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You may copy it, give it away or re-use + it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License <a href= + "#pglicense" class="tei tei-ref">included with this eBook</a> or + online at <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/license" class= + "tei tei-xref">http://www.gutenberg.org/license</a></p> + </div> + <pre class="pre tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> +Title: The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 1 of 3) + +Author: Arthur Schopenhauer + +Release Date: December 27, 2011 [Ebook #38427] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA (VOL. 1 OF 3)*** +</pre> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"></div> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.73em"><span style= + "font-size: 173%">The World As Will And Idea</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.20em"><span style= + "font-size: 120%">By</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.44em"><span style= + "font-size: 144%">Arthur Schopenhauer</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.20em"><span style= + "font-size: 120%">Translated From The German By</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.44em"><span style= + "font-size: 144%">R. B. Haldane, M.A.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.20em"><span style= + "font-size: 120%">And</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.44em"><span style= + "font-size: 144%">J. Kemp, M.A.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.44em"><span style= + "font-size: 144%">Vol. I.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.20em"><span style= + "font-size: 120%">Containing Four Books.</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class="tei tei-q" + style="text-align: center">“Ob nicht Natur zuletzt sich doch + ergünde?”</span>—<span class="tei tei-hi" style= + "text-align: center"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">Goethe</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.20em"><span style= + "font-size: 120%">Seventh Edition</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em">London</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em">Kegan Paul, Trench, + Trübner & Co.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em">1909</p> + </div> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Contents</span></h1> + + <ul class="tei tei-index tei-index-toc"> + <li><a href="#toc1">Translators' Preface.</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc3">Preface To The First Edition.</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc5">Preface To The Second Edition.</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc7">First Book. The World As Idea.</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc9">First Aspect. The Idea + Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Object Of + Experience And Science.</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc11">Second Book. The World As Will.</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc13">First Aspect. The + Objectification Of The Will.</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc15">Third Book. The World As Idea.</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc17">Second Aspect. The + Idea Independent Of The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The + Platonic Idea: The Object Of Art.</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc19">Fourth Book. The World As Will.</a></li> + + <li style="margin-left: 2em"><a href="#toc21">Second Aspect. The + Assertion And Denial Of The Will To Live, When Self-Consciousness + Has Been Attained.</a></li> + + <li><a href="#toc23">Footnotes</a></li> + </ul> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-body" style= + "margin-bottom: 6.00em; margin-top: 6.00em"> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagev">[pg v]</span><a name="Pgv" id="Pgv" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc1" id="toc1"></a> <a name="pdf2" id="pdf2"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Translators' Preface.</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The style of + <span class="tei tei-q">“Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung”</span> + is sometimes loose and involved, as is so often the case in German + philosophical treatises. The translation of the book has consequently + been a matter of no little difficulty. It was found that extensive + alteration of the long and occasionally involved sentences, however + likely to prove conducive to a satisfactory English style, tended not + only to obliterate the form of the original but even to imperil the + meaning. Where a choice has had to be made, the alternative of a + somewhat slavish adherence to Schopenhauer's <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ipsissima verba</span></span> has accordingly + been preferred to that of inaccuracy. The result is a piece of work + which leaves much to be desired, but which has yet consistently + sought to reproduce faithfully the spirit as well as the letter of + the original.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As regards the + rendering of the technical terms about which there has been so much + controversy, the equivalents used have only been adopted after + careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge. + For example, <span class="tei tei-q">“Vorstellung”</span> has been + rendered by <span class="tei tei-q">“idea,”</span> in preference to + <span class="tei tei-q">“representation,”</span> which is neither + accurate, intelligible, nor elegant. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Idee,”</span> is translated by the <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagevi">[pg vi]</span><a name="Pgvi" id="Pgvi" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> same word, but spelled with a + capital,—<span class="tei tei-q">“Idea.”</span> Again, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Anschauung”</span> has been rendered according to the + context, either by <span class="tei tei-q">“perception”</span> + simply, or by <span class="tei tei-q">“intuition or + perception.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Notwithstanding + statements to the contrary in the text, the book is probably quite + intelligible in itself, apart from the treatise <span class= + "tei tei-q">“On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient + Reason.”</span> It has, however, been considered desirable to add an + abstract of the latter work in an appendix to the third volume of + this translation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">R. B. H.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">J. K.</p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagevii">[pg vii]</span><a name= + "Pgvii" id="Pgvii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc3" id="toc3"></a> <a name="pdf4" id="pdf4"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Preface To The First + Edition.</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I propose to point + out here how this book must be read in order to be thoroughly + understood. By means of it I only intend to impart a single thought. + Yet, notwithstanding all my endeavours, I could find no shorter way + of imparting it than this whole book. I hold this thought to be that + which has very long been sought for under the name of philosophy, and + the discovery of which is therefore regarded by those who are + familiar with history as quite as impossible as the discovery of the + philosopher's stone, although it was already said by Pliny: + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint + facta, judicantur?</span></span> (Hist. nat. 7, 1.)</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">According as we + consider the different aspects of this one thought which I am about + to impart, it exhibits itself as that which we call metaphysics, that + which we call ethics, and that which we call æsthetics; and certainly + it must be all this if it is what I have already acknowledged I take + it to be.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">system of + thought</span></em> must always have an architectonic connection or + coherence, that is, a connection in which one part always supports + the other, though the latter does not support the former, in which + ultimately the foundation supports all the rest without being + supported by it, and the apex is supported without supporting. On the + other hand, a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">single thought</span></em>, however + comprehensive <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pageviii">[pg + viii]</span><a name="Pgviii" id="Pgviii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + it may be, must preserve the most perfect unity. If it admits of + being broken up into parts to facilitate its communication, the + connection of these parts must yet be organic, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, it + must be a connection in which every part supports the whole just as + much as it is supported by it, a connection in which there is no + first and no last, in which the whole thought gains distinctness + through every part, and even the smallest part cannot be completely + understood unless the whole has already been grasped. A book, + however, must always have a first and a last line, and in this + respect will always remain very unlike an organism, however like one + its content may be: thus form and matter are here in + contradiction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is self-evident + that under these circumstances no other advice can be given as to how + one may enter into the thought explained in this work than <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">to read the book + twice</span></em>, and the first time with great patience, a patience + which is only to be derived from the belief, voluntarily accorded, + that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end + presupposes the beginning, and that all the earlier parts presuppose + the later almost as much as the later presuppose the earlier. I say + <span class="tei tei-q">“almost;”</span> for this is by no means + absolutely the case, and I have honestly and conscientiously done all + that was possible to give priority to that which stands least in need + of explanation from what follows, as indeed generally to everything + that can help to make the thought as easy to comprehend and as + distinct as possible. This might indeed to a certain extent be + achieved if it were not that the reader, as is very natural, thinks, + as he reads, not merely of what is actually said, but also of its + possible consequences, and thus besides the many contradictions + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pageix">[pg ix]</span><a name="Pgix" id= + "Pgix" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> actually given of the opinions of + the time, and presumably of the reader, there may be added as many + more which are anticipated and imaginary. That, then, which is really + only misunderstanding, must take the form of active disapproval, and + it is all the more difficult to recognise that it is + misunderstanding, because although the laboriously-attained clearness + of the explanation and distinctness of the expression never leaves + the immediate sense of what is said doubtful, it cannot at the same + time express its relations to all that remains to be said. Therefore, + as we have said, the first perusal demands patience, founded on + confidence that on a second perusal much, or all, will appear in an + entirely different light. Further, the earnest endeavour to be more + completely and even more easily comprehended in the case of a very + difficult subject, must justify occasional repetition. Indeed the + structure of the whole, which is organic, not a mere chain, makes it + necessary sometimes to touch on the same point twice. Moreover this + construction, and the very close connection of all the parts, has not + left open to me the division into chapters and paragraphs which I + should otherwise have regarded as very important, but has obliged me + to rest satisfied with four principal divisions, as it were four + aspects of one thought. In each of these four books it is especially + important to guard against losing sight, in the details which must + necessarily be discussed, of the principal thought to which they + belong, and the progress of the whole exposition. I have thus + expressed the first, and like those which follow, unavoidable demand + upon the reader, who holds the philosopher in small favour just + because he himself is a philosopher.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The second demand + is this, that the introduction be <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagex">[pg x]</span><a name="Pgx" id="Pgx" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> read before the book itself, although it is not + contained in the book, but appeared five years earlier under the + title, <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom + zureichenden Grunde: eine philosophische + Abhandlung</span></span>”</span> (On the fourfold root of the + principle of sufficient reason: a philosophical essay). Without an + acquaintance with this introduction and propadeutic it is absolutely + impossible to understand the present work properly, and the content + of that essay will always be presupposed in this work just as if it + were given with it. Besides, even if it had not preceded this book by + several years, it would not properly have been placed before it as an + introduction, but would have been incorporated in the first book. As + it is, the first book does not contain what was said in the earlier + essay, and it therefore exhibits a certain incompleteness on account + of these deficiencies, which must always be supplied by reference to + it. However, my disinclination was so great either to quote myself or + laboriously to state again in other words what I had already said + once in an adequate manner, that I preferred this course, + notwithstanding the fact that I might now be able to give the content + of that essay a somewhat better expression, chiefly by freeing it + from several conceptions which resulted from the excessive influence + which the Kantian philosophy had over me at the time, such + as—categories, outer and inner sense, and the like. But even there + these conceptions only occur because as yet I had never really + entered deeply into them, therefore only by the way and quite out of + connection with the principal matter. The correction of such passages + in that essay will consequently take place of its own accord in the + mind of the reader through his acquaintance with the present work. + But only if we have fully recognised <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexi">[pg xi]</span><a name="Pgxi" id="Pgxi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> by means of that essay what the principle of + sufficient reason is and signifies, what its validity extends to, and + what it does not extend to, and that that principle is not before all + things, and the whole world merely in consequence of it, and in + conformity to it, a corollary, as it were, of it; but rather that it + is merely the form in which the object, of whatever kind it may be, + which is always conditioned by the subject, is invariably known so + far as the subject is a knowing individual: only then will it be + possible to enter into the method of philosophy which is here + attempted for the first time, and which is completely different from + all previous methods.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the same + disinclination to repeat myself word for word, or to say the same + thing a second time in other and worse words, after I have deprived + myself of the better, has occasioned another defect in the first book + of this work. For I have omitted all that is said in the first + chapter of my essay <span class="tei tei-q">“On Sight and + Colour,”</span> which would otherwise have found its place here, word + for word. Therefore the knowledge of this short, earlier work is also + presupposed.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Finally, the third + demand I have to make on the reader might indeed be tacitly assumed, + for it is nothing but an acquaintance with the most important + phenomenon that has appeared in philosophy for two thousand years, + and that lies so near us: I mean the principal writings of Kant. It + seems to me, in fact, as indeed has already been said by others, that + the effect these writings produce in the mind to which they truly + speak is very like that of the operation for cataract on a blind man: + and if we wish to pursue the simile further, the aim of my own work + may be described by saying that I have sought to put into the hands + of those upon whom that operation <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexii">[pg xii]</span><a name="Pgxii" id="Pgxii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> has been successfully performed a pair of + spectacles suitable to eyes that have recovered their + sight—spectacles of whose use that operation is the absolutely + necessary condition. Starting then, as I do to a large extent, from + what has been accomplished by the great Kant, I have yet been + enabled, just on account of my earnest study of his writings, to + discover important errors in them. These I have been obliged to + separate from the rest and prove to be false, in order that I might + be able to presuppose and apply what is true and excellent in his + doctrine, pure and freed from error. But not to interrupt and + complicate my own exposition by a constant polemic against Kant, I + have relegated this to a special appendix. It follows then, from what + has been said, that my work presupposes a knowledge of this appendix + just as much as it presupposes a knowledge of the philosophy of Kant; + and in this respect it would therefore be advisable to read the + appendix first, all the more as its content is specially related to + the first book of the present work. On the other hand, it could not + be avoided, from the nature of the case, that here and there the + appendix also should refer to the text of the work; and the only + result of this is, that the appendix, as well as the principal part + of the work, must be read twice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The philosophy of + Kant, then, is the only philosophy with which a thorough acquaintance + is directly presupposed in what we have to say here. But if, besides + this, the reader has lingered in the school of the divine Plato, he + will be so much the better prepared to hear me, and susceptible to + what I say. And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of + the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us + through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexiii">[pg xiii]</span><a name= + "Pgxiii" id="Pgxiii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> this still young + century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the + influence of the Sanscrit literature will penetrate not less deeply + than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: + if, I say, the reader has also already received and assimilated the + sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best of all prepared to + hear what I have to say to him. My work will not speak to him, as to + many others, in a strange and even hostile tongue; for, if it does + not sound too vain, I might express the opinion that each one of the + individual and disconnected aphorisms which make up the Upanishads + may be deduced as a consequence from the thought I am going to + impart, though the converse, that my thought is to be found in the + Upanishads, is by no means the case.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But most readers + have already grown angry with impatience, and burst into reproaches + with difficulty kept back so long. How can I venture to present a + book to the public under conditions and demands the first two of + which are presumptuous and altogether immodest, and this at a time + when there is such a general wealth of special ideas, that in Germany + alone they are made common property through the press, in three + thousand valuable, original, and absolutely indispensable works every + year, besides innumerable periodicals, and even daily papers; at a + time when especially there is not the least deficiency of entirely + original and profound philosophers, but in Germany alone there are + more of them alive at the same time, than several centuries could + formerly boast of in succession to each other? How is one ever to + come to the end, asks the indignant reader, if one must set to work + upon a book in such a fashion?</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexiv">[pg xiv]</span><a name="Pgxiv" id="Pgxiv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As I have + absolutely nothing to advance against these reproaches, I only hope + for some small thanks from such readers for having warned them in + time, so that they may not lose an hour over a book which it would be + useless to read without complying with the demands that have been + made, and which should therefore be left alone, particularly as apart + from this we might wager a great deal that it can say nothing to + them, but rather that it will always be only <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pancorum hominum</span></span>, and must + therefore quietly and modestly wait for the few whose unusual mode of + thought may find it enjoyable. For apart from the difficulties and + the effort which it requires from the reader, what cultured man of + this age, whose knowledge has almost reached the august point at + which the paradoxical and the false are all one to it, could bear to + meet thoughts almost on every page that directly contradict that + which he has yet himself established once for all as true and + undeniable? And then, how disagreeably disappointed will many a one + be if he finds no mention here of what he believes it is precisely + here he ought to look for, because his method of speculation agrees + with that of a great living philosopher,<a id="noteref_1" name= + "noteref_1" href="#note_1"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">1</span></span></a> who has + certainly written pathetic books, and who only has the trifling + weakness that he takes all he learned and approved before his + fifteenth year for inborn ideas of the human mind. Who could stand + all this? Therefore my advice is simply to lay down the book.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But I fear I shall + not escape even thus. The reader who has got as far as the preface + and been stopped by it, has bought the book for cash, and asks how he + is to be indemnified. My last refuge is now to remind him that he + knows how to make use of a book in several <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagexv">[pg xv]</span><a name="Pgxv" id="Pgxv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> ways, without exactly reading it. It may fill a + gap in his library as well as many another, where, neatly bound, it + will certainly look well. Or he can lay it on the toilet-table or the + tea-table of some learned lady friend. Or, finally, what certainly is + best of all, and I specially advise it, he can review it.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And now that I + have allowed myself the jest to which in this two-sided life hardly + any page can be too serious to grant a place, I part with the book + with deep seriousness, in the sure hope that sooner or later it will + reach those to whom alone it can be addressed; and for the rest, + patiently resigned that the same fate should, in full measure, befall + it, that in all ages has, to some extent, befallen all knowledge, and + especially the weightiest knowledge of the truth, to which only a + brief triumph is allotted between the two long periods in which it is + condemned as paradoxical or disparaged as trivial. The former fate is + also wont to befall its author. But life is short, and truth works + far and lives long: let us speak the truth.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Written at Dresden in + August 1818.</span></span></p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexvii">[pg xvii]</span><a name= + "Pgxvii" id="Pgxvii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc5" id="toc5"></a> <a name="pdf6" id="pdf6"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Preface To The Second + Edition.</span></h1> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Not to my + contemporaries, not to my compatriots—to mankind I commit my now + completed work in the confidence that it will not be without value + for them, even if this should be late recognised, as is commonly the + lot of what is good. For it cannot have been for the passing + generation, engrossed with the delusion of the moment, that my mind, + almost against my will, has uninterruptedly stuck to its work through + the course of a long life. And while the lapse of time has not been + able to make me doubt the worth of my work, neither has the lack of + sympathy; for I constantly saw the false and the bad, and finally the + absurd and senseless,<a id="noteref_2" name="noteref_2" href= + "#note_2"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">2</span></span></a> stand in + universal admiration and honour, and I bethought myself that if it + were not the case those who are capable of recognising the genuine + and right are so rare that we may look for them in vain for some + twenty years, then those who are capable of producing it could not be + so few that their works afterwards form an exception to the + perishableness of earthly things; and thus would be lost the reviving + prospect of posterity which every one who sets before himself a high + aim requires to strengthen him.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whoever seriously + takes up and pursues an object that does not lead to material + advantages, must not count on <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexviii">[pg xviii]</span><a name="Pgxviii" id="Pgxviii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the sympathy of his contemporaries. For the + most part he will see, however, that in the meantime the superficial + aspect of that object becomes current in the world, and enjoys its + day; and this is as it should be. The object itself must be pursued + for its own sake, otherwise it cannot be attained; for any design or + intention is always dangerous to insight. Accordingly, as the whole + history of literature proves, everything of real value required a + long time to gain acceptance, especially if it belonged to the class + of instructive, not entertaining, works; and meanwhile the false + flourished. For to combine the object with its superficial appearance + is difficult, when it is not impossible. Indeed that is just the + curse of this world of want and need, that everything must serve and + slave for these; and therefore it is not so constituted that any + noble and sublime effort, like the endeavour after light and truth, + can prosper unhindered and exist for its own sake. But even if such + an endeavour has once succeeded in asserting itself, and the + conception of it has thus been introduced, material interests and + personal aims will immediately take possession of it, in order to + make it their tool or their mask. Accordingly, when Kant brought + philosophy again into repute, it had soon to become the tool of + political aims from above, and personal aims from below; although, + strictly speaking, not philosophy itself, but its ghost, that passes + for it. This should not really astonish us; for the incredibly large + majority of men are by nature quite incapable of any but material + aims, indeed they can conceive no others. Thus the pursuit of truth + alone is far too lofty and eccentric an endeavour for us to expect + all or many, or indeed even a few, faithfully to take part in. If yet + we see, as for example at present in Germany, a <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagexix">[pg xix]</span><a name="Pgxix" id="Pgxix" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> remarkable activity, a general moving, + writing, and talking with reference to philosophical subjects, we may + confidently assume that, in spite of solemn looks and assurances, + only real, not ideal aims, are the actual <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">primum mobile</span></span>, the concealed + motive of such a movement; that it is personal, official, + ecclesiastical, political, in short, material ends that are really + kept in view, and consequently that mere party ends set the pens of + so many pretended philosophers in such rapid motion. Thus some design + or intention, not the desire of insight, is the guiding star of these + disturbers of the peace, and truth is certainly the last thing that + is thought of in the matter. It finds no partisans; rather, it may + pursue its way as silently and unheeded through such a philosophical + riot as through the winter night of the darkest century bound in the + rigid faith of the church, when it was communicated only to a few + alchemists as esoteric learning, or entrusted it may be only to the + parchment. Indeed I might say that no time can be more unfavourable + to philosophy than that in which it is shamefully misused, on the one + hand to further political objects, on the other as a means of + livelihood. Or is it believed that somehow, with such effort and such + a turmoil, the truth, at which it by no means aims, will also be + brought to light? Truth is no prostitute, that throws herself away + upon those who do not desire her; she is rather so coy a beauty that + he who sacrifices everything to her cannot even then be sure of her + favour.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If Governments + make philosophy a means of furthering political ends, learned men see + in philosophical professorships a trade that nourishes the outer man + just like any other; therefore they crowd after them in the assurance + of their good intentions, that is, the purpose of subserving + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexx">[pg xx]</span><a name="Pgxx" id= + "Pgxx" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> these ends. And they keep their + word: not truth, not clearness, not Plato, not Aristotle, but the + ends they were appointed to serve are their guiding star, and become + at once the criterion of what is true, valuable, and to be respected, + and of the opposites of these. Whatever, therefore, does not answer + these ends, even if it were the most important and extraordinary + things in their department, is either condemned, or, when this seems + hazardous, suppressed by being unanimously ignored. Look only at + their zeal against pantheism; will any simpleton believe that it + proceeds from conviction? And, in general, how is it possible that + philosophy, degraded to the position of a means of making one's + bread, can fail to degenerate into sophistry? Just because this is + infallibly the case, and the rule, <span class="tei tei-q">“I sing + the song of him whose bread I eat,”</span> has always held good, the + making of money by philosophy was regarded by the ancients as the + characteristic of the sophists. But we have still to add this, that + since throughout this world nothing is to be expected, can be + demanded, or is to be had for gold but mediocrity, we must be + contented with it here also. Consequently we see in all the German + universities the cherished mediocrity striving to produce the + philosophy which as yet is not there to produce, at its own expense + and indeed in accordance with a predetermined standard and aim, a + spectacle at which it would be almost cruel to mock.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">While thus + philosophy has long been obliged to serve entirely as a means to + public ends on the one side and private ends on the other, I have + pursued the course of my thought, undisturbed by them, for more than + thirty years, and simply because I was obliged to do so and could not + help myself, from an instinctive impulse, which <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagexxi">[pg xxi]</span><a name="Pgxxi" id="Pgxxi" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> was, however, supported by the confidence + that anything true one may have thought, and anything obscure one may + have thrown light upon, will appeal to any thinking mind, no matter + when it comprehends it, and will rejoice and comfort it. To such an + one we speak as those who are like us have spoken to us, and have so + become our comfort in the wilderness of this life. Meanwhile the + object is pursued on its own account and for its own sake. Now it + happens curiously enough with philosophical meditations, that + precisely that which one has thought out and investigated for + oneself, is afterwards of benefit to others; not that, however, which + was originally intended for others. The former is confessedly nearest + in character to perfect honesty; for a man does not seek to deceive + himself, nor does he offer himself empty husks; so that all + sophistication and all mere talk is omitted, and consequently every + sentence that is written at once repays the trouble of reading it. + Thus my writings bear the stamp of honesty and openness so distinctly + on the face of them, that by this alone they are a glaring contrast + to those of three celebrated sophists of the post-Kantian period. I + am always to be found at the standpoint of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reflection</span></em>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + rational deliberation and honest statement, never at that of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inspiration</span></em>, called intellectual + intuition, or absolute thought; though, if it received its proper + name, it would be called empty bombast and charlatanism. Working then + in this spirit, and always seeing the false and bad in universal + acceptance, yea, bombast<a id="noteref_3" name="noteref_3" href= + "#note_3"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">3</span></span></a> and + charlatanism<a id="noteref_4" name="noteref_4" href= + "#note_4"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">4</span></span></a> in the + highest honour, I have long renounced the approbation of my + contemporaries. It is impossible that an age which for twenty years + has applauded a Hegel, that intellectual Caliban, as the <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="pagexxii">[pg xxii]</span><a name="Pgxxii" id= + "Pgxxii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> greatest of the philosophers, so + loudly that it echoes through the whole of Europe, could make him who + has looked on at that desirous of its approbation. It has no more + crowns of honour to bestow; its applause is prostituted, and its + censure has no significance. That I mean what I say is attested by + the fact that if I had in any way sought the approbation of my + contemporaries, I would have had to strike out a score of passages + which entirely contradict all their opinions, and indeed must in part + be offensive to them. But I would count it a crime to sacrifice a + single syllable to that approbation. My guiding star has, in all + seriousness, been truth. Following it, I could first aspire only to + my own approbation, entirely averted from an age deeply degraded as + regards all higher intellectual efforts, and a national literature + demoralised even to the exceptions, a literature in which the art of + combining lofty words with paltry significance has reached its + height. I can certainly never escape from the errors and weaknesses + which, in my case as in every one else's, necessarily belong to my + nature; but I will not increase them by unworthy accommodations.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As regards this + second edition, first of all I am glad to say that after five and + twenty years I find nothing to retract; so that my fundamental + convictions have only been confirmed, as far as concerns myself at + least. The alterations in the first volume therefore, which contains + the whole text of the first edition, nowhere touch what is essential. + Sometimes they concern things of merely secondary importance, and + more often consist of very short explanatory additions inserted here + and there. Only the criticism of the Kantian philosophy has received + important corrections and large additions, for these could not be put + into a supplementary book, such as <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexxiii">[pg xxiii]</span><a name="Pgxxiii" id="Pgxxiii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> those which are given in the second volume, and + which correspond to each of the four books that contain the + exposition of my own doctrine. In the case of the latter, I have + chosen this form of enlarging and improving them, because the five + and twenty years that have passed since they were composed have + produced so marked a change in my method of exposition and in my + style, that it would not have done to combine the content of the + second volume with that of the first, as both must have suffered by + the fusion. I therefore give both works separately, and in the + earlier exposition, even in many places where I would now express + myself quite differently, I have changed nothing, because I desired + to guard against spoiling the work of my earlier years through the + carping criticism of age. What in this regard might need correction + will correct itself in the mind of the reader with the help of the + second volume. Both volumes have, in the full sense of the word, a + supplementary relation to each other, so far as this rests on the + fact that one age of human life is, intellectually, the supplement of + another. It will therefore be found, not only that each volume + contains what the other lacks, but that the merits of the one consist + peculiarly in that which is wanting in the other. Thus, if the first + half of my work surpasses the second in what can only be supplied by + the fire of youth and the energy of first conceptions, the second + will surpass the first by the ripeness and complete elaboration of + the thought which can only belong to the fruit of the labour of a + long life. For when I had the strength originally to grasp the + fundamental thought of my system, to follow it at once into its four + branches, to return from them to the unity of their origin, and then + to explain the whole distinctly, I could not yet be in a position to + work out all <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxiv">[pg + xxiv]</span><a name="Pgxxiv" id="Pgxxiv" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the branches of the system with the fulness, thoroughness, and + elaborateness which is only reached by the meditation of many + years—meditation which is required to test and illustrate the system + by innumerable facts, to support it by the most different kinds of + proof, to throw light on it from all sides, and then to place the + different points of view boldly in contrast, to separate thoroughly + the multifarious materials, and present them in a well-arranged + whole. Therefore, although it would, no doubt, have been more + agreeable to the reader to have my whole work in one piece, instead + of consisting, as it now does, of two halves, which must be combined + in using them, he must reflect that this would have demanded that I + should accomplish at one period of life what it is only possible to + accomplish in two, for I would have had to possess the qualities at + one period of life that nature has divided between two quite + different ones. Hence the necessity of presenting my work in two + halves supplementary to each other may be compared to the necessity + in consequence of which a chromatic object-glass, which cannot be + made out of one piece, is produced by joining together a convex lens + of flint glass and a concave lens of crown glass, the combined effect + of which is what was sought. Yet, on the other hand, the reader will + find some compensation for the inconvenience of using two volumes at + once, in the variety and the relief which is afforded by the handling + of the same subject, by the same mind, in the same spirit, but in + very different years. However, it is very advisable that those who + are not yet acquainted with my philosophy should first of all read + the first volume without using the supplementary books, and should + make use of these only on a second perusal; otherwise it would be too + difficult for them to grasp the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexxv">[pg xxv]</span><a name="Pgxxv" id="Pgxxv" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> system in its connection. For it is only thus + explained in the first volume, while the second is devoted to a more + detailed investigation and a complete development of the individual + doctrines. Even those who should not make up their minds to a second + reading of the first volume had better not read the second volume + till after the first, and then for itself, in the ordinary sequence + of its chapters, which, at any rate, stand in some kind of + connection, though a somewhat looser one, the gaps of which they will + fully supply by the recollection of the first volume, if they have + thoroughly comprehended it. Besides, they will find everywhere the + reference to the corresponding passages of the first volume, the + paragraphs of which I have numbered in the second edition for this + purpose, though in the first edition they were only divided by + lines.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have already + explained in the preface to the first edition, that my philosophy is + founded on that of Kant, and therefore presupposes a thorough + knowledge of it. I repeat this here. For Kant's teaching produces in + the mind of every one who has comprehended it a fundamental change + which is so great that it may be regarded as an intellectual + new-birth. It alone is able really to remove the inborn realism which + proceeds from the original character of the intellect, which neither + Berkeley nor Malebranche succeed in doing, for they remain too much + in the universal, while Kant goes into the particular, and indeed in + a way that is quite unexampled both before and after him, and which + has quite a peculiar, and, we might say, immediate effect upon the + mind in consequence of which it undergoes a complete undeception, and + forthwith looks at all things in another light. Only in this way can + any one become susceptible to the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexxvi">[pg xxvi]</span><a name="Pgxxvi" id="Pgxxvi" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> more positive expositions which I have to give. + On the other hand, he who has not mastered the Kantian philosophy, + whatever else he may have studied, is, as it were, in a state of + innocence; that is to say, he remains in the grasp of that natural + and childish realism in which we are all born, and which fits us for + everything possible, with the single exception of philosophy. Such a + man then stands to the man who knows the Kantian philosophy as a + minor to a man of full age. That this truth should nowadays sound + paradoxical, which would not have been the case in the first thirty + years after the appearance of the Critique of Reason, is due to the + fact that a generation has grown up that does not know Kant properly, + because it has never heard more of him than a hasty, impatient + lecture, or an account at second-hand; and this again is due to the + fact that in consequence of bad guidance, this generation has wasted + its time with the philosophemes of vulgar, uncalled men, or even of + bombastic sophists, which are unwarrantably commended to it. Hence + the confusion of fundamental conceptions, and in general the + unspeakable crudeness and awkwardness that appears from under the + covering of affectation and pretentiousness in the philosophical + attempts of the generation thus brought up. But whoever thinks he can + learn Kant's philosophy from the exposition of others makes a + terrible mistake. Nay, rather I must earnestly warn against such + accounts, especially the more recent ones; and indeed in the years + just past I have met with expositions of the Kantian philosophy in + the writings of the Hegelians which actually reach the incredible. + How should the minds that in the freshness of youth have been + strained and ruined by the nonsense of Hegelism, be still capable of + following Kant's profound <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxvii">[pg + xxvii]</span><a name="Pgxxvii" id="Pgxxvii" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> investigations? They are early accustomed to + take the hollowest jingle of words for philosophical thoughts, the + most miserable sophisms for acuteness, and silly conceits for + dialectic, and their minds are disorganised through the admission of + mad combinations of words to which the mind torments and exhausts + itself in vain to attach some thought. No Critique of Reason can + avail them, no philosophy, they need a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">medicina mentis</span></span>, first as a sort + of purgative, <span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "fr"><span style="font-style: italic">un petit cours de + senscommunologie</span></span>, and then one must further see + whether, in their case, there can even be any talk of philosophy. The + Kantian doctrine then will be sought for in vain anywhere else but in + Kant's own works; but these are throughout instructive, even where he + errs, even where he fails. In consequence of his originality, it + holds good of him in the highest degree, as indeed of all true + philosophers, that one can only come to know them from their own + works, not from the accounts of others. For the thoughts of any + extraordinary intellect cannot stand being filtered through the + vulgar mind. Born behind the broad, high, finely-arched brow, from + under which shine beaming eyes, they lose all power and life, and + appear no longer like themselves, when removed to the narrow lodging + and low roofing of the confined, contracted, thick-walled skull from + which dull glances steal directed to personal ends. Indeed we may say + that minds of this kind act like an uneven glass, in which everything + is twisted and distorted, loses the regularity of its beauty, and + becomes a caricature. Only from their authors themselves can we + receive philosophical thoughts; therefore whoever feels himself drawn + to philosophy must himself seek out its immortal teachers in the + still sanctuary of their works. The principal chapters of any one of + these true philosophers will afford <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "pagexxviii">[pg xxviii]</span><a name="Pgxxviii" id="Pgxxviii" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> a thousand times more insight into their + doctrines than the heavy and distorted accounts of them that everyday + men produce, who are still for the most part deeply entangled in the + fashionable philosophy of the time, or in the sentiments of their own + minds. But it is astonishing how decidedly the public seizes by + preference on these expositions at second-hand. It seems really as if + elective affinities were at work here, by virtue of which the common + nature is drawn to its like, and therefore will rather hear what a + great man has said from one of its own kind. Perhaps this rests on + the same principle as that of mutual instruction, according to which + children learn best from children.</p> + + <div class="tei tei-tb"> + <hr style="width: 50%" /> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">One word more for + the professors of philosophy. I have always been compelled to admire + not merely the sagacity, the true and fine tact with which, + immediately on its appearance, they recognised my philosophy as + something altogether different from and indeed dangerous to their own + attempts, or, in popular language, something that would not suit + their turn; but also the sure and astute policy by virtue of which + they at once discovered the proper procedure with regard to it, the + complete harmony with which they applied it, and the persistency with + which they have remained faithful to it. This procedure, which + further commended itself by the great ease of carrying it out, + consists, as is well known, in altogether ignoring and thus in + secreting—according to Goethe's malicious phrase, which just means + the appropriating of what is of weight and significance. The + efficiency of this quiet means is increased by the Corybantic shouts + with which those who are at one reciprocally greet the birth of their + own spiritual children—shouts which compel <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagexxix">[pg xxix]</span><a name="Pgxxix" id="Pgxxix" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the public to look and note the air of + importance with which they congratulate themselves on the event. Who + can mistake the object of such proceedings? Is there then nothing to + oppose to the maxim, <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">primum vivere, deinde + philosophari</span></span>? These gentlemen desire to live, and + indeed to live by philosophy. To philosophy they are assigned with + their wives and children, and in spite of Petrarch's <span class= + "tei tei-foreign"><span style="font-style: italic">povera e nuda vai + filosofia</span></span>, they have staked everything upon it. Now my + philosophy is by no means so constituted that any one can live by it. + It lacks the first indispensable requisite of a well-paid + professional philosophy, a speculative theology, which—in spite of + the troublesome Kant with his Critique of Reason—should and must, it + is supposed, be the chief theme of all philosophy, even if it thus + takes on itself the task of talking straight on of that of which it + can know absolutely nothing. Indeed my philosophy does not permit to + the professors the fiction they have so cunningly devised, and which + has become so indispensable to them, of a reason that knows, + perceives, or apprehends immediately and absolutely. This is a + doctrine which it is only necessary to impose upon the reader at + starting, in order to pass in the most comfortable manner in the + world, as it were in a chariot and four, into that region beyond the + possibility of all experience, which Kant has wholly and for ever + shut out from our knowledge, and in which are found immediately + revealed and most beautifully arranged the fundamental dogmas of + modern, Judaising, optimistic Christianity. Now what in the world has + my subtle philosophy, deficient as it is in these essential + requisites, with no intentional aim, and unable to afford a means of + subsistence, whose pole star is truth alone <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="pagexxx">[pg xxx]</span><a name="Pgxxx" id="Pgxxx" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the naked, unrewarded, unbefriended, often + persecuted truth, and which steers straight for it without looking to + the right hand or the left,—what, I say, has this to do with that + <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style="font-style: italic">alma + mater</span></span>, the good, well-to-do university philosophy + which, burdened with a hundred aims and a thousand motives, comes on + its course cautiously tacking, while it keeps before its eyes at all + times the fear of the Lord, the will of the ministry, the laws of the + established church, the wishes of the publisher, the attendance of + the students, the goodwill of colleagues, the course of current + politics, the momentary tendency of the public, and Heaven knows what + besides? Or what has my quiet, earnest search for truth in common + with the noisy scholastic disputations of the chair and the benches, + the inmost motives of which are always personal aims. The two kinds + of philosophy are, indeed, radically different. Thus it is that with + me there is no compromise and no fellowship, that no one reaps any + benefit from my works but the man who seeks the truth alone, and + therefore none of the philosophical parties of the day; for they all + follow their own aims, while I have only insight into truth to offer, + which suits none of these aims, because it is not modelled after any + of them. If my philosophy is to become susceptible of professorial + exposition, the times must entirely change. What a pretty thing it + would be if a philosophy by which nobody could live were to gain for + itself light and air, not to speak of the general ear! This must be + guarded against, and all must oppose it as one man. But it is not + just such an easy game to controvert and refute; and, moreover, these + are mistaken means to employ, because they just direct the attention + of the public to the matter, and its taste for the lucubrations + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxi">[pg xxxi]</span><a name= + "Pgxxxi" id="Pgxxxi" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of the professors of + philosophy might be destroyed by the perusal of my writings. For + whoever has tasted of earnest will not relish jest, especially when + it is tiresome. Therefore the silent system, so unanimously adopted, + is the only right one, and I can only advise them to stick to it and + go on with it as long as it will answer, that is, until to ignore is + taken to imply ignorance; then there will just be time to turn back. + Meanwhile it remains open to every one to pluck out a small feather + here and there for his own use, for the superfluity of thoughts at + home should not be very oppressive. Thus the ignoring and silent + system may hold out a good while, at least the span of time I may + have yet to live, whereby much is already won. And if, in the + meantime, here and there an indiscreet voice has let itself be heard, + it is soon drowned by the loud talking of the professors, who, with + important airs, know how to entertain the public with very different + things. I advise, however, that the unanimity of procedure should be + somewhat more strictly observed, and especially that the young men + should be looked after, for they are sometimes so fearfully + indiscreet. For even so I cannot guarantee that the commended + procedure will last for ever, and cannot answer for the final issue. + It is a nice question as to the steering of the public, which, on the + whole, is good and tractable. Although we nearly at all times see the + Gorgiases and the Hippiases uppermost, although the absurd, as a + rule, predominates, and it seems impossible that the voice of the + individual can ever penetrate through the chorus of the befooling and + the befooled, there yet remains to the genuine works of every age a + quite peculiar, silent, slow, and powerful influence; and, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="pagexxxii">[pg xxxii]</span><a name= + "Pgxxxii" id="Pgxxxii" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> as if by a + miracle, we see them rise at last out of the turmoil like a balloon + that floats up out of the thick atmosphere of this globe into purer + regions, where, having once arrived, it remains at rest, and no one + can draw it down again.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Written at + Frankfort-on-the-Maine in February 1844.</span></span></p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page001">[pg 001]</span><a name= + "Pg001" id="Pg001" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc7" id="toc7"></a> <a name="pdf8" id="pdf8"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">First Book. The World As + Idea.</span></h1> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc9" id="toc9"></a> <a name="pdf10" id="pdf10"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated + To The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Object Of Experience And + Science.</span></h2> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Sors de l'enfance, ami réveille + toi!</span> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">—</span><span class="tei tei-hi" + style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Jean Jacques + Rousseau.</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page003">[pg 003]</span><a name= + "Pg003" id="Pg003" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 1. + <span class="tei tei-q">“The world is my idea:”</span>—this is a + truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though + man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. + If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It + then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a + sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that + feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as + idea, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, only in relation to + something else, the consciousness, which is himself. If any truth + can be asserted <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, it is + this: for it is the expression of the most general form of all + possible and thinkable experience: a form which is more general + than time, or space, or causality, for they all presuppose it; and + each of these, which we have seen to be just so many modes of the + principle of sufficient reason, is valid only for a particular + class of ideas; whereas the antithesis of object and subject is the + common form of all these classes, is that form under which alone + any idea of whatever kind it may be, abstract or intuitive, pure or + empirical, is possible and thinkable. No truth therefore is more + certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof + than this, that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore this + whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a + perceiver, in a word, idea. This is obviously true of the past and + the future, as well as of the present, of what is farthest off, as + of what is near; for it is true of time and space themselves, in + which alone these distinctions arise. All that in any way + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page004">[pg 004]</span><a name= + "Pg004" id="Pg004" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> belongs or can + belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the + subject, and exists only for the subject. The world is idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This truth is by + no means new. It was implicitly involved in the sceptical + reflections from which Descartes started. Berkeley, however, was + the first who distinctly enunciated it, and by this he has rendered + a permanent service to philosophy, even though the rest of his + teaching should not endure. Kant's primary mistake was the neglect + of this principle, as is shown in the appendix. How early again + this truth was recognised by the wise men of India, appearing + indeed as the fundamental tenet of the Vedânta philosophy ascribed + to Vyasa, is pointed out by Sir William Jones in the last of his + essays: <span class="tei tei-q">“On the philosophy of the + Asiatics”</span> (Asiatic Researches, vol. iv. p. 164), where he + says, <span class="tei tei-q">“The fundamental tenet of the Vedanta + school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is, + of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which + would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and + in contending that it has no essence independent of mental + perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible + terms.”</span> These words adequately express the compatibility of + empirical reality and transcendental ideality.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In this first + book, then, we consider the world only from this side, only so far + as it is idea. The inward reluctance with which any one accepts the + world as merely his idea, warns him that this view of it, however + true it may be, is nevertheless one-sided, adopted in consequence + of some arbitrary abstraction. And yet it is a conception from + which he can never free himself. The defectiveness of this view + will be corrected in the next book by means of a truth which is not + so immediately certain as that from which we start here; a truth at + which we can arrive only by deeper research and more severe + abstraction, by the separation of what is different and the union + of what is identical. This <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page005">[pg 005]</span><a name="Pg005" id="Pg005" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> truth, which must be very serious and + impressive if not awful to every one, is that a man can also say + and must say, <span class="tei tei-q">“the world is my + will.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In this book, + however, we must consider separately that aspect of the world from + which we start, its aspect as knowable, and therefore, in the + meantime, we must, without reserve, regard all presented objects, + even our own bodies (as we shall presently show more fully), merely + as ideas, and call them merely ideas. By so doing we always + abstract from will (as we hope to make clear to every one further + on), which by itself constitutes the other aspect of the world. For + as the world is in one aspect entirely <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + so in another it is entirely <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>. A reality which is neither + of these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in + itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the + phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ignis fatuus</span></span> in philosophy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 2. That which + knows all things and is known by none is the subject. Thus it is + the supporter of the world, that condition of all phenomena, of all + objects which is always pre-supposed throughout experience; for all + that exists, exists only for the subject. Every one finds himself + to be subject, yet only in so far as he knows, not in so far as he + is an object of knowledge. But his body is object, and therefore + from this point of view we call it idea. For the body is an object + among objects, and is conditioned by the laws of objects, although + it is an immediate object. Like all objects of perception, it lies + within the universal forms of knowledge, time and space, which are + the conditions of multiplicity. The subject, on the contrary, which + is always the knower, never the known, does not come under these + forms, but is presupposed by them; it has therefore neither + multiplicity nor its opposite unity. We never know it, but it is + always the knower wherever there is knowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">So then the + world as idea, the only aspect in which <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page006">[pg 006]</span><a name="Pg006" id="Pg006" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> we consider it at present, has two + fundamental, necessary, and inseparable halves. The one half is the + object, the forms of which are space and time, and through these + multiplicity. The other half is the subject, which is not in space + and time, for it is present, entire and undivided, in every + percipient being. So that any one percipient being, with the + object, constitutes the whole world as idea just as fully as the + existing millions could do; but if this one were to disappear, then + the whole world as idea would cease to be. These halves are + therefore inseparable even for thought, for each of the two has + meaning and existence only through and for the other, each appears + with the other and vanishes with it. They limit each other + immediately; where the object begins the subject ends. The + universality of this limitation is shown by the fact that the + essential and hence universal forms of all objects, space, time, + and causality, may, without knowledge of the object, be discovered + and fully known from a consideration of the subject, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + in Kantian language, they lie <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> in our consciousness. That he discovered this + is one of Kant's principal merits, and it is a great one. I however + go beyond this, and maintain that the principle of sufficient + reason is the general expression for all these forms of the object + of which we are <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> + conscious; and that therefore all that we know purely <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, is merely the content + of that principle and what follows from it; in it all our certain + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> knowledge is expressed. + In my essay on the principle of sufficient reason I have shown in + detail how every possible object comes under it; that is, stands in + a necessary relation to other objects, on the one side as + determined, on the other side as determining: this is of such wide + application, that the whole existence of all objects, so far as + they are objects, ideas and nothing more, may be entirely traced to + this their necessary relation to each other, rests only in it, is + in fact merely relative; but of this more presently. I have further + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page007">[pg 007]</span><a name= + "Pg007" id="Pg007" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> shown, that the + necessary relation which the principle of sufficient reason + expresses generally, appears in other forms corresponding to the + classes into which objects are divided, according to their + possibility; and again that by these forms the proper division of + the classes is tested. I take it for granted that what I said in + this earlier essay is known and present to the reader, for if it + had not been already said it would necessarily find its place + here.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 3. The chief + distinction among our ideas is that between ideas of perception and + abstract ideas. The latter form just one class of ideas, namely + concepts, and these are the possession of man alone of all + creatures upon earth. The capacity for these, which distinguishes + him from all the lower animals, has always been called + reason.<a id="noteref_5" name="noteref_5" href= + "#note_5"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">5</span></span></a> We + shall consider these abstract ideas by themselves later, but, in + the first place, we shall speak exclusively of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideas of + perception</span></em>. These comprehend the whole visible world, + or the sum total of experience, with the conditions of its + possibility. We have already observed that it is a highly important + discovery of Kant's, that these very conditions, these forms of the + visible world, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the absolutely universal + element in its perception, the common property of all its + phenomena, space and time, even when taken by themselves and apart + from their content, can, not only be thought in the abstract, but + also be directly perceived; and that this perception or intuition + is not some kind of phantasm arising from constant recurrence in + experience, but is so entirely independent of experience that we + must rather regard the latter as dependent on it, inasmuch as the + qualities of space and time, as they are known in <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> perception or + intuition, are valid for all possible experience, as rules to which + it must invariably conform. Accordingly, in my <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page008">[pg 008]</span><a name="Pg008" id="Pg008" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> essay on the principle of sufficient + reason, I have treated space and time, because they are perceived + as pure and empty of content, as a special and independent class of + ideas. This quality of the universal forms of intuition, which was + discovered by Kant, that they may be perceived in themselves and + apart from experience, and that they may be known as exhibiting + those laws on which is founded the infallible science of + mathematics, is certainly very important. Not less worthy of + remark, however, is this other quality of time and space, that the + principle of sufficient reason, which conditions experience as the + law of causation and of motive, and thought as the law of the basis + of judgment, appears here in quite a special form, to which I have + given the name of the ground of being. In time, this is the + succession of its moments, and in space the position of its parts, + which reciprocally determine each other <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Any one who has + fully understood from the introductory essay the complete identity + of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in all its + different forms, must also be convinced of the importance of the + knowledge of the simplest of these forms, as affording him insight + into his own inmost nature. This simplest form of the principle we + have found to be time. In it each instant is, only in so far as it + has effaced the preceding one, its generator, to be itself in turn + as quickly effaced. The past and the future (considered apart from + the consequences of their content) are empty as a dream, and the + present is only the indivisible and unenduring boundary between + them. And in all the other forms of the principle of sufficient + reason, we shall find the same emptiness, and shall see that not + time only but also space, and the whole content of both of them, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, all that proceeds from + causes and motives, has a merely relative existence, is only + through and for another like to itself, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + not more enduring. The substance of this doctrine is old: it + appears in Heraclitus when he laments the eternal <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page009">[pg 009]</span><a name="Pg009" id="Pg009" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> flux of things; in Plato when he + degrades the object to that which is ever becoming, but never + being; in Spinoza as the doctrine of the mere accidents of the one + substance which is and endures. Kant opposes what is thus known as + the mere phenomenon to the thing in itself. Lastly, the ancient + wisdom of the Indian philosophers declares, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“It is Mâyâ, the veil of deception, which blinds the + eyes of mortals, and makes them behold a world of which they cannot + say either that it is or that it is not: for it is like a dream; it + is like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller takes from + afar for water, or the stray piece of rope he mistakes for a + snake.”</span> (These similes are repeated in innumerable passages + of the Vedas and the Puranas.) But what all these mean, and that of + which they all speak, is nothing more than what we have just + considered—the world as idea subject to the principle of sufficient + reason.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 4. Whoever has + recognised the form of the principle of sufficient reason, which + appears in pure time as such, and on which all counting and + arithmetical calculation rests, has completely mastered the nature + of time. Time is nothing more than that form of the principle of + sufficient reason, and has no further significance. Succession is + the form of the principle of sufficient reason in time, and + succession is the whole nature of time. Further, whoever has + recognised the principle of sufficient reason as it appears in the + presentation of pure space, has exhausted the whole nature of + space, which is absolutely nothing more than that possibility of + the reciprocal determination of its parts by each other, which is + called position. The detailed treatment of this, and the + formulation in abstract conceptions of the results which flow from + it, so that they may be more conveniently used, is the subject of + the science of geometry. Thus also, whoever has recognised the law + of causation, the aspect of the principle of sufficient reason + which appears in what fills these forms (space and time) as objects + of perception, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page010">[pg + 010]</span><a name="Pg010" id="Pg010" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + that is to say matter, has completely mastered the nature of matter + as such, for matter is nothing more than causation, as any one will + see at once if he reflects. Its true being is its action, nor can + we possibly conceive it as having any other meaning. Only as active + does it fill space and time; its action upon the immediate object + (which is itself matter) determines that perception in which alone + it exists. The consequence of the action of any material object + upon any other, is known only in so far as the latter acts upon the + immediate object in a different way from that in which it acted + before; it consists only of this. Cause and effect thus constitute + the whole nature of matter; its true being is its action. (A fuller + treatment of this will be found in the essay on the Principle of + Sufficient Reason, § 21, p. 77.) The nature of all material things + is therefore very appropriately called in German <span lang="de" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Wirklichkeit</span></span>,<a id="noteref_6" + name="noteref_6" href="#note_6"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">6</span></span></a> a word + which is far more expressive than <span lang="de" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Realität</span></span>. Again, that which is + acted upon is always matter, and thus the whole being and essence + of matter consists in the orderly change, which one part of it + brings about in another part. The existence of matter is therefore + entirely relative, according to a relation which is valid only + within its limits, as in the case of time and space.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But time and + space, each for itself, can be mentally presented apart from + matter, whereas matter cannot be so presented apart from time and + space. The form which is inseparable from it presupposes space, and + the action in which its very existence consists, always imports + some change, in other words a determination in time. But space and + time are not only, each for itself, presupposed by matter, but a + union of the two constitutes its essence, for this, as we have + seen, consists in action, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, in causation. All the + innumerable conceivable phenomena and conditions of things, might + be coexistent <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page011">[pg + 011]</span><a name="Pg011" id="Pg011" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + in boundless space, without limiting each other, or might be + successive in endless time without interfering with each other: + thus a necessary relation of these phenomena to each other, and a + law which should regulate them according to such a relation, is by + no means needful, would not, indeed, be applicable: it therefore + follows that in the case of all co-existence in space and change in + time, so long as each of these forms preserves for itself its + condition and its course without any connection with the other, + there can be no causation, and since causation constitutes the + essential nature of matter, there can be no matter. But the law of + causation receives its meaning and necessity only from this, that + the essence of change does not consist simply in the mere variation + of things, but rather in the fact that at the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">same part of + space</span></em> there is now <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one + thing</span></em> and then <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">another</span></em>, and at <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> and + the same point of time there is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">here</span></em> + one thing and there <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">another</span></em>: only this reciprocal + limitation of space and time by each other gives meaning, and at + the same time necessity, to a law, according to which change must + take place. What is determined by the law of causality is therefore + not merely a succession of things in time, but this succession with + reference to a definite space, and not merely existence of things + in a particular place, but in this place at a different point of + time. Change, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, variation which takes + place according to the law of causality, implies always a + determined part of space and a determined part of time together and + in union. Thus causality unites space with time. But we found that + the whole essence of matter consisted in action, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + in causation, consequently space and time must also be united in + matter, that is to say, matter must take to itself at once the + distinguishing qualities both of space and time, however much these + may be opposed to each other, and must unite in itself what is + impossible for each of these independently, that is, the fleeting + course of time, with the rigid unchangeable perduration of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page012">[pg 012]</span><a name= + "Pg012" id="Pg012" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> space: infinite + divisibility it receives from both. It is for this reason that we + find that co-existence, which could neither be in time alone, for + time has no contiguity, nor in space alone, for space has no + before, after, or now, is first established through matter. But the + co-existence of many things constitutes, in fact, the essence of + reality, for through it permanence first becomes possible; for + permanence is only knowable in the change of something which is + present along with what is permanent, while on the other hand it is + only because something permanent is present along with what + changes, that the latter gains the special character of change, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the mutation of quality + and form in the permanence of substance, that is to say, in + matter.<a id="noteref_7" name="noteref_7" href= + "#note_7"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">7</span></span></a> If the + world were in space alone, it would be rigid and immovable, without + succession, without change, without action; but we know that with + action, the idea of matter first appears. Again, if the world were + in time alone, all would be fleeting, without persistence, without + contiguity, hence without co-existence, and consequently without + permanence; so that in this case also there would be no matter. + Only through the union of space and time do we reach matter, and + matter is the possibility of co-existence, and, through that, of + permanence; through permanence again matter is the possibility of + the persistence of substance in the change of its states.<a id= + "noteref_8" name="noteref_8" href="#note_8"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">8</span></span></a> As + matter consists in the union of space and time, it bears throughout + the stamp of both. It manifests its origin in space, partly through + the form which is inseparable from it, but especially through its + persistence (substance), the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> certainty of which is therefore wholly + deducible from that of space<a id="noteref_9" name="noteref_9" + href="#note_9"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">9</span></span></a> (for + variation belongs to time alone, but in it alone and for itself + nothing is persistent). Matter shows that it springs <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page013">[pg 013]</span><a name="Pg013" id="Pg013" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> from time by quality (accidents), + without which it never exists, and which is plainly always + causality, action upon other matter, and therefore change (a time + concept). The law of this action, however, always depends upon + space and time together, and only thus obtains meaning. The + regulative function of causality is confined entirely to the + determination of what must occupy <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">this time and this + space</span></span>. The fact that we know <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> the unalterable characteristics of matter, + depends upon this derivation of its essential nature from the forms + of our knowledge of which we are conscious <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>. These unalterable characteristics are + space-occupation, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, impenetrability, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, causal action, + consequently, extension, infinite divisibility, persistence, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, indestructibility, and + lastly mobility: weight, on the other hand, notwithstanding its + universality, must be attributed to <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + posteriori</span></span> knowledge, although Kant, in his + <span class="tei tei-q">“Metaphysical Introduction to Natural + Philosophy,”</span> p. 71 (p. 372 of Rosenkranz's edition), treats + it as knowable <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But as the + object in general is only for the subject, as its idea, so every + special class of ideas is only for an equally special quality in + the subject, which is called a faculty of perception. This + subjective correlative of time and space in themselves as empty + forms, has been named by Kant pure sensibility; and we may retain + this expression, as Kant was the first to treat of the subject, + though it is not exact, for sensibility presupposes matter. The + subjective correlative of matter or of causation, for these two are + the same, is understanding, which is nothing more than this. To + know causality is its one function, its only power; and it is a + great one, embracing much, of manifold application, yet of + unmistakable identity in all its manifestations. Conversely all + causation, that is to say, all matter, or the whole of reality, is + only for the understanding, through the understanding, and in the + understanding. The first, simplest, and ever-present example of + understanding is the perception of the actual <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page014">[pg 014]</span><a name="Pg014" id="Pg014" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> world. This is throughout knowledge of + the cause from the effect, and therefore all perception is + intellectual. The understanding could never arrive at this + perception, however, if some effect did not become known + immediately, and thus serve as a starting-point. But this is the + affection of the animal body. So far, then, the animal body is the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">immediate + object</span></em> of the subject; the perception of all other + objects becomes possible through it. The changes which every animal + body experiences, are immediately known, that is, felt; and as + these effects are at once referred to their causes, the perception + of the latter as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objects</span></em> arises. This relation is + no conclusion in abstract conceptions; it does not arise from + reflection, nor is it arbitrary, but immediate, necessary, and + certain. It is the method of knowing of the pure understanding, + without which there could be no perception; there would only remain + a dull plant-like consciousness of the changes of the immediate + object, which would succeed each other in an utterly unmeaning way, + except in so far as they might have a meaning for the will either + as pain or pleasure. But as with the rising of the sun the visible + world appears, so at one stroke, the understanding, by means of its + one simple function, changes the dull, meaningless sensation into + perception. What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not + perception; it is merely its data. By the understanding passing + from the effect to the cause, the world first appears as perception + extended in space, varying in respect of form, persistent through + all time in respect of matter; for the understanding unites space + and time in the idea of matter, that is, causal action. As the + world as idea exists only through the understanding, so also it + exists only for the understanding. In the first chapter of my essay + on <span class="tei tei-q">“Light and Colour,”</span> I have + already explained how the understanding constructs perceptions out + of the data supplied by the senses; how by comparison of the + impressions which the various senses receive from the object, a + child <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page015">[pg 015]</span><a name= + "Pg015" id="Pg015" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> arrives at + perceptions; how this alone affords the solution of so many + phenomena of the senses; the single vision of two eyes, the double + vision in the case of a squint, or when we try to look at once at + objects which lie at unequal distances behind each other; and all + illusion which is produced by a sudden alteration in the organs of + sense. But I have treated this important subject much more fully + and thoroughly in the second edition of the essay on <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The Principle of Sufficient Reason,”</span> § 21. All + that is said there would find its proper place here, and would + therefore have to be said again; but as I have almost as much + disinclination to quote myself as to quote others, and as I am + unable to explain the subject better than it is explained there, I + refer the reader to it, instead of quoting it, and take for granted + that it is known.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The process by + which children, and persons born blind who have been operated upon, + learn to see, the single vision of the double sensation of two + eyes, the double vision and double touch which occur when the + organs of sense have been displaced from their usual position, the + upright appearance of objects while the picture on the retina is + upside down, the attributing of colour to the outward objects, + whereas it is merely an inner function, a division through + polarisation, of the activity of the eye, and lastly the + stereoscope,—all these are sure and incontrovertible evidence that + perception is not merely of the senses, but intellectual—that is, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">pure + knowledge through the understanding of the cause from the + effect</span></em>, and that, consequently, it presupposes the law + of causality, in a knowledge of which all perception—that is to say + all experience, by virtue of its primary and only possibility, + depends. The contrary doctrine that the law of causality results + from experience, which was the scepticism of Hume, is first refuted + by this. For the independence of the knowledge of causality of all + experience,—that is, its <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page016">[pg + 016]</span><a name="Pg016" id="Pg016" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + character—can only be deduced from the dependence of all experience + upon it; and this deduction can only be accomplished by proving, in + the manner here indicated, and explained in the passages referred + to above, that the knowledge of causality is included in perception + in general, to which all experience belongs, and therefore in + respect of experience is completely <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, does not presuppose it, but is presupposed by + it as a condition. This, however, cannot be deduced in the manner + attempted by Kant, which I have criticised in the essay on + <span class="tei tei-q">“The Principle of Sufficient + Reason,”</span> § 23.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 5. It is + needful to guard against the grave error of supposing that because + perception arises through the knowledge of causality, the relation + of subject and object is that of cause and effect. For this + relation subsists only between the immediate object and objects + known indirectly, thus always between objects alone. It is this + false supposition that has given rise to the foolish controversy + about the reality of the outer world; a controversy in which + dogmatism and scepticism oppose each other, and the former appears, + now as realism, now as idealism. Realism treats the object as + cause, and the subject as its effect. The idealism of Fichte + reduces the object to the effect of the subject. Since however, and + this cannot be too much emphasised, there is absolutely no relation + according to the principle of sufficient reason between subject and + object, neither of these views could be proved, and therefore + scepticism attacked them both with success. Now, just as the law of + causality precedes perception and experience as their condition, + and therefore cannot (as Hume thought) be derived from them, so + object and subject precede all knowledge, and hence the principle + of sufficient reason in general, as its first condition; for this + principle is merely the form of all objects, the whole nature and + possibility of their existence as phenomena: but the object always + presupposes the subject; and therefore between these two + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page017">[pg 017]</span><a name= + "Pg017" id="Pg017" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> there can be no + relation of reason and consequent. My essay on the principle of + sufficient reason accomplishes just this: it explains the content + of that principle as the essential form of every object—that is to + say, as the universal nature of all objective existence, as + something which pertains to the object as such; but the object as + such always presupposes the subject as its necessary correlative; + and therefore the subject remains always outside the province in + which the principle of sufficient reason is valid. The controversy + as to the reality of the outer world rests upon this false + extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason to + the subject also, and starting with this mistake it can never + understand itself. On the one side realistic dogmatism, looking + upon the idea as the effect of the object, desires to separate + these two, idea and object, which are really one, and to assume a + cause quite different from the idea, an object in itself, + independent of the subject, a thing which is quite inconceivable; + for even as object it presupposes subject, and so remains its idea. + Opposed to this doctrine is scepticism, which makes the same false + presupposition that in the idea we have only the effect, never the + cause, therefore never real being; that we always know merely the + action of the object. But this object, it supposes, may perhaps + have no resemblance whatever to its effect, may indeed have been + quite erroneously received as the cause, for the law of causality + is first to be gathered from experience, and the reality of + experience is then made to rest upon it. Thus both of these views + are open to the correction, firstly, that object and idea are the + same; secondly, that the true being of the object of perception is + its action, that the reality of the thing consists in this, and the + demand for an existence of the object outside the idea of the + subject, and also for an essence of the actual thing different from + its action, has absolutely no meaning, and is a contradiction: and + that the knowledge of the nature of the effect of any <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page018">[pg 018]</span><a name="Pg018" id="Pg018" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> perceived object, exhausts such an + object itself, so far as it is object, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + idea, for beyond this there is nothing more to be known. So far + then, the perceived world in space and time, which makes itself + known as causation alone, is entirely real, and is throughout + simply what it appears to be, and it appears wholly and without + reserve as idea, bound together according to the law of causality. + This is its empirical reality. On the other hand, all causality is + in the understanding alone, and for the understanding. The whole + actual, that is, active world is determined as such through the + understanding, and apart from it is nothing. This, however, is not + the only reason for altogether denying such a reality of the outer + world as is taught by the dogmatist, who explains its reality as + its independence of the subject. We also deny it, because no object + apart from a subject can be conceived without contradiction. The + whole world of objects is and remains idea, and therefore wholly + and for ever determined by the subject; that is to say, it has + transcendental ideality. But it is not therefore illusion or mere + appearance; it presents itself as that which it is, idea, and + indeed as a series of ideas of which the common bond is the + principle of sufficient reason. It is according to its inmost + meaning quite comprehensible to the healthy understanding, and + speaks a language quite intelligible to it. To dispute about its + reality can only occur to a mind perverted by over-subtilty, and + such discussion always arises from a false application of the + principle of sufficient reason, which binds all ideas together of + whatever kind they may be, but by no means connects them with the + subject, nor yet with a something which is neither subject nor + object, but only the ground of the object; an absurdity, for only + objects can be and always are the ground of objects. If we examine + more closely the source of this question as to the reality of the + outer world, we find that besides the false application of the + principle of sufficient reason generally to what lies <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page019">[pg 019]</span><a name="Pg019" id="Pg019" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> beyond its province, a special + confusion of its forms is also involved; for that form which it has + only in reference to concepts or abstract ideas, is applied to + perceived ideas, real objects; and a ground of knowing is demanded + of objects, whereas they can have nothing but a ground of being. + Among the abstract ideas, the concepts united in the judgment, the + principle of sufficient reason appears in such a way that each of + these has its worth, its validity, and its whole existence, here + called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">truth</span></em>, simply and solely through + the relation of the judgment to something outside of it, its ground + of knowledge, to which there must consequently always be a return. + Among real objects, ideas of perception, on the other hand, the + principle of sufficient reason appears not as the principle of the + ground of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">knowing</span></em>, but of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">being</span></em>, + as the law of causality: every real object has paid its debt to it, + inasmuch as it has come to be, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + has appeared as the effect of a cause. The demand for a ground of + knowing has therefore here no application and no meaning, but + belongs to quite another class of things. Thus the world of + perception raises in the observer no question or doubt so long as + he remains in contact with it: there is here neither error nor + truth, for these are confined to the province of the abstract—the + province of reflection. But here the world lies open for sense and + understanding; presents itself with naive truth as that which it + really is—ideas of perception which develop themselves according to + the law of causality.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">So far as we + have considered the question of the reality of the outer world, it + arises from a confusion which amounts even to a misunderstanding of + reason itself, and therefore thus far, the question could be + answered only by explaining its meaning. After examination of the + whole nature of the principle of sufficient reason, of the relation + of subject and object, and the special conditions of sense + perception, the question itself disappeared because it had no + longer any meaning. There <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page020">[pg + 020]</span><a name="Pg020" id="Pg020" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + is, however, one other possible origin of this question, quite + different from the purely speculative one which we have considered, + a specially empirical origin, though the question is always raised + from a speculative point of view, and in this form it has a much + more comprehensible meaning than it had in the first. We have + dreams; may not our whole life be a dream? or more exactly: is + there a sure criterion of the distinction between dreams and + reality? between phantasms and real objects? The assertion that + what is dreamt is less vivid and distinct than what we actually + perceive is not to the point, because no one has ever been able to + make a fair comparison of the two; for we can only compare the + recollection of a dream with the present reality. Kant answers the + question thus: <span class="tei tei-q">“The connection of ideas + among themselves, according to the law of causality, constitutes + the difference between real life and dreams.”</span> But in dreams, + as well as in real life, everything is connected individually at + any rate, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason in + all its forms, and this connection is broken only between life and + dreams, or between one dream and another. Kant's answer therefore + could only run thus:—the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">long</span></em> dream (life) has throughout + complete connection according to the principle of sufficient + reason; it has not this connection, however, with <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">short</span></em> + dreams, although each of these has in itself the same connection: + the bridge is therefore broken between the former and the latter, + and on this account we distinguish them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But to institute + an inquiry according to this criterion, as to whether something was + dreamt or seen, would always be difficult and often impossible. For + we are by no means in a position to trace link by link the causal + connection between any experienced event and the present moment, + but we do not on that account explain it as dreamt. Therefore in + real life we do not commonly employ that method of distinguishing + between dreams and reality. The only sure criterion by which to + distinguish <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page021">[pg + 021]</span><a name="Pg021" id="Pg021" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + them is in fact the entirely empirical one of awaking, through + which at any rate the causal connection between dreamed events and + those of waking life, is distinctly and sensibly broken off. This + is strongly supported by the remark of Hobbes in the second chapter + of Leviathan, that we easily mistake dreams for reality if we have + unintentionally fallen asleep without taking off our clothes, and + much more so when it also happens that some undertaking or design + fills all our thoughts, and occupies our dreams as well as our + waking moments. We then observe the awaking just as little as the + falling asleep, dream and reality run together and become + confounded. In such a case there is nothing for it but the + application of Kant's criterion; but if, as often happens, we fail + to establish by means of this criterion, either the existence of + causal connection with the present, or the absence of such + connection, then it must for ever remain uncertain whether an event + was dreamt or really happened. Here, in fact, the intimate + relationship between life and dreams is brought out very clearly, + and we need not be ashamed to confess it, as it has been recognised + and spoken of by many great men. The Vedas and Puranas have no + better simile than a dream for the whole knowledge of the actual + world, which they call the web of Mâyâ, and they use none more + frequently. Plato often says that men live only in a dream; the + philosopher alone strives to awake himself. Pindar says (ii. η. + 135): σκιας οναρ ανθρωπος (umbræ somnium homo), and Sophocles:—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Ὀνω γυν ἡμας ουδεν οντας αλλο, + πλην</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Σιδωλ᾽ ὁσοιπερ ζωμεν, ὴ κουφην + σκιαν.—Ajax, 125.</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">(Nos enim, + quicunque vivimus, nihil aliud esse comperio quam simulacra et + levem umbram.) Beside which most worthily stands Shakespeare:—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 5.40em"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">We are + such stuff</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">As dreams are made on, and our + little life</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Is rounded with a sleep.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">—</span><span class="tei tei-hi" style= + "text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Tempest</span></span><span style="font-size: 90%">, + Act iv. Sc. 1.</span> + </div> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page022">[pg 022]</span><a name= + "Pg022" id="Pg022" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lastly, Calderon + was so deeply impressed with this view of life that he sought to + embody it in a kind of metaphysical drama—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“Life a Dream.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">After these + numerous quotations from the poets, perhaps I also may be allowed + to express myself by a metaphor. Life and dreams are leaves of the + same book. The systematic reading of this book is real life, but + when the reading hours (that is, the day) are over, we often + continue idly to turn over the leaves, and read a page here and + there without method or connection: often one we have read before, + sometimes one that is new to us, but always in the same book. Such + an isolated page is indeed out of connection with the systematic + study of the book, but it does not seem so very different when we + remember that the whole continuous perusal begins and ends just as + abruptly, and may therefore be regarded as merely a larger single + page.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus although + individual dreams are distinguished from real life by the fact that + they do not fit into that continuity which runs through the whole + of experience, and the act of awaking brings this into + consciousness, yet that very continuity of experience belongs to + real life as its form, and the dream on its part can point to a + similar continuity in itself. If, therefore, we consider the + question from a point of view external to both, there is no + distinct difference in their nature, and we are forced to concede + to the poets that life is a long dream.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Let us turn back + now from this quite independent empirical origin of the question of + the reality of the outer world, to its speculative origin. We found + that this consisted, first, in the false application of the + principle of sufficient reason to the relation of subject and + object; and secondly, in the confusion of its forms, inasmuch as + the principle of sufficient reason of knowing was extended to a + province in which the principle of sufficient reason of being is + valid. But the question could hardly have occupied philosophers so + constantly if it <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page023">[pg + 023]</span><a name="Pg023" id="Pg023" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + were entirely devoid of all real content, and if some true thought + and meaning did not lie at its heart as its real source. + Accordingly, we must assume that when the element of truth that + lies at the bottom of the question first came into reflection and + sought its expression, it became involved in these confused and + meaningless forms and problems. This at least is my opinion, and I + think that the true expression of that inmost meaning of the + question, which it failed to find, is this:—What is this world of + perception besides being my idea? Is that of which I am conscious + only as idea, exactly like my own body, of which I am doubly + conscious, in one aspect as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, in another aspect as + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>? The fuller explanation of + this question and its answer in the affirmative, will form the + content of the second book, and its consequences will occupy the + remaining portion of this work.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 6. For the + present, however, in this first book we consider everything merely + as idea, as object for the subject. And our own body, which is the + starting-point for each of us in our perception of the world, we + consider, like all other real objects, from the side of its + knowableness, and in this regard it is simply an idea. Now the + consciousness of every one is in general opposed to the explanation + of objects as mere ideas, and more especially to the explanation of + our bodies as such; for the thing in itself is known to each of us + immediately in so far as it appears as our own body; but in so far + as it objectifies itself in the other objects of perception, it is + known only indirectly. But this abstraction, this one-sided + treatment, this forcible separation of what is essentially and + necessarily united, is only adopted to meet the demands of our + argument; and therefore the disinclination to it must, in the + meantime, be suppressed and silenced by the expectation that the + subsequent treatment will correct the one-sidedness of the present + one, and complete our knowledge of the nature of the world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">At present + therefore the body is for us immediate <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page024">[pg 024]</span><a name="Pg024" id="Pg024" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> object; that is to say, that idea which forms + the starting-point of the subject's knowledge; because the body, + with its immediately known changes, precedes the application of the + law of causality, and thus supplies it with its first data. The + whole nature of matter consists, as we have seen, in its causal + action. But cause and effect exist only for the understanding, + which is nothing but their subjective correlative. The + understanding, however, could never come into operation if there + were not something else from which it starts. This is simple + sensation—the immediate consciousness of the changes of the body, + by virtue of which it is immediate object. Thus the possibility of + knowing the world of perception depends upon two conditions; the + first, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objectively expressed</span></em>, is the + power of material things to act upon each other, to produce changes + in each other, without which common quality of all bodies no + perception would be possible, even by means of the sensibility of + the animal body. And if we wish to express this condition + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">subjectively</span></em> we say: The + understanding first makes perception possible; for the law of + causality, the possibility of effect and cause, springs only from + the understanding, and is valid only for it, and therefore the + world of perception exists only through and for it. The second + condition is the sensibility of animal bodies, or the quality of + being immediate objects of the subject which certain bodies + possess. The mere modification which the organs of sense sustain + from without through their specific affections, may here be called + ideas, so far as these affections produce neither pain nor + pleasure, that is, have no immediate significance for the will, and + are yet perceived, exist therefore only for <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">knowledge</span></em>. Thus far, then, I say + that the body is immediately <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">known</span></em>, is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">immediate + object</span></em>. But the conception of object is not to be taken + here in its fullest sense, for through this immediate knowledge of + the body, which precedes the operation of the understanding, and is + mere sensation, our own body does not exist <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page025">[pg 025]</span><a name="Pg025" id="Pg025" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> specifically as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">object</span></em>, + but first the material things which affect it: for all knowledge of + an object proper, of an idea perceived in space, exists only + through and for the understanding; therefore not before, but only + subsequently to its operation. Therefore the body as object proper, + that is, as an idea perceived in space, is first known indirectly, + like all other objects, through the application of the law of + causality to the action of one of its parts upon another, as, for + example, when the eye sees the body or the hand touches it. + Consequently the form of our body does not become known to us + through mere feeling, but only through knowledge, only in idea; + that is to say, only in the brain does our own body first come to + appear as extended, articulate, organic. A man born blind receives + this idea only little by little from the data afforded by touch. A + blind man without hands could never come to know his own form; or + at the most could infer and construct it little by little from the + effects of other bodies upon him. If, then, we call the body an + immediate object, we are to be understood with these + reservations.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In other + respects, then, according to what has been said, all animal bodies + are immediate objects; that is, starting-points for the subject + which always knows and therefore is never known in its perception + of the world. Thus the distinctive characteristic of animal life is + knowledge, with movement following on motives, which are determined + by knowledge, just as movement following on stimuli is the + distinctive characteristic of plant-life. Unorganised matter, + however, has no movement except such as is produced by causes + properly so called, using the term in its narrowest sense. All this + I have thoroughly discussed in my essay on the principle of + sufficient reason, § 20, in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Ethics,”</span> first essay, iii., and in my work on + Sight and Colour, § 1, to which I therefore refer.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It follows from + what has been said, that all animals, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page026">[pg 026]</span><a name="Pg026" id="Pg026" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> even the least developed, have understanding; + for they all know objects, and this knowledge determines their + movements as motive. Understanding is the same in all animals and + in all men; it has everywhere the same simple form; knowledge of + causality, transition from effect to cause, and from cause to + effect, nothing more; but the degree of its acuteness, and the + extension of the sphere of its knowledge varies enormously, with + innumerable gradations from the lowest form, which is only + conscious of the causal connection between the immediate object and + objects affecting it—that is to say, perceives a cause as an object + in space by passing to it from the affection which the body feels, + to the higher grades of knowledge of the causal connection among + objects known indirectly, which extends to the understanding of the + most complicated system of cause and effect in nature. For even + this high degree of knowledge is still the work of the + understanding, not of the reason. The abstract concepts of the + reason can only serve to take up the objective connections which + are immediately known by the understanding, to make them permanent + for thought, and to relate them to each other; but reason never + gives us immediate knowledge. Every force and law of nature, every + example of such forces and laws, must first be immediately known by + the understanding, must be apprehended through perception before it + can pass into abstract consciousness for reason. Hooke's discovery + of the law of gravitation, and the reference of so many important + phenomena to this one law, was the work of immediate apprehension + by the understanding; and such also was the proof of Newton's + calculations, and Lavoisier's discovery of acids and their + important function in nature, and also Goethe's discovery of the + origin of physical colours. All these discoveries are nothing more + than a correct immediate passage from the effect to the cause, + which is at once followed by the recognition of the ideality of the + force of nature which expresses itself in all <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page027">[pg 027]</span><a name="Pg027" id="Pg027" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> causes of the same kind; and this + complete insight is just an example of that single function of the + understanding, by which an animal perceives as an object in space + the cause which affects its body, and differs from such a + perception only in degree. Every one of these great discoveries is + therefore, just like perception, an operation of the understanding, + an immediate intuition, and as such the work of an instant, an + <span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">apperçu</span></span>, a flash of insight. + They are not the result of a process of abstract reasoning, which + only serves to make the immediate knowledge of the understanding + permanent for thought by bringing it under abstract concepts, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, it makes knowledge + distinct, it puts us in a position to impart it and explain it to + others. The keenness of the understanding in apprehending the + causal relations of objects which are known indirectly, does not + find its only application in the sphere of natural science (though + all the discoveries in that sphere are due to it), but it also + appears in practical life. It is then called good sense or + prudence, as in its other application it is better called + acuteness, penetration, sagacity. More exactly, good sense or + prudence signifies exclusively understanding at the command of the + will. But the limits of these conceptions must not be too sharply + defined, for it is always that one function of the understanding by + means of which all animals perceive objects in space, which, in its + keenest form, appears now in the phenomena of nature, correctly + inferring the unknown causes from the given effects, and providing + the material from which the reason frames general rules as laws of + nature; now inventing complicated and ingenious machines by + adapting known causes to desired effects; now in the sphere of + motives, seeing through and frustrating intrigues and machinations, + or fitly disposing the motives and the men who are susceptible to + them, setting them in motion, as machines are moved by levers and + wheels, and directing them at will to the accomplishment of its + ends. Deficiency of understanding is called <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page028">[pg 028]</span><a name="Pg028" id="Pg028" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">stupidity</span></em>. It is just <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">dulness in applying + the law of causality</span></em>, incapacity for the immediate + apprehension of the concatenations of causes and effects, motives + and actions. A stupid person has no insight into the connection of + natural phenomena, either when they follow their own course, or + when they are intentionally combined, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + are applied to machinery. Such a man readily believes in magic and + miracles. A stupid man does not observe that persons, who + apparently act independently of each other, are really in + collusion; he is therefore easily mystified, and outwitted; he does + not discern the hidden motives of proffered advice or expressions + of opinion, &c. But it is always just one thing that he + lacks—keenness, rapidity, ease in applying the law of causality, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, power of understanding. + The greatest, and, in this reference, the most instructive example + of stupidity I ever met with, was the case of a totally imbecile + boy of about eleven years of age, in an asylum. He had reason, + because he spoke and comprehended, but in respect of understanding + he was inferior to many of the lower animals. Whenever I visited + him he noticed an eye-glass which I wore round my neck, and in + which the window of the room and the tops of the trees beyond were + reflected: on every occasion he was greatly surprised and delighted + with this, and was never tired of looking at it with astonishment, + because he did not understand the immediate causation of + reflection.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">While the + difference in degree of the acuteness of the understanding, is very + great between man and man, it is even greater between one species + of animal and another. In all species of animals, even those which + are nearest to plants, there is at least as much understanding as + suffices for the inference from the effect on the immediate object, + to the indirectly known object as its cause, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + sufficient for perception, for the apprehension of an object. For + it is this that constitutes them animals, as it gives them the + power of movement following on motives, and <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page029">[pg 029]</span><a name="Pg029" id="Pg029" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> thereby the power of seeking for food, + or at least of seizing it; whereas plants have only movement + following on stimuli, whose direct influence they must await, or + else decay, for they cannot seek after them nor appropriate them. + We marvel at the great sagacity of the most developed species of + animals, such as the dog, the elephant, the monkey or the fox, + whose cleverness has been so admirably sketched by Buffon. From + these most sagacious animals, we can pretty accurately determine + how far understanding can go without reason, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + abstract knowledge embodied in concepts. We could not find this out + from ourselves, for in us understanding and reason always + reciprocally support each other. We find that the manifestation of + understanding in animals is sometimes above our expectation, and + sometimes below it. On the one hand, we are surprised at the + sagacity of the elephant, who, after crossing many bridges during + his journey in Europe, once refused to go upon one, because he + thought it was not strong enough to bear his weight, though he saw + the rest of the party, consisting of men and horses, go upon it as + usual. On the other hand, we wonder that the intelligent + Orang-outangs, who warm themselves at a fire they have found, do + not keep it alight by throwing wood on it; a proof that this + requires a deliberation which is not possible without abstract + concepts. It is clear that the knowledge of cause and effect, as + the universal form of understanding, belongs to all animals + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, because to them as to + us it is the prior condition of all perception of the outer world. + If any one desires additional proof of this, let him observe, for + example, how a young dog is afraid to jump down from a table, + however much he may wish to do so, because he foresees the effect + of the weight of his body, though he has not been taught this by + experience. In judging of the understanding of animals, we must + guard against ascribing to it the manifestations of instinct, a + faculty which is quite distinct both from understanding and + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page030">[pg 030]</span><a name= + "Pg030" id="Pg030" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> reason, but the + action of which is often very analogous to the combined action of + the two. We cannot, however, discuss this here; it will find its + proper place in the second book, when we consider the harmony or + so-called teleology of nature: and the 27th chapter of the + supplementary volume is expressly devoted to it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Deficiency of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">understanding</span></em> we call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">stupidity</span></em>: deficiency in the + application of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reason</span></em> to practice we shall + recognise later as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">foolishness</span></em>: deficiency of + judgment as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">silliness</span></em>, and lastly, partial or + entire deficiency of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">memory</span></em> as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">madness</span></em>. But each of these will be + considered in its own place. That which is correctly known by + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reason</span></em> is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">truth</span></em>, + that is, an abstract judgment on sufficient grounds (Essay on the + Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 29 and following paragraphs); + that which is correctly known by <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">understanding</span></em> is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em>, that is correct inference + from effect on the immediate object to its cause. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Error</span></em> + is opposed to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">truth</span></em>, as deception of the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reason</span></em>: <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">illusion</span></em> is opposed to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reality</span></em>, as deception of the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">understanding</span></em>. The full discussion + of all this will be found in the first chapter of my essay on Light + and Colour. Illusion takes place when the same effect may be + attributed to two causes, of which one occurs very frequently, the + other very seldom; the understanding having no data to decide which + of these two causes operates in any particular case,—for their + effects are exactly alike,—always assumes the presence of the + commoner cause, and as the activity of the understanding is not + reflective and discursive, but direct and immediate, this false + cause appears before us as a perceived object, whereas it is merely + illusion. I have explained in the essay referred to, how in this + way double sight and double feeling take place if the organs of + sense are brought into an unusual position; and have thus given an + incontrovertible proof that perception exists only through and for + the understanding. As additional examples of such illusions or + deceptions of the understanding, we may mention the broken + appearance <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page031">[pg + 031]</span><a name="Pg031" id="Pg031" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of a stick dipped in water; the reflections in spherical mirrors, + which, when the surface is convex appear somewhat behind it, and + when the surface is concave appear a long way in front of it. To + this class also belongs the apparently greater extension of the + moon at the horizon than at the zenith. This appearance is not + optical, for as the micrometre proves, the eye receives the image + of the moon at the zenith, at an even greater angle of vision than + at the horizon. The mistake is due to the understanding, which + assumes that the cause of the feebler light of the moon and of all + stars at the horizon is that they are further off, thus treating + them as earthly objects, according to the laws of atmospheric + perspective, and therefore it takes the moon to be much larger at + the horizon than at the zenith, and also regards the vault of + heaven as more extended or flattened out at the horizon. The same + false application of the laws of atmospheric perspective leads us + to suppose that very high mountains, whose summits alone are + visible in pure transparent air, are much nearer than they really + are, and therefore not so high as they are; for example, Mont Blanc + seen from Salenche. All such illusions are immediately present to + us as perceptions, and cannot be dispelled by any arguments of the + reason. Reason can only prevent error, that is, a judgment on + insufficient grounds, by opposing to it a truth; as for example, + the abstract knowledge that the cause of the weaker light of the + moon and the stars at the horizon is not greater distance, but the + denser atmosphere; but in all the cases we have referred to, the + illusion remains in spite of every abstract explanation. For the + understanding is in itself, even in the case of man, irrational, + and is completely and sharply distinguished from the reason, which + is a faculty of knowledge that belongs to man alone. The reason can + only <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">know</span></em>; perception remains free from + its influence and belongs to the understanding alone.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 7. With + reference to our exposition up to this point, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page032">[pg 032]</span><a name="Pg032" id="Pg032" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> it must be observed that we did not + start either from the object or the subject, but from the idea, + which contains and presupposes them both; for the antithesis of + object and subject is its primary, universal and essential form. We + have therefore first considered this form as such; then (though in + this respect reference has for the most part been made to the + introductory essay) the subordinate forms of time, space and + causality. The latter belong exclusively to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">object</span></em>, + and yet, as they are essential to the object <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">as + such</span></em>, and as the object again is essential to the + subject <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">as such</span></em>, they may be discovered + from the subject, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, they may be known + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, and so far they are to + be regarded as the common limits of both. But all these forms may + be referred to one general expression, the principle of sufficient + reason, as we have explained in the introductory essay.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This procedure + distinguishes our philosophical method from that of all former + systems. For they all start either from the object or from the + subject, and therefore seek to explain the one from the other, and + this according to the principle of sufficient reason. We, on the + contrary, deny the validity of this principle with reference to the + relation of subject and object, and confine it to the object. It + may be thought that the philosophy of identity, which has appeared + and become generally known in our own day, does not come under + either of the alternatives we have named, for it does not start + either from the subject or from the object, but from the absolute, + known through <span class="tei tei-q">“intellectual + intuition,”</span> which is neither object nor subject, but the + identity of the two. I will not venture to speak of this revered + identity, and this absolute, for I find myself entirely devoid of + all <span class="tei tei-q">“intellectual intuition.”</span> But as + I take my stand merely on those manifestoes of the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“intellectual intuiter”</span> which are open to all, + even to profane persons like myself, I must yet observe that this + philosophy is not to be excepted from the alternative errors + mentioned above. For it does not escape these <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page033">[pg 033]</span><a name="Pg033" id="Pg033" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> two opposite errors in spite of its + identity of subject and object, which is not thinkable, but only + <span class="tei tei-q">“intellectually intuitable,”</span> or to + be experienced by a losing of oneself in it. On the contrary, it + combines them both in itself; for it is divided into two parts, + firstly, transcendental idealism, which is just Fichte's doctrine + of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ego</span></em>, and therefore teaches that + the object is produced by the subject, or evolved out of it in + accordance with the principle of sufficient reason; secondly, the + philosophy of nature, which teaches that the subject is produced + little by little from the object, by means of a method called + construction, about which I understand very little, yet enough to + know that it is a process according to various forms of the + principle of sufficient reason. The deep wisdom itself which that + construction contains, I renounce; for as I entirely lack + <span class="tei tei-q">“intellectual intuition,”</span> all those + expositions which presuppose it must for me remain as a book sealed + with seven seals. This is so truly the case that, strange to say, I + have always been unable to find anything at all in this doctrine of + profound wisdom but atrocious and wearisome bombast.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The systems + starting from the object had always the whole world of perception + and its constitution as their problem; yet the object which they + take as their starting-point is not always this whole world of + perception, nor its fundamental element, matter. On the contrary, a + division of these systems may be made, based on the four classes of + possible objects set forth in the introductory essay. Thus Thales + and the Ionic school, Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno, and the + French materialists, may be said to have started from the first + class of objects, the real world: Spinoza (on account of his + conception of substance, which is purely abstract, and exists only + in his definition) and, earlier, the Eleatics, from the second + class, the abstract conception: the Pythagoreans and Chinese + philosophy in Y-King, from the third class, time, and consequently + number: and, lastly, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page034">[pg + 034]</span><a name="Pg034" id="Pg034" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the schoolmen, who teach a creation out of nothing by the act of + will of an extra-mundane personal being, started from the fourth + class of objects, the act of will directed by knowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Of all systems + of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and + that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It + regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, + and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this + really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a + guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order + (or arrangement) of things, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">veritas + aeterna</span></span>, and so fails to take account of the + understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. It seeks + the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to + develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to + chemism, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. + And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the + chain would be animal sensibility—that is knowledge—which would + consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter + produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far + with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would + suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of + the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once + become aware that its final result—knowledge, which it reached so + laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its + very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we + thought matter, we really thought only the subject that perceives + matter; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the + understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">petitio principii</span></span> reveals itself + unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the + starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like + Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the + horse into the air with his legs, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page035">[pg 035]</span><a name="Pg035" id="Pg035" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and himself also by his cue. The fundamental + absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objective</span></em>, and takes as the + ultimate ground of explanation something <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objective</span></em>, whether it be matter in + the abstract, simply as it is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thought</span></em>, or after it has taken + form, is empirically given—that is to say, is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">substance</span></em>, the chemical element + with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing + absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic + nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them + adequately by means of it; whereas in truth all that is objective + is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing + subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and + consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away. + Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately + given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is objective, + extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded + by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, + that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be + desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should + resolve itself into action and reaction). But we have shown that + all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, + and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has + passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has + thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of + which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever + active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism + seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which + alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally + even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that + manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore + according to law, are in truth to be explained. To the assertion + that thought is a modification of matter we may always, with equal + right, oppose the contrary assertion that all <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page036">[pg 036]</span><a name="Pg036" id="Pg036" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> matter is merely the modification of + the knowing subject, as its idea. Yet the aim and ideal of all + natural science is at bottom a consistent materialism. The + recognition here of the obvious impossibility of such a system + establishes another truth which will appear in the course of our + exposition, the truth that all science properly so called, by which + I understand systematic knowledge under the guidance of the + principle of sufficient reason, can never reach its final goal, nor + give a complete and adequate explanation: for it is not concerned + with the inmost nature of the world, it cannot get beyond the idea; + indeed, it really teaches nothing more than the relation of one + idea to another.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Every science + must start from two principal data. One of these is always the + principle of sufficient reason in some form or another, as organon; + the other is its special object as problem. Thus, for example, + geometry has space as problem, and the ground of existence in space + as organon. Arithmetic has time as problem, and the ground of + existence in time as organon. Logic has the combination of concepts + as such as problem, and the ground of knowledge as organon. History + has the past acts of men treated as a whole as problem, and the law + of human motives as organon. Natural science has matter as problem, + and the law of causality as organon. Its end and aim is therefore, + by the guidance of causality, to refer all possible states of + matter to other states, and ultimately to one single state; and + again to deduce these states from each other, and ultimately from + one single state. Thus two states of matter stand over against each + other in natural science as extremes: that state in which matter is + furthest from being the immediate object of the subject, and that + state in which it is most completely such an immediate object, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the most dead and crude + matter, the primary element, as the one extreme, and the human + organism as the other. Natural science as chemistry seeks for the + first, as physiology for the second. <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page037">[pg 037]</span><a name="Pg037" id="Pg037" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> But as yet neither extreme has been reached, + and it is only in the intermediate ground that something has been + won. The prospect is indeed somewhat hopeless. The chemists, under + the presupposition that the qualitative division of matter is not, + like quantitative division, an endless process, are always trying + to decrease the number of the elements, of which there are still + about sixty; and if they were to succeed in reducing them to two, + they would still try to find the common root of these. For, on the + one hand, the law of homogeneity leads to the assumption of a + primary chemical state of matter, which alone belongs to matter as + such, and precedes all others which are not essentially matter as + such, but merely contingent forms and qualities. On the other hand, + we cannot understand how this one state could ever experience a + chemical change, if there did not exist a second state to affect + it. Thus the same difficulty appears in chemistry which Epicurus + met with in mechanics. For he had to show how the first atom + departed from the original direction of its motion. Indeed this + contradiction, which develops entirely of itself and can neither be + escaped nor solved, might quite properly be set up as a chemical + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">antinomy</span></em>. Thus an antinomy appears + in the one extreme of natural science, and a corresponding one will + appear in the other. There is just as little hope of reaching this + opposite extreme of natural science, for we see ever more clearly + that what is chemical can never be referred to what is mechanical, + nor what is organic to what is chemical or electrical. Those who in + our own day are entering anew on this old, misleading path, will + soon slink back silent and ashamed, as all their predecessors have + done before them. We shall consider this more fully in the second + book. Natural science encounters the difficulties which we have + cursorily mentioned, in its own province. Regarded as philosophy, + it would further be materialism; but this, as we have seen, even at + its birth, has death in its heart, because it ignores <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page038">[pg 038]</span><a name="Pg038" id="Pg038" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the subject and the forms of knowledge, + which are presupposed, just as much in the case of the crudest + matter, from which it desires to start, as in that of the organism, + at which it desires to arrive. For, <span class="tei tei-q">“no + object without a subject,”</span> is the principle which renders + all materialism for ever impossible. Suns and planets without an + eye that sees them, and an understanding that knows them, may + indeed be spoken of in words, but for the idea, these words are + absolutely meaningless. On the other hand, the law of causality and + the treatment and investigation of nature which is based upon it, + lead us necessarily to the conclusion that, in time, each more + highly organised state of matter has succeeded a cruder state: so + that the lower animals existed before men, fishes before land + animals, plants before fishes, and the unorganised before all that + is organised; that, consequently, the original mass had to pass + through a long series of changes before the first eye could be + opened. And yet, the existence of this whole world remains ever + dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of + an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the + possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and + for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is + entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the + supporter of its existence. This long course of time itself, filled + with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to + form till at last the first percipient creature appeared,—this + whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a + consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it + is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at + all. Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world + necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however + undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just + as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and + effects which have preceded it, and in which it itself <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page039">[pg 039]</span><a name="Pg039" id="Pg039" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> appears as a small link. These two + contradictory points of view, to each of which we are led with the + same necessity, we might again call an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">antinomy</span></em> in our faculty of + knowledge, and set it up as the counterpart of that which we found + in the first extreme of natural science. The fourfold antinomy of + Kant will be shown, in the criticism of his philosophy appended to + this volume, to be a groundless delusion. But the necessary + contradiction which at last presents itself to us here, finds its + solution in the fact that, to use Kant's phraseology, time, space, + and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its + phenomena, of which they are the form; which in my language means + this: The objective world, the world as idea, is not the only side + of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has an entirely + different side—the side of its inmost nature—its kernel—the + thing-in-itself. This we shall consider in the second book, calling + it after the most immediate of its objective manifestations—will. + But the world as idea, with which alone we are here concerned, only + appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of + knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But + without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was + also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all + beginning is in time. Since, however, it is the most universal form + of the knowable, in which all phenomena are united together through + causality, time, with its infinity of past and future, is present + in the beginning of knowledge. The phenomenon which fills the first + present must at once be known as causally bound up with and + dependent upon a sequence of phenomena which stretches infinitely + into the past, and this past itself is just as truly conditioned by + this first present, as conversely the present is by the past. + Accordingly the past out of which the first present arises, is, + like it, dependent upon the knowing subject, without which it is + nothing. It necessarily happens, however, that this first + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page040">[pg 040]</span><a name= + "Pg040" id="Pg040" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> present does not + manifest itself as the first, that is, as having no past for its + parent, but as being the beginning of time. It manifests itself + rather as the consequence of the past, according to the principle + of existence in time. In the same way, the phenomena which fill + this first present appear as the effects of earlier phenomena which + filled the past, in accordance with the law of causality. Those who + like mythological interpretations may take the birth of Kronos + (χρονος), the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol of the moment + here referred to at which time appears, though, indeed it has no + beginning; for with him, since he ate his father, the crude + productions of heaven and earth cease, and the races of gods and + men appear upon the scene.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This explanation + at which we have arrived by following the most consistent of the + philosophical systems which start from the object, materialism, has + brought out clearly the inseparable and reciprocal dependence of + subject and object, and at the same time the inevitable antithesis + between them. And this knowledge leads us to seek for the inner + nature of the world, the thing-in-itself, not in either of the two + elements of the idea, but in something quite distinct from it, and + which is not encumbered with such a fundamental and insoluble + antithesis.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Opposed to the + system we have explained, which starts from the object in order to + derive the subject from it, is the system which starts from the + subject and tries to derive the object from it. The first of these + has been of frequent and common occurrence throughout the history + of philosophy, but of the second we find only one example, and that + a very recent one; the <span class="tei tei-q">“philosophy of + appearance”</span> of J. G. Fichte. In this respect, therefore, it + must be considered; little real worth or inner meaning as the + doctrine itself had. It was indeed for the most part merely a + delusion, but it was delivered with an air of the deepest + earnestness, with sustained loftiness of <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page041">[pg 041]</span><a name="Pg041" id="Pg041" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> tone and zealous ardour, and was defended + with eloquent polemic against weak opponents, so that it was able + to present a brilliant exterior and seemed to be something. But the + genuine earnestness which keeps truth always steadfastly before it + as its goal, and is unaffected by any external influences, was + entirely wanting to Fichte, as it is to all philosophers who, like + him, concern themselves with questions of the day. In his case, + indeed, it could not have been otherwise. A man becomes a + philosopher by reason of a certain perplexity, from which he seeks + to free himself. This is Plato's θαυμαξειν, which he calls a μαλα + φιλοσοφικον παθος. But what distinguishes the false philosopher + from the true is this: the perplexity of the latter arises from the + contemplation of the world itself, while that of the former results + from some book, some system of philosophy which is before him. Now + Fichte belongs to the class of the false philosophers. He was made + a philosopher by Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself, and if it + had not been for this he would probably have pursued entirely + different ends, with far better results, for he certainly possessed + remarkable rhetorical talent. If he had only penetrated somewhat + deeply into the meaning of the book that made him a philosopher, + <span class="tei tei-q">“The Critique of Pure Reason,”</span> he + would have understood that its principal teaching about mind is + this. The principle of sufficient reason is not, as all scholastic + philosophy maintains, a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">veritas + aeterna</span></span>—that is to say, it does not possess an + unconditioned validity before, outside of, and above the world. It + is relative and conditioned, and valid only in the sphere of + phenomena, and thus it may appear as the necessary nexus of space + and time, or as the law of causality, or as the law of the ground + of knowledge. The inner nature of the world, the thing-in-itself + can never be found by the guidance of this principle, for all that + it leads to will be found to be dependent and relative and merely + phenomenal, not the thing-in-itself. Further, it does not concern + the subject, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page042">[pg + 042]</span><a name="Pg042" id="Pg042" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + but is only the form of objects, which are therefore not + things-in-themselves. The subject must exist along with the object, + and the object along with the subject, so that it is impossible + that subject and object can stand to each other in a relation of + reason and consequent. But Fichte did not take up the smallest + fragment of all this. All that interested him about the matter was + that the system started from the subject. Now Kant had chosen this + procedure in order to show the fallacy of the prevalent systems, + which started from the object, and through which the object had + come, to be regarded as a thing-in-itself. Fichte, however, took + this departure from the subject for the really important matter, + and like all imitators, he imagined that in going further than Kant + he was surpassing him. Thus he repeated the fallacy with regard to + the subject, which all the previous dogmatism had perpetrated with + regard to the object, and which had been the occasion of Kant's + <span class="tei tei-q">“Critique”</span>. Fichte then made no + material change, and the fundamental fallacy, the assumption of a + relation of reason and consequent between object and subject, + remained after him as it was before him. The principle of + sufficient reason possessed as before an unconditioned validity, + and the only difference was that the thing-in-itself was now placed + in the subject instead of, as formerly, in the object. The entire + relativity of both subject and object, which proves that the + thing-in-itself, or the inner nature of the world, is not to be + sought in them at all, but outside of them, and outside everything + else that exists merely relatively, still remained unknown. Just as + if Kant had never existed, the principle of sufficient reason is to + Fichte precisely what it was to all the schoolmen, a <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">veritas aeterna</span></span>. As an eternal + fate reigned over the gods of old, so these <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">aeternæ veritates</span></span>, these + metaphysical, mathematical and metalogical truths, and in the case + of some, the validity of the moral law also, reigned over the God + of the schoolmen. These <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">veritates</span></span> alone were independent + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page043">[pg 043]</span><a name= + "Pg043" id="Pg043" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of everything, and + through their necessity both God and the world existed. According + to the principle of sufficient reason, as such a <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">veritas aeterna</span></span>, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ego</span></em> is + for Fichte the ground of the world, or of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">non-ego</span></em>, the object, which is just + its consequent, its creation. He has therefore taken good care to + avoid examining further or limiting the principle of sufficient + reason. If, however, it is thought I should specify the form of the + principle of sufficient reason under the guidance of which Fichte + derives the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">non-ego</span></em> from the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ego</span></em>, as + a spider spins its web out of itself, I find that it is the + principle of sufficient reason of existence in space: for it is + only as referred to this that some kind of meaning and sense can be + attached to the laboured deductions of the way in which the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ego</span></em> produces and fabricates the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">non-ego</span></em> from itself, which form + the content of the most senseless, and consequently the most + wearisome book that was ever written. This philosophy of Fichte, + otherwise not worth mentioning, is interesting to us only as the + tardy expression of the converse of the old materialism. For + materialism was the most consistent system starting from the + object, as this is the most consistent system starting from the + subject. Materialism overlooked the fact that, with the simplest + object, it assumed the subject also; and Fichte overlooked the fact + that with the subject (whatever he may call it) he assumed the + object also, for no subject is thinkable without an object. Besides + this he forgot that all <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> deduction, indeed all demonstration in + general, must rest upon some necessity, and that all necessity is + based on the principle of sufficient reason, because to be + necessary, and to follow from given grounds are convertible + conceptions.<a id="noteref_10" name="noteref_10" href= + "#note_10"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">10</span></span></a> But + the principle of sufficient reason is just the universal form of + the object as such. Thus it is in the object, but is not valid + before <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page044">[pg + 044]</span><a name="Pg044" id="Pg044" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and outside of it; it first produces the object and makes it appear + in conformity with its regulative principle. We see then that the + system which starts from the subject contains the same fallacy as + the system, explained above, which starts from the object; it + begins by assuming what it proposes to deduce, the necessary + correlative of its starting-point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The method of + our own system is <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">toto genere</span></span> + distinct from these two opposite misconceptions, for we start + neither from the object nor from the subject, but from the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, as the first fact of + consciousness. Its first essential, fundamental form is the + antithesis of subject and object. The form of the object again is + the principle of sufficient reason in its various forms. Each of + these reigns so absolutely in its own class of ideas that, as we + have seen, when the special form of the principle of sufficient + reason which governs any class of ideas is known, the nature of the + whole class is known also: for the whole class, as idea, is no more + than this form of the principle of sufficient reason itself; so + that time itself is nothing but the principle of existence in it, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, succession; space is + nothing but the principle of existence in it, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + position; matter is nothing but causality; the concept (as will + appear immediately) is nothing but relation to a ground of + knowledge. This thorough and consistent relativity of the world as + idea, both according to its universal form (subject and object), + and according to the form which is subordinate to this (the + principle of sufficient reason) warns us, as we said before, to + seek the inner nature of the world in an aspect of it which is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">quite + different and quite distinct from the idea</span></em>; and in the + next book we shall find this in a fact which is just as immediate + to every living being as the idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But we must + first consider that class of ideas which belongs to man alone. The + matter of these is the concept, and the subjective correlative is + reason, just as the subjective correlative of the ideas we have + already considered <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page045">[pg + 045]</span><a name="Pg045" id="Pg045" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + was understanding and sensibility, which are also to be attributed + to all the lower animals.<a id="noteref_11" name="noteref_11" href= + "#note_11"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">11</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 8. As from the + direct light of the sun to the borrowed light of the moon, we pass + from the immediate idea of perception, which stands by itself and + is its own warrant, to reflection, to the abstract, discursive + concepts of the reason, which obtain their whole content from + knowledge of perception, and in relation to it. As long as we + continue simply to perceive, all is clear, firm, and certain. There + are neither questions nor doubts nor errors; we desire to go no + further, can go no further; we find rest in perceiving, and + satisfaction in the present. Perception suffices for itself, and + therefore what springs purely from it, and remains true to it, for + example, a genuine work of art, can never be false, nor can it be + discredited through the lapse of time, for it does not present an + opinion but the thing itself. But with abstract knowledge, with + reason, doubt and error appear in the theoretical, care and sorrow + in the practical. In the idea of perception, illusion may at + moments take the place of the real; but in the sphere of abstract + thought, error may reign for a thousand years, impose its yoke upon + whole nations, extend to the noblest impulses of humanity, and, by + the help of its slaves and its dupes, may chain and fetter those + whom it cannot deceive. It is the enemy against which the wisest + men of all times have waged unequal war, and only what they have + won from it has become the possession of mankind. Therefore it is + well to draw attention to it at once, as we already tread the + ground to which its province belongs. It has often been said that + we ought to follow truth even although no utility can be seen in + it, because it may have indirect utility which may appear when it + is least expected; and I would add to this, that we ought to be + just as anxious to discover and to root out all error even + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page046">[pg 046]</span><a name= + "Pg046" id="Pg046" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> when no harm is + anticipated from it, because its mischief may be very indirect, and + may suddenly appear when we do not expect it, for all error has + poison at its heart. If it is mind, if it is knowledge, that makes + man the lord of creation, there can be no such thing as harmless + error, still less venerable and holy error. And for the consolation + of those who in any way and at any time may have devoted strength + and life to the noble and hard battle against error, I cannot + refrain from adding that, so long as truth is absent, error will + have free play, as owls and bats in the night; but sooner would we + expect to see the owls and the bats drive back the sun in the + eastern heavens, than that any truth which has once been known and + distinctly and fully expressed, can ever again be so utterly + vanquished and overcome that the old error shall once more reign + undisturbed over its wide kingdom. This is the power of truth; its + conquest is slow and laborious, but if once the victory be gained + it can never be wrested back again.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Besides the + ideas we have as yet considered, which, according to their + construction, could be referred to time, space, and matter, if we + consider them with reference to the object, or to pure sensibility + and understanding (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, knowledge of causality), + if we consider them with reference to the subject, another faculty + of knowledge has appeared in man alone of all earthly creatures, an + entirely new consciousness, which, with very appropriate and + significant exactness, is called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reflection</span></em>. For it is in fact + derived from the knowledge of perception, and is a reflected + appearance of it. But it has assumed a nature fundamentally + different. The forms of perception do not affect it, and even the + principle of sufficient reason which reigns over all objects has an + entirely different aspect with regard to it. It is just this new, + more highly endowed, consciousness, this abstract reflex of all + that belongs to perception in that conception of the reason which + has nothing to do with perception, that gives to man that + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page047">[pg 047]</span><a name= + "Pg047" id="Pg047" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> thoughtfulness which + distinguishes his consciousness so entirely from that of the lower + animals, and through which his whole behaviour upon earth is so + different from that of his irrational fellow-creatures. He far + surpasses them in power and also in suffering. They live in the + present alone, he lives also in the future and the past. They + satisfy the needs of the moment, he provides by the most ingenious + preparations for the future, yea for days that he shall never see. + They are entirely dependent on the impression of the moment, on the + effect of the perceptible motive; he is determined by abstract + conceptions independent of the present. Therefore he follows + predetermined plans, he acts from maxims, without reference to his + surroundings or the accidental impression of the moment. Thus, for + example, he can make with composure deliberate preparations for his + own death, he can dissemble past finding out, and can carry his + secret with him to the grave; lastly, he has an actual choice + between several motives; for only in the abstract can such motives, + present together in consciousness, afford the knowledge with regard + to themselves, that the one excludes the other, and can thus + measure themselves against each other with reference to their power + over the will. The motive that overcomes, in that it decides the + question at issue, is the deliberate determinant of the will, and + is a sure indication of its character. The brute, on the other + hand, is determined by the present impression; only the fear of + present compulsion can constrain its desires, until at last this + fear has become custom, and as such continues to determine it; this + is called training. The brute feels and perceives; man, in addition + to this, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thinks</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">knows</span></em>: + both <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>. The brute expresses its + feelings and dispositions by gestures and sounds; man communicates + his thought to others, or, if he wishes, he conceals it, by means + of speech. Speech is the first production, and also the necessary + organ of his reason. Therefore in Greek and Italian, speech and + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page048">[pg 048]</span><a name= + "Pg048" id="Pg048" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> reason are expressed + by the same word; ὁ λογος, <span lang="it" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="it"><span style="font-style: italic">il + discorso</span></span>. <span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Vernunft</span></span> is derived from + <span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vernehmen</span></span>, which is not a + synonym for the verb to hear, but signifies the consciousness of + the meaning of thoughts communicated in words. It is by the help of + language alone that reason accomplishes its most important + achievements,—the united action of several individuals, the planned + co-operation of many thousands, civilisation, the state; also + science, the storing up of experience, the uniting of common + properties in one concept, the communication of truth, the spread + of error, thoughts and poems, dogmas and superstitions. The brute + first knows death when it dies, but man draws consciously nearer to + it every hour that he lives; and this makes life at times a + questionable good even to him who has not recognised this character + of constant annihilation in the whole of life. Principally on this + account man has philosophies and religions, though it is uncertain + whether the qualities we admire most in his conduct, voluntary + rectitude and nobility of feeling, were ever the fruit of either of + them. As results which certainly belong only to them, and as + productions of reason in this sphere, we may refer to the + marvellous and monstrous opinions of philosophers of various + schools, and the extraordinary and sometimes cruel customs of the + priests of different religions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is the + universal opinion of all times and of all nations that these + manifold and far-reaching achievements spring from a common + principle, from that peculiar intellectual power which belongs + distinctively to man and which has been called reason, ὁ λογος, το + λογιστικον, το λογιμον, <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ratio</span></span>. Besides this, no one + finds any difficulty in recognising the manifestations of this + faculty, and in saying what is rational and what is irrational, + where reason appears as distinguished from the other faculties and + qualities of man, or lastly, in pointing out what, on account of + the want of reason, we must never expect even from the most + sensible brute. The philosophers <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page049">[pg 049]</span><a name="Pg049" id="Pg049" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of all ages may be said to be on the whole at + one about this general knowledge of reason, and they have also + given prominence to several very important manifestations of it; + such as, the control of the emotions and passions, the capacity for + drawing conclusions and formulating general principles, even such + as are true prior to all experience, and so forth. Still all their + explanations of the peculiar nature of reason are wavering, not + clearly defined, discursive, without unity and concentration; now + laying stress on one manifestation, now on another, and therefore + often at variance with each other. Besides this, many start from + the opposition between reason and revelation, a distinction which + is unknown to philosophy, and which only increases confusion. It is + very remarkable that up till now no philosopher has referred these + manifold expressions of reason to one simple function which would + be recognised in them all, from which they would all be explained, + and which would therefore constitute the real inner nature of + reason. It is true that the excellent Locke in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Essay on the Human Understanding”</span> (Book II., + ch. xi., §§ 10 and 11), very rightly refers to general concepts as + the characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes, and + Leibnitz quotes this with full approval in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humaine”</span> + (Book II., ch. xi., §§ 10 and 11.) But when Locke (in Book IV., ch. + xvii., §§ 2 and 3) comes to the special explanation of reason he + entirely loses sight of this simple, primary characteristic, and he + also falls into a wavering, undetermined, incomplete account of + mangled and derivative manifestations of it. Leibnitz also, in the + corresponding part of his work, behaves in a similar manner, only + with more confusion and indistinctness. In the Appendix, I have + fully considered how Kant confused and falsified the conception of + the nature of reason. But whoever will take the trouble to go + through in this reference the mass of philosophical writing which + has appeared since <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page050">[pg + 050]</span><a name="Pg050" id="Pg050" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Kant, will find out, that just as the faults of princes must be + expiated by whole nations, the errors of great minds extend their + influence over whole generations, and even over centuries; they + grow and propagate themselves, and finally degenerate into + monstrosities. All this arises from the fact that, as Berkeley + says, <span class="tei tei-q">“Few men think; yet all will have + opinions.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + understanding has only one function—immediate knowledge of the + relation of cause and effect. Yet the perception of the real world, + and all common sense, sagacity, and inventiveness, however + multifarious their applications may be, are quite clearly seen to + be nothing more than manifestations of that one function. So also + the reason has one function; and from it all the manifestations of + reason we have mentioned, which distinguish the life of man from + that of the brutes, may easily be explained. The application or the + non-application of this function is all that is meant by what men + have everywhere and always called rational and irrational.<a id= + "noteref_12" name="noteref_12" href="#note_12"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">12</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 9. Concepts + form a distinct class of ideas, existing only in the mind of man, + and entirely different from the ideas of perception which we have + considered up till now. We can therefore never attain to a sensuous + and, properly speaking, evident knowledge of their nature, but only + to a knowledge which is abstract and discursive. It would, + therefore, be absurd to demand that they should be verified in + experience, if by experience is meant the real external world, + which consists of ideas of perception, or that they should be + brought before the eyes or the imagination like objects of + perception. They can only be thought, not perceived, and only the + effects which men accomplish through them are properly objects of + experience. Such effects are language, preconceived and planned + action and science, and all that results from these. <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page051">[pg 051]</span><a name="Pg051" id="Pg051" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Speech, as an object of outer + experience, is obviously nothing more than a very complete + telegraph, which communicates arbitrary signs with the greatest + rapidity and the finest distinctions of difference. But what do + these signs mean? How are they interpreted? When some one speaks, + do we at once translate his words into pictures of the fancy, which + instantaneously flash upon us, arrange and link themselves + together, and assume form and colour according to the words that + are poured forth, and their grammatical inflections? What a tumult + there would be in our brains while we listened to a speech, or to + the reading of a book? But what actually happens is not this at + all. The meaning of a speech is, as a rule, immediately grasped, + accurately and distinctly taken in, without the imagination being + brought into play. It is reason which speaks to reason, keeping + within its own province. It communicates and receives abstract + conceptions, ideas that cannot be presented in perceptions, which + are framed once for all, and are relatively few in number, but + which yet encompass, contain, and represent all the innumerable + objects of the actual world. This itself is sufficient to prove + that the lower animals can never learn to speak or comprehend, + although they have the organs of speech and ideas of perception in + common with us. But because words represent this perfectly distinct + class of ideas, whose subjective correlative is reason, they are + without sense and meaning for the brutes. Thus language, like every + other manifestation which we ascribe to reason, and like everything + which distinguishes man from the brutes, is to be explained from + this as its one simple source—conceptions, abstract ideas which + cannot be presented in perception, but are general, and have no + individual existence in space and time. Only in single cases do we + pass from the conception to the perception, do we construct images + as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">representatives of concepts</span></em> in + perception, to which, however, they are never adequate. These cases + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page052">[pg 052]</span><a name= + "Pg052" id="Pg052" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> are fully discussed + in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 28, and + therefore I shall not repeat my explanation here. It may be + compared, however, with what is said by Hume in the twelfth of his + <span class="tei tei-q">“Philosophical Essays,”</span> p. 244, and + by Herder in the <span class="tei tei-q">“Metacritik,”</span> pt. + i. p. 274 (an otherwise worthless book). The Platonic idea, the + possibility of which depends upon the union of imagination and + reason, is the principal subject of the third book of this + work.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Although + concepts are fundamentally different from ideas of perception, they + stand in a necessary relation to them, without which they would be + nothing. This relation therefore constitutes the whole nature and + existence of concepts. Reflection is the necessary copy or + repetition of the originally presented world of perception, but it + is a special kind of copy in an entirely different material. Thus + concepts may quite properly be called ideas of ideas. The principle + of sufficient reason has here also a special form. Now we have seen + that the form under which the principle of sufficient reason + appears in a class of ideas always constitutes and exhausts the + whole nature of the class, so far as it consists of ideas, so that + time is throughout succession, and nothing more; space is + throughout position, and nothing more; matter is throughout + causation, and nothing more. In the same way the whole nature of + concepts, or the class of abstract ideas, consists simply in the + relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in + them; and as this is the relation to the ground of knowledge, the + whole nature of the abstract idea is simply and solely its relation + to another idea, which is its ground of knowledge. This, indeed, + may, in the first instance, be a concept, an abstract idea, and + this again may have only a similar abstract ground of knowledge; + but the chain of grounds of knowledge does not extend <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>; it must end at + last in a concept which has its ground in knowledge of perception; + for the whole world of reflection <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page053">[pg 053]</span><a name="Pg053" id="Pg053" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> rests on the world of perception as its + ground of knowledge. Hence the class of abstract ideas is in this + respect distinguished from other classes; in the latter the + principle of sufficient reason always demands merely a relation to + another idea of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">same</span></em> class, but in the case of + abstract ideas, it at last demands a relation to an idea of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">another</span></em> class.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Those concepts + which, as has just been pointed out, are not immediately related to + the world of perception, but only through the medium of one, or it + may be several other concepts, have been called by preference + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstracta</span></span>, and those which have + their ground immediately in the world of perception have been + called <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">concreta</span></span>. But + this last name is only loosely applicable to the concepts denoted + by it, for they are always merely <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstracta</span></span>, and not ideas of + perception. These names, which have originated in a very dim + consciousness of the distinctions they imply, may yet, with this + explanation, be retained. As examples of the first kind of + concepts, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstracta</span></span> in the fullest sense, + we may take <span class="tei tei-q">“relation,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“virtue,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“investigation,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“beginning,”</span> and so on. As examples of the + second kind, loosely called <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">concreta</span></span>, we may take such + concepts as <span class="tei tei-q">“man,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“stone,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“horse,”</span> + &c. If it were not a somewhat too pictorial and therefore + absurd simile, we might very appropriately call the latter the + ground floor, and the former the upper stories of the building of + reflection.<a id="noteref_13" name="noteref_13" href= + "#note_13"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">13</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is not, as is + commonly supposed, an essential characteristic of a concept that it + should contain much under it, that is to say, that many ideas of + perception, or it may be other abstract ideas, should stand to it + in the relation of its ground of knowledge, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + be thought through it. This is merely a derived and secondary + characteristic, and, as a matter of fact, does not always exist, + though it must always exist potentially. This characteristic arises + from the fact that a concept is an <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page054">[pg 054]</span><a name="Pg054" id="Pg054" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> idea of an idea, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + its whole nature consists in its relation to another idea; but as + it is not this idea itself, which is generally an idea of + perception and therefore belongs to quite a different class, the + latter may have temporal, spacial, and other determinations, and in + general many relations which are not thought along with it in the + concept. Thus we see that several ideas which are different in + unessential particulars may be thought by means of one concept, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, may be brought under it. + Yet this power of embracing several things is not an essential but + merely an accidental characteristic of the concept. There may be + concepts through which only one real object is thought, but which + are nevertheless abstract and general, by no means capable of + presentation individually and as perceptions. Such, for example, is + the conception which any one may have of a particular town which he + only knows from geography; although only this one town is thought + under it, it might yet be applied to several towns differing in + certain respects. We see then that a concept is not general because + of being abstracted from several objects; but conversely, because + generality, that is to say, non-determination of the particular, + belongs to the concept as an abstract idea of the reason, different + things can be thought by means of the same one.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It follows from + what has been said that every concept, just because it is abstract + and incapable of presentation in perception, and is therefore not a + completely determined idea, has what is called extension or sphere, + even in the case in which only one real object exists that + corresponds to it. Now we always find that the sphere of one + concept has something in common with the sphere of other concepts. + That is to say, part of what is thought under one concept is the + same as what is thought under other concepts; and conversely, part + of what is thought under these concepts is the same as what is + thought under the first; although, if they are <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page055">[pg 055]</span><a name="Pg055" id="Pg055" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> really different concepts, each of + them, or at least one of them, contains something which the other + does not contain; this is the relation in which every subject + stands to its predicate. The recognition of this relation is called + judgment. The representation of these spheres by means of figures + in space, is an exceedingly happy idea. It first occurred to + Gottfried Plouquet, who used squares for the purpose. Lambert, + although later than him, used only lines, which he placed under + each other. Euler carried out the idea completely with circles. + Upon what this complete analogy between the relations of concepts, + and those of figures in space, ultimately rests, I am unable to + say. It is, however, a very fortunate circumstance for logic that + all the relations of concepts, according to their possibility, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, may be made plain in perception by the use of + such figures, in the following way:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">(1.) The spheres + of two concepts coincide: for example the concept of necessity and + the concept of following from given grounds, in the same way the + concepts of <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Ruminantia</span></span> and <span class= + "tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Bisulca</span></span> (ruminating and + cloven-hoofed animals), also those of vertebrate and red-blooded + animals (although there might be some doubt about this on account + of the annelida): they are convertible concepts. Such concepts are + represented by a single circle which stands for either of them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">(2.) The sphere + of one concept includes that of the other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 50%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/illus_091.png" alt= + "Illustration: Category "horse" within category "animal"." /></div><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page056">[pg 056]</span><a name="Pg056" id="Pg056" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">(3.) A sphere + includes two or more spheres which exclude each other and fill + it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 50%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/illus_092_a.png" alt= + "Illustration: Circle divided into thirds "right", "acute", and "obtuse"." /></div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">(4.) Two spheres + include each a part of the other.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 50%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/illus_092_b.png" alt= + "Illustration: Two overlapping circles, one "flower" and one "red"." /></div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">(5.) Two spheres + lie in a third, but do not fill it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 50%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/illus_092_c.png" alt= + "Illustration: A large circle, "matter", within which are two other circles, "water" and "earth"." /></div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This last case + applies to all concepts whose spheres have nothing immediately in + common, for there is always a third sphere, often a much wider one, + which includes both.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To these cases + all combinations of concepts may be referred, and from them the + entire doctrine of the judgment, its conversion, contraposition, + equipollence, disjunction (this according to the third figure) may + be deduced. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page057">[pg + 057]</span><a name="Pg057" id="Pg057" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + From these also may be derived the properties of the judgment, upon + which Kant based his pretended categories of the understanding, + with the exception however of the hypothetical form, which is not a + combination of concepts, but of judgments. A full account is given + in the Appendix of <span class="tei tei-q">“Modality,”</span> and + indeed of every property of judgments on which the categories are + founded.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">With regard to + the possible combinations of concepts which we have given, it has + only further to be remarked that they may also be combined with + each other in many ways. For example, the fourth figure with the + second. Only if one sphere, which partly or wholly contains + another, is itself contained in a third sphere, do these together + exemplify the syllogism in the first figure, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + that combination of judgments, by means of which it is known that a + concept which is partly or wholly contained in another concept, is + also contained in a third concept, which again contains the first: + and also, conversely, the negation; the pictorial representation of + which can, of course, only be two connected spheres which do not + lie within a third sphere. If many spheres are brought together in + this way we get a long train of syllogisms. This schematism of + concepts, which has already been fairly well explained in more than + one textbook, may be used as the foundation of the doctrine of the + judgment, and indeed of the whole syllogistic theory, and in this + way the treatment of both becomes very easy and simple. Because, + through it, all syllogistic rules may be seen in their origin, and + may be deduced and explained. It is not necessary, however, to load + the memory with these rules, as logic is never of practical use, + but has only a theoretical interest for philosophy. For although it + may be said that logic is related to rational thinking as + thorough-bass is to music, or less exactly, as ethics is to virtue, + or æsthetics to art; we must yet remember that no one ever became + an artist by the study of æsthetics; that a noble character was + never <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page058">[pg 058]</span><a name= + "Pg058" id="Pg058" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> formed by the study + of ethics; that long before Rameau, men composed correctly and + beautifully, and that we do not need to know thorough-bass in order + to detect discords: and just as little do we need to know logic in + order to avoid being misled by fallacies. Yet it must be conceded + that thorough-bass is of the greatest use in the practice of + musical composition, although it may not be necessary for the + understanding of it; and indeed æsthetics and even ethics, though + in a much less degree, and for the most part negatively, may be of + some use in practice, so that we cannot deny them all practical + worth, but of logic even this much cannot be conceded. It is + nothing more than the knowledge in the abstract of what every one + knows in the concrete. Therefore we call in the aid of logical + rules, just as little to enable us to construct a correct argument + as to prevent us from consenting to a false one, and the most + learned logician lays aside the rules of logic altogether in his + actual thought. This may be explained in the following way. Every + science is a system of general and therefore abstract truths, laws, + and rules with reference to a special class of objects. The + individual case coming under these laws is determined in accordance + with this general knowledge, which is valid once for all; because + such application of the general principle is far easier than the + exhaustive investigation of the particular case; for the general + abstract knowledge which has once been obtained is always more + within our reach than the empirical investigation of the particular + case. With logic, however, it is just the other way. It is the + general knowledge of the mode of procedure of the reason expressed + in the form of rules. It is reached by the introspection of reason, + and by abstraction from all content. But this mode of procedure is + necessary and essential to reason, so that it will never depart + from it if left to itself. It is, therefore, easier and surer to + let it proceed itself according to its nature in each particular + case, than to <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page059">[pg + 059]</span><a name="Pg059" id="Pg059" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + present to it the knowledge abstracted from this procedure in the + form of a foreign and externally given law. It is easier, because, + while in the case of all other sciences, the general rule is more + within our reach than the investigation of the particular case + taken by itself; with the use of reason, on the contrary, its + necessary procedure in a given case is always more within our reach + than the general rule abstracted from it; for that which thinks in + us is reason itself. It is surer, because a mistake may more easily + occur in such abstract knowledge, or in its application, than that + a process of reason should take place which would run contrary to + its essence and nature. Hence arises the remarkable fact, that + while in other sciences the particular case is always proved by the + rule, in logic, on the contrary, the rule must always be proved + from the particular case; and even the most practised logician, if + he remark that in some particular case he concludes otherwise than + the rule prescribes, will always expect to find a mistake in the + rule rather than in his own conclusion. To desire to make practical + use of logic means, therefore, to desire to derive with unspeakable + trouble, from general rules, that which is immediately known with + the greatest certainty in the particular case. It is just as if a + man were to consult mechanics as to the motion of his body, and + physiology as to his digestion; and whoever has learnt logic for + practical purposes is like him who would teach a beaver to make its + own dam. Logic is, therefore, without practical utility; but it + must nevertheless be retained, because it has philosophical + interest as the special knowledge of the organisation and action of + reason. It is rightly regarded as a definite, self-subsisting, + self-contained, complete, and thoroughly safe discipline; to be + treated scientifically for itself alone and independently of + everything else, and therefore to be studied at the universities. + But it has its real value, in relation to philosophy as a whole, in + the inquiry into the nature of knowledge, and indeed of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page060">[pg 060]</span><a name= + "Pg060" id="Pg060" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> rational and + abstract knowledge. Therefore the exposition of logic should not + have so much the form of a practical science, should not contain + merely naked arbitrary rules for the correct formation of the + judgment, the syllogism, &c., but should rather be directed to + the knowledge of the nature of reason and the concept, and to the + detailed investigation of the principle of sufficient reason of + knowing. For logic is only a paraphrase of this principle, and, + more exactly, only of that exemplification of it in which the + ground that gives truth to the judgment is neither empirical nor + metaphysical, but logical or metalogical. Besides the principle of + sufficient reason of knowing, it is necessary to take account of + the three remaining fundamental laws of thought, or judgments of + metalogical truth, so nearly related to it; and out of these the + whole science of reason grows. The nature of thought proper, that + is to say, of the judgment and the syllogism, must be exhibited in + the combination of the spheres of concepts, according to the + analogy of the special schema, in the way shown above; and from all + this the rules of the judgment and the syllogism are to be deduced + by construction. The only practical use we can make of logic is in + a debate, when we can convict our antagonist of his intentional + fallacies, rather than of his actual mistakes, by giving them their + technical names. By thus throwing into the background the practical + aim of logic, and bringing out its connection with the whole scheme + of philosophy as one of its chapters, we do not think that we shall + make the study of it less prevalent than it is just now. For at the + present day every one who does not wish to remain uncultured, and + to be numbered with the ignorant and incompetent multitude, must + study speculative philosophy. For the nineteenth century is a + philosophical age, though by this we do not mean either that it has + philosophy, or that philosophy governs it, but rather that it is + ripe for philosophy, and, therefore, stands in need of it. This is + a sign of a high <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page061">[pg + 061]</span><a name="Pg061" id="Pg061" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + degree of civilisation, and indeed, is a definite stage in the + culture of the ages.<a id="noteref_14" name="noteref_14" href= + "#note_14"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">14</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Though logic is + of so little practical use, it cannot be denied that it was + invented for practical purposes. It appears to me to have + originated in the following way:—As the love of debating developed + among the Eleatics, the Megarics, and the Sophists, and by degrees + became almost a passion, the confusion in which nearly every debate + ended must have made them feel the necessity of a method of + procedure as a guide; and for this a scientific dialectic had to be + sought. The first thing which would have to be observed would be + that both the disputing parties should always be agreed on some one + proposition, to which the disputed points might be referred. The + beginning of the methodical procedure consisted in this, that the + propositions admitted on both sides were formally stated to be so, + and placed at the head of the inquiry. But these propositions were + at first concerned only with the material of the inquiry. It was + soon observed that in the process of going back to the truth + admitted on both sides, and of deducing their assertions from it, + each party followed certain forms and laws about which, without any + express agreement, there was no difference of opinion. And from + this it became evident that these must constitute the peculiar and + natural procedure of reason itself, the form of investigation. + Although this was not exposed to any doubt or difference of + opinion, some pedantically systematic philosopher hit upon the idea + that it would look well, and be the completion of the method of + dialectic, if this formal part of all discussion, this regular + procedure of reason itself, were to be expressed in abstract + propositions, just like the substantial propositions admitted on + both sides, and placed at the beginning of every investigation, as + the fixed canon of debate to which reference and appeal must always + be made. In this <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page062">[pg + 062]</span><a name="Pg062" id="Pg062" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + way what had formerly been followed only by tacit agreement, and + instinctively, would be consciously recognised and formally + expressed. By degrees, more or less perfect expressions were found + for the fundamental principles of logic, such as the principles of + contradiction, sufficient reason, excluded middle, the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">dictum de omni et nullo</span></span>, as well + as the special rules of the syllogism, as for example, <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ex meris particularibus aut negativis nihil + sequitur, a rationato ad rationem non valet + consequentia</span></span>, and so on. That all this was only + brought about slowly, and with great pains, and up till the time of + Aristotle remained very incomplete, is evident from the awkward and + tedious way in which logical truths are brought out in many of the + Platonic dialogues, and still more from what Sextus Empiricus tells + us of the controversies of the Megarics, about the easiest and + simplest logical rules, and the laborious way in which they were + brought into a definite form (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. 8, p. 112). + But Aristotle collected, arranged, and corrected all that had been + discovered before his time, and brought it to an incomparably + greater state of perfection. If we thus observe how the course of + Greek culture had prepared the way for, and led up to the work of + Aristotle, we shall be little inclined to believe the assertion of + the Persian author, quoted by Sir William Jones with much approval, + that Kallisthenes found a complete system of logic among the + Indians, and sent it to his uncle Aristotle (Asiatic Researches, + vol. iv. p. 163). It is easy to understand that in the dreary + middle ages the Aristotelian logic would be very acceptable to the + controversial spirit of the schoolmen, which, in the absence of all + real knowledge, spent its energy upon mere formulas and words, and + that it would be eagerly adopted even in its mutilated Arabian + form, and presently established as the centre of all knowledge. + Though its authority has since declined, yet up to our own time + logic has retained the credit of a self-contained, practical, and + highly important <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page063">[pg + 063]</span><a name="Pg063" id="Pg063" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + science. Indeed, in our own day, the Kantian philosophy, the + foundation-stone of which is taken from logic, has excited a new + interest in it; which, in this respect, at any rate, that is, as + the means of the knowledge of the nature of reason, it + deserves.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Correct and + accurate conclusions may be arrived at if we carefully observe the + relation of the spheres of concepts, and only conclude that one + sphere is contained in a third sphere, when we have clearly seen + that this first sphere is contained in a second, which in its turn + is contained in the third. On the other hand, the art of sophistry + lies in casting only a superficial glance at the relations of the + spheres of the concepts, and then manipulating these relations to + suit our purposes, generally in the following way:—When the sphere + of an observed concept lies partly within that of another concept, + and partly within a third altogether different sphere, we treat it + as if it lay entirely within the one or the other, as may suit our + purpose. For example, in speaking of passion, we may subsume it + under the concept of the greatest force, the mightiest agency in + the world, or under the concept of the irrational, and this again + under the concept of impotency or weakness. We may then repeat the + process, and start anew with each concept to which the argument + leads us. A concept has almost always several others, which + partially come under it, and each of these contains part of the + sphere of the first, but also includes in its own sphere something + more, which is not in the first. But we draw attention only to that + one of these latter concepts, under which we wish to subsume the + first, and let the others remain unobserved, or keep them + concealed. On the possession of this skill depends the whole art of + sophistry and all finer fallacies; for logical fallacies such as + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">mentiens</span></span>, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">velatus</span></span>, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cornatus</span></span>, &c., are clearly + too clumsy for actual use. I am not aware that hitherto any one has + traced the nature of all sophistry and persuasion back to this last + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page064">[pg 064]</span><a name= + "Pg064" id="Pg064" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> possible ground of + its existence, and referred it to the peculiar character of + concepts, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, to the procedure of reason + itself. Therefore, as my exposition has led me to it, though it is + very easily understood, I will illustrate it in the following table + by means of a schema. This table is intended to show how the + spheres of concepts overlap each other at many points, and so leave + room for a passage from each concept to whichever one we please of + several other concepts. I hope, however, that no one will be led by + this table to attach more importance to this little explanation, + which I have merely given in passing, than ought to belong to it, + from the nature of the subject. I have chosen as an illustration + the concept of travelling. Its sphere partially includes four + others, to any of which the sophist may pass at will; these again + partly include other spheres, several of them two or more at once, + and through these the sophist takes whichever way he chooses, + always as if it were the only way, till at last he reaches, in good + or evil, whatever end he may have in view. In passing from one + sphere to another, it is only necessary always to follow the + direction from the centre (the given chief concept) to the + circumference, and never to reverse this process. Such a piece of + sophistry may be either an unbroken speech, or it may assume the + strict syllogistic form, according to what is the weak side of the + hearer. Most scientific arguments, and especially philosophical + demonstrations, are at bottom not much more than this, for how else + would it be possible, that so much, in different ages, has not only + been falsely apprehended (for error itself has a different source), + but demonstrated and proved, and has yet afterwards been found to + be fundamentally wrong, for example, the Leibnitz-Wolfian + Philosophy, Ptolemaic Astronomy, Stahl's Chemistry, Newton's Theory + of Colours, &c. &c.<a id="noteref_15" name="noteref_15" + href="#note_15"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">15</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 10. Through + all this, the question presses ever more upon us, how <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">certainty</span></em> is to be attained, how + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">judgments</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page065">[pg 065]</span><a name="Pg065" id="Pg065" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">are to be + established</span></em>, what constitutes <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">rational + knowledge</span></em>, (<span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>), and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">science</span></em>, which we rank with + language and deliberate action as the third great benefit conferred + by reason.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Reason is + feminine in nature; it can only give after it has received. Of + itself it has nothing but the empty forms of its operation. There + is no absolutely pure rational knowledge except the four principles + to which I have attributed metalogical truth; the principles of + identity, contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason of + knowledge. For even the rest of logic is not absolutely pure + rational knowledge. It presupposes the relations and the + combinations of the spheres of concepts. But concepts in general + only exist after experience of ideas of perception, and as their + whole nature consists in their relation to these, it is clear that + they presuppose them. No special content, however, is presupposed, + but merely the existence of a content generally, and so logic as a + whole may fairly pass for pure rational science. In all other + sciences reason has received its content from ideas of perception; + in mathematics from the relations of space and time, presented in + intuition or perception prior to all experience; in pure natural + science, that is, in what we know of the course of nature prior to + any experience, the content of the science proceeds from the pure + understanding, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, from the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> knowledge of the law of + causality and its connection with those pure intuitions or + perceptions of space and time. In all other sciences everything + that is not derived from the sources we have just referred to + belongs to experience. Speaking generally, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">to know + rationally</span></em> (<span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>) means to have in the + power of the mind, and capable of being reproduced at will, such + judgments as have their sufficient ground of knowledge in something + outside themselves, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, are true. Thus only + abstract cognition is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">rational knowledge</span></em> (<span lang= + "de" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>), which is therefore the + result of reason, so that we cannot accurately say of the lower + animals that they <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">rationally</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page066">[pg 066]</span><a name="Pg066" id="Pg066" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style= + "font-style: italic">know</span></em> (<span lang="de" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>) anything, although they + have apprehension of what is presented in perception, and memory of + this, and consequently imagination, which is further proved by the + circumstance that they dream. We attribute consciousness to them, + and therefore although the word (<span lang="de" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bewusstsein</span></span>) is derived from the + verb to know rationally (<span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>), the conception of + consciousness corresponds generally with that of idea of whatever + kind it may be. Thus we attribute life to plants, but not + consciousness. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Rational knowledge</span></em> (<span lang= + "de" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>) is therefore abstract + consciousness, the permanent possession in concepts of the reason, + of what has become known in another way.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 11. In this + regard the direct opposite of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">rational knowledge</span></em> is feeling, and + therefore we must insert the explanation of feeling here. The + concept which the word feeling denotes has merely a negative + content, which is this, that something which is present in + consciousness, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">is not a concept</span></em>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">is not abstract + rational knowledge</span></em>. Except this, whatever it may be, it + comes under the concept of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">feeling</span></em>. Thus the immeasurably + wide sphere of the concept of feeling includes the most different + kinds of objects, and no one can ever understand how they come + together until he has recognised that they all agree in this + negative respect, that they are not <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">abstract + concepts</span></em>. For the most diverse and even antagonistic + elements lie quietly side by side in this concept; for example, + religious feeling, feeling of sensual pleasure, moral feeling, + bodily feeling, as touch, pain, sense of colour, of sounds and + their harmonies and discords, feeling of hate, of disgust, of + self-satisfaction, of honour, of disgrace, of right, of wrong, + sense of truth, æsthetic feeling, feeling of power, weakness, + health, friendship, love, &c. &c. There is absolutely + nothing in common among them except the negative quality that they + are not abstract rational knowledge. But this diversity becomes + more striking when the apprehension of space relations presented + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> in perception, and also + the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page067">[pg 067]</span><a name= + "Pg067" id="Pg067" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> knowledge of the + pure understanding is brought under this concept, and when we say + of all knowledge and all truth, of which we are first conscious + only intuitively, and have not yet formulated in abstract concepts, + we <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">feel</span></em> it. I should like, for the + sake of illustration, to give some examples of this taken from + recent books, as they are striking proofs of my theory. I remember + reading in the introduction to a German translation of Euclid, that + we ought to make beginners in geometry draw the figures before + proceeding to demonstrate, for in this way they would already feel + geometrical truth before the demonstration brought them complete + knowledge. In the same way Schleiermacher speaks in his + <span class="tei tei-q">“Critique of Ethics”</span> of logical and + mathematical feeling (p. 339), and also of the feeling of the + sameness or difference of two formulas (p. 342). Again Tennemann in + his <span class="tei tei-q">“History of Philosophy”</span> (vol. + I., p. 361) says, <span class="tei tei-q">“One <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">felt</span></em> + that the fallacies were not right, but could not point out the + mistakes.”</span> Now, so long as we do not regard this concept + <span class="tei tei-q">“<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">feeling</span></em>”</span> from the right + point of view, and do not recognise that one negative + characteristic which alone is essential to it, it must constantly + give occasion for misunderstanding and controversy, on account of + the excessive wideness of its sphere, and its entirely negative and + very limited content which is determined in a purely one-sided + manner. Since then we have in German the nearly synonymous word + <span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">empfindung</span></span> (sensation), it would + be convenient to make use of it for bodily feeling, as a + sub-species. This concept <span class="tei tei-q">“feeling,”</span> + which is quite out of proportion to all others, doubtless + originated in the following manner. All concepts, and concepts + alone, are denoted by words; they exist only for the reason, and + proceed from it. With concepts, therefore, we are already at a + one-sided point of view; but from such a point of view what is near + appears distinct and is set down as positive, what is farther off + becomes mixed up and is soon regarded as merely <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page068">[pg 068]</span><a name="Pg068" id="Pg068" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> negative. Thus each nation calls all + others foreign: to the Greek all others are barbarians; to the + Englishman all that is not England or English is continent or + continental; to the believer all others are heretics, or heathens; + to the noble all others are <span class= + "tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">roturiers</span></span>; to the student all + others are Philistines, and so forth. Now, reason itself, strange + as it may seem, is guilty of the same one-sidedness, indeed one + might say of the same crude ignorance arising from vanity, for it + classes under the one concept, <span class="tei tei-q">“<em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">feeling</span></em>,”</span> every + modification of consciousness which does not immediately belong to + its own mode of apprehension, that is to say, which is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">not an abstract + concept</span></em>. It has had to pay the penalty of this hitherto + in misunderstanding and confusion in its own province, because its + own procedure had not become clear to it through thorough + self-knowledge, for a special faculty of feeling has been set up, + and new theories of it are constructed.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 12. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Rational + knowledge</span></em> (<span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>) is then all abstract + knowledge,—that is, the knowledge which is peculiar to the reason + as distinguished from the understanding. Its contradictory opposite + has just been explained to be the concept <span class= + "tei tei-q">“feeling.”</span> Now, as reason only reproduces, for + knowledge, what has been received in another way, it does not + actually extend our knowledge, but only gives it another form. It + enables us to know in the abstract and generally, what first became + known in sense-perception, in the concrete. But this is much more + important than it appears at first sight when so expressed. For it + depends entirely upon the fact that knowledge has become rational + or abstract knowledge (<span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="de"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wissen</span></span>), that it can be safely + preserved, that it is communicable and susceptible of certain and + wide-reaching application to practice. Knowledge in the form of + sense-perception is valid only of the particular case, extends only + to what is nearest, and ends with it, for sensibility and + understanding can only comprehend one object at a time. Every + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page069">[pg 069]</span><a name= + "Pg069" id="Pg069" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> enduring, arranged, + and planned activity must therefore proceed from principles,—that + is, from abstract knowledge, and it must be conducted in accordance + with them. Thus, for example, the knowledge of the relation of + cause and effect arrived at by the understanding, is in itself far + completer, deeper and more exhaustive than anything that can be + thought about it in the abstract; the understanding alone knows in + perception directly and completely the nature of the effect of a + lever, of a pulley, or a cog-wheel, the stability of an arch, and + so forth. But on account of the peculiarity of the knowledge of + perception just referred to, that it only extends to what is + immediately present, the mere understanding can never enable us to + construct machines and buildings. Here reason must come in; it must + substitute abstract concepts for ideas of perception, and take them + as the guide of action; and if they are right, the anticipated + result will happen. In the same way we have perfect knowledge in + pure perception of the nature and constitution of the parabola, + hyperbola, and spiral; but if we are to make trustworthy + application of this knowledge to the real, it must first become + abstract knowledge, and by this it certainly loses its character of + intuition or perception, but on the other hand it gains the + certainty and preciseness of abstract knowledge. The differential + calculus does not really extend our knowledge of the curve, it + contains nothing that was not already in the mere pure perception + of the curve; but it alters the kind of knowledge, it changes the + intuitive into an abstract knowledge, which is so valuable for + application. But here we must refer to another peculiarity of our + faculty of knowledge, which could not be observed until the + distinction between the knowledge of the senses and understanding + and abstract knowledge had been made quite clear. It is this, that + relations of space cannot as such be directly translated into + abstract knowledge, but only temporal quantities,—that is, numbers, + are suitable for this. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page070">[pg + 070]</span><a name="Pg070" id="Pg070" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Numbers alone can be expressed in abstract concepts which + accurately correspond to them, not spacial quantities. The concept + <span class="tei tei-q">“thousand”</span> is just as different from + the concept <span class="tei tei-q">“ten,”</span> as both these + temporal quantities are in perception. We think of a thousand as a + distinct multiple of ten, into which we can resolve it at pleasure + for perception in time,—that is to say, we can count it. But + between the abstract concept of a mile and that of a foot, apart + from any concrete perception of either, and without the help of + number, there is no accurate distinction corresponding to the + quantities themselves. In both we only think of a spacial quantity + in general, and if they must be completely distinguished we are + compelled either to call in the assistance of intuition or + perception in space, which would be a departure from abstract + knowledge, or we must think the difference in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">numbers</span></em>. If then we wish to have + abstract knowledge of space-relations we must first translate them + into time-relations,—that is, into numbers; therefore only + arithmetic, and not geometry, is the universal science of quantity, + and geometry must be translated into arithmetic if it is to be + communicable, accurately precise and applicable in practice. It is + true that a space-relation as such may also be thought in the + abstract; for example, <span class="tei tei-q">“the sine increases + as the angle,”</span> but if the quantity of this relation is to be + given, it requires number for its expression. This necessity, that + if we wish to have abstract knowledge of space-relations + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, rational knowledge, not + mere intuition or perception), space with its three dimensions must + be translated into time which has only one dimension, this + necessity it is, which makes mathematics so difficult. This becomes + very clear if we compare the perception of curves with their + analytical calculation, or the table of logarithms of the + trigonometrical functions with the perception of the changing + relations of the parts of a triangle, which are expressed by them. + What vast mazes of figures, what laborious calculations + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page071">[pg 071]</span><a name= + "Pg071" id="Pg071" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> it would require to + express in the abstract what perception here apprehends at a glance + completely and with perfect accuracy, namely, how the co-sine + diminishes as the sine increases, how the co-sine of one angle is + the sine of another, the inverse relation of the increase and + decrease of the two angles, and so forth. How time, we might say, + must complain, that with its one dimension it should be compelled + to express the three dimensions of space! Yet this is necessary if + we wish to possess, for application, an expression, in abstract + concepts, of space-relations. They could not be translated directly + into abstract concepts, but only through the medium of the pure + temporal quantity, number, which alone is directly related to + abstract knowledge. Yet it is worthy of remark, that as space + adapts itself so well to perception, and by means of its three + dimensions, even its complicated relations are easily apprehended, + while it eludes the grasp of abstract knowledge; time, on the + contrary, passes easily into abstract knowledge, but gives very + little to perception. Our perceptions of numbers in their proper + element, mere time, without the help of space, scarcely extends as + far as ten, and beyond that we have only abstract concepts of + numbers, no knowledge of them which can be presented in perception. + On the other hand, we connect with every numeral, and with all + algebraical symbols, accurately defined abstract concepts.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We may further + remark here that some minds only find full satisfaction in what is + known through perception. What they seek is the reason and + consequent of being in space, sensuously expressed; a demonstration + after the manner of Euclid, or an arithmetical solution of spacial + problems, does not please them. Other minds, on the contrary, seek + merely the abstract concepts which are needful for applying and + communicating knowledge. They have patience and memory for abstract + principles, formulas, demonstrations in long trains of reasoning, + and calculations, in which the symbols represent the most + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page072">[pg 072]</span><a name= + "Pg072" id="Pg072" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> complicated + abstractions. The latter seek preciseness, the former sensible + perception. The difference is characteristic.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The greatest + value of rational or abstract knowledge is that it can be + communicated and permanently retained. It is principally on this + account that it is so inestimably important for practice. Any one + may have a direct perceptive knowledge through the understanding + alone, of the causal connection, of the changes and motions of + natural bodies, and he may find entire satisfaction in it; but he + cannot communicate this knowledge to others until it has been made + permanent for thought in concepts. Knowledge of the first kind is + even sufficient for practice, if a man puts his knowledge into + practice himself, in an action which can be accomplished while the + perception is still vivid; but it is not sufficient if the help of + others is required, or even if the action is his own but must be + carried out at different times, and therefore requires a + pre-conceived plan. Thus, for example, a practised billiard-player + may have a perfect knowledge of the laws of the impact of elastic + bodies upon each other, merely in the understanding, merely for + direct perception; and for him it is quite sufficient; but on the + other hand it is only the man who has studied the science of + mechanics, who has, properly speaking, a rational knowledge of + these laws, that is, a knowledge of them in the abstract. Such + knowledge of the understanding in perception is sufficient even for + the construction of machines, when the inventor of the machine + executes the work himself; as we often see in the case of talented + workmen, who have no scientific knowledge. But whenever a number of + men, and their united action taking place at different times, is + required for the completion of a mechanical work, of a machine, or + a building, then he who conducts it must have thought out the plan + in the abstract, and such co-operative activity is only possible + through the assistance of reason. It is, however, remarkable that + in <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page073">[pg 073]</span><a name= + "Pg073" id="Pg073" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the first kind of + activity, in which we have supposed that one man alone, in an + uninterrupted course of action, accomplishes something, abstract + knowledge, the application of reason or reflection, may often be a + hindrance to him; for example, in the case of billiard-playing, of + fighting, of tuning an instrument, or in the case of singing. Here + perceptive knowledge must directly guide action; its passage + through reflection makes it uncertain, for it divides the attention + and confuses the man. Thus savages and untaught men, who are little + accustomed to think, perform certain physical exercises, fight with + beasts, shoot with bows and arrows and the like, with a certainty + and rapidity which the reflecting European never attains to, just + because his deliberation makes him hesitate and delay. For he + tries, for example, to hit the right position or the right point of + time, by finding out the mean between two false extremes; while the + savage hits it directly without thinking of the false courses open + to him. In the same way it is of no use to me to know in the + abstract the exact angle, in degrees and minutes, at which I must + apply a razor, if I do not know it intuitively, that is, if I have + not got it in my touch. The knowledge of physiognomy also, is + interfered with by the application of reason. This knowledge must + be gained directly through the understanding. We say that the + expression, the meaning of the features, can only be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">felt</span></em>, + that is, it cannot be put into abstract concepts. Every man has his + direct intuitive method of physiognomy and pathognomy, yet one man + understands more clearly than another these <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">signatura rerum</span></span>. But an abstract + science of physiognomy to be taught and learned is not possible; + for the distinctions of difference are here so fine that concepts + cannot reach them; therefore abstract knowledge is related to them + as a mosaic is to a painting by a Van der Werft or a Denner. In + mosaics, however fine they may be, the limits of the stones are + always there, and therefore no continuous passage from <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page074">[pg 074]</span><a name="Pg074" id="Pg074" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> one colour to another is possible, and + this is also the case with regard to concepts, with their rigidity + and sharp delineation; however finely we may divide them by exact + definition, they are still incapable of reaching the finer + modifications of the perceptible, and this is just what happens in + the example we have taken, knowledge of physiognomy.<a id= + "noteref_16" name="noteref_16" href="#note_16"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">16</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This quality of + concepts by which they resemble the stones of a mosaic, and on + account of which perception always remains their asymptote, is also + the reason why nothing good is produced in art by their means. If + the singer or the virtuoso attempts to guide his execution by + reflection he remains silent. And this is equally true of the + composer, the painter, and the poet. The concept always remains + unfruitful in art; it can only direct the technical part of it, its + sphere is science. We shall consider more fully in the third book, + why all true art proceeds from sensuous knowledge, never from the + concept. Indeed, with regard to behaviour also, and personal + agreeableness in society, the concept has only a negative value in + restraining the grosser manifestations of egotism and brutality; so + that a polished manner is its commendable production. But all that + is attractive, gracious, charming in behaviour, all + affectionateness and friendliness, must not proceed from the + concepts, for if it does, <span class="tei tei-q">“we feel + intention, and are put out of tune.”</span> All dissimulation is + the work of reflection; but it cannot be maintained constantly and + without interruption: <span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nemo</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page075">[pg 075]</span><a name="Pg075" id="Pg075" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">potest + personam diu ferre fictum</span></span>,”</span> says Seneca in his + book <span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "de"><span style="font-style: italic">de clementia</span></span>; + and so it is generally found out and loses its effect. Reason is + needed in the full stress of life, where quick conclusions, bold + action, rapid and sure comprehension are required, but it may + easily spoil all if it gains the upper hand, and by perplexing + hinders the intuitive, direct discovery, and grasp of the right by + simple understanding, and thus induces irresolution.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lastly, virtue + and holiness do not proceed from reflection, but from the inner + depths of the will, and its relation to knowledge. The exposition + of this belongs to another part of our work; this, however, I may + remark here, that the dogmas relating to ethics may be the same in + the reason of whole nations, but the action of every individual + different; and the converse also holds good; action, we say, is + guided by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">feelings</span></em>,—that is, simply not by + concepts, but as a matter of fact by the ethical character. Dogmas + occupy the idle reason; but action in the end pursues its own + course independently of them, generally not according to abstract + rules, but according to unspoken maxims, the expression of which is + the whole man himself. Therefore, however different the religious + dogmas of nations may be, yet in the case of all of them, a good + action is accompanied by unspeakable satisfaction, and a bad action + by endless remorse. No mockery can shake the former; no priest's + absolution can deliver from the latter. Notwithstanding this, we + must allow, that for the pursuit of a virtuous life, the + application of reason is needful; only it is not its source, but + has the subordinate function of preserving resolutions which have + been made, of providing maxims to withstand the weakness of the + moment, and give consistency to action. It plays the same part + ultimately in art also, where it has just as little to do with the + essential matter, but assists in carrying it out, for genius is not + always at call, and yet the work must be completed in all its parts + and rounded off to a whole.<a id="noteref_17" name="noteref_17" + href="#note_17"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">17</span></span></a></p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page076">[pg 076]</span><a name="Pg076" id="Pg076" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 13. All these + discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of the application + of reason are intended to show, that although abstract rational + knowledge is the reflex of ideas of perception, and is founded on + them, it is by no means in such entire congruity with them that it + could everywhere take their place: indeed it never corresponds to + them quite accurately. And thus, as we have seen, many human + actions can only be performed by the help of reason and + deliberation, and yet there are some which are better performed + without its assistance. This very incongruity of sensuous and + abstract knowledge, on account of which the latter always merely + approximates to the former, as mosaic approximates to painting, is + the cause of a very remarkable phenomenon which, like reason + itself, is peculiar to human nature, and of which the explanations + that have ever anew been attempted, are insufficient: I mean + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">laughter</span></em>. On account of the source + of this phenomenon, we cannot avoid giving the explanation of it + here, though it again interrupts the course of our work to do so. + The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception + of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which + have been thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself + is just the expression of this incongruity. It often occurs in this + way: two or more real objects are thought through <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + concept, and the identity of the concept is transferred to the + objects; it then becomes strikingly apparent from the entire + difference of the objects in other respects, that the concept was + only applicable to them from a one-sided point of view. It occurs + just as often, however, that the incongruity between a single real + object and the concept under which, from one point of view, it has + rightly been subsumed, is suddenly felt. Now the more correct the + subsumption of such objects under a concept may be from one point + of view, and the greater and more glaring their incongruity with + it, from another point of view, the greater is <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page077">[pg 077]</span><a name="Pg077" id="Pg077" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the ludicrous effect which is produced + by this contrast. All laughter then is occasioned by a paradox, and + therefore by unexpected subsumption, whether this is expressed in + words or in actions. This, briefly stated, is the true explanation + of the ludicrous.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I shall not + pause here to relate anecdotes as examples to illustrate my theory; + for it is so simple and comprehensible that it does not require + them, and everything ludicrous which the reader may remember is + equally valuable as a proof of it. But the theory is confirmed and + illustrated by distinguishing two species into which the ludicrous + is divided, and which result from the theory. Either, we have + previously known two or more very different real objects, ideas of + sense-perception, and have intentionally identified them through + the unity of a concept which comprehends them both; this species of + the ludicrous is called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wit</span></em>. Or, conversely, the concept + is first present in knowledge, and we pass from it to reality, and + to operation upon it, to action: objects which in other respects + are fundamentally different, but which are all thought in that one + concept, are now regarded and treated in the same way, till, to the + surprise and astonishment of the person acting, the great + difference of their other aspects appears: this species of the + ludicrous is called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">folly</span></em>. Therefore everything + ludicrous is either a flash of wit or a foolish action, according + as the procedure has been from the discrepancy of the objects to + the identity of the concept, or the converse; the former always + intentional, the latter always unintentional, and from without. To + seem to reverse the starting-point, and to conceal wit with the + mask of folly, is the art of the jester and the clown. Being quite + aware of the diversity of the objects, the jester unites them, with + secret wit, under one concept, and then starting from this concept + he receives from the subsequently discovered diversity of the + objects the surprise which he himself prepared. It follows from + this short but <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page078">[pg + 078]</span><a name="Pg078" id="Pg078" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + sufficient theory of the ludicrous, that, if we set aside the last + case, that of the jester, wit must always show itself in words, + folly generally in actions, though also in words, when it only + expresses an intention and does not actually carry it out, or when + it shows itself merely in judgments and opinions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Pedantry</span></em> is a form of folly. It + arises in this way: a man lacks confidence in his own + understanding, and, therefore, does not wish to trust to it, to + recognise what is right directly in the particular case. He, + therefore, puts it entirely under the control of the reason, and + seeks to be guided by reason in everything; that is to say, he + tries always to proceed from general concepts, rules, and maxims, + and to confine himself strictly to them in life, in art, and even + in moral conduct. Hence that clinging to the form, to the manner, + to the expression and word which is characteristic of pedantry, and + which with it takes the place of the real nature of the matter. The + incongruity then between the concept and reality soon shows itself + here, and it becomes evident that the former never condescends to + the particular case, and that with its generality and rigid + definiteness it can never accurately apply to the fine distinctions + of difference and innumerable modifications of the actual. + Therefore, the pedant, with his general maxims, almost always + misses the mark in life, shows himself to be foolish, awkward, + useless. In art, in which the concept is unfruitful, he produces + lifeless, stiff, abortive mannerisms. Even with regard to ethics, + the purpose to act rightly or nobly cannot always be carried out in + accordance with abstract maxims; for in many cases the excessively + nice distinctions in the nature of the circumstances necessitate a + choice of the right proceeding directly from the character; for the + application of mere abstract maxims sometimes gives false results, + because the maxims only half apply; and sometimes cannot be carried + out, because they are foreign to the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page079">[pg 079]</span><a name="Pg079" id="Pg079" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> individual character of the actor, and this + never allows itself to be entirely discovered; therefore, + inconsistencies arise. Since then Kant makes it a condition of the + moral worth of an action, that it shall proceed from pure rational + abstract maxims, without any inclination or momentary emotion, we + cannot entirely absolve him from the reproach of encouraging moral + pedantry. This reproach is the significance of Schiller's epigram, + entitled <span class="tei tei-q">“Scruples of Conscience.”</span> + When we speak, especially in connection with politics, of + doctrinaires, theorists, savants, and so forth, we mean pedants, + that is, persons who know the things well in the abstract, but not + in the concrete. Abstraction consists in thinking away the less + general predicates; but it is precisely upon these that so much + depends in practice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To complete our + theory it remains for us to mention a spurious kind of wit, the + play upon words, the <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">calembourg</span></span>, the pun, to which + may be added the equivocation, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">double + entendre</span></em>, the chief use of which is the expression of + what is obscene. Just as the witticism brings two very different + real objects under one concept, the pun brings two different + concepts, by the assistance of accident, under one word. The same + contrast appears, only familiar and more superficial, because it + does not spring from the nature of things, but merely from the + accident of nomenclature. In the case of the witticism the identity + is in the concept, the difference in the reality, but in the case + of the pun the difference is in the concepts and the identity in + the reality, for the terminology is here the reality. It would only + be a somewhat far-fetched comparison if we were to say that the pun + is related to the witticism as the parabola (<span class= + "tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sic</span></span>) of the upper inverted cone + to that of the lower. The misunderstanding of the word or the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quid pro quo</span></span> is the + unintentional pun, and is related to it exactly as folly is to wit. + Thus the deaf man often affords occasion for laughter, just as much + as the fool, and inferior writers <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page080">[pg 080]</span><a name="Pg080" id="Pg080" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of comedy often use the former for the latter + to raise a laugh.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have treated + laughter here only from the psychical side; with regard to the + physical side, I refer to what is said on the subject in the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Parerga,”</span> vol. II. ch. vi., § + 98.<a id="noteref_18" name="noteref_18" href= + "#note_18"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">18</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 14. By means + of these various discussions it is hoped that both the difference + and the relation between the process of knowledge that belongs to + the reason, rational knowledge, the concept on the one hand, and + the direct knowledge in purely sensuous, mathematical intuition or + perception, and apprehension by the understanding on the other + hand, has been clearly brought out. This remarkable relation of our + kinds of knowledge led us almost inevitably to give, in passing, + explanations of feeling and of laughter, but from all this we now + turn back to the further consideration of science as the third + great benefit which reason confers on man, the other two being + speech and deliberate action. The general discussion of science + which now devolves upon us, will be concerned partly with its form, + partly with the foundation of its judgments, and lastly with its + content.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have seen + that, with the exception of the basis of pure logic, rational + knowledge in general has not its source in the reason itself; but + having been otherwise obtained as knowledge of perception, it is + stored up in the reason, for through reason it has entirely changed + its character, and has become abstract knowledge. All rational + knowledge, that is, knowledge that has been raised to consciousness + in the abstract, is related to science strictly so called, as a + fragment to the whole. Every one has gained a rational knowledge of + many different things through experience, through consideration of + the individual objects presented to him, but only he who sets + himself the task of acquiring a complete knowledge in the abstract + of a particular class of objects, strives after science. This class + can only be marked off <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page081">[pg + 081]</span><a name="Pg081" id="Pg081" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + by means of a concept; therefore, at the beginning of every science + there stands a concept, and by means of it the class of objects + concerning which this science promises a complete knowledge in the + abstract, is separated in thought from the whole world of things. + For example, the concept of space-relations, or of the action of + unorganised bodies upon each other, or of the nature of plants, or + of animals, or of the successive changes of the surface of the + globe, or of the changes of the human race as a whole, or of the + construction of a language, and so forth. If science sought to + obtain the knowledge of its object, by investigating each + individual thing that is thought through the concept, till by + degrees it had learned the whole, no human memory would be equal to + the task, and no certainty of completeness would be obtainable. + Therefore, it makes use of that property of concept-spheres + explained above, that they include each other, and it concerns + itself mainly with the wider spheres which lie within the concept + of its object in general. When the relations of these spheres to + each other have been determined, all that is thought in them is + also generally determined, and can now be more and more accurately + determined by the separation of smaller and smaller + concept-spheres. In this way it is possible for a science to + comprehend its object completely. This path which it follows to + knowledge, the path from the general to the particular, + distinguishes it from ordinary rational knowledge; therefore, + systematic form is an essential and characteristic feature of + science. The combination of the most general concept-spheres of + every science, that is, the knowledge of its first principles, is + the indispensable condition of mastering it; how far we advance + from these to the more special propositions is a matter of choice, + and does not increase the thoroughness but only the extent of our + knowledge of the science. The number of the first principles to + which all the rest are subordinated, varies greatly in the + different sciences, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page082">[pg + 082]</span><a name="Pg082" id="Pg082" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + so that in some there is more subordination, in others more + co-ordination; and in this respect, the former make greater claims + upon the judgment, the latter upon the memory. It was known to the + schoolmen,<a id="noteref_19" name="noteref_19" href= + "#note_19"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">19</span></span></a> that, + as the syllogism requires two premises, no science can proceed from + a single first principle which cannot be the subject of further + deduction, but must have several, at least two. The specially + classifying sciences: Zoology, Botany, and also Physics and + Chemistry, inasmuch as they refer all inorganic action to a few + fundamental forces, have most subordination; history, on the other + hand, has really none at all; for the general in it consists merely + in the survey of the principal periods, from which, however, the + particular events cannot be deduced, and are only subordinated to + them according to time, but according to the concept are + co-ordinate with them. Therefore, history, strictly speaking, is + certainly rational knowledge, but is not science. In mathematics, + according to Euclid's treatment, the axioms alone are + indemonstrable first principles, and all demonstrations are in + gradation strictly subordinated to them. But this method of + treatment is not essential to mathematics, and in fact each + proposition introduces quite a new space construction, which in + itself is independent of those which precede it, and indeed can be + completely comprehended from itself, quite independently of them, + in the pure intuition or perception of space, in which the most + complicated construction is just as directly evident as the axiom; + but of this more fully hereafter. Meanwhile every mathematical + proposition remains always a universal truth, which is valid for + innumerable particular cases; and a graduated process from the + simple to the complicated propositions which are to be deduced from + them, is also essential to mathematics; therefore, in every respect + mathematics is a science. The completeness of a science as such, + that is, in respect of form, consists in there being as much + subordination and as little <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page083">[pg 083]</span><a name="Pg083" id="Pg083" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> co-ordination of the principles as possible. + Scientific talent in general is, therefore, the faculty of + subordinating the concept-spheres according to their different + determinations, so that, as Plato repeatedly counsels, a science + shall not be constituted by a general concept and an indefinite + multiplicity immediately under it, but that knowledge shall descend + by degrees from the general to the particular, through intermediate + concepts and divisions, according to closer and closer definitions. + In Kantian language this is called satisfying equally the law of + homogeneity and that of specification. It arises from this peculiar + nature of scientific completeness, that the aim of science is not + greater certainty—for certainty may be possessed in just as high a + degree by the most disconnected particular knowledge—but its aim is + rather the facilitating of rational knowledge by means of its form, + and the possibility of the completeness of rational knowledge which + this form affords. It is therefore a very prevalent but perverted + opinion that the scientific character of knowledge consists in its + greater certainty, and just as false is the conclusion following + from this, that, strictly speaking, the only sciences are + mathematics and logic, because only in them, on account of their + purely <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> + character, is there unassailable certainty of knowledge. This + advantage cannot be denied them, but it gives them no special claim + to be regarded as sciences; for the special characteristic of + science does not lie in certainty but in the systematic form of + knowledge, based on the gradual descent from the general to the + particular. The process of knowledge from the general to the + particular, which is peculiar to the sciences, involves the + necessity that in the sciences much should be established by + deduction from preceding propositions, that is to say, by + demonstration; and this has given rise to the old mistake that only + what has been demonstrated is absolutely true, and that every truth + requires a demonstration; whereas, on the contrary, every + demonstration <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page084">[pg + 084]</span><a name="Pg084" id="Pg084" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + requires an undemonstrated truth, which ultimately supports it, or + it may be, its own demonstration. Therefore a directly established + truth is as much to be preferred to a truth established by + demonstration as water from the spring is to water from the + aqueduct. Perception, partly pure <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, as it forms the basis of mathematics, partly + empirical <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span>, + as it forms the basis of all the other sciences, is the source of + all truth and the foundation of all science. (Logic alone is to be + excepted, which is not founded upon perception but yet upon + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">direct</span></em> knowledge by the reason of + its own laws.) Not the demonstrated judgments nor their + demonstrations, but judgments which are created directly out of + perception, and founded upon it rather than on any demonstrations, + are to science what the sun is to the world; for all light proceeds + from them, and lighted by their light the others give light also. + To establish the truth of such primary judgments directly from + perception, to raise such strongholds of science from the + innumerable multitude of real objects, that is the work of the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">faculty + of judgment</span></em>, which consists in the power of rightly and + accurately carrying over into abstract consciousness what is known + in perception, and judgment is consequently the mediator between + understanding and reason. Only extraordinary and exceptional + strength of judgment in the individual can actually advance + science; but every one who is possessed of a healthy reason is able + to deduce propositions from propositions, to demonstrate, to draw + conclusions. To lay down and make permanent for reflection, in + suitable concepts, what is known through perception, so that, on + the one hand, what is common to many real objects is thought + through <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> concept, and, on the other + hand, their points of difference are each thought through one + concept, so that the different shall be known and thought as + different in spite of a partial agreement, and the identical shall + be known and thought as identical in spite of a partial difference, + all in accordance with the end and intention which in each case + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page085">[pg 085]</span><a name= + "Pg085" id="Pg085" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> is in view; all this + is done by the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">faculty of judgment</span></em>. Deficiency in + judgment is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">silliness</span></em>. The silly man fails to + grasp, now the partial or relative difference of concepts which in + one aspect are identical, now the identity of concepts which are + relatively or partially different. To this explanation of the + faculty of judgment, moreover, Kant's division of it into + reflecting and subsuming judgment may be applied, according as it + passes from the perceived objects to the concepts, or from the + latter to the former; in both cases always mediating between + empirical knowledge of the understanding and the reflective + knowledge of the reason. There can be no truth which could be + brought out by means of syllogisms alone; and the necessity of + establishing truth by means of syllogisms is merely relative, + indeed subjective. Since all demonstration is syllogistic, in the + case of a new truth we must first seek, not for a demonstration, + but for direct evidence, and only in the absence of such evidence + is a demonstration to be temporarily made use of. No science is + susceptible of demonstration throughout any more than a building + can stand in the air; all its demonstrations must ultimately rest + upon what is perceived, and consequently cannot be demonstrated, + for the whole world of reflection rests upon and is rooted in the + world of perception. All primal, that is, original, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">evidence</span></em> is a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">perception</span></em>, as the word itself + indicates. Therefore it is either empirical or founded upon the + perception <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> of the + conditions of possible experience. In both cases it affords only + immanent, not transcendent knowledge. Every concept has its worth + and its existence only in its relation, sometimes very indirect, to + an idea of perception; what is true of the concepts is also true of + the judgments constructed out of them, and of all science. + Therefore it must in some way be possible to know directly without + demonstrations or syllogisms every truth that is arrived at through + syllogisms and communicated by demonstrations. This is most + difficult in the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page086">[pg + 086]</span><a name="Pg086" id="Pg086" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + case of certain complicated mathematical propositions at which we + only arrive by chains of syllogisms; for example, the calculation + of the chords and tangents to all arcs by deduction from the + proposition of Pythagoras. But even such a truth as this cannot + essentially and solely rest upon abstract principles, and the + space-relations which lie at its foundation also must be capable of + being so presented <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> in pure intuition or perception that the truth + of their abstract expression is directly established. But of + mathematical demonstration we shall speak more fully shortly.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is true we + often hear men speak in a lofty strain of sciences which rest + entirely upon correct conclusions drawn from sure premises, and + which are consequently unassailable. But through pure logical + reasoning, however true the premises may be, we shall never receive + more than an articulate expression and exposition of what lies + already complete in the premises; thus we shall only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">explicitly</span></em> expound what was + already <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">implicitly</span></em> understood. The + esteemed sciences referred to are, however, specially the + mathematical sciences, particularly astronomy. But the certainty of + astronomy arises from the fact that it has for its basis the + intuition or perception of space, which is given <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, and is therefore + infallible. All space-relations, however, follow from each other + with a necessity (ground of being) which affords <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> certainty, and they can + therefore be safely deduced from each other. To these mathematical + properties we have only to add one force of nature, gravity, which + acts precisely in relation to the masses and the square of the + distance; and, lastly, the law of inertia, which follows from the + law of causality and is therefore true <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, and with it the empirical datum of the motion + impressed, once for all, upon each of these masses. This is the + whole material of astronomy, which both by its simplicity and its + certainty leads to definite results, which are highly interesting + on account of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page087">[pg + 087]</span><a name="Pg087" id="Pg087" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + vastness and importance of the objects. For example, if I know the + mass of a planet and the distance of its satellite from it, I can + tell with certainty the period of the revolution of the latter + according to Kepler's second law. But the ground of this law is, + that with this distance only this velocity will both chain the + satellite to the planet and prevent it from falling into it. Thus + it is only upon such a geometrical basis, that is, by means of an + intuition or perception <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, and also under the application of a law of + nature, that much can be arrived at by means of syllogisms, for + here they are merely like bridges from <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + sensuous apprehension to others; but it is not so with mere pure + syllogistic reasoning in the exclusively logical method. The source + of the first fundamental truths of astronomy is, however, properly + induction, that is, the comprehension of what is given in many + perceptions in one true and directly founded judgment. From this, + hypotheses are afterwards constructed, and their confirmation by + experience, as induction approaching to completeness, affords the + proof of the first judgment. For example, the apparent motion of + the planets is known empirically; after many false hypotheses with + regard to the spacial connection of this motion (planetary course) + the right one was at last found, then the laws which it obeyed (the + laws of Kepler), and, lastly, the cause of these laws (universal + gravitation), and the empirically known agreement of all observed + cases with the whole of the hypotheses, and with their + consequences, that is to say, induction, established them with + complete certainty. The invention of the hypotheses was the work of + the judgment, which rightly comprehended the given facts and + expressed them accordingly; but induction, that is, a multitude of + perceptions, confirmed their truth. But their truth could also be + known directly, and by a single empirical perception, if we could + pass freely through space and had telescopic eyes. Therefore, here + also syllogisms are not <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page088">[pg + 088]</span><a name="Pg088" id="Pg088" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the essential and only source of knowledge, but really only a + makeshift.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As a third + example taken from a different sphere we may mention that the + so-called metaphysical truths, that is, such truths as those to + which Kant assigns the position of the metaphysical first + principles of natural science, do not owe their evidence to + demonstration. What is <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> certain we know directly; as the form of all + knowledge, it is known to us with the most complete necessity. For + example, that matter is permanent, that is, can neither come into + being nor pass away, we know directly as negative truth; for our + pure intuition or perception of space and time gives the + possibility of motion; in the law of causality the understanding + affords us the possibility of change of form and quality, but we + lack powers of the imagination for conceiving the coming into being + or passing away of matter. Therefore that truth has at all times + been evident to all men everywhere, nor has it ever been seriously + doubted; and this could not be the case if it had no other ground + of knowledge than the abstruse and exceedingly subtle proof of + Kant. But besides this, I have found Kant's proof to be false (as + is explained in the Appendix), and have shown above that the + permanence of matter is to be deduced, not from the share which + time has in the possibility of experience, but from the share which + belongs to space. The true foundation of all truths which in this + sense are called metaphysical, that is, abstract expressions of the + necessary and universal forms of knowledge, cannot itself lie in + abstract principles; but only in the immediate consciousness of the + forms of the idea communicating itself in apodictic assertions + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, and fearing no + refutation. But if we yet desire to give a proof of them, it can + only consist in showing that what is to be proved is contained in + some truth about which there is no doubt, either as a part of it or + as a presupposition. Thus, for example, I have shown that all + empirical perception implies the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page089">[pg 089]</span><a name="Pg089" id="Pg089" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> application of the law of causality, the + knowledge of which is hence a condition of all experience, and + therefore cannot be first given and conditioned through experience + as Hume thought. Demonstrations in general are not so much for + those who wish to learn as for those who wish to dispute. Such + persons stubbornly deny directly established insight; now only the + truth can be consistent in all directions, and therefore we must + show such persons that they admit under <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + form and indirectly, what they deny under another form and + directly; that is, the logically necessary connection between what + is denied and what is admitted.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is also a + consequence of the scientific form, the subordination of everything + particular under a general, and so on always to what is more + general, that the truth of many propositions is only logically + proved,—that is, through their dependence upon other propositions, + through syllogisms, which at the same time appear as proofs. But we + must never forget that this whole form of science is merely a means + of rendering knowledge more easy, not a means to greater certainty. + It is easier to discover the nature of an animal, by means of the + species to which it belongs, and so on through the genus, family, + order, and class, than to examine on every occasion the animal + presented to us: but the truth of all propositions arrived at + syllogistically is always conditioned by and ultimately dependent + upon some truth which rests not upon reasoning but upon perception. + If this perception were always as much within our reach as a + deduction through syllogisms, then it would be in every respect + preferable. For every deduction from concepts is exposed to great + danger of error, on account of the fact we have considered above, + that so many spheres lie partly within each other, and that their + content is often vague or uncertain. This is illustrated by a + multitude of demonstrations of false doctrines and sophisms of + every kind. Syllogisms are indeed perfectly certain as regards + form, but they are <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page090">[pg + 090]</span><a name="Pg090" id="Pg090" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + very uncertain on account of their matter, the concepts. For, on + the one hand, the spheres of these are not sufficiently sharply + defined, and, on the other hand, they intersect each other in so + many ways that one sphere is in part contained in many others, and + we may pass at will from it to one or another of these, and from + this sphere again to others, as we have already shown. Or, in other + words, the minor term and also the middle can always be + subordinated to different concepts, from which we may choose at + will the major and the middle, and the nature of the conclusion + depends on this choice. Consequently immediate evidence is always + much to be preferred to reasoned truth, and the latter is only to + be accepted when the former is too remote, and not when it is as + near or indeed nearer than the latter. Accordingly we saw above + that, as a matter of fact, in the case of logic, in which the + immediate knowledge in each individual case lies nearer to hand + than deduced scientific knowledge, we always conduct our thought + according to our immediate knowledge of the laws of thought, and + leave logic unused.<a id="noteref_20" name="noteref_20" href= + "#note_20"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">20</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 15. If now + with our conviction that perception is the primary source of all + evidence, and that only direct or indirect connection with it is + absolute truth; and further, that the shortest way to this is + always the surest, as every interposition of concepts means + exposure to many deceptions; if, I say, we now turn with this + conviction to mathematics, as it was established as a science by + Euclid, and has remained as a whole to our own day, we cannot help + regarding the method it adopts, as strange and indeed perverted. We + ask that every logical proof shall be traced back to an origin in + perception; but mathematics, on the contrary, is at great pains + deliberately to throw away the evidence of perception which is + peculiar to it, and always at hand, that it may substitute for it a + logical demonstration. This must seem to us <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page091">[pg 091]</span><a name="Pg091" id="Pg091" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> like the action of a man who cuts off + his legs in order to go on crutches, or like that of the prince in + the <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Triumph der + Empfindsamkeit</span></span>”</span> who flees from the beautiful + reality of nature, to delight in a stage scene that imitates it. I + must here refer to what I have said in the sixth chapter of the + essay on the principle of sufficient reason, and take for granted + that it is fresh and present in the memory of the reader; so that I + may link my observations on to it without explaining again the + difference between the mere ground of knowledge of a mathematical + truth, which can be given logically, and the ground of being, which + is the immediate connection of the parts of space and time, known + only in perception. It is only insight into the ground of being + that secures satisfaction and thorough knowledge. The mere ground + of knowledge must always remain superficial; it can afford us + indeed rational knowledge <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">that</span></em> a thing is as it is, but it + cannot tell <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">why</span></em> it is so. Euclid chose the + latter way to the obvious detriment of the science. For just at the + beginning, for example, when he ought to show once for all how in a + triangle the angles and sides reciprocally determine each other, + and stand to each other in the relation of reason and consequent, + in accordance with the form which the principle of sufficient + reason has in pure space, and which there, as in every other + sphere, always affords the necessity that a thing is as it is, + because something quite different from it, is as it is; instead of + in this way giving a thorough insight into the nature of the + triangle, he sets up certain disconnected arbitrarily chosen + propositions concerning the triangle, and gives a logical ground of + knowledge of them, through a laborious logical demonstration, based + upon the principle of contradiction. Instead of an exhaustive + knowledge of these space-relations we therefore receive merely + certain results of them, imparted to us at pleasure, and in fact we + are very much in the position of a man to whom the different + effects of an ingenious <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page092">[pg + 092]</span><a name="Pg092" id="Pg092" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + machine are shown, but from whom its inner connection and + construction are withheld. We are compelled by the principle of + contradiction to admit that what Euclid demonstrates is true, but + we do not comprehend <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">why</span></em> it is so. We have therefore + almost the same uncomfortable feeling that we experience after a + juggling trick, and, in fact, most of Euclid's demonstrations are + remarkably like such feats. The truth almost always enters by the + back door, for it manifests itself <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">per accidens</span></span> through some + contingent circumstance. Often a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">reductio ad absurdum</span></span> shuts all + the doors one after another, until only one is left through which + we are therefore compelled to enter. Often, as in the proposition + of Pythagoras, lines are drawn, we don't know why, and it + afterwards appears that they were traps which close unexpectedly + and take prisoner the assent of the astonished learner, who must + now admit what remains wholly inconceivable in its inner + connection, so much so, that he may study the whole of Euclid + through and through without gaining a real insight into the laws of + space-relations, but instead of them he only learns by heart + certain results which follow from them. This specially empirical + and unscientific knowledge is like that of the doctor who knows + both the disease and the cure for it, but does not know the + connection between them. But all this is the necessary consequence + if we capriciously reject the special kind of proof and evidence of + one species of knowledge, and forcibly introduce in its stead a + kind which is quite foreign to its nature. However, in other + respects the manner in which this has been accomplished by Euclid + deserves all the praise which has been bestowed on him through so + many centuries, and which has been carried so far that his method + of treating mathematics has been set up as the pattern of all + scientific exposition. Men tried indeed to model all the sciences + after it, but later they gave up the attempt without quite knowing + why. Yet in our eyes this method of Euclid in mathematics + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page093">[pg 093]</span><a name= + "Pg093" id="Pg093" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> can appear only as a + very brilliant piece of perversity. But when a great error in life + or in science has been intentionally and methodically carried out + with universal applause, it is always possible to discover its + source in the philosophy which prevailed at the time. The Eleatics + first brought out the difference, and indeed often the conflict, + that exists between what is perceived, φαινομενον,<a id= + "noteref_21" name="noteref_21" href="#note_21"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">21</span></span></a> and + what is thought, νουμενον, and used it in many ways in their + philosophical epigrams, and also in sophisms. They were followed + later by the Megarics, the Dialecticians, the Sophists, the + New-Academy, and the Sceptics; these drew attention to the + illusion, that is to say, to the deception of the senses, or rather + of the understanding which transforms the data of the senses into + perception, and which often causes us to see things to which the + reason unhesitatingly denies reality; for example, a stick broken + in water, and such like. It came to be known that sense-perception + was not to be trusted unconditionally, and it was therefore hastily + concluded that only rational, logical thought could establish + truth; although Plato (in the Parmenides), the Megarics, Pyrrho, + and the New-Academy, showed by examples (in the manner which was + afterwards adopted by Sextus Empiricus) how syllogisms and concepts + were also sometimes misleading, and indeed produced paralogisms and + sophisms which arise much more easily and are far harder to explain + than the illusion of sense-perception. However, this rationalism, + which arose in opposition to empiricism, kept the upper hand, and + Euclid constructed the science of mathematics in accordance with + it. He was compelled by necessity to found the axioms upon evidence + of perception (φαινομενον), but all the rest he based upon + reasoning (νουμενον). His method reigned supreme through all the + succeeding centuries, and it could not but do so as long as pure + intuition or perception, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page094">[pg + 094]</span><a name="Pg094" id="Pg094" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + was not distinguished from empirical perception. Certain passages + from the works of Proclus, the commentator of Euclid, which Kepler + translated into Latin in his book, <span class="tei tei-q">“De + Harmonia Mundi,”</span> seem to show that he fully recognised this + distinction. But Proclus did not attach enough importance to the + matter; he merely mentioned it by the way, so that he remained + unnoticed and accomplished nothing. Therefore, not till two + thousand years later will the doctrine of Kant, which is destined + to make such great changes in all the knowledge, thought, and + action of European nations, produce this change in mathematics + also. For it is only after we have learned from this great man that + the intuitions or perceptions of space and time are quite different + from empirical perceptions, entirely independent of any impression + of the senses, conditioning it, not conditioned by it, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + are <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, and + therefore are not exposed to the illusions of sense; only after we + have learned this, I say, can we comprehend that Euclid's logical + method of treating mathematics is a useless precaution, a crutch + for sound legs, that it is like a wanderer who during the night + mistakes a bright, firm road for water, and carefully avoiding it, + toils over the broken ground beside it, content to keep from point + to point along the edge of the supposed water. Only now can we + affirm with certainty that what presents itself to us as necessary + in the perception of a figure, does not come from the figure on the + paper, which is perhaps very defectively drawn, nor from the + abstract concept under which we think it, but immediately from the + form of all knowledge of which we are conscious <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>. This is always the + principle of sufficient reason; here as the form of perception, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, space, it is the principle + of the ground of being, the evidence and validity of which is, + however, just as great and as immediate as that of the principle of + the ground of knowing, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, logical certainty. Thus we + need not and ought not to leave the peculiar province of + mathematics <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page095">[pg + 095]</span><a name="Pg095" id="Pg095" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + in order to put our trust only in logical proof, and seek to + authenticate mathematics in a sphere which is quite foreign to it, + that of concepts. If we confine ourselves to the ground peculiar to + mathematics, we gain the great advantage that in it the rational + knowledge <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">that</span></em> something is, is one with the + knowledge <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">why</span></em> it is so, whereas the method + of Euclid entirely separates these two, and lets us know only the + first, not the second. Aristotle says admirably in the Analyt., + post. i. 27: <span class="tei tei-q">“Ακριβεστερα δ᾽ επιστημη + επιστημης και προτερα, ἡτε του ὁτι και του διοτι ἡ αυτη, αλλα μη + χωρις του ὁτι, της του διοτι”</span> (<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Subtilior autem et praestantior ea est + scientia, quâ</span></span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">quod</span></span> <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">aliquid sit, et</span></span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">cur</span></span> <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sit una simulque intelligimus non + separatim</span></span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">quod</span></span>, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">et</span></span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">cur</span></span> <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sit</span></span>). In physics we are only + satisfied when the knowledge that a thing is as it is is combined + with the knowledge why it is so. To know that the mercury in the + Torricellian tube stands thirty inches high is not really rational + knowledge if we do not know that it is sustained at this height by + the counterbalancing weight of the atmosphere. Shall we then be + satisfied in mathematics with the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitas occulta</span></span> of the circle + that the segments of any two intersecting chords always contain + equal rectangles? That it is so Euclid certainly demonstrates in + the 35th Prop. of the Third Book; <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">why</span></em> it + is so remains doubtful. In the same way the proposition of + Pythagoras teaches us a <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitas occulta</span></span> of the + right-angled triangle; the stilted and indeed fallacious + demonstration of Euclid forsakes us at the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">why</span></em>, + and a simple figure, which we already know, and which is present to + us, gives at a glance far more insight into the matter, and firm + inner conviction of that necessity, and of the dependence of that + quality upon the right angle:—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style= + "text-align: center; margin-bottom: 1.00em"></p> + + <div class="tei tei-figure" style="width: 50%; text-align: center"> + <img src="images/illus_131.png" alt= + "Illustration" /></div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page096">[pg + 096]</span><a name="Pg096" id="Pg096" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the case of + unequal catheti also, and indeed generally in the case of every + possible geometrical truth, it is quite possible to obtain such a + conviction based on perception, because these truths were always + discovered by such an empirically known necessity, and their + demonstration was only thought out afterwards in addition. Thus we + only require an analysis of the process of thought in the first + discovery of a geometrical truth in order to know its necessity + empirically. It is the analytical method in general that I wish for + the exposition of mathematics, instead of the synthetical method + which Euclid made use of. Yet this would have very great, though + not insuperable, difficulties in the case of complicated + mathematical truths. Here and there in Germany men are beginning to + alter the exposition of mathematics, and to proceed more in this + analytical way. The greatest effort in this direction has been made + by Herr Kosack, teacher of mathematics and physics in the Gymnasium + at Nordhausen, who added a thorough attempt to teach geometry + according to my principles to the programme of the school + examination on the 6th of April 1852.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In order to + improve the method of mathematics, it is especially necessary to + overcome the prejudice that demonstrated truth has any superiority + over what is known through perception, or that logical truth + founded upon the principle of contradiction has any superiority + over metaphysical truth, which is immediately evident, and to which + belongs the pure intuition or perception of space.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That which is + most certain, and yet always inexplicable, is what is involved in + the principle of sufficient reason, for this principle, in its + different aspects, expresses the universal form of all our ideas + and knowledge. All explanation consists of reduction to it, + exemplification in the particular case of the connection of ideas + expressed generally through it. It is thus the principle of all + explanation, and therefore it is neither susceptible of an + explanation itself, nor does it stand in need of it; for + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page097">[pg 097]</span><a name= + "Pg097" id="Pg097" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> every explanation + presupposes it, and only obtains meaning through it. Now, none of + its forms are superior to the rest; it is equally certain and + incapable of demonstration as the principle of the ground of being, + or of change, or of action, or of knowing. The relation of reason + and consequent is a necessity in all its forms, and indeed it is, + in general, the source of the concept of necessity, for necessity + has no other meaning. If the reason is given there is no other + necessity than that of the consequent, and there is no reason that + does not involve the necessity of the consequent. Just as surely + then as the consequent expressed in the conclusion follows from the + ground of knowledge given in the premises, does the ground of being + in space determine its consequent in space: if I know through + perception the relation of these two, this certainty is just as + great as any logical certainty. But every geometrical proposition + is just as good an expression of such a relation as one of the + twelve axioms; it is a metaphysical truth, and as such, just as + certain as the principle of contradiction itself, which is a + metalogical truth, and the common foundation of all logical + demonstration. Whoever denies the necessity, exhibited for + intuition or perception, of the space-relations expressed in any + proposition, may just as well deny the axioms, or that the + conclusion follows from the premises, or, indeed, he may as well + deny the principle of contradiction itself, for all these relations + are equally undemonstrable, immediately evident and known + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>. For any one to wish to + derive the necessity of space-relations, known in intuition or + perception, from the principle of contradiction by means of a + logical demonstration is just the same as for the feudal superior + of an estate to wish to hold it as the vassal of another. Yet this + is what Euclid has done. His axioms only, he is compelled to leave + resting upon immediate evidence; all the geometrical truths which + follow are demonstrated logically, that is to say, from + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page098">[pg 098]</span><a name= + "Pg098" id="Pg098" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the agreement of the + assumptions made in the proposition with the axioms which are + presupposed, or with some earlier proposition; or from the + contradiction between the opposite of the proposition and the + assumptions made in it, or the axioms, or earlier propositions, or + even itself. But the axioms themselves have no more immediate + evidence than any other geometrical problem, but only more + simplicity on account of their smaller content.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When a criminal + is examined, a <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">procès-verbal</span></span> is made of his + statement in order that we may judge of its truth from its + consistency. But this is only a makeshift, and we are not satisfied + with it if it is possible to investigate the truth of each of his + answers for itself; especially as he might lie consistently from + the beginning. But Euclid investigated space according to this + first method. He set about it, indeed, under the correct assumption + that nature must everywhere be consistent, and that therefore it + must also be so in space, its fundamental form. Since then the + parts of space stand to each other in a relation of reason and + consequent, no single property of space can be different from what + it is without being in contradiction with all the others. But this + is a very troublesome, unsatisfactory, and roundabout way to + follow. It prefers indirect knowledge to direct, which is just as + certain, and it separates the knowledge that a thing is from the + knowledge why it is, to the great disadvantage of the science; and + lastly, it entirely withholds from the beginner insight into the + laws of space, and indeed renders him unaccustomed to the special + investigation of the ground and inner connection of things, + inclining him to be satisfied with a mere historical knowledge that + a thing is as it is. The exercise of acuteness which this method is + unceasingly extolled as affording consists merely in this, that the + pupil practises drawing conclusions, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + he practises applying the principle of contradiction, but specially + he exerts his memory to retain all those data whose agreement is to + be tested. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page099">[pg + 099]</span><a name="Pg099" id="Pg099" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Moreover, it is worth noticing that this method of proof was + applied only to geometry and not to arithmetic. In arithmetic the + truth is really allowed to come home to us through perception + alone, which in it consists simply in counting. As the perception + of numbers is in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">time alone</span></em>, and therefore cannot + be represented by a sensuous schema like the geometrical figure, + the suspicion that perception is merely empirical, and possibly + illusive, disappeared in arithmetic, and the introduction of the + logical method of proof into geometry was entirely due to this + suspicion. As time has only one dimension, counting is the only + arithmetical operation, to which all others may be reduced; and yet + counting is just intuition or perception <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, to which there is no hesitation in appealing + here, and through which alone everything else, every sum and every + equation, is ultimately proved. We prove, for example, not that (7 + + 9 × 8 - 2)/3 = 42; but we refer to the pure perception in time, + counting thus makes each individual problem an axiom. Instead of + the demonstrations that fill geometry, the whole content of + arithmetic and algebra is thus simply a method of abbreviating + counting. We mentioned above that our immediate perception of + numbers in time extends only to about ten. Beyond this an abstract + concept of the numbers, fixed by a word, must take the place of the + perception; which does not therefore actually occur any longer, but + is only indicated in a thoroughly definite manner. Yet even so, by + the important assistance of the system of figures which enables us + to represent all larger numbers by the same small ones, intuitive + or perceptive evidence of every sum is made possible, even where we + make such use of abstraction that not only the numbers, but + indefinite quantities and whole operations are thought only in the + abstract and indicated as so thought, as [sqrt](r^b) so that we do + not perform them, but merely symbolise them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We might + establish truth in geometry also, through <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page100">[pg 100]</span><a name="Pg100" id="Pg100" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> pure <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> perception, with the same right and certainty + as in arithmetic. It is in fact always this necessity, known + through perception in accordance with the principle of sufficient + reason of being, which gives to geometry its principal evidence, + and upon which in the consciousness of every one, the certainty of + its propositions rests. The stilted logical demonstration is always + foreign to the matter, and is generally soon forgotten, without + weakening our conviction. It might indeed be dispensed with + altogether without diminishing the evidence of geometry, for this + is always quite independent of such demonstration, which never + proves anything we are not convinced of already, through another + kind of knowledge. So far then it is like a cowardly soldier, who + adds a wound to an enemy slain by another, and then boasts that he + slew him himself.<a id="noteref_22" name="noteref_22" href= + "#note_22"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">22</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">After all this + we hope there will be no doubt that the evidence of mathematics, + which has become the pattern and symbol of all evidence, rests + essentially not upon demonstration, but upon immediate perception, + which is thus here, as everywhere else, the ultimate ground and + source of truth. Yet the perception which lies at the basis of + mathematics has a great advantage over all other perception, and + therefore over empirical perception. It is <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, and therefore independent of experience, + which is always given only in successive parts; therefore + everything is equally near to it, and we can start either from the + reason or from the consequent, as we please. Now this makes it + absolutely reliable, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page101">[pg + 101]</span><a name="Pg101" id="Pg101" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + for in it the consequent is known from the reason, and this is the + only kind of knowledge that has necessity; for example, the + equality of the sides is known as established by the equality of + the angles. All empirical perception, on the other hand, and the + greater part of experience, proceeds conversely from the consequent + to the reason, and this kind of knowledge is not infallible, for + necessity only attaches to the consequent on account of the reason + being given, and no necessity attaches to the knowledge of the + reason from the consequent, for the same consequent may follow from + different reasons. The latter kind of knowledge is simply + induction, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, from many consequents + which point to one reason, the reason is accepted as certain; but + as the cases can never be all before us, the truth here is not + unconditionally certain. But all knowledge through + sense-perception, and the great bulk of experience, has only this + kind of truth. The affection of one of the senses induces the + understanding to infer a cause of the effect, but, as a conclusion + from the consequent to the reason is never certain, illusion, which + is deception of the senses, is possible, and indeed often occurs, + as was pointed out above. Only when several of the senses, or it + may be all the five, receive impressions which point to the same + cause, the possibility of illusion is reduced to a minimum; but yet + it still exists, for there are cases, for example, the case of + counterfeit money, in which all the senses are deceived. All + empirical knowledge, and consequently the whole of natural science, + is in the same position, except only the pure, or as Kant calls it, + metaphysical part of it. Here also the causes are known from the + effects, consequently all natural philosophy rests upon hypotheses, + which are often false, and must then gradually give place to more + correct ones. Only in the case of purposely arranged experiments, + knowledge proceeds from the cause to the effect, that is, it + follows the method that affords certainty; but these experiments + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page102">[pg 102]</span><a name= + "Pg102" id="Pg102" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> themselves are + undertaken in consequence of hypotheses. Therefore, no branch of + natural science, such as physics, or astronomy, or physiology could + be discovered all at once, as was the case with mathematics and + logic, but required and requires the collected and compared + experiences of many centuries. In the first place, repeated + confirmation in experience brings the induction, upon which the + hypothesis rests, so near completeness that in practice it takes + the place of certainty, and is regarded as diminishing the value of + the hypothesis, its source, just as little as the + incommensurability of straight and curved lines diminishes the + value of the application of geometry, or that perfect exactness of + the logarithm, which is not attainable, diminishes the value of + arithmetic. For as the logarithm, or the squaring of the circle, + approaches infinitely near to correctness through infinite + fractions, so, through manifold experience, the induction, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the knowledge of the cause + from the effects, approaches, not infinitely indeed, but yet so + near mathematical evidence, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, knowledge of the effects + from the cause, that the possibility of mistake is small enough to + be neglected, but yet the possibility exists; for example, a + conclusion from an indefinite number of cases to all cases, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, to the unknown ground on + which all depend, is an induction. What conclusion of this kind + seems more certain than that all men have the heart on the left + side? Yet there are extremely rare and quite isolated exceptions of + men who have the heart upon the right side. Sense-perception and + empirical science have, therefore, the same kind of evidence. The + advantage which mathematics, pure natural science, and logic have + over them, as <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> + knowledge, rests merely upon this, that the formal element in + knowledge upon which all that is <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> is based, is given as a whole and at once, and + therefore in it we can always proceed from the cause to the effect, + while in the former kind of knowledge we are generally obliged to + proceed from the effect to the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page103">[pg 103]</span><a name="Pg103" id="Pg103" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> cause. In other respects, the law of + causality, or the principle of sufficient reason of change, which + guides empirical knowledge, is in itself just as certain as the + other forms of the principle of sufficient reason which are + followed by the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> + sciences referred to above. Logical demonstrations from concepts or + syllogisms have the advantage of proceeding from the reason to the + consequent, just as much as knowledge through perception + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, and therefore in + themselves, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, according to their form, + they are infallible. This has greatly assisted to bring + demonstration in general into such esteem. But this infallibility + is merely relative; the demonstration merely subsumes under the + first principles of the science, and it is these which contain the + whole material truth of science, and they must not themselves be + demonstrated, but must be founded on perception. In the few + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> sciences we have named + above, this perception is pure, but everywhere else it is + empirical, and is only raised to universality through induction. + If, then, in the empirical sciences also, the particular is proved + from the general, yet the general, on the other hand, has received + its truth from the particular; it is only a store of collected + material, not a self-constituted foundation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">So much for the + foundation of truth. Of the source and possibility of error many + explanations have been tried since Plato's metaphorical solution of + the dove-cot where the wrong pigeons are caught, &c. + (Theætetus, p. 167, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">et seq.</span></span>) Kant's vague, + indefinite explanation of the source of error by means of the + diagram of diagonal motion, will be found in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Critique of Pure Reason,”</span> p. 294 of the first + edition, and p. 350 of the fifth. As truth is the relation of a + judgment to its ground of knowledge, it is always a problem how the + person judging can believe that he has such a ground of knowledge + and yet not have it; that is to say, how error, the deception of + reason, is possible. I find this possibility quite analogous to + that of illusion, or the deception of the understanding, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page104">[pg 104]</span><a name= + "Pg104" id="Pg104" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which has been + explained above. My opinion is (and this is what gives this + explanation its proper place here) that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">every error is an + inference from the consequent to the reason</span></em>, which + indeed is valid when we know that the consequent has that reason + and can have no other; but otherwise is not valid. The person who + falls into error, either attributes to a consequent a reason which + it cannot have, in which case he shows actual deficiency of + understanding, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, deficiency in the capacity + for immediate knowledge of the connection between the cause and the + effect, or, as more frequently happens, he attributes to the effect + a cause which is possible, but he adds to the major proposition of + the syllogism, in which he infers the cause from the effect, that + this effect <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">always</span></em> results only from this + cause. Now he could only be assured of this by a complete + induction, which, however, he assumes without having made it. This + <span class="tei tei-q">“always”</span> is therefore too wide a + concept, and instead of it he ought to have used <span class= + "tei tei-q">“sometimes”</span> or <span class= + "tei tei-q">“generally.”</span> The conclusion would then be + problematical, and therefore not erroneous. That the man who errs + should proceed in this way is due either to haste, or to + insufficient knowledge of what is possible, on account of which he + does not know the necessity of the induction that ought to be made. + Error then is quite analogous to illusion. Both are inferences from + the effect to the cause; the illusion brought about always in + accordance with the law of causality, and by the understanding + alone, thus directly, in perception itself; the error in accordance + with all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and by + the reason, thus in thought itself; yet most commonly in accordance + with the law of causality, as will appear from the three following + examples, which may be taken as types or representatives of the + three kinds of error. (1.) The illusion of the senses (deception of + the understanding) induces error (deception of the reason); for + example, if one mistakes a painting for an alto-relief, and + actually <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page105">[pg + 105]</span><a name="Pg105" id="Pg105" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + takes it for such; the error results from a conclusion from the + following major premise: <span class="tei tei-q">“If dark grey + passes regularly through all shades to white; the cause is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">always</span></em> the light, which strikes + differently upon projections and depressions, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ergo</span></span>—.”</span> (2.) <span class= + "tei tei-q">“If there is no money in my safe, the cause is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">always</span></em> that my servant has got a + key for it: <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ergo</span></span>—.”</span> + (3.) <span class="tei tei-q">“If a ray of sunlight, broken through + a prism, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, bent up or down, appears + as a coloured band instead of round and white as before, the cause + must always be that light consists of homogeneous rays, differently + coloured and refrangible to different degrees, which, when forced + asunder on account of the difference of their refrangibility, give + an elongated and variously-coloured spectrum: <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ergo—bibamus!</span></span>”</span>—It must be + possible to trace every error to such a conclusion, drawn from a + major premise which is often only falsely generalised, + hypothetical, and founded on the assumption that some particular + cause is that of a certain effect. Only certain mistakes in + counting are to be excepted, and they are not really errors, but + merely mistakes. The operation prescribed by the concepts of the + numbers has not been carried out in pure intuition or perception, + in counting, but some other operation instead of it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As regards the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">content</span></em> of the sciences generally, + it is, in fact, always the relation of the phenomena of the world + to each other, according to the principle of sufficient reason, + under the guidance of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">why</span></em>, which has validity and + meaning only through this principle. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Explanation</span></em> is the establishment + of this relation. Therefore explanation can never go further than + to show two ideas standing to each other in the relation peculiar + to that form of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in + the class to which they belong. If this is done we cannot further + be asked the question, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">why</span></em>: for the relation proved is + that one which absolutely cannot be imagined as other than it is, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, it is the form of all + knowledge. Therefore we do not ask why 2 + 2 = 4; or why the + equality of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page106">[pg + 106]</span><a name="Pg106" id="Pg106" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + angles of a triangle determines the equality of the sides; or why + its effect follows any given cause; or why the truth of the + conclusion is evident from the truth of the premises. Every + explanation which does not ultimately lead to a relation of which + no <span class="tei tei-q">“why”</span> can further be demanded, + stops at an accepted <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">qualitas + occulta</span></span>; but this is the character of every original + force of nature. Every explanation in natural science must + ultimately end with such a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">qualitas + occulta</span></span>, and thus with complete obscurity. It must + leave the inner nature of a stone just as much unexplained as that + of a human being; it can give as little account of the weight, the + cohesion, the chemical qualities, &c., of the former, as of the + knowing and acting of the latter. Thus, for example, weight is a + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitas occulta</span></span>, for it can be + thought away, and does not proceed as a necessity from the form of + knowledge; which, on the contrary, is not the case with the law of + inertia, for it follows from the law of causality, and is therefore + sufficiently explained if it is referred to that law. There are two + things which are altogether inexplicable,—that is to say, do not + ultimately lead to the relation which the principle of sufficient + reason expresses. These are, first, the principle of sufficient + reason itself in all its four forms, because it is the principle of + all explanation, which has meaning only in relation to it; + secondly, that to which this principle does not extend, but which + is the original source of all phenomena; the thing-in-itself, the + knowledge of which is not subject to the principle of sufficient + reason. We must be content for the present not to understand this + thing-in-itself, for it can only be made intelligible by means of + the following book, in which we shall resume this consideration of + the possible achievements of the sciences. But at the point at + which natural science, and indeed every science, leaves things, + because not only its explanation of them, but even the principle of + this explanation, the principle of sufficient reason, does not + extend beyond this point; there philosophy <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page107">[pg 107]</span><a name="Pg107" id="Pg107" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> takes them up and treats them after its own + method, which is quite distinct from the method of science. In my + essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 51, I have shown how + in the different sciences the chief guiding clue is one or other + form of that principle; and, in fact, perhaps the most appropriate + classification of the sciences might be based upon this + circumstance. Every explanation arrived at by the help of this clue + is, as we have said, merely relative; it explains things in + relation to each other, but something which indeed is presupposed + is always left unexplained. In mathematics, for example, this is + space and time; in mechanics, physics, and chemistry it is matter, + qualities, original forces and laws of nature; in botany and + zoology it is the difference of species, and life itself; in + history it is the human race with all its properties of thought and + will: in all it is that form of the principle of sufficient reason + which is respectively applicable. It is peculiar to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">philosophy</span></em> that it presupposes + nothing as known, but treats everything as equally external and a + problem; not merely the relations of phenomena, but also the + phenomena themselves, and even the principle of sufficient reason + to which the other sciences are content to refer everything. In + philosophy nothing would be gained by such a reference, as one + member of the series is just as external to it as another; and, + moreover, that kind of connection is just as much a problem for + philosophy as what is joined together by it, and the latter again + is just as much a problem after its combination has been explained + as before it. For, as we have said, just what the sciences + presuppose and lay down as the basis and the limits of their + explanation, is precisely and peculiarly the problem of philosophy, + which may therefore be said to begin where science ends. It cannot + be founded upon demonstrations, for they lead from known principles + to unknown, but everything is equally unknown and external to + philosophy. There can be no principle in consequence of which the + world with <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page108">[pg + 108]</span><a name="Pg108" id="Pg108" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + all its phenomena first came into existence, and therefore it is + not possible to construct, as Spinoza wished, a philosophy which + demonstrates <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ex firmis + principiis</span></span>. Philosophy is the most general rational + knowledge, the first principles of which cannot therefore be + derived from another principle still more general. The principle of + contradiction establishes merely the agreement of concepts, but + does not itself produce concepts. The principle of sufficient + reason explains the connections of phenomena, but not the phenomena + themselves; therefore philosophy cannot proceed upon these + principles to seek a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">causa + efficiens</span></span> or a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">causa finalis</span></span> of the whole + world. My philosophy, at least, does not by any means seek to know + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">whence</span></em> or <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wherefore</span></em> the world exists, but + merely <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">what</span></em> the world is. But the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">why</span></em> is here subordinated to the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">what</span></em>, for it already belongs to + the world, as it arises and has meaning and validity only through + the form of its phenomena, the principle of sufficient reason. We + might indeed say that every one knows what the world is without + help, for he is himself that subject of knowledge of which the + world is the idea; and so far this would be true. But that + knowledge is empirical, is in the concrete; the task of philosophy + is to reproduce this in the abstract to raise to permanent rational + knowledge the successive changing perceptions, and in general, all + that is contained under the wide concept of feeling and merely + negatively defined as not abstract, distinct, rational knowledge. + It must therefore consist of a statement in the abstract, of the + nature of the whole world, of the whole, and of all the parts. In + order then that it may not lose itself in the endless multitude of + particular judgments, it must make use of abstraction and think + everything individual in the universal, and its differences also in + the universal. It must therefore partly separate and partly unite, + in order to present to rational knowledge the whole manifold of the + world generally, according to its nature, comprehended in a few + abstract concepts. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page109">[pg + 109]</span><a name="Pg109" id="Pg109" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Through these concepts, in which it fixes the nature of the world, + the whole individual must be known as well as the universal, the + knowledge of both therefore must be bound together to the minutest + point. Therefore the capacity for philosophy consists just in that + in which Plato placed it, the knowledge of the one in the many, and + the many in the one. Philosophy will therefore be a sum-total of + general judgments, whose ground of knowledge is immediately the + world itself in its entirety, without excepting anything; thus all + that is to be found in human consciousness; it will be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">a complete + recapitulation, as it were, a reflection, of the world in abstract + concepts</span></em>, which is only possible by the union of the + essentially identical in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> concept and the relegation of + the different to another. This task was already prescribed to + philosophy by Bacon of Verulam when he said: <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ea + demum vera est philosophia, quae mundi ipsius voces fidelissime + reddit, et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, et nihil aliud + est, quam ejusdem</span></span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-variant: small-caps">simulacrum et + reflectio</span></span>, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">neque addit quidquam + de proprio, sed tantum iterat et resonat</span></span> (De Augm. + Scient., L. 2, c. 13). But we take this in a wider sense than Bacon + could then conceive.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The agreement + which all the sides and parts of the world have with each other, + just because they belong to a whole, must also be found in this + abstract copy of it. Therefore the judgments in this sum-total + could to a certain extent be deduced from each other, and indeed + always reciprocally so deduced. Yet to make the first judgment + possible, they must all be present, and thus implied as prior to it + in the knowledge of the world in the concrete, especially as all + direct proof is more certain than indirect proof; their harmony + with each other by virtue of which they come together into the + unity of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> thought, and which arises from + the harmony and unity of the world of perception itself, which is + their common ground of knowledge, is not therefore to be made use + of to establish them, as that which is prior to them, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page110">[pg 110]</span><a name="Pg110" id="Pg110" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> but is only added as a confirmation of + their truth. This problem itself can only become quite clear in + being solved.<a id="noteref_23" name="noteref_23" href= + "#note_23"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">23</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 16. After this + full consideration of reason as a special faculty of knowledge + belonging to man alone, and the results and phenomena peculiar to + human nature brought about by it, it still remains for me to speak + of reason, so far as it is the guide of human action, and in this + respect may be called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">practical</span></em>. But what there is to + say upon this point has found its place elsewhere in the appendix + to this work, where I controvert the existence of the so-called + practical reason of Kant, which he (certainly very conveniently) + explained as the immediate source of virtue, and as the seat of an + absolute (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, fallen from heaven) + imperative. The detailed and thorough refutation of this Kantian + principle of morality I have given later in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Fundamental Problems of Ethics.”</span> There remains, + therefore, but little for me to say here about the actual influence + of reason, in the true sense of the word, upon action. At the + commencement of our treatment of reason we remarked, in general + terms, how much the action and behaviour of men differs from that + of brutes, and that this difference is to be regarded as entirely + due to the presence of abstract concepts in consciousness. The + influence of these upon our whole existence is so penetrating and + significant that, on account of them, we are related to the lower + animals very much as those animals that see are related to those + that have no eyes (certain larvae, worms, and zoophytes). Animals + without eyes know only by touch what is immediately present to them + in space, what comes into contact with them; those which see, on + the contrary, know a wide circle of near and distant objects. In + the same way the absence of reason confines the lower animals to + the ideas of perception, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the real objects which are + immediately present to them in time; we, on the contrary, on + account <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page111">[pg + 111]</span><a name="Pg111" id="Pg111" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of knowledge in the abstract, comprehend not only the narrow actual + present, but also the whole past and future, and the wide sphere of + the possible; we view life freely on all its sides, and go far + beyond the present and the actual. Thus what the eye is in space + and for sensuous knowledge, reason is, to a certain extent, in time + and for inner knowledge. But as the visibility of objects has its + worth and meaning only in the fact that it informs us of their + tangibility, so the whole worth of abstract knowledge always + consists in its relation to what is perceived. Therefore men + naturally attach far more worth to immediate and perceived + knowledge than to abstract concepts, to that which is merely + thought; they place empirical knowledge before logical. But this is + not the opinion of men who live more in words than in deeds, who + have seen more on paper and in books than in actual life, and who + in their greatest degeneracy become pedants and lovers of the mere + letter. Thus only is it conceivable that Leibnitz and Wolf and all + their successors could go so far astray as to explain knowledge of + perception, after the example of Duns Scotus, as merely confused + abstract knowledge! To the honour of Spinoza, I must mention that + his truer sense led him, on the contrary, to explain all general + concepts as having arisen from the confusion of that which was + known in perception (Eth. II., prop. 40, Schol. 1). It is also a + result of perverted opinion that in mathematics the evidence proper + to it was rejected, and logical evidence alone accepted; that + everything in general which was not abstract knowledge was + comprehended under the wide name of feeling, and consequently was + little valued; and lastly that the Kantian ethics regarded the good + will which immediately asserts itself upon knowledge of the + circumstances, and guides to right and good action as mere feeling + and emotion, and consequently as worthless and without merit, and + would <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page112">[pg 112]</span><a name= + "Pg112" id="Pg112" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> only recognise + actions which proceed from abstract maxims as having moral + worth.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The many-sided + view of life as a whole which man, as distinguished from the lower + animals, possesses through reason, may be compared to a + geometrical, colourless, abstract, reduced plan of his actual life. + He, therefore, stands to the lower animals as the navigator who, by + means of chart, compass, and quadrant, knows accurately his course + and his position at any time upon the sea, stands to the uneducated + sailors who see only the waves and the heavens. Thus it is worth + noticing, and indeed wonderful, how, besides his life in the + concrete, man always lives another life in the abstract. In the + former he is given as a prey to all the storms of actual life, and + to the influence of the present; he must struggle, suffer, and die + like the brute. But his life in the abstract, as it lies before his + rational consciousness, is the still reflection of the former, and + of the world in which he lives; it is just that reduced chart or + plan to which we have referred. Here in the sphere of quiet + deliberation, what completely possessed him and moved him intensely + before, appears to him cold, colourless, and for the moment + external to him; he is merely the spectator, the observer. In + respect of this withdrawal into reflection he may be compared to an + actor who has played his part in one scene, and who takes his place + among the audience till it is time for him to go upon the stage + again, and quietly looks on at whatever may happen, even though it + be the preparation for his own death (in the piece), but afterwards + he again goes on the stage and acts and suffers as he must. From + this double life proceeds that quietness peculiar to human beings, + so very different from the thoughtlessness of the brutes, and with + which, in accordance with previous reflection, or a formed + determination, or a recognised necessity, a man suffers or + accomplishes in cold blood, what is of the utmost and often + terrible importance to him; suicide, execution, the <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page113">[pg 113]</span><a name="Pg113" id="Pg113" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> duel, enterprises of every kind fraught + with danger to life, and, in general, things against which his + whole animal nature rebels. Under such circumstances we see to what + an extent reason has mastered the animal nature, and we say to the + strong: σιδηρειον νυ τοι ἡτορ! (<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ferreum certe tibi cor</span></span>), Il. 24, + 521. Here we can say truly that reason manifests itself + practically, and thus wherever action is guided by reason, where + the motives are abstract concepts, wherever we are not determined + by particular ideas of perception, nor by the impression of the + moment which guides the brutes, there <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">practical + reason</span></em> shows itself. But I have fully explained in the + Appendix, and illustrated by examples, that this is entirely + different from and unrelated to the ethical worth of actions; that + rational action and virtuous action are two entirely different + things; that reason may just as well find itself in connection with + great evil as with great good, and by its assistance may give great + power to the one as well as to the other; that it is equally ready + and valuable for the methodical and consistent carrying out of the + noble and of the bad intention, of the wise as of the foolish + maxim; which all results from the constitution of its nature, which + is feminine, receptive, retentive, and not spontaneous; all this I + have shown in detail in the Appendix, and illustrated by examples. + What is said there would have been placed here, but on account of + my polemic against Kant's pretended practical reason I have been + obliged to relegate it to the Appendix, to which I therefore + refer.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The ideal + explained in the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Stoical philosophy</span></em> is the most + complete development of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">practical reason</span></em> in the true and + genuine sense of the word; it is the highest summit to which man + can attain by the mere use of his reason, and in it his difference + from the brutes shows itself most distinctly. For the ethics of + Stoicism are originally and essentially, not a doctrine of virtue, + but merely a guide to a rational life, the end and aim of which is + happiness through peace of mind. Virtuous conduct appears in it + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page114">[pg 114]</span><a name= + "Pg114" id="Pg114" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> as it were merely by + accident, as the means, not as the end. Therefore the ethical + theory of Stoicism is in its whole nature and point of view + fundamentally different from the ethical systems which lay stress + directly upon virtue, such as the doctrines of the Vedas, of Plato, + of Christianity, and of Kant. The aim of Stoical ethics is + happiness: τελος το ευδαι μονειν (<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">virtutes omnes finem habere + beatitudinem</span></span>) it is called in the account of the Stoa + by Stobæus (Ecl., L. ii. c. 7, p. 114, and also p. 138). Yet the + ethics of Stoicism teach that happiness can only be attained with + certainty through inward peace and quietness of spirit (αταραξια), + and that this again can only be reached through virtue; this is the + whole meaning of the saying that virtue is the highest good. But if + indeed by degrees the end is lost sight of in the means, and virtue + is inculcated in a way which discloses an interest entirely + different from that of one's own happiness, for it contradicts this + too distinctly; this is just one of those inconsistencies by means + of which, in every system, the immediately known, or, as it is + called, felt truth leads us back to the right way in defiance of + syllogistic reasoning; as, for example, we see clearly in the + ethical teaching of Spinoza, which deduces a pure doctrine of + virtue from the egoistical <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">suum utile + quærere</span></span> by means of palpable sophisms. According to + this, as I conceive the spirit of the Stoical ethics, their source + lies in the question whether the great prerogative of man, reason, + which, by means of planned action and its results, relieves life + and its burdens so much, might not also be capable of freeing him + at once, directly, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, through mere knowledge, + completely, or nearly so, of the sorrows and miseries of every kind + of which his life is full. They held that it was not in keeping + with the prerogative of reason that the nature given with it, which + by means of it comprehends and contemplates an infinity of things + and circumstances, should yet, through the present, and the + accidents that can be contained in the few years of a life that is + short, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page115">[pg + 115]</span><a name="Pg115" id="Pg115" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + fleeting, and uncertain, be exposed to such intense pain, to such + great anxiety and suffering, as arise from the tempestuous strain + of the desires and the antipathies; and they believed that the due + application of reason must raise men above them, and can make them + invulnerable. Therefore Antisthenes says: Δει κτασθαι νουν, η + βροχον (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">aut mentem parandam, aut + laqueum.</span></span> Plut. de stoic. repugn., c. 14), + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, life is so full of + troubles and vexations, that one must either rise above it by means + of corrected thoughts, or leave it. It was seen that want and + suffering did not directly and of necessity spring from not having, + but from desiring to have and not having; that therefore this + desire to have is the necessary condition under which alone it + becomes a privation not to have and begets pain. Ου πενια λυπην + εργαζεται, αλλα επιθυμια (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">non paupertas + dolorem efficit, sed cupiditas</span></span>), Epict., fragm. 25. + Men learned also from experience that it is only the hope of what + is claimed that begets and nourishes the wish; therefore neither + the many unavoidable evils which are common to all, nor + unattainable blessings, disquiet or trouble us, but only the + trifling more or less of those things which we can avoid or attain; + indeed, not only what is absolutely unavoidable or unattainable, + but also what is merely relatively so, leaves us quite undisturbed; + therefore the ills that have once become joined to our + individuality, or the good things that must of necessity always be + denied us, are treated with indifference, in accordance with the + peculiarity of human nature that every wish soon dies and can no + more beget pain if it is not nourished by hope. It followed from + all this that happiness always depends upon the proportion between + our claims and what we receive. It is all one whether the + quantities thus related be great or small, and the proportion can + be established just as well by diminishing the amount of the first + as by increasing the amount of the second; and in the same way it + also follows that all suffering proceeds from the want of + proportion <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page116">[pg + 116]</span><a name="Pg116" id="Pg116" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + between what we demand and expect and what we get. Now this want of + proportion obviously lies only in knowledge, and it could be + entirely abolished through fuller insight.<a id="noteref_24" name= + "noteref_24" href="#note_24"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">24</span></span></a> + Therefore Chrysippus says: δει ζῃν κατ᾽ εμπειριαν των φυσει + συμβαινοντων (Stob. Ecl., L. ii. c. 7, p. 134), that is, one ought + to live with a due knowledge of the transitory nature of the things + of the world. For as often as a man loses self-command, or is + struck down by a misfortune, or grows angry, or becomes + faint-hearted, he shows that he finds things different from what he + expected, consequently that he was caught in error, and did not + know the world and life, did not know that the will of the + individual is crossed at every step by the chance of inanimate + nature and the antagonism of aims and the wickedness of other + individuals: he has therefore either not made use of his reason in + order to arrive at a general knowledge of this characteristic of + life, or he lacks judgment, in that he does not recognise in the + particular what he knows in general, and is therefore surprised by + it and loses his self-command.<a id="noteref_25" name="noteref_25" + href="#note_25"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">25</span></span></a> Thus + also every keen pleasure is an error and an illusion, for no + attained wish can give lasting satisfaction; and, moreover, every + possession and every happiness is but lent by chance for an + uncertain time, and may therefore be demanded back the next hour. + All pain rests on the passing away of such an illusion; thus both + arise from defective knowledge; the wise man therefore holds + himself equally aloof from joy and sorrow, and no event disturbs + his αταραξια.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In accordance + with this spirit and aim of the Stoa, Epictetus began and ended + with the doctrine as the kernel <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page117">[pg 117]</span><a name="Pg117" id="Pg117" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of his philosophy, that we should consider + well and distinguish what depends upon us and what does not, and + therefore entirely avoid counting upon the latter, whereby we shall + certainly remain free from all pain, sorrow, and anxiety. But that + which alone is dependent upon us is the will; and here a transition + gradually takes place to a doctrine of virtue, for it is observed + that as the outer world, which is independent of us, determines + good and bad fortune, so inner contentment with ourselves, or the + absence of it, proceeds from the will. But it was then asked + whether we ought to apply the words <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bonum</span></span> and <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">malum</span></span> to the two former or to + the two latter? This was indeed arbitrary and a matter of choice, + and did not make any real difference, but yet the Stoics disputed + everlastingly with the Peripatetics and Epicureans about it, and + amused themselves with the inadmissible comparison of two entirely + incommensurable quantities, and the antithetical, paradoxical + judgments which proceeded from them, and which they flung at each + other. The <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Paradoxa</span></span> of Cicero afford us an + interesting collection of these from the Stoical side.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Zeno, the + founder, seems originally to have followed a somewhat different + path. The starting-point with him was that for the attainment of + the highest good, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, blessedness and spiritual + peace, one must live in harmony with oneself (ὁμολογουμενους ξῃν; + δ᾽ εστι καθ᾽ ἑνα λογον και συμφωνον ξῃν.—<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Consonanter vivere: hoc est secundum unam + rationem et concordem sibi vivere.</span></span> Stob. Ecl. eth. L. + ii., c. 7, p. 132. Also: Αρετην διαθεσιν ειναι ψυχης συμφωνον ἑαυτῃ + περι ὁλον τον βιον. <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Virtutem esse animi + affectiomem secum per totam vitam consentientem</span></span>, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ibid.</span></span>, p. 104.) Now this was + only possible for a man if he determined himself entirely + rationally, according to concepts, not according to changing + impressions and moods; since, however, only the maxims of our + conduct, not the consequences nor the outward circumstances, are in + our power, in order to be always consistent we must set + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page118">[pg 118]</span><a name= + "Pg118" id="Pg118" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> before us as our aim + only the maxims and not the consequences and circumstances, and + thus again a doctrine of virtue is introduced.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the ethical + principle of Zeno—to live in harmony with oneself—appeared even to + his immediate successors to be too formal and empty. They therefore + gave it material content by the addition—<span class= + "tei tei-q">“to live in harmony with nature”</span> (ὁμολογουμενως + τῃ φυσει ζῃν), which, as Stobæus mentions in another place, was + first added by Kleanthes, and extended the matter very much on + account of the wide sphere of the concept and the vagueness of the + expression. For Kleanthes meant the whole of nature in general, + while Chrysippus meant human nature in particular (Diog. Laert., 7, + 89). It followed that what alone was adapted to the latter was + virtue, just as the satisfaction of animal desires was adapted to + animal natures; and thus ethics had again to be forcibly united to + a doctrine of virtue, and in some way or other established through + physics. For the Stoics always aimed at unity of principle, as for + them God and the world were not dissevered.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The ethical + system of Stoicism, regarded as a whole, is in fact a very valuable + and estimable attempt to use the great prerogative of man, reason, + for an important and salutary end; to raise him above the suffering + and pain to which all life is exposed, by means of a maxim—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Qua + ratione queas traducere leniter œvum:</span></span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" style= + "text-align: left" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Ne te semper inops + agitet vexetque cupido,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Ne pavor et rerum + mediocriter utilium spes,</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">and thus to make + him partake, in the highest degree, of the dignity which belongs to + him as a rational being, as distinguished from the brutes; a + dignity of which, in this sense at any rate, we can speak, though + not in any other. It is a consequence of my view of the ethical + system of Stoicism that it must be explained at the part of my work + at which I consider what <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page119">[pg + 119]</span><a name="Pg119" id="Pg119" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + reason is and what it can do. But although it may to a certain + extent be possible to attain that end through the application of + reason, and through a purely rational system of ethics, and + although experience shows that the happiest men are those purely + rational characters commonly called practical philosophers,—and + rightly so, because just as the true, that is, the theoretical + philosopher carries life into the concept, they carry the concept + into life,—yet it is far from the case that perfection can be + attained in this way, and that the reason, rightly used, can really + free us from the burden and sorrow of life, and lead us to + happiness. Rather, there lies an absolute contradiction in wishing + to live without suffering, and this contradiction is also implied + in the commonly used expression, <span class="tei tei-q">“blessed + life.”</span> This will become perfectly clear to whoever + comprehends the whole of the following exposition. In this purely + rational system of ethics the contradiction reveals itself thus, + the Stoic is obliged in his doctrine of the way to the blessed life + (for that is what his ethical system always remains) to insert a + recommendation of suicide (as among the magnificent ornaments and + apparel of Eastern despots there is always a costly vial of poison) + for the case in which the sufferings of the body, which cannot be + philosophised away by any principles or syllogistic reasonings, are + paramount and incurable; thus its one aim, blessedness, is rendered + vain, and nothing remains as a mode of escape from suffering except + death; in such a case then death must be voluntarily accepted, just + as we would take any other medicine. Here then a marked antagonism + is brought out between the ethical system of Stoicism and all those + systems referred to above which make virtue in itself directly, and + accompanied by the most grievous sorrows, their aim, and will not + allow a man to end his life in order to escape from suffering. Not + one of them, however, was able to give the true reason for the + rejection of suicide, but they laboriously collected illusory + explanations from all sides: the true <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page120">[pg 120]</span><a name="Pg120" id="Pg120" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> reason will appear in the Fourth Book in the + course of the development of our system. But the antagonism + referred to reveals and establishes the essential difference in + fundamental principle between Stoicism, which is just a special + form of endæmonism, and those doctrines we have mentioned, although + both are often at one in their results, and are apparently related. + And the inner contradiction referred to above, with which the + ethical system of Stoicism is affected even in its fundamental + thought, shows itself further in the circumstance that its ideal, + the Stoic philosopher, as the system itself represents him, could + never obtain life or inner poetic truth, but remains a wooden, + stiff lay-figure of which nothing can be made. He cannot himself + make use of his wisdom, and his perfect peace, contentment, and + blessedness directly contradict the nature of man, and preclude us + from forming any concrete idea of him. When compared with him, how + entirely different appear the overcomers of the world, and + voluntary hermits that Indian philosophy presents to us, and has + actually produced; or indeed, the holy man of Christianity, that + excellent form full of deep life, of the greatest poetic truth, and + the highest significance, which stands before us in perfect virtue, + holiness, and sublimity, yet in a state of supreme suffering.<a id= + "noteref_26" name="noteref_26" href="#note_26"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">26</span></span></a></p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page121">[pg 121]</span><a name= + "Pg121" id="Pg121" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc11" id="toc11"></a> <a name="pdf12" id="pdf12"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Second Book. The World As + Will.</span></h1> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc13" id="toc13"></a> <a name="pdf14" id="pdf14"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">First Aspect. The Objectification Of + The Will.</span></h2> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Nos habitat, non tartara, sed + nec sidera coeli:</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Spiritus, in nobis qui viget, + illa facit.</span> + </div> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page123">[pg 123]</span><a name= + "Pg123" id="Pg123" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 17. In the + first book we considered the idea merely as such, that is, only + according to its general form. It is true that as far as the + abstract idea, the concept, is concerned, we obtained a knowledge + of it in respect of its content also, because it has content and + meaning only in relation to the idea of perception, without which + it would be worthless and empty. Accordingly, directing our + attention exclusively to the idea of perception, we shall now + endeavour to arrive at a knowledge of its content, its more exact + definition, and the forms which it presents to us. And it will + specially interest us to find an explanation of its peculiar + significance, that significance which is otherwise merely felt, but + on account of which it is that these pictures do not pass by us + entirely strange and meaningless, as they must otherwise do, but + speak to us directly, are understood, and obtain an interest which + concerns our whole nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We direct our + attention to mathematics, natural science, and philosophy, for each + of these holds out the hope that it will afford us a part of the + explanation we desire. Now, taking philosophy first, we find that + it is like a monster with many heads, each of which speaks a + different language. They are not, indeed, all at variance on the + point we are here considering, the significance of the idea of + perception. For, with the exception of the Sceptics and the + Idealists, the others, for the most part, speak very much in the + same way of an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">object</span></em> which constitutes the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">basis</span></em> of the idea, and which is + indeed different in its whole being and nature from the idea, but + yet is in all <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page124">[pg + 124]</span><a name="Pg124" id="Pg124" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + points as like it as one egg is to another. But this does not help + us, for we are quite unable to distinguish such an object from the + idea; we find that they are one and the same; for every object + always and for ever presupposes a subject, and therefore remains + idea, so that we recognised objectivity as belonging to the most + universal form of the idea, which is the division into subject and + object. Further, the principle of sufficient reason, which is + referred to in support of this doctrine, is for us merely the form + of the idea, the orderly combination of one idea with another, but + not the combination of the whole finite or infinite series of ideas + with something which is not idea at all, and which cannot therefore + be presented in perception. Of the Sceptics and Idealists we spoke + above, in examining the controversy about the reality of the outer + world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If we turn to + mathematics to look for the fuller knowledge we desire of the idea + of perception, which we have, as yet, only understood generally, + merely in its form, we find that mathematics only treats of these + ideas so far as they fill time and space, that is, so far as they + are quantities. It will tell us with the greatest accuracy the + how-many and the how-much; but as this is always merely relative, + that is to say, merely a comparison of one idea with others, and a + comparison only in the one respect of quantity, this also is not + the information we are principally in search of.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lastly, if we + turn to the wide province of natural science, which is divided into + many fields, we may, in the first place, make a general division of + it into two parts. It is either the description of forms, which I + call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Morphology</span></em>, or the explanation of + changes, which I call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Etiology</span></em>. The first treats of the + permanent forms, the second of the changing matter, according to + the laws of its transition from one form to another. The first is + the whole extent of what is generally called natural history. It + teaches us, especially in the sciences of <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page125">[pg 125]</span><a name="Pg125" id="Pg125" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> botany and zoology, the various permanent, + organised, and therefore definitely determined forms in the + constant change of individuals; and these forms constitute a great + part of the content of the idea of perception. In natural history + they are classified, separated, united, arranged according to + natural and artificial systems, and brought under concepts which + make a general view and knowledge of the whole of them possible. + Further, an infinitely fine analogy both in the whole and in the + parts of these forms, and running through them all (<span lang="fr" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unité de plan</span></span>), is established, + and thus they may be compared to innumerable variations on a theme + which is not given. The passage of matter into these forms, that is + to say, the origin of individuals, is not a special part of natural + science, for every individual springs from its like by generation, + which is everywhere equally mysterious, and has as yet evaded + definite knowledge. The little that is known on the subject finds + its place in physiology, which belongs to that part of natural + science I have called etiology. Mineralogy also, especially where + it becomes geology, inclines towards etiology, though it + principally belongs to morphology. Etiology proper comprehends all + those branches of natural science in which the chief concern is the + knowledge of cause and effect. The sciences teach how, according to + an invariable rule, one condition of matter is necessarily followed + by a certain other condition; how one change necessarily conditions + and brings about a certain other change; this sort of teaching is + called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">explanation</span></em>. The principal + sciences in this department are mechanics, physics, chemistry, and + physiology.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If, however, we + surrender ourselves to its teaching, we soon become convinced that + etiology cannot afford us the information we chiefly desire, any + more than morphology. The latter presents to us innumerable and + infinitely varied forms, which are yet related by an unmistakable + family likeness. These are for us ideas, and when only treated in + this way, they remain always strange to us, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page126">[pg 126]</span><a name="Pg126" id="Pg126" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and stand before us like hieroglyphics + which we do not understand. Etiology, on the other hand, teaches us + that, according to the law of cause and effect, this particular + condition of matter brings about that other particular condition, + and thus it has explained it and performed its part. However, it + really does nothing more than indicate the orderly arrangement + according to which the states of matter appear in space and time, + and teach in all cases what phenomenon must necessarily appear at a + particular time in a particular place. It thus determines the + position of phenomena in time and space, according to a law whose + special content is derived from experience, but whose universal + form and necessity is yet known to us independently of experience. + But it affords us absolutely no information about the inner nature + of any one of these phenomena: this is called a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">force of + nature</span></em>, and it lies outside the province of causal + explanation, which calls the constant uniformity with which + manifestations of such a force appear whenever their known + conditions are present, a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">law of nature</span></em>. But this law of + nature, these conditions, and this appearance in a particular place + at a particular time, are all that it knows or ever can know. The + force itself which manifests itself, the inner nature of the + phenomena which appear in accordance with these laws, remains + always a secret to it, something entirely strange and unknown in + the case of the simplest as well as of the most complex phenomena. + For although as yet etiology has most completely achieved its aim + in mechanics, and least completely in physiology, still the force + on account of which a stone falls to the ground or one body repels + another is, in its inner nature, not less strange and mysterious + than that which produces the movements and the growth of an animal. + The science of mechanics presupposes matter, weight, + impenetrability, the possibility of communicating motion by impact, + inertia and so forth as ultimate facts, calls them forces of + nature, and their necessary and <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page127">[pg 127]</span><a name="Pg127" id="Pg127" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> orderly appearance under certain conditions a + law of nature. Only after this does its explanation begin, and it + consists in indicating truly and with mathematical exactness, how, + where and when each force manifests itself, and in referring every + phenomenon which presents itself to the operation of one of these + forces. Physics, chemistry, and physiology proceed in the same way + in their province, only they presuppose more and accomplish less. + Consequently the most complete etiological explanation of the whole + of nature can never be more than an enumeration of forces which + cannot be explained, and a reliable statement of the rule according + to which phenomena appear in time and space, succeed, and make way + for each other. But the inner nature of the forces which thus + appear remains unexplained by such an explanation, which must + confine itself to phenomena and their arrangement, because the law + which it follows does not extend further. In this respect it may be + compared to a section of a piece of marble which shows many veins + beside each other, but does not allow us to trace the course of the + veins from the interior of the marble to its surface. Or, if I may + use an absurd but more striking comparison, the philosophical + investigator must always have the same feeling towards the complete + etiology of the whole of nature, as a man who, without knowing how, + has been brought into a company quite unknown to him, each member + of which in turn presents another to him as his friend and cousin, + and therefore as quite well known, and yet the man himself, while + at each introduction he expresses himself gratified, has always the + question on his lips: <span class="tei tei-q">“But how the deuce do + I stand to the whole company?”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus we see + that, with regard to those phenomena which we know only as our + ideas, etiology can never give us the desired information that + shall carry us beyond this point. For, after all its explanations, + they still remain quite strange to us, as mere ideas whose + significance <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page128">[pg + 128]</span><a name="Pg128" id="Pg128" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + we do not understand. The causal connection merely gives us the + rule and the relative order of their appearance in space and time, + but affords us no further knowledge of that which so appears. + Moreover, the law of causality itself has only validity for ideas, + for objects of a definite class, and it has meaning only in so far + as it presupposes them. Thus, like these objects themselves, it + always exists only in relation to a subject, that is, + conditionally; and so it is known just as well if we start from the + subject, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, as if we start from the object, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span>. Kant indeed has + taught us this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But what now + impels us to inquiry is just that we are not satisfied with knowing + that we have ideas, that they are such and such, and that they are + connected according to certain laws, the general expression of + which is the principle of sufficient reason. We wish to know the + significance of these ideas; we ask whether this world is merely + idea; in which case it would pass by us like an empty dream or a + baseless vision, not worth our notice; or whether it is also + something else, something more than idea, and if so, what. Thus + much is certain, that this something we seek for must be completely + and in its whole nature different from the idea; that the forms and + laws of the idea must therefore be completely foreign to it; + further, that we cannot arrive at it from the idea under the + guidance of the laws which merely combine objects, ideas, among + themselves, and which are the forms of the principle of sufficient + reason.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus we see + already that we can never arrive at the real nature of things from + without. However much we investigate, we can never reach anything + but images and names. We are like a man who goes round a castle + seeking in vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the + façades. And yet this is the method that has been followed by all + philosophers before me.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 18. In fact, + the meaning for which we seek of that <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page129">[pg 129]</span><a name="Pg129" id="Pg129" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> world which is present to us only as our + idea, or the transition from the world as mere idea of the knowing + subject to whatever it may be besides this, would never be found if + the investigator himself were nothing more than the pure knowing + subject (a winged cherub without a body). But he is himself rooted + in that world; he finds himself in it as an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">individual</span></em>, that is to say, his + knowledge, which is the necessary supporter of the whole world as + idea, is yet always given through the medium of a body, whose + affections are, as we have shown, the starting-point for the + understanding in the perception of that world. His body is, for the + pure knowing subject, an idea like every other idea, an object + among objects. Its movements and actions are so far known to him in + precisely the same way as the changes of all other perceived + objects, and would be just as strange and incomprehensible to him + if their meaning were not explained for him in an entirely + different way. Otherwise he would see his actions follow upon given + motives with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes + of other objects follow upon causes, stimuli, or motives. But he + would not understand the influence of the motives any more than the + connection between every other effect which he sees and its cause. + He would then call the inner nature of these manifestations and + actions of his body which he did not understand a force, a quality, + or a character, as he pleased, but he would have no further insight + into it. But all this is not the case; indeed the answer to the + riddle is given to the subject of knowledge who appears as an + individual, and the answer is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>. This and this alone gives + him the key to his own existence, reveals to him the significance, + shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his + movements. The body is given in two entirely different ways to the + subject of knowledge, who becomes an individual only through his + identity with it. It is given as an idea in intelligent perception, + as an object among objects and <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page130">[pg 130]</span><a name="Pg130" id="Pg130" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> subject to the laws of objects. And it is + also given in quite a different way as that which is immediately + known to every one, and is signified by the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>. + Every true act of his will is also at once and without exception a + movement of his body. The act of will and the movement of the body + are not two different things objectively known, which the bond of + causality unites; they do not stand in the relation of cause and + effect; they are one and the same, but they are given in entirely + different ways,—immediately, and again in perception for the + understanding. The action of the body is nothing but the act of the + will objectified, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, passed into perception. It + will appear later that this is true of every movement of the body, + not merely those which follow upon motives, but also involuntary + movements which follow upon mere stimuli, and, indeed, that the + whole body is nothing but objectified will, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + will become idea. All this will be proved and made quite clear in + the course of this work. In one respect, therefore, I shall call + the body the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objectivity of will</span></em>; as in the + previous book, and in the essay on the principle of sufficient + reason, in accordance with the one-sided point of view + intentionally adopted there (that of the idea), I called it + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + immediate object</span></em>. Thus in a certain sense we may also + say that will is the knowledge <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> of the body, and the body is the knowledge + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> of the will. + Resolutions of the will which relate to the future are merely + deliberations of the reason about what we shall will at a + particular time, not real acts of will. Only the carrying out of + the resolve stamps it as will, for till then it is never more than + an intention that may be changed, and that exists only in the + reason <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">in abstracto</span></span>. + It is only in reflection that to will and to act are different; in + reality they are one. Every true, genuine, immediate act of will is + also, at once and immediately, a visible act of the body. And, + corresponding to this, every impression upon the body is also, on + the other hand, at once <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page131">[pg + 131]</span><a name="Pg131" id="Pg131" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and immediately an impression upon the will. As such it is called + pain when it is opposed to the will; gratification or pleasure when + it is in accordance with it. The degrees of both are widely + different. It is quite wrong, however, to call pain and pleasure + ideas, for they are by no means ideas, but immediate affections of + the will in its manifestation, the body; compulsory, instantaneous + willing or not-willing of the impression which the body sustains. + There are only a few impressions of the body which do not touch the + will, and it is through these alone that the body is an immediate + object of knowledge, for, as perceived by the understanding, it is + already an indirect object like all others. These impressions are, + therefore, to be treated directly as mere ideas, and excepted from + what has been said. The impressions we refer to are the affections + of the purely objective senses of sight, hearing, and touch, though + only so far as these organs are affected in the way which is + specially peculiar to their specific nature. This affection of them + is so excessively weak an excitement of the heightened and + specifically modified sensibility of these parts that it does not + affect the will, but only furnishes the understanding with the data + out of which the perception arises, undisturbed by any excitement + of the will. But every stronger or different kind of affection of + these organs of sense is painful, that is to say, against the will, + and thus they also belong to its objectivity. Weakness of the + nerves shows itself in this, that the impressions which have only + such a degree of strength as would usually be sufficient to make + them data for the understanding reach the higher degree at which + they influence the will, that is to say, give pain or pleasure, + though more often pain, which is, however, to some extent deadened + and inarticulate, so that not only particular tones and strong + light are painful to us, but there ensues a generally unhealthy and + hypochondriacal disposition which is not distinctly understood. The + identity of the body and the will shows itself further, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page132">[pg 132]</span><a name= + "Pg132" id="Pg132" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> among other ways, in + the circumstance that every vehement and excessive movement of the + will, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, every emotion, agitates + the body and its inner constitution directly, and disturbs the + course of its vital functions. This is shown in detail in + <span class="tei tei-q">“Will in Nature,”</span> p. 27 of the + second edition and p. 28 of the third.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lastly, the + knowledge which I have of my will, though it is immediate, cannot + be separated from that which I have of my body. I know my will, not + as a whole, not as a unity, not completely, according to its + nature, but I know it only in its particular acts, and therefore in + time, which is the form of the phenomenal aspect of my body, as of + every object. Therefore the body is a condition of the knowledge of + my will. Thus, I cannot really imagine this will apart from my + body. In the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, the will, + or rather the subject of willing, is treated as a special class of + ideas or objects. But even there we saw this object become one with + the subject; that is, we saw it cease to be an object. We there + called this union the miracle κατ᾽ εξοχην, and the whole of the + present work is to a certain extent an explanation of this. So far + as I know my will specially as object, I know it as body. But then + I am again at the first class of ideas laid down in that essay, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, real objects. As we + proceed we shall see always more clearly that these ideas of the + first class obtain their explanation and solution from those of the + fourth class given in the essay, which could no longer be properly + opposed to the subject as object, and that, therefore, we must + learn to understand the inner nature of the law of causality which + is valid in the first class, and of all that happens in accordance + with it from the law of motivation which governs the fourth + class.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The identity of + the will and the body, of which we have now given a cursory + explanation, can only be proved in the manner we have adopted here. + We have proved this identity for the first time, and shall do so + more and <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page133">[pg + 133]</span><a name="Pg133" id="Pg133" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + more fully in the course of this work. By <span class= + "tei tei-q">“proved”</span> we mean raised from the immediate + consciousness, from knowledge in the concrete to abstract knowledge + of the reason, or carried over into abstract knowledge. On the + other hand, from its very nature it can never be demonstrated, that + is, deduced as indirect knowledge from some other more direct + knowledge, just because it is itself the most direct knowledge; and + if we do not apprehend it and stick to it as such, we shall expect + in vain to receive it again in some indirect way as derivative + knowledge. It is knowledge of quite a special kind, whose truth + cannot therefore properly be brought under any of the four rubrics + under which I have classified all truth in the essay on the + principle of sufficient reason, § 29, the logical, the empirical, + the metaphysical, and the metalogical, for it is not, like all + these, the relation of an abstract idea to another idea, or to the + necessary form of perceptive or of abstract ideation, but it is the + relation of a judgment to the connection which an idea of + perception, the body, has to that which is not an idea at all, but + something <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">toto genere</span></span> + different, will. I should like therefore to distinguish this from + all other truth, and call it κατ᾽ εξοχην <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">philosophical + truth</span></em>. We can turn the expression of this truth in + different ways and say: My body and my will are one;—or, What as an + idea of perception I call my body, I call my will, so far as I am + conscious of it in an entirely different way which cannot be + compared to any other;—or, My body is the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objectivity</span></em> of my will;—or, My + body considered apart from the fact that it is my idea is still my + will, and so forth.<a id="noteref_27" name="noteref_27" href= + "#note_27"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">27</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 19. In the + first book we were reluctantly driven to explain the human body as + merely idea of the subject which knows it, like all the other + objects of this world of perception. But it has now become clear + that what enables us consciously to distinguish our own body from + all other objects which in other respects are precisely the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page134">[pg 134]</span><a name= + "Pg134" id="Pg134" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> same, is that our + body appears in consciousness in quite another way <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">toto genere</span></span> different from idea, + and this we denote by the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>; + and that it is just this double knowledge which we have of our own + body that affords us information about it, about its action and + movement following on motives, and also about what it experiences + by means of external impressions; in a word, about what it is, not + as idea, but as more than idea; that is to say, what it is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in + itself</span></em>. None of this information have we got directly + with regard to the nature, action, and experience of other real + objects.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is just + because of this special relation to one body that the knowing + subject is an individual. For regarded apart from this relation, + his body is for him only an idea like all other ideas. But the + relation through which the knowing subject is an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">individual</span></em>, is just on that + account a relation which subsists only between him and one + particular idea of all those which he has. Therefore he is + conscious of this <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> idea, not merely as an idea, + but in quite a different way as a will. If, however, he abstracts + from that special relation, from that twofold and completely + heterogeneous knowledge of what is one and the same, then that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em>, the body, is an idea like all + other ideas. Therefore, in order to understand the matter, the + individual who knows must either assume that what distinguishes + that one idea from others is merely the fact that his knowledge + stands in this double relation to it alone; that insight in two + ways at the same time is open to him only in the case of this one + object of perception, and that this is to be explained not by the + difference of this object from all others, but only by the + difference between the relation of his knowledge to this one + object, and its relation to all other objects. Or else he must + assume that this object is essentially different from all others; + that it alone of all objects is at once both will and idea, while + the rest are only ideas, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, only phantoms. Thus he + must assume that his body is the only real individual in + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page135">[pg 135]</span><a name= + "Pg135" id="Pg135" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the world, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the only phenomenon of + will and the only immediate object of the subject. That other + objects, considered merely as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideas</span></em>, are like his body, that is, + like it, fill space (which itself can only be present as idea), and + also, like it, are causally active in space, is indeed demonstrably + certain from the law of causality which is <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> valid for ideas, and which admits of no effect + without a cause; but apart from the fact that we can only reason + from an effect to a cause generally, and not to a similar cause, we + are still in the sphere of mere ideas, in which alone the law of + causality is valid, and beyond which it can never take us. But + whether the objects known to the individual only as ideas are yet, + like his own body, manifestations of a will, is, as was said in the + First Book, the proper meaning of the question as to the reality of + the external world. To deny this is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">theoretical + egoism</span></em>, which on that account regards all phenomena + that are outside its own will as phantoms, just as in a practical + reference exactly the same thing is done by practical egoism. For + in it a man regards and treats himself alone as a person, and all + other persons as mere phantoms. Theoretical egoism can never be + demonstrably refuted, yet in philosophy it has never been used + otherwise than as a sceptical sophism, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, a + pretence. As a serious conviction, on the other hand, it could only + be found in a madhouse, and as such it stands in need of a cure + rather than a refutation. We do not therefore combat it any further + in this regard, but treat it as merely the last stronghold of + scepticism, which is always polemical. Thus our knowledge, which is + always bound to individuality and is limited by this circumstance, + brings with it the necessity that each of us can only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">be one</span></em>, + while, on the other hand, each of us can <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">know + all</span></em>; and it is this limitation that creates the need + for philosophy. We therefore who, for this very reason, are + striving to extend the limits of our knowledge through philosophy, + will treat this sceptical argument of theoretical egoism + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page136">[pg 136]</span><a name= + "Pg136" id="Pg136" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which meets us, as + an army would treat a small frontier fortress. The fortress cannot + indeed be taken, but the garrison can never sally forth from it, + and therefore we pass it by without danger, and are not afraid to + have it in our rear.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The double + knowledge which each of us has of the nature and activity of his + own body, and which is given in two completely different ways, has + now been clearly brought out. We shall accordingly make further use + of it as a key to the nature of every phenomenon in nature, and + shall judge of all objects which are not our own bodies, and are + consequently not given to our consciousness in a double way but + only as ideas, according to the analogy of our own bodies, and + shall therefore assume that as in one aspect they are idea, just + like our bodies, and in this respect are analogous to them, so in + another aspect, what remains of objects when we set aside their + existence as idea of the subject, must in its inner nature be the + same as that in us which we call <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>. + For what other kind of existence or reality should we attribute to + the rest of the material world? Whence should we take the elements + out of which we construct such a world? Besides will and idea + nothing is known to us or thinkable. If we wish to attribute the + greatest known reality to the material world which exists + immediately only in our idea, we give it the reality which our own + body has for each of us; for that is the most real thing for every + one. But if we now analyse the reality of this body and its + actions, beyond the fact that it is idea, we find nothing in it + except the will; with this its reality is exhausted. Therefore we + can nowhere find another kind of reality which we can attribute to + the material world. Thus if we hold that the material world is + something more than merely our idea, we must say that besides being + idea, that is, in itself and according to its inmost nature, it is + that which we find immediately in ourselves as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>. I + say according to its inmost nature; but we must first come + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page137">[pg 137]</span><a name= + "Pg137" id="Pg137" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to know more + accurately this real nature of the will, in order that we may be + able to distinguish from it what does not belong to itself, but to + its manifestation, which has many grades. Such, for example, is the + circumstance of its being accompanied by knowledge, and the + determination by motives which is conditioned by this knowledge. As + we shall see farther on, this does not belong to the real nature of + will, but merely to its distinct manifestation as an animal or a + human being. If, therefore, I say,—the force which attracts a stone + to the earth is according to its nature, in itself, and apart from + all idea, will, I shall not be supposed to express in this + proposition the insane opinion that the stone moves itself in + accordance with a known motive, merely because this is the way in + which will appears in man.<a id="noteref_28" name="noteref_28" + href="#note_28"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">28</span></span></a> We + shall now proceed more clearly and in detail to prove, establish, + and develop to its full extent what as yet has only been + provisionally and generally explained.<a id="noteref_29" name= + "noteref_29" href="#note_29"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">29</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 20. As we have + said, the will proclaims itself primarily in the voluntary + movements of our own body, as the inmost nature of this body, as + that which it is besides being object of perception, idea. For + these voluntary movements are nothing else than the visible aspect + of the individual acts of will, with which they are directly + coincident and identical, and only distinguished through the form + of knowledge into which they have passed, and in which alone they + can be known, the form of idea.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But these acts + of will have always a ground or reason outside themselves in + motives. Yet these motives never determine more than what I will at + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">this</span></em> time, in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">this</span></em> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page138">[pg 138]</span><a name= + "Pg138" id="Pg138" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> place, and under + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">these</span></em> circumstances, not + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">that</span></em> I will in general, or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">what</span></em> I will in general, that is, + the maxims which characterise my volition generally. Therefore the + inner nature of my volition cannot be explained from these motives; + but they merely determine its manifestation at a given point of + time: they are merely the occasion of my will showing itself; but + the will itself lies outside the province of the law of motivation, + which determines nothing but its appearance at each point of time. + It is only under the presupposition of my empirical character that + the motive is a sufficient ground of explanation of my action. But + if I abstract from my character, and then ask, why, in general, I + will this and not that, no answer is possible, because it is only + the manifestation of the will that is subject to the principle of + sufficient reason, and not the will itself, which in this respect + is to be called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">groundless</span></em>. At this point I + presuppose Kant's doctrine of the empirical and intelligible + character, and also my own treatment of the subject in <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The Fundamental Problems of Ethics,”</span> pp. 48, + 58, and 178, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">et seq.</span></span>, of first edition (p. + 174, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">et + seq.</span></span>, of second edition). I shall also have to speak + more fully on the question in the Fourth Book. For the present, I + have only to draw attention to this, that the fact of one + manifestation being established through another, as here the deed + through the motive, does not at all conflict with the fact that its + real nature is will, which itself has no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ground</span></em>; + for as the principle of sufficient reason in all its aspects is + only the form of knowledge, its validity extends only to the idea, + to the phenomena, to the visibility of the will, but not to the + will itself, which becomes visible.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If now every + action of my body is the manifestation of an act of will in which + my will itself in general, and as a whole, thus my character, + expresses itself under given motives, manifestation of the will + must be the inevitable condition and presupposition of every + action. For the fact of its manifestation cannot depend upon + something <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page139">[pg + 139]</span><a name="Pg139" id="Pg139" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + which does not exist directly and only through it, which + consequently is for it merely accidental, and through which its + manifestation itself would be merely accidental. Now that condition + is just the whole body itself. Thus the body itself must be + manifestation of the will, and it must be related to my will as a + whole, that is, to my intelligible character, whose phenomenal + appearance in time is my empirical character, as the particular + action of the body is related to the particular act of the will. + The whole body, then, must be simply my will become visible, must + be my will itself, so far as this is object of perception, an idea + of the first class. It has already been advanced in confirmation of + this that every impression upon my body also affects my will at + once and immediately, and in this respect is called pain or + pleasure, or, in its lower degrees, agreeable or disagreeable + sensation; and also, conversely, that every violent movement of the + will, every emotion or passion, convulses the body and disturbs the + course of its functions. Indeed we can also give an etiological + account, though a very incomplete one, of the origin of my body, + and a somewhat better account of its development and conservation, + and this is the substance of physiology. But physiology merely + explains its theme in precisely the same way as motives explain + action. Thus the physiological explanation of the functions of the + body detracts just as little from the philosophical truth that the + whole existence of this body and the sum total of its functions are + merely the objectification of that will which appears in its + outward actions in accordance with a motive, as the establishment + of the individual action through the motive and the necessary + sequence of the action from the motive conflicts with the fact that + action in general, and according to its nature, is only the + manifestation of a will which itself has no ground. If, however, + physiology tries to refer even these outward actions, the immediate + voluntary movements, to causes in the organism,—for example, if it + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page140">[pg 140]</span><a name= + "Pg140" id="Pg140" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> explains the + movement of the muscles as resulting from the presence of fluids + (<span class="tei tei-q">“like the contraction of a cord when it is + wet,”</span> says Reil in his <span class="tei tei-q">“Archiv für + Physiologie,”</span> vol. vi. p. 153), even supposing it really + could give a thorough explanation of this kind, yet this would + never invalidate the immediately certain truth that every voluntary + motion (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">functiones + animales</span></span>) is the manifestation of an act of will. + Now, just as little can the physiological explanation of vegetative + life (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">functiones naturales + vitales</span></span>), however far it may advance, ever invalidate + the truth that the whole animal life which thus develops itself is + the manifestation of will. In general, then, as we have shown + above, no etiological explanation can ever give us more than the + necessarily determined position in time and space of a particular + manifestation, its necessary appearance there, according to a fixed + law; but the inner nature of everything that appears in this way + remains wholly inexplicable, and is presupposed by every + etiological explanation, and merely indicated by the names, force, + or law of nature, or, if we are speaking of action, character or + will. Thus, although every particular action, under the + presupposition of the definite character, necessarily follows from + the given motive, and although growth, the process of nourishment, + and all the changes of the animal body take place according to + necessarily acting causes (stimuli), yet the whole series of + actions, and consequently every individual act, and also its + condition, the whole body itself which accomplishes it, and + therefore also the process through which and in which it exists, + are nothing but the manifestation of the will, the becoming + visible, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the objectification of the will</span></em>. + Upon this rests the perfect suitableness of the human and animal + body to the human and animal will in general, resembling, though + far surpassing, the correspondence between an instrument made for a + purpose and the will of the maker, and on this account appearing as + design, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the teleological + explanation of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page141">[pg + 141]</span><a name="Pg141" id="Pg141" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the body. The parts of the body must, therefore, completely + correspond to the principal desires through which the will + manifests itself; they must be the visible expression of these + desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified hunger; the + organs of generation are objectified sexual desire; the grasping + hand, the hurrying feet, correspond to the more indirect desires of + the will which they express. As the human form generally + corresponds to the human will generally, so the individual bodily + structure corresponds to the individually modified will, the + character of the individual, and therefore it is throughout and in + all its parts characteristic and full of expression. It is very + remarkable that Parmenides already gave expression to this in the + following verses, quoted by Aristotle (Metaph. iii. 5):—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Ὁς γαρ ἑκαστος εχει κρασιν + μελεων πολυκαμπτων</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Τως νοος ανθρωποισι παρεστηκεν; + το γαρ αυτο</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Εστιν, ὁπερ φρονεει, μελεων + φυσις ανθρωποισι</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Και πασιν και παντι; το γαρ + πλεον εστι νοημα.</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">(Ut enim cuique + complexio membrorum flexibilium se habet, ita mens hominibus adest: + idem namque est, quod sapit, membrorum natura hominibus, et omnibus + et omni: quod enim plus est, intelligentia est.)<a id="noteref_30" + name="noteref_30" href="#note_30"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">30</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 21. Whoever + has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in abstracto</span></span>, and therefore + clear and certain, of what every one knows directly <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in concreto</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + as feeling, a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of + his phenomenal being, which manifests itself to him as idea, both + in his actions and in their permanent substratum, his body, and + that his will is that which is most immediate in his consciousness, + though it has not as such completely passed into the form of idea + in which object and subject stand over against each other, but + makes <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page142">[pg 142]</span><a name= + "Pg142" id="Pg142" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> itself known to him + in a direct manner, in which he does not quite clearly distinguish + subject and object, yet is not known as a whole to the individual + himself, but only in its particular acts,—whoever, I say, has with + me gained this conviction will find that of itself it affords him + the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of + nature; for he now transfers it to all those phenomena which are + not given to him, like his own phenomenal existence, both in direct + and indirect knowledge, but only in the latter, thus merely + one-sidedly as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em> alone. He will recognise this + will of which we are speaking not only in those phenomenal + existences which exactly resemble his own, in men and animals as + their inmost nature, but the course of reflection will lead him to + recognise the force which germinates and vegetates in the plant, + and indeed the force through which the crystal is formed, that by + which the magnet turns to the north pole, the force whose shock he + experiences from the contact of two different kinds of metals, the + force which appears in the elective affinities of matter as + repulsion and attraction, decomposition and combination, and, + lastly, even gravitation, which acts so powerfully throughout + matter, draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun,—all + these, I say, he will recognise as different only in their + phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as identical, as + that which is directly known to him so intimately and so much + better than anything else, and which in its most distinct + manifestation is called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>. It is this application of + reflection alone that prevents us from remaining any longer at the + phenomenon, and leads us to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing in + itself</span></em>. Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. + All idea, of whatever kind it may be, all <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">object</span></em>, + is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomenal</span></em> existence, but the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> alone is a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">thing in + itself</span></em>. As such, it is throughout not idea, but + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">toto genere</span></span> different from it; + it is that of which all idea, all object, is the phenomenal + appearance, the visibility, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page143">[pg 143]</span><a name="Pg143" id="Pg143" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the objectification. It is the inmost nature, + the kernel, of every particular thing, and also of the whole. It + appears in every blind force of nature and also in the + preconsidered action of man; and the great difference between these + two is merely in the degree of the manifestation, not in the nature + of what manifests itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 22. Now, if we + are to think as an object this thing-in-itself (we wish to retain + the Kantian expression as a standing formula), which, as such, is + never object, because all object is its mere manifestation, and + therefore cannot be it itself, we must borrow for it the name and + concept of an object, of something in some way objectively given, + consequently of one of its own manifestations. But in order to + serve as a clue for the understanding, this can be no other than + the most complete of all its manifestations, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the most distinct, the most developed, and directly enlightened by + knowledge. Now this is the human will. It is, however, well to + observe that here, at any rate, we only make use of a <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">denominatio a potiori</span></span>, through + which, therefore, the concept of will receives a greater extension + than it has hitherto had. Knowledge of the identical in different + phenomena, and of difference in similar phenomena, is, as Plato so + often remarks, a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">sine qua non</span></span> of + philosophy. But hitherto it was not recognised that every kind of + active and operating force in nature is essentially identical with + will, and therefore the multifarious kinds of phenomena were not + seen to be merely different species of the same genus, but were + treated as heterogeneous. Consequently there could be no word to + denote the concept of this genus. I therefore name the genus after + its most important species, the direct knowledge of which lies + nearer to us and guides us to the indirect knowledge of all other + species. But whoever is incapable of carrying out the required + extension of the concept will remain involved in a permanent + misunderstanding. For by the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em> he + understands only that species of it which has hitherto been + exclusively <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page144">[pg + 144]</span><a name="Pg144" id="Pg144" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + denoted by it, the will which is guided by knowledge, and whose + manifestation follows only upon motives, and indeed merely abstract + motives, and thus takes place under the guidance of the reason. + This, we have said, is only the most prominent example of the + manifestation of will. We must now distinctly separate in thought + the inmost essence of this manifestation which is known to us + directly, and then transfer it to all the weaker, less distinct + manifestations of the same nature, and thus we shall accomplish the + desired extension of the concept of will. From another point of + view I should be equally misunderstood by any one who should think + that it is all the same in the end whether we denote this inner + nature of all phenomena by the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em> or + by any other. This would be the case if the thing-in-itself were + something whose existence we merely <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inferred</span></em>, and thus knew indirectly + and only in the abstract. Then, indeed, we might call it what we + pleased; the name would stand merely as the symbol of an unknown + quantity. But the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>, which, like a magic spell, + discloses to us the inmost being of everything in nature, is by no + means an unknown quantity, something arrived at only by inference, + but is fully and immediately comprehended, and is so familiar to us + that we know and understand what will is far better than anything + else whatever. The concept of will has hitherto commonly been + subordinated to that of force, but I reverse the matter entirely, + and desire that every force in nature should be thought as will. It + must not be supposed that this is mere verbal quibbling or of no + consequence; rather, it is of the greatest significance and + importance. For at the foundation of the concept of force, as of + all other concepts, there ultimately lies the knowledge in + sense-perception of the objective world, that is to say, the + phenomenon, the idea; and the concept is constructed out of this. + It is an abstraction from the province in which cause and effect + reign, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, from ideas of perception, + and means just the causal nature of <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page145">[pg 145]</span><a name="Pg145" id="Pg145" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> causes at the point at which this causal + nature is no further etiologically explicable, but is the necessary + presupposition of all etiological explanation. The concept will, on + the other hand, is of all possible concepts the only one which has + its source <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">not</span></em> in the phenomenal, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">not</span></em> in + the mere idea of perception, but comes from within, and proceeds + from the most immediate consciousness of each of us, in which each + of us knows his own individuality, according to its nature, + immediately, apart from all form, even that of subject and object, + and which at the same time is this individuality, for here the + subject and the object of knowledge are one. If, therefore, we + refer the concept of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">force</span></em> to that of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>, + we have in fact referred the less known to what is infinitely + better known; indeed, to the one thing that is really immediately + and fully known to us, and have very greatly extended our + knowledge. If, on the contrary, we subsume the concept of will + under that of force, as has hitherto always been done, we renounce + the only immediate knowledge which we have of the inner nature of + the world, for we allow it to disappear in a concept which is + abstracted from the phenomenal, and with which we can therefore + never go beyond the phenomenal.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 23. The + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> as a thing in itself is quite + different from its phenomenal appearance, and entirely free from + all the forms of the phenomenal, into which it first passes when it + manifests itself, and which therefore only concern its <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objectivity</span></em>, and are foreign to + the will itself. Even the most universal form of all idea, that of + being object for a subject, does not concern it; still less the + forms which are subordinate to this and which collectively have + their common expression in the principle of sufficient reason, to + which we know that time and space belong, and consequently + multiplicity also, which exists and is possible only through these. + In this last regard I shall call time and space the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, + borrowing an expression from the old schoolmen, and I beg to draw + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page146">[pg 146]</span><a name= + "Pg146" id="Pg146" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> attention to this, + once for all. For it is only through the medium of time and space + that what is one and the same, both according to its nature and to + its concept, yet appears as different, as a multiplicity of + co-existent and successive phenomena. Thus time and space are the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, the + subject of so many subtleties and disputes among the schoolmen, + which may be found collected in Suarez (Disp. 5, Sect. 3). + According to what has been said, the will as a thing-in-itself lies + outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason in all + its forms, and is consequently completely groundless, although all + its manifestations are entirely subordinated to the principle of + sufficient reason. Further, it is free from all <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">multiplicity</span></em>, although its + manifestations in time and space are innumerable. It is itself one, + though not in the sense in which an object is one, for the unity of + an object can only be known in opposition to a possible + multiplicity; nor yet in the sense in which a concept is one, for + the unity of a concept originates only in abstraction from a + multiplicity; but it is one as that which lies outside time and + space, the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the possibility of multiplicity. Only when all this has become + quite clear to us through the subsequent examination of the + phenomena and different manifestations of the will, shall we fully + understand the meaning of the Kantian doctrine that time, space and + causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but are only forms + of knowing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The uncaused + nature of will has been actually recognised, where it manifests + itself most distinctly, as the will of man, and this has been + called free, independent. But on account of the uncaused nature of + the will itself, the necessity to which its manifestation is + everywhere subjected has been overlooked, and actions are treated + as free, which they are not. For every individual action follows + with strict necessity from the effect of the motive upon the + character. All necessity is, as we have already <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page147">[pg 147]</span><a name="Pg147" id="Pg147" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> said, the relation of the consequent to + the reason, and nothing more. The principle of sufficient reason is + the universal form of all phenomena, and man in his action must be + subordinated to it like every other phenomenon. But because in + self-consciousness the will is known directly and in itself, in + this consciousness lies also the consciousness of freedom. The fact + is, however, overlooked that the individual, the person, is not + will as a thing-in-itself, but is a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomenon</span></em> of will, is already + determined as such, and has come under the form of the phenomenal, + the principle of sufficient reason. Hence arises the strange fact + that every one believes himself <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> to be perfectly free, even in his individual + actions, and thinks that at every moment he can commence another + manner of life, which just means that he can become another person. + But <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span>, + through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not + free, but subjected to necessity; that in spite of all his + resolutions and reflections he does not change his conduct, and + that from the beginning of his life to the end of it, he must carry + out the very character which he himself condemns, and as it were + play the part he has undertaken to the end. I cannot pursue this + subject further at present, for it belongs, as ethical, to another + part of this work. In the meantime, I only wish to point out here + that the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phenomenon</span></em> of the will which in + itself is uncaused, is yet as such subordinated to the law of + necessity, that is, the principle of sufficient reason, so that in + the necessity with which the phenomena of nature follow each other, + we may find nothing to hinder us from recognising in them the + manifestations of will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Only those + changes which have no other ground than a motive, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + an idea, have hitherto been regarded as manifestations of will. + Therefore in nature a will has only been attributed to man, or at + the most to animals; for knowledge, the idea, is of course, as I + have said elsewhere, the true and exclusive characteristic of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page148">[pg 148]</span><a name= + "Pg148" id="Pg148" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> animal life. But + that the will is also active where no knowledge guides it, we see + at once in the instinct and the mechanical skill of animals.<a id= + "noteref_31" name="noteref_31" href="#note_31"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">31</span></span></a> That + they have ideas and knowledge is here not to the point, for the end + towards which they strive as definitely as if it were a known + motive, is yet entirely unknown to them. Therefore in such cases + their action takes place without motive, is not guided by the idea, + and shows us first and most distinctly how the will may be active + entirely without knowledge. The bird of a year old has no idea of + the eggs for which it builds a nest; the young spider has no idea + of the prey for which it spins a web; nor has the ant-lion any idea + of the ants for which he digs a trench for the first time. The + larva of the stag-beetle makes the hole in the wood, in which it is + to await its metamorphosis, twice as big if it is going to be a + male beetle as if it is going to be a female, so that if it is a + male there may be room for the horns, of which, however, it has no + idea. In such actions of these creatures the will is clearly + operative as in their other actions, but it is in blind activity, + which is indeed accompanied by knowledge but not guided by it. If + now we have once gained insight into the fact, that idea as motive + is not a necessary and essential condition of the activity of the + will, we shall more easily recognise the activity of will where it + is less apparent. For example, we shall see that the house of the + snail is no more made by a will which is foreign to the snail + itself, than the house which we build is produced through another + will than our own; but we shall recognise in both houses the work + of a will which objectifies itself in both the phenomena—a will + which works in us according to motives, but in the snail still + blindly as formative impulse directed outwards. In us also the same + will is in many ways only blindly active: in all the functions of + our body which are not guided by knowledge, in all its vital and + vegetative processes, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page149">[pg + 149]</span><a name="Pg149" id="Pg149" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + digestion, circulation, secretion, growth, reproduction. Not only + the actions of the body, but the whole body itself is, as we have + shown above, phenomenon of the will, objectified will, concrete + will. All that goes on in it must therefore proceed through will, + although here this will is not guided by knowledge, but acts + blindly according to causes, which in this case are called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">stimuli</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I call a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cause</span></em>, in the narrowest sense of + the word, that state of matter, which, while it introduces another + state with necessity, yet suffers just as great a change itself as + that which it causes; which is expressed in the rule, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“action and reaction are equal.”</span> Further, in the + case of what is properly speaking a cause, the effect increases + directly in proportion to the cause, and therefore also the + reaction. So that, if once the mode of operation be known, the + degree of the effect may be measured and calculated from the degree + of the intensity of the cause; and conversely the degree of the + intensity of the cause may be calculated from the degree of the + effect. Such causes, properly so called, operate in all the + phenomena of mechanics, chemistry, and so forth; in short, in all + the changes of unorganised bodies. On the other hand, I call a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">stimulus</span></em>, such a cause as sustains + no reaction proportional to its effect, and the intensity of which + does not vary directly in proportion to the intensity of its + effect, so that the effect cannot be measured by it. On the + contrary, a small increase of the stimulus may cause a very great + increase of the effect, or conversely, it may eliminate the + previous effect altogether, and so forth. All effects upon + organised bodies as such are of this kind. All properly organic and + vegetative changes of the animal body must therefore be referred to + stimuli, not to mere causes. But the stimulus, like every cause and + motive generally, never determines more than the point of time and + space at <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page150">[pg + 150]</span><a name="Pg150" id="Pg150" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + which the manifestation of every force is to take place, and does + not determine the inner nature of the force itself which is + manifested. This inner nature we know, from our previous + investigation, is will, to which therefore we ascribe both the + unconscious and the conscious changes of the body. The stimulus + holds the mean, forms the transition between the motive, which is + causality accompanied throughout by knowledge, and the cause in the + narrowest sense. In particular cases it is sometimes nearer a + motive, sometimes nearer a cause, but yet it can always be + distinguished from both. Thus, for example, the rising of the sap + in a plant follows upon stimuli, and cannot be explained from mere + causes, according to the laws of hydraulics or capillary + attraction; yet it is certainly assisted by these, and altogether + approaches very near to a purely causal change. On the other hand, + the movements of the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Hedysarum + gyrans</span></span> and the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Mimosa pudica</span></span>, although still + following upon mere stimuli, are yet very like movements which + follow upon motives, and seem almost to wish to make the + transition. The contraction of the pupils of the eyes as the light + is increased is due to stimuli, but it passes into movement which + is due to motive; for it takes place, because too strong lights + would affect the retina painfully, and to avoid this we contract + the pupils. The occasion of an erection is a motive, because it is + an idea, yet it operates with the necessity of a stimulus, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, it cannot be resisted, but + we must put the idea away in order to make it cease to affect us. + This is also the case with disgusting things, which excite the + desire to vomit. Thus we have treated the instinct of animals as an + actual link, of quite a distinct kind, between movement following + upon stimuli, and action following upon a known motive. Now we + might be asked to regard breathing as another link of this kind. It + has been disputed whether it belongs to the voluntary or the + involuntary movements, that is to say, whether it follows upon + motive or stimulus, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page151">[pg + 151]</span><a name="Pg151" id="Pg151" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and perhaps it may be explained as something which is between the + two. Marshall Hall (<span class="tei tei-q">“On the Diseases of the + Nervous System,”</span> § 293 sq.) explains it as a mixed function, + for it is partly under the influence of the cerebral (voluntary), + and partly under that of the spinal (non-voluntary) nerves. + However, we are finally obliged to number it with the expressions + of will which result from motives. For other motives, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + mere ideas, can determine the will to check it or accelerate it, + and, as is the case with every other voluntary action, it seems to + us that we could give up breathing altogether and voluntarily + suffocate. And in fact we could do so if any other motive + influenced the will sufficiently strongly to overcome the pressing + desire for air. According to some accounts Diogenes actually put an + end to his life in this way (Diog. Laert. VI. 76). Certain negroes + also are said to have done this (F. B. Osiander <span class= + "tei tei-q">“On Suicide”</span> [1813] pp. 170-180). If this be + true, it affords us a good example of the influence of abstract + motives, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, of the victory of + distinctively rational over merely animal will. For, that breathing + is at least partially conditioned by cerebral activity is shown by + the fact that the primary cause of death from prussic acid is that + it paralyses the brain, and so, indirectly, restricts the + breathing; but if the breathing be artificially maintained till the + stupefaction of the brain has passed away, death will not ensue. We + may also observe in passing that breathing affords us the most + obvious example of the fact that motives act with just as much + necessity as stimuli, or as causes in the narrowest sense of the + word, and their operation can only be neutralised by antagonistic + motives, as action is neutralised by re-action. For, in the case of + breathing, the illusion that we can stop when we like is much + weaker than in the case of other movements which follow upon + motives; because in breathing the motive is very powerful, very + near to us, and its satisfaction is very easy, for the muscles + which accomplish it are never tired, nothing, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page152">[pg 152]</span><a name="Pg152" id="Pg152" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> as a rule, obstructs it, and the whole + process is supported by the most inveterate habit of the + individual. And yet all motives act with the same necessity. The + knowledge that necessity is common to movements following upon + motives, and those following upon stimuli, makes it easier for us + to understand that that also which takes place in our bodily + organism in accordance with stimuli and in obedience to law, is + yet, according to its inner nature—will, which in all its + manifestations, though never in itself, is subordinated to the + principle of sufficient reason, that is, to necessity.<a id= + "noteref_32" name="noteref_32" href="#note_32"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">32</span></span></a> + Accordingly, we shall not rest contented with recognising that + animals, both in their actions and also in their whole existence, + bodily structure and organisation, are manifestations of will; but + we shall extend to plants also this immediate knowledge of the + essential nature of things which is given to us alone. Now all the + movements of plants follow upon stimuli; for the absence of + knowledge, and the movement following upon motives which is + conditioned by knowledge, constitutes the only essential difference + between animals and plants. Therefore, what appears for the idea as + plant life, as mere vegetation, as blindly impelling force, we + shall claim, according to its inner nature, for will, and recognise + it as just that which constitutes the basis of our own phenomenal + being, as it expresses itself in our actions, and also in the whole + existence of our body itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It only remains + for us to take the final step, the extension of our way of looking + at things to all those forces which act in nature in accordance + with universal, unchangeable laws, in conformity with which the + movements of all those bodies take place, which are wholly without + organs, and have therefore no susceptibility for stimuli, and have + no knowledge, which is the necessary condition <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page153">[pg 153]</span><a name="Pg153" id="Pg153" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of motives. Thus we must also apply the + key to the understanding of the inner nature of things, which the + immediate knowledge of our own existence alone can give us, to + those phenomena of the unorganised world which are most remote from + us. And if we consider them attentively, if we observe the strong + and unceasing impulse with which the waters hurry to the ocean, the + persistency with which the magnet turns ever to the north pole, the + readiness with which iron flies to the magnet, the eagerness with + which the electric poles seek to be re-united, and which, just like + human desire, is increased by obstacles; if we see the crystal + quickly and suddenly take form with such wonderful regularity of + construction, which is clearly only a perfectly definite and + accurately determined impulse in different directions, seized and + retained by crystallisation; if we observe the choice with which + bodies repel and attract each other, combine and separate, when + they are set free in a fluid state, and emancipated from the bonds + of rigidness; lastly, if we feel directly how a burden which + hampers our body by its gravitation towards the earth, unceasingly + presses and strains upon it in pursuit of its one tendency; if we + observe all this, I say, it will require no great effort of the + imagination to recognise, even at so great a distance, our own + nature. That which in us pursues its ends by the light of + knowledge; but here, in the weakest of its manifestations, only + strives blindly and dumbly in a one-sided and unchangeable manner, + must yet in both cases come under the name of will, as it is + everywhere one and the same—just as the first dim light of dawn + must share the name of sunlight with the rays of the full mid-day. + For the name <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> denotes that which is the + inner nature of everything in the world, and the one kernel of + every phenomenon.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Yet the + remoteness, and indeed the appearance of absolute difference + between the phenomena of unorganised nature and the will which we + know as the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page154">[pg + 154]</span><a name="Pg154" id="Pg154" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + inner reality of our own being, arises chiefly from the contrast + between the completely determined conformity to law of the one + species of phenomena, and the apparently unfettered freedom of the + other. For in man, individuality makes itself powerfully felt. + Every one has a character of his own; and therefore the same motive + has not the same influence over all, and a thousand circumstances + which exist in the wide sphere of the knowledge of the individual, + but are unknown to others, modify its effect. Therefore action + cannot be predetermined from the motive alone, for the other factor + is wanting, the accurate acquaintance with the individual + character, and with the knowledge which accompanies it. On the + other hand, the phenomena of the forces of nature illustrate the + opposite extreme. They act according to universal laws, without + variation, without individuality in accordance with openly manifest + circumstances, subject to the most exact predetermination; and the + same force of nature appears in its million phenomena in precisely + the same way. In order to explain this point and prove the identity + of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> indivisible will in all its + different phenomena, in the weakest as in the strongest, we must + first of all consider the relation of the will as thing-in-itself + to its phenomena, that is, the relation of the world as will to the + world as idea; for this will open to us the best way to a more + thorough investigation of the whole subject we are considering in + this second book.<a id="noteref_33" name="noteref_33" href= + "#note_33"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">33</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 24. We have + learnt from the great Kant that time, space, and causality, with + their entire constitution, and the possibility of all their forms, + are present in our consciousness quite independently of the objects + which appear in them, and which constitute their content; or, in + other words, they can be arrived at just as well if we <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page155">[pg 155]</span><a name="Pg155" id="Pg155" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> start from the subject as if we start + from the object. Therefore, with equal accuracy, we may call them + either forms of intuition or perception of the subject, or + qualities of the object <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">as object</span></em> (with Kant, phenomenon), + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>. + We may also regard these forms as the irreducible boundary between + object and subject. All objects must therefore exist in them, yet + the subject, independently of the phenomenal object, possesses and + surveys them completely. But if the objects appearing in these + forms are not to be empty phantoms, but are to have a meaning, they + must refer to something, must be the expression of something which + is not, like themselves, object, idea, a merely relative existence + for a subject, but which exists without such dependence upon + something which stands over against it as a condition of its being, + and independent of the forms of such a thing, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">is not + idea</span></em>, but a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing-in-itself</span></em>. Consequently it + may at least be asked: Are these ideas, these objects, something + more than or apart from the fact that they are ideas, objects of + the subject? And what would they be in this sense? What is that + other side of them which is <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">toto + genere</span></span> different from idea? What is the + thing-in-itself? <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">The will</span></em>, we have answered, but + for the present I set that answer aside.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whatever the + thing-in-itself may be, Kant is right in his conclusion that time, + space, and causality (which we afterwards found to be forms of the + principle of sufficient reason, the general expression of the forms + of the phenomenon) are not its properties, but come to it only + after, and so far as, it has become idea. That is, they belong only + to its phenomenal existence, not to itself. For since the subject + fully understands and constructs them out of itself, independently + of all object, they must be dependent upon <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">existence as + idea</span></em> as such, not upon that which becomes idea. They + must be the form of the idea as such; but not qualities of that + which has assumed this form. They must be already given with the + mere antithesis of subject <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page156">[pg 156]</span><a name="Pg156" id="Pg156" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and object (not as concepts but as facts), + and consequently they must be only the more exact determination of + the form of knowledge in general, whose most universal + determination is that antithesis itself. Now, that in the + phenomenon, in the object, which is in its turn conditioned by + time, space and causality, inasmuch as it can only become idea by + means of them, namely <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">multiplicity</span></em>, through co-existence + and succession, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">change</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">permanence</span></em> through the law of + causality, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">matter</span></em> which can only become idea + under the presupposition of causality, and lastly, all that becomes + idea only by means of these,—all this, I say, as a whole, does not + in reality belong to that which appears, to that which has passed + into the form of idea, but belongs merely to this form itself. And + conversely, that in the phenomenon which is not conditioned through + time, space and causality, and which cannot be referred to them, + nor explained in accordance with them, is precisely that in which + the thing manifested, the thing-in-itself, directly reveals itself. + It follows from this that the most complete capacity for being + known, that is to say, the greatest clearness, distinctness, and + susceptibility of exhaustive explanation, will necessarily belong + to that which pertains to knowledge <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">as + such</span></em>, and thus to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">form</span></em> of + knowledge; but not to that which in itself is not idea, not object, + but which has become knowledge only through entering these forms; + in other words, has become idea, object. Thus only that which + depends entirely upon being an object of knowledge, upon existing + as idea in general and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">as such</span></em> (not upon that which + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">becomes</span></em> known, and has only + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">become</span></em> idea), which therefore + belongs without distinction to everything that is known, and which, + on that account, is found just as well if we start from the subject + as if we start from the object,—this alone can afford us without + reserve a sufficient, exhaustive knowledge, a knowledge which is + clear to the very foundation. But this consists of nothing but + those forms of all phenomena of which we are conscious <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page157">[pg 157]</span><a name="Pg157" id="Pg157" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, and which may be generally expressed as the + principle of sufficient reason. Now, the forms of this principle + which occur in knowledge of perception (with which alone we are + here concerned) are time, space, and causality. The whole of pure + mathematics and pure natural science <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> is based entirely upon these. Therefore it is + only in these sciences that knowledge finds no obscurity, does not + rest upon what is incomprehensible (groundless, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + will), upon what cannot be further deduced. It is on this account + that Kant wanted, as we have said, to apply the name science + specially and even exclusively to these branches of knowledge + together with logic. But, on the other hand, these branches of + knowledge show us nothing more than mere connections, relations of + one idea to another, form devoid of all content. All content which + they receive, every phenomenon which fills these forms, contains + something which is no longer completely knowable in its whole + nature, something which can no longer be entirely explained through + something else, something then which is groundless, through which + consequently the knowledge loses its evidence and ceases to be + completely lucid. This that withholds itself from investigation, + however, is the thing-in-itself, is that which is essentially not + idea, not object of knowledge, but has only become knowable by + entering that form. The form is originally foreign to it, and the + thing-in-itself can never become entirely one with it, can never be + referred to mere form, and, since this form is the principle of + sufficient reason, can never be completely explained. If therefore + all mathematics affords us an exhaustive knowledge of that which in + the phenomena is quantity, position, number, in a word, spatial and + temporal relations; if all etiology gives us a complete account of + the regular conditions under which phenomena, with all their + determinations, appear in time and space, but, with it all, teaches + us nothing more than why in each case this particular phenomenon + must appear <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page158">[pg + 158]</span><a name="Pg158" id="Pg158" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + just at this time here, and at this place now; it is clear that + with their assistance we can never penetrate to the inner nature of + things. There always remains something which no explanation can + venture to attack, but which it always presupposes; the forces of + nature, the definite mode of operation of things, the quality and + character of every phenomenon, that which is without ground, that + which does not depend upon the form of the phenomenal, the + principle of sufficient reason, but is something to which this form + in itself is foreign, something which has yet entered this form, + and now appears according to its law, a law, however, which only + determines the appearance, not that which appears, only the how, + not the what, only the form, not the content. Mechanics, physics, + and chemistry teach the rules and laws according to which the + forces of impenetrability, gravitation, rigidity, fluidity, + cohesion, elasticity, heat, light, affinity, magnetism, + electricity, &c., operate; that is to say, the law, the rule + which these forces observe whenever they enter time and space. But + do what we will, the forces themselves remain <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitates occultæ</span></span>. For it is + just the thing-in-itself, which, because it is manifested, exhibits + these phenomena, which are entirely different from itself. In its + manifestation, indeed, it is completely subordinated to the + principle of sufficient reason as the form of the idea, but it can + never itself be referred to this form, and therefore cannot be + fully explained etiologically, can never be completely fathomed. It + is certainly perfectly comprehensible so far as it has assumed that + form, that is, so far as it is phenomenon, but its inner nature is + not in the least explained by the fact that it can thus be + comprehended. Therefore the more necessity any knowledge carries + with it, the more there is in it of that which cannot be otherwise + thought or presented in perception—as, for example, + space-relations—the clearer and more sufficing then it is, the less + pure objective content it has, or the less reality, properly so + called, is <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page159">[pg + 159]</span><a name="Pg159" id="Pg159" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + given in it. And conversely, the more there is in it which must be + conceived as mere chance, and the more it impresses us as given + merely empirically, the more proper objectivity and true reality is + there in such knowledge, and at the same time, the more that is + inexplicable, that is, that cannot be deduced from anything + else.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is true that + at all times an etiology, unmindful of its real aim, has striven to + reduce all organised life to chemism or electricity; all chemism, + that is to say quality, again to mechanism (action determined by + the shape of the atom), this again sometimes to the object of + phoronomy, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the combination of time + and space, which makes motion possible, sometimes to the object of + mere geometry, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, position in space (much in + the same way as we rightly deduce the diminution of an effect from + the square of the distance, and the theory of the lever in a purely + geometrical manner): geometry may finally be reduced to arithmetic, + which, on account of its one dimension, is of all the forms of the + principle of sufficient reason, the most intelligible, + comprehensible, and completely susceptible of investigation. As + instances of the method generally indicated here, we may refer to + the atoms of Democritus, the vortex of Descartes, the mechanical + physics of Lesage, which towards the end of last century tried to + explain both chemical affinities and gravitation mechanically by + impact and pressure, as may be seen in detail in <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Lucrèce Neutonien</span></span>;”</span> + Reil's form and combination as the cause of animal life, also tends + in this direction. Finally, the crude materialism which even now in + the middle of the nineteenth century has been served up again under + the ignorant delusion that it is original, belongs distinctly to + this class. It stupidly denies vital force, and first of all tries + to explain the phenomena of life from physical and chemical forces, + and those again from the mechanical effects of the matter, + position, form, and motion of imagined atoms, and thus <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page160">[pg 160]</span><a name="Pg160" id="Pg160" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> seeks to reduce all the forces of + nature to action and reaction as its thing-in-itself. According to + this teaching, light is the mechanical vibration or undulation of + an imaginary ether, postulated for this end. This ether, if it + reaches the eye, beats rapidly upon the retina, and gives us the + knowledge of colour. Thus, for example, four hundred and + eighty-three billion beats in a second give red, and seven hundred + and twenty-seven billion beats in a second give violet. Upon this + theory, persons who are colour-blind must be those who are unable + to count the beats, must they not? Such crass, mechanical, clumsy, + and certainly knotty theories, which remind one of Democritus, are + quite worthy of those who, fifty years after the appearance of + Goethe's doctrine of colour, still believe in Newton's homogeneous + light, and are not ashamed to say so. They will find that what is + overlooked in the child (Democritus) will not be forgiven to the + man. They might indeed, some day, come to an ignominious end; but + then every one would slink away and pretend that he never had + anything to do with them. We shall soon have to speak again of this + false reduction of the forces of nature to each other; so much for + the present. Supposing this theory were possible, all would + certainly be explained and established and finally reduced to an + arithmetical problem, which would then be the holiest thing in the + temple of wisdom, to which the principle of sufficient reason would + at last have happily conducted us. But all content of the + phenomenon would have disappeared, and the mere form would remain. + The <span class="tei tei-q">“what appears”</span> would be referred + to the <span class="tei tei-q">“how it appears,”</span> and this + <span class="tei tei-q">“how”</span> would be what is <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> knowable, therefore + entirely dependent on the subject, therefore only for the subject, + therefore, lastly, mere phantom, idea and form of idea, through and + through: no thing-in-itself could be demanded. Supposing, then, + that this were possible, the whole world would be derived from the + subject, and in fact, that would be accomplished which <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page161">[pg 161]</span><a name="Pg161" id="Pg161" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Fichte wanted to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">seem</span></em> to + accomplish by his empty bombast. But it is not possible: + phantasies, sophisms, castles in the air, have been constructed in + this way, but science never. The many and multifarious phenomena in + nature have been successfully referred to particular original + forces, and as often as this has been done, a real advance has been + made. Several forces and qualities, which were at first regarded as + different, have been derived from each other, and thus their number + has been curtailed. (For example, magnetism from electricity.) + Etiology will have reached its goal when it has recognised and + exhibited as such all the original forces of nature, and + established their mode of operation, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the law according to which, under the guidance of causality, their + phenomena appear in time and space, and determine their position + with regard to each other. But certain original forces will always + remain over; there will always remain as an insoluble residuum a + content of phenomena which cannot be referred to their form, and + thus cannot be explained from something else in accordance with the + principle of sufficient reason. For in everything in nature there + is something of which no ground can ever be assigned, of which no + explanation is possible, and no ulterior cause is to be sought. + This is the specific nature of its action, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the nature of its existence, its being. Of each particular effect + of the thing a cause may be certainly indicated, from which it + follows that it must act just at this time and in this place; but + no cause can ever be found from which it follows that a thing acts + in general, and precisely in the way it does. If it has no other + qualities, if it is merely a mote in a sunbeam, it yet exhibits + this unfathomable something, at least as weight and + impenetrability. But this, I say, is to the mote what his will is + to a man; and, like the human will, it is, according to its inner + nature, not subject to explanation; nay, more—it is in itself + identical with this will. It is true that a motive may be given for + every manifestation <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page162">[pg + 162]</span><a name="Pg162" id="Pg162" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of will, for every act of will at a particular time and in a + particular place, upon which it must necessarily follow, under the + presupposition of the character of the man. But no reason can ever + be given that the man has this character; that he wills at all; + that, of several motives, just this one and no other, or indeed + that any motive at all, moves his will. That which in the case of + man is the unfathomable character which is presupposed in every + explanation of his actions from motives is, in the case of every + unorganised body, its definitive quality—the mode of its action, + the manifestations of which are occasioned by impressions from + without, while it itself, on the contrary, is determined by nothing + outside itself, and thus is also inexplicable. Its particular + manifestations, through which alone it becomes visible, are + subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason; it itself is + groundless. This was in substance rightly understood by the + schoolmen, who called it <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">forma + substantialis</span></span>. (Cf. Suarez, Disput. Metaph., disp. + xv. sect. 1.)</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is a greater + and a commoner error that the phenomena which we best understand + are those which are of most frequent occurrence, and which are most + universal and simple; for, on the contrary, these are just the + phenomena that we are most accustomed to see about us, and to be + ignorant of. It is just as inexplicable to us that a stone should + fall to the earth as that an animal should move itself. It has been + supposed, as we have remarked above, that, starting from the most + universal forces of nature (gravitation, cohesion, + impenetrability), it was possible to explain from them the rarer + forces, which only operate under a combination of circumstances + (for example, chemical quality, electricity, magnetism), and, + lastly, from these to understand the organism and the life of + animals, and even the nature of human knowing and willing. Men + resigned themselves without a word to starting from mere + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitates occultæ</span></span>, the + elucidation of which was entirely given up, for they intended to + build <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page163">[pg 163]</span><a name= + "Pg163" id="Pg163" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> upon them, not to + investigate them. Such an intention cannot, as we have already + said, be carried out. But apart from this, such structures would + always stand in the air. What is the use of explanations which + ultimately refer us to something which is quite as unknown as the + problem with which we started? Do we in the end understand more of + the inner nature of these universal natural forces than of the + inner nature of an animal? Is not the one as much a sealed book to + us as the other? Unfathomable because it is without ground, because + it is the content, that which the phenomenon is, and which can + never be referred to the form, to the how, to the principle of + sufficient reason. But we, who have in view not etiology but + philosophy, that is, not relative but unconditioned knowledge of + the real nature of the world, take the opposite course, and start + from that which is immediately and most completely known to us, and + fully and entirely trusted by us—that which lies nearest to us, in + order to understand that which is known to us only at a distance, + one-sidedly and indirectly. From the most powerful, most + significant, and most distinct phenomenon we seek to arrive at an + understanding of those that are less complete and weaker. With the + exception of my own body, all things are known to me only on + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> side, that of the idea. Their + inner nature remains hidden from me and a profound secret, even if + I know all the causes from which their changes follow. Only by + comparison with that which goes on in me if my body performs an + action when I am influenced by a motive—only by comparison, I say, + with what is the inner nature of my own changes determined by + external reasons, can I obtain insight into the way in which these + lifeless bodies change under the influence of causes, and so + understand what is their inner nature. For the knowledge of the + causes of the manifestation of this inner nature affords me merely + the rule of its appearance in time and space, and nothing more. I + can make this comparison because <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page164">[pg 164]</span><a name="Pg164" id="Pg164" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> my body is the only object of which I know + not merely the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> side, that of the idea, but + also the other side which is called will. Thus, instead of + believing that I would better understand my own organisation, and + then my own knowing and willing, and my movements following upon + motives, if I could only refer them to movements due to electrical, + chemical, and mechanical causes, I must, seeing that I seek + philosophy and not etiology, learn to understand from my own + movements following upon motives the inner nature of the simplest + and commonest movements of an unorganised body which I see + following upon causes. I must recognise the inscrutable forces + which manifest themselves in all natural bodies as identical in + kind with that which in me is the will, and as differing from it + only in degree. That is to say, the fourth class of ideas given in + the Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason must be the key to + the knowledge of the inner nature of the first class, and by means + of the law of motivation I must come to understand the inner + meaning of the law of causation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Spinoza (Epist. + 62) says that if a stone which has been projected through the air + had consciousness, it would believe that it was moving of its own + will. I add to this only that the stone would be right. The impulse + given it is for the stone what the motive is for me, and what in + the case of the stone appears as cohesion, gravitation, rigidity, + is in its inner nature the same as that which I recognise in myself + as will, and what the stone also, if knowledge were given to it, + would recognise as will. In the passage referred to, Spinoza had in + view the necessity with which the stone flies, and he rightly + desires to transfer this necessity to that of the particular act of + will of a person. I, on the other hand, consider the inner being, + which alone imparts meaning and validity to all real necessity + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, effect following upon a + cause) as its presupposition. In the case of men this is called + character; in the case of a stone it is called quality, but it is + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page165">[pg 165]</span><a name= + "Pg165" id="Pg165" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the same in both. + When it is immediately known it is called will. In the stone it has + the weakest, and in man the strongest degree of visibility, of + objectivity. St. Augustine recognises, with a true instinct, this + identity of the tendencies of all things with our own willing, and + I cannot refrain from quoting his naïve account of the + matter:—<span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Si + pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum ejusdem est + amaremus, idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum, et secundum hoc si + esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quæreremus. Item, si arbores essemus, + nihil quidem sentientes motu amare possemus: verumtamen id quasi + appetere videremur, quo feracius essemus, uberiusque fructuosæ. Si + essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel quid + ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis + deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam + velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum + gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur: ita enim corpus pondere, + sicut animus amore fertur quocunque fertur</span></span>”</span> + (De Civ. Dei, xi. 28).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It ought further + to be mentioned that Euler saw that the inner nature of gravitation + must ultimately be referred to an <span class= + "tei tei-q">“inclination and desire”</span> (thus will) peculiar to + material bodies (in the 68th letter to the Princess). Indeed, it is + just this that makes him averse to the conception of gravitation as + it existed for Newton, and he is inclined to try a modification of + it in accordance with the earlier Cartesian theory, and so to + derive gravitation from the impact of an ether upon the bodies, as + being <span class="tei tei-q">“more rational and more suitable for + persons who like clear and intelligible principles.”</span> He + wishes to banish attraction from physics as a <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitas occulta</span></span>. This is only + in keeping with the dead view of nature which prevailed at Euler's + time as the correlative of the immaterial soul. It is only worth + noticing because of its bearing upon the fundamental truth + established by me, which even at that time this fine intellect saw + glimmering in the distance. He hastened to turn in time, and then, + in his anxiety at <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page166">[pg + 166]</span><a name="Pg166" id="Pg166" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + seeing all the prevalent fundamental views endangered, he sought + safety in the old and already exploded absurdities.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We know that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">multiplicity</span></em> in general is + necessarily conditioned by space and time, and is only thinkable in + them. In this respect they are called the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>. But + we have found that space and time are forms of the principle of + sufficient reason. In this principle all our knowledge <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> is expressed, but, as + we showed above, this <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> knowledge, as such, only applies to the + knowableness of things, not to the things themselves, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + it is only our form of knowledge, it is not a property of the + thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is, as such, free from all + forms of knowledge, even the most universal, that of being an + object for the subject. In other words, the thing-in-itself is + something altogether different from the idea. If, now, this + thing-in-itself is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the will</span></em>, as I believe I have + fully and convincingly proved it to be, then, regarded as such and + apart from its manifestation, it lies outside time and space, and + therefore knows no multiplicity, and is consequently <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em>. + Yet, as I have said, it is not one in the sense in which an + individual or a concept is one, but as something to which the + condition of the possibility of multiplicity, the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, is + foreign. The multiplicity of things in space and time, which + collectively constitute the objectification of will, does not + affect the will itself, which remains indivisible notwithstanding + it. It is not the case that, in some way or other, a smaller part + of will is in the stone and a larger part in the man, for the + relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space, and has no + longer any meaning when we go beyond this form of intuition or + perception. The more and the less have application only to the + phenomenon of will, that is, its visibility, its objectification. + Of this there is a higher grade in the plant than in the stone; in + the animal a higher grade than in the plant: indeed, the passage of + will into visibility, its <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page167">[pg + 167]</span><a name="Pg167" id="Pg167" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + objectification, has grades as innumerable as exist between the + dimmest twilight and the brightest sunshine, the loudest sound and + the faintest echo. We shall return later to the consideration of + these grades of visibility which belong to the objectification of + the will, to the reflection of its nature. But as the grades of its + objectification do not directly concern the will itself, still less + is it concerned by the multiplicity of the phenomena of these + different grades, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the multitude of + individuals of each form, or the particular manifestations of each + force. For this multiplicity is directly conditioned by time and + space, into which the will itself never enters. The will reveals + itself as completely and as much in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> oak + as in millions. Their number and multiplication in space and time + has no meaning with regard to it, but only with regard to the + multiplicity of individuals who know in space and time, and who are + themselves multiplied and dispersed in these. The multiplicity of + these individuals itself belongs not to the will, but only to its + manifestation. We may therefore say that if, <span class= + "tei tei-foreign"><span style="font-style: italic">per + impossibile</span></span>, a single real existence, even the most + insignificant, were to be entirely annihilated, the whole world + would necessarily perish with it. The great mystic Angelus Silesius + feels this when he says—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">I know + God cannot live an instant without me,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">He must give up the ghost if I should cease + to be.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men have tried + in various ways to bring the immeasurable greatness of the material + universe nearer to the comprehension of us all, and then they have + seized the opportunity to make edifying remarks. They have referred + perhaps to the relative smallness of the earth, and indeed of man; + or, on the contrary, they have pointed out the greatness of the + mind of this man who is so insignificant—the mind that can solve, + comprehend, and even measure the greatness of the universe, and so + forth. Now, all this is very well, but to me, when I consider the + vastness <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page168">[pg + 168]</span><a name="Pg168" id="Pg168" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of the world, the most important point is this, that the + thing-in-itself, whose manifestation is the world—whatever else it + may be—cannot have its true self spread out and dispersed after + this fashion in boundless space, but that this endless extension + belongs only to its manifestation. The thing-in-itself, on the + contrary, is present entire and undivided in every object of nature + and in every living being. Therefore we lose nothing by standing + still beside any single individual thing, and true wisdom is not to + be gained by measuring out the boundless world, or, what would be + more to the purpose, by actually traversing endless space. It is + rather to be attained by the thorough investigation of any + individual thing, for thus we seek to arrive at a full knowledge + and understanding of its true and peculiar nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The subject + which will therefore be fully considered in the next book, and + which has, doubtless, already presented itself to the mind of every + student of Plato, is, that these different grades of the + objectification of will which are manifested in innumerable + individuals, and exist as their unattained types or as the eternal + forms of things, not entering themselves into time and space, which + are the medium of individual things, but remaining fixed, subject + to no change, always being, never becoming, while the particular + things arise and pass away, always become and never are,—that these + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">grades of + the objectification of will</span></em> are, I say, simply + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Plato's + Ideas</span></em>. I make this passing reference to the matter here + in order that I may be able in future to use the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Idea</span></em> in + this sense. In my writings, therefore, the word is always to be + understood in its true and original meaning given to it by Plato, + and has absolutely no reference to those abstract productions of + dogmatising scholastic reason, which Kant has inaptly and + illegitimately used this word to denote, though Plato had already + appropriated and used it most fitly. By Idea, then, I understand + every definite and fixed grade of the objectification <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page169">[pg 169]</span><a name="Pg169" id="Pg169" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of will, so far as it is + thing-in-itself, and therefore has no multiplicity. These grades + are related to individual things as their eternal forms or + prototypes. The shortest and most concise statement of this famous + Platonic doctrine is given us by Diogenes Laertes (iii. 12): + <span class="tei tei-q">“ὁ Πλατων φησι, εν τῃ φυσει τας ιδεας + ἑσταναι, καθαπερ παραδειγματα, τα δ᾽ αλλα ταυταις εοικεναι, τουτων + ὁμοιωματα καθεστωτα”</span>—(<span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Plato ideas in natura velut exemplaria dixit + subsistere; cetera his esse similia, ad istarum similitudinem + consistentia</span></span>”</span>). Of Kant's misuse of the word I + take no further notice; what it is needful to say about it will be + found in the Appendix.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 26. The lowest + grades of the objectification of will are to be found in those most + universal forces of nature which partly appear in all matter + without exception, as gravity and impenetrability, and partly have + shared the given matter among them, so that certain of them reign + in one species of matter and others in another species, + constituting its specific difference, as rigidity, fluidity, + elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties and + qualities of every kind. They are in themselves immediate + manifestations of will, just as much as human action; and as such + they are groundless, like human character. Only their particular + manifestations are subordinated to the principle of sufficient + reason, like the particular actions of men. They themselves, on the + other hand, can never be called either effect or cause, but are the + prior and presupposed conditions of all causes and effects through + which their real nature unfolds and reveals itself. It is therefore + senseless to demand a cause of gravity or electricity, for they are + original forces. Their expressions, indeed, take place in + accordance with the law of cause and effect, so that every one of + their particular manifestations has a cause, which is itself again + just a similar particular manifestation which determines that this + force must express itself here, must appear in space and time; but + the force itself is by no means the effect of a cause, nor the + cause of an <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page170">[pg + 170]</span><a name="Pg170" id="Pg170" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + effect. It is therefore a mistake to say <span class= + "tei tei-q">“gravity is the cause of a stone falling;”</span> for + the cause in this case is rather the nearness of the earth, because + it attracts the stone. Take the earth away and the stone will not + fall, although gravity remains. The force itself lies quite outside + the chain of causes and effects, which presupposes time, because it + only has meaning in relation to it; but the force lies outside + time. The individual change always has for its cause another change + just as individual as itself, and not the force of which it is the + expression. For that which always gives its efficiency to a cause, + however many times it may appear, is a force of nature. As such, it + is groundless, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, it lies outside the chain + of causes and outside the province of the principle of sufficient + reason in general, and is philosophically known as the immediate + objectivity of will, which is the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“in-itself”</span> of the whole of nature; but in + etiology, which in this reference is physics, it is set down as an + original force, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitas occulta</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the higher + grades of the objectivity of will we see individuality occupy a + prominent position, especially in the case of man, where it appears + as the great difference of individual characters, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + as complete personality, outwardly expressed in strongly marked + individual physiognomy, which influences the whole bodily form. + None of the brutes have this individuality in anything like so high + a degree, though the higher species of them have a trace of it; but + the character of the species completely predominates over it, and + therefore they have little individual physiognomy. The farther down + we go, the more completely is every trace of the individual + character lost in the common character of the species, and the + physiognomy of the species alone remains. We know the physiological + character of the species, and from that we know exactly what is to + be expected from the individual; while, on the contrary, in the + human species every individual has to be studied and fathomed for + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page171">[pg 171]</span><a name= + "Pg171" id="Pg171" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> himself, which, if + we wish to forecast his action with some degree of certainty, is, + on account of the possibility of concealment that first appears + with reason, a matter of the greatest difficulty. It is probably + connected with this difference of the human species from all + others, that the folds and convolutions of the brain, which are + entirely wanting in birds, and very weakly marked in rodents, are + even in the case of the higher animals far more symmetrical on both + sides, and more constantly the same in each individual, than in the + case of human beings.<a id="noteref_34" name="noteref_34" href= + "#note_34"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">34</span></span></a> It is + further to be regarded as a phenomenon of this peculiar individual + character which distinguishes men from all the lower animals, that + in the case of the brutes the sexual instinct seeks its + satisfaction without observable choice of objects, while in the + case of man this choice is, in a purely instinctive manner and + independent of all reflection, carried so far that it rises into a + powerful passion. While then every man is to be regarded as a + specially determined and characterised phenomenon of will, and + indeed to a certain extent as a special Idea, in the case of the + brutes this individual character as a whole is wanting, because + only the species has a special significance. And the farther we go + from man, the fainter becomes the trace of this individual + character, so that plants have no individual qualities left, except + such as may be fully explained from the favourable or unfavourable + external influences of soil, climate, and other accidents. Finally, + in the inorganic kingdom of nature all individuality disappears. + The crystal alone is to be regarded as to a certain extent + individual. It is a unity of the tendency in definite directions, + fixed by crystallisation, which makes the trace of this tendency + permanent. It is at the same time a cumulative repetition of its + primitive form, bound into unity by an idea, just as the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page172">[pg 172]</span><a name= + "Pg172" id="Pg172" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> tree is an aggregate + of the single germinating fibre which shows itself in every rib of + the leaves, in every leaf, in every branch; which repeats itself, + and to some extent makes each of these appear as a separate growth, + nourishing itself from the greater as a parasite, so that the tree, + resembling the crystal, is a systematic aggregate of small plants, + although only the whole is the complete expression of an individual + Idea, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, of this particular grade + of the objectification of will. But the individuals of the same + species of crystal can have no other difference than such as is + produced by external accidents; indeed we can make at pleasure + large or small crystals of every species. The individual, however, + as such, that is, with traces of an individual character, does not + exist further in unorganised nature. All its phenomena are + expressions of general forces of nature, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + of those grades of the objectification of will which do not + objectify themselves (as is the case in organised nature), by means + of the difference of the individualities which collectively express + the whole of the Idea, but show themselves only in the species, and + as a whole, without any variation in each particular example of it. + Time, space, multiplicity, and existence conditioned by causes, do + not belong to the will or to the Idea (the grade of the + objectification of will), but only to their particular phenomena. + Therefore such a force of nature as, for example, gravity or + electricity, must show itself as such in precisely the same way in + all its million phenomena, and only external circumstances can + modify these. This unity of its being in all its phenomena, this + unchangeable constancy of the appearance of these, whenever, under + the guidance of causality, the necessary conditions are present, is + called a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">law of nature</span></em>. If such a law is + once learned from experience, then the phenomenon of that force of + nature, the character of which is expressed and laid down in it, + may be accurately forecast and counted upon. But it is just this + conformity to law of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page173">[pg + 173]</span><a name="Pg173" id="Pg173" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + phenomena of the lower grades of the objectification of will which + gives them such a different aspect from the phenomena of the same + will in the higher, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the more distinct, grades + of its objectification, in animals, and in men and their actions, + where the stronger or weaker influence of the individual character + and the susceptibility to motives which often remain hidden from + the spectator, because they lie in knowledge, has had the result + that the identity of the inner nature of the two kinds of phenomena + has hitherto been entirely overlooked.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If we start from + the knowledge of the particular, and not from that of the Idea, + there is something astonishing, and sometimes even terrible, in the + absolute uniformity of the laws of nature. It might astonish us + that nature never once forgets her laws; that if, for example, it + has once been according to a law of nature that where certain + materials are brought together under given conditions, a chemical + combination will take place, or gas will be evolved, or they will + go on fire; if these conditions are fulfilled, whether by our + interposition or entirely by chance (and in this case the accuracy + is the more astonishing because unexpected), to-day just as well as + a thousand years ago, the determined phenomenon will take place at + once and without delay. We are most vividly impressed with the + marvellousness of this fact in the case of rare phenomena, which + only occur under very complex circumstances, but which we are + previously informed will take place if these conditions are + fulfilled. For example, when we are told that if certain metals, + when arranged alternately in fluid with which an acid has been + mixed, are brought into contact, silver leaf brought between the + extremities of this combination will suddenly be consumed in a + green flame; or that under certain conditions the hard diamond + turns into carbonic acid. It is the ghostly omnipresence of natural + forces that astonishes us in such <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page174">[pg 174]</span><a name="Pg174" id="Pg174" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> cases, and we remark here what in the case of + phenomena which happen daily no longer strikes us, how the + connection between cause and effect is really as mysterious as that + which is imagined between a magic formula and a spirit that must + appear when invoked by it. On the other hand, if we have attained + to the philosophical knowledge that a force of nature is a definite + grade of the objectification of will, that is to say, a definite + grade of that which we recognise as our own inmost nature, and that + this will, in itself, and distinguished from its phenomena and + their forms, lies outside time and space, and that, therefore, the + multiplicity, which is conditioned by time and space, does not + belong to it, nor directly to the grade of its objectification, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the Idea, but only to the + phenomena of the Idea; and if we remember that the law of causality + has significance only in relation to time and space, inasmuch as it + determines the position of the multitude of phenomena of the + different Ideas in which the will reveals itself, governing the + order in which they must appear; if, I say, in this knowledge the + inner meaning of the great doctrine of Kant has been fully grasped, + the doctrine that time, space, and causality do not belong to the + thing-in-itself, but merely to the phenomenon, that they are only + the forms of our knowledge, not qualities of things in themselves; + then we shall understand that this astonishment at the conformity + to law and accurate operation of a force of nature, this + astonishment at the complete sameness of all its million phenomena + and the infallibility of their occurrence, is really like that of a + child or a savage who looks for the first time through a glass with + many facets at a flower, and marvels at the complete similarity of + the innumerable flowers which he sees, and counts the leaves of + each of them separately.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus every + universal, original force of nature is nothing but a low grade of + the objectification of will, and we call <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page175">[pg 175]</span><a name="Pg175" id="Pg175" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> every such grade an eternal <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Idea</span></em> in + Plato's sense. But a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">law of nature</span></em> is the relation of + the Idea to the form of its manifestation. This form is time, + space, and causality, which are necessarily and inseparably + connected and related to each other. Through time and space the + Idea multiplies itself in innumerable phenomena, but the order + according to which it enters these forms of multiplicity is + definitely determined by the law of causality; this law is as it + were the norm of the limit of these phenomena of different Ideas, + in accordance with which time, space, and matter are assigned to + them. This norm is therefore necessarily related to the identity of + the aggregate of existing matter, which is the common substratum of + all those different phenomena. If all these were not directed to + that common matter in the possession of which they must be divided, + there would be no need for such a law to decide their claims. They + might all at once and together fill a boundless space throughout an + endless time. Therefore, because all these phenomena of the eternal + Ideas are directed to one and the same matter, must there be a rule + for their appearance and disappearance; for if there were not, they + would not make way for each other. Thus the law of causality is + essentially bound up with that of the permanence of substance; they + reciprocally derive significance from each other. Time and space, + again, are related to them in the same way. For time is merely the + possibility of conflicting states of the same matter, and space is + merely the possibility of the permanence of the same matter under + all sorts of conflicting states. Accordingly, in the preceding book + we explained matter as the union of space and time, and this union + shows itself as change of the accidents in the permanence of the + substance, of which causality or becoming is the universal + possibility. And accordingly, we said that matter is through and + through causality. We explained the understanding as the subjective + correlative of causality, and said matter (and thus the whole + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page176">[pg 176]</span><a name= + "Pg176" id="Pg176" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> world as idea) + exists only for the understanding; the understanding is its + condition, its supporter as its necessary correlative. I repeat all + this in passing, merely to call to mind what was demonstrated in + the First Book, for it is necessary for the complete understanding + of these two books that their inner agreement should be observed, + since what is inseparably united in the actual world as its two + sides, will and idea, has, in order that we might understand each + of them more clearly in isolation, been dissevered in these two + books.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It may not + perhaps be superfluous to elucidate further by an example how the + law of causality has meaning only in relation to time and space, + and the matter which consists in the union of the two. For it + determines the limits in accordance with which the phenomena of the + forces of nature divide themselves in the possession of matter, + while the original forces of nature, as the immediate + objectification of will, which, as a thing in itself, is not + subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason, lie outside + these forms, within which alone all etiological explanation has + validity and meaning, and just on that account can never lead us to + the inner reality of nature. For this purpose let us think of some + kind of machine constructed according to the laws of mechanics. + Iron weights begin the motion by their gravity; copper wheels + resist by their rigidity, affect and raise each other and the lever + by their impenetrability, and so on. Here gravity, rigidity, and + impenetrability are original unexplained forces; mechanics only + gives us the condition under which, and the manner in which, they + manifest themselves, appear, and govern a definite matter, time, + and place. If, now, a strong magnet is made to attract the iron of + the weight, and overcome its gravity, the movement of the machine + stops, and the matter becomes forthwith the scene of quite a + different force of nature—magnetism, of which etiology again gives + no further explanation than the condition under which it appears. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page177">[pg 177]</span><a name= + "Pg177" id="Pg177" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Or let us suppose + that the copper discs of such a machine are laid upon zinc plates, + and an acid solution introduced between them. At once the same + matter of the machine has become subject to another original force, + galvanism, which now governs it according to its own laws, and + reveals itself in it through its phenomena; and etiology can again + tell us nothing about this force except the conditions under which, + and the laws in accordance with which, it manifests itself. Let us + now raise the temperature and add pure acid; the whole machine + burns; that is to say, once more an entirely different force of + nature, chemical energy, asserts at this time and in this place + irresistible claims to this particular matter, and reveals itself + in it as Idea, as a definite grade of the objectification of will. + The calcined metal thus produced now unites with an acid, and a + salt is obtained which forms itself into crystals. These are the + phenomena of another Idea, which in itself is again quite + inexplicable, while the appearance of its phenomena is dependent + upon certain conditions which etiology can give us. The crystals + dissolve, mix with other materials, and vegetation springs up from + them—a new phenomenon of will: and so the same permanent matter may + be followed <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>, + to observe how now this and now that natural force obtains a right + to it and temporarily takes possession of it, in order to appear + and reveal its own nature. The condition of this right, the point + of time and space at which it becomes valid, is given by causality, + but the explanation founded upon this law only extends thus far. + The force itself is a manifestation of will, and as such is not + subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, that + is, it is groundless. It lies outside all time, is omnipresent, and + seems as it were to wait constantly till the circumstances occur + under which it can appear and take possession of a definite matter, + supplanting the forces which have reigned in it till then. All time + exists only for the phenomena of such a force, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page178">[pg 178]</span><a name="Pg178" id="Pg178" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and is without significance for the + force itself. Through thousands of years chemical forces slumber in + matter till the contact with the reagents sets them free; then they + appear; but time exists only for the phenomena, not for the forces + themselves. For thousands of years galvanism slumbered in copper + and zinc, and they lay quietly beside silver, which must be + consumed in flame as soon as all three are brought together under + the required conditions. Even in the organic kingdom we see a dry + seed preserve the slumbering force through three thousand years, + and when at last the favourable circumstances occur, grow up as a + plant.<a id="noteref_35" name="noteref_35" href= + "#note_35"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">35</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If by this + exposition the difference between a force of nature and all its + phenomena has been made quite distinct; if we have seen clearly + that the former is the will itself at this particular grade of its + objectification, but that multiplicity comes to phenomena only + through time and space, and that the law of causality is nothing + but the determination of the position of these phenomena in time + and space; then we shall recognise the complete truth and the deep + meaning of Malebranche's doctrine of occasional causes (<span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">causes occasionelles</span></span>). It is + well worth <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page179">[pg + 179]</span><a name="Pg179" id="Pg179" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + while comparing this doctrine of his, as he explains it in the + <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Recherches de la Vérite</span></span>,”</span> + both in the 3rd Chapter of the second part of the 6th Book, and in + the <span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">éclaircissements</span></span> appended to + this chapter, with this exposition of mine, and observing the + complete agreement of the two doctrines in the case of such + different systems of thought. Indeed I cannot help admiring how + Malebranche, though thoroughly involved in the positive dogmas + which his age inevitably forced upon him, yet, in such bonds and + under such a burden, hit the truth so happily, so correctly, and + even knew how to combine it with these dogmas, at all events + verbally.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For the power of + truth is incredibly great and of unspeakable endurance. We find + constant traces of it in all, even the most eccentric and absurd + dogmas, of different times and different lands,—often indeed in + strange company, curiously mixed up with other things, but still + recognisable. It is like a plant that germinates under a heap of + great stones, but still struggles up to the light, working itself + through with many deviations and windings, disfigured, worn out, + stunted in its growth,—but yet, to the light.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In any case + Malebranche is right: every natural cause is only an occasional + cause. It only gives opportunity or occasion for the manifestation + of the one indivisible will which is the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“in-itself”</span> of all things, and whose graduated + objectification is the whole visible world. Only the appearance, + the becoming visible, in this place, at this time, is brought about + by the cause and is so far dependent on it, but not the whole of + the phenomenon, nor its inner nature. This is the will itself, to + which the principle of sufficient reason has not application, and + which is therefore groundless. Nothing in the world has a + sufficient cause of its existence generally, but only a cause of + existence just here and just now. That a stone exhibits now + gravity, now rigidity, now electricity, now chemical qualities, + depends upon causes, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page180">[pg + 180]</span><a name="Pg180" id="Pg180" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + upon impressions upon it from without, and is to be explained from + these. But these qualities themselves, and thus the whole inner + nature of the stone which consists in them, and therefore manifests + itself in all the ways referred to; thus, in general, that the + stone is such as it is, that it exists generally—all this, I say, + has no ground, but is the visible appearance of the groundless + will. Every cause is thus an occasional cause. We have found it to + be so in nature, which is without knowledge, and it is also + precisely the same when motives and not causes or stimuli determine + the point at which the phenomena are to appear, that is to say, in + the actions of animals and human beings. For in both cases it is + one and the same will which appears; very different in the grades + of its manifestation, multiplied in the phenomena of these grades, + and, in respect of these, subordinated to the principle of + sufficient reason, but in itself free from all this. Motives do not + determine the character of man, but only the phenomena of his + character, that is, his actions; the outward fashion of his life, + not its inner meaning and content. These proceed from the character + which is the immediate manifestation of the will, and is therefore + groundless. That one man is bad and another good, does not depend + upon motives or outward influences, such as teaching and preaching, + and is in this sense quite inexplicable. But whether a bad man + shows his badness in petty acts of injustice, cowardly tricks, and + low knavery which he practises in the narrow sphere of his + circumstances, or whether as a conqueror he oppresses nations, + throws a world into lamentation, and sheds the blood of millions; + this is the outward form of his manifestation, that which is + unessential to it, and depends upon the circumstances in which fate + has placed him, upon his surroundings, upon external influences, + upon motives; but his decision upon these motives can never be + explained from them; it proceeds from the will, of which this man + is a manifestation. Of this we shall <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page181">[pg 181]</span><a name="Pg181" id="Pg181" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> speak in the Fourth Book. The manner in which + the character discloses its qualities is quite analogous to the way + in which those of every material body in unconscious nature are + disclosed. Water remains water with its intrinsic qualities, + whether as a still lake it reflects its banks, or leaps in foam + from the cliffs, or, artificially confined, spouts in a long jet + into the air. All that depends upon external causes; the one form + is as natural to it as the other, but it will always show the same + form in the same circumstances; it is equally ready for any, but in + every case true to its character, and at all times revealing this + alone. So will every human character under all circumstances reveal + itself, but the phenomena which proceed from it will always be in + accordance with the circumstances.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 27. If, from + the foregoing consideration of the forces of nature and their + phenomena, we have come to see clearly how far an explanation from + causes can go, and where it must stop if it is not to degenerate + into the vain attempt to reduce the content of all phenomena to + their mere form, in which case there would ultimately remain + nothing but form, we shall be able to settle in general terms what + is to be demanded of etiology as a whole. It must seek out the + causes of all phenomena in nature, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the circumstances under which they invariably appear. Then it must + refer the multitude of phenomena which have various forms in + various circumstances to what is active in every phenomenon, and is + presupposed in the cause,—original forces of nature. It must + correctly distinguish between a difference of the phenomenon which + arises from a difference of the force, and one which results merely + from a difference of the circumstances under which the force + expresses itself; and with equal care it must guard against taking + the expressions of one and the same force under different + circumstances for the manifestations of different forces, and + conversely against taking for manifestations of one <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page182">[pg 182]</span><a name="Pg182" id="Pg182" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and the same force what originally + belongs to different forces. Now this is the direct work of the + faculty of judgment, and that is why so few men are capable of + increasing our insight in physics, while all are able to enlarge + experience. Indolence and ignorance make us disposed to appeal too + soon to original forces. This is exemplified with an exaggeration + that savours of irony in the entities and quidities of the + schoolmen. Nothing is further from my desire than to favour their + resuscitation. We have just as little right to appeal to the + objectification of will, instead of giving a physical explanation, + as we have to appeal to the creative power of God. For physics + demands causes, and the will is never a cause. Its whole relation + to the phenomenon is not in accordance with the principle of + sufficient reason. But that which in itself is the will exists in + another aspect as idea; that is to say, is phenomenon. As such, it + obeys the laws which constitute the form of the phenomenon. Every + movement, for example, although it is always a manifestation of + will, must yet have a cause from which it is to be explained in + relation to a particular time and space; that is, not in general in + its inner nature, but as a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">particular</span></em> phenomenon. In the case + of the stone, this is a mechanical cause; in that of the movement + of a man, it is a motive; but in no case can it be wanting. On the + other hand, the universal common nature of all phenomena of one + particular kind, that which must be presupposed if the explanation + from causes is to have any sense and meaning, is the general force + of nature, which, in physics, must remain a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">qualitas occulta</span></span>, because with + it the etiological explanation ends and the metaphysical begins. + But the chain of causes and effects is never broken by an original + force to which it has been necessary to appeal. It does not run + back to such a force as if it were its first link, but the nearest + link, as well as the remotest, presupposes the original force, and + could otherwise explain nothing. A series of <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page183">[pg 183]</span><a name="Pg183" id="Pg183" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> causes and effects may be the + manifestation of the most different kinds of forces, whose + successive visible appearances are conducted through it, as I have + illustrated above by the example of a metal machine. But the + difference of these original forces, which cannot be referred to + each other, by no means breaks the unity of that chain of causes, + and the connection between all its links. The etiology and the + philosophy of nature never do violence to each other, but go hand + in hand, regarding the same object from different points of view. + Etiology gives an account of the causes which necessarily produce + the particular phenomenon to be explained. It exhibits, as the + foundation of all its explanations, the universal forces which are + active in all these causes and effects. It accurately defines, + enumerates, and distinguishes these forces, and then indicates all + the different effects in which each force appears, regulated by the + difference of the circumstances, always in accordance with its own + peculiar character, which it discloses in obedience to an + invariable rule, called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a law of nature</span></em>. When all this has + been thoroughly accomplished by physics in every particular, it + will be complete, and its work will be done. There will then remain + no unknown force in unorganised nature, nor any effect, which has + not been proved to be the manifestation of one of these forces + under definite circumstances, in accordance with a law of nature. + Yet a law of nature remains merely the observed rule according to + which nature invariably proceeds whenever certain definite + circumstances occur. Therefore a law of nature may be defined as a + fact expressed generally—<span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="fr"><span style="font-style: italic">un fait + généralisé</span></span>—and thus a complete enumeration of all the + laws of nature would only be a complete register of facts. The + consideration of nature as a whole is thus completed in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">morphology</span></em>, which enumerates, + compares, and arranges all the enduring forms of organised nature. + Of the causes of the appearance of the individual creature it has + little to say, for in all cases this is procreation (the theory of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page184">[pg 184]</span><a name= + "Pg184" id="Pg184" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which is a separate + matter), and in rare cases the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">generatio æquivoca</span></span>. But to this + last belongs, strictly speaking, the manner in which all the lower + grades of the objectification of will, that is to say, physical and + chemical phenomena, appear as individual, and it is precisely the + task of etiology to point out the conditions of this appearance. + Philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself only with the + universal, in nature as everywhere else. The original forces + themselves are here its object, and it recognises in them the + different grades of the objectivity of will, which is the inner + nature, the <span class="tei tei-q">“in-itself”</span> of this + world; and when it regards the world apart from will, it explains + it as merely the idea of the subject. But if etiology, instead of + preparing the way for philosophy, and supplying its doctrines with + practical application by means of instances, supposes that its aim + is rather to deny the existence of all original forces, except + perhaps <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em>, the most general, for + example, impenetrability, which it imagines it thoroughly + understands, and consequently seeks forcibly to refer all the + others to it—it forsakes its own province and can only give us + error instead of truth. The content of nature is supplanted by its + form, everything is ascribed to the circumstances which work from + without, and nothing to the inner nature of the thing. Now if it + were possible to succeed by this method, a problem in arithmetic + would ultimately, as we have already remarked, solve the riddle of + the universe. But this is the method adopted by those, referred to + above, who think that all physiological effects ought to be reduced + to form and combination, this, perhaps, to electricity, and this + again to chemism, and chemism to mechanism. The mistake of + Descartes, for example, and of all the Atomists, was of this last + description. They referred the movements of the globe to the impact + of a fluid, and the qualities of matter to the connection and form + of the atoms, and hence they laboured to explain all the phenomena + of nature as merely manifestations of impenetrability <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page185">[pg 185]</span><a name="Pg185" id="Pg185" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and cohesion. Although this has been + given up, precisely the same error is committed in our own day by + the electrical, chemical, and mechanical physiologists, who + obstinately attempt to explain the whole of life and all the + functions of the organism from <span class="tei tei-q">“form and + combination.”</span> In Meckel's <span class="tei tei-q">“Archiv + für Physiologie”</span> (1820, vol. v. p. 185) we still find it + stated that the aim of physiological explanation is the reduction + of organic life to the universal forces with which physics deals. + Lamarck also, in his <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Philosophie + Zoologique</span></span>,”</span> explains life as merely the + effect of warmth and electricity: <span lang="fr" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style="font-style: italic">le + calorique et la matière électrique suffisent parfaitement pour + composer ensemble cette cause essentielle de la vie</span></span> + (p. 16). According to this, warmth and electricity would be the + <span class="tei tei-q">“thing-in-itself,”</span> and the world of + animals and plants its phenomenal appearance. The absurdity of this + opinion becomes glaringly apparent at the 306th and following pages + of that work. It is well known that all these opinions, that have + been so often refuted, have reappeared quite recently with renewed + confidence. If we carefully examine the foundation of these views, + we shall find that they ultimately involve the presupposition that + the organism is merely an aggregate of phenomena of physical, + chemical, and mechanical forces, which have come together here by + chance, and produced the organism as a freak of nature without + further significance. The organism of an animal or of a human being + would therefore be, if considered philosophically, not the + exhibition of a special Idea, that is, not itself immediate + objectivity of the will at a definite higher grade, but in it would + appear only those Ideas which objectify the will in electricity, in + chemism, and in mechanism. Thus the organism would be as + fortuitously constructed by the concurrence of these forces as the + forms of men and beasts in clouds and stalactites, and would + therefore in itself be no more interesting than they are. However, + we shall see immediately how far the application of physical and + chemical modes of explanation <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page186">[pg 186]</span><a name="Pg186" id="Pg186" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> to the organism may yet, within certain + limits, be allowable and useful; for I shall explain that the vital + force certainly avails itself of and uses the forces of unorganised + nature; yet these forces no more constitute the vital force than a + hammer and anvil make a blacksmith. Therefore even the most simple + example of plant life can never be explained from these forces by + any theory of capillary attraction and endosmose, much less animal + life. The following observations will prepare the way for this + somewhat difficult discussion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It follows from + all that has been said that it is certainly an error on the part of + natural science to seek to refer the higher grades of the + objectification of will to the lower; for the failure to recognise, + or the denial of, original and self-existing forces of nature is + just as wrong as the groundless assumption of special forces when + what occurs is merely a peculiar kind of manifestation of what is + already known. Thus Kant rightly says that it would be absurd to + hope for a blade of grass from a Newton, that is, from one who + reduced the blade of grass to the manifestations of physical and + chemical forces, of which it was the chance product, and therefore + a mere freak of nature, in which no special Idea appeared, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the will did not directly + reveal itself in it in a higher and specific grade, but just as in + the phenomena of unorganised nature and by chance in this form. The + schoolmen, who certainly would not have allowed such a doctrine, + would rightly have said that it was a complete denial of the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">forma substantialis</span></span>, and a + degradation of it to the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">forma + accidentalis</span></span>. For the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">forma substantialis</span></span> of Aristotle + denotes exactly what I call the grade of the objectification of + will in a thing. On the other hand, it is not to be overlooked that + in all Ideas, that is, in all forces of unorganised, and all forms + of organised nature, it is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one and the same</span></em> will that reveals + itself, that is to say, which enters the form of the idea and + passes into <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objectivity</span></em>. Its unity must + therefore be also recognisable <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page187">[pg 187]</span><a name="Pg187" id="Pg187" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> through an inner relationship between all its + phenomena. Now this reveals itself in the higher grades of the + objectification of will, where the whole phenomenon is more + distinct, thus in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, through the + universally prevailing analogy of all forms, the fundamental type + which recurs in all phenomena. This has, therefore, become the + guiding principle of the admirable zoological system which was + originated by the French in this century, and it is most completely + established in comparative anatomy as <span lang="fr" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">l'unité de plan</span></span>, <span lang="fr" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">l'uniformité de l'élément + anatomique</span></span>. To discover this fundamental type has + been the chief concern, or at any rate the praiseworthy endeavour, + of the natural philosophers of the school of Schelling, who have in + this respect considerable merit, although in many cases their hunt + after analogies in nature degenerated into mere conceits. They + have, however, rightly shown that that general relationship and + family likeness exists also in the Ideas of unorganised nature; for + example, between electricity and magnetism, the identity of which + was afterwards established; between chemical attraction and + gravitation, and so forth. They specially called attention to the + fact that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">polarity</span></em>, that is, the sundering + of a force into two qualitatively different and opposed activities + striving after reunion, which also shows itself for the most part + in space as a dispersion in opposite directions, is a fundamental + type of almost all the phenomena of nature, from the magnet and the + crystal to man himself. Yet this knowledge has been current in + China from the earliest times, in the doctrine of opposition of Yin + and Yang. Indeed, since all things in the world are the + objectification of one and the same will, and therefore in their + inner nature identical, it must not only be the case that there is + that unmistakable analogy between them, and that in every + phenomenon the trace, intimation, and plan of the higher phenomenon + that lies next to it in point of <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page188">[pg 188]</span><a name="Pg188" id="Pg188" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> development shows itself, but also because + all these forms belong to the world as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + it is indeed conceivable that even in the most universal forms of + the idea, in that peculiar framework of the phenomenal world space + and time, it may be possible to discern and establish the + fundamental type, intimation, and plan of what fills the forms. It + seems to have been a dim notion of this that was the origin of the + Cabala and all the mathematical philosophy of the Pythagoreans, and + also of the Chinese in Y-king. In the school of Schelling also, to + which we have already referred, we find, among their efforts to + bring to light the similarity among the phenomena of nature, + several attempts (though rather unfortunate ones) to deduce laws of + nature from the laws of pure space and time. However, one can never + tell to what extent a man of genius will realise both + endeavours.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now, although + the difference between phenomenon and thing-in-itself is never lost + sight of, and therefore the identity of the will which objectifies + itself in all Ideas can never (because it has different grades of + its objectification) be distorted to mean identity of the + particular Ideas themselves in which it appears, so that, for + example, chemical or electrical attraction can never be reduced to + the attraction of gravitation, although this inner analogy is + known, and the former may be regarded as, so to speak, higher + powers of the latter, just as little does the similarity of the + construction of all animals warrant us in mixing and identifying + the species and explaining the more developed as mere variations of + the less developed; and although, finally, the physiological + functions are never to be reduced to chemical or physical + processes, yet, in justification of this procedure, within certain + limits, we may accept the following observations as highly + probable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If several of + the phenomena of will in the lower grades of its + objectification—that is, in unorganised nature—come into conflict + because each of them, under the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page189">[pg 189]</span><a name="Pg189" id="Pg189" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> guidance of causality, seeks to possess a + given portion of matter, there arises from the conflict the + phenomenon of a higher Idea which prevails over all the less + developed phenomena previously there, yet in such a way that it + allows the essence of these to continue to exist in a subordinate + manner, in that it takes up into itself from them something which + is analogous to them. This process is only intelligible from the + identity of the will which manifests itself in all the Ideas, and + which is always striving after higher objectification. We thus see, + for example, in the hardening of the bones, an unmistakable analogy + to crystallisation, as the force which originally had possession of + the chalk, although ossification is never to be reduced to + crystallisation. The analogy shows itself in a weaker degree in the + flesh becoming firm. The combination of humours in the animal body + and secretion are also analogous to chemical combination and + separation. Indeed, the laws of chemistry are still strongly + operative in this case, but subordinated, very much modified, and + mastered by a higher Idea; therefore mere chemical forces outside + the organism will never afford us such humours; but</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Encheiresin naturæ nennt es die + Chemie,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Spottet ihrer selbst und weiss nicht + wie.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The more + developed Idea resulting from this victory over several lower Ideas + or objectifications of will, gains an entirely new character by + taking up into itself from every Idea over which it has prevailed a + strengthened analogy. The will objectifies itself in a new, more + distinct way. It originally appears in <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">generatio æquivoca</span></span>; afterwards + in assimilation to the given germ, organic moisture, plant, animal, + man. Thus from the strife of lower phenomena the higher arise, + swallowing them all up, but yet realising in the higher grade the + tendency of all the lower. Here, then, already the law + applies—<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Serpens nisi serpentem + comederit non fit draco.</span></span></p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page190">[pg 190]</span><a name="Pg190" id="Pg190" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I wish it had + been possible for me to dispel by clearness of explanation the + obscurity which clings to the subject of these thoughts; but I see + very well that the reader's own consideration of the matter must + materially aid me if I am not to remain uncomprehended or + misunderstood. According to the view I have expressed, the traces + of chemical and physical modes of operation will indeed be found in + the organism, but it can never be explained from them; because it + is by no means a phenomenon even accidentally brought about through + the united actions of such forces, but a higher Idea which has + overcome these lower ideas by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">subduing assimilation</span></em>; for the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> will which objectifies itself + in all Ideas always seeks the highest possible objectification, and + has therefore in this case given up the lower grades of its + manifestation after a conflict, in order to appear in a higher + grade, and one so much the more powerful. No victory without + conflict: since the higher Idea or objectification of will can only + appear through the conquest of the lower, it endures the opposition + of these lower Ideas, which, although brought into subjection, + still constantly strive to obtain an independent and complete + expression of their being. The magnet that has attracted a piece of + iron carries on a perpetual conflict with gravitation, which, as + the lower objectification of will, has a prior right to the matter + of the iron; and in this constant battle the magnet indeed grows + stronger, for the opposition excites it, as it were, to greater + effort. In the same way every manifestation of the will, including + that which expresses itself in the human organism, wages a constant + war against the many physical and chemical forces which, as lower + Ideas, have a prior right to that matter. Thus the arm falls which + for a while, overcoming gravity, we have held stretched out; thus + the pleasing sensation of health, which proclaims the victory of + the Idea of the self-conscious organism over the physical and + chemical laws, which originally governed the humours of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page191">[pg 191]</span><a name= + "Pg191" id="Pg191" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the body, is so + often interrupted, and is indeed always accompanied by greater or + less discomfort, which arises from the resistance of these forces, + and on account of which the vegetative part of our life is + constantly attended by slight pain. Thus also digestion weakens all + the animal functions, because it requires the whole vital force to + overcome the chemical forces of nature by assimilation. Hence also + in general the burden of physical life, the necessity of sleep, + and, finally, of death; for at last these subdued forces of nature, + assisted by circumstances, win back from the organism, wearied even + by the constant victory, the matter it took from them, and attain + to an unimpeded expression of their being. We may therefore say + that every organism expresses the Idea of which it is the image, + only after we have subtracted the part of its force which is + expended in subduing the lower Ideas that strive with it for + matter. This seems to have been running in the mind of Jacob Böhm + when he says somewhere that all the bodies of men and animals, and + even all plants, are really half dead. According as the subjection + in the organism of these forces of nature, which express the lower + grades of the objectification of will, is more or less successful, + the more or the less completely does it attain to the expression of + its Idea; that is to say, the nearer it is to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">ideal</span></em> + or the further from it—the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ideal</span></em> of beauty in its + species.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus everywhere + in nature we see strife, conflict, and alternation of victory, and + in it we shall come to recognise more distinctly that variance with + itself which is essential to the will. Every grade of the + objectification of will fights for the matter, the space, and the + time of the others. The permanent matter must constantly change its + form; for under the guidance of causality, mechanical, physical, + chemical, and organic phenomena, eagerly striving to appear, wrest + the matter from each other, for each desires to reveal its own + Idea. This strife may be followed through the whole of nature; + indeed nature exists only through it: <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page192">[pg 192]</span><a name="Pg192" id="Pg192" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> ει γαρ μη ην το νεικος εν τοις πραγμασιν, ἑν + αν ην ἁπαντα, ὡς φησιν Εμπεδοκλης; (nam si non inesset in rebus + contentio, unum omnia essent, ut ait Empedocles. Aris. Metaph., B. + 5). Yet this strife itself is only the revelation of that variance + with itself which is essential to the will. This universal conflict + becomes most distinctly visible in the animal kingdom. For animals + have the whole of the vegetable kingdom for their food, and even + within the animal kingdom every beast is the prey and the food of + another; that is, the matter in which its Idea expresses itself + must yield itself to the expression of another Idea, for each + animal can only maintain its existence by the constant destruction + of some other. Thus the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, + and in different forms is its own nourishment, till finally the + human race, because it subdues all the others, regards nature as a + manufactory for its use. Yet even the human race, as we shall see + in the Fourth Book, reveals in itself with most terrible + distinctness this conflict, this variance with itself of the will, + and we find <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">homo homini + lupus</span></span>. Meanwhile we can recognise this strife, this + subjugation, just as well in the lower grades of the + objectification of will. Many insects (especially ichneumon-flies) + lay their eggs on the skin, and even in the body of the larvæ of + other insects, whose slow destruction is the first work of the + newly hatched brood. The young hydra, which grows like a bud out of + the old one, and afterwards separates itself from it, fights while + it is still joined to the old one for the prey that offers itself, + so that the one snatches it out of the mouth of the other + (Trembley, Polypod., ii. p. 110, and iii. p. 165). But the + bulldog-ant of Australia affords us the most extraordinary example + of this kind; for if it is cut in two, a battle begins between the + head and the tail. The head seizes the tail with its teeth, and the + tail defends itself bravely by stinging the head: the battle may + last for half an hour, until they die or are dragged away by other + ants. This contest takes place <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page193">[pg 193]</span><a name="Pg193" id="Pg193" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> every time the experiment is tried. (From a + letter by Howitt in the W. Journal, reprinted in Galignani's + Messenger, 17th November 1855.) On the banks of the Missouri one + sometimes sees a mighty oak the stem and branches of which are so + encircled, fettered, and interlaced by a gigantic wild vine, that + it withers as if choked. The same thing shows itself in the lowest + grades; for example, when water and carbon are changed into + vegetable sap, or vegetables or bread into blood by organic + assimilation; and so also in every case in which animal secretion + takes place, along with the restriction of chemical forces to a + subordinate mode of activity. This also occurs in unorganised + nature, when, for example, crystals in process of formation meet, + cross, and mutually disturb each other to such an extent that they + are unable to assume the pure crystalline form, so that almost + every cluster of crystals is an image of such a conflict of will at + this low grade of its objectification; or again, when a magnet + forces its magnetism upon iron, in order to express its Idea in it; + or when galvanism overcomes chemical affinity, decomposes the + closest combinations, and so entirely suspends the laws of + chemistry that the acid of a decomposed salt at the negative pole + must pass to the positive pole without combining with the alkalies + through which it goes on its way, or turning red the litmus paper + that touches it. On a large scale it shows itself in the relation + between the central body and the planet, for although the planet is + in absolute dependence, yet it always resists, just like the + chemical forces in the organism; hence arises the constant tension + between centripetal and centrifugal force, which keeps the globe in + motion, and is itself an example of that universal essential + conflict of the manifestation of will which we are considering. For + as every body must be regarded as the manifestation of a will, and + as will necessarily expresses itself as a struggle, the original + condition of every world that is formed into a globe cannot be + rest, but motion, a striving forward in boundless space + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page194">[pg 194]</span><a name= + "Pg194" id="Pg194" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> without rest and + without end. Neither the law of inertia nor that of causality is + opposed to this: for as, according to the former, matter as such is + alike indifferent to rest and motion, its original condition may + just as well be the one as the other, therefore if we first find it + in motion, we have just as little right to assume that this was + preceded by a condition of rest, and to inquire into the cause of + the origin of the motion, as, conversely, if we found it at rest, + we would have to assume a previous motion and inquire into the + cause of its suspension. It is, therefore, not needful to seek for + a first impulse for centrifugal force, for, according to the + hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, it is, in the case of the planets, + the residue of the original rotation of the central body, from + which the planets have separated themselves as it contracted. But + to this central body itself motion is essential; it always + continues its rotation, and at the same time rushes forward in + endless space, or perhaps circulates round a greater central body + invisible to us. This view entirely agrees with the conjecture of + astronomers that there is a central sun, and also with the observed + advance of our whole solar system, and perhaps of the whole stellar + system to which our sun belongs. From this we are finally led to + assume a general advance of fixed stars, together with the central + sun, and this certainly loses all meaning in boundless space (for + motion in absolute space cannot be distinguished from rest), and + becomes, as is already the case from its striving and aimless + flight, an expression of that nothingness, that failure of all aim, + which, at the close of this book, we shall be obliged to recognise + in the striving of will in all its phenomena. Thus boundless space + and endless time must be the most universal and essential forms of + the collective phenomena of will, which exist for the expression of + its whole being. Lastly, we can recognise that conflict which we + are considering of all phenomena of will against each other in + simple matter regarded as such; for the real characteristic + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page195">[pg 195]</span><a name= + "Pg195" id="Pg195" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of matter is + correctly expressed by Kant as repulsive and attractive force; so + that even crude matter has its existence only in the strife of + conflicting forces. If we abstract from all chemical differences in + matter, or go so far back in the chain of causes and effects that + as yet there is no chemical difference, there remains mere + matter,—the world rounded to a globe, whose life, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + objectification of will, is now constituted by the conflict between + attractive and repulsive forces, the former as gravitation pressing + from all sides towards the centre, the latter as impenetrability + always opposing the former either as rigidity or elasticity; and + this constant pressure and resistance may be regarded as the + objectivity of will in its very lowest grade, and even there it + expresses its character.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We should see + the will express itself here in the lowest grade as blind striving, + an obscure, inarticulate impulse, far from susceptible of being + directly known. It is the simplest and the weakest mode of its + objectification. But it appears as this blind and unconscious + striving in the whole of unorganised nature, in all those original + forces of which it is the work of physics and chemistry to discover + and to study the laws, and each of which manifests itself to us in + millions of phenomena which are exactly similar and regular, and + show no trace of individual character, but are mere multiplicity + through space and time, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, through the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, as a + picture is multiplied through the facets of a glass.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From grade to + grade objectifying itself more distinctly, yet still completely + without consciousness as an obscure striving force, the will acts + in the vegetable kingdom also, in which the bond of its phenomena + consists no longer properly of causes, but of stimuli; and, + finally, also in the vegetative part of the animal phenomenon, in + the production and maturing of the animal, and in sustaining its + inner economy, in which the manifestation of <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page196">[pg 196]</span><a name="Pg196" id="Pg196" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> will is still always necessarily + determined by stimuli. The ever-ascending grades of the + objectification of will bring us at last to the point at which the + individual that expresses the Idea could no longer receive food for + its assimilation through mere movement following upon stimuli. For + such a stimulus must be waited for, but the food has now come to be + of a more special and definite kind, and with the ever-increasing + multiplicity of the individual phenomena, the crowd and confusion + has become so great that they interfere with each other, and the + chance of the individual that is moved merely by stimuli and must + wait for its food would be too unfavourable. From the point, + therefore, at which the animal has delivered itself from the egg or + the womb in which it vegetated without consciousness, its food must + be sought out and selected. For this purpose movement following + upon motives, and therefore consciousness, becomes necessary, and + consequently it appears as an agent, μηχανη, called in at this + stage of the objectification of will for the conservation of the + individual and the propagation of the species. It appears + represented by the brain or a large ganglion, just as every other + effort or determination of the will which objectifies itself is + represented by an organ, that is to say, manifests itself for the + idea as an organ.<a id="noteref_36" name="noteref_36" href= + "#note_36"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">36</span></span></a> But + with this means of assistance, this μηχανη, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">world as + idea</span></em> comes into existence at a stroke, with all its + forms, object and subject, time, space, multiplicity, and + causality. The world now shows its second side. Till now <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">mere + will</span></em>, it becomes also <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + object of the knowing subject. The will, which up to this point + followed its tendency in the dark with unerring certainty, has at + this grade kindled for itself a light as a means which became + necessary for getting rid of the disadvantage which arose from the + throng and the complicated <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page197">[pg 197]</span><a name="Pg197" id="Pg197" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> nature of its manifestations, and which would + have accrued precisely to the most perfect of them. The hitherto + infallible certainty and regularity with which it worked in + unorganised and merely vegetative nature, rested upon the fact that + it alone was active in its original nature, as blind impulse, will, + without assistance, and also without interruption, from a second + and entirely different world, the world as idea, which is indeed + only the image of its own inner being, but is yet of quite another + nature, and now encroaches on the connected whole of its phenomena. + Hence its infallible certainty comes to an end. Animals are already + exposed to illusion, to deception. They have, however, merely ideas + of perception, no conceptions, no reflection, and they are + therefore bound to the present; they cannot have regard for the + future. It seems as if this knowledge without reason was not in all + cases sufficient for its end, and at times required, as it were, + some assistance. For the very remarkable phenomenon presents + itself, that the blind working of the will and the activity + enlightened by knowledge encroach in a most astonishing manner upon + each other's spheres in two kinds of phenomena. In the one case we + find in the very midst of those actions of animals which are guided + by perceptive knowledge and its motives one kind of action which is + accomplished apart from these, and thus through the necessity of + the blindly acting will. I refer to those mechanical instincts + which are guided by no motive or knowledge, and which yet have the + appearance of performing their work from abstract rational motives. + The other case, which is opposed to this, is that in which, on the + contrary, the light of knowledge penetrates into the workshop of + the blindly active will, and illuminates the vegetative functions + of the human organism. I mean clairvoyance. Finally, when the will + has attained to the highest grade of its objectification, that + knowledge of the understanding given to brutes to which the senses + supply the data, out of which there arises mere perception confined + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page198">[pg 198]</span><a name= + "Pg198" id="Pg198" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to what is + immediately present, does not suffice. That complicated, + many-sided, imaginative being, man, with his many needs, and + exposed as he is to innumerable dangers, must, in order to exist, + be lighted by a double knowledge; a higher power, as it were, of + perceptive knowledge must be given him, and also reason, as the + faculty of framing abstract conceptions. With this there has + appeared reflection, surveying the future and the past, and, as a + consequence, deliberation, care, the power of premeditated action + independent of the present, and finally, the full and distinct + consciousness of one's own deliberate volition as such. Now if with + mere knowledge of perception there arose the possibility of + illusion and deception, by which the previous infallibility of the + blind striving of will was done away with, so that mechanical and + other instincts, as expressions of unconscious will, had to lend + their help in the midst of those that were conscious, with the + entrance of reason that certainty and infallibility of the + expressions of will (which at the other extreme in unorganised + nature appeared as strict conformity to law) is almost entirely + lost; instinct disappears altogether; deliberation, which is + supposed to take the place of everything else, begets (as was shown + in the First Book) irresolution and uncertainty; then error becomes + possible, and in many cases obstructs the adequate objectification + of the will in action. For although in the character the will has + already taken its definite and unchangeable bent or direction, in + accordance with which volition, when occasioned by the presence of + a motive, invariably takes place, yet error can falsify its + expressions, for it introduces illusive motives that take the place + of the real ones which they resemble;<a id="noteref_37" name= + "noteref_37" href="#note_37"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">37</span></span></a> as, + for example, when superstition forces on a man imaginary motives + which impel him to a course of action directly opposed <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page199">[pg 199]</span><a name="Pg199" id="Pg199" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to the way in which the will would + otherwise express itself in the given circumstances. Agamemnon + slays his daughter; a miser dispenses alms, out of pure egotism, in + the hope that he will some day receive an hundred-fold; and so + on.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus knowledge + generally, rational as well as merely sensuous, proceeds originally + from the will itself, belongs to the inner being of the higher + grades of its objectification as a mere μηχανη, a means of + supporting the individual and the species, just like any organ of + the body. Originally destined for the service of the will for the + accomplishment of its aims, it remains almost throughout entirely + subjected to its service: it is so in all brutes and in almost all + men. Yet we shall see in the Third Book how in certain individual + men knowledge can deliver itself from this bondage, throw off its + yoke, and, free from all the aims of will, exist purely for itself, + simply as a clear mirror of the world, which is the source of art. + Finally, in the Fourth Book, we shall see how, if this kind of + knowledge reacts on the will, it can bring about self-surrender, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, resignation, which is the + final goal, and indeed the inmost nature of all virtue and + holiness, and is deliverance from the world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 28. We have + considered the great multiplicity and diversity of the phenomena in + which the will objectifies itself, and we have seen their endless + and implacable strife with each other. Yet, according to the whole + discussion up to this point, the will itself, as thing-in-itself, + is by no means included in that multiplicity and change. The + diversity of the (Platonic) Ideas, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + grades of objectification, the multitude of individuals in which + each of these expresses itself, the struggle of forms for + matter,—all this does not concern it, but is only the manner of its + objectification, and only through this has an indirect relation to + it, by virtue of which it belongs to the expression of the nature + of will for the idea. As the magic-lantern shows many different + pictures, which <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page200">[pg + 200]</span><a name="Pg200" id="Pg200" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + are all made visible by one and the same light, so in all the + multifarious phenomena which fill the world together or throng + after each other as events, only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one + will</span></em> manifests itself, of which everything is the + visibility, the objectivity, and which remains unmoved in the midst + of this change; it alone is thing-in-itself; all objects are + manifestations, or, to speak the language of Kant, phenomena. + Although in man, as (Platonic) Idea, the will finds its clearest + and fullest objectification, yet man alone could not express its + being. In order to manifest the full significance of the will, the + Idea of man would need to appear, not alone and sundered from + everything else, but accompanied by the whole series of grades, + down through all the forms of animals, through the vegetable + kingdom to unorganised nature. All these supplement each other in + the complete objectification of will; they are as much presupposed + by the Idea of man as the blossoms of a tree presuppose leaves, + branches, stem, and root; they form a pyramid, of which man is the + apex. If fond of similes, one might also say that their + manifestations accompany that of man as necessarily as the full + daylight is accompanied by all the gradations of twilight, through + which, little by little, it loses itself in darkness; or one might + call them the echo of man, and say: Animal and plant are the + descending fifth and third of man, the inorganic kingdom is the + lower octave. The full truth of this last comparison will only + become clear to us when, in the following book, we attempt to + fathom the deep significance of music, and see how a connected, + progressive melody, made up of high, quick notes, may be regarded + as in some sense expressing the life and efforts of man connected + by reflection, while the unconnected complemental notes and the + slow bass, which make up the harmony necessary to perfect the + music, represent the rest of the animal kingdom and the whole of + nature that is without knowledge. But of this in its own place, + where it will not sound so paradoxical. <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page201">[pg 201]</span><a name="Pg201" id="Pg201" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> We find, however, that the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">inner + necessity</span></em> of the gradation of its manifestations, which + is inseparable from the adequate objectification of the will, is + expressed by an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">outer necessity</span></em> in the whole of + these manifestations themselves, by reason of which man has need of + the beasts for his support, the beasts in their grades have need of + each other as well as of plants, which in their turn require the + ground, water, chemical elements and their combinations, the + planet, the sun, rotation and motion round the sun, the curve of + the ellipse, &c., &c. At bottom this results from the fact + that the will must live on itself, for there exists nothing beside + it, and it is a hungry will. Hence arise eager pursuit, anxiety, + and suffering.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is only the + knowledge of the unity of will as thing-in-itself, in the endless + diversity and multiplicity of the phenomena, that can afford us the + true explanation of that wonderful, unmistakable analogy of all the + productions of nature, that family likeness on account of which we + may regard them as variations on the same ungiven theme. So in like + measure, through the distinct and thoroughly comprehended knowledge + of that harmony, that essential connection of all the parts of the + world, that necessity of their gradation which we have just been + considering, we shall obtain a true and sufficient insight into the + inner nature and meaning of the undeniable <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">teleology</span></em> of all organised + productions of nature, which, indeed, we presupposed <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, when considering and + investigating them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">teleology</span></em> is of a twofold + description; sometimes an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">inner teleology</span></em>, that is, an + agreement of all the parts of a particular organism, so ordered + that the sustenance of the individual and the species results from + it, and therefore presents itself as the end of that disposition or + arrangement. Sometimes, however, there is an <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">outward + teleology</span></em>, a relation of unorganised to organised + nature in general, or of particular parts of organised nature to + each <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page202">[pg 202]</span><a name= + "Pg202" id="Pg202" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> other, which makes + the maintenance of the whole of organised nature, or of the + particular animal species, possible, and therefore presents itself + to our judgment as the means to this end.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Inner + teleology</span></em> is connected with the scheme of our work in + the following way. If, in accordance with what has been said, all + variations of form in nature, and all multiplicity of individuals, + belong not to the will itself, but merely to its objectivity and + the form of this objectivity, it necessarily follows that the will + is indivisible and is present as a whole in every manifestation, + although the grades of its objectification, the (Platonic) Ideas, + are very different from each other. We may, for the sake of + simplicity, regard these different Ideas as in themselves + individual and simple acts of the will, in which it expresses its + nature more or less. Individuals, however, are again manifestations + of the Ideas, thus of these acts, in time, space, and multiplicity. + Now, in the lowest grades of objectivity, such an act (or an Idea) + retains its unity in the manifestation; while, in order to appear + in higher grades, it requires a whole series of conditions and + developments in time, which only collectively express its nature + completely. Thus, for example the Idea that reveals itself in any + general force of nature has always one single expression, although + it presents itself differently according to the external relations + that are present: otherwise its identity could not be proved, for + this is done by abstracting the diversity that arises merely from + external relations. In the same way the crystal has only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + manifestation of life, crystallisation, which afterwards has its + fully adequate and exhaustive expression in the rigid form, the + corpse of that momentary life. The plant, however, does not express + the Idea, whose phenomenon it is, at once and through a single + manifestation, but in a succession of developments of its organs in + time. The animal not only develops its organism in the same manner, + in a succession of forms which are often very different + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page203">[pg 203]</span><a name= + "Pg203" id="Pg203" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> (metamorphosis), but + this form itself, although it is already objectivity of will at + this grade, does not attain to a full expression of its Idea. This + expression must be completed through the actions of the animal, in + which its empirical character, common to the whole species, + manifests itself, and only then does it become the full revelation + of the Idea, a revelation which presupposes the particular organism + as its first condition. In the case of man, the empirical character + is peculiar to every individual (indeed, as we shall see in the + Fourth Book, even to the extent of supplanting entirely the + character of the species, through the self-surrender of the whole + will). That which is known as the empirical character, through the + necessary development in time, and the division into particular + actions that is conditioned by it, is, when we abstract from this + temporal form of the manifestation the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">intelligible + character</span></em>, according to the expression of Kant, who + shows his undying merit especially in establishing this distinction + and explaining the relation between freedom and necessity, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, between the will as + thing-in-itself and its manifestations in time.<a id="noteref_38" + name="noteref_38" href="#note_38"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">38</span></span></a> Thus + the intelligible character coincides with the Idea, or, more + accurately, with the original act of will which reveals itself in + it. So far then, not only the empirical character of every man, but + also that of every species of animal and plant, and even of every + original force of unorganised nature, is to be regarded as the + manifestation of an intelligible character, that is, of a timeless, + indivisible act of will. I should like here to draw attention in + passing to the naïveté with which every plant expresses and lays + open its whole character in its mere form, reveals its whole being + and will. This is <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page204">[pg + 204]</span><a name="Pg204" id="Pg204" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + why the physiognomy of plants is so interesting; while in order to + know an animal in its Idea, it is necessary to observe the course + of its action. As for man, he must be fully investigated and + tested, for reason makes him capable of a high degree of + dissimulation. The beast is as much more naïve than the man as the + plant is more naïve than the beast. In the beast we see the will to + live more naked, as it were, than in the man, in whom it is clothed + with so much knowledge, and is, moreover, so veiled through the + capacity for dissimulation, that it is almost only by chance, and + here and there, that its true nature becomes apparent. In the plant + it shows itself quite naked, but also much weaker, as mere blind + striving for existence without end or aim. For the plant reveals + its whole being at the first glance, and with complete innocence, + which does not suffer from the fact that it carries its organs of + generation exposed to view on its upper surface, though in all + animals they have been assigned to the most hidden part. This + innocence of the plant results from its complete want of knowledge. + Guilt does not lie in willing, but in willing with knowledge. Every + plant speaks to us first of all of its home, of the climate, and + the nature of the ground in which it has grown. Therefore, even + those who have had little practice easily tell whether an exotic + plant belongs to the tropical or the temperate zone, and whether it + grows in water, in marshes, on mountain, or on moorland. Besides + this, however, every plant expresses the special will of its + species, and says something that cannot be uttered in any other + tongue. But we must now apply what has been said to the + teleological consideration of the organism, so far as it concerns + its inner design. If in unorganised nature the Idea, which is + everywhere to be regarded as a single act of will, reveals itself + also in a single manifestation which is always the same, and thus + one may say that here the empirical character directly partakes of + the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page205">[pg 205]</span><a name= + "Pg205" id="Pg205" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> unity of the + intelligible, coincides, as it were, with it, so that no inner + design can show itself here; if, on the contrary, all organisms + express their Ideas through a series of successive developments, + conditioned by a multiplicity of co-existing parts, and thus only + the sum of the manifestations of the empirical character + collectively constitute the expression of the intelligible + character; this necessary co-existence of the parts and succession + of the stages of development does not destroy the unity of the + appearing Idea, the act of will which expresses itself; nay, rather + this unity finds its expression in the necessary relation and + connection of the parts and stages of development with each other, + in accordance with the law of causality. Since it is the will which + is one, indivisible, and therefore entirely in harmony with itself, + that reveals itself in the whole Idea as in act, its manifestation, + although broken up into a number of different parts and conditions, + must yet show this unity again in the thorough agreement of all of + these. This is effected by a necessary relation and dependence of + all the parts upon each other, by means of which the unity of the + Idea is re-established in the manifestation. In accordance with + this, we now recognise these different parts and functions of the + organism as related to each other reciprocally as means and end, + but the organism itself as the final end of all. Consequently, + neither the breaking up of the Idea, which in itself is simple, + into the multiplicity of the parts and conditions of the organism, + on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, the re-establishment of + its unity through the necessary connection of the parts and + functions which arises from the fact that they are the cause and + effect, the means and end, of each other, is peculiar and essential + to the appearing will as such, to the thing-in-itself, but only to + its manifestation in space, time, and causality (mere modes of the + principle of sufficient reason, the form of the phenomenon). They + belong to the world as <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page206">[pg + 206]</span><a name="Pg206" id="Pg206" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + idea, not to the world as will; they belong to the way in which the + will becomes object, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, idea at this grade of its + objectivity. Every one who has grasped the meaning of this + discussion—a discussion which is perhaps somewhat difficult—will + now fully understand the doctrine of Kant, which follows from it, + that both the design of organised and the conformity to law of + unorganised nature are only introduced by our understanding, and + therefore both belong only to the phenomenon, not to the + thing-in-itself. The surprise, which was referred to above, at the + infallible constancy of the conformity to law of unorganised + nature, is essentially the same as the surprise that is excited by + design in organised nature; for in both cases what we wonder at is + only the sight of the original unity of the Idea, which, for the + phenomenon, has assumed the form of multiplicity and + diversity.<a id="noteref_39" name="noteref_39" href= + "#note_39"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">39</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As regards the + second kind of teleology, according to the division made above, the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">outer</span></em> design, which shows itself, + not in the inner economy of the organisms, but in the support and + assistance they receive from without, both from unorganised nature + and from each other; its general explanation is to be found in the + exposition we have just given. For the whole world, with all its + phenomena, is the objectivity of the one indivisible will, the + Idea, which is related to all other Ideas as harmony is related to + the single voice. Therefore that unity of the will must show itself + also in the agreement of all its manifestations. But we can very + much increase the clearness of this insight if we go somewhat more + closely into the manifestations of that outer teleology and + agreement of the different parts of nature with each other, an + inquiry which will also throw some light on the foregoing + exposition. We shall best attain this end by considering the + following analogy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The character of + each individual man, so far as it is <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page207">[pg 207]</span><a name="Pg207" id="Pg207" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> thoroughly individual, and not entirely + included in that of the species, may be regarded as a special Idea, + corresponding to a special act of the objectification of will. This + act itself would then be his intelligible character, and his + empirical character would be the manifestation of it. The empirical + character is entirely determined through the intelligible, which is + without ground, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, as thing-in-itself is not + subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason (the form of the + phenomenon). The empirical character must in the course of life + afford us the express image of the intelligible, and can only + become what the nature of the latter demands. But this property + extends only to the essential, not to the unessential in the course + of life to which it applies. To this unessential belong the + detailed events and actions which are the material in which the + empirical character shows itself. These are determined by outward + circumstances, which present the motives upon which the character + reacts according to its nature; and as they may be very different, + the outward form of the manifestation of the empirical character, + that is, the definite actual or historical form of the course of + life, will have to accommodate itself to their influence. Now this + form may be very different, although what is essential to the + manifestation, its content, remains the same. Thus, for example it + is immaterial whether a man plays for nuts or for crowns; but + whether a man cheats or plays fairly, that is the real matter; the + latter is determined by the intelligible character, the former by + outward circumstances. As the same theme may be expressed in a + hundred different variations, so the same character may be + expressed in a hundred very different lives. But various as the + outward influence may be, the empirical character which expresses + itself in the course of life must yet, whatever form it takes, + accurately objectify the intelligible character, for the latter + adapts its objectification to the given material of actual + circumstances. We have now to assume something analogous to the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page208">[pg 208]</span><a name= + "Pg208" id="Pg208" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> influence of outward + circumstances upon the life that is determined in essential matters + by the character, if we desire to understand how the will, in the + original act of its objectification, determines the various Ideas + in which it objectifies itself, that is, the different forms of + natural existence of every kind, among which it distributes its + objectification, and which must therefore necessarily have a + relation to each other in the manifestation. We must assume that + between all these manifestations of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + will there existed a universal and reciprocal adaptation and + accommodation of themselves to each other, by which, however, as we + shall soon see more clearly, all time-determination is to be + excluded, for the Idea lies outside time. In accordance with this, + every manifestation must have adapted itself to the surroundings + into which it entered, and these again must have adapted themselves + to it, although it occupied a much later position in time; and we + see this <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">consensus + naturæ</span></span> everywhere. Every plant is therefore adapted + to its soil and climate, every animal to its element and the prey + that will be its food, and is also in some way protected, to a + certain extent, against its natural enemy: the eye is adapted to + the light and its refrangibility, the lungs and the blood to the + air, the air-bladder of fish to water, the eye of the seal to the + change of the medium in which it must see, the water-pouch in the + stomach of the camel to the drought of the African deserts, the + sail of the nautilus to the wind that is to drive its little bark, + and so on down to the most special and astonishing outward + adaptations.<a id="noteref_40" name="noteref_40" href= + "#note_40"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">40</span></span></a> We + must abstract however here from all temporal relations, for these + can only concern the manifestation of the Idea, not the Idea + itself. Accordingly this kind of explanation must also be used + retrospectively, and we must not merely admit that every species + accommodated itself to the given environment, but also that this + environment itself, which preceded it in time, had just as much + regard for the being <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page209">[pg + 209]</span><a name="Pg209" id="Pg209" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + that would some time come into it. For it is one and the same will + that objectifies itself in the whole world; it knows no time, for + this form of the principle of sufficient reason does not belong to + it, nor to its original objectivity, the Ideas, but only to the way + in which these are known by the individuals who themselves are + transitory, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, to the manifestation of + the Ideas. Thus, time has no significance for our present + examination of the manner in which the objectification of the will + distributes itself among the Ideas, and the Ideas whose <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">manifestations</span></em> entered into the + course of time earlier, according to the law of causality, to which + as phenomena they are subject, have no advantage over those whose + manifestation entered later; nay rather, these last are the + completest objectifications of the will, to which the earlier + manifestations must adapt themselves just as much as they must + adapt themselves to the earlier. Thus the course of the planets, + the tendency to the ellipse, the rotation of the earth, the + division of land and sea, the atmosphere, light, warmth, and all + such phenomena, which are in nature what bass is in harmony, + adapted themselves in anticipation of the coming species of living + creatures of which they were to become the supporter and sustainer. + In the same way the ground adapted itself to the nutrition of + plants, plants adapted themselves to the nutrition of animals, + animals to that of other animals, and conversely they all adapted + themselves to the nutrition of the ground. All the parts of nature + correspond to each other, for it is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + will that appears in them all, but the course of time is quite + foreign to its original and only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">adequate + objectification</span></em> (this expression will be explained in + the following book), the Ideas. Even now, when the species have + only to sustain themselves, no longer to come into existence, we + see here and there some such forethought of nature extending to the + future, and abstracting as it were from the process of time, a + self-adaptation of what is to what <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page210">[pg 210]</span><a name="Pg210" id="Pg210" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> is yet to come. The bird builds the nest for + the young which it does not yet know; the beaver constructs a dam + the object of which is unknown to it; ants, marmots, and bees lay + in provision for the winter they have never experienced; the spider + and the ant-lion make snares, as if with deliberate cunning, for + future unknown prey; insects deposit their eggs where the coming + brood finds future nourishment. In the spring-time the female + flower of the diœcian valisneria unwinds the spirals of its stalk, + by which till now it was held at the bottom of the water, and thus + rises to the surface. Just then the male flower, which grows on a + short stalk from the bottom, breaks away, and so, at the sacrifice + of its life, reaches the surface, where it swims about in search of + the female. The latter is fructified, and then draws itself down + again to the bottom by contracting its spirals, and there the fruit + grows.<a id="noteref_41" name="noteref_41" href= + "#note_41"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">41</span></span></a> I must + again refer here to the larva of the male stag-beetle, which makes + the hole in the wood for its metamorphosis as big again as the + female does, in order to have room for its future horns. The + instinct of animals in general gives us the best illustration of + what remains of teleology in nature. For as instinct is an action, + like that which is guided by the conception of an end, and yet is + entirely without this; so all construction of nature resembles that + which is guided by the conception of an end, and yet is entirely + without it. For in the outer as in the inner teleology of nature, + what we are obliged to think as means and end is, in every case, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + manifestation of the unity of the one will so thoroughly agreeing + with itself</span></em>, which has assumed multiplicity in space + and time for our manner of knowing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reciprocal + adaptation and self-accommodation of phenomena that springs from + this unity cannot, however, annul the inner contradiction which + appears in the universal conflict of nature described above, and + which <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page211">[pg 211]</span><a name= + "Pg211" id="Pg211" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> is essential to the + will. That harmony goes only so far as to render possible the + duration of the world and the different kinds of existences in it, + which without it would long since have perished. Therefore it only + extends to the continuance of the species, and the general + conditions of life, but not to that of the individual. If, then, by + reason of that harmony and accommodation, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">species</span></em> + in organised nature and the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">universal forces</span></em> in unorganised + nature continue to exist beside each other, and indeed support each + other reciprocally, on the other hand, the inner contradiction of + the will which objectifies itself in all these ideas shows itself + in the ceaseless internecine war of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">individuals</span></em> of these species, and + in the constant struggle of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">manifestations</span></em> of these natural + forces with each other, as we pointed out above. The scene and the + object of this conflict is matter, which they try to wrest from + each other, and also space and time, the combination of which + through the form of causality is, in fact, matter, as was explained + in the First Book.<a id="noteref_42" name="noteref_42" href= + "#note_42"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">42</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 29. I here + conclude the second principal division of my exposition, in the + hope that, so far as is possible in the case of an entirely new + thought, which cannot be quite free from traces of the + individuality in which it originated, I have succeeded in conveying + to the reader the complete certainty that this world in which we + live and have our being is in its whole nature through and through + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>, and at the same time through + and through <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>: that this idea, as such, + already presupposes a form, object and subject, is therefore + relative; and if we ask what remains if we take away this form, and + all those forms which are subordinate to it, and which express the + principle of sufficient reason, the answer must be that as + something <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">toto genere</span></span> + different from idea, this can be nothing but <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>, + which is thus properly the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing-in-itself</span></em>. Every one finds + that he himself is this will, in which the real nature of the world + consists, and he also <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page212">[pg + 212]</span><a name="Pg212" id="Pg212" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + finds that he is the knowing subject, whose idea the whole world + is, the world which exists only in relation to his consciousness, + as its necessary supporter. Every one is thus himself in a double + aspect the whole world, the microcosm; finds both sides whole and + complete in himself. And what he thus recognises as his own real + being also exhausts the being of the whole world—the macrocosm; + thus the world, like man, is through and through <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>, + and through and through <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, and nothing more than this. + So we see the philosophy of Thales, which concerned the macrocosm, + unite at this point with that of Socrates, which dealt with the + microcosm, for the object of both is found to be the same. But all + the knowledge that has been communicated in the two first books + will gain greater completeness, and consequently greater certainty, + from the two following books, in which I hope that several + questions that have more or less distinctly arisen in the course of + our work will also be sufficiently answered.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the meantime + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> such question may be more + particularly considered, for it can only properly arise so long as + one has not fully penetrated the meaning of the foregoing + exposition, and may so far serve as an illustration of it. It is + this: Every will is a will towards something, has an object, an end + of its willing; what then is the final end, or towards what is that + will striving that is exhibited to us as the being-in-itself of the + world? This question rests, like so many others, upon the confusion + of the thing-in-itself with the manifestation. The principle of + sufficient reason, of which the law of motivation is also a form, + extends only to the latter, not to the former. It is only of + phenomena, of individual things, that a ground can be given, never + of the will itself, nor of the Idea in which it adequately + objectifies itself. So then of every particular movement or change + of any kind in nature, a cause is to be sought, that is, a + condition that of necessity produced it, but never of the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page213">[pg 213]</span><a name= + "Pg213" id="Pg213" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> natural force itself + which is revealed in this and innumerable similar phenomena; and it + is therefore simple misunderstanding, arising from want of + consideration, to ask for a cause of gravity, electricity, and so + on. Only if one had somehow shown that gravity and electricity were + not original special forces of nature, but only the manifestations + of a more general force already known, would it be allowable to ask + for the cause which made this force produce the phenomena of + gravity or of electricity here. All this has been explained at + length above. In the same way every particular act of will of a + knowing individual (which is itself only a manifestation of will as + the thing-in-itself) has necessarily a motive without which that + act would never have occurred; but just as material causes contain + merely the determination that at this time, in this place, and in + this matter, a manifestation of this or that natural force must + take place, so the motive determines only the act of will of a + knowing being, at this time, in this place, and under these + circumstances, as a particular act, but by no means determines that + that being wills in general or wills in this manner; this is the + expression of his intelligible character, which, as will itself, + the thing-in-itself, is without ground, for it lies outside the + province of the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore every man + has permanent aims and motives by which he guides his conduct, and + he can always give an account of his particular actions; but if he + were asked why he wills at all, or why in general he wills to + exist, he would have no answer, and the question would indeed seem + to him meaningless; and this would be just the expression of his + consciousness that he himself is nothing but will, whose willing + stands by itself and requires more particular determination by + motives only in its individual acts at each point of time.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In fact, freedom + from all aim, from all limits, belongs to the nature of the will, + which is an endless striving. This was already touched on above in + the reference to <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page214">[pg + 214]</span><a name="Pg214" id="Pg214" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + centrifugal force. It also discloses itself in its simplest form in + the lowest grade of the objectification of will, in gravitation, + which we see constantly exerting itself, though a final goal is + obviously impossible for it. For if, according to its will, all + existing matter were collected in one mass, yet within this mass + gravity, ever striving towards the centre, would still wage war + with impenetrability as rigidity or elasticity. The tendency of + matter can therefore only be confined, never completed or appeased. + But this is precisely the case with all tendencies of all phenomena + of will. Every attained end is also the beginning of a new course, + and so on <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad infinitum</span></span>. + The plant raises its manifestation from the seed through the stem + and the leaf to the blossom and the fruit, which again is the + beginning of a new seed, a new individual, that runs through the + old course, and so on through endless time. Such also is the life + of the animal; procreation is its highest point, and after + attaining to it, the life of the first individual quickly or slowly + sinks, while a new life ensures to nature the endurance of the + species and repeats the same phenomena. Indeed, the constant + renewal of the matter of every organism is also to be regarded as + merely the manifestation of this continual pressure and change, and + physiologists are now ceasing to hold that it is the necessary + reparation of the matter wasted in motion, for the possible wearing + out of the machine can by no means be equivalent to the support it + is constantly receiving through nourishment. Eternal becoming, + endless flux, characterises the revelation of the inner nature of + will. Finally, the same thing shows itself in human endeavours and + desires, which always delude us by presenting their satisfaction as + the final end of will. As soon as we attain to them they no longer + appear the same, and therefore they soon grow stale, are forgotten, + and though not openly disowned, are yet always thrown aside as + vanished illusions. We are fortunate enough if there <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page215">[pg 215]</span><a name="Pg215" id="Pg215" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> still remains something to wish for and + to strive after, that the game may be kept up of constant + transition from desire to satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a + new desire, the rapid course of which is called happiness, and the + slow course sorrow, and does not sink into that stagnation that + shows itself in fearful ennui that paralyses life, vain yearning + without a definite object, deadening languor. According to all + this, when the will is enlightened by knowledge, it always knows + what it wills now and here, never what it wills in general; every + particular act of will has its end, the whole will has none; just + as every particular phenomenon of nature is determined by a + sufficient cause so far as concerns its appearance in this place at + this time, but the force which manifests itself in it has no + general cause, for it belongs to the thing-in-itself, to the + groundless will. The single example of self-knowledge of the will + as a whole is the idea as a whole, the whole world of perception. + It is the objectification, the revelation, the mirror of the will. + What the will expresses in it will be the subject of our further + consideration.<a id="noteref_43" name="noteref_43" href= + "#note_43"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">43</span></span></a></p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page217">[pg 217]</span><a name= + "Pg217" id="Pg217" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc15" id="toc15"></a> <a name="pdf16" id="pdf16"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Third Book. The World As + Idea.</span></h1> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc17" id="toc17"></a> <a name="pdf18" id="pdf18"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Second Aspect. The Idea Independent + Of The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The + Object Of Art.</span></h2> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 0.90em"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Τί τὸ ὄν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον; καὶ τί τό + γιγνόμενον μὲν καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δε οὐδέποτε + ὄν.——ΠΛΑΤΩΝ.</span></p> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page219">[pg 219]</span><a name= + "Pg219" id="Pg219" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 30. In the + First Book the world was explained as mere <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">idea</span></em>, + object for a subject. In the Second Book we considered it from its + other side, and found that in this aspect it is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">will</span></em>, + which proved to be simply that which this world is besides being + idea. In accordance with this knowledge we called the world as + idea, both as a whole and in its parts, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">objectification of + will</span></em>, which therefore means the will become object, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, idea. Further, we remember + that this objectification of will was found to have many definite + grades, in which, with gradually increasing distinctness and + completeness, the nature of will appears in the idea, that is to + say, presents itself as object. In these grades we already + recognised the Platonic Ideas, for the grades are just the + determined species, or the original unchanging forms and qualities + of all natural bodies, both organised and unorganised, and also the + general forces which reveal themselves according to natural laws. + These Ideas, then, as a whole express themselves in innumerable + individuals and particulars, and are related to these as archetypes + to their copies. The multiplicity of such individuals is only + conceivable through time and space, their appearing and passing + away through causality, and in all these forms we recognise merely + the different modes of the principle of sufficient reason, which is + the ultimate principle of all that is finite, of all individual + existence, and the universal form of the idea as it appears in the + knowledge of the individual as such. The Platonic Idea, on the + other <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page220">[pg 220]</span><a name= + "Pg220" id="Pg220" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> hand, does not come + under this principle, and has therefore neither multiplicity nor + change. While the individuals in which it expresses itself are + innumerable, and unceasingly come into being and pass away, it + remains unchanged as one and the same, and the principle of + sufficient reason has for it no meaning. As, however, this is the + form under which all knowledge of the subject comes, so far as the + subject knows as an <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">individual</span></em>, the Ideas lie quite + outside the sphere of its knowledge. If, therefore, the Ideas are + to become objects of knowledge, this can only happen by + transcending the individuality of the knowing subject. The more + exact and detailed explanation of this is what will now occupy our + attention.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 31. First, + however, the following very essential remark. I hope that in the + preceding book I have succeeded in producing the conviction that + what is called in the Kantian philosophy the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing-in-itself</span></em>, and appears there + as so significant, and yet so obscure and paradoxical a doctrine, + and especially on account of the manner in which Kant introduced it + as an inference from the caused to the cause, was considered a + stumbling-stone, and, in fact, the weak side of his + philosophy,—that this, I say, if it is reached by the entirely + different way by which we have arrived at it, is nothing but the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> when the sphere of that + conception is extended and defined in the way I have shown. I hope, + further, that after what has been said there will be no hesitation + in recognising the definite grades of the objectification of the + will, which is the inner reality of the world, to be what Plato + called the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">eternal Ideas</span></em> or unchangeable + forms (ειδῆ); a doctrine which is regarded as the principal, but at + the same time the most obscure and paradoxical dogma of his system, + and has been the subject of reflection and controversy of ridicule + and of reverence to so many and such differently endowed minds in + the course of many centuries.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page221">[pg 221]</span><a name="Pg221" id="Pg221" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If now the will + is for us the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thing-in-itself</span></em>, and the Idea is + the immediate objectivity of that will at a definite grade, we find + that Kant's thing-in-itself, and Plato's Idea, which to him is the + only οντως ον, these two great obscure paradoxes of the two + greatest philosophers of the West are not indeed identical, but yet + very closely related, and only distinguished by a single + circumstance. The purport of these two great paradoxes, with all + inner harmony and relationship, is yet so very different on account + of the remarkable diversity of the individuality of their authors, + that they are the best commentary on each other, for they are like + two entirely different roads that conduct us to the same goal. This + is easily made clear. What Kant says is in substance + this:—<span class="tei tei-q">“Time, space, and causality are not + determinations of the thing-in-itself, but belong only to its + phenomenal existence, for they are nothing but the forms of our + knowledge. Since, however, all multiplicity, and all coming into + being and passing away, are only possible through time, space, and + causality, it follows that they also belong only to the phenomenon, + not to the thing-in-itself. But as our knowledge is conditioned by + these forms, the whole of experience is only knowledge of the + phenomenon, not of the thing-in-itself; therefore its laws cannot + be made valid for the thing-in-itself. This extends even to our own + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ego</span></em>, and we know it only as + phenomenon, and not according to what it may be in itself.”</span> + This is the meaning and content of the doctrine of Kant in the + important respect we are considering. What Plato says is + this:—<span class="tei tei-q">“The things of this world which our + senses perceive have no true being; <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">they always become, + they never are:</span></em> they have only a relative being; they + all exist merely in and through their relations to each other; + their whole being may, therefore, quite as well be called a + non-being. They are consequently not objects of a true knowledge + (επιστημη), for such a knowledge can only be of what exists for + itself, and always in the same way; <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page222">[pg 222]</span><a name="Pg222" id="Pg222" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> they, on the contrary, are only the objects + of an opinion based on sensation (δοξα μετ᾽ αισθησεως αλογου). So + long as we are confined to the perception of these, we are like men + who sit in a dark cave, bound so fast that they cannot turn their + heads, and who see nothing but the shadows of real things which + pass between them and a fire burning behind them, the light of + which casts the shadows on the wall opposite them; and even of + themselves and of each other they see only the shadows on the wall. + Their wisdom would thus consist in predicting the order of the + shadows learned from experience. The real archetypes, on the other + hand, to which these shadows correspond, the eternal Ideas, the + original forms of all things, can alone be said to have true being + (οντως ον), because they <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">always are, but never become nor pass + away</span></em>. To them belongs <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">no + multiplicity</span></em>; for each of them is according to its + nature only one, for it is the archetype itself, of which all + particular transitory things of the same kind which are named after + it are copies or shadows. They have also <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">no coming into + being nor passing away</span></em>, for they are truly being, never + becoming nor vanishing, like their fleeting shadows. (It is + necessarily presupposed, however, in these two negative + definitions, that time, space, and causality have no significance + or validity for these Ideas, and that they do not exist in them.) + Of these only can there be true knowledge, for the object of such + knowledge can only be that which always and in every respect (thus + in-itself) is; not that which is and again is not, according as we + look at it.”</span> This is Plato's doctrine. It is clear, and + requires no further proof that the inner meaning of both doctrines + is entirely the same; that both explain the visible world as a + manifestation, which in itself is nothing, and which only has + meaning and a borrowed reality through that which expresses itself + in it (in the one case the thing-in-itself, in the other the Idea). + To this last, which has true being, all the forms of that + phenomenal existence, even <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page223">[pg 223]</span><a name="Pg223" id="Pg223" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the most universal and essential, are, + according to both doctrines, entirely foreign. In order to disown + these forms Kant has directly expressed them even in abstract + terms, and distinctly refused time, space, and causality as mere + forms of the phenomenon to the thing-in-itself. Plato, on the other + hand, did not attain to the fullest expression, and has only + distinctly refused these forms to his Ideas in that he denies of + the Ideas what is only possible through these forms, multiplicity + of similar things, coming into being and passing away. Though it is + perhaps superfluous, I should like to illustrate this remarkable + and important agreement by an example. There stands before us, let + us suppose, an animal in the full activity of life. Plato would + say, <span class="tei tei-q">“This animal has no true existence, + but merely an apparent existence, a constant becoming, a relative + existence which may just as well be called non-being as being. Only + the Idea which expresses itself in that animal is truly + <span class="tei tei-q">‘being,’</span> or the animal in-itself + (αυτο το θηριον), which is dependent upon nothing, but is in and + for itself (καθ᾽ ἑαυτο, αει ὡς αυτως); it has not become, it will + not end, but always is in the same way (αει ον, και μηδεποτε ουτε + γυγνομενον ουτε απολλυμενον). If now we recognise its Idea in this + animal, it is all one and of no importance whether we have this + animal now before us or its progenitor of a thousand years ago, + whether it is here or in a distant land, whether it presents itself + in this or that manner, position, or action; whether, lastly, it is + this or any other individual of the same species; all this is + nothing, and only concerns the phenomenon; the Idea of the animal + alone has true being, and is the object of real knowledge.”</span> + So Plato; Kant would say something of this kind, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“This animal is a phenomenon in time, space, and + causality, which are collectively the conditions <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> of the possibility of + experience, lying in our faculty of knowledge, not determinations + of the thing-in-itself. Therefore this animal as we perceive it at + this definite point of time, in <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page224">[pg 224]</span><a name="Pg224" id="Pg224" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> this particular place, as an individual in + the connection of experience (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, in the chain of causes and + effects), which has come into being, and will just as necessarily + pass away, is not a thing-in-itself, but a phenomenon which only + exists in relation to our knowledge. To know it as what it may be + in itself, that is to say, independent of all the determinations + which lie in time, space, and causality, would demand another kind + of knowledge than that which is possible for us through the senses + and the understanding.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In order to + bring Kant's mode of expression nearer the Platonic, we might say: + Time, space, and causality are that arrangement of our intellect by + virtue of which the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> being of each kind which alone + really is, manifests itself to us as a multiplicity of similar + beings, constantly appearing and disappearing in endless + succession. The apprehension of things by means of and in + accordance with this arrangement is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immanent</span></em> knowledge; that, on the + other hand, which is conscious of the true state of the case, is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">transcendental</span></em> knowledge. The + latter is obtained <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">in + abstracto</span></span> through the criticism of pure reason, but + in exceptional cases it may also appear intuitively. This last is + an addition of my own, which I am endeavouring in this Third Book + to explain.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If the doctrine + of Kant had ever been properly understood and grasped, and since + Kant's time that of Plato, if men had truly and earnestly reflected + on the inner meaning and content of the teaching of these two great + masters, instead of involving themselves in the technicalities of + the one and writing parodies of the style of the other, they could + not have failed to discern long ago to what an extent these two + great philosophers agree, and that the true meaning, the aim of + both systems, is the same. Not only would they have refrained from + constantly comparing Plato to Leibnitz, on whom his spirit + certainly did not rest, or indeed to a <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page225">[pg 225]</span><a name="Pg225" id="Pg225" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> well-known gentleman who is still + alive,<a id="noteref_44" name="noteref_44" href= + "#note_44"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">44</span></span></a> as if + they wanted to mock the manes of the great thinker of the past; but + they would have advanced much farther in general, or rather they + would not have fallen so disgracefully far behind as they have in + the last forty years. They would not have let themselves be led by + the nose, to-day by one vain boaster and to-morrow by another, nor + would they have opened the nineteenth century, which promised so + much in Germany, with the philosophical farces that were performed + over the grave of Kant (as the ancients sometimes did at the + funeral obsequies of their dead), and which deservedly called forth + the derision of other nations, for such things least become the + earnest and strait-laced German. But so small is the chosen public + of true philosophers, that even students who understand are but + scantily brought them by the centuries—Εισι δη ναρθηκοφοροι μεν + πολλοι, βακχοι δε γε παυροι (<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Thyrsigeri quidem multi, Baachi vero + pauci</span></span>). Ἡ ατιμια φιλοσοφιᾳ δια ταυτα προσπεπτωκεν, + ὁτι ου κατ αξιαν αυτης ἁπτονται; ου γαρ νοθους εδει ἁπτεσθαι, αλλα + γνησιους (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Eam ob rem philosophia in + infamiam incidit, quad non pro dignitate ipsam attingunt: neque + enim a spuriis, sad a legitimis erat + attrectanda</span></span>).—Plato.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Men followed the + words,—such words as <span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> ideas,”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“forms of perception and thought existing + in consciousness independently of experience,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“fundamental conceptions of the pure + understanding,”</span> &c., &c.,—and asked whether Plato's + Ideas, which were also original conceptions, and besides this were + supposed to be reminiscences of a perception before life of the + truly real things, were in some way the same as Kant's forms of + perception and thought, which lie <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> in our consciousness. On account of some + slight resemblance in the expression of these two entirely + different doctrines, the Kantian doctrine of the forms which limit + the knowledge of the individual to the phenomenon, and the Platonic + doctrine <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page226">[pg + 226]</span><a name="Pg226" id="Pg226" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of Ideas, the knowledge of which these very forms expressly deny, + these so far diametrically opposed doctrines were carefully + compared, and men deliberated and disputed as to whether they were + identical, found at last that they were not the same, and concluded + that Plato's doctrine of Ideas and Kant's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Critique of Reason”</span> had nothing in common. But + enough of this.<a id="noteref_45" name="noteref_45" href= + "#note_45"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">45</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 32. It follows + from our consideration of the subject, that, for us, Idea and + thing-in-itself are not entirely one and the same, in spite of the + inner agreement between Kant and Plato, and the identity of the aim + they had before them, or the conception of the world which roused + them and led them to philosophise. The Idea is for us rather the + direct, and therefore adequate, objectivity of the thing-in-itself, + which is, however, itself the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>—the will as not yet + objectified, not yet become idea. For the thing-in-itself must, + even according to Kant, be free from all the forms connected with + knowing as such; and it is merely an error on his part (as is shown + in the Appendix) that he did not count among these forms, before + all others, that of being object for a subject, for it is the first + and most universal form of all phenomena, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + of all idea; he should therefore have distinctly denied objective + existence to his thing-in-itself, which would have saved him from a + great inconsistency that was soon discovered. The Platonic Idea, on + the other hand, is necessarily object, something known, an idea, + and in that respect is different from the thing-in-itself, but in + that respect only. It has merely laid aside the subordinate forms + of the phenomenon, all of which we include in the principle of + sufficient reason, or rather it has not yet assumed them; but it + has retained the first and most universal form, that of the idea in + general, the form of being object for a subject. It is the forms + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page227">[pg 227]</span><a name= + "Pg227" id="Pg227" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which are + subordinate to this (whose general expression is the principle of + sufficient reason) that multiply the Idea in particular transitory + individuals, whose number is a matter of complete indifference to + the Idea. The principle of sufficient reason is thus again the form + into which the Idea enters when it appears in the knowledge of the + subject as individual. The particular thing that manifests itself + in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason is thus only + an indirect objectification of the thing-in-itself (which is the + will), for between it and the thing-in-itself stands the Idea as + the only direct objectivity of the will, because it has assumed + none of the special forms of knowledge as such, except that of the + idea in general, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the form of being object + for a subject. Therefore it alone is the most <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">adequate + objectivity</span></em> of the will or thing-in-itself which is + possible; indeed it is the whole thing-in-itself, only under the + form of the idea; and here lies the ground of the great agreement + between Plato and Kant, although, in strict accuracy, that of which + they speak is not the same. But the particular things are no really + adequate objectivity of the will, for in them it is obscured by + those forms whose general expression is the principle of sufficient + reason, but which are conditions of the knowledge which belongs to + the individual as such. If it is allowable to draw conclusions from + an impossible presupposition, we would, in fact, no longer know + particular things, nor events, nor change, nor multiplicity, but + would comprehend only Ideas,—only the grades of the objectification + of that one will, of the thing-in-itself, in pure unclouded + knowledge. Consequently our world would be a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nunc stans</span></span>, if it were not that, + as knowing subjects, we are also individuals, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + our perceptions come to us through the medium of a body, from the + affections of which they proceed, and which is itself only concrete + willing, objectivity of the will, and thus is an object among + objects, and as such comes into the knowing consciousness in the + only way in <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page228">[pg + 228]</span><a name="Pg228" id="Pg228" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + which an object can, through the forms of the principle of + sufficient reason, and consequently already presupposes, and + therefore brings in, time, and all other forms which that principle + expresses. Time is only the broken and piecemeal view which the + individual being has of the Ideas, which are outside time, and + consequently <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">eternal</span></em>. Therefore Plato says time + is the moving picture of eternity: αιωνος εικων κινητη ὁ + χρονος.<a id="noteref_46" name="noteref_46" href= + "#note_46"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">46</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 33. Since now, + as individuals, we have no other knowledge than that which is + subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and this form of + knowledge excludes the Ideas, it is certain that if it is possible + for us to raise ourselves from the knowledge of particular things + to that of the Ideas, this can only happen by an alteration taking + place in the subject which is analogous and corresponds to the + great change of the whole nature of the object, and by virtue of + which the subject, so far as it knows an Idea, is no more + individual.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It will be + remembered from the preceding book that knowledge in general + belongs to the objectification of will at its higher grades, and + sensibility, nerves, and brain, just like the other parts of the + organised being, are the expression of the will at this stage of + its objectivity, and therefore the idea which appears through them + is also in the same way bound to the service of will as a means + (μηχανη) for the attainment of its now complicated (πολυτελεστερα) + aims for sustaining a being of manifold requirements. Thus + originally and according to its nature, knowledge is completely + subject to the will, and, like the immediate object, which, by + means of the application of the law of causality, is its + starting-point, all knowledge which proceeds in accordance with the + principle of sufficient reason remains in a closer or more distant + relation to the will. For the individual finds his body as an + object among objects, to all of which it is related and connected + according to the principle <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page229">[pg 229]</span><a name="Pg229" id="Pg229" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of sufficient reason. Thus all investigations + of these relations and connections lead back to his body, and + consequently to his will. Since it is the principle of sufficient + reason which places the objects in this relation to the body, and, + through it, to the will, the one endeavour of the knowledge which + is subject to this principle will be to find out the relations in + which objects are placed to each other through this principle, and + thus to trace their innumerable connections in space, time, and + causality. For only through these is the object <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">interesting</span></em> to the individual, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, related to the will. + Therefore the knowledge which is subject to the will knows nothing + further of objects than their relations, knows the objects only so + far as they exist at this time, in this place, under these + circumstances, from these causes, and with these effects—in a word, + as particular things; and if all these relations were to be taken + away, the objects would also have disappeared for it, because it + knew nothing more about them. We must not disguise the fact that + what the sciences consider in things is also in reality nothing + more than this; their relations, the connections of time and space, + the causes of natural changes, the resemblance of forms, the + motives of actions,—thus merely relations. What distinguishes + science from ordinary knowledge is merely its systematic form, the + facilitating of knowledge by the comprehension of all particulars + in the universal, by means of the subordination of concepts, and + the completeness of knowledge which is thereby attained. All + relation has itself only a relative existence; for example, all + being in time is also non-being; for time is only that by means of + which opposite determinations can belong to the same thing; + therefore every phenomenon which is in time again is not, for what + separates its beginning from its end is only time, which is + essentially a fleeting, inconstant, and relative thing, here called + duration. But time is the most universal form of all objects of the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page230">[pg 230]</span><a name= + "Pg230" id="Pg230" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> knowledge which is + subject to the will, and the prototype of its other forms.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Knowledge now, + as a rule, remains always subordinate to the service of the will, + as indeed it originated for this service, and grew, so to speak, to + the will, as the head to the body. In the case of the brutes this + subjection of knowledge to the will can never be abolished. In the + case of men it can be abolished only in exceptional cases, which we + shall presently consider more closely. This distinction between man + and brute is outwardly expressed by the difference of the relation + of the head to the body. In the case of the lower brutes both are + deformed: in all brutes the head is directed towards the earth, + where the objects of its will lie; even in the higher species the + head and the body are still far more one than in the case of man, + whose head seems freely set upon his body, as if only carried by + and not serving it. This human excellence is exhibited in the + highest degree by the Apollo of Belvedere; the head of the god of + the Muses, with eyes fixed on the far distance, stands so freely on + his shoulders that it seems wholly delivered from the body, and no + more subject to its cares.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 34. The + transition which we have referred to as possible, but yet to be + regarded as only exceptional, from the common knowledge of + particular things to the knowledge of the Idea, takes place + suddenly; for knowledge breaks free from the service of the will, + by the subject ceasing to be merely individual, and thus becoming + the pure will-less subject of knowledge, which no longer traces + relations in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, + but rests in fixed contemplation of the object presented to it, out + of its connection with all others, and rises into it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A full + explanation is necessary to make this clear, and the reader must + suspend his surprise for a while, till he has grasped the whole + thought expressed in this work, and then it will vanish of + itself.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page231">[pg + 231]</span><a name="Pg231" id="Pg231" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If, raised by + the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the common way of looking + at things, gives up tracing, under the guidance of the forms of the + principle of sufficient reason, their relations to each other, the + final goal of which is always a relation to his own will; if he + thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the + whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">what</span></em>; + if, further, he does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of + the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead + of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks + himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be + filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually + present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or + whatever it may be; inasmuch as he <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">loses</span></em> + himself in this object (to use a pregnant German idiom), + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, forgets even his + individuality, his will, and only continues to exist as the pure + subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the + object alone were there, without any one to perceive it, and he can + no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both have + become one, because the whole consciousness is filled and occupied + with one single sensuous picture; if thus the object has to such an + extent passed out of all relation to something outside it, and the + subject out of all relation to the will, then that which is so + known is no longer the particular thing as such; but it is the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Idea</span></em>, the eternal form, the + immediate objectivity of the will at this grade; and, therefore, he + who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, for in such + perception the individual has lost himself; but he is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">pure</span></em>, + will-less, painless, timeless <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">subject of knowledge</span></em>. This, which + in itself is so remarkable (which I well know confirms the saying + that originated with Thomas Paine, <span lang="fr" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style="font-style: italic">Du + sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas</span></span>), will by + degrees become clearer and less surprising from what follows. It + was this that was running in Spinoza's mind when he wrote: + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Meus æterna est, quatenus res sub æternitatis + specie</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page232">[pg + 232]</span><a name="Pg232" id="Pg232" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style= + "font-style: italic">concipit</span></span> (Eth. V. pr. 31, + Schol.)<a id="noteref_47" name="noteref_47" href= + "#note_47"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">47</span></span></a> In + such contemplation the particular thing becomes at once the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Idea</span></em> of its species, and the + perceiving individual becomes <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pure subject of knowledge</span></em>. The + individual, as such, knows only particular things; the pure subject + of knowledge knows only Ideas. For the individual is the subject of + knowledge in its relation to a definite particular manifestation of + will, and in subjection to this. This particular manifestation of + will is, as such, subordinated to the principle of sufficient + reason in all its forms; therefore, all knowledge which relates + itself to it also follows the principle of sufficient reason, and + no other kind of knowledge is fitted to be of use to the will but + this, which always consists merely of relations to the object. The + knowing individual as such, and the particular things known by him, + are always in some place, at some time, and are links in the chain + of causes and effects. The pure subject of knowledge and his + correlative, the Idea, have passed out of all these forms of the + principle of sufficient reason: time, place, the individual that + knows, and the individual that is known, have for them no meaning. + When an individual knower has raised himself in the manner + described to be pure subject of knowledge, and at the same time has + raised the observed object to the Platonic Idea, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">world as + idea</span></em> appears complete and pure, and the full + objectification of the will takes place, for the Platonic Idea + alone is its <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">adequate objectivity</span></em>. The Idea + includes object and subject in like manner in itself, for they are + its one form; but in it they are absolutely of equal importance; + for as the object is here, as elsewhere, simply the idea of the + subject, the subject, which passes entirely into the perceived + object has thus become this object itself, for the whole + consciousness is nothing but its perfectly <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page233">[pg 233]</span><a name="Pg233" id="Pg233" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> distinct picture. Now this consciousness + constitutes the whole <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">world as idea</span></em>, for one imagines + the whole of the Platonic Ideas, or grades of the objectivity of + will, in their series passing through it. The particular things of + all time and space are nothing but Ideas multiplied through the + principle of sufficient reason (the form of the knowledge of the + individual as such), and thus obscured as regards their pure + objectivity. When the Platonic Idea appears, in it subject and + object are no longer to be distinguished, for the Platonic Idea, + the adequate objectivity of will, the true world as idea, arises + only when the subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate + each other completely; and in the same way the knowing and the + known individuals, as things in themselves, are not to be + distinguished. For if we look entirely away from the true + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">world as + idea</span></em>, there remains nothing but the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">world as + will</span></em>. The will is the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“in-itself”</span> of the Platonic Idea, which fully + objectifies it; it is also the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“in-itself”</span> of the particular thing and of the + individual that knows it, which objectify it incompletely. As will, + outside the idea and all its forms, it is one and the same in the + object contemplated and in the individual, who soars aloft in this + contemplation, and becomes conscious of himself as pure subject. + These two are, therefore, in themselves not different, for in + themselves they are will, which here knows itself; and multiplicity + and difference exist only as the way in which this knowledge comes + to the will, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, only in the phenomenon, on + account of its form, the principle of sufficient reason.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now the known + thing, without me as the subject of knowledge, is just as little an + object, and not mere will, blind effort, as without the object, + without the idea, I am a knowing subject and not mere blind will. + This will is in itself, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, outside the idea, one and + the same with mine: only in the world as idea, whose form is always + at least that of subject and object, we are separated as the known + and the knowing individual. As <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page234">[pg 234]</span><a name="Pg234" id="Pg234" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> soon as knowledge, the world as idea, is + abolished, there remains nothing but mere will, blind effort. That + it should receive objectivity, become idea, supposes at once both + subject and object; but that this should be pure, complete, and + adequate objectivity of the will, supposes the object as Platonic + Idea, free from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, + and the subject as the pure subject of knowledge, free from + individuality and subjection to the will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Whoever now, + has, after the manner referred to, become so absorbed and lost in + the perception of nature that he only continues to exist as the + pure knowing subject, becomes in this way directly conscious that, + as such, he is the condition, that is, the supporter, of the world + and all objective existence; for this now shows itself as dependent + upon his existence. Thus he draws nature into himself, so that he + sees it to be merely an accident of his own being. In this sense + Byron says—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Are not + the mountains, waves, and skies, a part</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 1.80em"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Of me and of my soul, as I of + them?</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But how shall he + who feels this, regard himself as absolutely transitory, in + contrast to imperishable nature? Such a man will rather be filled + with the consciousness, which the Upanishad of the Veda expresses: + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Hæ omnes creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter + me aliud ens non est</span></span> (Oupnek'hat, i. 122).<a id= + "noteref_48" name="noteref_48" href="#note_48"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">48</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 35. In order + to gain a deeper insight into the nature of the world, it is + absolutely necessary that we should learn to distinguish the will + as thing-in-itself from its adequate objectivity, and also the + different grades in which this appears more and more distinctly and + fully, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the Ideas themselves, from + the merely phenomenal existence of these Ideas in the forms of the + principle of sufficient reason, the restricted method of knowledge + of the individual. We shall then agree with Plato when he + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page235">[pg 235]</span><a name= + "Pg235" id="Pg235" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> attributes actual + being only to the Ideas, and allows only an illusive, dream-like + existence to things in space and time, the real world for the + individual. Then we shall understand how one and the same Idea + reveals itself in so many phenomena, and presents its nature only + bit by bit to the individual, one side after another. Then we shall + also distinguish the Idea itself from the way in which its + manifestation appears in the observation of the individual, and + recognise the former as essential and the latter as unessential. + Let us consider this with the help of examples taken from the most + insignificant things, and also from the greatest. When the clouds + move, the figures which they form are not essential, but + indifferent to them; but that as elastic vapour they are pressed + together, drifted along, spread out, or torn asunder by the force + of the wind: this is their nature, the essence of the forces which + objectify themselves in them, the Idea; their actual forms are only + for the individual observer. To the brook that flows over stones, + the eddies, the waves, the foam-flakes which it forms are + indifferent and unessential; but that it follows the attraction of + gravity, and behaves as inelastic, perfectly mobile, formless, + transparent fluid: this is its nature; this, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">if known through + perception</span></em>, is its Idea; these accidental forms are + only for us so long as we know as individuals. The ice on the + window-pane forms itself into crystals according to the laws of + crystallisation, which reveal the essence of the force of nature + that appears here, exhibit the Idea; but the trees and flowers + which it traces on the pane are unessential, and are only there for + us. What appears in the clouds, the brook, and the crystal is the + weakest echo of that will which appears more fully in the plant, + more fully still in the beast, and most fully in man. But only the + essential in all these grades of its objectification constitutes + the Idea; on the other hand, its unfolding or development, because + broken up in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason into a + multiplicity of many-sided <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page236">[pg 236]</span><a name="Pg236" id="Pg236" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> phenomena, is unessential to the Idea, lies + merely in the kind of knowledge that belongs to the individual and + has reality only for this. The same thing necessarily holds good of + the unfolding of that Idea which is the completest objectivity of + will. Therefore, the history of the human race, the throng of + events, the change of times, the multifarious forms of human life + in different lands and countries, all this is only the accidental + form of the manifestation of the Idea, does not belong to the Idea + itself, in which alone lies the adequate objectivity of the will, + but only to the phenomenon which appears in the knowledge of the + individual, and is just as foreign, unessential, and indifferent to + the Idea itself as the figures which they assume are to the clouds, + the form of its eddies and foam-flakes to the brook, or its trees + and flowers to the ice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To him who has + thoroughly grasped this, and can distinguish between the will and + the Idea, and between the Idea and its manifestation, the events of + the world will have significance only so far as they are the + letters out of which we may read the Idea of man, but not in and + for themselves. He will not believe with the vulgar that time may + produce something actually new and significant; that through it, or + in it, something absolutely real may attain to existence, or indeed + that it itself as a whole has beginning and end, plan and + development, and in some way has for its final aim the highest + perfection (according to their conception) of the last generation + of man, whose life is a brief thirty years. Therefore he will just + as little, with Homer, people a whole Olympus with gods to guide + the events of time, as, with Ossian, he will take the forms of the + clouds for individual beings; for, as we have said, both have just + as much meaning as regards the Idea which appears in them. In the + manifold forms of human life and in the unceasing change of events, + he will regard the Idea only as the abiding and essential, in which + the will to live has its fullest objectivity, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page237">[pg 237]</span><a name="Pg237" id="Pg237" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and which shows its different sides in + the capacities, the passions, the errors and the excellences of the + human race; in self-interest, hatred, love, fear, boldness, + frivolity, stupidity, slyness, wit, genius, and so forth, all of + which crowding together and combining in thousands of forms + (individuals), continually create the history of the great and the + little world, in which it is all the same whether they are set in + motion by nuts or by crowns. Finally, he will find that in the + world it is the same as in the dramas of Gozzi, in all of which the + same persons appear, with like intention, and with a like fate; the + motives and incidents are certainly different in each piece, but + the spirit of the incidents is the same; the actors in one piece + know nothing of the incidents of another, although they performed + in it themselves; therefore, after all experience of former pieces, + Pantaloon has become no more agile or generous, Tartaglia no more + conscientious, Brighella no more courageous, and Columbine no more + modest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Suppose we were + allowed for once a clearer glance into the kingdom of the possible, + and over the whole chain of causes and effects; if the earth-spirit + appeared and showed us in a picture all the greatest men, + enlighteners of the world, and heroes, that chance destroyed before + they were ripe for their work; then the great events that would + have changed the history of the world and brought in periods of the + highest culture and enlightenment, but which the blindest chance, + the most insignificant accident, hindered at the outset; lastly, + the splendid powers of great men, that would have enriched whole + ages of the world, but which, either misled by error or passion, or + compelled by necessity, they squandered uselessly on unworthy or + unfruitful objects, or even wasted in play. If we saw all this, we + would shudder and lament at the thought of the lost treasures of + whole periods of the world. But the earth-spirit would smile and + say, <span class="tei tei-q">“The source from which the individuals + and their powers <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page238">[pg + 238]</span><a name="Pg238" id="Pg238" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + proceed is inexhaustible and unending as time and space; for, like + these forms of all phenomena, they also are only phenomena, + visibility of the will. No finite measure can exhaust that infinite + source; therefore an undiminished eternity is always open for the + return of any event or work that was nipped in the bud. In this + world of phenomena true loss is just as little possible as true + gain. The will alone is; it is the thing in-itself, and the source + of all these phenomena. Its self-knowledge and its assertion or + denial, which is then decided upon, is the only event + in-itself.”</span><a id="noteref_49" name="noteref_49" href= + "#note_49"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">49</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 36. History + follows the thread of events; it is pragmatic so far as it deduces + them in accordance with the law of motivation, a law that + determines the self-manifesting will wherever it is enlightened by + knowledge. At the lowest grades of its objectivity, where it still + acts without knowledge, natural science, in the form of etiology, + treats of the laws of the changes of its phenomena, and, in the + form of morphology, of what is permanent in them. This almost + endless task is lightened by the aid of concepts, which comprehend + what is general in order that we may deduce what is particular from + it. Lastly, mathematics treats of the mere forms, time and space, + in which the Ideas, broken up into multiplicity, appear for the + knowledge of the subject as individual. All these, of which the + common name is science, proceed according to the principle of + sufficient reason in its different forms, and their theme is always + the phenomenon, its laws, connections, and the relations which + result from them. But what kind of knowledge is concerned with that + which is outside and independent of all relations, that which alone + is really essential to the world, the true content of its + phenomena, that which is subject to no change, and therefore is + known with equal truth for all time, in a word, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Ideas</span></em>, + which are the direct and adequate objectivity <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page239">[pg 239]</span><a name="Pg239" id="Pg239" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of the thing in-itself, the will? We + answer, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Art</span></em>, the work of genius. It + repeats or reproduces the eternal Ideas grasped through pure + contemplation, the essential and abiding in all the phenomena of + the world; and according to what the material is in which it + reproduces, it is sculpture or painting, poetry or music. Its one + source is the knowledge of Ideas; its one aim the communication of + this knowledge. While science, following the unresting and + inconstant stream of the fourfold forms of reason and consequent, + with each end attained sees further, and can never reach a final + goal nor attain full satisfaction, any more than by running we can + reach the place where the clouds touch the horizon; art, on the + contrary, is everywhere at its goal. For it plucks the object of + its contemplation out of the stream of the world's course, and has + it isolated before it. And this particular thing, which in that + stream was a small perishing part, becomes to art the + representative of the whole, an equivalent of the endless multitude + in space and time. It therefore pauses at this particular thing; + the course of time stops; the relations vanish for it; only the + essential, the Idea, is its object. We may, therefore, accurately + define it as the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">way of viewing things independent of the + principle of sufficient reason</span></em>, in opposition to the + way of viewing them which proceeds in accordance with that + principle, and which is the method of experience and of science. + This last method of considering things may be compared to a line + infinitely extended in a horizontal direction, and the former to a + vertical line which cuts it at any point. The method of viewing + things which proceeds in accordance with the principle of + sufficient reason is the rational method, and it alone is valid and + of use in practical life and in science. The method which looks + away from the content of this principle is the method of genius, + which is only valid and of use in art. The first is the method of + Aristotle; the second is, on the whole, that of Plato. The first is + like <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page240">[pg 240]</span><a name= + "Pg240" id="Pg240" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the mighty storm, + that rushes along without beginning and without aim, bending, + agitating, and carrying away everything before it; the second is + like the silent sunbeam, that pierces through the storm quite + unaffected by it. The first is like the innumerable showering drops + of the waterfall, which, constantly changing, never rest for an + instant; the second is like the rainbow, quietly resting on this + raging torrent. Only through the pure contemplation described + above, which ends entirely in the object, can Ideas be + comprehended; and the nature of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">genius</span></em> + consists in pre-eminent capacity for such contemplation. Now, as + this requires that a man should entirely forget himself and the + relations in which he stands, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">genius</span></em> is simply the completest + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objectivity</span></em>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the objective tendency of the mind, as opposed to the subjective, + which is directed to one's own self—in other words, to the will. + Thus genius is the faculty of continuing in the state of pure + perception, of losing oneself in perception, and of enlisting in + this service the knowledge which originally existed only for the + service of the will; that is to say, genius is the power of leaving + one's own interests, wishes, and aims entirely out of sight, thus + of entirely renouncing one's own personality for a time, so as to + remain <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pure knowing subject</span></em>, clear vision + of the world; and this not merely at moments, but for a sufficient + length of time, and with sufficient consciousness, to enable one to + reproduce by deliberate art what has thus been apprehended, and + <span class="tei tei-q">“to fix in lasting thoughts the wavering + images that float before the mind.”</span> It is as if, when genius + appears in an individual, a far larger measure of the power of + knowledge falls to his lot than is necessary for the service of an + individual will; and this superfluity of knowledge, being free, now + becomes subject purified from will, a clear mirror of the inner + nature of the world. This explains the activity, amounting even to + disquietude, of men of genius, for the present can seldom satisfy + them, because it does not fill their consciousness. This gives + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page241">[pg 241]</span><a name= + "Pg241" id="Pg241" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> them that restless + aspiration, that unceasing desire for new things, and for the + contemplation of lofty things, and also that longing that is hardly + ever satisfied, for men of similar nature and of like stature, to + whom they might communicate themselves; whilst the common mortal, + entirely filled and satisfied by the common present, ends in it, + and finding everywhere his like, enjoys that peculiar satisfaction + in daily life that is denied to genius.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Imagination has + rightly been recognised as an essential element of genius; it has + sometimes even been regarded as identical with it; but this is a + mistake. As the objects of genius are the eternal Ideas, the + permanent, essential forms of the world and all its phenomena, and + as the knowledge of the Idea is necessarily knowledge through + perception, is not abstract, the knowledge of the genius would be + limited to the Ideas of the objects actually present to his person, + and dependent upon the chain of circumstances that brought these + objects to him, if his imagination did not extend his horizon far + beyond the limits of his actual personal existence, and thus enable + him to construct the whole out of the little that comes into his + own actual apperception, and so to let almost all possible scenes + of life pass before him in his own consciousness. Further, the + actual objects are almost always very imperfect copies of the Ideas + expressed in them; therefore the man of genius requires imagination + in order to see in things, not that which Nature has actually made, + but that which she endeavoured to make, yet could not because of + that conflict of her forms among themselves which we referred to in + the last book. We shall return to this farther on in treating of + sculpture. The imagination then extends the intellectual horizon of + the man of genius beyond the objects which actually present + themselves to him, both as regards quality and quantity. Therefore + extraordinary strength of imagination accompanies, and is indeed a + necessary condition of genius. But the converse does not hold, for + strength of imagination <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page242">[pg + 242]</span><a name="Pg242" id="Pg242" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + does not indicate genius; on the contrary, men who have no touch of + genius may have much imagination. For as it is possible to consider + a real object in two opposite ways, purely objectively, the way of + genius grasping its Idea, or in the common way, merely in the + relations in which it stands to other objects and to one's own + will, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, it is + also possible to perceive an imaginary object in both of these + ways. Regarded in the first way, it is a means to the knowledge of + the Idea, the communication of which is the work of art; in the + second case, the imaginary object is used to build castles in the + air congenial to egotism and the individual humour, and which for + the moment delude and gratify; thus only the relations of the + phantasies so linked together are known. The man who indulges in + such an amusement is a dreamer; he will easily mingle those fancies + that delight his solitude with reality, and so unfit himself for + real life: perhaps he will write them down, and then we shall have + the ordinary novel of every description, which entertains those who + are like him and the public at large, for the readers imagine + themselves in the place of the hero, and then find the story very + agreeable.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The common + mortal, that manufacture of Nature which she produces by the + thousand every day, is, as we have said, not capable, at least not + continuously so, of observation that in every sense is wholly + disinterested, as sensuous contemplation, strictly so called, is. + He can turn his attention to things only so far as they have some + relation to his will, however indirect it may be. Since in this + respect, which never demands anything but the knowledge of + relations, the abstract conception of the thing is sufficient, and + for the most part even better adapted for use; the ordinary man + does not linger long over the mere perception, does not fix his + attention long on one object, but in all that is presented to him + hastily seeks merely the concept under which it is to be brought, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page243">[pg 243]</span><a name= + "Pg243" id="Pg243" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> as the lazy man + seeks a chair, and then it interests him no further. This is why he + is so soon done with everything, with works of art, objects of + natural beauty, and indeed everywhere with the truly significant + contemplation of all the scenes of life. He does not linger; only + seeks to know his own way in life, together with all that might at + any time become his way. Thus he makes topographical notes in the + widest sense; over the consideration of life itself as such he + wastes no time. The man of genius, on the other hand, whose + excessive power of knowledge frees it at times from the service of + will, dwells on the consideration of life itself, strives to + comprehend the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other + things; and in doing this he often forgets to consider his own path + in life, and therefore for the most part pursues it awkwardly + enough. While to the ordinary man his faculty of knowledge is a + lamp to lighten his path, to the man of genius it is the sun which + reveals the world. This great diversity in their way of looking at + life soon becomes visible in the outward appearance both of the man + of genius and of the ordinary mortal. The man in whom genius lives + and works is easily distinguished by his glance, which is both keen + and steady, and bears the stamp of perception, of contemplation. + This is easily seen from the likenesses of the few men of genius + whom Nature has produced here and there among countless millions. + On the other hand, in the case of an ordinary man, the true object + of his contemplation, what he is prying into, can be easily seen + from his glance, if indeed it is not quite stupid and vacant, as is + generally the case. Therefore the expression of genius in a face + consists in this, that in it a decided predominance of knowledge + over will is visible, and consequently there also shows itself in + it a knowledge that is entirely devoid of relation to will, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">pure + knowing</span></em>. On the contrary, in ordinary countenances + there is a predominant expression of will; and we see that + knowledge only comes into activity under <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page244">[pg 244]</span><a name="Pg244" id="Pg244" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the impulse of will, and thus is directed + merely by motives.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Since the + knowledge that pertains to genius, or the knowledge of Ideas, is + that knowledge which does not follow the principle of sufficient + reason, so, on the other hand, the knowledge which does follow that + principle is that which gives us prudence and rationality in life, + and which creates the sciences. Thus men of genius are affected + with the deficiencies entailed in the neglect of this latter kind + of knowledge. Yet what I say in this regard is subject to the + limitation that it only concerns them in so far as and while they + are actually engaged in that kind of knowledge which is peculiar to + genius; and this is by no means at every moment of their lives, for + the great though spontaneous exertion which is demanded for the + comprehension of Ideas free from will must necessarily relax, and + there are long intervals during which men of genius are placed in + very much the same position as ordinary mortals, both as regards + advantages and deficiencies. On this account the action of genius + has always been regarded as an inspiration, as indeed the name + indicates, as the action of a superhuman being distinct from the + individual himself, and which takes possession of him only + periodically. The disinclination of men of genius to direct their + attention to the content of the principle of sufficient reason will + first show itself, with regard to the ground of being, as dislike + of mathematics; for its procedure is based upon the most universal + forms of the phenomenon space and time, which are themselves merely + modes of the principle of sufficient reason, and is consequently + precisely the opposite of that method of thought which seeks merely + the content of the phenomenon, the Idea which expresses itself in + it apart from all relations. The logical method of mathematics is + also antagonistic to genius, for it does not satisfy but obstructs + true insight, and presents merely a chain of conclusions in + accordance with the principle of <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page245">[pg 245]</span><a name="Pg245" id="Pg245" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the ground of knowing. The mental faculty + upon which it makes the greatest claim is memory, for it is + necessary to recollect all the earlier propositions which are + referred to. Experience has also proved that men of great artistic + genius have no faculty for mathematics; no man was ever very + distinguished for both. Alfieri relates that he was never able to + understand the fourth proposition of Euclid. Goethe was constantly + reproached with his want of mathematical knowledge by the ignorant + opponents of his theory of colours. Here certainly, where it was + not a question of calculation and measurement upon hypothetical + data, but of direct knowledge by the understanding of causes and + effects, this reproach was so utterly absurd and inappropriate, + that by making it they have exposed their entire want of judgment, + just as much as by the rest of their ridiculous arguments. The fact + that up to the present day, nearly half a century after the + appearance of Goethe's theory of colours, even in Germany the + Newtonian fallacies still have undisturbed possession of the + professorial chair, and men continue to speak quite seriously of + the seven homogeneous rays of light and their different + refrangibility, will some day be numbered among the great + intellectual peculiarities of men generally, and especially of + Germans. From the same cause as we have referred to above, may be + explained the equally well-known fact that, conversely, admirable + mathematicians have very little susceptibility for works of fine + art. This is very naïvely expressed in the well-known anecdote of + the French mathematician, who, after having read Racine's + <span class="tei tei-q">“Iphigenia,”</span> shrugged his shoulders + and asked, <span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang="fr" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Qu'est ce que cela + prouve?</span></span>”</span> Further, as quick comprehension of + relations in accordance with the laws of causality and motivation + is what specially constitutes prudence or sagacity, a prudent man, + so far as and while he is so, will not be a genius, and a man of + genius, so far as and while he is so, will not be a prudent man. + Lastly, perceptive knowledge generally, <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page246">[pg 246]</span><a name="Pg246" id="Pg246" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> in the province of which the Idea always + lies, is directly opposed to rational or abstract knowledge, which + is guided by the principle of the ground of knowing. It is also + well known that we seldom find great genius united with pre-eminent + reasonableness; on the contrary, persons of genius are often + subject to violent emotions and irrational passions. But the ground + of this is not weakness of reason, but partly unwonted energy of + that whole phenomenon of will—the man of genius—which expresses + itself through the violence of all his acts of will, and partly + preponderance of the knowledge of perception through the senses and + understanding over abstract knowledge, producing a decided tendency + to the perceptible, the exceedingly lively impressions of which so + far outshine colourless concepts, that they take their place in the + guidance of action, which consequently becomes irrational. + Accordingly the impression of the present moment is very strong + with such persons, and carries them away into unconsidered action, + violent emotions and passions. Moreover, since, in general, the + knowledge of persons of genius has to some extent freed itself from + the service of will, they will not in conversation think so much of + the person they are addressing as of the thing they are speaking + about, which is vividly present to them; and therefore they are + likely to judge or narrate things too objectively for their own + interests; they will not pass over in silence what would more + prudently be concealed, and so forth. Finally, they are given to + soliloquising, and in general may exhibit certain weaknesses which + are actually akin to madness. It has often been remarked that there + is a side at which genius and madness touch, and even pass over + into each other, and indeed poetical inspiration has been called a + kind of madness: <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">amabilis + insania</span></span>, Horace calls it (Od. iii. 4), and Wieland in + the introduction to <span class="tei tei-q">“Oberon”</span> speaks + of it as <span class="tei tei-q">“amiable madness.”</span> Even + Aristotle, as quoted by Seneca (De Tranq. Animi, 15, 16), is + reported to have <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page247">[pg + 247]</span><a name="Pg247" id="Pg247" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + said: <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Nullum magnum ingenium sine + mixtura dementiæ fuit</span></span>. Plato expresses it in the + figure of the dark cave, referred to above (De Rep. 7), when he + says: <span class="tei tei-q">“Those who, outside the cave, have + seen the true sunlight and the things that have true being (Ideas), + cannot afterwards see properly down in the cave, because their eyes + are not accustomed to the darkness; they cannot distinguish the + shadows, and are jeered at for their mistakes by those who have + never left the cave and its shadows.”</span> In the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Phædrus”</span> also (p. 317), he distinctly says that + there can be no true poet without a certain madness; in fact, (p. + 327), that every one appears mad who recognises the eternal Ideas + in fleeting things. Cicero also quotes: <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Negat enim sine furore, Democritus, quemquam + poetam magnum esse posse; quod idem dicit Plato</span></span> (De + Divin., i. 37). And, lastly, Pope says—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Great + wits to madness sure are near allied,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">And thin partitions do their bounds + divide.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Especially + instructive in this respect is Goethe's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Torquato Tasso,”</span> in which he shows us not only + the suffering, the martyrdom of genius as such, but also how it + constantly passes into madness. Finally, the fact of the direct + connection of genius and madness is established by the biographies + of great men of genius, such as Rousseau, Byron, and Alfieri, and + by anecdotes from the lives of others. On the other hand, I must + mention that, by a diligent search in lunatic asylums, I have found + individual cases of patients who were unquestionably endowed with + great talents, and whose genius distinctly appeared through their + madness, which, however, had completely gained the upper hand. Now + this cannot be ascribed to chance, for on the one hand the number + of mad persons is relatively very small, and on the other hand a + person of genius is a phenomenon which is rare beyond all ordinary + estimation, and only appears in nature as the greatest exception. + It will be sufficient to convince us of this if we compare the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page248">[pg 248]</span><a name= + "Pg248" id="Pg248" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> number of really + great men of genius that the whole of civilised Europe has + produced, both in ancient and modern times, with the two hundred + and fifty millions who are always living in Europe, and who change + entirely every thirty years. In estimating the number of men of + outstanding genius, we must of course only count those who have + produced works which have retained through all time an enduring + value for mankind. I shall not refrain from mentioning, that I have + known some persons of decided, though not remarkable, mental + superiority, who also showed a slight trace of insanity. It might + seem from this that every advance of intellect beyond the ordinary + measure, as an abnormal development, disposes to madness. In the + meantime, however, I will explain as briefly as possible my view of + the purely intellectual ground of the relation between genius and + madness, for this will certainly assist the explanation of the real + nature of genius, that is to say, of that mental endowment which + alone can produce genuine works of art. But this necessitates a + brief explanation of madness itself.<a id="noteref_50" name= + "noteref_50" href="#note_50"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">50</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A clear and + complete insight into the nature of madness, a correct and distinct + conception of what constitutes the difference between the sane and + the insane, has, as far as I know, not as yet been found. Neither + reason nor understanding can be denied to madmen, for they talk and + understand, and often draw very accurate conclusions; they also, as + a rule, perceive what is present quite correctly, and apprehend the + connection between cause and effect. Visions, like the phantasies + of delirium, are no ordinary symptom of madness: delirium falsifies + perception, madness the thoughts. For the most part, madmen do not + err in the knowledge of what is immediately <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">present</span></em>; their raving always + relates to what is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absent</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">past</span></em>, + and only through these to their connection with what is present. + Therefore it seems to me that <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page249">[pg 249]</span><a name="Pg249" id="Pg249" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> their malady specially concerns the memory; + not indeed that memory fails them entirely, for many of them know a + great deal by heart, and sometimes recognise persons whom they have + not seen for a long time; but rather that the thread of memory is + broken, the continuity of its connection destroyed, and no + uniformly connected recollection of the past is possible. + Particular scenes of the past are known correctly, just like the + particular present; but there are gaps in their recollection which + they fill up with fictions, and these are either always the same, + in which case they become fixed ideas, and the madness that results + is called monomania or melancholy; or they are always different, + momentary fancies, and then it is called folly, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">fatuitas</span></span>. This is why it is so + difficult to find out their former life from lunatics when they + enter an asylum. The true and the false are always mixed up in + their memory. Although the immediate present is correctly known, it + becomes falsified through its fictitious connection with an + imaginary past; they therefore regard themselves and others as + identical with persons who exist only in their imaginary past; they + do not recognise some of their acquaintances at all, and thus while + they perceive correctly what is actually present, they have only + false conceptions of its relations to what is absent. If the + madness reaches a high degree, there is complete absence of memory, + so that the madman is quite incapable of any reference to what is + absent or past, and is only determined by the caprice of the moment + in connection with the fictions which, in his mind, fill the past. + In such a case, we are never for a moment safe from violence or + murder, unless we constantly make the madman aware of the presence + of superior force. The knowledge of the madman has this in common + with that of the brute, both are confined to the present. What + distinguishes them is that the brute has really no idea of the past + as such, though the past acts upon it through the medium of custom, + so that, for example, the dog <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page250">[pg 250]</span><a name="Pg250" id="Pg250" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> recognises its former master even after + years, that is to say, it receives the wonted impression at the + sight of him; but of the time that has passed since it saw him it + has no recollection. The madman, on the other hand, always carries + about in his reason an abstract past, but it is a false past, which + exists only for him, and that either constantly, or only for the + moment. The influence of this false past prevents the use of the + true knowledge of the present which the brute is able to make. The + fact that violent mental suffering or unexpected and terrible + calamities should often produce madness, I explain in the following + manner. All such suffering is as an actual event confined to the + present. It is thus merely transitory, and is consequently never + excessively heavy; it only becomes unendurably great when it is + lasting pain; but as such it exists only in thought, and therefore + lies in the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">memory</span></em>. If now such a sorrow, such + painful knowledge or reflection, is so bitter that it becomes + altogether unbearable, and the individual is prostrated under it, + then, terrified Nature seizes upon <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">madness</span></em> + as the last resource of life; the mind so fearfully tortured at + once destroys the thread of its memory, fills up the gaps with + fictions, and thus seeks refuge in madness from the mental + suffering that exceeds its strength, just as we cut off a mortified + limb and replace it with a wooden one. The distracted Ajax, King + Lear, and Ophelia may be taken as examples; for the creations of + true genius, to which alone we can refer here, as universally + known, are equal in truth to real persons; besides, in this case, + frequent actual experience shows the same thing. A faint analogy of + this kind of transition from pain to madness is to be found in the + way in which all of us often seek, as it were mechanically, to + drive away a painful thought that suddenly occurs to us by some + loud exclamation or quick movement—to turn ourselves from it, to + distract our minds by force.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We see, from + what has been said, that the madman has <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page251">[pg 251]</span><a name="Pg251" id="Pg251" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> a true knowledge of what is actually present, + and also of certain particulars of the past, but that he mistakes + the connection, the relations, and therefore falls into error and + talks nonsense. Now this is exactly the point at which he comes + into contact with the man of genius; for he also leaves out of + sight the knowledge of the connection of things, since he neglects + that knowledge of relations which conforms to the principle of + sufficient reason, in order to see in things only their Ideas, and + to seek to comprehend their true nature, which manifests itself to + perception, and in regard to which <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one + thing</span></em> represents its whole species, in which way, as + Goethe says, one case is valid for a thousand. The particular + object of his contemplation, or the present which is perceived by + him with extraordinary vividness, appear in so strong a light that + the other links of the chain to which they belong are at once + thrown into the shade, and this gives rise to phenomena which have + long been recognised as resembling those of madness. That which in + particular given things exists only incompletely and weakened by + modifications, is raised by the man of genius, through his way of + contemplating it, to the Idea of the thing, to completeness: he + therefore sees everywhere extremes, and therefore his own action + tends to extremes; he cannot hit the mean, he lacks soberness, and + the result is what we have said. He knows the Ideas completely but + not the individuals. Therefore it has been said that a poet may + know mankind deeply and thoroughly, and may yet have a very + imperfect knowledge of men. He is easily deceived, and is a tool in + the hands of the crafty.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 37. Genius, + then, consists, according to our explanation, in the capacity for + knowing, independently of the principle of sufficient reason, not + individual things, which have their existence only in their + relations, but the Ideas of such things, and of being oneself the + correlative of the Idea, and thus no longer an individual, but the + pure subject of knowledge. Yet this faculty must exist in all + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page252">[pg 252]</span><a name= + "Pg252" id="Pg252" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> men in a smaller and + different degree; for if not, they would be just as incapable of + enjoying works of art as of producing them; they would have no + susceptibility for the beautiful or the sublime; indeed, these + words could have no meaning for them. We must therefore assume that + there exists in all men this power of knowing the Ideas in things, + and consequently of transcending their personality for the moment, + unless indeed there are some men who are capable of no æsthetic + pleasure at all. The man of genius excels ordinary men only by + possessing this kind of knowledge in a far higher degree and more + continuously. Thus, while under its influence he retains the + presence of mind which is necessary to enable him to repeat in a + voluntary and intentional work what he has learned in this manner; + and this repetition is the work of art. Through this he + communicates to others the Idea he has grasped. This Idea remains + unchanged and the same, so that æsthetic pleasure is one and the + same whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly by the + contemplation of nature and life. The work of art is only a means + of facilitating the knowledge in which this pleasure consists. That + the Idea comes to us more easily from the work of art than directly + from nature and the real world, arises from the fact that the + artist, who knew only the Idea, no longer the actual, has + reproduced in his work the pure Idea, has abstracted it from the + actual, omitting all disturbing accidents. The artist lets us see + the world through his eyes. That he has these eyes, that he knows + the inner nature of things apart from all their relations, is the + gift of genius, is inborn; but that he is able to lend us this + gift, to let us see with his eyes, is acquired, and is the + technical side of art. Therefore, after the account which I have + given in the preceding pages of the inner nature of æsthetical + knowledge in its most general outlines, the following more exact + philosophical treatment of the beautiful and the sublime will + explain them both, in nature and in art, without separating + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page253">[pg 253]</span><a name= + "Pg253" id="Pg253" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> them further. First + of all we shall consider what takes place in a man when he is + affected by the beautiful and the sublime; whether he derives this + emotion directly from nature, from life, or partakes of it only + through the medium of art, does not make any essential, but merely + an external, difference.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><a name= + "Section_38" id="Section_38" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> § 38. In + the æsthetical mode of contemplation we have found <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">two inseparable + constituent parts</span></em>—the knowledge of the object, not as + individual thing but as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring + form of this whole species of things; and the self-consciousness of + the knowing person, not as individual, but as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">pure will-less + subject of knowledge</span></em>. The condition under which both + these constituent parts appear always united was found to be the + abandonment of the method of knowing which is bound to the + principle of sufficient reason, and which, on the other hand, is + the only kind of knowledge that is of value for the service of the + will and also for science. Moreover, we shall see that the pleasure + which is produced by the contemplation of the beautiful arises from + these two constituent parts, sometimes more from the one, sometimes + more from the other, according to what the object of the æsthetical + contemplation may be.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">willing</span></em> + arises from want, therefore from deficiency, and therefore from + suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends it; yet for one wish + that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied. + Further, the desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the + satisfaction is short and scantily measured out. But even the final + satisfaction is itself only apparent; every satisfied wish at once + makes room for a new one; both are illusions; the one is known to + be so, the other not yet. No attained object of desire can give + lasting satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is + like the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day + that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. Therefore, so + long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page254">[pg 254]</span><a name= + "Pg254" id="Pg254" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> given up to the + throng of desires with their constant hopes and fears, so long as + we are the subject of willing, we can never have lasting happiness + nor peace. It is essentially all the same whether we pursue or + flee, fear injury or seek enjoyment; the care for the constant + demands of the will, in whatever form it may be, continually + occupies and sways the consciousness; but without peace no true + well-being is possible. The subject of willing is thus constantly + stretched on the revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the + sieve of the Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But when some + external cause or inward disposition lifts us suddenly out of the + endless stream of willing, delivers knowledge from the slavery of + the will, the attention is no longer directed to the motives of + willing, but comprehends things free from their relation to the + will, and thus observes them without personal interest, without + subjectivity, purely objectively, gives itself entirely up to them + so far as they are ideas, but not in so far as they are motives. + Then all at once the peace which we were always seeking, but which + always fled from us on the former path of the desires, comes to us + of its own accord, and it is well with us. It is the painless state + which Epicurus prized as the highest good and as the state of the + gods; for we are for the moment set free from the miserable + striving of the will; we keep the Sabbath of the penal servitude of + willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But this is just + the state which I described above as necessary for the knowledge of + the Idea, as pure contemplation, as sinking oneself in perception, + losing oneself in the object, forgetting all individuality, + surrendering that kind of knowledge which follows the principle of + sufficient reason, and comprehends only relations; the state by + means of which at once and inseparably the perceived particular + thing is raised to the Idea of its whole species, and the knowing + individual to the pure subject of will-less <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page255">[pg 255]</span><a name="Pg255" id="Pg255" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> knowledge, and as such they are both + taken out of the stream of time and all other relations. It is then + all one whether we see the sun set from the prison or from the + palace.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Inward + disposition, the predominance of knowing over willing, can produce + this state under any circumstances. This is shown by those + admirable Dutch artists who directed this purely objective + perception to the most insignificant objects, and established a + lasting monument of their objectivity and spiritual peace in their + pictures of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">still life</span></em>, which the æsthetic + beholder does not look on without emotion; for they present to him + the peaceful, still, frame of mind of the artist, free from will, + which was needed to contemplate such insignificant things so + objectively, to observe them so attentively, and to repeat this + perception so intelligently; and as the picture enables the + onlooker to participate in this state, his emotion is often + increased by the contrast between it and the unquiet frame of mind, + disturbed by vehement willing, in which he finds himself. In the + same spirit, landscape-painters, and particularly Ruisdael, have + often painted very insignificant country scenes, which produce the + same effect even more agreeably.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All this is + accomplished by the inner power of an artistic nature alone; but + that purely objective disposition is facilitated and assisted from + without by suitable objects, by the abundance of natural beauty + which invites contemplation, and even presses itself upon us. + Whenever it discloses itself suddenly to our view, it almost always + succeeds in delivering us, though it may be only for a moment, from + subjectivity, from the slavery of the will, and in raising us to + the state of pure knowing. This is why the man who is tormented by + passion, or want, or care, is so suddenly revived, cheered, and + restored by a single free glance into nature: the storm of passion, + the pressure of desire and fear, and all the miseries of willing + are then at once, and in a marvellous manner, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page256">[pg 256]</span><a name="Pg256" id="Pg256" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> calmed and appeased. For at the moment + at which, freed from the will, we give ourselves up to pure + will-less knowing, we pass into a world from which everything is + absent that influenced our will and moved us so violently through + it. This freeing of knowledge lifts us as wholly and entirely away + from all that, as do sleep and dreams; happiness and unhappiness + have disappeared; we are no longer individual; the individual is + forgotten; we are only pure subject of knowledge; we are only that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> eye of the world which looks + out from all knowing creatures, but which can become perfectly free + from the service of will in man alone. Thus all difference of + individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the same + whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a + wretched beggar; for neither joy nor complaining can pass that + boundary with us. So near us always lies a sphere in which we + escape from all our misery; but who has the strength to continue + long in it? As soon as any single relation to our will, to our + person, even of these objects of our pure contemplation, comes + again into consciousness, the magic is at an end; we fall back into + the knowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient + reason; we know no longer the Idea, but the particular thing, the + link of a chain to which we also belong, and we are again abandoned + to all our woe. Most men remain almost always at this standpoint + because they entirely lack objectivity, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + genius. Therefore they have no pleasure in being alone with nature; + they need company, or at least a book. For their knowledge remains + subject to their will; they seek, therefore, in objects, only some + relation to their will, and whenever they see anything that has no + such relation, there sounds within them, like a ground bass in + music, the constant inconsolable cry, <span class="tei tei-q">“It + is of no use to me;”</span> thus in solitude the most beautiful + surroundings have for them a desolate, dark, strange, and hostile + appearance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Lastly, it is + this blessedness of will-less perception <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page257">[pg 257]</span><a name="Pg257" id="Pg257" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> which casts an enchanting glamour over the + past and distant, and presents them to us in so fair a light by + means of self-deception. For as we think of days long gone by, days + in which we lived in a distant place, it is only the objects which + our fancy recalls, not the subject of will, which bore about with + it then its incurable sorrows just as it bears them now; but they + are forgotten, because since then they have often given place to + others. Now, objective perception acts with regard to what is + remembered just as it would in what is present, if we let it have + influence over us, if we surrendered ourselves to it free from + will. Hence it arises that, especially when we are more than + ordinarily disturbed by some want, the remembrance of past and + distant scenes suddenly flits across our minds like a lost + paradise. The fancy recalls only what was objective, not what was + individually subjective, and we imagine that that objective stood + before us then just as pure and undisturbed by any relation to the + will as its image stands in our fancy now; while in reality the + relation of the objects to our will gave us pain then just as it + does now. We can deliver ourselves from all suffering just as well + through present objects as through distant ones whenever we raise + ourselves to a purely objective contemplation of them, and so are + able to bring about the illusion that only the objects are present + and not we ourselves. Then, as the pure subject of knowledge, freed + from the miserable self, we become entirely one with these objects, + and, for the moment, our wants are as foreign to us as they are to + them. The world as idea alone remains, and the world as will has + disappeared.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In all these + reflections it has been my object to bring out clearly the nature + and the scope of the subjective element in æsthetic pleasure; the + deliverance of knowledge from the service of the will, the + forgetting of self as an individual, and the raising of the + consciousness to the pure will-less, timeless, subject of + knowledge, independent <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page258">[pg + 258]</span><a name="Pg258" id="Pg258" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of all relations. With this subjective side of æsthetic + contemplation, there must always appear as its necessary + correlative the objective side, the intuitive comprehension of the + Platonic Idea. But before we turn to the closer consideration of + this, and to the achievements of art in relation to it, it is + better that we should pause for a little at the subjective side of + æsthetic pleasure, in order to complete our treatment of this by + explaining the impression of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sublime</span></em> + which depends altogether upon it, and arises from a modification of + it. After that we shall complete our investigation of æsthetic + pleasure by considering its objective side.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But we must + first add the following remarks to what has been said. Light is the + pleasantest and most gladdening of things; it has become the symbol + of all that is good and salutary. In all religions it symbolises + salvation, while darkness symbolises damnation. Ormuzd dwells in + the purest light, Ahrimines in eternal night. Dante's Paradise + would look very much like Vauxhall in London, for all the blessed + spirits appear as points of light and arrange themselves in regular + figures. The very absence of light makes us sad; its return cheers + us. Colours excite directly a keen delight, which reaches its + highest degree when they are transparent. All this depends entirely + upon the fact that light is the correlative and condition of the + most perfect kind of knowledge of perception, the only knowledge + which does not in any way affect the will. For sight, unlike the + affections of the other senses, cannot, in itself, directly and + through its sensuous effect, make the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sensation</span></em> of the special organ + agreeable or disagreeable; that is, it has no immediate connection + with the will. Such a quality can only belong to the perception + which arises in the understanding, and then it lies in the relation + of the object to the will. In the case of hearing this is to some + extent otherwise; sounds can give pain directly, and they may also + be sensuously agreeable, directly and without regard to + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page259">[pg 259]</span><a name= + "Pg259" id="Pg259" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> harmony or melody. + Touch, as one with the feeling of the whole body, is still more + subordinated to this direct influence upon the will; and yet there + is such a thing as a sensation of touch which is neither painful + nor pleasant. But smells are always either agreeable or + disagreeable, and tastes still more so. Thus the last two senses + are most closely related to the will, and therefore they are always + the most ignoble, and have been called by Kant the subjective + senses. The pleasure which we experience from light is in fact only + the pleasure which arises from the objective possibility of the + purest and fullest perceptive knowledge, and as such it may be + traced to the fact that pure knowledge, freed and delivered from + all will, is in the highest degree pleasant, and of itself + constitutes a large part of æsthetic enjoyment. Again, we must + refer to this view of light the incredible beauty which we + associate with the reflection of objects in water. That lightest, + quickest, finest species of the action of bodies upon each other, + that to which we owe by far the completest and purest of our + perceptions, the action of reflected rays of light, is here brought + clearly before our eyes, distinct and perfect, in cause and in + effect, and indeed in its entirety, hence the æsthetic delight it + gives us, which, in the most important aspect, is entirely based on + the subjective ground of æsthetic pleasure, and is delight in pure + knowing and its method.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 39. All these + reflections are intended to bring out the subjective part of + æsthetic pleasure; that is to say, that pleasure so far as it + consists simply of delight in perceptive knowledge as such, in + opposition to will. And as directly connected with this, there + naturally follows the explanation of that disposition or frame of + mind which has been called the sense of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sublime</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have already + remarked above that the transition to the state of pure perception + takes place most easily when the objects bend themselves to it, + that is, when by their manifold and yet definite and distinct form + they easily <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page260">[pg + 260]</span><a name="Pg260" id="Pg260" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + become representatives of their Ideas, in which beauty, in the + objective sense, consists. This quality belongs pre-eminently to + natural beauty, which thus affords even to the most insensible at + least a fleeting æsthetic satisfaction: indeed it is so remarkable + how especially the vegetable world invites æsthetic observation, + and, as it were, presses itself upon it, that one might say, that + these advances are connected with the fact that these organisms, + unlike the bodies of animals, are not themselves immediate objects + of knowledge, and therefore require the assistance of a foreign + intelligent individual in order to rise out of the world of blind + will and enter the world of idea, and that thus they long, as it + were, for this entrance, that they may attain at least indirectly + what is denied them directly. But I leave this suggestion which I + have hazarded, and which borders perhaps upon extravagance, + entirely undecided, for only a very intimate and devoted + consideration of nature can raise or justify it.<a id="noteref_51" + name="noteref_51" href="#note_51"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">51</span></span></a> As + long as that which raises us from the knowledge of mere relations + subject to the will, to æsthetic contemplation, and thereby exalts + us to the position of the subject of knowledge free from will, is + this fittingness of nature, this significance and distinctness of + its forms, on account of which the Ideas individualised in them + readily present themselves to us; so long is it merely <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">beauty</span></em> + that affects us and the sense of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">beautiful</span></em> that is excited. But if + these very objects whose significant forms invite us to pure + contemplation, have a hostile relation to the human will in + general, as it exhibits itself in its objectivity, the human body, + if they are opposed to it, so that it is menaced by the + irresistible predominance of their power, or sinks into + insignificance before their immeasurable <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page261">[pg 261]</span><a name="Pg261" id="Pg261" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> greatness; if, nevertheless, the beholder + does not direct his attention to this eminently hostile relation to + his will, but, although perceiving and recognising it, turns + consciously away from it, forcibly detaches himself from his will + and its relations, and, giving himself up entirely to knowledge, + quietly contemplates those very objects that are so terrible to the + will, comprehends only their Idea, which is foreign to all + relation, so that he lingers gladly over its contemplation, and is + thereby raised above himself, his person, his will, and all + will:—in that case he is filled with the sense of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sublime</span></em>, he is in the state of + spiritual exaltation, and therefore the object producing such a + state is called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sublime</span></em>. Thus what distinguishes + the sense of the sublime from that of the beautiful is this: in the + case of the beautiful, pure knowledge has gained the upper hand + without a struggle, for the beauty of the object, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + that property which facilitates the knowledge of its Idea, has + removed from consciousness without resistance, and therefore + imperceptibly, the will and the knowledge of relations which is + subject to it, so that what is left is the pure subject of + knowledge without even a remembrance of will. On the other hand, in + the case of the sublime that state of pure knowledge is only + attained by a conscious and forcible breaking away from the + relations of the same object to the will, which are recognised as + unfavourable, by a free and conscious transcending of the will and + the knowledge related to it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This exaltation + must not only be consciously won, but also consciously retained, + and it is therefore accompanied by a constant remembrance of will; + yet not of a single particular volition, such as fear or desire, + but of human volition in general, so far as it is universally + expressed in its objectivity the human body. If a single real act + of will were to come into consciousness, through actual personal + pressure and danger from the object, then the individual will thus + actually influenced would at once <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page262">[pg 262]</span><a name="Pg262" id="Pg262" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> gain the upper hand, the peace of + contemplation would become impossible, the impression of the + sublime would be lost, because it yields to the anxiety, in which + the effort of the individual to right itself has sunk every other + thought. A few examples will help very much to elucidate this + theory of the æsthetic sublime and remove all doubt with regard to + it; at the same time they will bring out the different degrees of + this sense of the sublime. It is in the main identical with that of + the beautiful, with pure will-less knowing, and the knowledge, that + necessarily accompanies it of Ideas out of all relation determined + by the principle of sufficient reason, and it is distinguished from + the sense of the beautiful only by the additional quality that it + rises above the known hostile relation of the object contemplated + to the will in general. Thus there come to be various degrees of + the sublime, and transitions from the beautiful to the sublime, + according as this additional quality is strong, bold, urgent, near, + or weak, distant, and merely indicated. I think it is more in + keeping with the plan of my treatise, first to give examples of + these transitions, and of the weaker degrees of the impression of + the sublime, although persons whose æsthetical susceptibility in + general is not very great, and whose imagination is not very + lively, will only understand the examples given later of the higher + and more distinct grades of that impression; and they should + therefore confine themselves to these, and pass over the examples + of the very weak degrees of the sublime that are to be given + first.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As man is at + once impetuous and blind striving of will (whose pole or focus lies + in the genital organs), and eternal, free, serene subject of pure + knowing (whose pole is the brain); so, corresponding to this + antithesis, the sun is both the source of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">light</span></em>, + the condition of the most perfect kind of knowledge, and therefore + of the most delightful of things—and the source of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">warmth</span></em>, + the first condition of life, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, of all phenomena of will + in its higher grades. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page263">[pg + 263]</span><a name="Pg263" id="Pg263" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Therefore, what warmth is for the will, light is for knowledge. + Light is the largest gem in the crown of beauty, and has the most + marked influence on the knowledge of every beautiful object. Its + presence is an indispensable condition of beauty; its favourable + disposition increases the beauty of the most beautiful. + Architectural beauty more than any other object is enhanced by + favourable light, though even the most insignificant things become + through its influence most beautiful. If, in the dead of winter, + when all nature is frozen and stiff, we see the rays of the setting + sun reflected by masses of stone, illuminating without warming, and + thus favourable only to the purest kind of knowledge, not to the + will; the contemplation of the beautiful effect of the light upon + these masses lifts us, as does all beauty, into a state of pure + knowing. But, in this case, a certain transcending of the interests + of the will is needed to enable us to rise into the state of pure + knowing, because there is a faint recollection of the lack of + warmth from these rays, that is, an absence of the principle of + life; there is a slight challenge to persist in pure knowing, and + to refrain from all willing, and therefore it is an example of a + transition from the sense of the beautiful to that of the sublime. + It is the faintest trace of the sublime in the beautiful; and + beauty itself is indeed present only in a slight degree. The + following is almost as weak an example.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Let us imagine + ourselves transported to a very lonely place, with unbroken + horizon, under a cloudless sky, trees and plants in the perfectly + motionless air, no animals, no men, no running water, the deepest + silence. Such surroundings are, as it were, a call to seriousness + and contemplation, apart from all will and its cravings; but this + is just what imparts to such a scene of desolate stillness a touch + of the sublime. For, because it affords no object, either + favourable or unfavourable, for the will which is constantly in + need of striving and attaining, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page264">[pg 264]</span><a name="Pg264" id="Pg264" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> there only remains the state of pure + contemplation, and whoever is incapable of this, is ignominiously + abandoned to the vacancy of unoccupied will, and the misery of + ennui. So far it is a test of our intellectual worth, of which, + generally speaking, the degree of our power of enduring solitude, + or our love of it, is a good criterion. The scene we have sketched + affords us, then, an example of the sublime in a low degree, for in + it, with the state of pure knowing in its peace and + all-sufficiency, there is mingled, by way of contrast, the + recollection of the dependence and poverty of the will which stands + in need of constant action. This is the species of the sublime for + which the sight of the boundless prairies of the interior of North + America is celebrated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But let us + suppose such a scene, stripped also of vegetation, and showing only + naked rocks; then from the entire absence of that organic life + which is necessary for existence, the will at once becomes uneasy, + the desert assumes a terrible aspect, our mood becomes more tragic; + the elevation to the sphere of pure knowing takes place with a more + decided tearing of ourselves away from the interests of the will; + and because we persist in continuing in the state of pure knowing, + the sense of the sublime distinctly appears.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The following + situation may occasion this feeling in a still higher degree: + Nature convulsed by a storm; the sky darkened by black threatening + thunder-clouds; stupendous, naked, overhanging cliffs, completely + shutting out the view; rushing, foaming torrents; absolute desert; + the wail of the wind sweeping through the clefts of the rocks. Our + dependence, our strife with hostile nature, our will broken in the + conflict, now appears visibly before our eyes. Yet, so long as the + personal pressure does not gain the upper hand, but we continue in + æsthetic contemplation, the pure subject of knowing gazes unshaken + and unconcerned through that strife of nature, through that picture + of the broken will, and quietly comprehends <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page265">[pg 265]</span><a name="Pg265" id="Pg265" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the Ideas even of those objects which + are threatening and terrible to the will. In this contrast lies the + sense of the sublime.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the + impression becomes still stronger, if, when we have before our + eyes, on a large scale, the battle of the raging elements, in such + a scene we are prevented from hearing the sound of our own voice by + the noise of a falling stream; or, if we are abroad in the storm of + tempestuous seas, where the mountainous waves rise and fall, dash + themselves furiously against steep cliffs, and toss their spray + high into the air; the storm howls, the sea boils, the lightning + flashes from black clouds, and the peals of thunder drown the voice + of storm and sea. Then, in the undismayed beholder, the two-fold + nature of his consciousness reaches the highest degree of + distinctness. He perceives himself, on the one hand, as an + individual, as the frail phenomenon of will, which the slightest + touch of these forces can utterly destroy, helpless against + powerful nature, dependent, the victim of chance, a vanishing + nothing in the presence of stupendous might; and, on the other + hand, as the eternal, peaceful, knowing subject, the condition of + the object, and, therefore, the supporter of this whole world; the + terrific strife of nature only his idea; the subject itself free + and apart from all desires and necessities, in the quiet + comprehension of the Ideas. This is the complete impression of the + sublime. Here he obtains a glimpse of a power beyond all comparison + superior to the individual, threatening it with annihilation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The impression + of the sublime may be produced in quite another way, by presenting + a mere immensity in space and time; its immeasurable greatness + dwindles the individual to nothing. Adhering to Kant's nomenclature + and his accurate division, we may call the first kind the + dynamical, and the second the mathematical sublime, although we + entirely dissent from his explanation of the inner nature of the + impression, and can allow no share <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page266">[pg 266]</span><a name="Pg266" id="Pg266" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> in it either to moral reflections, or to + hypostases from scholastic philosophy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If we lose + ourselves in the contemplation of the infinite greatness of the + universe in space and time, meditate on the thousands of years that + are past or to come, or if the heavens at night actually bring + before our eyes innumerable worlds and so force upon our + consciousness the immensity of the universe, we feel ourselves + dwindle to nothing; as individuals, as living bodies, as transient + phenomena of will, we feel ourselves pass away and vanish into + nothing like drops in the ocean. But at once there rises against + this ghost of our own nothingness, against such lying + impossibility, the immediate consciousness that all these worlds + exist only as our idea, only as modifications of the eternal + subject of pure knowing, which we find ourselves to be as soon as + we forget our individuality, and which is the necessary supporter + of all worlds and all times the condition of their possibility. The + vastness of the world which disquieted us before, rests now in us; + our dependence upon it is annulled by its dependence upon us. All + this, however, does not come at once into reflection, but shows + itself merely as the felt consciousness that in some sense or other + (which philosophy alone can explain) we are one with the world, and + therefore not oppressed, but exalted by its immensity. It is the + felt consciousness of this that the Upanishads of the Vedas + repeatedly express in such a multitude of different ways; very + admirably in the saying already quoted: <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Hæ + omnes creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter me aliud ens non + est</span></span> (Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 122.) It is the + transcending of our own individuality, the sense of the + sublime.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We receive this + impression of the mathematical-sublime, quite directly, by means of + a space which is small indeed as compared with the world, but which + has become directly perceptible to us, and affects us with its + whole extent in all its three dimensions, so as to make our own + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page267">[pg 267]</span><a name= + "Pg267" id="Pg267" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> body seem almost + infinitely small. An empty space can never be thus perceived, and + therefore never an open space, but only space that is directly + perceptible in all its dimensions by means of the limits which + enclose it; thus for example a very high, vast dome, like that of + St. Peter's at Rome, or St. Paul's in London. The sense of the + sublime here arises through the consciousness of the vanishing + nothingness of our own body in the presence of a vastness which, + from another point of view, itself exists only in our idea, and of + which we are as knowing subject, the supporter. Thus here as + everywhere it arises from the contrast between the insignificance + and dependence of ourselves as individuals, as phenomena of will, + and the consciousness of ourselves as pure subject of knowing. Even + the vault of the starry heaven produces this if it is contemplated + without reflection; but just in the same way as the vault of stone, + and only by its apparent, not its real extent. Some objects of our + perception excite in us the feeling of the sublime because, not + only on account of their spatial vastness, but also of their great + age, that is, their temporal duration, we feel ourselves dwarfed to + insignificance in their presence, and yet revel in the pleasure of + contemplating them: of this kind are very high mountains, the + Egyptian pyramids, and colossal ruins of great antiquity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Our explanation + of the sublime applies also to the ethical, to what is called the + sublime character. Such a character arises from this, that the will + is not excited by objects which are well calculated to excite it, + but that knowledge retains the upper hand in their presence. A man + of sublime character will accordingly consider men in a purely + objective way, and not with reference to the relations which they + might have to his will; he will, for example, observe their faults, + even their hatred and injustice to himself, without being himself + excited to hatred; he will behold their happiness without envy; he + will recognise their good qualities without desiring any + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page268">[pg 268]</span><a name= + "Pg268" id="Pg268" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> closer relations + with them; he will perceive the beauty of women, but he will not + desire them. His personal happiness or unhappiness will not greatly + affect him, he will rather be as Hamlet describes Horatio:—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 7.20em"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">... for + thou hast been,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">As one, in suffering all, that + suffers nothing;</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">A man that fortune's buffets and + rewards</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Hast ta'en with equal + thanks,</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + <span style="font-size: 90%">&c. (A. 3. Sc. 2.)</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For in the + course of his own life and its misfortunes, he will consider less + his individual lot than that of humanity in general, and will + therefore conduct himself in its regard, rather as knowing than as + suffering.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 40. Opposites + throw light upon each other, and therefore the remark may be in + place here, that the proper opposite of the sublime is something + which would not at the first glance be recognised, as such: + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + charming</span></em> or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">attractive</span></em>. By this, however, I + understand, that which excites the will by presenting to it + directly its fulfilment, its satisfaction. We saw that the feeling + of the sublime arises from the fact, that something entirely + unfavourable to the will, becomes the object of pure contemplation, + so that such contemplation can only be maintained by persistently + turning away from the will, and transcending its interests; this + constitutes the sublimity of the character. The charming or + attractive, on the contrary, draws the beholder away from the pure + contemplation which is demanded by all apprehension of the + beautiful, because it necessarily excites this will, by objects + which directly appeal to it, and thus he no longer remains pure + subject of knowing, but becomes the needy and dependent subject of + will. That every beautiful thing which is bright or cheering should + be called charming, is the result of a too general concept, which + arises from a want of accurate discrimination, and which I must + entirely set aside, and indeed condemn. But in the sense of the + word which has been given and explained, I <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page269">[pg 269]</span><a name="Pg269" id="Pg269" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> find only two species of the charming or + attractive in the province of art, and both of them are unworthy of + it. The one species, a very low one, is found in Dutch paintings of + still life, when they err by representing articles of food, which + by their deceptive likeness necessarily excite the appetite for the + things they represent, and this is just an excitement of the will, + which puts an end to all æsthetic contemplation of the object. + Painted fruit is yet admissible, because we may regard it as the + further development of the flower, and as a beautiful product of + nature in form and colour, without being obliged to think of it as + eatable; but unfortunately we often find, represented with + deceptive naturalness, prepared and served dishes, oysters, + herrings, crabs, bread and butter, beer, wine, and so forth, which + is altogether to be condemned. In historical painting and in + sculpture the charming consists in naked figures, whose position, + drapery, and general treatment are calculated to excite the + passions of the beholder, and thus pure æsthetical contemplation is + at once annihilated, and the aim of art is defeated. This mistake + corresponds exactly to that which we have just censured in the + Dutch paintings. The ancients are almost always free from this + fault in their representations of beauty and complete nakedness of + form, because the artist himself created them in a purely objective + spirit, filled with ideal beauty, not in the spirit of subjective, + and base sensuality. The charming is thus everywhere to be avoided + in art.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is also a + negative species of the charming or exciting which is even more + reprehensible than the positive form which has been discussed; this + is the disgusting or the loathsome. It arouses the will of the + beholder, just as what is properly speaking charming, and therefore + disturbs pure æsthetic contemplation. But it is an active aversion + and opposition which is excited by it; it arouses the will by + presenting to it objects which it abhors. Therefore it has always + been recognised that it is <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page270">[pg 270]</span><a name="Pg270" id="Pg270" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> altogether inadmissible in art, where even + what is ugly, when it is not disgusting, is allowable in its proper + place, as we shall see later.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 41. The course + of the discussion has made it necessary to insert at this point the + treatment of the sublime, though we have only half done with the + beautiful, as we have considered its subjective side only. For it + was merely a special modification of this subjective side that + distinguished the beautiful from the sublime. This difference was + found to depend upon whether the state of pure will-less knowing, + which is presupposed and demanded by all æsthetic contemplation, + was reached without opposition, by the mere disappearance of the + will from consciousness, because the object invited and drew us + towards it; or whether it was only attained through the free, + conscious transcending of the will, to which the object + contemplated had an unfavourable and even hostile relation, which + would destroy contemplation altogether, if we were to give + ourselves up to it. This is the distinction between the beautiful + and the sublime. In the object they are not essentially different, + for in every case the object of æsthetical contemplation is not the + individual thing, but the Idea in it which is striving to reveal + itself; that is to say, adequate objectivity of will at a + particular grade. Its necessary correlative, independent, like + itself of the principle of sufficient reason, is the pure subject + of knowing; just as the correlative of the particular thing is the + knowing individual, both of which lie within the province of the + principle of sufficient reason.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When we say that + a thing is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">beautiful</span></em>, we thereby assert that + it is an object of our æsthetic contemplation, and this has a + double meaning; on the one hand it means that the sight of the + thing makes us <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">objective</span></em>, that is to say, that in + contemplating it we are no longer conscious of ourselves as + individuals, but as pure will-less subjects of knowledge; and on + the other hand it means that we recognise in the object, not the + particular thing, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page271">[pg + 271]</span><a name="Pg271" id="Pg271" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + but an Idea; and this can only happen, so far as our contemplation + of it is not subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason, + does not follow the relation of the object to anything outside it + (which is always ultimately connected with relations to our own + will), but rests in the object itself. For the Idea and the pure + subject of knowledge always appear at once in consciousness as + necessary correlatives, and on their appearance all distinction of + time vanishes, for they are both entirely foreign to the principle + of sufficient reason in all its forms, and lie outside the + relations which are imposed by it; they may be compared to the + rainbow and the sun, which have no part in the constant movement + and succession of the falling drops. Therefore, if, for example, I + contemplate a tree æsthetically, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + with artistic eyes, and thus recognise, not it, but its Idea, it + becomes at once of no consequence whether it is this tree or its + predecessor which flourished a thousand years ago, and whether the + observer is this individual or any other that lived anywhere and at + any time; the particular thing and the knowing individual are + abolished with the principle of sufficient reason, and there + remains nothing but the Idea and the pure subject of knowing, which + together constitute the adequate objectivity of will at this grade. + And the Idea dispenses not only with time, but also with space, for + the Idea proper is not this special form which appears before me + but its expression, its pure significance, its inner being, which + discloses itself to me and appeals to me, and which may be quite + the same though the spatial relations of its form be very + different.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Since, on the + one hand, every given thing may be observed in a. purely objective + manner and apart from all relations; and since, on the other hand, + the will manifests itself in everything at some grade of its + objectivity, so that everything is the expression of an Idea; it + follows that everything is also <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">beautiful</span></em>. That even the most + insignificant things admit of pure objective and <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page272">[pg 272]</span><a name="Pg272" id="Pg272" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> will-less contemplation, and thus prove + that they are beautiful, is shown by what was said above in this + reference about the Dutch pictures of still-life (<a href= + "#Section_38" class="tei tei-ref">§ 38</a>). But one thing is more + beautiful than another, because it makes this pure objective + contemplation easier, it lends itself to it, and, so to speak, even + compels it, and then we call it very beautiful. This is the case + sometimes because, as an individual thing, it expresses in its + purity the Idea of its species by the very distinct, clearly + defined, and significant relation of its parts, and also fully + reveals that Idea through the completeness of all the possible + expressions of its species united in it, so that it makes the + transition from the individual thing to the Idea, and therefore + also the condition of pure contemplation, very easy for the + beholder. Sometimes this possession of special beauty in an object + lies in the fact that the Idea itself which appeals to us in it is + a high grade of the objectivity of will, and therefore very + significant and expressive. Therefore it is that man is more + beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation of his nature + is the highest aim of art. Human form and expression are the most + important objects of plastic art, and human action the most + important object of poetry. Yet each thing has its own peculiar + beauty, not only every organism which expresses itself in the unity + of an individual being, but also everything unorganised and + formless, and even every manufactured article. For all these reveal + the Ideas through which the will objectifies itself at its lowest + grades, they give, as it were, the deepest resounding bass-notes of + nature. Gravity, rigidity, fluidity, light, and so forth, are the + Ideas which express themselves in rocks, in buildings, in waters. + Landscape-gardening or architecture can do no more than assist them + to unfold their qualities distinctly, fully, and variously; they + can only give them the opportunity of expressing themselves purely, + so that they lend themselves to æsthetic contemplation and make it + easier. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page273">[pg + 273]</span><a name="Pg273" id="Pg273" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Inferior buildings or ill-favoured localities, on the contrary, + which nature has neglected or art has spoiled, perform this task in + a very slight degree or not at all; yet even from them these + universal, fundamental Ideas of nature cannot altogether disappear. + To the careful observer they present themselves here also, and even + bad buildings and the like are capable of being æsthetically + considered; the Ideas of the most universal properties of their + materials are still recognisable in them, only the artificial form + which has been given them does not assist but hinders æsthetic + contemplation. Manufactured articles also serve to express Ideas, + only it is not the Idea of the manufactured article which speaks in + them, but the Idea of the material to which this artificial form + has been given. This may be very conveniently expressed in two + words, in the language of the schoolmen, thus,—the manufactured + article expresses the Idea of its <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">forma substantialis</span></span>, but not + that of its <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">forma + accidentalis</span></span>; the latter leads to no Idea, but only + to a human conception of which it is the result. It is needless to + say that by manufactured article no work of plastic art is meant. + The schoolmen understand, in fact, by <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">forma substantialis</span></span> that which I + call the grade of the objectification of will in a thing. We shall + return immediately, when we treat of architecture, to the Idea of + the material. Our view, then, cannot be reconciled with that of + Plato if he is of opinion that a table or a chair express the Idea + of a table or a chair (De Rep., x., pp. 284, 285, et Parmen., p. + 79, ed. Bip.), but we say that they express the Ideas which are + already expressed in their mere material as such. According to + Aristotle (Metap. xi., chap. 3), however, Plato himself only + maintained Ideas of natural objects: ὁ Πλατων εφη, ὁτι ειδη εστιν + ὁποσα φυσει (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Plato dixit, quod ideæ eorum + sunt, quæ natura sunt</span></span>), and in chap. 5 he says that, + according to the Platonists, there are no Ideas of house and ring. + In any case, Plato's earliest disciples, as Alcinous informs us + (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Introductio</span> <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page274">[pg 274]</span><a name="Pg274" id="Pg274" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a><span style="font-style: italic">in Platonicam + Philosophiam</span></span>, chap. 9), denied that there were any + ideas of manufactured articles. He says: Ὁριζονται δε την ιδεαν, + παραδειγμα των κατα φυσιν αιωνιον. Ουτε γαρ τοις πλειστοις των απο + Πλατωνος αρεσκει, των τεχνικων ειναι ιδεας, οἱον ασπιδος η λυρας, + ουτε μην των παρα φυσιν, οἱον πυρετου και χολερας, ουτε των κατα + μερος, οἱον Σωκρατους και Πλατωνος, αλλ᾽ ουτε των ευτελων τινος, + οἱον ρυπου και καρφους, ουτε των προς τι, οἱον μειζονος και + ὑπερεχοντος; ειναι γαρ τας ιδεας νοησεις θεου αιωνιους τε και + αυτοτελεις (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Definiunt autem</span></span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">ideam</span></span> <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">exemplar æternum eorum, quæ secundum naturam + existunt. Nam plurimis ex iis, qui Platonem secuti sunt, minime + placuit, arte factorum ideas esse, ut clypei atque lyræ; neque + rursus eorum, quæ prætor naturam, ut febris et choleræ, neque + particularium, ceu Socratis et Platonis; neque etiam rerum vilium, + veluti sordium et festucæ; neque relationum, ut majoris et + excedentis: esse namque ideas intellectiones dei æternas, ac + seipsis perfectas</span></span>). We may take this opportunity of + mentioning another point in which our doctrine of Ideas differs + very much from that of Plato. He teaches (De Rep., x., p. 288) that + the object which art tries to express, the ideal of painting and + poetry, is not the Idea but the particular thing. Our whole + exposition hitherto has maintained exactly the opposite, and + Plato's opinion is the less likely to lead us astray, inasmuch as + it is the source of one of the greatest and best known errors of + this great man, his depreciation and rejection of art, and + especially poetry; he directly connects his false judgment in + reference to this with the passage quoted.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 42. I return + to the exposition of the æsthetic impression. The knowledge of the + beautiful always supposes at once and inseparably the pure knowing + subject and the known Idea as object. Yet the source of æsthetic + satisfaction will sometimes lie more in the comprehension of the + known Idea, sometimes more in the blessedness and spiritual peace + of the pure knowing subject <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page275">[pg 275]</span><a name="Pg275" id="Pg275" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> freed from all willing, and therefore from + all individuality, and the pain that proceeds from it. And, indeed, + this predominance of one or the other constituent part of æsthetic + feeling will depend upon whether the intuitively grasped Idea is a + higher or a lower grade of the objectivity of will. Thus in + æsthetic contemplation (in the real, or through the medium of art) + of the beauty of nature in the inorganic and vegetable worlds, or + in works of architecture, the pleasure of pure will-less knowing + will predominate, because the Ideas which are here apprehended are + only low grades of the objectivity of will, and are therefore not + manifestations of deep significance and rich content. On the other + hand, if animals and man are the objects of æsthetic contemplation + or representation, the pleasure will consist rather in the + comprehension of these Ideas, which are the most distinct + revelation of will; for they exhibit the greatest multiplicity of + forms, the greatest richness and deep significance of phenomena, + and reveal to us most completely the nature of will, whether in its + violence, its terribleness, its satisfaction or its aberration (the + latter in tragic situations), or finally in its change and + self-surrender, which is the peculiar theme of christian painting; + as the Idea of the will enlightened by full knowledge is the object + of historical painting in general, and of the drama. We shall now + go through the fine arts one by one, and this will give + completeness and distinctness to the theory of the beautiful which + we have advanced.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 43. Matter as + such cannot be the expression of an Idea. For, as we found in the + first book, it is throughout nothing but causality: its being + consists in its casual action. But causality is a form of the + principle of sufficient reason; knowledge of the Idea, on the other + hand, absolutely excludes the content of that principle. We also + found, in the second book, that matter is the common substratum of + all particular phenomena of the Ideas, and consequently is the + connecting link between <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page276">[pg + 276]</span><a name="Pg276" id="Pg276" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the Idea and the phenomenon, or the particular thing. Accordingly + for both of these reasons it is impossible that matter can for + itself express any Idea. This is confirmed <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + posteriori</span></span> by the fact that it is impossible to have + a perceptible idea of matter as such, but only an abstract + conception; in the former, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, in perceptible ideas are + exhibited only the forms and qualities of which matter is the + supporter, and in all of which Ideas reveal themselves. This + corresponds also with the fact, that causality (the whole essence + of matter) cannot for itself be presented perceptibly, but is + merely a definite casual connection. On the other hand, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">every + phenomenon</span></em> of an Idea, because as such it has entered + the form of the principle of sufficient reason, or the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, must + exhibit itself in matter, as one of its qualities. So far then + matter is, as we have said, the connecting link between the Idea + and the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, which is the form of knowledge of + the individual, or the principle of sufficient reason. Plato is + therefore perfectly right in his enumeration, for after the Idea + and the phenomenon, which include all other things in the world, he + gives matter only, as a third thing which is different from both + (Timaus, p. 345). The individual, as a phenomenon of the Idea, is + always matter. Every quality of matter is also the phenomenon of an + Idea, and as such it may always be an object of æsthetic + contemplation, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the Idea expressed in it + may always be recognised. This holds good of even the most + universal qualities of matter, without which it never appears, and + which are the weakest objectivity of will. Such are gravity, + cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, sensitiveness to light, and so + forth.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If now we + consider <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">architecture</span></em> simply as a fine art + and apart from its application to useful ends, in which it serves + the will and not pure knowledge, and therefore ceases to be art in + our sense; we can assign to it no other aim than that of bringing + to greater distinctness <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page277">[pg + 277]</span><a name="Pg277" id="Pg277" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + some of those ideas, which are the lowest grades of the objectivity + of will; such as gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, those + universal qualities of stone, those first, simplest, most + inarticulate manifestations of will; the bass notes of nature; and + after these light, which in many respects is their opposite. Even + at these low grades of the objectivity of will we see its nature + revealing itself in discord; for properly speaking the conflict + between gravity and rigidity is the sole æsthetic material of + architecture; its problem is to make this conflict appear with + perfect distinctness in a multitude of different ways. It solves it + by depriving these indestructible forces of the shortest way to + their satisfaction, and conducting them to it by a circuitous + route, so that the conflict is lengthened and the inexhaustible + efforts of both forces become visible in many different ways. The + whole mass of the building, if left to its original tendency, would + exhibit a mere heap or clump, bound as closely as possible to the + earth, to which gravity, the form in which the will appears here, + continually presses, while rigidity, also objectivity of will, + resists. But this very tendency, this effort, is hindered by + architecture from obtaining direct satisfaction, and only allowed + to reach it indirectly and by roundabout ways. The roof, for + example, can only press the earth through columns, the arch must + support itself, and can only satisfy its tendency towards the earth + through the medium of the pillars, and so forth. But just by these + enforced digressions, just by these restrictions, the forces which + reside in the crude mass of stone unfold themselves in the most + distinct and multifarious ways; and the purely æsthetic aim of + architecture can go no further than this. Therefore the beauty, at + any rate, of a building lies in the obvious adaptation of every + part, not to the outward arbitrary end of man (so far the work + belongs to practical architecture), but directly to the stability + of the whole, to which the position, dimensions, and form of every + part must have so <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page278">[pg + 278]</span><a name="Pg278" id="Pg278" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + necessary a relation that, where it is possible, if any one part + were taken away, the whole would fall to pieces. For just because + each part bears just as much as it conveniently can, and each is + supported just where it requires to be and just to the necessary + extent, this opposition unfolds itself, this conflict between + rigidity and gravity, which constitutes the life, the manifestation + of will, in the stone, becomes completely visible, and these lowest + grades of the objectivity of will reveal themselves distinctly. In + the same way the form of each part must not be determined + arbitrarily, but by its end, and its relation to the whole. The + column is the simplest form of support, determined simply by its + end: the twisted column is tasteless; the four-cornered pillar is + in fact not so simple as the round column, though it happens that + it is easier to make it. The forms also of frieze, rafter, roof, + and dome are entirely determined by their immediate end, and + explain themselves from it. The decoration of capitals, &c., + belongs to sculpture, not to architecture, which admits it merely + as extraneous ornament, and could dispense with it. According to + what has been said, it is absolutely necessary, in order to + understand the æsthetic satisfaction afforded by a work of + architecture, to have immediate knowledge through perception of its + matter as regards its weight, rigidity, and cohesion, and our + pleasure in such a work would suddenly be very much diminished by + the discovery that the material used was pumice-stone; for then it + would appear to us as a kind of sham building. We would be affected + in almost the same way if we were told that it was made of wood, + when we had supposed it to be of stone, just because this alters + and destroys the relation between rigidity and gravity, and + consequently the significance and necessity of all the parts, for + these natural forces reveal themselves in a far weaker degree in a + wooden building. Therefore no real work of architecture as a fine + art can be made of wood, although it assumes all forms so easily; + this can only be <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page279">[pg + 279]</span><a name="Pg279" id="Pg279" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + explained by our theory. If we were distinctly told that a + building, the sight of which gave us pleasure, was made of + different kinds of material of very unequal weight and consistency, + but not distinguishable to the eye, the whole building would become + as utterly incapable of affording us pleasure as a poem in an + unknown language. All this proves that architecture does not affect + us mathematically, but also dynamically, and that what speaks to us + through it, is not mere form and symmetry, but rather those + fundamental forces of nature, those first Ideas, those lowest + grades of the objectivity of will. The regularity of the building + and its parts is partly produced by the direct adaptation of each + member to the stability of the whole, partly it serves to + facilitate the survey and comprehension of the whole, and finally, + regular figures to some extent enhance the beauty because they + reveal the constitution of space as such. But all this is of + subordinate value and necessity, and by no means the chief concern; + indeed, symmetry is not invariably demanded, as ruins are still + beautiful.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Works of + architecture have further quite a special relation to light; they + gain a double beauty in the full sunshine, with the blue sky as a + background, and again they have quite a different effect by + moonlight. Therefore, when a beautiful work of architecture is to + be erected, special attention is always paid to the effects of the + light and to the climate. The reason of all this is, indeed, + principally that all the parts and their relations are only made + clearly visible by a bright, strong light; but besides this I am of + opinion that it is the function of architecture to reveal the + nature of light just as it reveals that of things so opposite to it + as gravity and rigidity. For the light is intercepted, confined, + and reflected by the great opaque, sharply outlined, and variously + formed masses of stone, and thus it unfolds its nature and + qualities in the purest and clearest way, to the great pleasure of + the beholders, for light is the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page280">[pg 280]</span><a name="Pg280" id="Pg280" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> most joy-giving of things, as the condition + and the objective correlative of the most perfect kind of knowledge + of perception.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now, because the + Ideas which architecture brings to clear perception, are the lowest + grades of the objectivity of will, and consequently their objective + significance, which architecture reveals to us, is comparatively + small; the æsthetic pleasure of looking at a beautiful building in + a good light will lie, not so much in the comprehension of the + Idea, as in the subjective correlative which accompanies this + comprehension; it will consist pre-eminently in the fact that the + beholder, set free from the kind of knowledge that belongs to the + individual, and which serves the will and follows the principle of + sufficient reason, is raised to that of the pure subject of knowing + free from will. It will consist then principally in pure + contemplation itself, free from all the suffering of will and of + individuality. In this respect the opposite of architecture, and + the other extreme of the series of the fine arts, is the drama, + which brings to knowledge the most significant Ideas. Therefore in + the æsthetic pleasure afforded by the drama the objective side is + throughout predominant.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Architecture has + this distinction from plastic art and poetry: it does not give us a + copy but the thing itself. It does not repeat, as they do, the + known Idea, so that the artist lends his eyes to the beholder, but + in it the artist merely presents the object to the beholder, and + facilitates for him the comprehension of the Idea by bringing the + actual, individual object to a distinct and complete expression of + its nature.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Unlike the works + of the other arts, those of architecture are very seldom executed + for purely æsthetic ends. These are generally subordinated to other + useful ends which are foreign to art itself. Thus the great merit + of the architect consists in achieving and attaining the pure + æsthetic ends, in spite of their subordination to other + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page281">[pg 281]</span><a name= + "Pg281" id="Pg281" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> ends which are + foreign to them. This he does by cleverly adapting them in a + variety of ways to the arbitrary ends in view, and by rightly + judging which form of æsthetical architectonic beauty is compatible + and may be associated with a temple, which with a palace, which + with a prison, and so forth. The more a harsh climate increases + these demands of necessity and utility, determines them definitely, + and prescribes them more inevitably, the less free play has beauty + in architecture. In the mild climate of India, Egypt, Greece, and + Rome, where the demands of necessity were fewer and less definite, + architecture could follow its æsthetic ends with the greatest + freedom. But under a northern sky this was sorely hindered. Here, + when caissons, pointed roofs and towers were what was demanded, + architecture could only unfold its own beauty within very narrow + limits, and therefore it was obliged to make amends by resorting + all the more to the borrowed ornaments of sculpture, as is seen in + Gothic architecture.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We thus see that + architecture is greatly restricted by the demands of necessity and + utility; but on the other hand it has in them a very powerful + support, for, on account of the magnitude and costliness of its + works, and the narrow sphere of its æsthetic effect, it could not + continue to exist merely as a fine art, if it had not also, as a + useful and necessary profession, a firm and honourable place among + the occupations of men. It is the want of this that prevents + another art from taking its place beside architecture as a sister + art, although in an æsthetical point of view it is quite properly + to be classed along with it as its counterpart; I mean artistic + arrangements of water. For what architecture accomplishes for the + Idea of gravity when it appears in connection with that of + rigidity, hydraulics accomplishes for the same Idea, when it is + connected with fluidity, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, formlessness, the greatest + mobility and transparency. Leaping waterfalls foaming and tumbling + over rocks, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page282">[pg + 282]</span><a name="Pg282" id="Pg282" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + cataracts dispersed into floating spray, springs gushing up as high + columns of water, and clear reflecting lakes, reveal the Ideas of + fluid and heavy matter, in precisely the same way as the works of + architecture unfold the Ideas of rigid matter. Artistic hydraulics, + however, obtains no support from practical hydraulics, for, as a + rule, their ends cannot be combined; yet, in exceptional cases, + this happens; for example, in the Cascata di Trevi at Rome.<a id= + "noteref_52" name="noteref_52" href="#note_52"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">52</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 44. What the + two arts we have spoken of accomplish for these lowest grades of + the objectivity of will, is performed for the higher grades of + vegetable nature by artistic horticulture. The landscape beauty of + a scene consists, for the most part, in the multiplicity of natural + objects which are present in it, and then in the fact that they are + clearly separated, appear distinctly, and yet exhibit a fitting + connection and alternation. These two conditions are assisted and + promoted by landscape-gardening, but it has by no means such a + mastery over its material as architecture, and therefore its effect + is limited. The beauty with which it is concerned belongs almost + exclusively to nature; it has done little for it; and, on the other + hand, it can do little against unfavourable nature, and when nature + works, not for it, but against it, its achievements are small.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The vegetable + world offers itself everywhere for æsthetic enjoyment without the + medium of art; but so far as it is an object of art, it belongs + principally to landscape-painting; to the province of which all the + rest of unconscious nature also belongs. In paintings of still + life, and of mere architecture, ruins, interiors of churches, + &c., the subjective side of æsthetic pleasure is predominant, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, our satisfaction does not + lie principally in the direct comprehension of the represented + Ideas, but rather in the subjective correlative of this + comprehension, pure, will-less knowing. For, because the painter + lets us see these <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page283">[pg + 283]</span><a name="Pg283" id="Pg283" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + things through his eyes, we at once receive a sympathetic and + reflected sense of the deep spiritual peace and absolute silence of + the will, which were necessary in order to enter with knowledge so + entirely into these lifeless objects, and comprehend them with such + love, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, in this case with such a + degree of objectivity. The effect of landscape-painting proper is + indeed, as a whole, of this kind; but because the Ideas expressed + are more distinct and significant, as higher grades of the + objectivity of will, the objective side of æsthetic pleasure + already comes more to the front and assumes as much importance as + the subjective side. Pure knowing as such is no longer the + paramount consideration, for we are equally affected by the known + Platonic Idea, the world as idea at an important grade of the + objectification of will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But a far higher + grade is revealed by animal painting and sculpture. Of the latter + we have some important antique remains; for example, horses at + Venice, on Monte Cavallo, and on the Elgin Marbles, also at + Florence in bronze and marble; the ancient boar, howling wolves, + the lions in the arsenal at Venice, also in the Vatican a whole + room almost filled with ancient animals, &c. In these + representations the objective side of æsthetic pleasure obtains a + marked predominance over the subjective. The peace of the subject + which knows these Ideas, which has silenced its own will, is indeed + present, as it is in all æsthetic contemplation; but its effect is + not felt, for we are occupied with the restlessness and impetuosity + of the will represented. It is that very will, which constitutes + our own nature, that here appears to us in forms, in which its + manifestation is not, as in us, controlled and tempered by + intellect, but exhibits itself in stronger traits, and with a + distinctness that borders on the grotesque and monstrous. For this + very reason there is no concealment; it is free, naïve, open as the + day, and this is the cause of our interest in animals. The + characteristics of species appeared already in the representation + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page284">[pg 284]</span><a name= + "Pg284" id="Pg284" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of plants, but + showed itself only in the forms; here it becomes much more + distinct, and expresses itself not only in the form, but in the + action, position, and mien, yet always merely as the character of + the species, not of the individual. This knowledge of the Ideas of + higher grades, which in painting we receive through extraneous + means, we may gain directly by the pure contemplative perception of + plants, and observation of beasts, and indeed of the latter in + their free, natural, and unrestrained state. The objective + contemplation of their manifold and marvellous forms, and of their + actions and behaviour, is an instructive lesson from the great book + of nature, it is a deciphering of the true <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">signatura rerum</span></span>.<a id= + "noteref_53" name="noteref_53" href="#note_53"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">53</span></span></a> We see + in them the manifold grades and modes of the manifestation of will, + which in all beings of one and the same grade, wills always in the + same way, which objectifies itself as life, as existence in such + endless variety, and such different forms, which are all + adaptations to the different external circumstances, and may be + compared to many variations on the same theme. But if we had to + communicate to the observer, for reflection, and in a word, the + explanation of their inner nature, it would be best to make use of + that Sanscrit formula which occurs so often in the sacred books of + the Hindoos, and is called Mahavakya, i.e., the great word: + <span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang="sa" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="sa"><span style="font-style: italic">Tat twam + asi</span></span>,”</span> which means, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“this living thing art thou.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 45. The great + problem of historical painting and sculpture is to express directly + and for perception the Idea in which the will reaches the highest + grade of its objectification. The objective side of the pleasure + afforded by the beautiful is here always predominant, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page285">[pg 285]</span><a name="Pg285" id="Pg285" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and the subjective side has retired + into the background. It is further to be observed that at the next + grade below this, animal painting, the characteristic is entirely + one with the beautiful; the most characteristic lion, wolf, horse, + sheep, or ox, was always the most beautiful also. The reason of + this is that animals have only the character of their species, no + individual character. In the representation of men the character of + the species is separated from that of the individual; the former is + now called beauty (entirely in the objective sense), but the latter + retains the name, character, or expression, and the new difficulty + arises of representing both, at once and completely, in the same + individual.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Human + beauty</span></em> is an objective expression, which means the + fullest objectification of will at the highest grade at which it is + knowable, the Idea of man in general, completely expressed in the + sensible form. But however much the objective side of the beautiful + appears here, the subjective side still always accompanies it. And + just because no object transports us so quickly into pure æsthetic + contemplation, as the most beautiful human countenance and form, at + the sight of which we are instantly filled with unspeakable + satisfaction, and raised above ourselves and all that troubles us; + this is only possible because this most distinct and purest + knowledge of will raises us most easily and quickly to the state of + pure knowing, in which our personality, our will with its constant + pain, disappears, so long as the pure æsthetic pleasure lasts. + Therefore it is that Goethe says: <span class="tei tei-q">“No evil + can touch him who looks on human beauty; he feels himself at one + with himself and with the world.”</span> That a beautiful human + form is produced by nature must be explained in this way. At this + its highest grade the will objectifies itself in an individual; and + therefore through circumstances and its own power it completely + overcomes all the hindrances and opposition which the phenomena of + the lower grades present to it. Such are the forces <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page286">[pg 286]</span><a name="Pg286" id="Pg286" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> of nature, from which the will must + always first extort and win back the matter that belongs to all its + manifestations. Further, the phenomenon of will at its higher + grades always has multiplicity in its form. Even the tree is only a + systematic aggregate of innumerably repeated sprouting fibres. This + combination assumes greater complexity in higher forms, and the + human body is an exceedingly complex system of different parts, + each of which has a peculiar life of its own, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vita propria</span></span>, subordinate to the + whole. Now that all these parts are in the proper fashion + subordinate to the whole, and co-ordinate to each other, that they + all work together harmoniously for the expression of the whole, + nothing superfluous, nothing restricted; all these are the rare + conditions, whose result is beauty, the completely expressed + character of the species. So is it in nature. But how in art? One + would suppose that art achieved the beautiful by imitating nature. + But how is the artist to recognise the perfect work which is to be + imitated, and distinguish it from the failures, if he does not + anticipate the beautiful <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">before experience</span></em>? And besides + this, has nature ever produced a human being perfectly beautiful in + all his parts? It has accordingly been thought that the artist must + seek out the beautiful parts, distributed among a number of + different human beings, and out of them construct a beautiful + whole; a perverse and foolish opinion. For it will be asked, how is + he to know that just these forms and not others are beautiful? We + also see what kind of success attended the efforts of the old + German painters to achieve the beautiful by imitating nature. + Observe their naked figures. No knowledge of the beautiful is + possible purely <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span>, + and from mere experience; it is always, at least in part, + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, although quite + different in kind, from the forms of the principle of sufficient + reason, of which we are conscious <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>. These concern the universal form of phenomena + as such, as it constitutes the possibility <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page287">[pg 287]</span><a name="Pg287" id="Pg287" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> of knowledge in general, the universal + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">how</span></em> of all phenomena, and from + this knowledge proceed mathematics and pure natural science. But + this other kind of knowledge <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, which makes it possible to express the + beautiful, concerns, not the form but the content of phenomena, not + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">how</span></em> but the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">what</span></em> of + the phenomenon. That we all recognise human beauty when we see it, + but that in the true artist this takes place with such clearness + that he shows it as he has never seen it, and surpasses nature in + his representation; this is only possible because <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">we ourselves + are</span></em> the will whose adequate objectification at its + highest grade is here to be judged and discovered. Thus alone have + we in fact an anticipation of that which nature (which is just the + will that constitutes our own being) strives to express. And in the + true genius this anticipation is accompanied by so great a degree + of intelligence that he recognises the Idea in the particular + thing, and thus, as it were, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">understands the half-uttered speech of + nature</span></em>, and articulates clearly what she only stammered + forth. He expresses in the hard marble that beauty of form which in + a thousand attempts she failed to produce, he presents it to + nature, saying, as it were, to her, <span class="tei tei-q">“That + is what you wanted to say!”</span> And whoever is able to judge + replies, <span class="tei tei-q">“Yes, that is it.”</span> Only in + this way was it possible for the genius of the Greeks to find the + type of human beauty and establish it as a canon for the school of + sculpture; and only by virtue of such an anticipation is it + possible for all of us to recognise beauty, when it has actually + been achieved by nature in the particular case. This anticipation + is the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Ideal</span></em>. It is the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Idea</span></em> so + far as it is known <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, at least half, and it becomes practical for + art, because it corresponds to and completes what is given + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> through nature. The + possibility of such an anticipation of the beautiful <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> in the artist, and of + its recognition <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> by + the critic, lies in the fact that the artist and the critic are + themselves the <span class="tei tei-q">“in-itself”</span> of + nature, the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page288">[pg + 288]</span><a name="Pg288" id="Pg288" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + will which objectifies itself. For, as Empedocles said, like can + only be known by like: only nature can understand itself: only + nature can fathom itself: but only spirit also can understand + spirit.<a id="noteref_54" name="noteref_54" href= + "#note_54"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">54</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The opinion, + which is absurd, although expressed by the Socrates of Xenophon + (Stobæi Floril, vol. ii. p. 384) that the Greeks discovered the + established ideal of human beauty empirically, by collecting + particular beautiful parts, uncovering and noting here a knee, + there an arm, has an exact parallel in the art of poetry. The view + is entertained, that Shakespeare, for example, observed, and then + gave forth from his own experience of life, the innumerable variety + of the characters in his dramas, so true, so sustained, so + profoundly worked out. The impossibility and absurdity of such an + assumption need not be dwelt upon. It is obvious that the man of + genius produces the works of poetic art by means of an anticipation + of what is characteristic, just as he produces the works of plastic + and pictorial art by means of a prophetic anticipation of the + beautiful; yet both require experience as a pattern or model, for + thus alone can that which is dimly known <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> be called into clear consciousness, and an + intelligent representation of it becomes possible.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Human beauty was + explained above as the fullest objectification of will at the + highest grade at which it is knowable. It expresses itself through + the form; and this lies in space alone, and has no necessary + connection with time, as, for example, motion has. Thus far then we + may say: the adequate objectification of will through a merely + spatial phenomenon is beauty, in the objective sense. A plant is + nothing but such a merely spatial <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page289">[pg 289]</span><a name="Pg289" id="Pg289" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> phenomenon of will; for no motion, and + consequently no relation to time (regarded apart from its + development), belongs to the expression of its nature; its mere + form expresses its whole being and displays it openly. But brutes + and men require, further, for the full revelation of the will which + is manifested in them, a series of actions, and thus the + manifestation in them takes on a direct relation to time. All this + has already been explained in the preceding book; it is related to + what we are considering at present in the following way. As the + merely spatial manifestation of will can objectify it fully or + defectively at each definite grade,—and it is this which + constitutes beauty or ugliness,—so the temporal objectification of + will, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the action, and indeed the + direct action, the movement, may correspond to the will, which + objectifies itself in it, purely and fully without foreign + admixture, without superfluity, without defect, only expressing + exactly the act of will determined in each case;—or the converse of + all this may occur. In the first case the movement is made with + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">grace</span></em>, in the second case without + it. Thus as beauty is the adequate representation of will + generally, through its merely spatial manifestation; <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">grace</span></em> + is the adequate representation of will through its temporal + manifestation, that is to say, the perfectly accurate and fitting + expression of each act of will, through the movement and position + which objectify it. Since movement and position presuppose the + body, Winckelmann's expression is very true and suitable, when he + says, <span class="tei tei-q">“Grace is the proper relation of the + acting person to the action”</span> (Works, vol. i. p. 258). It is + thus evident that beauty may be attributed to a plant, but no + grace, unless in a figurative sense; but to brutes and men, both + beauty and grace. Grace consists, according to what has been said, + in every movement being performed, and every position assumed, in + the easiest, most appropriate and convenient way, and therefore + being the pure, adequate expression of its intention, or of + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page290">[pg 290]</span><a name= + "Pg290" id="Pg290" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the act of will, + without any superfluity, which exhibits itself as aimless, + meaningless bustle, or as wooden stiffness. Grace presupposes as + its condition a true proportion of all the limbs, and a + symmetrical, harmonious figure; for complete ease and evident + appropriateness of all positions and movements are only possible by + means of these. Grace is therefore never without a certain degree + of beauty of person. The two, complete and united, are the most + distinct manifestation of will at the highest grade of its + objectification.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It was mentioned + above that in order rightly to portray man, it is necessary to + separate the character of the species from that of the individual, + so that to a certain extent every man expresses an Idea peculiar to + himself, as was said in the last book. Therefore the arts whose aim + is the representation of the Idea of man, have as their problem, + not only beauty, the character of the species, but also the + character of the individual, which is called, <span lang="fr" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">par excellence</span></span>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">character</span></em>. But this is only the + case in so far as this character is to be regarded, not as + something accidental and quite peculiar to the man as a single + individual, but as a side of the Idea of humanity which is + specially apparent in this individual, and the representation of + which is therefore of assistance in revealing this Idea. Thus the + character, although as such it is individual, must yet be Ideal, + that is, its significance in relation to the Idea of humanity + generally (the objectifying of which it assists in its own way) + must be comprehended and expressed with special prominence. Apart + from this the representation is a portrait, a copy of the + individual as such, with all his accidental qualities. And even the + portrait ought to be, as Winckelmann says, the ideal of the + individual.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">character</span></em> which is to be ideally + comprehended, as the prominence of a special side of the Idea of + humanity, expresses itself visibly, partly through permanent + physiognomy and bodily form, partly through passing <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page291">[pg 291]</span><a name="Pg291" id="Pg291" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> emotion and passion, the reciprocal + modification of knowing and willing by each other, which is all + exhibited in the mien and movements. Since the individual always + belongs to humanity, and, on the other hand, humanity always + reveals itself in the individual with what is indeed peculiar ideal + significance, beauty must not be destroyed by character nor + character by beauty. For if the character of the species is + annulled by that of the individual, the result is caricature; and + if the character of the individual is annulled by that of the + species, the result is an absence of meaning. Therefore the + representation which aims at beauty, as sculpture principally does, + will yet always modify this (the character of the species), in some + respect, by the individual character, and will always express the + Idea of man in a definite individual manner, giving prominence to a + special side of it. For the human individual as such has to a + certain extent the dignity of a special Idea, and it is essential + to the Idea of man that it should express itself in individuals of + special significance. Therefore we find in the works of the + ancients, that the beauty distinctly comprehended by them, is not + expressed in one form, but in many forms of different character. It + is always apprehended, as it were, from a different side, and + expressed in one way in Apollo, in another way in Bacchus, in + another in Hercules, in another in Antinous; indeed the + characteristic may limit the beautiful, and finally extend even to + hideousness, in the drunken Silenus, in the Faun, &c. If the + characteristic goes so far as actually to annul the character of + the species, if it extends to the unnatural, it becomes caricature. + But we can far less afford to allow grace to be interfered with by + what is characteristic than even beauty, for graceful position and + movement are demanded for the expression of the character also; but + yet it must be achieved in the way which is most fitting, + appropriate, and easy for the person. This will be observed, not + only by the sculptor and the painter, but <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page292">[pg 292]</span><a name="Pg292" id="Pg292" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> also by every good actor; otherwise + caricature will appear here also as grimace or distortion.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In sculpture, + beauty and grace are the principal concern. The special character + of the mind, appearing in emotion, passion, alternations of knowing + and willing, which can only be represented by the expression of the + countenance and the gestures, is the peculiar sphere of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">painting</span></em>. For although eyes and + colour, which lie outside the province of sculpture, contribute + much to beauty, they are yet far more essential to character. + Further, beauty unfolds itself more completely when it is + contemplated from various points of view; but the expression, the + character, can only be completely comprehended from <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + point of view.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Because beauty + is obviously the chief aim of sculpture, Lessing tried to explain + the fact that the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Laocoon does not cry out</span></em>, by + saying that crying out is incompatible with beauty. The Laocoon + formed for Lessing the theme, or at least the text of a work of his + own, and both before and after him a great deal has been written on + the subject. I may therefore be allowed to express my views about + it in passing, although so special a discussion does not properly + belong to the scheme of this work, which is throughout concerned + with what is general.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 46. That + Laocoon, in the celebrated group, does not cry out is obvious, and + the universal and ever-renewed surprise at this must be occasioned + by the fact that any of us would cry out if we were in his place. + And nature demands that it should be so; for in the case of the + acutest physical pain, and the sudden seizure by the greatest + bodily fear, all reflection, that might have inculcated silent + endurance, is entirely expelled from consciousness, and nature + relieves itself by crying out, thus expressing both the pain and + the fear, summoning the deliverer and terrifying the assailer. Thus + Winckelmann missed the expression of crying out; but as he wished + to justify the artist he turned Laocoon into a Stoic, who + considered it beneath his dignity to cry out <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page293">[pg 293]</span><a name="Pg293" id="Pg293" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">secundum + naturam</span></span>, but added to his pain the useless constraint + of suppressing all utterance of it. Winckelmann therefore sees in + him <span class="tei tei-q">“the tried spirit of a great man, who + writhes in agony, and yet seeks to suppress the utterance of his + feeling, and to lock it up in himself. He does not break forth into + loud cries, as in Virgil, but only anxious sighs escape + him,”</span> &c. (Works, vol. vii. p. 98, and at greater length + in vol. vi. p. 104). Now Lessing criticised this opinion of + Winckelmann's in his Laocoon, and improved it in the way mentioned + above. In place of the psychological he gave the purely æsthetic + reason that beauty, the principle of ancient art, does not admit of + the expression of crying out. Another argument which he added to + this, that a merely passing state incapable of duration ought not + to be represented in motionless works of art, has a hundred + examples of most excellent figures against it, which are fixed in + merely transitory movements, dancing, wrestling, catching, &c. + Indeed Goethe, in the essay on the Laocoon, which opens the + Propylaen (p. 8), holds that the choice of such a merely fleeting + movement is absolutely necessary. In our own day Hirt (Horen, 1797, + tenth St.) finally decided the point, deducing everything from the + highest truth of expression, that Laocoon does not cry out, because + he can no longer do so, as he is at the point of death from + choking. Lastly, Fernow (<span class="tei tei-q">“Römische + Studien,”</span> vol. i. p. 246) expounded and weighed all these + opinions; he added, however, no new one of his own, but combined + these three eclectically.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I cannot but + wonder that such thoughtful and acute men should laboriously bring + far-fetched and insufficient reasons, should resort to + psychological and physiological arguments, to explain a matter the + reason of which lies so near at hand, and is obvious at once to the + unprejudiced; and especially I wonder that Lessing, who came so + near the true explanation, should yet have entirely missed the real + point.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page294">[pg + 294]</span><a name="Pg294" id="Pg294" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Before all + psychological and physiological inquiries as to whether Laocoon + would cry out in his position or not (and I certainly affirm that + he would), it must be decided as regards the group in question, + that crying out ought not to be expressed in it, for the simple + reason that its expression lies quite outside the province of + sculpture. A shrieking Laocoon could not be produced in marble, but + only a figure with the mouth open vainly endeavouring to shriek; a + Laocoon whose voice has stuck in his throat, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vox faucibus haesit</span></span>. The essence + of shrieking, and consequently its effect upon the onlooker, lies + entirely in sound; not in the distortion of the mouth. This + phenomenon, which necessarily accompanies shrieking, derives motive + and justification only from the sound produced by means of it; then + it is permissible and indeed necessary, as characteristic of the + action, even though it interferes with beauty. But in plastic art, + to which the representation of shrieking is quite foreign and + impossible, it would be actual folly to represent the medium of + violent shrieking, the distorted mouth, which would disturb all the + features and the remainder of the expression; for thus at the + sacrifice of many other things the means would be represented, + while its end, the shrieking itself, and its effect upon our + feelings, would be left out. Nay more, there would be produced the + spectacle of a continuous effort without effect, which is always + ridiculous, and may really be compared to what happened when some + one for a joke stopped the horn of a night watchman with wax while + he was asleep, and then awoke him with the cry of fire, and amused + himself by watching his vain endeavours to blow the horn. When, on + the other hand, the expression of shrieking lies in the province of + poetic or histrionic art, it is quite admissible, because it helps + to express the truth, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the complete expression of + the Idea. Thus it is with poetry, which claims the assistance of + the imagination of the reader, in order to enable it to represent + things perceptibly. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page295">[pg + 295]</span><a name="Pg295" id="Pg295" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Therefore Virgil makes Laocoon cry out like the bellowing of an ox + that has broken loose after being struck by the axe; and Homer (Il. + xx. 48-53) makes Mars and Minerva shriek horribly, without + derogating from their divine dignity or beauty. The same with + acting; Laocoon on the stage would certainly have to shriek. + Sophocles makes Philoctetus cry out, and, on the ancient stage at + any rate, he must actually have done so. As a case in point, I + remember having seen in London the great actor Kemble play in a + piece called Pizarro, translated from the German. He took the part + of the American, a half-savage, but of very noble character. When + he was wounded he cried out loudly and wildly, which had a great + and admirable effect, for it was exceedingly characteristic and + therefore assisted the truth of the representation very much. On + the other hand, a painted or sculptured model of a man shrieking, + would be much more absurd than the painted music which is censured + in Goethe's Propylaen. For shrieking does far more injury to the + expression and beauty of the whole than music, which at the most + only occupies the hands and arms, and is to be looked upon as an + occupation characteristic of the person; indeed thus far it may + quite rightly be painted, as long as it demands no violent movement + of the body, or distortion of the mouth: for example, St. Cecilia + at the organ, Raphael's violin-player in the Sciarra Gallery at + Rome, and others. Since then, on account of the limits of the art, + the pain of Laocoon must not be expressed by shrieking, the artist + was obliged to employ every other expression of pain; this he has + done in the most perfect manner, as is ably described by + Winckelmann (Works, vol. vi. p. 104), whose admirable account thus + retains its full value and truth, as soon as we abstract from the + stoical view which underlies it.<a id="noteref_55" name= + "noteref_55" href="#note_55"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">55</span></span></a></p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page296">[pg 296]</span><a name="Pg296" id="Pg296" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 47. Because + beauty accompanied with grace is the principal object of sculpture, + it loves nakedness, and allows clothing only so far as it does not + conceal the form. It makes use of drapery, not as a covering, but + as a means of exhibiting the form, a method of exposition that + gives much exercise to the understanding, for it can only arrive at + a perception of the cause, the form of the body, through the only + directly given effect, the drapery. Thus to a certain extent + drapery is in sculpture what fore-shortening is in painting. Both + are suggestions, yet not symbolical, but such that, if they are + successful, they force the understanding directly to perceive what + is suggested, just as if it were actually given.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I may be + allowed, in passing, to insert here a comparison that is very + pertinent to the arts we are discussing. It is this: as the + beautiful bodily form is seen to the greatest advantage when + clothed in the lightest way, or indeed without any clothing at all, + and therefore a very handsome man, if he had also taste and the + courage to follow it, would go about almost naked, clothed only + after the manner of the ancients; so every one who possesses a + beautiful and rich mind will always express himself in the most + natural, direct, and simple way, concerned, if it be possible, to + communicate his thoughts to others, and thus relieve the loneliness + that he must feel in such a world as this. And conversely, poverty + of mind, confusion, and perversity of thought, will clothe itself + in the most far-fetched expressions and the obscurest forms of + speech, in order to wrap up in difficult and pompous phraseology + small, trifling, insipid, or commonplace thoughts; like a man who + has lost the majesty of beauty, and trying to make up for the + deficiency by means of clothing, seeks to hide the insignificance + or ugliness of his person under barbaric finery, tinsel, feathers, + ruffles, cuffs, and mantles. Many an author, if compelled to + translate his pompous and <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page297">[pg + 297]</span><a name="Pg297" id="Pg297" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + obscure book into its little clear content, would be as utterly + spoilt as this man if he had to go naked.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 48. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Historical + painting</span></em> has for its principal object, besides beauty + and grace, character. By character we mean generally, the + representation of will at the highest grade of its objectification, + when the individual, as giving prominence to a particular side of + the Idea of humanity, has special significance, and shows this not + merely by his form, but makes it visible in his bearing and + occupation, by action of every kind, and the modifications of + knowing and willing that occasion and accompany it. The Idea of man + must be exhibited in these circumstances, and therefore the + unfolding of its many-sidedness must be brought before our eyes by + means of representative individuals, and these individuals can only + be made visible in their significance through various scenes, + events, and actions. This is the endless problem of the historical + painter, and he solves it by placing before us scenes of life of + every kind, of greater or less significance. No individual and no + action can be without significance; in all and through all the Idea + of man unfolds itself more and more. Therefore no event of human + life is excluded from the sphere of painting. It is thus a great + injustice to the excellent painters of the Dutch school, to prize + merely their technical skill, and to look down upon them in other + respects, because, for the most part, they represent objects of + common life, whereas it is assumed that only the events of the + history of the world, or the incidents of biblical story, have + significance. We ought first to bethink ourselves that the inward + significance of an action is quite different from its outward + significance, and that these are often separated from each other. + The outward significance is the importance of an action in relation + to its result for and in the actual world; thus according to the + principle of sufficient reason. The inward significance is the + depth of the insight into the Idea of man which it reveals, in that + it brings <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page298">[pg + 298]</span><a name="Pg298" id="Pg298" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + to light sides of that Idea which rarely appear, by making + individuals who assert themselves distinctly and decidedly, + disclose their peculiar characteristics by means of appropriately + arranged circumstances. Only the inward significance concerns art; + the outward belongs to history. They are both completely + independent of each other; they may appear together, but may each + appear alone. An action which is of the highest significance for + history may in inward significance be a very ordinary and common + one; and conversely, a scene of ordinary daily life may be of great + inward significance, if human individuals, and the inmost recesses + of human action and will, appear in it in a clear and distinct + light. Further, the outward and the inward significance of a scene + may be equal and yet very different. Thus, for example, it is all + the same, as far as inward significance is concerned, whether + ministers discuss the fate of countries and nations over a map, or + boors wrangle in a beer-house over cards and dice, just as it is + all the same whether we play chess with golden or wooden pieces. + But apart from this, the scenes and events that make up the life of + so many millions of men, their actions, their sorrows, their joys, + are on that account important enough to be the object of art, and + by their rich variety they must afford material enough for + unfolding the many-sided Idea of man. Indeed the very + transitoriness of the moment which art has fixed in such a picture + (now called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">genre</span></em>-painting) excites a slight + and peculiar sensation; for to fix the fleeting, ever-changing + world in the enduring picture of a single event, which yet + represents the whole, is an achievement of the art of painting by + which it seems to bring time itself to a standstill, for it raises + the individual to the Idea of its species. Finally, the historical + and outwardly significant subjects of painting have often the + disadvantage that just what is significant in them cannot be + presented to perception, but must be arrived at by thought. In this + respect the nominal <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page299">[pg + 299]</span><a name="Pg299" id="Pg299" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + significance of the picture must be distinguished from its real + significance. The former is the outward significance, which, + however, can only be reached as a conception; the latter is that + side of the Idea of man which is made visible to the onlooker in + the picture. For example, Moses found by the Egyptian princess is + the nominal significance of a painting; it represents a moment of + the greatest importance in history; the real significance, on the + other hand, that which is really given to the onlooker, is a + foundling child rescued from its floating cradle by a great lady, + an incident which may have happened more than once. The costume + alone can here indicate the particular historical case to the + learned; but the costume is only of importance to the nominal + significance, and is a matter of indifference to the real + significance; for the latter knows only the human being as such, + not the arbitrary forms. Subjects taken from history have no + advantage over those which are taken from mere possibility, and + which are therefore to be called, not individual, but merely + general. For what is peculiarly significant in the former is not + the individual, not the particular event as such, but the universal + in it, the side of the Idea of humanity which expresses itself + through it. But, on the other hand, definite historical subjects + are not on this account to be rejected, only the really artistic + view of such subjects, both in the painter and in the beholder, is + never directed to the individual particulars in them, which + properly constitute the historical, but to the universal which + expresses itself in them, to the Idea. And only those historical + subjects are to be chosen the chief point of which can actually be + represented, and not merely arrived at by thought, otherwise the + nominal significance is too remote from the real; what is merely + thought in connection with the picture becomes of most importance, + and interferes with what is perceived. If even on the stage it is + not right that the chief incident of the plot should take place + behind the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page300">[pg + 300]</span><a name="Pg300" id="Pg300" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + scenes (as in French tragedies), it is clearly a far greater fault + in a picture. Historical subjects are distinctly disadvantageous + only when they confine the painter to a field which has not been + chosen for artistic but for other reasons, and especially when this + field is poor in picturesque and significant objects—if, for + example, it is the history of a small, isolated, capricious, + hierarchical (<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, ruled by error), obscure + people, like the Jews, despised by the great contemporary nations + of the East and the West. Since the wandering of the tribes lies + between us and all ancient nations, as the change of the bed of the + ocean lies between the earth's surface as it is to-day and as it + was when those organisations existed which we only know from fossil + remains, it is to be regarded generally as a great misfortune that + the people whose culture was to be the principal basis of our own + were not the Indians or the Greeks, or even the Romans, but these + very Jews. But it was especially a great misfortune for the Italian + painters of genius in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that, + in the narrow sphere to which they were arbitrarily driven for the + choice of subjects, they were obliged to have recourse to miserable + beings of every kind. For the New Testament, as regards its + historical part, is almost more unsuitable for painting than the + Old, and the subsequent history of martyrs and doctors of the + church is a very unfortunate subject. Yet of the pictures, whose + subject is the history or mythology of Judaism and Christianity, we + must carefully distinguish those in which the peculiar, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the ethical spirit of + Christianity is revealed for perception, by the representation of + men who are full of this spirit. These representations are in fact + the highest and most admirable achievements of the art of painting; + and only the greatest masters of this art succeeded in this, + particularly Raphael and Correggio, and especially in their earlier + pictures. Pictures of this kind are not properly to be classed as + historical: for, as a rule, they represent no event, no action; but + are merely groups of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page301">[pg + 301]</span><a name="Pg301" id="Pg301" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + saints, with the Saviour himself, often still a child, with His + mother, angels, &c. In their countenances, and especially in + the eyes, we see the expression, the reflection, of the completest + knowledge, that which is not directed to particular things, but has + fully grasped the Ideas, and thus the whole nature of the world and + life. And this knowledge in them, reacting upon the will, does not, + like other knowledge, convey <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motives</span></em> to it, but on the contrary + has become a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quieter</span></em> of all will, from which + proceeded the complete resignation, which is the innermost spirit + of Christianity, as of the Indian philosophy; the surrender of all + volition, conversion, the suppression of will, and with it of the + whole inner being of this world, that is to say, salvation. Thus + these masters of art, worthy of eternal praise, expressed + perceptibly in their works the highest wisdom. And this is the + summit of all art. It has followed the will in its adequate + objectivity, the Ideas, through all its grades, in which it is + affected and its nature unfolded in so many ways, first by causes, + then by stimuli, and finally by motives. And now art ends with the + representation of the free self-suppression of will, by means of + the great peace which it gains from the perfect knowledge of its + own nature.<a id="noteref_56" name="noteref_56" href= + "#note_56"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">56</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 49. The truth + which lies at the foundation of all that we have hitherto said + about art, is that the object of art, the representation of which + is the aim of the artist, and the knowledge of which must therefore + precede his work as its germ and source, is an Idea in Plato's + sense, and never anything else; not the particular thing, the + object of common apprehension, and not the concept, the object of + rational thought and of science. Although the Idea and the concept + have something in common, because both represent as unity a + multiplicity of real things; yet the great difference between them + has no doubt been made clear and evident enough by what we have + said <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page302">[pg 302]</span><a name= + "Pg302" id="Pg302" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> about concepts in + the first book, and about Ideas in this book. I by no means wish to + assert, however, that Plato really distinctly comprehended this + difference; indeed many of his examples of Ideas, and his + discussions of them, are applicable only to concepts. Meanwhile we + leave this question alone and go on our own way, glad when we come + upon traces of any great and noble mind, yet not following his + footsteps but our own aim. The <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">concept</span></em> + is abstract, discursive, undetermined within its own sphere, only + determined by its limits, attainable and comprehensible by him who + has only reason, communicable by words without any other + assistance, entirely exhausted by its definition. The <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Idea</span></em> on + the contrary, although defined as the adequate representative of + the concept, is always object of perception, and although + representing an infinite number of particular things, is yet + thoroughly determined. It is never known by the individual as such, + but only by him who has raised himself above all willing and all + individuality to the pure subject of knowing. Thus it is only + attainable by the man of genius, and by him who, for the most part + through the assistance of the works of genius, has reached an + exalted frame of mind, by increasing his power of pure knowing. It + is therefore not absolutely but only conditionally communicable, + because the Idea, comprehended and repeated in the work of art, + appeals to every one only according to the measure of his own + intellectual worth. So that just the most excellent works of every + art, the noblest productions of genius, must always remain sealed + books to the dull majority of men, inaccessible to them, separated + from them by a wide gulf, just as the society of princes is + inaccessible to the common people. It is true that even the dullest + of them accept on authority recognisedly great works, lest + otherwise they should argue their own incompetence; but they wait + in silence, always ready to express their condemnation, as soon as + they are allowed to hope that they may do so without being left + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page303">[pg 303]</span><a name= + "Pg303" id="Pg303" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to stand alone; and + then their long-restrained hatred against all that is great and + beautiful, and against the authors of it, gladly relieves itself; + for such things never appealed to them, and for that very reason + were humiliating to them. For as a rule a man must have worth in + himself in order to recognise it and believe in it willingly and + freely in others. On this rests the necessity of modesty in all + merit, and the disproportionately loud praise of this virtue, which + alone of all its sisters is always included in the eulogy of every + one who ventures to praise any distinguished man, in order to + appease and quiet the wrath of the unworthy. What then is modesty + but hypocritical humility, by means of which, in a world swelling + with base envy, a man seeks to obtain pardon for excellences and + merits from those who have none? For whoever attributes to himself + no merits, because he actually has none, is not modest but merely + honest.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Idea</span></em> is + the unity that falls into multiplicity on account of the temporal + and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension; the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">concept</span></em>, on the contrary, is the + unity reconstructed out of multiplicity by the abstraction of our + reason; the latter may be defined as <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unitas post rem</span></span>, the former as + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">unitas ante rem</span></span>. Finally, we may + express the distinction between the Idea and the concept, by a + comparison, thus: the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">concept</span></em> is like a dead receptacle, + in which, whatever has been put, actually lies side by side, but + out of which no more can be taken (by analytical judgment) than was + put in (by synthetical reflection); the (Platonic) <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Idea</span></em>, + on the other hand, develops, in him who has comprehended it, ideas + which are new as regards the concept of the same name; it resembles + a living organism, developing itself and possessed of the power of + reproduction, which brings forth what was not put into it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It follows from + all that has been said, that the concept, useful as it is in life, + and serviceable, necessary and productive as it is in science, is + yet always barren <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page304">[pg + 304]</span><a name="Pg304" id="Pg304" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and unfruitful in art. The comprehended Idea, on the contrary, is + the true and only source of every work of art. In its powerful + originality it is only derived from life itself, from nature, from + the world, and that only by the true genius, or by him whose + momentary inspiration reaches the point of genius. Genuine and + immortal works of art spring only from such direct apprehension. + Just because the Idea is and remains object of perception, the + artist is not conscious in the abstract of the intention and aim of + his work; not a concept, but an Idea floats before his mind; + therefore he can give no justification of what he does. He works, + as people say, from pure feeling, and unconsciously, indeed + instinctively. On the contrary, imitators, mannerists, <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">imitatores, servum pecus</span></span>, start, + in art, from the concept; they observe what pleases and affects us + in true works of art; understand it clearly, fix it in a concept, + and thus abstractly, and then imitate it, openly or disguisedly, + with dexterity and intentionally. They suck their nourishment, like + parasite plants, from the works of others, and like polypi, they + become the colour of their food. We might carry comparison further, + and say that they are like machines which mince fine and mingle + together whatever is put into them, but can never digest it, so + that the different constituent parts may always be found again if + they are sought out and separated from the mixture; the man of + genius alone resembles the organised, assimilating, transforming + and reproducing body. For he is indeed educated and cultured by his + predecessors and their works; but he is really fructified only by + life and the world directly, through the impression of what he + perceives; therefore the highest culture never interferes with his + originality. All imitators, all mannerists, apprehend in concepts + the nature of representative works of art; but concepts can never + impart inner life to a work. The age, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the dull multitude of every time, knows only concepts, and sticks + to them, and therefore receives <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page305">[pg 305]</span><a name="Pg305" id="Pg305" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> mannered works of art with ready and loud + applause: but after a few years these works become insipid, because + the spirit of the age, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the prevailing concepts, + in which alone they could take root, have changed. Only true works + of art, which are drawn directly from nature and life, have eternal + youth and enduring power, like nature and life themselves. For they + belong to no age, but to humanity, and as on that account they are + coldly received by their own age, to which they disdain to link + themselves closely, and because indirectly and negatively they + expose the existing errors, they are slowly and unwillingly + recognised; on the other hand, they cannot grow old, but appear to + us ever fresh and new down to the latest ages. Then they are no + longer exposed to neglect and ignorance, for they are crowned and + sanctioned by the praise of the few men capable of judging, who + appear singly and rarely in the course of ages,<a id="noteref_57" + name="noteref_57" href="#note_57"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">57</span></span></a> and + give in their votes, whose slowly growing number constitutes the + authority, which alone is the judgment-seat we mean when we appeal + to posterity. It is these successively appearing individuals, for + the mass of posterity will always be and remain just as perverse + and dull as the mass of contemporaries always was and always is. We + read the complaints of great men in every century about the customs + of their age. They always sound as if they referred to our own age, + for the race is always the same. At every time and in every art, + mannerisms have taken the place of the spirit, which was always the + possession of a few individuals, but mannerisms are just the old + cast-off garments of the last manifestation of the spirit that + existed and was recognised. From all this it appears that, as a + rule, the praise of posterity can only be gained at the cost of the + praise of one's contemporaries, and <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">vice + versa</span></span>.<a id="noteref_58" name="noteref_58" href= + "#note_58"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">58</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 50. If the aim + of all art is the communication of the comprehended Idea, which + through the mind of the artist <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page306">[pg 306]</span><a name="Pg306" id="Pg306" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> appears in such a form that it is purged and + isolated from all that is foreign to it, and may now be grasped by + the man of weaker comprehension and no productive faculty; if + further, it is forbidden in art to start from the concept, we shall + not be able to consent to the intentional and avowed employment of + a work of art for the expression of a concept; this is the case in + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Allegory</span></em>. An allegory is a work of + art which means something different from what it represents. But + the object of perception, and consequently also the Idea, expresses + itself directly and completely, and does not require the medium of + something else which implies or indicates it. Thus, that which in + this way is indicated and represented by something entirely + different, because it cannot itself be made object of perception, + is always a concept. Therefore through the allegory a conception + has always to be signified, and consequently the mind of the + beholder has to be drawn away from the expressed perceptible idea + to one which is entirely different, abstract and not perceptible, + and which lies quite outside the work of art. The picture or statue + is intended to accomplish here what is accomplished far more fully + by a book. Now, what we hold is the end of art, representation of a + perceivable, comprehensible Idea, is not here the end. No great + completeness in the work of art is demanded for what is aimed at + here. It is only necessary that we should see what the thing is + meant to be, for, as soon as this has been discovered, the end is + reached, and the mind is now led away to quite a different kind of + idea to an abstract conception, which is the end that was in view. + Allegories in plastic and pictorial art are, therefore, nothing but + hieroglyphics; the artistic value which they may have as + perceptible representations, belongs to them not as allegories, but + otherwise. That the <span class="tei tei-q">“Night”</span> of + Correggio, the <span class="tei tei-q">“Genius of Fame”</span> of + Hannibal Caracci, and the <span class="tei tei-q">“Hours”</span> of + Poussin, are very beautiful pictures, is to be separated altogether + from the fact that they are <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page307">[pg 307]</span><a name="Pg307" id="Pg307" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> allegories. As allegories they do not + accomplish more than a legend, indeed rather less. We are here + again reminded of the distinction drawn above between the real and + the nominal significance of a picture. The nominal is here the + allegorical as such, for example, the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Genius of Fame.”</span> The real is what is actually + represented, in this case a beautiful winged youth, surrounded by + beautiful boys; this expresses an Idea. But this real significance + affects us only so long as we forget the nominal, allegorical + significance; if we think of the latter, we forsake the perception, + and the mind is occupied with an abstract conception; but the + transition from the Idea to the conception is always a fall. + Indeed, that nominal significance, that allegorical intention, + often injures the real significance, the perceptible truth. For + example, the unnatural light in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Night”</span> of Correggio, which, though beautifully + executed, has yet a merely allegorical motive, and is really + impossible. If then an allegorical picture has artistic value, it + is quite separate from and independent of what it accomplishes as + allegory. Such a work of art serves two ends at once, the + expression of a conception and the expression of an Idea. Only the + latter can be an end of art; the other is a foreign end, the + trifling amusement of making a picture also do service as a legend, + as a hieroglyphic, invented for the pleasure of those to whom the + true nature of art can never appeal. It is the same thing as when a + work of art is also a useful implement of some kind, in which case + it also serves two ends; for example, a statue which is at the same + time a candelabrum or a caryatide; or a bas-relief, which is also + the shield of Achilles. True lovers of art will allow neither the + one nor the other. It is true that an allegorical picture may, + because of this quality, produce a vivid impression upon the + feelings; but when this is the case, a legend would under the same + circumstances produce the same effect. For example, if the desire + of fame were firmly and lastingly <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page308">[pg 308]</span><a name="Pg308" id="Pg308" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> rooted in the heart of a man, because he + regarded it as his rightful possession, which is only withheld from + him so long as he has not produced the charter of his ownership; + and if the Genius of Fame, with his laurel crown, were to appear to + such a man, his whole mind would be excited, and his powers called + into activity; but the same effect would be produced if he were + suddenly to see the word <span class="tei tei-q">“fame,”</span> in + large distinct letters on the wall. Or if a man has made known a + truth, which is of importance either as a maxim for practical life, + or as insight for science, but it has not been believed; an + allegorical picture representing time as it lifts the veil, and + discloses the naked figure of Truth, will affect him powerfully; + but the same effect would be produced by the legend: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "fr"><span style="font-style: italic">Le temps découvre la + vérité.</span></span>”</span> For what really produces the effect + here is the abstract thought, not the object of perception.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If then, in + accordance with what has been said, allegory in plastic and + pictorial art is a mistaken effort, serving an end which is + entirely foreign to art, it becomes quite unbearable when it leads + so far astray that the representation of forced and violently + introduced subtilties degenerates into absurdity. Such, for + example, is a tortoise, to represent feminine seclusion; the + downward glance of Nemesis into the drapery of her bosom, + signifying that she can see into what is hidden; the explanation of + Bellori that Hannibal Carracci represents voluptuousness clothed in + a yellow robe, because he wishes to indicate that her lovers soon + fade and become yellow as straw. If there is absolutely no + connection between the representation and the conception signified + by it, founded on subsumption under the concept, or association of + Ideas; but the signs and the things signified are combined in a + purely conventional manner, by positive, accidentally introduced + laws; then I call this degenerate kind of allegory <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Symbolism</span></em>. Thus the rose is the + symbol of secrecy, the laurel is the symbol of fame, the palm is + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page309">[pg 309]</span><a name= + "Pg309" id="Pg309" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the symbol of peace, + the scallop-shell is the symbol of pilgrimage, the cross is the + symbol of the Christian religion. To this class also belongs all + significance of mere colour, as yellow is the colour of falseness, + and blue is the colour of fidelity. Such symbols may often be of + use in life, but their value is foreign to art. They are simply to + be regarded as hieroglyphics, or like Chinese word-writing, and + really belong to the same class as armorial bearings, the bush that + indicates a public-house, the key of the chamberlain, or the + leather of the mountaineer. If, finally, certain historical or + mythical persons, or personified conceptions, are represented by + certain fixed symbols, these are properly called <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">emblems</span></em>. Such are the beasts of + the Evangelist, the owl of Minerva, the apple of Paris, the Anchor + of Hope, &c. For the most part, however, we understand by + emblems those simple allegorical representations explained by a + motto, which are meant to express a moral truth, and of which large + collections have been made by J. Camerarius, Alciatus, and others. + They form the transition to poetical allegory, of which we shall + have more to say later. Greek sculpture devotes itself to the + perception, and therefore it is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">æsthetical</span></em>; Indian sculpture + devotes itself to the conception, and therefore it is merely + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">symbolical</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This conclusion + in regard to allegory, which is founded on our consideration of the + nature of art and quite consistent with it, is directly opposed to + the opinion of Winckelmann, who, far from explaining allegory, as + we do, as something quite foreign to the end of art, and often + interfering with it, always speaks in favour of it, and indeed + (Works, vol. i. p. 55) places the highest aim of art in the + <span class="tei tei-q">“representation of universal conceptions, + and non-sensuous things.”</span> We leave it to every one to adhere + to whichever view he pleases. Only the truth became very clear to + me from these and similar views of Winckelmann connected with his + peculiar metaphysic of the beautiful, that one may have the + greatest susceptibility <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page310">[pg + 310]</span><a name="Pg310" id="Pg310" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + for artistic beauty, and the soundest judgment in regard to it, + without being able to give an abstract and strictly philosophical + justification of the nature of the beautiful; just as one may be + very noble and virtuous, and may have a tender conscience, which + decides with perfect accuracy in particular cases, without on that + account being in a position to investigate and explain in the + abstract the ethical significance of action.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Allegory has an + entirely different relation to poetry from that which it has to + plastic and pictorial art, and although it is to be rejected in the + latter, it is not only permissible, but very serviceable to the + former. For in plastic and pictorial art it leads away from what is + perceptibly given, the proper object of all art, to abstract + thoughts; but in poetry the relation is reversed; for here what is + directly given in words is the concept, and the first aim is to + lead from this to the object of perception, the representation of + which must be undertaken by the imagination of the hearer. If in + plastic and pictorial art we are led from what is immediately given + to something else, this must always be a conception, because here + only the abstract cannot be given directly; but a conception must + never be the source, and its communication must never be the end of + a work of art. In poetry, on the contrary, the conception is the + material, the immediately given, and therefore we may very well + leave it, in order to call up perceptions which are quite + different, and in which the end is reached. Many a conception or + abstract thought may be quite indispensable to the connection of a + poem, which is yet, in itself and directly, quite incapable of + being perceived; and then it is often made perceptible by means of + some example which is subsumed under it. This takes place in every + trope, every metaphor, simile, parable, and allegory, all of which + differ only in the length and completeness of their expression. + Therefore, in the arts which employ language as their medium, + similes and allegories are of striking effect. How beautifully + Cervantes <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page311">[pg + 311]</span><a name="Pg311" id="Pg311" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + says of sleep in order to express the fact that it frees us from + all spiritual and bodily suffering, <span class="tei tei-q">“It is + a mantle that covers all mankind.”</span> How beautifully Kleist + expresses allegorically the thought that philosophers and men of + science enlighten mankind, in the line, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Those whose midnight lamp lights the world.”</span> + How strongly and sensuously Homer describes the harmful Ate when he + says: <span class="tei tei-q">“She has tender feet, for she walks + not on the hard earth, but treads on the heads of men”</span> (Il. + xix. 91.) How forcibly we are struck by Menenius Agrippa's fable of + the belly and the limbs, addressed to the people of Rome when they + seceded. How beautifully Plato's figure of the Cave, at the + beginning of the seventh book of the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Republic”</span> to which we have already referred, + expresses a very abstract philosophical dogma. The fable of + Persephone is also to be regarded as a deeply significant allegory + of philosophical tendency, for she became subject to the nether + world by tasting a pomegranate. This becomes peculiarly + enlightening from Goethe's treatment of the fable, as an episode in + the <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Triumph der Empfindsamkeit</span></span>, + which is beyond all praise. Three detailed allegorical works are + known to me, one, open and avowed, is the incomparable <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Criticon”</span> of Balthasar Gracian. It consists of + a great rich web of connected and highly ingenious allegories, that + serve here as the fair clothing of moral truths, to which he thus + imparts the most perceptible form, and astonishes us by the + richness of his invention. The two others are concealed allegories, + <span class="tei tei-q">“Don Quixote”</span> and <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Gulliver's Travels.”</span> The first is an allegory + of the life of every man, who will not, like others, be careful, + merely for his own welfare, but follows some objective, ideal end, + which has taken possession of his thoughts and will; and certainly, + in this world, he has then a strange appearance. In the case of + Gulliver we have only to take everything physical as spiritual or + intellectual, in order to see what the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“satirical rogue,”</span> as Hamlet would call him, + meant by it. Such, then, in the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page312">[pg 312]</span><a name="Pg312" id="Pg312" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> poetical allegory, the conception is always + the given, which it tries to make perceptible by means of a + picture; it may sometimes be expressed or assisted by a painted + picture. Such a picture will not be regarded as a work of art, but + only as a significant symbol, and it makes no claim to pictorial, + but only to poetical worth. Such is that beautiful allegorical + vignette of Lavater's, which must be so heartening to every + defender of truth: a hand holding a light is stung by a wasp, while + gnats are burning themselves in the flame above; underneath is the + motto:</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">And + although it singes the wings of the gnats,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Destroys their heads and all + their little brains,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 12.60em"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Light is still light;</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">And although I am stung by the + angriest wasp,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 12.60em"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">I will not let it go.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">To this class + also belongs the gravestone with the burnt-out, smoking candle, and + the inscription—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">When it + is out, it becomes clear</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Whether the candle was tallow or + wax.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Finally, of this + kind is an old German genealogical tree, in which the last + representative of a very ancient family thus expresses his + determination to live his life to the end in abstinence and perfect + chastity, and therefore to let his race die out; he represents + himself at the root of the high-branching tree cutting it over + himself with shears. In general all those symbols referred to + above, commonly called emblems, which might also be defined as + short painted fables with obvious morals, belong to this class. + Allegories of this kind are always to be regarded as belonging to + poetry, not to painting, and as justified thereby; moreover, the + pictorial execution is here always a matter of secondary + importance, and no more is demanded of it than that it shall + represent the thing so that we can recognise it. But in poetry, as + in plastic art, the allegory passes into the symbol if there is + merely <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page313">[pg + 313]</span><a name="Pg313" id="Pg313" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + an arbitrary connection between what it presented to perception and + the abstract significance of it. For as all symbolism rests, at + bottom, on an agreement, the symbol has this among other + disadvantages, that in time its meaning is forgotten, and then it + is dumb. Who would guess why the fish is a symbol of Christianity + if he did not know? Only a Champollion; for it is entirely a + phonetic hieroglyphic. Therefore, as a poetical allegory, the + Revelation of John stands much in the same position as the reliefs + with <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Magnus Deus sol Mithra</span></span>, which + are still constantly being explained.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 51. If now, + with the exposition which has been given of art in general, we turn + from plastic and pictorial art to poetry, we shall have no doubt + that its aim also is the revelation of the Ideas, the grades of the + objectification of will, and the communication of them to the + hearer with the distinctness and vividness with which the poetical + sense comprehends them. Ideas are essentially perceptible; if, + therefore, in poetry only abstract conceptions are directly + communicated through words, it is yet clearly the intention to make + the hearer perceive the Ideas of life in the representatives of + these conceptions, and this can only take place through the + assistance of his own imagination. But in order to set the + imagination to work for the accomplishment of this end, the + abstract conceptions, which are the immediate material of poetry as + of dry prose, must be so arranged that their spheres intersect each + other in such a way that none of them can remain in its abstract + universality; but, instead of it, a perceptible representative + appears to the imagination; and this is always further modified by + the words of the poet according to what his intention may be. As + the chemist obtains solid precipitates by combining perfectly clear + and transparent fluids; the poet understands how to precipitate, as + it were, the concrete, the individual, the perceptible idea, out of + the abstract and transparent universality of the concepts by the + manner in which he <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page314">[pg + 314]</span><a name="Pg314" id="Pg314" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + combines them. For the Idea can only be known by perception; and + knowledge of the Idea is the end of art. The skill of a master, in + poetry as in chemistry, enables us always to obtain the precise + precipitate we intended. This end is assisted by the numerous + epithets in poetry, by means of which the universality of every + concept is narrowed more and more till we reach the perceptible. + Homer attaches to almost every substantive an adjective, whose + concept intersects and considerably diminishes the sphere of the + concept of the substantive, which is thus brought so much the + nearer to perception: for example—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Εν δ᾽ + επεσ᾽ Ωκεανῳ λαμπρον φαος ἡελιοιο,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Ἑλκον νυκτα μελαιναν επι ζειδωρον + αρουραν.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">(</span><span class="tei tei-q" + style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Occidit + vero in Oceanum splendidum lumen solis,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Trahens noctem nigram super almam + terram.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">)</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Where + gentle winds from the blue heavens sigh,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">There stand the myrtles still, the laurel + high,</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">—</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">calls up before + the imagination by means of a few concepts the whole delight of a + southern clime.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Rhythm and rhyme + are quite peculiar aids to poetry. I can give no other explanation + of their incredibly powerful effect than that our faculties of + perception have received from time, to which they are essentially + bound, some quality on account of which we inwardly follow, and, as + it were, consent to each regularly recurring sound. In this way + rhythm and rhyme are partly a means of holding our attention, + because we willingly follow the poem read, and partly they produce + in us a blind consent to what is read prior to any judgment, and + this gives the poem a certain emphatic power of convincing + independent of all reasons.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From the general + nature of the material, that is, the concepts, which poetry uses to + communicate the Ideas, the extent of its province is very great. + The whole of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page315">[pg + 315]</span><a name="Pg315" id="Pg315" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + nature, the Ideas of all grades, can be represented by means of it, + for it proceeds according to the Idea it has to impart, so that its + representations are sometimes descriptive, sometimes narrative, and + sometimes directly dramatic. If, in the representation of the lower + grades of the objectivity of will, plastic and pictorial art + generally surpass it, because lifeless nature, and even brute + nature, reveals almost its whole being in a single well-chosen + moment; man, on the contrary, so far as he does not express himself + by the mere form and expression of his person, but through a series + of actions and the accompanying thoughts and emotions, is the + principal object of poetry, in which no other art can compete with + it, for here the progress or movement which cannot be represented + in plastic or pictorial art just suits its purpose.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The revelation + of the Idea, which is the highest grade of the objectivity of will, + the representation of man in the connected series of his efforts + and actions, is thus the great problem of poetry. It is true that + both experience and history teach us to know man; yet oftener men + than man, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, they give us empirical + notes of the behaviour of men to each other, from which we may + frame rules for our own conduct, oftener than they afford us deep + glimpses of the inner nature of man. The latter function, however, + is by no means entirely denied them; but as often as it is the + nature of mankind itself that discloses itself to us in history or + in our own experience, we have comprehended our experience, and the + historian has comprehended history, with artistic eyes, poetically, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, according to the Idea, not + the phenomenon, in its inner nature, not in its relations. Our own + experience is the indispensable condition of understanding poetry + as of understanding history; for it is, so to speak, the dictionary + of the language that both speak. But history is related to poetry + as portrait-painting is related to historical painting; the one + gives us the true in the individual, the other the true in the + universal; the one has the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page316">[pg 316]</span><a name="Pg316" id="Pg316" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> truth of the phenomenon, and can therefore + verify it from the phenomenal, the other has the truth of the Idea, + which can be found in no particular phenomenon, but yet speaks to + us from them all. The poet from deliberate choice represents + significant characters in significant situations; the historian + takes both as they come. Indeed, he must regard and select the + circumstances and the persons, not with reference to their inward + and true significance, which expresses the Idea, but according to + the outward, apparent, and relatively important significance with + regard to the connection and the consequences. He must consider + nothing in and for itself in its essential character and + expression, but must look at everything in its relations, in its + connection, in its influence upon what follows, and especially upon + its own age. Therefore he will not overlook an action of a king, + though of little significance, and in itself quite common, because + it has results and influence. And, on the other hand, actions of + the highest significance of particular and very eminent individuals + are not to be recorded by him if they have no consequences. For his + treatment follows the principle of sufficient reason, and + apprehends the phenomenon, of which this principle is the form. But + the poet comprehends the Idea, the inner nature of man apart from + all relations, outside all time, the adequate objectivity of the + thing-in-itself, at its highest grade. Even in that method of + treatment which is necessary for the historian, the inner nature + and significance of the phenomena, the kernel of all these shells, + can never be entirely lost. He who seeks for it, at any rate, may + find it and recognise it. Yet that which is significant in itself, + not in its relations, the real unfolding of the Idea, will be found + far more accurately and distinctly in poetry than in history, and, + therefore, however paradoxical it may sound, far more really + genuine inner truth is to be attributed to poetry than to history. + For the historian must accurately follow the particular event + according to <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page317">[pg + 317]</span><a name="Pg317" id="Pg317" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + life, as it develops itself in time in the manifold tangled chains + of causes and effects. It is, however, impossible that he can have + all the data for this; he cannot have seen all and discovered all. + He is forsaken at every moment by the original of his picture, or a + false one substitutes itself for it, and this so constantly that I + think I may assume that in all history the false outweighs the + true. The poet, on the contrary, has comprehended the Idea of man + from some definite side which is to be represented; thus it is the + nature of his own self that objectifies itself in it for him. His + knowledge, as we explained above when speaking of sculpture, is + half <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>; his + ideal stands before his mind firm, distinct, brightly illuminated, + and cannot forsake him; therefore he shows us, in the mirror of his + mind, the Idea pure and distinct, and his delineation of it down to + the minutest particular is true as life itself.<a id="noteref_59" + name="noteref_59" href="#note_59"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">59</span></span></a> The + great ancient historians are, therefore, in those particulars in + which their data fail them, for example, in the speeches of their + heroes—poets; indeed their whole manner of handling their material + approaches <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page318">[pg + 318]</span><a name="Pg318" id="Pg318" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + to the epic. But this gives their representations unity, and + enables them to retain inner truth, even when outward truth was not + accessible, or indeed was falsified. And as we compared history to + portrait-painting, in contradistinction to poetry, which + corresponds to historical painting, we find that Winckelmann's + maxim, that the portrait ought to be the ideal of the individual, + was followed by the ancient historians, for they represent the + individual in such a way as to bring out that side of the Idea of + man which is expressed in it. Modern historians, on the contrary, + with few exceptions, give us in general only <span class= + "tei tei-q">“a dust-bin and a lumber-room, and at the most a + chronicle of the principal political events.”</span> Therefore, + whoever desires to know man in his inner nature, identical in all + its phenomena and developments, to know him according to the Idea, + will find that the works of the great, immortal poet present a far + truer, more distinct picture, than the historians can ever give. + For even the best of the historians are, as poets, far from the + first; and moreover their hands are tied. In this aspect the + relation between the historian and the poet may be illustrated by + the following comparison. The mere, pure historian, who works only + according to data, is like a man, who without any knowledge of + mathematics, has investigated the relations of certain figures, + which he has accidentally found, by measuring them; and the problem + thus empirically solved is affected of course by all the errors of + the drawn figure. The poet, on the other hand, is like the + mathematician, who constructs these relations <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> in pure perception, and + expresses them not as they actually are in the drawn figure, but as + they are in the Idea, which the drawing is intended to render for + the senses. Therefore Schiller says:—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">What + has never anywhere come to pass,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">That alone never grows + old.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page319">[pg 319]</span><a name= + "Pg319" id="Pg319" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Indeed I must + attribute greater value to biographies, and especially to + autobiographies, in relation to the knowledge of the nature of man, + than to history proper, at least as it is commonly handled. Partly + because in the former the data can be collected more accurately and + completely than in the latter; partly, because in history proper, + it is not so much men as nations and heroes that act, and the + individuals who do appear, seem so far off, surrounded with such + pomp and circumstance, clothed in the stiff robes of state, or + heavy, inflexible armour, that it is really hard through all this + to recognise the human movements. On the other hand, the life of + the individual when described with truth, in a narrow sphere, shows + the conduct of men in all its forms and subtilties, the excellence, + the virtue, and even holiness of a few, the perversity, meanness, + and knavery of most, the dissolute profligacy of some. Besides, in + the only aspect we are considering here, that of the inner + significance of the phenomenal, it is quite the same whether the + objects with which the action is concerned, are, relatively + considered, trifling or important, farm-houses or kingdoms: for all + these things in themselves are without significance, and obtain it + only in so far as the will is moved by them. The motive has + significance only through its relation to the will, while the + relation which it has as a thing to other things like itself, does + not concern us here. As a circle of one inch in diameter, and a + circle of forty million miles in diameter, have precisely the same + geometrical properties, so are the events and the history of a + village and a kingdom essentially the same; and we may study and + learn to know mankind as well in the one as in the other. It is + also a mistake to suppose that autobiographies are full of deceit + and dissimulation. On the contrary, lying (though always possible) + is perhaps more difficult there than elsewhere. Dissimulation is + easiest in mere conversation; indeed, though it may sound + paradoxical, it is really more <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page320">[pg 320]</span><a name="Pg320" id="Pg320" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> difficult even in a letter. For in the case + of a letter the writer is alone, and looks into himself, and not + out on the world, so that what is strange and distant does not + easily approach him; and he has not the test of the impression made + upon another before his eyes. But the receiver of the letter + peruses it quietly in a mood unknown to the writer, reads it + repeatedly and at different times, and thus easily finds out the + concealed intention. We also get to know an author as a man most + easily from his books, because all these circumstances act here + still more strongly and permanently. And in an autobiography it is + so difficult to dissimulate, that perhaps there does not exist a + single one that is not, as a whole, more true, than any history + that ever was written. The man who writes his own life surveys it + as a whole, the particular becomes small, the near becomes distant, + the distant becomes near again, the motives that influenced him + shrink; he seats himself at the confessional, and has done so of + his own free will; the spirit of lying does not so easily take hold + of him here, for there is also in every man an inclination to truth + which has first to be overcome whenever he lies, and which here has + taken up a specially strong position. The relation between + biography and the history of nations may be made clear for + perception by means of the following comparison: History shows us + mankind as a view from a high mountain shows us nature; we see much + at a time, wide stretches, great masses, but nothing is distinct + nor recognisable in all the details of its own peculiar nature. On + the other hand, the representation of the life of the individual + shows us the man, as we see nature if we go about among her trees, + plants, rocks, and waters. But in landscape-painting, in which the + artist lets us look at nature with his eyes, the knowledge of the + Ideas, and the condition of pure will-less knowing, which is + demanded by these, is made much easier for us; and, in the same + way, poetry is far superior both to <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page321">[pg 321]</span><a name="Pg321" id="Pg321" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> history and biography, in the representation + of the Ideas which may be looked for in all three. For here also + genius holds up to us the magic glass, in which all that is + essential and significant appears before us collected and placed in + the clearest light, and what is accidental and foreign is left + out.<a id="noteref_60" name="noteref_60" href= + "#note_60"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">60</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The + representation of the Idea of man, which is the work of the poet, + may be performed, so that what is represented is also the + representer. This is the case in lyrical poetry, in songs, properly + so called, in which the poet only perceives vividly his own state + and describes it. Thus a certain subjectivity is essential to this + kind of poetry from the nature of its object. Again, what is to be + represented may be entirely different from him who represents it, + as is the case in all other kinds of poetry, in which the poet more + or less conceals himself behind his representation, and at last + disappears altogether. In the ballad the poet still expresses to + some extent his own state through the tone and proportion of the + whole; therefore, though much more objective than the lyric, it has + yet something subjective. This becomes less in the idyll, still + less in the romantic poem, almost entirely disappears in the true + epic, and even to the last vestige in the drama, which is the most + objective and, in more than one respect, the completest and most + difficult form of poetry. The lyrical form of poetry is + consequently the easiest, and although art, as a whole, belongs + only to the true man of genius, who so rarely appears, even a man + who is not in general very remarkable may produce a beautiful song + if, by actual strong excitement from without, some inspiration + raises his mental powers; for all that is required for this is a + lively perception of his own state at a moment of emotional + excitement. This is proved by the existence of many single songs by + individuals who have otherwise remained unknown; especially the + German national songs, of which we have an exquisite collection + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page322">[pg 322]</span><a name= + "Pg322" id="Pg322" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Wunderhorn;”</span> and also by innumerable love-songs + and other songs of the people in all languages;—for to seize the + mood of a moment and embody it in a song is the whole achievement + of this kind of poetry. Yet in the lyrics of true poets the inner + nature of all mankind is reflected, and all that millions of past, + present, and future men have found, or will find, in the same + situations, which are constantly recurring, finds its exact + expression in them. And because these situations, by constant + recurrence, are permanent as man himself and always call up the + same sensations, the lyrical productions of genuine poets remain + through thousands of years true, powerful, and fresh. But if the + poet is always the universal man, then all that has ever moved a + human heart, all that human nature in any situation has ever + produced from itself, all that dwells and broods in any human + breast—is his theme and his material, and also all the rest of + nature. Therefore the poet may just as well sing of voluptuousness + as of mysticism, be Anacreon or Angelus Silesius, write tragedies + or comedies, represent the sublime or the common mind—according to + humour or vocation. And no one has the right to prescribe to the + poet what he ought to be—noble and sublime, moral, pious, + Christian, one thing or another, still less to reproach him because + he is one thing and not another. He is the mirror of mankind, and + brings to its consciousness what it feels and does.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If we now + consider more closely the nature of the lyric proper, and select as + examples exquisite and pure models, not those that approach in any + way to some other form of poetry, such as the ballad, the elegy, + the hymn, the epigram, &c., we shall find that the peculiar + nature of the lyric, in the narrowest sense, is this: It is the + subject of will, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, his own volition, which + the consciousness of the singer feels; often as a released and + satisfied desire (joy), but still oftener as a restricted desire + (grief), always as an emotion, a passion, a moved frame of mind. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page323">[pg 323]</span><a name= + "Pg323" id="Pg323" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Besides this, + however, and along with it, by the sight of surrounding nature, the + singer becomes conscious of himself as the subject of pure, + will-less knowing, whose unbroken blissful peace now appears, in + contrast to the stress of desire which is always restricted and + always needy. The feeling of this contrast, this alternation, is + really what the lyric as a whole expresses, and what principally + constitutes the lyrical state of mind. In it pure knowing comes to + us, as it were, to deliver us from desire and its stain; we follow, + but only for an instant; desire, the remembrance of our own + personal ends, tears us anew from peaceful contemplation; yet ever + again the next beautiful surrounding in which the pure will-less + knowledge presents itself to us, allures us away from desire. + Therefore, in the lyric and the lyrical mood, desire (the personal + interest of the ends), and pure perception of the surrounding + presented, are wonderfully mingled with each other; connections + between them are sought for and imagined; the subjective + disposition, the affection of the will, imparts its own hue to the + perceived surrounding, and conversely, the surroundings communicate + the reflex of their colour to the will. The true lyric is the + expression of the whole of this mingled and divided state of mind. + In order to make clear by examples this abstract analysis of a + frame of mind that is very far from all abstraction, any of the + immortal songs of Goethe may be taken. As specially adapted for + this end I shall recommend only a few: <span class="tei tei-q">“The + Shepherd's Lament,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“Welcome and + Farewell,”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“To the Moon,”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“On the Lake,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Autumn;”</span> also the songs in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Wunderhorn”</span> are excellent examples; + particularly the one which begins, <span class="tei tei-q">“O + Bremen, I must now leave thee.”</span> As a comical and happy + parody of the lyrical character a song of Voss strikes me as + remarkable. It describes the feeling of a drunk plumber falling + from a tower, who observes in passing that the clock on the tower + is at half-past eleven, a remark which is quite foreign to his + condition, and thus <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page324">[pg + 324]</span><a name="Pg324" id="Pg324" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + belongs to knowledge free from will. Whoever accepts the view that + has been expressed of the lyrical frame of mind, will also allow, + that it is the sensuous and poetical knowledge of the principle + which I established in my essay on the Principle of Sufficient + Reason, and have also referred to in this work, that the identity + of the subject of knowing with that of willing may be called the + miracle κατ᾽ εξοχην; so that the poetical effect of the lyric rests + finally on the truth of that principle. In the course of life these + two subjects, or, in popular language, head and heart, are ever + becoming further apart; men are always separating more between + their subjective feeling and their objective knowledge. In the + child the two are still entirely blended together; it scarcely + knows how to distinguish itself from its surroundings, it is at one + with them. In the young man all perception chiefly affects feeling + and mood, and even mingles with it, as Byron very beautifully + expresses—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">I live + not in myself, but I become</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Portion of that around me; and + to me</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">High mountains are a + feeling.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This is why the + youth clings so closely to the perceptible and outward side of + things; this is why he is only fit for lyrical poetry, and only the + full-grown man is capable of the drama. The old man we can think of + as at the most an epic poet, like Ossian, and Homer, for narration + is characteristic of old age.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the more + objective kinds of poetry, especially in the romance, the epic, and + the drama, the end, the revelation of the Idea of man, is + principally attained by two means, by true and profound + representation of significant characters, and by the invention of + pregnant situations in which they disclose themselves. For as it is + incumbent upon the chemist not only to exhibit the simple elements, + pure and genuine, and their principal compounds, but also to expose + them to the influence of such reagents as will <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page325">[pg 325]</span><a name="Pg325" id="Pg325" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> clearly and strikingly bring out their + peculiar qualities, so is it incumbent on the poet not only to + present to us significant characters truly and faithfully as nature + itself; but, in order that we may get to know them, he must place + them in those situations in which their peculiar qualities will + fully unfold themselves, and appear distinctly in sharp outline; + situations which are therefore called significant. In real life, + and in history, situations of this kind are rarely brought about by + chance, and they stand alone, lost and concealed in the multitude + of those which are insignificant. The complete significance of the + situations ought to distinguish the romance, the epic, and the + drama from real life as completely as the arrangement and selection + of significant characters. In both, however, absolute truth is a + necessary condition of their effect, and want of unity in the + characters, contradiction either of themselves or of the nature of + humanity in general, as well as impossibility, or very great + improbability in the events, even in mere accessories, offend just + as much in poetry as badly drawn figures, false perspective, or + wrong lighting in painting. For both in poetry and painting we + demand the faithful mirror of life, of man, of the world, only made + more clear by the representation, and more significant by the + arrangement. For there is only one end of all the arts, the + representation of the Ideas; and their essential difference lies + simply in the different grades of the objectification of will to + which the Ideas that are to be represented belong. This also + determines the material of the representation. Thus the arts which + are most widely separated may yet throw light on each other. For + example, in order to comprehend fully the Ideas of water it is not + sufficient to see it in the quiet pond or in the evenly-flowing + stream; but these Ideas disclose themselves fully only when the + water appears under all circumstances and exposed to all kinds of + obstacles. The effects of the varied circumstances and obstacles + give it the opportunity of fully <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page326">[pg 326]</span><a name="Pg326" id="Pg326" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> exhibiting all its qualities. This is why we + find it beautiful when it tumbles, rushes, and foams, or leaps into + the air, or falls in a cataract of spray; or, lastly, if + artificially confined it springs up in a fountain. Thus showing + itself different under different circumstances, it yet always + faithfully asserts its character; it is just as natural to it to + spout up as to lie in glassy stillness; it is as ready for the one + as for the other as soon as the circumstances appear. Now, what the + engineer achieves with the fluid matter of water, the architect + achieves with the rigid matter of stone, and just this the epic or + dramatic poet achieves with the Idea of man. Unfolding and + rendering distinct the Idea expressing itself in the object of + every art, the Idea of the will which objectifies itself at each + grade, is the common end of all the arts. The life of man, as it + shows itself for the most part in the real world, is like the + water, as it is generally seen in the pond and the river; but in + the epic, the romance, the tragedy, selected characters are placed + in those circumstances in which all their special qualities unfold + themselves, the depths of the human heart are revealed, and become + visible in extraordinary and very significant actions. Thus poetry + objectifies the Idea of man, an Idea which has the peculiarity of + expressing itself in highly individual characters.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Tragedy is to be + regarded, and is recognised as the summit of poetical art, both on + account of the greatness of its effect and the difficulty of its + achievement. It is very significant for our whole system, and well + worthy of observation, that the end of this highest poetical + achievement is the representation of the terrible side of life. The + unspeakable pain, the wail of humanity, the triumph of evil, the + scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just + and innocent, is here presented to us; and in this lies a + significant hint of the nature of the world and of existence. It is + the strife of will with itself, which here, completely unfolded at + the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page327">[pg 327]</span><a name= + "Pg327" id="Pg327" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> highest grade of its + objectivity, comes into fearful prominence. It becomes visible in + the suffering of men, which is now introduced, partly through + chance and error, which appear as the rulers of the world, + personified as fate, on account of their insidiousness, which even + reaches the appearance of design; partly it proceeds from man + himself, through the self-mortifying efforts of a few, through the + wickedness and perversity of most. It is one and the same will that + lives and appears in them all, but whose phenomena fight against + each other and destroy each other. In one individual it appears + powerfully, in another more weakly; in one more subject to reason, + and softened by the light of knowledge, in another less so, till at + last, in some single case, this knowledge, purified and heightened + by suffering itself, reaches the point at which the phenomenon, the + veil of Mâya, no longer deceives it. It sees through the form of + the phenomenon, the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>. The egoism which rests on this + perishes with it, so that now the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motives</span></em> + that were so powerful before have lost their might, and instead of + them the complete knowledge of the nature of the world, which has a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quieting</span></em> effect on the will, + produces resignation, the surrender not merely of life, but of the + very will to live. Thus we see in tragedies the noblest men, after + long conflict and suffering, at last renounce the ends they have so + keenly followed, and all the pleasures of life for ever, or else + freely and joyfully surrender life itself. So is it with the + steadfast prince of Calderon; with Gretchen in <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Faust;”</span> with Hamlet, whom his friend Horatio + would willingly follow, but is bade remain a while, and in this + harsh world draw his breath in pain, to tell the story of Hamlet, + and clear his memory; so also is it with the Maid of Orleans, the + Bride of Messina; they all die purified by suffering, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + after the will to live which was formerly in them is dead. In the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Mohammed”</span> of Voltaire this is + actually expressed in the concluding <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page328">[pg 328]</span><a name="Pg328" id="Pg328" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> words which the dying Palmira addresses to + Mohammad: <span class="tei tei-q">“The world is for tyrants: + live!”</span> On the other hand, the demand for so-called poetical + justice rests on entire misconception of the nature of tragedy, + and, indeed, of the nature of the world itself. It boldly appears + in all its dulness in the criticisms which Dr. Samuel Johnson made + on particular plays of Shakespeare, for he very naïvely laments its + entire absence. And its absence is certainly obvious, for in what + has Ophelia, Desdemona, or Cordelia offended? But only the dull, + optimistic, Protestant-rationalistic, or peculiarly Jewish view of + life will make the demand for poetical justice, and find + satisfaction in it. The true sense of tragedy is the deeper + insight, that it is not his own individual sins that the hero + atones for, but original sin, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the crime of existence + itself:</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Pues el + delito mayor</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Del hombre es haber + nacido;</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">(</span><span class="tei tei-q" + style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">For the + greatest crime of man</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Is that he was born;</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">)</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">as Calderon + exactly expresses it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I shall allow + myself only one remark, more closely concerning the treatment of + tragedy. The representation of a great misfortune is alone + essential to tragedy. But the many different ways in which this is + introduced by the poet may be brought under three specific + conceptions. It may happen by means of a character of extraordinary + wickedness, touching the utmost limits of possibility, who becomes + the author of the misfortune; examples of this kind are Richard + III., Iago in <span class="tei tei-q">“Othello,”</span> Shylock in + <span class="tei tei-q">“The Merchant of Venice,”</span> Franz + Moor, Phædra of Euripides, Creon in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Antigone,”</span> &c., &c. Secondly, it may + happen through blind fate, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, chance and error; a true + pattern of this kind is the Œdipus Rex of Sophocles, the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Trachiniæ”</span> also; and in general + most of the tragedies of the ancients belong <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page329">[pg 329]</span><a name="Pg329" id="Pg329" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to this class. Among modern tragedies, + <span class="tei tei-q">“Romeo and Juliet,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Tancred”</span> by Voltaire, and <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The Bride of Messina,”</span> are examples. Lastly, + the misfortune may be brought about by the mere position of the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">dramatis personæ</span></span> with regard to + each other, through their relations; so that there is no need + either for a tremendous error or an unheard-of accident, nor yet + for a character whose wickedness reaches the limits of human + possibility; but characters of ordinary morality, under + circumstances such as often occur, are so situated with regard to + each other that their position compels them, knowingly and with + their eyes open, to do each other the greatest injury, without any + one of them being entirely in the wrong. This last kind of tragedy + seems to me far to surpass the other two, for it shows us the + greatest misfortune, not as an exception, not as something + occasioned by rare circumstances or monstrous characters, but as + arising easily and of itself out of the actions and characters of + men, indeed almost as essential to them, and thus brings it + terribly near to us. In the other two kinds we may look on the + prodigious fate and the horrible wickedness as terrible powers + which certainly threaten us, but only from afar, which we may very + well escape without taking refuge in renunciation. But in the last + kind of tragedy we see that those powers which destroy happiness + and life are such that their path to us also is open at every + moment; we see the greatest sufferings brought about by + entanglements that our fate might also partake of, and through + actions that perhaps we also are capable of performing, and so + could not complain of injustice; then shuddering we feel ourselves + already in the midst of hell. This last kind of tragedy is also the + most difficult of achievement; for the greatest effect has to be + produced in it with the least use of means and causes of movement, + merely through the position and distribution of the characters; + therefore even in many of the best tragedies this difficulty is + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page330">[pg 330]</span><a name= + "Pg330" id="Pg330" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> evaded. Yet one + tragedy may be referred to as a perfect model of this kind, a + tragedy which in other respects is far surpassed by more than one + work of the same great master; it is <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Clavigo.”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Hamlet”</span> belongs to a certain extent to this + class, as far as the relation of Hamlet to Laertes and Ophelia is + concerned. <span class="tei tei-q">“Wallenstein”</span> has also + this excellence. <span class="tei tei-q">“Faust”</span> belongs + entirely to this class, if we regard the events connected with + Gretchen and her brother as the principal action; also the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Cid”</span> of Corneille, only that it + lacks the tragic conclusion, while on the contrary the analogous + relation of Max to Thecla has it.<a id="noteref_61" name= + "noteref_61" href="#note_61"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">61</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 52. Now that + we have considered all the fine arts in the general way that is + suitable to our point of view, beginning with architecture, the + peculiar end of which is to elucidate the objectification of will + at the lowest grades of its visibility, in which it shows itself as + the dumb unconscious tendency of the mass in accordance with laws, + and yet already reveals a breach of the unity of will with itself + in a conflict between gravity and rigidity—and ending with the + consideration of tragedy, which presents to us at the highest + grades of the objectification of will this very conflict with + itself in terrible magnitude and distinctness; we find that there + is still another fine art which has been excluded from our + consideration, and had to be excluded, for in the systematic + connection of our exposition there was no fitting place for it—I + mean <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">music</span></em>. It stands alone, quite cut + off from all the other arts. In it we do not recognise the copy or + repetition of any Idea of existence in the world. Yet it is such a + great and exceedingly noble art, its effect on the inmost nature of + man is so powerful, and it is so entirely and deeply understood by + him in his inmost consciousness as a perfectly universal language, + the distinctness of which surpasses even that of the perceptible + world itself, that we certainly have more to <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page331">[pg 331]</span><a name="Pg331" id="Pg331" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> look for in it than an <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">exercitum arithmeticæ occultum nescientis se + numerare animi</span></span>,<a id="noteref_62" name="noteref_62" + href="#note_62"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">62</span></span></a> which + Leibnitz called it. Yet he was perfectly right, as he considered + only its immediate external significance, its form. But if it were + nothing more, the satisfaction which it affords would be like that + which we feel when a sum in arithmetic comes out right, and could + not be that intense pleasure with which we see the deepest recesses + of our nature find utterance. From our standpoint, therefore, at + which the æsthetic effect is the criterion, we must attribute to + music a far more serious and deep significance, connected with the + inmost nature of the world and our own self, and in reference to + which the arithmetical proportions, to which it may be reduced, are + related, not as the thing signified, but merely as the sign. That + in some sense music must be related to the world as the + representation to the thing represented, as the copy to the + original, we may conclude from the analogy of the other arts, all + of which possess this character, and affect us on the whole in the + same way as it does, only that the effect of music is stronger, + quicker, more necessary and infallible. Further, its representative + relation to the world must be very deep, absolutely true, and + strikingly accurate, because it is instantly understood by every + one, and has the appearance of a certain infallibility, because its + form may be reduced to perfectly definite rules expressed in + numbers, from which it cannot free itself without entirely ceasing + to be music. Yet the point of comparison between music and the + world, the respect in which it stands to the world in the relation + of a copy or repetition, is very obscure. Men have practised music + in all ages without being able to account for this; content to + understand it directly, they renounce all claim to an abstract + conception of this direct understanding itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I gave my mind + entirely up to the impression of music <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page332">[pg 332]</span><a name="Pg332" id="Pg332" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> in all its forms, and then returned to + reflection and the system of thought expressed in the present work, + and thus I arrived at an explanation of the inner nature of music + and of the nature of its imitative relation to the world—which from + analogy had necessarily to be presupposed—an explanation which is + quite sufficient for myself, and satisfactory to my investigation, + and which will doubtless be equally evident to any one who has + followed me thus far and has agreed with my view of the world. Yet + I recognise the fact that it is essentially impossible to prove + this explanation, for it assumes and establishes a relation of + music, as idea, to that which from its nature can never be idea, + and music will have to be regarded as the copy of an original which + can never itself be directly presented as idea. I can therefore do + no more than state here, at the conclusion of this third book, + which has been principally devoted to the consideration of the + arts, the explanation of the marvellous art of music which + satisfies myself, and I must leave the acceptance or denial of my + view to the effect produced upon each of my readers both by music + itself and by the whole system of thought communicated in this + work. Moreover, I regard it as necessary, in order to be able to + assent with full conviction to the exposition of the significance + of music I am about to give, that one should often listen to music + with constant reflection upon my theory concerning it, and for this + again it is necessary to be very familiar with the whole of my + system of thought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The (Platonic) + Ideas are the adequate objectification of will. To excite or + suggest the knowledge of these by means of the representation of + particular things (for works of art themselves are always + representations of particular things) is the end of all the other + arts, which can only be attained by a corresponding change in the + knowing subject. Thus all these arts objectify the will indirectly + only by means of the Ideas; and since our world is nothing but the + manifestation of the Ideas in <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page333">[pg 333]</span><a name="Pg333" id="Pg333" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> multiplicity, though their entrance into the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span> (the + form of the knowledge possible for the individual as such), music + also, since it passes over the Ideas, is entirely independent of + the phenomenal world, ignores it altogether, could to a certain + extent exist if there was no world at all, which cannot be said of + the other arts. Music is as <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">direct</span></em> an objectification and copy + of the whole <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em> as the world itself, nay, + even as the Ideas, whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the + world of individual things. Music is thus by no means like the + other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">copy of the will + itself</span></em>, whose objectivity the Ideas are. This is why + the effect of music is so much more powerful and penetrating than + that of the other arts, for they speak only of shadows, but it + speaks of the thing itself. Since, however, it is the same will + which objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in music, though in + quite different ways, there must be, not indeed a direct likeness, + but yet a parallel, an analogy, between music and the Ideas whose + manifestation in multiplicity and incompleteness is the visible + world. The establishing of this analogy will facilitate, as an + illustration, the understanding of this exposition, which is so + difficult on account of the obscurity of the subject.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I recognise in + the deepest tones of harmony, in the bass, the lowest grades of the + objectification of will, unorganised nature, the mass of the + planet. It is well known that all the high notes which are easily + sounded, and die away more quickly, are produced by the vibration + in their vicinity of the deep bass-notes. When, also, the low notes + sound, the high notes always sound faintly, and it is a law of + harmony that only those high notes may accompany a bass-note which + actually already sound along with it of themselves (its <span lang= + "fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sons harmoniques</span></span>) on account of + its vibration. This is analogous to the fact that the whole of the + bodies and organisations of nature must be regarded as having come + into existence through gradual development out of the mass of the + planet; this <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page334">[pg + 334]</span><a name="Pg334" id="Pg334" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + is both their supporter and their source, and the same relation + subsists between the high notes and the bass. There is a limit of + depth, below which no sound is audible. This corresponds to the + fact that no matter can be perceived without form and quality, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, without the manifestation + of a force which cannot be further explained, in which an Idea + expresses itself, and, more generally, that no matter can be + entirely without will. Thus, as a certain pitch is inseparable from + the note as such, so a certain grade of the manifestation of will + is inseparable from matter. Bass is thus, for us, in harmony what + unorganised nature, the crudest mass, upon which all rests, and + from which everything originates and develops, is in the world. + Now, further, in the whole of the complemental parts which make up + the harmony between the bass and the leading voice singing the + melody, I recognise the whole gradation of the Ideas in which the + will objectifies itself. Those nearer to the bass are the lower of + these grades, the still unorganised, but yet manifold phenomenal + things; the higher represent to me the world of plants and beasts. + The definite intervals of the scale are parallel to the definite + grades of the objectification of will, the definite species in + nature. The departure from the arithmetical correctness of the + intervals, through some temperament, or produced by the key + selected, is analogous to the departure of the individual from the + type of the species. Indeed, even the impure discords, which give + no definite interval, may be compared to the monstrous abortions + produced by beasts of two species, or by man and beast. But to all + these bass and complemental parts which make up the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">harmony</span></em> + there is wanting that connected progress which belongs only to the + high voice singing the melody, and it alone moves quickly and + lightly in modulations and runs, while all these others have only a + slower movement without a connection in each part for itself. The + deep bass moves most slowly, the representative of the crudest + mass. Its <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page335">[pg + 335]</span><a name="Pg335" id="Pg335" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + rising and falling occurs only by large intervals, in thirds, + fourths, fifths, never by <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> tone, unless it is a base + inverted by double counterpoint. This slow movement is also + physically essential to it; a quick run or shake in the low notes + cannot even be imagined. The higher complemental parts, which are + parallel to animal life, move more quickly, but yet without + melodious connection and significant progress. The disconnected + course of all the complemental parts, and their regulation by + definite laws, is analogous to the fact that in the whole + irrational world, from the crystal to the most perfect animal, no + being has a connected consciousness of its own which would make its + life into a significant whole, and none experiences a succession of + mental developments, none perfects itself by culture, but + everything exists always in the same way according to its kind, + determined by fixed law. Lastly, in the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">melody</span></em>, + in the high, singing, principal voice leading the whole and + progressing with unrestrained freedom, in the unbroken significant + connection of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">one</span></em> thought from beginning to end + representing a whole, I recognise the highest grade of the + objectification of will, the intellectual life and effort of man. + As he alone, because endowed with reason, constantly looks before + and after on the path of his actual life and its innumerable + possibilities, and so achieves a course of life which is + intellectual, and therefore connected as a whole; corresponding to + this, I say, the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">melody</span></em> has significant intentional + connection from beginning to end. It records, therefore, the + history of the intellectually enlightened will. This will expresses + itself in the actual world as the series of its deeds; but melody + says more, it records the most secret history of this + intellectually-enlightened will, pictures every excitement, every + effort, every movement of it, all that which the reason collects + under the wide and negative concept of feeling, and which it cannot + apprehend further through its abstract concepts. Therefore it has + always been said that music <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page336">[pg 336]</span><a name="Pg336" id="Pg336" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> is the language of feeling and of passion, as + words are the language of reason. Plato explains it as ἡ των μελων + κινησις μεμιμημενη, εν τοις παθημασιν ὁταν ψυχη γινηται + (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">melodiarum motus, animi affectus + imitans</span></span>), De Leg. vii.; and also Aristotle says: δια + τι οἱ ρυθμοι και τα μελη, φωνη ουσα, ηθεσιν εοικε (<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cur numeri musici et modi, qui voces sunt, + moribus similes sese exhibent?</span></span>): Probl. c. 19.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now the nature + of man consists in this, that his will strives, is satisfied and + strives anew, and so on for ever. Indeed, his happiness and + well-being consist simply in the quick transition from wish to + satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new wish. For the absence + of satisfaction is suffering, the empty longing for a new wish, + languor, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ennui</span></em>. And corresponding to this + the nature of melody is a constant digression and deviation from + the key-note in a thousand ways, not only to the harmonious + intervals to the third and dominant, but to every tone, to the + dissonant sevenths and to the superfluous degrees; yet there always + follows a constant return to the key-note. In all these deviations + melody expresses the multifarious efforts of will, but always its + satisfaction also by the final return to an harmonious interval, + and still more, to the key-note. The composition of melody, the + disclosure in it of all the deepest secrets of human willing and + feeling, is the work of genius, whose action, which is more + apparent here than anywhere else, lies far from all reflection and + conscious intention, and may be called an inspiration. The + conception is here, as everywhere in art, unfruitful. The composer + reveals the inner nature of the world, and expresses the deepest + wisdom in a language which his reason does not understand; as a + person under the influence of mesmerism tells things of which he + has no conception when he awakes. Therefore in the composer, more + than in any other artist, the man is entirely separated and + distinct from the artist. Even in the explanation of this wonderful + art, the concept shows its poverty <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page337">[pg 337]</span><a name="Pg337" id="Pg337" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and limitation. I shall try, however, to + complete our analogy. As quick transition from wish to + satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new wish, is happiness and + well-being, so quick melodies without great deviations are + cheerful; slow melodies, striking painful discords, and only + winding back through many bars to the keynote are, as analogous to + the delayed and hardly won satisfaction, sad. The delay of the new + excitement of will, languor, could have no other expression than + the sustained keynote, the effect of which would soon be + unbearable; very monotonous and unmeaning melodies approach this + effect. The short intelligible subjects of quick dance-music seem + to speak only of easily attained common pleasure. On the other + hand, the <span lang="it" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "it"><span style="font-style: italic">Allegro + maestoso</span></span>, in elaborate movements, long passages, and + wide deviations, signifies a greater, nobler effort towards a more + distant end, and its final attainment. The <span lang="it" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="it"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Adagio</span></span> speaks of the pain of a + great and noble effort which despises all trifling happiness. But + how wonderful is the effect of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">minor</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">major</span></em>! How astounding that the + change of half a tone, the entrance of a minor third instead of a + major, at once and inevitably forces upon us an anxious painful + feeling, from which again we are just as instantaneously delivered + by the major. The <span lang="it" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "it"><span style="font-style: italic">Adagio</span></span> + lengthens in the minor the expression of the keenest pain, and + becomes even a convulsive wail. Dance-music in the minor seems to + indicate the failure of that trifling happiness which we ought + rather to despise, seems to speak of the attainment of a lower end + with toil and trouble. The inexhaustibleness of possible melodies + corresponds to the inexhaustibleness of Nature in difference of + individuals, physiognomies, and courses of life. The transition + from one key to an entirely different one, since it altogether + breaks the connection with what went before, is like death, for the + individual ends in it; but the will which appeared in this + individual lives after him as before him, appearing in other + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page338">[pg 338]</span><a name= + "Pg338" id="Pg338" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> individuals, whose + consciousness, however, has no connection with his.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But it must + never be forgotten, in the investigation of all these analogies I + have pointed out, that music has no direct, but merely an indirect + relation to them, for it never expresses the phenomenon, but only + the inner nature, the in-itself of all phenomena, the will itself. + It does not therefore express this or that particular and definite + joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or delight, or + merriment, or peace of mind; but joy, sorrow, pain, horror, + delight, merriment, peace of mind <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">themselves</span></em>, to a certain extent in + the abstract, their essential nature, without accessories, and + therefore without their motives. Yet we completely understand them + in this extracted quintessence. Hence it arises that our + imagination is so easily excited by music, and now seeks to give + form to that invisible yet actively moved spirit-world which speaks + to us directly, and clothe it with flesh and blood, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + to embody it in an analogous example. This is the origin of the + song with words, and finally of the opera, the text of which should + therefore never forsake that subordinate position in order to make + itself the chief thing and the music a mere means of expressing it, + which is a great misconception and a piece of utter perversity; for + music always expresses only the quintessence of life and its + events, never these themselves, and therefore their differences do + not always affect it. It is precisely this universality, which + belongs exclusively to it, together with the greatest + determinateness, that gives music the high worth which it has as + the panacea for all our woes. Thus, if music is too closely united + to the words, and tries to form itself according to the events, it + is striving to speak a language which is not its own. No one has + kept so free from this mistake as Rossini; therefore his music + speaks <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">its own language</span></em> so distinctly and + purely that it requires no words, and produces its full effect when + rendered by instruments alone.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page339">[pg 339]</span><a name="Pg339" id="Pg339" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">According to all + this, we may regard the phenomenal world, or nature, and music as + two different expressions of the same thing, which is therefore + itself the only medium of their analogy, so that a knowledge of it + is demanded in order to understand that analogy. Music, therefore, + if regarded as an expression of the world, is in the highest degree + a universal language, which is related indeed to the universality + of concepts, much as they are related to the particular things. Its + universality, however, is by no means that empty universality of + abstraction, but quite of a different kind, and is united with + thorough and distinct definiteness. In this respect it resembles + geometrical figures and numbers, which are the universal forms of + all possible objects of experience and applicable to them all + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, and yet are not + abstract but perceptible and thoroughly determined. All possible + efforts, excitements, and manifestations of will, all that goes on + in the heart of man and that reason includes in the wide, negative + concept of feeling, may be expressed by the infinite number of + possible melodies, but always in the universal, in the mere form, + without the material, always according to the thing-in-itself, not + the phenomenon, the inmost soul, as it were, of the phenomenon, + without the body. This deep relation which music has to the true + nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable music + played to any scene, action, event, or surrounding seems to + disclose to us its most secret meaning, and appears as the most + accurate and distinct commentary upon it. This is so truly the + case, that whoever gives himself up entirely to the impression of a + symphony, seems to see all the possible events of life and the + world take place in himself, yet if he reflects, he can find no + likeness between the music and the things that passed before his + mind. For, as we have said, music is distinguished from all the + other arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or, + more accurately, the adequate objectivity of will, but is the + direct copy of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page340">[pg + 340]</span><a name="Pg340" id="Pg340" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + will itself, and therefore exhibits itself as the metaphysical to + everything physical in the world, and as the thing-in-itself to + every phenomenon. We might, therefore, just as well call the world + embodied music as embodied will; and this is the reason why music + makes every picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of the + world, at once appear with higher significance, certainly all the + more in proportion as its melody is analogous to the inner spirit + of the given phenomenon. It rests upon this that we are able to set + a poem to music as a song, or a perceptible representation as a + pantomime, or both as an opera. Such particular pictures of human + life, set to the universal language of music, are never bound to it + or correspond to it with stringent necessity; but they stand to it + only in the relation of an example chosen at will to a general + concept. In the determinateness of the real, they represent that + which music expresses in the universality of mere form. For + melodies are to a certain extent, like general concepts, an + abstraction from the actual. This actual world, then, the world of + particular things, affords the object of perception, the special + and individual, the particular case, both to the universality of + the concepts and to the universality of the melodies. But these two + universalities are in a certain respect opposed to each other; for + the concepts contain particulars only as the first forms abstracted + from perception, as it were, the separated shell of things; thus + they are, strictly speaking, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abstracta</span></span>; music, on the other + hand, gives the inmost kernel which precedes all forms, or the + heart of things. This relation may be very well expressed in the + language of the schoolmen by saying the concepts are the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">universalia post rem</span></span>, but music + gives the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">universalia ante + rem</span></span>, and the real world the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">universalia in re</span></span>. To the + universal significance of a melody to which a poem has been set, it + is quite possible to set other equally arbitrarily selected + examples of the universal expressed in this poem corresponding to + the significance of the melody in the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page341">[pg 341]</span><a name="Pg341" id="Pg341" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> same degree. This is why the same composition + is suitable to many verses; and this is also what makes the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vaudeville</span></em> possible. But that in + general a relation is possible between a composition and a + perceptible representation rests, as we have said, upon the fact + that both are simply different expressions of the same inner being + of the world. When now, in the particular case, such a relation is + actually given, that is to say, when the composer has been able to + express in the universal language of music the emotions of will + which constitute the heart of an event, then the melody of the + song, the music of the opera, is expressive. But the analogy + discovered by the composer between the two must have proceeded from + the direct knowledge of the nature of the world unknown to his + reason, and must not be an imitation produced with conscious + intention by means of conceptions, otherwise the music does not + express the inner nature of the will itself, but merely gives an + inadequate imitation of its phenomenon. All specially imitative + music does this; for example, <span class="tei tei-q">“The + Seasons,”</span> by Haydn; also many passages of his <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Creation,”</span> in which phenomena of the external + world are directly imitated; also all battle-pieces. Such music is + entirely to be rejected.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The unutterable + depth of all music by virtue of which it floats through our + consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in yet + ever distant from us, and by which also it is so fully understood + and yet so inexplicable, rests on the fact that it restores to us + all the emotions of our inmost nature, but entirely without reality + and far removed from their pain. So also the seriousness which is + essential to it, which excludes the absurd from its direct and + peculiar province, is to be explained by the fact that its object + is not the idea, with reference to which alone deception and + absurdity are possible; but its object is directly the will, and + this is essentially the most serious of all things, for it is that + on which all depends. How rich in content and full of <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page342">[pg 342]</span><a name="Pg342" id="Pg342" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> significance the language of music is, + we see from the repetitions, as well as the <span lang="it" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="it"><span style="font-style: italic">Da + capo</span></span>, the like of which would be unbearable in works + composed in a language of words, but in music are very appropriate + and beneficial, for, in order to comprehend it fully, we must hear + it twice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the whole of + this exposition of music I have been trying to bring out clearly + that it expresses in a perfectly universal language, in a + homogeneous material, mere tones, and with the greatest + determinateness and truth, the inner nature, the in-itself of the + world, which we think under the concept of will, because will is + its most distinct manifestation. Further, according to my view and + contention, philosophy is nothing but a complete and accurate + repetition or expression of the nature of the world in very general + concepts, for only in such is it possible to get a view of that + whole nature which will everywhere be adequate and applicable. + Thus, whoever has followed me and entered into my mode of thought, + will not think it so very paradoxical if I say, that supposing it + were possible to give a perfectly accurate, complete explanation of + music, extending even to particulars, that is to say, a detailed + repetition in concepts of what it expresses, this would also be a + sufficient repetition and explanation of the world in concepts, or + at least entirely parallel to such an explanation, and thus it + would be the true philosophy. Consequently the saying of Leibnitz + quoted above, which is quite accurate from a lower standpoint, may + be parodied in the following way to suit our higher view of music: + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum + nescientis se philosophari animi</span></span>; for <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">scire</span></span>, to know, always means to + have fixed in abstract concepts. But further, on account of the + truth of the saying of Leibnitz, which is confirmed in various + ways, music, regarded apart from its æsthetic or inner + significance, and looked at merely externally and purely + empirically, is simply the means of comprehending directly and in + the concrete <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page343">[pg + 343]</span><a name="Pg343" id="Pg343" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + large numbers and complex relations of numbers, which otherwise we + could only know indirectly by fixing them in concepts. Therefore by + the union of these two very different but correct views of music we + may arrive at a conception of the possibility of a philosophy of + number, such as that of Pythagoras and of the Chinese in Y-King, + and then interpret in this sense the saying of the Pythagoreans + which Sextus Empiricus quotes (adv. Math., L. vii.): τῳ αριθμῳ δε + τα παντ᾽ επεοικεν (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">numero cuncta + assimilantur</span></span>). And if, finally, we apply this view to + the interpretation of harmony and melody given above, we shall find + that a mere moral philosophy without an explanation of Nature, such + as Socrates wanted to introduce, is precisely analogous to a mere + melody without harmony, which Rousseau exclusively desired; and, in + opposition to this mere physics and metaphysics without ethics, + will correspond to mere harmony without melody. Allow me to add to + these cursory observations a few more remarks concerning the + analogy of music with the phenomenal world. We found in the second + book that the highest grade of the objectification of will, man, + could not appear alone and isolated, but presupposed the grades + below him, as these again presupposed the grades lower still. In + the same way music, which directly objectifies the will, just as + the world does, is complete only in full harmony. In order to + achieve its full effect, the high leading voice of the melody + requires the accompaniment of all the other voices, even to the + lowest bass, which is to be regarded as the origin of all. The + melody itself enters as an integral part into the harmony, as the + harmony enters into it, and only thus, in the full harmonious + whole, music expresses what it aims at expressing. Thus also the + one will outside of time finds its full objectification only in the + complete union of all the steps which reveal its nature in the + innumerable ascending grades of distinctness. The following analogy + is also very remarkable. We have seen in the preceding book that + notwithstanding <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page344">[pg + 344]</span><a name="Pg344" id="Pg344" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the self-adaptation of all the phenomena of will to each other as + regards their species, which constitutes their teleological aspect, + there yet remains an unceasing conflict between those phenomena as + individuals, which is visible at every grade, and makes the world a + constant battle-field of all those manifestations of one and the + same will, whose inner contradiction with itself becomes visible + through it. In music also there is something corresponding to this. + A complete, pure, harmonious system of tones is not only physically + but arithmetically impossible. The numbers themselves by which the + tones are expressed have inextricable irrationality. There is no + scale in which, when it is counted, every fifth will be related to + the keynote as 2 to 3, every major third as 4 to 5, every minor + third as 5 to 6, and so on. For if they are correctly related to + the keynote, they can no longer be so to each other; because, for + example, the fifth must be the minor third to the third, &c. + For the notes of the scale may be compared to actors who must play + now one part, now another. Therefore a perfectly accurate system of + music cannot even be thought, far less worked out; and on this + account all possible music deviates from perfect purity; it can + only conceal the discords essential to it by dividing them among + all the notes, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, by temperament. On this + see Chladni's <span class="tei tei-q">“Akustik,”</span> § 30, and + his <span class="tei tei-q">“Kurze Uebersicht der Schall- und + Klanglehre.”</span><a id="noteref_63" name="noteref_63" href= + "#note_63"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">63</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I might still + have something to say about the way in which music is perceived, + namely, in and through time alone, with absolute exclusion of + space, and also apart from the influence of the knowledge of + causality, thus without understanding; for the tones make the + æsthetic impression as effect, and without obliging us to go back + to their causes, as in the case of perception. I do not wish, + however, to lengthen this discussion, as I have perhaps already + gone too much into detail with regard to <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page345">[pg 345]</span><a name="Pg345" id="Pg345" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> some things in this Third Book, or have dwelt + too much on particulars. But my aim made it necessary, and it will + be the less disapproved if the importance and high worth of art, + which is seldom sufficiently recognised, be kept in mind. For if, + according to our view, the whole visible world is just the + objectification, the mirror, of the will, conducting it to + knowledge of itself, and, indeed, as we shall soon see, to the + possibility of its deliverance; and if, at the same time, the world + as idea, if we regard it in isolation, and, freeing ourselves from + all volition, allow it alone to take possession of our + consciousness, is the most joy-giving and the only innocent side of + life; we must regard art as the higher ascent, the more complete + development of all this, for it achieves essentially just what is + achieved by the visible world itself, only with greater + concentration, more perfectly, with intention and intelligence, and + therefore may be called, in the full significance of the word, the + flower of life. If the whole world as idea is only the visibility + of will, the work of art is to render this visibility more + distinct. It is the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">camera + obscura</span></span> which shows the objects more purely, and + enables us to survey them and comprehend them better. It is the + play within the play, the stage upon the stage in <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Hamlet.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The pleasure we + receive from all beauty, the consolation which art affords, the + enthusiasm of the artist, which enables him to forget the cares of + life,—the latter an advantage of the man of genius over other men, + which alone repays him for the suffering that increases in + proportion to the clearness of consciousness, and for the desert + loneliness among men of a different race,—all this rests on the + fact that the in-itself of life, the will, existence itself, is, as + we shall see farther on, a constant sorrow, partly miserable, + partly terrible; while, on the contrary, as idea alone, purely + contemplated, or copied by art, free from pain, it presents to us a + drama full of significance. This purely knowable side of the world, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page346">[pg 346]</span><a name= + "Pg346" id="Pg346" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and the copy of it + in any art, is the element of the artist. He is chained to the + contemplation of the play, the objectification of will; he remains + beside it, does not get tired of contemplating it and representing + it in copies; and meanwhile he bears himself the cost of the + production of that play, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, he himself is the will + which objectifies itself, and remains in constant suffering. That + pure, true, and deep knowledge of the inner nature of the world + becomes now for him an end in itself: he stops there. Therefore it + does not become to him a quieter of the will, as, we shall see in + the next book, it does in the case of the saint who has attained to + resignation; it does not deliver him for ever from life, but only + at moments, and is therefore not for him a path out of life, but + only an occasional consolation in it, till his power, increased by + this contemplation and at last tired of the play, lays hold on the + real. The St. Cecilia of Raphael may be regarded as a + representation of this transition. To the real, then, we now turn + in the following book.</p> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page347">[pg 347]</span><a name= + "Pg347" id="Pg347" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + <hr class="page" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc19" id="toc19"></a> <a name="pdf20" id="pdf20"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Fourth Book. The World As + Will.</span></h1> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <a name="toc21" id="toc21"></a> <a name="pdf22" id="pdf22"></a> + + <h2 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em"> + <span style="font-size: 144%">Second Aspect. The Assertion And + Denial Of The Will To Live, When Self-Consciousness Has Been + Attained.</span></h2> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Tempore quo cognitio simul + advenit, amor e medio supersurrexit.—</span><span class= + "tei tei-hi" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Oupnek'hat,</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-hi" style= + "text-align: left"><span style="font-size: 90%; font-style: italic"> + Studio Anquetil Duperron</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">, vol. ii. p. 216.</span> + </div> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page349">[pg 349]</span><a name= + "Pg349" id="Pg349" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 53. The last + part of our work presents itself as the most serious, for it + relates to the action of men, the matter which concerns every one + directly and can be foreign or indifferent to none. It is indeed so + characteristic of the nature of man to relate everything else to + action, that in every systematic investigation he will always treat + the part that has to do with action as the result or outcome of the + whole work, so far, at least, as it interests him, and will + therefore give his most serious attention to this part, even if to + no other. In this respect the following part of our work would, in + ordinary language, be called practical philosophy, in opposition to + the theoretical, which has occupied us hitherto. But, in my + opinion, all philosophy is theoretical, because it is essential to + it that it should retain a purely contemplative attitude, and + should investigate, not prescribe. To become, on the contrary, + practical, to guide conduct, to transform character, are old + claims, which with fuller insight it ought finally to give up. For + here, where the worth or worthlessness of an existence, where + salvation or damnation are in question, the dead conceptions of + philosophy do not decide the matter, but the inmost nature of man + himself, the Dæmon that guides him and that has not chosen him, but + been chosen by him, as Plato would say; his intelligible character, + as Kant expresses himself. Virtue cannot be taught any more than + genius; indeed, for it the concept is just as unfruitful as it is + in art, and in both cases can only be used as <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page350">[pg 350]</span><a name="Pg350" id="Pg350" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> an instrument. It would, therefore, be + just as absurd to expect that our moral systems and ethics will + produce virtuous, noble, and holy men, as that our æsthetics will + produce poets, painters, and musicians.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Philosophy can + never do more than interpret and explain what is given. It can only + bring to distinct abstract knowledge of the reason the nature of + the world which in the concrete, that is, as feeling, expresses + itself comprehensibly to every one. This, however, it does in every + possible reference and from every point of view. Now, as this + attempt has been made from other points of view in the three + preceding books with the generality that is proper to philosophy, + in this book the action of men will be considered in the same way; + and this side of the world might, indeed, be considered the most + important of all, not only subjectively, as I remarked above, but + also objectively. In considering it I shall faithfully adhere to + the method I have hitherto followed, and shall support myself by + presupposing all that has already been advanced. There is, indeed, + just one thought which forms the content of this whole work. I have + endeavoured to work it out in all other spheres, and I shall now do + so with regard to human action. I shall then have done all that is + in my power to communicate it as fully as possible.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The given point + of view, and the method of treatment announced, are themselves + sufficient to indicate that in this ethical book no precepts, no + doctrine of duty must be looked for; still less will a general + moral principle be given, an universal receipt, as it were, for the + production of all the virtues. Neither shall we talk of an + <span class="tei tei-q">“<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">absolute ought</span></em>,”</span> for this + contains a contradiction, as is explained in the Appendix; nor yet + of a <span class="tei tei-q">“<em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">law of freedom</span></em>,”</span> which is + in the same position. In general, we shall not speak at all of + <span class="tei tei-q">“ought,”</span> for this is how one speaks + to children and to nations still in their childhood, but not to + those who have appropriated all the culture of a full-grown + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page351">[pg 351]</span><a name= + "Pg351" id="Pg351" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> age. It is a + palpable contradiction to call the will free, and yet to prescribe + laws for it according to which it ought to will. <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Ought to will!”</span>—wooden iron! But it follows + from the point of view of our system that the will is not only + free, but almighty. From it proceeds not only its action, but also + its world; and as the will is, so does its action and its world + become. Both are the self-knowledge of the will and nothing more. + The will determines itself, and at the same time both its action + and its world; for besides it there is nothing, and these are the + will itself. Only thus is the will truly autonomous, and from every + other point of view it is heteronomous. Our philosophical + endeavours can only extend to exhibiting and explaining the action + of men in its inner nature and content, the various and even + opposite maxims, whose living expression it is. This we shall do in + connection with the preceding portion of our work, and in precisely + the same way as we have hitherto explained the other phenomena of + the world, and have sought to bring their inmost nature to distinct + abstract knowledge. Our philosophy will maintain the same + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">immanency</span></em> in the case of action, + as in all that we have hitherto considered. Notwithstanding Kant's + great doctrine, it will not attempt to use the forms of the + phenomenon, the universal expression of which is the principle of + sufficient reason, as a leaping-pole to jump over the phenomenon + itself, which alone gives meaning to these forms, and land in the + boundless sphere of empty fictions. But this actual world of + experience, in which we are, and which is in us, remains both the + material and the limits of our consideration: a world which is so + rich in content that even the most searching investigation of which + the human mind is capable could not exhaust it. Since then the real + world of experience will never fail to afford material and reality + to our ethical investigations, any more than to those we have + already conducted, nothing will be less needful than to take refuge + in negative conceptions <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page352">[pg + 352]</span><a name="Pg352" id="Pg352" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + void of content, and then somehow or other make even ourselves + believe that we are saying something when we speak with lifted + eyebrows of <span class="tei tei-q">“absolutes,”</span> + <span class="tei tei-q">“infinites,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“supersensibles,”</span> and whatever other mere + negations of this sort there may be (ουδεν εστι, η το της στερησεως + ονομα, μετα αμυδρας επινοιας—<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nihil est, nisi negationis nomen, cum obscura + notione</span></span>.—Jul. or. 5), instead of which it would be + shorter to say at once cloud-cuckoo-town (νεφελοκοκκυγια): we shall + not require to serve up covered empty dishes of this kind. Finally, + we shall not in this book, any more than in those which have + preceded it, narrate histories and give them out as philosophy. For + we are of opinion that whoever supposes that the inner nature of + the world can in any way, however plausibly disguised, be + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">historically</span></em> comprehended, is + infinitely far from a philosophical knowledge of the world. Yet + this is what is supposed whenever a <span class= + "tei tei-q">“becoming,”</span> or a <span class="tei tei-q">“having + become,”</span> or an <span class="tei tei-q">“about to + become”</span> enters into a theory of the nature of the world, + whenever an earlier or a later has the least place in it; and in + this way a beginning and an end of the world, and the path it + pursues between them, is, either openly or disguisedly, both sought + for and found, and the individual who philosophises even recognises + his own position on that path. Such <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">historical + philosophising</span></em> in most cases produces a cosmogony which + admits of many varieties, or else a system of emanations, a + doctrine of successive disengagements from one being; or, finally, + driven in despair from fruitless efforts upon these paths to the + last path of all, it takes refuge in the converse doctrine of a + constant becoming, springing up, arising, coming to light out of + darkness, out of the hidden ground source or groundlessness, or + whatever other nonsense of this sort there may be, which is most + shortly disposed of with the remark that at the present moment a + whole eternity, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, an endless time, has + already passed, so that everything that can or ought to become must + have already done so. For all such historical philosophy, whatever + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page353">[pg 353]</span><a name= + "Pg353" id="Pg353" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> airs it may give + itself, regards <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">time</span></em> just as if Kant had never + lived, as a quality of the thing-in-itself, and thus stops at that + which Kant calls the phenomenon in opposition to the + thing-in-itself; which Plato calls the becoming and never being, in + opposition to the being and never becoming; and which, finally, is + called in the Indian philosophy the web of Mâya. It is just the + knowledge which belongs to the principle of sufficient reason, with + which no one can penetrate to the inner nature of things, but + endlessly pursues phenomena, moving without end or aim, like a + squirrel in its wheel, till, tired out at last, he stops at some + point or other arbitrarily chosen, and now desires to extort + respect for it from others also. The genuine philosophical + consideration of the world, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the consideration that + affords us a knowledge of its inner nature, and so leads us beyond + the phenomenon, is precisely that method which does not concern + itself with the whence, the whither, and the why of the world, but + always and everywhere demands only the what; the method which + considers things not according to any relation, not as becoming and + passing away, in short, not according to one of the four forms of + the principle of sufficient reason; but, on the contrary, just that + which remains when all that belongs to the form of knowledge proper + to that principle has been abstracted, the inner nature of the + world, which always appears unchanged in all the relations, but is + itself never subject to them, and has the Ideas of the world as its + object or material. From such knowledge as this proceeds + philosophy, like art, and also, as we shall see in this book, that + disposition of mind which alone leads to true holiness and to + deliverance from the world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 54. The first + three books will, it is hoped, have conveyed the distinct and + certain knowledge that the world as idea is the complete mirror of + the will, in which it knows itself in ascending grades of + distinctness <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page354">[pg + 354]</span><a name="Pg354" id="Pg354" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and completeness, the highest of which is man, whose nature, + however, receives its complete expression only through the whole + connected series of his actions. The self-conscious connection of + these actions is made possible by reason, which enables a man + constantly to survey the whole in the abstract.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The will, which, + considered purely in itself, is without knowledge, and is merely a + blind incessant impulse, as we see it appear in unorganised and + vegetable nature and their laws, and also in the vegetative part of + our own life, receives through the addition of the world as idea, + which is developed in subjection to it, the knowledge of its own + willing and of what it is that it wills. And this is nothing else + than the world as idea, life, precisely as it exists. Therefore we + called the phenomenal world the mirror of the will, its + objectivity. And since what the will wills is always life, just + because life is nothing but the representation of that willing for + the idea, it is all one and a mere pleonism if, instead of simply + saying <span class="tei tei-q">“the will,”</span> we say + <span class="tei tei-q">“the will to live.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Will is the + thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world. Life, + the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will. + Therefore life accompanies the will as inseparably as the shadow + accompanies the body; and if will exists, so will life, the world, + exist. Life is, therefore, assured to the will to live; and so long + as we are filled with the will to live we need have no fear for our + existence, even in the presence of death. It is true we see the + individual come into being and pass away; but the individual is + only phenomenal, exists only for the knowledge which is bound to + the principle of sufficient reason, to the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principio individuationis</span></span>. + Certainly, for this kind of knowledge, the individual receives his + life as a gift, rises out of nothing, then suffers the loss of this + gift through death, and returns again to nothing. But we desire to + consider life <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page355">[pg + 355]</span><a name="Pg355" id="Pg355" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + philosophically, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, according to its Ideas, + and in this sphere we shall find that neither the will, the + thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject of knowing, that + which perceives all phenomena, is affected at all by birth or by + death. Birth and death belong merely to the phenomenon of will, + thus to life; and it is essential to this to exhibit itself in + individuals which come into being and pass away, as fleeting + phenomena appearing in the form of time—phenomena of that which in + itself knows no time, but must exhibit itself precisely in the way + we have said, in order to objectify its peculiar nature. Birth and + death belong in like manner to life, and hold the balance as + reciprocal conditions of each other, or, if one likes the + expression, as poles of the whole phenomenon of life. The wisest of + all mythologies, the Indian, expresses this by giving to the very + god that symbolises destruction, death (as Brahma, the most sinful + and the lowest god of the Trimurti, symbolises generation, coming + into being, and Vishnu maintaining or preserving), by giving, I + say, to Siva as an attribute not only the necklace of skulls, but + also the lingam, the symbol of generation, which appears here as + the counterpart of death, thus signifying that generation and death + are essentially correlatives, which reciprocally neutralise and + annul each other. It was precisely the same sentiment that led the + Greeks and Romans to adorn their costly sarcophagi, just as we see + them now, with feasts, dances, marriages, the chase, fights of wild + beasts, bacchanalians, &c.; thus with representations of the + full ardour of life, which they place before us not only in such + revels and sports, but also in sensual groups, and even go so far + as to represent the sexual intercourse of satyrs and goats. Clearly + the aim was to point in the most impressive manner away from the + death of the mourned individual to the immortal life of nature, and + thus to indicate, though without abstract knowledge, that the whole + of nature is the phenomenon and also the fulfilment of the will to + live. The form of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page356">[pg + 356]</span><a name="Pg356" id="Pg356" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + this phenomenon is time, space, and causality, and by means of + these individuation, which carries with it that the individual must + come into being and pass away. But this no more affects the will to + live, of whose manifestation the individual is, as it were, only a + particular example or specimen, than the death of an individual + injures the whole of nature. For it is not the individual, but only + the species that Nature cares for, and for the preservation of + which she so earnestly strives, providing for it with the utmost + prodigality through the vast surplus of the seed and the great + strength of the fructifying impulse. The individual, on the + contrary, neither has nor can have any value for Nature, for her + kingdom is infinite time and infinite space, and in these infinite + multiplicity of possible individuals. Therefore she is always ready + to let the individual fall, and hence it is not only exposed to + destruction in a thousand ways by the most insignificant accident, + but originally destined for it, and conducted towards it by Nature + herself from the moment it has served its end of maintaining the + species. Thus Nature naïvely expresses the great truth that only + the Ideas, not the individuals, have, properly speaking, reality, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, are complete objectivity + of the will. Now, since man is Nature itself, and indeed Nature at + the highest grade of its self-consciousness, but Nature is only the + objectified will to live, the man who has comprehended and retained + this point of view may well console himself, when contemplating his + own death and that of his friends, by turning his eyes to the + immortal life of Nature, which he himself is. This is the + significance of Siva with the lingam, and of those ancient + sarcophagi with their pictures of glowing life, which say to the + mourning beholder, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Natura non + contristatur</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That generation + and death are to be regarded as something belonging to life, and + essential to this phenomenon of the will, arises also from the fact + that they both exhibit themselves merely as higher powers of the + expression <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page357">[pg + 357]</span><a name="Pg357" id="Pg357" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + of that in which all the rest of life consists. This is through and + through nothing else than the constant change of matter in the + fixed permanence of form; and this is what constitutes the + transitoriness of the individual and the permanence of the species. + Constant nourishment and renewal differ from generation only in + degree, and constant excretion differs only in degree from death. + The first shows itself most simply and distinctly in the plant. The + plant is throughout a constant recurrence of the same impulse of + its simplest fibre, which groups itself into leaf and branch. It is + a systematic aggregate of similar plants supporting each other, + whose constant reproduction is its single impulse. It ascends to + the full satisfaction of this tendency through the grades of its + metamorphosis, finally to the blossom and fruit, that compendium of + its existence and effort in which it now attains, by a short way, + to that which is its single aim, and at a stroke produces a + thousand-fold what, up till then, it effected only in the + particular case—the repetition of itself. Its earlier growth and + development stands in the same relation to its fruit as writing + stands to printing. With the animal it is clearly quite the same. + The process of nourishing is a constant reproduction; the process + of reproduction is a higher power of nourishing. The pleasure which + accompanies the act of procreation is a higher power of the + agreeableness of the sense of life. On the other hand, excretion, + the constant exhalation and throwing off of matter, is the same as + that which, at a higher power, death, is the contrary of + generation. And if here we are always content to retain the form + without lamenting the discarded matter, we ought to bear ourselves + in the same way if in death the same thing happens, in a higher + degree and to the whole, as takes place daily and hourly in a + partial manner in excretion: if we are indifferent to the one, we + ought not to shrink from the other. Therefore, from this point of + view, it appears just as perverse to desire <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page358">[pg 358]</span><a name="Pg358" id="Pg358" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the continuance of an individuality + which will be replaced by other individuals as to desire the + permanence of matter which will be replaced by other matter. It + appears just as foolish to embalm the body as it would be carefully + to preserve its excrement. As to the individual consciousness which + is bound to the individual body, it is absolutely interrupted every + day by sleep. Deep sleep is, while it lasts, in no way different + from death, into which, in fact, it often passes continuously, as + in the case of freezing to death. It differs only with regard to + the future, the awaking. Death is a sleep in which individuality is + forgotten; everything else wakes again, or rather never + slept.<a id="noteref_64" name="noteref_64" href= + "#note_64"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">64</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Above all + things, we must distinctly recognise that the form of the + phenomenon of will, the form of life or reality, is really only the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">present</span></em>, not the future nor the + past. The latter are only in the conception, exist only in the + connection of knowledge, so far as it follows the principle of + sufficient reason. No man has ever lived in the past, and none will + live in the future; the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">present</span></em> alone is the form of all + life, and is its sure possession which can never be taken from it. + The present always exists, together with its content. Both remain + fixed without wavering, like the rainbow on the waterfall. For life + is firm and certain in the will, and the present is firm and + certain in life. Certainly, if we reflect on <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page359">[pg 359]</span><a name="Pg359" id="Pg359" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the thousands of years that are past, + of the millions of men who lived in them, we ask, What were they? + what has become of them? But, on the other hand, we need only + recall our own past life and renew its scenes vividly in our + imagination, and then ask again, What was all this? what has become + of it? As it is with it, so is it with the life of those millions. + Or should we suppose that the past could receive a new existence + because it has been sealed by death? Our own past, the most recent + part of it, and even yesterday, is now no more than an empty dream + of the fancy, and such is the past of all those millions. What was? + What is? The will, of which life is the mirror, and knowledge free + from will, which beholds it clearly in that mirror. Whoever has not + yet recognised this, or will not recognise it, must add to the + question asked above as to the fate of past generations of men this + question also: Why he, the questioner, is so fortunate as to be + conscious of this costly, fleeting, and only real present, while + those hundreds of generations of men, even the heroes and + philosophers of those ages, have sunk into the night of the past, + and have thus become nothing; but he, his insignificant ego, + actually exists? or more shortly, though somewhat strangely: Why + this now, his now, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">is</span></em> just now and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">was</span></em> not + long ago? Since he asks such strange questions, he regards his + existence and his time as independent of each other, and the former + as projected into the latter. He assumes indeed two nows—one which + belongs to the object, the other which belongs to the subject, and + marvels at the happy accident of their coincidence. But in truth, + only the point of contact of the object, the form of which is time, + with the subject, which has no mode of the principle of sufficient + reason as its form, constitutes the present, as is shown in the + essay on the principle of sufficient reason. Now all object is the + will so far as it has become idea, and the subject is the necessary + correlative of the object. But real objects are only in the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page360">[pg 360]</span><a name= + "Pg360" id="Pg360" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> present; the past + and the future contain only conceptions and fancies, therefore the + present is the essential form of the phenomenon of the will, and + inseparable from it. The present alone is that which always exists + and remains immovable. That which, empirically apprehended, is the + most transitory of all, presents itself to the metaphysical vision, + which sees beyond the forms of empirical perception, as that which + alone endures, the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">nunc + stans</span></span> of the schoolmen. The source and the supporter + of its content is the will to live or the thing-in-itself,—which we + are. That which constantly becomes and passes away, in that it has + either already been or is still to be, belongs to the phenomenon as + such on account of its forms, which make coming into being and + passing away possible. Accordingly, we must think:—<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Quid fuit?</span></span>—<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Quod est.</span></span> <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Quid erit?</span></span>—<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Quod fuit;</span></span> and take it in the + strict meaning of the words; thus understand not <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">simile</span></span> but <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">idem</span></span>. For life is certain to the + will, and the present is certain to life. Thus it is that every one + can say, <span class="tei tei-q">“I am once for all lord of the + present, and through all eternity it will accompany me as my + shadow: therefore I do not wonder where it has come from, and how + it happens that it is exactly now.”</span> We might compare time to + a constantly revolving sphere; the half that was always sinking + would be the past, that which was always rising would be the + future; but the indivisible point at the top, where the tangent + touches, would be the extensionless present. As the tangent does + not revolve with the sphere, neither does the present, the point of + contact of the object, the form of which is time, with the subject, + which has no form, because it does not belong to the knowable, but + is the condition of all that is knowable. Or, time is like an + unceasing stream, and the present a rock on which the stream breaks + itself, but does not carry away with it. The will, as + thing-in-itself, is just as little subordinate to the principle of + sufficient reason <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page361">[pg + 361]</span><a name="Pg361" id="Pg361" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + as the subject of knowledge, which, finally, in a certain regard is + the will itself or its expression. And as life, its own phenomenon, + is assured to the will, so is the present, the single form of real + life. Therefore we have not to investigate the past before life, + nor the future after death: we have rather to know the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">present</span></em>, the one form in which the + will manifests itself.<a id="noteref_65" name="noteref_65" href= + "#note_65"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">65</span></span></a> It + will not escape from the will, but neither will the will escape + from it. If, therefore, life as it is satisfies, whoever affirms it + in every way may regard it with confidence as endless, and banish + the fear of death as an illusion that inspires him with the foolish + dread that he can ever be robbed of the present, and foreshadows a + time in which there is no present; an illusion with regard to time + analogous to the illusion with regard to space through which every + one imagines the position on the globe he happens to occupy as + above, and all other places as below. In the same way every one + links the present to his own individuality, and imagines that all + present is extinguished with it; that then past and future might be + without a present. But as on the surface of the globe every place + is above, so the form of all life is the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">present</span></em>, and to fear death because + it robs us of the present, is just as foolish as to fear that we + may slip down from the round globe upon which we have now the good + fortune to occupy the upper surface. The present is the form + essential to the objectification of the will. It cuts time, which + extends infinitely in both directions, as a mathematical point, and + stands immovably fixed, like an everlasting mid-day with no cool + evening, as the actual sun burns without intermission, while it + only seems to sink into the bosom of night. Therefore, if a man + fears death as his annihilation, it is just as if he were to think + that the sun cries out at evening, <span class="tei tei-q">“Woe is + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page362">[pg 362]</span><a name= + "Pg362" id="Pg362" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> me! for I go down + into eternal night.”</span><a id="noteref_66" name="noteref_66" + href="#note_66"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">66</span></span></a> And + conversely, whoever is oppressed with the burden of life, whoever + desires life and affirms it, but abhors its torments, and + especially can no longer endure the hard lot that has fallen to + himself, such a man has no deliverance to hope for from death, and + cannot right himself by suicide. The cool shades of Orcus allure + him only with the false appearance of a haven of rest. The earth + rolls from day into night, the individual dies, but the sun itself + shines without intermission, an eternal noon. Life is assured to + the will to live; the form of life is an endless present, no matter + how the individuals, the phenomena of the Idea, arise and pass away + in time, like fleeting dreams. Thus even already suicide appears to + us as a vain and therefore a foolish action; when we have carried + our investigation further it will appear to us in a still less + favourable light.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Dogmas change + and our knowledge is deceptive; but Nature never errs, her + procedure is sure, and she never conceals it. Everything is + entirely in Nature, and Nature is entire in everything. She has her + centre in every brute. It has surely found its way into existence, + and it will surely find its way out of it. In the meantime it + lives, fearless and without care, in the presence of annihilation, + supported by the consciousness that it is Nature herself, and + imperishable as she is. Man alone carries about with him, in + abstract conceptions, the certainty of his death; yet this can only + trouble him very rarely, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page363">[pg + 363]</span><a name="Pg363" id="Pg363" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + when for a single moment some occasion calls it up to his + imagination. Against the mighty voice of Nature reflection can do + little. In man, as in the brute which does not think, the certainty + that springs from his inmost consciousness that he himself is + Nature, the world, predominates as a lasting frame of mind; and on + account of this no man is observably disturbed by the thought of + certain and never-distant death, but lives as if he would live for + ever. Indeed this is carried so far that we may say that no one has + really a lively conviction of the certainty of his death, otherwise + there would be no great difference between his frame of mind and + that of a condemned criminal. Every one recognises that certainty + in the abstract and theoretically, but lays it aside like other + theoretical truths which are not applicable to practice, without + really receiving it into his living consciousness. Whoever + carefully considers this peculiarity of human character will see + that the psychological explanations of it, from habit and + acquiescence in the inevitable, are by no means sufficient, and + that its true explanation lies in the deeper ground we have given. + The same fact explains the circumstance that at all times and among + all peoples dogmas of some kind or other relating to the continued + existence of the individual after death arise, and are believed in, + although the evidence in support of them must always be very + insufficient, and the evidence against them forcible and varied. + But, in truth, this really requires no proof, but is recognised by + the healthy understanding as a fact, and confirmed by the + confidence that Nature never lies any more than she errs, but + openly exhibits and naïvely expresses her action and her nature, + while only we ourselves obscure it by our folly, in order to + establish what is agreeable to our limited point of view.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But this that we + have brought to clearest consciousness, that although the + particular phenomenon of the will has a temporal beginning and end, + the will itself as thing-in-itself is not affected by it, nor yet + the correlative of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page364">[pg + 364]</span><a name="Pg364" id="Pg364" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + all object, the knowing but never known subject, and that life is + always assured to the will to live—this is not to be numbered with + the doctrines of immortality. For permanence has no more to do with + the will or with the pure subject of knowing, the eternal eye of + the world, than transitoriness, for both are predicates that are + only valid in time, and the will and the pure subject of knowing + lie outside time. Therefore the egoism of the individual (this + particular phenomenon of will enlightened by the subject of + knowing) can extract as little nourishment and consolation for his + wish to endure through endless time from the view we have + expressed, as he could from the knowledge that after his death the + rest of the eternal world would continue to exist, which is just + the expression of the same view considered objectively, and + therefore temporally. For every individual is transitory only as + phenomenon, but as thing-in-itself is timeless, and therefore + endless. But it is also only as phenomenon that an individual is + distinguished from the other things of the world; as + thing-in-itself he is the will which appears in all, and death + destroys the illusion which separates his consciousness from that + of the rest: this is immortality. His exemption from death, which + belongs to him only as thing-in-itself, is for the phenomenon one + with the immortality of the rest of the external world.<a id= + "noteref_67" name="noteref_67" href="#note_67"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">67</span></span></a> Hence + also, it arises that although the inward and merely felt + consciousness of that which we have raised to distinct knowledge is + indeed, as we have said, sufficient to prevent the thought of death + from poisoning the life of the rational being, because this + consciousness is the basis of that love of life which maintains + everything living, and enables it to live on <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page365">[pg 365]</span><a name="Pg365" id="Pg365" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> at ease as if there were no such thing + as death, so long as it is face to face with life, and turns its + attention to it, yet it will not prevent the individual from being + seized with the fear of death, and trying in every way to escape + from it, when it presents itself to him in some particular real + case, or even only in his imagination, and he is compelled to + contemplate it. For just as, so long as his knowledge was directed + to life as such, he was obliged to recognise immortality in it, so + when death is brought before his eyes, he is obliged to recognise + it as that which it is, the temporal end of the particular temporal + phenomenon. What we fear in death is by no means the pain, for it + lies clearly on this side of death, and, moreover, we often take + refuge in death from pain, just as, on the contrary, we sometimes + endure the most fearful suffering merely to escape death for a + while, although it would be quick and easy. Thus we distinguish + pain and death as two entirely different evils. What we fear in + death is the end of the individual, which it openly professes + itself to be, and since the individual is a particular + objectification of the will to live itself, its whole nature + struggles against death. Now when feeling thus exposes us helpless, + reason can yet step in and for the most part overcome its adverse + influence, for it places us upon a higher standpoint, from which we + no longer contemplate the particular but the whole. Therefore a + philosophical knowledge of the nature of the world, which extended + to the point we have now reached in this work but went no farther, + could even at this point of view overcome the terror of death in + the measure in which reflection had power over direct feeling in + the given individual. A man who had thoroughly assimilated the + truths we have already advanced, but had not come to know, either + from his own experience or from a deeper insight, that constant + suffering is essential to life, who found satisfaction and all that + he wished in life, and could calmly and deliberately desire that + his <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page366">[pg 366]</span><a name= + "Pg366" id="Pg366" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> life, as he had + hitherto known it, should endure for ever or repeat itself ever + anew, and whose love of life was so great that he willingly and + gladly accepted all the hardships and miseries to which it is + exposed for the sake of its pleasures,—such a man would stand + <span class="tei tei-q">“with firm-knit bones on the well-rounded, + enduring earth,”</span> and would have nothing to fear. Armed with + the knowledge we have given him, he would await with indifference + the death that hastens towards him on the wings of time. He would + regard it as a false illusion, an impotent spectre, which frightens + the weak but has no power over him who knows that he is himself the + will of which the whole world is the objectification or copy, and + that therefore he is always certain of life, and also of the + present, the peculiar and only form of the phenomenon of the will. + He could not be terrified by an endless past or future in which he + would not be, for this he would regard as the empty delusion of the + web of Mâya. Thus he would no more fear death than the sun fears + the night. In the <span class="tei tei-q">“Bhagavad-Gita”</span> + Krishna thus raises the mind of his young pupil Arjuna, when, + seized with compunction at the sight of the arrayed hosts (somewhat + as Xerxes was), he loses heart and desires to give up the battle in + order to avert the death of so many thousands. Krishna leads him to + this point of view, and the death of those thousands can no longer + restrain him; he gives the sign for battle. This point of view is + also expressed by Goethe's Prometheus, especially when he says—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Here + sit I, form mankind</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">In my own image,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">A race like to myself,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">To suffer and to weep,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Rejoice, enjoy,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">And heed thee not,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">As I.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The philosophy + of Bruno and that of Spinoza might also lead any one to this point + of view whose conviction was <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page367">[pg 367]</span><a name="Pg367" id="Pg367" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> not shaken and weakened by their errors and + imperfections. That of Bruno has properly no ethical theory at all, + and the theory contained in the philosophy of Spinoza does not + really proceed from the inner nature of his doctrine, but is merely + tacked on to it by means of weak and palpable sophisms, though in + itself it is praiseworthy and beautiful. Finally, there are many + men who would occupy this point of view if their knowledge kept + pace with their will, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, if, free from all + illusion, they were in a position to become clearly and distinctly + themselves. For this is, for knowledge, the point of view of the + complete <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">assertion of the will to live</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That the will + asserts itself means, that while in its objectivity, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + in the world and life, its own nature is completely and distinctly + given it as idea, this knowledge does not by any means check its + volition; but this very life, so known, is willed as such by the + will with knowledge, consciously and deliberately, just as up to + this point it willed it as blind effort without knowledge. The + opposite of this, the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">denial of the will to live</span></em>, shows + itself if, when that knowledge is attained, volition ends, because + the particular known phenomena no longer act as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motives</span></em> + for willing, but the whole knowledge of the nature of the world, + the mirror of the will, which has grown up through the + comprehension of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Ideas</span></em>, becomes a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">quieter</span></em> + of the will; and thus free, the will suppresses itself. These quite + unfamiliar conceptions are difficult to understand when expressed + in this general way, but it is hoped they will become clear through + the exposition we shall give presently, with special reference to + action, of the phenomena in which, on the one hand, the assertion + in its different grades, and, on the other hand, the denial, + expresses itself. For both proceed from knowledge, yet not from + abstract knowledge, which is expressed in words, but from living + knowledge, which is expressed in action and behaviour alone, and is + independent of the dogmas which at the same time occupy the reason + as abstract knowledge. To <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page368">[pg + 368]</span><a name="Pg368" id="Pg368" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + exhibit them both, and bring them to distinct knowledge of the + reason, can alone be my aim, and not to prescribe or recommend the + one or the other, which would be as foolish as it would be useless; + for the will in itself is absolutely free and entirely + self-determining, and for it there is no law. But before we go on + to the exposition referred to, we must first explain and more + exactly define this <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">freedom</span></em> and its relation to + necessity. And also, with regard to the life, the assertion and + denial of which is our problem, we must insert a few general + remarks connected with the will and its objects. Through all this + we shall facilitate the apprehension of the inmost nature of the + knowledge we are aiming at, of the ethical significance of methods + of action.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Since, as has + been said, this whole work is only the unfolding of a single + thought, it follows that all its parts have the most intimate + connection with each other. Not merely that each part stands in a + necessary relation to what immediately precedes it, and only + presupposes a recollection of that by the reader, as is the case + with all philosophies which consist merely of a series of + inferences, but that every part of the whole work is related to + every other part and presupposes it. It is, therefore, necessary + that the reader should remember not only what has just been said, + but all the earlier parts of the work, so that he may be able to + connect them with what he is reading, however much may have + intervened. Plato also makes this demand upon his readers through + the intricate digressions of his dialogues, in which he only + returns to the leading thought after long episodes, which + illustrate and explain it. In our case this demand is necessary; + for the breaking up of our one single thought into its many aspects + is indeed the only means of imparting it, though not essential to + the thought itself, but merely an artificial form. The division of + four principal points of view into four books, and the most careful + bringing together of all that is related and homogeneous, assists + the exposition <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page369">[pg + 369]</span><a name="Pg369" id="Pg369" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and its comprehension; yet the material absolutely does not admit + of an advance in a straight line, such as the progress of history, + but necessitates a more complicated exposition. This again makes a + repeated study of the book necessary, for thus alone does the + connection of all the parts with each other become distinct, and + only then do they all mutually throw light upon each other and + become quite clear.<a id="noteref_68" name="noteref_68" href= + "#note_68"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">68</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 55. That the + will as such is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">free</span></em>, follows from the fact that, + according to our view, it is the thing-in-itself, the content of + all phenomena. The phenomena, on the other hand, we recognise as + absolutely subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason in its + four forms. And since we know that necessity is throughout + identical with following from given grounds, and that these are + convertible conceptions, all that belongs to the phenomenon, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, all that is object for the + knowing subject as individual, is in one aspect reason, and in + another aspect consequent; and in this last capacity is determined + with absolute necessity, and can, therefore, in no respect be other + than it is. The whole content of Nature, the collective sum of its + phenomena, is thus throughout necessary, and the necessity of every + part, of every phenomenon, of every event, can always be proved, + because it must be possible to find the reason from which it + follows as a consequent. This admits of no exception: it follows + from the unrestricted validity of the principle of sufficient + reason. In another aspect, however, the same world is for us, in + all its phenomena, objectivity of will. And the will, since it is + not phenomenon, is not idea or object, but thing-in-itself, and is + not subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of + all object; thus is not determined as a consequent through any + reason, knows no necessity, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, is <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">free</span></em>. + The concept of freedom is thus <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page370">[pg 370]</span><a name="Pg370" id="Pg370" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> properly a negative concept, for its content + is merely the denial of necessity, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the relation of consequent to its reason, according to the + principle of sufficient reason. Now here lies before us in its most + distinct form the solution of that great contradiction, the union + of freedom with necessity, which has so often been discussed in + recent times, yet, so far as I know, never clearly and adequately. + Everything is as phenomenon, as object, absolutely necessary: + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in + itself</span></em> it is will, which is perfectly free to all + eternity. The phenomenon, the object, is necessarily and + unalterably determined in that chain of causes and effects which + admits of no interruption. But the existence in general of this + object, and its specific nature, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the Idea which reveals itself in it, or, in other words, its + character, is a direct manifestation of will. Thus, in conformity + with the freedom of this will, the object might not be at all, or + it might be originally and essentially something quite different + from what it is, in which case, however, the whole chain of which + it is a link, and which is itself a manifestation of the same will, + would be quite different also. But once there and existing, it has + entered the chain of causes and effects, is always necessarily + determined in it, and can, therefore, neither become something + else, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, change itself, nor yet + escape from the chain, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, vanish. Man, like every + other part of Nature, is objectivity of the will; therefore all + that has been said holds good of him. As everything in Nature has + its forces and qualities, which react in a definite way when + definitely affected, and constitute its character, man also has his + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">character</span></em>, from which the motives + call forth his actions with necessity. In this manner of conduct + his empirical character reveals itself, but in this again his + intelligible character, the will in itself, whose determined + phenomenon he is. But man is the most complete phenomenon of will, + and, as we explained in the Second Book, he had to be enlightened + with so high a degree of knowledge <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page371">[pg 371]</span><a name="Pg371" id="Pg371" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> in order to maintain himself in existence, + that in it a perfectly adequate copy or repetition of the nature of + the world under the form of the idea became possible: this is the + comprehension of the Ideas, the pure mirror of the world, as we + learnt in the Third Book. Thus in man the will can attain to full + self-consciousness, to distinct and exhaustive knowledge of its own + nature, as it mirrors itself in the whole world. We saw in the + preceding book that art springs from the actual presence of this + degree of knowledge; and at the end of our whole work it will + further appear that, through the same knowledge, in that the will + relates it to itself, a suppression and self-denial of the will in + its most perfect manifestation is possible. So that the freedom + which otherwise, as belonging to the thing-in-itself, can never + show itself in the phenomenon, in such a case does also appear in + it, and, by abolishing the nature which lies at the foundation of + the phenomenon, while the latter itself still continues to exist in + time, it brings about a contradiction of the phenomenon with + itself, and in this way exhibits the phenomena of holiness and + self-renunciation. But all this can only be fully understood at the + end of this book. What has just been said merely affords a + preliminary and general indication of how man is distinguished from + all the other phenomena of will by the fact that freedom, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, independence of the + principle of sufficient reason, which only belongs to the will as + thing-in-itself, and contradicts the phenomenon, may yet possibly, + in his case, appear in the phenomenon also, where, however, it + necessarily exhibits itself as a contradiction of the phenomenon + with itself. In this sense, not only the will in itself, but man + also may certainly be called free, and thus distinguished from all + other beings. But how this is to be understood can only become + clear through all that is to follow, and for the present we must + turn away from it altogether. For, in the first place, we must + beware of the error that the action of the individual definite man + is subject to no <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page372">[pg + 372]</span><a name="Pg372" id="Pg372" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + necessity, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, that the power of the + motive is less certain than the power of the cause, or the + following of the conclusion from the premises. The freedom of the + will as thing-in-itself, if, as has been said, we abstract from the + entirely exceptional case mentioned above, by no means extends + directly to its phenomenon, not even in the case in which this + reaches the highest made of its visibility, and thus does not + extend to the rational animal endowed with individual character, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the person. The person is + never free although he is the phenomenon of a free will; for he is + already the determined phenomenon of the free volition of this + will, and, because he enters the form of every object, the + principle of sufficient reason, he develops indeed the unity of + that will in a multiplicity of actions, but on account of the + timeless unity of that volition in itself, this multiplicity + exhibits in itself the regular conformity to law of a force of + Nature. Since, however, it is that free volition that becomes + visible in the person and the whole of his conduct, relating itself + to him as the concept to the definition, every individual action of + the person is to be ascribed to the free will, and directly + proclaims itself as such in consciousness. Therefore, as was said + in the Second Book, every one regards himself <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> (<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + here in this original feeling) as free in his individual actions, + in the sense that in every given case every action is possible for + him, and he only recognises <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + posteriori</span></span> from experience and reflection upon + experience that his actions take place with absolute necessity from + the coincidence of his character with his motives. Hence it arises + that every uncultured man, following his feeling, ardently defends + complete freedom in particular actions, while the great thinkers of + all ages, and indeed the more profound systems of religion, have + denied it. But whoever has come to see clearly that the whole + nature of man is will, and he himself only a phenomenon of this + will, and that such a phenomenon has, even from the subject itself, + the principle of sufficient reason as its <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page373">[pg 373]</span><a name="Pg373" id="Pg373" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> necessary form, which here appears as the law + of motivation,—such a man will regard it as just as absurd to doubt + the inevitable nature of an action when the motive is presented to + a given character, as to doubt that the three angles of any + triangle are together equal to two right angles. Priestley has very + sufficiently proved the necessity of the individual action in his + <span class="tei tei-q">“Doctrine of Philosophical + Necessity;”</span> but Kant, whose merit in this respect is + specially great, first proved the coexistence of this necessity + with the freedom of the will in itself, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + apart from the phenomenon,<a id="noteref_69" name="noteref_69" + href="#note_69"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">69</span></span></a> by + establishing the distinction between the intelligible and the + empirical character. I entirely adhere to this distinction, for the + former is the will as thing-in-itself so far as it appears in a + definite individual in a definite grade, and the latter is this + phenomenon itself as it exhibits itself in time in the mode of + action, and in space in the physical structure. In order to make + the relation of the two comprehensible, the best expression is that + which I have already used in the introductory essay, that the + intelligible character of every man is to be regarded as an act of + will outside time, and therefore indivisible and unchangeable, and + the manifestation of this act of will developed and broken up in + time and space and all the forms of the principle of sufficient + reason is the empirical character as it exhibits itself for + experience in the whole conduct and life of this man. As the whole + tree is only the constantly repeated manifestation of one and the + same tendency, which exhibits itself in its simplest form in the + fibre, and recurs and is easily recognised in the construction of + the leaf, shoot, branch, and trunk, so all a man's deeds are merely + the constantly repeated expression, somewhat varied in form, of his + intelligible character, and the induction based on the sum of all + these expressions gives us his empirical <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page374">[pg 374]</span><a name="Pg374" id="Pg374" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> character. For the rest, I shall not at this + point repeat in my own words Kant's masterly exposition, but + presuppose it as known.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the year 1840 + I dealt with the important chapter on the freedom of the will, + thoroughly and in detail, in my crowned prize-essay upon the + subject, and exposed the reason of the delusion which led men to + imagine that they found an empirically given absolute freedom of + the will, that is to say, a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">liberum arbitrium + indifferentiæ</span></span>, as a fact in self-consciousness; for + the question propounded for the essay was with great insight + directed to this point. Therefore, as I refer the reader to that + work, and also to the tenth paragraph of the prize-essay on the + basis of morals, which was published along with it under the title + <span class="tei tei-q">“The Two Fundamental Problems of + Ethics,”</span> I now omit the incomplete exposition of the + necessity of the act of will, which was given at this place in the + first edition. Instead of it I shall explain the delusion mentioned + above in a brief discussion which is presupposed in the nineteenth + chapter of the supplement to the present work, and therefore could + not be given in the prize-essay referred to.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Apart from the + fact that the will as the true thing-in-itself is actually original + and independent, and that the feeling of its originality and + absoluteness must accompany its acts in self-consciousness, though + here they are already determined, there arises the illusion of an + empirical freedom of the will (instead of the transcendental + freedom which alone is to be attributed to it), and thus a freedom + of its particular actions, from that attitude of the intellect + towards the will which is explained, separated, and subordinated in + the nineteenth chapter of the supplement, especially under No. 3. + The intellect knows the conclusions of the will only <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> and empirically; + therefore when a choice is presented, it has no data as to how the + will is to decide. For the intelligible character, by virtue of + which, when motives are given, only <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page375">[pg 375]</span><a name= + "Pg375" id="Pg375" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> decision is possible + and is therefore necessary, does not come within the knowledge of + the intellect, but merely the empirical character is known to it + through the succession of its particular acts. Therefore it seems + to the intellect that in a given case two opposite decisions are + possible for the will. But this is just the same thing as if we + were to say of a perpendicular beam that has lost its balance, and + is hesitating which way to fall, <span class="tei tei-q">“It can + fall either to the right hand or the left.”</span> This <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">can</span></em> has + merely a subjective significance, and really means <span class= + "tei tei-q">“as far as the data known to us are concerned.”</span> + Objectively, the direction of the fall is necessarily determined as + soon as the equilibrium is lost. Accordingly, the decision of one's + own will is undetermined only to the beholder, one's own intellect, + and thus merely relatively and subjectively for the subject of + knowing. In itself and objectively, on the other hand, in every + choice presented to it, its decision is at once determined and + necessary. But this determination only comes into consciousness + through the decision that follows upon it. Indeed, we receive an + empirical proof of this when any difficult and important choice + lies before us, but only under a condition which is not yet + present, but merely hoped for, so that in the meanwhile we can do + nothing, but must remain passive. Now we consider how we shall + decide when the circumstances occur that will give us a free + activity and choice. Generally the foresight of rational + deliberation recommends one decision, while direct inclination + leans rather to the other. So long as we are compelled to remain + passive, the side of reason seems to wish to keep the upper hand; + but we see beforehand how strongly the other side will influence us + when the opportunity for action arises. Till then we are eagerly + concerned to place the motives on both sides in the clearest light, + by calm meditation on the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">pro et + contra</span></span>, so that every motive may exert its full + influence upon the will when the time arrives, and it may not be + misled by a <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page376">[pg + 376]</span><a name="Pg376" id="Pg376" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + mistake on the part of the intellect to decide otherwise than it + would have done if all the motives had their due influence upon it. + But this distinct unfolding of the motives on both sides is all + that the intellect can do to assist the choice. It awaits the real + decision just as passively and with the same intense curiosity as + if it were that of a foreign will. Therefore from its point of view + both decisions must seem to it equally possible; and this is just + the illusion of the empirical freedom of the will. Certainly the + decision enters the sphere of the intellect altogether empirically, + as the final conclusion of the matter; but yet it proceeded from + the inner nature, the intelligible character, of the individual + will in its conflict with given motives, and therefore with + complete necessity. The intellect can do nothing more than bring + out clearly and fully the nature of the motives; it cannot + determine the will itself; for the will is quite inaccessible to + it, and, as we have seen, cannot be investigated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If, under the + same circumstances, a man could act now one way and now another, it + would be necessary that his will itself should have changed in the + meantime, and thus that it should lie in time, for change is only + possible in time; but then either the will would be a mere + phenomenon, or time would be a condition of the thing-in-itself. + Accordingly the dispute as to the freedom of the particular action, + the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">liberum arbitrium + indifferentiæ</span></span>, really turns on the question whether + the will lies in time or not. If, as both Kant's doctrine and the + whole of my system necessitates, the will is the thing-in-itself + outside time and outside every form of the principle of sufficient + reason, not only must the individual act in the same way in the + same circumstances, and not only must every bad action be the sure + warrant of innumerable others, which the individual <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">must</span></em> + perform and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cannot</span></em> leave, but, as Kant said, + if only the empirical character and the motives were completely + given, it would be possible to calculate the future conduct of a + man just as we can calculate an <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page377">[pg 377]</span><a name="Pg377" id="Pg377" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> eclipse of the sun or moon. As Nature is + consistent, so is the character; every action must take place in + accordance with it, just as every phenomenon takes place according + to a law of Nature: the causes in the latter case and the motives + in the former are merely the occasional causes, as was shown in the + Second Book. The will, whose phenomenon is the whole being and life + of man, cannot deny itself in the particular case, and what the man + wills on the whole, that will he also will in the particular + case.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The assertion of + an empirical freedom of the will, a <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ</span></span>, + agrees precisely with the doctrine that places the inner nature of + man in a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">soul</span></em>, which is originally a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">knowing</span></em>, and indeed really an + abstract <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">thinking</span></em> nature, and only in + consequence of this a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">willing</span></em> nature—a doctrine which + thus regards the will as of a secondary or derivative nature, + instead of knowledge which is really so. The will indeed came to be + regarded as an act of thought, and to be identified with the + judgment, especially by Descartes and Spinoza. According to this + doctrine every man must become what he is only through his + knowledge; he must enter the world as a moral cipher come to know + the things in it, and thereupon determine to be this or that, to + act thus or thus, and may also through new knowledge achieve a new + course of action, that is to say, become another person. Further, + he must first know a thing to be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">good</span></em>, + and in consequence of this will it, instead of first <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">willing</span></em> + it, and in consequence of this calling it <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">good</span></em>. + According to my fundamental point of view, all this is a reversal + of the true relation. Will is first and original; knowledge is + merely added to it as an instrument belonging to the phenomenon of + will. Therefore every man is what he is through his will, and his + character is original, for willing is the basis of his nature. + Through the knowledge which is added to it he comes to know in the + course of experience <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">what he is</span></em>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + he learns his <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page378">[pg + 378]</span><a name="Pg378" id="Pg378" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + character. Thus he <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">knows</span></em> himself in consequence of + and in accordance with the nature of his will, instead of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">willing</span></em> in consequence of and in + accordance with his knowing. According to the latter view, he would + only require to consider how he would like best to be, and he would + be it; that is its doctrine of the freedom of the will. Thus it + consists really in this, that a man is his own work guided by the + light of knowledge. I, on the contrary, say that he is his own work + before all knowledge, and knowledge is merely added to it to + enlighten it. Therefore he cannot resolve to be this or that, nor + can he become other than he is; but he <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">is</span></em> once + for all, and he knows in the course of experience <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">what</span></em> he + is. According to one doctrine he <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">wills</span></em> + what he knows, and according to the other he <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">knows</span></em> + what he wills.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The Greeks + called the character ηθος, and its expression, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + morals, ηθη. But this word comes from εθος, custom; they chose it + in order to express metaphorically the constancy of character + through the constancy of custom. Το γαρ ηθος απο του εθους εχει την + επωνυμιαν. ηθικε γαρ καλειται δια το εθιζεσθαι (<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a voce</span></span> ηθος, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">consuetudo</span></span> ηθος <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">est appellatum: ethica ergo dicta + est</span></span> απο του εθιζεσθαι, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sivi ab assuescendo</span></span>) says + Aristotle (Eth. Magna, i. 6, p. 1186, and Eth. Eud., p. 1220, and + Eth. Nic., p. 1103, ed. Ber.) Stobæus quotes: οἱ δε κατα Ζηνωνα + τροπικως; ηθος εστι πηγη βιου αφ᾽ ἡς αἱ κατα μερος πραξεις ρεουσι + (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Stoici autem, Zenonis castra sequentes, + metaphorice ethos definiunt vitæ fontem, e quo singulæ manant + actiones</span></span>), ii. ch. 7. In Christian theology we find + the dogma of predestination in consequence of election and + non-election (Rom. ix. 11-24), clearly originating from the + knowledge that man does not change himself, but his life and + conduct, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, his empirical character, + is only the unfolding of his intelligible character, the + development of decided and unchangeable natural dispositions + recognisable even in the child; therefore, as it were, even at his + birth his conduct is firmly determined, and <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page379">[pg 379]</span><a name="Pg379" id="Pg379" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> remains essentially the same to the + end. This we entirely agree with; but certainly the consequences + which followed from the union of this perfectly correct insight + with the dogmas that already existed in Jewish theology, and which + now gave rise to the great difficulty, the Gordian knot upon which + most of the controversies of the Church turned, I do not undertake + to defend, for even the Apostle Paul scarcely succeeded in doing so + by means of his simile of the potter's vessels which he invented + for the purpose, for the result he finally arrived at was nothing + else than this:—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Let + mankind</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Fear the gods!</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">They hold the power</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">In everlasting hands:</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">And they can use it</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">As seems good to them.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Such + considerations, however, are really foreign to our subject. Some + explanation as to the relation between the character and the + knowledge in which all its motives lie, will now be more to the + point.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The motives + which determine the manifestation of the character or conduct + influence it through the medium of knowledge. But knowledge is + changeable, and often vacillates between truth and error, yet, as a + rule, is rectified more and more in the course of life, though + certainly in very different degrees. Therefore the conduct of a man + may be observably altered without justifying us in concluding that + his character has been changed. What the man really and in general + wills, the striving of his inmost nature, and the end he pursues in + accordance with it, this we can never change by influence upon him + from without by instruction, otherwise we could transform him. + Seneca says admirably, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">velle non + discitur</span></span>; whereby he preferred truth to his Stoic + philosophers, who taught διδακτην ειναι την αρετην (<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">doceri posse virtutem</span></span>). From + without the will can only be affected by motives. But <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page380">[pg 380]</span><a name="Pg380" id="Pg380" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> these can never change the will itself; + for they have power over it only under the presupposition that it + is precisely such as it is. All that they can do is thus to alter + the direction of its effort, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, bring it about that it + shall seek in another way than it has hitherto done that which it + invariably seeks. Therefore instruction, improved knowledge, in + other words, influence from without, may indeed teach the will that + it erred in the means it employed, and can therefore bring it about + that the end after which it strives once for all according to its + inner nature shall be pursued on an entirely different path and in + an entirely different object from what has hitherto been the case. + But it can never bring about that the will shall will something + actually different from what it has hitherto willed; this remains + unchangeable, for the will is simply this willing itself, which + would have to be abolished. The former, however, the possible + modification of knowledge, and through knowledge of conduct, + extends so far that the will seeks to attain its unalterable end, + for example, Mohammed's paradise, at one time in the real world, at + another time in a world of imagination, adapting the means to each, + and thus in the first case applying prudence, might, and fraud, and + in the second case, abstinence, justice, alms, and pilgrimages to + Mecca. But its effort itself has not therefore changed, still less + the will itself. Thus, although its action certainly shows itself + very different at different times, its willing has yet remained + precisely the same. <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Velle non + discitur.</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For motives to + act, it is necessary not only that they should be present, but that + they should be known; for, according to a very good expression of + the schoolmen, which we referred to once before, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse + reale; sed secundum esse cognitum</span></span>. For example, in + order that the relation may appear that exists in a given man + between egoism and sympathy, it is not sufficient that he should + possess wealth <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page381">[pg + 381]</span><a name="Pg381" id="Pg381" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and see others in want, but he must also know what he can do with + his wealth, both for himself and for others: not only must the + suffering of others be presented to him, but he must know both what + suffering and also what pleasure is. Perhaps, on a first occasion, + he did not know all this so well as on a second; and if, on a + similar occasion, he acts differently, this arises simply from the + fact that the circumstances were really different, as regards the + part of them that depends on his knowing them, although they seem + to be the same. As ignorance of actually existing circumstances + robs them of their influence, so, on the other hand, entirely + imaginary circumstances may act as if they were real, not only in + the case of a particular deception, but also in general and + continuously. For example, if a man is firmly persuaded that every + good action will be repaid him a hundredfold in a future life, such + a conviction affects him in precisely the same way as a good bill + of exchange at a very long date, and he can give from mere egoism, + as from another point of view he would take from egoism. He has not + changed himself: <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">velle non + discitur.</span></span> It is on account of this great influence of + knowledge upon action, while the will remains unchangeable, that + the character develops and its different features appear only + little by little. Therefore it shows itself different at every + period of life, and an impetuous, wild youth may be succeeded by a + staid, sober, manly age. Especially what is bad in the character + will always come out more strongly with time, yet sometimes it + occurs that passions which a man gave way to in his youth are + afterwards voluntarily restrained, simply because the motives + opposed to them have only then come into knowledge. Hence, also, we + are all innocent to begin with, and this merely means that neither + we nor others know the evil of our own nature; it only appears with + the motives, and only in time do the motives appear in knowledge. + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page382">[pg 382]</span><a name= + "Pg382" id="Pg382" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> Finally we come to + know ourselves as quite different from what <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> we supposed ourselves to be, and then we are + often terrified at ourselves.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Repentance never + proceeds from a change of the will (which is impossible), but from + a change of knowledge. The essential and peculiar in what I have + always willed I must still continue to will; for I myself am this + will which lies outside time and change. I can therefore never + repent of what I have willed, though I can repent of what I have + done; because, led by false conceptions, I did something that was + not in conformity with my will. The discovery of this through + fuller knowledge is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">repentance</span></em>. This extends not + merely to worldly wisdom, to the choice of the means, and the + judgment of the appropriateness of the end to my own will, but also + to what is properly ethical. For example, I may have acted more + egotistically than is in accordance with my character, led astray + by exaggerated ideas of the need in which I myself stood, or of the + craft, falseness, and wickedness of others, or because I hurried + too much, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, acted without + deliberation, determined not by motives distinctly known + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in abstracto</span></span>, but by merely + perceived motives, by the present and the emotion which it excited, + and which was so strong that I had not properly the use of my + reason; but the return of reflection is thus here also merely + corrected knowledge, and from this repentance may proceed, which + always proclaims itself by making amends for the past, as far as is + possible. Yet it must be observed that, in order to deceive + themselves, men prearrange what seem to be hasty errors, but are + really secretly considered actions. For we deceive and flatter no + one through such fine devices as ourselves. The converse of the + case we have given may also occur. I may be misled by too good an + opinion of others, or want of knowledge of the relative value of + the good things of life, or some abstract dogma in which I have + since lost faith, and thus I may act less egotistically than is in + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page383">[pg 383]</span><a name= + "Pg383" id="Pg383" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> keeping with my + character, and lay up for myself repentance of another kind. Thus + repentance is always corrected knowledge of the relation of an act + to its special intention. When the will reveals its Ideas in space + alone, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, through mere form, the + matter in which other Ideas—in this case natural forces—already + reign, resists the will, and seldom allows the form that is + striving after visibility to appear in perfect purity and + distinctness, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, in perfect beauty. And + there is an analogous hindrance to the will as it reveals itself in + time alone, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, through actions, in the + knowledge which seldom gives it the data quite correctly, so that + the action which takes place does not accurately correspond to the + will, and leads to repentance. Repentance thus always proceeds from + corrected knowledge, not from the change of the will, which is + impossible. Anguish of conscience for past deeds is anything but + repentance. It is pain at the knowledge of oneself in one's inmost + nature, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, as will. It rests + precisely on the certainty that we have still the same will. If the + will were changed, and therefore the anguish of conscience mere + repentance, it would cease to exist. The past could then no longer + give us pain, for it exhibited the expressions of a will which is + no longer that of him who has repented. We shall explain the + significance of anguish of conscience in detail farther on.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The influence + which knowledge, as the medium of motives, exerts, not indeed upon + the will itself, but upon its appearance in actions, is also the + source of the principal distinction between the action of men and + that of brutes, for their methods of knowledge are different. The + brute has only knowledge of perception, the man, through reason, + has also abstract ideas, conceptions. Now, although man and brute + are with equal necessity determined by their motives, yet man, as + distinguished from the brute, has a complete <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">choice</span></em>, + which has often been regarded as a freedom of the will in + particular actions, although it is nothing but the possibility of a + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page384">[pg 384]</span><a name= + "Pg384" id="Pg384" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + thoroughly-fought-out battle between several motives, the strongest + of which then determines it with necessity. For this the motives + must have assumed the form of abstract thoughts, because it is + really only by means of these that deliberation, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, a + weighing of opposite reasons for action, is possible. In the case + of the brute there can only be a choice between perceptible motives + presented to it, so that the choice is limited to the narrow sphere + of its present sensuous perception. Therefore the necessity of the + determination of the will by the motive, which is like that of the + effect by the cause, can be exhibited perceptibly and directly only + in the case of the brutes, because here the spectator has the + motives just as directly before his eyes as their effect; while in + the case of man the motives are almost always abstract ideas, which + are not communicated to the spectator, and even for the actor + himself the necessity of their effect is hidden behind their + conflict. For only <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">in + abstracto</span></span> can several ideas, as judgments and chains + of conclusions, lie beside each other in consciousness, and then, + free from all determination of time, work against each other till + the stronger overcomes the rest and determines the will. This is + the complete <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">choice</span></em> or power of deliberation + which man has as distinguished from the brutes, and on account of + which freedom of the will has been attributed to him, in the belief + that his willing is a mere result of the operations of his + intellect, without a definite tendency which serves as its basis; + while, in truth, the motives only work on the foundation and under + the presupposition of his definite tendency, which in his case is + individual, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, a character. A fuller + exposition of this power of deliberation, and the difference + between human and brute choice which is introduced by it, will be + found in the <span class="tei tei-q">“Two Fundamental Problems of + Ethics”</span> (1st edition, p. 35, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">et + seq.</span></span>; 2d edition, p. 34, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">et + seq.</span></span>), to which I therefore refer. For the rest, this + power of deliberation which man possesses is one of those things + that makes his <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page385">[pg + 385]</span><a name="Pg385" id="Pg385" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + existence so much more miserable than that of the brute. For in + general our greatest sufferings do not lie in the present as ideas + of perception or as immediate feelings; but in the reason, as + abstract conceptions, painful thoughts, from which the brute, which + lives only in the present, and therefore in enviable carelessness, + is entirely free.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It seems to have + been the dependence, which we have shown, of the human power of + deliberation upon the faculty of abstract thinking, and thus also + of judging and drawing conclusions also, that led both Descartes + and Spinoza to identify the decisions of the will with the faculty + of asserting and denying (the faculty of judgment). From this + Descartes deduced the doctrine that the will, which, according to + him, is indifferently free, is the source of sin, and also of all + theoretical error. And Spinoza, on the other hand, concluded that + the will is necessarily determined by the motives, as the judgment + is by the reasons.<a id="noteref_70" name="noteref_70" href= + "#note_70"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">70</span></span></a> The + latter doctrine is in a sense true, but it appears as a true + conclusion from false premises.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The distinction + we have established between the ways in which the brutes and man + are respectively moved by motives exerts a very wide influence upon + the nature of both, and has most to do with the complete and + obvious differences of their existence. While an idea of perception + is in every case the motive which determines the brute, the man + strives to exclude this kind of motivation altogether, and to + determine himself entirely by abstract ideas. Thus he uses his + prerogative of reason to the greatest possible advantage. + Independent of the present, he neither chooses nor avoids the + passing pleasure or pain, but reflects on the consequences of both. + In most cases, setting aside quite insignificant actions, we are + determined by abstract, thought motives, not present impressions. + Therefore all particular privation for the moment is for us + comparatively light, but all renunciation is terribly <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page386">[pg 386]</span><a name="Pg386" id="Pg386" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> hard; for the former only concerns the + fleeting present, but the latter concerns the future, and includes + in itself innumerable privations, of which it is the equivalent. + The causes of our pain, as of our pleasure, lie for the most part, + not in the real present, but merely in abstract thoughts. It is + these which are often unbearable to us—inflict torments in + comparison with which all the sufferings of the animal world are + very small; for even our own physical pain is not felt at all when + they are present. Indeed, in the case of keen mental suffering, we + even inflict physical suffering on ourselves merely to distract our + attention from the former to the latter. This is why, in great + mental anguish, men tear their hair, beat their breasts, lacerate + their faces, or roll on the floor, for all these are in reality + only violent means of diverting the mind from an unbearable + thought. Just because mental pain, being much greater, makes us + insensible to physical pain, suicide is very easy to the person who + is in despair, or who is consumed by morbid depression, even though + formerly, in comfortable circumstances, he recoiled at the thought + of it. In the same way care and passion (thus the play of thought) + wear out the body oftener and more than physical hardships. And in + accordance with this Epictetus rightly says: Ταρασσει τους + ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα + (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus + decreta</span></span>) (V.); and Seneca: <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Plura sunt quæ nos terrent, quam quæ premunt, + et sæpius opinione quam re laboramus</span></span> (Ep. 5). + Eulenspiegel also admirably bantered human nature, for going uphill + he laughed, and going downhill he wept. Indeed, children who have + hurt themselves often cry, not at the pain, but at the thought of + the pain which is awakened when some one condoles with them. Such + great differences in conduct and in life arise from the diversity + between the methods of knowledge of the brutes and man. Further, + the appearance of the distinct and decided individual character, + the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page387">[pg 387]</span><a name= + "Pg387" id="Pg387" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> principal + distinction between man and the brute, which has scarcely more than + the character of the species, is conditioned by the choice between + several motives, which is only possible through abstract + conceptions. For only after a choice has been made are the + resolutions, which vary in different individuals, an indication of + the individual character which is different in each; while the + action of the brute depends only upon the presence or absence of + the impression, supposing this impression to be in general a motive + for its species. And, finally, in the case of man, only the + resolve, and not the mere wish, is a valid indication of his + character both for himself and for others; but the resolve becomes + for himself, as for others, a certain fact only through the deed. + The wish is merely the necessary consequence of the present + impression, whether of the outward stimulus, or the inward passing + mood; and is therefore as immediately necessary and devoid of + consideration as the action of the brutes. Therefore, like the + action of the brutes, it merely expresses the character of the + species, not that of the individual, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + it indicates merely what <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">man in general</span></em>, not what the + individual who experiences the wish, is capable of doing. The deed + alone,—because as human action it always requires a certain + deliberation, and because as a rule a man has command of his + reason, is considerate, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, decides in accordance with + considered and abstract motives,—is the expression of the + intelligible maxims of his conduct, the result of his inmost + willing, and is related as a letter to the word that stands for his + empirical character, itself merely the temporal expression of his + intelligible character. In a healthy mind, therefore, only deeds + oppress the conscience, not wishes and thoughts; for it is only our + deeds that hold up to us the mirror of our will. The deed referred + to above, that is entirely unconsidered and is really committed in + blind passion, is to a certain extent an intermediate thing between + the mere wish and the resolve.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page388">[pg 388]</span><a name="Pg388" id="Pg388" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Therefore, by + true repentance, which, however, shows itself as action also, it + can be obliterated, as a falsely drawn line, from that picture of + our will which our course of life is. I may insert the remark here, + as a very good comparison, that the relation between wish and deed + has a purely accidental but accurate analogy with that between the + accumulation and discharge of electricity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As the result of + the whole of this discussion of the freedom of the will and what + relates to it, we find that although the will may, in itself and + apart from the phenomenon, be called free and even omnipotent, yet + in its particular phenomena enlightened by knowledge, as in men and + brutes, it is determined by motives to which the special character + regularly and necessarily responds, and always in the same way. We + see that because of the possession on his part of abstract or + rational knowledge, man, as distinguished from the brutes, has a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">choice</span></em>, which only makes him the + scene of the conflict of his motives, without withdrawing him from + their control. This choice is therefore certainly the condition of + the possibility of the complete expression of the individual + character, but is by no means to be regarded as freedom of the + particular volition, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, independence of the law of + causality, the necessity of which extends to man as to every other + phenomenon. Thus the difference between human volition and that of + the brutes, which is introduced by reason or knowledge through + concepts, extends to the point we have indicated, and no farther. + But, what is quite a different thing, there may arise a phenomenon + of the human will which is quite impossible in the brute creation, + if man altogether lays aside the knowledge of particular things as + such which is subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, + and by means of his knowledge of the Ideas sees through the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>. Then + an actual appearance of the real freedom of the will as a + thing-in-itself is possible, by which the phenomenon comes into a + sort of contradiction with <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page389">[pg 389]</span><a name="Pg389" id="Pg389" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> itself, as is indicated by the word + self-renunciation; and, finally, the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“in-itself”</span> of its nature suppresses itself. But + this, the one, real, and direct expression of the freedom of the + will in itself in the phenomenon, cannot be distinctly explained + here, but will form the subject of the concluding part of our + work.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now that we have + shown clearly in these pages the unalterable nature of the + empirical character, which is just the unfolding of the + intelligible character that lies outside time, together with the + necessity with which actions follow upon its contact with motives, + we hasten to anticipate an argument which may very easily be drawn + from this in the interest of bad dispositions. Our character is to + be regarded as the temporal unfolding of an extra-temporal, and + therefore indivisible and unalterable, act of will, or an + intelligible character. This necessarily determines all that is + essential in our conduct in life, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + its ethical content, which must express itself in accordance with + it in its phenomenal appearance, the empirical character; while + only what is unessential in this, the outward form of our course of + life, depends upon the forms in which the motives present + themselves. It might, therefore, be inferred that it is a waste of + trouble to endeavour to improve one's character, and that it is + wiser to submit to the inevitable, and gratify every inclination at + once, even if it is bad. But this is precisely the same thing as + the theory of an inevitable fate which is called αργος λογος, and + in more recent times Turkish faith. Its true refutation, as it is + supposed to have been given by Chrysippus, is explained by Cicero + in his book <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Fato</span></span>, ch. 12, 13.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Though + everything may be regarded as irrevocably predetermined by fate, + yet it is so only through the medium of the chain of causes; + therefore in no case can it be determined that an effect shall + appear without its cause. Thus it is not simply the event that is + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page390">[pg 390]</span><a name= + "Pg390" id="Pg390" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> predetermined, but + the event as the consequence of preceding causes; so that fate does + not decide the consequence alone, but also the means as the + consequence of which it is destined to appear. Accordingly, if some + means is not present, it is certain that the consequence also will + not be present: each is always present in accordance with the + determination of fate, but this is never known to us till + afterwards.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As events always + take place according to fate, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, according to the infinite + concatenation of causes, so our actions always take place according + to our intelligible character. But just as we do not know the + former beforehand, so no <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> insight is given us into the latter, but we + only come to know ourselves as we come to know other persons + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> through experience. + If the intelligible character involved that we could only form a + good resolution after a long conflict with a bad disposition, this + conflict would have to come first and be waited for. Reflection on + the unalterable nature of the character, on the unity of the source + from which all our actions flow, must not mislead us into claiming + the decision of the character in favour of one side or the other; + it is in the resolve that follows that we shall see what manner of + men we are, and mirror ourselves in our actions. This is the + explanation of the satisfaction or the anguish of soul with which + we look back on the course of our past life. Both are experienced, + not because these past deeds have still an existence; they are + past, they have been, and now are no more; but their great + importance for us lies in their significance, lies in the fact that + these deeds are the expression of the character, the mirror of the + will, in which we look and recognise our inmost self, the kernel of + our will. Because we experience this not before, but only after, it + behoves us to strive and fight in time, in order that the picture + we produce by our deeds may be such that the contemplation of it + may calm us as much as possible, instead of harassing us. The + significance of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page391">[pg + 391]</span><a name="Pg391" id="Pg391" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + this consolation or anguish of soul will, as we have said, be + inquired into farther on; but to this place there belongs the + inquiry which follows, and which stands by itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Besides the + intelligible and the empirical character, we must mention a third + which is different from them both, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">acquired + character</span></em>, which one only receives in life through + contact with the world, and which is referred to when one is + praised as a man of character or censured as being without + character. Certainly one might suppose that, since the empirical + character, as the phenomenon of the intelligible, is unalterable, + and, like every natural phenomenon, is consistent with itself, man + would always have to appear like himself and consistent, and would + therefore have no need to acquire a character artificially by + experience and reflection. But the case is otherwise, and although + a man is always the same, yet he does not always understand + himself, but often mistakes himself, till he has in some degree + acquired real self-knowledge. The empirical character, as a mere + natural tendency, is in itself irrational; nay, more, its + expressions are disturbed by reason, all the more so the more + intellect and power of thought the man has; for these always keep + before him what becomes <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">man in general</span></em> as the character of + the species, and what is possible for him both in will and in deed. + This makes it the more difficult for him to see how much his + individuality enables him to will and to accomplish. He finds in + himself the germs of all the various human pursuits and powers, but + the difference of degree in which they exist in his individuality + is not clear to him in the absence of experience; and if he now + applies himself to the pursuits which alone correspond to his + character, he yet feels, especially at particular moments and in + particular moods, the inclination to directly opposite pursuits + which cannot be combined with them, but must be entirely suppressed + if he desires to follow the former undisturbed. For as our physical + path upon earth is always <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page392">[pg + 392]</span><a name="Pg392" id="Pg392" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + merely a line, not an extended surface, so in life, if we desire to + grasp and possess one thing, we must renounce and leave innumerable + others on the right hand and on the left. If we cannot make up our + minds to this, but, like children at the fair, snatch at everything + that attracts us in passing, we are making the perverse endeavour + to change the line of our path into an extended surface; we run in + a zigzag, skip about like a will o' the wisp, and attain to + nothing. Or, to use another comparison, as, according to Hobbes' + philosophy of law, every one has an original right to everything + but an exclusive right to nothing, yet can obtain an exclusive + right to particular things by renouncing his right to all the rest, + while others, on their part, do likewise with regard to what he has + chosen; so is it in life, in which some definite pursuit, whether + it be pleasure, honour, wealth, science, art, or virtue, can only + be followed with seriousness and success when all claims that are + foreign to it are given up, when everything else is renounced. + Accordingly, the mere will and the mere ability are not sufficient, + but a man must also <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">know</span></em> what he wills, and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">know</span></em> + what he can do; only then will he show character, and only then can + he accomplish something right. Until he attains to that, + notwithstanding the natural consistency of the empirical character, + he is without character. And although, on the whole, he must remain + true to himself, and fulfil his course, led by his dæmon, yet his + path will not be a straight line, but wavering and uneven. He will + hesitate, deviate, turn back, lay up for himself repentance and + pain. And all this is because, in great and small, he sees before + him all that is possible and attainable for man in general, but + does not know what part of all this is alone suitable for him, can + be accomplished by him, and is alone enjoyable by him. He will, + therefore, envy many men on account of a position and circumstances + which are yet only suitable to their characters and not to his, and + in which he would feel unhappy, if indeed he found <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page393">[pg 393]</span><a name="Pg393" id="Pg393" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> them endurable at all. For as a fish is + only at home in water, a bird in the air, a mole in the earth, so + every man is only at home in the atmosphere suitable to him. For + example, not all men can breathe the air of court life. From + deficiency of proper insight into all this, many a man will make + all kinds of abortive attempts, will do violence to his character + in particulars, and yet, on the whole, will have to yield to it + again; and what he thus painfully attains will give him no + pleasure; what he thus learns will remain dead; even in an ethical + regard, a deed that is too noble for his character, that has not + sprung from pure, direct impulse, but from a concept, a dogma, will + lose all merit, even in his own eyes, through subsequent egoistical + repentance. <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Velle non + discitur.</span></span> We only become conscious of the + inflexibility of another person's character through experience, and + till then we childishly believe that it is possible, by means of + rational ideas, by prayers and entreaties, by example and + noble-mindedness, ever to persuade any one to leave his own way, to + change his course of conduct, to depart from his mode of thinking, + or even to extend his capacities: so is it also with ourselves. We + must first learn from experience what we desire and what we can do. + Till then we know it not, we are without character, and must often + be driven back to our own way by hard blows from without. But if we + have finally learnt it, then we have attained to what in the world + is called character, the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">acquired character</span></em>. This is + accordingly nothing but the most perfect knowledge possible of our + own individuality. It is the abstract, and consequently distinct, + knowledge of the unalterable qualities of our own empirical + character, and of the measure and direction of our mental and + physical powers, and thus of the whole strength and weakness of our + own individuality. This places us in a position to carry out + deliberately and methodically the rôle which belongs to our own + person, and to fill up the gaps which caprices or weaknesses + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page394">[pg 394]</span><a name= + "Pg394" id="Pg394" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> produce in it, under + the guidance of fixed conceptions. This rôle is in itself + unchangeably determined once for all, but hitherto we have allowed + it to follow its natural course without any rule. We have now + brought to distinct conscious maxims which are always present to us + the form of conduct which is necessarily determined by our own + individual nature, and now we conduct it in accordance with them as + deliberately as if we had learned it; without ever falling into + error through the passing influence of the mood or the impression + of the present, without being checked by the bitterness or + sweetness of some particular thing we meet with on our path, + without delay, without hesitation, without inconsistency. We shall + now no longer, as novices, wait, attempt, and grope about in order + to see what we really desire and are able to do, but we know this + once for all, and in every choice we have only to apply general + principles to particular cases, and arrive at once at a decision. + We know our will in general, and do not allow ourselves to be led + by the passing mood or by solicitations from without to resolve in + particular cases what is contrary to it as a whole. We know in the + same way the nature and the measure of our strength and our + weakness, and thereby are spared much suffering. For we experience + no real pleasure except in the use and feeling of our own powers, + and the greatest pain is the conscious deficiency of our powers + where we need them. If, now, we have discovered where our strength + and our weakness lie, we will endeavour to cultivate, employ, and + in every way make use of those talents which are naturally + prominent in us. We will always turn to those occupations in which + they are valuable and to the purpose, and entirely avoid, even with + self-renunciation, those pursuits for which we have naturally + little aptitude; we will beware of attempting that in which we have + no chance of succeeding. Only he who has attained to this will + constantly and with <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page395">[pg + 395]</span><a name="Pg395" id="Pg395" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + full consciousness be completely himself, and will never fail + himself at the critical moment, because he will always have known + what he could expect from himself. He will often enjoy the + satisfaction of feeling his strength, and seldom experience the + pain of being reminded of his weakness. The latter is + mortification, which causes perhaps the greatest of mental + sufferings; therefore it is far more endurable to have our + misfortune brought clearly before us than our incapacity. And, + further, if we are thus fully acquainted with our strength and our + weakness, we will not attempt to make a show of powers which we do + not possess; we will not play with base coin, for all such + dissimulation misses the mark in the end. For since the whole man + is only the phenomenon of his will, nothing can be more perverse + than to try, by means of reflection, to become something else than + one is, for this is a direct contradiction of the will with itself. + The imitation of the qualities and idiosyncrasies of others is much + more shameful than to dress in other people's clothes; for it is + the judgment of our own worthlessness pronounced by ourselves. + Knowledge of our own mind and its capacities of every kind, and + their unalterable limits, is in this respect the surest way to the + attainment of the greatest possible contentment with ourselves. For + it holds good of inward as of outward circumstances that there is + for us no consolation so effective as the complete certainty of + unalterable necessity. No evil that befalls us pains us so much as + the thought of the circumstances by which it might have been warded + off. Therefore nothing comforts us so effectually as the + consideration of what has happened from the standpoint of + necessity, from which all accidents appear as tools in the hand of + an overruling fate, and we therefore recognise the evil that has + come to us as inevitably produced by the conflict of inner and + outer circumstances; in other words, fatalism. We really only + complain and storm so long as we hope <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page396">[pg 396]</span><a name="Pg396" id="Pg396" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> either to affect others or to excite + ourselves to unheard-of efforts. But children and grown-up people + know very well to yield contentedly as soon as they clearly see + that it absolutely cannot be otherwise:—Θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον + δαμάσσαντες ἀνάγκη (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Animo in pectoribus + nostro domito necessitate</span></span>). We are like the entrapped + elephants, that rage and struggle for many days, till they see that + it is useless, and then suddenly offer their necks quietly to the + yoke, tamed for ever. We are like King David, who, as long as his + son still lived, unceasingly importuned Jehovah with prayers, and + behaved himself as if in despair; but as soon as his son was dead, + thought no longer about it. Hence it arises that innumerable + permanent ills, such as lameness, poverty, low estate, ugliness, a + disagreeable dwelling-place, are borne with indifference by + innumerable persons, and are no longer felt, like healed wounds, + just because these persons know that inward or outward necessity + renders it impossible that any change can take place in these + things; while those who are more fortunate cannot understand how + such misfortunes can be borne. Now as with outward necessity, so + also with inward; nothing reconciles so thoroughly as a distinct + knowledge of it. If we have once for all distinctly recognised not + only our good qualities and our strength, but also our defects and + weakness, established our aim accordingly, and rest satisfied + concerning what cannot be attained, we thus escape in the surest + way, as far as our individuality permits, the bitterest of all + sorrows, discontentment with ourselves, which is the inevitable + result of ignorance of our own individuality, of false conceit and + the audacity that proceeds from it. To the bitter chapter of the + self-knowledge here recommended the lines of Ovid admit of + excellent application—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Optimus + ille animi vindex lædentia pectus,</span></span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Vincula qui rupit, + dedoluitque semel.</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page397">[pg 397]</span><a name= + "Pg397" id="Pg397" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">So much with + regard to the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">acquired character</span></em>, which, indeed, + is not of so much importance for ethics proper as for life in the + world. But its investigation was related as that of a third species + to the investigation of the intelligible and the empirical + character, in regard to which we were obliged to enter upon a + somewhat detailed inquiry in order to bring out clearly how in all + its phenomena the will is subject to necessity, while yet in itself + it may be called free and even omnipotent.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 56. This + freedom, this omnipotence, as the expression of which the whole + visible world exists and progressively develops in accordance with + the laws which belong to the form of knowledge, can now, at the + point at which in its most perfect manifestation it has attained to + the completely adequate knowledge of its own nature, express itself + anew in two ways. Either it wills here, at the summit of mental + endowment and self-consciousness, simply what it willed before + blindly and unconsciously, and if so, knowledge always remains its + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">motive</span></em> in the whole as in the + particular case. Or, conversely, this knowledge becomes for it a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quieter</span></em>, which appeases and + suppresses all willing. This is that assertion and denial of the + will to live which was stated above in general terms. As, in the + reference of individual conduct, a general, not a particular + manifestation of will, it does not disturb and modify the + development of the character, nor does it find its expression in + particular actions; but, either by an ever more marked appearance + of the whole method of action it has followed hitherto, or + conversely by the entire suppression of it, it expresses in a + living form the maxims which the will has freely adopted in + accordance with the knowledge it has now attained to. By the + explanations we have just given of freedom, necessity, and + character, we have somewhat facilitated and prepared the way for + the clearer development of all this, which is the principal subject + of this last book. But we shall have done so still more when we + have turned our attention to <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page398">[pg 398]</span><a name="Pg398" id="Pg398" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> life itself, the willing or not willing of + which is the great question, and have endeavoured to find out + generally what the will itself, which is everywhere the inmost + nature of this life, will really attain by its assertion—in what + way and to what extent this assertion satisfies or can satisfy the + will; in short, what is generally and mainly to be regarded as its + position in this its own world, which in every relation belongs to + it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">First of all, I + wish the reader to recall the passage with which we closed the + Second Book,—a passage occasioned by the question, which met us + then, as to the end and aim of the will. Instead of the answer to + this question, it appeared clearly before us how, in all the grades + of its manifestation, from the lowest to the highest, the will + dispenses altogether with a final goal and aim. It always strives, + for striving is its sole nature, which no attained goal can put an + end to. Therefore it is not susceptible of any final satisfaction, + but can only be restrained by hindrances, while in itself it goes + on for ever. We see this in the simplest of all natural phenomena, + gravity, which does not cease to strive and press towards a + mathematical centre to reach which would be the annihilation both + of itself and matter, and would not cease even if the whole + universe were already rolled into one ball. We see it in the other + simple natural phenomena. A solid tends towards fluidity either by + melting or dissolving, for only so will its chemical forces be + free; rigidity is the imprisonment in which it is held by cold. The + fluid tends towards the gaseous state, into which it passes at once + as soon as all pressure is removed from it. No body is without + relationship, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, without tendency or + without desire and longing, as Jacob Böhme would say. Electricity + transmits its inner self-repulsion to infinity, though the mass of + the earth absorbs the effect. Galvanism is certainly, so long as + the pile is working, an aimless, unceasingly repeated act of + repulsion and attraction. The existence of the plant is just such a + restless, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page399">[pg + 399]</span><a name="Pg399" id="Pg399" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + never satisfied striving, a ceaseless tendency through + ever-ascending forms, till the end, the seed, becomes a new + starting-point; and this repeated <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">ad + infinitum</span></span>—nowhere an end, nowhere a final + satisfaction, nowhere a resting-place. It will also be remembered, + from the Second Book, that the multitude of natural forces and + organised forms everywhere strive with each other for the matter in + which they desire to appear, for each of them only possesses what + it has wrested from the others; and thus a constant internecine war + is waged, from which, for the most part, arises the resistance + through which that striving, which constitutes the inner nature of + everything, is at all points hindered; struggles in vain, yet, from + its nature, cannot leave off; toils on laboriously till this + phenomenon dies, when others eagerly seize its place and its + matter.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have long + since recognised this striving, which constitutes the kernel and + in-itself of everything, as identical with that which in us, where + it manifests itself most distinctly in the light of the fullest + consciousness, is called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>. Its hindrance through an + obstacle which places itself between it and its temporary aim we + call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suffering</span></em>, and, on the other hand, + its attainment of the end satisfaction, wellbeing, happiness. We + may also transfer this terminology to the phenomena of the + unconscious world, for though weaker in degree, they are identical + in nature. Then we see them involved in constant suffering, and + without any continuing happiness. For all effort springs from + defect—from discontent with one's estate—is thus suffering so long + as it is not satisfied; but no satisfaction is lasting, rather it + is always merely the starting-point of a new effort. The striving + we see everywhere hindered in many ways, everywhere in conflict, + and therefore always under the form of suffering. Thus, if there is + no final end of striving, there is no measure and end of + suffering.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But what we only + discover in unconscious Nature by sharpened observation, and with + an effort, presents itself <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page400">[pg 400]</span><a name="Pg400" id="Pg400" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> distinctly to us in the intelligent world in + the life of animals, whose constant suffering is easily proved. But + without lingering over these intermediate grades, we shall turn to + the life of man, in which all this appears with the greatest + distinctness, illuminated by the clearest knowledge; for as the + phenomenon of will becomes more complete, the suffering also + becomes more and more apparent. In the plant there is as yet no + sensibility, and therefore no pain. A certain very small degree of + suffering is experienced by the lowest species of animal + life—infusoria and radiata; even in insects the capacity to feel + and suffer is still limited. It first appears in a high degree with + the complete nervous system of vertebrate animals, and always in a + higher degree the more intelligence develops. Thus, in proportion + as knowledge attains to distinctness, as consciousness ascends, + pain also increases, and therefore reaches its highest degree in + man. And then, again, the more distinctly a man knows, the more + intelligent he is, the more pain he has; the man who is gifted with + genius suffers most of all. In this sense, that is, with reference + to the degree of knowledge in general, not mere abstract rational + knowledge, I understand and use here that saying of the Preacher: + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Qui auget scientiam, auget at + dolorem.</span></span> That philosophical painter or painting + philosopher, Tischbein, has very beautifully expressed the accurate + relation between the degree of consciousness and that of suffering + by exhibiting it in a visible and clear form in a drawing. The + upper half of his drawing represents women whose children have been + stolen, and who in different groups and attitudes, express in many + ways deep maternal pain, anguish, and despair. The lower half of + the drawing represents sheep whose lambs have been taken away. They + are arranged and grouped in precisely the same way; so that every + human head, every human attitude of the upper half, has below a + brute head and attitude corresponding to it. Thus we see distinctly + how the pain which is possible in the dull brute consciousness + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page401">[pg 401]</span><a name= + "Pg401" id="Pg401" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> is related to the + violent grief, which only becomes possible through distinctness of + knowledge and clearness of consciousness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We desire to + consider in this way, in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">human existence</span></em>, the inner and + essential destiny of will. Every one will easily recognise that + same destiny expressed in various degrees in the life of the + brutes, only more weakly, and may also convince himself to his own + satisfaction, from the suffering animal world, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">how essential to + all life is suffering</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 57. At every + grade that is enlightened by knowledge, the will appears as an + individual. The human individual finds himself as finite in + infinite space and time, and consequently as a vanishing quantity + compared with them. He is projected into them, and, on account of + their unlimited nature, he has always a merely relative, never + absolute <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">when</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">where</span></em> + of his existence; for his place and duration are finite parts of + what is infinite and boundless. His real existence is only in the + present, whose unchecked flight into the past is a constant + transition into death, a constant dying. For his past life, apart + from its possible consequences for the present, and the testimony + regarding the will that is expressed in it, is now entirely done + with, dead, and no longer anything; and, therefore, it must be, as + a matter of reason, indifferent to him whether the content of that + past was pain or pleasure. But the present is always passing + through his hands into the past; the future is quite uncertain and + always short. Thus his existence, even when we consider only its + formal side, is a constant hurrying of the present into the dead + past, a constant dying. But if we look at it from the physical + side; it is clear that, as our walking is admittedly merely a + constantly prevented falling, the life of our body is only a + constantly prevented dying, an ever-postponed death: finally, in + the same way, the activity of our mind is a constantly deferred + ennui. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page402">[pg + 402]</span><a name="Pg402" id="Pg402" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Every breath we draw wards off the death that is constantly + intruding upon us. In this way we fight with it every moment, and + again, at longer intervals, through every meal we eat, every sleep + we take, every time we warm ourselves, &c. In the end, death + must conquer, for we became subject to him through birth, and he + only plays for a little while with his prey before he swallows it + up. We pursue our life, however, with great interest and much + solicitude as long as possible, as we blow out a soap-bubble as + long and as large as possible, although we know perfectly well that + it will burst.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We saw that the + inner being of unconscious nature is a constant striving without + end and without rest. And this appears to us much more distinctly + when we consider the nature of brutes and man. Willing and striving + is its whole being, which may be very well compared to an + unquenchable thirst. But the basis of all willing is need, + deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently, the nature of brutes and + man is subject to pain originally and through its very being. If, + on the other hand, it lacks objects of desire, because it is at + once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction, a terrible void + and ennui comes over it, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, its being and existence + itself becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus its life swings + like a pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui. This + has also had to express itself very oddly in this way; after man + had transferred all pain and torments to hell, there then remained + nothing over for heaven but ennui.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the constant + striving which constitutes the inner nature of every manifestation + of will obtains its primary and most general foundation at the + higher grades of objectification, from the fact that here the will + manifests itself as a living body, with the iron command to nourish + it; and what gives strength to this command is just that this body + is nothing but the objectified will to live <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page403">[pg 403]</span><a name="Pg403" id="Pg403" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> itself. Man, as the most complete + objectification of that will, is in like measure also the most + necessitous of all beings: he is through and through concrete + willing and needing; he is a concretion of a thousand necessities. + With these he stands upon the earth, left to himself, uncertain + about everything except his own need and misery. Consequently the + care for the maintenance of that existence under exacting demands, + which are renewed every day, occupies, as a rule, the whole of + human life. To this is directly related the second claim, that of + the propagation of the species. At the same time he is threatened + from all sides by the most different kinds of dangers, from which + it requires constant watchfulness to escape. With cautious steps + and casting anxious glances round him he pursues his path, for a + thousand accidents and a thousand enemies lie in wait for him. Thus + he went while yet a savage, thus he goes in civilised life; there + is no security for him.</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" xml:lang= + "la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Qualibus in tenebris + vitæ, quantisque periclis</span></span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Degitur hocc' ævi, + quodcunque est!</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">—</span><span class="tei tei-hi" style= + "text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps">Lucr.</span></span> + <span style="font-size: 90%">ii. 15.</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The life of the + great majority is only a constant struggle for this existence + itself, with the certainty of losing it at last. But what enables + them to endure this wearisome battle is not so much the love of + life as the fear of death, which yet stands in the background as + inevitable, and may come upon them at any moment. Life itself is a + sea, full of rocks and whirlpools, which man avoids with the + greatest care and solicitude, although he knows that even if he + succeeds in getting through with all his efforts and skill, he yet + by doing so comes nearer at every step to the greatest, the total, + inevitable, and irremediable shipwreck, death; nay, even steers + right upon it: this is the final goal of the laborious voyage, and + worse for him than all the rocks from which he has escaped.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now it is well + worth observing that, on the one hand, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page404">[pg 404]</span><a name="Pg404" id="Pg404" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the suffering and misery of life may easily + increase to such an extent that death itself, in the flight from + which the whole of life consists, becomes desirable, and we hasten + towards it voluntarily; and again, on the other hand, that as soon + as want and suffering permit rest to a man, ennui is at once so + near that he necessarily requires diversion. The striving after + existence is what occupies all living things and maintains them in + motion. But when existence is assured, then they know not what to + do with it; thus the second thing that sets them in motion is the + effort to get free from the burden of existence, to make it cease + to be felt, <span class="tei tei-q">“to kill time,”</span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, to escape from ennui. + Accordingly we see that almost all men who are secure from want and + care, now that at last they have thrown off all other burdens, + become a burden to themselves, and regard as a gain every hour they + succeed in getting through; and thus every diminution of the very + life which, till then, they have employed all their powers to + maintain as long as possible. Ennui is by no means an evil to be + lightly esteemed; in the end it depicts on the countenance real + despair. It makes beings who love each other so little as men do, + seek each other eagerly, and thus becomes the source of social + intercourse. Moreover, even from motives of policy, public + precautions are everywhere taken against it, as against other + universal calamities. For this evil may drive men to the greatest + excesses, just as much as its opposite extreme, famine: the people + require <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">panem et + circenses</span></span>. The strict penitentiary system of + Philadelphia makes use of ennui alone as a means of punishment, + through solitary confinement and idleness, and it is found so + terrible that it has even led prisoners to commit suicide. As want + is the constant scourge of the people, so ennui is that of the + fashionable world. In middle-class life ennui is represented by the + Sunday, and want by the six week-days.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus between + desiring and attaining all human life flows on throughout. The wish + is, in its nature, pain; <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page405">[pg + 405]</span><a name="Pg405" id="Pg405" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the attainment soon begets satiety: the end was only apparent; + possession takes away the charm; the wish, the need, presents + itself under a new form; when it does not, then follows + desolateness, emptiness, ennui, against which the conflict is just + as painful as against want. That wish and satisfaction should + follow each other neither too quickly nor too slowly reduces the + suffering, which both occasion to the smallest amount, and + constitutes the happiest life. For that which we might otherwise + call the most beautiful part of life, its purest joy, if it were + only because it lifts us out of real existence and transforms us + into disinterested spectators of it—that is, pure knowledge, which + is foreign to all willing, the pleasure of the beautiful, the true + delight in art—this is granted only to a very few, because it + demands rare talents, and to these few only as a passing dream. And + then, even these few, on account of their higher intellectual + power, are made susceptible of far greater suffering than duller + minds can ever feel, and are also placed in lonely isolation by a + nature which is obviously different from that of others; thus here + also accounts are squared. But to the great majority of men purely + intellectual pleasures are not accessible. They are almost quite + incapable of the joys which lie in pure knowledge. They are + entirely given up to willing. If, therefore, anything is to win + their sympathy, to be <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">interesting</span></em> to them, it must (as + is implied in the meaning of the word) in some way excite their + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">will</span></em>, even if it is only through a + distant and merely problematical relation to it; the will must not + be left altogether out of the question, for their existence lies + far more in willing than in knowing,—action and reaction is their + one element. We may find in trifles and everyday occurrences the + naïve expressions of this quality. Thus, for example, at any place + worth seeing they may visit, they write their names, in order thus + to react, to affect the place since it does not affect them. Again, + when they see a strange rare animal, they cannot <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page406">[pg 406]</span><a name="Pg406" id="Pg406" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> easily confine themselves to merely + observing it; they must rouse it, tease it, play with it, merely to + experience action and reaction; but this need for excitement of the + will manifests itself very specially in the discovery and support + of card-playing, which is quite peculiarly the expression of the + miserable side of humanity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But whatever + nature and fortune may have done, whoever a man be and whatever he + may possess, the pain which is essential to life cannot be thrown + off:—Πηλειδης δ᾽ ῳμωξεν, ιδων εις ουρανον ευρυν (<span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Pelides autem ejulavit, intuitus in cælum + latum</span></span>). And again:—Ζηνος μεν παις ηα Κρονιονος, αυταρ + οιζυν ειχον απειρεσιην (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Jovis quidem filius + eram Saturnii; verum ærumnam habebam infinitam</span></span>). The + ceaseless efforts to banish suffering accomplish no more than to + make it change its form. It is essentially deficiency, want, care + for the maintenance of life. If we succeed, which is very + difficult, in removing pain in this form, it immediately assumes a + thousand others, varying according to age and circumstances, such + as lust, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety, + ambition, covetousness, sickness, &c., &c. If at last it + can find entrance in no other form, it comes in the sad, grey + garments of tediousness and ennui, against which we then strive in + various ways. If finally we succeed in driving this away, we shall + hardly do so without letting pain enter in one of its earlier + forms, and the dance begin again from the beginning; for all human + life is tossed backwards and forwards between pain and ennui. + Depressing as this view of life is, I will draw attention, by the + way, to an aspect of it from which consolation may be drawn, and + perhaps even a stoical indifference to one's own present ills may + be attained. For our impatience at these arises for the most part + from the fact that we regard them as brought about by a chain of + causes which might easily be different. We do not generally grieve + over ills which are directly necessary and quite universal; for + example, the necessity of age and of <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page407">[pg 407]</span><a name="Pg407" id="Pg407" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> death, and many daily inconveniences. It is + rather the consideration of the accidental nature of the + circumstances that brought some sorrow just to us, that gives it + its sting. But if we have recognised that pain, as such, is + inevitable and essential to life, and that nothing depends upon + chance but its mere fashion, the form under which it presents + itself, that thus our present sorrow fills a place that, without + it, would at once be occupied by another which now is excluded by + it, and that therefore fate can affect us little in what is + essential; such a reflection, if it were to become a living + conviction, might produce a considerable degree of stoical + equanimity, and very much lessen the anxious care for our own + well-being. But, in fact, such a powerful control of reason over + directly felt suffering seldom or never occurs.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Besides, through + this view of the inevitableness of pain, of the supplanting of one + pain by another, and the introduction of a new pain through the + passing away of that which preceded it, one might be led to the + paradoxical but not absurd hypothesis, that in every individual the + measure of the pain essential to him was determined once for all by + his nature, a measure which could neither remain empty, nor be more + than filled, however much the form of the suffering might change. + Thus his suffering and well-being would by no means be determined + from without, but only through that measure, that natural + disposition, which indeed might experience certain additions and + diminutions from the physical condition at different times, but + yet, on the whole, would remain the same, and would just be what is + called the temperament, or, more accurately, the degree in which he + might be ευκολος or δυσκολος, as Plato expresses it in the First + Book of the Republic, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, in an easy or difficult + mood. This hypothesis is supported not only by the well-known + experience that great suffering makes all lesser ills cease to be + felt, and conversely that freedom from great suffering makes even + the most trifling inconveniences torment us <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page408">[pg 408]</span><a name="Pg408" id="Pg408" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and put us out of humour; but + experience also teaches that if a great misfortune, at the mere + thought of which we shuddered, actually befalls us, as soon as we + have overcome the first pain of it, our disposition remains for the + most part unchanged; and, conversely, that after the attainment of + some happiness we have long desired, we do not feel ourselves on + the whole and permanently very much better off and agreeably + situated than before. Only the moment at which these changes occur + affects us with unusual strength, as deep sorrow or exulting joy, + but both soon pass away, for they are based upon illusion. For they + do not spring from the immediately present pleasure or pain, but + only from the opening up of a new future which is anticipated in + them. Only by borrowing from the future could pain or pleasure be + heightened so abnormally, and consequently not enduringly. It would + follow, from the hypothesis advanced, that a large part of the + feeling of suffering and of well-being would be subjective and + determined <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>, as is + the case with knowing; and we may add the following remarks as + evidence in favour of it. Human cheerfulness or dejection are + manifestly not determined by external circumstances, such as wealth + and position, for we see at least as many glad faces among the poor + as among the rich. Further, the motives which induce suicide are so + very different, that we can assign no motive that is so great as to + bring it about, even with great probability, in every character, + and few that would be so small that the like of them had never + caused it. Now although the degree of our serenity or sadness is + not at all times the same, yet, in consequence of this view, we + shall not attribute it to the change of outward circumstances, but + to that of the inner condition, the physical state. For when an + actual, though only temporary, increase of our serenity, even to + the extent of joyfulness, takes place, it usually appears without + any external occasion. It is true that <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page409">[pg 409]</span><a name="Pg409" id="Pg409" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> we often see our pain arise only from some + definite external relation, and are visibly oppressed and saddened + by this only. Then we believe that if only this were taken away, + the greatest contentment would necessarily ensue. But this is + illusion. The measure of our pain and our happiness is on the + whole, according to our hypothesis, subjectively determined for + each point of time, and the motive for sadness is related to that, + just as a blister which draws to a head all the bad humours + otherwise distributed is related to the body. The pain which is at + that period of time essential to our nature, and therefore cannot + be shaken off, would, without the definite external cause of our + suffering, be divided at a hundred points, and appear in the form + of a hundred little annoyances and cares about things which we now + entirely overlook, because our capacity for pain is already filled + by that chief evil which has concentrated in a point all the + suffering otherwise dispersed. This corresponds also to the + observation that if a great and pressing care is lifted from our + breast by its fortunate issue, another immediately takes its place, + the whole material of which was already there before, yet could not + come into consciousness as care because there was no capacity left + for it, and therefore this material of care remained indistinct and + unobserved in a cloudy form on the farthest horizon of + consciousness. But now that there is room, this prepared material + at once comes forward and occupies the throne of the reigning care + of the day (πρυτανευουσα). And if it is very much lighter in its + matter than the material of the care which has vanished, it knows + how to blow itself out so as apparently to equal it in size, and + thus, as the chief care of the day, completely fills the + throne.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Excessive joy + and very keen suffering always occur in the same person, for they + condition each other reciprocally, and are also in common + conditioned by great activity of the mind. Both are produced, as we + have just seen, not by what is really present, but by the + anticipation of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page410">[pg + 410]</span><a name="Pg410" id="Pg410" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the future. But since pain is essential to life, and its degree is + also determined by the nature of the subject, sudden changes, + because they are always external, cannot really alter its degree. + Thus an error and delusion always lies at the foundation of + immoderate joy or grief, and consequently both these excessive + strainings of the mind can be avoided by knowledge. Every + immoderate joy (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">exultatio, insolens + lætitia</span></span>) always rests on the delusion that one has + found in life what can never be found there—lasting satisfaction of + the harassing desires and cares, which are constantly breeding new + ones. From every particular delusion of this kind one must + inevitably be brought back later, and then when it vanishes must + pay for it with pain as bitter as the joy its entrance caused was + keen. So far, then, it is precisely like a height from which one + can come down only by a fall. Therefore one ought to avoid them; + and every sudden excessive grief is just a fall from some such + height, the vanishing of such a delusion, and so conditioned by it. + Consequently we might avoid them both if we had sufficient control + over ourselves to survey things always with perfect clearness as a + whole and in their connection, and steadfastly to guard against + really lending them the colours which we wish they had. The + principal effort of the Stoical ethics was to free the mind from + all such delusion and its consequences, and to give it instead an + equanimity that could not be disturbed. It is this insight that + inspires Horace in the well-known ode—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Æquam + memento rebus in arduiis</span></span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Servare mentem, non secus in + bonis</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 3.60em"> + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" style= + "text-align: left" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Ab insolenti + temperatam</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 5.40em"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Lætitia.</span></span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For the most + part, however, we close our minds against the knowledge, which may + be compared to a bitter medicine, that suffering is essential to + life, and therefore does not flow in upon us from without, but that + every one carries about with him its perennial source in his own + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page411">[pg 411]</span><a name= + "Pg411" id="Pg411" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> heart. We rather + seek constantly for an external particular cause, as it were, a + pretext for the pain which never leaves us, just as the free man + makes himself an idol, in order to have a master. For we + unweariedly strive from wish to wish; and although every + satisfaction, however much it promised, when attained fails to + satisfy us, but for the most part comes presently to be an error of + which we are ashamed, yet we do not see that we draw water with the + sieve of the Danaides, but ever hasten to new desires.</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span class="tei tei-foreign" style= + "text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Sed, dum abest quod + avemus, id exsuperare videtur</span></span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" style= + "text-align: left" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Cætera; post aliud, quum + contigit illud, avemus;</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Et sitis æqua tenet + vitai semper hiantes.</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">—</span><span class="tei tei-hi" style= + "text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps">Lucr.</span></span> + <span style="font-size: 90%">iii. 1095.</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus it either + goes on for ever, or, what is more rare and presupposes a certain + strength of character, till we reach a wish which is not satisfied + and yet cannot be given up. In that case we have, as it were, found + what we sought, something that we can always blame, instead of our + own nature, as the source of our suffering. And thus, although we + are now at variance with our fate, we are reconciled to our + existence, for the knowledge is again put far from us that + suffering is essential to this existence itself, and true + satisfaction impossible. The result of this form of development is + a somewhat melancholy disposition, the constant endurance of a + single great pain, and the contempt for all lesser sorrows or joys + that proceeds from it; consequently an already nobler phenomenon + than that constant seizing upon ever-new forms of illusion, which + is much more common.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 58. All + satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is always + really and essentially only <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">negative</span></em>, and never positive. It + is not an original gratification coming to us of itself, but must + always be the satisfaction of a wish. The wish, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + some want, is the condition which precedes every pleasure. But with + the satisfaction the wish and therefore the pleasure cease. Thus + the satisfaction or the pleasing can never be more than the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page412">[pg 412]</span><a name= + "Pg412" id="Pg412" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> deliverance from a + pain, from a want; for such is not only every actual, open sorrow, + but every desire, the importunity of which disturbs our peace, and, + indeed, the deadening ennui also that makes life a burden to us. It + is, however, so hard to attain or achieve anything; difficulties + and troubles without end are opposed to every purpose, and at every + step hindrances accumulate. But when finally everything is overcome + and attained, nothing can ever be gained but deliverance from some + sorrow or desire, so that we find ourselves just in the same + position as we occupied before this sorrow or desire appeared. All + that is even directly given us is merely the want, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the pain. The satisfaction and the pleasure we can only know + indirectly through the remembrance of the preceding suffering and + want, which ceases with its appearance. Hence it arises that we are + not properly conscious of the blessings and advantages we actually + possess, nor do we prize them, but think of them merely as a matter + of course, for they gratify us only negatively by restraining + suffering. Only when we have lost them do we become sensible of + their value; for the want, the privation, the sorrow, is the + positive, communicating itself directly to us. Thus also we are + pleased by the remembrance of past need, sickness, want, and such + like, because this is the only means of enjoying the present + blessings. And, further, it cannot be denied that in this respect, + and from this standpoint of egoism, which is the form of the will + to live, the sight or the description of the sufferings of others + affords us satisfaction and pleasure in precisely the way Lucretius + beautifully and frankly expresses it in the beginning of the Second + Book—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Suave, + mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis,</span></span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" style= + "text-align: left" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">E terra magnum alterius + spectare laborem:</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" style= + "text-align: left" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Non, quia vexari + quemquam est jucunda voluptas;</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" style="text-align: left" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-size: 90%; font-style: italic">Sed, quibus ipse malis + careas, quia cernere suave est.</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Yet we shall see + farther on that this kind of pleasure, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page413">[pg 413]</span><a name="Pg413" id="Pg413" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> through knowledge of our own well-being + obtained in this way, lies very near the source of real, positive + wickedness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That all + happiness is only of a negative not a positive nature, that just on + this account it cannot be lasting satisfaction and gratification, + but merely delivers us from some pain or want which must be + followed either by a new pain, or by languor, empty longing, and + ennui; this finds support in art, that true mirror of the world and + life, and especially in poetry. Every epic and dramatic poem can + only represent a struggle, an effort, and fight for happiness, + never enduring and complete happiness itself. It conducts its + heroes through a thousand difficulties and dangers to the goal; as + soon as this is reached, it hastens to let the curtain fall; for + now there would remain nothing for it to do but to show that the + glittering goal in which the hero expected to find happiness had + only disappointed him, and that after its attainment he was no + better off than before. Because a genuine enduring happiness is not + possible, it cannot be the subject of art. Certainly the aim of the + idyll is the description of such a happiness, but one also sees + that the idyll as such cannot continue. The poet always finds that + it either becomes epical in his hands, and in this case it is a + very insignificant epic, made up of trifling sorrows, trifling + delights, and trifling efforts—this is the commonest case—or else + it becomes a merely descriptive poem, describing the beauty of + nature, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, pure knowing free from + will, which certainly, as a matter of fact, is the only pure + happiness, which is neither preceded by suffering or want, nor + necessarily followed by repentance, sorrow, emptiness, or satiety; + but this happiness cannot fill the whole life, but is only possible + at moments. What we see in poetry we find again in music; in the + melodies of which we have recognised the universal expression of + the inmost history of the self-conscious will, the most secret + life, longing, suffering, and delight; the ebb and <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page414">[pg 414]</span><a name="Pg414" id="Pg414" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> flow of the human heart. Melody is + always a deviation from the keynote through a thousand capricious + wanderings, even to the most painful discord, and then a final + return to the keynote which expresses the satisfaction and + appeasing of the will, but with which nothing more can then be + done, and the continuance of which any longer would only be a + wearisome and unmeaning monotony corresponding to ennui.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All that we + intend to bring out clearly through these investigations, the + impossibility of attaining lasting satisfaction and the negative + nature of all happiness, finds its explanation in what is shown at + the conclusion of the Second Book: that the will, of which human + life, like every phenomenon, is the objectification, is a striving + without aim or end. We find the stamp of this endlessness imprinted + upon all the parts of its whole manifestation, from its most + universal form, endless time and space, up to the most perfect of + all phenomena, the life and efforts of man. We may theoretically + assume three extremes of human life, and treat them as elements of + actual human life. First, the powerful will, the strong passions + (Radscha-Guna). It appears in great historical characters; it is + described in the epic and the drama. But it can also show itself in + the little world, for the size of the objects is measured here by + the degree in which they influence the will, not according to their + external relations. Secondly, pure knowing, the comprehension of + the Ideas, conditioned by the freeing of knowledge from the service + of will: the life of genius (Satwa-Guna). Thirdly and lastly, the + greatest lethargy of the will, and also of the knowledge attaching + to it, empty longing, life-benumbing languor (Tama-Guna). The life + of the individual, far from becoming permanently fixed in one of + these extremes, seldom touches any of them, and is for the most + part only a weak and wavering approach to one or the other side, a + needy desiring of trifling objects, constantly recurring, and so + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page415">[pg 415]</span><a name= + "Pg415" id="Pg415" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> escaping ennui. It + is really incredible how meaningless and void of significance when + looked at from without, how dull and unenlightened by intellect + when felt from within, is the course of the life of the great + majority of men. It is a weary longing and complaining, a + dream-like staggering through the four ages of life to death, + accompanied by a series of trivial thoughts. Such men are like + clockwork, which is wound up, and goes it knows not why; and every + time a man is begotten and born, the clock of human life is wound + up anew, to repeat the same old piece it has played innumerable + times before, passage after passage, measure after measure, with + insignificant variations. Every individual, every human being and + his course of life, is but another short dream of the endless + spirit of nature, of the persistent will to live; is only another + fleeting form, which it carelessly sketches on its infinite page, + space and time; allows to remain for a time so short that it + vanishes into nothing in comparison with these, and then + obliterates to make new room. And yet, and here lies the serious + side of life, every one of these fleeting forms, these empty + fancies, must be paid for by the whole will to live, in all its + activity, with many and deep sufferings, and finally with a bitter + death, long feared and coming at last. This is why the sight of a + corpse makes us suddenly so serious.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The life of + every individual, if we survey it as a whole and in general, and + only lay stress upon its most significant features, is really + always a tragedy, but gone through in detail, it has the character + of a comedy. For the deeds and vexations of the day, the restless + irritation of the moment, the desires and fears of the week, the + mishaps of every hour, are all through chance, which is ever bent + upon some jest, scenes of a comedy. But the never-satisfied wishes, + the frustrated efforts, the hopes unmercifully crushed by fate, the + unfortunate errors of the whole life, with increasing suffering and + death at the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page416">[pg + 416]</span><a name="Pg416" id="Pg416" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + end, are always a tragedy. Thus, as if fate would add derision to + the misery of our existence, our life must contain all the woes of + tragedy, and yet we cannot even assert the dignity of tragic + characters, but in the broad detail of life must inevitably be the + foolish characters of a comedy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But however much + great and small trials may fill human life, they are not able to + conceal its insufficiency to satisfy the spirit; they cannot hide + the emptiness and superficiality of existence, nor exclude ennui, + which is always ready to fill up every pause that care may allow. + Hence it arises that the human mind, not content with the cares, + anxieties, and occupations which the actual world lays upon it, + creates for itself an imaginary world also in the form of a + thousand different superstitions, then finds all manner of + employment with this, and wastes time and strength upon it, as soon + as the real world is willing to grant it the rest which it is quite + incapable of enjoying. This is accordingly most markedly the case + with nations for which life is made easy by the congenial nature of + the climate and the soil, most of all with the Hindus, then with + the Greeks, the Romans, and later with the Italians, the Spaniards, + &c. Demons, gods, and saints man creates in his own image; and + to them he must then unceasingly bring offerings, prayers, temple + decorations, vows and their fulfilment, pilgrimages, salutations, + ornaments for their images, &c. Their service mingles + everywhere with the real, and, indeed, obscures it. Every event of + life is regarded as the work of these beings; the intercourse with + them occupies half the time of life, constantly sustains hope, and + by the charm of illusion often becomes more interesting than + intercourse with real beings. It is the expression and symptom of + the actual need of mankind, partly for help and support, partly for + occupation and diversion; and if it often works in direct + opposition to the first need, because when accidents and dangers + arise valuable time <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page417">[pg + 417]</span><a name="Pg417" id="Pg417" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and strength, instead of being directed to warding them off, are + uselessly wasted on prayers and offerings; it serves the second end + all the better by this imaginary converse with a visionary spirit + world; and this is the by no means contemptible gain of all + superstitions.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 59. If we have + so far convinced ourselves <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span>, by the most general consideration, by + investigation of the primary and elemental features of human life, + that in its whole plan it is capable of no true blessedness, but is + in its very nature suffering in various forms, and throughout a + state of misery, we might now awaken this conviction much more + vividly within us if, proceeding more <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + posteriori</span></span>, we were to turn to more definite + instances, call up pictures to the fancy, and illustrate by + examples the unspeakable misery which experience and history + present, wherever one may look and in whatever direction one may + seek. But the chapter would have no end, and would carry us far + from the standpoint of the universal, which is essential to + philosophy; and, moreover, such a description might easily be taken + for a mere declamation on human misery, such as has often been + given, and, as such, might be charged with one-sidedness, because + it started from particular facts. From such a reproach and + suspicion our perfectly cold and philosophical investigation of the + inevitable suffering which is founded in the nature of life is + free, for it starts from the universal and is conducted <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span>. But confirmation + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a posteriori</span></span> is everywhere + easily obtained. Every one who has awakened from the first dream of + youth, who has considered his own experience and that of others, + who has studied himself in life, in the history of the past and of + his own time, and finally in the works of the great poets, will, if + his judgment is not paralysed by some indelibly imprinted + prejudice, certainly arrive at the conclusion that this human world + is the kingdom of chance and error, which rule without mercy in + great things and in small, and along with which folly and + wickedness also wield the scourge. Hence it arises <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page418">[pg 418]</span><a name="Pg418" id="Pg418" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> that everything better only struggles + through with difficulty; what is noble and wise seldom attains to + expression, becomes effective and claims attention, but the absurd + and the perverse in the sphere of thought, the dull and tasteless + in the sphere of art, the wicked and deceitful in the sphere of + action, really assert a supremacy, only disturbed by short + interruptions. On the other hand, everything that is excellent is + always a mere exception, one case in millions, and therefore, if it + presents itself in a lasting work, this, when it has outlived the + enmity of its contemporaries, exists in isolation, is preserved + like a meteoric stone, sprung from an order of things different + from that which prevails here. But as far as the life of the + individual is concerned, every biography is the history of + suffering, for every life is, as a rule, a continual series of + great and small misfortunes, which each one conceals as much as + possible, because he knows that others can seldom feel sympathy or + compassion, but almost always satisfaction at the sight of the woes + from which they are themselves for the moment exempt. But perhaps + at the end of life, if a man is sincere and in full possession of + his faculties, he will never wish to have it to live over again, + but rather than this, he will much prefer absolute annihilation. + The essential content of the famous soliloquy in <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Hamlet”</span> is briefly this: Our state is so + wretched that absolute annihilation would be decidedly preferable. + If suicide really offered us this, so that the alternative + <span class="tei tei-q">“to be or not to be,”</span> in the full + sense of the word, was placed before us, then it would be + unconditionally to be chosen as <span class="tei tei-q">“a + consummation devoutly to be wished.”</span> But there is something + in us which tells us that this is not the case: suicide is not the + end; death is not absolute annihilation. In like manner, what was + said by the father of history<a id="noteref_71" name="noteref_71" + href="#note_71"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">71</span></span></a> has + not since him been contradicted, that no man has ever lived who has + not wished more than once that he had not to live the following + day. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page419">[pg 419]</span><a name= + "Pg419" id="Pg419" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> According to this, + the brevity of life, which is so constantly lamented, may be the + best quality it possesses. If, finally, we should bring clearly to + a man's sight the terrible sufferings and miseries to which his + life is constantly exposed, he would be seized with horror; and if + we were to conduct the confirmed optimist through the hospitals, + infirmaries, and surgical operating-rooms, through the prisons, + torture-chambers, and slave-kennels, over battle-fields and places + of execution; if we were to open to him all the dark abodes of + misery, where it hides itself from the glance of cold curiosity, + and, finally, allow him to glance into the starving dungeon of + Ugolino, he, too, would understand at last the nature of this + <span class="tei tei-q">“best of possible worlds.”</span> For + whence did Dante take the materials for his hell but from this our + actual world? And yet he made a very proper hell of it. And when, + on the other hand, he came to the task of describing heaven and its + delights, he had an insurmountable difficulty before him, for our + world affords no materials at all for this. Therefore there + remained nothing for him to do but, instead of describing the joys + of paradise, to repeat to us the instruction given him there by his + ancestor, by Beatrice, and by various saints. But from this it is + sufficiently clear what manner of world it is. Certainly human + life, like all bad ware, is covered over with a false lustre: what + suffers always conceals itself; on the other hand, whatever pomp or + splendour any one can get, he makes a show of openly, and the more + inner contentment deserts him, the more he desires to exist as + fortunate in the opinion of others: to such an extent does folly + go, and the opinion of others is a chief aim of the efforts of + every one, although the utter nothingness of it is expressed in the + fact that in almost all languages vanity, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">vanitas</span></span>, originally signifies + emptiness and nothingness. But under all this false show, the + miseries of life can so increase—and this happens every day—that + the death which hitherto has been feared above all things is + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page420">[pg 420]</span><a name= + "Pg420" id="Pg420" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> eagerly seized upon. + Indeed, if fate will show its whole malice, even this refuge is + denied to the sufferer, and, in the hands of enraged enemies, he + may remain exposed to terrible and slow tortures without remedy. In + vain the sufferer then calls on his gods for help; he remains + exposed to his fate without grace. But this irremediableness is + only the mirror of the invincible nature of his will, of which his + person is the objectivity. As little as an external power can + change or suppress this will, so little can a foreign power deliver + it from the miseries which proceed from the life which is the + phenomenal appearance of that will. In the principal matter, as in + everything else, a man is always thrown back upon himself. In vain + does he make to himself gods in order to get from them by prayers + and flattery what can only be accomplished by his own will-power. + The Old Testament made the world and man the work of a god, but the + New Testament saw that, in order to teach that holiness and + salvation from the sorrows of this world can only come from the + world itself, it was necessary that this god should become man. It + is and remains the will of man upon which everything depends for + him. Fanatics, martyrs, saints of every faith and name, have + voluntarily and gladly endured every torture, because in them the + will to live had suppressed itself; and then even the slow + destruction of its phenomenon was welcome to them. But I do not + wish to anticipate the later exposition. For the rest, I cannot + here avoid the statement that, to me, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">optimism</span></em>, when it is not merely + the thoughtless talk of such as harbour nothing but words under + their low foreheads, appears not merely as an absurd, but also as a + really <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wicked</span></em> way of thinking, as a + bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity. Let no one + think that Christianity is favourable to optimism; for, on the + contrary, in the Gospels world and evil are used as almost + synonymous.<a id="noteref_72" name="noteref_72" href= + "#note_72"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">72</span></span></a></p><span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page421">[pg 421]</span><a name="Pg421" id="Pg421" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 60. We have + now completed the two expositions it was necessary to insert; the + exposition of the freedom of the will in itself together with the + necessity of its phenomenon, and the exposition of its lot in the + world which reflects its own nature, and upon the knowledge of + which it has to assert or deny itself. Therefore we can now proceed + to bring out more clearly the nature of this assertion and denial + itself, which was referred to and explained in a merely general way + above. This we shall do by exhibiting the conduct in which alone it + finds its expression, and considering it in its inner + significance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">assertion of the + will</span></em> is the continuous willing itself, undisturbed by + any knowledge, as it fills the life of man in general. For even the + body of a man is the objectivity of the will, as it appears at this + grade and in this individual. And thus his willing which develops + itself in time is, as it were, a paraphrase of his body, an + elucidation of the significance of the whole and its parts; it is + another way of exhibiting the same thing-in-itself, of which the + body is already the phenomenon. Therefore, instead of saying + assertion of the will, we may say assertion of the body. The + fundamental theme or subject of all the multifarious acts of will + is the satisfaction of the wants which are inseparable from the + existence of the body in health, they already have their expression + in it, and may be referred to the maintenance of the individual and + the propagation of the species. But indirectly the most different + kinds of motives obtain in this way power over the will, and bring + about the most multifarious acts of will. Each of these is only an + example, an instance, of the will which here manifests itself + generally. Of what nature this example may be, what form the motive + may have and impart to it, is not essential; the important point + here is that something is willed in general and the degree of + intensity with which it is so willed. The will can only become + visible in the motives, as the eye only manifests its power of + seeing in the light. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page422">[pg + 422]</span><a name="Pg422" id="Pg422" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + The motive in general stands before the will in protean forms. It + constantly promises complete satisfaction, the quenching of the + thirst of will. But whenever it is attained it at once appears in + another form, and thus influences the will anew, always according + to the degree of the intensity of this will, and its relation to + knowledge which are revealed as empirical character, in these very + examples and instances.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">From the first + appearance of consciousness, a man finds himself a willing being, + and as a rule, his knowledge remains in constant relation to his + will. He first seeks to know thoroughly the objects of his desire, + and then the means of attaining them. Now he knows what he has to + do, and, as a rule, he does not strive after other knowledge. He + moves and acts; his consciousness keeps him always working directly + and actively towards the aims of his will; his thought is concerned + with the choice of motives. Such is life for almost all men; they + wish, they know what they wish, and they strive after it, with + sufficient success to keep them from despair, and sufficient + failure to keep them from ennui and its consequences. From this + proceeds a certain serenity, or at least indifference, which cannot + be affected by wealth or poverty; for the rich and the poor do not + enjoy what they have, for this, as we have shown, acts in a purely + negative way, but what they hope to attain to by their efforts. + They press forward with much earnestness, and indeed with an air of + importance; thus children also pursue their play. It is always an + exception if such a life suffers interruption from the fact that + either the æsthetic demand for contemplation or the ethical demand + for renunciation proceed from a knowledge which is independent of + the service of the will, and directed to the nature of the world in + general. Most men are pursued by want all through life, without + ever being allowed to come to their senses. On the other hand, the + will is often inflamed to a degree that far transcends the + assertion of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page423">[pg + 423]</span><a name="Pg423" id="Pg423" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + body, and then violent emotions and powerful passions show + themselves, in which the individual not only asserts his own + existence, but denies and seeks to suppress that of others when it + stands in his way.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The maintenance + of the body through its own powers is so small a degree of the + assertion of will, that if it voluntarily remains at this degree, + we might assume that, with the death of this body, the will also + which appeared in it would be extinguished. But even the + satisfaction of the sexual passions goes beyond the assertion of + one's own existence, which fills so short a time, and asserts life + for an indefinite time after the death of the individual. Nature, + always true and consistent, here even naïve, exhibits to us openly + the inner significance of the act of generation. Our own + consciousness, the intensity of the impulse, teaches us that in + this act the most decided <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">assertion of the will to live</span></em> + expresses itself, pure and without further addition (any denial of + other individuals); and now, as the consequence of this act, a new + life appears in time and the causal series, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + in nature; the begotten appears before the begetter, different as + regards the phenomenon, but in himself, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + according to the Idea, identical with him. Therefore it is this act + through which every species of living creature binds itself to a + whole and is perpetuated. Generation is, with reference to the + begetter, only the expression, the symptom, of his decided + assertion of the will to live: with reference to the begotten, it + is not the cause of the will which appears in him, for the will in + itself knows neither cause nor effect, but, like all causes, it is + merely the occasional cause of the phenomenal appearance of this + will at this time in this place. As thing-in-itself, the will of + the begetter and that of the begotten are not different, for only + the phenomenon, not the thing-in-itself, is subordinate to the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principim individuationis</span></span>. With + that assertion beyond our own body and extending to the production + of a new body, suffering <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page424">[pg + 424]</span><a name="Pg424" id="Pg424" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and death, as belonging to the phenomenon of life, have also been + asserted anew, and the possibility of salvation, introduced by the + completest capability of knowledge, has for this time been shown to + be fruitless. Here lies the profound reason of the shame connected + with the process of generation. This view is mythically expressed + in the dogma of Christian theology that we are all partakers in + Adam's first transgression (which is clearly just the satisfaction + of sexual passion), and through it are guilty of suffering and + death. In this theology goes beyond the consideration of things + according to the principle of sufficient reason, and recognises the + Idea of man, the unity of which is re-established out of its + dispersion into innumerable individuals through the bond of + generation which holds them all together. Accordingly it regards + every individual as on one side identical with Adam, the + representative of the assertion of life, and, so far, as subject to + sin (original sin), suffering, and death; on the other side, the + knowledge of the Idea of man enables it to regard every individual + as identical with the saviour, the representative of the denial of + the will to live, and, so far as a partaker of his sacrifice of + himself, saved through his merits, and delivered from the bands of + sin and death, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the world (Rom. v. + 12-21).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Another mythical + exposition of our view of sexual pleasure as the assertion of the + will to live beyond the individual life, as an attainment to life + which is brought about for the first time by this means, or as it + were a renewed assignment of life, is the Greek myth of Proserpine, + who might return from the lower world so long as she had not tasted + its fruit, but who became subject to it altogether through eating + the pomegranate. This meaning appears very clearly in Goethe's + incomparable presentation of this myth, especially when, as soon as + she has tasted the pomegranate, the invisible chorus of the + Fates—</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id="page425">[pg + 425]</span><a name="Pg425" id="Pg425" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style= + "text-align: left; margin-left: 14.40em"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Thou + art ours!</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Fasting shouldest thou + return:</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">And the bite of the apple makes thee + ours!</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is worth + noticing that Clement of Alexandria (Strom. iii. c. 15) illustrates + the matter with the same image and the same expression: Οἱ μεν + ευνουχισαντες ἑαυτους απο πασης ἁμαρτιας, δια την βασιλειαν, των + ουρανων, μακαριοι οὑτοι εισιν, οἱ του κοσμου νηστευοντες; + (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Qui se castrarunt ab omni peccato propter + regnum cœlorum, ii sunt beati, a mundo + jejunantes</span></span>).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The sexual + impulse also proves itself the decided and strongest assertion of + life by the fact that to man in a state of nature, as to the + brutes, it is the final end, the highest goal of life. + Self-maintenance is his first effort, and as soon as he has made + provision for that, he only strives after the propagation of the + species: as a merely natural being he can attempt no more. Nature + also, the inner being of which is the will to live itself, impels + with all her power both man and the brute towards propagation. Then + it has attained its end with the individual, and is quite + indifferent to its death, for, as the will to live, it cares only + for the preservation of the species, the individual is nothing to + it. Because the will to live expresses itself most strongly in the + sexual impulse, the inner being of nature, the old poets and + philosophers—Hesiod and Parmenides—said very significantly that + Eros is the first, the creator, the principle from which all things + proceed. (Cf. Arist. Metaph., i. 4.) Pherecydes said: Εις ερωτα + μεταβεβλησθαι τον Δια, μελλοντα δημιουργειν (<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Jovem, cum mundum fabricare vellet, in + cupidinem sese transformasse</span></span>). <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Proclus ad Plat. + Tim.</span></span>, l. iii. A complete treatment of this subject we + have recently received from G. F. Schœmann, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Cupidine Cosmogonico</span></span>,”</span> + 1852. The Mâya of the Hindus, whose work and web is the whole world + of illusion, is also symbolised by love.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The genital + organs are, far more than any other external member of the body, + subject merely to the will, and <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page426">[pg 426]</span><a name="Pg426" id="Pg426" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> not at all to knowledge. Indeed, the will + shows itself here almost as independent of knowledge, as in those + parts which, acting merely in consequence of stimuli, are + subservient to vegetative life and reproduction, in which the will + works blindly as in unconscious nature. For generation is only + reproduction passing over to a new individual, as it were + reproduction at the second power, as death is only excretion at the + second power. According to all this, the genitals are properly the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">focus</span></em> of will, and consequently + the opposite pole of the brain, the representative of knowledge, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the other side of the + world, the world as idea. The former are the life-sustaining + principle ensuring endless life to time. In this respect they were + worshipped by the Greeks in the <span lang="el" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="el"><span style= + "font-style: italic">phallus</span></span>, and by the Hindus in + the <span lang="sa" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "sa"><span style="font-style: italic">lingam</span></span>, which + are thus the symbol of the assertion of the will. Knowledge, on the + other hand, affords the possibility of the suppression of willing, + of salvation through freedom, of conquest and annihilation of the + world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We already + considered fully at the beginning of this Fourth Book how the will + to live in its assertion must regard its relation to death. We saw + that death does not trouble it, because it exists as something + included in life itself and belonging to it. Its opposite, + generation, completely counterbalances it; and, in spite of the + death of the individual, ensures and guarantees life to the will to + live through all time. To express this the Hindus made the + <span lang="sa" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="sa"><span style= + "font-style: italic">lingam</span></span> an attribute of Siva, the + god of death. We also fully explained there how he who with full + consciousness occupies the standpoint of the decided assertion of + life awaits death without fear. We shall therefore say nothing more + about this here. Without clear consciousness most men occupy this + standpoint and continually assert life. The world exists as the + mirror of this assertion, with innumerable individuals in infinite + time and space, in infinite suffering, between generation and death + without end. Yet from no side is a complaint to be <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page427">[pg 427]</span><a name="Pg427" id="Pg427" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> further raised about this; for the will + conducts the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and is + also its own spectator. The world is just what it is because the + will, whose manifestation it is, is what it is, because it so + wills. The justification of suffering is, that in this phenomenon + also the will asserts itself; and this assertion is justified and + balanced by the fact that the will bears the suffering. Here we get + a glimpse of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">eternal justice</span></em> in the whole: we + shall recognise it later more definitely and distinctly, and also + in the particular. But first we must consider temporal or human + justice.<a id="noteref_73" name="noteref_73" href= + "#note_73"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">73</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><a name= + "Section_61" id="Section_61" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> § 61. It + may be remembered from the Second Book that in the whole of nature, + at all the grades of the objectification of will, there was a + necessary and constant conflict between the individuals of all + species; and in this way was expressed the inner contradiction of + the will to live with itself. At the highest grade of the + objectification, this phenomenon, like all others, will exhibit + itself with greater distinctness, and will therefore be more easily + explained. With this aim we shall next attempt to trace the source + of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">egoism</span></em> as the starting-point of + all conflict.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have called + time and space the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, because only through them and in + them is multiplicity of the homogeneous possible. They are the + essential forms of natural knowledge, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + knowledge springing from the will. Therefore the will everywhere + manifests itself in the multiplicity of individuals. But this + multiplicity does not concern the will as thing-in-itself, but only + its phenomena. The will itself is present, whole and undivided, in + every one of these, and beholds around it the innumerably repeated + image of its own nature; but this nature itself, the actually real, + it finds directly only in its inner self. Therefore every one + desires everything for himself, desires to possess, or at least to + control, everything, and whatever opposes it it would like to + destroy. To this is added, in <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page428">[pg 428]</span><a name="Pg428" id="Pg428" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the case of such beings as have knowledge, + that the individual is the supporter of the knowing subject, and + the knowing subject is the supporter of the world, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + that the whole of Nature outside the knowing subject, and thus also + all other individuals, exist only in its idea; it is only conscious + of them as its idea, thus merely indirectly as something which is + dependent on its own nature and existence; for with its + consciousness the world necessarily disappears for it, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + its being and non-being become synonymous and indistinguishable. + Every knowing individual is thus in truth, and finds itself as the + whole will to live, or the inner being of the world itself, and + also as the complemental condition of the world as idea, + consequently as a microcosm which is of equal value with the + macrocosm. Nature itself, which is everywhere and always truthful, + gives him this knowledge, originally and independently of all + reflection, with simple and direct certainty. Now from these two + necessary properties we have given the fact may be explained that + every individual, though vanishing altogether and diminished to + nothing in the boundless world, yet makes itself the centre of the + world, has regard for its own existence and well-being before + everything else; indeed, from the natural standpoint, is ready to + sacrifice everything else for this—is ready to annihilate the world + in order to maintain its own self, this drop in the ocean, a little + longer. This disposition is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">egoism</span></em>, which is essential to + everything in Nature. Yet it is just through egoism that the inner + conflict of the will with itself attains to such a terrible + revelation; for this egoism has its continuance and being in that + opposition of the microcosm and macrocosm, or in the fact that the + objectification of will has the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span> for + its form, through which the will manifests itself in the same way + in innumerable individuals, and indeed entire and completely in + both aspects (will and idea) in each. Thus, while each individual + is given to itself directly as the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page429">[pg 429]</span><a name="Pg429" id="Pg429" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> whole will and the whole subject of ideas, + other individuals are only given it as ideas. Therefore its own + being, and the maintenance of it, is of more importance to it than + that of all others together. Every one looks upon his own death as + upon the end of the world, while he accepts the death of his + acquaintances as a matter of comparative indifference, if he is not + in some way affected by it. In the consciousness that has reached + the highest grade, that of man, egoism, as well as knowledge, pain + and pleasure, must have reached its highest grade also, and the + conflict of individuals which is conditioned by it must appear in + its most terrible form. And indeed we see this everywhere before + our eyes, in small things as in great. Now we see its terrible side + in the lives of great tyrants and miscreants, and in + world-desolating wars; now its absurd side, in which it is the + theme of comedy, and very specially appears as self-conceit and + vanity. Rochefoucault understood this better than any one else, and + presented it in the abstract. We see it both in the history of the + world and in our own experience. But it appears most distinctly of + all when any mob of men is set free from all law and order; then + there shows itself at once in the distinctest form the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bellum omnium contra omnes</span></span>, + which Hobbes has so admirably described in the first chapter + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De + Cive</span></span>. We see not only how every one tries to seize + from the other what he wants himself, but how often one will + destroy the whole happiness or life of another for the sake of an + insignificant addition to his own happiness. This is the highest + expression of egoism, the manifestations of which in this regard + are only surpassed by those of actual wickedness, which seeks, + quite disinterestedly, the hurt and suffering of others, without + any advantage to itself. Of this we shall speak soon. With this + exhibition of the source of egoism the reader should compare the + presentation of it in my prize-essay on the basis of morals, § + 14.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A chief source + of that suffering which we found above <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page430">[pg 430]</span><a name="Pg430" id="Pg430" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> to be essential and inevitable to all life + is, when it really appears in a definite form, that <span lang="el" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="el"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Eris</span></span>, the conflict of all + individuals, the expression of the contradiction, with which the + will to live is affected in its inner self, and which attains a + visible form through the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>. Wild-beast fights are the most cruel + means of showing this directly and vividly. In this original + discord lies an unquenchable source of suffering, in spite of the + precautions that have been taken against it, and which we shall now + consider more closely.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 62. It has + already been explained that the first and simplest assertion of the + will to live is only the assertion of one's own body, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the exhibition of the will through acts in time, so far as the + body, in its form and design, exhibits the same will in space, and + no further. This assertion shows itself as maintenance of the body, + by means of the application of its own powers. To it is directly + related the satisfaction of the sexual impulse; indeed this belongs + to it, because the genitals belong to the body. Therefore + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">voluntary</span></em> renunciation of the + satisfaction of that impulse, based upon no <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motive</span></em>, + is already a denial of the will to live, is a voluntary + self-suppression of it, upon the entrance of knowledge which acts + as a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quieter</span></em>. Accordingly such denial + of one's own body exhibits itself as a contradiction by the will of + its own phenomenon. For although here also the body objectifies in + the genitals the will to perpetuate the species, yet this is not + willed. Just on this account, because it is a denial or suppression + of the will to live, such a renunciation is a hard and painful + self-conquest; but of this later. But since the will exhibits that + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">self-assertion</span></em> of one's own body + in innumerable individuals beside each other, it very easily + extends in one individual, on account of the egoism peculiar to + them all, beyond this assertion to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">denial</span></em> + of the same will appearing in another individual. The will of the + first breaks through the limits of the assertion of will of + another, because the individual either destroys or injures + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page431">[pg 431]</span><a name= + "Pg431" id="Pg431" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> this other body + itself, or else because it compels the powers of the other body to + serve <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">its + own</span></em> will, instead of the will which manifests itself in + that other body. Thus if, from the will manifesting itself as + another body, it withdraws the powers of this body, and so + increases the power serving its own will beyond that of its own + body, it consequently asserts its own will beyond its own body by + means of the negation of the will appearing in another body. This + breaking through the limits of the assertion of will of another has + always been distinctly recognised, and its concept denoted by the + word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wrong</span></em>. For both sides recognise + the fact instantly, not, indeed, as we do here in distinct + abstraction, but as feeling. He who suffers wrong feels the + transgression into the sphere of the assertion of his own body, + through the denial of it by another individual, as a direct and + mental pain which is entirely separated and different from the + accompanying physical suffering experienced from the act or the + vexation at the loss. To the doer of wrong, on the other hand, the + knowledge presents itself that he is in himself the same will which + appears in that body also, and which asserts itself with such + vehemence; the one phenomenon that, transgressing the limits of its + own body and its powers, it extends to the denial of this very will + in another phenomenon, and so, regarded as will in itself, it + strives against itself by this vehemence and rends itself. + Moreover, this knowledge presents itself to him instantly, not + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in abstracto</span></span>, but as an obscure + feeling; and this is called remorse, or, more accurately in this + case, the feeling of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wrong committed</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Wrong</span></em>, + the conception of which we have thus analysed in its most general + and abstract form, expresses itself in the concrete most + completely, peculiarly, and palpably in cannibalism. This is its + most distinct and evident type, the terrible picture of the + greatest conflict of the will with itself at the highest grade of + its objectification, which is man. Next to this, it expresses + itself most distinctly <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page432">[pg + 432]</span><a name="Pg432" id="Pg432" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + in murder; and therefore the committal of murder is followed + instantly and with fearful distinctness by remorse, the abstract + and dry significance of which we have just given, which inflicts a + wound on our peace of mind that a lifetime cannot heal. For our + horror at the murder committed, as also our shrinking from the + committal of it, corresponds to that infinite clinging to life with + which everything living, as phenomenon of the will to live, is + penetrated. (We shall analyse this feeling which accompanies the + doing of wrong and evil, in other words, the pangs of conscience, + more fully later on, and raise its concept to distinctness.) + Mutilation, or mere injury of another body, indeed every blow, is + to be regarded as in its nature the same as murder, and differing + from it only in degree. Further, wrong shows itself in the + subjugation of another individual, in forcing him into slavery, + and, finally, in the seizure of another's goods, which, so far as + these goods are regarded as the fruit of his labour, is just the + same thing as making him a slave, and is related to this as mere + injury is to murder.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">property</span></em>, which is not taken from + a man without <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wrong</span></em>, can, according to our + explanation of wrong, only be that which has been produced by his + own powers. Therefore by taking this we really take the powers of + his body from the will objectified in it, to make them subject to + the will objectified in another body. For only so does the + wrong-doer, by seizing, not the body of another, but a lifeless + thing quite different from it, break into the sphere of the + assertion of will of another person, because the powers, the work + of this other body, are, as it were, incorporated and identified + with this thing. It follows from this that all true, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + moral, right of property is based simply and solely on work, as was + pretty generally assumed before Kant, and is distinctly and + beautifully expressed in the oldest of all codes of law: + <span class="tei tei-q">“Wise men who know the past explain that a + cultured field is the property of him who cut down the wood and + cleared and <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page433">[pg + 433]</span><a name="Pg433" id="Pg433" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + ploughed it, as an antelope belongs to the first hunter who + mortally wounds it”</span> (Laws of Manu, ix. 44). Kant's + philosophy of law is an extraordinary concatenation of errors all + leading to each other, and he bases the right of property upon + first occupation. To me this is only explicable on the supposition + that his powers were failing through old age. For how should the + mere avowal of my will to exclude others from the use of a thing at + once give me a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">right</span></em> to it? Clearly such an + avowal itself requires a foundation of right, instead of being one, + as Kant assumes. And how would he act unjustly <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in se</span></span>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + morally, who does not respect that claim to the sole possession of + a thing which is based upon nothing but its own avowal? How should + his conscience trouble him about it? For it is so clear and easy to + understand that there can be absolutely no such thing as a just + seizure of anything, but only a just conversion or acquired + possession of it, by spending our own original powers upon it. + When, by any foreign labour, however little, a thing has been + cultivated, improved, kept from harm or preserved, even if this + labour were only the plucking or picking up from the ground of + fruit that has grown wild; the person who forcibly seizes such a + thing clearly deprives the other of the result of his labour + expended upon it, makes the body of this other serve his will + instead of its own, asserts his will beyond its own phenomenon to + the denial of that of the other, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + does injustice or wrong.<a id="noteref_74" name="noteref_74" href= + "#note_74"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">74</span></span></a> On the + other hand, the mere enjoyment of a thing, without any cultivation + or preservation of it from destruction, gives just as little right + to it as the mere avowal of our desire for its sole possession. + Therefore, though one family has hunted a district alone, even for + a <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page434">[pg 434]</span><a name= + "Pg434" id="Pg434" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> hundred years, but + has done nothing for its improvement; if a stranger comes and + desires to hunt there, it cannot prevent him from doing so without + moral injustice. Thus the so-called right of preoccupation, + according to which, for the mere past enjoyment of a thing, there + is demanded the further recompense of the exclusive right to its + future enjoyment, is morally entirely without foundation. A + new-comer might with far better right reply to him who was + depending upon such a right, <span class="tei tei-q">“Just because + you have so long enjoyed, it is right that others should now enjoy + also.”</span> No moral right can be established to the sole + possession of anything upon which labour cannot be expended, either + in improving it or in preserving it from harm, unless it be through + a voluntary surrender on the part of others, as a reward for other + services. This, however, already presupposes a community regulated + by agreement—the State. The morally established right of property, + as we have deduced it above, gives, from its nature, to the owner + of a thing, the same unlimited power over it which he has over his + own body; and hence it follows that he can part with his + possessions to others either in exchange or as a gift, and they + then possess them with the same moral right as he did.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">As regards the + doing of wrong generally, it occurs either through violence or + through craft; it matters not which as far as what is morally + essential is concerned. First, in the case of murder, it is a + matter of indifference whether I make use of a dagger or of poison; + and the case of every bodily injury is analogous. Other cases of + wrong can all be reduced to the fact that I, as the doer of wrong, + compel another individual to serve my will instead of his own, to + act according to my will instead of according to his own. On the + path of violence I attain this end through physical causality, but + on the path of craft by means of motivation, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + by means of causality through knowledge; for I present to his will + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page435">[pg 435]</span><a name= + "Pg435" id="Pg435" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> illusive motives, on + account of which he follows my will, while he believes he is + following his own. Since the medium in which the motives lie is + knowledge, I can only accomplish this by falsifying his knowledge, + and this is the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">lie</span></em>. The lie always aims at + influencing another's will, not merely his knowledge, for itself + and as such, but only as a means, so far as it determines his will. + For my lying itself, inasmuch as it proceeds from my will, requires + a motive; and only the will of another can be such a motive, not + his knowledge in and for itself; for as such it can never have an + influence upon <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">my</span></em> will, therefore it can never + move it, can never be a motive of its aim. But only the willing and + doing of another can be this, and his knowledge indirectly through + it. This holds good not only of all lies that have manifestly + sprung from self-interest, but also of those which proceed from + pure wickedness, which seeks enjoyment in the painful consequences + of the error into which it has led another. Indeed, mere empty + boasting aims at influencing the will and action of others more or + less, by increasing their respect or improving their opinion of the + boaster. The mere refusal of a truth, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + of an assertion generally, is in itself no wrong, but every + imposing of a lie is certainly a wrong. He who refuses to show the + strayed traveller the right road does him no wrong, but he who + directs him to a false road certainly does. It follows from what + has been said, that every <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">lie</span></em>, like every act of violence, + is as such <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wrong</span></em>, because as such it has for + its aim the extension of the authority of my will to other + individuals, and so the assertion of my will through the denial of + theirs, just as much as violence has. But the most complete lie is + the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">broken contract</span></em>, because here all + the conditions mentioned are completely and distinctly present + together. For when I enter into a contract, the promised + performance of the other individual is directly and confessedly the + motive for my reciprocal performance. The promises were + deliberately <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page436">[pg + 436]</span><a name="Pg436" id="Pg436" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and formally exchanged. The fulfilment of the declarations made is, + it is assumed, in the power of each. If the other breaks the + covenant, he has deceived me, and by introducing merely illusory + motives into my knowledge, he has bent my will according to his + intention; he has extended the control of his will to another + individual, and thus has committed a distinct wrong. On this is + founded the moral lawfulness and validity of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">contract</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Wrong through + violence is not so <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">shameful</span></em> to the doer of it as + wrong through craft; for the former arises from physical power, + which under all circumstances impresses mankind; while the latter, + by the use of subterfuge, betrays weakness, and lowers man at once + as a physical and moral being. This is further the case because + lying and deception can only succeed if he who employs them + expresses at the same time horror and contempt of them in order to + win confidence, and his victory rests on the fact that men credit + him with honesty which he does not possess. The deep horror which + is always excited by cunning, faithlessness, and treachery rests on + the fact that good faith and honesty are the bond which externally + binds into a unity the will which has been broken up into the + multiplicity of individuals, and thereby limits the consequences of + the egoism which results from that dispersion. Faithlessness and + treachery break this outward bond asunder, and thus give boundless + scope to the consequences of egoism.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the + connection of our system we have found that the content of the + concept of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wrong</span></em> is that quality of the + conduct of an individual in which he extends the assertion of the + will appearing in his own body so far that it becomes the denial of + the will appearing in the bodies of others. We have also laid down, + by means of very general examples, the limits at which the province + of wrong begins; for we have at once defined its gradations, from + the highest degree to the lowest, by means of a few <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page437">[pg 437]</span><a name="Pg437" id="Pg437" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> leading conceptions. According to this, + the concept of wrong is the original and positive, and the concept + of right, which is opposed to it, is the derivative and negative; + for we must keep to the concepts, and not to the words. As a matter + of fact, there would be no talk of right if there were no such + thing as wrong. The concept right contains merely the negation of + wrong, and every action is subsumed under it which does not + transgress the limit laid down above, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + is not a denial of the will of another for the stronger assertion + of our own. That limit, therefore, divides, as regards a purely + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">moral</span></em> definition, the whole + province of possible actions into such as are wrong or right. + Whenever an action does not encroach, in the way explained above, + on the sphere of the assertion of will of another, denying it, it + is not wrong. Therefore, for example, the refusal of help to + another in great need, the quiet contemplation of the death of + another from starvation while we ourselves have more than enough, + is certainly cruel and fiendish, but it is not wrong; only it can + be affirmed with certainty that whoever is capable of carrying + unkindness and hardness to such a degree will certainly also commit + every wrong whenever his wishes demand it and no compulsion + prevents it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the + conception of right as the negation of wrong finds its principal + application, and no doubt its origin, in cases in which an + attempted wrong by violence is warded off. This warding off cannot + itself be wrong, and consequently is right, although the violence + it requires, regarded in itself and in isolation, would be wrong, + and is here only justified by the motive, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + becomes right. If an individual goes so far in the assertion of his + own will that he encroaches upon the assertion of will which is + essential to my person as such, and denies it, then my warding off + of that encroachment is only the denial of that denial, and thus + from my side is nothing more than the assertion of the will which + essentially and originally appears in my body, and is already + implicitly <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page438">[pg + 438]</span><a name="Pg438" id="Pg438" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + expressed by the mere appearance of this body; consequently is not + wrong, but right. That is to say: I have then a right to deny that + denial of another with the force necessary to overcome it, and it + is easy to see that this may extend to the killing of the other + individual, whose encroachment as external violence pressing upon + me may be warded off by a somewhat stronger counteraction, entirely + without wrong, consequently with right. For all that happens from + my side lies always within the sphere of the assertion of will + essential to my person as such, and already expressed by it (which + is the scene of the conflict), and does not encroach on that of the + other, consequently is only negation of the negation, and thus + affirmation, not itself negation. Thus if the will of another + denies my will, as this appears in my body and the use of its + powers for its maintenance, without denial of any foreign will + which observes a like limitation, I can <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">without + wrong</span></em> compel it to desist from such denial, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, I have so far a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">right of + compulsion</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In all cases in + which I have a right of compulsion, a complete right to use + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">violence</span></em> against another, I may, + according to the circumstances, just as well oppose the violence of + the other with <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">craft</span></em> without doing any wrong, and + accordingly I have an actual <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">right to lie precisely so far as I have a + right of compulsion</span></em>. Therefore a man acts with perfect + right who assures a highway robber who is searching him that he has + nothing more upon him; or, if a burglar has broken into his house + by night, induces him by a lie to enter a cellar and then locks him + in. A man who has been captured and carried off by robbers, for + example by pirates, has the right to kill them not only by violence + but also by craft, in order to regain his freedom. Thus, also, a + promise is certainly not binding when it has been extorted by + direct bodily violence, because he who suffers such compulsion may + with full right free himself by killing, and, <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a fortiori</span></span>, by deceiving his + oppressor. Whoever cannot recover through force the property which + has <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page439">[pg 439]</span><a name= + "Pg439" id="Pg439" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> been stolen from + him, commits no wrong if he can accomplish it through craft. + Indeed, if some one plays with me for money he has stolen from me, + I have the right to use false dice against him, because all that I + win from him already belongs to me. Whoever would deny this must + still more deny the justifiableness of stratagem in war, which is + just an acted lie, and is a proof of the saying of Queen Christina + of Sweden, <span class="tei tei-q">“The words of men are to be + esteemed as nothing; scarcely are their deeds to be + trusted.”</span> So sharply does the limit of right border upon + that of wrong. For the rest, I regard it as superfluous to show + that all this completely agrees with what was said above about the + unlawfulness of the lie and of violence. It may also serve to + explain the peculiar theory of the lie told under pressure.<a id= + "noteref_75" name="noteref_75" href="#note_75"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">75</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In accordance + with what has been said, wrong and right are merely moral + determinations, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, such as are valid with + regard to the consideration of human action as such, and in + relation <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">to the inner significance of this action in + itself</span></em>. This asserts itself directly in consciousness + through the fact that the doing of wrong is accompanied by an + inward pain, which is the merely felt consciousness of the + wrong-doer of the excessive strength of the assertion of will in + itself, which extends even to the denial of the manifestation of + the will of another, and also the consciousness that although he is + different from the person suffering wrong as far as the + manifestation is concerned, yet in himself he is identical with + him. The further explanation of this inner significance of all pain + of conscience cannot be given till later. He who suffers wrong is, + on the other hand, painfully conscious of the denial of his will, + as it is expressed through the body and its natural requirements, + for the satisfaction of which nature refers him to the powers of + his body; and at the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page440">[pg + 440]</span><a name="Pg440" id="Pg440" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + same time he is conscious that without doing wrong he might ward + off that denial by every means unless he lacks the power. This + purely moral significance is the only one which right and wrong + have for men as men, not as members of the State, and which + consequently remains even when man is in a state of nature without + any positive law. It constitutes the basis and the content of all + that has on this account been named <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">natural + law</span></em>, though it is better called moral law, for its + validity does not extend to suffering, to the external reality, but + only to the action of man and the self-knowledge of his individual + will which grows up in him from his action, and which is called + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">conscience</span></em>. It cannot, however, in + a state of nature, assert itself in all cases, and outwardly upon + other individuals, and prevent might from reigning instead of + right. In a state of nature it depends upon every one merely to see + that in every case he <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">does</span></em> no wrong, but by no means to + see that in every case he <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suffers</span></em> no wrong, for this depends + on the accident of his outward power. Therefore the concepts right + and wrong, even in a state of nature, are certainly valid and by no + means conventional, but there they are valid merely as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">moral</span></em> + concepts, for the self-knowledge of one's own will in each. They + are a fixed point in the scale of the very different degrees of + strength with which the will to live asserts itself in human + individuals, like the freezing-point on the thermometer; the point + at which the assertion of one's own will becomes the denial of the + will of another, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, specifies through + wrong-doing the degree of its intensity, combined with the degree + in which knowledge is involved in the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span> + (which is the form of all knowledge that is subject to the will). + But whoever wants to set aside the purely moral consideration of + human action, or denies it, and wishes to regard conduct merely in + its outward effects and their consequences, may certainly, with + Hobbes, explain right and wrong as conventional definitions + arbitrarily assumed, and therefore <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page441">[pg 441]</span><a name="Pg441" id="Pg441" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> not existing outside positive law, and we can + never show him through external experience what does not belong to + such experience. Hobbes himself characterises his completely + empirical method of thought very remarkably by the fact that in his + book <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Principiis + Geometrarum</span></span>”</span> he denies all pure mathematics + properly so called, and obstinately maintains that the point has + extension and the line has breadth, and we can never show him a + point without extension or a line without breadth. Thus we can just + as little impart to him the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">a + priori</span></span> nature of mathematics as the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">a priori</span></span> nature of right, + because he shuts himself out from all knowledge which is not + empirical.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The pure + doctrine of right is thus a chapter of ethics, and is directly + related only to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">action</span></em>, not to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suffering</span></em>; for only the former is + the expression of will, and this alone is considered by ethics. + Suffering is mere occurrence. Ethics can only have regard to + suffering indirectly, merely to show that what takes place merely + to avoid suffering wrong is itself no infliction of wrong. The + working out of this chapter of ethics would contain the precise + definition of the limits to which an individual may go in the + assertion of the will already objectified in his body without + denying the same will as it appears in another individual; and also + the actions which transgress these limits, which consequently are + wrong, and therefore in their turn may be warded off without wrong. + Thus our own <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">action</span></em> always remains the point of + view of the investigation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">suffering + of wrong</span></em> appears as an event in outward experience, and + in it is manifested, as we have said, more distinctly than anywhere + else, the phenomenon of the conflict of the will to live with + itself, arising from the multiplicity of individuals and from + egoism, both of which are conditioned through the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, + which is the form of the world as idea for the knowledge of the + individual. We also saw above that a very large <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page442">[pg 442]</span><a name="Pg442" id="Pg442" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> part of the suffering essential to + human life has its perennial source in that conflict of + individuals.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The reason, + however, which is common to all these individuals, and which + enables them to know not merely the particular case, as the brutes + do, but also the whole abstractly in its connection, has also + taught them to discern the source of that suffering, and induced + them to consider the means of diminishing it, or, when possible, of + suppressing it by a common sacrifice, which is, however, more than + counterbalanced by the common advantage that proceeds from it. + However agreeable it is to the egoism of the individual to inflict + wrong in particular cases, this has yet a necessary correlative in + the suffering of wrong of another individual, to whom it is a great + pain. And because the reason which surveys the whole left the + one-sided point of view of the individual to which it belongs, and + freed itself for the moment from its dependence upon it, it saw the + pleasure of an individual in inflicting wrong always outweighed by + the relatively greater pain of the other who suffered the wrong; + and it found further, that because here everything was left to + chance, every one had to fear that the pleasure of conveniently + inflicting wrong would far more rarely fall to his lot than the + pain of enduring it. From this reason recognised that both in order + to diminish the suffering which is everywhere disseminated, and as + far as possible to divide it equally, the best and only means was + to spare all the pain of suffering wrong by renouncing all the + pleasure to be obtained by inflicting it. This means is the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">contract + of the state</span></em> or <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">law</span></em>. It is easily conceived, and + little by little carried out by the egoism, which, through the use + of reason, proceeds methodically and forsakes its one-sided point + of view. This origin of the state and of law I have indicated was + already exhibited as such by Plato in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Republic.”</span> In fact, it is the essential and + only origin, determined by the nature of the matter. Moreover, in + no land can the state have ever had a <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page443">[pg 443]</span><a name="Pg443" id="Pg443" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> different origin, because it is just this + mode of originating this aim that makes it a state. But it is a + matter of indifference whether, in each particular nation, the + condition which preceded it was that of a horde of savages + independent of each other (anarchy), or that of a horde of slaves + ruled at will by the stronger (despotism). In both cases there + existed as yet no state; it first arose through that common + agreement; and according as that agreement is more or less free + from anarchy or despotism, the state is more or less perfect. + Republics tend to anarchy, monarchies to despotism, and the mean of + constitutional monarchy, which was therefore devised, tends to + government by factions. In order to found a perfect state, we must + begin by providing beings whose nature allows them always to + sacrifice their own to the public good. Till then, however, + something may be attained through the existence of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> + family whose good is quite inseparable from that of the country; so + that, at least in matters of importance, it can never advance the + one without the other. On this rests the power and the advantage of + the hereditary monarchy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now as ethics + was concerned exclusively with right and wrong doing, and could + accurately point out the limits of his action to whoever was + resolved to do no wrong; politics, on the contrary, the theory of + legislation, is exclusively concerned with the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suffering</span></em> of wrong, and would + never trouble itself with wrong-doing at all if it were not on + account of its ever-necessary correlative, the suffering of wrong, + which it always keeps in view as the enemy it opposes. Indeed, if + it were possible to conceive an infliction of wrong with which no + suffering of wrong on the part of another was connected, the state + would, consistently, by no means prohibit it. And because in ethics + the will, the disposition, is the object of consideration, and the + only real thing, the firm will to do wrong, which is only + restrained <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page444">[pg + 444]</span><a name="Pg444" id="Pg444" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and rendered ineffective by external might, and the actually + committed wrong, are to it quite the same, and it condemns him who + so wills as unjust at its tribunal. On the other hand, will and + disposition, merely as such, do not concern the state at all, but + only the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">deed</span></em> (whether it is merely + attempted or carried out), on account of its correlative, the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suffering</span></em> on the part of another. + Thus for the state the deed, the event, is the only real; the + disposition, the intention, is only investigated so far as the + significance of the deed becomes known through it. Therefore the + state will forbid no one to carry about in his thought murder and + poison against another, so long as it knows certainly that the fear + of the sword and the wheel will always restrain the effects of that + will. The state has also by no means to eradicate the foolish + purpose, the inclination to wrong-doing, the wicked disposition; + but merely always to place beside every possible motive for doing a + wrong a more powerful motive for leaving it undone in the + inevitable punishment that will ensue. Therefore the criminal code + is as complete a register as possible of motives against every + criminal action that can possibly be imagined—both <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in abstracto</span></span>, in order to make + any case that occurs an application <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">in + concreto</span></span>. Politics or legislation will therefore for + this end borrow from that chapter of ethics which is the doctrine + of right, and which, besides the inner significance of right and + wrong, determines the exact limits between them. Yet it will only + do so for the purpose of making use of its reverse side, and + regarding all the limits which ethics lays down as not to be + transgressed, if we are to avoid <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">doing</span></em> + wrong, from the other side, as the limits which we must not allow + others to transgress if we do not wish to <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">suffer</span></em> + wrong, and from which we have therefore a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">right</span></em> + to drive others back. Therefore these limits are, as much as + possible, from the passive side, barricaded by laws. It is evident + that as an historian has very wittily been called an inverted + prophet, the professor of <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page445">[pg + 445]</span><a name="Pg445" id="Pg445" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + law is an inverted moralist, and therefore law itself, in its + proper sense, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the doctrine of the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">right</span></em>, which we ought to maintain, + is inverted ethics in that chapter of it in which the rights are + laid down which we ought not to violate. The concept of wrong and + its negation, that of right, which is originally <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ethical</span></em>, becomes <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">juridical</span></em> by the transference of + the starting-point from the active to the passive side, and thus by + inversion. This, as well as Kant's theory of law, which very + falsely deduces the institution of the state as a moral duty from + his categorical imperative, has, even in the most recent times, + repeatedly occasioned the very extraordinary error that the state + is an institution for furthering morality; that it arises from the + endeavour after this, and is, consequently, directed against + egoism. As if the inward disposition, to which alone morality or + immorality belongs, the externally free will, would allow itself to + be modified from without and changed by influences exerted upon it! + Still more perverse is the theory that the state is the condition + of freedom in the moral sense, and in this way the condition of + morality; for freedom lies beyond the phenomenon, and indeed beyond + human arrangements. The state is, as we have said, so little + directed against egoism in general and as such, that, on the + contrary, it has sprung from egoism and exists only in its + service—an egoism that well understands itself, proceeds + methodically and forsakes the one-sided for the universal point of + view, and so by addition is the common egoism of all. The state is + thus instituted under the correct presupposition that pure + morality, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, right action from moral + grounds, is not to be expected; if this were not the case, it would + itself be superfluous. Thus the state, which aims at well-being, is + by no means directed against egoism, but only against the + disadvantageous consequences which arise from the multiplicity of + egoistic individuals, and reciprocally affect them all and disturb + their well-being. Therefore it was already said by Aristotle (De. + Rep. iii.): Τελος μεν ουν πολεως το ευ ζην; <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page446">[pg 446]</span><a name="Pg446" id="Pg446" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> τουτο δε εστιν το ζῃν ευδαιμονως και + καλως (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Finis civitatis est bene + vivere, hoc autem est beate et pulchre vivere</span></span>). + Hobbes also has accurately and excellently expounded this origin + and end of the state; and that old first principle of all state + policy, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">salus publica prima lex + esto</span></span>, indicates the same thing. If the state + completely attains its end, it will produce the same outward result + as if perfect justice of disposition prevailed everywhere. But the + inner nature and origin of both phenomena will be the converse. + Thus in the second case it would be that no one wished to + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">do</span></em> wrong, and in the first that no + one wished to <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">suffer</span></em> wrong, and the means + appropriate to this end had been fully employed. Thus the same line + may be drawn from opposite directions, and a beast of prey with a + muzzle is as harmless as a graminivorous animal. But beyond this + point the state cannot go. It cannot exhibit a phenomenon such as + would spring from universal mutual well-wishing and love. For just + as we found that from its nature it would not forbid the doing of a + wrong which involved no corresponding suffering of wrong on the + part of another, and prohibits all wrong-doing only because this is + impossible; so conversely, in accordance with its tendency towards + the well-being of all, it would very gladly take care that every + benevolent action and work of human love should be <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">experienced</span></em>, if it were not that + these also have an inevitable correlative in the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">performance</span></em> of acts of benevolence + and works of love, and every member of the state would wish to + assume the passive and none the active rôle, and there would be no + reason for exacting the latter from one member of the state rather + than from another. Accordingly only the negative, which is just the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">right</span></em>, not the positive, which has + been comprehended under the name of obligations of love, or, less + completely, duties, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">can be exacted by force</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Legislation, as + we have said, borrows the pure philosophy of right, or the doctrine + of the nature and limits of right and wrong, from ethics, in order + to apply it from <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page447">[pg + 447]</span><a name="Pg447" id="Pg447" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the reverse side to its own ends, which are different from those of + ethics, and to institute positive legislation and the means of + supporting it, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the state, in accordance + with it. Positive legislation is thus the inverted application of + the purely moral doctrine of right. This application may be made + with reference to the peculiar relations and circumstances of a + particular people. But only if the positive legislation is, in + essential matters, throughout determined in accordance with the + guidance of the pure theory of right, and for each of its + propositions a ground can be established in the pure theory of + right, is the legislation which has arisen a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">positive + right</span></em> and the state a community <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">based upon + right</span></em>, a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">state</span></em> in the proper meaning of the + word, a morally permissible, not immoral institution. Otherwise the + positive legislation is, on the contrary, the establishment of a + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">positive + wrong</span></em>; it is itself an openly avowed enforced wrong. + Such is every despotism, the constitution of most Mohammedan + kingdoms; and indeed various parts of many constitutions are also + of this kind; for example, serfdom, vassalage, and many such + institutions. The pure theory of right or natural right—better, + moral right—though always reversed, lies at the foundation of every + just positive legislation, as pure mathematics lies at the + foundation of every branch of applied mathematics. The most + important points of the doctrine of right, as philosophy has to + supply it for that end to legislation, are the following: 1. The + explanation of the inner and real significance both of the origin + of the conceptions of wrong and right, and of their application and + position in ethics. 2. The deduction of the law of property. 3. The + deduction of the moral validity of contracts; for this is the moral + basis of the contract of the state. 4. The explanation of the + origin and the aim of the state, of the relation of this aim to + ethics, and of the intentional transference of the ethical doctrine + of right, by reversing it, to legislation, in consequence of this + relation. 5. The deduction of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page448">[pg 448]</span><a name="Pg448" id="Pg448" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> right of punishment. The remaining content of + the doctrine of right is mere application of these principles, mere + accurate definition of the limits of right and wrong for all + possible relations of life, which are consequently united and + distributed under certain points of view and titles. In these + special doctrines the books which treat of pure law are fairly at + one; it is only in the principles that they differ much, for these + are always connected with some philosophical system. In connection + with our system, we have explained the first four of these + principal points shortly and generally, yet definitely and + distinctly, and it remains for us to speak in the same way of the + right of punishment.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Kant makes the + fundamentally false assertion that apart from the state there would + be no complete right of property. It follows from our deduction, as + given above, that even in a state of nature there is property with + complete natural, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, moral right, which cannot + be injured without wrong, but may without wrong be defended to the + uttermost. On the other hand, it is certain that apart from the + state there is no right of punishment. All right to punish is based + upon the positive law alone, which <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">before</span></em> + the offence has determined a punishment for it, the threat of + which, as a counter-motive, is intended to outweigh all possible + motives for the offence. This positive law is to be regarded as + sanctioned and recognised by all the members of the state. It is + thus based upon a common contract which the members of the state + are in duty bound to fulfil, and thus, on the one hand, to inflict + the punishment, and, on the other hand, to endure it; thus the + endurance of the punishment may with right be enforced. + Consequently the immediate <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">end of punishment</span></em> is, in the + particular case, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the fulfilment of the law as a + contract</span></em>. But the one end of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">law</span></em> is + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">deterrence</span></em> from the infringement + of the rights of others. For, in order that every one may be + protected from suffering wrong, men have combined to <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page449">[pg 449]</span><a name="Pg449" id="Pg449" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> form a state, have renounced the doing + of wrong, and assumed the task of maintaining the state. Thus the + law and the fulfilment of it, the punishment, are essentially + directed to the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">future</span></em>, not to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">past</span></em>. + This distinguishes <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">punishment</span></em> from <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">revenge</span></em>; for the motives which + instigate the latter are solely concerned with what has happened, + and thus with the past as such. All requital of wrong by the + infliction of pain, without any aim for the future, is revenge, and + can have no other end than consolation for the suffering one has + borne by the sight of the suffering one has inflicted upon another. + This is wickedness and cruelty, and cannot be morally justified. + Wrong which some one has inflicted upon me by no means entitles me + to inflict wrong upon him. The requital of evil with evil without + further intention is neither morally nor otherwise through any + rational ground to be justified, and the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">jus talionis</span></span> set up as the + absolute, final principle of the right of punishment, is + meaningless. Therefore Kant's theory of punishment as mere requital + for requital's sake is a completely groundless and perverse view. + Yet it is always appearing in the writings of many jurists, under + all kinds of lofty phrases, which amount to nothing but empty + words, as: Through the punishment the crime is expiated or + neutralised and abolished, and many such. But no man has the right + to set himself up as a purely moral judge and requiter, and punish + the misdeeds of another with pains which he inflicts upon him, and + so to impose penance upon him for his sins. Nay, this would rather + be the most presumptuous arrogance; and therefore the Bible says, + <span class="tei tei-q">“Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the + Lord.”</span> But man has the right to care for the safety of + society; and this can only be done by interdicting all actions + which are denoted by the word <span class= + "tei tei-q">“criminal,”</span> in order to prevent them by means of + counter-motives, which are the threatened punishments. And this + threat can only be made effective by carrying it out when a case + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page450">[pg 450]</span><a name= + "Pg450" id="Pg450" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> occurs in spite of + it. Accordingly that the end of punishment, or more accurately of + penal law, is the deterrence from crime, is a truth so generally + recognised and indeed self-evident, that in England it is expressed + in the very old form of indictment which is still served by the + counsel for the Crown in criminal actions, for it concludes with + the words, <span class="tei tei-q">“If this be proved, you, the + said N. N., ought to be punished with pains of law, to deter others + from the like crimes in all time coming.”</span> If a prince + desires to extend mercy to a criminal who has justly been + condemned, his Ministers will represent to him that, if he does, + this crime will soon be repeated. An end for the future + distinguishes punishment from revenge, and punishment only has this + end when it is inflicted <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">in fulfilment of a law</span></em>. It thus + announces itself as inevitable in every future case, and thus the + law obtains the power to deter, in which its end really consists. + Now here a Kantian would inevitably reply that certainly according + to this view the punished criminal would be used <span class= + "tei tei-q">“merely as a means.”</span> This proposition, so + unweariedly repeated by all the Kantians, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Man must always be treated as an end, never as a + means,”</span> certainly sounds significant, and is therefore a + very suitable proposition for those who like to have a formula + which saves them all further thought; but looked at in the light, + it is an exceedingly vague, indefinite assertion, which reaches its + aim quite indirectly, requires to be explained, defined, and + modified in every case of its application, and, if taken generally, + is insufficient, meagre, and moreover problematical. The murderer + who has been condemned to the punishment of death according to law + must now, at any rate, and with complete right, be used as a mere + means. For public security, the chief end of the state, is + disturbed by him; indeed it is abolished if the law is not carried + out. The murderer, his life, his person, must now be the means of + fulfilling the law, and thereby of re-establishing the public + security. And he is made such a means with perfect right, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page451">[pg 451]</span><a name= + "Pg451" id="Pg451" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> in fulfilment of the + contract of the state, which was entered into by him because he was + a citizen, and in accordance with which, in order to enjoy security + for his life, freedom, and property, he has pledged his life, his + freedom, and his property for the security of all, which pledge has + now been forfeited.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This theory of + punishment which we have established, the theory which is directly + supported by sound reason, is certainly in the main no new thought; + but it is a thought which was almost supplanted by new errors, and + therefore it was necessary to exhibit it as distinctly as possible. + The same thing is in its essence contained in what Puffendorf says + on the subject, <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Officio Hominis et + Civis</span></span>”</span> (Bk. ii. chap. 12). Hobbes also agrees + with it, <span class="tei tei-q">“Leviathan”</span> (chaps. 15-28). + In our own day Feurbach is well known to have maintained it. + Indeed, it occurs even in the utterances of the ancient + philosophers. Plato expresses it clearly in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Protagoras”</span> (p. 114, edit. Bip.), also in the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Gorgias”</span> (p. 168), and lastly in + the eleventh book of the <span class="tei tei-q">“Laws”</span> (p. + 165). Seneca expresses Plato's opinion and the theory of all + punishment in the short sentence, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Nemo prudens punit, quia + peccatum est; sed ne peccetur</span></span>”</span> (De Ira, i. + 16).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus we have + come to recognise in the state the means by which egoism endowed + with reason seeks to escape from its own evil consequences which + turn against itself, and now each promotes the well-being of all + because he sees that his own well-being is involved in it. If the + state attained its end completely, then to a certain extent + something approaching to an Utopia might finally, by the removal of + all kinds of evil, be brought about. For by the human powers united + in it, it is able to make the rest of nature more and more + serviceable. But as yet the state has always remained very far from + this goal. And even if it attained to it, innumerable evils + essential to all life would still keep it in suffering; and + finally, if they were all removed, ennui would at once occupy + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page452">[pg 452]</span><a name= + "Pg452" id="Pg452" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> every place they + left. And besides, the strife of individuals is never completely + abolished by the state, for it vexes in trifles when it is + prohibited in greater things. Finally, Eris, happily expelled from + within, turns to what is without; as the conflict of individuals, + she is banished by the institution of the state; but she reappears + from without as the war of nations, and now demands in bulk and at + once, as an accumulated debt, the bloody sacrifice which by wise + precautions has been denied her in the particular. And even + supposing that all this were finally overcome and removed, by + wisdom founded on the experience of thousands of years, at the end + the result would be the actual over-population of the whole planet, + the terrible evil of which only a bold imagination can now + realise.<a id="noteref_76" name="noteref_76" href= + "#note_76"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">76</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 63. We have + recognised <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">temporal justice</span></em>, which has its + seat in the state, as requiting and punishing, and have seen that + this only becomes justice through a reference to the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">future</span></em>. + For without this reference all punishing and requiting would be an + outrage without justification, and indeed merely the addition of + another evil to that which has already occurred, without meaning or + significance. But it is quite otherwise with <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">eternal + justice</span></em>, which was referred to before, and which rules + not the state but the world, is not dependent upon human + institutions, is not subject to chance and deception, is not + uncertain, wavering, and erring, but infallible, fixed, and sure. + The conception of requital implies that of time; therefore + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">eternal + justice</span></em> cannot be requital. Thus it cannot, like + temporal justice, admit of respite and delay, and require time in + order to triumph, equalising the evil deed by the evil consequences + only by means of time. The punishment must here be so bound up with + the offence that both are one.</p><span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page453">[pg 453]</span><a name="Pg453" id="Pg453" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Δοκειτε πηδᾳν τ᾽ αδικηματ᾽ εις + θεους</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Πτεροισι, κἀπειτ᾽ εν Διος δελτου + πτυχαις</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Γραφειν τιν᾽ αυτα, Ζηνα δ᾽ + εισορωντα νιν</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Θνητοις δικαζειν? Ουδ᾽ ὁ παρ + ουρανος,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Διος γραφοντος ταρ βροτων + ἁμαρτιας,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Εξαρκεσειεν, ουδ᾽ εκεινος αν + σκοπων</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Πεμπειν ἑκαστῳ ζημιαν; αλλ᾽ ἡ + Δικη</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Ενταυθα που εστιν εγγυς, ει + βουλεσθ᾽ ὁρᾳν.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Eurip. ap. Stob. Ecl., i. c. + 4.</span> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">(</span><span class="tei tei-q" + style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Volare + pennis scelera ad ætherias domus</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Putatis, illic in Jovis + tabularia</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Scripto referri; tum Jovem + lectis super</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Sententiam proferre?—sed + mortalium</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Facinora cœli, quantaquanta est, + regia</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Nequit tenere: nec legendis + Juppiter</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Et puniendis par est. Est tamen + ultio,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Et, si intuemur, illa nos habitat + prope.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">)</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now that such an + eternal justice really lies in the nature of the world will soon + become completely evident to whoever has grasped the whole of the + thought which we have hitherto been developing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The world, in + all the multiplicity of its parts and forms, is the manifestation, + the objectivity, of the one will to live. Existence itself, and the + kind of existence, both as a collective whole and in every part, + proceeds from the will alone. The will is free, the will is + almighty. The will appears in everything, just as it determines + itself in itself and outside time. The world is only the mirror of + this willing; and all finitude, all suffering, all miseries, which + it contains, belong to the expression of that which the will wills, + are as they are because the will so wills. Accordingly with perfect + right every being supports existence in general, and also the + existence of its species and its peculiar individuality, entirely + as it is and in circumstances as they are, in a world such as it + is, swayed by chance and error, transient, ephemeral, and + constantly suffering; and in all that it experiences, or indeed can + experience, it always gets its <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page454">[pg 454]</span><a name="Pg454" id="Pg454" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> due. For the will belongs to it; and as the + will is, so is the world. Only this world itself can bear the + responsibility of its own existence and nature—no other; for by + what means could another have assumed it? Do we desire to know what + men, morally considered, are worth as a whole and in general, we + have only to consider their fate as a whole and in general. This is + want, wretchedness, affliction, misery, and death. Eternal justice + reigns; if they were not, as a whole, worthless, their fate, as a + whole, would not be so sad. In this sense we may say, the world + itself is the judgment of the world. If we could lay all the misery + of the world in one scale of the balance, and all the guilt of the + world in the other, the needle would certainly point to the + centre.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Certainly, + however, the world does not exhibit itself to the knowledge of the + individual as such, developed for the service of the will, as it + finally reveals itself to the inquirer as the objectivity of the + one and only will to live, which he himself is. But the sight of + the uncultured individual is clouded, as the Hindus say, by the + veil of Mâyâ. He sees not the thing-in-itself but the phenomenon in + time and space, the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, and in the other forms of the + principle of sufficient reason. And in this form of his limited + knowledge he sees not the inner nature of things, which is one, but + its phenomena as separated, disunited, innumerable, very different, + and indeed opposed. For to him pleasure appears as one thing and + pain as quite another thing: one man as a tormentor and a murderer, + another as a martyr and a victim; wickedness as one thing and evil + as another. He sees one man live in joy, abundance, and pleasure, + and even at his door another die miserably of want and cold. Then + he asks, Where is the retribution? And he himself, in the vehement, + pressure of will which is his origin and his nature, seizes upon + the pleasures and enjoyments of life, firmly <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page455">[pg 455]</span><a name="Pg455" id="Pg455" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> embraces them, and knows not that by + this very act of his will he seizes and hugs all those pains and + sorrows at the sight of which he shudders. He sees the ills and he + sees the wickedness in the world, but far from knowing that both of + these are but different sides of the manifestation of the one will + to live, he regards them as very different, and indeed quite + opposed, and often seeks to escape by wickedness, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + by causing the suffering of another, from ills, from the suffering + of his own individuality, for he is involved in the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, + deluded by the veil of Mâyâ. Just as a sailor sits in a boat + trusting to his frail barque in a stormy sea, unbounded in every + direction, rising and falling with the howling mountainous waves; + so in the midst of a world of sorrows the individual man sits + quietly, supported by and trusting to the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, or + the way in which the individual knows things as phenomena. The + boundless world, everywhere full of suffering in the infinite past, + in the infinite future, is strange to him, indeed is to him but a + fable; his ephemeral person, his extensionless present, his + momentary satisfaction, this alone has reality for him; and he does + all to maintain this, so long as his eyes are not opened by a + better knowledge. Till then, there lives only in the inmost depths + of his consciousness a very obscure presentiment that all that is + after all not really so strange to him, but has a connection with + him, from which the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span> cannot protect him. From this + presentiment arises that ineradicable <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">awe</span></em> + common to all men (and indeed perhaps even to the most sensible of + the brutes) which suddenly seizes them if by any chance they become + puzzled about the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, because the principle of sufficient + reason in some one of its forms seems to admit of an exception. For + example, if it seems as if some change took place without a cause, + or some one who is dead appears again, or if in any <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page456">[pg 456]</span><a name="Pg456" id="Pg456" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> other way the past or the future + becomes present or the distant becomes near. The fearful terror at + anything of the kind is founded on the fact that they suddenly + become puzzled about the forms of knowledge of the phenomenon, + which alone separate their own individuality from the rest of the + world. But even this separation lies only in the phenomenon, and + not in the thing-in-itself; and on this rests eternal justice. In + fact, all temporal happiness stands, and all prudence proceeds, + upon ground that is undermined. They defend the person from + accidents and supply its pleasures; but the person is merely + phenomenon, and its difference from other individuals, and + exemption from the sufferings which they endure, rests merely in + the form of the phenomenon, the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>. + According to the true nature of things, every one has all the + suffering of the world as his own, and indeed has to regard all + merely possible suffering as for him actual, so long as he is the + fixed will to live, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, asserts life with all his + power. For the knowledge that sees through the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, a + happy life in time, the gift of chance or won by prudence, amid the + sorrows of innumerable others, is only the dream of a beggar in + which he is a king, but from which he must awake and learn from + experience that only a fleeting illusion had separated him from the + suffering of his life.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Eternal justice + withdraws itself from the vision that is involved in the knowledge + which follows the principle of sufficient reason in the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>; such + vision misses it altogether unless it vindicates it in some way by + fictions. It sees the bad, after misdeeds and cruelties of every + kind, live in happiness and leave the world unpunished. It sees the + oppressed drag out a life full of suffering to the end without an + avenger, a requiter appearing. But that man only will grasp and + comprehend eternal justice who raises himself above the knowledge + that proceeds under the guidance of the principle of sufficient + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page457">[pg 457]</span><a name= + "Pg457" id="Pg457" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> reason, bound to the + particular thing, and recognises the Ideas, sees through the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, and + becomes conscious that the forms of the phenomenon do not apply to + the thing-in-itself. Moreover, he alone, by virtue of the same + knowledge, can understand the true nature of virtue, as it will + soon disclose itself to us in connection with the present inquiry, + although for the practice of virtue this knowledge in the abstract + is by no means demanded. Thus it becomes clear to whoever has + attained to the knowledge referred to, that because the will is the + in-itself of all phenomena, the misery which is awarded to others + and that which he experiences himself, the bad and the evil, always + concerns only that one inner being which is everywhere the same, + although the phenomena in which the one and the other exhibits + itself exist as quite different individuals, and are widely + separated by time and space. He sees that the difference between + him who inflicts the suffering and him who must bear it is only the + phenomenon, and does not concern the thing-in-itself, for this is + the will living in both, which here, deceived by the knowledge + which is bound to its service, does not recognise itself, and + seeking an increased happiness in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">one</span></em> of + its phenomena, produces great suffering in <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">another</span></em>, and thus, in the pressure + of excitement, buries its teeth in its own flesh, not knowing that + it always injures only itself, revealing in this form, through the + medium of individuality, the conflict with itself which it bears in + its inner nature. The inflicter of suffering and the sufferer are + one. The former errs in that he believes he is not a partaker in + the suffering; the latter, in that he believes he is not a partaker + in the guilt. If the eyes of both were opened, the inflicter of + suffering would see that he lives in all that suffers pain in the + wide world, and which, if endowed with reason, in vain asks why it + was called into existence for such great suffering, its desert of + which it does not understand. And the sufferer would see that all + the wickedness <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page458">[pg + 458]</span><a name="Pg458" id="Pg458" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + which is or ever was committed in the world proceeds from that will + which constitutes <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">his</span></em> own nature also, appears also + in <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">him</span></em>, and that through this + phenomenon and its assertion he has taken upon himself all the + sufferings which proceed from such a will and bears them as his + due, so long as he is this will. From this knowledge speaks the + profound poet Calderon in <span class="tei tei-q">“Life a + Dream”</span>—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">Pues el + delito mayor</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Del hombre es haber + nacido.</span><span style="font-size: 90%">”</span></span> + </div> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">(</span><span class="tei tei-q" + style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">For the + greatest crime of man</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Is that he ever was born.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">)</span> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Why should it + not be a crime, since, according to an eternal law, death follows + upon it? Calderon has merely expressed in these lines the Christian + dogma of original sin.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The living + knowledge of eternal justice, of the balance that inseparably binds + together the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">malum culpæ</span></span> + with the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">malum pœnæ</span></span>, + demands the complete transcending of individuality and the + principle of its possibility. Therefore it will always remain + unattainable to the majority of men, as will also be the case with + the pure and distinct knowledge of the nature of all virtue, which + is akin to it, and which we are about to explain. Accordingly the + wise ancestors of the Hindu people have directly expressed it in + the Vedas, which are only allowed to the three regenerate castes, + or in their esoteric teaching, so far at any rate as conception and + language comprehend it, and their method of exposition, which + always remains pictorial and even rhapsodical, admits; but in the + religion of the people, or exoteric teaching, they only communicate + it by means of myths. The direct exposition we find in the Vedas, + the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom, the kernel of + which has at last reached us in the Upanishads as the greatest gift + of this century. It is expressed in various <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page459">[pg 459]</span><a name="Pg459" id="Pg459" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> ways, but especially by making all the + beings in the world, living and lifeless, pass successively before + the view of the student, and pronouncing over every one of them + that word which has become a formula, and as such has been called + the Mahavakya: Tatoumes,—more correctly, Tat twam asi,—which means, + <span class="tei tei-q">“This thou art.”</span><a id="noteref_77" + name="noteref_77" href="#note_77"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">77</span></span></a> But + for the people, that great truth, so far as in their limited + condition they could comprehend it, was translated into the form of + knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason. This + form of knowledge is indeed, from its nature, quite incapable of + apprehending that truth pure and in itself, and even stands in + contradiction to it, yet in the form of a myth it received a + substitute for it which was sufficient as a guide for conduct. For + the myth enables the method of knowledge, in accordance with the + principle of sufficient reason, to comprehend by figurative + representation the ethical significance of conduct, which itself is + ever foreign to it. This is the aim of all systems of religion, for + as a whole they are the mythical clothing of the truth which is + unattainable to the uncultured human intellect. In this sense this + myth might, in Kant's language, be called a postulate of the + practical reason; but regarded as such, it has the great advantage + that it contains absolutely no elements but such as lie before our + eyes in the course of actual experience, and can therefore support + all its conceptions with perceptions. What is here referred to is + the myth of the transmigration of souls. It teaches that all + sufferings which in life one inflicts upon other beings must be + expiated in a subsequent life in this world, through precisely the + same sufferings; and this extends so far, that he who only kills a + brute must, some time in endless time, be born as the same kind of + brute and suffer the same death. It teaches that wicked conduct + involves a future life in this world in suffering and despised + creatures, and, accordingly, that one will then be born again in + lower castes, or as <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page460">[pg + 460]</span><a name="Pg460" id="Pg460" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> a + woman, or as a brute, as Pariah or Tschandala, as a leper, or as a + crocodile, and so forth. All the pains which the myth threatens it + supports with perceptions from actual life, through suffering + creatures which do not know how they have merited their misery, and + it does not require to call in the assistance of any other hell. As + a reward, on the other hand, it promises re-birth in better, nobler + forms, as Brahmans, wise men, or saints. The highest reward, which + awaits the noblest deeds and the completest resignation, which is + also given to the woman who in seven successive lives has + voluntarily died on the funeral pile of her husband, and not less + to the man whose pure mouth has never uttered a single lie,—this + reward the myth can only express negatively in the language of this + world by the promise, which is so often repeated, that they shall + never be born again, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Non adsumes iterum + existentiam apparentem</span></span>; or, as the Buddhists, who + recognise neither Vedas nor castes, express it, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Thou shalt attain to Nirvâna,”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + to a state in which four things no longer exist—birth, age, + sickness, and death.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Never has a myth + entered, and never will one enter, more closely into the + philosophical truth which is attainable to so few than this + primitive doctrine of the noblest and most ancient nation. Broken + up as this nation now is into many parts, this myth yet reigns as + the universal belief of the people, and has the most decided + influence upon life to-day, as four thousand years ago. Therefore + Pythagoras and Plato have seized with admiration on that + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">ne plus ultra</span></span> of mythical + representation, received it from India or Egypt, honoured it, made + use of it, and, we know not how far, even believed it. We, on the + contrary, now send the Brahmans English clergymen and evangelical + linen-weavers to set them right out of sympathy, and to show them + that they are created out of nothing, and ought thankfully to + rejoice in the fact. But it is just the same as if we fired a + bullet against a cliff. In India our religions will never take + root. The ancient <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page461">[pg + 461]</span><a name="Pg461" id="Pg461" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + wisdom of the human race will not be displaced by what happened in + Galilee. On the contrary, Indian philosophy streams back to Europe, + and will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and + thought.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 64. From our + exposition of eternal justice, which is not mythical but + philosophical, we will now proceed to the kindred investigation of + the ethical significance of conduct and of conscience, which is the + merely felt knowledge of that significance. But first I wish at + this point to draw attention to two peculiarities of human nature, + that might help to make clear how the nature of that eternal + justice, and the unity and identity of the will in all its + phenomena upon which it rests, is known to every one, at least as + an obscure feeling.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">When a bad deed + has been done, it affords satisfaction not only to the sufferer, + who for the most part feels the desire of revenge, but also to the + perfectly indifferent spectator, to see that he who caused another + pain suffers himself a like measure of pain; and this quite + independently of the end which we have shown the state has in view + in punishment, and which is the foundation of penal law. It seems + to me that what expresses itself here is nothing but the + consciousness of that eternal justice, which is, nevertheless, at + once misunderstood and falsified by the unenlightened mind, for, + involved in the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, it produces an amphiboly of the + concepts and demands from the phenomenon what only belongs to the + thing in itself. It does not see how far in themselves the offender + and the offended are one, and that it is the same being which, not + recognising itself in its own manifestation, bears both the pain + and the guilt, but it desires rather to see the pain also in the + particular individual to whom the guilt belongs. Therefore, most + persons would demand that a man who had a very high degree of + wickedness which might yet occur in many others, only not matched + with other qualities such as are found in him, a man who also far + surpassed <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page462">[pg + 462]</span><a name="Pg462" id="Pg462" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + others by extraordinary intellectual powers, and who inflicted + unspeakable sufferings upon millions of others—for example, as a + conqueror,—most persons, I say, would demand that such a man should + at some time and in some place expiate all these sufferings by a + like amount of pain; for they do not recognise how in themselves + the inflicter of suffering and the sufferers are one, and that it + is the same will through which the latter exist and live which also + appears in the former, and just through him attains to a distinct + revelation of its nature, and which likewise suffers both in the + oppressed and the oppressor; and indeed in the latter in a greater + measure, as the consciousness has attained a higher degree of + clearness and distinctness and the will has greater vehemence. But + that the deeper knowledge, which is no longer involved in the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, from + which all virtue and nobleness proceed, no longer retains the + disposition which demands requital, is shown by the Christian + ethics, which absolutely forbids all requital of evil with evil, + and allows eternal justice to proceed in the sphere of the + thing-in-itself, which is different from that of the phenomenon. + (<span class="tei tei-q">“Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith + the Lord,”</span>—Rom. xii. 19.)</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A much more + striking, but also a much rarer, characteristic of human nature, + which expresses that desire to draw eternal justice into the + province of experience, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, of individuality, and at + the same time indicates a felt consciousness that, as I have + expressed it above, the will to live conducts at its own cost the + great tragedy and comedy, and that the same one will lives in all + manifestations,—such a characteristic, I say, is the following. We + sometimes see a man so deeply moved by a great injury which he has + experienced, or, it may be, only witnessed, that he deliberately + and irretrievably stakes his own life in order to take vengeance on + the perpetrator of that wrong. We see him seek for some mighty + oppressor through long years, murder him at last, and then himself + die on the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page463">[pg + 463]</span><a name="Pg463" id="Pg463" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + scaffold, as he had foreseen, and often, it may be, did not seek to + avoid, for his life had value for him only as a means of vengeance. + We find examples of this especially among the Spaniards.<a id= + "noteref_78" name="noteref_78" href="#note_78"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">78</span></span></a> If, + now, we consider the spirit of that desire for retribution + carefully, we find that it is very different from common revenge, + which seeks to mitigate the suffering, endured by the sight of the + suffering inflicted; indeed, we find that what it aims at deserves + to be called, not so much revenge as punishment. For in it there + really lies the intention of an effect upon the future through the + example, and that without any selfish aim, either for the avenging + person, for it costs him his life, or for a society which secures + its own safety by laws. For that punishment is carried out by + individuals, not by the state, nor is it in fulfilment of a law, + but, on the contrary, always concerns a deed which the state either + would not or could not punish, and the punishment of which it + condemns. It seems to me that the indignation which carries such a + man so far beyond the limits of all self-love springs from the + deepest consciousness that he himself is the whole will to live, + which appears in all beings through all time, and that therefore + the most distant future belongs to him just as the present, and + cannot be indifferent to him. Asserting this will, he yet desires + that in the drama which represents its nature no such fearful wrong + shall ever appear again, and wishes to frighten ever future + wrong-doer by the example of a vengeance against which there is no + means of defence, since the avenger is not deterred by the fear of + death. The will to live, though still asserting itself, does not + here depend any longer upon the particular phenomenon, the + individual, but comprehends the Idea of man, and wishes to keep its + manifestation pure from such a fearful and shocking wrong. It is a + rare, very significant, and even sublime <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page464">[pg 464]</span><a name="Pg464" id="Pg464" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> trait of character through which the + individual sacrifices himself by striving to make himself the arm + of eternal justice, of the true nature of which he is yet + ignorant.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 65. In all the + preceding investigations of human action, we have been leading up + to the final investigation, and have to a considerable extent + lightened the task of raising to abstract and philosophical + clearness, and exhibiting as a branch of our central thought that + special ethical significance of action which in life is with + perfect understanding denoted by the words <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">good</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bad</span></em>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">First, however, + I wish to trace back to their real meaning those conceptions of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">good</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bad</span></em> + which have been treated by the philosophical writers of the day, + very extraordinarily, as simple conceptions, and thus incapable of + analysis; so that the reader may not remain involved in the + senseless delusion that they contain more than is actually the + case, and express in and for themselves all that is here necessary. + I am in a position to do this because in ethics I am no more + disposed to take refuge behind the word <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">good</span></em> + than formerly behind the words <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">beautiful</span></em> + and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">true</span></em>, in order that by the adding + a <span class="tei tei-q">“ness,”</span> which at the present day + is supposed to have a special σεμνοτης, and therefore to be of + assistance in various cases, and by assuming an air of solemnity, I + might induce the belief that by uttering three such words I had + done more than denote three very wide and abstract, and + consequently empty conceptions, of very different origin and + significance. Who is there, indeed, who has made himself acquainted + with the books of our own day to whom these three words, admirable + as are the things to which they originally refer, have not become + an aversion after he has seen for the thousandth time how those who + are least capable of thinking believe that they have only to utter + these three words with open mouth and the air of an intelligent + sheep, in order to have spoken the greatest wisdom?</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The explanation + of the concept <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">true</span></em> has already been <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page465">[pg 465]</span><a name="Pg465" id="Pg465" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> given in the essay on the principle of + sufficient reason, chap. v. § 29 <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">et seq.</span></span> + The content of the concept <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">beautiful</span></em> found for the first time + its proper explanation through the whole of the Third Book of the + present work. We now wish to discover the significance of the + concept <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">good</span></em>, which can be done with very + little trouble. This concept is essentially relative, and signifies + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + conformity of an object to any definite effort of the + will</span></em>. Accordingly everything that corresponds to the + will in any of its expressions and fulfils its end is thought + through the concept <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">good</span></em>, however different such + things may be in other respects. Thus we speak of good eating, good + roads, good weather, good weapons, good omens, and so on; in short, + we call everything good that is just as we wish it to be; and + therefore that may be good in the eyes of one man which is just the + reverse in those of another. The conception of the good divides + itself into two sub-species—that of the direct and present + satisfaction of any volition, and that of its indirect satisfaction + which has reference to the future, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the agreeable and the useful. The conception of the opposite, so + long as we are speaking of unconscious existence, is expressed by + the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bad</span></em>, more rarely and abstractly by + the word <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">evil</span></em>, which thus denotes + everything that does not correspond to any effort of the will. Like + all other things that can come into relation to the will, men who + are favourable to the ends which happen to be desired, who further + and befriend them, are called good, in the same sense, and always + with that relative limitation, which shows itself, for example, in + the expression, <span class="tei tei-q">“I find this good, but you + don't.”</span> Those, however, who are naturally disposed not to + hinder the endeavours of others, but rather to assist them, and who + are thus consistently helpful, benevolent, friendly, and + charitable, are called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">good</span></em> men, on account of this + relation of their conduct to the will of others in general. In the + case of conscious beings (brutes and men) the contrary conception + is denoted in German, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page466">[pg + 466]</span><a name="Pg466" id="Pg466" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + and, within the last hundred years or so, in French also, by a + different word from that which is used in speaking of unconscious + existence; in German, <span lang="de" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="de"><span style="font-style: italic">böse</span></span>; + in French, <span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "fr"><span style="font-style: italic">méchant</span></span>; while + in almost all other languages this distinction does not exist; and + κακος, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">malus</span></span>, + <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cattivo</span></span>, <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bad</span></em>, + are used of men, as of lifeless things, which are opposed to the + ends of a definite individual will. Thus, having started entirely + from the passive element in the good, the inquiry could only + proceed later to the active element, and investigate the conduct of + the man who is called good, no longer with reference to others, but + to himself; specially setting itself the task of explaining both + the purely objective respect which such conduct produces in others, + and the peculiar contentment with himself which it clearly produces + in the man himself, since he purchases it with sacrifices of + another kind; and also, on the other hand, the inner pain which + accompanies the bad disposition, whatever outward advantages it + brings to him who entertains it. It was from this source that the + ethical systems, both the philosophical and those which are + supported by systems of religion, took their rise. Both seek + constantly in some way or other to connect happiness with virtue, + the former either by means of the principle of contradiction or + that of sufficient reason, and thus to make happiness either + identical with or the consequence of virtue, always sophistically; + the latter, by asserting the existence of other worlds than that + which alone can be known to experience.<a id="noteref_79" name= + "noteref_79" href="#note_79"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">79</span></span></a> In our + system, on the contrary, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page467">[pg + 467]</span><a name="Pg467" id="Pg467" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + virtue will show itself, not as a striving after happiness, that + is, well-being and life, but as an effort in quite an opposite + direction.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It follows from + what has been said above, that the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">good</span></em> + is, according to its concept, των πρως τι; thus every good is + essentially relative, for its being consists in its relation to a + desiring will. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Absolute good</span></em> is, therefore, a + contradiction in terms; highest good, <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">summum bonum</span></span>, really signifies + the same thing—a final satisfaction of the will, after which no new + desire could arise,—a last motive, the attainment of which would + afford enduring satisfaction of the will. But, according to the + investigations which have already been conducted in this Fourth + Book, such a consummation is not even thinkable. The will can just + as little cease from willing altogether on account of some + particular satisfaction, as time can end or begin; for it there is + no such thing as a permanent fulfilment which shall completely and + for ever satisfy its craving. It is the vessel of the Danaides; for + it there is no highest good, no absolute good, but always a merely + temporary good. If, however, we wish to give an honorary position, + as it were emeritus, to an old expression, which from custom we do + not like to discard altogether, we may, metaphorically and + figuratively, call the complete self-effacement and denial of the + will, the true absence of will, which alone for ever stills and + silences its struggle, alone gives that contentment which can never + again be disturbed, alone redeems the world, and which we shall now + soon consider at the close of our whole investigation—the + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page468">[pg 468]</span><a name= + "Pg468" id="Pg468" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> absolute good, the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">summum bonum</span></span>—and regard it as + the only radical cure of the disease of which all other means are + only palliations or anodynes. In this sense the Greek τελος and + also <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">finis bonorum</span></span> + correspond to the thing still better. So much for the words + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">good</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bad</span></em>; + now for the thing itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If a man is + always disposed to do <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wrong</span></em> whenever the opportunity + presents itself, and there is no external power to restrain him, we + call him <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bad</span></em>. According to our doctrine of + wrong, this means that such a man does not merely assert the will + to live as it appears in his own body, but in this assertion goes + so far that he denies the will which appears in other individuals. + This is shown by the fact that he desires their powers for the + service of his own will, and seeks to destroy their existence when + they stand in the way of its efforts. The ultimate source of this + is a high degree of egoism, the nature of which has been already + explained. Two things are here apparent. In the first place, that + in such a man an excessively vehement will to live expresses + itself, extending far beyond the assertion of his own body; and, in + the second place, that his knowledge, entirely given up to the + principle of sufficient reason and involved in the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, + cannot get beyond the difference which this latter principle + establishes between his own person and every one else. Therefore he + seeks his own well-being alone, completely indifferent to that of + all others, whose existence is to him altogether foreign and + divided from his own by a wide gulf, and who are indeed regarded by + him as mere masks with no reality behind them. And these two + qualities are the constituent elements of the bad character.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This great + intensity of will is in itself and directly a constant source of + suffering. In the first place, because all volition as such arises + from want; that is, suffering. (Therefore, as will be remembered, + from the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page469">[pg + 469]</span><a name="Pg469" id="Pg469" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + Third Book, the momentary cessation of all volition, which takes + place whenever we give ourselves up to æsthetic contemplation, as + pure will-less subject of knowledge, the correlative of the Idea, + is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful.) + Secondly, because, through the causal connection of things, most of + our desires must remain unfulfilled, and the will is oftener + crossed than satisfied, and therefore much intense volition carries + with it much intense suffering. For all suffering is simply + unfulfilled and crossed volition; and even the pain of the body + when it is injured or destroyed is as such only possible through + the fact that the body is nothing but the will itself become + object. Now on this account, because much intense suffering is + inseparable from much intense volition, very bad men bear the stamp + of inward suffering in the very expression of the countenance; even + when they have attained every external happiness, they always look + unhappy so long as they are not transported by some momentary + ecstasy and are not dissembling. From this inward torment, which is + absolutely and directly essential to them, there finally proceeds + that delight in the suffering of others which does not spring from + mere egoism, but is disinterested, and which constitutes <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wickedness</span></em> proper, rising to the + pitch of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cruelty</span></em>. For this the suffering of + others is not a means for the attainment of the ends of its own + will, but an end in itself. The more definite explanation of this + phenomenon is as follows:—Since man is a manifestation of will + illuminated by the clearest knowledge, he is always contrasting the + actual and felt satisfaction of his will with the merely possible + satisfaction of it which knowledge presents to him. Hence arises + envy: every privation is infinitely increased by the enjoyment of + others, and relieved by the knowledge that others also suffer the + same privation. Those ills which are common to all and inseparable + from human life trouble us little, just as those which belong to + the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page470">[pg 470]</span><a name= + "Pg470" id="Pg470" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> climate, to the + whole country. The recollection of greater sufferings than our own + stills our pain; the sight of the sufferings of others soothes our + own. If, now, a man is filled with an exceptionally intense + pressure of will,—if with burning eagerness he seeks to accumulate + everything to slake the thirst of his egoism, and thus experiences, + as he inevitably must, that all satisfaction is merely apparent, + that the attained end never fulfils the promise of the desired + object, the final appeasing of the fierce pressure of will, but + that when fulfilled the wish only changes its form, and now + torments him in a new one; and indeed that if at last all wishes + are exhausted, the pressure of will itself remains without any + conscious motive, and makes itself known to him with fearful pain + as a feeling of terrible desolation and emptiness; if from all + this, which in the case of the ordinary degrees of volition is only + felt in a small measure, and only produces the ordinary degree of + melancholy, in the case of him who is a manifestation of will + reaching the point of extraordinary wickedness, there necessarily + springs an excessive inward misery, an eternal unrest, an incurable + pain; he seeks indirectly the alleviation which directly is denied + him,—seeks to mitigate his own suffering by the sight of the + suffering of others, which at the same time he recognises as an + expression of his power. The suffering of others now becomes for + him an end in itself, and is a spectacle in which he delights; and + thus arises the phenomenon of pure cruelty, blood-thirstiness, + which history exhibits so often in the Neros and Domitians, in the + African Deis, in Robespierre, and the like.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The desire of + revenge is closely related to wickedness. It recompenses evil with + evil, not with reference to the future, which is the character of + punishment, but merely on account of what has happened, what is + past, as such, thus disinterestedly, not as a means, but as an end, + in order to revel in the torment which the avenger himself has + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page471">[pg 471]</span><a name= + "Pg471" id="Pg471" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> inflicted on the + offender. What distinguishes revenge from pure wickedness, and to + some extent excuses it, is an appearance of justice. For if the + same act, which is now revenge, were to be done legally, that is, + according to a previously determined and known rule, and in a + society which had sanctioned this rule, it would be punishment, and + thus justice.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Besides the + suffering which has been described, and which is inseparable from + wickedness, because it springs from the same root, excessive + vehemence of will, another specific pain quite different from this + is connected with wickedness, which is felt in the case of every + bad action, whether it be merely injustice proceeding from egoism + or pure wickedness, and according to the length of its duration is + called <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the sting of conscience</span></em> or + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">remorse</span></em>. Now, whoever remembers + and has present in his mind the content of the preceding portion of + this Fourth Book, and especially the truth explained at the + beginning of it, that life itself is always assured to the will to + live, as its mere copy or mirror, and also the exposition of + eternal justice, will find that the sting of conscience can have no + other meaning than the following, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + its content, abstractly expressed, is what follows, in which two + parts are distinguished, which again, however, entirely coincide, + and must be thought as completely united.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">However closely + the veil of Mâyâ may envelop the mind of the bad man, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + however firmly he may be involved in the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, + according to which he regards his person as absolutely different + and separated by a wide gulf from all others, a knowledge to which + he clings with all his might, as it alone suits and supports his + egoism, so that knowledge is almost always corrupted by will, yet + there arises in the inmost depths of his consciousness the secret + presentiment that such an order of things is only phenomenal, and + that their real constitution is quite different. He has a dim + foreboding that, however much time and space may separate + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page472">[pg 472]</span><a name= + "Pg472" id="Pg472" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> him from other + individuals and the innumerable miseries which they suffer, and + even suffer through him, and may represent them as quite foreign to + him, yet in themselves, and apart from the idea and its forms, it + is the one will to live appearing in them all, which here failing + to recognise itself, turns its weapons against itself, and, by + seeking increased happiness in one of its phenomena, imposes the + greatest suffering upon another. He dimly sees that he, the bad + man, is himself this whole will; that consequently he is not only + the inflicter of pain but also the endurer of it, from whose + suffering he is only separated and exempted by an illusive dream, + the form of which is space and time, which, however, vanishes away; + that he must in reality pay for the pleasure with the pain, and + that all suffering which he only knows as possible really concerns + him as the will to live, inasmuch as the possible and actual, the + near and the distant in time and space, are only different for the + knowledge of the individual, only by means of the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, not + in themselves. This is the truth which mythically, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + adapted to the principle of sufficient reason, and so translated + into the form of the phenomenal, is expressed in the transmigration + of souls. Yet it has its purest expression, free from all foreign + admixture, in that obscurely felt yet inconsolable misery called + remorse. But this springs also from a second immediate knowledge, + which is closely bound to the first—the knowledge of the strength + with which the will to live asserts itself in the wicked + individual, which extends far beyond his own individual phenomenon, + to the absolute denial of the same will appearing in other + individuals. Consequently the inward horror of the wicked man at + his own deed, which he himself tries to conceal, contains, besides + that presentment of the nothingness, the mere illusiveness of the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, and + of the distinction established by it between him and others; also + the knowledge of the <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page473">[pg + 473]</span><a name="Pg473" id="Pg473" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + vehemence of his own will, the intensity with which he has seized + upon life and attached himself closely to it, even that life whose + terrible side he sees before him in the misery of those who are + oppressed by him, and with which he is yet so firmly united, that + just on this account the greatest atrocity proceeds from him + himself, as a means for the fuller assertion of his own will. He + recognises himself as the concentrated manifestation of the will to + live, feels to what degree he is given up to life, and with it also + to innumerable sufferings which are essential to it, for it has + infinite time and infinite space to abolish the distinction between + the possible and the actual, and to change all the sufferings which + as yet are merely <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">known</span></em> to him into sufferings he + has <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">experienced</span></em>. The millions of years + of constant rebirth certainly exist, like the whole past and + future, only in conception; occupied time, the form of the + phenomenon of the will, is only the present, and for the individual + time is ever new: it seems to him always as if he had newly come + into being. For life is inseparable from the will to live, and the + only form of life is the present. Death (the repetition of the + comparison must be excused) is like the setting of the sun, which + is only apparently swallowed up by the night, but in reality, + itself the source of all light, burns without intermission, brings + new days to new worlds, is always rising and always setting. + Beginning and end only concern the individual through time, the + form of the phenomenon for the idea. Outside time lies only the + will, Kant's thing-in-itself, and its adequate objectification, the + Idea of Plato. Therefore suicide affords no escape; what every one + in his inmost consciousness <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">wills</span></em>, that must he <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">be</span></em>; and + what every one <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">is</span></em>, that he <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">wills</span></em>. + Thus, besides the merely felt knowledge of the illusiveness and + nothingness of the forms of the idea which separate individuals, it + is the self-knowledge of one's own will and its degree that gives + the sting to conscience. The course of life draws <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page474">[pg 474]</span><a name="Pg474" id="Pg474" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the image of the empirical character, + whose original is the intelligible character, and horrifies the + wicked man by this image. He is horrified all the same whether the + image is depicted in large characters, so that the world shares his + horror, or in such small ones that he alone sees it, for it only + concerns him directly. The past would be a matter of indifference, + and could not pain the conscience if the character did not feel + itself free from all time and unalterable by it, so long as it does + not deny itself. Therefore things which are long past still weigh + on the conscience. The prayer, <span class="tei tei-q">“Lead me not + into temptation,”</span> means, <span class="tei tei-q">“Let me not + see what manner of person I am.”</span> In the might with which the + bad man asserts life, and which exhibits itself to him in the + sufferings which he inflicts on others, he measures how far he is + from the surrender and denial of that will, the only possible + deliverance from the world and its miseries. He sees how far he + belongs to it, and how firmly he is bound to it; the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">known</span></em> + suffering of others has no power to move him; he is given up to + life and <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">felt</span></em> suffering. It remains hidden + whether this will ever break and overcome the vehemence of his + will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This exposition + of the significance and inner nature of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">bad</span></em>, + which as mere feeling, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, not as distinct, abstract + knowledge, is the content of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">remorse</span></em>, will gain distinctness + and completeness by the similar consideration of the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">good</span></em> as + a quality of human will, and finally of absolute resignation and + holiness, which proceeds from it when it has attained its highest + grade. For opposites always throw light upon each other, and the + day at once reveals both itself and the night, as Spinoza admirably + remarks.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 66. A theory + of morals without proof, that is, mere moralising, can effect + nothing, because it does not act as a motive. A theory of morals + which does act as a motive can do so only by working on self-love. + But what springs from this source has no moral worth. It follows + from this that no genuine virtue can be produced <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page475">[pg 475]</span><a name="Pg475" id="Pg475" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> through moral theory or abstract + knowledge in general, but that such virtue must spring from that + intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others + the same nature as in our own.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">For virtue + certainly proceeds from knowledge, but not from the abstract + knowledge that can be communicated through words. If it were so, + virtue could be taught, and by here expressing in abstract language + its nature and the knowledge which lies at its foundation, we + should make every one who comprehends this even ethically better. + But this is by no means the case. On the contrary, ethical + discourses and preaching will just as little produce a virtuous man + as all the systems of æsthetics from Aristotle downwards have + succeeded in producing a poet. For the real inner nature of virtue + the concept is unfruitful, just as it is in art, and it is only in + a completely subordinate position that it can be of use as a tool + in the elaboration and preserving of what has been ascertained and + inferred by other means. <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Velle non + discitur.</span></span> Abstract dogmas are, in fact, without + influence upon virtue, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, upon the goodness of the + disposition. False dogmas do not disturb it; true ones will + scarcely assist it. It would, in fact, be a bad look-out if the + cardinal fact in the life of man, his ethical worth, that worth + which counts for eternity, were dependent upon anything the + attainment of which is so much a matter of chance as is the case + with dogmas, religious doctrines, and philosophical theories. For + morality dogmas have this value only: The man who has become + virtuous from knowledge of another kind, which is presently to be + considered, possesses in them a scheme or formula according to + which he accounts to his own reason, for the most part + fictitiously, for his non-egoistical action, the nature of which + it, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, he himself, does not + comprehend, and with which account he has accustomed it to be + content.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Upon conduct, + outward action, dogmas may certainly exercise a powerful influence, + as also custom and example <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page476">[pg 476]</span><a name="Pg476" id="Pg476" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> (the last because the ordinary man does not + trust his judgment, of the weakness of which he is conscious, but + only follows his own or some one else's experience), but the + disposition is not altered in this way.<a id="noteref_80" name= + "noteref_80" href="#note_80"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">80</span></span></a> All + abstract knowledge gives only motives; but, as was shown above, + motives can only alter the direction of the will, not the will + itself. All communicable knowledge, however, can only affect the + will as a motive. Thus when dogmas lead it, what the man really and + in general wills remains still the same. He has only received + different thoughts as to the ways in which it is to be attained, + and imaginary motives guide him just like real ones. Therefore, for + example, it is all one, as regards his ethical worth, whether he + gives large gifts to the poor, firmly persuaded that he will + receive everything tenfold in a future life, or expends the same + sum on the improvement of an estate which will yield interest, + certainly late, but all the more surely and largely. And he who for + the sake of orthodoxy commits the heretic to the flames is as much + a murderer as the bandit who does it for gain; and indeed, as + regards inward circumstances, so also was he who slaughtered the + Turks in the Holy Land, if, like the burner of heretics, he really + did so because he thought that he would thereby gain a place in + heaven. For these are careful only for themselves, for their own + egoism, just like the bandit, from whom they are only distinguished + by the absurdity of their means. From without, as has been said, + the will can only be reached through motives, and these only alter + the way in which it expresses itself, never the will itself. + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Velle non discitur.</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In the case of + good deeds, however, the doer of which appeals to dogmas, we must + always distinguish whether these dogmas really are the motives + which lead to the good deeds, or whether, as was said above, they + are <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page477">[pg 477]</span><a name= + "Pg477" id="Pg477" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> merely the illusive + account of them with which he seeks to satisfy his own reason with + regard to a good deed which really flows from quite a different + source, a deed which he does because he is good, though he does not + understand how to explain it rightly, and yet wishes to think + something with regard to it. But this distinction is very hard to + make, because it lies in the heart of a man. Therefore we can + scarcely ever pass a correct moral judgment on the action of + others, and very seldom on our own. The deeds and conduct of an + individual and of a nation may be very much modified through + dogmas, example, and custom. But in themselves all deeds + (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">opera operata</span></span>) are merely empty + forms, and only the disposition which leads to them gives them + moral significance. This disposition, however, may be quite the + same when its outward manifestation is very different. With an + equal degree of wickedness, one man may die on the wheel, and + another in the bosom of his family. It may be the same grade of + wickedness which expresses itself in one nation in the coarse + characteristics of murder and cannibalism, and in another finely + and softly in miniature, in court intrigues, oppressions, and + delicate plots of every kind; the inner nature remains the same. It + is conceivable that a perfect state, or perhaps indeed a complete + and firmly believed doctrine of rewards and punishments after + death, might prevent every crime; politically much would be gained + thereby; morally, nothing; only the expression of the will in life + would be restricted.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus genuine + goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue, and pure nobility do + not proceed from abstract knowledge. Yet they do proceed from + knowledge; but it is a direct intuitive knowledge, which can + neither be reasoned away, nor arrived at by reasoning, a knowledge + which, just because it is not abstract, cannot be communicated, but + must arise in each for himself, which therefore finds its real and + adequate expression not in <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page478">[pg 478]</span><a name="Pg478" id="Pg478" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> words, but only in deeds, in conduct, in the + course of the life of man. We who here seek the theory of virtue, + and have therefore also to express abstractly the nature of the + knowledge which lies at its foundation, will yet be unable to + convey that knowledge itself in this expression. We can only give + the concept of this knowledge, and thus always start from action in + which alone it becomes visible, and refer to action as its only + adequate expression. We can only explain and interpret action, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, express abstractly what + really takes place in it.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Before we speak + of the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">good</span></em> proper, in opposition to the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">bad</span></em>, which has been explained, we + must touch on an intermediate grade, the mere negation of the bad: + this is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">justice</span></em>. The nature of right and + wrong has been fully explained above; therefore we may briefly say + here, that he who voluntarily recognises and observes those merely + moral limits between wrong and right, even where this is not + secured by the state or any other external power, thus he who, + according to our explanation, never carries the assertion of his + own will so far as to deny the will appearing in another + individual, is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">just</span></em>. Thus, in order to increase + his own well-being, he will not inflict suffering upon others, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, he will commit no crime, + he will respect the rights and the property of others. We see that + for such a just man the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span> is no longer, as in the case of the + bad man, an absolute wall of partition. We see that he does not, + like the bad man, merely assert his own manifestation of will and + deny all others; that other persons are not for him mere masks, + whose nature is quite different from his own; but he shows in his + conduct that he also recognises his own nature—the will to live as + a thing-in-itself, in the foreign manifestation which is only given + to him as idea. Thus he finds himself again in that other + manifestation, up to a certain point, that of doing no wrong, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, abstaining from injury. To + this extent, therefore, he sees through the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, the + veil of Mâyâ; so far he <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page479">[pg + 479]</span><a name="Pg479" id="Pg479" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + sets the being external to him on a level with his own—he does it + no injury.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If we examine + the inmost nature of this justice, there already lies in it the + resolution not to go so far in the assertion of one's own will as + to deny the manifestations of will of others, by compelling them to + serve one's own. One will therefore wish to render to others as + much as one receives from them. The highest degree of this justice + of disposition, which is, however, always united with goodness + proper, whose character is no longer merely negative, extends so + far that a man doubts his right to inherited property, wishes to + support his body only by his own powers, mental and physical, feels + every service of others and every luxury a reproach, and finally + embraces voluntary poverty. Thus we see how Pascal, when he became + an ascetic, would no longer permit any services to be rendered him, + although he had servants enough; in spite of his constant bad + health he made his bed himself, brought his own food from the + kitchen, &c. (<span class="tei tei-q">“Vie de Pascal, par sa + Sœur,”</span> p. 19). Quite in keeping with this, it is reported + that many Hindus, even Rajas with great wealth, expend it merely on + the maintenance of their position, their court and attendants, and + themselves observe with the greatest scrupulousness the maxim that + a man should eat nothing that he has not himself both sowed and + reaped. Yet a certain misunderstanding lies at the bottom of this; + for one man, just because he is rich and powerful, can render such + signal services to the whole of human society that they + counterbalance the wealth he has inherited, for the secure + possession of which he is indebted to society. In reality that + excessive justice of such Hindus is already more than justice; it + is actual renunciation, denial of the will to live,—asceticism, of + which we shall speak last. On the other hand, pure idleness and + living through the exertions of others, in the case of inherited + wealth, without accomplishing anything, may be regarded as morally + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page480">[pg 480]</span><a name= + "Pg480" id="Pg480" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> wrong, even if it + must remain right according to positive laws.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We have found + that voluntary justice has its inmost source in a certain degree of + penetration of the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, while the unjust remain entirely + involved in this principle. This penetration may exist not only in + the degree which is required for justice, but also in the higher + degree which leads to benevolence and well-doing, to love of + mankind. And this may take place however strong and energetic in + itself the will which appears in such an individual may be. + Knowledge can always counterbalance it in him, teach him to resist + the tendency to wrong, and even produce in him every degree of + goodness, and indeed of resignation. Thus the good man is by no + means to be regarded as originally a weaker manifestation of will + than the bad man, but it is knowledge which in him masters the + blind striving of will. There are certainly individuals who merely + seem to have a good disposition on account of the weakness of the + will appearing in them, but what they are soon appears from the + fact that they are not capable of any remarkable self-conquest in + order to perform a just or good deed.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If, however, as + a rare exception, we meet a man who possesses a considerable + income, but uses very little of it for himself and gives all the + rest to the poor, while he denies himself many pleasures and + comforts, and we seek to explain the action of this man, we shall + find, apart altogether from the dogmas through which he tries to + make his action intelligible to his reason, that the simplest + general expression and the essential character of his conduct is + that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">he + makes less distinction than is usually made between himself and + others</span></em>. This distinction is so great in the eyes of + many that the suffering of others is a direct pleasure to the + wicked and a welcome means of happiness to the unjust. The merely + just man is content not to cause it; and, in general, most men + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page481">[pg 481]</span><a name= + "Pg481" id="Pg481" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> know and are + acquainted with innumerable sufferings of others in their vicinity, + but do not determine to mitigate them, because to do so would + involve some self-denial on their part. Thus, in each of all these + a strong distinction seems to prevail between his own ego and that + of others; on the other hand, to the noble man we have imagined, + this distinction is not so significant. The <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, the + form of the phenomenon, no longer holds him so tightly in its + grasp, but the suffering which he sees in others touches him almost + as closely as his own. He therefore tries to strike a balance + between them, denies himself pleasures, practises renunciation, in + order to mitigate the sufferings of others. He sees that the + distinction between himself and others, which to the bad man is so + great a gulf, only belongs to a fleeting and illusive phenomenon. + He recognises directly and without reasoning that the in-itself of + his own manifestation is also that of others, the will to live, + which constitutes the inner nature of everything and lives in all; + indeed, that this applies also to the brutes and the whole of + nature, and therefore he will not cause suffering even to a + brute.<a id="noteref_81" name="noteref_81" href= + "#note_81"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">81</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">He is now just + as little likely to allow others to starve, while he himself has + enough and to spare, as any one would be to suffer hunger one day + in order to have more the next day than he could enjoy. For to him + who does works of love the veil of Mâyâ has become transparent, + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page482">[pg 482]</span><a name= + "Pg482" id="Pg482" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the illusion of the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span> has + left him. He recognises himself, his will, in every being, and + consequently also in the sufferer. He is now free from the + perversity with which the will to live, not recognising itself, + here in one individual enjoys a fleeting and precarious pleasure, + and there in another pays for it with suffering and starvation, and + thus both inflicts and endures misery, not knowing that, like + Thyestes, it eagerly devours its own flesh; and then, on the one + hand, laments its undeserved suffering, and on the other hand + transgresses without fear of Nemesis, always merely because, + involved in the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, thus generally in the kind of + knowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient reason, + it does not recognise itself in the foreign phenomenon, and + therefore does not perceive eternal justice. To be cured of this + illusion and deception of Mâyâ, and to do works of love, are one + and the same. But the latter is the necessary and inevitable + symptom of that knowledge.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The opposite of + the sting of conscience, the origin and significance of which is + explained above, is the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">good conscience</span></em>, the satisfaction + which we experience after every disinterested deed. It arises from + the fact that such a deed, as it proceeds from the direct + recognition of our own inner being in the phenomenon of another, + affords us also the verification of this knowledge, the knowledge + that our true self exists not only in our own person, this + particular manifestation, but in everything that lives. By this the + heart feels itself enlarged, as by egoism it is contracted. For as + the latter concentrates our interest upon the particular + manifestation of our own individuality, upon which knowledge always + presents to us the innumerable dangers which constantly threaten + this manifestation, and anxiety and care becomes the key-note of + our disposition; the knowledge that everything living is just as + much our own inner nature, as is our own person, extends our + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page483">[pg 483]</span><a name= + "Pg483" id="Pg483" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> interest to + everything living; and in this way the heart is enlarged. Thus + through the diminished interest in our own self, the anxious care + for the self is attacked at its very root and limited; hence the + peace, the unbroken serenity, which a virtuous disposition and a + good conscience affords, and the more distinct appearance of this + with every good deed, for it proves to ourselves the depth of that + disposition. The egoist feels himself surrounded by strange and + hostile individuals, and all his hope is centred in his own good. + The good man lives in a world of friendly individuals, the + well-being of any of whom he regards as his own. Therefore, + although the knowledge of the lot of mankind generally does not + make his disposition a joyful one, yet the permanent knowledge of + his own nature in all living beings, gives him a certain evenness, + and even serenity of disposition. For the interest which is + extended to innumerable manifestations cannot cause such anxiety as + that which is concentrated upon one. The accidents which concern + individuals collectively, equalise themselves, while those which + happen to the particular individual constitute good or bad + fortune.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus, though + others have set up moral principles which they give out as + prescriptions for virtue, and laws which it was necessary to + follow, I, as has already been said, cannot do this because I have + no <span class="tei tei-q">“ought”</span> or law to prescribe to + the eternally free-will. Yet on the other hand, in the connection + of my system, what to a certain extent corresponds and is analogous + to that undertaking is the purely theoretical truth, of which my + whole exposition may be regarded as merely an elaboration, that the + will is the in-itself of every phenomenon but itself, as such, is + free from the forms of the phenomenal, and consequently from + multiplicity; a truth, which, with reference to action, I do not + know how to express better than by the formula of the Vedas already + quoted: <span class="tei tei-q">“Tat twam asi!”</span> (This thou + art!) Whoever is able to say this to himself, with regard to every + being with whom <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page484">[pg + 484]</span><a name="Pg484" id="Pg484" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + he comes in contact, with clear knowledge and firm inward + conviction, is certain of all virtue and blessedness, and is on the + direct road to salvation.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But before I go + further, and, as the conclusion of my exposition, show how love, + the origin and nature of which we recognised as the penetration of + the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, leads to salvation, to the entire + surrender of the will to live, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + of all volition, and also how another path, less soft but more + frequented, leads men to the same goal, a paradoxical proposition + must first be stated and explained; not because it is paradoxical, + but because it is true, and is necessary to the completeness of the + thought I have present. It is this: <span class="tei tei-q">“All + love (αγαπη, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">caritas</span></span>) is + sympathy.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 67. We have + seen how justice proceeds from the penetration of the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span> in a + less degree, and how from its penetration in a higher degree there + arises goodness of disposition proper, which shows itself as pure, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, disinterested love towards + others. When now the latter becomes perfect, it places other + individuals and their fate completely on a level with itself and + its own fate. Further than this it cannot go, for there exists no + reason for preferring the individuality of another to its own. Yet + the number of other individuals whose whole happiness or life is in + danger may outweigh the regard for one's own particular well-being. + In such a case, the character that has attained to the highest + goodness and perfect nobility will entirely sacrifice its own + well-being, and even its life, for the well-being of many others. + So died Codrus, and Leonidas, and Regulus, and Decius Mus, and + Arnold von Winkelried; so dies every one who voluntarily and + consciously faces certain death for his friends or his country. And + they also stand on the same level who voluntarily submit to + suffering and death for maintaining what conduces and rightly + belongs to the welfare of all mankind; that is, for maintaining + universal and important truths and <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page485">[pg 485]</span><a name="Pg485" id="Pg485" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> destroying great errors. So died Socrates and + Giordano Bruno, and so many a hero of the truth suffered death at + the stake at the hands of the priests.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now, however, I + must remind the reader, with reference to the paradox stated above, + that we found before that suffering is essential to life as a + whole, and inseparable from it. And that we saw that every wish + proceeds from a need, from a want, from suffering, and that + therefore every satisfaction is only the removal of a pain, and + brings no positive happiness; that the joys certainly lie to the + wish, presenting themselves as a positive good, but in truth they + have only a negative nature, and are only the end of an evil. + Therefore what goodness, love, and nobleness do for others, is + always merely an alleviation of their suffering, and consequently + all that can influence them to good deeds and works of love, is + simply the <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">knowledge of the suffering of + others</span></em>, which is directly understood from their own + suffering and placed on a level with it. But it follows from this + that pure love (αγαπη, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">caritas</span></span>) is in its nature + sympathy; whether the suffering it mitigates, to which every + unsatisfied wish belongs, be great or small. Therefore we shall + have no hesitation, in direct contradiction to Kant, who will only + recognise all true goodness and all virtue to be such, if it has + proceeded from abstract reflection, and indeed from the conception + of duty and of the categorical imperative, and explains felt + sympathy as weakness, and by no means virtue, we shall have no + hesitation, I say, in direct contradiction to Kant, in saying: the + mere concept is for genuine virtue just as unfruitful as it is for + genuine art: all true and pure love is sympathy, and all love which + is not sympathy is selfishness. Ερος is selfishness, αγαπη is + sympathy. Combinations of the two frequently occur. Indeed genuine + friendship is always a mixture of selfishness and sympathy; the + former lies in the pleasure experienced in the presence of the + friend, whose individuality corresponds to our <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page486">[pg 486]</span><a name="Pg486" id="Pg486" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> own, and this almost always constitutes + the greatest part; sympathy shows itself in the sincere + participation in his joy and grief, and the disinterested + sacrifices made in respect of the latter. Thus Spinoza says: + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Benevolentia nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas + ex commiseratione orta</span></span> (Eth. iii. pr. 27, cor. 3, + schol.) As a confirmation of our paradoxical proposition it may be + observed that the tone and words of the language and caresses of + pure love, entirely coincide with the tones of sympathy; and we may + also remark in passing that in Italian sympathy and true love are + denoted by the same word <span lang="it" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="it"><span style= + "font-style: italic">pietà</span></span>.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">This is also the + place to explain one of the most striking peculiarities of human + nature, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">weeping</span></em>, which, like laughter, + belongs to those qualities which distinguish man from the brutes. + Weeping is by no means a direct expression of pain, for it occurs + where there is very little pain. In my opinion, indeed, we never + weep directly on account of the pain we experience, but always + merely on account of its repetition in reflection. We pass from the + felt pain, even when it is physical, to a mere idea of it, and then + find our own state so deserving of sympathy that we are firmly and + sincerely convinced that if another were the sufferer, we would be + full of sympathy, and love to relieve him. But now we ourselves are + the object of our own sympathy; with the most benevolent + disposition we are ourselves most in need of help; we feel that we + suffer more than we could see another suffer; and in this very + complex frame of mind, in which the directly felt suffering only + comes to perception by a doubly circuitous route, imagined as the + suffering of another, sympathised with as such, and then suddenly + perceived again as directly our own,—in this complex frame of mind, + I say, Nature relieves itself through that remarkable physical + conflict. <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Weeping</span></em> is accordingly <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">sympathy with our + own selves</span></em>, or sympathy directed back on its source. It + is therefore conditional upon the capacity for love and sympathy, + and also upon imagination. Therefore <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page487">[pg 487]</span><a name="Pg487" id="Pg487" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> men who are either hard-hearted or + unimaginative do not weep easily, and weeping is even always + regarded as a sign of a certain degree of goodness of character, + and disarms anger, because it is felt that whoever can still weep, + must necessarily always be capable of love, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + sympathy towards others, for this enters in the manner described + into the disposition that leads to weeping. The description which + Petrarch gives of the rising of his own tears, naïvely and truly + expressing his feeling, entirely agrees with the explanation we + have given—</p> + + <div class="block tei tei-quote" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em"> + <div class="tei tei-lg" style= + "margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em"> + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">“</span><span style="font-size: 90%">I vo + pensando: e nel pensar m' assale</span></span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <em class="tei tei-emph" style= + "text-align: left"><span style="font-size: 90%; font-style: italic"> + Una pietà si forte di me stesso</span></em><span style= + "font-size: 90%">,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span style="font-size: 90%">Che mi conduce spesso,</span> + </div> + + <div class="tei tei-l" style="text-align: left"> + <span class="tei tei-q" style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 90%">Ad alto lagrimar, ch'i non + soleva.</span><span style= + "font-size: 90%">”</span></span><a id="noteref_82" name= + "noteref_82" href="#note_82"><span class="tei tei-noteref" + style="text-align: left"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">82</span></span></a> + </div> + </div> + </div> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">What has been + said is also confirmed by the fact that children who have been hurt + generally do not cry till some one commiserates them; thus not on + account of the pain, but on account of the idea of it. When we are + moved to tears, not through our own suffering but through that of + another, this happens as follows. Either we vividly put ourselves + in the place of the sufferer by imagination, or see in his fate the + lot of humanity as a whole, and consequently, first of all, our own + lot; and thus, in a very roundabout way, it is yet always about + ourselves that we weep, sympathy with ourselves which we feel. This + seems to be the principal reason of the universal, and thus + natural, weeping in the case of death. The mourner does not weep + for his loss; he would be ashamed of such egotistical tears, + instead of which he is sometimes ashamed of not weeping. First of + all he certainly weeps for the fate of the dead, but he also weeps + when, after long, heavy, and incurable suffering, death was to this + man a wished-for deliverance. Thus, principally, he is seized with + sympathy for the lot of all <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page488">[pg 488]</span><a name="Pg488" id="Pg488" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> mankind, which is necessarily finite, so that + every life, however aspiring, and often rich in deeds, must be + extinguished and become nothing. But in this lot of mankind the + mourner sees first of all his own, and this all the more, the more + closely he is related to him who has died, thus most of all if it + is his father. Although to his father his life was misery through + age and sickness, and though his helplessness was a heavy burden to + his son, yet that son weeps bitterly over the death of his father + for the reason which has been given.<a id="noteref_83" name= + "noteref_83" href="#note_83"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">83</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 68. After this + digression about the identity of pure love and sympathy, the final + return of which upon our own individuality has, as its symptom, the + phenomenon of weeping, I now take up the thread of our discussion + of the ethical significance of action, in order to show how, from + the same source from which all goodness, love, virtue, and nobility + of character spring, there finally arises that which I call the + denial of the will to live.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We saw before + that hatred and wickedness are conditioned by egoism, and egoism + rests on the entanglement of knowledge in the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>. Thus + we found that the penetration of that <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span> is + the source and the nature of justice, and when it is carried + further, even to its fullest extent, it is the source and nature of + love and nobility of character. For this penetration alone, by + abolishing the distinction between our own individuality and that + of others, renders possible and explains perfect goodness of + disposition, extending to disinterested love and the most generous + self-sacrifice for others.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If, however, + this penetration of the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, this direct knowledge of the + identity of will in all its manifestations, is present in a high + degree of distinctness, it will at once show an influence upon the + will <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page489">[pg 489]</span><a name= + "Pg489" id="Pg489" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which extends still + further. If that veil of Mâyâ, the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, is + lifted from the eyes of a man to such an extent that he no longer + makes the egotistical distinction between his person and that of + others, but takes as much interest in the sufferings of other + individuals as in his own, and therefore is not only benevolent in + the highest degree, but even ready to sacrifice his own + individuality whenever such a sacrifice will save a number of other + persons, then it clearly follows that such a man, who recognises in + all beings his own inmost and true self, must also regard the + infinite suffering of all suffering beings as his own, and take on + himself the pain of the whole world. No suffering is any longer + strange to him. All the miseries of others which he sees and is so + seldom able to alleviate, all the miseries he knows directly, and + even those which he only knows as possible, work upon his mind like + his own. It is no longer the changing joy and sorrow of his own + person that he has in view, as is the case with him who is still + involved in egoism; but, since he sees through the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, all + lies equally near him. He knows the whole, comprehends its nature, + and finds that it consists in a constant passing away, vain + striving, inward conflict, and continual suffering. He sees + wherever he looks suffering humanity, the suffering brute creation, + and a world that passes away. But all this now lies as near him as + his own person lies to the egoist. Why should he now, with such + knowledge of the world, assert this very life through constant acts + of will, and thereby bind himself ever more closely to it, press it + ever more firmly to himself? Thus he who is still involved in the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, in + egoism, only knows particular things and their relation to his own + person, and these constantly become new <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motives</span></em> + of his volition. But, on the other hand, that knowledge of the + whole, of the nature of the thing-in-itself which has been + described, becomes a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quieter</span></em> of all and every volition. + The will now turns away <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page490">[pg + 490]</span><a name="Pg490" id="Pg490" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + from life; it now shudders at the pleasures in which it recognises + the assertion of life. Man now attains to the state of voluntary + renunciation, resignation, true indifference, and perfect + will-lessness. If at times, in the hard experience of our own + suffering, or in the vivid recognition of that of others, the + knowledge of the vanity and bitterness of life draws nigh to us + also who are still wrapt in the veil of Mâyâ, and we would like to + destroy the sting of the desires, close the entrance against all + suffering, and purify and sanctify ourselves by complete and final + renunciation; yet the illusion of the phenomenon soon entangles us + again, and its motives influence the will anew; we cannot tear + ourselves free. The allurement of hope, the flattery of the + present, the sweetness of pleasure, the well-being which falls to + our lot, amid the lamentations of a suffering world governed by + chance and error, draws us back to it and rivets our bonds anew. + Therefore Jesus says: <span class="tei tei-q">“It is easier for a + camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to + enter into the kingdom of God.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If we compare + life to a course or path through which we must unceasingly run—a + path of red-hot coals, with a few cool places here and there; then + he who is entangled in delusion is consoled by the cool places, on + which he now stands, or which he sees near him, and sets out to run + through the course. But he who sees through the <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, and + recognises the real nature of the thing-in-itself, and thus the + whole, is no longer susceptible of such consolation; he sees + himself in all places at once, and withdraws. His will turns round, + no longer asserts its own nature, which is reflected in the + phenomenon, but denies it. The phenomenon by which this change is + marked, is the transition from virtue to asceticism. That is to + say, it no longer suffices for such a man to love others as + himself, and to do as much for them as for himself; but there + arises within him a horror of the nature of which his own + phenomenal existence <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page491">[pg + 491]</span><a name="Pg491" id="Pg491" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + is an expression, the will to live, the kernel and inner nature of + that world which is recognised as full of misery. He therefore + disowns this nature which appears in him, and is already expressed + through his body, and his action gives the lie to his phenomenal + existence, and appears in open contradiction to it. Essentially + nothing else but a manifestation of will, he ceases to will + anything, guards against attaching his will to anything, and seeks + to confirm in himself the greatest indifference to everything. His + body, healthy and strong, expresses through the genitals, the + sexual impulse; but he denies the will and gives the lie to the + body; he desires no sensual gratification under any condition. + Voluntary and complete chastity is the first step in asceticism or + the denial of the will to live. It thereby denies the assertion of + the will which extends beyond the individual life, and gives the + assurance that with the life of this body, the will, whose + manifestation it is, ceases. Nature, always true and naïve, + declares that if this maxim became universal, the human race would + die out; and I think I may assume, in accordance with what was said + in the Second Book about the connection of all manifestations of + will, that with its highest manifestation, the weaker reflection of + it would also pass away, as the twilight vanishes along with the + full light. With the entire abolition of knowledge, the rest of the + world would of itself vanish into nothing; for without a subject + there is no object. I should like here to refer to a passage in the + Vedas, where it is said: <span class="tei tei-q">“As in this world + hungry infants press round their mother; so do all beings await the + holy oblation.”</span> (Asiatic Researches, vol. viii.; Colebrooke, + On the Vedas, Abstract of the Sama-Veda; also in Colebrooke's + Miscellaneous Essays, vol. i. p. 79.) Sacrifice means resignation + generally, and the rest of nature must look for its salvation to + man who is at once the priest and the sacrifice. Indeed it deserves + to be noticed as very remarkable, that this thought has also + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page492">[pg 492]</span><a name= + "Pg492" id="Pg492" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> been expressed by + the admirable and unfathomably profound Angelus Silesius, in the + little poem entitled, <span class="tei tei-q">“Man brings all to + God;”</span> it runs, <span class="tei tei-q">“Man! all loves thee; + around thee great is the throng. All things flee to thee that they + may attain to God.”</span> But a yet greater mystic, Meister + Eckhard, whose wonderful writings are at last accessible (1857) + through the edition of Franz Pfeiffer, says the same thing (p. 459) + quite in the sense explained here: <span class="tei tei-q">“I bear + witness to the saying of Christ. I, if I be lifted up from the + earth, will draw all things unto me (John xii. 32). So shall the + good man draw all things up to God, to the source whence they first + came. The Masters certify to us that all creatures are made for the + sake of man. This is proved in all created things, by the fact that + the one makes the use of the other; the ox makes use of the grass, + the fish of the water, the bird of the air, the wild beast of the + forest. Thus, all created things become of use to the good man. A + good man brings to God the one created thing in the other.”</span> + He means to say, that man makes use of the brutes in this life + because, in and with himself, he saves them also. It also seems to + me that that difficult passage in the Bible, Rom. viii. 21-24, must + be interpreted in this sense.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In Buddhism + also, there is no lack of expressions of this truth. For example, + when Buddha, still as Bodisatwa, has his horse saddled for the last + time, for his flight into the wilderness from his father's house, + he says these lines to the horse: <span class="tei tei-q">“Long + hast thou existed in life and in death, but now thou shalt cease + from carrying and drawing. Bear me but this once more, O Kantakana, + away from here, and when I have attained to the Law (have become + Buddha) I will not forget thee”</span> (Foe Koue Ki, trad. p. Abel + Rémusat, p. 233).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Asceticism then + shows itself further in voluntary and intentional poverty, which + not only arises <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">per accidens</span></span>, + because the possessions are given away to mitigate the sufferings + of others, but is here an end in itself, is meant <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page493">[pg 493]</span><a name="Pg493" id="Pg493" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> to serve as a constant mortification of + will, so that the satisfaction of the wishes, the sweet of life, + shall not again arouse the will, against which self-knowledge has + conceived a horror. He who has attained to this point, still always + feels, as a living body, as concrete manifestation of will, the + natural disposition for every kind of volition; but he + intentionally suppresses it, for he compels himself to refrain from + doing all that he would like to do, and to do all that he would + like not to do, even if this has no further end than that of + serving as a mortification of will. Since he himself denies the + will which appears in his own person, he will not resist if another + does the same, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, inflicts wrongs upon him. + Therefore every suffering coming to him from without, through + chance or the wickedness of others, is welcome to him, every + injury, ignominy, and insult; he receives them gladly as the + opportunity of learning with certainty that he no longer asserts + the will, but gladly sides with every enemy of the manifestation of + will which is his own person. Therefore he bears such ignominy and + suffering with inexhaustible patience and meekness, returns good + for evil without ostentation, and allows the fire of anger to rise + within him just as little as that of the desires. And he mortifies + not only the will itself, but also its visible form, its + objectivity, the body. He nourishes it sparingly, lest its + excessive vigour and prosperity should animate and excite more + strongly the will, of which it is merely the expression and the + mirror. So he practises fasting, and even resorts to chastisement + and self-inflicted torture, in order that, by constant privation + and suffering, he may more and more break down and destroy the + will, which he recognises and abhors as the source of his own + suffering existence and that of the world. If at last death comes, + which puts an end to this manifestation of that will, whose + existence here has long since perished through free-denial of + itself, with the exception of the weak residue of it <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page494">[pg 494]</span><a name="Pg494" id="Pg494" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> which appears as the life of this body; + it is most welcome, and is gladly received as a longed-for + deliverance. Here it is not, as in the case of others, merely the + manifestation which ends with death; but the inner nature itself is + abolished, which here existed only in the manifestation, and that + in a very weak degree;<a id="noteref_84" name="noteref_84" href= + "#note_84"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">84</span></span></a> this + last slight bond is now broken. For him who thus ends, the world + has ended also.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">And what I have + here described with feeble tongue and only in general terms, is no + philosophical fable, invented by myself, and only of to-day; no, it + was the enviable life of so many saints and beautiful souls among + Christians, and still more among Hindus and Buddhists, and also + among the believers of other religions. However different were the + dogmas impressed on their reason, the same inward, direct, + intuitive knowledge, from which alone all virtue and holiness + proceed, expressed itself in precisely the same way in the conduct + of life. For here also the great distinction between intuitive and + abstract knowledge shows itself; a distinction which is of such + importance and universal application in our whole investigation, + and which has hitherto been too little attended to. There is a wide + gulf between the two, which can only be crossed by the aid of + philosophy, as regards the knowledge of the nature of the world. + Intuitively or <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">in concreto</span></span>, + every man is really conscious of all philosophical truths, but to + bring them to abstract knowledge, to reflection, is the work of + philosophy, which neither ought nor is able to do more than + this.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Thus it may be + that the inner nature of holiness, self-renunciation, mortification + of our own will, asceticism, is <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page495">[pg 495]</span><a name="Pg495" id="Pg495" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> here for the first time expressed abstractly, + and free from all mythical elements, as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">denial of the will + to live</span></em>, appearing after the complete knowledge of its + own nature has become a quieter of all volition. On the other hand, + it has been known directly and realised in practice by saints and + ascetics, who had all the same inward knowledge, though they used + very different language with regard to it, according to the dogmas + which their reason had accepted, and in consequence of which an + Indian, a Christian, or a Lama saint must each give a very + different account of his conduct, which is, however, of no + importance as regards the fact. A saint may be full of the + absurdest superstition, or, on the contrary, he may be a + philosopher, it is all the same. His conduct alone certifies that + he is a saint, for, in a moral regard, it proceeds from knowledge + of the world and its nature, which is not abstractly but + intuitively and directly apprehended, and is only expressed by him + in any dogma for the satisfaction of his reason. It is therefore + just as little needful that a saint should be a philosopher as that + a philosopher should be a saint; just as it is not necessary that a + perfectly beautiful man should be a great sculptor, or that a great + sculptor should himself be a beautiful man. In general, it is a + strange demand upon a moralist that he should teach no other virtue + than that which he himself possesses. To repeat the whole nature of + the world abstractly, universally, and distinctly in concepts, and + thus to store up, as it were, a reflected image of it in permanent + concepts always at the command of the reason; this and nothing else + is philosophy. I refer the reader to the passage quoted from Bacon + in the First Book.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But the + description I have given above of the denial of the will to live, + of the conduct of a beautiful soul, of a resigned and voluntarily + expiating saint, is merely abstract and general, and therefore + cold. As the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds + is intuitive and not abstract, it finds its most perfect + expression, not in abstract <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page496">[pg 496]</span><a name="Pg496" id="Pg496" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> conceptions, but in deeds and conduct. + Therefore, in order to understand fully what we philosophically + express as denial of the will to live, one must come to know + examples of it in experience and actual life. Certainly they are + not to be met with in daily experience: <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Nam omnia præclara tam difficilia quam rara + sunt</span></span>, Spinoza admirably says. Therefore, unless by a + specially happy fate we are made eye-witnesses, we have to content + ourselves with descriptions of the lives of such men. Indian + literature, as we see from the little that we as yet know through + translations, is very rich in descriptions of the lives of saints, + penitents, Samanas or ascetics, Sannyâsis or mendicants, and + whatever else they may be called. Even the well-known <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Mythologie des Indous, par Mad. de Polier,”</span> + though by no means to be commended in every respect, contains many + excellent examples of this kind (especially in ch. 13, vol. ii.) + Among Christians also there is no lack of examples which afford us + the illustrations we desire. See the biographies, for the most part + badly written, of those persons who are sometimes called saintly + souls, sometimes pietists, quietists, devout enthusiasts, and so + forth. Collections of such biographies have been made at various + times, such as Tersteegen's <span class="tei tei-q">“Leben heiliger + Seelen,”</span> Reiz's <span class="tei tei-q">“Geschichte der + Wiedergeborennen,”</span> in our own day, a collection by Kanne, + which, with much that is bad, yet contains some good, and + especially the <span class="tei tei-q">“Leben der Beata + Sturmin.”</span> To this category very properly belongs the life of + St. Francis of Assisi, that true personification of the ascetic, + and prototype of all mendicant friars. His life, described by his + younger contemporary, St. Bonaventura, also famous as a scholastic, + has recently been republished. <span class="tei tei-q">“Vita S. + Francisci a S. Bonaventura concinnata”</span> (Soest, 1847), though + shortly before a painstaking and detailed biography, making use of + all sources of information, appeared in France, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Histoire de S. François d'Assise, par Chavin de + Mallan”</span> (1845). As an Oriental parallel of these + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page497">[pg 497]</span><a name= + "Pg497" id="Pg497" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> monastic writings we + have the very valuable work of Spence Hardy, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Eastern Monachism; an Account of the Order of + Mendicants founded by Gotama Budha”</span> (1850). It shows us the + same thing in another dress. We also see what a matter of + indifference it is whether it proceeds from a theistical or an + atheistical religion. But as a special and exceedingly full example + and practical illustration of the conceptions I have established, I + can thoroughly recommend the <span class="tei tei-q">“Autobiography + of Madame de Guion.”</span> To become acquainted with this great + and beautiful soul, the very thought of whom always fills me with + reverence, and to do justice to the excellence of her disposition + while making allowance for the superstition of her reason, must be + just as delightful to every man of the better sort as with vulgar + thinkers, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the majority, that book + will always stand in bad repute. For it is the case with regard to + everything, that each man can only prize that which to a certain + extent is analogous to him and for which he has at least a slight + inclination. This holds good of ethical concerns as well as of + intellectual. We might to a certain extent regard the well-known + French biography of Spinoza as a case in point, if we used as a key + to it that noble introduction to his very insufficient essay, + <span class="tei tei-q">“De Emendatione Intellectus,”</span> a + passage which I can also recommend as the most effectual means I + know of stilling the storm of the passions. Finally, even the great + Goethe, Greek as he is, did not think it below his dignity to show + us this most beautiful side of humanity in the magic mirror of + poetic art, for he represented the life of Fräulein Klettenberg in + an idealised form in his <span class="tei tei-q">“Confessions of a + Beautiful Soul,”</span> and later, in his own biography, gave us + also an historical account of it. Besides this, he twice told the + story of the life of St. Philippo Neri. The history of the world, + will, and indeed must, keep silence about the men whose conduct is + the best and only adequate illustration of this important point of + our investigation, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page498">[pg + 498]</span><a name="Pg498" id="Pg498" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + for the material of the history of the world is quite different, + and indeed opposed to this. It is not the denial of the will to + live, but its assertion and its manifestation in innumerable + individuals in which its conflict with itself at the highest grade + of its objectification appears with perfect distinctness, and + brings before our eyes, now the ascendancy of the individual + through prudence, now the might of the many through their mass, now + the might of chance personified as fate, always the vanity and + emptiness of the whole effort. We, however, do not follow here the + course of phenomena in time, but, as philosophers, we seek to + investigate the ethical significance of action, and take this as + the only criterion of what for us is significant and important. + Thus we will not be withheld by any fear of the constant numerical + superiority of vulgarity and dulness from acknowledging that the + greatest, most important, and most significant phenomenon that the + world can show is not the conqueror of the world, but the subduer + of it; is nothing but the quiet, unobserved life of a man who has + attained to the knowledge in consequence of which he surrenders and + denies that will to live which fills everything and strives and + strains in all, and which first gains freedom here in him alone, so + that his conduct becomes the exact opposite of that of other men. + In this respect, therefore, for the philosopher, these accounts of + the lives of holy, self-denying men, badly as they are generally + written, and mixed as they are with superstition and nonsense, are, + because of the significance of the material, immeasurably more + instructive and important than even Plutarch and Livy.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It will further + assist us much in obtaining a more definite and full knowledge of + what we have expressed abstractly and generally, according to our + method of exposition, as the denial of the will to live, if we + consider the moral teaching that has been imparted with this + intention, and by men who were full of this spirit; <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page499">[pg 499]</span><a name="Pg499" id="Pg499" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> and this will also show how old our + view is, though the pure philosophical expression of it may be + quite new. The teaching of this kind which lies nearest to hand is + Christianity, the ethics of which are entirely in the spirit + indicated, and lead not only to the highest degrees of human love, + but also to renunciation. The germ of this last side of it is + certainly distinctly present in the writings of the Apostles, but + it was only fully developed and expressed later. We find the + Apostles enjoining the love of our neighbour as ourselves, + benevolence, the requital of hatred with love and well-doing, + patience, meekness, the endurance of all possible injuries without + resistance, abstemiousness in nourishment to keep down lust, + resistance to sensual desire, if possible, altogether. We already + see here the first degrees of asceticism, or denial of the will + proper. This last expression denotes that which in the Gospels is + called denying ourselves and taking up the cross (Matt. xvi. 24, + 25; Mark viii. 34, 35; Luke ix. 23, 24, xiv. 26, 27, 33). This + tendency soon developed itself more and more, and was the origin of + hermits, anchorites, and monasticism—an origin which in itself was + pure and holy, but for that very reason unsuitable for the great + majority of men; therefore what developed out of it could only be + hypocrisy and wickedness, for <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">abusus optimi pessimus</span></span>. In more + developed Christianity, we see that seed of asceticism unfold into + the full flower in the writings of the Christian saints and + mystics. These preach, besides the purest love, complete + resignation, voluntary and absolute poverty, genuine calmness, + perfect indifference to all worldly things, dying to our own will + and being born again in God, entire forgetting of our own person, + and sinking ourselves in the contemplation of God. A full + exposition of this will be found in Fénélon's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Explication des Maximes des Saints sur la Vie + Interieure.”</span> But the spirit of this development of + Christianity is certainly nowhere so fully and powerfully + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page500">[pg 500]</span><a name= + "Pg500" id="Pg500" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> expressed as in the + writings of the German mystics, in the works of Meister Eckhard, + and in that justly famous book <span class="tei tei-q">“Die + Deutsche Theologie,”</span> of which Luther says in the + introduction to it which he wrote, that with the exception of the + Bible and St. Augustine, he had learnt more from it of what God, + Christ, and man are than from any other book. Yet we only got the + genuine and correct text of it in the year 1851, in the Stuttgart + edition by Pfeiffer. The precepts and doctrines which are laid down + there are the most perfect exposition, sprung from deep inward + conviction of what I have presented as the denial of the will. It + should therefore be studied more closely in that form before it is + dogmatised about with Jewish-Protestant assurance. Tauler's + <span class="tei tei-q">“Nachfolgung des armen Leben + Christi,”</span> and also his <span class="tei tei-q">“Medulla + Animæ,”</span> are written in the same admirable spirit, though not + quite equal in value to that work. In my opinion the teaching of + these genuine Christian mystics, when compared with the teaching of + the New Testament, is as alcohol to wine, or what becomes visible + in the New Testament as through a veil and mist appears to us in + the works of the mystics without cloak or disguise, in full + clearness and distinctness. Finally, the New Testament might be + regarded as the first initiation, the mystics as the second,—σμικρα + και μεγαλα μυστηρια.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We find, + however, that which we have called the denial of the will to live + more fully developed, more variously expressed, and more vividly + represented in the ancient Sanscrit writings than could be the case + in the Christian Church and the Western world. That this important + ethical view of life could here attain to a fuller development and + a more distinct expression is perhaps principally to be ascribed to + the fact that it was not confined by an element quite foreign to + it, as Christianity is by the Jewish theology, to which its sublime + author had necessarily to adopt and accommodate it, partly + consciously, partly, it may be, unconsciously. Thus Christianity + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page501">[pg 501]</span><a name= + "Pg501" id="Pg501" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> is made up of two + very different constituent parts, and I should like to call the + purely ethical part especially and indeed exclusively Christian, + and distinguish it from the Jewish dogmatism with which it is + combined. If, as has often been feared, and especially at the + present time, that excellent and salutary religion should + altogether decline, I should look for the reason of this simply in + the fact that it does not consist of one single element, but of two + originally different elements, which have only been combined + through the accident of history. In such a case dissolution had to + follow through the separation of these elements, arising from their + different relationship to and reaction against the progressive + spirit of the age. But even after this dissolution the purely + ethical part must always remain uninjured, because it is + indestructible. Our knowledge of Hindu literature is still very + imperfect. Yet, as we find their ethical teaching variously and + powerfully expressed in the Vedas, Puranas, poems, myths, legends + of their saints, maxims and precepts,<a id="noteref_85" name= + "noteref_85" href="#note_85"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">85</span></span></a> we see + that it inculcates love of our neighbour with complete renunciation + of self-love; love generally, not confined to mankind, but + including all living creatures; benevolence, even to the giving + away of the hard-won wages of daily toil; unlimited patience + towards all who injure us; the requital of all wickedness, however + base, with goodness and love; voluntary and glad endurance of all + ignominy; abstinence from all animal food; perfect chastity and + renunciation of all sensual pleasure <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page502">[pg 502]</span><a name="Pg502" id="Pg502" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> for him who strives after true holiness; the + surrender of all possessions, the forsaking of every dwelling-place + and of all relatives; deep unbroken solitude, spent in silent + contemplation, with voluntary penance and terrible slow + self-torture for the absolute mortification of the will, torture + which extends to voluntary death by starvation, or by men giving + themselves up to crocodiles, or flinging themselves over the sacred + precipice in the Himalayas, or being buried alive, or, finally, by + flinging themselves under the wheels of the huge car of an idol + drawn along amid the singing, shouting, and dancing of bayaderes. + And even yet these precepts, whose origin reaches back more than + four thousand years, are carried out in practice, in some cases + even to the utmost extreme,<a id="noteref_86" name="noteref_86" + href="#note_86"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">86</span></span></a> and + this notwithstanding the fact that the Hindu nation has been broken + up into so many parts. A religion which demands the greatest + sacrifices, and which has yet remained so long in practice in a + nation that embraces so many millions of persons, cannot be an + arbitrarily invented superstition, but must have its foundation in + the nature of man. But besides this, if we read the life of a + Christian penitent or saint, and also that of a Hindu saint, we + cannot sufficiently wonder at the harmony we find between them. In + the case of such radically different dogmas, customs, and + circumstances, the inward life and effort of both is the same. And + the same harmony prevails in the maxims prescribed for both of + them. For example, Tauler speaks of the absolute poverty which one + ought to seek, and which consists in giving away and divesting + oneself completely of everything from which one might draw comfort + or worldly pleasure, clearly because all this constantly affords + new nourishment to the will, which it is intended to destroy + entirely. <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page503">[pg + 503]</span><a name="Pg503" id="Pg503" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + And as an Indian counterpart of this, we find in the precepts of Fo + that the Saniassi, who ought to be without a dwelling and entirely + without property, is further finally enjoined not to lay himself + down often under the same tree, lest he should acquire a preference + or inclination for it above other trees. The Christian mystic and + the teacher of the Vedanta philosophy agree in this respect also, + they both regard all outward works and religious exercises as + superfluous for him who has attained to perfection. So much + agreement in the case of such different ages and nations is a + practical proof that what is expressed here is not, as optimistic + dulness likes to assert, an eccentricity and perversity of the + mind, but an essential side of human nature, which only appears so + rarely because of its excellence.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have now + indicated the sources from which there may be obtained a direct + knowledge, drawn from life itself, of the phenomena in which the + denial of the will to live exhibits itself. In some respects this + is the most important point of our whole work; yet I have only + explained it quite generally, for it is better to refer to those + who speak from direct experience, than to increase the size of this + book unduly by weak repetitions of what is said by them.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I only wish to + add a little to the general indication of the nature of this state. + We saw above that the wicked man, by the vehemence of his volition, + suffers constant, consuming, inward pain, and finally, if all + objects of volition are exhausted, quenches the fiery thirst of his + self-will by the sight of the suffering of others. He, on the + contrary, who has attained to the denial of the will to live, + however poor, joyless, and full of privation his condition may + appear when looked at externally, is yet filled with inward joy and + the true peace of heaven. It is not the restless strain of life, + the jubilant delight which has keen suffering as its preceding or + succeeding condition, in the experience of the man who loves life; + but it is a <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page504">[pg + 504]</span><a name="Pg504" id="Pg504" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + peace that cannot be shaken, a deep rest and inward serenity, a + state which we cannot behold without the greatest longing when it + is brought before our eyes or our imagination, because we at once + recognise it as that which alone is right, infinitely surpassing + everything else, upon which our better self cries within us the + great <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">sapere aude</span></span>. + Then we feel that every gratification of our wishes won from the + world is merely like the alms which the beggar receives from life + to-day that he may hunger again on the morrow; resignation, on the + contrary, is like an inherited estate, it frees the owner for ever + from all care.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It will be + remembered from the Third Book that the æsthetic pleasure in the + beautiful consists in great measure in the fact that in entering + the state of pure contemplation we are lifted for the moment above + all willing, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, all wishes and cares; we + become, as it were, freed from ourselves. We are no longer the + individual whose knowledge is subordinated to the service of its + constant willing, the correlative of the particular thing to which + objects are motives, but the eternal subject of knowing purified + from will, the correlative of the Platonic Idea. And we know that + these moments in which, delivered from the ardent strain of will, + we seem to rise out of the heavy atmosphere of earth, are the + happiest which we experience. From this we can understand how + blessed the life of a man must be whose will is silenced, not + merely for a moment, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for + ever, indeed altogether extinguished, except as regards the last + glimmering spark that retains the body in life, and will be + extinguished with its death. Such a man, who, after many bitter + struggles with his own nature, has finally conquered entirely, + continues to exist only as a pure, knowing being, the undimmed + mirror of the world. Nothing can trouble him more, nothing can move + him, for he has cut all the thousand cords of will which hold us + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page505">[pg 505]</span><a name= + "Pg505" id="Pg505" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> bound to the world, + and, as desire, fear, envy, anger, drag us hither and thither in + constant pain. He now looks back smiling and at rest on the + delusions of this world, which once were able to move and agonise + his spirit also, but which now stand before him as utterly + indifferent to him, as the chess-men when the game is ended, or as, + in the morning, the cast-off masquerading dress which worried and + disquieted us in a night in Carnival. Life and its forms now pass + before him as a fleeting illusion, as a light morning dream before + half-waking eyes, the real world already shining through it so that + it can no longer deceive; and like this morning dream, they finally + vanish altogether without any violent transition. From this we can + understand the meaning of Madame Guion when towards the end of her + autobiography she often expresses herself thus: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Everything is alike to me; I <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cannot</span></em> + will anything more: often I know not whether I exist or + not.”</span> In order to express how, after the extinction of the + will, the death of the body (which is indeed only the manifestation + of the will, and therefore loses all significance when the will is + abolished) can no longer have any bitterness, but is very welcome, + I may be allowed to quote the words of that holy penitent, although + they are not very elegantly turned: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "fr"><span style="font-style: italic">Midi de la gloire; jour où il + n'y a plus de nuit; vie qui ne craint plus la mort, dans la mort + même: parceque la mort a vaincu la mort, et que celui qui a + souffert la première mort, ne goutera plus la seconde + mort</span></span>”</span> (Vie de Mad. de Guion, vol. ii. p. + 13).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We must not, + however, suppose that when, by means of the knowledge which acts as + a quieter of will, the denial of the will to live has once + appeared, it never wavers or vacillates, and that we can rest upon + it as on an assured possession. Rather, it must ever anew be + attained by a constant battle. For since the body is the will + itself only in the form of objectivity or as manifestation in the + world as idea, so long as the body lives, the whole <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page506">[pg 506]</span><a name="Pg506" id="Pg506" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> will to live exists potentially, and + constantly strives to become actual, and to burn again with all its + ardour. Therefore that peace and blessedness in the life of holy + men which we have described is only found as the flower which + proceeds from the constant victory over the will, and the ground in + which it grows is the constant battle with the will to live, for no + one can have lasting peace upon earth. We therefore see the + histories of the inner life of saints full of spiritual conflicts, + temptations, and absence of grace, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the kind of knowledge which makes all motives ineffectual, and as + an universal quieter silences all volition, gives the deepest peace + and opens the door of freedom. Therefore also we see those who have + once attained to the denial of the will to live strive with all + their might to keep upon this path, by enforced renunciation of + every kind, by penance and severity of life, and by selecting + whatever is disagreeable to them, all in order to suppress the + will, which is constantly springing up anew. Hence, finally, + because they already know the value of salvation, their anxious + carefulness to retain the hard-won blessing, their scruples of + conscience about every innocent pleasure, or about every little + excitement of their vanity, which here also dies last, the most + immovable, the most active, and the most foolish of all the + inclinations of man. By the term <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">asceticism</span></em>, which I have used so + often, I mean in its narrower sense this <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">intentional</span></em> breaking of the will + by the refusal of what is agreeable and the selection of what is + disagreeable, the voluntarily chosen life of penance and + self-chastisement for the continual mortification of the will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We see this + practised by him who has attained to the denial of the will in + order to enable him to persist in it; but suffering in general, as + it is inflicted by fate, is a second way (δευτερος πλους<a id= + "noteref_87" name="noteref_87" href="#note_87"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">87</span></span></a>) of + attaining to that denial. Indeed, we may assume that most men only + attain to it in this way, and that it is the suffering which is + personally <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page507">[pg + 507]</span><a name="Pg507" id="Pg507" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + experienced, not that which is merely known, which most frequently + produces complete resignation, often only at the approach of death. + For only in the case of a few is the mere knowledge which, seeing + through the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, first produces perfect goodness of + disposition and universal love of humanity, and finally enables + them to regard all the suffering of the world as their own; only in + the case of a few, I say, is this knowledge sufficient to bring + about the denial of the will. Even with him who approaches this + point, it is almost invariably the case that the tolerable + condition of his own body, the flattery of the moment, the delusion + of hope, and the satisfaction of the will, which is ever presenting + itself anew, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, lust, is a constant + hindrance to the denial of the will, and a constant temptation to + the renewed assertion of it. Therefore in this respect all these + illusions have been personified as the devil. Thus in most cases + the will must be broken by great personal suffering before its + self-conquest appears. Then we see the man who has passed through + all the increasing degrees of affliction with the most vehement + resistance, and is finally brought to the verge of despair, + suddenly retire into himself, know himself and the world, change + his whole nature, rise above himself and all suffering, as if + purified and sanctified by it, in inviolable peace, blessedness, + and sublimity, willingly renounce everything he previously desired + with all his might, and joyfully embrace death. It is the refined + silver of the denial of the will to live that suddenly comes forth + from the purifying flame of suffering. It is salvation. Sometimes + we see even those who were very wicked purified to this degree by + great grief; they have become new beings and are completely + changed. Therefore their former misdeeds trouble their consciences + no more, yet they willingly atone for them by death, and gladly see + the end of the manifestation of that will which is now foreign to + them and abhorred by them. The great <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page508">[pg 508]</span><a name="Pg508" id="Pg508" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> Goethe has given us a distinct and visible + representation of this denial of the will, brought about by great + misfortunes and despair of all deliverance, in his immortal + masterpiece <span class="tei tei-q">“Faust,”</span> in the story of + the sufferings of Gretchen. I know no parallel to this in poetry. + It is a perfect example of the second path that leads to the denial + of the will, not, as the first, through the mere knowledge of the + sufferings of a whole world which one has voluntarily acquired, but + through excessive suffering experienced in one's own person. Many + tragedies certainly end by conducting their strong-willed heroes to + the point of entire resignation, and then generally the will to + live and its manifestation end together, but no representation that + is known to me brings what is essential to that change so + distinctly before us, free from all that is extraneous, as the part + of <span class="tei tei-q">“Faust”</span> I have referred to.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In actual life + we see that those unfortunate persons who have to drink to the + dregs the greatest cup of suffering, since when all hope is taken + from them they have to face with full consciousness a shameful, + violent, and often painful death on the scaffold, are very + frequently changed in this way. We must not indeed assume that + there is so great a difference between their character and that of + most men as their fate would seem to indicate, but must attribute + the latter for the most part to circumstances; yet they are guilty + and to a considerable degree bad. We see, however, many of them, + when they have entirely lost hope, changed in the way referred to. + They now show actual goodness and purity of disposition, true + abhorrence of doing any act in the least degree bad or unkind. They + forgive their enemies, even if it is through them that they + innocently suffer; and not with words merely and a sort of + hypocritical fear of the judges of the lower world, but in reality + and with inward earnestness and no desire for revenge. Indeed, + their sufferings and death at last becomes dear to them, for the + denial of the will to live has appeared; they often decline the + deliverance <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page509">[pg + 509]</span><a name="Pg509" id="Pg509" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + when it is offered, and die gladly, peacefully, and happily. To + them the last secret of life has revealed itself in their excessive + pain; the secret that misery and wickedness, sorrow and hate, the + sufferer and the inflicter of suffering, however different they may + appear to the knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient + reason, are in themselves one, the manifestation of that one will + to live which objectifies its conflict with itself by means of the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>. They + have learned to know both sides in full measure, the badness and + the misery; and since at last they see the identity of the two, + they reject them both at once; they deny the will to live. In what + myths and dogmas they account to their reason for this intuitive + and direct knowledge and for their own change is, as has been said, + a matter of no importance.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Matthias + Claudius must without doubt have witnessed a change of mind of this + description when he wrote the remarkable essay in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Wandsbecker Boten”</span> (pt. i. p. 115) with the + title <span class="tei tei-q">“Bekehrungsgeschichte des ***”</span> + (<span class="tei tei-q">“History of the Conversion of + ***”</span>), which concludes thus: <span class="tei tei-q">“Man's + way of thinking may pass from one point of the periphery to the + opposite point, and again back to the former point, if + circumstances mark out for him the path. And these changes in a man + are really nothing great or interesting, but that <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">remarkable, + catholic, transcendental change</span></em> in which the whole + circle is irreparably broken up and all the laws of psychology + become vain and empty when the coat is stripped from the shoulders, + or at least turned outside in, and as it were scales fall from a + man's eyes, is such that every one who has breath in his nostrils + forsakes father and mother if he can hear or experience something + certain about it.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The approach of + death and hopelessness are in other respects not absolutely + necessary for such a purification through suffering. Even without + them the knowledge of the contradiction of the will to live with + itself can, through <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page510">[pg + 510]</span><a name="Pg510" id="Pg510" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + great misfortune and pain, force an entrance, and the vanity of all + striving become recognised. Hence it has often happened that men + who have led a very restless life in the full strain of the + passions, kings, heroes, and adventurers, suddenly change, betake + themselves to resignation and penance, become hermits or monks. To + this class belong all true accounts of conversions; for example, + that of Raymond Lully, who had long wooed a fair lady, and was at + last admitted to her chamber, anticipating the fulfilment of all + his wishes, when she, opening her bodice, showed him her bosom + frightfully eaten with cancer. From that moment, as if he had + looked into hell, he was changed; he forsook the court of the king + of Majorca, and went into the desert to do penance.<a id= + "noteref_88" name="noteref_88" href="#note_88"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">88</span></span></a> This + conversion is very like that of the Abbé Rancé, which I have + briefly related in the 48th chapter of the Supplement. If we + consider how in both cases the transition from the pleasure to the + horror of life was the occasion of it, this throws some light upon + the remarkable fact that it is among the French, the most cheerful, + gay, sensuous, and frivolous nation in Europe, that by far the + strictest of all monastic orders, the Trappists, arose, was + re-established by Rancé after its fall, and has maintained itself + to the present day in all its purity and strictness, in spite of + revolutions, Church reformations, and encroachments of + infidelity.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">But a knowledge + such as that referred to above of the nature of this existence may + leave us again along with the occasion of it and the will to live, + and with it the previous character may reappear. Thus we see that + the passionate Benvenuto Cellini was changed in this way, once when + he was in prison, and again when very ill; but when the suffering + passed over, he fell back again into his old state. In general, the + denial of the will to live by no means proceeds from suffering with + the necessity of an effect from its cause, but the will remains + free; <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page511">[pg 511]</span><a name= + "Pg511" id="Pg511" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> for this is indeed + the one point at which its freedom appears directly in the + phenomenon; hence the astonishment which Asmus expresses so + strongly at the <span class="tei tei-q">“transcendental + change.”</span> In the case of every suffering, it is always + possible to conceive a will which exceeds it in intensity and is + therefore unconquered by it. Thus Plato speaks in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Phædon”</span> of men who up to the moment of their + execution feast, drink, and indulge in sensuous pleasure, asserting + life even to the death. Shakespeare shows us in Cardinal Beaufort + the fearful end of a profligate, who dies full of despair, for no + suffering or death can break his will, which is vehement to the + extreme of wickedness.<a id="noteref_89" name="noteref_89" href= + "#note_89"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">89</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">The more intense + the will is, the more glaring is the conflict of its manifestation, + and thus the greater is the suffering. A world which was the + manifestation of a far more intense will to live than this world + manifests would produce so much the greater suffering; would thus + be a hell.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">All suffering, + since it is a mortification and a call to resignation, has + potentially a sanctifying power. This is the explanation of the + fact that every great misfortune or deep pain inspires a certain + awe. But the sufferer only really becomes an object of reverence + when, surveying the course of his life as a chain of sorrows, or + mourning some great and incurable misfortune, he does not really + look at the special combination of circumstances which has plunged + his own life into suffering, nor stops at the single great + misfortune that has befallen him; for in so doing his knowledge + still follows the principle of sufficient reason, and clings to the + particular phenomenon; he still wills life only not under the + conditions which have happened to him; but only then, I say, he is + truly worthy of reverence when he raises his glance from the + particular to the universal, when he regards his suffering as + merely an example of the whole, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page512">[pg 512]</span><a name="Pg512" id="Pg512" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> and for him, since in a moral regard he + partakes of genius, one case stands for a thousand, so that the + whole of life conceived as essentially suffering brings him to + resignation. Therefore it inspires reverence when in Goethe's + <span class="tei tei-q">“Torquato Tasso”</span> the princess speaks + of how her own life and that of her relations has always been sad + and joyless, and yet regards the matter from an entirely universal + point of view.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A very noble + character we always imagine with a certain trace of quiet sadness, + which is anything but a constant fretfulness at daily annoyances + (this would be an ignoble trait, and lead us to fear a bad + disposition), but is a consciousness derived from knowledge of the + vanity of all possessions, of the suffering of all life, not merely + of his own. But such knowledge may primarily be awakened by the + personal experience of suffering, especially some one great sorrow, + as a single unfulfilled wish brought Petrarch to that state of + resigned sadness concerning the whole of life which appeals to us + so pathetically in his works; for the Daphne he pursued had to flee + from his hands in order to leave him, instead of herself, the + immortal laurel. When through some such great and irrevocable + denial of fate the will is to some extent broken, almost nothing + else is desired, and the character shows itself mild, just, noble, + and resigned. When, finally, grief has no definite object, but + extends itself over the whole of life, then it is to a certain + extent a going into itself, a withdrawal, a gradual disappearance + of the will, whose visible manifestation, the body, it + imperceptibly but surely undermines, so that a man feels a certain + loosening of his bonds, a mild foretaste of that death which + promises to be the abolition at once of the body and of the will. + Therefore a secret pleasure accompanies this grief, and it is this, + as I believe, which the most melancholy of all nations has called + <span class="tei tei-q">“the joy of grief.”</span> But here also + lies the danger of <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">sentimentality</span></em>, both in life + itself and in the representation of it in poetry; when a man is + always mourning and <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page513">[pg + 513]</span><a name="Pg513" id="Pg513" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + lamenting without courageously rising to resignation. In this way + we lose both earth and heaven, and retain merely a watery + sentimentality. Only if suffering assumes the form of pure + knowledge, and this, acting as a <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">quieter of the + will</span></em>, brings about resignation, is it worthy of + reverence. In this regard, however, we feel a certain respect at + the sight of every great sufferer which is akin to the feeling + excited by virtue and nobility of character, and also seems like a + reproach of our own happy condition. We cannot help regarding every + sorrow, both our own and those of others, as at least a potential + advance towards virtue and holiness, and, on the contrary, + pleasures and worldly satisfactions as a retrogression from them. + This goes so far, that every man who endures a great bodily or + mental suffering, indeed every one who merely performs some + physical labour which demands the greatest exertion, in the sweat + of his brow and with evident exhaustion, yet with patience and + without murmuring, every such man, I say, if we consider him with + close attention, appears to us like a sick man who tries a painful + cure, and who willingly, and even with satisfaction, endures the + suffering it causes him, because he knows that the more he suffers + the more the cause of his disease is affected, and that therefore + the present suffering is the measure of his cure.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">According to + what has been said, the denial of the will to live, which is just + what is called absolute, entire resignation, or holiness, always + proceeds from that quieter of the will which the knowledge of its + inner conflict and essential vanity, expressing themselves in the + suffering of all living things, becomes. The difference, which we + have represented as two paths, consists in whether that knowledge + is called up by suffering which is merely and purely <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">known</span></em>, + and is freely appropriated by means of the penetration of the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">principium individuationis</span></span>, or + by suffering which is directly <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">felt</span></em> by + a man himself. True salvation, deliverance from life and suffering, + cannot even be imagined without complete denial of the will. Till + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page514">[pg 514]</span><a name= + "Pg514" id="Pg514" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> then, every one is + simply this will itself, whose manifestation is an ephemeral + existence, a constantly vain and empty striving, and the world full + of suffering we have represented, to which all irrevocably and in + like manner belong. For we found above that life is always assured + to the will to live, and its one real form is the present, from + which they can never escape, since birth and death reign in the + phenomenal world. The Indian mythus expresses this by saying + <span class="tei tei-q">“they are born again.”</span> The great + ethical difference of character means this, that the bad man is + infinitely far from the attainment of the knowledge from which the + denial of the will proceeds, and therefore he is in truth + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">actually</span></em> exposed to all the + miseries which appear in life as <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">possible</span></em>; for even the present + fortunate condition of his personality is merely a phenomenon + produced by the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, and a delusion of Mâyâ, the happy + dream of a beggar. The sufferings which in the vehemence and ardour + of his will he inflicts upon others are the measure of the + suffering, the experience of which in his own person cannot break + his will, and plainly lead it to the denial of itself. All true and + pure love, on the other hand, and even all free justice, proceed + from the penetration of the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span>, which, if it appears with its full + power, results in perfect sanctification and salvation, the + phenomenon of which is the state of resignation described above, + the unbroken peace which accompanies it, and the greatest delight + in death.<a id="noteref_90" name="noteref_90" href= + "#note_90"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">90</span></span></a></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 69. Suicide, + the actual doing away with the individual manifestation of will, + differs most widely from the denial of the will to live, which is + the single outstanding act of free-will in the manifestation, and + is therefore, as Asmus calls it, the transcendental change. This + last has been fully considered in the course of our work. Far from + being denial of the will, suicide is a phenomenon of strong + assertion of will; for the essence of negation lies <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page515">[pg 515]</span><a name="Pg515" id="Pg515" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> in this, that the joys of life are + shunned, not its sorrows. The suicide wills life, and is only + dissatisfied with the conditions under which it has presented + itself to him. He therefore by no means surrenders the will to + live, but only life, in that he destroys the individual + manifestation. He wills life—wills the unrestricted existence and + assertion of the body; but the complication of circumstances does + not allow this, and there results for him great suffering. The very + will to live finds itself so much hampered in this particular + manifestation that it cannot put forth its energies. It therefore + comes to such a determination as is in conformity with its own + nature, which lies outside the conditions of the principle of + sufficient reason, and to which, therefore, all particular + manifestations are alike indifferent, inasmuch as it itself remains + unaffected by all appearing and passing away, and is the inner life + of all things; for that firm inward assurance by reason of which we + all live free from the constant dread of death, the assurance that + a phenomenal existence can never be wanting to the will, supports + our action even in the case of suicide. Thus the will to live + appears just as much in suicide (Siva) as in the satisfaction of + self-preservation (Vishnu) and in the sensual pleasure of + procreation (Brahma). This is the inner meaning of the unity of the + Trimurtis, which is embodied in its entirety in every human being, + though in time it raises now one, now another, of its three heads. + Suicide stands in the same relation to the denial of the will as + the individual thing does to the Idea. The suicide denies only the + individual, not the species. We have already seen that as life is + always assured to the will to live, and as sorrow is inseparable + from life, suicide, the wilful destruction of the single phenomenal + existence, is a vain and foolish act; for the thing-in-itself + remains unaffected by it, even as the rainbow endures however fast + the drops which support it for the moment may change. But, more + than this, it is also the masterpiece of Mâyâ, as the most + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page516">[pg 516]</span><a name= + "Pg516" id="Pg516" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> flagrant example of + the contradiction of the will to live with itself. As we found this + contradiction in the case of the lowest manifestations of will, in + the permanent struggle of all the forces of nature, and of all + organic individuals for matter and time and space; and as we saw + this antagonism come ever more to the front with terrible + distinctness in the ascending grades of the objectification of the + will, so at last in the highest grade, the Idea of man, it reaches + the point at which, not only the individuals which express the same + Idea extirpate each other, but even the same individual declares + war against itself. The vehemence with which it wills life, and + revolts against what hinders it, namely, suffering, brings it to + the point of destroying itself; so that the individual will, by its + own act, puts an end to that body which is merely its particular + visible expression, rather than permit suffering to break the will. + Just because the suicide cannot give up willing, he gives up + living. The will asserts itself here even in putting an end to its + own manifestation, because it can no longer assert itself + otherwise. As, however, it was just the suffering which it so shuns + that was able, as mortification of the will, to bring it to the + denial of itself, and hence to freedom, so in this respect the + suicide is like a sick man, who, after a painful operation which + would entirely cure him has been begun, will not allow it to be + completed, but prefers to retain his disease. Suffering approaches + and reveals itself as the possibility of the denial of will; but + the will rejects it, in that it destroys the body, the + manifestation of itself, in order that it may remain unbroken. This + is the reason why almost all ethical teachers, whether + philosophical or religious, condemn suicide, although they + themselves can only give far-fetched sophistical reasons for their + opinion. But if a human being was ever restrained from committing + suicide by purely moral motives, the inmost meaning of this + self-conquest (in whatever ideas his reason may <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page517">[pg 517]</span><a name="Pg517" id="Pg517" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> have clothed it) was this: <span class= + "tei tei-q">“I will not shun suffering, in order that it may help + to put an end to the will to live, whose manifestation is so + wretched, by so strengthening the knowledge of the real nature of + the world which is already beginning to dawn upon me, that it may + become the final quieter of my will, and may free me for + ever.”</span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is well known + that from time to time cases occur in which the act of suicide + extends to the children. The father first kills the children he + loves, and then himself. Now, if we consider that conscience, + religion, and all influencing ideas teach him to look upon murder + as the greatest of crimes, and that, in spite of this, he yet + commits it, in the hour of his own death, and when he is altogether + uninfluenced by any egotistical motive, such a deed can only be + explained in the following manner: in this case, the will of the + individual, the father, recognises itself immediately in the + children, though involved in the delusion of mistaking the + appearance for the true nature; and as he is at the same time + deeply impressed with the knowledge of the misery of all life, he + now thinks to put an end to the inner nature itself, along with the + appearance, and thus seeks to deliver from existence and its misery + both himself and his children, in whom he discerns himself as + living again. It would be an error precisely analogous to this to + suppose that one may reach the same end as is attained through + voluntary chastity by frustrating the aim of nature in fecundation; + or indeed if, in consideration of the unendurable suffering of + life, parents were to use means for the destruction of their + new-born children, instead of doing everything possible to ensure + life to that which is struggling into it. For if the will to live + is there, as it is the only metaphysical reality, or the + thing-in-itself, no physical force can break it, but can only + destroy its manifestation at this place and time. It itself can + never be transcended except through <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page518">[pg 518]</span><a name="Pg518" id="Pg518" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> knowledge. Thus the only way of salvation is, + that the will shall manifest itself unrestrictedly, in order that + in this individual manifestation it may come to apprehend its own + nature. Only as the result of this knowledge can the will transcend + itself, and thereby end the suffering which is inseparable from its + manifestation. It is quite impossible to accomplish this end by + physical force, as by destroying the germ, or by killing the + new-born child, or by committing suicide. Nature guides the will to + the light, just because it is only in the light that it can work + out its salvation. Therefore the aims of Nature are to be promoted + in every way as soon as the will to live, which is its inner being, + has determined itself.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">There is a + species of suicide which seems to be quite distinct from the common + kind, though its occurrence has perhaps not yet been fully + established. It is starvation, voluntarily chosen on the ground of + extreme asceticism. All instances of it, however, have been + accompanied and obscured by much religious fanaticism, and even + superstition. Yet it seems that the absolute denial of will may + reach the point at which the will shall be wanting to take the + necessary nourishment for the support of the natural life. This + kind of suicide is so far from being the result of the will to + live, that such a completely resigned ascetic only ceases to live + because he has already altogether ceased to will. No other death + than that by starvation is in this case conceivable (unless it were + the result of some special superstition); for the intention to cut + short the torment would itself be a stage in the assertion of will. + The dogmas which satisfy the reason of such a penitent delude him + with the idea that a being of a higher nature has inculcated the + fasting to which his own inner tendency drives him. Old examples of + this may be found in the <span class="tei tei-q">“Breslauer + Sammlung von Natur- und Medicin-Geschichten,”</span> September + 1799, p. 363; in Bayle's <span class="tei tei-q">“Nouvelles de la + République <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page519">[pg + 519]</span><a name="Pg519" id="Pg519" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + des Lettres,”</span> February 1685, p. 189; in Zimmermann, + <span class="tei tei-q">“Ueber die Einsamkeit,”</span> vol. i. p. + 182; in the <span class="tei tei-q">“Histoire de l'Académie des + Sciences”</span> for 1764, an account by Houttuyn, which is quoted + in the <span class="tei tei-q">“Sammlung für praktische + Aerzte,”</span> vol. i. p. 69. More recent accounts may be found in + Hufeland's <span class="tei tei-q">“Journal für praktische + Heilkunde,”</span> vol. x. p. 181, and vol. xlviii. p. 95; also in + Nasse's <span class="tei tei-q">“Zeitschrift für psychische + Aerzte,”</span> 1819, part iii. p. 460; and in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal,”</span> 1809, + vol. v. p. 319. In the year 1833 all the papers announced that the + English historian, Dr. Lingard, had died in January at Dover of + voluntary starvation; according to later accounts, it was not he + himself, but a relation of his who died. Still in these accounts + the persons were generally described as insane, and it is no longer + possible to find out how far this was the case. But I will give + here a more recent case of this kind, if it were only to ensure the + preservation of one of the rare instances of this striking and + extraordinary phenomenon of human nature, which, to all appearance + at any rate, belongs to the category to which I wish to assign it + and could hardly be explained in any other way. This case is + reported in the <span class="tei tei-q">“Nürnberger + Correspondenten”</span> of the 29th July 1813, in these + words:—<span class="tei tei-q">“We hear from Bern that in a thick + wood near Thurnen a hut has been discovered in which was lying the + body of a man who had been dead about a month. His clothes gave + little or no clue to his social position. Two very fine shirts lay + beside him. The most important article, however, was a Bible + interleaved with white paper, part of which had been written upon + by the deceased. In this writing he gives the date of his departure + from home (but does not mention where his home was). He then says + that he was driven by the Spirit of God into the wilderness to pray + and fast. During his journey he had fasted seven days and then he + had again taken food. After this he had begun again to fast, and + continued to do so for <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page520">[pg + 520]</span><a name="Pg520" id="Pg520" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + the same number of days as before. From this point we find each day + marked with a stroke, and of these there are five, at the + expiration of which the pilgrim presumably died. There was further + found a letter to a clergyman about a sermon which the deceased + heard him preach, but the letter was not addressed.”</span> Between + this voluntary death arising from extreme asceticism and the common + suicide resulting from despair there may be various intermediate + species and combinations, though this is hard to find out. But + human nature has depths, obscurities, and perplexities, the + analysis and elucidation of which is a matter of the very greatest + difficulty.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 70. It might + be supposed that the entire exposition (now terminated) of that + which I call the denial of the will is irreconcilable with the + earlier explanation of necessity, which belongs just as much to + motivation as to every other form of the principle of sufficient + reason, and according to which, motives, like all causes, are only + occasional causes, upon which the character unfolds its nature and + reveals it with the necessity of a natural law, on account of which + we absolutely denied freedom as <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ</span></span>. + But far from suppressing this here, I would call it to mind. In + truth, real freedom, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, independence of the + principle of sufficient reason, belongs to the will only as a + thing-in-itself, not to its manifestation, whose essential form is + everywhere the principle of sufficient reason, the element or + sphere of necessity. But the one case in which that freedom can + become directly visible in the manifestation is that in which it + makes an end of what manifests itself, and because the mere + manifestation, as a link in the chain of causes, the living body in + time, which contains only phenomena, still continues to exist, the + will which manifests itself through this phenomenon then stands in + contradiction to it, for it denies what the phenomenon expresses. + In such a case the organs of generation, for example, as the + visible form of the sexual impulse, are <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page521">[pg 521]</span><a name="Pg521" id="Pg521" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> there and in health; but yet, in the inmost + consciousness, no sensual gratification is desired; and although + the whole body is only the visible expression of the will to live, + yet the motives which correspond to this will no longer act; + indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end of the individual, and + in this way the greatest check to the natural will, is welcome and + desired. Now, the contradiction between our assertions of the + necessity of the determination of the will by motives, in + accordance with the character, on the one hand, and of the + possibility of the entire suppression of the will whereby the + motives become powerless, on the other hand, is only the repetition + in the reflection of philosophy of this <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">real</span></em> + contradiction which arises from the direct encroachment of the + freedom of the will-in-itself, which knows no necessity, into the + sphere of the necessity of its manifestation. But the key to the + solution of these contradictions lies in the fact that the state in + which the character is withdrawn from the power of motives does not + proceed directly from the will, but from a changed form of + knowledge. So long as the knowledge is merely that which is + involved in the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span> and exclusively follows the principle + of sufficient reason, the strength of the motives is irresistible. + But when the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span> is seen through, when the Ideas, and + indeed the inner nature of the thing-in-itself, as the same will in + all, are directly recognised, and from this knowledge an universal + quieter of volition arises, then the particular motives become + ineffective, because the kind of knowledge which corresponds to + them is obscured and thrown into the background by quite another + kind. Therefore the character can never partially change, but must, + with the consistency of a law of Nature, carry out in the + particular the will which it manifests as a whole. But this whole, + the character itself, may be completely suppressed or abolished + through the change of knowledge referred to above. It is this + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page522">[pg 522]</span><a name= + "Pg522" id="Pg522" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> suppression or + abolition which Asmus, as quoted above, marvels at and denotes the + <span class="tei tei-q">“catholic, transcendental change;”</span> + and in the Christian Church it has very aptly been called the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">new + birth</span></em>, and the knowledge from which it springs, the + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">work of + grace</span></em>. Therefore it is not a question of a change, but + of an entire suppression of the character; and hence it arises + that, however different the characters which experience the + suppression may have been before it, after it they show a great + similarity in their conduct, though every one still speaks very + differently according to his conceptions and dogmas.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">In this sense, + then, the old philosophical doctrine of the freedom of the will, + which has constantly been contested and constantly maintained, is + not without ground, and the dogma of the Church of the work of + grace and the new birth is not without meaning and significance. + But we now unexpectedly see both united in one, and we can also now + understand in what sense the excellent Malebranche could say, + <span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="fr"><span style="font-style: italic">La liberté est un + mystère</span></span>,”</span> and was right. For precisely what + the Christian mystics call <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the work of grace</span></em> and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the new + birth</span></em>, is for us the single direct expression of + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">the + freedom of the will</span></em>. It only appears if the will, + having attained to a knowledge of its own real nature, receives + from this a <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">quieter</span></em>, by means of which the + motives are deprived of their effect, which belongs to the province + of another kind of knowledge, the objects of which are merely + phenomena. The possibility of the freedom which thus expresses + itself is the greatest prerogative of man, which is for ever + wanting to the brute, because the condition of it is the + deliberation of reason, which enables him to survey the whole of + life independent of the impression of the present. The brute is + entirely without the possibility of freedom, as, indeed, it is + without the possibility of a proper or deliberate choice following + upon a completed conflict of motives, which for this purpose would + have to be abstract ideas. Therefore with the same necessity with + which <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page523">[pg 523]</span><a name= + "Pg523" id="Pg523" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> the stone falls to + the earth, the hungry wolf buries its fangs in the flesh of its + prey, without the possibility of the knowledge that it is itself + the destroyed as well as the destroyer. <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Necessity is the + kingdom of nature; freedom is the kingdom of grace.</span></em></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Now because, as + we have seen, that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">self-suppression of the will</span></em> + proceeds from knowledge, and all knowledge is involuntary, that + denial of will also, that entrance into freedom, cannot be forcibly + attained to by intention or design, but proceeds from the inmost + relation of knowing and volition in the man, and therefore comes + suddenly, as if spontaneously from without. This is why the Church + has called it <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the work of grace</span></em>; and that it + still regards it as independent of the acceptance of grace + corresponds to the fact that the effect of the quieter is finally a + free act of will. And because, in consequence of such a work of + grace, the whole nature of man is changed and reversed from its + foundation, so that he no longer wills anything of all that he + previously willed so intensely, so that it is as if a new man + actually took the place of the old, the Church has called this + consequence of the work of grace the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">new + birth</span></em>. For what it calls the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">natural + man</span></em>, to which it denies all capacity for good, is just + the will to live, which must be denied if deliverance from an + existence such as ours is to be attained. Behind our existence lies + something else, which is only accessible to us if we have shaken + off this world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Having regard, + not to the individuals according to the principle of sufficient + reason, but to the Idea of man in its unity, Christian theology + symbolises <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nature</span></em>, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">assertion of the + will to live</span></em> in Adam, whose sin, inherited by us, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, our unity with him in the + Idea, which is represented in time by the bond of procreation, + makes us all partakers of suffering and eternal death. On the other + hand, it symbolises <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">grace</span></em>, the <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">denial of the + will</span></em>, <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">salvation</span></em>, in the incarnate God, + who, as free from all sin, that is, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page524">[pg 524]</span><a name="Pg524" id="Pg524" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> from all willing of life, cannot, like us, + have proceeded from the most pronounced assertion of the will, nor + can he, like us, have a body which is through and through simply + concrete will, manifestation of the will; but born of a pure + virgin, he has only a phantom body. This last is the doctrine of + the Docetæ, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, certain Church Fathers, + who in this respect are very consistent. It is especially taught by + Apelles, against whom and his followers Tertullian wrote. But even + Augustine comments thus on the passage, Rom. viii. 3, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful + flesh:”</span> <span class="tei tei-q">“<span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Non enim caro peccati erat, quæ non de carnali + delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei similitudo carnis + peccati, quia mortalis caro erat</span></span>”</span> (Liber 83, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">quæst. + qu.</span></span> 66). He also teaches in his work entitled + <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Opus Imperfectum</span></span>,”</span> i. 47, + that inherited sin is both sin and punishment at once. It is + already present in new-born children, but only shows itself if they + grow up. Yet the origin of this sin is to be referred to the will + of the sinner. This sinner was Adam, but we all existed in him; + Adam became miserable, and in him we have all become miserable. + Certainly the doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will) and + of salvation (denial of the will) is the great truth which + constitutes the essence of Christianity, while most of what remains + is only the clothing of it, the husk or accessories. Therefore + Jesus Christ ought always to be conceived in the universal, as the + symbol or personification of the denial of the will to live, but + never as an individual, whether according to his mythical history + given in the Gospels, or according to the probably true history + which lies at the foundation of this. For neither the one nor the + other will easily satisfy us entirely. It is merely the vehicle of + that conception for the people, who always demand something actual. + That in recent times Christianity has forgotten its true + significance, and degenerated into dull optimism, does not concern + us here.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is further an + original and evangelical doctrine of <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page525">[pg 525]</span><a name="Pg525" id="Pg525" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> Christianity—which Augustine, with the + consent of the leaders of the Church, defended against the + platitudes of the Pelagians, and which it was the principal aim of + Luther's endeavour to purify from error and re-establish, as he + expressly declares in his book, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Servo Arbitrio</span></span>,”</span>—the + doctrine that <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the will is not free</span></em>, but + originally subject to the inclination to evil. Therefore according + to this doctrine the deeds of the will are always sinful and + imperfect, and can never fully satisfy justice; and, finally, these + works can never save us, but faith alone, a faith which itself does + not spring from resolution and free will, but from the work of + grace, without our co-operation, comes to us as from without.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Not only the + dogmas referred to before, but also this last genuine evangelical + dogma belongs to those which at the present day an ignorant and + dull opinion rejects as absurd or hides. For, in spite of Augustine + and Luther, it adheres to the vulgar Pelagianism, which the + rationalism of the day really is, and treats as antiquated those + deeply significant dogmas which are peculiar and essential to + Christianity in the strictest sense; while, on the other hand, it + holds fast and regards as the principal matter only the dogma that + originates in Judaism, and has been retained from it, and is merely + historically connected with Christianity.<a id="noteref_91" name= + "noteref_91" href="#note_91"><span class= + "tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">91</span></span></a> We, + however, <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page526">[pg + 526]</span><a name="Pg526" id="Pg526" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> + recognise in the doctrine referred to above the truth completely + agreeing with the result of our own investigations. We see that + true virtue and holiness of disposition have their origin not in + deliberate choice (works), but in knowledge (faith); just as we + have in like manner developed it from our leading thought. If it + were works, which spring from motives and deliberate intention, + that led to salvation, then, however one may turn it, virtue would + always be a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism. But the faith + to which the Christian Church promises salvation is this: that as + through the fall of the first man we are all partakers of sin and + subject to death and perdition, through the divine substitute, + through grace and the taking upon himself of our fearful guilt, we + are all saved, without any merit of our own (of the person); since + that which can proceed from the intentional (determined by motives) + action of the person, works, can never justify us, from its very + nature, just because it is <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">intentional</span></em>, action induced by + motives, <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">opus operatum</span></span>. + Thus in this faith there is implied, first of all, <span class= + "tei tei-pb" id="page527">[pg 527]</span><a name="Pg527" id="Pg527" + class="tei tei-anchor"></a> that our condition is originally and + essentially an incurable one, from which we need <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">salvation</span></em>; then, that we ourselves + essentially belong to evil, and are so firmly bound to it that our + works according to law and precept, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + according to motives, can never satisfy justice nor save us; but + salvation is only obtained through faith, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + through a changed mode of knowing, and this faith can only come + through grace, thus as from without. This means that the salvation + is one which is quite foreign to our person, and points to a denial + and surrender of this person necessary to salvation. Works, the + result of the law as such, can never justify, because they are + always action following upon motives. Luther demands (in his book + <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Libertate Christiana</span></span>”</span>) + that after the entrance of faith the good works shall proceed from + it entirely of themselves, as symptoms, as fruits of it; yet by no + means as constituting in themselves a claim to merit, + justification, or reward, but taking place quite voluntarily and + gratuitously. So we also hold that from the ever-clearer + penetration of the <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">principium + individuationis</span></span> proceeds, first, merely free justice, + then love, extending to the complete abolition of egoism, and + finally resignation or denial of the will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">I have here + introduced these dogmas of Christian theology, which in themselves + are foreign to philosophy, merely for the purpose of showing that + the ethical doctrine which proceeds from our whole investigation, + and is in complete agreement and connection with all its parts, + although new and unprecedented in its expression, is by no means so + in its real nature, but fully agrees with the Christian dogmas + properly so called, and indeed, as regards its essence, was + contained and present in them. It also agrees quite as accurately + with the doctrines and ethical teachings of the sacred books of + India, which in their turn are presented in quite different forms. + At the same time the calling to mind of the dogmas of the Christian + Church serves to explain and illustrate <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page528">[pg 528]</span><a name="Pg528" id="Pg528" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> the apparent contradiction between the + necessity of all expressions of character when motives are + presented (the kingdom of Nature) on the one hand, and the freedom + of the will in itself, to deny itself, and abolish the character + with all the necessity of the motives based upon it (the kingdom of + grace) on the other hand.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">§ 71. I now end + the general account of ethics, and with it the whole development of + that one thought which it has been my object to impart; and I by no + means desire to conceal here an objection which concerns this last + part of my exposition, but rather to point out that it lies in the + nature of the question, and that it is quite impossible to remove + it. It is this, that after our investigation has brought us to the + point at which we have before our eyes perfect holiness, the denial + and surrender of all volition, and thus the deliverance from a + world whose whole existence we have found to be suffering, this + appears to us as a passing away into empty nothingness.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">On this I must + first remark, that the conception of nothing is essentially + relative, and always refers to a definite something which it + negatives. This quality has been attributed (by Kant) merely to the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nihil privativum</span></span>, which is + indicated by - as opposed to +, which -, from an opposite point of + view, might become +, and in opposition to this <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nihil privativum</span></span> the <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nihil negativum</span></span> has been set up, + which would in every reference be nothing, and as an example of + this the logical contradiction which does away with itself has been + given. But more closely considered, no absolute nothing, no proper + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">nihil negativum</span></span> is even + thinkable; but everything of this kind, when considered from a + higher standpoint or subsumed under a wider concept, is always + merely a <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">nihil + privativum</span></span>. Every nothing is thought as such only in + relation to something, and presupposes this relation, and thus also + this something. Even a logical contradiction is only a relative + nothing. It is no thought of the reason, but it is not on that + account an absolute nothing; <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page529">[pg 529]</span><a name="Pg529" id="Pg529" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> for it is a combination of words; it is an + example of the unthinkable, which is necessary in logic in order to + prove the laws of thought. Therefore if for this end such an + example is sought, we will stick to the nonsense as the positive + which we are in search of, and pass over the sense as the negative. + Thus every <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">nihil + negativum</span></span>, if subordinated to a higher concept, will + appear as a mere <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">nihil + privativum</span></span> or relative nothing, which can, moreover, + always exchange signs with what it negatives, so that that would + then be thought as negation, and it itself as assertion. This also + agrees with the result of the difficult dialectical investigation + of the meaning of nothing which Plato gives in the <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Sophist”</span> (pp. 277-287): Την του ἑτερου φυσιν + αποδειξαντες ουσαν τε, και κατακεκερματισμενην επι παντα τα οντα + προς αλληλα, το προς το ον ἑκαστου μοριου αυτης αντιτιθεμενον, + ετολμησαμεν ειπειν, ὡς αυτο τουτο εστιν οντως το μη ον (<span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Cum enim ostenderemus, alterius ipsius naturam + esse perque omnia entia divisam atque dispersam in vicem; tunc + partem ejus oppositam ei, quod cujusque ens est, esse ipsum revera + non ens asseruimus</span></span>).</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">That which is + generally received as positive, which we call the real, and the + negation of which the concept nothing in its most general + significance expresses, is just the world as idea, which I have + shown to be the objectivity and mirror of the will. Moreover, we + ourselves are just this will and this world, and to them belongs + the idea in general, as one aspect of them. The form of the idea is + space and time, therefore for this point of view all that is real + must be in some place and at some time. Denial, abolition, + conversion of the will, is also the abolition and the vanishing of + the world, its mirror. If we no longer perceive it in this mirror, + we ask in vain where it has gone, and then, because it has no + longer any where and when, complain that it has vanished into + nothing.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">A reversed point + of view, if it were possible for us, <span class="tei tei-pb" id= + "page530">[pg 530]</span><a name="Pg530" id="Pg530" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> would reverse the signs and show the real for + us as nothing, and that nothing as the real. But as long as we + ourselves are the will to live, this last—nothing as the real—can + only be known and signified by us negatively, because the old + saying of Empedocles, that like can only be known by like, deprives + us here of all knowledge, as, conversely, upon it finally rests the + possibility of all our actual knowledge, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + the world as idea; for the world is the self-knowledge of the + will.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">If, however, it + should be absolutely insisted upon that in some way or other a + positive knowledge should be attained of that which philosophy can + only express negatively as the denial of the will, there would be + nothing for it but to refer to that state which all those who have + attained to complete denial of the will have experienced, and which + has been variously denoted by the names ecstasy, rapture, + illumination, union with God, and so forth; a state, however, which + cannot properly be called knowledge, because it has not the form of + subject and object, and is, moreover, only attainable in one's own + experience and cannot be further communicated.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">We, however, who + consistently occupy the standpoint of philosophy, must be satisfied + here with negative knowledge, content to have reached the utmost + limit of the positive. We have recognised the inmost nature of the + world as will, and all its phenomena as only the objectivity of + will; and we have followed this objectivity from the unconscious + working of obscure forces of Nature up to the completely conscious + action of man. Therefore we shall by no means evade the + consequence, that with the free denial, the surrender of the will, + all those phenomena are also abolished; that constant strain and + effort without end and without rest at all the grades of + objectivity, in which and through which the world consists; the + multifarious forms succeeding each other in gradation; the whole + manifestation of the will; and, finally, also the universal forms + of this manifestation, time and space, and <span class="tei tei-pb" + id="page531">[pg 531]</span><a name="Pg531" id="Pg531" class= + "tei tei-anchor"></a> also its last fundamental form, subject and + object; all are abolished. No will: no idea, no world.</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">Before us there + is certainly only nothingness. But that which resists this passing + into nothing, our nature, is indeed just the will to live, which we + ourselves are as it is our world. That we abhor annihilation so + greatly, is simply another expression of the fact that we so + strenuously will life, and are nothing but this will, and know + nothing besides it. But if we turn our glance from our own needy + and embarrassed condition to those who have overcome the world, in + whom the will, having attained to perfect self-knowledge, found + itself again in all, and then freely denied itself, and who then + merely wait to see the last trace of it vanish with the body which + it animates; then, instead of the restless striving and effort, + instead of the constant transition from wish to fruition, and from + joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope + which constitutes the life of the man who wills, we shall see that + peace which is above all reason, that perfect calm of the spirit, + that deep rest, that inviolable confidence and serenity, the mere + reflection of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio + have represented it, is an entire and certain gospel; only + knowledge remains, the will has vanished. We look with deep and + painful longing upon this state, beside which the misery and + wretchedness of our own is brought out clearly by the contrast. Yet + this is the only consideration which can afford us lasting + consolation, when, on the one hand, we have recognised incurable + suffering and endless misery as essential to the manifestation of + will, the world; and, on the other hand, see the world pass away + with the abolition of will, and retain before us only empty + nothingness. Thus, in this way, by contemplation of the life and + conduct of saints, whom it is certainly rarely granted us to meet + with in our own experience, but who are brought before our eyes by + their written history, and, with the stamp of inner truth, by + <span class="tei tei-pb" id="page532">[pg 532]</span><a name= + "Pg532" id="Pg532" class="tei tei-anchor"></a> art, we must banish + the dark impression of that nothingness which we discern behind all + virtue and holiness as their final goal, and which we fear as + children fear the dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, + through myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahma + or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. Rather do we freely acknowledge + that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all + those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, + conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied + itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and + milky-ways—is nothing.<a id="noteref_92" name="noteref_92" href= + "#note_92"><span class="tei tei-noteref"><span style= + "font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super">92</span></span></a></p> + </div> + </div> + </div> + <hr class="doublepage" /> + + <div class="tei tei-back" style= + "margin-bottom: 2.00em; margin-top: 6.00em"> + <div id="footnotes" class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <a name="toc23" id="toc23"></a> <a name="pdf24" id="pdf24"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Footnotes</span></h1> + + <dl class="tei tei-list-footnotes"> + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_1" name="note_1" href= + "#noteref_1">1.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">F. H. Jacobi.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_2" name="note_2" href= + "#noteref_2">2.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The Hegelian Philosophy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_3" name="note_3" href= + "#noteref_3">3.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Fichte and Schelling.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_4" name="note_4" href= + "#noteref_4">4.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Hegel.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_5" name="note_5" href= + "#noteref_5">5.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Kant is the only writer who has + confused this idea of reason, and in this connection I refer the + reader to the Appendix, and also to my <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Grundprobleme der Ethik”</span>: Grundl. dd. Moral. § + 6, pp. 148-154, first and second editions.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_6" name="note_6" href= + "#noteref_6">6.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum + proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam + efficacissimis notis signat. <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Seneca</span></span>, epist. 81.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_7" name="note_7" href= + "#noteref_7">7.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">It is shown in the Appendix that + matter and substance are one.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_8" name="note_8" href= + "#noteref_8">8.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This shows the ground of the Kantian + explanation of matter, that it is <span class="tei tei-q">“that + which is movable in space,”</span> for motion consists simply in + the union of space and time.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_9" name="note_9" href= + "#noteref_9">9.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Not, as Kant holds, from the knowledge + of time, as will be explained in the Appendix.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_10" name="note_10" href= + "#noteref_10">10.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On this see <span class= + "tei tei-q">“The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient + Reason,”</span> § 49.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_11" name="note_11" href= + "#noteref_11">11.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The first four chapters of the first + of the supplementary books belong to these seven paragraphs.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_12" name="note_12" href= + "#noteref_12">12.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and + 27 of the third edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient + reason.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_13" name="note_13" href= + "#noteref_13">13.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_14" name="note_14" href= + "#noteref_14">14.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_15" name="note_15" href= + "#noteref_15">15.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_16" name="note_16" href= + "#noteref_16">16.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">I am therefore of opinion that a + science of physiognomy cannot, with certainty, go further than to + lay down a few quite general rules. For example, the intellectual + qualities are to be read in the forehead and the eyes; the moral + qualities, the expression of will, in the mouth and lower part of + the face. The forehead and the eyes interpret each other; either of + them seen alone can only be half understood. Genius is never + without a high, broad, finely-arched brow; but such a brow often + occurs where there is no genius. A clever-looking person may the + more certainly be judged to be so the uglier the face is; and a + stupid-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be stupid + the more beautiful the face is; for beauty, as the approximation to + the type of humanity, carries in and for itself the expression of + mental clearness; the opposite is the case with ugliness, and so + forth.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_17" name="note_17" href= + "#noteref_17">17.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_18" name="note_18" href= + "#noteref_18">18.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_19" name="note_19" href= + "#noteref_19">19.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. + iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_20" name="note_20" href= + "#noteref_20">20.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_21" name="note_21" href= + "#noteref_21">21.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The reader must not think here of + Kant's misuse of these Greek terms, which is condemned in the + Appendix.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_22" name="note_22" href= + "#noteref_22">22.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Spinoza, who always boasts that he + proceeds <span class="tei tei-foreign"><span style= + "font-style: italic">more geometrico</span></span>, has actually + done so more than he himself was aware. For what he knew with + certainty and decision from the immediate, perceptive apprehension + of the nature of the world, he seeks to demonstrate logically + without reference to this knowledge. He only arrives at the + intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary + concepts framed by himself (<span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">substantia causa + sui</span></span>, &c.), and in the demonstrations he allows + himself all the freedom of choice for which the nature of the wide + concept-spheres afford such convenient opportunity. That his + doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in his case, as in that + of geometry, quite independent of the demonstrations of it. Cf. ch. + 13 of supplementary volume.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_23" name="note_23" href= + "#noteref_23">23.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_24" name="note_24" href= + "#noteref_24">24.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Omnes perturbationes judicio censent + fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα + πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines + non res ipsæ, sed de rebus opiniones). Epictet., c. v.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_25" name="note_25" href= + "#noteref_25">25.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις + ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι + εφαρμοξειν ταις επι μερους (Hæc est causa mortalibus omnium + malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus). Epict. + dissert., ii., 26.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_26" name="note_26" href= + "#noteref_26">26.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. 16 of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_27" name="note_27" href= + "#noteref_27">27.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xviii. of the Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_28" name="note_28" href= + "#noteref_28">28.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">We can thus by no means agree with + Bacon if he (De Augm. Scient., L. iv. in fine.) thinks that all + mechanical and physical movement of bodies has always been preceded + by perception in these bodies; though a glimmering of truth lies at + the bottom of this false proposition. This is also the case with + Kepler's opinion, expressed in his essay <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De Planeta + Martis</span></span>, that the planets must have knowledge in order + to keep their elliptical courses so correctly, and to regulate the + velocity of their motion so that the triangle of the plane of their + course always remains proportional to the time in which they pass + through its base.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_29" name="note_29" href= + "#noteref_29">29.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xix. of the Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_30" name="note_30" href= + "#noteref_30">30.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xx. of the Supplement, and + also in my work, <span class="tei tei-q">“<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Ueber den Willen in + der Natur</span></span>,”</span> the chapters on Physiology and + Comparative Anatomy, where the subject I have only touched upon + here is fully discussed.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_31" name="note_31" href= + "#noteref_31">31.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is specially treated in the 27th + Ch. of the Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_32" name="note_32" href= + "#noteref_32">32.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This subject is fully worked out in my + prize essay on the freedom of the will, in which therefore (pp. + 29-44 of the <span class="tei tei-q">“Grundprobleme der + Ethik”</span>) the relation of <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">cause</span></em>, + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">stimulus</span></em>, and <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">motive</span></em> + has also been fully explained.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_33" name="note_33" href= + "#noteref_33">33.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xxiii. of the Supplement, and + also the Ch. on the physiology of plants in my work <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”</span> and the Ch. on + physical astronomy, which is of great importance with regard to the + kernel of my metaphysic.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_34" name="note_34" href= + "#noteref_34">34.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Wenzel, De Structura Cerebri Hominis + et Brutorum, 1812, ch. iii.; Cuvier, Leçons d'Anat., comp. leçon 9, + arts. 4 and 5; Vic. d'Azyr, Hist. de l'Acad. de Sc. de Paris, 1783, + pp. 470 and 483.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_35" name="note_35" href= + "#noteref_35">35.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On the 16th of September 1840, at a + lecture upon Egyptian Archæology delivered by Mr. Pettigrew at the + Literary and Scientific Institute of London, he showed some corns + of wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a grave at Thebes, in + which they must have lain for three thousand years. They were found + in an hermetically sealed vase. Mr. Pettigrew had sowed twelve + grains, and obtained a plant which grew five feet high, and the + seeds of which were now quite ripe.—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">Times</span></span>, + 21st September 1840. In the same way in 1830 Mr. Haulton produced + in the Medical Botanical Society of London a bulbous root which was + found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy, in which it was probably + put in observance of some religious rite, and which must have been + at least two thousand years old. He had planted it in a flower-pot, + in which it grew up and flourished. This is quoted from the Medical + Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institute of Great + Britain, October 1830, p. 196.—<span class="tei tei-q">“In the + garden of Mr. Grimstone of the Herbarium, Highgate, London, is a + pea in full fruit, which has sprung from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew + and the officials of the British Museum took out of a vase which + had been found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain + 2844 years.”</span>—<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Times</span></span>, 16th August 1844. Indeed, + the living toads found in limestone lead to the conclusion that + even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of + years, if this is begun in the dormant period and maintained by + special circumstances.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_36" name="note_36" href= + "#noteref_36">36.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chap. xxii. of the Supplement, and + also my work <span class="tei tei-q">“Ueber den Willen in der + Natur,”</span> p. 54 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">et seq.</span></span>, and pp. 70-79 of the + first edition, or p. 46 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">et seq.</span></span>, and pp. 63-72 of the + second, or p. 48 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">et seq.</span></span>, and pp. 69-77 of the + third edition.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_37" name="note_37" href= + "#noteref_37">37.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The Scholastics therefore said very + truly: <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">Causa finalis movet non + secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum.</span></span> + Cf. Suarez, Disp. Metaph. disp. xxiii., sec. 7 and 8.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_38" name="note_38" href= + "#noteref_38">38.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class="tei tei-q">“Critique + of Pure Reason. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality + of the Deduction of the Events in the Universe,”</span> pp. 560-586 + of the fifth, and p. 532 and following of first edition; and + <span class="tei tei-q">“Critique of Practical Reason,”</span> + fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz' edition, p. 224 and + following. Cf. my Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § + 43.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_39" name="note_39" href= + "#noteref_39">39.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class="tei tei-q">“Ueber den + Willen in der Natur,”</span> at the end of the section on + Comparative Anatomy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_40" name="note_40" href= + "#noteref_40">40.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. <span class="tei tei-q">“Ueber den + Willen in der Natur,”</span> the section on Comparative + Anatomy.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_41" name="note_41" href= + "#noteref_41">41.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Chatin, Sur la Valisneria Spiralis, in + the Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. de Sc., No. 13, 1855.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_42" name="note_42" href= + "#noteref_42">42.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chaps. xxvi. and xxvii. of the + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_43" name="note_43" href= + "#noteref_43">43.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chap. xxviii. of the + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_44" name="note_44" href= + "#noteref_44">44.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">F. H. Jacobi.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_45" name="note_45" href= + "#noteref_45">45.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See for example, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Immanuel Kant, a Reminiscence, by Fr. + Bouterweck,”</span> pg. 49, and Buhle's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“History of Philosophy,”</span> vol. vi. pp. 802-815 + and 823.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_46" name="note_46" href= + "#noteref_46">46.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chap. xxix. of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_47" name="note_47" href= + "#noteref_47">47.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">I also recommend the perusal of what + Spinoza says in his Ethics (Book II., Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and Book + V., Props. 25-38), concerning the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">cognitio tertii generis, sive + intuitiva</span></span>, in illustration of the kind of knowledge + we are considering, and very specially Prop. 29, Schol.; prop. 36, + Schol., and Prop. 38, Demonst. et Schol.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_48" name="note_48" href= + "#noteref_48">48.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chap. xxx. of the Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_49" name="note_49" href= + "#noteref_49">49.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This last sentence cannot be + understood without some acquaintance with the next book.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_50" name="note_50" href= + "#noteref_50">50.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chap. xxxi. of the + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_51" name="note_51" href= + "#noteref_51">51.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">I am all the more delighted and + astonished, forty years after I so timidly and hesitatingly + advanced this thought, to discover that it has already been + expressed by St. Augustine: <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" + xml:lang="la"><span style="font-style: italic">Arbusta formas suas + varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, + sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quod</span></span> + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">nosse</span></span> <span lang="la" + class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">non possunt, quasi</span></span> <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-variant: small-caps">innotescere</span></span> <span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">velle videantur</span></span>.—<span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">De civ. Dei, + xi.</span></span> 27.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_52" name="note_52" href= + "#noteref_52">52.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chap. 35 of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_53" name="note_53" href= + "#noteref_53">53.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Jakob Böhm in his book, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“de Signatura Rerum,”</span> ch. i., § 13-15, says, + <span class="tei tei-q">“There is nothing in nature that does not + manifest its internal form externally; for the internal continually + labours to manifest itself.... Everything has its language by which + to reveal itself.... And this is the language of nature when + everything speaks out of its own property, and continually + manifests and declares itself, ... for each thing reveals its + mother, which thus gives <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">the essence and the will</span></em> to the + form.”</span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_54" name="note_54" href= + "#noteref_54">54.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The last sentence is the German of the + <span lang="fr" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="fr"><span style= + "font-style: italic">il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente + l'esprit</span></span>, of Helvetius. In the first edition there + was no occasion to point this out, but since then the age has + become so degraded and ignorant through the stupefying influence of + the Hegelian sophistry, that some might quite likely say that an + antithesis was intended here between <span class= + "tei tei-q">“spirit and nature.”</span> I am therefore obliged to + guard myself in express terms against the suspicion of such vulgar + sophisms.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_55" name="note_55" href= + "#noteref_55">55.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This digression is worked out more + fully in the 36th Chapter of the Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_56" name="note_56" href= + "#noteref_56">56.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In order to understand this passage it + is necessary to have read the whole of the next book.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_57" name="note_57" href= + "#noteref_57">57.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class= + "tei tei-foreign"><span style="font-style: italic">Apparent rari, + nantes in gurgite vasto.</span></span></dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_58" name="note_58" href= + "#noteref_58">58.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xxxiv. of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_59" name="note_59" href= + "#noteref_59">59.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"> + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is scarcely + necessary to say that wherever I speak of poets I refer + exclusively to that rare phenomenon the great true poet. I mean + no one else; least of all that dull insipid tribe, the mediocre + poets, rhymsters, and inventors of fables, that flourishes so + luxuriantly at the present day in Germany. They ought rather to + have the words shouted in their ears unceasingly from all + sides—</p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em"><span lang= + "la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Mediocribus esse poëtis</span><br /> + <span style="font-style: italic">Non homines, non Dî, non + concessere columnæ.</span></span></p> + + <p class="tei tei-p" style="margin-bottom: 1.00em">It is worthy + of serious consideration what an amount of time—both their own + and other people's—and paper is lost by this swarm of mediocre + poets, and how injurious is their influence. For the public + always seizes on what is new, and has naturally a greater + proneness to what is perverse and dull as akin to itself. + Therefore these works of the mediocre poets draw it away and hold + it back from the true masterpieces and the education they afford, + and thus working in direct antagonism to the benign influence of + genius, they ruin taste more and more, and retard the progress of + the age. Such poets should therefore be scourged with criticism + and satire without indulgence or sympathy till they are induced, + for their own good, to apply their muse rather to reading what is + good than to writing what is bad. For if the bungling of the + incompetent so raised the wrath of the gentle Apollo that he + could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what the mediocre poets will + base their claim to tolerance.</p> + </dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_60" name="note_60" href= + "#noteref_60">60.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xxxviii. of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_61" name="note_61" href= + "#noteref_61">61.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xxxvii. of the + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_62" name="note_62" href= + "#noteref_62">62.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Leibnitii epistolæ, collectio + Kortholti, ep. 154.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_63" name="note_63" href= + "#noteref_63">63.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xxxix. of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_64" name="note_64" href= + "#noteref_64">64.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The following remark may assist those + for whom it is not too subtle to understand clearly that the + individual is only the phenomenon, not the thing in itself. Every + individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing, + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the complemental condition + of the possibility of the whole objective world, and, on the other + hand, a particular phenomenon of will, the same will which + objectifies itself in everything. But this double nature of our + being does not rest upon a self-existing unity, otherwise it would + be possible for us to be conscious of ourselves <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">in ourselves, and + independent of the objects of knowledge and will</span></em>. Now + this is by no means possible, for as soon as we turn into ourselves + to make the attempt, and seek for once to know ourselves fully by + means of introspective reflection, we are lost in a bottomless + void; we find ourselves like the hollow glass globe, from out of + which a voice speaks whose cause is not to be found in it, and + whereas we desired to comprehend ourselves, we find, with a + shudder, nothing but a vanishing spectre.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_65" name="note_65" href= + "#noteref_65">65.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Scholastici + docuerunt, quod æternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio + successio; sed <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Nunc stans</span></em>, <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, + idem nobis <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Nunc esse</span></em>, quod erat <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">Nunc + Adamo</span></em>, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, inter <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style="font-style: italic">nunc</span></em> et + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">tunc</span></em> nullam esse + differentiam.”</span>—Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 46.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_66" name="note_66" href= + "#noteref_66">66.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">In Eckermann's <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Conversations of Goethe”</span> (vol. i. p. 161), + Goethe says: <span class="tei tei-q">“Our spirit is a being of a + nature quite indestructible, and its activity continues from + eternity to eternity. It is like the sun, which seems to set only + to our earthly eyes, but which, in reality, never sets, but shines + on unceasingly.”</span> Goethe has taken the simile from me; not I + from him. Without doubt he used it in this conversation, which was + held in 1824, in consequence of a (possibly unconscious) + reminiscence of the above passage, for it occurs in the first + edition, p. 401, in exactly the same words, and it is also repeated + at p. 528 of that edition, as at the close of § 65 of the present + work. The first edition was sent to him in December 1818, and in + March 1819, when I was at Naples, he sent me his congratulations by + letter, through my sister, and enclosed a piece of paper upon which + he had noted the places of certain passages which had specially + pleased him. Thus he had read my book.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_67" name="note_67" href= + "#noteref_67">67.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is expressed in the Veda by + saying, that when a man dies his sight becomes one with the sun, + his smell with the earth, his taste with water, his hearing with + the air, his speech with fire, &c., &c. (Oupnek'hat, vol. + i. p. 249 <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">et seq.</span></span>) And also by the fact + that, in a special ceremony, the dying man gives over his senses + and all his faculties singly to his son, in whom they are now + supposed to live on (Oupnek'hat, vol. ii. p. 82 <span class= + "tei tei-hi"><span style="font-style: italic">et + seq.</span></span>)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_68" name="note_68" href= + "#noteref_68">68.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Chap. xli.-xliv. of + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_69" name="note_69" href= + "#noteref_69">69.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext"><span class="tei tei-q">“Critique of + Pure Reason,”</span> first edition, pp. 532-558; fifth edition, pp. + 560-586; and <span class="tei tei-q">“Critique of Practical + Reason,”</span> fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz's edition, + pp. 224-231.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_70" name="note_70" href= + "#noteref_70">70.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cart. Medit. 4.—Spin. Eth., pt. ii. + prop. 48 et 49, cæt.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_71" name="note_71" href= + "#noteref_71">71.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Herodot. vii. 46.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_72" name="note_72" href= + "#noteref_72">72.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xlvi. of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_73" name="note_73" href= + "#noteref_73">73.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xlv. of the Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_74" name="note_74" href= + "#noteref_74">74.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Thus the basis of natural right of + property does not require the assumption of two grounds of right + beside each other, that based on <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">detention</span></em> and that based on + <em class="tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">formation</span></em>; but the latter is + itself sufficient. Only the name <em class= + "tei tei-emph"><span style= + "font-style: italic">formation</span></em> is not very suitable, + for the spending of any labour upon a thing does not need to be a + forming or fashioning of it.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_75" name="note_75" href= + "#noteref_75">75.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The further exposition of the + philosophy of law here laid down will be found in my prize-essay, + <span class="tei tei-q">“Ueber das Fundament der Moral,”</span> § + 17, pp. 221-230 of 1st ed., pp. 216-226 of 2d ed.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_76" name="note_76" href= + "#noteref_76">76.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_77" name="note_77" href= + "#noteref_77">77.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 60 et seq.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_78" name="note_78" href= + "#noteref_78">78.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">That Spanish bishop who, in the last + war, poisoned both himself and the French generals at his own + table, is an instance of this; and also various incidents in that + war. Examples are also to be found in Montaigne, Bk. ii. ch. + 12.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_79" name="note_79" href= + "#noteref_79">79.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Observe, in passing, that what gives + every positive system of religion its great strength, the point of + contact through which it takes possession of the soul, is entirely + its ethical side. Not, however, the ethical side directly as such, + but as it appears firmly united and interwoven with the element of + mythical dogma which is present in every system of religion, and as + intelligible only by means of this. So much is this the case, that + although the ethical significance of action cannot be explained in + accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, yet since every + mythus follows this principle, believers regard the ethical + significance of action as quite inseparable, and indeed as + absolutely identical, and regard every attack upon the mythus as an + attack upon right and virtue. This goes so far that among + monotheistic nations atheism or godlessness has become synonymous + with the absence of all morality. To the priests such confusions of + conceptions are welcome, and only in consequence of them could that + horrible monstrosity fanaticism arise and govern, not merely single + individuals who happen to be specially perverse and bad, but whole + nations, and finally embody itself in the Western world as the + Inquisition (to the honour of mankind be it said that this only + happened once in their history), which, according to the latest and + most authentic accounts, in Madrid alone (in the rest of Spain + there were many more such ecclesiastical dens of murderers) in 300 + years put 300,000 human beings to a painful death at the stake on + theological grounds—a fact of which every zealot ought to be + reminded whenever he begins to make himself heard.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_80" name="note_80" href= + "#noteref_80">80.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The Church would say that these are + merely <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang= + "la"><span style="font-style: italic">opera operata</span></span>, + which do not avail unless grace gives the faith which leads to the + new birth. But of this farther on.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_81" name="note_81" href= + "#noteref_81">81.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">The right of man over the life and + powers of the brutes rests on the fact that, because with the + growing clearness of consciousness suffering increases in like + measure; the pain which the brute suffers through death or work is + not so great as man would suffer by merely denying himself the + flesh, or the powers of the brutes. Therefore man may carry the + assertion of his existence to the extent of denying the existence + of the brute, and the will to live as a whole endures less + suffering in this way than if the opposite course were adopted. + This at once determines the extent of the use man may make of the + powers of the brutes without wrong; a limit, however, which is + often transgressed, especially in the case of beasts of burden and + dogs used in the chase; to which the activity of societies for the + prevention of cruelty to animals is principally devoted. In my + opinion, that right does not extend to vivisection, particularly of + the higher animals. On the other hand, the insect does not suffer + so much through its death as a man suffers from its sting. The + Hindus do not understand this.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_82" name="note_82" href= + "#noteref_82">82.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">As I wander sunk in thought, so strong + a sympathy with myself comes over me that I must often weep aloud, + which otherwise I am not wont to do.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_83" name="note_83" href= + "#noteref_83">83.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement. It is + scarcely necessary to remind the reader that the whole ethical + doctrine given in outline in §§ <a href="#Section_61" class= + "tei tei-ref">61-67</a> has been explained fully and in detail in + my prize-essay on the foundation of morals.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_84" name="note_84" href= + "#noteref_84">84.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This thought is expressed by a + beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical Sanscrit writing, + <span class="tei tei-q">“Sankhya Karica:”</span> <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Yet the soul remains a while invested with body; as + the potter's wheel continues whirling after the pot has been + fashioned, by force of the impulse previously given to it. When + separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length + takes place and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute + and final deliverance accomplished.”</span> Colebrooke, + <span class="tei tei-q">“On the Philosophy of the Hindus: + Miscellaneous Essays,”</span> vol i. p. 271. Also in the + <span class="tei tei-q">“Sankhya Karica by Horace Wilson,”</span> § + 67, p. 184.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_85" name="note_85" href= + "#noteref_85">85.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">See, for example, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron,”</span> vol. + ii., Nos. 138, 144, 145, 146. <span class="tei tei-q">“Mythologie + des Indous,”</span> par Mad. de Polier, vol. ii., ch. 13, 14, 15, + 16, 17. <span class="tei tei-q">“Asiatisches Magazin,”</span> by + Klaproth: in the first volume, <span class="tei tei-q">“Ueber die + Fo-Religion,”</span> also <span class="tei tei-q">“Baghnat + Geeta”</span> or <span class="tei tei-q">“Gespräche zwischen + Krishna und Arjoon;”</span> in the second volume, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Moha-Mudgava.”</span> Also, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Institutes of Hindu Law, or the Ordinances of + Manu,”</span> from the Sanscrit, by Sir William Jones (German by + Hüttner, 1797), especially the sixth and twelfth chapters. Finally, + many passages in the <span class="tei tei-q">“Asiatic + Researches.”</span> (In the last forty years Indian literature has + grown so much in Europe, that if I were now to complete this note + to the first edition, it would occupy several pages.)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_86" name="note_86" href= + "#noteref_86">86.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">At the procession of Jagganath in June + 1840, eleven Hindus threw themselves under the wheels, and were + instantly killed. (Letter of an East Indian proprietor in the + <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">Times</span></span> of 30th December + 1840.)</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_87" name="note_87" href= + "#noteref_87">87.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">On δευτερος πλους cf. Stob. Floril., + vol. ii. p. 374.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_88" name="note_88" href= + "#noteref_88">88.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Bruckeri Hist. Philos., tomi iv. pars. + i. p. 10.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_89" name="note_89" href= + "#noteref_89">89.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Henry VI., Part ii. act 3, sc. 3.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_90" name="note_90" href= + "#noteref_90">90.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">Cf. Ch. xlviii. of the + Supplement.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_91" name="note_91" href= + "#noteref_91">91.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">How truly this is the case may be seen + from the fact that all the contradictions and inconceivabilities + contained in the Christian dogmatics, consistently systematised by + Augustine, which have led to the Pelagian insipidity which is + opposed to them, vanish as soon as we abstract from the fundamental + Jewish dogma, and recognize that man is not the work of another, + but of his own will. Then all is at once clear and correct: then + there is no need of freedom in the <span lang="la" class= + "tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">operari</span></span>, for it lies in the + <span lang="la" class="tei tei-foreign" xml:lang="la"><span style= + "font-style: italic">esse</span></span>; and there also lies the + sin as original sin. The work of grace is, however, our own. To the + rationalistic point of view of the day, on the contrary, many + doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics, founded on the New + Testament, appear quite untenable, and indeed revolting; for + example, predestination. Accordingly Christianity proper is + rejected, and a return is made to crude Judaism. But the + miscalculation or the original weakness of Christian dogmatics + lies—where it is never sought—precisely in that which is withdrawn + from all investigation as established and certain. Take this away + and the whole of dogmatics is rational; for this dogma destroys + theology as it does all other sciences. If any one studies the + Augustinian theology in the books <span class= + "tei tei-q">“<span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">De Civitate Dei</span></span>”</span> + (especially in the Fourteenth Book), he experiences something + analogous to the feeling of one who tries to make a body stand + whose centre of gravity falls outside it; however he may turn it + and place it, it always tumbles over again. So here, in spite of + all the efforts and sophisms of Augustine, the guilt and misery of + the world always falls back on God, who made everything and + everything that is in everything, and also knew how all things + would go. That Augustine himself was conscious of the difficulty, + and puzzled by it, I have already shown in my prize-essay on the + Freedom of the Will (ch. iv. pp. 66-68 of the first and second + editions). In the same way, the contradiction between the goodness + of God and the misery of the world, and also between the freedom of + the will and the foreknowledge of God, is the inexhaustible theme + of a controversy which lasted nearly a hundred years between the + Cartesians, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld, and many + others. The only dogma which was regarded as fixed by all parties + was the existence and attributes of God, and they all unceasingly + move in a circle, because they seek to bring these things into + harmony, <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, to solve a sum that will + not come right, but always shows a remainder at some new place + whenever we have concealed it elsewhere. But it does not occur to + any one to seek for the source of the difficulty in the fundamental + assumption, although it palpably obtrudes itself. Bayle alone shows + that he saw this.</dd> + + <dt class="tei tei-notelabel"><a id="note_92" name="note_92" href= + "#noteref_92">92.</a></dt> + + <dd class="tei tei-notetext">This is also just the Prajna—Paramita + of the Buddhists, the <span class="tei tei-q">“beyond all + knowledge,”</span> <span class="tei tei-hi"><span style= + "font-style: italic">i.e.</span></span>, the point at which subject + and object are no more. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt, <span class= + "tei tei-q">“Ueber das Mahajana und + Pratschna-Paramita.”</span>)</dd> + </dl> + </div> + <hr class="doublepage" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em"> + <div id="pgfooter" class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em"> + <pre class="pre tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA (VOL. 1 OF 3)*** +</pre> + <hr class="doublepage" /> + + <div class="tei tei-div" style= + "margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em"> + <a name="rightpageheader25" id="rightpageheader25"></a><a name= + "pgtoc26" id="pgtoc26"></a><a name="pdf27" id="pdf27"></a> + + <h1 class="tei tei-head" style= + "text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em"> + <span style="font-size: 173%">Credits</span></h1> + + <table summary="This is a list." class="tei tei-list" style= + "margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + <tbody> + <tr> + <th class="tei tei-label tei-label-gloss">>December 27, + 2011 </th> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="tei tei-item tei-item-gloss"> + <table summary="This is a list." class="tei tei-list" + style="margin-bottom: 1.00em; margin-top: 1.00em"> + <tbody> + <tr class="tei tei-labelitem"> + <th class="tei tei-label"></th> + + <td class="tei tei-item">Project Gutenberg TEI + edition 1</td> + </tr> + + <tr class="tei tei-labelitem"> + <th class="tei tei-label"></th> + + <td class="tei tei-item"><span class= + "tei tei-respStmt"><span class= + "tei tei-name">Produced by Albert László, David + King, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team + at <http://www.pgdp.net/>. 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