non discitur.</foreign>
+Abstract dogmas are, in fact, without influence
+upon virtue, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, upon the goodness of the disposition.
+False dogmas do not disturb it; true ones will scarcely
+assist it. It would, in fact, be a bad look-out if the
+cardinal fact in the life of man, his ethical worth, that
+worth which counts for eternity, were dependent upon
+anything the attainment of which is so much a matter of
+chance as is the case with dogmas, religious doctrines,
+and philosophical theories. For morality dogmas have
+this value only: The man who has become virtuous from
+knowledge of another kind, which is presently to be considered,
+possesses in them a scheme or formula according
+to which he accounts to his own reason, for the most part
+fictitiously, for his non-egoistical action, the nature of
+which it, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, he himself, does not comprehend, and with
+which account he has accustomed it to be content.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Upon conduct, outward action, dogmas may certainly
+exercise a powerful influence, as also custom and example
+<pb n='476'/><anchor id='Pg476'/>
+(the last because the ordinary man does not trust his
+judgment, of the weakness of which he is conscious, but
+only follows his own or some one else's experience), but
+the disposition is not altered in this way.<note place='foot'>The Church would say that these
+are merely <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>opera operata</foreign>, which do
+not avail unless grace gives the faith
+which leads to the new birth. But
+of this farther on.</note> All abstract
+knowledge gives only motives; but, as was shown above,
+motives can only alter the direction of the will, not the
+will itself. All communicable knowledge, however, can
+only affect the will as a motive. Thus when dogmas lead
+it, what the man really and in general wills remains still
+the same. He has only received different thoughts as to the
+ways in which it is to be attained, and imaginary motives
+guide him just like real ones. Therefore, for example,
+it is all one, as regards his ethical worth, whether he
+gives large gifts to the poor, firmly persuaded that he will
+receive everything tenfold in a future life, or expends the
+same sum on the improvement of an estate which will
+yield interest, certainly late, but all the more surely and
+largely. And he who for the sake of orthodoxy commits
+the heretic to the flames is as much a murderer as the
+bandit who does it for gain; and indeed, as regards
+inward circumstances, so also was he who slaughtered the
+Turks in the Holy Land, if, like the burner of heretics, he
+really did so because he thought that he would thereby
+gain a place in heaven. For these are careful only for
+themselves, for their own egoism, just like the bandit,
+from whom they are only distinguished by the absurdity
+of their means. From without, as has been said, the
+will can only be reached through motives, and these only
+alter the way in which it expresses itself, never the will
+itself. <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Velle non discitur.</foreign>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In the case of good deeds, however, the doer of which
+appeals to dogmas, we must always distinguish whether
+these dogmas really are the motives which lead to the
+good deeds, or whether, as was said above, they are
+<pb n='477'/><anchor id='Pg477'/>
+merely the illusive account of them with which he seeks
+to satisfy his own reason with regard to a good deed
+which really flows from quite a different source, a deed
+which he does because he is good, though he does not
+understand how to explain it rightly, and yet wishes to
+think something with regard to it. But this distinction
+is very hard to make, because it lies in the heart of a
+man. Therefore we can scarcely ever pass a correct
+moral judgment on the action of others, and very seldom
+on our own. The deeds and conduct of an individual
+and of a nation may be very much modified through
+dogmas, example, and custom. But in themselves all
+deeds (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>opera operata</foreign>) are merely empty forms, and only
+the disposition which leads to them gives them moral
+significance. This disposition, however, may be quite the
+same when its outward manifestation is very different.
+With an equal degree of wickedness, one man may die on
+the wheel, and another in the bosom of his family. It
+may be the same grade of wickedness which expresses
+itself in one nation in the coarse characteristics of murder
+and cannibalism, and in another finely and softly in
+miniature, in court intrigues, oppressions, and delicate
+plots of every kind; the inner nature remains the same.
+It is conceivable that a perfect state, or perhaps indeed
+a complete and firmly believed doctrine of rewards and
+punishments after death, might prevent every crime;
+politically much would be gained thereby; morally,
+nothing; only the expression of the will in life would
+be restricted.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus genuine goodness of disposition, disinterested
+virtue, and pure nobility do not proceed from abstract
+knowledge. Yet they do proceed from knowledge; but
+it is a direct intuitive knowledge, which can neither
+be reasoned away, nor arrived at by reasoning, a knowledge
+which, just because it is not abstract, cannot be
+communicated, but must arise in each for himself, which
+therefore finds its real and adequate expression not in
+<pb n='478'/><anchor id='Pg478'/>
+words, but only in deeds, in conduct, in the course of the
+life of man. We who here seek the theory of virtue,
+and have therefore also to express abstractly the nature
+of the knowledge which lies at its foundation, will yet be
+unable to convey that knowledge itself in this expression.
+We can only give the concept of this knowledge, and
+thus always start from action in which alone it becomes
+visible, and refer to action as its only adequate expression.
+We can only explain and interpret action, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+express abstractly what really takes place in it.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Before we speak of the <emph>good</emph> proper, in opposition to
+the <emph>bad</emph>, which has been explained, we must touch on
+an intermediate grade, the mere negation of the bad:
+this is <emph>justice</emph>. The nature of right and wrong has been
+fully explained above; therefore we may briefly say here,
+that he who voluntarily recognises and observes those
+merely moral limits between wrong and right, even where
+this is not secured by the state or any other external
+power, thus he who, according to our explanation, never
+carries the assertion of his own will so far as to deny
+the will appearing in another individual, is <emph>just</emph>. Thus,
+in order to increase his own well-being, he will not inflict
+suffering upon others, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, he will commit no crime, he
+will respect the rights and the property of others. We
+see that for such a just man the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>
+is no longer, as in the case of the bad man, an absolute
+wall of partition. We see that he does not, like the
+bad man, merely assert his own manifestation of will and
+deny all others; that other persons are not for him mere
+masks, whose nature is quite different from his own; but
+he shows in his conduct that he also recognises his own
+nature&mdash;the will to live as a thing-in-itself, in the foreign
+manifestation which is only given to him as idea. Thus he
+finds himself again in that other manifestation, up to a
+certain point, that of doing no wrong, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, abstaining from
+injury. To this extent, therefore, he sees through the
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, the veil of Mâyâ; so far he
+<pb n='479'/><anchor id='Pg479'/>
+sets the being external to him on a level with his own&mdash;he
+does it no injury.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If we examine the inmost nature of this justice, there
+already lies in it the resolution not to go so far in
+the assertion of one's own will as to deny the manifestations
+of will of others, by compelling them to
+serve one's own. One will therefore wish to render
+to others as much as one receives from them. The
+highest degree of this justice of disposition, which is,
+however, always united with goodness proper, whose
+character is no longer merely negative, extends so far
+that a man doubts his right to inherited property, wishes
+to support his body only by his own powers, mental and
+physical, feels every service of others and every luxury a
+reproach, and finally embraces voluntary poverty. Thus
+we see how Pascal, when he became an ascetic, would no
+longer permit any services to be rendered him, although he
+had servants enough; in spite of his constant bad health
+he made his bed himself, brought his own food from
+the kitchen, &amp;c. (<q>Vie de Pascal, par sa Sœur,</q> p. 19).
+Quite in keeping with this, it is reported that many
+Hindus, even Rajas with great wealth, expend it merely
+on the maintenance of their position, their court and
+attendants, and themselves observe with the greatest
+scrupulousness the maxim that a man should eat nothing
+that he has not himself both sowed and reaped. Yet a
+certain misunderstanding lies at the bottom of this; for
+one man, just because he is rich and powerful, can render
+such signal services to the whole of human society that
+they counterbalance the wealth he has inherited, for the
+secure possession of which he is indebted to society. In
+reality that excessive justice of such Hindus is already
+more than justice; it is actual renunciation, denial of the
+will to live,&mdash;asceticism, of which we shall speak last.
+On the other hand, pure idleness and living through the
+exertions of others, in the case of inherited wealth, without
+accomplishing anything, may be regarded as morally
+<pb n='480'/><anchor id='Pg480'/>
+wrong, even if it must remain right according to positive
+laws.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We have found that voluntary justice has its inmost
+source in a certain degree of penetration of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign>, while the unjust remain entirely involved
+in this principle. This penetration may exist not only
+in the degree which is required for justice, but also in
+the higher degree which leads to benevolence and well-doing,
+to love of mankind. And this may take place
+however strong and energetic in itself the will which
+appears in such an individual may be. Knowledge can
+always counterbalance it in him, teach him to resist the
+tendency to wrong, and even produce in him every
+degree of goodness, and indeed of resignation. Thus the
+good man is by no means to be regarded as originally a
+weaker manifestation of will than the bad man, but it is
+knowledge which in him masters the blind striving of
+will. There are certainly individuals who merely seem
+to have a good disposition on account of the weakness of
+the will appearing in them, but what they are soon
+appears from the fact that they are not capable of any
+remarkable self-conquest in order to perform a just or
+good deed.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If, however, as a rare exception, we meet a man who
+possesses a considerable income, but uses very little of it
+for himself and gives all the rest to the poor, while he
+denies himself many pleasures and comforts, and we seek
+to explain the action of this man, we shall find, apart
+altogether from the dogmas through which he tries to
+make his action intelligible to his reason, that the simplest
+general expression and the essential character of his
+conduct is that <emph>he makes less distinction than is usually
+made between himself and others</emph>. This distinction is so
+great in the eyes of many that the suffering of others
+is a direct pleasure to the wicked and a welcome means
+of happiness to the unjust. The merely just man
+is content not to cause it; and, in general, most men
+<pb n='481'/><anchor id='Pg481'/>
+know and are acquainted with innumerable sufferings of
+others in their vicinity, but do not determine to mitigate
+them, because to do so would involve some self-denial on
+their part. Thus, in each of all these a strong distinction
+seems to prevail between his own ego and that of others;
+on the other hand, to the noble man we have imagined, this
+distinction is not so significant. The <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+the form of the phenomenon, no longer holds him
+so tightly in its grasp, but the suffering which he sees in
+others touches him almost as closely as his own. He therefore
+tries to strike a balance between them, denies himself
+pleasures, practises renunciation, in order to mitigate the
+sufferings of others. He sees that the distinction between
+himself and others, which to the bad man is so great a
+gulf, only belongs to a fleeting and illusive phenomenon.
+He recognises directly and without reasoning that the
+in-itself of his own manifestation is also that of others,
+the will to live, which constitutes the inner nature of
+everything and lives in all; indeed, that this applies also
+to the brutes and the whole of nature, and therefore he
+will not cause suffering even to a brute.<note place='foot'>The right of man over the life
+and powers of the brutes rests on
+the fact that, because with the
+growing clearness of consciousness
+suffering increases in like measure;
+the pain which the brute suffers
+through death or work is not so
+great as man would suffer by merely
+denying himself the flesh, or the
+powers of the brutes. Therefore
+man may carry the assertion of his
+existence to the extent of denying
+the existence of the brute, and the
+will to live as a whole endures less
+suffering in this way than if the
+opposite course were adopted. This
+at once determines the extent of the
+use man may make of the powers
+of the brutes without wrong; a
+limit, however, which is often transgressed,
+especially in the case of
+beasts of burden and dogs used in
+the chase; to which the activity
+of societies for the prevention of
+cruelty to animals is principally devoted.
+In my opinion, that right
+does not extend to vivisection, particularly
+of the higher animals. On
+the other hand, the insect does not
+suffer so much through its death as
+a man suffers from its sting. The
+Hindus do not understand this.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+He is now just as little likely to allow others to starve,
+while he himself has enough and to spare, as any one
+would be to suffer hunger one day in order to have more
+the next day than he could enjoy. For to him who does
+works of love the veil of Mâyâ has become transparent,
+<pb n='482'/><anchor id='Pg482'/>
+the illusion of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign> has left
+him. He recognises himself, his will, in every being,
+and consequently also in the sufferer. He is now
+free from the perversity with which the will to live, not
+recognising itself, here in one individual enjoys a fleeting
+and precarious pleasure, and there in another pays for it
+with suffering and starvation, and thus both inflicts and
+endures misery, not knowing that, like Thyestes, it eagerly
+devours its own flesh; and then, on the one hand,
+laments its undeserved suffering, and on the other hand
+transgresses without fear of Nemesis, always merely because,
+involved in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, thus
+generally in the kind of knowledge which is governed
+by the principle of sufficient reason, it does not recognise
+itself in the foreign phenomenon, and therefore does not
+perceive eternal justice. To be cured of this illusion
+and deception of Mâyâ, and to do works of love, are one
+and the same. But the latter is the necessary and
+inevitable symptom of that knowledge.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The opposite of the sting of conscience, the origin and
+significance of which is explained above, is the <emph>good
+conscience</emph>, the satisfaction which we experience after
+every disinterested deed. It arises from the fact that
+such a deed, as it proceeds from the direct recognition
+of our own inner being in the phenomenon of another,
+affords us also the verification of this knowledge, the
+knowledge that our true self exists not only in our
+own person, this particular manifestation, but in everything
+that lives. By this the heart feels itself enlarged,
+as by egoism it is contracted. For as the latter
+concentrates our interest upon the particular manifestation
+of our own individuality, upon which knowledge
+always presents to us the innumerable dangers
+which constantly threaten this manifestation, and anxiety
+and care becomes the key-note of our disposition;
+the knowledge that everything living is just as much our
+own inner nature, as is our own person, extends our
+<pb n='483'/><anchor id='Pg483'/>
+interest to everything living; and in this way the heart
+is enlarged. Thus through the diminished interest in
+our own self, the anxious care for the self is attacked at
+its very root and limited; hence the peace, the unbroken
+serenity, which a virtuous disposition and a good conscience
+affords, and the more distinct appearance of this
+with every good deed, for it proves to ourselves the depth
+of that disposition. The egoist feels himself surrounded
+by strange and hostile individuals, and all his hope is
+centred in his own good. The good man lives in a world
+of friendly individuals, the well-being of any of whom he
+regards as his own. Therefore, although the knowledge
+of the lot of mankind generally does not make his disposition
+a joyful one, yet the permanent knowledge of his
+own nature in all living beings, gives him a certain evenness,
+and even serenity of disposition. For the interest
+which is extended to innumerable manifestations cannot
+cause such anxiety as that which is concentrated upon
+one. The accidents which concern individuals collectively,
+equalise themselves, while those which happen to
+the particular individual constitute good or bad fortune.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus, though others have set up moral principles
+which they give out as prescriptions for virtue, and laws
+which it was necessary to follow, I, as has already been
+said, cannot do this because I have no <q>ought</q> or law to
+prescribe to the eternally free-will. Yet on the other
+hand, in the connection of my system, what to a certain
+extent corresponds and is analogous to that undertaking
+is the purely theoretical truth, of which my whole exposition
+may be regarded as merely an elaboration,
+that the will is the in-itself of every phenomenon but
+itself, as such, is free from the forms of the phenomenal,
+and consequently from multiplicity; a truth, which, with
+reference to action, I do not know how to express better
+than by the formula of the Vedas already quoted: <q>Tat
+twam asi!</q> (This thou art!) Whoever is able to say
+this to himself, with regard to every being with whom
+<pb n='484'/><anchor id='Pg484'/>
+he comes in contact, with clear knowledge and firm
+inward conviction, is certain of all virtue and blessedness,
+and is on the direct road to salvation.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But before I go further, and, as the conclusion of my
+exposition, show how love, the origin and nature of which
+we recognised as the penetration of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+leads to salvation, to the entire surrender of
+the will to live, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, of all volition, and also how another
+path, less soft but more frequented, leads men to the
+same goal, a paradoxical proposition must first be stated
+and explained; not because it is paradoxical, but because
+it is true, and is necessary to the completeness of the
+thought I have present. It is this: <q>All love (αγαπη,
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>caritas</foreign>) is sympathy.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 67. We have seen how justice proceeds from the
+penetration of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign> in a less
+degree, and how from its penetration in a higher degree
+there arises goodness of disposition proper, which shows
+itself as pure, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, disinterested love towards others.
+When now the latter becomes perfect, it places other
+individuals and their fate completely on a level with
+itself and its own fate. Further than this it cannot go,
+for there exists no reason for preferring the individuality
+of another to its own. Yet the number of other individuals
+whose whole happiness or life is in danger may
+outweigh the regard for one's own particular well-being.
+In such a case, the character that has attained to the
+highest goodness and perfect nobility will entirely sacrifice
+its own well-being, and even its life, for the well-being
+of many others. So died Codrus, and Leonidas,
+and Regulus, and Decius Mus, and Arnold von Winkelried;
+so dies every one who voluntarily and consciously
+faces certain death for his friends or his country. And
+they also stand on the same level who voluntarily submit
+to suffering and death for maintaining what conduces and
+rightly belongs to the welfare of all mankind; that is,
+for maintaining universal and important truths and
+<pb n='485'/><anchor id='Pg485'/>
+destroying great errors. So died Socrates and Giordano
+Bruno, and so many a hero of the truth suffered death
+at the stake at the hands of the priests.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now, however, I must remind the reader, with reference
+to the paradox stated above, that we found before that
+suffering is essential to life as a whole, and inseparable
+from it. And that we saw that every wish proceeds
+from a need, from a want, from suffering, and that therefore
+every satisfaction is only the removal of a pain, and
+brings no positive happiness; that the joys certainly lie
+to the wish, presenting themselves as a positive good,
+but in truth they have only a negative nature, and are
+only the end of an evil. Therefore what goodness, love,
+and nobleness do for others, is always merely an alleviation
+of their suffering, and consequently all that can
+influence them to good deeds and works of love, is
+simply the <emph>knowledge of the suffering of others</emph>, which is
+directly understood from their own suffering and placed
+on a level with it. But it follows from this that pure
+love (αγαπη, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>caritas</foreign>) is in its nature sympathy; whether
+the suffering it mitigates, to which every unsatisfied
+wish belongs, be great or small. Therefore we shall
+have no hesitation, in direct contradiction to Kant, who
+will only recognise all true goodness and all virtue to
+be such, if it has proceeded from abstract reflection, and
+indeed from the conception of duty and of the categorical
+imperative, and explains felt sympathy as weakness, and
+by no means virtue, we shall have no hesitation, I say,
+in direct contradiction to Kant, in saying: the mere
+concept is for genuine virtue just as unfruitful as it is
+for genuine art: all true and pure love is sympathy, and
+all love which is not sympathy is selfishness. Ερος is
+selfishness, αγαπη is sympathy. Combinations of the
+two frequently occur. Indeed genuine friendship is
+always a mixture of selfishness and sympathy; the
+former lies in the pleasure experienced in the presence
+of the friend, whose individuality corresponds to our
+<pb n='486'/><anchor id='Pg486'/>
+own, and this almost always constitutes the greatest
+part; sympathy shows itself in the sincere participation
+in his joy and grief, and the disinterested sacrifices made
+in respect of the latter. Thus Spinoza says: <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Benevolentia
+nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta</foreign>
+(Eth. iii. pr. 27, cor. 3, schol.) As a confirmation of our
+paradoxical proposition it may be observed that the
+tone and words of the language and caresses of pure
+love, entirely coincide with the tones of sympathy; and
+we may also remark in passing that in Italian sympathy
+and true love are denoted by the same word <foreign lang='it' rend='italic'>pietà</foreign>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+This is also the place to explain one of the most
+striking peculiarities of human nature, <emph>weeping</emph>, which,
+like laughter, belongs to those qualities which distinguish
+man from the brutes. Weeping is by no means a direct
+expression of pain, for it occurs where there is very little
+pain. In my opinion, indeed, we never weep directly
+on account of the pain we experience, but always merely
+on account of its repetition in reflection. We pass from
+the felt pain, even when it is physical, to a mere idea of
+it, and then find our own state so deserving of sympathy
+that we are firmly and sincerely convinced that if another
+were the sufferer, we would be full of sympathy, and love
+to relieve him. But now we ourselves are the object of
+our own sympathy; with the most benevolent disposition
+we are ourselves most in need of help; we feel that
+we suffer more than we could see another suffer; and in
+this very complex frame of mind, in which the directly
+felt suffering only comes to perception by a doubly
+circuitous route, imagined as the suffering of another,
+sympathised with as such, and then suddenly perceived
+again as directly our own,&mdash;in this complex frame of
+mind, I say, Nature relieves itself through that remarkable
+physical conflict. <emph>Weeping</emph> is accordingly <emph>sympathy
+with our own selves</emph>, or sympathy directed back on its
+source. It is therefore conditional upon the capacity for
+love and sympathy, and also upon imagination. Therefore
+<pb n='487'/><anchor id='Pg487'/>
+men who are either hard-hearted or unimaginative do not
+weep easily, and weeping is even always regarded as a
+sign of a certain degree of goodness of character, and
+disarms anger, because it is felt that whoever can still
+weep, must necessarily always be capable of love, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>,
+sympathy towards others, for this enters in the manner
+described into the disposition that leads to weeping. The
+description which Petrarch gives of the rising of his own
+tears, naïvely and truly expressing his feeling, entirely
+agrees with the explanation we have given&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<quote rend='display'>
+<lg>
+<l><q rend='pre'>I vo pensando: e nel pensar m' assale</q></l>
+<l><emph>Una pietà si forte di me stesso</emph>,</l>
+<l>Che mi conduce spesso,</l>
+<l><q rend='post'>Ad alto lagrimar, ch'i non soleva.</q><note place='foot'>As I wander sunk in thought,
+so strong a sympathy with myself
+comes over me that I must often
+weep aloud, which otherwise I am
+not wont to do.</note></l>
+</lg>
+</quote>
+
+<p>
+What has been said is also confirmed by the fact that
+children who have been hurt generally do not cry till
+some one commiserates them; thus not on account of
+the pain, but on account of the idea of it. When we
+are moved to tears, not through our own suffering but
+through that of another, this happens as follows. Either
+we vividly put ourselves in the place of the sufferer by
+imagination, or see in his fate the lot of humanity as a
+whole, and consequently, first of all, our own lot; and
+thus, in a very roundabout way, it is yet always about
+ourselves that we weep, sympathy with ourselves which
+we feel. This seems to be the principal reason of the
+universal, and thus natural, weeping in the case of death.
+The mourner does not weep for his loss; he would be
+ashamed of such egotistical tears, instead of which he is
+sometimes ashamed of not weeping. First of all he
+certainly weeps for the fate of the dead, but he also
+weeps when, after long, heavy, and incurable suffering,
+death was to this man a wished-for deliverance. Thus,
+principally, he is seized with sympathy for the lot of all
+<pb n='488'/><anchor id='Pg488'/>
+mankind, which is necessarily finite, so that every life,
+however aspiring, and often rich in deeds, must be extinguished
+and become nothing. But in this lot of
+mankind the mourner sees first of all his own, and this
+all the more, the more closely he is related to him who
+has died, thus most of all if it is his father. Although
+to his father his life was misery through age and sickness,
+and though his helplessness was a heavy burden
+to his son, yet that son weeps bitterly over the death of
+his father for the reason which has been given.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement. It
+is scarcely necessary to remind the
+reader that the whole ethical doctrine
+given in outline in §§ <ref target='Section_61'>61-67</ref>
+has been explained fully and in
+detail in my prize-essay on the
+foundation of morals.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 68. After this digression about the identity of pure
+love and sympathy, the final return of which upon our
+own individuality has, as its symptom, the phenomenon
+of weeping, I now take up the thread of our discussion
+of the ethical significance of action, in order to show
+how, from the same source from which all goodness,
+love, virtue, and nobility of character spring, there finally
+arises that which I call the denial of the will to live.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We saw before that hatred and wickedness are conditioned
+by egoism, and egoism rests on the entanglement
+of knowledge in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>.
+Thus we found that the penetration of that <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign> is the source and the nature of justice,
+and when it is carried further, even to its fullest extent,
+it is the source and nature of love and nobility of character.
+For this penetration alone, by abolishing the
+distinction between our own individuality and that of
+others, renders possible and explains perfect goodness of
+disposition, extending to disinterested love and the most
+generous self-sacrifice for others.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If, however, this penetration of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+this direct knowledge of the identity of will in
+all its manifestations, is present in a high degree of distinctness,
+it will at once show an influence upon the will
+<pb n='489'/><anchor id='Pg489'/>
+which extends still further. If that veil of Mâyâ, the
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, is lifted from the eyes of a
+man to such an extent that he no longer makes the egotistical
+distinction between his person and that of others,
+but takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals
+as in his own, and therefore is not only benevolent
+in the highest degree, but even ready to sacrifice his
+own individuality whenever such a sacrifice will save a
+number of other persons, then it clearly follows that such
+a man, who recognises in all beings his own inmost and
+true self, must also regard the infinite suffering of all
+suffering beings as his own, and take on himself the pain
+of the whole world. No suffering is any longer strange
+to him. All the miseries of others which he sees and is
+so seldom able to alleviate, all the miseries he knows
+directly, and even those which he only knows as possible,
+work upon his mind like his own. It is no longer the
+changing joy and sorrow of his own person that he has
+in view, as is the case with him who is still involved in
+egoism; but, since he sees through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+all lies equally near him. He knows the
+whole, comprehends its nature, and finds that it consists
+in a constant passing away, vain striving, inward conflict,
+and continual suffering. He sees wherever he looks suffering
+humanity, the suffering brute creation, and a world
+that passes away. But all this now lies as near him as
+his own person lies to the egoist. Why should he now,
+with such knowledge of the world, assert this very life
+through constant acts of will, and thereby bind himself
+ever more closely to it, press it ever more firmly to himself?
+Thus he who is still involved in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign>, in egoism, only knows particular things
+and their relation to his own person, and these constantly
+become new <emph>motives</emph> of his volition. But, on the other
+hand, that knowledge of the whole, of the nature of the
+thing-in-itself which has been described, becomes a <emph>quieter</emph>
+of all and every volition. The will now turns away
+<pb n='490'/><anchor id='Pg490'/>
+from life; it now shudders at the pleasures in which it
+recognises the assertion of life. Man now attains to the
+state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true indifference,
+and perfect will-lessness. If at times, in the hard
+experience of our own suffering, or in the vivid recognition
+of that of others, the knowledge of the vanity and
+bitterness of life draws nigh to us also who are still
+wrapt in the veil of Mâyâ, and we would like to destroy
+the sting of the desires, close the entrance against all
+suffering, and purify and sanctify ourselves by complete
+and final renunciation; yet the illusion of the phenomenon
+soon entangles us again, and its motives influence
+the will anew; we cannot tear ourselves free. The allurement
+of hope, the flattery of the present, the sweetness
+of pleasure, the well-being which falls to our lot, amid
+the lamentations of a suffering world governed by chance
+and error, draws us back to it and rivets our bonds anew.
+Therefore Jesus says: <q>It is easier for a camel to go
+through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter
+into the kingdom of God.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If we compare life to a course or path through which
+we must unceasingly run&mdash;a path of red-hot coals, with
+a few cool places here and there; then he who is entangled
+in delusion is consoled by the cool places, on
+which he now stands, or which he sees near him, and
+sets out to run through the course. But he who sees
+through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, and recognises
+the real nature of the thing-in-itself, and thus the whole,
+is no longer susceptible of such consolation; he sees himself
+in all places at once, and withdraws. His will turns
+round, no longer asserts its own nature, which is reflected
+in the phenomenon, but denies it. The phenomenon by
+which this change is marked, is the transition from virtue
+to asceticism. That is to say, it no longer suffices for
+such a man to love others as himself, and to do as much
+for them as for himself; but there arises within him a
+horror of the nature of which his own phenomenal existence
+<pb n='491'/><anchor id='Pg491'/>
+is an expression, the will to live, the kernel and
+inner nature of that world which is recognised as full of
+misery. He therefore disowns this nature which appears
+in him, and is already expressed through his body, and
+his action gives the lie to his phenomenal existence, and
+appears in open contradiction to it. Essentially nothing
+else but a manifestation of will, he ceases to will anything,
+guards against attaching his will to anything, and
+seeks to confirm in himself the greatest indifference to
+everything. His body, healthy and strong, expresses
+through the genitals, the sexual impulse; but he denies
+the will and gives the lie to the body; he desires no
+sensual gratification under any condition. Voluntary
+and complete chastity is the first step in asceticism or
+the denial of the will to live. It thereby denies the
+assertion of the will which extends beyond the individual
+life, and gives the assurance that with the life of this
+body, the will, whose manifestation it is, ceases. Nature,
+always true and naïve, declares that if this maxim became
+universal, the human race would die out; and I think I
+may assume, in accordance with what was said in the
+Second Book about the connection of all manifestations
+of will, that with its highest manifestation, the weaker
+reflection of it would also pass away, as the twilight
+vanishes along with the full light. With the entire
+abolition of knowledge, the rest of the world would of
+itself vanish into nothing; for without a subject there is
+no object. I should like here to refer to a passage in
+the Vedas, where it is said: <q>As in this world hungry
+infants press round their mother; so do all beings await
+the holy oblation.</q> (Asiatic Researches, vol. viii.; Colebrooke,
+On the Vedas, Abstract of the Sama-Veda; also
+in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays, vol. i. p. 79.)
+Sacrifice means resignation generally, and the rest of
+nature must look for its salvation to man who is at once
+the priest and the sacrifice. Indeed it deserves to be
+noticed as very remarkable, that this thought has also
+<pb n='492'/><anchor id='Pg492'/>
+been expressed by the admirable and unfathomably profound
+Angelus Silesius, in the little poem entitled, <q>Man
+brings all to God;</q> it runs, <q>Man! all loves thee;
+around thee great is the throng. All things flee to thee
+that they may attain to God.</q> But a yet greater mystic,
+Meister Eckhard, whose wonderful writings are at last accessible
+(1857) through the edition of Franz Pfeiffer, says the
+same thing (p. 459) quite in the sense explained here:
+<q>I bear witness to the saying of Christ. I, if I be lifted
+up from the earth, will draw all things unto me (John
+xii. 32). So shall the good man draw all things up to
+God, to the source whence they first came. The Masters
+certify to us that all creatures are made for the sake of
+man. This is proved in all created things, by the fact
+that the one makes the use of the other; the ox makes
+use of the grass, the fish of the water, the bird of the air,
+the wild beast of the forest. Thus, all created things
+become of use to the good man. A good man brings to
+God the one created thing in the other.</q> He means to
+say, that man makes use of the brutes in this life because,
+in and with himself, he saves them also. It also seems
+to me that that difficult passage in the Bible, Rom. viii.
+21-24, must be interpreted in this sense.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In Buddhism also, there is no lack of expressions of
+this truth. For example, when Buddha, still as Bodisatwa,
+has his horse saddled for the last time, for his
+flight into the wilderness from his father's house, he
+says these lines to the horse: <q>Long hast thou existed
+in life and in death, but now thou shalt cease from
+carrying and drawing. Bear me but this once more,
+O Kantakana, away from here, and when I have attained
+to the Law (have become Buddha) I will not forget
+thee</q> (Foe Koue Ki, trad. p. Abel Rémusat, p. 233).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Asceticism then shows itself further in voluntary and
+intentional poverty, which not only arises <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>per accidens</foreign>,
+because the possessions are given away to mitigate the
+sufferings of others, but is here an end in itself, is meant
+<pb n='493'/><anchor id='Pg493'/>
+to serve as a constant mortification of will, so that the
+satisfaction of the wishes, the sweet of life, shall not
+again arouse the will, against which self-knowledge has
+conceived a horror. He who has attained to this point, still
+always feels, as a living body, as concrete manifestation
+of will, the natural disposition for every kind of volition;
+but he intentionally suppresses it, for he compels himself
+to refrain from doing all that he would like to
+do, and to do all that he would like not to do, even
+if this has no further end than that of serving as a
+mortification of will. Since he himself denies the will
+which appears in his own person, he will not resist if
+another does the same, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, inflicts wrongs upon him.
+Therefore every suffering coming to him from without,
+through chance or the wickedness of others, is welcome
+to him, every injury, ignominy, and insult; he
+receives them gladly as the opportunity of learning
+with certainty that he no longer asserts the will, but
+gladly sides with every enemy of the manifestation of
+will which is his own person. Therefore he bears such
+ignominy and suffering with inexhaustible patience and
+meekness, returns good for evil without ostentation, and
+allows the fire of anger to rise within him just as little
+as that of the desires. And he mortifies not only the
+will itself, but also its visible form, its objectivity, the
+body. He nourishes it sparingly, lest its excessive vigour
+and prosperity should animate and excite more strongly
+the will, of which it is merely the expression and the
+mirror. So he practises fasting, and even resorts to
+chastisement and self-inflicted torture, in order that, by
+constant privation and suffering, he may more and more
+break down and destroy the will, which he recognises
+and abhors as the source of his own suffering existence
+and that of the world. If at last death comes, which
+puts an end to this manifestation of that will, whose
+existence here has long since perished through free-denial
+of itself, with the exception of the weak residue of it
+<pb n='494'/><anchor id='Pg494'/>
+which appears as the life of this body; it is most welcome,
+and is gladly received as a longed-for deliverance.
+Here it is not, as in the case of others, merely the manifestation
+which ends with death; but the inner nature
+itself is abolished, which here existed only in the manifestation,
+and that in a very weak degree;<note place='foot'>This thought is expressed by a
+beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical
+Sanscrit writing, <q>Sankhya
+Karica:</q> <q>Yet the soul remains
+a while invested with body; as the
+potter's wheel continues whirling
+after the pot has been fashioned, by
+force of the impulse previously given
+to it. When separation of the informed
+soul from its corporeal frame
+at length takes place and nature in
+respect of it ceases, then is absolute
+and final deliverance accomplished.</q>
+Colebrooke, <q>On the Philosophy of
+the Hindus: Miscellaneous Essays,</q>
+vol i. p. 271. Also in the <q>Sankhya
+Karica by Horace Wilson,</q> § 67,
+p. 184.</note> this last
+slight bond is now broken. For him who thus ends, the
+world has ended also.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+And what I have here described with feeble tongue
+and only in general terms, is no philosophical fable, invented
+by myself, and only of to-day; no, it was the
+enviable life of so many saints and beautiful souls among
+Christians, and still more among Hindus and Buddhists,
+and also among the believers of other religions. However
+different were the dogmas impressed on their reason,
+the same inward, direct, intuitive knowledge, from which
+alone all virtue and holiness proceed, expressed itself in
+precisely the same way in the conduct of life. For here
+also the great distinction between intuitive and abstract
+knowledge shows itself; a distinction which is of such
+importance and universal application in our whole investigation,
+and which has hitherto been too little attended
+to. There is a wide gulf between the two, which can
+only be crossed by the aid of philosophy, as regards the
+knowledge of the nature of the world. Intuitively or <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>in
+concreto</foreign>, every man is really conscious of all philosophical
+truths, but to bring them to abstract knowledge, to reflection,
+is the work of philosophy, which neither ought nor
+is able to do more than this.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Thus it may be that the inner nature of holiness, self-renunciation,
+mortification of our own will, asceticism, is
+<pb n='495'/><anchor id='Pg495'/>
+here for the first time expressed abstractly, and free from
+all mythical elements, as <emph>denial of the will to live</emph>, appearing
+after the complete knowledge of its own nature has
+become a quieter of all volition. On the other hand, it
+has been known directly and realised in practice by saints
+and ascetics, who had all the same inward knowledge,
+though they used very different language with regard to
+it, according to the dogmas which their reason had accepted,
+and in consequence of which an Indian, a Christian,
+or a Lama saint must each give a very different
+account of his conduct, which is, however, of no importance
+as regards the fact. A saint may be full of the
+absurdest superstition, or, on the contrary, he may be a
+philosopher, it is all the same. His conduct alone
+certifies that he is a saint, for, in a moral regard, it proceeds
+from knowledge of the world and its nature, which
+is not abstractly but intuitively and directly apprehended,
+and is only expressed by him in any dogma for the satisfaction
+of his reason. It is therefore just as little needful
+that a saint should be a philosopher as that a philosopher
+should be a saint; just as it is not necessary that a perfectly
+beautiful man should be a great sculptor, or that a
+great sculptor should himself be a beautiful man. In
+general, it is a strange demand upon a moralist that he
+should teach no other virtue than that which he himself
+possesses. To repeat the whole nature of the world
+abstractly, universally, and distinctly in concepts, and thus
+to store up, as it were, a reflected image of it in permanent
+concepts always at the command of the reason; this and
+nothing else is philosophy. I refer the reader to the
+passage quoted from Bacon in the First Book.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But the description I have given above of the denial
+of the will to live, of the conduct of a beautiful soul, of a
+resigned and voluntarily expiating saint, is merely abstract
+and general, and therefore cold. As the knowledge from
+which the denial of the will proceeds is intuitive and not
+abstract, it finds its most perfect expression, not in abstract
+<pb n='496'/><anchor id='Pg496'/>
+conceptions, but in deeds and conduct. Therefore,
+in order to understand fully what we philosophically
+express as denial of the will to live, one must come to
+know examples of it in experience and actual life.
+Certainly they are not to be met with in daily experience:
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Nam omnia præclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt</foreign>,
+Spinoza admirably says. Therefore, unless by a specially
+happy fate we are made eye-witnesses, we have to content
+ourselves with descriptions of the lives of such men.
+Indian literature, as we see from the little that we as
+yet know through translations, is very rich in descriptions
+of the lives of saints, penitents, Samanas or ascetics,
+Sannyâsis or mendicants, and whatever else they may be
+called. Even the well-known <q>Mythologie des Indous,
+par Mad. de Polier,</q> though by no means to be commended
+in every respect, contains many excellent examples
+of this kind (especially in ch. 13, vol. ii.) Among
+Christians also there is no lack of examples which afford
+us the illustrations we desire. See the biographies, for
+the most part badly written, of those persons who are
+sometimes called saintly souls, sometimes pietists, quietists,
+devout enthusiasts, and so forth. Collections of such
+biographies have been made at various times, such as
+Tersteegen's <q>Leben heiliger Seelen,</q> Reiz's <q>Geschichte
+der Wiedergeborennen,</q> in our own day, a collection by
+Kanne, which, with much that is bad, yet contains some
+good, and especially the <q>Leben der Beata Sturmin.</q> To
+this category very properly belongs the life of St. Francis
+of Assisi, that true personification of the ascetic, and prototype
+of all mendicant friars. His life, described by his
+younger contemporary, St. Bonaventura, also famous as
+a scholastic, has recently been republished. <q>Vita S.
+Francisci a S. Bonaventura concinnata</q> (Soest, 1847),
+though shortly before a painstaking and detailed biography,
+making use of all sources of information, appeared
+in France, <q>Histoire de S. François d'Assise, par Chavin
+de Mallan</q> (1845). As an Oriental parallel of these
+<pb n='497'/><anchor id='Pg497'/>
+monastic writings we have the very valuable work of
+Spence Hardy, <q>Eastern Monachism; an Account of the
+Order of Mendicants founded by Gotama Budha</q>
+(1850). It shows us the same thing in another dress.
+We also see what a matter of indifference it is whether
+it proceeds from a theistical or an atheistical religion.
+But as a special and exceedingly full example and practical
+illustration of the conceptions I have established,
+I can thoroughly recommend the <q>Autobiography of
+Madame de Guion.</q> To become acquainted with this
+great and beautiful soul, the very thought of whom
+always fills me with reverence, and to do justice to the
+excellence of her disposition while making allowance for
+the superstition of her reason, must be just as delightful
+to every man of the better sort as with vulgar thinkers,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the majority, that book will always stand in bad
+repute. For it is the case with regard to everything,
+that each man can only prize that which to a certain
+extent is analogous to him and for which he has at least
+a slight inclination. This holds good of ethical concerns
+as well as of intellectual. We might to a certain extent
+regard the well-known French biography of Spinoza as a
+case in point, if we used as a key to it that noble introduction
+to his very insufficient essay, <q>De Emendatione
+Intellectus,</q> a passage which I can also recommend
+as the most effectual means I know of stilling the storm
+of the passions. Finally, even the great Goethe, Greek as
+he is, did not think it below his dignity to show us this
+most beautiful side of humanity in the magic mirror of
+poetic art, for he represented the life of Fräulein Klettenberg
+in an idealised form in his <q>Confessions of a
+Beautiful Soul,</q> and later, in his own biography, gave
+us also an historical account of it. Besides this, he
+twice told the story of the life of St. Philippo Neri. The
+history of the world, will, and indeed must, keep silence
+about the men whose conduct is the best and only adequate
+illustration of this important point of our investigation,
+<pb n='498'/><anchor id='Pg498'/>
+for the material of the history of the world is quite
+different, and indeed opposed to this. It is not the denial
+of the will to live, but its assertion and its manifestation
+in innumerable individuals in which its conflict
+with itself at the highest grade of its objectification
+appears with perfect distinctness, and brings before our
+eyes, now the ascendancy of the individual through
+prudence, now the might of the many through their
+mass, now the might of chance personified as fate,
+always the vanity and emptiness of the whole effort.
+We, however, do not follow here the course of phenomena
+in time, but, as philosophers, we seek to investigate
+the ethical significance of action, and take this as the
+only criterion of what for us is significant and important.
+Thus we will not be withheld by any fear of the constant
+numerical superiority of vulgarity and dulness from
+acknowledging that the greatest, most important, and
+most significant phenomenon that the world can show is
+not the conqueror of the world, but the subduer of it;
+is nothing but the quiet, unobserved life of a man who
+has attained to the knowledge in consequence of which
+he surrenders and denies that will to live which fills
+everything and strives and strains in all, and which first
+gains freedom here in him alone, so that his conduct
+becomes the exact opposite of that of other men. In
+this respect, therefore, for the philosopher, these accounts
+of the lives of holy, self-denying men, badly as they are
+generally written, and mixed as they are with superstition
+and nonsense, are, because of the significance of
+the material, immeasurably more instructive and important
+than even Plutarch and Livy.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It will further assist us much in obtaining a more
+definite and full knowledge of what we have expressed
+abstractly and generally, according to our method of
+exposition, as the denial of the will to live, if we consider
+the moral teaching that has been imparted with
+this intention, and by men who were full of this spirit;
+<pb n='499'/><anchor id='Pg499'/>
+and this will also show how old our view is, though the
+pure philosophical expression of it may be quite new.
+The teaching of this kind which lies nearest to hand is
+Christianity, the ethics of which are entirely in the
+spirit indicated, and lead not only to the highest degrees
+of human love, but also to renunciation. The germ
+of this last side of it is certainly distinctly present
+in the writings of the Apostles, but it was only fully
+developed and expressed later. We find the Apostles
+enjoining the love of our neighbour as ourselves, benevolence,
+the requital of hatred with love and well-doing,
+patience, meekness, the endurance of all possible injuries
+without resistance, abstemiousness in nourishment to
+keep down lust, resistance to sensual desire, if possible,
+altogether. We already see here the first degrees of
+asceticism, or denial of the will proper. This last
+expression denotes that which in the Gospels is called
+denying ourselves and taking up the cross (Matt. xvi. 24,
+25; Mark viii. 34, 35; Luke ix. 23, 24, xiv. 26, 27,
+33). This tendency soon developed itself more and
+more, and was the origin of hermits, anchorites, and
+monasticism&mdash;an origin which in itself was pure and
+holy, but for that very reason unsuitable for the great
+majority of men; therefore what developed out of it
+could only be hypocrisy and wickedness, for <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>abusus optimi
+pessimus</foreign>. In more developed Christianity, we see that
+seed of asceticism unfold into the full flower in the
+writings of the Christian saints and mystics. These
+preach, besides the purest love, complete resignation,
+voluntary and absolute poverty, genuine calmness, perfect
+indifference to all worldly things, dying to our own will
+and being born again in God, entire forgetting of our
+own person, and sinking ourselves in the contemplation
+of God. A full exposition of this will be found in
+Fénélon's <q>Explication des Maximes des Saints sur la Vie
+Interieure.</q> But the spirit of this development of Christianity
+is certainly nowhere so fully and powerfully
+<pb n='500'/><anchor id='Pg500'/>
+expressed as in the writings of the German mystics, in
+the works of Meister Eckhard, and in that justly famous
+book <q>Die Deutsche Theologie,</q> of which Luther says
+in the introduction to it which he wrote, that with the
+exception of the Bible and St. Augustine, he had learnt
+more from it of what God, Christ, and man are than from
+any other book. Yet we only got the genuine and correct
+text of it in the year 1851, in the Stuttgart edition
+by Pfeiffer. The precepts and doctrines which are laid
+down there are the most perfect exposition, sprung from
+deep inward conviction of what I have presented as
+the denial of the will. It should therefore be studied
+more closely in that form before it is dogmatised about
+with Jewish-Protestant assurance. Tauler's <q>Nachfolgung
+des armen Leben Christi,</q> and also his <q>Medulla
+Animæ,</q> are written in the same admirable spirit, though
+not quite equal in value to that work. In my opinion
+the teaching of these genuine Christian mystics, when
+compared with the teaching of the New Testament, is as
+alcohol to wine, or what becomes visible in the New
+Testament as through a veil and mist appears to us in the
+works of the mystics without cloak or disguise, in full
+clearness and distinctness. Finally, the New Testament
+might be regarded as the first initiation, the mystics as
+the second,&mdash;σμικρα και μεγαλα μυστηρια.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We find, however, that which we have called the
+denial of the will to live more fully developed, more
+variously expressed, and more vividly represented in the
+ancient Sanscrit writings than could be the case in the
+Christian Church and the Western world. That this
+important ethical view of life could here attain to a fuller
+development and a more distinct expression is perhaps
+principally to be ascribed to the fact that it was not
+confined by an element quite foreign to it, as Christianity
+is by the Jewish theology, to which its sublime author
+had necessarily to adopt and accommodate it, partly consciously,
+partly, it may be, unconsciously. Thus Christianity
+<pb n='501'/><anchor id='Pg501'/>
+is made up of two very different constituent parts,
+and I should like to call the purely ethical part especially
+and indeed exclusively Christian, and distinguish it from
+the Jewish dogmatism with which it is combined. If,
+as has often been feared, and especially at the present
+time, that excellent and salutary religion should altogether
+decline, I should look for the reason of this simply
+in the fact that it does not consist of one single element,
+but of two originally different elements, which have only
+been combined through the accident of history. In such
+a case dissolution had to follow through the separation
+of these elements, arising from their different relationship
+to and reaction against the progressive spirit of the age.
+But even after this dissolution the purely ethical part
+must always remain uninjured, because it is indestructible.
+Our knowledge of Hindu literature is still very imperfect.
+Yet, as we find their ethical teaching variously
+and powerfully expressed in the Vedas, Puranas, poems,
+myths, legends of their saints, maxims and precepts,<note place='foot'>See, for example, <q>Oupnek'hat,
+studio Anquetil du Perron,</q> vol. ii.,
+Nos. 138, 144, 145, 146. <q>Mythologie
+des Indous,</q> par Mad. de Polier,
+vol. ii., ch. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.
+<q>Asiatisches Magazin,</q> by Klaproth:
+in the first volume, <q>Ueber
+die Fo-Religion,</q> also <q>Baghnat
+Geeta</q> or <q>Gespräche zwischen
+Krishna und Arjoon;</q> in the second
+volume, <q>Moha-Mudgava.</q> Also,
+<q>Institutes of Hindu Law, or the
+Ordinances of Manu,</q> from the
+Sanscrit, by Sir William Jones (German
+by Hüttner, 1797), especially
+the sixth and twelfth chapters. Finally,
+many passages in the <q>Asiatic
+Researches.</q> (In the last forty
+years Indian literature has grown
+so much in Europe, that if I were
+now to complete this note to the
+first edition, it would occupy several
+pages.)</note> we see
+that it inculcates love of our neighbour with complete
+renunciation of self-love; love generally, not confined
+to mankind, but including all living creatures; benevolence,
+even to the giving away of the hard-won
+wages of daily toil; unlimited patience towards all who
+injure us; the requital of all wickedness, however base,
+with goodness and love; voluntary and glad endurance
+of all ignominy; abstinence from all animal food; perfect
+chastity and renunciation of all sensual pleasure
+<pb n='502'/><anchor id='Pg502'/>
+for him who strives after true holiness; the surrender
+of all possessions, the forsaking of every dwelling-place
+and of all relatives; deep unbroken solitude, spent in
+silent contemplation, with voluntary penance and terrible
+slow self-torture for the absolute mortification of
+the will, torture which extends to voluntary death by
+starvation, or by men giving themselves up to crocodiles,
+or flinging themselves over the sacred precipice
+in the Himalayas, or being buried alive, or, finally, by
+flinging themselves under the wheels of the huge car
+of an idol drawn along amid the singing, shouting, and
+dancing of bayaderes. And even yet these precepts,
+whose origin reaches back more than four thousand
+years, are carried out in practice, in some cases even
+to the utmost extreme,<note place='foot'>At the procession of Jagganath
+in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw
+themselves under the wheels, and
+were instantly killed. (Letter of an
+East Indian proprietor in the <hi rend='italic'>Times</hi>
+of 30th December 1840.)</note> and this notwithstanding the
+fact that the Hindu nation has been broken up into
+so many parts. A religion which demands the greatest
+sacrifices, and which has yet remained so long in practice
+in a nation that embraces so many millions of
+persons, cannot be an arbitrarily invented superstition,
+but must have its foundation in the nature of man.
+But besides this, if we read the life of a Christian
+penitent or saint, and also that of a Hindu saint, we
+cannot sufficiently wonder at the harmony we find
+between them. In the case of such radically different
+dogmas, customs, and circumstances, the inward life
+and effort of both is the same. And the same harmony
+prevails in the maxims prescribed for both of them.
+For example, Tauler speaks of the absolute poverty
+which one ought to seek, and which consists in giving
+away and divesting oneself completely of everything
+from which one might draw comfort or worldly pleasure,
+clearly because all this constantly affords new nourishment
+to the will, which it is intended to destroy entirely.
+<pb n='503'/><anchor id='Pg503'/>
+And as an Indian counterpart of this, we find
+in the precepts of Fo that the Saniassi, who ought to
+be without a dwelling and entirely without property,
+is further finally enjoined not to lay himself down often
+under the same tree, lest he should acquire a preference
+or inclination for it above other trees. The Christian
+mystic and the teacher of the Vedanta philosophy agree
+in this respect also, they both regard all outward works
+and religious exercises as superfluous for him who has
+attained to perfection. So much agreement in the case
+of such different ages and nations is a practical proof
+that what is expressed here is not, as optimistic dulness
+likes to assert, an eccentricity and perversity of
+the mind, but an essential side of human nature, which
+only appears so rarely because of its excellence.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I have now indicated the sources from which there
+may be obtained a direct knowledge, drawn from life
+itself, of the phenomena in which the denial of the will to
+live exhibits itself. In some respects this is the most
+important point of our whole work; yet I have only
+explained it quite generally, for it is better to refer to
+those who speak from direct experience, than to increase
+the size of this book unduly by weak repetitions of what
+is said by them.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I only wish to add a little to the general indication of
+the nature of this state. We saw above that the wicked
+man, by the vehemence of his volition, suffers constant,
+consuming, inward pain, and finally, if all objects of volition
+are exhausted, quenches the fiery thirst of his self-will
+by the sight of the suffering of others. He, on the
+contrary, who has attained to the denial of the will to
+live, however poor, joyless, and full of privation his condition
+may appear when looked at externally, is yet filled
+with inward joy and the true peace of heaven. It is not
+the restless strain of life, the jubilant delight which has
+keen suffering as its preceding or succeeding condition,
+in the experience of the man who loves life; but it is a
+<pb n='504'/><anchor id='Pg504'/>
+peace that cannot be shaken, a deep rest and inward
+serenity, a state which we cannot behold without the
+greatest longing when it is brought before our eyes or
+our imagination, because we at once recognise it as that
+which alone is right, infinitely surpassing everything else,
+upon which our better self cries within us the great
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>sapere aude</foreign>. Then we feel that every gratification of
+our wishes won from the world is merely like the alms
+which the beggar receives from life to-day that he may
+hunger again on the morrow; resignation, on the contrary,
+is like an inherited estate, it frees the owner for
+ever from all care.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It will be remembered from the Third Book that the
+æsthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists in great measure
+in the fact that in entering the state of pure contemplation
+we are lifted for the moment above all willing,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, all wishes and cares; we become, as it were, freed
+from ourselves. We are no longer the individual whose
+knowledge is subordinated to the service of its constant
+willing, the correlative of the particular thing to which
+objects are motives, but the eternal subject of knowing
+purified from will, the correlative of the Platonic
+Idea. And we know that these moments in which,
+delivered from the ardent strain of will, we seem to rise
+out of the heavy atmosphere of earth, are the happiest
+which we experience. From this we can understand
+how blessed the life of a man must be whose will is
+silenced, not merely for a moment, as in the enjoyment
+of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed altogether extinguished,
+except as regards the last glimmering spark
+that retains the body in life, and will be extinguished
+with its death. Such a man, who, after many bitter
+struggles with his own nature, has finally conquered
+entirely, continues to exist only as a pure, knowing
+being, the undimmed mirror of the world. Nothing
+can trouble him more, nothing can move him, for he
+has cut all the thousand cords of will which hold us
+<pb n='505'/><anchor id='Pg505'/>
+bound to the world, and, as desire, fear, envy, anger,
+drag us hither and thither in constant pain. He now
+looks back smiling and at rest on the delusions of this
+world, which once were able to move and agonise his
+spirit also, but which now stand before him as utterly
+indifferent to him, as the chess-men when the game is
+ended, or as, in the morning, the cast-off masquerading
+dress which worried and disquieted us in a night in
+Carnival. Life and its forms now pass before him as a
+fleeting illusion, as a light morning dream before half-waking
+eyes, the real world already shining through it
+so that it can no longer deceive; and like this morning
+dream, they finally vanish altogether without any violent
+transition. From this we can understand the meaning
+of Madame Guion when towards the end of her autobiography
+she often expresses herself thus: <q>Everything
+is alike to me; I <emph>cannot</emph> will anything more: often I
+know not whether I exist or not.</q> In order to express
+how, after the extinction of the will, the death of the
+body (which is indeed only the manifestation of the
+will, and therefore loses all significance when the will is
+abolished) can no longer have any bitterness, but is very
+welcome, I may be allowed to quote the words of that
+holy penitent, although they are not very elegantly
+turned: <q><foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>Midi de la gloire; jour où il n'y a plus de
+nuit; vie qui ne craint plus la mort, dans la mort même:
+parceque la mort a vaincu la mort, et que celui qui a
+souffert la première mort, ne goutera plus la seconde mort</foreign></q>
+(Vie de Mad. de Guion, vol. ii. p. 13).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We must not, however, suppose that when, by means
+of the knowledge which acts as a quieter of will, the
+denial of the will to live has once appeared, it never
+wavers or vacillates, and that we can rest upon it as on an
+assured possession. Rather, it must ever anew be attained
+by a constant battle. For since the body is the will
+itself only in the form of objectivity or as manifestation in
+the world as idea, so long as the body lives, the whole
+<pb n='506'/><anchor id='Pg506'/>
+will to live exists potentially, and constantly strives to
+become actual, and to burn again with all its ardour.
+Therefore that peace and blessedness in the life of holy
+men which we have described is only found as the
+flower which proceeds from the constant victory over the
+will, and the ground in which it grows is the constant
+battle with the will to live, for no one can have lasting
+peace upon earth. We therefore see the histories of the
+inner life of saints full of spiritual conflicts, temptations,
+and absence of grace, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the kind of knowledge which
+makes all motives ineffectual, and as an universal quieter
+silences all volition, gives the deepest peace and opens
+the door of freedom. Therefore also we see those who
+have once attained to the denial of the will to live strive
+with all their might to keep upon this path, by enforced
+renunciation of every kind, by penance and severity of
+life, and by selecting whatever is disagreeable to them,
+all in order to suppress the will, which is constantly
+springing up anew. Hence, finally, because they already
+know the value of salvation, their anxious carefulness to
+retain the hard-won blessing, their scruples of conscience
+about every innocent pleasure, or about every little excitement
+of their vanity, which here also dies last, the most
+immovable, the most active, and the most foolish of all
+the inclinations of man. By the term <emph>asceticism</emph>, which
+I have used so often, I mean in its narrower sense this
+<emph>intentional</emph> breaking of the will by the refusal of what
+is agreeable and the selection of what is disagreeable, the
+voluntarily chosen life of penance and self-chastisement
+for the continual mortification of the will.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We see this practised by him who has attained to the
+denial of the will in order to enable him to persist in it;
+but suffering in general, as it is inflicted by fate, is a
+second way (δευτερος πλους<note place='foot'>On δευτερος πλους cf. Stob. Floril., vol. ii. p. 374.</note>) of attaining to that denial.
+Indeed, we may assume that most men only attain to it
+in this way, and that it is the suffering which is personally
+<pb n='507'/><anchor id='Pg507'/>
+experienced, not that which is merely known, which
+most frequently produces complete resignation, often only
+at the approach of death. For only in the case of a few
+is the mere knowledge which, seeing through the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign>, first produces perfect goodness of
+disposition and universal love of humanity, and finally
+enables them to regard all the suffering of the world as
+their own; only in the case of a few, I say, is this
+knowledge sufficient to bring about the denial of the
+will. Even with him who approaches this point, it is
+almost invariably the case that the tolerable condition of
+his own body, the flattery of the moment, the delusion
+of hope, and the satisfaction of the will, which is ever
+presenting itself anew, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, lust, is a constant hindrance
+to the denial of the will, and a constant temptation to
+the renewed assertion of it. Therefore in this respect
+all these illusions have been personified as the devil.
+Thus in most cases the will must be broken by great
+personal suffering before its self-conquest appears. Then
+we see the man who has passed through all the increasing
+degrees of affliction with the most vehement
+resistance, and is finally brought to the verge of despair,
+suddenly retire into himself, know himself and the
+world, change his whole nature, rise above himself and
+all suffering, as if purified and sanctified by it, in inviolable
+peace, blessedness, and sublimity, willingly renounce
+everything he previously desired with all his might, and
+joyfully embrace death. It is the refined silver of the
+denial of the will to live that suddenly comes forth from
+the purifying flame of suffering. It is salvation. Sometimes
+we see even those who were very wicked purified to
+this degree by great grief; they have become new beings
+and are completely changed. Therefore their former
+misdeeds trouble their consciences no more, yet they
+willingly atone for them by death, and gladly see the
+end of the manifestation of that will which is now
+foreign to them and abhorred by them. The great
+<pb n='508'/><anchor id='Pg508'/>
+Goethe has given us a distinct and visible representation
+of this denial of the will, brought about by great misfortunes
+and despair of all deliverance, in his immortal
+masterpiece <q>Faust,</q> in the story of the sufferings of
+Gretchen. I know no parallel to this in poetry. It is
+a perfect example of the second path that leads to the
+denial of the will, not, as the first, through the mere
+knowledge of the sufferings of a whole world which one
+has voluntarily acquired, but through excessive suffering
+experienced in one's own person. Many tragedies certainly
+end by conducting their strong-willed heroes to the
+point of entire resignation, and then generally the will to
+live and its manifestation end together, but no representation
+that is known to me brings what is essential to
+that change so distinctly before us, free from all that is
+extraneous, as the part of <q>Faust</q> I have referred to.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In actual life we see that those unfortunate persons
+who have to drink to the dregs the greatest cup of
+suffering, since when all hope is taken from them they
+have to face with full consciousness a shameful, violent,
+and often painful death on the scaffold, are very frequently
+changed in this way. We must not indeed assume that
+there is so great a difference between their character and
+that of most men as their fate would seem to indicate,
+but must attribute the latter for the most part to circumstances;
+yet they are guilty and to a considerable degree
+bad. We see, however, many of them, when they have
+entirely lost hope, changed in the way referred to. They
+now show actual goodness and purity of disposition, true
+abhorrence of doing any act in the least degree bad or
+unkind. They forgive their enemies, even if it is through
+them that they innocently suffer; and not with words
+merely and a sort of hypocritical fear of the judges of the
+lower world, but in reality and with inward earnestness
+and no desire for revenge. Indeed, their sufferings and
+death at last becomes dear to them, for the denial of the
+will to live has appeared; they often decline the deliverance
+<pb n='509'/><anchor id='Pg509'/>
+when it is offered, and die gladly, peacefully, and
+happily. To them the last secret of life has revealed
+itself in their excessive pain; the secret that misery and
+wickedness, sorrow and hate, the sufferer and the inflicter
+of suffering, however different they may appear to the
+knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason,
+are in themselves one, the manifestation of that one will
+to live which objectifies its conflict with itself by means
+of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>. They have learned
+to know both sides in full measure, the badness and the
+misery; and since at last they see the identity of the
+two, they reject them both at once; they deny the will to
+live. In what myths and dogmas they account to their
+reason for this intuitive and direct knowledge and for
+their own change is, as has been said, a matter of no
+importance.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Matthias Claudius must without doubt have witnessed
+a change of mind of this description when he wrote the
+remarkable essay in the <q>Wandsbecker Boten</q> (pt. i.
+p. 115) with the title <q>Bekehrungsgeschichte des ***</q>
+(<q>History of the Conversion of ***</q>), which concludes
+thus: <q>Man's way of thinking may pass from one point
+of the periphery to the opposite point, and again back to
+the former point, if circumstances mark out for him the
+path. And these changes in a man are really nothing
+great or interesting, but that <emph>remarkable, catholic, transcendental
+change</emph> in which the whole circle is irreparably
+broken up and all the laws of psychology become vain
+and empty when the coat is stripped from the shoulders,
+or at least turned outside in, and as it were scales fall
+from a man's eyes, is such that every one who has breath
+in his nostrils forsakes father and mother if he can hear
+or experience something certain about it.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The approach of death and hopelessness are in other
+respects not absolutely necessary for such a purification
+through suffering. Even without them the knowledge of
+the contradiction of the will to live with itself can, through
+<pb n='510'/><anchor id='Pg510'/>
+great misfortune and pain, force an entrance, and the vanity
+of all striving become recognised. Hence it has often
+happened that men who have led a very restless life in the
+full strain of the passions, kings, heroes, and adventurers,
+suddenly change, betake themselves to resignation and
+penance, become hermits or monks. To this class belong
+all true accounts of conversions; for example, that of
+Raymond Lully, who had long wooed a fair lady, and
+was at last admitted to her chamber, anticipating the fulfilment
+of all his wishes, when she, opening her bodice,
+showed him her bosom frightfully eaten with cancer.
+From that moment, as if he had looked into hell, he was
+changed; he forsook the court of the king of Majorca,
+and went into the desert to do penance.<note place='foot'>Bruckeri Hist. Philos., tomi iv. pars. i. p. 10.</note> This conversion
+is very like that of the Abbé Rancé, which I have briefly
+related in the 48th chapter of the Supplement. If we
+consider how in both cases the transition from the pleasure
+to the horror of life was the occasion of it, this
+throws some light upon the remarkable fact that it is
+among the French, the most cheerful, gay, sensuous, and
+frivolous nation in Europe, that by far the strictest of all
+monastic orders, the Trappists, arose, was re-established by
+Rancé after its fall, and has maintained itself to the
+present day in all its purity and strictness, in spite of
+revolutions, Church reformations, and encroachments of
+infidelity.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+But a knowledge such as that referred to above of the
+nature of this existence may leave us again along with
+the occasion of it and the will to live, and with it the
+previous character may reappear. Thus we see that the
+passionate Benvenuto Cellini was changed in this way,
+once when he was in prison, and again when very ill;
+but when the suffering passed over, he fell back again
+into his old state. In general, the denial of the will to
+live by no means proceeds from suffering with the necessity
+of an effect from its cause, but the will remains free;
+<pb n='511'/><anchor id='Pg511'/>
+for this is indeed the one point at which its freedom
+appears directly in the phenomenon; hence the astonishment
+which Asmus expresses so strongly at the <q>transcendental
+change.</q> In the case of every suffering, it is
+always possible to conceive a will which exceeds it in
+intensity and is therefore unconquered by it. Thus
+Plato speaks in the <q>Phædon</q> of men who up to the
+moment of their execution feast, drink, and indulge in
+sensuous pleasure, asserting life even to the death. Shakespeare
+shows us in Cardinal Beaufort the fearful end of
+a profligate, who dies full of despair, for no suffering or
+death can break his will, which is vehement to the extreme
+of wickedness.<note place='foot'>Henry VI., Part ii. act 3, sc. 3.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+The more intense the will is, the more glaring is the
+conflict of its manifestation, and thus the greater is the
+suffering. A world which was the manifestation of a
+far more intense will to live than this world manifests
+would produce so much the greater suffering; would
+thus be a hell.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+All suffering, since it is a mortification and a call to
+resignation, has potentially a sanctifying power. This
+is the explanation of the fact that every great misfortune
+or deep pain inspires a certain awe. But the sufferer
+only really becomes an object of reverence when, surveying
+the course of his life as a chain of sorrows, or
+mourning some great and incurable misfortune, he does
+not really look at the special combination of circumstances
+which has plunged his own life into suffering,
+nor stops at the single great misfortune that has befallen
+him; for in so doing his knowledge still follows the
+principle of sufficient reason, and clings to the particular
+phenomenon; he still wills life only not under the conditions
+which have happened to him; but only then, I
+say, he is truly worthy of reverence when he raises his
+glance from the particular to the universal, when he
+regards his suffering as merely an example of the whole,
+<pb n='512'/><anchor id='Pg512'/>
+and for him, since in a moral regard he partakes of
+genius, one case stands for a thousand, so that the whole
+of life conceived as essentially suffering brings him to
+resignation. Therefore it inspires reverence when in
+Goethe's <q>Torquato Tasso</q> the princess speaks of how
+her own life and that of her relations has always been
+sad and joyless, and yet regards the matter from an
+entirely universal point of view.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A very noble character we always imagine with a
+certain trace of quiet sadness, which is anything but a
+constant fretfulness at daily annoyances (this would be an
+ignoble trait, and lead us to fear a bad disposition), but
+is a consciousness derived from knowledge of the vanity
+of all possessions, of the suffering of all life, not merely
+of his own. But such knowledge may primarily be
+awakened by the personal experience of suffering, especially
+some one great sorrow, as a single unfulfilled wish
+brought Petrarch to that state of resigned sadness concerning
+the whole of life which appeals to us so pathetically
+in his works; for the Daphne he pursued had to flee
+from his hands in order to leave him, instead of herself,
+the immortal laurel. When through some such great and
+irrevocable denial of fate the will is to some extent broken,
+almost nothing else is desired, and the character shows
+itself mild, just, noble, and resigned. When, finally, grief
+has no definite object, but extends itself over the whole
+of life, then it is to a certain extent a going into itself,
+a withdrawal, a gradual disappearance of the will, whose
+visible manifestation, the body, it imperceptibly but surely
+undermines, so that a man feels a certain loosening of his
+bonds, a mild foretaste of that death which promises to be
+the abolition at once of the body and of the will. Therefore
+a secret pleasure accompanies this grief, and it is this,
+as I believe, which the most melancholy of all nations has
+called <q>the joy of grief.</q> But here also lies the danger
+of <emph>sentimentality</emph>, both in life itself and in the representation
+of it in poetry; when a man is always mourning and
+<pb n='513'/><anchor id='Pg513'/>
+lamenting without courageously rising to resignation. In
+this way we lose both earth and heaven, and retain merely
+a watery sentimentality. Only if suffering assumes the
+form of pure knowledge, and this, acting as a <emph>quieter of
+the will</emph>, brings about resignation, is it worthy of reverence.
+In this regard, however, we feel a certain respect at the
+sight of every great sufferer which is akin to the feeling
+excited by virtue and nobility of character, and also seems
+like a reproach of our own happy condition. We cannot
+help regarding every sorrow, both our own and those of
+others, as at least a potential advance towards virtue and
+holiness, and, on the contrary, pleasures and worldly satisfactions
+as a retrogression from them. This goes so far,
+that every man who endures a great bodily or mental
+suffering, indeed every one who merely performs some
+physical labour which demands the greatest exertion, in
+the sweat of his brow and with evident exhaustion, yet
+with patience and without murmuring, every such man,
+I say, if we consider him with close attention, appears to
+us like a sick man who tries a painful cure, and who
+willingly, and even with satisfaction, endures the suffering
+it causes him, because he knows that the more he suffers
+the more the cause of his disease is affected, and that
+therefore the present suffering is the measure of his cure.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+According to what has been said, the denial of the
+will to live, which is just what is called absolute, entire
+resignation, or holiness, always proceeds from that quieter
+of the will which the knowledge of its inner conflict
+and essential vanity, expressing themselves in the suffering
+of all living things, becomes. The difference, which
+we have represented as two paths, consists in whether
+that knowledge is called up by suffering which is merely
+and purely <emph>known</emph>, and is freely appropriated by means of
+the penetration of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, or by
+suffering which is directly <emph>felt</emph> by a man himself. True
+salvation, deliverance from life and suffering, cannot even
+be imagined without complete denial of the will. Till
+<pb n='514'/><anchor id='Pg514'/>
+then, every one is simply this will itself, whose manifestation
+is an ephemeral existence, a constantly vain and empty
+striving, and the world full of suffering we have represented,
+to which all irrevocably and in like manner belong. For
+we found above that life is always assured to the will
+to live, and its one real form is the present, from which
+they can never escape, since birth and death reign in
+the phenomenal world. The Indian mythus expresses
+this by saying <q>they are born again.</q> The great ethical
+difference of character means this, that the bad man is
+infinitely far from the attainment of the knowledge from
+which the denial of the will proceeds, and therefore he is
+in truth <emph>actually</emph> exposed to all the miseries which appear
+in life as <emph>possible</emph>; for even the present fortunate condition
+of his personality is merely a phenomenon produced by
+the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>, and a delusion of Mâyâ,
+the happy dream of a beggar. The sufferings which in
+the vehemence and ardour of his will he inflicts upon
+others are the measure of the suffering, the experience
+of which in his own person cannot break his will, and
+plainly lead it to the denial of itself. All true and pure
+love, on the other hand, and even all free justice, proceed
+from the penetration of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>,
+which, if it appears with its full power, results in perfect
+sanctification and salvation, the phenomenon of which is
+the state of resignation described above, the unbroken
+peace which accompanies it, and the greatest delight in
+death.<note place='foot'>Cf. Ch. xlviii. of the Supplement.</note>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 69. Suicide, the actual doing away with the individual
+manifestation of will, differs most widely from the
+denial of the will to live, which is the single outstanding
+act of free-will in the manifestation, and is therefore, as
+Asmus calls it, the transcendental change. This last has
+been fully considered in the course of our work. Far
+from being denial of the will, suicide is a phenomenon of
+strong assertion of will; for the essence of negation lies
+<pb n='515'/><anchor id='Pg515'/>
+in this, that the joys of life are shunned, not its sorrows.
+The suicide wills life, and is only dissatisfied with the
+conditions under which it has presented itself to him.
+He therefore by no means surrenders the will to live,
+but only life, in that he destroys the individual manifestation.
+He wills life&mdash;wills the unrestricted existence
+and assertion of the body; but the complication of circumstances
+does not allow this, and there results for him
+great suffering. The very will to live finds itself so
+much hampered in this particular manifestation that it
+cannot put forth its energies. It therefore comes to such
+a determination as is in conformity with its own nature,
+which lies outside the conditions of the principle of sufficient
+reason, and to which, therefore, all particular manifestations
+are alike indifferent, inasmuch as it itself remains
+unaffected by all appearing and passing away, and is the
+inner life of all things; for that firm inward assurance
+by reason of which we all live free from the constant
+dread of death, the assurance that a phenomenal existence
+can never be wanting to the will, supports our action
+even in the case of suicide. Thus the will to live appears
+just as much in suicide (Siva) as in the satisfaction of
+self-preservation (Vishnu) and in the sensual pleasure of
+procreation (Brahma). This is the inner meaning of the
+unity of the Trimurtis, which is embodied in its entirety
+in every human being, though in time it raises now one,
+now another, of its three heads. Suicide stands in the
+same relation to the denial of the will as the individual
+thing does to the Idea. The suicide denies only the
+individual, not the species. We have already seen that
+as life is always assured to the will to live, and as sorrow
+is inseparable from life, suicide, the wilful destruction of
+the single phenomenal existence, is a vain and foolish
+act; for the thing-in-itself remains unaffected by it, even
+as the rainbow endures however fast the drops which
+support it for the moment may change. But, more than
+this, it is also the masterpiece of Mâyâ, as the most
+<pb n='516'/><anchor id='Pg516'/>
+flagrant example of the contradiction of the will to live
+with itself. As we found this contradiction in the case
+of the lowest manifestations of will, in the permanent
+struggle of all the forces of nature, and of all organic
+individuals for matter and time and space; and as we
+saw this antagonism come ever more to the front with
+terrible distinctness in the ascending grades of the objectification
+of the will, so at last in the highest grade, the
+Idea of man, it reaches the point at which, not only the
+individuals which express the same Idea extirpate each
+other, but even the same individual declares war against
+itself. The vehemence with which it wills life, and
+revolts against what hinders it, namely, suffering, brings
+it to the point of destroying itself; so that the individual
+will, by its own act, puts an end to that body which is
+merely its particular visible expression, rather than
+permit suffering to break the will. Just because the
+suicide cannot give up willing, he gives up living. The
+will asserts itself here even in putting an end to its
+own manifestation, because it can no longer assert itself
+otherwise. As, however, it was just the suffering which
+it so shuns that was able, as mortification of the
+will, to bring it to the denial of itself, and hence to
+freedom, so in this respect the suicide is like a sick
+man, who, after a painful operation which would entirely
+cure him has been begun, will not allow it to be
+completed, but prefers to retain his disease. Suffering
+approaches and reveals itself as the possibility of the
+denial of will; but the will rejects it, in that it
+destroys the body, the manifestation of itself, in order
+that it may remain unbroken. This is the reason why
+almost all ethical teachers, whether philosophical or religious,
+condemn suicide, although they themselves can
+only give far-fetched sophistical reasons for their opinion.
+But if a human being was ever restrained from committing
+suicide by purely moral motives, the inmost meaning
+of this self-conquest (in whatever ideas his reason may
+<pb n='517'/><anchor id='Pg517'/>
+have clothed it) was this: <q>I will not shun suffering, in
+order that it may help to put an end to the will to live,
+whose manifestation is so wretched, by so strengthening
+the knowledge of the real nature of the world which
+is already beginning to dawn upon me, that it may
+become the final quieter of my will, and may free me
+for ever.</q>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is well known that from time to time cases occur
+in which the act of suicide extends to the children.
+The father first kills the children he loves, and then
+himself. Now, if we consider that conscience, religion,
+and all influencing ideas teach him to look upon murder
+as the greatest of crimes, and that, in spite of this, he
+yet commits it, in the hour of his own death, and when
+he is altogether uninfluenced by any egotistical motive,
+such a deed can only be explained in the following
+manner: in this case, the will of the individual, the
+father, recognises itself immediately in the children,
+though involved in the delusion of mistaking the appearance
+for the true nature; and as he is at the same
+time deeply impressed with the knowledge of the misery
+of all life, he now thinks to put an end to the inner
+nature itself, along with the appearance, and thus seeks
+to deliver from existence and its misery both himself
+and his children, in whom he discerns himself as living
+again. It would be an error precisely analogous to
+this to suppose that one may reach the same end as is
+attained through voluntary chastity by frustrating the
+aim of nature in fecundation; or indeed if, in consideration
+of the unendurable suffering of life, parents
+were to use means for the destruction of their new-born
+children, instead of doing everything possible to ensure
+life to that which is struggling into it. For if the will
+to live is there, as it is the only metaphysical reality,
+or the thing-in-itself, no physical force can break it,
+but can only destroy its manifestation at this place and
+time. It itself can never be transcended except through
+<pb n='518'/><anchor id='Pg518'/>
+knowledge. Thus the only way of salvation is, that
+the will shall manifest itself unrestrictedly, in order that
+in this individual manifestation it may come to apprehend
+its own nature. Only as the result of this knowledge
+can the will transcend itself, and thereby end the
+suffering which is inseparable from its manifestation.
+It is quite impossible to accomplish this end by physical
+force, as by destroying the germ, or by killing the new-born
+child, or by committing suicide. Nature guides
+the will to the light, just because it is only in the light
+that it can work out its salvation. Therefore the aims
+of Nature are to be promoted in every way as soon as
+the will to live, which is its inner being, has determined
+itself.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+There is a species of suicide which seems to be quite
+distinct from the common kind, though its occurrence
+has perhaps not yet been fully established. It is starvation,
+voluntarily chosen on the ground of extreme
+asceticism. All instances of it, however, have been
+accompanied and obscured by much religious fanaticism,
+and even superstition. Yet it seems that the absolute
+denial of will may reach the point at which the will
+shall be wanting to take the necessary nourishment for
+the support of the natural life. This kind of suicide
+is so far from being the result of the will to live, that
+such a completely resigned ascetic only ceases to live
+because he has already altogether ceased to will. No
+other death than that by starvation is in this case conceivable
+(unless it were the result of some special superstition);
+for the intention to cut short the torment would
+itself be a stage in the assertion of will. The dogmas
+which satisfy the reason of such a penitent delude him
+with the idea that a being of a higher nature has inculcated
+the fasting to which his own inner tendency drives him.
+Old examples of this may be found in the <q>Breslauer
+Sammlung von Natur- und Medicin-Geschichten,</q> September
+1799, p. 363; in Bayle's <q>Nouvelles de la République
+<pb n='519'/><anchor id='Pg519'/>
+des Lettres,</q> February 1685, p. 189; in Zimmermann,
+<q>Ueber die Einsamkeit,</q> vol. i. p. 182; in the
+<q>Histoire de l'Académie des Sciences</q> for 1764, an
+account by Houttuyn, which is quoted in the <q>Sammlung
+für praktische Aerzte,</q> vol. i. p. 69. More recent
+accounts may be found in Hufeland's <q>Journal für praktische
+Heilkunde,</q> vol. x. p. 181, and vol. xlviii. p. 95;
+also in Nasse's <q>Zeitschrift für psychische Aerzte,</q> 1819,
+part iii. p. 460; and in the <q>Edinburgh Medical and
+Surgical Journal,</q> 1809, vol. v. p. 319. In the year
+1833 all the papers announced that the English historian,
+Dr. Lingard, had died in January at Dover of
+voluntary starvation; according to later accounts, it was
+not he himself, but a relation of his who died. Still in
+these accounts the persons were generally described as
+insane, and it is no longer possible to find out how far
+this was the case. But I will give here a more recent
+case of this kind, if it were only to ensure the preservation
+of one of the rare instances of this striking and
+extraordinary phenomenon of human nature, which, to all
+appearance at any rate, belongs to the category to which I
+wish to assign it and could hardly be explained in any other
+way. This case is reported in the <q>Nürnberger Correspondenten</q>
+of the 29th July 1813, in these words:&mdash;<q>We
+hear from Bern that in a thick wood near Thurnen
+a hut has been discovered in which was lying the body of
+a man who had been dead about a month. His clothes
+gave little or no clue to his social position. Two very
+fine shirts lay beside him. The most important article,
+however, was a Bible interleaved with white paper, part
+of which had been written upon by the deceased. In this
+writing he gives the date of his departure from home (but
+does not mention where his home was). He then says
+that he was driven by the Spirit of God into the wilderness
+to pray and fast. During his journey he had fasted
+seven days and then he had again taken food. After this
+he had begun again to fast, and continued to do so for
+<pb n='520'/><anchor id='Pg520'/>
+the same number of days as before. From this point we
+find each day marked with a stroke, and of these there
+are five, at the expiration of which the pilgrim presumably
+died. There was further found a letter to a clergyman
+about a sermon which the deceased heard him preach,
+but the letter was not addressed.</q> Between this voluntary
+death arising from extreme asceticism and the common
+suicide resulting from despair there may be various intermediate
+species and combinations, though this is hard to
+find out. But human nature has depths, obscurities, and
+perplexities, the analysis and elucidation of which is a
+matter of the very greatest difficulty.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 70. It might be supposed that the entire exposition
+(now terminated) of that which I call the denial of the
+will is irreconcilable with the earlier explanation of
+necessity, which belongs just as much to motivation as to
+every other form of the principle of sufficient reason, and
+according to which, motives, like all causes, are only
+occasional causes, upon which the character unfolds its
+nature and reveals it with the necessity of a natural law,
+on account of which we absolutely denied freedom as
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ</foreign>. But far from suppressing
+this here, I would call it to mind. In truth, real
+freedom, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, independence of the principle of sufficient
+reason, belongs to the will only as a thing-in-itself, not
+to its manifestation, whose essential form is everywhere
+the principle of sufficient reason, the element or sphere
+of necessity. But the one case in which that freedom
+can become directly visible in the manifestation is that
+in which it makes an end of what manifests itself, and
+because the mere manifestation, as a link in the chain of
+causes, the living body in time, which contains only
+phenomena, still continues to exist, the will which manifests
+itself through this phenomenon then stands in contradiction
+to it, for it denies what the phenomenon
+expresses. In such a case the organs of generation, for
+example, as the visible form of the sexual impulse, are
+<pb n='521'/><anchor id='Pg521'/>
+there and in health; but yet, in the inmost consciousness,
+no sensual gratification is desired; and although the
+whole body is only the visible expression of the will to
+live, yet the motives which correspond to this will no
+longer act; indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end
+of the individual, and in this way the greatest check to
+the natural will, is welcome and desired. Now, the contradiction
+between our assertions of the necessity of the
+determination of the will by motives, in accordance with
+the character, on the one hand, and of the possibility of
+the entire suppression of the will whereby the motives
+become powerless, on the other hand, is only the repetition
+in the reflection of philosophy of this <emph>real</emph> contradiction
+which arises from the direct encroachment of
+the freedom of the will-in-itself, which knows no
+necessity, into the sphere of the necessity of its
+manifestation. But the key to the solution of these
+contradictions lies in the fact that the state in which
+the character is withdrawn from the power of motives
+does not proceed directly from the will, but from a
+changed form of knowledge. So long as the knowledge
+is merely that which is involved in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium
+individuationis</foreign> and exclusively follows the principle of
+sufficient reason, the strength of the motives is irresistible.
+But when the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign> is seen through,
+when the Ideas, and indeed the inner nature of the thing-in-itself,
+as the same will in all, are directly recognised,
+and from this knowledge an universal quieter of volition
+arises, then the particular motives become ineffective,
+because the kind of knowledge which corresponds to them
+is obscured and thrown into the background by quite
+another kind. Therefore the character can never partially
+change, but must, with the consistency of a law of
+Nature, carry out in the particular the will which it
+manifests as a whole. But this whole, the character
+itself, may be completely suppressed or abolished through
+the change of knowledge referred to above. It is this
+<pb n='522'/><anchor id='Pg522'/>
+suppression or abolition which Asmus, as quoted above,
+marvels at and denotes the <q>catholic, transcendental
+change;</q> and in the Christian Church it has very aptly
+been called the <emph>new birth</emph>, and the knowledge from which
+it springs, the <emph>work of grace</emph>. Therefore it is not a
+question of a change, but of an entire suppression of the
+character; and hence it arises that, however different
+the characters which experience the suppression may
+have been before it, after it they show a great similarity
+in their conduct, though every one still speaks very
+differently according to his conceptions and dogmas.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+In this sense, then, the old philosophical doctrine of
+the freedom of the will, which has constantly been contested
+and constantly maintained, is not without ground,
+and the dogma of the Church of the work of grace and
+the new birth is not without meaning and significance.
+But we now unexpectedly see both united in one, and
+we can also now understand in what sense the excellent
+Malebranche could say, <q><foreign lang='fr' rend='italic'>La liberté est un mystère</foreign>,</q> and
+was right. For precisely what the Christian mystics
+call <emph>the work of grace</emph> and <emph>the new birth</emph>, is for us the
+single direct expression of <emph>the freedom of the will</emph>. It
+only appears if the will, having attained to a knowledge
+of its own real nature, receives from this a <emph>quieter</emph>, by
+means of which the motives are deprived of their effect,
+which belongs to the province of another kind of knowledge,
+the objects of which are merely phenomena. The
+possibility of the freedom which thus expresses itself is
+the greatest prerogative of man, which is for ever wanting
+to the brute, because the condition of it is the deliberation
+of reason, which enables him to survey the whole of
+life independent of the impression of the present. The
+brute is entirely without the possibility of freedom, as,
+indeed, it is without the possibility of a proper or deliberate
+choice following upon a completed conflict of
+motives, which for this purpose would have to be abstract
+ideas. Therefore with the same necessity with which
+<pb n='523'/><anchor id='Pg523'/>
+the stone falls to the earth, the hungry wolf buries its
+fangs in the flesh of its prey, without the possibility of
+the knowledge that it is itself the destroyed as well as
+the destroyer. <emph>Necessity is the kingdom of nature; freedom
+is the kingdom of grace.</emph>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Now because, as we have seen, that <emph>self-suppression of
+the will</emph> proceeds from knowledge, and all knowledge is
+involuntary, that denial of will also, that entrance into
+freedom, cannot be forcibly attained to by intention or
+design, but proceeds from the inmost relation of knowing
+and volition in the man, and therefore comes suddenly,
+as if spontaneously from without. This is why the
+Church has called it <emph>the work of grace</emph>; and that it still
+regards it as independent of the acceptance of grace
+corresponds to the fact that the effect of the quieter is
+finally a free act of will. And because, in consequence
+of such a work of grace, the whole nature of man is
+changed and reversed from its foundation, so that he no
+longer wills anything of all that he previously willed so
+intensely, so that it is as if a new man actually took
+the place of the old, the Church has called this consequence
+of the work of grace the <emph>new birth</emph>. For what it
+calls the <emph>natural man</emph>, to which it denies all capacity for
+good, is just the will to live, which must be denied if
+deliverance from an existence such as ours is to be
+attained. Behind our existence lies something else,
+which is only accessible to us if we have shaken off this
+world.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Having regard, not to the individuals according to the
+principle of sufficient reason, but to the Idea of man in
+its unity, Christian theology symbolises <emph>nature</emph>, the <emph>assertion
+of the will to live</emph> in Adam, whose sin, inherited by
+us, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, our unity with him in the Idea, which is represented
+in time by the bond of procreation, makes us all
+partakers of suffering and eternal death. On the other
+hand, it symbolises <emph>grace</emph>, the <emph>denial of the will</emph>, <emph>salvation</emph>,
+in the incarnate God, who, as free from all sin, that is,
+<pb n='524'/><anchor id='Pg524'/>
+from all willing of life, cannot, like us, have proceeded
+from the most pronounced assertion of the will, nor can
+he, like us, have a body which is through and through
+simply concrete will, manifestation of the will; but born
+of a pure virgin, he has only a phantom body. This last
+is the doctrine of the Docetæ, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, certain Church Fathers,
+who in this respect are very consistent. It is especially
+taught by Apelles, against whom and his followers Tertullian
+wrote. But even Augustine comments thus on
+the passage, Rom. viii. 3, <q>God sent his Son in the likeness
+of sinful flesh:</q> <q><foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Non enim caro peccati erat, quæ
+non de carnali delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei
+similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat</foreign></q> (Liber 83,
+<hi rend='italic'>quæst. qu.</hi> 66). He also teaches in his work entitled
+<q><hi rend='italic'>Opus Imperfectum</hi>,</q> i. 47, that inherited sin is both sin
+and punishment at once. It is already present in new-born
+children, but only shows itself if they grow up. Yet
+the origin of this sin is to be referred to the will of the
+sinner. This sinner was Adam, but we all existed in
+him; Adam became miserable, and in him we have all
+become miserable. Certainly the doctrine of original sin
+(assertion of the will) and of salvation (denial of the will)
+is the great truth which constitutes the essence of Christianity,
+while most of what remains is only the clothing
+of it, the husk or accessories. Therefore Jesus Christ
+ought always to be conceived in the universal, as the
+symbol or personification of the denial of the will to live,
+but never as an individual, whether according to his
+mythical history given in the Gospels, or according to the
+probably true history which lies at the foundation of this.
+For neither the one nor the other will easily satisfy us
+entirely. It is merely the vehicle of that conception for
+the people, who always demand something actual. That
+in recent times Christianity has forgotten its true significance,
+and degenerated into dull optimism, does not concern
+us here.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+It is further an original and evangelical doctrine of
+<pb n='525'/><anchor id='Pg525'/>
+Christianity&mdash;which Augustine, with the consent of the
+leaders of the Church, defended against the platitudes of
+the Pelagians, and which it was the principal aim of
+Luther's endeavour to purify from error and re-establish,
+as he expressly declares in his book, <q><hi rend='italic'>De Servo Arbitrio</hi>,</q>&mdash;the
+doctrine that <emph>the will is not free</emph>, but originally
+subject to the inclination to evil. Therefore according to
+this doctrine the deeds of the will are always sinful and
+imperfect, and can never fully satisfy justice; and, finally,
+these works can never save us, but faith alone, a faith
+which itself does not spring from resolution and free will,
+but from the work of grace, without our co-operation,
+comes to us as from without.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Not only the dogmas referred to before, but also this
+last genuine evangelical dogma belongs to those which
+at the present day an ignorant and dull opinion rejects
+as absurd or hides. For, in spite of Augustine and
+Luther, it adheres to the vulgar Pelagianism, which the
+rationalism of the day really is, and treats as antiquated
+those deeply significant dogmas which are peculiar and
+essential to Christianity in the strictest sense; while,
+on the other hand, it holds fast and regards as the
+principal matter only the dogma that originates in
+Judaism, and has been retained from it, and is merely
+historically connected with Christianity.<note place='foot'>How truly this is the case
+may be seen from the fact that all
+the contradictions and inconceivabilities
+contained in the Christian
+dogmatics, consistently systematised
+by Augustine, which have led to the
+Pelagian insipidity which is opposed
+to them, vanish as soon as we abstract
+from the fundamental Jewish
+dogma, and recognize that man is
+not the work of another, but of his
+own will. Then all is at once clear
+and correct: then there is no need
+of freedom in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>operari</foreign>, for it lies
+in the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>esse</foreign>; and there also lies the
+sin as original sin. The work
+of grace is, however, our own. To
+the rationalistic point of view of
+the day, on the contrary, many doctrines
+of the Augustinian dogmatics,
+founded on the New Testament,
+appear quite untenable, and indeed
+revolting; for example, predestination.
+Accordingly Christianity
+proper is rejected, and a return is
+made to crude Judaism. But the
+miscalculation or the original weakness
+of Christian dogmatics lies&mdash;where
+it is never sought&mdash;precisely
+in that which is withdrawn from all
+investigation as established and certain.
+Take this away and the
+whole of dogmatics is rational; for
+this dogma destroys theology as
+it does all other sciences. If
+any one studies the Augustinian
+theology in the books <q><hi rend='italic'>De Civitate
+Dei</hi></q> (especially in the Fourteenth
+Book), he experiences something
+analogous to the feeling of one
+who tries to make a body stand
+whose centre of gravity falls outside
+it; however he may turn it
+and place it, it always tumbles over
+again. So here, in spite of all the
+efforts and sophisms of Augustine,
+the guilt and misery of the world
+always falls back on God, who
+made everything and everything
+that is in everything, and also
+knew how all things would go.
+That Augustine himself was conscious
+of the difficulty, and puzzled
+by it, I have already shown in my
+prize-essay on the Freedom of the
+Will (ch. iv. pp. 66-68 of the first
+and second editions). In the same
+way, the contradiction between the
+goodness of God and the misery of
+the world, and also between the
+freedom of the will and the foreknowledge
+of God, is the inexhaustible
+theme of a controversy
+which lasted nearly a hundred
+years between the Cartesians, Malebranche,
+Leibnitz, Bayle, Clarke,
+Arnauld, and many others. The
+only dogma which was regarded as
+fixed by all parties was the existence
+and attributes of God, and
+they all unceasingly move in a
+circle, because they seek to bring
+these things into harmony, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, to
+solve a sum that will not come
+right, but always shows a remainder
+at some new place whenever we
+have concealed it elsewhere. But
+it does not occur to any one to seek
+for the source of the difficulty in
+the fundamental assumption, although
+it palpably obtrudes itself.
+Bayle alone shows that he saw
+this.</note> We, however,
+<pb n='526'/><anchor id='Pg526'/>
+recognise in the doctrine referred to above the truth
+completely agreeing with the result of our own investigations.
+We see that true virtue and holiness of
+disposition have their origin not in deliberate choice
+(works), but in knowledge (faith); just as we have in
+like manner developed it from our leading thought.
+If it were works, which spring from motives and deliberate
+intention, that led to salvation, then, however
+one may turn it, virtue would always be a prudent,
+methodical, far-seeing egoism. But the faith to which
+the Christian Church promises salvation is this: that
+as through the fall of the first man we are all partakers
+of sin and subject to death and perdition,
+through the divine substitute, through grace and the
+taking upon himself of our fearful guilt, we are all
+saved, without any merit of our own (of the person);
+since that which can proceed from the intentional
+(determined by motives) action of the person, works,
+can never justify us, from its very nature, just because
+it is <emph>intentional</emph>, action induced by motives, <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>opus operatum</foreign>.
+Thus in this faith there is implied, first of all,
+<pb n='527'/><anchor id='Pg527'/>
+that our condition is originally and essentially an incurable
+one, from which we need <emph>salvation</emph>; then, that we
+ourselves essentially belong to evil, and are so firmly
+bound to it that our works according to law and precept,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, according to motives, can never satisfy justice nor
+save us; but salvation is only obtained through faith,
+<hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, through a changed mode of knowing, and this faith
+can only come through grace, thus as from without.
+This means that the salvation is one which is quite
+foreign to our person, and points to a denial and surrender
+of this person necessary to salvation. Works, the result
+of the law as such, can never justify, because they are
+always action following upon motives. Luther demands
+(in his book <q><hi rend='italic'>De Libertate Christiana</hi></q>) that after the
+entrance of faith the good works shall proceed from it
+entirely of themselves, as symptoms, as fruits of it; yet
+by no means as constituting in themselves a claim to
+merit, justification, or reward, but taking place quite
+voluntarily and gratuitously. So we also hold that from
+the ever-clearer penetration of the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>principium individuationis</foreign>
+proceeds, first, merely free justice, then love,
+extending to the complete abolition of egoism, and finally
+resignation or denial of the will.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+I have here introduced these dogmas of Christian
+theology, which in themselves are foreign to philosophy,
+merely for the purpose of showing that the ethical doctrine
+which proceeds from our whole investigation, and
+is in complete agreement and connection with all its
+parts, although new and unprecedented in its expression,
+is by no means so in its real nature, but fully agrees
+with the Christian dogmas properly so called, and indeed,
+as regards its essence, was contained and present in
+them. It also agrees quite as accurately with the doctrines
+and ethical teachings of the sacred books of India,
+which in their turn are presented in quite different forms.
+At the same time the calling to mind of the dogmas
+of the Christian Church serves to explain and illustrate
+<pb n='528'/><anchor id='Pg528'/>
+the apparent contradiction between the necessity of all
+expressions of character when motives are presented
+(the kingdom of Nature) on the one hand, and the freedom
+of the will in itself, to deny itself, and abolish the
+character with all the necessity of the motives based
+upon it (the kingdom of grace) on the other hand.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+§ 71. I now end the general account of ethics, and
+with it the whole development of that one thought which
+it has been my object to impart; and I by no means
+desire to conceal here an objection which concerns this
+last part of my exposition, but rather to point out that
+it lies in the nature of the question, and that it is quite
+impossible to remove it. It is this, that after our investigation
+has brought us to the point at which we have
+before our eyes perfect holiness, the denial and surrender
+of all volition, and thus the deliverance from a world
+whose whole existence we have found to be suffering, this
+appears to us as a passing away into empty nothingness.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+On this I must first remark, that the conception of
+nothing is essentially relative, and always refers to a
+definite something which it negatives. This quality has
+been attributed (by Kant) merely to the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil privativum</foreign>,
+which is indicated by - as opposed to +, which -,
+from an opposite point of view, might become +, and in
+opposition to this <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil privativum</foreign> the <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil negativum</foreign>
+has been set up, which would in every reference be
+nothing, and as an example of this the logical contradiction
+which does away with itself has been given. But
+more closely considered, no absolute nothing, no proper
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil negativum</foreign> is even thinkable; but everything of this
+kind, when considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed
+under a wider concept, is always merely a <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil
+privativum</foreign>. Every nothing is thought as such only in
+relation to something, and presupposes this relation, and
+thus also this something. Even a logical contradiction
+is only a relative nothing. It is no thought of the
+reason, but it is not on that account an absolute nothing;
+<pb n='529'/><anchor id='Pg529'/>
+for it is a combination of words; it is an example of the
+unthinkable, which is necessary in logic in order to prove
+the laws of thought. Therefore if for this end such an
+example is sought, we will stick to the nonsense as the
+positive which we are in search of, and pass over the
+sense as the negative. Thus every <foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil negativum</foreign>, if
+subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a mere
+<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>nihil privativum</foreign> or relative nothing, which can, moreover,
+always exchange signs with what it negatives, so that
+that would then be thought as negation, and it itself as
+assertion. This also agrees with the result of the difficult
+dialectical investigation of the meaning of nothing which
+Plato gives in the <q>Sophist</q> (pp. 277-287): Την του
+ἑτερου φυσιν αποδειξαντες ουσαν τε, και κατακεκερματισμενην
+επι παντα τα οντα προς αλληλα, το προς το ον
+ἑκαστου μοριου αυτης αντιτιθεμενον, ετολμησαμεν ειπειν,
+ὡς αυτο τουτο εστιν οντως το μη ον (<foreign lang='la' rend='italic'>Cum enim ostenderemus,
+alterius ipsius naturam esse perque omnia entia divisam
+atque dispersam in vicem; tunc partem ejus oppositam
+ei, quod cujusque ens est, esse ipsum revera non ens asseruimus</foreign>).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+That which is generally received as positive, which we
+call the real, and the negation of which the concept nothing
+in its most general significance expresses, is just
+the world as idea, which I have shown to be the objectivity
+and mirror of the will. Moreover, we ourselves
+are just this will and this world, and to them belongs the
+idea in general, as one aspect of them. The form of the
+idea is space and time, therefore for this point of view all
+that is real must be in some place and at some time.
+Denial, abolition, conversion of the will, is also the abolition
+and the vanishing of the world, its mirror. If we
+no longer perceive it in this mirror, we ask in vain
+where it has gone, and then, because it has no longer any
+where and when, complain that it has vanished into
+nothing.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A reversed point of view, if it were possible for us,
+<pb n='530'/><anchor id='Pg530'/>
+would reverse the signs and show the real for us as nothing,
+and that nothing as the real. But as long as we
+ourselves are the will to live, this last&mdash;nothing as the
+real&mdash;can only be known and signified by us negatively,
+because the old saying of Empedocles, that like can only
+be known by like, deprives us here of all knowledge, as,
+conversely, upon it finally rests the possibility of all our
+actual knowledge, <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the world as idea; for the world
+is the self-knowledge of the will.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+If, however, it should be absolutely insisted upon that
+in some way or other a positive knowledge should be
+attained of that which philosophy can only express negatively
+as the denial of the will, there would be nothing
+for it but to refer to that state which all those who have
+attained to complete denial of the will have experienced,
+and which has been variously denoted by the names
+ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so
+forth; a state, however, which cannot properly be called
+knowledge, because it has not the form of subject and
+object, and is, moreover, only attainable in one's own
+experience and cannot be further communicated.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+We, however, who consistently occupy the standpoint
+of philosophy, must be satisfied here with negative knowledge,
+content to have reached the utmost limit of the
+positive. We have recognised the inmost nature of the
+world as will, and all its phenomena as only the objectivity
+of will; and we have followed this objectivity from
+the unconscious working of obscure forces of Nature up to
+the completely conscious action of man. Therefore we
+shall by no means evade the consequence, that with the
+free denial, the surrender of the will, all those phenomena
+are also abolished; that constant strain and effort without
+end and without rest at all the grades of objectivity, in
+which and through which the world consists; the multifarious
+forms succeeding each other in gradation; the
+whole manifestation of the will; and, finally, also the
+universal forms of this manifestation, time and space, and
+<pb n='531'/><anchor id='Pg531'/>
+also its last fundamental form, subject and object; all are
+abolished. No will: no idea, no world.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Before us there is certainly only nothingness. But
+that which resists this passing into nothing, our nature,
+is indeed just the will to live, which we ourselves are as
+it is our world. That we abhor annihilation so greatly,
+is simply another expression of the fact that we so strenuously
+will life, and are nothing but this will, and know
+nothing besides it. But if we turn our glance from our
+own needy and embarrassed condition to those who have
+overcome the world, in whom the will, having attained to
+perfect self-knowledge, found itself again in all, and
+then freely denied itself, and who then merely wait to
+see the last trace of it vanish with the body which it
+animates; then, instead of the restless striving and effort,
+instead of the constant transition from wish to fruition,
+and from joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and
+never-dying hope which constitutes the life of the man
+who wills, we shall see that peace which is above all
+reason, that perfect calm of the spirit, that deep rest,
+that inviolable confidence and serenity, the mere reflection
+of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio
+have represented it, is an entire and certain gospel;
+only knowledge remains, the will has vanished. We look
+with deep and painful longing upon this state, beside
+which the misery and wretchedness of our own is brought
+out clearly by the contrast. Yet this is the only consideration
+which can afford us lasting consolation, when,
+on the one hand, we have recognised incurable suffering
+and endless misery as essential to the manifestation of
+will, the world; and, on the other hand, see the world
+pass away with the abolition of will, and retain before us
+only empty nothingness. Thus, in this way, by contemplation
+of the life and conduct of saints, whom it is
+certainly rarely granted us to meet with in our own experience,
+but who are brought before our eyes by their
+written history, and, with the stamp of inner truth, by
+<pb n='532'/><anchor id='Pg532'/>
+art, we must banish the dark impression of that nothingness
+which we discern behind all virtue and holiness as
+their final goal, and which we fear as children fear the
+dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, through
+myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in
+Brahma or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. Rather do we
+freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire
+abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will
+certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the
+will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which
+is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways&mdash;is nothing.<note place='foot'>This is also just the Prajna&mdash;Paramita
+of the Buddhists, the
+<q>beyond all knowledge,</q> <hi rend='italic'>i.e.</hi>, the
+point at which subject and object
+are no more. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt,
+<q>Ueber das Mahajana und Pratschna-Paramita.</q>)</note>
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+</body>
+<back rend="page-break-before: right">
+  <div id="footnotes">
+    <index index="toc" />
+    <index index="pdf" />
+    <head>Footnotes</head>
+    <divGen type="footnotes"/>
+  </div>
+  <div rend="page-break-before: right">
+    <divGen type="pgfooter" />
+  </div>
+</back>
+</text>
+</TEI.2>
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