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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 1 of 3) by
+Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no
+restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under
+the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or
+online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license
+
+
+
+Title: The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 1 of 3)
+
+Author: Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+Release Date: December 27, 2011 [Ebook #38427]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO 8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA (VOL. 1 OF 3)***
+
+
+
+
+
+                        The World As Will And Idea
+
+                                    By
+
+                           Arthur Schopenhauer
+
+                      Translated From The German By
+
+                           R. B. Haldane, M.A.
+
+                                   And
+
+                              J. Kemp, M.A.
+
+                                 Vol. I.
+
+                          Containing Four Books.
+
+            "Ob nicht Natur zuletzt sich doch ergünde?"--GOETHE
+
+                             Seventh Edition
+
+                                  London
+
+                    Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.
+
+                                   1909
+
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+Translators' Preface.
+Preface To The First Edition.
+Preface To The Second Edition.
+First Book. The World As Idea.
+   First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient
+   Reason: The Object Of Experience And Science.
+Second Book. The World As Will.
+   First Aspect. The Objectification Of The Will.
+Third Book. The World As Idea.
+   Second Aspect. The Idea Independent Of The Principle Of Sufficient
+   Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object Of Art.
+Fourth Book. The World As Will.
+   Second Aspect. The Assertion And Denial Of The Will To Live, When
+   Self-Consciousness Has Been Attained.
+Footnotes
+
+
+
+
+
+
+TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.
+
+
+The style of "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung" is sometimes loose and
+involved, as is so often the case in German philosophical treatises. The
+translation of the book has consequently been a matter of no little
+difficulty. It was found that extensive alteration of the long and
+occasionally involved sentences, however likely to prove conducive to a
+satisfactory English style, tended not only to obliterate the form of the
+original but even to imperil the meaning. Where a choice has had to be
+made, the alternative of a somewhat slavish adherence to Schopenhauer's
+_ipsissima verba_ has accordingly been preferred to that of inaccuracy.
+The result is a piece of work which leaves much to be desired, but which
+has yet consistently sought to reproduce faithfully the spirit as well as
+the letter of the original.
+
+As regards the rendering of the technical terms about which there has been
+so much controversy, the equivalents used have only been adopted after
+careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge. For
+example, "Vorstellung" has been rendered by "idea," in preference to
+"representation," which is neither accurate, intelligible, nor elegant.
+"Idee," is translated by the same word, but spelled with a
+capital,--"Idea." Again, "Anschauung" has been rendered according to the
+context, either by "perception" simply, or by "intuition or perception."
+
+Notwithstanding statements to the contrary in the text, the book is
+probably quite intelligible in itself, apart from the treatise "On the
+Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason." It has, however,
+been considered desirable to add an abstract of the latter work in an
+appendix to the third volume of this translation.
+
+R. B. H.
+
+J. K.
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
+
+
+I propose to point out here how this book must be read in order to be
+thoroughly understood. By means of it I only intend to impart a single
+thought. Yet, notwithstanding all my endeavours, I could find no shorter
+way of imparting it than this whole book. I hold this thought to be that
+which has very long been sought for under the name of philosophy, and the
+discovery of which is therefore regarded by those who are familiar with
+history as quite as impossible as the discovery of the philosopher's
+stone, although it was already said by Pliny: _Quam multa fieri non posse,
+priusquam sint facta, judicantur?_ (Hist. nat. 7, 1.)
+
+According as we consider the different aspects of this one thought which I
+am about to impart, it exhibits itself as that which we call metaphysics,
+that which we call ethics, and that which we call æsthetics; and certainly
+it must be all this if it is what I have already acknowledged I take it to
+be.
+
+A _system of thought_ must always have an architectonic connection or
+coherence, that is, a connection in which one part always supports the
+other, though the latter does not support the former, in which ultimately
+the foundation supports all the rest without being supported by it, and
+the apex is supported without supporting. On the other hand, a _single
+thought_, however comprehensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect
+unity. If it admits of being broken up into parts to facilitate its
+communication, the connection of these parts must yet be organic, _i.e._,
+it must be a connection in which every part supports the whole just as
+much as it is supported by it, a connection in which there is no first and
+no last, in which the whole thought gains distinctness through every part,
+and even the smallest part cannot be completely understood unless the
+whole has already been grasped. A book, however, must always have a first
+and a last line, and in this respect will always remain very unlike an
+organism, however like one its content may be: thus form and matter are
+here in contradiction.
+
+It is self-evident that under these circumstances no other advice can be
+given as to how one may enter into the thought explained in this work than
+_to read the book twice_, and the first time with great patience, a
+patience which is only to be derived from the belief, voluntarily
+accorded, that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end
+presupposes the beginning, and that all the earlier parts presuppose the
+later almost as much as the later presuppose the earlier. I say "almost;"
+for this is by no means absolutely the case, and I have honestly and
+conscientiously done all that was possible to give priority to that which
+stands least in need of explanation from what follows, as indeed generally
+to everything that can help to make the thought as easy to comprehend and
+as distinct as possible. This might indeed to a certain extent be achieved
+if it were not that the reader, as is very natural, thinks, as he reads,
+not merely of what is actually said, but also of its possible
+consequences, and thus besides the many contradictions actually given of
+the opinions of the time, and presumably of the reader, there may be added
+as many more which are anticipated and imaginary. That, then, which is
+really only misunderstanding, must take the form of active disapproval,
+and it is all the more difficult to recognise that it is misunderstanding,
+because although the laboriously-attained clearness of the explanation and
+distinctness of the expression never leaves the immediate sense of what is
+said doubtful, it cannot at the same time express its relations to all
+that remains to be said. Therefore, as we have said, the first perusal
+demands patience, founded on confidence that on a second perusal much, or
+all, will appear in an entirely different light. Further, the earnest
+endeavour to be more completely and even more easily comprehended in the
+case of a very difficult subject, must justify occasional repetition.
+Indeed the structure of the whole, which is organic, not a mere chain,
+makes it necessary sometimes to touch on the same point twice. Moreover
+this construction, and the very close connection of all the parts, has not
+left open to me the division into chapters and paragraphs which I should
+otherwise have regarded as very important, but has obliged me to rest
+satisfied with four principal divisions, as it were four aspects of one
+thought. In each of these four books it is especially important to guard
+against losing sight, in the details which must necessarily be discussed,
+of the principal thought to which they belong, and the progress of the
+whole exposition. I have thus expressed the first, and like those which
+follow, unavoidable demand upon the reader, who holds the philosopher in
+small favour just because he himself is a philosopher.
+
+The second demand is this, that the introduction be read before the book
+itself, although it is not contained in the book, but appeared five years
+earlier under the title, "_Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom
+zureichenden Grunde: eine philosophische Abhandlung_" (On the fourfold
+root of the principle of sufficient reason: a philosophical essay).
+Without an acquaintance with this introduction and propadeutic it is
+absolutely impossible to understand the present work properly, and the
+content of that essay will always be presupposed in this work just as if
+it were given with it. Besides, even if it had not preceded this book by
+several years, it would not properly have been placed before it as an
+introduction, but would have been incorporated in the first book. As it
+is, the first book does not contain what was said in the earlier essay,
+and it therefore exhibits a certain incompleteness on account of these
+deficiencies, which must always be supplied by reference to it. However,
+my disinclination was so great either to quote myself or laboriously to
+state again in other words what I had already said once in an adequate
+manner, that I preferred this course, notwithstanding the fact that I
+might now be able to give the content of that essay a somewhat better
+expression, chiefly by freeing it from several conceptions which resulted
+from the excessive influence which the Kantian philosophy had over me at
+the time, such as--categories, outer and inner sense, and the like. But
+even there these conceptions only occur because as yet I had never really
+entered deeply into them, therefore only by the way and quite out of
+connection with the principal matter. The correction of such passages in
+that essay will consequently take place of its own accord in the mind of
+the reader through his acquaintance with the present work. But only if we
+have fully recognised by means of that essay what the principle of
+sufficient reason is and signifies, what its validity extends to, and what
+it does not extend to, and that that principle is not before all things,
+and the whole world merely in consequence of it, and in conformity to it,
+a corollary, as it were, of it; but rather that it is merely the form in
+which the object, of whatever kind it may be, which is always conditioned
+by the subject, is invariably known so far as the subject is a knowing
+individual: only then will it be possible to enter into the method of
+philosophy which is here attempted for the first time, and which is
+completely different from all previous methods.
+
+But the same disinclination to repeat myself word for word, or to say the
+same thing a second time in other and worse words, after I have deprived
+myself of the better, has occasioned another defect in the first book of
+this work. For I have omitted all that is said in the first chapter of my
+essay "On Sight and Colour," which would otherwise have found its place
+here, word for word. Therefore the knowledge of this short, earlier work
+is also presupposed.
+
+Finally, the third demand I have to make on the reader might indeed be
+tacitly assumed, for it is nothing but an acquaintance with the most
+important phenomenon that has appeared in philosophy for two thousand
+years, and that lies so near us: I mean the principal writings of Kant. It
+seems to me, in fact, as indeed has already been said by others, that the
+effect these writings produce in the mind to which they truly speak is
+very like that of the operation for cataract on a blind man: and if we
+wish to pursue the simile further, the aim of my own work may be described
+by saying that I have sought to put into the hands of those upon whom that
+operation has been successfully performed a pair of spectacles suitable to
+eyes that have recovered their sight--spectacles of whose use that
+operation is the absolutely necessary condition. Starting then, as I do to
+a large extent, from what has been accomplished by the great Kant, I have
+yet been enabled, just on account of my earnest study of his writings, to
+discover important errors in them. These I have been obliged to separate
+from the rest and prove to be false, in order that I might be able to
+presuppose and apply what is true and excellent in his doctrine, pure and
+freed from error. But not to interrupt and complicate my own exposition by
+a constant polemic against Kant, I have relegated this to a special
+appendix. It follows then, from what has been said, that my work
+presupposes a knowledge of this appendix just as much as it presupposes a
+knowledge of the philosophy of Kant; and in this respect it would
+therefore be advisable to read the appendix first, all the more as its
+content is specially related to the first book of the present work. On the
+other hand, it could not be avoided, from the nature of the case, that
+here and there the appendix also should refer to the text of the work; and
+the only result of this is, that the appendix, as well as the principal
+part of the work, must be read twice.
+
+The philosophy of Kant, then, is the only philosophy with which a thorough
+acquaintance is directly presupposed in what we have to say here. But if,
+besides this, the reader has lingered in the school of the divine Plato,
+he will be so much the better prepared to hear me, and susceptible to what
+I say. And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit
+conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the
+Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young
+century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the influence of
+the Sanscrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the
+revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the
+reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive
+Indian wisdom, then is he best of all prepared to hear what I have to say
+to him. My work will not speak to him, as to many others, in a strange and
+even hostile tongue; for, if it does not sound too vain, I might express
+the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected aphorisms
+which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the
+thought I am going to impart, though the converse, that my thought is to
+be found in the Upanishads, is by no means the case.
+
+But most readers have already grown angry with impatience, and burst into
+reproaches with difficulty kept back so long. How can I venture to present
+a book to the public under conditions and demands the first two of which
+are presumptuous and altogether immodest, and this at a time when there is
+such a general wealth of special ideas, that in Germany alone they are
+made common property through the press, in three thousand valuable,
+original, and absolutely indispensable works every year, besides
+innumerable periodicals, and even daily papers; at a time when especially
+there is not the least deficiency of entirely original and profound
+philosophers, but in Germany alone there are more of them alive at the
+same time, than several centuries could formerly boast of in succession to
+each other? How is one ever to come to the end, asks the indignant reader,
+if one must set to work upon a book in such a fashion?
+
+As I have absolutely nothing to advance against these reproaches, I only
+hope for some small thanks from such readers for having warned them in
+time, so that they may not lose an hour over a book which it would be
+useless to read without complying with the demands that have been made,
+and which should therefore be left alone, particularly as apart from this
+we might wager a great deal that it can say nothing to them, but rather
+that it will always be only _pancorum hominum_, and must therefore quietly
+and modestly wait for the few whose unusual mode of thought may find it
+enjoyable. For apart from the difficulties and the effort which it
+requires from the reader, what cultured man of this age, whose knowledge
+has almost reached the august point at which the paradoxical and the false
+are all one to it, could bear to meet thoughts almost on every page that
+directly contradict that which he has yet himself established once for all
+as true and undeniable? And then, how disagreeably disappointed will many
+a one be if he finds no mention here of what he believes it is precisely
+here he ought to look for, because his method of speculation agrees with
+that of a great living philosopher,(1) who has certainly written pathetic
+books, and who only has the trifling weakness that he takes all he learned
+and approved before his fifteenth year for inborn ideas of the human mind.
+Who could stand all this? Therefore my advice is simply to lay down the
+book.
+
+But I fear I shall not escape even thus. The reader who has got as far as
+the preface and been stopped by it, has bought the book for cash, and asks
+how he is to be indemnified. My last refuge is now to remind him that he
+knows how to make use of a book in several ways, without exactly reading
+it. It may fill a gap in his library as well as many another, where,
+neatly bound, it will certainly look well. Or he can lay it on the
+toilet-table or the tea-table of some learned lady friend. Or, finally,
+what certainly is best of all, and I specially advise it, he can review
+it.
+
+                  -------------------------------------
+
+And now that I have allowed myself the jest to which in this two-sided
+life hardly any page can be too serious to grant a place, I part with the
+book with deep seriousness, in the sure hope that sooner or later it will
+reach those to whom alone it can be addressed; and for the rest, patiently
+resigned that the same fate should, in full measure, befall it, that in
+all ages has, to some extent, befallen all knowledge, and especially the
+weightiest knowledge of the truth, to which only a brief triumph is
+allotted between the two long periods in which it is condemned as
+paradoxical or disparaged as trivial. The former fate is also wont to
+befall its author. But life is short, and truth works far and lives long:
+let us speak the truth.
+
+_Written at Dresden in August 1818._
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
+
+
+Not to my contemporaries, not to my compatriots--to mankind I commit my now
+completed work in the confidence that it will not be without value for
+them, even if this should be late recognised, as is commonly the lot of
+what is good. For it cannot have been for the passing generation,
+engrossed with the delusion of the moment, that my mind, almost against my
+will, has uninterruptedly stuck to its work through the course of a long
+life. And while the lapse of time has not been able to make me doubt the
+worth of my work, neither has the lack of sympathy; for I constantly saw
+the false and the bad, and finally the absurd and senseless,(2) stand in
+universal admiration and honour, and I bethought myself that if it were
+not the case those who are capable of recognising the genuine and right
+are so rare that we may look for them in vain for some twenty years, then
+those who are capable of producing it could not be so few that their works
+afterwards form an exception to the perishableness of earthly things; and
+thus would be lost the reviving prospect of posterity which every one who
+sets before himself a high aim requires to strengthen him.
+
+Whoever seriously takes up and pursues an object that does not lead to
+material advantages, must not count on the sympathy of his contemporaries.
+For the most part he will see, however, that in the meantime the
+superficial aspect of that object becomes current in the world, and enjoys
+its day; and this is as it should be. The object itself must be pursued
+for its own sake, otherwise it cannot be attained; for any design or
+intention is always dangerous to insight. Accordingly, as the whole
+history of literature proves, everything of real value required a long
+time to gain acceptance, especially if it belonged to the class of
+instructive, not entertaining, works; and meanwhile the false flourished.
+For to combine the object with its superficial appearance is difficult,
+when it is not impossible. Indeed that is just the curse of this world of
+want and need, that everything must serve and slave for these; and
+therefore it is not so constituted that any noble and sublime effort, like
+the endeavour after light and truth, can prosper unhindered and exist for
+its own sake. But even if such an endeavour has once succeeded in
+asserting itself, and the conception of it has thus been introduced,
+material interests and personal aims will immediately take possession of
+it, in order to make it their tool or their mask. Accordingly, when Kant
+brought philosophy again into repute, it had soon to become the tool of
+political aims from above, and personal aims from below; although,
+strictly speaking, not philosophy itself, but its ghost, that passes for
+it. This should not really astonish us; for the incredibly large majority
+of men are by nature quite incapable of any but material aims, indeed they
+can conceive no others. Thus the pursuit of truth alone is far too lofty
+and eccentric an endeavour for us to expect all or many, or indeed even a
+few, faithfully to take part in. If yet we see, as for example at present
+in Germany, a remarkable activity, a general moving, writing, and talking
+with reference to philosophical subjects, we may confidently assume that,
+in spite of solemn looks and assurances, only real, not ideal aims, are
+the actual _primum mobile_, the concealed motive of such a movement; that
+it is personal, official, ecclesiastical, political, in short, material
+ends that are really kept in view, and consequently that mere party ends
+set the pens of so many pretended philosophers in such rapid motion. Thus
+some design or intention, not the desire of insight, is the guiding star
+of these disturbers of the peace, and truth is certainly the last thing
+that is thought of in the matter. It finds no partisans; rather, it may
+pursue its way as silently and unheeded through such a philosophical riot
+as through the winter night of the darkest century bound in the rigid
+faith of the church, when it was communicated only to a few alchemists as
+esoteric learning, or entrusted it may be only to the parchment. Indeed I
+might say that no time can be more unfavourable to philosophy than that in
+which it is shamefully misused, on the one hand to further political
+objects, on the other as a means of livelihood. Or is it believed that
+somehow, with such effort and such a turmoil, the truth, at which it by no
+means aims, will also be brought to light? Truth is no prostitute, that
+throws herself away upon those who do not desire her; she is rather so coy
+a beauty that he who sacrifices everything to her cannot even then be sure
+of her favour.
+
+If Governments make philosophy a means of furthering political ends,
+learned men see in philosophical professorships a trade that nourishes the
+outer man just like any other; therefore they crowd after them in the
+assurance of their good intentions, that is, the purpose of subserving
+these ends. And they keep their word: not truth, not clearness, not Plato,
+not Aristotle, but the ends they were appointed to serve are their guiding
+star, and become at once the criterion of what is true, valuable, and to
+be respected, and of the opposites of these. Whatever, therefore, does not
+answer these ends, even if it were the most important and extraordinary
+things in their department, is either condemned, or, when this seems
+hazardous, suppressed by being unanimously ignored. Look only at their
+zeal against pantheism; will any simpleton believe that it proceeds from
+conviction? And, in general, how is it possible that philosophy, degraded
+to the position of a means of making one's bread, can fail to degenerate
+into sophistry? Just because this is infallibly the case, and the rule, "I
+sing the song of him whose bread I eat," has always held good, the making
+of money by philosophy was regarded by the ancients as the characteristic
+of the sophists. But we have still to add this, that since throughout this
+world nothing is to be expected, can be demanded, or is to be had for gold
+but mediocrity, we must be contented with it here also. Consequently we
+see in all the German universities the cherished mediocrity striving to
+produce the philosophy which as yet is not there to produce, at its own
+expense and indeed in accordance with a predetermined standard and aim, a
+spectacle at which it would be almost cruel to mock.
+
+While thus philosophy has long been obliged to serve entirely as a means
+to public ends on the one side and private ends on the other, I have
+pursued the course of my thought, undisturbed by them, for more than
+thirty years, and simply because I was obliged to do so and could not help
+myself, from an instinctive impulse, which was, however, supported by the
+confidence that anything true one may have thought, and anything obscure
+one may have thrown light upon, will appeal to any thinking mind, no
+matter when it comprehends it, and will rejoice and comfort it. To such an
+one we speak as those who are like us have spoken to us, and have so
+become our comfort in the wilderness of this life. Meanwhile the object is
+pursued on its own account and for its own sake. Now it happens curiously
+enough with philosophical meditations, that precisely that which one has
+thought out and investigated for oneself, is afterwards of benefit to
+others; not that, however, which was originally intended for others. The
+former is confessedly nearest in character to perfect honesty; for a man
+does not seek to deceive himself, nor does he offer himself empty husks;
+so that all sophistication and all mere talk is omitted, and consequently
+every sentence that is written at once repays the trouble of reading it.
+Thus my writings bear the stamp of honesty and openness so distinctly on
+the face of them, that by this alone they are a glaring contrast to those
+of three celebrated sophists of the post-Kantian period. I am always to be
+found at the standpoint of _reflection_, _i.e._, rational deliberation and
+honest statement, never at that of _inspiration_, called intellectual
+intuition, or absolute thought; though, if it received its proper name, it
+would be called empty bombast and charlatanism. Working then in this
+spirit, and always seeing the false and bad in universal acceptance, yea,
+bombast(3) and charlatanism(4) in the highest honour, I have long
+renounced the approbation of my contemporaries. It is impossible that an
+age which for twenty years has applauded a Hegel, that intellectual
+Caliban, as the greatest of the philosophers, so loudly that it echoes
+through the whole of Europe, could make him who has looked on at that
+desirous of its approbation. It has no more crowns of honour to bestow;
+its applause is prostituted, and its censure has no significance. That I
+mean what I say is attested by the fact that if I had in any way sought
+the approbation of my contemporaries, I would have had to strike out a
+score of passages which entirely contradict all their opinions, and indeed
+must in part be offensive to them. But I would count it a crime to
+sacrifice a single syllable to that approbation. My guiding star has, in
+all seriousness, been truth. Following it, I could first aspire only to my
+own approbation, entirely averted from an age deeply degraded as regards
+all higher intellectual efforts, and a national literature demoralised
+even to the exceptions, a literature in which the art of combining lofty
+words with paltry significance has reached its height. I can certainly
+never escape from the errors and weaknesses which, in my case as in every
+one else's, necessarily belong to my nature; but I will not increase them
+by unworthy accommodations.
+
+As regards this second edition, first of all I am glad to say that after
+five and twenty years I find nothing to retract; so that my fundamental
+convictions have only been confirmed, as far as concerns myself at least.
+The alterations in the first volume therefore, which contains the whole
+text of the first edition, nowhere touch what is essential. Sometimes they
+concern things of merely secondary importance, and more often consist of
+very short explanatory additions inserted here and there. Only the
+criticism of the Kantian philosophy has received important corrections and
+large additions, for these could not be put into a supplementary book,
+such as those which are given in the second volume, and which correspond
+to each of the four books that contain the exposition of my own doctrine.
+In the case of the latter, I have chosen this form of enlarging and
+improving them, because the five and twenty years that have passed since
+they were composed have produced so marked a change in my method of
+exposition and in my style, that it would not have done to combine the
+content of the second volume with that of the first, as both must have
+suffered by the fusion. I therefore give both works separately, and in the
+earlier exposition, even in many places where I would now express myself
+quite differently, I have changed nothing, because I desired to guard
+against spoiling the work of my earlier years through the carping
+criticism of age. What in this regard might need correction will correct
+itself in the mind of the reader with the help of the second volume. Both
+volumes have, in the full sense of the word, a supplementary relation to
+each other, so far as this rests on the fact that one age of human life
+is, intellectually, the supplement of another. It will therefore be found,
+not only that each volume contains what the other lacks, but that the
+merits of the one consist peculiarly in that which is wanting in the
+other. Thus, if the first half of my work surpasses the second in what can
+only be supplied by the fire of youth and the energy of first conceptions,
+the second will surpass the first by the ripeness and complete elaboration
+of the thought which can only belong to the fruit of the labour of a long
+life. For when I had the strength originally to grasp the fundamental
+thought of my system, to follow it at once into its four branches, to
+return from them to the unity of their origin, and then to explain the
+whole distinctly, I could not yet be in a position to work out all the
+branches of the system with the fulness, thoroughness, and elaborateness
+which is only reached by the meditation of many years--meditation which is
+required to test and illustrate the system by innumerable facts, to
+support it by the most different kinds of proof, to throw light on it from
+all sides, and then to place the different points of view boldly in
+contrast, to separate thoroughly the multifarious materials, and present
+them in a well-arranged whole. Therefore, although it would, no doubt,
+have been more agreeable to the reader to have my whole work in one piece,
+instead of consisting, as it now does, of two halves, which must be
+combined in using them, he must reflect that this would have demanded that
+I should accomplish at one period of life what it is only possible to
+accomplish in two, for I would have had to possess the qualities at one
+period of life that nature has divided between two quite different ones.
+Hence the necessity of presenting my work in two halves supplementary to
+each other may be compared to the necessity in consequence of which a
+chromatic object-glass, which cannot be made out of one piece, is produced
+by joining together a convex lens of flint glass and a concave lens of
+crown glass, the combined effect of which is what was sought. Yet, on the
+other hand, the reader will find some compensation for the inconvenience
+of using two volumes at once, in the variety and the relief which is
+afforded by the handling of the same subject, by the same mind, in the
+same spirit, but in very different years. However, it is very advisable
+that those who are not yet acquainted with my philosophy should first of
+all read the first volume without using the supplementary books, and
+should make use of these only on a second perusal; otherwise it would be
+too difficult for them to grasp the system in its connection. For it is
+only thus explained in the first volume, while the second is devoted to a
+more detailed investigation and a complete development of the individual
+doctrines. Even those who should not make up their minds to a second
+reading of the first volume had better not read the second volume till
+after the first, and then for itself, in the ordinary sequence of its
+chapters, which, at any rate, stand in some kind of connection, though a
+somewhat looser one, the gaps of which they will fully supply by the
+recollection of the first volume, if they have thoroughly comprehended it.
+Besides, they will find everywhere the reference to the corresponding
+passages of the first volume, the paragraphs of which I have numbered in
+the second edition for this purpose, though in the first edition they were
+only divided by lines.
+
+I have already explained in the preface to the first edition, that my
+philosophy is founded on that of Kant, and therefore presupposes a
+thorough knowledge of it. I repeat this here. For Kant's teaching produces
+in the mind of every one who has comprehended it a fundamental change
+which is so great that it may be regarded as an intellectual new-birth. It
+alone is able really to remove the inborn realism which proceeds from the
+original character of the intellect, which neither Berkeley nor
+Malebranche succeed in doing, for they remain too much in the universal,
+while Kant goes into the particular, and indeed in a way that is quite
+unexampled both before and after him, and which has quite a peculiar, and,
+we might say, immediate effect upon the mind in consequence of which it
+undergoes a complete undeception, and forthwith looks at all things in
+another light. Only in this way can any one become susceptible to the more
+positive expositions which I have to give. On the other hand, he who has
+not mastered the Kantian philosophy, whatever else he may have studied,
+is, as it were, in a state of innocence; that is to say, he remains in the
+grasp of that natural and childish realism in which we are all born, and
+which fits us for everything possible, with the single exception of
+philosophy. Such a man then stands to the man who knows the Kantian
+philosophy as a minor to a man of full age. That this truth should
+nowadays sound paradoxical, which would not have been the case in the
+first thirty years after the appearance of the Critique of Reason, is due
+to the fact that a generation has grown up that does not know Kant
+properly, because it has never heard more of him than a hasty, impatient
+lecture, or an account at second-hand; and this again is due to the fact
+that in consequence of bad guidance, this generation has wasted its time
+with the philosophemes of vulgar, uncalled men, or even of bombastic
+sophists, which are unwarrantably commended to it. Hence the confusion of
+fundamental conceptions, and in general the unspeakable crudeness and
+awkwardness that appears from under the covering of affectation and
+pretentiousness in the philosophical attempts of the generation thus
+brought up. But whoever thinks he can learn Kant's philosophy from the
+exposition of others makes a terrible mistake. Nay, rather I must
+earnestly warn against such accounts, especially the more recent ones; and
+indeed in the years just past I have met with expositions of the Kantian
+philosophy in the writings of the Hegelians which actually reach the
+incredible. How should the minds that in the freshness of youth have been
+strained and ruined by the nonsense of Hegelism, be still capable of
+following Kant's profound investigations? They are early accustomed to
+take the hollowest jingle of words for philosophical thoughts, the most
+miserable sophisms for acuteness, and silly conceits for dialectic, and
+their minds are disorganised through the admission of mad combinations of
+words to which the mind torments and exhausts itself in vain to attach
+some thought. No Critique of Reason can avail them, no philosophy, they
+need a _medicina mentis_, first as a sort of purgative, _un petit cours de
+senscommunologie_, and then one must further see whether, in their case,
+there can even be any talk of philosophy. The Kantian doctrine then will
+be sought for in vain anywhere else but in Kant's own works; but these are
+throughout instructive, even where he errs, even where he fails. In
+consequence of his originality, it holds good of him in the highest
+degree, as indeed of all true philosophers, that one can only come to know
+them from their own works, not from the accounts of others. For the
+thoughts of any extraordinary intellect cannot stand being filtered
+through the vulgar mind. Born behind the broad, high, finely-arched brow,
+from under which shine beaming eyes, they lose all power and life, and
+appear no longer like themselves, when removed to the narrow lodging and
+low roofing of the confined, contracted, thick-walled skull from which
+dull glances steal directed to personal ends. Indeed we may say that minds
+of this kind act like an uneven glass, in which everything is twisted and
+distorted, loses the regularity of its beauty, and becomes a caricature.
+Only from their authors themselves can we receive philosophical thoughts;
+therefore whoever feels himself drawn to philosophy must himself seek out
+its immortal teachers in the still sanctuary of their works. The principal
+chapters of any one of these true philosophers will afford a thousand
+times more insight into their doctrines than the heavy and distorted
+accounts of them that everyday men produce, who are still for the most
+part deeply entangled in the fashionable philosophy of the time, or in the
+sentiments of their own minds. But it is astonishing how decidedly the
+public seizes by preference on these expositions at second-hand. It seems
+really as if elective affinities were at work here, by virtue of which the
+common nature is drawn to its like, and therefore will rather hear what a
+great man has said from one of its own kind. Perhaps this rests on the
+same principle as that of mutual instruction, according to which children
+learn best from children.
+
+                  -------------------------------------
+
+One word more for the professors of philosophy. I have always been
+compelled to admire not merely the sagacity, the true and fine tact with
+which, immediately on its appearance, they recognised my philosophy as
+something altogether different from and indeed dangerous to their own
+attempts, or, in popular language, something that would not suit their
+turn; but also the sure and astute policy by virtue of which they at once
+discovered the proper procedure with regard to it, the complete harmony
+with which they applied it, and the persistency with which they have
+remained faithful to it. This procedure, which further commended itself by
+the great ease of carrying it out, consists, as is well known, in
+altogether ignoring and thus in secreting--according to Goethe's malicious
+phrase, which just means the appropriating of what is of weight and
+significance. The efficiency of this quiet means is increased by the
+Corybantic shouts with which those who are at one reciprocally greet the
+birth of their own spiritual children--shouts which compel the public to
+look and note the air of importance with which they congratulate
+themselves on the event. Who can mistake the object of such proceedings?
+Is there then nothing to oppose to the maxim, _primum vivere, deinde
+philosophari_? These gentlemen desire to live, and indeed to live by
+philosophy. To philosophy they are assigned with their wives and children,
+and in spite of Petrarch's _povera e nuda vai filosofia_, they have staked
+everything upon it. Now my philosophy is by no means so constituted that
+any one can live by it. It lacks the first indispensable requisite of a
+well-paid professional philosophy, a speculative theology, which--in spite
+of the troublesome Kant with his Critique of Reason--should and must, it is
+supposed, be the chief theme of all philosophy, even if it thus takes on
+itself the task of talking straight on of that of which it can know
+absolutely nothing. Indeed my philosophy does not permit to the professors
+the fiction they have so cunningly devised, and which has become so
+indispensable to them, of a reason that knows, perceives, or apprehends
+immediately and absolutely. This is a doctrine which it is only necessary
+to impose upon the reader at starting, in order to pass in the most
+comfortable manner in the world, as it were in a chariot and four, into
+that region beyond the possibility of all experience, which Kant has
+wholly and for ever shut out from our knowledge, and in which are found
+immediately revealed and most beautifully arranged the fundamental dogmas
+of modern, Judaising, optimistic Christianity. Now what in the world has
+my subtle philosophy, deficient as it is in these essential requisites,
+with no intentional aim, and unable to afford a means of subsistence,
+whose pole star is truth alone the naked, unrewarded, unbefriended, often
+persecuted truth, and which steers straight for it without looking to the
+right hand or the left,--what, I say, has this to do with that _alma
+mater_, the good, well-to-do university philosophy which, burdened with a
+hundred aims and a thousand motives, comes on its course cautiously
+tacking, while it keeps before its eyes at all times the fear of the Lord,
+the will of the ministry, the laws of the established church, the wishes
+of the publisher, the attendance of the students, the goodwill of
+colleagues, the course of current politics, the momentary tendency of the
+public, and Heaven knows what besides? Or what has my quiet, earnest
+search for truth in common with the noisy scholastic disputations of the
+chair and the benches, the inmost motives of which are always personal
+aims. The two kinds of philosophy are, indeed, radically different. Thus
+it is that with me there is no compromise and no fellowship, that no one
+reaps any benefit from my works but the man who seeks the truth alone, and
+therefore none of the philosophical parties of the day; for they all
+follow their own aims, while I have only insight into truth to offer,
+which suits none of these aims, because it is not modelled after any of
+them. If my philosophy is to become susceptible of professorial
+exposition, the times must entirely change. What a pretty thing it would
+be if a philosophy by which nobody could live were to gain for itself
+light and air, not to speak of the general ear! This must be guarded
+against, and all must oppose it as one man. But it is not just such an
+easy game to controvert and refute; and, moreover, these are mistaken
+means to employ, because they just direct the attention of the public to
+the matter, and its taste for the lucubrations of the professors of
+philosophy might be destroyed by the perusal of my writings. For whoever
+has tasted of earnest will not relish jest, especially when it is
+tiresome. Therefore the silent system, so unanimously adopted, is the only
+right one, and I can only advise them to stick to it and go on with it as
+long as it will answer, that is, until to ignore is taken to imply
+ignorance; then there will just be time to turn back. Meanwhile it remains
+open to every one to pluck out a small feather here and there for his own
+use, for the superfluity of thoughts at home should not be very
+oppressive. Thus the ignoring and silent system may hold out a good while,
+at least the span of time I may have yet to live, whereby much is already
+won. And if, in the meantime, here and there an indiscreet voice has let
+itself be heard, it is soon drowned by the loud talking of the professors,
+who, with important airs, know how to entertain the public with very
+different things. I advise, however, that the unanimity of procedure
+should be somewhat more strictly observed, and especially that the young
+men should be looked after, for they are sometimes so fearfully
+indiscreet. For even so I cannot guarantee that the commended procedure
+will last for ever, and cannot answer for the final issue. It is a nice
+question as to the steering of the public, which, on the whole, is good
+and tractable. Although we nearly at all times see the Gorgiases and the
+Hippiases uppermost, although the absurd, as a rule, predominates, and it
+seems impossible that the voice of the individual can ever penetrate
+through the chorus of the befooling and the befooled, there yet remains to
+the genuine works of every age a quite peculiar, silent, slow, and
+powerful influence; and, as if by a miracle, we see them rise at last out
+of the turmoil like a balloon that floats up out of the thick atmosphere
+of this globe into purer regions, where, having once arrived, it remains
+at rest, and no one can draw it down again.
+
+_Written at Frankfort-on-the-Maine in February 1844._
+
+
+
+
+
+FIRST BOOK. THE WORLD AS IDEA.
+
+
+
+
+First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient Reason:
+The Object Of Experience And Science.
+
+
+    Sors de l'enfance, ami réveille toi!
+
+    --_Jean Jacques Rousseau._
+
+
+§ 1. "The world is my idea:"--this is a truth which holds good for
+everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into
+reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has
+attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him
+that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a
+sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is
+there only as idea, _i.e._, only in relation to something else, the
+consciousness, which is himself. If any truth can be asserted _a priori_,
+it is this: for it is the expression of the most general form of all
+possible and thinkable experience: a form which is more general than time,
+or space, or causality, for they all presuppose it; and each of these,
+which we have seen to be just so many modes of the principle of sufficient
+reason, is valid only for a particular class of ideas; whereas the
+antithesis of object and subject is the common form of all these classes,
+is that form under which alone any idea of whatever kind it may be,
+abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is possible and thinkable. No
+truth therefore is more certain, more independent of all others, and less
+in need of proof than this, that all that exists for knowledge, and
+therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject,
+perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea. This is obviously true of the
+past and the future, as well as of the present, of what is farthest off,
+as of what is near; for it is true of time and space themselves, in which
+alone these distinctions arise. All that in any way belongs or can belong
+to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject, and
+exists only for the subject. The world is idea.
+
+This truth is by no means new. It was implicitly involved in the sceptical
+reflections from which Descartes started. Berkeley, however, was the first
+who distinctly enunciated it, and by this he has rendered a permanent
+service to philosophy, even though the rest of his teaching should not
+endure. Kant's primary mistake was the neglect of this principle, as is
+shown in the appendix. How early again this truth was recognised by the
+wise men of India, appearing indeed as the fundamental tenet of the
+Vedânta philosophy ascribed to Vyasa, is pointed out by Sir William Jones
+in the last of his essays: "On the philosophy of the Asiatics" (Asiatic
+Researches, vol. iv. p. 164), where he says, "The fundamental tenet of the
+Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is,
+of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be
+lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending
+that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence
+and perceptibility are convertible terms." These words adequately express
+the compatibility of empirical reality and transcendental ideality.
+
+In this first book, then, we consider the world only from this side, only
+so far as it is idea. The inward reluctance with which any one accepts the
+world as merely his idea, warns him that this view of it, however true it
+may be, is nevertheless one-sided, adopted in consequence of some
+arbitrary abstraction. And yet it is a conception from which he can never
+free himself. The defectiveness of this view will be corrected in the next
+book by means of a truth which is not so immediately certain as that from
+which we start here; a truth at which we can arrive only by deeper
+research and more severe abstraction, by the separation of what is
+different and the union of what is identical. This truth, which must be
+very serious and impressive if not awful to every one, is that a man can
+also say and must say, "the world is my will."
+
+In this book, however, we must consider separately that aspect of the
+world from which we start, its aspect as knowable, and therefore, in the
+meantime, we must, without reserve, regard all presented objects, even our
+own bodies (as we shall presently show more fully), merely as ideas, and
+call them merely ideas. By so doing we always abstract from will (as we
+hope to make clear to every one further on), which by itself constitutes
+the other aspect of the world. For as the world is in one aspect entirely
+_idea_, so in another it is entirely _will_. A reality which is neither of
+these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in itself has
+unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the phantom of a dream,
+and its acceptance is an _ignis fatuus_ in philosophy.
+
+§ 2. That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject. Thus
+it is the supporter of the world, that condition of all phenomena, of all
+objects which is always pre-supposed throughout experience; for all that
+exists, exists only for the subject. Every one finds himself to be
+subject, yet only in so far as he knows, not in so far as he is an object
+of knowledge. But his body is object, and therefore from this point of
+view we call it idea. For the body is an object among objects, and is
+conditioned by the laws of objects, although it is an immediate object.
+Like all objects of perception, it lies within the universal forms of
+knowledge, time and space, which are the conditions of multiplicity. The
+subject, on the contrary, which is always the knower, never the known,
+does not come under these forms, but is presupposed by them; it has
+therefore neither multiplicity nor its opposite unity. We never know it,
+but it is always the knower wherever there is knowledge.
+
+So then the world as idea, the only aspect in which we consider it at
+present, has two fundamental, necessary, and inseparable halves. The one
+half is the object, the forms of which are space and time, and through
+these multiplicity. The other half is the subject, which is not in space
+and time, for it is present, entire and undivided, in every percipient
+being. So that any one percipient being, with the object, constitutes the
+whole world as idea just as fully as the existing millions could do; but
+if this one were to disappear, then the whole world as idea would cease to
+be. These halves are therefore inseparable even for thought, for each of
+the two has meaning and existence only through and for the other, each
+appears with the other and vanishes with it. They limit each other
+immediately; where the object begins the subject ends. The universality of
+this limitation is shown by the fact that the essential and hence
+universal forms of all objects, space, time, and causality, may, without
+knowledge of the object, be discovered and fully known from a
+consideration of the subject, _i.e._, in Kantian language, they lie _a
+priori_ in our consciousness. That he discovered this is one of Kant's
+principal merits, and it is a great one. I however go beyond this, and
+maintain that the principle of sufficient reason is the general expression
+for all these forms of the object of which we are _a priori_ conscious;
+and that therefore all that we know purely _a priori_, is merely the
+content of that principle and what follows from it; in it all our certain
+_a priori_ knowledge is expressed. In my essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason I have shown in detail how every possible object comes
+under it; that is, stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on the
+one side as determined, on the other side as determining: this is of such
+wide application, that the whole existence of all objects, so far as they
+are objects, ideas and nothing more, may be entirely traced to this their
+necessary relation to each other, rests only in it, is in fact merely
+relative; but of this more presently. I have further shown, that the
+necessary relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses
+generally, appears in other forms corresponding to the classes into which
+objects are divided, according to their possibility; and again that by
+these forms the proper division of the classes is tested. I take it for
+granted that what I said in this earlier essay is known and present to the
+reader, for if it had not been already said it would necessarily find its
+place here.
+
+§ 3. The chief distinction among our ideas is that between ideas of
+perception and abstract ideas. The latter form just one class of ideas,
+namely concepts, and these are the possession of man alone of all
+creatures upon earth. The capacity for these, which distinguishes him from
+all the lower animals, has always been called reason.(5) We shall consider
+these abstract ideas by themselves later, but, in the first place, we
+shall speak exclusively of the _ideas of perception_. These comprehend the
+whole visible world, or the sum total of experience, with the conditions
+of its possibility. We have already observed that it is a highly important
+discovery of Kant's, that these very conditions, these forms of the
+visible world, _i.e._, the absolutely universal element in its perception,
+the common property of all its phenomena, space and time, even when taken
+by themselves and apart from their content, can, not only be thought in
+the abstract, but also be directly perceived; and that this perception or
+intuition is not some kind of phantasm arising from constant recurrence in
+experience, but is so entirely independent of experience that we must
+rather regard the latter as dependent on it, inasmuch as the qualities of
+space and time, as they are known in _a priori_ perception or intuition,
+are valid for all possible experience, as rules to which it must
+invariably conform. Accordingly, in my essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason, I have treated space and time, because they are
+perceived as pure and empty of content, as a special and independent class
+of ideas. This quality of the universal forms of intuition, which was
+discovered by Kant, that they may be perceived in themselves and apart
+from experience, and that they may be known as exhibiting those laws on
+which is founded the infallible science of mathematics, is certainly very
+important. Not less worthy of remark, however, is this other quality of
+time and space, that the principle of sufficient reason, which conditions
+experience as the law of causation and of motive, and thought as the law
+of the basis of judgment, appears here in quite a special form, to which I
+have given the name of the ground of being. In time, this is the
+succession of its moments, and in space the position of its parts, which
+reciprocally determine each other _ad infinitum_.
+
+Any one who has fully understood from the introductory essay the complete
+identity of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in all its
+different forms, must also be convinced of the importance of the knowledge
+of the simplest of these forms, as affording him insight into his own
+inmost nature. This simplest form of the principle we have found to be
+time. In it each instant is, only in so far as it has effaced the
+preceding one, its generator, to be itself in turn as quickly effaced. The
+past and the future (considered apart from the consequences of their
+content) are empty as a dream, and the present is only the indivisible and
+unenduring boundary between them. And in all the other forms of the
+principle of sufficient reason, we shall find the same emptiness, and
+shall see that not time only but also space, and the whole content of both
+of them, _i.e._, all that proceeds from causes and motives, has a merely
+relative existence, is only through and for another like to itself,
+_i.e._, not more enduring. The substance of this doctrine is old: it
+appears in Heraclitus when he laments the eternal flux of things; in Plato
+when he degrades the object to that which is ever becoming, but never
+being; in Spinoza as the doctrine of the mere accidents of the one
+substance which is and endures. Kant opposes what is thus known as the
+mere phenomenon to the thing in itself. Lastly, the ancient wisdom of the
+Indian philosophers declares, "It is Mâyâ, the veil of deception, which
+blinds the eyes of mortals, and makes them behold a world of which they
+cannot say either that it is or that it is not: for it is like a dream; it
+is like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller takes from afar for
+water, or the stray piece of rope he mistakes for a snake." (These similes
+are repeated in innumerable passages of the Vedas and the Puranas.) But
+what all these mean, and that of which they all speak, is nothing more
+than what we have just considered--the world as idea subject to the
+principle of sufficient reason.
+
+§ 4. Whoever has recognised the form of the principle of sufficient
+reason, which appears in pure time as such, and on which all counting and
+arithmetical calculation rests, has completely mastered the nature of
+time. Time is nothing more than that form of the principle of sufficient
+reason, and has no further significance. Succession is the form of the
+principle of sufficient reason in time, and succession is the whole nature
+of time. Further, whoever has recognised the principle of sufficient
+reason as it appears in the presentation of pure space, has exhausted the
+whole nature of space, which is absolutely nothing more than that
+possibility of the reciprocal determination of its parts by each other,
+which is called position. The detailed treatment of this, and the
+formulation in abstract conceptions of the results which flow from it, so
+that they may be more conveniently used, is the subject of the science of
+geometry. Thus also, whoever has recognised the law of causation, the
+aspect of the principle of sufficient reason which appears in what fills
+these forms (space and time) as objects of perception, that is to say
+matter, has completely mastered the nature of matter as such, for matter
+is nothing more than causation, as any one will see at once if he
+reflects. Its true being is its action, nor can we possibly conceive it as
+having any other meaning. Only as active does it fill space and time; its
+action upon the immediate object (which is itself matter) determines that
+perception in which alone it exists. The consequence of the action of any
+material object upon any other, is known only in so far as the latter acts
+upon the immediate object in a different way from that in which it acted
+before; it consists only of this. Cause and effect thus constitute the
+whole nature of matter; its true being is its action. (A fuller treatment
+of this will be found in the essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason,
+§ 21, p. 77.) The nature of all material things is therefore very
+appropriately called in German _Wirklichkeit_,(6) a word which is far more
+expressive than _Realität_. Again, that which is acted upon is always
+matter, and thus the whole being and essence of matter consists in the
+orderly change, which one part of it brings about in another part. The
+existence of matter is therefore entirely relative, according to a
+relation which is valid only within its limits, as in the case of time and
+space.
+
+But time and space, each for itself, can be mentally presented apart from
+matter, whereas matter cannot be so presented apart from time and space.
+The form which is inseparable from it presupposes space, and the action in
+which its very existence consists, always imports some change, in other
+words a determination in time. But space and time are not only, each for
+itself, presupposed by matter, but a union of the two constitutes its
+essence, for this, as we have seen, consists in action, _i.e._, in
+causation. All the innumerable conceivable phenomena and conditions of
+things, might be coexistent in boundless space, without limiting each
+other, or might be successive in endless time without interfering with
+each other: thus a necessary relation of these phenomena to each other,
+and a law which should regulate them according to such a relation, is by
+no means needful, would not, indeed, be applicable: it therefore follows
+that in the case of all co-existence in space and change in time, so long
+as each of these forms preserves for itself its condition and its course
+without any connection with the other, there can be no causation, and
+since causation constitutes the essential nature of matter, there can be
+no matter. But the law of causation receives its meaning and necessity
+only from this, that the essence of change does not consist simply in the
+mere variation of things, but rather in the fact that at the _same part of
+space_ there is now _one thing_ and then _another_, and at _one_ and the
+same point of time there is _here_ one thing and there _another_: only
+this reciprocal limitation of space and time by each other gives meaning,
+and at the same time necessity, to a law, according to which change must
+take place. What is determined by the law of causality is therefore not
+merely a succession of things in time, but this succession with reference
+to a definite space, and not merely existence of things in a particular
+place, but in this place at a different point of time. Change, _i.e._,
+variation which takes place according to the law of causality, implies
+always a determined part of space and a determined part of time together
+and in union. Thus causality unites space with time. But we found that the
+whole essence of matter consisted in action, _i.e._, in causation,
+consequently space and time must also be united in matter, that is to say,
+matter must take to itself at once the distinguishing qualities both of
+space and time, however much these may be opposed to each other, and must
+unite in itself what is impossible for each of these independently, that
+is, the fleeting course of time, with the rigid unchangeable perduration
+of space: infinite divisibility it receives from both. It is for this
+reason that we find that co-existence, which could neither be in time
+alone, for time has no contiguity, nor in space alone, for space has no
+before, after, or now, is first established through matter. But the
+co-existence of many things constitutes, in fact, the essence of reality,
+for through it permanence first becomes possible; for permanence is only
+knowable in the change of something which is present along with what is
+permanent, while on the other hand it is only because something permanent
+is present along with what changes, that the latter gains the special
+character of change, _i.e._, the mutation of quality and form in the
+permanence of substance, that is to say, in matter.(7) If the world were
+in space alone, it would be rigid and immovable, without succession,
+without change, without action; but we know that with action, the idea of
+matter first appears. Again, if the world were in time alone, all would be
+fleeting, without persistence, without contiguity, hence without
+co-existence, and consequently without permanence; so that in this case
+also there would be no matter. Only through the union of space and time do
+we reach matter, and matter is the possibility of co-existence, and,
+through that, of permanence; through permanence again matter is the
+possibility of the persistence of substance in the change of its
+states.(8) As matter consists in the union of space and time, it bears
+throughout the stamp of both. It manifests its origin in space, partly
+through the form which is inseparable from it, but especially through its
+persistence (substance), the _a priori_ certainty of which is therefore
+wholly deducible from that of space(9) (for variation belongs to time
+alone, but in it alone and for itself nothing is persistent). Matter shows
+that it springs from time by quality (accidents), without which it never
+exists, and which is plainly always causality, action upon other matter,
+and therefore change (a time concept). The law of this action, however,
+always depends upon space and time together, and only thus obtains
+meaning. The regulative function of causality is confined entirely to the
+determination of what must occupy _this time and this space_. The fact
+that we know _a priori_ the unalterable characteristics of matter, depends
+upon this derivation of its essential nature from the forms of our
+knowledge of which we are conscious _a priori_. These unalterable
+characteristics are space-occupation, _i.e._, impenetrability, _i.e._,
+causal action, consequently, extension, infinite divisibility,
+persistence, _i.e._, indestructibility, and lastly mobility: weight, on
+the other hand, notwithstanding its universality, must be attributed to _a
+posteriori_ knowledge, although Kant, in his "Metaphysical Introduction to
+Natural Philosophy," p. 71 (p. 372 of Rosenkranz's edition), treats it as
+knowable _a priori_.
+
+But as the object in general is only for the subject, as its idea, so
+every special class of ideas is only for an equally special quality in the
+subject, which is called a faculty of perception. This subjective
+correlative of time and space in themselves as empty forms, has been named
+by Kant pure sensibility; and we may retain this expression, as Kant was
+the first to treat of the subject, though it is not exact, for sensibility
+presupposes matter. The subjective correlative of matter or of causation,
+for these two are the same, is understanding, which is nothing more than
+this. To know causality is its one function, its only power; and it is a
+great one, embracing much, of manifold application, yet of unmistakable
+identity in all its manifestations. Conversely all causation, that is to
+say, all matter, or the whole of reality, is only for the understanding,
+through the understanding, and in the understanding. The first, simplest,
+and ever-present example of understanding is the perception of the actual
+world. This is throughout knowledge of the cause from the effect, and
+therefore all perception is intellectual. The understanding could never
+arrive at this perception, however, if some effect did not become known
+immediately, and thus serve as a starting-point. But this is the affection
+of the animal body. So far, then, the animal body is the _immediate
+object_ of the subject; the perception of all other objects becomes
+possible through it. The changes which every animal body experiences, are
+immediately known, that is, felt; and as these effects are at once
+referred to their causes, the perception of the latter as _objects_
+arises. This relation is no conclusion in abstract conceptions; it does
+not arise from reflection, nor is it arbitrary, but immediate, necessary,
+and certain. It is the method of knowing of the pure understanding,
+without which there could be no perception; there would only remain a dull
+plant-like consciousness of the changes of the immediate object, which
+would succeed each other in an utterly unmeaning way, except in so far as
+they might have a meaning for the will either as pain or pleasure. But as
+with the rising of the sun the visible world appears, so at one stroke,
+the understanding, by means of its one simple function, changes the dull,
+meaningless sensation into perception. What the eye, the ear, or the hand
+feels, is not perception; it is merely its data. By the understanding
+passing from the effect to the cause, the world first appears as
+perception extended in space, varying in respect of form, persistent
+through all time in respect of matter; for the understanding unites space
+and time in the idea of matter, that is, causal action. As the world as
+idea exists only through the understanding, so also it exists only for the
+understanding. In the first chapter of my essay on "Light and Colour," I
+have already explained how the understanding constructs perceptions out of
+the data supplied by the senses; how by comparison of the impressions
+which the various senses receive from the object, a child arrives at
+perceptions; how this alone affords the solution of so many phenomena of
+the senses; the single vision of two eyes, the double vision in the case
+of a squint, or when we try to look at once at objects which lie at
+unequal distances behind each other; and all illusion which is produced by
+a sudden alteration in the organs of sense. But I have treated this
+important subject much more fully and thoroughly in the second edition of
+the essay on "The Principle of Sufficient Reason," § 21. All that is said
+there would find its proper place here, and would therefore have to be
+said again; but as I have almost as much disinclination to quote myself as
+to quote others, and as I am unable to explain the subject better than it
+is explained there, I refer the reader to it, instead of quoting it, and
+take for granted that it is known.
+
+The process by which children, and persons born blind who have been
+operated upon, learn to see, the single vision of the double sensation of
+two eyes, the double vision and double touch which occur when the organs
+of sense have been displaced from their usual position, the upright
+appearance of objects while the picture on the retina is upside down, the
+attributing of colour to the outward objects, whereas it is merely an
+inner function, a division through polarisation, of the activity of the
+eye, and lastly the stereoscope,--all these are sure and incontrovertible
+evidence that perception is not merely of the senses, but
+intellectual--that is, _pure knowledge through the understanding of the
+cause from the effect_, and that, consequently, it presupposes the law of
+causality, in a knowledge of which all perception--that is to say all
+experience, by virtue of its primary and only possibility, depends. The
+contrary doctrine that the law of causality results from experience, which
+was the scepticism of Hume, is first refuted by this. For the independence
+of the knowledge of causality of all experience,--that is, its _a priori_
+character--can only be deduced from the dependence of all experience upon
+it; and this deduction can only be accomplished by proving, in the manner
+here indicated, and explained in the passages referred to above, that the
+knowledge of causality is included in perception in general, to which all
+experience belongs, and therefore in respect of experience is completely
+_a priori_, does not presuppose it, but is presupposed by it as a
+condition. This, however, cannot be deduced in the manner attempted by
+Kant, which I have criticised in the essay on "The Principle of Sufficient
+Reason," § 23.
+
+§ 5. It is needful to guard against the grave error of supposing that
+because perception arises through the knowledge of causality, the relation
+of subject and object is that of cause and effect. For this relation
+subsists only between the immediate object and objects known indirectly,
+thus always between objects alone. It is this false supposition that has
+given rise to the foolish controversy about the reality of the outer
+world; a controversy in which dogmatism and scepticism oppose each other,
+and the former appears, now as realism, now as idealism. Realism treats
+the object as cause, and the subject as its effect. The idealism of Fichte
+reduces the object to the effect of the subject. Since however, and this
+cannot be too much emphasised, there is absolutely no relation according
+to the principle of sufficient reason between subject and object, neither
+of these views could be proved, and therefore scepticism attacked them
+both with success. Now, just as the law of causality precedes perception
+and experience as their condition, and therefore cannot (as Hume thought)
+be derived from them, so object and subject precede all knowledge, and
+hence the principle of sufficient reason in general, as its first
+condition; for this principle is merely the form of all objects, the whole
+nature and possibility of their existence as phenomena: but the object
+always presupposes the subject; and therefore between these two there can
+be no relation of reason and consequent. My essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason accomplishes just this: it explains the content of that
+principle as the essential form of every object--that is to say, as the
+universal nature of all objective existence, as something which pertains
+to the object as such; but the object as such always presupposes the
+subject as its necessary correlative; and therefore the subject remains
+always outside the province in which the principle of sufficient reason is
+valid. The controversy as to the reality of the outer world rests upon
+this false extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason
+to the subject also, and starting with this mistake it can never
+understand itself. On the one side realistic dogmatism, looking upon the
+idea as the effect of the object, desires to separate these two, idea and
+object, which are really one, and to assume a cause quite different from
+the idea, an object in itself, independent of the subject, a thing which
+is quite inconceivable; for even as object it presupposes subject, and so
+remains its idea. Opposed to this doctrine is scepticism, which makes the
+same false presupposition that in the idea we have only the effect, never
+the cause, therefore never real being; that we always know merely the
+action of the object. But this object, it supposes, may perhaps have no
+resemblance whatever to its effect, may indeed have been quite erroneously
+received as the cause, for the law of causality is first to be gathered
+from experience, and the reality of experience is then made to rest upon
+it. Thus both of these views are open to the correction, firstly, that
+object and idea are the same; secondly, that the true being of the object
+of perception is its action, that the reality of the thing consists in
+this, and the demand for an existence of the object outside the idea of
+the subject, and also for an essence of the actual thing different from
+its action, has absolutely no meaning, and is a contradiction: and that
+the knowledge of the nature of the effect of any perceived object,
+exhausts such an object itself, so far as it is object, _i.e._, idea, for
+beyond this there is nothing more to be known. So far then, the perceived
+world in space and time, which makes itself known as causation alone, is
+entirely real, and is throughout simply what it appears to be, and it
+appears wholly and without reserve as idea, bound together according to
+the law of causality. This is its empirical reality. On the other hand,
+all causality is in the understanding alone, and for the understanding.
+The whole actual, that is, active world is determined as such through the
+understanding, and apart from it is nothing. This, however, is not the
+only reason for altogether denying such a reality of the outer world as is
+taught by the dogmatist, who explains its reality as its independence of
+the subject. We also deny it, because no object apart from a subject can
+be conceived without contradiction. The whole world of objects is and
+remains idea, and therefore wholly and for ever determined by the subject;
+that is to say, it has transcendental ideality. But it is not therefore
+illusion or mere appearance; it presents itself as that which it is, idea,
+and indeed as a series of ideas of which the common bond is the principle
+of sufficient reason. It is according to its inmost meaning quite
+comprehensible to the healthy understanding, and speaks a language quite
+intelligible to it. To dispute about its reality can only occur to a mind
+perverted by over-subtilty, and such discussion always arises from a false
+application of the principle of sufficient reason, which binds all ideas
+together of whatever kind they may be, but by no means connects them with
+the subject, nor yet with a something which is neither subject nor object,
+but only the ground of the object; an absurdity, for only objects can be
+and always are the ground of objects. If we examine more closely the
+source of this question as to the reality of the outer world, we find that
+besides the false application of the principle of sufficient reason
+generally to what lies beyond its province, a special confusion of its
+forms is also involved; for that form which it has only in reference to
+concepts or abstract ideas, is applied to perceived ideas, real objects;
+and a ground of knowing is demanded of objects, whereas they can have
+nothing but a ground of being. Among the abstract ideas, the concepts
+united in the judgment, the principle of sufficient reason appears in such
+a way that each of these has its worth, its validity, and its whole
+existence, here called _truth_, simply and solely through the relation of
+the judgment to something outside of it, its ground of knowledge, to which
+there must consequently always be a return. Among real objects, ideas of
+perception, on the other hand, the principle of sufficient reason appears
+not as the principle of the ground of _knowing_, but of _being_, as the
+law of causality: every real object has paid its debt to it, inasmuch as
+it has come to be, _i.e._, has appeared as the effect of a cause. The
+demand for a ground of knowing has therefore here no application and no
+meaning, but belongs to quite another class of things. Thus the world of
+perception raises in the observer no question or doubt so long as he
+remains in contact with it: there is here neither error nor truth, for
+these are confined to the province of the abstract--the province of
+reflection. But here the world lies open for sense and understanding;
+presents itself with naive truth as that which it really is--ideas of
+perception which develop themselves according to the law of causality.
+
+So far as we have considered the question of the reality of the outer
+world, it arises from a confusion which amounts even to a misunderstanding
+of reason itself, and therefore thus far, the question could be answered
+only by explaining its meaning. After examination of the whole nature of
+the principle of sufficient reason, of the relation of subject and object,
+and the special conditions of sense perception, the question itself
+disappeared because it had no longer any meaning. There is, however, one
+other possible origin of this question, quite different from the purely
+speculative one which we have considered, a specially empirical origin,
+though the question is always raised from a speculative point of view, and
+in this form it has a much more comprehensible meaning than it had in the
+first. We have dreams; may not our whole life be a dream? or more exactly:
+is there a sure criterion of the distinction between dreams and reality?
+between phantasms and real objects? The assertion that what is dreamt is
+less vivid and distinct than what we actually perceive is not to the
+point, because no one has ever been able to make a fair comparison of the
+two; for we can only compare the recollection of a dream with the present
+reality. Kant answers the question thus: "The connection of ideas among
+themselves, according to the law of causality, constitutes the difference
+between real life and dreams." But in dreams, as well as in real life,
+everything is connected individually at any rate, in accordance with the
+principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and this connection is
+broken only between life and dreams, or between one dream and another.
+Kant's answer therefore could only run thus:--the _long_ dream (life) has
+throughout complete connection according to the principle of sufficient
+reason; it has not this connection, however, with _short_ dreams, although
+each of these has in itself the same connection: the bridge is therefore
+broken between the former and the latter, and on this account we
+distinguish them.
+
+But to institute an inquiry according to this criterion, as to whether
+something was dreamt or seen, would always be difficult and often
+impossible. For we are by no means in a position to trace link by link the
+causal connection between any experienced event and the present moment,
+but we do not on that account explain it as dreamt. Therefore in real life
+we do not commonly employ that method of distinguishing between dreams and
+reality. The only sure criterion by which to distinguish them is in fact
+the entirely empirical one of awaking, through which at any rate the
+causal connection between dreamed events and those of waking life, is
+distinctly and sensibly broken off. This is strongly supported by the
+remark of Hobbes in the second chapter of Leviathan, that we easily
+mistake dreams for reality if we have unintentionally fallen asleep
+without taking off our clothes, and much more so when it also happens that
+some undertaking or design fills all our thoughts, and occupies our dreams
+as well as our waking moments. We then observe the awaking just as little
+as the falling asleep, dream and reality run together and become
+confounded. In such a case there is nothing for it but the application of
+Kant's criterion; but if, as often happens, we fail to establish by means
+of this criterion, either the existence of causal connection with the
+present, or the absence of such connection, then it must for ever remain
+uncertain whether an event was dreamt or really happened. Here, in fact,
+the intimate relationship between life and dreams is brought out very
+clearly, and we need not be ashamed to confess it, as it has been
+recognised and spoken of by many great men. The Vedas and Puranas have no
+better simile than a dream for the whole knowledge of the actual world,
+which they call the web of Mâyâ, and they use none more frequently. Plato
+often says that men live only in a dream; the philosopher alone strives to
+awake himself. Pindar says (ii. {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}. 135): {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} (umbræ
+somnium homo), and Sophocles:--
+
+
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}.--Ajax, 125.
+
+
+(Nos enim, quicunque vivimus, nihil aliud esse comperio quam simulacra et
+levem umbram.) Beside which most worthily stands Shakespeare:--
+
+
+          "We are such stuff
+    As dreams are made on, and our little life
+    Is rounded with a sleep."--_Tempest_, Act iv. Sc. 1.
+
+
+Lastly, Calderon was so deeply impressed with this view of life that he
+sought to embody it in a kind of metaphysical drama--"Life a Dream."
+
+After these numerous quotations from the poets, perhaps I also may be
+allowed to express myself by a metaphor. Life and dreams are leaves of the
+same book. The systematic reading of this book is real life, but when the
+reading hours (that is, the day) are over, we often continue idly to turn
+over the leaves, and read a page here and there without method or
+connection: often one we have read before, sometimes one that is new to
+us, but always in the same book. Such an isolated page is indeed out of
+connection with the systematic study of the book, but it does not seem so
+very different when we remember that the whole continuous perusal begins
+and ends just as abruptly, and may therefore be regarded as merely a
+larger single page.
+
+Thus although individual dreams are distinguished from real life by the
+fact that they do not fit into that continuity which runs through the
+whole of experience, and the act of awaking brings this into
+consciousness, yet that very continuity of experience belongs to real life
+as its form, and the dream on its part can point to a similar continuity
+in itself. If, therefore, we consider the question from a point of view
+external to both, there is no distinct difference in their nature, and we
+are forced to concede to the poets that life is a long dream.
+
+Let us turn back now from this quite independent empirical origin of the
+question of the reality of the outer world, to its speculative origin. We
+found that this consisted, first, in the false application of the
+principle of sufficient reason to the relation of subject and object; and
+secondly, in the confusion of its forms, inasmuch as the principle of
+sufficient reason of knowing was extended to a province in which the
+principle of sufficient reason of being is valid. But the question could
+hardly have occupied philosophers so constantly if it were entirely devoid
+of all real content, and if some true thought and meaning did not lie at
+its heart as its real source. Accordingly, we must assume that when the
+element of truth that lies at the bottom of the question first came into
+reflection and sought its expression, it became involved in these confused
+and meaningless forms and problems. This at least is my opinion, and I
+think that the true expression of that inmost meaning of the question,
+which it failed to find, is this:--What is this world of perception besides
+being my idea? Is that of which I am conscious only as idea, exactly like
+my own body, of which I am doubly conscious, in one aspect as _idea_, in
+another aspect as _will_? The fuller explanation of this question and its
+answer in the affirmative, will form the content of the second book, and
+its consequences will occupy the remaining portion of this work.
+
+§ 6. For the present, however, in this first book we consider everything
+merely as idea, as object for the subject. And our own body, which is the
+starting-point for each of us in our perception of the world, we consider,
+like all other real objects, from the side of its knowableness, and in
+this regard it is simply an idea. Now the consciousness of every one is in
+general opposed to the explanation of objects as mere ideas, and more
+especially to the explanation of our bodies as such; for the thing in
+itself is known to each of us immediately in so far as it appears as our
+own body; but in so far as it objectifies itself in the other objects of
+perception, it is known only indirectly. But this abstraction, this
+one-sided treatment, this forcible separation of what is essentially and
+necessarily united, is only adopted to meet the demands of our argument;
+and therefore the disinclination to it must, in the meantime, be
+suppressed and silenced by the expectation that the subsequent treatment
+will correct the one-sidedness of the present one, and complete our
+knowledge of the nature of the world.
+
+At present therefore the body is for us immediate object; that is to say,
+that idea which forms the starting-point of the subject's knowledge;
+because the body, with its immediately known changes, precedes the
+application of the law of causality, and thus supplies it with its first
+data. The whole nature of matter consists, as we have seen, in its causal
+action. But cause and effect exist only for the understanding, which is
+nothing but their subjective correlative. The understanding, however,
+could never come into operation if there were not something else from
+which it starts. This is simple sensation--the immediate consciousness of
+the changes of the body, by virtue of which it is immediate object. Thus
+the possibility of knowing the world of perception depends upon two
+conditions; the first, _objectively expressed_, is the power of material
+things to act upon each other, to produce changes in each other, without
+which common quality of all bodies no perception would be possible, even
+by means of the sensibility of the animal body. And if we wish to express
+this condition _subjectively_ we say: The understanding first makes
+perception possible; for the law of causality, the possibility of effect
+and cause, springs only from the understanding, and is valid only for it,
+and therefore the world of perception exists only through and for it. The
+second condition is the sensibility of animal bodies, or the quality of
+being immediate objects of the subject which certain bodies possess. The
+mere modification which the organs of sense sustain from without through
+their specific affections, may here be called ideas, so far as these
+affections produce neither pain nor pleasure, that is, have no immediate
+significance for the will, and are yet perceived, exist therefore only for
+_knowledge_. Thus far, then, I say that the body is immediately _known_,
+is _immediate object_. But the conception of object is not to be taken
+here in its fullest sense, for through this immediate knowledge of the
+body, which precedes the operation of the understanding, and is mere
+sensation, our own body does not exist specifically as _object_, but first
+the material things which affect it: for all knowledge of an object
+proper, of an idea perceived in space, exists only through and for the
+understanding; therefore not before, but only subsequently to its
+operation. Therefore the body as object proper, that is, as an idea
+perceived in space, is first known indirectly, like all other objects,
+through the application of the law of causality to the action of one of
+its parts upon another, as, for example, when the eye sees the body or the
+hand touches it. Consequently the form of our body does not become known
+to us through mere feeling, but only through knowledge, only in idea; that
+is to say, only in the brain does our own body first come to appear as
+extended, articulate, organic. A man born blind receives this idea only
+little by little from the data afforded by touch. A blind man without
+hands could never come to know his own form; or at the most could infer
+and construct it little by little from the effects of other bodies upon
+him. If, then, we call the body an immediate object, we are to be
+understood with these reservations.
+
+In other respects, then, according to what has been said, all animal
+bodies are immediate objects; that is, starting-points for the subject
+which always knows and therefore is never known in its perception of the
+world. Thus the distinctive characteristic of animal life is knowledge,
+with movement following on motives, which are determined by knowledge,
+just as movement following on stimuli is the distinctive characteristic of
+plant-life. Unorganised matter, however, has no movement except such as is
+produced by causes properly so called, using the term in its narrowest
+sense. All this I have thoroughly discussed in my essay on the principle
+of sufficient reason, § 20, in the "Ethics," first essay, iii., and in my
+work on Sight and Colour, § 1, to which I therefore refer.
+
+It follows from what has been said, that all animals, even the least
+developed, have understanding; for they all know objects, and this
+knowledge determines their movements as motive. Understanding is the same
+in all animals and in all men; it has everywhere the same simple form;
+knowledge of causality, transition from effect to cause, and from cause to
+effect, nothing more; but the degree of its acuteness, and the extension
+of the sphere of its knowledge varies enormously, with innumerable
+gradations from the lowest form, which is only conscious of the causal
+connection between the immediate object and objects affecting it--that is
+to say, perceives a cause as an object in space by passing to it from the
+affection which the body feels, to the higher grades of knowledge of the
+causal connection among objects known indirectly, which extends to the
+understanding of the most complicated system of cause and effect in
+nature. For even this high degree of knowledge is still the work of the
+understanding, not of the reason. The abstract concepts of the reason can
+only serve to take up the objective connections which are immediately
+known by the understanding, to make them permanent for thought, and to
+relate them to each other; but reason never gives us immediate knowledge.
+Every force and law of nature, every example of such forces and laws, must
+first be immediately known by the understanding, must be apprehended
+through perception before it can pass into abstract consciousness for
+reason. Hooke's discovery of the law of gravitation, and the reference of
+so many important phenomena to this one law, was the work of immediate
+apprehension by the understanding; and such also was the proof of Newton's
+calculations, and Lavoisier's discovery of acids and their important
+function in nature, and also Goethe's discovery of the origin of physical
+colours. All these discoveries are nothing more than a correct immediate
+passage from the effect to the cause, which is at once followed by the
+recognition of the ideality of the force of nature which expresses itself
+in all causes of the same kind; and this complete insight is just an
+example of that single function of the understanding, by which an animal
+perceives as an object in space the cause which affects its body, and
+differs from such a perception only in degree. Every one of these great
+discoveries is therefore, just like perception, an operation of the
+understanding, an immediate intuition, and as such the work of an instant,
+an _apperçu_, a flash of insight. They are not the result of a process of
+abstract reasoning, which only serves to make the immediate knowledge of
+the understanding permanent for thought by bringing it under abstract
+concepts, _i.e._, it makes knowledge distinct, it puts us in a position to
+impart it and explain it to others. The keenness of the understanding in
+apprehending the causal relations of objects which are known indirectly,
+does not find its only application in the sphere of natural science
+(though all the discoveries in that sphere are due to it), but it also
+appears in practical life. It is then called good sense or prudence, as in
+its other application it is better called acuteness, penetration,
+sagacity. More exactly, good sense or prudence signifies exclusively
+understanding at the command of the will. But the limits of these
+conceptions must not be too sharply defined, for it is always that one
+function of the understanding by means of which all animals perceive
+objects in space, which, in its keenest form, appears now in the phenomena
+of nature, correctly inferring the unknown causes from the given effects,
+and providing the material from which the reason frames general rules as
+laws of nature; now inventing complicated and ingenious machines by
+adapting known causes to desired effects; now in the sphere of motives,
+seeing through and frustrating intrigues and machinations, or fitly
+disposing the motives and the men who are susceptible to them, setting
+them in motion, as machines are moved by levers and wheels, and directing
+them at will to the accomplishment of its ends. Deficiency of
+understanding is called _stupidity_. It is just _dulness in applying the
+law of causality_, incapacity for the immediate apprehension of the
+concatenations of causes and effects, motives and actions. A stupid person
+has no insight into the connection of natural phenomena, either when they
+follow their own course, or when they are intentionally combined, _i.e._,
+are applied to machinery. Such a man readily believes in magic and
+miracles. A stupid man does not observe that persons, who apparently act
+independently of each other, are really in collusion; he is therefore
+easily mystified, and outwitted; he does not discern the hidden motives of
+proffered advice or expressions of opinion, &c. But it is always just one
+thing that he lacks--keenness, rapidity, ease in applying the law of
+causality, _i.e._, power of understanding. The greatest, and, in this
+reference, the most instructive example of stupidity I ever met with, was
+the case of a totally imbecile boy of about eleven years of age, in an
+asylum. He had reason, because he spoke and comprehended, but in respect
+of understanding he was inferior to many of the lower animals. Whenever I
+visited him he noticed an eye-glass which I wore round my neck, and in
+which the window of the room and the tops of the trees beyond were
+reflected: on every occasion he was greatly surprised and delighted with
+this, and was never tired of looking at it with astonishment, because he
+did not understand the immediate causation of reflection.
+
+While the difference in degree of the acuteness of the understanding, is
+very great between man and man, it is even greater between one species of
+animal and another. In all species of animals, even those which are
+nearest to plants, there is at least as much understanding as suffices for
+the inference from the effect on the immediate object, to the indirectly
+known object as its cause, _i.e._, sufficient for perception, for the
+apprehension of an object. For it is this that constitutes them animals,
+as it gives them the power of movement following on motives, and thereby
+the power of seeking for food, or at least of seizing it; whereas plants
+have only movement following on stimuli, whose direct influence they must
+await, or else decay, for they cannot seek after them nor appropriate
+them. We marvel at the great sagacity of the most developed species of
+animals, such as the dog, the elephant, the monkey or the fox, whose
+cleverness has been so admirably sketched by Buffon. From these most
+sagacious animals, we can pretty accurately determine how far
+understanding can go without reason, _i.e._, abstract knowledge embodied
+in concepts. We could not find this out from ourselves, for in us
+understanding and reason always reciprocally support each other. We find
+that the manifestation of understanding in animals is sometimes above our
+expectation, and sometimes below it. On the one hand, we are surprised at
+the sagacity of the elephant, who, after crossing many bridges during his
+journey in Europe, once refused to go upon one, because he thought it was
+not strong enough to bear his weight, though he saw the rest of the party,
+consisting of men and horses, go upon it as usual. On the other hand, we
+wonder that the intelligent Orang-outangs, who warm themselves at a fire
+they have found, do not keep it alight by throwing wood on it; a proof
+that this requires a deliberation which is not possible without abstract
+concepts. It is clear that the knowledge of cause and effect, as the
+universal form of understanding, belongs to all animals _a priori_,
+because to them as to us it is the prior condition of all perception of
+the outer world. If any one desires additional proof of this, let him
+observe, for example, how a young dog is afraid to jump down from a table,
+however much he may wish to do so, because he foresees the effect of the
+weight of his body, though he has not been taught this by experience. In
+judging of the understanding of animals, we must guard against ascribing
+to it the manifestations of instinct, a faculty which is quite distinct
+both from understanding and reason, but the action of which is often very
+analogous to the combined action of the two. We cannot, however, discuss
+this here; it will find its proper place in the second book, when we
+consider the harmony or so-called teleology of nature: and the 27th
+chapter of the supplementary volume is expressly devoted to it.
+
+Deficiency of _understanding_ we call _stupidity_: deficiency in the
+application of _reason_ to practice we shall recognise later as
+_foolishness_: deficiency of judgment as _silliness_, and lastly, partial
+or entire deficiency of _memory_ as _madness_. But each of these will be
+considered in its own place. That which is correctly known by _reason_ is
+_truth_, that is, an abstract judgment on sufficient grounds (Essay on the
+Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 29 and following paragraphs); that which
+is correctly known by _understanding_ is _reality_, that is correct
+inference from effect on the immediate object to its cause. _Error_ is
+opposed to _truth_, as deception of the _reason_: _illusion_ is opposed to
+_reality_, as deception of the _understanding_. The full discussion of all
+this will be found in the first chapter of my essay on Light and Colour.
+Illusion takes place when the same effect may be attributed to two causes,
+of which one occurs very frequently, the other very seldom; the
+understanding having no data to decide which of these two causes operates
+in any particular case,--for their effects are exactly alike,--always
+assumes the presence of the commoner cause, and as the activity of the
+understanding is not reflective and discursive, but direct and immediate,
+this false cause appears before us as a perceived object, whereas it is
+merely illusion. I have explained in the essay referred to, how in this
+way double sight and double feeling take place if the organs of sense are
+brought into an unusual position; and have thus given an incontrovertible
+proof that perception exists only through and for the understanding. As
+additional examples of such illusions or deceptions of the understanding,
+we may mention the broken appearance of a stick dipped in water; the
+reflections in spherical mirrors, which, when the surface is convex appear
+somewhat behind it, and when the surface is concave appear a long way in
+front of it. To this class also belongs the apparently greater extension
+of the moon at the horizon than at the zenith. This appearance is not
+optical, for as the micrometre proves, the eye receives the image of the
+moon at the zenith, at an even greater angle of vision than at the
+horizon. The mistake is due to the understanding, which assumes that the
+cause of the feebler light of the moon and of all stars at the horizon is
+that they are further off, thus treating them as earthly objects,
+according to the laws of atmospheric perspective, and therefore it takes
+the moon to be much larger at the horizon than at the zenith, and also
+regards the vault of heaven as more extended or flattened out at the
+horizon. The same false application of the laws of atmospheric perspective
+leads us to suppose that very high mountains, whose summits alone are
+visible in pure transparent air, are much nearer than they really are, and
+therefore not so high as they are; for example, Mont Blanc seen from
+Salenche. All such illusions are immediately present to us as perceptions,
+and cannot be dispelled by any arguments of the reason. Reason can only
+prevent error, that is, a judgment on insufficient grounds, by opposing to
+it a truth; as for example, the abstract knowledge that the cause of the
+weaker light of the moon and the stars at the horizon is not greater
+distance, but the denser atmosphere; but in all the cases we have referred
+to, the illusion remains in spite of every abstract explanation. For the
+understanding is in itself, even in the case of man, irrational, and is
+completely and sharply distinguished from the reason, which is a faculty
+of knowledge that belongs to man alone. The reason can only _know_;
+perception remains free from its influence and belongs to the
+understanding alone.
+
+§ 7. With reference to our exposition up to this point, it must be
+observed that we did not start either from the object or the subject, but
+from the idea, which contains and presupposes them both; for the
+antithesis of object and subject is its primary, universal and essential
+form. We have therefore first considered this form as such; then (though
+in this respect reference has for the most part been made to the
+introductory essay) the subordinate forms of time, space and causality.
+The latter belong exclusively to the _object_, and yet, as they are
+essential to the object _as such_, and as the object again is essential to
+the subject _as such_, they may be discovered from the subject, _i.e._,
+they may be known _a priori_, and so far they are to be regarded as the
+common limits of both. But all these forms may be referred to one general
+expression, the principle of sufficient reason, as we have explained in
+the introductory essay.
+
+This procedure distinguishes our philosophical method from that of all
+former systems. For they all start either from the object or from the
+subject, and therefore seek to explain the one from the other, and this
+according to the principle of sufficient reason. We, on the contrary, deny
+the validity of this principle with reference to the relation of subject
+and object, and confine it to the object. It may be thought that the
+philosophy of identity, which has appeared and become generally known in
+our own day, does not come under either of the alternatives we have named,
+for it does not start either from the subject or from the object, but from
+the absolute, known through "intellectual intuition," which is neither
+object nor subject, but the identity of the two. I will not venture to
+speak of this revered identity, and this absolute, for I find myself
+entirely devoid of all "intellectual intuition." But as I take my stand
+merely on those manifestoes of the "intellectual intuiter" which are open
+to all, even to profane persons like myself, I must yet observe that this
+philosophy is not to be excepted from the alternative errors mentioned
+above. For it does not escape these two opposite errors in spite of its
+identity of subject and object, which is not thinkable, but only
+"intellectually intuitable," or to be experienced by a losing of oneself
+in it. On the contrary, it combines them both in itself; for it is divided
+into two parts, firstly, transcendental idealism, which is just Fichte's
+doctrine of the _ego_, and therefore teaches that the object is produced
+by the subject, or evolved out of it in accordance with the principle of
+sufficient reason; secondly, the philosophy of nature, which teaches that
+the subject is produced little by little from the object, by means of a
+method called construction, about which I understand very little, yet
+enough to know that it is a process according to various forms of the
+principle of sufficient reason. The deep wisdom itself which that
+construction contains, I renounce; for as I entirely lack "intellectual
+intuition," all those expositions which presuppose it must for me remain
+as a book sealed with seven seals. This is so truly the case that, strange
+to say, I have always been unable to find anything at all in this doctrine
+of profound wisdom but atrocious and wearisome bombast.
+
+The systems starting from the object had always the whole world of
+perception and its constitution as their problem; yet the object which
+they take as their starting-point is not always this whole world of
+perception, nor its fundamental element, matter. On the contrary, a
+division of these systems may be made, based on the four classes of
+possible objects set forth in the introductory essay. Thus Thales and the
+Ionic school, Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno, and the French
+materialists, may be said to have started from the first class of objects,
+the real world: Spinoza (on account of his conception of substance, which
+is purely abstract, and exists only in his definition) and, earlier, the
+Eleatics, from the second class, the abstract conception: the Pythagoreans
+and Chinese philosophy in Y-King, from the third class, time, and
+consequently number: and, lastly, the schoolmen, who teach a creation out
+of nothing by the act of will of an extra-mundane personal being, started
+from the fourth class of objects, the act of will directed by knowledge.
+
+Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most
+consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism.
+It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and
+ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists.
+It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue,
+regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things, _veritas
+aeterna_, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and
+for which alone causality is. It seeks the primary and most simple state
+of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending
+from mere mechanism, to chemism, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the
+animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in
+the chain would be animal sensibility--that is knowledge--which would
+consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced
+by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear
+ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with
+a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from
+a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final
+result--knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the
+indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when
+we imagined that we thought matter, we really thought only the subject
+that perceives matter; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the
+understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous _petitio principii_
+reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the
+starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron
+Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into
+the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue. The fundamental
+absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the _objective_, and takes
+as the ultimate ground of explanation something _objective_, whether it be
+matter in the abstract, simply as it is _thought_, or after it has taken
+form, is empirically given--that is to say, is _substance_, the chemical
+element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing
+absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and
+finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means
+of it; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as
+such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing,
+and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think
+the subject away. Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is
+immediately given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is
+objective, extended, active--that is to say, all that is material--is
+regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation,
+that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired
+(especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself
+into action and reaction). But we have shown that all this is given
+indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a
+relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and
+manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time
+and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended
+in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object,
+materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which
+alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even
+the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest
+themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law,
+are in truth to be explained. To the assertion that thought is a
+modification of matter we may always, with equal right, oppose the
+contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the
+knowing subject, as its idea. Yet the aim and ideal of all natural science
+is at bottom a consistent materialism. The recognition here of the obvious
+impossibility of such a system establishes another truth which will appear
+in the course of our exposition, the truth that all science properly so
+called, by which I understand systematic knowledge under the guidance of
+the principle of sufficient reason, can never reach its final goal, nor
+give a complete and adequate explanation: for it is not concerned with the
+inmost nature of the world, it cannot get beyond the idea; indeed, it
+really teaches nothing more than the relation of one idea to another.
+
+Every science must start from two principal data. One of these is always
+the principle of sufficient reason in some form or another, as organon;
+the other is its special object as problem. Thus, for example, geometry
+has space as problem, and the ground of existence in space as organon.
+Arithmetic has time as problem, and the ground of existence in time as
+organon. Logic has the combination of concepts as such as problem, and the
+ground of knowledge as organon. History has the past acts of men treated
+as a whole as problem, and the law of human motives as organon. Natural
+science has matter as problem, and the law of causality as organon. Its
+end and aim is therefore, by the guidance of causality, to refer all
+possible states of matter to other states, and ultimately to one single
+state; and again to deduce these states from each other, and ultimately
+from one single state. Thus two states of matter stand over against each
+other in natural science as extremes: that state in which matter is
+furthest from being the immediate object of the subject, and that state in
+which it is most completely such an immediate object, _i.e._, the most
+dead and crude matter, the primary element, as the one extreme, and the
+human organism as the other. Natural science as chemistry seeks for the
+first, as physiology for the second. But as yet neither extreme has been
+reached, and it is only in the intermediate ground that something has been
+won. The prospect is indeed somewhat hopeless. The chemists, under the
+presupposition that the qualitative division of matter is not, like
+quantitative division, an endless process, are always trying to decrease
+the number of the elements, of which there are still about sixty; and if
+they were to succeed in reducing them to two, they would still try to find
+the common root of these. For, on the one hand, the law of homogeneity
+leads to the assumption of a primary chemical state of matter, which alone
+belongs to matter as such, and precedes all others which are not
+essentially matter as such, but merely contingent forms and qualities. On
+the other hand, we cannot understand how this one state could ever
+experience a chemical change, if there did not exist a second state to
+affect it. Thus the same difficulty appears in chemistry which Epicurus
+met with in mechanics. For he had to show how the first atom departed from
+the original direction of its motion. Indeed this contradiction, which
+develops entirely of itself and can neither be escaped nor solved, might
+quite properly be set up as a chemical _antinomy_. Thus an antinomy
+appears in the one extreme of natural science, and a corresponding one
+will appear in the other. There is just as little hope of reaching this
+opposite extreme of natural science, for we see ever more clearly that
+what is chemical can never be referred to what is mechanical, nor what is
+organic to what is chemical or electrical. Those who in our own day are
+entering anew on this old, misleading path, will soon slink back silent
+and ashamed, as all their predecessors have done before them. We shall
+consider this more fully in the second book. Natural science encounters
+the difficulties which we have cursorily mentioned, in its own province.
+Regarded as philosophy, it would further be materialism; but this, as we
+have seen, even at its birth, has death in its heart, because it ignores
+the subject and the forms of knowledge, which are presupposed, just as
+much in the case of the crudest matter, from which it desires to start, as
+in that of the organism, at which it desires to arrive. For, "no object
+without a subject," is the principle which renders all materialism for
+ever impossible. Suns and planets without an eye that sees them, and an
+understanding that knows them, may indeed be spoken of in words, but for
+the idea, these words are absolutely meaningless. On the other hand, the
+law of causality and the treatment and investigation of nature which is
+based upon it, lead us necessarily to the conclusion that, in time, each
+more highly organised state of matter has succeeded a cruder state: so
+that the lower animals existed before men, fishes before land animals,
+plants before fishes, and the unorganised before all that is organised;
+that, consequently, the original mass had to pass through a long series of
+changes before the first eye could be opened. And yet, the existence of
+this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened,
+even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary
+condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only
+in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is
+entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of
+its existence. This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable
+changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the
+first percipient creature appeared,--this whole time itself is only
+thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas,
+whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning
+and is nothing at all. Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the
+whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however
+undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just as
+necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects
+which have preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link.
+These two contradictory points of view, to each of which we are led with
+the same necessity, we might again call an _antinomy_ in our faculty of
+knowledge, and set it up as the counterpart of that which we found in the
+first extreme of natural science. The fourfold antinomy of Kant will be
+shown, in the criticism of his philosophy appended to this volume, to be a
+groundless delusion. But the necessary contradiction which at last
+presents itself to us here, finds its solution in the fact that, to use
+Kant's phraseology, time, space, and causality do not belong to the
+thing-in-itself, but only to its phenomena, of which they are the form;
+which in my language means this: The objective world, the world as idea,
+is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has
+an entirely different side--the side of its inmost nature--its kernel--the
+thing-in-itself. This we shall consider in the second book, calling it
+after the most immediate of its objective manifestations--will. But the
+world as idea, with which alone we are here concerned, only appears with
+the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot
+be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to
+say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time
+has no beginning, but all beginning is in time. Since, however, it is the
+most universal form of the knowable, in which all phenomena are united
+together through causality, time, with its infinity of past and future, is
+present in the beginning of knowledge. The phenomenon which fills the
+first present must at once be known as causally bound up with and
+dependent upon a sequence of phenomena which stretches infinitely into the
+past, and this past itself is just as truly conditioned by this first
+present, as conversely the present is by the past. Accordingly the past
+out of which the first present arises, is, like it, dependent upon the
+knowing subject, without which it is nothing. It necessarily happens,
+however, that this first present does not manifest itself as the first,
+that is, as having no past for its parent, but as being the beginning of
+time. It manifests itself rather as the consequence of the past, according
+to the principle of existence in time. In the same way, the phenomena
+which fill this first present appear as the effects of earlier phenomena
+which filled the past, in accordance with the law of causality. Those who
+like mythological interpretations may take the birth of Kronos ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}),
+the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol of the moment here referred to at
+which time appears, though, indeed it has no beginning; for with him,
+since he ate his father, the crude productions of heaven and earth cease,
+and the races of gods and men appear upon the scene.
+
+This explanation at which we have arrived by following the most consistent
+of the philosophical systems which start from the object, materialism, has
+brought out clearly the inseparable and reciprocal dependence of subject
+and object, and at the same time the inevitable antithesis between them.
+And this knowledge leads us to seek for the inner nature of the world, the
+thing-in-itself, not in either of the two elements of the idea, but in
+something quite distinct from it, and which is not encumbered with such a
+fundamental and insoluble antithesis.
+
+Opposed to the system we have explained, which starts from the object in
+order to derive the subject from it, is the system which starts from the
+subject and tries to derive the object from it. The first of these has
+been of frequent and common occurrence throughout the history of
+philosophy, but of the second we find only one example, and that a very
+recent one; the "philosophy of appearance" of J. G. Fichte. In this
+respect, therefore, it must be considered; little real worth or inner
+meaning as the doctrine itself had. It was indeed for the most part merely
+a delusion, but it was delivered with an air of the deepest earnestness,
+with sustained loftiness of tone and zealous ardour, and was defended with
+eloquent polemic against weak opponents, so that it was able to present a
+brilliant exterior and seemed to be something. But the genuine earnestness
+which keeps truth always steadfastly before it as its goal, and is
+unaffected by any external influences, was entirely wanting to Fichte, as
+it is to all philosophers who, like him, concern themselves with questions
+of the day. In his case, indeed, it could not have been otherwise. A man
+becomes a philosopher by reason of a certain perplexity, from which he
+seeks to free himself. This is Plato's {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, which he calls a {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}. But what distinguishes the false philosopher from the
+true is this: the perplexity of the latter arises from the contemplation
+of the world itself, while that of the former results from some book, some
+system of philosophy which is before him. Now Fichte belongs to the class
+of the false philosophers. He was made a philosopher by Kant's doctrine of
+the thing-in-itself, and if it had not been for this he would probably
+have pursued entirely different ends, with far better results, for he
+certainly possessed remarkable rhetorical talent. If he had only
+penetrated somewhat deeply into the meaning of the book that made him a
+philosopher, "The Critique of Pure Reason," he would have understood that
+its principal teaching about mind is this. The principle of sufficient
+reason is not, as all scholastic philosophy maintains, a _veritas
+aeterna_--that is to say, it does not possess an unconditioned validity
+before, outside of, and above the world. It is relative and conditioned,
+and valid only in the sphere of phenomena, and thus it may appear as the
+necessary nexus of space and time, or as the law of causality, or as the
+law of the ground of knowledge. The inner nature of the world, the
+thing-in-itself can never be found by the guidance of this principle, for
+all that it leads to will be found to be dependent and relative and merely
+phenomenal, not the thing-in-itself. Further, it does not concern the
+subject, but is only the form of objects, which are therefore not
+things-in-themselves. The subject must exist along with the object, and
+the object along with the subject, so that it is impossible that subject
+and object can stand to each other in a relation of reason and consequent.
+But Fichte did not take up the smallest fragment of all this. All that
+interested him about the matter was that the system started from the
+subject. Now Kant had chosen this procedure in order to show the fallacy
+of the prevalent systems, which started from the object, and through which
+the object had come, to be regarded as a thing-in-itself. Fichte, however,
+took this departure from the subject for the really important matter, and
+like all imitators, he imagined that in going further than Kant he was
+surpassing him. Thus he repeated the fallacy with regard to the subject,
+which all the previous dogmatism had perpetrated with regard to the
+object, and which had been the occasion of Kant's "Critique". Fichte then
+made no material change, and the fundamental fallacy, the assumption of a
+relation of reason and consequent between object and subject, remained
+after him as it was before him. The principle of sufficient reason
+possessed as before an unconditioned validity, and the only difference was
+that the thing-in-itself was now placed in the subject instead of, as
+formerly, in the object. The entire relativity of both subject and object,
+which proves that the thing-in-itself, or the inner nature of the world,
+is not to be sought in them at all, but outside of them, and outside
+everything else that exists merely relatively, still remained unknown.
+Just as if Kant had never existed, the principle of sufficient reason is
+to Fichte precisely what it was to all the schoolmen, a _veritas aeterna_.
+As an eternal fate reigned over the gods of old, so these _aeternæ
+veritates_, these metaphysical, mathematical and metalogical truths, and
+in the case of some, the validity of the moral law also, reigned over the
+God of the schoolmen. These _veritates_ alone were independent of
+everything, and through their necessity both God and the world existed.
+According to the principle of sufficient reason, as such a _veritas
+aeterna_, the _ego_ is for Fichte the ground of the world, or of the
+_non-ego_, the object, which is just its consequent, its creation. He has
+therefore taken good care to avoid examining further or limiting the
+principle of sufficient reason. If, however, it is thought I should
+specify the form of the principle of sufficient reason under the guidance
+of which Fichte derives the _non-ego_ from the _ego_, as a spider spins
+its web out of itself, I find that it is the principle of sufficient
+reason of existence in space: for it is only as referred to this that some
+kind of meaning and sense can be attached to the laboured deductions of
+the way in which the _ego_ produces and fabricates the _non-ego_ from
+itself, which form the content of the most senseless, and consequently the
+most wearisome book that was ever written. This philosophy of Fichte,
+otherwise not worth mentioning, is interesting to us only as the tardy
+expression of the converse of the old materialism. For materialism was the
+most consistent system starting from the object, as this is the most
+consistent system starting from the subject. Materialism overlooked the
+fact that, with the simplest object, it assumed the subject also; and
+Fichte overlooked the fact that with the subject (whatever he may call it)
+he assumed the object also, for no subject is thinkable without an object.
+Besides this he forgot that all _a priori_ deduction, indeed all
+demonstration in general, must rest upon some necessity, and that all
+necessity is based on the principle of sufficient reason, because to be
+necessary, and to follow from given grounds are convertible
+conceptions.(10) But the principle of sufficient reason is just the
+universal form of the object as such. Thus it is in the object, but is not
+valid before and outside of it; it first produces the object and makes it
+appear in conformity with its regulative principle. We see then that the
+system which starts from the subject contains the same fallacy as the
+system, explained above, which starts from the object; it begins by
+assuming what it proposes to deduce, the necessary correlative of its
+starting-point.
+
+The method of our own system is _toto genere_ distinct from these two
+opposite misconceptions, for we start neither from the object nor from the
+subject, but from the _idea_, as the first fact of consciousness. Its
+first essential, fundamental form is the antithesis of subject and object.
+The form of the object again is the principle of sufficient reason in its
+various forms. Each of these reigns so absolutely in its own class of
+ideas that, as we have seen, when the special form of the principle of
+sufficient reason which governs any class of ideas is known, the nature of
+the whole class is known also: for the whole class, as idea, is no more
+than this form of the principle of sufficient reason itself; so that time
+itself is nothing but the principle of existence in it, _i.e._,
+succession; space is nothing but the principle of existence in it, _i.e._,
+position; matter is nothing but causality; the concept (as will appear
+immediately) is nothing but relation to a ground of knowledge. This
+thorough and consistent relativity of the world as idea, both according to
+its universal form (subject and object), and according to the form which
+is subordinate to this (the principle of sufficient reason) warns us, as
+we said before, to seek the inner nature of the world in an aspect of it
+which is _quite different and quite distinct from the idea_; and in the
+next book we shall find this in a fact which is just as immediate to every
+living being as the idea.
+
+But we must first consider that class of ideas which belongs to man alone.
+The matter of these is the concept, and the subjective correlative is
+reason, just as the subjective correlative of the ideas we have already
+considered was understanding and sensibility, which are also to be
+attributed to all the lower animals.(11)
+
+§ 8. As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed light of the
+moon, we pass from the immediate idea of perception, which stands by
+itself and is its own warrant, to reflection, to the abstract, discursive
+concepts of the reason, which obtain their whole content from knowledge of
+perception, and in relation to it. As long as we continue simply to
+perceive, all is clear, firm, and certain. There are neither questions nor
+doubts nor errors; we desire to go no further, can go no further; we find
+rest in perceiving, and satisfaction in the present. Perception suffices
+for itself, and therefore what springs purely from it, and remains true to
+it, for example, a genuine work of art, can never be false, nor can it be
+discredited through the lapse of time, for it does not present an opinion
+but the thing itself. But with abstract knowledge, with reason, doubt and
+error appear in the theoretical, care and sorrow in the practical. In the
+idea of perception, illusion may at moments take the place of the real;
+but in the sphere of abstract thought, error may reign for a thousand
+years, impose its yoke upon whole nations, extend to the noblest impulses
+of humanity, and, by the help of its slaves and its dupes, may chain and
+fetter those whom it cannot deceive. It is the enemy against which the
+wisest men of all times have waged unequal war, and only what they have
+won from it has become the possession of mankind. Therefore it is well to
+draw attention to it at once, as we already tread the ground to which its
+province belongs. It has often been said that we ought to follow truth
+even although no utility can be seen in it, because it may have indirect
+utility which may appear when it is least expected; and I would add to
+this, that we ought to be just as anxious to discover and to root out all
+error even when no harm is anticipated from it, because its mischief may
+be very indirect, and may suddenly appear when we do not expect it, for
+all error has poison at its heart. If it is mind, if it is knowledge, that
+makes man the lord of creation, there can be no such thing as harmless
+error, still less venerable and holy error. And for the consolation of
+those who in any way and at any time may have devoted strength and life to
+the noble and hard battle against error, I cannot refrain from adding
+that, so long as truth is absent, error will have free play, as owls and
+bats in the night; but sooner would we expect to see the owls and the bats
+drive back the sun in the eastern heavens, than that any truth which has
+once been known and distinctly and fully expressed, can ever again be so
+utterly vanquished and overcome that the old error shall once more reign
+undisturbed over its wide kingdom. This is the power of truth; its
+conquest is slow and laborious, but if once the victory be gained it can
+never be wrested back again.
+
+Besides the ideas we have as yet considered, which, according to their
+construction, could be referred to time, space, and matter, if we consider
+them with reference to the object, or to pure sensibility and
+understanding (_i.e._, knowledge of causality), if we consider them with
+reference to the subject, another faculty of knowledge has appeared in man
+alone of all earthly creatures, an entirely new consciousness, which, with
+very appropriate and significant exactness, is called _reflection_. For it
+is in fact derived from the knowledge of perception, and is a reflected
+appearance of it. But it has assumed a nature fundamentally different. The
+forms of perception do not affect it, and even the principle of sufficient
+reason which reigns over all objects has an entirely different aspect with
+regard to it. It is just this new, more highly endowed, consciousness,
+this abstract reflex of all that belongs to perception in that conception
+of the reason which has nothing to do with perception, that gives to man
+that thoughtfulness which distinguishes his consciousness so entirely from
+that of the lower animals, and through which his whole behaviour upon
+earth is so different from that of his irrational fellow-creatures. He far
+surpasses them in power and also in suffering. They live in the present
+alone, he lives also in the future and the past. They satisfy the needs of
+the moment, he provides by the most ingenious preparations for the future,
+yea for days that he shall never see. They are entirely dependent on the
+impression of the moment, on the effect of the perceptible motive; he is
+determined by abstract conceptions independent of the present. Therefore
+he follows predetermined plans, he acts from maxims, without reference to
+his surroundings or the accidental impression of the moment. Thus, for
+example, he can make with composure deliberate preparations for his own
+death, he can dissemble past finding out, and can carry his secret with
+him to the grave; lastly, he has an actual choice between several motives;
+for only in the abstract can such motives, present together in
+consciousness, afford the knowledge with regard to themselves, that the
+one excludes the other, and can thus measure themselves against each other
+with reference to their power over the will. The motive that overcomes, in
+that it decides the question at issue, is the deliberate determinant of
+the will, and is a sure indication of its character. The brute, on the
+other hand, is determined by the present impression; only the fear of
+present compulsion can constrain its desires, until at last this fear has
+become custom, and as such continues to determine it; this is called
+training. The brute feels and perceives; man, in addition to this,
+_thinks_ and _knows_: both _will_. The brute expresses its feelings and
+dispositions by gestures and sounds; man communicates his thought to
+others, or, if he wishes, he conceals it, by means of speech. Speech is
+the first production, and also the necessary organ of his reason.
+Therefore in Greek and Italian, speech and reason are expressed by the
+same word; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, _il discorso_. _Vernunft_ is derived from _vernehmen_,
+which is not a synonym for the verb to hear, but signifies the
+consciousness of the meaning of thoughts communicated in words. It is by
+the help of language alone that reason accomplishes its most important
+achievements,--the united action of several individuals, the planned
+co-operation of many thousands, civilisation, the state; also science, the
+storing up of experience, the uniting of common properties in one concept,
+the communication of truth, the spread of error, thoughts and poems,
+dogmas and superstitions. The brute first knows death when it dies, but
+man draws consciously nearer to it every hour that he lives; and this
+makes life at times a questionable good even to him who has not recognised
+this character of constant annihilation in the whole of life. Principally
+on this account man has philosophies and religions, though it is uncertain
+whether the qualities we admire most in his conduct, voluntary rectitude
+and nobility of feeling, were ever the fruit of either of them. As results
+which certainly belong only to them, and as productions of reason in this
+sphere, we may refer to the marvellous and monstrous opinions of
+philosophers of various schools, and the extraordinary and sometimes cruel
+customs of the priests of different religions.
+
+It is the universal opinion of all times and of all nations that these
+manifold and far-reaching achievements spring from a common principle,
+from that peculiar intellectual power which belongs distinctively to man
+and which has been called reason, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~},
+_ratio_. Besides this, no one finds any difficulty in recognising the
+manifestations of this faculty, and in saying what is rational and what is
+irrational, where reason appears as distinguished from the other faculties
+and qualities of man, or lastly, in pointing out what, on account of the
+want of reason, we must never expect even from the most sensible brute.
+The philosophers of all ages may be said to be on the whole at one about
+this general knowledge of reason, and they have also given prominence to
+several very important manifestations of it; such as, the control of the
+emotions and passions, the capacity for drawing conclusions and
+formulating general principles, even such as are true prior to all
+experience, and so forth. Still all their explanations of the peculiar
+nature of reason are wavering, not clearly defined, discursive, without
+unity and concentration; now laying stress on one manifestation, now on
+another, and therefore often at variance with each other. Besides this,
+many start from the opposition between reason and revelation, a
+distinction which is unknown to philosophy, and which only increases
+confusion. It is very remarkable that up till now no philosopher has
+referred these manifold expressions of reason to one simple function which
+would be recognised in them all, from which they would all be explained,
+and which would therefore constitute the real inner nature of reason. It
+is true that the excellent Locke in the "Essay on the Human Understanding"
+(Book II., ch. xi., §§ 10 and 11), very rightly refers to general concepts
+as the characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes, and
+Leibnitz quotes this with full approval in the "Nouveaux Essais sur
+l'Entendement Humaine" (Book II., ch. xi., §§ 10 and 11.) But when Locke
+(in Book IV., ch. xvii., §§ 2 and 3) comes to the special explanation of
+reason he entirely loses sight of this simple, primary characteristic, and
+he also falls into a wavering, undetermined, incomplete account of mangled
+and derivative manifestations of it. Leibnitz also, in the corresponding
+part of his work, behaves in a similar manner, only with more confusion
+and indistinctness. In the Appendix, I have fully considered how Kant
+confused and falsified the conception of the nature of reason. But whoever
+will take the trouble to go through in this reference the mass of
+philosophical writing which has appeared since Kant, will find out, that
+just as the faults of princes must be expiated by whole nations, the
+errors of great minds extend their influence over whole generations, and
+even over centuries; they grow and propagate themselves, and finally
+degenerate into monstrosities. All this arises from the fact that, as
+Berkeley says, "Few men think; yet all will have opinions."
+
+The understanding has only one function--immediate knowledge of the
+relation of cause and effect. Yet the perception of the real world, and
+all common sense, sagacity, and inventiveness, however multifarious their
+applications may be, are quite clearly seen to be nothing more than
+manifestations of that one function. So also the reason has one function;
+and from it all the manifestations of reason we have mentioned, which
+distinguish the life of man from that of the brutes, may easily be
+explained. The application or the non-application of this function is all
+that is meant by what men have everywhere and always called rational and
+irrational.(12)
+
+§ 9. Concepts form a distinct class of ideas, existing only in the mind of
+man, and entirely different from the ideas of perception which we have
+considered up till now. We can therefore never attain to a sensuous and,
+properly speaking, evident knowledge of their nature, but only to a
+knowledge which is abstract and discursive. It would, therefore, be absurd
+to demand that they should be verified in experience, if by experience is
+meant the real external world, which consists of ideas of perception, or
+that they should be brought before the eyes or the imagination like
+objects of perception. They can only be thought, not perceived, and only
+the effects which men accomplish through them are properly objects of
+experience. Such effects are language, preconceived and planned action and
+science, and all that results from these. Speech, as an object of outer
+experience, is obviously nothing more than a very complete telegraph,
+which communicates arbitrary signs with the greatest rapidity and the
+finest distinctions of difference. But what do these signs mean? How are
+they interpreted? When some one speaks, do we at once translate his words
+into pictures of the fancy, which instantaneously flash upon us, arrange
+and link themselves together, and assume form and colour according to the
+words that are poured forth, and their grammatical inflections? What a
+tumult there would be in our brains while we listened to a speech, or to
+the reading of a book? But what actually happens is not this at all. The
+meaning of a speech is, as a rule, immediately grasped, accurately and
+distinctly taken in, without the imagination being brought into play. It
+is reason which speaks to reason, keeping within its own province. It
+communicates and receives abstract conceptions, ideas that cannot be
+presented in perceptions, which are framed once for all, and are
+relatively few in number, but which yet encompass, contain, and represent
+all the innumerable objects of the actual world. This itself is sufficient
+to prove that the lower animals can never learn to speak or comprehend,
+although they have the organs of speech and ideas of perception in common
+with us. But because words represent this perfectly distinct class of
+ideas, whose subjective correlative is reason, they are without sense and
+meaning for the brutes. Thus language, like every other manifestation
+which we ascribe to reason, and like everything which distinguishes man
+from the brutes, is to be explained from this as its one simple
+source--conceptions, abstract ideas which cannot be presented in
+perception, but are general, and have no individual existence in space and
+time. Only in single cases do we pass from the conception to the
+perception, do we construct images as _representatives of concepts_ in
+perception, to which, however, they are never adequate. These cases are
+fully discussed in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 28,
+and therefore I shall not repeat my explanation here. It may be compared,
+however, with what is said by Hume in the twelfth of his "Philosophical
+Essays," p. 244, and by Herder in the "Metacritik," pt. i. p. 274 (an
+otherwise worthless book). The Platonic idea, the possibility of which
+depends upon the union of imagination and reason, is the principal subject
+of the third book of this work.
+
+Although concepts are fundamentally different from ideas of perception,
+they stand in a necessary relation to them, without which they would be
+nothing. This relation therefore constitutes the whole nature and
+existence of concepts. Reflection is the necessary copy or repetition of
+the originally presented world of perception, but it is a special kind of
+copy in an entirely different material. Thus concepts may quite properly
+be called ideas of ideas. The principle of sufficient reason has here also
+a special form. Now we have seen that the form under which the principle
+of sufficient reason appears in a class of ideas always constitutes and
+exhausts the whole nature of the class, so far as it consists of ideas, so
+that time is throughout succession, and nothing more; space is throughout
+position, and nothing more; matter is throughout causation, and nothing
+more. In the same way the whole nature of concepts, or the class of
+abstract ideas, consists simply in the relation which the principle of
+sufficient reason expresses in them; and as this is the relation to the
+ground of knowledge, the whole nature of the abstract idea is simply and
+solely its relation to another idea, which is its ground of knowledge.
+This, indeed, may, in the first instance, be a concept, an abstract idea,
+and this again may have only a similar abstract ground of knowledge; but
+the chain of grounds of knowledge does not extend _ad infinitum_; it must
+end at last in a concept which has its ground in knowledge of perception;
+for the whole world of reflection rests on the world of perception as its
+ground of knowledge. Hence the class of abstract ideas is in this respect
+distinguished from other classes; in the latter the principle of
+sufficient reason always demands merely a relation to another idea of the
+_same_ class, but in the case of abstract ideas, it at last demands a
+relation to an idea of _another_ class.
+
+Those concepts which, as has just been pointed out, are not immediately
+related to the world of perception, but only through the medium of one, or
+it may be several other concepts, have been called by preference
+_abstracta_, and those which have their ground immediately in the world of
+perception have been called _concreta_. But this last name is only loosely
+applicable to the concepts denoted by it, for they are always merely
+_abstracta_, and not ideas of perception. These names, which have
+originated in a very dim consciousness of the distinctions they imply, may
+yet, with this explanation, be retained. As examples of the first kind of
+concepts, _i.e._, _abstracta_ in the fullest sense, we may take
+"relation," "virtue," "investigation," "beginning," and so on. As examples
+of the second kind, loosely called _concreta_, we may take such concepts
+as "man," "stone," "horse," &c. If it were not a somewhat too pictorial
+and therefore absurd simile, we might very appropriately call the latter
+the ground floor, and the former the upper stories of the building of
+reflection.(13)
+
+It is not, as is commonly supposed, an essential characteristic of a
+concept that it should contain much under it, that is to say, that many
+ideas of perception, or it may be other abstract ideas, should stand to it
+in the relation of its ground of knowledge, _i.e._, be thought through it.
+This is merely a derived and secondary characteristic, and, as a matter of
+fact, does not always exist, though it must always exist potentially. This
+characteristic arises from the fact that a concept is an idea of an idea,
+_i.e._, its whole nature consists in its relation to another idea; but as
+it is not this idea itself, which is generally an idea of perception and
+therefore belongs to quite a different class, the latter may have
+temporal, spacial, and other determinations, and in general many relations
+which are not thought along with it in the concept. Thus we see that
+several ideas which are different in unessential particulars may be
+thought by means of one concept, _i.e._, may be brought under it. Yet this
+power of embracing several things is not an essential but merely an
+accidental characteristic of the concept. There may be concepts through
+which only one real object is thought, but which are nevertheless abstract
+and general, by no means capable of presentation individually and as
+perceptions. Such, for example, is the conception which any one may have
+of a particular town which he only knows from geography; although only
+this one town is thought under it, it might yet be applied to several
+towns differing in certain respects. We see then that a concept is not
+general because of being abstracted from several objects; but conversely,
+because generality, that is to say, non-determination of the particular,
+belongs to the concept as an abstract idea of the reason, different things
+can be thought by means of the same one.
+
+It follows from what has been said that every concept, just because it is
+abstract and incapable of presentation in perception, and is therefore not
+a completely determined idea, has what is called extension or sphere, even
+in the case in which only one real object exists that corresponds to it.
+Now we always find that the sphere of one concept has something in common
+with the sphere of other concepts. That is to say, part of what is thought
+under one concept is the same as what is thought under other concepts; and
+conversely, part of what is thought under these concepts is the same as
+what is thought under the first; although, if they are really different
+concepts, each of them, or at least one of them, contains something which
+the other does not contain; this is the relation in which every subject
+stands to its predicate. The recognition of this relation is called
+judgment. The representation of these spheres by means of figures in
+space, is an exceedingly happy idea. It first occurred to Gottfried
+Plouquet, who used squares for the purpose. Lambert, although later than
+him, used only lines, which he placed under each other. Euler carried out
+the idea completely with circles. Upon what this complete analogy between
+the relations of concepts, and those of figures in space, ultimately
+rests, I am unable to say. It is, however, a very fortunate circumstance
+for logic that all the relations of concepts, according to their
+possibility, _i.e._, _a priori_, may be made plain in perception by the
+use of such figures, in the following way:--
+
+(1.) The spheres of two concepts coincide: for example the concept of
+necessity and the concept of following from given grounds, in the same way
+the concepts of _Ruminantia_ and _Bisulca_ (ruminating and cloven-hoofed
+animals), also those of vertebrate and red-blooded animals (although there
+might be some doubt about this on account of the annelida): they are
+convertible concepts. Such concepts are represented by a single circle
+which stands for either of them.
+
+(2.) The sphere of one concept includes that of the other.
+
+        [Illustration: Category "horse" within category "animal".]
+
+(3.) A sphere includes two or more spheres which exclude each other and
+fill it.
+
+[Illustration: Circle divided into thirds "right", "acute", and "obtuse".]
+
+(4.) Two spheres include each a part of the other.
+
+   [Illustration: Two overlapping circles, one "flower" and one "red".]
+
+(5.) Two spheres lie in a third, but do not fill it.
+
+   [Illustration: A large circle, "matter", within which are two other
+                      circles, "water" and "earth".]
+
+This last case applies to all concepts whose spheres have nothing
+immediately in common, for there is always a third sphere, often a much
+wider one, which includes both.
+
+To these cases all combinations of concepts may be referred, and from them
+the entire doctrine of the judgment, its conversion, contraposition,
+equipollence, disjunction (this according to the third figure) may be
+deduced. From these also may be derived the properties of the judgment,
+upon which Kant based his pretended categories of the understanding, with
+the exception however of the hypothetical form, which is not a combination
+of concepts, but of judgments. A full account is given in the Appendix of
+"Modality," and indeed of every property of judgments on which the
+categories are founded.
+
+With regard to the possible combinations of concepts which we have given,
+it has only further to be remarked that they may also be combined with
+each other in many ways. For example, the fourth figure with the second.
+Only if one sphere, which partly or wholly contains another, is itself
+contained in a third sphere, do these together exemplify the syllogism in
+the first figure, _i.e._, that combination of judgments, by means of which
+it is known that a concept which is partly or wholly contained in another
+concept, is also contained in a third concept, which again contains the
+first: and also, conversely, the negation; the pictorial representation of
+which can, of course, only be two connected spheres which do not lie
+within a third sphere. If many spheres are brought together in this way we
+get a long train of syllogisms. This schematism of concepts, which has
+already been fairly well explained in more than one textbook, may be used
+as the foundation of the doctrine of the judgment, and indeed of the whole
+syllogistic theory, and in this way the treatment of both becomes very
+easy and simple. Because, through it, all syllogistic rules may be seen in
+their origin, and may be deduced and explained. It is not necessary,
+however, to load the memory with these rules, as logic is never of
+practical use, but has only a theoretical interest for philosophy. For
+although it may be said that logic is related to rational thinking as
+thorough-bass is to music, or less exactly, as ethics is to virtue, or
+æsthetics to art; we must yet remember that no one ever became an artist
+by the study of æsthetics; that a noble character was never formed by the
+study of ethics; that long before Rameau, men composed correctly and
+beautifully, and that we do not need to know thorough-bass in order to
+detect discords: and just as little do we need to know logic in order to
+avoid being misled by fallacies. Yet it must be conceded that
+thorough-bass is of the greatest use in the practice of musical
+composition, although it may not be necessary for the understanding of it;
+and indeed æsthetics and even ethics, though in a much less degree, and
+for the most part negatively, may be of some use in practice, so that we
+cannot deny them all practical worth, but of logic even this much cannot
+be conceded. It is nothing more than the knowledge in the abstract of what
+every one knows in the concrete. Therefore we call in the aid of logical
+rules, just as little to enable us to construct a correct argument as to
+prevent us from consenting to a false one, and the most learned logician
+lays aside the rules of logic altogether in his actual thought. This may
+be explained in the following way. Every science is a system of general
+and therefore abstract truths, laws, and rules with reference to a special
+class of objects. The individual case coming under these laws is
+determined in accordance with this general knowledge, which is valid once
+for all; because such application of the general principle is far easier
+than the exhaustive investigation of the particular case; for the general
+abstract knowledge which has once been obtained is always more within our
+reach than the empirical investigation of the particular case. With logic,
+however, it is just the other way. It is the general knowledge of the mode
+of procedure of the reason expressed in the form of rules. It is reached
+by the introspection of reason, and by abstraction from all content. But
+this mode of procedure is necessary and essential to reason, so that it
+will never depart from it if left to itself. It is, therefore, easier and
+surer to let it proceed itself according to its nature in each particular
+case, than to present to it the knowledge abstracted from this procedure
+in the form of a foreign and externally given law. It is easier, because,
+while in the case of all other sciences, the general rule is more within
+our reach than the investigation of the particular case taken by itself;
+with the use of reason, on the contrary, its necessary procedure in a
+given case is always more within our reach than the general rule
+abstracted from it; for that which thinks in us is reason itself. It is
+surer, because a mistake may more easily occur in such abstract knowledge,
+or in its application, than that a process of reason should take place
+which would run contrary to its essence and nature. Hence arises the
+remarkable fact, that while in other sciences the particular case is
+always proved by the rule, in logic, on the contrary, the rule must always
+be proved from the particular case; and even the most practised logician,
+if he remark that in some particular case he concludes otherwise than the
+rule prescribes, will always expect to find a mistake in the rule rather
+than in his own conclusion. To desire to make practical use of logic
+means, therefore, to desire to derive with unspeakable trouble, from
+general rules, that which is immediately known with the greatest certainty
+in the particular case. It is just as if a man were to consult mechanics
+as to the motion of his body, and physiology as to his digestion; and
+whoever has learnt logic for practical purposes is like him who would
+teach a beaver to make its own dam. Logic is, therefore, without practical
+utility; but it must nevertheless be retained, because it has
+philosophical interest as the special knowledge of the organisation and
+action of reason. It is rightly regarded as a definite, self-subsisting,
+self-contained, complete, and thoroughly safe discipline; to be treated
+scientifically for itself alone and independently of everything else, and
+therefore to be studied at the universities. But it has its real value, in
+relation to philosophy as a whole, in the inquiry into the nature of
+knowledge, and indeed of rational and abstract knowledge. Therefore the
+exposition of logic should not have so much the form of a practical
+science, should not contain merely naked arbitrary rules for the correct
+formation of the judgment, the syllogism, &c., but should rather be
+directed to the knowledge of the nature of reason and the concept, and to
+the detailed investigation of the principle of sufficient reason of
+knowing. For logic is only a paraphrase of this principle, and, more
+exactly, only of that exemplification of it in which the ground that gives
+truth to the judgment is neither empirical nor metaphysical, but logical
+or metalogical. Besides the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, it
+is necessary to take account of the three remaining fundamental laws of
+thought, or judgments of metalogical truth, so nearly related to it; and
+out of these the whole science of reason grows. The nature of thought
+proper, that is to say, of the judgment and the syllogism, must be
+exhibited in the combination of the spheres of concepts, according to the
+analogy of the special schema, in the way shown above; and from all this
+the rules of the judgment and the syllogism are to be deduced by
+construction. The only practical use we can make of logic is in a debate,
+when we can convict our antagonist of his intentional fallacies, rather
+than of his actual mistakes, by giving them their technical names. By thus
+throwing into the background the practical aim of logic, and bringing out
+its connection with the whole scheme of philosophy as one of its chapters,
+we do not think that we shall make the study of it less prevalent than it
+is just now. For at the present day every one who does not wish to remain
+uncultured, and to be numbered with the ignorant and incompetent
+multitude, must study speculative philosophy. For the nineteenth century
+is a philosophical age, though by this we do not mean either that it has
+philosophy, or that philosophy governs it, but rather that it is ripe for
+philosophy, and, therefore, stands in need of it. This is a sign of a high
+degree of civilisation, and indeed, is a definite stage in the culture of
+the ages.(14)
+
+Though logic is of so little practical use, it cannot be denied that it
+was invented for practical purposes. It appears to me to have originated
+in the following way:--As the love of debating developed among the
+Eleatics, the Megarics, and the Sophists, and by degrees became almost a
+passion, the confusion in which nearly every debate ended must have made
+them feel the necessity of a method of procedure as a guide; and for this
+a scientific dialectic had to be sought. The first thing which would have
+to be observed would be that both the disputing parties should always be
+agreed on some one proposition, to which the disputed points might be
+referred. The beginning of the methodical procedure consisted in this,
+that the propositions admitted on both sides were formally stated to be
+so, and placed at the head of the inquiry. But these propositions were at
+first concerned only with the material of the inquiry. It was soon
+observed that in the process of going back to the truth admitted on both
+sides, and of deducing their assertions from it, each party followed
+certain forms and laws about which, without any express agreement, there
+was no difference of opinion. And from this it became evident that these
+must constitute the peculiar and natural procedure of reason itself, the
+form of investigation. Although this was not exposed to any doubt or
+difference of opinion, some pedantically systematic philosopher hit upon
+the idea that it would look well, and be the completion of the method of
+dialectic, if this formal part of all discussion, this regular procedure
+of reason itself, were to be expressed in abstract propositions, just like
+the substantial propositions admitted on both sides, and placed at the
+beginning of every investigation, as the fixed canon of debate to which
+reference and appeal must always be made. In this way what had formerly
+been followed only by tacit agreement, and instinctively, would be
+consciously recognised and formally expressed. By degrees, more or less
+perfect expressions were found for the fundamental principles of logic,
+such as the principles of contradiction, sufficient reason, excluded
+middle, the _dictum de omni et nullo_, as well as the special rules of the
+syllogism, as for example, _ex meris particularibus aut negativis nihil
+sequitur, a rationato ad rationem non valet consequentia_, and so on. That
+all this was only brought about slowly, and with great pains, and up till
+the time of Aristotle remained very incomplete, is evident from the
+awkward and tedious way in which logical truths are brought out in many of
+the Platonic dialogues, and still more from what Sextus Empiricus tells us
+of the controversies of the Megarics, about the easiest and simplest
+logical rules, and the laborious way in which they were brought into a
+definite form (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. l. 8, p. 112). But Aristotle
+collected, arranged, and corrected all that had been discovered before his
+time, and brought it to an incomparably greater state of perfection. If we
+thus observe how the course of Greek culture had prepared the way for, and
+led up to the work of Aristotle, we shall be little inclined to believe
+the assertion of the Persian author, quoted by Sir William Jones with much
+approval, that Kallisthenes found a complete system of logic among the
+Indians, and sent it to his uncle Aristotle (Asiatic Researches, vol. iv.
+p. 163). It is easy to understand that in the dreary middle ages the
+Aristotelian logic would be very acceptable to the controversial spirit of
+the schoolmen, which, in the absence of all real knowledge, spent its
+energy upon mere formulas and words, and that it would be eagerly adopted
+even in its mutilated Arabian form, and presently established as the
+centre of all knowledge. Though its authority has since declined, yet up
+to our own time logic has retained the credit of a self-contained,
+practical, and highly important science. Indeed, in our own day, the
+Kantian philosophy, the foundation-stone of which is taken from logic, has
+excited a new interest in it; which, in this respect, at any rate, that
+is, as the means of the knowledge of the nature of reason, it deserves.
+
+Correct and accurate conclusions may be arrived at if we carefully observe
+the relation of the spheres of concepts, and only conclude that one sphere
+is contained in a third sphere, when we have clearly seen that this first
+sphere is contained in a second, which in its turn is contained in the
+third. On the other hand, the art of sophistry lies in casting only a
+superficial glance at the relations of the spheres of the concepts, and
+then manipulating these relations to suit our purposes, generally in the
+following way:--When the sphere of an observed concept lies partly within
+that of another concept, and partly within a third altogether different
+sphere, we treat it as if it lay entirely within the one or the other, as
+may suit our purpose. For example, in speaking of passion, we may subsume
+it under the concept of the greatest force, the mightiest agency in the
+world, or under the concept of the irrational, and this again under the
+concept of impotency or weakness. We may then repeat the process, and
+start anew with each concept to which the argument leads us. A concept has
+almost always several others, which partially come under it, and each of
+these contains part of the sphere of the first, but also includes in its
+own sphere something more, which is not in the first. But we draw
+attention only to that one of these latter concepts, under which we wish
+to subsume the first, and let the others remain unobserved, or keep them
+concealed. On the possession of this skill depends the whole art of
+sophistry and all finer fallacies; for logical fallacies such as
+_mentiens_, _velatus_, _cornatus_, &c., are clearly too clumsy for actual
+use. I am not aware that hitherto any one has traced the nature of all
+sophistry and persuasion back to this last possible ground of its
+existence, and referred it to the peculiar character of concepts, _i.e._,
+to the procedure of reason itself. Therefore, as my exposition has led me
+to it, though it is very easily understood, I will illustrate it in the
+following table by means of a schema. This table is intended to show how
+the spheres of concepts overlap each other at many points, and so leave
+room for a passage from each concept to whichever one we please of several
+other concepts. I hope, however, that no one will be led by this table to
+attach more importance to this little explanation, which I have merely
+given in passing, than ought to belong to it, from the nature of the
+subject. I have chosen as an illustration the concept of travelling. Its
+sphere partially includes four others, to any of which the sophist may
+pass at will; these again partly include other spheres, several of them
+two or more at once, and through these the sophist takes whichever way he
+chooses, always as if it were the only way, till at last he reaches, in
+good or evil, whatever end he may have in view. In passing from one sphere
+to another, it is only necessary always to follow the direction from the
+centre (the given chief concept) to the circumference, and never to
+reverse this process. Such a piece of sophistry may be either an unbroken
+speech, or it may assume the strict syllogistic form, according to what is
+the weak side of the hearer. Most scientific arguments, and especially
+philosophical demonstrations, are at bottom not much more than this, for
+how else would it be possible, that so much, in different ages, has not
+only been falsely apprehended (for error itself has a different source),
+but demonstrated and proved, and has yet afterwards been found to be
+fundamentally wrong, for example, the Leibnitz-Wolfian Philosophy,
+Ptolemaic Astronomy, Stahl's Chemistry, Newton's Theory of Colours, &c.
+&c.(15)
+
+§ 10. Through all this, the question presses ever more upon us, how
+_certainty_ is to be attained, how _judgments __ are to be established_,
+what constitutes _rational knowledge_, (_wissen_), and _science_, which we
+rank with language and deliberate action as the third great benefit
+conferred by reason.
+
+Reason is feminine in nature; it can only give after it has received. Of
+itself it has nothing but the empty forms of its operation. There is no
+absolutely pure rational knowledge except the four principles to which I
+have attributed metalogical truth; the principles of identity,
+contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason of knowledge. For
+even the rest of logic is not absolutely pure rational knowledge. It
+presupposes the relations and the combinations of the spheres of concepts.
+But concepts in general only exist after experience of ideas of
+perception, and as their whole nature consists in their relation to these,
+it is clear that they presuppose them. No special content, however, is
+presupposed, but merely the existence of a content generally, and so logic
+as a whole may fairly pass for pure rational science. In all other
+sciences reason has received its content from ideas of perception; in
+mathematics from the relations of space and time, presented in intuition
+or perception prior to all experience; in pure natural science, that is,
+in what we know of the course of nature prior to any experience, the
+content of the science proceeds from the pure understanding, _i.e._, from
+the _a priori_ knowledge of the law of causality and its connection with
+those pure intuitions or perceptions of space and time. In all other
+sciences everything that is not derived from the sources we have just
+referred to belongs to experience. Speaking generally, _to know
+rationally_ (_wissen_) means to have in the power of the mind, and capable
+of being reproduced at will, such judgments as have their sufficient
+ground of knowledge in something outside themselves, _i.e._, are true.
+Thus only abstract cognition is _rational knowledge_ (_wissen_), which is
+therefore the result of reason, so that we cannot accurately say of the
+lower animals that they _rationally __ know_ (_wissen_) anything, although
+they have apprehension of what is presented in perception, and memory of
+this, and consequently imagination, which is further proved by the
+circumstance that they dream. We attribute consciousness to them, and
+therefore although the word (_bewusstsein_) is derived from the verb to
+know rationally (_wissen_), the conception of consciousness corresponds
+generally with that of idea of whatever kind it may be. Thus we attribute
+life to plants, but not consciousness. _Rational knowledge_ (_wissen_) is
+therefore abstract consciousness, the permanent possession in concepts of
+the reason, of what has become known in another way.
+
+§ 11. In this regard the direct opposite of _rational knowledge_ is
+feeling, and therefore we must insert the explanation of feeling here. The
+concept which the word feeling denotes has merely a negative content,
+which is this, that something which is present in consciousness, _is not a
+concept_, _is not abstract rational knowledge_. Except this, whatever it
+may be, it comes under the concept of _feeling_. Thus the immeasurably
+wide sphere of the concept of feeling includes the most different kinds of
+objects, and no one can ever understand how they come together until he
+has recognised that they all agree in this negative respect, that they are
+not _abstract concepts_. For the most diverse and even antagonistic
+elements lie quietly side by side in this concept; for example, religious
+feeling, feeling of sensual pleasure, moral feeling, bodily feeling, as
+touch, pain, sense of colour, of sounds and their harmonies and discords,
+feeling of hate, of disgust, of self-satisfaction, of honour, of disgrace,
+of right, of wrong, sense of truth, æsthetic feeling, feeling of power,
+weakness, health, friendship, love, &c. &c. There is absolutely nothing in
+common among them except the negative quality that they are not abstract
+rational knowledge. But this diversity becomes more striking when the
+apprehension of space relations presented _a priori_ in perception, and
+also the knowledge of the pure understanding is brought under this
+concept, and when we say of all knowledge and all truth, of which we are
+first conscious only intuitively, and have not yet formulated in abstract
+concepts, we _feel_ it. I should like, for the sake of illustration, to
+give some examples of this taken from recent books, as they are striking
+proofs of my theory. I remember reading in the introduction to a German
+translation of Euclid, that we ought to make beginners in geometry draw
+the figures before proceeding to demonstrate, for in this way they would
+already feel geometrical truth before the demonstration brought them
+complete knowledge. In the same way Schleiermacher speaks in his "Critique
+of Ethics" of logical and mathematical feeling (p. 339), and also of the
+feeling of the sameness or difference of two formulas (p. 342). Again
+Tennemann in his "History of Philosophy" (vol. I., p. 361) says, "One
+_felt_ that the fallacies were not right, but could not point out the
+mistakes." Now, so long as we do not regard this concept "_feeling_" from
+the right point of view, and do not recognise that one negative
+characteristic which alone is essential to it, it must constantly give
+occasion for misunderstanding and controversy, on account of the excessive
+wideness of its sphere, and its entirely negative and very limited content
+which is determined in a purely one-sided manner. Since then we have in
+German the nearly synonymous word _empfindung_ (sensation), it would be
+convenient to make use of it for bodily feeling, as a sub-species. This
+concept "feeling," which is quite out of proportion to all others,
+doubtless originated in the following manner. All concepts, and concepts
+alone, are denoted by words; they exist only for the reason, and proceed
+from it. With concepts, therefore, we are already at a one-sided point of
+view; but from such a point of view what is near appears distinct and is
+set down as positive, what is farther off becomes mixed up and is soon
+regarded as merely negative. Thus each nation calls all others foreign: to
+the Greek all others are barbarians; to the Englishman all that is not
+England or English is continent or continental; to the believer all others
+are heretics, or heathens; to the noble all others are _roturiers_; to the
+student all others are Philistines, and so forth. Now, reason itself,
+strange as it may seem, is guilty of the same one-sidedness, indeed one
+might say of the same crude ignorance arising from vanity, for it classes
+under the one concept, "_feeling_," every modification of consciousness
+which does not immediately belong to its own mode of apprehension, that is
+to say, which is _not an abstract concept_. It has had to pay the penalty
+of this hitherto in misunderstanding and confusion in its own province,
+because its own procedure had not become clear to it through thorough
+self-knowledge, for a special faculty of feeling has been set up, and new
+theories of it are constructed.
+
+§ 12. _Rational knowledge_ (_wissen_) is then all abstract knowledge,--that
+is, the knowledge which is peculiar to the reason as distinguished from
+the understanding. Its contradictory opposite has just been explained to
+be the concept "feeling." Now, as reason only reproduces, for knowledge,
+what has been received in another way, it does not actually extend our
+knowledge, but only gives it another form. It enables us to know in the
+abstract and generally, what first became known in sense-perception, in
+the concrete. But this is much more important than it appears at first
+sight when so expressed. For it depends entirely upon the fact that
+knowledge has become rational or abstract knowledge (_wissen_), that it
+can be safely preserved, that it is communicable and susceptible of
+certain and wide-reaching application to practice. Knowledge in the form
+of sense-perception is valid only of the particular case, extends only to
+what is nearest, and ends with it, for sensibility and understanding can
+only comprehend one object at a time. Every enduring, arranged, and
+planned activity must therefore proceed from principles,--that is, from
+abstract knowledge, and it must be conducted in accordance with them.
+Thus, for example, the knowledge of the relation of cause and effect
+arrived at by the understanding, is in itself far completer, deeper and
+more exhaustive than anything that can be thought about it in the
+abstract; the understanding alone knows in perception directly and
+completely the nature of the effect of a lever, of a pulley, or a
+cog-wheel, the stability of an arch, and so forth. But on account of the
+peculiarity of the knowledge of perception just referred to, that it only
+extends to what is immediately present, the mere understanding can never
+enable us to construct machines and buildings. Here reason must come in;
+it must substitute abstract concepts for ideas of perception, and take
+them as the guide of action; and if they are right, the anticipated result
+will happen. In the same way we have perfect knowledge in pure perception
+of the nature and constitution of the parabola, hyperbola, and spiral; but
+if we are to make trustworthy application of this knowledge to the real,
+it must first become abstract knowledge, and by this it certainly loses
+its character of intuition or perception, but on the other hand it gains
+the certainty and preciseness of abstract knowledge. The differential
+calculus does not really extend our knowledge of the curve, it contains
+nothing that was not already in the mere pure perception of the curve; but
+it alters the kind of knowledge, it changes the intuitive into an abstract
+knowledge, which is so valuable for application. But here we must refer to
+another peculiarity of our faculty of knowledge, which could not be
+observed until the distinction between the knowledge of the senses and
+understanding and abstract knowledge had been made quite clear. It is
+this, that relations of space cannot as such be directly translated into
+abstract knowledge, but only temporal quantities,--that is, numbers, are
+suitable for this. Numbers alone can be expressed in abstract concepts
+which accurately correspond to them, not spacial quantities. The concept
+"thousand" is just as different from the concept "ten," as both these
+temporal quantities are in perception. We think of a thousand as a
+distinct multiple of ten, into which we can resolve it at pleasure for
+perception in time,--that is to say, we can count it. But between the
+abstract concept of a mile and that of a foot, apart from any concrete
+perception of either, and without the help of number, there is no accurate
+distinction corresponding to the quantities themselves. In both we only
+think of a spacial quantity in general, and if they must be completely
+distinguished we are compelled either to call in the assistance of
+intuition or perception in space, which would be a departure from abstract
+knowledge, or we must think the difference in _numbers_. If then we wish
+to have abstract knowledge of space-relations we must first translate them
+into time-relations,--that is, into numbers; therefore only arithmetic, and
+not geometry, is the universal science of quantity, and geometry must be
+translated into arithmetic if it is to be communicable, accurately precise
+and applicable in practice. It is true that a space-relation as such may
+also be thought in the abstract; for example, "the sine increases as the
+angle," but if the quantity of this relation is to be given, it requires
+number for its expression. This necessity, that if we wish to have
+abstract knowledge of space-relations (_i.e._, rational knowledge, not
+mere intuition or perception), space with its three dimensions must be
+translated into time which has only one dimension, this necessity it is,
+which makes mathematics so difficult. This becomes very clear if we
+compare the perception of curves with their analytical calculation, or the
+table of logarithms of the trigonometrical functions with the perception
+of the changing relations of the parts of a triangle, which are expressed
+by them. What vast mazes of figures, what laborious calculations it would
+require to express in the abstract what perception here apprehends at a
+glance completely and with perfect accuracy, namely, how the co-sine
+diminishes as the sine increases, how the co-sine of one angle is the sine
+of another, the inverse relation of the increase and decrease of the two
+angles, and so forth. How time, we might say, must complain, that with its
+one dimension it should be compelled to express the three dimensions of
+space! Yet this is necessary if we wish to possess, for application, an
+expression, in abstract concepts, of space-relations. They could not be
+translated directly into abstract concepts, but only through the medium of
+the pure temporal quantity, number, which alone is directly related to
+abstract knowledge. Yet it is worthy of remark, that as space adapts
+itself so well to perception, and by means of its three dimensions, even
+its complicated relations are easily apprehended, while it eludes the
+grasp of abstract knowledge; time, on the contrary, passes easily into
+abstract knowledge, but gives very little to perception. Our perceptions
+of numbers in their proper element, mere time, without the help of space,
+scarcely extends as far as ten, and beyond that we have only abstract
+concepts of numbers, no knowledge of them which can be presented in
+perception. On the other hand, we connect with every numeral, and with all
+algebraical symbols, accurately defined abstract concepts.
+
+We may further remark here that some minds only find full satisfaction in
+what is known through perception. What they seek is the reason and
+consequent of being in space, sensuously expressed; a demonstration after
+the manner of Euclid, or an arithmetical solution of spacial problems,
+does not please them. Other minds, on the contrary, seek merely the
+abstract concepts which are needful for applying and communicating
+knowledge. They have patience and memory for abstract principles,
+formulas, demonstrations in long trains of reasoning, and calculations, in
+which the symbols represent the most complicated abstractions. The latter
+seek preciseness, the former sensible perception. The difference is
+characteristic.
+
+The greatest value of rational or abstract knowledge is that it can be
+communicated and permanently retained. It is principally on this account
+that it is so inestimably important for practice. Any one may have a
+direct perceptive knowledge through the understanding alone, of the causal
+connection, of the changes and motions of natural bodies, and he may find
+entire satisfaction in it; but he cannot communicate this knowledge to
+others until it has been made permanent for thought in concepts. Knowledge
+of the first kind is even sufficient for practice, if a man puts his
+knowledge into practice himself, in an action which can be accomplished
+while the perception is still vivid; but it is not sufficient if the help
+of others is required, or even if the action is his own but must be
+carried out at different times, and therefore requires a pre-conceived
+plan. Thus, for example, a practised billiard-player may have a perfect
+knowledge of the laws of the impact of elastic bodies upon each other,
+merely in the understanding, merely for direct perception; and for him it
+is quite sufficient; but on the other hand it is only the man who has
+studied the science of mechanics, who has, properly speaking, a rational
+knowledge of these laws, that is, a knowledge of them in the abstract.
+Such knowledge of the understanding in perception is sufficient even for
+the construction of machines, when the inventor of the machine executes
+the work himself; as we often see in the case of talented workmen, who
+have no scientific knowledge. But whenever a number of men, and their
+united action taking place at different times, is required for the
+completion of a mechanical work, of a machine, or a building, then he who
+conducts it must have thought out the plan in the abstract, and such
+co-operative activity is only possible through the assistance of reason.
+It is, however, remarkable that in the first kind of activity, in which we
+have supposed that one man alone, in an uninterrupted course of action,
+accomplishes something, abstract knowledge, the application of reason or
+reflection, may often be a hindrance to him; for example, in the case of
+billiard-playing, of fighting, of tuning an instrument, or in the case of
+singing. Here perceptive knowledge must directly guide action; its passage
+through reflection makes it uncertain, for it divides the attention and
+confuses the man. Thus savages and untaught men, who are little accustomed
+to think, perform certain physical exercises, fight with beasts, shoot
+with bows and arrows and the like, with a certainty and rapidity which the
+reflecting European never attains to, just because his deliberation makes
+him hesitate and delay. For he tries, for example, to hit the right
+position or the right point of time, by finding out the mean between two
+false extremes; while the savage hits it directly without thinking of the
+false courses open to him. In the same way it is of no use to me to know
+in the abstract the exact angle, in degrees and minutes, at which I must
+apply a razor, if I do not know it intuitively, that is, if I have not got
+it in my touch. The knowledge of physiognomy also, is interfered with by
+the application of reason. This knowledge must be gained directly through
+the understanding. We say that the expression, the meaning of the
+features, can only be _felt_, that is, it cannot be put into abstract
+concepts. Every man has his direct intuitive method of physiognomy and
+pathognomy, yet one man understands more clearly than another these
+_signatura rerum_. But an abstract science of physiognomy to be taught and
+learned is not possible; for the distinctions of difference are here so
+fine that concepts cannot reach them; therefore abstract knowledge is
+related to them as a mosaic is to a painting by a Van der Werft or a
+Denner. In mosaics, however fine they may be, the limits of the stones are
+always there, and therefore no continuous passage from one colour to
+another is possible, and this is also the case with regard to concepts,
+with their rigidity and sharp delineation; however finely we may divide
+them by exact definition, they are still incapable of reaching the finer
+modifications of the perceptible, and this is just what happens in the
+example we have taken, knowledge of physiognomy.(16)
+
+This quality of concepts by which they resemble the stones of a mosaic,
+and on account of which perception always remains their asymptote, is also
+the reason why nothing good is produced in art by their means. If the
+singer or the virtuoso attempts to guide his execution by reflection he
+remains silent. And this is equally true of the composer, the painter, and
+the poet. The concept always remains unfruitful in art; it can only direct
+the technical part of it, its sphere is science. We shall consider more
+fully in the third book, why all true art proceeds from sensuous
+knowledge, never from the concept. Indeed, with regard to behaviour also,
+and personal agreeableness in society, the concept has only a negative
+value in restraining the grosser manifestations of egotism and brutality;
+so that a polished manner is its commendable production. But all that is
+attractive, gracious, charming in behaviour, all affectionateness and
+friendliness, must not proceed from the concepts, for if it does, "we feel
+intention, and are put out of tune." All dissimulation is the work of
+reflection; but it cannot be maintained constantly and without
+interruption: "_nemo __ potest personam diu ferre fictum_," says Seneca in
+his book _de clementia_; and so it is generally found out and loses its
+effect. Reason is needed in the full stress of life, where quick
+conclusions, bold action, rapid and sure comprehension are required, but
+it may easily spoil all if it gains the upper hand, and by perplexing
+hinders the intuitive, direct discovery, and grasp of the right by simple
+understanding, and thus induces irresolution.
+
+Lastly, virtue and holiness do not proceed from reflection, but from the
+inner depths of the will, and its relation to knowledge. The exposition of
+this belongs to another part of our work; this, however, I may remark
+here, that the dogmas relating to ethics may be the same in the reason of
+whole nations, but the action of every individual different; and the
+converse also holds good; action, we say, is guided by _feelings_,--that
+is, simply not by concepts, but as a matter of fact by the ethical
+character. Dogmas occupy the idle reason; but action in the end pursues
+its own course independently of them, generally not according to abstract
+rules, but according to unspoken maxims, the expression of which is the
+whole man himself. Therefore, however different the religious dogmas of
+nations may be, yet in the case of all of them, a good action is
+accompanied by unspeakable satisfaction, and a bad action by endless
+remorse. No mockery can shake the former; no priest's absolution can
+deliver from the latter. Notwithstanding this, we must allow, that for the
+pursuit of a virtuous life, the application of reason is needful; only it
+is not its source, but has the subordinate function of preserving
+resolutions which have been made, of providing maxims to withstand the
+weakness of the moment, and give consistency to action. It plays the same
+part ultimately in art also, where it has just as little to do with the
+essential matter, but assists in carrying it out, for genius is not always
+at call, and yet the work must be completed in all its parts and rounded
+off to a whole.(17)
+
+§ 13. All these discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of the
+application of reason are intended to show, that although abstract
+rational knowledge is the reflex of ideas of perception, and is founded on
+them, it is by no means in such entire congruity with them that it could
+everywhere take their place: indeed it never corresponds to them quite
+accurately. And thus, as we have seen, many human actions can only be
+performed by the help of reason and deliberation, and yet there are some
+which are better performed without its assistance. This very incongruity
+of sensuous and abstract knowledge, on account of which the latter always
+merely approximates to the former, as mosaic approximates to painting, is
+the cause of a very remarkable phenomenon which, like reason itself, is
+peculiar to human nature, and of which the explanations that have ever
+anew been attempted, are insufficient: I mean _laughter_. On account of
+the source of this phenomenon, we cannot avoid giving the explanation of
+it here, though it again interrupts the course of our work to do so. The
+cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the
+incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought
+through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of
+this incongruity. It often occurs in this way: two or more real objects
+are thought through _one_ concept, and the identity of the concept is
+transferred to the objects; it then becomes strikingly apparent from the
+entire difference of the objects in other respects, that the concept was
+only applicable to them from a one-sided point of view. It occurs just as
+often, however, that the incongruity between a single real object and the
+concept under which, from one point of view, it has rightly been subsumed,
+is suddenly felt. Now the more correct the subsumption of such objects
+under a concept may be from one point of view, and the greater and more
+glaring their incongruity with it, from another point of view, the greater
+is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. All laughter
+then is occasioned by a paradox, and therefore by unexpected subsumption,
+whether this is expressed in words or in actions. This, briefly stated, is
+the true explanation of the ludicrous.
+
+I shall not pause here to relate anecdotes as examples to illustrate my
+theory; for it is so simple and comprehensible that it does not require
+them, and everything ludicrous which the reader may remember is equally
+valuable as a proof of it. But the theory is confirmed and illustrated by
+distinguishing two species into which the ludicrous is divided, and which
+result from the theory. Either, we have previously known two or more very
+different real objects, ideas of sense-perception, and have intentionally
+identified them through the unity of a concept which comprehends them
+both; this species of the ludicrous is called _wit_. Or, conversely, the
+concept is first present in knowledge, and we pass from it to reality, and
+to operation upon it, to action: objects which in other respects are
+fundamentally different, but which are all thought in that one concept,
+are now regarded and treated in the same way, till, to the surprise and
+astonishment of the person acting, the great difference of their other
+aspects appears: this species of the ludicrous is called _folly_.
+Therefore everything ludicrous is either a flash of wit or a foolish
+action, according as the procedure has been from the discrepancy of the
+objects to the identity of the concept, or the converse; the former always
+intentional, the latter always unintentional, and from without. To seem to
+reverse the starting-point, and to conceal wit with the mask of folly, is
+the art of the jester and the clown. Being quite aware of the diversity of
+the objects, the jester unites them, with secret wit, under one concept,
+and then starting from this concept he receives from the subsequently
+discovered diversity of the objects the surprise which he himself
+prepared. It follows from this short but sufficient theory of the
+ludicrous, that, if we set aside the last case, that of the jester, wit
+must always show itself in words, folly generally in actions, though also
+in words, when it only expresses an intention and does not actually carry
+it out, or when it shows itself merely in judgments and opinions.
+
+_Pedantry_ is a form of folly. It arises in this way: a man lacks
+confidence in his own understanding, and, therefore, does not wish to
+trust to it, to recognise what is right directly in the particular case.
+He, therefore, puts it entirely under the control of the reason, and seeks
+to be guided by reason in everything; that is to say, he tries always to
+proceed from general concepts, rules, and maxims, and to confine himself
+strictly to them in life, in art, and even in moral conduct. Hence that
+clinging to the form, to the manner, to the expression and word which is
+characteristic of pedantry, and which with it takes the place of the real
+nature of the matter. The incongruity then between the concept and reality
+soon shows itself here, and it becomes evident that the former never
+condescends to the particular case, and that with its generality and rigid
+definiteness it can never accurately apply to the fine distinctions of
+difference and innumerable modifications of the actual. Therefore, the
+pedant, with his general maxims, almost always misses the mark in life,
+shows himself to be foolish, awkward, useless. In art, in which the
+concept is unfruitful, he produces lifeless, stiff, abortive mannerisms.
+Even with regard to ethics, the purpose to act rightly or nobly cannot
+always be carried out in accordance with abstract maxims; for in many
+cases the excessively nice distinctions in the nature of the circumstances
+necessitate a choice of the right proceeding directly from the character;
+for the application of mere abstract maxims sometimes gives false results,
+because the maxims only half apply; and sometimes cannot be carried out,
+because they are foreign to the individual character of the actor, and
+this never allows itself to be entirely discovered; therefore,
+inconsistencies arise. Since then Kant makes it a condition of the moral
+worth of an action, that it shall proceed from pure rational abstract
+maxims, without any inclination or momentary emotion, we cannot entirely
+absolve him from the reproach of encouraging moral pedantry. This reproach
+is the significance of Schiller's epigram, entitled "Scruples of
+Conscience." When we speak, especially in connection with politics, of
+doctrinaires, theorists, savants, and so forth, we mean pedants, that is,
+persons who know the things well in the abstract, but not in the concrete.
+Abstraction consists in thinking away the less general predicates; but it
+is precisely upon these that so much depends in practice.
+
+To complete our theory it remains for us to mention a spurious kind of
+wit, the play upon words, the _calembourg_, the pun, to which may be added
+the equivocation, the _double entendre_, the chief use of which is the
+expression of what is obscene. Just as the witticism brings two very
+different real objects under one concept, the pun brings two different
+concepts, by the assistance of accident, under one word. The same contrast
+appears, only familiar and more superficial, because it does not spring
+from the nature of things, but merely from the accident of nomenclature.
+In the case of the witticism the identity is in the concept, the
+difference in the reality, but in the case of the pun the difference is in
+the concepts and the identity in the reality, for the terminology is here
+the reality. It would only be a somewhat far-fetched comparison if we were
+to say that the pun is related to the witticism as the parabola (_sic_) of
+the upper inverted cone to that of the lower. The misunderstanding of the
+word or the _quid pro quo_ is the unintentional pun, and is related to it
+exactly as folly is to wit. Thus the deaf man often affords occasion for
+laughter, just as much as the fool, and inferior writers of comedy often
+use the former for the latter to raise a laugh.
+
+I have treated laughter here only from the psychical side; with regard to
+the physical side, I refer to what is said on the subject in the
+"Parerga," vol. II. ch. vi., § 98.(18)
+
+§ 14. By means of these various discussions it is hoped that both the
+difference and the relation between the process of knowledge that belongs
+to the reason, rational knowledge, the concept on the one hand, and the
+direct knowledge in purely sensuous, mathematical intuition or perception,
+and apprehension by the understanding on the other hand, has been clearly
+brought out. This remarkable relation of our kinds of knowledge led us
+almost inevitably to give, in passing, explanations of feeling and of
+laughter, but from all this we now turn back to the further consideration
+of science as the third great benefit which reason confers on man, the
+other two being speech and deliberate action. The general discussion of
+science which now devolves upon us, will be concerned partly with its
+form, partly with the foundation of its judgments, and lastly with its
+content.
+
+We have seen that, with the exception of the basis of pure logic, rational
+knowledge in general has not its source in the reason itself; but having
+been otherwise obtained as knowledge of perception, it is stored up in the
+reason, for through reason it has entirely changed its character, and has
+become abstract knowledge. All rational knowledge, that is, knowledge that
+has been raised to consciousness in the abstract, is related to science
+strictly so called, as a fragment to the whole. Every one has gained a
+rational knowledge of many different things through experience, through
+consideration of the individual objects presented to him, but only he who
+sets himself the task of acquiring a complete knowledge in the abstract of
+a particular class of objects, strives after science. This class can only
+be marked off by means of a concept; therefore, at the beginning of every
+science there stands a concept, and by means of it the class of objects
+concerning which this science promises a complete knowledge in the
+abstract, is separated in thought from the whole world of things. For
+example, the concept of space-relations, or of the action of unorganised
+bodies upon each other, or of the nature of plants, or of animals, or of
+the successive changes of the surface of the globe, or of the changes of
+the human race as a whole, or of the construction of a language, and so
+forth. If science sought to obtain the knowledge of its object, by
+investigating each individual thing that is thought through the concept,
+till by degrees it had learned the whole, no human memory would be equal
+to the task, and no certainty of completeness would be obtainable.
+Therefore, it makes use of that property of concept-spheres explained
+above, that they include each other, and it concerns itself mainly with
+the wider spheres which lie within the concept of its object in general.
+When the relations of these spheres to each other have been determined,
+all that is thought in them is also generally determined, and can now be
+more and more accurately determined by the separation of smaller and
+smaller concept-spheres. In this way it is possible for a science to
+comprehend its object completely. This path which it follows to knowledge,
+the path from the general to the particular, distinguishes it from
+ordinary rational knowledge; therefore, systematic form is an essential
+and characteristic feature of science. The combination of the most general
+concept-spheres of every science, that is, the knowledge of its first
+principles, is the indispensable condition of mastering it; how far we
+advance from these to the more special propositions is a matter of choice,
+and does not increase the thoroughness but only the extent of our
+knowledge of the science. The number of the first principles to which all
+the rest are subordinated, varies greatly in the different sciences, so
+that in some there is more subordination, in others more co-ordination;
+and in this respect, the former make greater claims upon the judgment, the
+latter upon the memory. It was known to the schoolmen,(19) that, as the
+syllogism requires two premises, no science can proceed from a single
+first principle which cannot be the subject of further deduction, but must
+have several, at least two. The specially classifying sciences: Zoology,
+Botany, and also Physics and Chemistry, inasmuch as they refer all
+inorganic action to a few fundamental forces, have most subordination;
+history, on the other hand, has really none at all; for the general in it
+consists merely in the survey of the principal periods, from which,
+however, the particular events cannot be deduced, and are only
+subordinated to them according to time, but according to the concept are
+co-ordinate with them. Therefore, history, strictly speaking, is certainly
+rational knowledge, but is not science. In mathematics, according to
+Euclid's treatment, the axioms alone are indemonstrable first principles,
+and all demonstrations are in gradation strictly subordinated to them. But
+this method of treatment is not essential to mathematics, and in fact each
+proposition introduces quite a new space construction, which in itself is
+independent of those which precede it, and indeed can be completely
+comprehended from itself, quite independently of them, in the pure
+intuition or perception of space, in which the most complicated
+construction is just as directly evident as the axiom; but of this more
+fully hereafter. Meanwhile every mathematical proposition remains always a
+universal truth, which is valid for innumerable particular cases; and a
+graduated process from the simple to the complicated propositions which
+are to be deduced from them, is also essential to mathematics; therefore,
+in every respect mathematics is a science. The completeness of a science
+as such, that is, in respect of form, consists in there being as much
+subordination and as little co-ordination of the principles as possible.
+Scientific talent in general is, therefore, the faculty of subordinating
+the concept-spheres according to their different determinations, so that,
+as Plato repeatedly counsels, a science shall not be constituted by a
+general concept and an indefinite multiplicity immediately under it, but
+that knowledge shall descend by degrees from the general to the
+particular, through intermediate concepts and divisions, according to
+closer and closer definitions. In Kantian language this is called
+satisfying equally the law of homogeneity and that of specification. It
+arises from this peculiar nature of scientific completeness, that the aim
+of science is not greater certainty--for certainty may be possessed in just
+as high a degree by the most disconnected particular knowledge--but its aim
+is rather the facilitating of rational knowledge by means of its form, and
+the possibility of the completeness of rational knowledge which this form
+affords. It is therefore a very prevalent but perverted opinion that the
+scientific character of knowledge consists in its greater certainty, and
+just as false is the conclusion following from this, that, strictly
+speaking, the only sciences are mathematics and logic, because only in
+them, on account of their purely _a priori_ character, is there
+unassailable certainty of knowledge. This advantage cannot be denied them,
+but it gives them no special claim to be regarded as sciences; for the
+special characteristic of science does not lie in certainty but in the
+systematic form of knowledge, based on the gradual descent from the
+general to the particular. The process of knowledge from the general to
+the particular, which is peculiar to the sciences, involves the necessity
+that in the sciences much should be established by deduction from
+preceding propositions, that is to say, by demonstration; and this has
+given rise to the old mistake that only what has been demonstrated is
+absolutely true, and that every truth requires a demonstration; whereas,
+on the contrary, every demonstration requires an undemonstrated truth,
+which ultimately supports it, or it may be, its own demonstration.
+Therefore a directly established truth is as much to be preferred to a
+truth established by demonstration as water from the spring is to water
+from the aqueduct. Perception, partly pure _a priori_, as it forms the
+basis of mathematics, partly empirical _a posteriori_, as it forms the
+basis of all the other sciences, is the source of all truth and the
+foundation of all science. (Logic alone is to be excepted, which is not
+founded upon perception but yet upon _direct_ knowledge by the reason of
+its own laws.) Not the demonstrated judgments nor their demonstrations,
+but judgments which are created directly out of perception, and founded
+upon it rather than on any demonstrations, are to science what the sun is
+to the world; for all light proceeds from them, and lighted by their light
+the others give light also. To establish the truth of such primary
+judgments directly from perception, to raise such strongholds of science
+from the innumerable multitude of real objects, that is the work of the
+_faculty of judgment_, which consists in the power of rightly and
+accurately carrying over into abstract consciousness what is known in
+perception, and judgment is consequently the mediator between
+understanding and reason. Only extraordinary and exceptional strength of
+judgment in the individual can actually advance science; but every one who
+is possessed of a healthy reason is able to deduce propositions from
+propositions, to demonstrate, to draw conclusions. To lay down and make
+permanent for reflection, in suitable concepts, what is known through
+perception, so that, on the one hand, what is common to many real objects
+is thought through _one_ concept, and, on the other hand, their points of
+difference are each thought through one concept, so that the different
+shall be known and thought as different in spite of a partial agreement,
+and the identical shall be known and thought as identical in spite of a
+partial difference, all in accordance with the end and intention which in
+each case is in view; all this is done by the _faculty of judgment_.
+Deficiency in judgment is _silliness_. The silly man fails to grasp, now
+the partial or relative difference of concepts which in one aspect are
+identical, now the identity of concepts which are relatively or partially
+different. To this explanation of the faculty of judgment, moreover,
+Kant's division of it into reflecting and subsuming judgment may be
+applied, according as it passes from the perceived objects to the
+concepts, or from the latter to the former; in both cases always mediating
+between empirical knowledge of the understanding and the reflective
+knowledge of the reason. There can be no truth which could be brought out
+by means of syllogisms alone; and the necessity of establishing truth by
+means of syllogisms is merely relative, indeed subjective. Since all
+demonstration is syllogistic, in the case of a new truth we must first
+seek, not for a demonstration, but for direct evidence, and only in the
+absence of such evidence is a demonstration to be temporarily made use of.
+No science is susceptible of demonstration throughout any more than a
+building can stand in the air; all its demonstrations must ultimately rest
+upon what is perceived, and consequently cannot be demonstrated, for the
+whole world of reflection rests upon and is rooted in the world of
+perception. All primal, that is, original, _evidence_ is a _perception_,
+as the word itself indicates. Therefore it is either empirical or founded
+upon the perception _a priori_ of the conditions of possible experience.
+In both cases it affords only immanent, not transcendent knowledge. Every
+concept has its worth and its existence only in its relation, sometimes
+very indirect, to an idea of perception; what is true of the concepts is
+also true of the judgments constructed out of them, and of all science.
+Therefore it must in some way be possible to know directly without
+demonstrations or syllogisms every truth that is arrived at through
+syllogisms and communicated by demonstrations. This is most difficult in
+the case of certain complicated mathematical propositions at which we only
+arrive by chains of syllogisms; for example, the calculation of the chords
+and tangents to all arcs by deduction from the proposition of Pythagoras.
+But even such a truth as this cannot essentially and solely rest upon
+abstract principles, and the space-relations which lie at its foundation
+also must be capable of being so presented _a priori_ in pure intuition or
+perception that the truth of their abstract expression is directly
+established. But of mathematical demonstration we shall speak more fully
+shortly.
+
+It is true we often hear men speak in a lofty strain of sciences which
+rest entirely upon correct conclusions drawn from sure premises, and which
+are consequently unassailable. But through pure logical reasoning, however
+true the premises may be, we shall never receive more than an articulate
+expression and exposition of what lies already complete in the premises;
+thus we shall only _explicitly_ expound what was already _implicitly_
+understood. The esteemed sciences referred to are, however, specially the
+mathematical sciences, particularly astronomy. But the certainty of
+astronomy arises from the fact that it has for its basis the intuition or
+perception of space, which is given _a priori_, and is therefore
+infallible. All space-relations, however, follow from each other with a
+necessity (ground of being) which affords _a priori_ certainty, and they
+can therefore be safely deduced from each other. To these mathematical
+properties we have only to add one force of nature, gravity, which acts
+precisely in relation to the masses and the square of the distance; and,
+lastly, the law of inertia, which follows from the law of causality and is
+therefore true _a priori_, and with it the empirical datum of the motion
+impressed, once for all, upon each of these masses. This is the whole
+material of astronomy, which both by its simplicity and its certainty
+leads to definite results, which are highly interesting on account of the
+vastness and importance of the objects. For example, if I know the mass of
+a planet and the distance of its satellite from it, I can tell with
+certainty the period of the revolution of the latter according to Kepler's
+second law. But the ground of this law is, that with this distance only
+this velocity will both chain the satellite to the planet and prevent it
+from falling into it. Thus it is only upon such a geometrical basis, that
+is, by means of an intuition or perception _a priori_, and also under the
+application of a law of nature, that much can be arrived at by means of
+syllogisms, for here they are merely like bridges from _one_ sensuous
+apprehension to others; but it is not so with mere pure syllogistic
+reasoning in the exclusively logical method. The source of the first
+fundamental truths of astronomy is, however, properly induction, that is,
+the comprehension of what is given in many perceptions in one true and
+directly founded judgment. From this, hypotheses are afterwards
+constructed, and their confirmation by experience, as induction
+approaching to completeness, affords the proof of the first judgment. For
+example, the apparent motion of the planets is known empirically; after
+many false hypotheses with regard to the spacial connection of this motion
+(planetary course) the right one was at last found, then the laws which it
+obeyed (the laws of Kepler), and, lastly, the cause of these laws
+(universal gravitation), and the empirically known agreement of all
+observed cases with the whole of the hypotheses, and with their
+consequences, that is to say, induction, established them with complete
+certainty. The invention of the hypotheses was the work of the judgment,
+which rightly comprehended the given facts and expressed them accordingly;
+but induction, that is, a multitude of perceptions, confirmed their truth.
+But their truth could also be known directly, and by a single empirical
+perception, if we could pass freely through space and had telescopic eyes.
+Therefore, here also syllogisms are not the essential and only source of
+knowledge, but really only a makeshift.
+
+As a third example taken from a different sphere we may mention that the
+so-called metaphysical truths, that is, such truths as those to which Kant
+assigns the position of the metaphysical first principles of natural
+science, do not owe their evidence to demonstration. What is _a priori_
+certain we know directly; as the form of all knowledge, it is known to us
+with the most complete necessity. For example, that matter is permanent,
+that is, can neither come into being nor pass away, we know directly as
+negative truth; for our pure intuition or perception of space and time
+gives the possibility of motion; in the law of causality the understanding
+affords us the possibility of change of form and quality, but we lack
+powers of the imagination for conceiving the coming into being or passing
+away of matter. Therefore that truth has at all times been evident to all
+men everywhere, nor has it ever been seriously doubted; and this could not
+be the case if it had no other ground of knowledge than the abstruse and
+exceedingly subtle proof of Kant. But besides this, I have found Kant's
+proof to be false (as is explained in the Appendix), and have shown above
+that the permanence of matter is to be deduced, not from the share which
+time has in the possibility of experience, but from the share which
+belongs to space. The true foundation of all truths which in this sense
+are called metaphysical, that is, abstract expressions of the necessary
+and universal forms of knowledge, cannot itself lie in abstract
+principles; but only in the immediate consciousness of the forms of the
+idea communicating itself in apodictic assertions _a priori_, and fearing
+no refutation. But if we yet desire to give a proof of them, it can only
+consist in showing that what is to be proved is contained in some truth
+about which there is no doubt, either as a part of it or as a
+presupposition. Thus, for example, I have shown that all empirical
+perception implies the application of the law of causality, the knowledge
+of which is hence a condition of all experience, and therefore cannot be
+first given and conditioned through experience as Hume thought.
+Demonstrations in general are not so much for those who wish to learn as
+for those who wish to dispute. Such persons stubbornly deny directly
+established insight; now only the truth can be consistent in all
+directions, and therefore we must show such persons that they admit under
+_one_ form and indirectly, what they deny under another form and directly;
+that is, the logically necessary connection between what is denied and
+what is admitted.
+
+It is also a consequence of the scientific form, the subordination of
+everything particular under a general, and so on always to what is more
+general, that the truth of many propositions is only logically
+proved,--that is, through their dependence upon other propositions, through
+syllogisms, which at the same time appear as proofs. But we must never
+forget that this whole form of science is merely a means of rendering
+knowledge more easy, not a means to greater certainty. It is easier to
+discover the nature of an animal, by means of the species to which it
+belongs, and so on through the genus, family, order, and class, than to
+examine on every occasion the animal presented to us: but the truth of all
+propositions arrived at syllogistically is always conditioned by and
+ultimately dependent upon some truth which rests not upon reasoning but
+upon perception. If this perception were always as much within our reach
+as a deduction through syllogisms, then it would be in every respect
+preferable. For every deduction from concepts is exposed to great danger
+of error, on account of the fact we have considered above, that so many
+spheres lie partly within each other, and that their content is often
+vague or uncertain. This is illustrated by a multitude of demonstrations
+of false doctrines and sophisms of every kind. Syllogisms are indeed
+perfectly certain as regards form, but they are very uncertain on account
+of their matter, the concepts. For, on the one hand, the spheres of these
+are not sufficiently sharply defined, and, on the other hand, they
+intersect each other in so many ways that one sphere is in part contained
+in many others, and we may pass at will from it to one or another of
+these, and from this sphere again to others, as we have already shown. Or,
+in other words, the minor term and also the middle can always be
+subordinated to different concepts, from which we may choose at will the
+major and the middle, and the nature of the conclusion depends on this
+choice. Consequently immediate evidence is always much to be preferred to
+reasoned truth, and the latter is only to be accepted when the former is
+too remote, and not when it is as near or indeed nearer than the latter.
+Accordingly we saw above that, as a matter of fact, in the case of logic,
+in which the immediate knowledge in each individual case lies nearer to
+hand than deduced scientific knowledge, we always conduct our thought
+according to our immediate knowledge of the laws of thought, and leave
+logic unused.(20)
+
+§ 15. If now with our conviction that perception is the primary source of
+all evidence, and that only direct or indirect connection with it is
+absolute truth; and further, that the shortest way to this is always the
+surest, as every interposition of concepts means exposure to many
+deceptions; if, I say, we now turn with this conviction to mathematics, as
+it was established as a science by Euclid, and has remained as a whole to
+our own day, we cannot help regarding the method it adopts, as strange and
+indeed perverted. We ask that every logical proof shall be traced back to
+an origin in perception; but mathematics, on the contrary, is at great
+pains deliberately to throw away the evidence of perception which is
+peculiar to it, and always at hand, that it may substitute for it a
+logical demonstration. This must seem to us like the action of a man who
+cuts off his legs in order to go on crutches, or like that of the prince
+in the "_Triumph der Empfindsamkeit_" who flees from the beautiful reality
+of nature, to delight in a stage scene that imitates it. I must here refer
+to what I have said in the sixth chapter of the essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason, and take for granted that it is fresh and present in
+the memory of the reader; so that I may link my observations on to it
+without explaining again the difference between the mere ground of
+knowledge of a mathematical truth, which can be given logically, and the
+ground of being, which is the immediate connection of the parts of space
+and time, known only in perception. It is only insight into the ground of
+being that secures satisfaction and thorough knowledge. The mere ground of
+knowledge must always remain superficial; it can afford us indeed rational
+knowledge _that_ a thing is as it is, but it cannot tell _why_ it is so.
+Euclid chose the latter way to the obvious detriment of the science. For
+just at the beginning, for example, when he ought to show once for all how
+in a triangle the angles and sides reciprocally determine each other, and
+stand to each other in the relation of reason and consequent, in
+accordance with the form which the principle of sufficient reason has in
+pure space, and which there, as in every other sphere, always affords the
+necessity that a thing is as it is, because something quite different from
+it, is as it is; instead of in this way giving a thorough insight into the
+nature of the triangle, he sets up certain disconnected arbitrarily chosen
+propositions concerning the triangle, and gives a logical ground of
+knowledge of them, through a laborious logical demonstration, based upon
+the principle of contradiction. Instead of an exhaustive knowledge of
+these space-relations we therefore receive merely certain results of them,
+imparted to us at pleasure, and in fact we are very much in the position
+of a man to whom the different effects of an ingenious machine are shown,
+but from whom its inner connection and construction are withheld. We are
+compelled by the principle of contradiction to admit that what Euclid
+demonstrates is true, but we do not comprehend _why_ it is so. We have
+therefore almost the same uncomfortable feeling that we experience after a
+juggling trick, and, in fact, most of Euclid's demonstrations are
+remarkably like such feats. The truth almost always enters by the back
+door, for it manifests itself _per accidens_ through some contingent
+circumstance. Often a _reductio ad absurdum_ shuts all the doors one after
+another, until only one is left through which we are therefore compelled
+to enter. Often, as in the proposition of Pythagoras, lines are drawn, we
+don't know why, and it afterwards appears that they were traps which close
+unexpectedly and take prisoner the assent of the astonished learner, who
+must now admit what remains wholly inconceivable in its inner connection,
+so much so, that he may study the whole of Euclid through and through
+without gaining a real insight into the laws of space-relations, but
+instead of them he only learns by heart certain results which follow from
+them. This specially empirical and unscientific knowledge is like that of
+the doctor who knows both the disease and the cure for it, but does not
+know the connection between them. But all this is the necessary
+consequence if we capriciously reject the special kind of proof and
+evidence of one species of knowledge, and forcibly introduce in its stead
+a kind which is quite foreign to its nature. However, in other respects
+the manner in which this has been accomplished by Euclid deserves all the
+praise which has been bestowed on him through so many centuries, and which
+has been carried so far that his method of treating mathematics has been
+set up as the pattern of all scientific exposition. Men tried indeed to
+model all the sciences after it, but later they gave up the attempt
+without quite knowing why. Yet in our eyes this method of Euclid in
+mathematics can appear only as a very brilliant piece of perversity. But
+when a great error in life or in science has been intentionally and
+methodically carried out with universal applause, it is always possible to
+discover its source in the philosophy which prevailed at the time. The
+Eleatics first brought out the difference, and indeed often the conflict,
+that exists between what is perceived, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~},(21) and what is
+thought, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, and used it in many ways in their philosophical
+epigrams, and also in sophisms. They were followed later by the Megarics,
+the Dialecticians, the Sophists, the New-Academy, and the Sceptics; these
+drew attention to the illusion, that is to say, to the deception of the
+senses, or rather of the understanding which transforms the data of the
+senses into perception, and which often causes us to see things to which
+the reason unhesitatingly denies reality; for example, a stick broken in
+water, and such like. It came to be known that sense-perception was not to
+be trusted unconditionally, and it was therefore hastily concluded that
+only rational, logical thought could establish truth; although Plato (in
+the Parmenides), the Megarics, Pyrrho, and the New-Academy, showed by
+examples (in the manner which was afterwards adopted by Sextus Empiricus)
+how syllogisms and concepts were also sometimes misleading, and indeed
+produced paralogisms and sophisms which arise much more easily and are far
+harder to explain than the illusion of sense-perception. However, this
+rationalism, which arose in opposition to empiricism, kept the upper hand,
+and Euclid constructed the science of mathematics in accordance with it.
+He was compelled by necessity to found the axioms upon evidence of
+perception ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}), but all the rest he based upon reasoning
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}). His method reigned supreme through all the succeeding
+centuries, and it could not but do so as long as pure intuition or
+perception, _a priori_, was not distinguished from empirical perception.
+Certain passages from the works of Proclus, the commentator of Euclid,
+which Kepler translated into Latin in his book, "De Harmonia Mundi," seem
+to show that he fully recognised this distinction. But Proclus did not
+attach enough importance to the matter; he merely mentioned it by the way,
+so that he remained unnoticed and accomplished nothing. Therefore, not
+till two thousand years later will the doctrine of Kant, which is destined
+to make such great changes in all the knowledge, thought, and action of
+European nations, produce this change in mathematics also. For it is only
+after we have learned from this great man that the intuitions or
+perceptions of space and time are quite different from empirical
+perceptions, entirely independent of any impression of the senses,
+conditioning it, not conditioned by it, _i.e._, are _a priori_, and
+therefore are not exposed to the illusions of sense; only after we have
+learned this, I say, can we comprehend that Euclid's logical method of
+treating mathematics is a useless precaution, a crutch for sound legs,
+that it is like a wanderer who during the night mistakes a bright, firm
+road for water, and carefully avoiding it, toils over the broken ground
+beside it, content to keep from point to point along the edge of the
+supposed water. Only now can we affirm with certainty that what presents
+itself to us as necessary in the perception of a figure, does not come
+from the figure on the paper, which is perhaps very defectively drawn, nor
+from the abstract concept under which we think it, but immediately from
+the form of all knowledge of which we are conscious _a priori_. This is
+always the principle of sufficient reason; here as the form of perception,
+_i.e._, space, it is the principle of the ground of being, the evidence
+and validity of which is, however, just as great and as immediate as that
+of the principle of the ground of knowing, _i.e._, logical certainty. Thus
+we need not and ought not to leave the peculiar province of mathematics in
+order to put our trust only in logical proof, and seek to authenticate
+mathematics in a sphere which is quite foreign to it, that of concepts. If
+we confine ourselves to the ground peculiar to mathematics, we gain the
+great advantage that in it the rational knowledge _that_ something is, is
+one with the knowledge _why_ it is so, whereas the method of Euclid
+entirely separates these two, and lets us know only the first, not the
+second. Aristotle says admirably in the Analyt., post. i. 27: "{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}" (_Subtilior autem et praestantior ea est
+scientia, quâ_ QUOD _aliquid sit, et_ CUR _sit una simulque intelligimus
+non separatim_ QUOD, _et_ CUR _sit_). In physics we are only satisfied
+when the knowledge that a thing is as it is is combined with the knowledge
+why it is so. To know that the mercury in the Torricellian tube stands
+thirty inches high is not really rational knowledge if we do not know that
+it is sustained at this height by the counterbalancing weight of the
+atmosphere. Shall we then be satisfied in mathematics with the _qualitas
+occulta_ of the circle that the segments of any two intersecting chords
+always contain equal rectangles? That it is so Euclid certainly
+demonstrates in the 35th Prop. of the Third Book; _why_ it is so remains
+doubtful. In the same way the proposition of Pythagoras teaches us a
+_qualitas occulta_ of the right-angled triangle; the stilted and indeed
+fallacious demonstration of Euclid forsakes us at the _why_, and a simple
+figure, which we already know, and which is present to us, gives at a
+glance far more insight into the matter, and firm inner conviction of that
+necessity, and of the dependence of that quality upon the right angle:--
+
+                              [Illustration]
+
+In the case of unequal catheti also, and indeed generally in the case of
+every possible geometrical truth, it is quite possible to obtain such a
+conviction based on perception, because these truths were always
+discovered by such an empirically known necessity, and their demonstration
+was only thought out afterwards in addition. Thus we only require an
+analysis of the process of thought in the first discovery of a geometrical
+truth in order to know its necessity empirically. It is the analytical
+method in general that I wish for the exposition of mathematics, instead
+of the synthetical method which Euclid made use of. Yet this would have
+very great, though not insuperable, difficulties in the case of
+complicated mathematical truths. Here and there in Germany men are
+beginning to alter the exposition of mathematics, and to proceed more in
+this analytical way. The greatest effort in this direction has been made
+by Herr Kosack, teacher of mathematics and physics in the Gymnasium at
+Nordhausen, who added a thorough attempt to teach geometry according to my
+principles to the programme of the school examination on the 6th of April
+1852.
+
+In order to improve the method of mathematics, it is especially necessary
+to overcome the prejudice that demonstrated truth has any superiority over
+what is known through perception, or that logical truth founded upon the
+principle of contradiction has any superiority over metaphysical truth,
+which is immediately evident, and to which belongs the pure intuition or
+perception of space.
+
+That which is most certain, and yet always inexplicable, is what is
+involved in the principle of sufficient reason, for this principle, in its
+different aspects, expresses the universal form of all our ideas and
+knowledge. All explanation consists of reduction to it, exemplification in
+the particular case of the connection of ideas expressed generally through
+it. It is thus the principle of all explanation, and therefore it is
+neither susceptible of an explanation itself, nor does it stand in need of
+it; for every explanation presupposes it, and only obtains meaning through
+it. Now, none of its forms are superior to the rest; it is equally certain
+and incapable of demonstration as the principle of the ground of being, or
+of change, or of action, or of knowing. The relation of reason and
+consequent is a necessity in all its forms, and indeed it is, in general,
+the source of the concept of necessity, for necessity has no other
+meaning. If the reason is given there is no other necessity than that of
+the consequent, and there is no reason that does not involve the necessity
+of the consequent. Just as surely then as the consequent expressed in the
+conclusion follows from the ground of knowledge given in the premises,
+does the ground of being in space determine its consequent in space: if I
+know through perception the relation of these two, this certainty is just
+as great as any logical certainty. But every geometrical proposition is
+just as good an expression of such a relation as one of the twelve axioms;
+it is a metaphysical truth, and as such, just as certain as the principle
+of contradiction itself, which is a metalogical truth, and the common
+foundation of all logical demonstration. Whoever denies the necessity,
+exhibited for intuition or perception, of the space-relations expressed in
+any proposition, may just as well deny the axioms, or that the conclusion
+follows from the premises, or, indeed, he may as well deny the principle
+of contradiction itself, for all these relations are equally
+undemonstrable, immediately evident and known _a priori_. For any one to
+wish to derive the necessity of space-relations, known in intuition or
+perception, from the principle of contradiction by means of a logical
+demonstration is just the same as for the feudal superior of an estate to
+wish to hold it as the vassal of another. Yet this is what Euclid has
+done. His axioms only, he is compelled to leave resting upon immediate
+evidence; all the geometrical truths which follow are demonstrated
+logically, that is to say, from the agreement of the assumptions made in
+the proposition with the axioms which are presupposed, or with some
+earlier proposition; or from the contradiction between the opposite of the
+proposition and the assumptions made in it, or the axioms, or earlier
+propositions, or even itself. But the axioms themselves have no more
+immediate evidence than any other geometrical problem, but only more
+simplicity on account of their smaller content.
+
+When a criminal is examined, a _procès-verbal_ is made of his statement in
+order that we may judge of its truth from its consistency. But this is
+only a makeshift, and we are not satisfied with it if it is possible to
+investigate the truth of each of his answers for itself; especially as he
+might lie consistently from the beginning. But Euclid investigated space
+according to this first method. He set about it, indeed, under the correct
+assumption that nature must everywhere be consistent, and that therefore
+it must also be so in space, its fundamental form. Since then the parts of
+space stand to each other in a relation of reason and consequent, no
+single property of space can be different from what it is without being in
+contradiction with all the others. But this is a very troublesome,
+unsatisfactory, and roundabout way to follow. It prefers indirect
+knowledge to direct, which is just as certain, and it separates the
+knowledge that a thing is from the knowledge why it is, to the great
+disadvantage of the science; and lastly, it entirely withholds from the
+beginner insight into the laws of space, and indeed renders him
+unaccustomed to the special investigation of the ground and inner
+connection of things, inclining him to be satisfied with a mere historical
+knowledge that a thing is as it is. The exercise of acuteness which this
+method is unceasingly extolled as affording consists merely in this, that
+the pupil practises drawing conclusions, _i.e._, he practises applying the
+principle of contradiction, but specially he exerts his memory to retain
+all those data whose agreement is to be tested. Moreover, it is worth
+noticing that this method of proof was applied only to geometry and not to
+arithmetic. In arithmetic the truth is really allowed to come home to us
+through perception alone, which in it consists simply in counting. As the
+perception of numbers is in _time alone_, and therefore cannot be
+represented by a sensuous schema like the geometrical figure, the
+suspicion that perception is merely empirical, and possibly illusive,
+disappeared in arithmetic, and the introduction of the logical method of
+proof into geometry was entirely due to this suspicion. As time has only
+one dimension, counting is the only arithmetical operation, to which all
+others may be reduced; and yet counting is just intuition or perception _a
+priori_, to which there is no hesitation in appealing here, and through
+which alone everything else, every sum and every equation, is ultimately
+proved. We prove, for example, not that (7 + 9 × 8 - 2)/3 = 42; but we
+refer to the pure perception in time, counting thus makes each individual
+problem an axiom. Instead of the demonstrations that fill geometry, the
+whole content of arithmetic and algebra is thus simply a method of
+abbreviating counting. We mentioned above that our immediate perception of
+numbers in time extends only to about ten. Beyond this an abstract concept
+of the numbers, fixed by a word, must take the place of the perception;
+which does not therefore actually occur any longer, but is only indicated
+in a thoroughly definite manner. Yet even so, by the important assistance
+of the system of figures which enables us to represent all larger numbers
+by the same small ones, intuitive or perceptive evidence of every sum is
+made possible, even where we make such use of abstraction that not only
+the numbers, but indefinite quantities and whole operations are thought
+only in the abstract and indicated as so thought, as [sqrt](r^b) so that
+we do not perform them, but merely symbolise them.
+
+We might establish truth in geometry also, through pure _a priori_
+perception, with the same right and certainty as in arithmetic. It is in
+fact always this necessity, known through perception in accordance with
+the principle of sufficient reason of being, which gives to geometry its
+principal evidence, and upon which in the consciousness of every one, the
+certainty of its propositions rests. The stilted logical demonstration is
+always foreign to the matter, and is generally soon forgotten, without
+weakening our conviction. It might indeed be dispensed with altogether
+without diminishing the evidence of geometry, for this is always quite
+independent of such demonstration, which never proves anything we are not
+convinced of already, through another kind of knowledge. So far then it is
+like a cowardly soldier, who adds a wound to an enemy slain by another,
+and then boasts that he slew him himself.(22)
+
+After all this we hope there will be no doubt that the evidence of
+mathematics, which has become the pattern and symbol of all evidence,
+rests essentially not upon demonstration, but upon immediate perception,
+which is thus here, as everywhere else, the ultimate ground and source of
+truth. Yet the perception which lies at the basis of mathematics has a
+great advantage over all other perception, and therefore over empirical
+perception. It is _a priori_, and therefore independent of experience,
+which is always given only in successive parts; therefore everything is
+equally near to it, and we can start either from the reason or from the
+consequent, as we please. Now this makes it absolutely reliable, for in it
+the consequent is known from the reason, and this is the only kind of
+knowledge that has necessity; for example, the equality of the sides is
+known as established by the equality of the angles. All empirical
+perception, on the other hand, and the greater part of experience,
+proceeds conversely from the consequent to the reason, and this kind of
+knowledge is not infallible, for necessity only attaches to the consequent
+on account of the reason being given, and no necessity attaches to the
+knowledge of the reason from the consequent, for the same consequent may
+follow from different reasons. The latter kind of knowledge is simply
+induction, _i.e._, from many consequents which point to one reason, the
+reason is accepted as certain; but as the cases can never be all before
+us, the truth here is not unconditionally certain. But all knowledge
+through sense-perception, and the great bulk of experience, has only this
+kind of truth. The affection of one of the senses induces the
+understanding to infer a cause of the effect, but, as a conclusion from
+the consequent to the reason is never certain, illusion, which is
+deception of the senses, is possible, and indeed often occurs, as was
+pointed out above. Only when several of the senses, or it may be all the
+five, receive impressions which point to the same cause, the possibility
+of illusion is reduced to a minimum; but yet it still exists, for there
+are cases, for example, the case of counterfeit money, in which all the
+senses are deceived. All empirical knowledge, and consequently the whole
+of natural science, is in the same position, except only the pure, or as
+Kant calls it, metaphysical part of it. Here also the causes are known
+from the effects, consequently all natural philosophy rests upon
+hypotheses, which are often false, and must then gradually give place to
+more correct ones. Only in the case of purposely arranged experiments,
+knowledge proceeds from the cause to the effect, that is, it follows the
+method that affords certainty; but these experiments themselves are
+undertaken in consequence of hypotheses. Therefore, no branch of natural
+science, such as physics, or astronomy, or physiology could be discovered
+all at once, as was the case with mathematics and logic, but required and
+requires the collected and compared experiences of many centuries. In the
+first place, repeated confirmation in experience brings the induction,
+upon which the hypothesis rests, so near completeness that in practice it
+takes the place of certainty, and is regarded as diminishing the value of
+the hypothesis, its source, just as little as the incommensurability of
+straight and curved lines diminishes the value of the application of
+geometry, or that perfect exactness of the logarithm, which is not
+attainable, diminishes the value of arithmetic. For as the logarithm, or
+the squaring of the circle, approaches infinitely near to correctness
+through infinite fractions, so, through manifold experience, the
+induction, _i.e._, the knowledge of the cause from the effects,
+approaches, not infinitely indeed, but yet so near mathematical evidence,
+_i.e._, knowledge of the effects from the cause, that the possibility of
+mistake is small enough to be neglected, but yet the possibility exists;
+for example, a conclusion from an indefinite number of cases to all cases,
+_i.e._, to the unknown ground on which all depend, is an induction. What
+conclusion of this kind seems more certain than that all men have the
+heart on the left side? Yet there are extremely rare and quite isolated
+exceptions of men who have the heart upon the right side. Sense-perception
+and empirical science have, therefore, the same kind of evidence. The
+advantage which mathematics, pure natural science, and logic have over
+them, as _a priori_ knowledge, rests merely upon this, that the formal
+element in knowledge upon which all that is _a priori_ is based, is given
+as a whole and at once, and therefore in it we can always proceed from the
+cause to the effect, while in the former kind of knowledge we are
+generally obliged to proceed from the effect to the cause. In other
+respects, the law of causality, or the principle of sufficient reason of
+change, which guides empirical knowledge, is in itself just as certain as
+the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason which are followed
+by the _a priori_ sciences referred to above. Logical demonstrations from
+concepts or syllogisms have the advantage of proceeding from the reason to
+the consequent, just as much as knowledge through perception _a priori_,
+and therefore in themselves, _i.e._, according to their form, they are
+infallible. This has greatly assisted to bring demonstration in general
+into such esteem. But this infallibility is merely relative; the
+demonstration merely subsumes under the first principles of the science,
+and it is these which contain the whole material truth of science, and
+they must not themselves be demonstrated, but must be founded on
+perception. In the few _a priori_ sciences we have named above, this
+perception is pure, but everywhere else it is empirical, and is only
+raised to universality through induction. If, then, in the empirical
+sciences also, the particular is proved from the general, yet the general,
+on the other hand, has received its truth from the particular; it is only
+a store of collected material, not a self-constituted foundation.
+
+So much for the foundation of truth. Of the source and possibility of
+error many explanations have been tried since Plato's metaphorical
+solution of the dove-cot where the wrong pigeons are caught, &c.
+(Theætetus, p. 167, _et seq._) Kant's vague, indefinite explanation of the
+source of error by means of the diagram of diagonal motion, will be found
+in the "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 294 of the first edition, and p. 350
+of the fifth. As truth is the relation of a judgment to its ground of
+knowledge, it is always a problem how the person judging can believe that
+he has such a ground of knowledge and yet not have it; that is to say, how
+error, the deception of reason, is possible. I find this possibility quite
+analogous to that of illusion, or the deception of the understanding,
+which has been explained above. My opinion is (and this is what gives this
+explanation its proper place here) that _every error is an inference from
+the consequent to the reason_, which indeed is valid when we know that the
+consequent has that reason and can have no other; but otherwise is not
+valid. The person who falls into error, either attributes to a consequent
+a reason which it cannot have, in which case he shows actual deficiency of
+understanding, _i.e._, deficiency in the capacity for immediate knowledge
+of the connection between the cause and the effect, or, as more frequently
+happens, he attributes to the effect a cause which is possible, but he
+adds to the major proposition of the syllogism, in which he infers the
+cause from the effect, that this effect _always_ results only from this
+cause. Now he could only be assured of this by a complete induction,
+which, however, he assumes without having made it. This "always" is
+therefore too wide a concept, and instead of it he ought to have used
+"sometimes" or "generally." The conclusion would then be problematical,
+and therefore not erroneous. That the man who errs should proceed in this
+way is due either to haste, or to insufficient knowledge of what is
+possible, on account of which he does not know the necessity of the
+induction that ought to be made. Error then is quite analogous to
+illusion. Both are inferences from the effect to the cause; the illusion
+brought about always in accordance with the law of causality, and by the
+understanding alone, thus directly, in perception itself; the error in
+accordance with all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and
+by the reason, thus in thought itself; yet most commonly in accordance
+with the law of causality, as will appear from the three following
+examples, which may be taken as types or representatives of the three
+kinds of error. (1.) The illusion of the senses (deception of the
+understanding) induces error (deception of the reason); for example, if
+one mistakes a painting for an alto-relief, and actually takes it for
+such; the error results from a conclusion from the following major
+premise: "If dark grey passes regularly through all shades to white; the
+cause is _always_ the light, which strikes differently upon projections
+and depressions, _ergo_--." (2.) "If there is no money in my safe, the
+cause is _always_ that my servant has got a key for it: _ergo_--." (3.) "If
+a ray of sunlight, broken through a prism, _i.e._, bent up or down,
+appears as a coloured band instead of round and white as before, the cause
+must always be that light consists of homogeneous rays, differently
+coloured and refrangible to different degrees, which, when forced asunder
+on account of the difference of their refrangibility, give an elongated
+and variously-coloured spectrum: _ergo--bibamus!_"--It must be possible to
+trace every error to such a conclusion, drawn from a major premise which
+is often only falsely generalised, hypothetical, and founded on the
+assumption that some particular cause is that of a certain effect. Only
+certain mistakes in counting are to be excepted, and they are not really
+errors, but merely mistakes. The operation prescribed by the concepts of
+the numbers has not been carried out in pure intuition or perception, in
+counting, but some other operation instead of it.
+
+As regards the _content_ of the sciences generally, it is, in fact, always
+the relation of the phenomena of the world to each other, according to the
+principle of sufficient reason, under the guidance of the _why_, which has
+validity and meaning only through this principle. _Explanation_ is the
+establishment of this relation. Therefore explanation can never go further
+than to show two ideas standing to each other in the relation peculiar to
+that form of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in the class
+to which they belong. If this is done we cannot further be asked the
+question, _why_: for the relation proved is that one which absolutely
+cannot be imagined as other than it is, _i.e._, it is the form of all
+knowledge. Therefore we do not ask why 2 + 2 = 4; or why the equality of
+the angles of a triangle determines the equality of the sides; or why its
+effect follows any given cause; or why the truth of the conclusion is
+evident from the truth of the premises. Every explanation which does not
+ultimately lead to a relation of which no "why" can further be demanded,
+stops at an accepted _qualitas occulta_; but this is the character of
+every original force of nature. Every explanation in natural science must
+ultimately end with such a _qualitas occulta_, and thus with complete
+obscurity. It must leave the inner nature of a stone just as much
+unexplained as that of a human being; it can give as little account of the
+weight, the cohesion, the chemical qualities, &c., of the former, as of
+the knowing and acting of the latter. Thus, for example, weight is a
+_qualitas occulta_, for it can be thought away, and does not proceed as a
+necessity from the form of knowledge; which, on the contrary, is not the
+case with the law of inertia, for it follows from the law of causality,
+and is therefore sufficiently explained if it is referred to that law.
+There are two things which are altogether inexplicable,--that is to say, do
+not ultimately lead to the relation which the principle of sufficient
+reason expresses. These are, first, the principle of sufficient reason
+itself in all its four forms, because it is the principle of all
+explanation, which has meaning only in relation to it; secondly, that to
+which this principle does not extend, but which is the original source of
+all phenomena; the thing-in-itself, the knowledge of which is not subject
+to the principle of sufficient reason. We must be content for the present
+not to understand this thing-in-itself, for it can only be made
+intelligible by means of the following book, in which we shall resume this
+consideration of the possible achievements of the sciences. But at the
+point at which natural science, and indeed every science, leaves things,
+because not only its explanation of them, but even the principle of this
+explanation, the principle of sufficient reason, does not extend beyond
+this point; there philosophy takes them up and treats them after its own
+method, which is quite distinct from the method of science. In my essay on
+the principle of sufficient reason, § 51, I have shown how in the
+different sciences the chief guiding clue is one or other form of that
+principle; and, in fact, perhaps the most appropriate classification of
+the sciences might be based upon this circumstance. Every explanation
+arrived at by the help of this clue is, as we have said, merely relative;
+it explains things in relation to each other, but something which indeed
+is presupposed is always left unexplained. In mathematics, for example,
+this is space and time; in mechanics, physics, and chemistry it is matter,
+qualities, original forces and laws of nature; in botany and zoology it is
+the difference of species, and life itself; in history it is the human
+race with all its properties of thought and will: in all it is that form
+of the principle of sufficient reason which is respectively applicable. It
+is peculiar to _philosophy_ that it presupposes nothing as known, but
+treats everything as equally external and a problem; not merely the
+relations of phenomena, but also the phenomena themselves, and even the
+principle of sufficient reason to which the other sciences are content to
+refer everything. In philosophy nothing would be gained by such a
+reference, as one member of the series is just as external to it as
+another; and, moreover, that kind of connection is just as much a problem
+for philosophy as what is joined together by it, and the latter again is
+just as much a problem after its combination has been explained as before
+it. For, as we have said, just what the sciences presuppose and lay down
+as the basis and the limits of their explanation, is precisely and
+peculiarly the problem of philosophy, which may therefore be said to begin
+where science ends. It cannot be founded upon demonstrations, for they
+lead from known principles to unknown, but everything is equally unknown
+and external to philosophy. There can be no principle in consequence of
+which the world with all its phenomena first came into existence, and
+therefore it is not possible to construct, as Spinoza wished, a philosophy
+which demonstrates _ex firmis principiis_. Philosophy is the most general
+rational knowledge, the first principles of which cannot therefore be
+derived from another principle still more general. The principle of
+contradiction establishes merely the agreement of concepts, but does not
+itself produce concepts. The principle of sufficient reason explains the
+connections of phenomena, but not the phenomena themselves; therefore
+philosophy cannot proceed upon these principles to seek a _causa
+efficiens_ or a _causa finalis_ of the whole world. My philosophy, at
+least, does not by any means seek to know _whence_ or _wherefore_ the
+world exists, but merely _what_ the world is. But the _why_ is here
+subordinated to the _what_, for it already belongs to the world, as it
+arises and has meaning and validity only through the form of its
+phenomena, the principle of sufficient reason. We might indeed say that
+every one knows what the world is without help, for he is himself that
+subject of knowledge of which the world is the idea; and so far this would
+be true. But that knowledge is empirical, is in the concrete; the task of
+philosophy is to reproduce this in the abstract to raise to permanent
+rational knowledge the successive changing perceptions, and in general,
+all that is contained under the wide concept of feeling and merely
+negatively defined as not abstract, distinct, rational knowledge. It must
+therefore consist of a statement in the abstract, of the nature of the
+whole world, of the whole, and of all the parts. In order then that it may
+not lose itself in the endless multitude of particular judgments, it must
+make use of abstraction and think everything individual in the universal,
+and its differences also in the universal. It must therefore partly
+separate and partly unite, in order to present to rational knowledge the
+whole manifold of the world generally, according to its nature,
+comprehended in a few abstract concepts. Through these concepts, in which
+it fixes the nature of the world, the whole individual must be known as
+well as the universal, the knowledge of both therefore must be bound
+together to the minutest point. Therefore the capacity for philosophy
+consists just in that in which Plato placed it, the knowledge of the one
+in the many, and the many in the one. Philosophy will therefore be a
+sum-total of general judgments, whose ground of knowledge is immediately
+the world itself in its entirety, without excepting anything; thus all
+that is to be found in human consciousness; it will be _a complete
+recapitulation, as it were, a reflection, of the world in abstract
+concepts_, which is only possible by the union of the essentially
+identical in _one_ concept and the relegation of the different to another.
+This task was already prescribed to philosophy by Bacon of Verulam when he
+said: _ea demum vera est philosophia, quae mundi ipsius voces fidelissime
+reddit, et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, et nihil aliud est, quam
+ejusdem_ SIMULACRUM ET REFLECTIO, _neque addit quidquam de proprio, sed
+tantum iterat et resonat_ (De Augm. Scient., L. 2, c. 13). But we take
+this in a wider sense than Bacon could then conceive.
+
+The agreement which all the sides and parts of the world have with each
+other, just because they belong to a whole, must also be found in this
+abstract copy of it. Therefore the judgments in this sum-total could to a
+certain extent be deduced from each other, and indeed always reciprocally
+so deduced. Yet to make the first judgment possible, they must all be
+present, and thus implied as prior to it in the knowledge of the world in
+the concrete, especially as all direct proof is more certain than indirect
+proof; their harmony with each other by virtue of which they come together
+into the unity of _one_ thought, and which arises from the harmony and
+unity of the world of perception itself, which is their common ground of
+knowledge, is not therefore to be made use of to establish them, as that
+which is prior to them, but is only added as a confirmation of their
+truth. This problem itself can only become quite clear in being
+solved.(23)
+
+§ 16. After this full consideration of reason as a special faculty of
+knowledge belonging to man alone, and the results and phenomena peculiar
+to human nature brought about by it, it still remains for me to speak of
+reason, so far as it is the guide of human action, and in this respect may
+be called _practical_. But what there is to say upon this point has found
+its place elsewhere in the appendix to this work, where I controvert the
+existence of the so-called practical reason of Kant, which he (certainly
+very conveniently) explained as the immediate source of virtue, and as the
+seat of an absolute (_i.e._, fallen from heaven) imperative. The detailed
+and thorough refutation of this Kantian principle of morality I have given
+later in the "Fundamental Problems of Ethics." There remains, therefore,
+but little for me to say here about the actual influence of reason, in the
+true sense of the word, upon action. At the commencement of our treatment
+of reason we remarked, in general terms, how much the action and behaviour
+of men differs from that of brutes, and that this difference is to be
+regarded as entirely due to the presence of abstract concepts in
+consciousness. The influence of these upon our whole existence is so
+penetrating and significant that, on account of them, we are related to
+the lower animals very much as those animals that see are related to those
+that have no eyes (certain larvae, worms, and zoophytes). Animals without
+eyes know only by touch what is immediately present to them in space, what
+comes into contact with them; those which see, on the contrary, know a
+wide circle of near and distant objects. In the same way the absence of
+reason confines the lower animals to the ideas of perception, _i.e._, the
+real objects which are immediately present to them in time; we, on the
+contrary, on account of knowledge in the abstract, comprehend not only the
+narrow actual present, but also the whole past and future, and the wide
+sphere of the possible; we view life freely on all its sides, and go far
+beyond the present and the actual. Thus what the eye is in space and for
+sensuous knowledge, reason is, to a certain extent, in time and for inner
+knowledge. But as the visibility of objects has its worth and meaning only
+in the fact that it informs us of their tangibility, so the whole worth of
+abstract knowledge always consists in its relation to what is perceived.
+Therefore men naturally attach far more worth to immediate and perceived
+knowledge than to abstract concepts, to that which is merely thought; they
+place empirical knowledge before logical. But this is not the opinion of
+men who live more in words than in deeds, who have seen more on paper and
+in books than in actual life, and who in their greatest degeneracy become
+pedants and lovers of the mere letter. Thus only is it conceivable that
+Leibnitz and Wolf and all their successors could go so far astray as to
+explain knowledge of perception, after the example of Duns Scotus, as
+merely confused abstract knowledge! To the honour of Spinoza, I must
+mention that his truer sense led him, on the contrary, to explain all
+general concepts as having arisen from the confusion of that which was
+known in perception (Eth. II., prop. 40, Schol. 1). It is also a result of
+perverted opinion that in mathematics the evidence proper to it was
+rejected, and logical evidence alone accepted; that everything in general
+which was not abstract knowledge was comprehended under the wide name of
+feeling, and consequently was little valued; and lastly that the Kantian
+ethics regarded the good will which immediately asserts itself upon
+knowledge of the circumstances, and guides to right and good action as
+mere feeling and emotion, and consequently as worthless and without merit,
+and would only recognise actions which proceed from abstract maxims as
+having moral worth.
+
+The many-sided view of life as a whole which man, as distinguished from
+the lower animals, possesses through reason, may be compared to a
+geometrical, colourless, abstract, reduced plan of his actual life. He,
+therefore, stands to the lower animals as the navigator who, by means of
+chart, compass, and quadrant, knows accurately his course and his position
+at any time upon the sea, stands to the uneducated sailors who see only
+the waves and the heavens. Thus it is worth noticing, and indeed
+wonderful, how, besides his life in the concrete, man always lives another
+life in the abstract. In the former he is given as a prey to all the
+storms of actual life, and to the influence of the present; he must
+struggle, suffer, and die like the brute. But his life in the abstract, as
+it lies before his rational consciousness, is the still reflection of the
+former, and of the world in which he lives; it is just that reduced chart
+or plan to which we have referred. Here in the sphere of quiet
+deliberation, what completely possessed him and moved him intensely
+before, appears to him cold, colourless, and for the moment external to
+him; he is merely the spectator, the observer. In respect of this
+withdrawal into reflection he may be compared to an actor who has played
+his part in one scene, and who takes his place among the audience till it
+is time for him to go upon the stage again, and quietly looks on at
+whatever may happen, even though it be the preparation for his own death
+(in the piece), but afterwards he again goes on the stage and acts and
+suffers as he must. From this double life proceeds that quietness peculiar
+to human beings, so very different from the thoughtlessness of the brutes,
+and with which, in accordance with previous reflection, or a formed
+determination, or a recognised necessity, a man suffers or accomplishes in
+cold blood, what is of the utmost and often terrible importance to him;
+suicide, execution, the duel, enterprises of every kind fraught with
+danger to life, and, in general, things against which his whole animal
+nature rebels. Under such circumstances we see to what an extent reason
+has mastered the animal nature, and we say to the strong: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}! (_ferreum certe tibi cor_), Il. 24, 521. Here we can say truly that
+reason manifests itself practically, and thus wherever action is guided by
+reason, where the motives are abstract concepts, wherever we are not
+determined by particular ideas of perception, nor by the impression of the
+moment which guides the brutes, there _practical reason_ shows itself. But
+I have fully explained in the Appendix, and illustrated by examples, that
+this is entirely different from and unrelated to the ethical worth of
+actions; that rational action and virtuous action are two entirely
+different things; that reason may just as well find itself in connection
+with great evil as with great good, and by its assistance may give great
+power to the one as well as to the other; that it is equally ready and
+valuable for the methodical and consistent carrying out of the noble and
+of the bad intention, of the wise as of the foolish maxim; which all
+results from the constitution of its nature, which is feminine, receptive,
+retentive, and not spontaneous; all this I have shown in detail in the
+Appendix, and illustrated by examples. What is said there would have been
+placed here, but on account of my polemic against Kant's pretended
+practical reason I have been obliged to relegate it to the Appendix, to
+which I therefore refer.
+
+The ideal explained in the _Stoical philosophy_ is the most complete
+development of _practical reason_ in the true and genuine sense of the
+word; it is the highest summit to which man can attain by the mere use of
+his reason, and in it his difference from the brutes shows itself most
+distinctly. For the ethics of Stoicism are originally and essentially, not
+a doctrine of virtue, but merely a guide to a rational life, the end and
+aim of which is happiness through peace of mind. Virtuous conduct appears
+in it as it were merely by accident, as the means, not as the end.
+Therefore the ethical theory of Stoicism is in its whole nature and point
+of view fundamentally different from the ethical systems which lay stress
+directly upon virtue, such as the doctrines of the Vedas, of Plato, of
+Christianity, and of Kant. The aim of Stoical ethics is happiness: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_virtutes omnes finem habere beatitudinem_) it is called
+in the account of the Stoa by Stobæus (Ecl., L. ii. c. 7, p. 114, and also
+p. 138). Yet the ethics of Stoicism teach that happiness can only be
+attained with certainty through inward peace and quietness of spirit
+({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}), and that this again can only be reached through virtue; this
+is the whole meaning of the saying that virtue is the highest good. But if
+indeed by degrees the end is lost sight of in the means, and virtue is
+inculcated in a way which discloses an interest entirely different from
+that of one's own happiness, for it contradicts this too distinctly; this
+is just one of those inconsistencies by means of which, in every system,
+the immediately known, or, as it is called, felt truth leads us back to
+the right way in defiance of syllogistic reasoning; as, for example, we
+see clearly in the ethical teaching of Spinoza, which deduces a pure
+doctrine of virtue from the egoistical _suum utile quærere_ by means of
+palpable sophisms. According to this, as I conceive the spirit of the
+Stoical ethics, their source lies in the question whether the great
+prerogative of man, reason, which, by means of planned action and its
+results, relieves life and its burdens so much, might not also be capable
+of freeing him at once, directly, _i.e._, through mere knowledge,
+completely, or nearly so, of the sorrows and miseries of every kind of
+which his life is full. They held that it was not in keeping with the
+prerogative of reason that the nature given with it, which by means of it
+comprehends and contemplates an infinity of things and circumstances,
+should yet, through the present, and the accidents that can be contained
+in the few years of a life that is short, fleeting, and uncertain, be
+exposed to such intense pain, to such great anxiety and suffering, as
+arise from the tempestuous strain of the desires and the antipathies; and
+they believed that the due application of reason must raise men above
+them, and can make them invulnerable. Therefore Antisthenes says: {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_aut mentem parandam, aut laqueum._ Plut. de
+stoic. repugn., c. 14), _i.e._, life is so full of troubles and vexations,
+that one must either rise above it by means of corrected thoughts, or
+leave it. It was seen that want and suffering did not directly and of
+necessity spring from not having, but from desiring to have and not
+having; that therefore this desire to have is the necessary condition
+under which alone it becomes a privation not to have and begets pain. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} (_non paupertas dolorem efficit, sed
+cupiditas_), Epict., fragm. 25. Men learned also from experience that it
+is only the hope of what is claimed that begets and nourishes the wish;
+therefore neither the many unavoidable evils which are common to all, nor
+unattainable blessings, disquiet or trouble us, but only the trifling more
+or less of those things which we can avoid or attain; indeed, not only
+what is absolutely unavoidable or unattainable, but also what is merely
+relatively so, leaves us quite undisturbed; therefore the ills that have
+once become joined to our individuality, or the good things that must of
+necessity always be denied us, are treated with indifference, in
+accordance with the peculiarity of human nature that every wish soon dies
+and can no more beget pain if it is not nourished by hope. It followed
+from all this that happiness always depends upon the proportion between
+our claims and what we receive. It is all one whether the quantities thus
+related be great or small, and the proportion can be established just as
+well by diminishing the amount of the first as by increasing the amount of
+the second; and in the same way it also follows that all suffering
+proceeds from the want of proportion between what we demand and expect and
+what we get. Now this want of proportion obviously lies only in knowledge,
+and it could be entirely abolished through fuller insight.(24) Therefore
+Chrysippus says: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (Stob.
+Ecl., L. ii. c. 7, p. 134), that is, one ought to live with a due
+knowledge of the transitory nature of the things of the world. For as
+often as a man loses self-command, or is struck down by a misfortune, or
+grows angry, or becomes faint-hearted, he shows that he finds things
+different from what he expected, consequently that he was caught in error,
+and did not know the world and life, did not know that the will of the
+individual is crossed at every step by the chance of inanimate nature and
+the antagonism of aims and the wickedness of other individuals: he has
+therefore either not made use of his reason in order to arrive at a
+general knowledge of this characteristic of life, or he lacks judgment, in
+that he does not recognise in the particular what he knows in general, and
+is therefore surprised by it and loses his self-command.(25) Thus also
+every keen pleasure is an error and an illusion, for no attained wish can
+give lasting satisfaction; and, moreover, every possession and every
+happiness is but lent by chance for an uncertain time, and may therefore
+be demanded back the next hour. All pain rests on the passing away of such
+an illusion; thus both arise from defective knowledge; the wise man
+therefore holds himself equally aloof from joy and sorrow, and no event
+disturbs his {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}.
+
+In accordance with this spirit and aim of the Stoa, Epictetus began and
+ended with the doctrine as the kernel of his philosophy, that we should
+consider well and distinguish what depends upon us and what does not, and
+therefore entirely avoid counting upon the latter, whereby we shall
+certainly remain free from all pain, sorrow, and anxiety. But that which
+alone is dependent upon us is the will; and here a transition gradually
+takes place to a doctrine of virtue, for it is observed that as the outer
+world, which is independent of us, determines good and bad fortune, so
+inner contentment with ourselves, or the absence of it, proceeds from the
+will. But it was then asked whether we ought to apply the words _bonum_
+and _malum_ to the two former or to the two latter? This was indeed
+arbitrary and a matter of choice, and did not make any real difference,
+but yet the Stoics disputed everlastingly with the Peripatetics and
+Epicureans about it, and amused themselves with the inadmissible
+comparison of two entirely incommensurable quantities, and the
+antithetical, paradoxical judgments which proceeded from them, and which
+they flung at each other. The _Paradoxa_ of Cicero afford us an
+interesting collection of these from the Stoical side.
+
+Zeno, the founder, seems originally to have followed a somewhat different
+path. The starting-point with him was that for the attainment of the
+highest good, _i.e._, blessedness and spiritual peace, one must live in
+harmony with oneself ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}.--_Consonanter vivere: hoc est secundum unam rationem et
+concordem sibi vivere._ Stob. Ecl. eth. L. ii., c. 7, p. 132. Also: {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. _Virtutem esse
+animi affectiomem secum per totam vitam consentientem_, _ibid._, p. 104.)
+Now this was only possible for a man if he determined himself entirely
+rationally, according to concepts, not according to changing impressions
+and moods; since, however, only the maxims of our conduct, not the
+consequences nor the outward circumstances, are in our power, in order to
+be always consistent we must set before us as our aim only the maxims and
+not the consequences and circumstances, and thus again a doctrine of
+virtue is introduced.
+
+But the ethical principle of Zeno--to live in harmony with oneself--appeared
+even to his immediate successors to be too formal and empty. They
+therefore gave it material content by the addition--"to live in harmony
+with nature" ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}), which, as Stobæus mentions in
+another place, was first added by Kleanthes, and extended the matter very
+much on account of the wide sphere of the concept and the vagueness of the
+expression. For Kleanthes meant the whole of nature in general, while
+Chrysippus meant human nature in particular (Diog. Laert., 7, 89). It
+followed that what alone was adapted to the latter was virtue, just as the
+satisfaction of animal desires was adapted to animal natures; and thus
+ethics had again to be forcibly united to a doctrine of virtue, and in
+some way or other established through physics. For the Stoics always aimed
+at unity of principle, as for them God and the world were not dissevered.
+
+The ethical system of Stoicism, regarded as a whole, is in fact a very
+valuable and estimable attempt to use the great prerogative of man,
+reason, for an important and salutary end; to raise him above the
+suffering and pain to which all life is exposed, by means of a maxim--
+
+
+    "_Qua ratione queas traducere leniter oevum:_
+    _Ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido,_
+    _Ne pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes,_"
+
+
+and thus to make him partake, in the highest degree, of the dignity which
+belongs to him as a rational being, as distinguished from the brutes; a
+dignity of which, in this sense at any rate, we can speak, though not in
+any other. It is a consequence of my view of the ethical system of
+Stoicism that it must be explained at the part of my work at which I
+consider what reason is and what it can do. But although it may to a
+certain extent be possible to attain that end through the application of
+reason, and through a purely rational system of ethics, and although
+experience shows that the happiest men are those purely rational
+characters commonly called practical philosophers,--and rightly so, because
+just as the true, that is, the theoretical philosopher carries life into
+the concept, they carry the concept into life,--yet it is far from the case
+that perfection can be attained in this way, and that the reason, rightly
+used, can really free us from the burden and sorrow of life, and lead us
+to happiness. Rather, there lies an absolute contradiction in wishing to
+live without suffering, and this contradiction is also implied in the
+commonly used expression, "blessed life." This will become perfectly clear
+to whoever comprehends the whole of the following exposition. In this
+purely rational system of ethics the contradiction reveals itself thus,
+the Stoic is obliged in his doctrine of the way to the blessed life (for
+that is what his ethical system always remains) to insert a recommendation
+of suicide (as among the magnificent ornaments and apparel of Eastern
+despots there is always a costly vial of poison) for the case in which the
+sufferings of the body, which cannot be philosophised away by any
+principles or syllogistic reasonings, are paramount and incurable; thus
+its one aim, blessedness, is rendered vain, and nothing remains as a mode
+of escape from suffering except death; in such a case then death must be
+voluntarily accepted, just as we would take any other medicine. Here then
+a marked antagonism is brought out between the ethical system of Stoicism
+and all those systems referred to above which make virtue in itself
+directly, and accompanied by the most grievous sorrows, their aim, and
+will not allow a man to end his life in order to escape from suffering.
+Not one of them, however, was able to give the true reason for the
+rejection of suicide, but they laboriously collected illusory explanations
+from all sides: the true reason will appear in the Fourth Book in the
+course of the development of our system. But the antagonism referred to
+reveals and establishes the essential difference in fundamental principle
+between Stoicism, which is just a special form of endæmonism, and those
+doctrines we have mentioned, although both are often at one in their
+results, and are apparently related. And the inner contradiction referred
+to above, with which the ethical system of Stoicism is affected even in
+its fundamental thought, shows itself further in the circumstance that its
+ideal, the Stoic philosopher, as the system itself represents him, could
+never obtain life or inner poetic truth, but remains a wooden, stiff
+lay-figure of which nothing can be made. He cannot himself make use of his
+wisdom, and his perfect peace, contentment, and blessedness directly
+contradict the nature of man, and preclude us from forming any concrete
+idea of him. When compared with him, how entirely different appear the
+overcomers of the world, and voluntary hermits that Indian philosophy
+presents to us, and has actually produced; or indeed, the holy man of
+Christianity, that excellent form full of deep life, of the greatest
+poetic truth, and the highest significance, which stands before us in
+perfect virtue, holiness, and sublimity, yet in a state of supreme
+suffering.(26)
+
+
+
+
+
+SECOND BOOK. THE WORLD AS WILL.
+
+
+
+
+First Aspect. The Objectification Of The Will.
+
+
+    Nos habitat, non tartara, sed nec sidera coeli:
+    Spiritus, in nobis qui viget, illa facit.
+
+
+§ 17. In the first book we considered the idea merely as such, that is,
+only according to its general form. It is true that as far as the abstract
+idea, the concept, is concerned, we obtained a knowledge of it in respect
+of its content also, because it has content and meaning only in relation
+to the idea of perception, without which it would be worthless and empty.
+Accordingly, directing our attention exclusively to the idea of
+perception, we shall now endeavour to arrive at a knowledge of its
+content, its more exact definition, and the forms which it presents to us.
+And it will specially interest us to find an explanation of its peculiar
+significance, that significance which is otherwise merely felt, but on
+account of which it is that these pictures do not pass by us entirely
+strange and meaningless, as they must otherwise do, but speak to us
+directly, are understood, and obtain an interest which concerns our whole
+nature.
+
+We direct our attention to mathematics, natural science, and philosophy,
+for each of these holds out the hope that it will afford us a part of the
+explanation we desire. Now, taking philosophy first, we find that it is
+like a monster with many heads, each of which speaks a different language.
+They are not, indeed, all at variance on the point we are here
+considering, the significance of the idea of perception. For, with the
+exception of the Sceptics and the Idealists, the others, for the most
+part, speak very much in the same way of an _object_ which constitutes the
+_basis_ of the idea, and which is indeed different in its whole being and
+nature from the idea, but yet is in all points as like it as one egg is to
+another. But this does not help us, for we are quite unable to distinguish
+such an object from the idea; we find that they are one and the same; for
+every object always and for ever presupposes a subject, and therefore
+remains idea, so that we recognised objectivity as belonging to the most
+universal form of the idea, which is the division into subject and object.
+Further, the principle of sufficient reason, which is referred to in
+support of this doctrine, is for us merely the form of the idea, the
+orderly combination of one idea with another, but not the combination of
+the whole finite or infinite series of ideas with something which is not
+idea at all, and which cannot therefore be presented in perception. Of the
+Sceptics and Idealists we spoke above, in examining the controversy about
+the reality of the outer world.
+
+If we turn to mathematics to look for the fuller knowledge we desire of
+the idea of perception, which we have, as yet, only understood generally,
+merely in its form, we find that mathematics only treats of these ideas so
+far as they fill time and space, that is, so far as they are quantities.
+It will tell us with the greatest accuracy the how-many and the how-much;
+but as this is always merely relative, that is to say, merely a comparison
+of one idea with others, and a comparison only in the one respect of
+quantity, this also is not the information we are principally in search
+of.
+
+Lastly, if we turn to the wide province of natural science, which is
+divided into many fields, we may, in the first place, make a general
+division of it into two parts. It is either the description of forms,
+which I call _Morphology_, or the explanation of changes, which I call
+_Etiology_. The first treats of the permanent forms, the second of the
+changing matter, according to the laws of its transition from one form to
+another. The first is the whole extent of what is generally called natural
+history. It teaches us, especially in the sciences of botany and zoology,
+the various permanent, organised, and therefore definitely determined
+forms in the constant change of individuals; and these forms constitute a
+great part of the content of the idea of perception. In natural history
+they are classified, separated, united, arranged according to natural and
+artificial systems, and brought under concepts which make a general view
+and knowledge of the whole of them possible. Further, an infinitely fine
+analogy both in the whole and in the parts of these forms, and running
+through them all (_unité de plan_), is established, and thus they may be
+compared to innumerable variations on a theme which is not given. The
+passage of matter into these forms, that is to say, the origin of
+individuals, is not a special part of natural science, for every
+individual springs from its like by generation, which is everywhere
+equally mysterious, and has as yet evaded definite knowledge. The little
+that is known on the subject finds its place in physiology, which belongs
+to that part of natural science I have called etiology. Mineralogy also,
+especially where it becomes geology, inclines towards etiology, though it
+principally belongs to morphology. Etiology proper comprehends all those
+branches of natural science in which the chief concern is the knowledge of
+cause and effect. The sciences teach how, according to an invariable rule,
+one condition of matter is necessarily followed by a certain other
+condition; how one change necessarily conditions and brings about a
+certain other change; this sort of teaching is called _explanation_. The
+principal sciences in this department are mechanics, physics, chemistry,
+and physiology.
+
+If, however, we surrender ourselves to its teaching, we soon become
+convinced that etiology cannot afford us the information we chiefly
+desire, any more than morphology. The latter presents to us innumerable
+and infinitely varied forms, which are yet related by an unmistakable
+family likeness. These are for us ideas, and when only treated in this
+way, they remain always strange to us, and stand before us like
+hieroglyphics which we do not understand. Etiology, on the other hand,
+teaches us that, according to the law of cause and effect, this particular
+condition of matter brings about that other particular condition, and thus
+it has explained it and performed its part. However, it really does
+nothing more than indicate the orderly arrangement according to which the
+states of matter appear in space and time, and teach in all cases what
+phenomenon must necessarily appear at a particular time in a particular
+place. It thus determines the position of phenomena in time and space,
+according to a law whose special content is derived from experience, but
+whose universal form and necessity is yet known to us independently of
+experience. But it affords us absolutely no information about the inner
+nature of any one of these phenomena: this is called a _force of nature_,
+and it lies outside the province of causal explanation, which calls the
+constant uniformity with which manifestations of such a force appear
+whenever their known conditions are present, a _law of nature_. But this
+law of nature, these conditions, and this appearance in a particular place
+at a particular time, are all that it knows or ever can know. The force
+itself which manifests itself, the inner nature of the phenomena which
+appear in accordance with these laws, remains always a secret to it,
+something entirely strange and unknown in the case of the simplest as well
+as of the most complex phenomena. For although as yet etiology has most
+completely achieved its aim in mechanics, and least completely in
+physiology, still the force on account of which a stone falls to the
+ground or one body repels another is, in its inner nature, not less
+strange and mysterious than that which produces the movements and the
+growth of an animal. The science of mechanics presupposes matter, weight,
+impenetrability, the possibility of communicating motion by impact,
+inertia and so forth as ultimate facts, calls them forces of nature, and
+their necessary and orderly appearance under certain conditions a law of
+nature. Only after this does its explanation begin, and it consists in
+indicating truly and with mathematical exactness, how, where and when each
+force manifests itself, and in referring every phenomenon which presents
+itself to the operation of one of these forces. Physics, chemistry, and
+physiology proceed in the same way in their province, only they presuppose
+more and accomplish less. Consequently the most complete etiological
+explanation of the whole of nature can never be more than an enumeration
+of forces which cannot be explained, and a reliable statement of the rule
+according to which phenomena appear in time and space, succeed, and make
+way for each other. But the inner nature of the forces which thus appear
+remains unexplained by such an explanation, which must confine itself to
+phenomena and their arrangement, because the law which it follows does not
+extend further. In this respect it may be compared to a section of a piece
+of marble which shows many veins beside each other, but does not allow us
+to trace the course of the veins from the interior of the marble to its
+surface. Or, if I may use an absurd but more striking comparison, the
+philosophical investigator must always have the same feeling towards the
+complete etiology of the whole of nature, as a man who, without knowing
+how, has been brought into a company quite unknown to him, each member of
+which in turn presents another to him as his friend and cousin, and
+therefore as quite well known, and yet the man himself, while at each
+introduction he expresses himself gratified, has always the question on
+his lips: "But how the deuce do I stand to the whole company?"
+
+Thus we see that, with regard to those phenomena which we know only as our
+ideas, etiology can never give us the desired information that shall carry
+us beyond this point. For, after all its explanations, they still remain
+quite strange to us, as mere ideas whose significance we do not
+understand. The causal connection merely gives us the rule and the
+relative order of their appearance in space and time, but affords us no
+further knowledge of that which so appears. Moreover, the law of causality
+itself has only validity for ideas, for objects of a definite class, and
+it has meaning only in so far as it presupposes them. Thus, like these
+objects themselves, it always exists only in relation to a subject, that
+is, conditionally; and so it is known just as well if we start from the
+subject, _i.e._, _a priori_, as if we start from the object, _i.e._, _a
+posteriori_. Kant indeed has taught us this.
+
+But what now impels us to inquiry is just that we are not satisfied with
+knowing that we have ideas, that they are such and such, and that they are
+connected according to certain laws, the general expression of which is
+the principle of sufficient reason. We wish to know the significance of
+these ideas; we ask whether this world is merely idea; in which case it
+would pass by us like an empty dream or a baseless vision, not worth our
+notice; or whether it is also something else, something more than idea,
+and if so, what. Thus much is certain, that this something we seek for
+must be completely and in its whole nature different from the idea; that
+the forms and laws of the idea must therefore be completely foreign to it;
+further, that we cannot arrive at it from the idea under the guidance of
+the laws which merely combine objects, ideas, among themselves, and which
+are the forms of the principle of sufficient reason.
+
+Thus we see already that we can never arrive at the real nature of things
+from without. However much we investigate, we can never reach anything but
+images and names. We are like a man who goes round a castle seeking in
+vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the façades. And yet this is
+the method that has been followed by all philosophers before me.
+
+§ 18. In fact, the meaning for which we seek of that world which is
+present to us only as our idea, or the transition from the world as mere
+idea of the knowing subject to whatever it may be besides this, would
+never be found if the investigator himself were nothing more than the pure
+knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body). But he is himself rooted
+in that world; he finds himself in it as an _individual_, that is to say,
+his knowledge, which is the necessary supporter of the whole world as
+idea, is yet always given through the medium of a body, whose affections
+are, as we have shown, the starting-point for the understanding in the
+perception of that world. His body is, for the pure knowing subject, an
+idea like every other idea, an object among objects. Its movements and
+actions are so far known to him in precisely the same way as the changes
+of all other perceived objects, and would be just as strange and
+incomprehensible to him if their meaning were not explained for him in an
+entirely different way. Otherwise he would see his actions follow upon
+given motives with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes
+of other objects follow upon causes, stimuli, or motives. But he would not
+understand the influence of the motives any more than the connection
+between every other effect which he sees and its cause. He would then call
+the inner nature of these manifestations and actions of his body which he
+did not understand a force, a quality, or a character, as he pleased, but
+he would have no further insight into it. But all this is not the case;
+indeed the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge who
+appears as an individual, and the answer is _will_. This and this alone
+gives him the key to his own existence, reveals to him the significance,
+shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his
+movements. The body is given in two entirely different ways to the subject
+of knowledge, who becomes an individual only through his identity with it.
+It is given as an idea in intelligent perception, as an object among
+objects and subject to the laws of objects. And it is also given in quite
+a different way as that which is immediately known to every one, and is
+signified by the word _will_. Every true act of his will is also at once
+and without exception a movement of his body. The act of will and the
+movement of the body are not two different things objectively known, which
+the bond of causality unites; they do not stand in the relation of cause
+and effect; they are one and the same, but they are given in entirely
+different ways,--immediately, and again in perception for the
+understanding. The action of the body is nothing but the act of the will
+objectified, _i.e._, passed into perception. It will appear later that
+this is true of every movement of the body, not merely those which follow
+upon motives, but also involuntary movements which follow upon mere
+stimuli, and, indeed, that the whole body is nothing but objectified will,
+_i.e._, will become idea. All this will be proved and made quite clear in
+the course of this work. In one respect, therefore, I shall call the body
+the _objectivity of will_; as in the previous book, and in the essay on
+the principle of sufficient reason, in accordance with the one-sided point
+of view intentionally adopted there (that of the idea), I called it _the
+immediate object_. Thus in a certain sense we may also say that will is
+the knowledge _a priori_ of the body, and the body is the knowledge _a
+posteriori_ of the will. Resolutions of the will which relate to the
+future are merely deliberations of the reason about what we shall will at
+a particular time, not real acts of will. Only the carrying out of the
+resolve stamps it as will, for till then it is never more than an
+intention that may be changed, and that exists only in the reason _in
+abstracto_. It is only in reflection that to will and to act are
+different; in reality they are one. Every true, genuine, immediate act of
+will is also, at once and immediately, a visible act of the body. And,
+corresponding to this, every impression upon the body is also, on the
+other hand, at once and immediately an impression upon the will. As such
+it is called pain when it is opposed to the will; gratification or
+pleasure when it is in accordance with it. The degrees of both are widely
+different. It is quite wrong, however, to call pain and pleasure ideas,
+for they are by no means ideas, but immediate affections of the will in
+its manifestation, the body; compulsory, instantaneous willing or
+not-willing of the impression which the body sustains. There are only a
+few impressions of the body which do not touch the will, and it is through
+these alone that the body is an immediate object of knowledge, for, as
+perceived by the understanding, it is already an indirect object like all
+others. These impressions are, therefore, to be treated directly as mere
+ideas, and excepted from what has been said. The impressions we refer to
+are the affections of the purely objective senses of sight, hearing, and
+touch, though only so far as these organs are affected in the way which is
+specially peculiar to their specific nature. This affection of them is so
+excessively weak an excitement of the heightened and specifically modified
+sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will, but only
+furnishes the understanding with the data out of which the perception
+arises, undisturbed by any excitement of the will. But every stronger or
+different kind of affection of these organs of sense is painful, that is
+to say, against the will, and thus they also belong to its objectivity.
+Weakness of the nerves shows itself in this, that the impressions which
+have only such a degree of strength as would usually be sufficient to make
+them data for the understanding reach the higher degree at which they
+influence the will, that is to say, give pain or pleasure, though more
+often pain, which is, however, to some extent deadened and inarticulate,
+so that not only particular tones and strong light are painful to us, but
+there ensues a generally unhealthy and hypochondriacal disposition which
+is not distinctly understood. The identity of the body and the will shows
+itself further, among other ways, in the circumstance that every vehement
+and excessive movement of the will, _i.e._, every emotion, agitates the
+body and its inner constitution directly, and disturbs the course of its
+vital functions. This is shown in detail in "Will in Nature," p. 27 of the
+second edition and p. 28 of the third.
+
+Lastly, the knowledge which I have of my will, though it is immediate,
+cannot be separated from that which I have of my body. I know my will, not
+as a whole, not as a unity, not completely, according to its nature, but I
+know it only in its particular acts, and therefore in time, which is the
+form of the phenomenal aspect of my body, as of every object. Therefore
+the body is a condition of the knowledge of my will. Thus, I cannot really
+imagine this will apart from my body. In the essay on the principle of
+sufficient reason, the will, or rather the subject of willing, is treated
+as a special class of ideas or objects. But even there we saw this object
+become one with the subject; that is, we saw it cease to be an object. We
+there called this union the miracle {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, and the whole of the
+present work is to a certain extent an explanation of this. So far as I
+know my will specially as object, I know it as body. But then I am again
+at the first class of ideas laid down in that essay, _i.e._, real objects.
+As we proceed we shall see always more clearly that these ideas of the
+first class obtain their explanation and solution from those of the fourth
+class given in the essay, which could no longer be properly opposed to the
+subject as object, and that, therefore, we must learn to understand the
+inner nature of the law of causality which is valid in the first class,
+and of all that happens in accordance with it from the law of motivation
+which governs the fourth class.
+
+The identity of the will and the body, of which we have now given a
+cursory explanation, can only be proved in the manner we have adopted
+here. We have proved this identity for the first time, and shall do so
+more and more fully in the course of this work. By "proved" we mean raised
+from the immediate consciousness, from knowledge in the concrete to
+abstract knowledge of the reason, or carried over into abstract knowledge.
+On the other hand, from its very nature it can never be demonstrated, that
+is, deduced as indirect knowledge from some other more direct knowledge,
+just because it is itself the most direct knowledge; and if we do not
+apprehend it and stick to it as such, we shall expect in vain to receive
+it again in some indirect way as derivative knowledge. It is knowledge of
+quite a special kind, whose truth cannot therefore properly be brought
+under any of the four rubrics under which I have classified all truth in
+the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29, the logical, the
+empirical, the metaphysical, and the metalogical, for it is not, like all
+these, the relation of an abstract idea to another idea, or to the
+necessary form of perceptive or of abstract ideation, but it is the
+relation of a judgment to the connection which an idea of perception, the
+body, has to that which is not an idea at all, but something _toto genere_
+different, will. I should like therefore to distinguish this from all
+other truth, and call it {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} _philosophical truth_. We can turn
+the expression of this truth in different ways and say: My body and my
+will are one;--or, What as an idea of perception I call my body, I call my
+will, so far as I am conscious of it in an entirely different way which
+cannot be compared to any other;--or, My body is the _objectivity_ of my
+will;--or, My body considered apart from the fact that it is my idea is
+still my will, and so forth.(27)
+
+§ 19. In the first book we were reluctantly driven to explain the human
+body as merely idea of the subject which knows it, like all the other
+objects of this world of perception. But it has now become clear that what
+enables us consciously to distinguish our own body from all other objects
+which in other respects are precisely the same, is that our body appears
+in consciousness in quite another way _toto genere_ different from idea,
+and this we denote by the word _will_; and that it is just this double
+knowledge which we have of our own body that affords us information about
+it, about its action and movement following on motives, and also about
+what it experiences by means of external impressions; in a word, about
+what it is, not as idea, but as more than idea; that is to say, what it is
+_in itself_. None of this information have we got directly with regard to
+the nature, action, and experience of other real objects.
+
+It is just because of this special relation to one body that the knowing
+subject is an individual. For regarded apart from this relation, his body
+is for him only an idea like all other ideas. But the relation through
+which the knowing subject is an _individual_, is just on that account a
+relation which subsists only between him and one particular idea of all
+those which he has. Therefore he is conscious of this _one_ idea, not
+merely as an idea, but in quite a different way as a will. If, however, he
+abstracts from that special relation, from that twofold and completely
+heterogeneous knowledge of what is one and the same, then that _one_, the
+body, is an idea like all other ideas. Therefore, in order to understand
+the matter, the individual who knows must either assume that what
+distinguishes that one idea from others is merely the fact that his
+knowledge stands in this double relation to it alone; that insight in two
+ways at the same time is open to him only in the case of this one object
+of perception, and that this is to be explained not by the difference of
+this object from all others, but only by the difference between the
+relation of his knowledge to this one object, and its relation to all
+other objects. Or else he must assume that this object is essentially
+different from all others; that it alone of all objects is at once both
+will and idea, while the rest are only ideas, _i.e._, only phantoms. Thus
+he must assume that his body is the only real individual in the world,
+_i.e._, the only phenomenon of will and the only immediate object of the
+subject. That other objects, considered merely as _ideas_, are like his
+body, that is, like it, fill space (which itself can only be present as
+idea), and also, like it, are causally active in space, is indeed
+demonstrably certain from the law of causality which is _a priori_ valid
+for ideas, and which admits of no effect without a cause; but apart from
+the fact that we can only reason from an effect to a cause generally, and
+not to a similar cause, we are still in the sphere of mere ideas, in which
+alone the law of causality is valid, and beyond which it can never take
+us. But whether the objects known to the individual only as ideas are yet,
+like his own body, manifestations of a will, is, as was said in the First
+Book, the proper meaning of the question as to the reality of the external
+world. To deny this is _theoretical egoism_, which on that account regards
+all phenomena that are outside its own will as phantoms, just as in a
+practical reference exactly the same thing is done by practical egoism.
+For in it a man regards and treats himself alone as a person, and all
+other persons as mere phantoms. Theoretical egoism can never be
+demonstrably refuted, yet in philosophy it has never been used otherwise
+than as a sceptical sophism, _i.e._, a pretence. As a serious conviction,
+on the other hand, it could only be found in a madhouse, and as such it
+stands in need of a cure rather than a refutation. We do not therefore
+combat it any further in this regard, but treat it as merely the last
+stronghold of scepticism, which is always polemical. Thus our knowledge,
+which is always bound to individuality and is limited by this
+circumstance, brings with it the necessity that each of us can only _be
+one_, while, on the other hand, each of us can _know all_; and it is this
+limitation that creates the need for philosophy. We therefore who, for
+this very reason, are striving to extend the limits of our knowledge
+through philosophy, will treat this sceptical argument of theoretical
+egoism which meets us, as an army would treat a small frontier fortress.
+The fortress cannot indeed be taken, but the garrison can never sally
+forth from it, and therefore we pass it by without danger, and are not
+afraid to have it in our rear.
+
+The double knowledge which each of us has of the nature and activity of
+his own body, and which is given in two completely different ways, has now
+been clearly brought out. We shall accordingly make further use of it as a
+key to the nature of every phenomenon in nature, and shall judge of all
+objects which are not our own bodies, and are consequently not given to
+our consciousness in a double way but only as ideas, according to the
+analogy of our own bodies, and shall therefore assume that as in one
+aspect they are idea, just like our bodies, and in this respect are
+analogous to them, so in another aspect, what remains of objects when we
+set aside their existence as idea of the subject, must in its inner nature
+be the same as that in us which we call _will_. For what other kind of
+existence or reality should we attribute to the rest of the material
+world? Whence should we take the elements out of which we construct such a
+world? Besides will and idea nothing is known to us or thinkable. If we
+wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the material world which
+exists immediately only in our idea, we give it the reality which our own
+body has for each of us; for that is the most real thing for every one.
+But if we now analyse the reality of this body and its actions, beyond the
+fact that it is idea, we find nothing in it except the will; with this its
+reality is exhausted. Therefore we can nowhere find another kind of
+reality which we can attribute to the material world. Thus if we hold that
+the material world is something more than merely our idea, we must say
+that besides being idea, that is, in itself and according to its inmost
+nature, it is that which we find immediately in ourselves as _will_. I say
+according to its inmost nature; but we must first come to know more
+accurately this real nature of the will, in order that we may be able to
+distinguish from it what does not belong to itself, but to its
+manifestation, which has many grades. Such, for example, is the
+circumstance of its being accompanied by knowledge, and the determination
+by motives which is conditioned by this knowledge. As we shall see farther
+on, this does not belong to the real nature of will, but merely to its
+distinct manifestation as an animal or a human being. If, therefore, I
+say,--the force which attracts a stone to the earth is according to its
+nature, in itself, and apart from all idea, will, I shall not be supposed
+to express in this proposition the insane opinion that the stone moves
+itself in accordance with a known motive, merely because this is the way
+in which will appears in man.(28) We shall now proceed more clearly and in
+detail to prove, establish, and develop to its full extent what as yet has
+only been provisionally and generally explained.(29)
+
+§ 20. As we have said, the will proclaims itself primarily in the
+voluntary movements of our own body, as the inmost nature of this body, as
+that which it is besides being object of perception, idea. For these
+voluntary movements are nothing else than the visible aspect of the
+individual acts of will, with which they are directly coincident and
+identical, and only distinguished through the form of knowledge into which
+they have passed, and in which alone they can be known, the form of idea.
+
+But these acts of will have always a ground or reason outside themselves
+in motives. Yet these motives never determine more than what I will at
+_this_ time, in _this_ place, and under _these_ circumstances, not _that_
+I will in general, or _what_ I will in general, that is, the maxims which
+characterise my volition generally. Therefore the inner nature of my
+volition cannot be explained from these motives; but they merely determine
+its manifestation at a given point of time: they are merely the occasion
+of my will showing itself; but the will itself lies outside the province
+of the law of motivation, which determines nothing but its appearance at
+each point of time. It is only under the presupposition of my empirical
+character that the motive is a sufficient ground of explanation of my
+action. But if I abstract from my character, and then ask, why, in
+general, I will this and not that, no answer is possible, because it is
+only the manifestation of the will that is subject to the principle of
+sufficient reason, and not the will itself, which in this respect is to be
+called _groundless_. At this point I presuppose Kant's doctrine of the
+empirical and intelligible character, and also my own treatment of the
+subject in "The Fundamental Problems of Ethics," pp. 48, 58, and 178, _et
+seq._, of first edition (p. 174, _et seq._, of second edition). I shall
+also have to speak more fully on the question in the Fourth Book. For the
+present, I have only to draw attention to this, that the fact of one
+manifestation being established through another, as here the deed through
+the motive, does not at all conflict with the fact that its real nature is
+will, which itself has no _ground_; for as the principle of sufficient
+reason in all its aspects is only the form of knowledge, its validity
+extends only to the idea, to the phenomena, to the visibility of the will,
+but not to the will itself, which becomes visible.
+
+If now every action of my body is the manifestation of an act of will in
+which my will itself in general, and as a whole, thus my character,
+expresses itself under given motives, manifestation of the will must be
+the inevitable condition and presupposition of every action. For the fact
+of its manifestation cannot depend upon something which does not exist
+directly and only through it, which consequently is for it merely
+accidental, and through which its manifestation itself would be merely
+accidental. Now that condition is just the whole body itself. Thus the
+body itself must be manifestation of the will, and it must be related to
+my will as a whole, that is, to my intelligible character, whose
+phenomenal appearance in time is my empirical character, as the particular
+action of the body is related to the particular act of the will. The whole
+body, then, must be simply my will become visible, must be my will itself,
+so far as this is object of perception, an idea of the first class. It has
+already been advanced in confirmation of this that every impression upon
+my body also affects my will at once and immediately, and in this respect
+is called pain or pleasure, or, in its lower degrees, agreeable or
+disagreeable sensation; and also, conversely, that every violent movement
+of the will, every emotion or passion, convulses the body and disturbs the
+course of its functions. Indeed we can also give an etiological account,
+though a very incomplete one, of the origin of my body, and a somewhat
+better account of its development and conservation, and this is the
+substance of physiology. But physiology merely explains its theme in
+precisely the same way as motives explain action. Thus the physiological
+explanation of the functions of the body detracts just as little from the
+philosophical truth that the whole existence of this body and the sum
+total of its functions are merely the objectification of that will which
+appears in its outward actions in accordance with a motive, as the
+establishment of the individual action through the motive and the
+necessary sequence of the action from the motive conflicts with the fact
+that action in general, and according to its nature, is only the
+manifestation of a will which itself has no ground. If, however,
+physiology tries to refer even these outward actions, the immediate
+voluntary movements, to causes in the organism,--for example, if it
+explains the movement of the muscles as resulting from the presence of
+fluids ("like the contraction of a cord when it is wet," says Reil in his
+"Archiv für Physiologie," vol. vi. p. 153), even supposing it really could
+give a thorough explanation of this kind, yet this would never invalidate
+the immediately certain truth that every voluntary motion (_functiones
+animales_) is the manifestation of an act of will. Now, just as little can
+the physiological explanation of vegetative life (_functiones naturales
+vitales_), however far it may advance, ever invalidate the truth that the
+whole animal life which thus develops itself is the manifestation of will.
+In general, then, as we have shown above, no etiological explanation can
+ever give us more than the necessarily determined position in time and
+space of a particular manifestation, its necessary appearance there,
+according to a fixed law; but the inner nature of everything that appears
+in this way remains wholly inexplicable, and is presupposed by every
+etiological explanation, and merely indicated by the names, force, or law
+of nature, or, if we are speaking of action, character or will. Thus,
+although every particular action, under the presupposition of the definite
+character, necessarily follows from the given motive, and although growth,
+the process of nourishment, and all the changes of the animal body take
+place according to necessarily acting causes (stimuli), yet the whole
+series of actions, and consequently every individual act, and also its
+condition, the whole body itself which accomplishes it, and therefore also
+the process through which and in which it exists, are nothing but the
+manifestation of the will, the becoming visible, _the objectification of
+the will_. Upon this rests the perfect suitableness of the human and
+animal body to the human and animal will in general, resembling, though
+far surpassing, the correspondence between an instrument made for a
+purpose and the will of the maker, and on this account appearing as
+design, _i.e._, the teleological explanation of the body. The parts of the
+body must, therefore, completely correspond to the principal desires
+through which the will manifests itself; they must be the visible
+expression of these desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified
+hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire; the
+grasping hand, the hurrying feet, correspond to the more indirect desires
+of the will which they express. As the human form generally corresponds to
+the human will generally, so the individual bodily structure corresponds
+to the individually modified will, the character of the individual, and
+therefore it is throughout and in all its parts characteristic and full of
+expression. It is very remarkable that Parmenides already gave expression
+to this in the following verses, quoted by Aristotle (Metaph. iii. 5):--
+
+
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}.
+
+
+(Ut enim cuique complexio membrorum flexibilium se habet, ita mens
+hominibus adest: idem namque est, quod sapit, membrorum natura hominibus,
+et omnibus et omni: quod enim plus est, intelligentia est.)(30)
+
+§ 21. Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge _in
+abstracto_, and therefore clear and certain, of what every one knows
+directly _in concreto_, _i.e._, as feeling, a knowledge that his will is
+the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, which manifests itself to
+him as idea, both in his actions and in their permanent substratum, his
+body, and that his will is that which is most immediate in his
+consciousness, though it has not as such completely passed into the form
+of idea in which object and subject stand over against each other, but
+makes itself known to him in a direct manner, in which he does not quite
+clearly distinguish subject and object, yet is not known as a whole to the
+individual himself, but only in its particular acts,--whoever, I say, has
+with me gained this conviction will find that of itself it affords him the
+key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature; for he
+now transfers it to all those phenomena which are not given to him, like
+his own phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but
+only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as _idea_ alone. He will
+recognise this will of which we are speaking not only in those phenomenal
+existences which exactly resemble his own, in men and animals as their
+inmost nature, but the course of reflection will lead him to recognise the
+force which germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force
+through which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the
+north pole, the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two
+different kinds of metals, the force which appears in the elective
+affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, decomposition and
+combination, and, lastly, even gravitation, which acts so powerfully
+throughout matter, draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the
+sun,--all these, I say, he will recognise as different only in their
+phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as identical, as that
+which is directly known to him so intimately and so much better than
+anything else, and which in its most distinct manifestation is called
+_will_. It is this application of reflection alone that prevents us from
+remaining any longer at the phenomenon, and leads us to the _thing in
+itself_. Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. All idea, of
+whatever kind it may be, all _object_, is _phenomenal_ existence, but the
+_will_ alone is a _thing in itself_. As such, it is throughout not idea,
+but _toto genere_ different from it; it is that of which all idea, all
+object, is the phenomenal appearance, the visibility, the objectification.
+It is the inmost nature, the kernel, of every particular thing, and also
+of the whole. It appears in every blind force of nature and also in the
+preconsidered action of man; and the great difference between these two is
+merely in the degree of the manifestation, not in the nature of what
+manifests itself.
+
+§ 22. Now, if we are to think as an object this thing-in-itself (we wish
+to retain the Kantian expression as a standing formula), which, as such,
+is never object, because all object is its mere manifestation, and
+therefore cannot be it itself, we must borrow for it the name and concept
+of an object, of something in some way objectively given, consequently of
+one of its own manifestations. But in order to serve as a clue for the
+understanding, this can be no other than the most complete of all its
+manifestations, _i.e._, the most distinct, the most developed, and
+directly enlightened by knowledge. Now this is the human will. It is,
+however, well to observe that here, at any rate, we only make use of a
+_denominatio a potiori_, through which, therefore, the concept of will
+receives a greater extension than it has hitherto had. Knowledge of the
+identical in different phenomena, and of difference in similar phenomena,
+is, as Plato so often remarks, a _sine qua non_ of philosophy. But
+hitherto it was not recognised that every kind of active and operating
+force in nature is essentially identical with will, and therefore the
+multifarious kinds of phenomena were not seen to be merely different
+species of the same genus, but were treated as heterogeneous. Consequently
+there could be no word to denote the concept of this genus. I therefore
+name the genus after its most important species, the direct knowledge of
+which lies nearer to us and guides us to the indirect knowledge of all
+other species. But whoever is incapable of carrying out the required
+extension of the concept will remain involved in a permanent
+misunderstanding. For by the word _will_ he understands only that species
+of it which has hitherto been exclusively denoted by it, the will which is
+guided by knowledge, and whose manifestation follows only upon motives,
+and indeed merely abstract motives, and thus takes place under the
+guidance of the reason. This, we have said, is only the most prominent
+example of the manifestation of will. We must now distinctly separate in
+thought the inmost essence of this manifestation which is known to us
+directly, and then transfer it to all the weaker, less distinct
+manifestations of the same nature, and thus we shall accomplish the
+desired extension of the concept of will. From another point of view I
+should be equally misunderstood by any one who should think that it is all
+the same in the end whether we denote this inner nature of all phenomena
+by the word _will_ or by any other. This would be the case if the
+thing-in-itself were something whose existence we merely _inferred_, and
+thus knew indirectly and only in the abstract. Then, indeed, we might call
+it what we pleased; the name would stand merely as the symbol of an
+unknown quantity. But the word _will_, which, like a magic spell,
+discloses to us the inmost being of everything in nature, is by no means
+an unknown quantity, something arrived at only by inference, but is fully
+and immediately comprehended, and is so familiar to us that we know and
+understand what will is far better than anything else whatever. The
+concept of will has hitherto commonly been subordinated to that of force,
+but I reverse the matter entirely, and desire that every force in nature
+should be thought as will. It must not be supposed that this is mere
+verbal quibbling or of no consequence; rather, it is of the greatest
+significance and importance. For at the foundation of the concept of
+force, as of all other concepts, there ultimately lies the knowledge in
+sense-perception of the objective world, that is to say, the phenomenon,
+the idea; and the concept is constructed out of this. It is an abstraction
+from the province in which cause and effect reign, _i.e._, from ideas of
+perception, and means just the causal nature of causes at the point at
+which this causal nature is no further etiologically explicable, but is
+the necessary presupposition of all etiological explanation. The concept
+will, on the other hand, is of all possible concepts the only one which
+has its source _not_ in the phenomenal, _not_ in the mere idea of
+perception, but comes from within, and proceeds from the most immediate
+consciousness of each of us, in which each of us knows his own
+individuality, according to its nature, immediately, apart from all form,
+even that of subject and object, and which at the same time is this
+individuality, for here the subject and the object of knowledge are one.
+If, therefore, we refer the concept of _force_ to that of _will_, we have
+in fact referred the less known to what is infinitely better known;
+indeed, to the one thing that is really immediately and fully known to us,
+and have very greatly extended our knowledge. If, on the contrary, we
+subsume the concept of will under that of force, as has hitherto always
+been done, we renounce the only immediate knowledge which we have of the
+inner nature of the world, for we allow it to disappear in a concept which
+is abstracted from the phenomenal, and with which we can therefore never
+go beyond the phenomenal.
+
+§ 23. The _will_ as a thing in itself is quite different from its
+phenomenal appearance, and entirely free from all the forms of the
+phenomenal, into which it first passes when it manifests itself, and which
+therefore only concern its _objectivity_, and are foreign to the will
+itself. Even the most universal form of all idea, that of being object for
+a subject, does not concern it; still less the forms which are subordinate
+to this and which collectively have their common expression in the
+principle of sufficient reason, to which we know that time and space
+belong, and consequently multiplicity also, which exists and is possible
+only through these. In this last regard I shall call time and space the
+_principium individuationis_, borrowing an expression from the old
+schoolmen, and I beg to draw attention to this, once for all. For it is
+only through the medium of time and space that what is one and the same,
+both according to its nature and to its concept, yet appears as different,
+as a multiplicity of co-existent and successive phenomena. Thus time and
+space are the _principium individuationis_, the subject of so many
+subtleties and disputes among the schoolmen, which may be found collected
+in Suarez (Disp. 5, Sect. 3). According to what has been said, the will as
+a thing-in-itself lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient
+reason in all its forms, and is consequently completely groundless,
+although all its manifestations are entirely subordinated to the principle
+of sufficient reason. Further, it is free from all _multiplicity_,
+although its manifestations in time and space are innumerable. It is
+itself one, though not in the sense in which an object is one, for the
+unity of an object can only be known in opposition to a possible
+multiplicity; nor yet in the sense in which a concept is one, for the
+unity of a concept originates only in abstraction from a multiplicity; but
+it is one as that which lies outside time and space, the _principium
+individuationis_, _i.e._, the possibility of multiplicity. Only when all
+this has become quite clear to us through the subsequent examination of
+the phenomena and different manifestations of the will, shall we fully
+understand the meaning of the Kantian doctrine that time, space and
+causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but are only forms of
+knowing.
+
+The uncaused nature of will has been actually recognised, where it
+manifests itself most distinctly, as the will of man, and this has been
+called free, independent. But on account of the uncaused nature of the
+will itself, the necessity to which its manifestation is everywhere
+subjected has been overlooked, and actions are treated as free, which they
+are not. For every individual action follows with strict necessity from
+the effect of the motive upon the character. All necessity is, as we have
+already said, the relation of the consequent to the reason, and nothing
+more. The principle of sufficient reason is the universal form of all
+phenomena, and man in his action must be subordinated to it like every
+other phenomenon. But because in self-consciousness the will is known
+directly and in itself, in this consciousness lies also the consciousness
+of freedom. The fact is, however, overlooked that the individual, the
+person, is not will as a thing-in-itself, but is a _phenomenon_ of will,
+is already determined as such, and has come under the form of the
+phenomenal, the principle of sufficient reason. Hence arises the strange
+fact that every one believes himself _a priori_ to be perfectly free, even
+in his individual actions, and thinks that at every moment he can commence
+another manner of life, which just means that he can become another
+person. But _a posteriori_, through experience, he finds to his
+astonishment that he is not free, but subjected to necessity; that in
+spite of all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his
+conduct, and that from the beginning of his life to the end of it, he must
+carry out the very character which he himself condemns, and as it were
+play the part he has undertaken to the end. I cannot pursue this subject
+further at present, for it belongs, as ethical, to another part of this
+work. In the meantime, I only wish to point out here that the _phenomenon_
+of the will which in itself is uncaused, is yet as such subordinated to
+the law of necessity, that is, the principle of sufficient reason, so that
+in the necessity with which the phenomena of nature follow each other, we
+may find nothing to hinder us from recognising in them the manifestations
+of will.
+
+Only those changes which have no other ground than a motive, _i.e._, an
+idea, have hitherto been regarded as manifestations of will. Therefore in
+nature a will has only been attributed to man, or at the most to animals;
+for knowledge, the idea, is of course, as I have said elsewhere, the true
+and exclusive characteristic of animal life. But that the will is also
+active where no knowledge guides it, we see at once in the instinct and
+the mechanical skill of animals.(31) That they have ideas and knowledge is
+here not to the point, for the end towards which they strive as definitely
+as if it were a known motive, is yet entirely unknown to them. Therefore
+in such cases their action takes place without motive, is not guided by
+the idea, and shows us first and most distinctly how the will may be
+active entirely without knowledge. The bird of a year old has no idea of
+the eggs for which it builds a nest; the young spider has no idea of the
+prey for which it spins a web; nor has the ant-lion any idea of the ants
+for which he digs a trench for the first time. The larva of the
+stag-beetle makes the hole in the wood, in which it is to await its
+metamorphosis, twice as big if it is going to be a male beetle as if it is
+going to be a female, so that if it is a male there may be room for the
+horns, of which, however, it has no idea. In such actions of these
+creatures the will is clearly operative as in their other actions, but it
+is in blind activity, which is indeed accompanied by knowledge but not
+guided by it. If now we have once gained insight into the fact, that idea
+as motive is not a necessary and essential condition of the activity of
+the will, we shall more easily recognise the activity of will where it is
+less apparent. For example, we shall see that the house of the snail is no
+more made by a will which is foreign to the snail itself, than the house
+which we build is produced through another will than our own; but we shall
+recognise in both houses the work of a will which objectifies itself in
+both the phenomena--a will which works in us according to motives, but in
+the snail still blindly as formative impulse directed outwards. In us also
+the same will is in many ways only blindly active: in all the functions of
+our body which are not guided by knowledge, in all its vital and
+vegetative processes, digestion, circulation, secretion, growth,
+reproduction. Not only the actions of the body, but the whole body itself
+is, as we have shown above, phenomenon of the will, objectified will,
+concrete will. All that goes on in it must therefore proceed through will,
+although here this will is not guided by knowledge, but acts blindly
+according to causes, which in this case are called _stimuli_.
+
+I call a _cause_, in the narrowest sense of the word, that state of
+matter, which, while it introduces another state with necessity, yet
+suffers just as great a change itself as that which it causes; which is
+expressed in the rule, "action and reaction are equal." Further, in the
+case of what is properly speaking a cause, the effect increases directly
+in proportion to the cause, and therefore also the reaction. So that, if
+once the mode of operation be known, the degree of the effect may be
+measured and calculated from the degree of the intensity of the cause; and
+conversely the degree of the intensity of the cause may be calculated from
+the degree of the effect. Such causes, properly so called, operate in all
+the phenomena of mechanics, chemistry, and so forth; in short, in all the
+changes of unorganised bodies. On the other hand, I call a _stimulus_,
+such a cause as sustains no reaction proportional to its effect, and the
+intensity of which does not vary directly in proportion to the intensity
+of its effect, so that the effect cannot be measured by it. On the
+contrary, a small increase of the stimulus may cause a very great increase
+of the effect, or conversely, it may eliminate the previous effect
+altogether, and so forth. All effects upon organised bodies as such are of
+this kind. All properly organic and vegetative changes of the animal body
+must therefore be referred to stimuli, not to mere causes. But the
+stimulus, like every cause and motive generally, never determines more
+than the point of time and space at which the manifestation of every force
+is to take place, and does not determine the inner nature of the force
+itself which is manifested. This inner nature we know, from our previous
+investigation, is will, to which therefore we ascribe both the unconscious
+and the conscious changes of the body. The stimulus holds the mean, forms
+the transition between the motive, which is causality accompanied
+throughout by knowledge, and the cause in the narrowest sense. In
+particular cases it is sometimes nearer a motive, sometimes nearer a
+cause, but yet it can always be distinguished from both. Thus, for
+example, the rising of the sap in a plant follows upon stimuli, and cannot
+be explained from mere causes, according to the laws of hydraulics or
+capillary attraction; yet it is certainly assisted by these, and
+altogether approaches very near to a purely causal change. On the other
+hand, the movements of the _Hedysarum gyrans_ and the _Mimosa pudica_,
+although still following upon mere stimuli, are yet very like movements
+which follow upon motives, and seem almost to wish to make the transition.
+The contraction of the pupils of the eyes as the light is increased is due
+to stimuli, but it passes into movement which is due to motive; for it
+takes place, because too strong lights would affect the retina painfully,
+and to avoid this we contract the pupils. The occasion of an erection is a
+motive, because it is an idea, yet it operates with the necessity of a
+stimulus, _i.e._, it cannot be resisted, but we must put the idea away in
+order to make it cease to affect us. This is also the case with disgusting
+things, which excite the desire to vomit. Thus we have treated the
+instinct of animals as an actual link, of quite a distinct kind, between
+movement following upon stimuli, and action following upon a known motive.
+Now we might be asked to regard breathing as another link of this kind. It
+has been disputed whether it belongs to the voluntary or the involuntary
+movements, that is to say, whether it follows upon motive or stimulus, and
+perhaps it may be explained as something which is between the two.
+Marshall Hall ("On the Diseases of the Nervous System," § 293 sq.)
+explains it as a mixed function, for it is partly under the influence of
+the cerebral (voluntary), and partly under that of the spinal
+(non-voluntary) nerves. However, we are finally obliged to number it with
+the expressions of will which result from motives. For other motives,
+_i.e._, mere ideas, can determine the will to check it or accelerate it,
+and, as is the case with every other voluntary action, it seems to us that
+we could give up breathing altogether and voluntarily suffocate. And in
+fact we could do so if any other motive influenced the will sufficiently
+strongly to overcome the pressing desire for air. According to some
+accounts Diogenes actually put an end to his life in this way (Diog.
+Laert. VI. 76). Certain negroes also are said to have done this (F. B.
+Osiander "On Suicide" [1813] pp. 170-180). If this be true, it affords us
+a good example of the influence of abstract motives, _i.e._, of the
+victory of distinctively rational over merely animal will. For, that
+breathing is at least partially conditioned by cerebral activity is shown
+by the fact that the primary cause of death from prussic acid is that it
+paralyses the brain, and so, indirectly, restricts the breathing; but if
+the breathing be artificially maintained till the stupefaction of the
+brain has passed away, death will not ensue. We may also observe in
+passing that breathing affords us the most obvious example of the fact
+that motives act with just as much necessity as stimuli, or as causes in
+the narrowest sense of the word, and their operation can only be
+neutralised by antagonistic motives, as action is neutralised by
+re-action. For, in the case of breathing, the illusion that we can stop
+when we like is much weaker than in the case of other movements which
+follow upon motives; because in breathing the motive is very powerful,
+very near to us, and its satisfaction is very easy, for the muscles which
+accomplish it are never tired, nothing, as a rule, obstructs it, and the
+whole process is supported by the most inveterate habit of the individual.
+And yet all motives act with the same necessity. The knowledge that
+necessity is common to movements following upon motives, and those
+following upon stimuli, makes it easier for us to understand that that
+also which takes place in our bodily organism in accordance with stimuli
+and in obedience to law, is yet, according to its inner nature--will, which
+in all its manifestations, though never in itself, is subordinated to the
+principle of sufficient reason, that is, to necessity.(32) Accordingly, we
+shall not rest contented with recognising that animals, both in their
+actions and also in their whole existence, bodily structure and
+organisation, are manifestations of will; but we shall extend to plants
+also this immediate knowledge of the essential nature of things which is
+given to us alone. Now all the movements of plants follow upon stimuli;
+for the absence of knowledge, and the movement following upon motives
+which is conditioned by knowledge, constitutes the only essential
+difference between animals and plants. Therefore, what appears for the
+idea as plant life, as mere vegetation, as blindly impelling force, we
+shall claim, according to its inner nature, for will, and recognise it as
+just that which constitutes the basis of our own phenomenal being, as it
+expresses itself in our actions, and also in the whole existence of our
+body itself.
+
+It only remains for us to take the final step, the extension of our way of
+looking at things to all those forces which act in nature in accordance
+with universal, unchangeable laws, in conformity with which the movements
+of all those bodies take place, which are wholly without organs, and have
+therefore no susceptibility for stimuli, and have no knowledge, which is
+the necessary condition of motives. Thus we must also apply the key to the
+understanding of the inner nature of things, which the immediate knowledge
+of our own existence alone can give us, to those phenomena of the
+unorganised world which are most remote from us. And if we consider them
+attentively, if we observe the strong and unceasing impulse with which the
+waters hurry to the ocean, the persistency with which the magnet turns
+ever to the north pole, the readiness with which iron flies to the magnet,
+the eagerness with which the electric poles seek to be re-united, and
+which, just like human desire, is increased by obstacles; if we see the
+crystal quickly and suddenly take form with such wonderful regularity of
+construction, which is clearly only a perfectly definite and accurately
+determined impulse in different directions, seized and retained by
+crystallisation; if we observe the choice with which bodies repel and
+attract each other, combine and separate, when they are set free in a
+fluid state, and emancipated from the bonds of rigidness; lastly, if we
+feel directly how a burden which hampers our body by its gravitation
+towards the earth, unceasingly presses and strains upon it in pursuit of
+its one tendency; if we observe all this, I say, it will require no great
+effort of the imagination to recognise, even at so great a distance, our
+own nature. That which in us pursues its ends by the light of knowledge;
+but here, in the weakest of its manifestations, only strives blindly and
+dumbly in a one-sided and unchangeable manner, must yet in both cases come
+under the name of will, as it is everywhere one and the same--just as the
+first dim light of dawn must share the name of sunlight with the rays of
+the full mid-day. For the name _will_ denotes that which is the inner
+nature of everything in the world, and the one kernel of every phenomenon.
+
+Yet the remoteness, and indeed the appearance of absolute difference
+between the phenomena of unorganised nature and the will which we know as
+the inner reality of our own being, arises chiefly from the contrast
+between the completely determined conformity to law of the one species of
+phenomena, and the apparently unfettered freedom of the other. For in man,
+individuality makes itself powerfully felt. Every one has a character of
+his own; and therefore the same motive has not the same influence over
+all, and a thousand circumstances which exist in the wide sphere of the
+knowledge of the individual, but are unknown to others, modify its effect.
+Therefore action cannot be predetermined from the motive alone, for the
+other factor is wanting, the accurate acquaintance with the individual
+character, and with the knowledge which accompanies it. On the other hand,
+the phenomena of the forces of nature illustrate the opposite extreme.
+They act according to universal laws, without variation, without
+individuality in accordance with openly manifest circumstances, subject to
+the most exact predetermination; and the same force of nature appears in
+its million phenomena in precisely the same way. In order to explain this
+point and prove the identity of the _one_ indivisible will in all its
+different phenomena, in the weakest as in the strongest, we must first of
+all consider the relation of the will as thing-in-itself to its phenomena,
+that is, the relation of the world as will to the world as idea; for this
+will open to us the best way to a more thorough investigation of the whole
+subject we are considering in this second book.(33)
+
+§ 24. We have learnt from the great Kant that time, space, and causality,
+with their entire constitution, and the possibility of all their forms,
+are present in our consciousness quite independently of the objects which
+appear in them, and which constitute their content; or, in other words,
+they can be arrived at just as well if we start from the subject as if we
+start from the object. Therefore, with equal accuracy, we may call them
+either forms of intuition or perception of the subject, or qualities of
+the object _as object_ (with Kant, phenomenon), _i.e._, _idea_. We may
+also regard these forms as the irreducible boundary between object and
+subject. All objects must therefore exist in them, yet the subject,
+independently of the phenomenal object, possesses and surveys them
+completely. But if the objects appearing in these forms are not to be
+empty phantoms, but are to have a meaning, they must refer to something,
+must be the expression of something which is not, like themselves, object,
+idea, a merely relative existence for a subject, but which exists without
+such dependence upon something which stands over against it as a condition
+of its being, and independent of the forms of such a thing, _i.e._, _is
+not idea_, but a _thing-in-itself_. Consequently it may at least be asked:
+Are these ideas, these objects, something more than or apart from the fact
+that they are ideas, objects of the subject? And what would they be in
+this sense? What is that other side of them which is _toto genere_
+different from idea? What is the thing-in-itself? _The will_, we have
+answered, but for the present I set that answer aside.
+
+Whatever the thing-in-itself may be, Kant is right in his conclusion that
+time, space, and causality (which we afterwards found to be forms of the
+principle of sufficient reason, the general expression of the forms of the
+phenomenon) are not its properties, but come to it only after, and so far
+as, it has become idea. That is, they belong only to its phenomenal
+existence, not to itself. For since the subject fully understands and
+constructs them out of itself, independently of all object, they must be
+dependent upon _existence as idea_ as such, not upon that which becomes
+idea. They must be the form of the idea as such; but not qualities of that
+which has assumed this form. They must be already given with the mere
+antithesis of subject and object (not as concepts but as facts), and
+consequently they must be only the more exact determination of the form of
+knowledge in general, whose most universal determination is that
+antithesis itself. Now, that in the phenomenon, in the object, which is in
+its turn conditioned by time, space and causality, inasmuch as it can only
+become idea by means of them, namely _multiplicity_, through co-existence
+and succession, _change_ and _permanence_ through the law of causality,
+_matter_ which can only become idea under the presupposition of causality,
+and lastly, all that becomes idea only by means of these,--all this, I say,
+as a whole, does not in reality belong to that which appears, to that
+which has passed into the form of idea, but belongs merely to this form
+itself. And conversely, that in the phenomenon which is not conditioned
+through time, space and causality, and which cannot be referred to them,
+nor explained in accordance with them, is precisely that in which the
+thing manifested, the thing-in-itself, directly reveals itself. It follows
+from this that the most complete capacity for being known, that is to say,
+the greatest clearness, distinctness, and susceptibility of exhaustive
+explanation, will necessarily belong to that which pertains to knowledge
+_as such_, and thus to the _form_ of knowledge; but not to that which in
+itself is not idea, not object, but which has become knowledge only
+through entering these forms; in other words, has become idea, object.
+Thus only that which depends entirely upon being an object of knowledge,
+upon existing as idea in general and _as such_ (not upon that which
+_becomes_ known, and has only _become_ idea), which therefore belongs
+without distinction to everything that is known, and which, on that
+account, is found just as well if we start from the subject as if we start
+from the object,--this alone can afford us without reserve a sufficient,
+exhaustive knowledge, a knowledge which is clear to the very foundation.
+But this consists of nothing but those forms of all phenomena of which we
+are conscious _a priori_, and which may be generally expressed as the
+principle of sufficient reason. Now, the forms of this principle which
+occur in knowledge of perception (with which alone we are here concerned)
+are time, space, and causality. The whole of pure mathematics and pure
+natural science _a priori_ is based entirely upon these. Therefore it is
+only in these sciences that knowledge finds no obscurity, does not rest
+upon what is incomprehensible (groundless, _i.e._, will), upon what cannot
+be further deduced. It is on this account that Kant wanted, as we have
+said, to apply the name science specially and even exclusively to these
+branches of knowledge together with logic. But, on the other hand, these
+branches of knowledge show us nothing more than mere connections,
+relations of one idea to another, form devoid of all content. All content
+which they receive, every phenomenon which fills these forms, contains
+something which is no longer completely knowable in its whole nature,
+something which can no longer be entirely explained through something
+else, something then which is groundless, through which consequently the
+knowledge loses its evidence and ceases to be completely lucid. This that
+withholds itself from investigation, however, is the thing-in-itself, is
+that which is essentially not idea, not object of knowledge, but has only
+become knowable by entering that form. The form is originally foreign to
+it, and the thing-in-itself can never become entirely one with it, can
+never be referred to mere form, and, since this form is the principle of
+sufficient reason, can never be completely explained. If therefore all
+mathematics affords us an exhaustive knowledge of that which in the
+phenomena is quantity, position, number, in a word, spatial and temporal
+relations; if all etiology gives us a complete account of the regular
+conditions under which phenomena, with all their determinations, appear in
+time and space, but, with it all, teaches us nothing more than why in each
+case this particular phenomenon must appear just at this time here, and at
+this place now; it is clear that with their assistance we can never
+penetrate to the inner nature of things. There always remains something
+which no explanation can venture to attack, but which it always
+presupposes; the forces of nature, the definite mode of operation of
+things, the quality and character of every phenomenon, that which is
+without ground, that which does not depend upon the form of the
+phenomenal, the principle of sufficient reason, but is something to which
+this form in itself is foreign, something which has yet entered this form,
+and now appears according to its law, a law, however, which only
+determines the appearance, not that which appears, only the how, not the
+what, only the form, not the content. Mechanics, physics, and chemistry
+teach the rules and laws according to which the forces of impenetrability,
+gravitation, rigidity, fluidity, cohesion, elasticity, heat, light,
+affinity, magnetism, electricity, &c., operate; that is to say, the law,
+the rule which these forces observe whenever they enter time and space.
+But do what we will, the forces themselves remain _qualitates occultæ_.
+For it is just the thing-in-itself, which, because it is manifested,
+exhibits these phenomena, which are entirely different from itself. In its
+manifestation, indeed, it is completely subordinated to the principle of
+sufficient reason as the form of the idea, but it can never itself be
+referred to this form, and therefore cannot be fully explained
+etiologically, can never be completely fathomed. It is certainly perfectly
+comprehensible so far as it has assumed that form, that is, so far as it
+is phenomenon, but its inner nature is not in the least explained by the
+fact that it can thus be comprehended. Therefore the more necessity any
+knowledge carries with it, the more there is in it of that which cannot be
+otherwise thought or presented in perception--as, for example,
+space-relations--the clearer and more sufficing then it is, the less pure
+objective content it has, or the less reality, properly so called, is
+given in it. And conversely, the more there is in it which must be
+conceived as mere chance, and the more it impresses us as given merely
+empirically, the more proper objectivity and true reality is there in such
+knowledge, and at the same time, the more that is inexplicable, that is,
+that cannot be deduced from anything else.
+
+It is true that at all times an etiology, unmindful of its real aim, has
+striven to reduce all organised life to chemism or electricity; all
+chemism, that is to say quality, again to mechanism (action determined by
+the shape of the atom), this again sometimes to the object of phoronomy,
+_i.e._, the combination of time and space, which makes motion possible,
+sometimes to the object of mere geometry, _i.e._, position in space (much
+in the same way as we rightly deduce the diminution of an effect from the
+square of the distance, and the theory of the lever in a purely
+geometrical manner): geometry may finally be reduced to arithmetic, which,
+on account of its one dimension, is of all the forms of the principle of
+sufficient reason, the most intelligible, comprehensible, and completely
+susceptible of investigation. As instances of the method generally
+indicated here, we may refer to the atoms of Democritus, the vortex of
+Descartes, the mechanical physics of Lesage, which towards the end of last
+century tried to explain both chemical affinities and gravitation
+mechanically by impact and pressure, as may be seen in detail in "_Lucrèce
+Neutonien_;" Reil's form and combination as the cause of animal life, also
+tends in this direction. Finally, the crude materialism which even now in
+the middle of the nineteenth century has been served up again under the
+ignorant delusion that it is original, belongs distinctly to this class.
+It stupidly denies vital force, and first of all tries to explain the
+phenomena of life from physical and chemical forces, and those again from
+the mechanical effects of the matter, position, form, and motion of
+imagined atoms, and thus seeks to reduce all the forces of nature to
+action and reaction as its thing-in-itself. According to this teaching,
+light is the mechanical vibration or undulation of an imaginary ether,
+postulated for this end. This ether, if it reaches the eye, beats rapidly
+upon the retina, and gives us the knowledge of colour. Thus, for example,
+four hundred and eighty-three billion beats in a second give red, and
+seven hundred and twenty-seven billion beats in a second give violet. Upon
+this theory, persons who are colour-blind must be those who are unable to
+count the beats, must they not? Such crass, mechanical, clumsy, and
+certainly knotty theories, which remind one of Democritus, are quite
+worthy of those who, fifty years after the appearance of Goethe's doctrine
+of colour, still believe in Newton's homogeneous light, and are not
+ashamed to say so. They will find that what is overlooked in the child
+(Democritus) will not be forgiven to the man. They might indeed, some day,
+come to an ignominious end; but then every one would slink away and
+pretend that he never had anything to do with them. We shall soon have to
+speak again of this false reduction of the forces of nature to each other;
+so much for the present. Supposing this theory were possible, all would
+certainly be explained and established and finally reduced to an
+arithmetical problem, which would then be the holiest thing in the temple
+of wisdom, to which the principle of sufficient reason would at last have
+happily conducted us. But all content of the phenomenon would have
+disappeared, and the mere form would remain. The "what appears" would be
+referred to the "how it appears," and this "how" would be what is _a
+priori_ knowable, therefore entirely dependent on the subject, therefore
+only for the subject, therefore, lastly, mere phantom, idea and form of
+idea, through and through: no thing-in-itself could be demanded.
+Supposing, then, that this were possible, the whole world would be derived
+from the subject, and in fact, that would be accomplished which Fichte
+wanted to _seem_ to accomplish by his empty bombast. But it is not
+possible: phantasies, sophisms, castles in the air, have been constructed
+in this way, but science never. The many and multifarious phenomena in
+nature have been successfully referred to particular original forces, and
+as often as this has been done, a real advance has been made. Several
+forces and qualities, which were at first regarded as different, have been
+derived from each other, and thus their number has been curtailed. (For
+example, magnetism from electricity.) Etiology will have reached its goal
+when it has recognised and exhibited as such all the original forces of
+nature, and established their mode of operation, _i.e._, the law according
+to which, under the guidance of causality, their phenomena appear in time
+and space, and determine their position with regard to each other. But
+certain original forces will always remain over; there will always remain
+as an insoluble residuum a content of phenomena which cannot be referred
+to their form, and thus cannot be explained from something else in
+accordance with the principle of sufficient reason. For in everything in
+nature there is something of which no ground can ever be assigned, of
+which no explanation is possible, and no ulterior cause is to be sought.
+This is the specific nature of its action, _i.e._, the nature of its
+existence, its being. Of each particular effect of the thing a cause may
+be certainly indicated, from which it follows that it must act just at
+this time and in this place; but no cause can ever be found from which it
+follows that a thing acts in general, and precisely in the way it does. If
+it has no other qualities, if it is merely a mote in a sunbeam, it yet
+exhibits this unfathomable something, at least as weight and
+impenetrability. But this, I say, is to the mote what his will is to a
+man; and, like the human will, it is, according to its inner nature, not
+subject to explanation; nay, more--it is in itself identical with this
+will. It is true that a motive may be given for every manifestation of
+will, for every act of will at a particular time and in a particular
+place, upon which it must necessarily follow, under the presupposition of
+the character of the man. But no reason can ever be given that the man has
+this character; that he wills at all; that, of several motives, just this
+one and no other, or indeed that any motive at all, moves his will. That
+which in the case of man is the unfathomable character which is
+presupposed in every explanation of his actions from motives is, in the
+case of every unorganised body, its definitive quality--the mode of its
+action, the manifestations of which are occasioned by impressions from
+without, while it itself, on the contrary, is determined by nothing
+outside itself, and thus is also inexplicable. Its particular
+manifestations, through which alone it becomes visible, are subordinated
+to the principle of sufficient reason; it itself is groundless. This was
+in substance rightly understood by the schoolmen, who called it _forma
+substantialis_. (Cf. Suarez, Disput. Metaph., disp. xv. sect. 1.)
+
+It is a greater and a commoner error that the phenomena which we best
+understand are those which are of most frequent occurrence, and which are
+most universal and simple; for, on the contrary, these are just the
+phenomena that we are most accustomed to see about us, and to be ignorant
+of. It is just as inexplicable to us that a stone should fall to the earth
+as that an animal should move itself. It has been supposed, as we have
+remarked above, that, starting from the most universal forces of nature
+(gravitation, cohesion, impenetrability), it was possible to explain from
+them the rarer forces, which only operate under a combination of
+circumstances (for example, chemical quality, electricity, magnetism),
+and, lastly, from these to understand the organism and the life of
+animals, and even the nature of human knowing and willing. Men resigned
+themselves without a word to starting from mere _qualitates occultæ_, the
+elucidation of which was entirely given up, for they intended to build
+upon them, not to investigate them. Such an intention cannot, as we have
+already said, be carried out. But apart from this, such structures would
+always stand in the air. What is the use of explanations which ultimately
+refer us to something which is quite as unknown as the problem with which
+we started? Do we in the end understand more of the inner nature of these
+universal natural forces than of the inner nature of an animal? Is not the
+one as much a sealed book to us as the other? Unfathomable because it is
+without ground, because it is the content, that which the phenomenon is,
+and which can never be referred to the form, to the how, to the principle
+of sufficient reason. But we, who have in view not etiology but
+philosophy, that is, not relative but unconditioned knowledge of the real
+nature of the world, take the opposite course, and start from that which
+is immediately and most completely known to us, and fully and entirely
+trusted by us--that which lies nearest to us, in order to understand that
+which is known to us only at a distance, one-sidedly and indirectly. From
+the most powerful, most significant, and most distinct phenomenon we seek
+to arrive at an understanding of those that are less complete and weaker.
+With the exception of my own body, all things are known to me only on
+_one_ side, that of the idea. Their inner nature remains hidden from me
+and a profound secret, even if I know all the causes from which their
+changes follow. Only by comparison with that which goes on in me if my
+body performs an action when I am influenced by a motive--only by
+comparison, I say, with what is the inner nature of my own changes
+determined by external reasons, can I obtain insight into the way in which
+these lifeless bodies change under the influence of causes, and so
+understand what is their inner nature. For the knowledge of the causes of
+the manifestation of this inner nature affords me merely the rule of its
+appearance in time and space, and nothing more. I can make this comparison
+because my body is the only object of which I know not merely the _one_
+side, that of the idea, but also the other side which is called will.
+Thus, instead of believing that I would better understand my own
+organisation, and then my own knowing and willing, and my movements
+following upon motives, if I could only refer them to movements due to
+electrical, chemical, and mechanical causes, I must, seeing that I seek
+philosophy and not etiology, learn to understand from my own movements
+following upon motives the inner nature of the simplest and commonest
+movements of an unorganised body which I see following upon causes. I must
+recognise the inscrutable forces which manifest themselves in all natural
+bodies as identical in kind with that which in me is the will, and as
+differing from it only in degree. That is to say, the fourth class of
+ideas given in the Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason must be the
+key to the knowledge of the inner nature of the first class, and by means
+of the law of motivation I must come to understand the inner meaning of
+the law of causation.
+
+Spinoza (Epist. 62) says that if a stone which has been projected through
+the air had consciousness, it would believe that it was moving of its own
+will. I add to this only that the stone would be right. The impulse given
+it is for the stone what the motive is for me, and what in the case of the
+stone appears as cohesion, gravitation, rigidity, is in its inner nature
+the same as that which I recognise in myself as will, and what the stone
+also, if knowledge were given to it, would recognise as will. In the
+passage referred to, Spinoza had in view the necessity with which the
+stone flies, and he rightly desires to transfer this necessity to that of
+the particular act of will of a person. I, on the other hand, consider the
+inner being, which alone imparts meaning and validity to all real
+necessity (_i.e._, effect following upon a cause) as its presupposition.
+In the case of men this is called character; in the case of a stone it is
+called quality, but it is the same in both. When it is immediately known
+it is called will. In the stone it has the weakest, and in man the
+strongest degree of visibility, of objectivity. St. Augustine recognises,
+with a true instinct, this identity of the tendencies of all things with
+our own willing, and I cannot refrain from quoting his naïve account of
+the matter:--"_Si pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum
+ejusdem est amaremus, idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum, et secundum
+hoc si esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quæreremus. Item, si arbores essemus,
+nihil quidem sentientes motu amare possemus: verumtamen id quasi appetere
+videremur, quo feracius essemus, uberiusque fructuosæ. Si essemus lapides,
+aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel quid ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem
+sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum
+atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum,
+sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur: ita enim corpus
+pondere, sicut animus amore fertur quocunque fertur_" (De Civ. Dei, xi.
+28).
+
+It ought further to be mentioned that Euler saw that the inner nature of
+gravitation must ultimately be referred to an "inclination and desire"
+(thus will) peculiar to material bodies (in the 68th letter to the
+Princess). Indeed, it is just this that makes him averse to the conception
+of gravitation as it existed for Newton, and he is inclined to try a
+modification of it in accordance with the earlier Cartesian theory, and so
+to derive gravitation from the impact of an ether upon the bodies, as
+being "more rational and more suitable for persons who like clear and
+intelligible principles." He wishes to banish attraction from physics as a
+_qualitas occulta_. This is only in keeping with the dead view of nature
+which prevailed at Euler's time as the correlative of the immaterial soul.
+It is only worth noticing because of its bearing upon the fundamental
+truth established by me, which even at that time this fine intellect saw
+glimmering in the distance. He hastened to turn in time, and then, in his
+anxiety at seeing all the prevalent fundamental views endangered, he
+sought safety in the old and already exploded absurdities.
+
+We know that _multiplicity_ in general is necessarily conditioned by space
+and time, and is only thinkable in them. In this respect they are called
+the _principium individuationis_. But we have found that space and time
+are forms of the principle of sufficient reason. In this principle all our
+knowledge _a priori_ is expressed, but, as we showed above, this _a
+priori_ knowledge, as such, only applies to the knowableness of things,
+not to the things themselves, _i.e._, it is only our form of knowledge, it
+is not a property of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is, as such,
+free from all forms of knowledge, even the most universal, that of being
+an object for the subject. In other words, the thing-in-itself is
+something altogether different from the idea. If, now, this
+thing-in-itself is _the will_, as I believe I have fully and convincingly
+proved it to be, then, regarded as such and apart from its manifestation,
+it lies outside time and space, and therefore knows no multiplicity, and
+is consequently _one_. Yet, as I have said, it is not one in the sense in
+which an individual or a concept is one, but as something to which the
+condition of the possibility of multiplicity, the _principium
+individuationis_, is foreign. The multiplicity of things in space and
+time, which collectively constitute the objectification of will, does not
+affect the will itself, which remains indivisible notwithstanding it. It
+is not the case that, in some way or other, a smaller part of will is in
+the stone and a larger part in the man, for the relation of part and whole
+belongs exclusively to space, and has no longer any meaning when we go
+beyond this form of intuition or perception. The more and the less have
+application only to the phenomenon of will, that is, its visibility, its
+objectification. Of this there is a higher grade in the plant than in the
+stone; in the animal a higher grade than in the plant: indeed, the passage
+of will into visibility, its objectification, has grades as innumerable as
+exist between the dimmest twilight and the brightest sunshine, the loudest
+sound and the faintest echo. We shall return later to the consideration of
+these grades of visibility which belong to the objectification of the
+will, to the reflection of its nature. But as the grades of its
+objectification do not directly concern the will itself, still less is it
+concerned by the multiplicity of the phenomena of these different grades,
+_i.e._, the multitude of individuals of each form, or the particular
+manifestations of each force. For this multiplicity is directly
+conditioned by time and space, into which the will itself never enters.
+The will reveals itself as completely and as much in _one_ oak as in
+millions. Their number and multiplication in space and time has no meaning
+with regard to it, but only with regard to the multiplicity of individuals
+who know in space and time, and who are themselves multiplied and
+dispersed in these. The multiplicity of these individuals itself belongs
+not to the will, but only to its manifestation. We may therefore say that
+if, _per impossibile_, a single real existence, even the most
+insignificant, were to be entirely annihilated, the whole world would
+necessarily perish with it. The great mystic Angelus Silesius feels this
+when he says--
+
+
+    "I know God cannot live an instant without me,
+    He must give up the ghost if I should cease to be."
+
+
+Men have tried in various ways to bring the immeasurable greatness of the
+material universe nearer to the comprehension of us all, and then they
+have seized the opportunity to make edifying remarks. They have referred
+perhaps to the relative smallness of the earth, and indeed of man; or, on
+the contrary, they have pointed out the greatness of the mind of this man
+who is so insignificant--the mind that can solve, comprehend, and even
+measure the greatness of the universe, and so forth. Now, all this is very
+well, but to me, when I consider the vastness of the world, the most
+important point is this, that the thing-in-itself, whose manifestation is
+the world--whatever else it may be--cannot have its true self spread out and
+dispersed after this fashion in boundless space, but that this endless
+extension belongs only to its manifestation. The thing-in-itself, on the
+contrary, is present entire and undivided in every object of nature and in
+every living being. Therefore we lose nothing by standing still beside any
+single individual thing, and true wisdom is not to be gained by measuring
+out the boundless world, or, what would be more to the purpose, by
+actually traversing endless space. It is rather to be attained by the
+thorough investigation of any individual thing, for thus we seek to arrive
+at a full knowledge and understanding of its true and peculiar nature.
+
+The subject which will therefore be fully considered in the next book, and
+which has, doubtless, already presented itself to the mind of every
+student of Plato, is, that these different grades of the objectification
+of will which are manifested in innumerable individuals, and exist as
+their unattained types or as the eternal forms of things, not entering
+themselves into time and space, which are the medium of individual things,
+but remaining fixed, subject to no change, always being, never becoming,
+while the particular things arise and pass away, always become and never
+are,--that these _grades of the objectification of will_ are, I say, simply
+_Plato's Ideas_. I make this passing reference to the matter here in order
+that I may be able in future to use the word _Idea_ in this sense. In my
+writings, therefore, the word is always to be understood in its true and
+original meaning given to it by Plato, and has absolutely no reference to
+those abstract productions of dogmatising scholastic reason, which Kant
+has inaptly and illegitimately used this word to denote, though Plato had
+already appropriated and used it most fitly. By Idea, then, I understand
+every definite and fixed grade of the objectification of will, so far as
+it is thing-in-itself, and therefore has no multiplicity. These grades are
+related to individual things as their eternal forms or prototypes. The
+shortest and most concise statement of this famous Platonic doctrine is
+given us by Diogenes Laertes (iii. 12): "{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}"--("_Plato ideas in natura velut exemplaria dixit
+subsistere; cetera his esse similia, ad istarum similitudinem
+consistentia_"). Of Kant's misuse of the word I take no further notice;
+what it is needful to say about it will be found in the Appendix.
+
+§ 26. The lowest grades of the objectification of will are to be found in
+those most universal forces of nature which partly appear in all matter
+without exception, as gravity and impenetrability, and partly have shared
+the given matter among them, so that certain of them reign in one species
+of matter and others in another species, constituting its specific
+difference, as rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism,
+chemical properties and qualities of every kind. They are in themselves
+immediate manifestations of will, just as much as human action; and as
+such they are groundless, like human character. Only their particular
+manifestations are subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason,
+like the particular actions of men. They themselves, on the other hand,
+can never be called either effect or cause, but are the prior and
+presupposed conditions of all causes and effects through which their real
+nature unfolds and reveals itself. It is therefore senseless to demand a
+cause of gravity or electricity, for they are original forces. Their
+expressions, indeed, take place in accordance with the law of cause and
+effect, so that every one of their particular manifestations has a cause,
+which is itself again just a similar particular manifestation which
+determines that this force must express itself here, must appear in space
+and time; but the force itself is by no means the effect of a cause, nor
+the cause of an effect. It is therefore a mistake to say "gravity is the
+cause of a stone falling;" for the cause in this case is rather the
+nearness of the earth, because it attracts the stone. Take the earth away
+and the stone will not fall, although gravity remains. The force itself
+lies quite outside the chain of causes and effects, which presupposes
+time, because it only has meaning in relation to it; but the force lies
+outside time. The individual change always has for its cause another
+change just as individual as itself, and not the force of which it is the
+expression. For that which always gives its efficiency to a cause, however
+many times it may appear, is a force of nature. As such, it is groundless,
+_i.e._, it lies outside the chain of causes and outside the province of
+the principle of sufficient reason in general, and is philosophically
+known as the immediate objectivity of will, which is the "in-itself" of
+the whole of nature; but in etiology, which in this reference is physics,
+it is set down as an original force, _i.e._, a _qualitas occulta_.
+
+In the higher grades of the objectivity of will we see individuality
+occupy a prominent position, especially in the case of man, where it
+appears as the great difference of individual characters, _i.e._, as
+complete personality, outwardly expressed in strongly marked individual
+physiognomy, which influences the whole bodily form. None of the brutes
+have this individuality in anything like so high a degree, though the
+higher species of them have a trace of it; but the character of the
+species completely predominates over it, and therefore they have little
+individual physiognomy. The farther down we go, the more completely is
+every trace of the individual character lost in the common character of
+the species, and the physiognomy of the species alone remains. We know the
+physiological character of the species, and from that we know exactly what
+is to be expected from the individual; while, on the contrary, in the
+human species every individual has to be studied and fathomed for himself,
+which, if we wish to forecast his action with some degree of certainty,
+is, on account of the possibility of concealment that first appears with
+reason, a matter of the greatest difficulty. It is probably connected with
+this difference of the human species from all others, that the folds and
+convolutions of the brain, which are entirely wanting in birds, and very
+weakly marked in rodents, are even in the case of the higher animals far
+more symmetrical on both sides, and more constantly the same in each
+individual, than in the case of human beings.(34) It is further to be
+regarded as a phenomenon of this peculiar individual character which
+distinguishes men from all the lower animals, that in the case of the
+brutes the sexual instinct seeks its satisfaction without observable
+choice of objects, while in the case of man this choice is, in a purely
+instinctive manner and independent of all reflection, carried so far that
+it rises into a powerful passion. While then every man is to be regarded
+as a specially determined and characterised phenomenon of will, and indeed
+to a certain extent as a special Idea, in the case of the brutes this
+individual character as a whole is wanting, because only the species has a
+special significance. And the farther we go from man, the fainter becomes
+the trace of this individual character, so that plants have no individual
+qualities left, except such as may be fully explained from the favourable
+or unfavourable external influences of soil, climate, and other accidents.
+Finally, in the inorganic kingdom of nature all individuality disappears.
+The crystal alone is to be regarded as to a certain extent individual. It
+is a unity of the tendency in definite directions, fixed by
+crystallisation, which makes the trace of this tendency permanent. It is
+at the same time a cumulative repetition of its primitive form, bound into
+unity by an idea, just as the tree is an aggregate of the single
+germinating fibre which shows itself in every rib of the leaves, in every
+leaf, in every branch; which repeats itself, and to some extent makes each
+of these appear as a separate growth, nourishing itself from the greater
+as a parasite, so that the tree, resembling the crystal, is a systematic
+aggregate of small plants, although only the whole is the complete
+expression of an individual Idea, _i.e._, of this particular grade of the
+objectification of will. But the individuals of the same species of
+crystal can have no other difference than such as is produced by external
+accidents; indeed we can make at pleasure large or small crystals of every
+species. The individual, however, as such, that is, with traces of an
+individual character, does not exist further in unorganised nature. All
+its phenomena are expressions of general forces of nature, _i.e._, of
+those grades of the objectification of will which do not objectify
+themselves (as is the case in organised nature), by means of the
+difference of the individualities which collectively express the whole of
+the Idea, but show themselves only in the species, and as a whole, without
+any variation in each particular example of it. Time, space, multiplicity,
+and existence conditioned by causes, do not belong to the will or to the
+Idea (the grade of the objectification of will), but only to their
+particular phenomena. Therefore such a force of nature as, for example,
+gravity or electricity, must show itself as such in precisely the same way
+in all its million phenomena, and only external circumstances can modify
+these. This unity of its being in all its phenomena, this unchangeable
+constancy of the appearance of these, whenever, under the guidance of
+causality, the necessary conditions are present, is called a _law of
+nature_. If such a law is once learned from experience, then the
+phenomenon of that force of nature, the character of which is expressed
+and laid down in it, may be accurately forecast and counted upon. But it
+is just this conformity to law of the phenomena of the lower grades of the
+objectification of will which gives them such a different aspect from the
+phenomena of the same will in the higher, _i.e._, the more distinct,
+grades of its objectification, in animals, and in men and their actions,
+where the stronger or weaker influence of the individual character and the
+susceptibility to motives which often remain hidden from the spectator,
+because they lie in knowledge, has had the result that the identity of the
+inner nature of the two kinds of phenomena has hitherto been entirely
+overlooked.
+
+If we start from the knowledge of the particular, and not from that of the
+Idea, there is something astonishing, and sometimes even terrible, in the
+absolute uniformity of the laws of nature. It might astonish us that
+nature never once forgets her laws; that if, for example, it has once been
+according to a law of nature that where certain materials are brought
+together under given conditions, a chemical combination will take place,
+or gas will be evolved, or they will go on fire; if these conditions are
+fulfilled, whether by our interposition or entirely by chance (and in this
+case the accuracy is the more astonishing because unexpected), to-day just
+as well as a thousand years ago, the determined phenomenon will take place
+at once and without delay. We are most vividly impressed with the
+marvellousness of this fact in the case of rare phenomena, which only
+occur under very complex circumstances, but which we are previously
+informed will take place if these conditions are fulfilled. For example,
+when we are told that if certain metals, when arranged alternately in
+fluid with which an acid has been mixed, are brought into contact, silver
+leaf brought between the extremities of this combination will suddenly be
+consumed in a green flame; or that under certain conditions the hard
+diamond turns into carbonic acid. It is the ghostly omnipresence of
+natural forces that astonishes us in such cases, and we remark here what
+in the case of phenomena which happen daily no longer strikes us, how the
+connection between cause and effect is really as mysterious as that which
+is imagined between a magic formula and a spirit that must appear when
+invoked by it. On the other hand, if we have attained to the philosophical
+knowledge that a force of nature is a definite grade of the
+objectification of will, that is to say, a definite grade of that which we
+recognise as our own inmost nature, and that this will, in itself, and
+distinguished from its phenomena and their forms, lies outside time and
+space, and that, therefore, the multiplicity, which is conditioned by time
+and space, does not belong to it, nor directly to the grade of its
+objectification, _i.e._, the Idea, but only to the phenomena of the Idea;
+and if we remember that the law of causality has significance only in
+relation to time and space, inasmuch as it determines the position of the
+multitude of phenomena of the different Ideas in which the will reveals
+itself, governing the order in which they must appear; if, I say, in this
+knowledge the inner meaning of the great doctrine of Kant has been fully
+grasped, the doctrine that time, space, and causality do not belong to the
+thing-in-itself, but merely to the phenomenon, that they are only the
+forms of our knowledge, not qualities of things in themselves; then we
+shall understand that this astonishment at the conformity to law and
+accurate operation of a force of nature, this astonishment at the complete
+sameness of all its million phenomena and the infallibility of their
+occurrence, is really like that of a child or a savage who looks for the
+first time through a glass with many facets at a flower, and marvels at
+the complete similarity of the innumerable flowers which he sees, and
+counts the leaves of each of them separately.
+
+Thus every universal, original force of nature is nothing but a low grade
+of the objectification of will, and we call every such grade an eternal
+_Idea_ in Plato's sense. But a _law of nature_ is the relation of the Idea
+to the form of its manifestation. This form is time, space, and causality,
+which are necessarily and inseparably connected and related to each other.
+Through time and space the Idea multiplies itself in innumerable
+phenomena, but the order according to which it enters these forms of
+multiplicity is definitely determined by the law of causality; this law is
+as it were the norm of the limit of these phenomena of different Ideas, in
+accordance with which time, space, and matter are assigned to them. This
+norm is therefore necessarily related to the identity of the aggregate of
+existing matter, which is the common substratum of all those different
+phenomena. If all these were not directed to that common matter in the
+possession of which they must be divided, there would be no need for such
+a law to decide their claims. They might all at once and together fill a
+boundless space throughout an endless time. Therefore, because all these
+phenomena of the eternal Ideas are directed to one and the same matter,
+must there be a rule for their appearance and disappearance; for if there
+were not, they would not make way for each other. Thus the law of
+causality is essentially bound up with that of the permanence of
+substance; they reciprocally derive significance from each other. Time and
+space, again, are related to them in the same way. For time is merely the
+possibility of conflicting states of the same matter, and space is merely
+the possibility of the permanence of the same matter under all sorts of
+conflicting states. Accordingly, in the preceding book we explained matter
+as the union of space and time, and this union shows itself as change of
+the accidents in the permanence of the substance, of which causality or
+becoming is the universal possibility. And accordingly, we said that
+matter is through and through causality. We explained the understanding as
+the subjective correlative of causality, and said matter (and thus the
+whole world as idea) exists only for the understanding; the understanding
+is its condition, its supporter as its necessary correlative. I repeat all
+this in passing, merely to call to mind what was demonstrated in the First
+Book, for it is necessary for the complete understanding of these two
+books that their inner agreement should be observed, since what is
+inseparably united in the actual world as its two sides, will and idea,
+has, in order that we might understand each of them more clearly in
+isolation, been dissevered in these two books.
+
+It may not perhaps be superfluous to elucidate further by an example how
+the law of causality has meaning only in relation to time and space, and
+the matter which consists in the union of the two. For it determines the
+limits in accordance with which the phenomena of the forces of nature
+divide themselves in the possession of matter, while the original forces
+of nature, as the immediate objectification of will, which, as a thing in
+itself, is not subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason, lie
+outside these forms, within which alone all etiological explanation has
+validity and meaning, and just on that account can never lead us to the
+inner reality of nature. For this purpose let us think of some kind of
+machine constructed according to the laws of mechanics. Iron weights begin
+the motion by their gravity; copper wheels resist by their rigidity,
+affect and raise each other and the lever by their impenetrability, and so
+on. Here gravity, rigidity, and impenetrability are original unexplained
+forces; mechanics only gives us the condition under which, and the manner
+in which, they manifest themselves, appear, and govern a definite matter,
+time, and place. If, now, a strong magnet is made to attract the iron of
+the weight, and overcome its gravity, the movement of the machine stops,
+and the matter becomes forthwith the scene of quite a different force of
+nature--magnetism, of which etiology again gives no further explanation
+than the condition under which it appears. Or let us suppose that the
+copper discs of such a machine are laid upon zinc plates, and an acid
+solution introduced between them. At once the same matter of the machine
+has become subject to another original force, galvanism, which now governs
+it according to its own laws, and reveals itself in it through its
+phenomena; and etiology can again tell us nothing about this force except
+the conditions under which, and the laws in accordance with which, it
+manifests itself. Let us now raise the temperature and add pure acid; the
+whole machine burns; that is to say, once more an entirely different force
+of nature, chemical energy, asserts at this time and in this place
+irresistible claims to this particular matter, and reveals itself in it as
+Idea, as a definite grade of the objectification of will. The calcined
+metal thus produced now unites with an acid, and a salt is obtained which
+forms itself into crystals. These are the phenomena of another Idea, which
+in itself is again quite inexplicable, while the appearance of its
+phenomena is dependent upon certain conditions which etiology can give us.
+The crystals dissolve, mix with other materials, and vegetation springs up
+from them--a new phenomenon of will: and so the same permanent matter may
+be followed _ad infinitum_, to observe how now this and now that natural
+force obtains a right to it and temporarily takes possession of it, in
+order to appear and reveal its own nature. The condition of this right,
+the point of time and space at which it becomes valid, is given by
+causality, but the explanation founded upon this law only extends thus
+far. The force itself is a manifestation of will, and as such is not
+subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, that is, it is
+groundless. It lies outside all time, is omnipresent, and seems as it were
+to wait constantly till the circumstances occur under which it can appear
+and take possession of a definite matter, supplanting the forces which
+have reigned in it till then. All time exists only for the phenomena of
+such a force, and is without significance for the force itself. Through
+thousands of years chemical forces slumber in matter till the contact with
+the reagents sets them free; then they appear; but time exists only for
+the phenomena, not for the forces themselves. For thousands of years
+galvanism slumbered in copper and zinc, and they lay quietly beside
+silver, which must be consumed in flame as soon as all three are brought
+together under the required conditions. Even in the organic kingdom we see
+a dry seed preserve the slumbering force through three thousand years, and
+when at last the favourable circumstances occur, grow up as a plant.(35)
+
+If by this exposition the difference between a force of nature and all its
+phenomena has been made quite distinct; if we have seen clearly that the
+former is the will itself at this particular grade of its objectification,
+but that multiplicity comes to phenomena only through time and space, and
+that the law of causality is nothing but the determination of the position
+of these phenomena in time and space; then we shall recognise the complete
+truth and the deep meaning of Malebranche's doctrine of occasional causes
+(_causes occasionelles_). It is well worth while comparing this doctrine
+of his, as he explains it in the "_Recherches de la Vérite_," both in the
+3rd Chapter of the second part of the 6th Book, and in the
+_éclaircissements_ appended to this chapter, with this exposition of mine,
+and observing the complete agreement of the two doctrines in the case of
+such different systems of thought. Indeed I cannot help admiring how
+Malebranche, though thoroughly involved in the positive dogmas which his
+age inevitably forced upon him, yet, in such bonds and under such a
+burden, hit the truth so happily, so correctly, and even knew how to
+combine it with these dogmas, at all events verbally.
+
+For the power of truth is incredibly great and of unspeakable endurance.
+We find constant traces of it in all, even the most eccentric and absurd
+dogmas, of different times and different lands,--often indeed in strange
+company, curiously mixed up with other things, but still recognisable. It
+is like a plant that germinates under a heap of great stones, but still
+struggles up to the light, working itself through with many deviations and
+windings, disfigured, worn out, stunted in its growth,--but yet, to the
+light.
+
+In any case Malebranche is right: every natural cause is only an
+occasional cause. It only gives opportunity or occasion for the
+manifestation of the one indivisible will which is the "in-itself" of all
+things, and whose graduated objectification is the whole visible world.
+Only the appearance, the becoming visible, in this place, at this time, is
+brought about by the cause and is so far dependent on it, but not the
+whole of the phenomenon, nor its inner nature. This is the will itself, to
+which the principle of sufficient reason has not application, and which is
+therefore groundless. Nothing in the world has a sufficient cause of its
+existence generally, but only a cause of existence just here and just now.
+That a stone exhibits now gravity, now rigidity, now electricity, now
+chemical qualities, depends upon causes, upon impressions upon it from
+without, and is to be explained from these. But these qualities
+themselves, and thus the whole inner nature of the stone which consists in
+them, and therefore manifests itself in all the ways referred to; thus, in
+general, that the stone is such as it is, that it exists generally--all
+this, I say, has no ground, but is the visible appearance of the
+groundless will. Every cause is thus an occasional cause. We have found it
+to be so in nature, which is without knowledge, and it is also precisely
+the same when motives and not causes or stimuli determine the point at
+which the phenomena are to appear, that is to say, in the actions of
+animals and human beings. For in both cases it is one and the same will
+which appears; very different in the grades of its manifestation,
+multiplied in the phenomena of these grades, and, in respect of these,
+subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason, but in itself free
+from all this. Motives do not determine the character of man, but only the
+phenomena of his character, that is, his actions; the outward fashion of
+his life, not its inner meaning and content. These proceed from the
+character which is the immediate manifestation of the will, and is
+therefore groundless. That one man is bad and another good, does not
+depend upon motives or outward influences, such as teaching and preaching,
+and is in this sense quite inexplicable. But whether a bad man shows his
+badness in petty acts of injustice, cowardly tricks, and low knavery which
+he practises in the narrow sphere of his circumstances, or whether as a
+conqueror he oppresses nations, throws a world into lamentation, and sheds
+the blood of millions; this is the outward form of his manifestation, that
+which is unessential to it, and depends upon the circumstances in which
+fate has placed him, upon his surroundings, upon external influences, upon
+motives; but his decision upon these motives can never be explained from
+them; it proceeds from the will, of which this man is a manifestation. Of
+this we shall speak in the Fourth Book. The manner in which the character
+discloses its qualities is quite analogous to the way in which those of
+every material body in unconscious nature are disclosed. Water remains
+water with its intrinsic qualities, whether as a still lake it reflects
+its banks, or leaps in foam from the cliffs, or, artificially confined,
+spouts in a long jet into the air. All that depends upon external causes;
+the one form is as natural to it as the other, but it will always show the
+same form in the same circumstances; it is equally ready for any, but in
+every case true to its character, and at all times revealing this alone.
+So will every human character under all circumstances reveal itself, but
+the phenomena which proceed from it will always be in accordance with the
+circumstances.
+
+§ 27. If, from the foregoing consideration of the forces of nature and
+their phenomena, we have come to see clearly how far an explanation from
+causes can go, and where it must stop if it is not to degenerate into the
+vain attempt to reduce the content of all phenomena to their mere form, in
+which case there would ultimately remain nothing but form, we shall be
+able to settle in general terms what is to be demanded of etiology as a
+whole. It must seek out the causes of all phenomena in nature, _i.e._, the
+circumstances under which they invariably appear. Then it must refer the
+multitude of phenomena which have various forms in various circumstances
+to what is active in every phenomenon, and is presupposed in the
+cause,--original forces of nature. It must correctly distinguish between a
+difference of the phenomenon which arises from a difference of the force,
+and one which results merely from a difference of the circumstances under
+which the force expresses itself; and with equal care it must guard
+against taking the expressions of one and the same force under different
+circumstances for the manifestations of different forces, and conversely
+against taking for manifestations of one and the same force what
+originally belongs to different forces. Now this is the direct work of the
+faculty of judgment, and that is why so few men are capable of increasing
+our insight in physics, while all are able to enlarge experience.
+Indolence and ignorance make us disposed to appeal too soon to original
+forces. This is exemplified with an exaggeration that savours of irony in
+the entities and quidities of the schoolmen. Nothing is further from my
+desire than to favour their resuscitation. We have just as little right to
+appeal to the objectification of will, instead of giving a physical
+explanation, as we have to appeal to the creative power of God. For
+physics demands causes, and the will is never a cause. Its whole relation
+to the phenomenon is not in accordance with the principle of sufficient
+reason. But that which in itself is the will exists in another aspect as
+idea; that is to say, is phenomenon. As such, it obeys the laws which
+constitute the form of the phenomenon. Every movement, for example,
+although it is always a manifestation of will, must yet have a cause from
+which it is to be explained in relation to a particular time and space;
+that is, not in general in its inner nature, but as a _particular_
+phenomenon. In the case of the stone, this is a mechanical cause; in that
+of the movement of a man, it is a motive; but in no case can it be
+wanting. On the other hand, the universal common nature of all phenomena
+of one particular kind, that which must be presupposed if the explanation
+from causes is to have any sense and meaning, is the general force of
+nature, which, in physics, must remain a _qualitas occulta_, because with
+it the etiological explanation ends and the metaphysical begins. But the
+chain of causes and effects is never broken by an original force to which
+it has been necessary to appeal. It does not run back to such a force as
+if it were its first link, but the nearest link, as well as the remotest,
+presupposes the original force, and could otherwise explain nothing. A
+series of causes and effects may be the manifestation of the most
+different kinds of forces, whose successive visible appearances are
+conducted through it, as I have illustrated above by the example of a
+metal machine. But the difference of these original forces, which cannot
+be referred to each other, by no means breaks the unity of that chain of
+causes, and the connection between all its links. The etiology and the
+philosophy of nature never do violence to each other, but go hand in hand,
+regarding the same object from different points of view. Etiology gives an
+account of the causes which necessarily produce the particular phenomenon
+to be explained. It exhibits, as the foundation of all its explanations,
+the universal forces which are active in all these causes and effects. It
+accurately defines, enumerates, and distinguishes these forces, and then
+indicates all the different effects in which each force appears, regulated
+by the difference of the circumstances, always in accordance with its own
+peculiar character, which it discloses in obedience to an invariable rule,
+called _a law of nature_. When all this has been thoroughly accomplished
+by physics in every particular, it will be complete, and its work will be
+done. There will then remain no unknown force in unorganised nature, nor
+any effect, which has not been proved to be the manifestation of one of
+these forces under definite circumstances, in accordance with a law of
+nature. Yet a law of nature remains merely the observed rule according to
+which nature invariably proceeds whenever certain definite circumstances
+occur. Therefore a law of nature may be defined as a fact expressed
+generally--_un fait généralisé_--and thus a complete enumeration of all the
+laws of nature would only be a complete register of facts. The
+consideration of nature as a whole is thus completed in _morphology_,
+which enumerates, compares, and arranges all the enduring forms of
+organised nature. Of the causes of the appearance of the individual
+creature it has little to say, for in all cases this is procreation (the
+theory of which is a separate matter), and in rare cases the _generatio
+æquivoca_. But to this last belongs, strictly speaking, the manner in
+which all the lower grades of the objectification of will, that is to say,
+physical and chemical phenomena, appear as individual, and it is precisely
+the task of etiology to point out the conditions of this appearance.
+Philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself only with the universal, in
+nature as everywhere else. The original forces themselves are here its
+object, and it recognises in them the different grades of the objectivity
+of will, which is the inner nature, the "in-itself" of this world; and
+when it regards the world apart from will, it explains it as merely the
+idea of the subject. But if etiology, instead of preparing the way for
+philosophy, and supplying its doctrines with practical application by
+means of instances, supposes that its aim is rather to deny the existence
+of all original forces, except perhaps _one_, the most general, for
+example, impenetrability, which it imagines it thoroughly understands, and
+consequently seeks forcibly to refer all the others to it--it forsakes its
+own province and can only give us error instead of truth. The content of
+nature is supplanted by its form, everything is ascribed to the
+circumstances which work from without, and nothing to the inner nature of
+the thing. Now if it were possible to succeed by this method, a problem in
+arithmetic would ultimately, as we have already remarked, solve the riddle
+of the universe. But this is the method adopted by those, referred to
+above, who think that all physiological effects ought to be reduced to
+form and combination, this, perhaps, to electricity, and this again to
+chemism, and chemism to mechanism. The mistake of Descartes, for example,
+and of all the Atomists, was of this last description. They referred the
+movements of the globe to the impact of a fluid, and the qualities of
+matter to the connection and form of the atoms, and hence they laboured to
+explain all the phenomena of nature as merely manifestations of
+impenetrability and cohesion. Although this has been given up, precisely
+the same error is committed in our own day by the electrical, chemical,
+and mechanical physiologists, who obstinately attempt to explain the whole
+of life and all the functions of the organism from "form and combination."
+In Meckel's "Archiv für Physiologie" (1820, vol. v. p. 185) we still find
+it stated that the aim of physiological explanation is the reduction of
+organic life to the universal forces with which physics deals. Lamarck
+also, in his "_Philosophie Zoologique_," explains life as merely the
+effect of warmth and electricity: _le calorique et la matière électrique
+suffisent parfaitement pour composer ensemble cette cause essentielle de
+la vie_ (p. 16). According to this, warmth and electricity would be the
+"thing-in-itself," and the world of animals and plants its phenomenal
+appearance. The absurdity of this opinion becomes glaringly apparent at
+the 306th and following pages of that work. It is well known that all
+these opinions, that have been so often refuted, have reappeared quite
+recently with renewed confidence. If we carefully examine the foundation
+of these views, we shall find that they ultimately involve the
+presupposition that the organism is merely an aggregate of phenomena of
+physical, chemical, and mechanical forces, which have come together here
+by chance, and produced the organism as a freak of nature without further
+significance. The organism of an animal or of a human being would
+therefore be, if considered philosophically, not the exhibition of a
+special Idea, that is, not itself immediate objectivity of the will at a
+definite higher grade, but in it would appear only those Ideas which
+objectify the will in electricity, in chemism, and in mechanism. Thus the
+organism would be as fortuitously constructed by the concurrence of these
+forces as the forms of men and beasts in clouds and stalactites, and would
+therefore in itself be no more interesting than they are. However, we
+shall see immediately how far the application of physical and chemical
+modes of explanation to the organism may yet, within certain limits, be
+allowable and useful; for I shall explain that the vital force certainly
+avails itself of and uses the forces of unorganised nature; yet these
+forces no more constitute the vital force than a hammer and anvil make a
+blacksmith. Therefore even the most simple example of plant life can never
+be explained from these forces by any theory of capillary attraction and
+endosmose, much less animal life. The following observations will prepare
+the way for this somewhat difficult discussion.
+
+It follows from all that has been said that it is certainly an error on
+the part of natural science to seek to refer the higher grades of the
+objectification of will to the lower; for the failure to recognise, or the
+denial of, original and self-existing forces of nature is just as wrong as
+the groundless assumption of special forces when what occurs is merely a
+peculiar kind of manifestation of what is already known. Thus Kant rightly
+says that it would be absurd to hope for a blade of grass from a Newton,
+that is, from one who reduced the blade of grass to the manifestations of
+physical and chemical forces, of which it was the chance product, and
+therefore a mere freak of nature, in which no special Idea appeared,
+_i.e._, the will did not directly reveal itself in it in a higher and
+specific grade, but just as in the phenomena of unorganised nature and by
+chance in this form. The schoolmen, who certainly would not have allowed
+such a doctrine, would rightly have said that it was a complete denial of
+the _forma substantialis_, and a degradation of it to the _forma
+accidentalis_. For the _forma substantialis_ of Aristotle denotes exactly
+what I call the grade of the objectification of will in a thing. On the
+other hand, it is not to be overlooked that in all Ideas, that is, in all
+forces of unorganised, and all forms of organised nature, it is _one and
+the same_ will that reveals itself, that is to say, which enters the form
+of the idea and passes into _objectivity_. Its unity must therefore be
+also recognisable through an inner relationship between all its phenomena.
+Now this reveals itself in the higher grades of the objectification of
+will, where the whole phenomenon is more distinct, thus in the vegetable
+and animal kingdoms, through the universally prevailing analogy of all
+forms, the fundamental type which recurs in all phenomena. This has,
+therefore, become the guiding principle of the admirable zoological system
+which was originated by the French in this century, and it is most
+completely established in comparative anatomy as _l'unité de plan_,
+_l'uniformité de l'élément anatomique_. To discover this fundamental type
+has been the chief concern, or at any rate the praiseworthy endeavour, of
+the natural philosophers of the school of Schelling, who have in this
+respect considerable merit, although in many cases their hunt after
+analogies in nature degenerated into mere conceits. They have, however,
+rightly shown that that general relationship and family likeness exists
+also in the Ideas of unorganised nature; for example, between electricity
+and magnetism, the identity of which was afterwards established; between
+chemical attraction and gravitation, and so forth. They specially called
+attention to the fact that _polarity_, that is, the sundering of a force
+into two qualitatively different and opposed activities striving after
+reunion, which also shows itself for the most part in space as a
+dispersion in opposite directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the
+phenomena of nature, from the magnet and the crystal to man himself. Yet
+this knowledge has been current in China from the earliest times, in the
+doctrine of opposition of Yin and Yang. Indeed, since all things in the
+world are the objectification of one and the same will, and therefore in
+their inner nature identical, it must not only be the case that there is
+that unmistakable analogy between them, and that in every phenomenon the
+trace, intimation, and plan of the higher phenomenon that lies next to it
+in point of development shows itself, but also because all these forms
+belong to the world as _idea_, it is indeed conceivable that even in the
+most universal forms of the idea, in that peculiar framework of the
+phenomenal world space and time, it may be possible to discern and
+establish the fundamental type, intimation, and plan of what fills the
+forms. It seems to have been a dim notion of this that was the origin of
+the Cabala and all the mathematical philosophy of the Pythagoreans, and
+also of the Chinese in Y-king. In the school of Schelling also, to which
+we have already referred, we find, among their efforts to bring to light
+the similarity among the phenomena of nature, several attempts (though
+rather unfortunate ones) to deduce laws of nature from the laws of pure
+space and time. However, one can never tell to what extent a man of genius
+will realise both endeavours.
+
+Now, although the difference between phenomenon and thing-in-itself is
+never lost sight of, and therefore the identity of the will which
+objectifies itself in all Ideas can never (because it has different grades
+of its objectification) be distorted to mean identity of the particular
+Ideas themselves in which it appears, so that, for example, chemical or
+electrical attraction can never be reduced to the attraction of
+gravitation, although this inner analogy is known, and the former may be
+regarded as, so to speak, higher powers of the latter, just as little does
+the similarity of the construction of all animals warrant us in mixing and
+identifying the species and explaining the more developed as mere
+variations of the less developed; and although, finally, the physiological
+functions are never to be reduced to chemical or physical processes, yet,
+in justification of this procedure, within certain limits, we may accept
+the following observations as highly probable.
+
+If several of the phenomena of will in the lower grades of its
+objectification--that is, in unorganised nature--come into conflict because
+each of them, under the guidance of causality, seeks to possess a given
+portion of matter, there arises from the conflict the phenomenon of a
+higher Idea which prevails over all the less developed phenomena
+previously there, yet in such a way that it allows the essence of these to
+continue to exist in a subordinate manner, in that it takes up into itself
+from them something which is analogous to them. This process is only
+intelligible from the identity of the will which manifests itself in all
+the Ideas, and which is always striving after higher objectification. We
+thus see, for example, in the hardening of the bones, an unmistakable
+analogy to crystallisation, as the force which originally had possession
+of the chalk, although ossification is never to be reduced to
+crystallisation. The analogy shows itself in a weaker degree in the flesh
+becoming firm. The combination of humours in the animal body and secretion
+are also analogous to chemical combination and separation. Indeed, the
+laws of chemistry are still strongly operative in this case, but
+subordinated, very much modified, and mastered by a higher Idea; therefore
+mere chemical forces outside the organism will never afford us such
+humours; but
+
+
+    "Encheiresin naturæ nennt es die Chemie,
+    Spottet ihrer selbst und weiss nicht wie."
+
+
+The more developed Idea resulting from this victory over several lower
+Ideas or objectifications of will, gains an entirely new character by
+taking up into itself from every Idea over which it has prevailed a
+strengthened analogy. The will objectifies itself in a new, more distinct
+way. It originally appears in _generatio æquivoca_; afterwards in
+assimilation to the given germ, organic moisture, plant, animal, man. Thus
+from the strife of lower phenomena the higher arise, swallowing them all
+up, but yet realising in the higher grade the tendency of all the lower.
+Here, then, already the law applies--_Serpens nisi serpentem comederit non
+fit draco._
+
+I wish it had been possible for me to dispel by clearness of explanation
+the obscurity which clings to the subject of these thoughts; but I see
+very well that the reader's own consideration of the matter must
+materially aid me if I am not to remain uncomprehended or misunderstood.
+According to the view I have expressed, the traces of chemical and
+physical modes of operation will indeed be found in the organism, but it
+can never be explained from them; because it is by no means a phenomenon
+even accidentally brought about through the united actions of such forces,
+but a higher Idea which has overcome these lower ideas by _subduing
+assimilation_; for the _one_ will which objectifies itself in all Ideas
+always seeks the highest possible objectification, and has therefore in
+this case given up the lower grades of its manifestation after a conflict,
+in order to appear in a higher grade, and one so much the more powerful.
+No victory without conflict: since the higher Idea or objectification of
+will can only appear through the conquest of the lower, it endures the
+opposition of these lower Ideas, which, although brought into subjection,
+still constantly strive to obtain an independent and complete expression
+of their being. The magnet that has attracted a piece of iron carries on a
+perpetual conflict with gravitation, which, as the lower objectification
+of will, has a prior right to the matter of the iron; and in this constant
+battle the magnet indeed grows stronger, for the opposition excites it, as
+it were, to greater effort. In the same way every manifestation of the
+will, including that which expresses itself in the human organism, wages a
+constant war against the many physical and chemical forces which, as lower
+Ideas, have a prior right to that matter. Thus the arm falls which for a
+while, overcoming gravity, we have held stretched out; thus the pleasing
+sensation of health, which proclaims the victory of the Idea of the
+self-conscious organism over the physical and chemical laws, which
+originally governed the humours of the body, is so often interrupted, and
+is indeed always accompanied by greater or less discomfort, which arises
+from the resistance of these forces, and on account of which the
+vegetative part of our life is constantly attended by slight pain. Thus
+also digestion weakens all the animal functions, because it requires the
+whole vital force to overcome the chemical forces of nature by
+assimilation. Hence also in general the burden of physical life, the
+necessity of sleep, and, finally, of death; for at last these subdued
+forces of nature, assisted by circumstances, win back from the organism,
+wearied even by the constant victory, the matter it took from them, and
+attain to an unimpeded expression of their being. We may therefore say
+that every organism expresses the Idea of which it is the image, only
+after we have subtracted the part of its force which is expended in
+subduing the lower Ideas that strive with it for matter. This seems to
+have been running in the mind of Jacob Böhm when he says somewhere that
+all the bodies of men and animals, and even all plants, are really half
+dead. According as the subjection in the organism of these forces of
+nature, which express the lower grades of the objectification of will, is
+more or less successful, the more or the less completely does it attain to
+the expression of its Idea; that is to say, the nearer it is to the
+_ideal_ or the further from it--the _ideal_ of beauty in its species.
+
+Thus everywhere in nature we see strife, conflict, and alternation of
+victory, and in it we shall come to recognise more distinctly that
+variance with itself which is essential to the will. Every grade of the
+objectification of will fights for the matter, the space, and the time of
+the others. The permanent matter must constantly change its form; for
+under the guidance of causality, mechanical, physical, chemical, and
+organic phenomena, eagerly striving to appear, wrest the matter from each
+other, for each desires to reveal its own Idea. This strife may be
+followed through the whole of nature; indeed nature exists only through
+it: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; (nam si non inesset in rebus contentio, unum omnia essent, ut
+ait Empedocles. Aris. Metaph., B. 5). Yet this strife itself is only the
+revelation of that variance with itself which is essential to the will.
+This universal conflict becomes most distinctly visible in the animal
+kingdom. For animals have the whole of the vegetable kingdom for their
+food, and even within the animal kingdom every beast is the prey and the
+food of another; that is, the matter in which its Idea expresses itself
+must yield itself to the expression of another Idea, for each animal can
+only maintain its existence by the constant destruction of some other.
+Thus the will to live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different forms
+is its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues
+all the others, regards nature as a manufactory for its use. Yet even the
+human race, as we shall see in the Fourth Book, reveals in itself with
+most terrible distinctness this conflict, this variance with itself of the
+will, and we find _homo homini lupus_. Meanwhile we can recognise this
+strife, this subjugation, just as well in the lower grades of the
+objectification of will. Many insects (especially ichneumon-flies) lay
+their eggs on the skin, and even in the body of the larvæ of other
+insects, whose slow destruction is the first work of the newly hatched
+brood. The young hydra, which grows like a bud out of the old one, and
+afterwards separates itself from it, fights while it is still joined to
+the old one for the prey that offers itself, so that the one snatches it
+out of the mouth of the other (Trembley, Polypod., ii. p. 110, and iii. p.
+165). But the bulldog-ant of Australia affords us the most extraordinary
+example of this kind; for if it is cut in two, a battle begins between the
+head and the tail. The head seizes the tail with its teeth, and the tail
+defends itself bravely by stinging the head: the battle may last for half
+an hour, until they die or are dragged away by other ants. This contest
+takes place every time the experiment is tried. (From a letter by Howitt
+in the W. Journal, reprinted in Galignani's Messenger, 17th November
+1855.) On the banks of the Missouri one sometimes sees a mighty oak the
+stem and branches of which are so encircled, fettered, and interlaced by a
+gigantic wild vine, that it withers as if choked. The same thing shows
+itself in the lowest grades; for example, when water and carbon are
+changed into vegetable sap, or vegetables or bread into blood by organic
+assimilation; and so also in every case in which animal secretion takes
+place, along with the restriction of chemical forces to a subordinate mode
+of activity. This also occurs in unorganised nature, when, for example,
+crystals in process of formation meet, cross, and mutually disturb each
+other to such an extent that they are unable to assume the pure
+crystalline form, so that almost every cluster of crystals is an image of
+such a conflict of will at this low grade of its objectification; or
+again, when a magnet forces its magnetism upon iron, in order to express
+its Idea in it; or when galvanism overcomes chemical affinity, decomposes
+the closest combinations, and so entirely suspends the laws of chemistry
+that the acid of a decomposed salt at the negative pole must pass to the
+positive pole without combining with the alkalies through which it goes on
+its way, or turning red the litmus paper that touches it. On a large scale
+it shows itself in the relation between the central body and the planet,
+for although the planet is in absolute dependence, yet it always resists,
+just like the chemical forces in the organism; hence arises the constant
+tension between centripetal and centrifugal force, which keeps the globe
+in motion, and is itself an example of that universal essential conflict
+of the manifestation of will which we are considering. For as every body
+must be regarded as the manifestation of a will, and as will necessarily
+expresses itself as a struggle, the original condition of every world that
+is formed into a globe cannot be rest, but motion, a striving forward in
+boundless space without rest and without end. Neither the law of inertia
+nor that of causality is opposed to this: for as, according to the former,
+matter as such is alike indifferent to rest and motion, its original
+condition may just as well be the one as the other, therefore if we first
+find it in motion, we have just as little right to assume that this was
+preceded by a condition of rest, and to inquire into the cause of the
+origin of the motion, as, conversely, if we found it at rest, we would
+have to assume a previous motion and inquire into the cause of its
+suspension. It is, therefore, not needful to seek for a first impulse for
+centrifugal force, for, according to the hypothesis of Kant and Laplace,
+it is, in the case of the planets, the residue of the original rotation of
+the central body, from which the planets have separated themselves as it
+contracted. But to this central body itself motion is essential; it always
+continues its rotation, and at the same time rushes forward in endless
+space, or perhaps circulates round a greater central body invisible to us.
+This view entirely agrees with the conjecture of astronomers that there is
+a central sun, and also with the observed advance of our whole solar
+system, and perhaps of the whole stellar system to which our sun belongs.
+From this we are finally led to assume a general advance of fixed stars,
+together with the central sun, and this certainly loses all meaning in
+boundless space (for motion in absolute space cannot be distinguished from
+rest), and becomes, as is already the case from its striving and aimless
+flight, an expression of that nothingness, that failure of all aim, which,
+at the close of this book, we shall be obliged to recognise in the
+striving of will in all its phenomena. Thus boundless space and endless
+time must be the most universal and essential forms of the collective
+phenomena of will, which exist for the expression of its whole being.
+Lastly, we can recognise that conflict which we are considering of all
+phenomena of will against each other in simple matter regarded as such;
+for the real characteristic of matter is correctly expressed by Kant as
+repulsive and attractive force; so that even crude matter has its
+existence only in the strife of conflicting forces. If we abstract from
+all chemical differences in matter, or go so far back in the chain of
+causes and effects that as yet there is no chemical difference, there
+remains mere matter,--the world rounded to a globe, whose life, _i.e._,
+objectification of will, is now constituted by the conflict between
+attractive and repulsive forces, the former as gravitation pressing from
+all sides towards the centre, the latter as impenetrability always
+opposing the former either as rigidity or elasticity; and this constant
+pressure and resistance may be regarded as the objectivity of will in its
+very lowest grade, and even there it expresses its character.
+
+We should see the will express itself here in the lowest grade as blind
+striving, an obscure, inarticulate impulse, far from susceptible of being
+directly known. It is the simplest and the weakest mode of its
+objectification. But it appears as this blind and unconscious striving in
+the whole of unorganised nature, in all those original forces of which it
+is the work of physics and chemistry to discover and to study the laws,
+and each of which manifests itself to us in millions of phenomena which
+are exactly similar and regular, and show no trace of individual
+character, but are mere multiplicity through space and time, _i.e._,
+through the _principium individuationis_, as a picture is multiplied
+through the facets of a glass.
+
+From grade to grade objectifying itself more distinctly, yet still
+completely without consciousness as an obscure striving force, the will
+acts in the vegetable kingdom also, in which the bond of its phenomena
+consists no longer properly of causes, but of stimuli; and, finally, also
+in the vegetative part of the animal phenomenon, in the production and
+maturing of the animal, and in sustaining its inner economy, in which the
+manifestation of will is still always necessarily determined by stimuli.
+The ever-ascending grades of the objectification of will bring us at last
+to the point at which the individual that expresses the Idea could no
+longer receive food for its assimilation through mere movement following
+upon stimuli. For such a stimulus must be waited for, but the food has now
+come to be of a more special and definite kind, and with the
+ever-increasing multiplicity of the individual phenomena, the crowd and
+confusion has become so great that they interfere with each other, and the
+chance of the individual that is moved merely by stimuli and must wait for
+its food would be too unfavourable. From the point, therefore, at which
+the animal has delivered itself from the egg or the womb in which it
+vegetated without consciousness, its food must be sought out and selected.
+For this purpose movement following upon motives, and therefore
+consciousness, becomes necessary, and consequently it appears as an agent,
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, called in at this stage of the objectification of will for the
+conservation of the individual and the propagation of the species. It
+appears represented by the brain or a large ganglion, just as every other
+effort or determination of the will which objectifies itself is
+represented by an organ, that is to say, manifests itself for the idea as
+an organ.(36) But with this means of assistance, this {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, the _world
+as idea_ comes into existence at a stroke, with all its forms, object and
+subject, time, space, multiplicity, and causality. The world now shows its
+second side. Till now _mere will_, it becomes also _idea_, object of the
+knowing subject. The will, which up to this point followed its tendency in
+the dark with unerring certainty, has at this grade kindled for itself a
+light as a means which became necessary for getting rid of the
+disadvantage which arose from the throng and the complicated nature of its
+manifestations, and which would have accrued precisely to the most perfect
+of them. The hitherto infallible certainty and regularity with which it
+worked in unorganised and merely vegetative nature, rested upon the fact
+that it alone was active in its original nature, as blind impulse, will,
+without assistance, and also without interruption, from a second and
+entirely different world, the world as idea, which is indeed only the
+image of its own inner being, but is yet of quite another nature, and now
+encroaches on the connected whole of its phenomena. Hence its infallible
+certainty comes to an end. Animals are already exposed to illusion, to
+deception. They have, however, merely ideas of perception, no conceptions,
+no reflection, and they are therefore bound to the present; they cannot
+have regard for the future. It seems as if this knowledge without reason
+was not in all cases sufficient for its end, and at times required, as it
+were, some assistance. For the very remarkable phenomenon presents itself,
+that the blind working of the will and the activity enlightened by
+knowledge encroach in a most astonishing manner upon each other's spheres
+in two kinds of phenomena. In the one case we find in the very midst of
+those actions of animals which are guided by perceptive knowledge and its
+motives one kind of action which is accomplished apart from these, and
+thus through the necessity of the blindly acting will. I refer to those
+mechanical instincts which are guided by no motive or knowledge, and which
+yet have the appearance of performing their work from abstract rational
+motives. The other case, which is opposed to this, is that in which, on
+the contrary, the light of knowledge penetrates into the workshop of the
+blindly active will, and illuminates the vegetative functions of the human
+organism. I mean clairvoyance. Finally, when the will has attained to the
+highest grade of its objectification, that knowledge of the understanding
+given to brutes to which the senses supply the data, out of which there
+arises mere perception confined to what is immediately present, does not
+suffice. That complicated, many-sided, imaginative being, man, with his
+many needs, and exposed as he is to innumerable dangers, must, in order to
+exist, be lighted by a double knowledge; a higher power, as it were, of
+perceptive knowledge must be given him, and also reason, as the faculty of
+framing abstract conceptions. With this there has appeared reflection,
+surveying the future and the past, and, as a consequence, deliberation,
+care, the power of premeditated action independent of the present, and
+finally, the full and distinct consciousness of one's own deliberate
+volition as such. Now if with mere knowledge of perception there arose the
+possibility of illusion and deception, by which the previous infallibility
+of the blind striving of will was done away with, so that mechanical and
+other instincts, as expressions of unconscious will, had to lend their
+help in the midst of those that were conscious, with the entrance of
+reason that certainty and infallibility of the expressions of will (which
+at the other extreme in unorganised nature appeared as strict conformity
+to law) is almost entirely lost; instinct disappears altogether;
+deliberation, which is supposed to take the place of everything else,
+begets (as was shown in the First Book) irresolution and uncertainty; then
+error becomes possible, and in many cases obstructs the adequate
+objectification of the will in action. For although in the character the
+will has already taken its definite and unchangeable bent or direction, in
+accordance with which volition, when occasioned by the presence of a
+motive, invariably takes place, yet error can falsify its expressions, for
+it introduces illusive motives that take the place of the real ones which
+they resemble;(37) as, for example, when superstition forces on a man
+imaginary motives which impel him to a course of action directly opposed
+to the way in which the will would otherwise express itself in the given
+circumstances. Agamemnon slays his daughter; a miser dispenses alms, out
+of pure egotism, in the hope that he will some day receive an
+hundred-fold; and so on.
+
+Thus knowledge generally, rational as well as merely sensuous, proceeds
+originally from the will itself, belongs to the inner being of the higher
+grades of its objectification as a mere {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, a means of supporting the
+individual and the species, just like any organ of the body. Originally
+destined for the service of the will for the accomplishment of its aims,
+it remains almost throughout entirely subjected to its service: it is so
+in all brutes and in almost all men. Yet we shall see in the Third Book
+how in certain individual men knowledge can deliver itself from this
+bondage, throw off its yoke, and, free from all the aims of will, exist
+purely for itself, simply as a clear mirror of the world, which is the
+source of art. Finally, in the Fourth Book, we shall see how, if this kind
+of knowledge reacts on the will, it can bring about self-surrender,
+_i.e._, resignation, which is the final goal, and indeed the inmost nature
+of all virtue and holiness, and is deliverance from the world.
+
+§ 28. We have considered the great multiplicity and diversity of the
+phenomena in which the will objectifies itself, and we have seen their
+endless and implacable strife with each other. Yet, according to the whole
+discussion up to this point, the will itself, as thing-in-itself, is by no
+means included in that multiplicity and change. The diversity of the
+(Platonic) Ideas, _i.e._, grades of objectification, the multitude of
+individuals in which each of these expresses itself, the struggle of forms
+for matter,--all this does not concern it, but is only the manner of its
+objectification, and only through this has an indirect relation to it, by
+virtue of which it belongs to the expression of the nature of will for the
+idea. As the magic-lantern shows many different pictures, which are all
+made visible by one and the same light, so in all the multifarious
+phenomena which fill the world together or throng after each other as
+events, only _one will_ manifests itself, of which everything is the
+visibility, the objectivity, and which remains unmoved in the midst of
+this change; it alone is thing-in-itself; all objects are manifestations,
+or, to speak the language of Kant, phenomena. Although in man, as
+(Platonic) Idea, the will finds its clearest and fullest objectification,
+yet man alone could not express its being. In order to manifest the full
+significance of the will, the Idea of man would need to appear, not alone
+and sundered from everything else, but accompanied by the whole series of
+grades, down through all the forms of animals, through the vegetable
+kingdom to unorganised nature. All these supplement each other in the
+complete objectification of will; they are as much presupposed by the Idea
+of man as the blossoms of a tree presuppose leaves, branches, stem, and
+root; they form a pyramid, of which man is the apex. If fond of similes,
+one might also say that their manifestations accompany that of man as
+necessarily as the full daylight is accompanied by all the gradations of
+twilight, through which, little by little, it loses itself in darkness; or
+one might call them the echo of man, and say: Animal and plant are the
+descending fifth and third of man, the inorganic kingdom is the lower
+octave. The full truth of this last comparison will only become clear to
+us when, in the following book, we attempt to fathom the deep significance
+of music, and see how a connected, progressive melody, made up of high,
+quick notes, may be regarded as in some sense expressing the life and
+efforts of man connected by reflection, while the unconnected complemental
+notes and the slow bass, which make up the harmony necessary to perfect
+the music, represent the rest of the animal kingdom and the whole of
+nature that is without knowledge. But of this in its own place, where it
+will not sound so paradoxical. We find, however, that the _inner
+necessity_ of the gradation of its manifestations, which is inseparable
+from the adequate objectification of the will, is expressed by an _outer
+necessity_ in the whole of these manifestations themselves, by reason of
+which man has need of the beasts for his support, the beasts in their
+grades have need of each other as well as of plants, which in their turn
+require the ground, water, chemical elements and their combinations, the
+planet, the sun, rotation and motion round the sun, the curve of the
+ellipse, &c., &c. At bottom this results from the fact that the will must
+live on itself, for there exists nothing beside it, and it is a hungry
+will. Hence arise eager pursuit, anxiety, and suffering.
+
+It is only the knowledge of the unity of will as thing-in-itself, in the
+endless diversity and multiplicity of the phenomena, that can afford us
+the true explanation of that wonderful, unmistakable analogy of all the
+productions of nature, that family likeness on account of which we may
+regard them as variations on the same ungiven theme. So in like measure,
+through the distinct and thoroughly comprehended knowledge of that
+harmony, that essential connection of all the parts of the world, that
+necessity of their gradation which we have just been considering, we shall
+obtain a true and sufficient insight into the inner nature and meaning of
+the undeniable _teleology_ of all organised productions of nature, which,
+indeed, we presupposed _a priori_, when considering and investigating
+them.
+
+This _teleology_ is of a twofold description; sometimes an _inner
+teleology_, that is, an agreement of all the parts of a particular
+organism, so ordered that the sustenance of the individual and the species
+results from it, and therefore presents itself as the end of that
+disposition or arrangement. Sometimes, however, there is an _outward
+teleology_, a relation of unorganised to organised nature in general, or
+of particular parts of organised nature to each other, which makes the
+maintenance of the whole of organised nature, or of the particular animal
+species, possible, and therefore presents itself to our judgment as the
+means to this end.
+
+_Inner teleology_ is connected with the scheme of our work in the
+following way. If, in accordance with what has been said, all variations
+of form in nature, and all multiplicity of individuals, belong not to the
+will itself, but merely to its objectivity and the form of this
+objectivity, it necessarily follows that the will is indivisible and is
+present as a whole in every manifestation, although the grades of its
+objectification, the (Platonic) Ideas, are very different from each other.
+We may, for the sake of simplicity, regard these different Ideas as in
+themselves individual and simple acts of the will, in which it expresses
+its nature more or less. Individuals, however, are again manifestations of
+the Ideas, thus of these acts, in time, space, and multiplicity. Now, in
+the lowest grades of objectivity, such an act (or an Idea) retains its
+unity in the manifestation; while, in order to appear in higher grades, it
+requires a whole series of conditions and developments in time, which only
+collectively express its nature completely. Thus, for example the Idea
+that reveals itself in any general force of nature has always one single
+expression, although it presents itself differently according to the
+external relations that are present: otherwise its identity could not be
+proved, for this is done by abstracting the diversity that arises merely
+from external relations. In the same way the crystal has only _one_
+manifestation of life, crystallisation, which afterwards has its fully
+adequate and exhaustive expression in the rigid form, the corpse of that
+momentary life. The plant, however, does not express the Idea, whose
+phenomenon it is, at once and through a single manifestation, but in a
+succession of developments of its organs in time. The animal not only
+develops its organism in the same manner, in a succession of forms which
+are often very different (metamorphosis), but this form itself, although
+it is already objectivity of will at this grade, does not attain to a full
+expression of its Idea. This expression must be completed through the
+actions of the animal, in which its empirical character, common to the
+whole species, manifests itself, and only then does it become the full
+revelation of the Idea, a revelation which presupposes the particular
+organism as its first condition. In the case of man, the empirical
+character is peculiar to every individual (indeed, as we shall see in the
+Fourth Book, even to the extent of supplanting entirely the character of
+the species, through the self-surrender of the whole will). That which is
+known as the empirical character, through the necessary development in
+time, and the division into particular actions that is conditioned by it,
+is, when we abstract from this temporal form of the manifestation the
+_intelligible character_, according to the expression of Kant, who shows
+his undying merit especially in establishing this distinction and
+explaining the relation between freedom and necessity, _i.e._, between the
+will as thing-in-itself and its manifestations in time.(38) Thus the
+intelligible character coincides with the Idea, or, more accurately, with
+the original act of will which reveals itself in it. So far then, not only
+the empirical character of every man, but also that of every species of
+animal and plant, and even of every original force of unorganised nature,
+is to be regarded as the manifestation of an intelligible character, that
+is, of a timeless, indivisible act of will. I should like here to draw
+attention in passing to the naïveté with which every plant expresses and
+lays open its whole character in its mere form, reveals its whole being
+and will. This is why the physiognomy of plants is so interesting; while
+in order to know an animal in its Idea, it is necessary to observe the
+course of its action. As for man, he must be fully investigated and
+tested, for reason makes him capable of a high degree of dissimulation.
+The beast is as much more naïve than the man as the plant is more naïve
+than the beast. In the beast we see the will to live more naked, as it
+were, than in the man, in whom it is clothed with so much knowledge, and
+is, moreover, so veiled through the capacity for dissimulation, that it is
+almost only by chance, and here and there, that its true nature becomes
+apparent. In the plant it shows itself quite naked, but also much weaker,
+as mere blind striving for existence without end or aim. For the plant
+reveals its whole being at the first glance, and with complete innocence,
+which does not suffer from the fact that it carries its organs of
+generation exposed to view on its upper surface, though in all animals
+they have been assigned to the most hidden part. This innocence of the
+plant results from its complete want of knowledge. Guilt does not lie in
+willing, but in willing with knowledge. Every plant speaks to us first of
+all of its home, of the climate, and the nature of the ground in which it
+has grown. Therefore, even those who have had little practice easily tell
+whether an exotic plant belongs to the tropical or the temperate zone, and
+whether it grows in water, in marshes, on mountain, or on moorland.
+Besides this, however, every plant expresses the special will of its
+species, and says something that cannot be uttered in any other tongue.
+But we must now apply what has been said to the teleological consideration
+of the organism, so far as it concerns its inner design. If in unorganised
+nature the Idea, which is everywhere to be regarded as a single act of
+will, reveals itself also in a single manifestation which is always the
+same, and thus one may say that here the empirical character directly
+partakes of the unity of the intelligible, coincides, as it were, with it,
+so that no inner design can show itself here; if, on the contrary, all
+organisms express their Ideas through a series of successive developments,
+conditioned by a multiplicity of co-existing parts, and thus only the sum
+of the manifestations of the empirical character collectively constitute
+the expression of the intelligible character; this necessary co-existence
+of the parts and succession of the stages of development does not destroy
+the unity of the appearing Idea, the act of will which expresses itself;
+nay, rather this unity finds its expression in the necessary relation and
+connection of the parts and stages of development with each other, in
+accordance with the law of causality. Since it is the will which is one,
+indivisible, and therefore entirely in harmony with itself, that reveals
+itself in the whole Idea as in act, its manifestation, although broken up
+into a number of different parts and conditions, must yet show this unity
+again in the thorough agreement of all of these. This is effected by a
+necessary relation and dependence of all the parts upon each other, by
+means of which the unity of the Idea is re-established in the
+manifestation. In accordance with this, we now recognise these different
+parts and functions of the organism as related to each other reciprocally
+as means and end, but the organism itself as the final end of all.
+Consequently, neither the breaking up of the Idea, which in itself is
+simple, into the multiplicity of the parts and conditions of the organism,
+on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, the re-establishment of its unity
+through the necessary connection of the parts and functions which arises
+from the fact that they are the cause and effect, the means and end, of
+each other, is peculiar and essential to the appearing will as such, to
+the thing-in-itself, but only to its manifestation in space, time, and
+causality (mere modes of the principle of sufficient reason, the form of
+the phenomenon). They belong to the world as idea, not to the world as
+will; they belong to the way in which the will becomes object, _i.e._,
+idea at this grade of its objectivity. Every one who has grasped the
+meaning of this discussion--a discussion which is perhaps somewhat
+difficult--will now fully understand the doctrine of Kant, which follows
+from it, that both the design of organised and the conformity to law of
+unorganised nature are only introduced by our understanding, and therefore
+both belong only to the phenomenon, not to the thing-in-itself. The
+surprise, which was referred to above, at the infallible constancy of the
+conformity to law of unorganised nature, is essentially the same as the
+surprise that is excited by design in organised nature; for in both cases
+what we wonder at is only the sight of the original unity of the Idea,
+which, for the phenomenon, has assumed the form of multiplicity and
+diversity.(39)
+
+As regards the second kind of teleology, according to the division made
+above, the _outer_ design, which shows itself, not in the inner economy of
+the organisms, but in the support and assistance they receive from
+without, both from unorganised nature and from each other; its general
+explanation is to be found in the exposition we have just given. For the
+whole world, with all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one
+indivisible will, the Idea, which is related to all other Ideas as harmony
+is related to the single voice. Therefore that unity of the will must show
+itself also in the agreement of all its manifestations. But we can very
+much increase the clearness of this insight if we go somewhat more closely
+into the manifestations of that outer teleology and agreement of the
+different parts of nature with each other, an inquiry which will also
+throw some light on the foregoing exposition. We shall best attain this
+end by considering the following analogy.
+
+The character of each individual man, so far as it is thoroughly
+individual, and not entirely included in that of the species, may be
+regarded as a special Idea, corresponding to a special act of the
+objectification of will. This act itself would then be his intelligible
+character, and his empirical character would be the manifestation of it.
+The empirical character is entirely determined through the intelligible,
+which is without ground, _i.e._, as thing-in-itself is not subordinated to
+the principle of sufficient reason (the form of the phenomenon). The
+empirical character must in the course of life afford us the express image
+of the intelligible, and can only become what the nature of the latter
+demands. But this property extends only to the essential, not to the
+unessential in the course of life to which it applies. To this unessential
+belong the detailed events and actions which are the material in which the
+empirical character shows itself. These are determined by outward
+circumstances, which present the motives upon which the character reacts
+according to its nature; and as they may be very different, the outward
+form of the manifestation of the empirical character, that is, the
+definite actual or historical form of the course of life, will have to
+accommodate itself to their influence. Now this form may be very
+different, although what is essential to the manifestation, its content,
+remains the same. Thus, for example it is immaterial whether a man plays
+for nuts or for crowns; but whether a man cheats or plays fairly, that is
+the real matter; the latter is determined by the intelligible character,
+the former by outward circumstances. As the same theme may be expressed in
+a hundred different variations, so the same character may be expressed in
+a hundred very different lives. But various as the outward influence may
+be, the empirical character which expresses itself in the course of life
+must yet, whatever form it takes, accurately objectify the intelligible
+character, for the latter adapts its objectification to the given material
+of actual circumstances. We have now to assume something analogous to the
+influence of outward circumstances upon the life that is determined in
+essential matters by the character, if we desire to understand how the
+will, in the original act of its objectification, determines the various
+Ideas in which it objectifies itself, that is, the different forms of
+natural existence of every kind, among which it distributes its
+objectification, and which must therefore necessarily have a relation to
+each other in the manifestation. We must assume that between all these
+manifestations of the _one_ will there existed a universal and reciprocal
+adaptation and accommodation of themselves to each other, by which,
+however, as we shall soon see more clearly, all time-determination is to
+be excluded, for the Idea lies outside time. In accordance with this,
+every manifestation must have adapted itself to the surroundings into
+which it entered, and these again must have adapted themselves to it,
+although it occupied a much later position in time; and we see this
+_consensus naturæ_ everywhere. Every plant is therefore adapted to its
+soil and climate, every animal to its element and the prey that will be
+its food, and is also in some way protected, to a certain extent, against
+its natural enemy: the eye is adapted to the light and its refrangibility,
+the lungs and the blood to the air, the air-bladder of fish to water, the
+eye of the seal to the change of the medium in which it must see, the
+water-pouch in the stomach of the camel to the drought of the African
+deserts, the sail of the nautilus to the wind that is to drive its little
+bark, and so on down to the most special and astonishing outward
+adaptations.(40) We must abstract however here from all temporal
+relations, for these can only concern the manifestation of the Idea, not
+the Idea itself. Accordingly this kind of explanation must also be used
+retrospectively, and we must not merely admit that every species
+accommodated itself to the given environment, but also that this
+environment itself, which preceded it in time, had just as much regard for
+the being that would some time come into it. For it is one and the same
+will that objectifies itself in the whole world; it knows no time, for
+this form of the principle of sufficient reason does not belong to it, nor
+to its original objectivity, the Ideas, but only to the way in which these
+are known by the individuals who themselves are transitory, _i.e._, to the
+manifestation of the Ideas. Thus, time has no significance for our present
+examination of the manner in which the objectification of the will
+distributes itself among the Ideas, and the Ideas whose _manifestations_
+entered into the course of time earlier, according to the law of
+causality, to which as phenomena they are subject, have no advantage over
+those whose manifestation entered later; nay rather, these last are the
+completest objectifications of the will, to which the earlier
+manifestations must adapt themselves just as much as they must adapt
+themselves to the earlier. Thus the course of the planets, the tendency to
+the ellipse, the rotation of the earth, the division of land and sea, the
+atmosphere, light, warmth, and all such phenomena, which are in nature
+what bass is in harmony, adapted themselves in anticipation of the coming
+species of living creatures of which they were to become the supporter and
+sustainer. In the same way the ground adapted itself to the nutrition of
+plants, plants adapted themselves to the nutrition of animals, animals to
+that of other animals, and conversely they all adapted themselves to the
+nutrition of the ground. All the parts of nature correspond to each other,
+for it is _one_ will that appears in them all, but the course of time is
+quite foreign to its original and only _adequate objectification_ (this
+expression will be explained in the following book), the Ideas. Even now,
+when the species have only to sustain themselves, no longer to come into
+existence, we see here and there some such forethought of nature extending
+to the future, and abstracting as it were from the process of time, a
+self-adaptation of what is to what is yet to come. The bird builds the
+nest for the young which it does not yet know; the beaver constructs a dam
+the object of which is unknown to it; ants, marmots, and bees lay in
+provision for the winter they have never experienced; the spider and the
+ant-lion make snares, as if with deliberate cunning, for future unknown
+prey; insects deposit their eggs where the coming brood finds future
+nourishment. In the spring-time the female flower of the dioecian
+valisneria unwinds the spirals of its stalk, by which till now it was held
+at the bottom of the water, and thus rises to the surface. Just then the
+male flower, which grows on a short stalk from the bottom, breaks away,
+and so, at the sacrifice of its life, reaches the surface, where it swims
+about in search of the female. The latter is fructified, and then draws
+itself down again to the bottom by contracting its spirals, and there the
+fruit grows.(41) I must again refer here to the larva of the male
+stag-beetle, which makes the hole in the wood for its metamorphosis as big
+again as the female does, in order to have room for its future horns. The
+instinct of animals in general gives us the best illustration of what
+remains of teleology in nature. For as instinct is an action, like that
+which is guided by the conception of an end, and yet is entirely without
+this; so all construction of nature resembles that which is guided by the
+conception of an end, and yet is entirely without it. For in the outer as
+in the inner teleology of nature, what we are obliged to think as means
+and end is, in every case, _the manifestation of the unity of the one will
+so thoroughly agreeing with itself_, which has assumed multiplicity in
+space and time for our manner of knowing.
+
+The reciprocal adaptation and self-accommodation of phenomena that springs
+from this unity cannot, however, annul the inner contradiction which
+appears in the universal conflict of nature described above, and which is
+essential to the will. That harmony goes only so far as to render possible
+the duration of the world and the different kinds of existences in it,
+which without it would long since have perished. Therefore it only extends
+to the continuance of the species, and the general conditions of life, but
+not to that of the individual. If, then, by reason of that harmony and
+accommodation, the _species_ in organised nature and the _universal
+forces_ in unorganised nature continue to exist beside each other, and
+indeed support each other reciprocally, on the other hand, the inner
+contradiction of the will which objectifies itself in all these ideas
+shows itself in the ceaseless internecine war of the _individuals_ of
+these species, and in the constant struggle of the _manifestations_ of
+these natural forces with each other, as we pointed out above. The scene
+and the object of this conflict is matter, which they try to wrest from
+each other, and also space and time, the combination of which through the
+form of causality is, in fact, matter, as was explained in the First
+Book.(42)
+
+§ 29. I here conclude the second principal division of my exposition, in
+the hope that, so far as is possible in the case of an entirely new
+thought, which cannot be quite free from traces of the individuality in
+which it originated, I have succeeded in conveying to the reader the
+complete certainty that this world in which we live and have our being is
+in its whole nature through and through _will_, and at the same time
+through and through _idea_: that this idea, as such, already presupposes a
+form, object and subject, is therefore relative; and if we ask what
+remains if we take away this form, and all those forms which are
+subordinate to it, and which express the principle of sufficient reason,
+the answer must be that as something _toto genere_ different from idea,
+this can be nothing but _will_, which is thus properly the
+_thing-in-itself_. Every one finds that he himself is this will, in which
+the real nature of the world consists, and he also finds that he is the
+knowing subject, whose idea the whole world is, the world which exists
+only in relation to his consciousness, as its necessary supporter. Every
+one is thus himself in a double aspect the whole world, the microcosm;
+finds both sides whole and complete in himself. And what he thus
+recognises as his own real being also exhausts the being of the whole
+world--the macrocosm; thus the world, like man, is through and through
+_will_, and through and through _idea_, and nothing more than this. So we
+see the philosophy of Thales, which concerned the macrocosm, unite at this
+point with that of Socrates, which dealt with the microcosm, for the
+object of both is found to be the same. But all the knowledge that has
+been communicated in the two first books will gain greater completeness,
+and consequently greater certainty, from the two following books, in which
+I hope that several questions that have more or less distinctly arisen in
+the course of our work will also be sufficiently answered.
+
+In the meantime _one_ such question may be more particularly considered,
+for it can only properly arise so long as one has not fully penetrated the
+meaning of the foregoing exposition, and may so far serve as an
+illustration of it. It is this: Every will is a will towards something,
+has an object, an end of its willing; what then is the final end, or
+towards what is that will striving that is exhibited to us as the
+being-in-itself of the world? This question rests, like so many others,
+upon the confusion of the thing-in-itself with the manifestation. The
+principle of sufficient reason, of which the law of motivation is also a
+form, extends only to the latter, not to the former. It is only of
+phenomena, of individual things, that a ground can be given, never of the
+will itself, nor of the Idea in which it adequately objectifies itself. So
+then of every particular movement or change of any kind in nature, a cause
+is to be sought, that is, a condition that of necessity produced it, but
+never of the natural force itself which is revealed in this and
+innumerable similar phenomena; and it is therefore simple
+misunderstanding, arising from want of consideration, to ask for a cause
+of gravity, electricity, and so on. Only if one had somehow shown that
+gravity and electricity were not original special forces of nature, but
+only the manifestations of a more general force already known, would it be
+allowable to ask for the cause which made this force produce the phenomena
+of gravity or of electricity here. All this has been explained at length
+above. In the same way every particular act of will of a knowing
+individual (which is itself only a manifestation of will as the
+thing-in-itself) has necessarily a motive without which that act would
+never have occurred; but just as material causes contain merely the
+determination that at this time, in this place, and in this matter, a
+manifestation of this or that natural force must take place, so the motive
+determines only the act of will of a knowing being, at this time, in this
+place, and under these circumstances, as a particular act, but by no means
+determines that that being wills in general or wills in this manner; this
+is the expression of his intelligible character, which, as will itself,
+the thing-in-itself, is without ground, for it lies outside the province
+of the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore every man has permanent
+aims and motives by which he guides his conduct, and he can always give an
+account of his particular actions; but if he were asked why he wills at
+all, or why in general he wills to exist, he would have no answer, and the
+question would indeed seem to him meaningless; and this would be just the
+expression of his consciousness that he himself is nothing but will, whose
+willing stands by itself and requires more particular determination by
+motives only in its individual acts at each point of time.
+
+In fact, freedom from all aim, from all limits, belongs to the nature of
+the will, which is an endless striving. This was already touched on above
+in the reference to centrifugal force. It also discloses itself in its
+simplest form in the lowest grade of the objectification of will, in
+gravitation, which we see constantly exerting itself, though a final goal
+is obviously impossible for it. For if, according to its will, all
+existing matter were collected in one mass, yet within this mass gravity,
+ever striving towards the centre, would still wage war with
+impenetrability as rigidity or elasticity. The tendency of matter can
+therefore only be confined, never completed or appeased. But this is
+precisely the case with all tendencies of all phenomena of will. Every
+attained end is also the beginning of a new course, and so on _ad
+infinitum_. The plant raises its manifestation from the seed through the
+stem and the leaf to the blossom and the fruit, which again is the
+beginning of a new seed, a new individual, that runs through the old
+course, and so on through endless time. Such also is the life of the
+animal; procreation is its highest point, and after attaining to it, the
+life of the first individual quickly or slowly sinks, while a new life
+ensures to nature the endurance of the species and repeats the same
+phenomena. Indeed, the constant renewal of the matter of every organism is
+also to be regarded as merely the manifestation of this continual pressure
+and change, and physiologists are now ceasing to hold that it is the
+necessary reparation of the matter wasted in motion, for the possible
+wearing out of the machine can by no means be equivalent to the support it
+is constantly receiving through nourishment. Eternal becoming, endless
+flux, characterises the revelation of the inner nature of will. Finally,
+the same thing shows itself in human endeavours and desires, which always
+delude us by presenting their satisfaction as the final end of will. As
+soon as we attain to them they no longer appear the same, and therefore
+they soon grow stale, are forgotten, and though not openly disowned, are
+yet always thrown aside as vanished illusions. We are fortunate enough if
+there still remains something to wish for and to strive after, that the
+game may be kept up of constant transition from desire to satisfaction,
+and from satisfaction to a new desire, the rapid course of which is called
+happiness, and the slow course sorrow, and does not sink into that
+stagnation that shows itself in fearful ennui that paralyses life, vain
+yearning without a definite object, deadening languor. According to all
+this, when the will is enlightened by knowledge, it always knows what it
+wills now and here, never what it wills in general; every particular act
+of will has its end, the whole will has none; just as every particular
+phenomenon of nature is determined by a sufficient cause so far as
+concerns its appearance in this place at this time, but the force which
+manifests itself in it has no general cause, for it belongs to the
+thing-in-itself, to the groundless will. The single example of
+self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the idea as a whole, the whole
+world of perception. It is the objectification, the revelation, the mirror
+of the will. What the will expresses in it will be the subject of our
+further consideration.(43)
+
+
+
+
+
+THIRD BOOK. THE WORLD AS IDEA.
+
+
+
+
+Second Aspect. The Idea Independent Of The Principle Of Sufficient Reason:
+The Platonic Idea: The Object Of Art.
+
+
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+    {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}.----{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER NU~}.
+
+
+§ 30. In the First Book the world was explained as mere _idea_, object for
+a subject. In the Second Book we considered it from its other side, and
+found that in this aspect it is _will_, which proved to be simply that
+which this world is besides being idea. In accordance with this knowledge
+we called the world as idea, both as a whole and in its parts, the
+_objectification of will_, which therefore means the will become object,
+_i.e._, idea. Further, we remember that this objectification of will was
+found to have many definite grades, in which, with gradually increasing
+distinctness and completeness, the nature of will appears in the idea,
+that is to say, presents itself as object. In these grades we already
+recognised the Platonic Ideas, for the grades are just the determined
+species, or the original unchanging forms and qualities of all natural
+bodies, both organised and unorganised, and also the general forces which
+reveal themselves according to natural laws. These Ideas, then, as a whole
+express themselves in innumerable individuals and particulars, and are
+related to these as archetypes to their copies. The multiplicity of such
+individuals is only conceivable through time and space, their appearing
+and passing away through causality, and in all these forms we recognise
+merely the different modes of the principle of sufficient reason, which is
+the ultimate principle of all that is finite, of all individual existence,
+and the universal form of the idea as it appears in the knowledge of the
+individual as such. The Platonic Idea, on the other hand, does not come
+under this principle, and has therefore neither multiplicity nor change.
+While the individuals in which it expresses itself are innumerable, and
+unceasingly come into being and pass away, it remains unchanged as one and
+the same, and the principle of sufficient reason has for it no meaning.
+As, however, this is the form under which all knowledge of the subject
+comes, so far as the subject knows as an _individual_, the Ideas lie quite
+outside the sphere of its knowledge. If, therefore, the Ideas are to
+become objects of knowledge, this can only happen by transcending the
+individuality of the knowing subject. The more exact and detailed
+explanation of this is what will now occupy our attention.
+
+§ 31. First, however, the following very essential remark. I hope that in
+the preceding book I have succeeded in producing the conviction that what
+is called in the Kantian philosophy the _thing-in-itself_, and appears
+there as so significant, and yet so obscure and paradoxical a doctrine,
+and especially on account of the manner in which Kant introduced it as an
+inference from the caused to the cause, was considered a stumbling-stone,
+and, in fact, the weak side of his philosophy,--that this, I say, if it is
+reached by the entirely different way by which we have arrived at it, is
+nothing but the _will_ when the sphere of that conception is extended and
+defined in the way I have shown. I hope, further, that after what has been
+said there will be no hesitation in recognising the definite grades of the
+objectification of the will, which is the inner reality of the world, to
+be what Plato called the _eternal Ideas_ or unchangeable forms ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI~}); a
+doctrine which is regarded as the principal, but at the same time the most
+obscure and paradoxical dogma of his system, and has been the subject of
+reflection and controversy of ridicule and of reverence to so many and
+such differently endowed minds in the course of many centuries.
+
+If now the will is for us the _thing-in-itself_, and the Idea is the
+immediate objectivity of that will at a definite grade, we find that
+Kant's thing-in-itself, and Plato's Idea, which to him is the only {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, these two great obscure paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of
+the West are not indeed identical, but yet very closely related, and only
+distinguished by a single circumstance. The purport of these two great
+paradoxes, with all inner harmony and relationship, is yet so very
+different on account of the remarkable diversity of the individuality of
+their authors, that they are the best commentary on each other, for they
+are like two entirely different roads that conduct us to the same goal.
+This is easily made clear. What Kant says is in substance this:--"Time,
+space, and causality are not determinations of the thing-in-itself, but
+belong only to its phenomenal existence, for they are nothing but the
+forms of our knowledge. Since, however, all multiplicity, and all coming
+into being and passing away, are only possible through time, space, and
+causality, it follows that they also belong only to the phenomenon, not to
+the thing-in-itself. But as our knowledge is conditioned by these forms,
+the whole of experience is only knowledge of the phenomenon, not of the
+thing-in-itself; therefore its laws cannot be made valid for the
+thing-in-itself. This extends even to our own _ego_, and we know it only
+as phenomenon, and not according to what it may be in itself." This is the
+meaning and content of the doctrine of Kant in the important respect we
+are considering. What Plato says is this:--"The things of this world which
+our senses perceive have no true being; _they always become, they never
+are:_ they have only a relative being; they all exist merely in and
+through their relations to each other; their whole being may, therefore,
+quite as well be called a non-being. They are consequently not objects of
+a true knowledge ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}), for such a knowledge can only be of what
+exists for itself, and always in the same way; they, on the contrary, are
+only the objects of an opinion based on sensation ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}). So long as we are confined to the perception of these, we are
+like men who sit in a dark cave, bound so fast that they cannot turn their
+heads, and who see nothing but the shadows of real things which pass
+between them and a fire burning behind them, the light of which casts the
+shadows on the wall opposite them; and even of themselves and of each
+other they see only the shadows on the wall. Their wisdom would thus
+consist in predicting the order of the shadows learned from experience.
+The real archetypes, on the other hand, to which these shadows correspond,
+the eternal Ideas, the original forms of all things, can alone be said to
+have true being ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}), because they _always are, but never become nor
+pass away_. To them belongs _no multiplicity_; for each of them is
+according to its nature only one, for it is the archetype itself, of which
+all particular transitory things of the same kind which are named after it
+are copies or shadows. They have also _no coming into being nor passing
+away_, for they are truly being, never becoming nor vanishing, like their
+fleeting shadows. (It is necessarily presupposed, however, in these two
+negative definitions, that time, space, and causality have no significance
+or validity for these Ideas, and that they do not exist in them.) Of these
+only can there be true knowledge, for the object of such knowledge can
+only be that which always and in every respect (thus in-itself) is; not
+that which is and again is not, according as we look at it." This is
+Plato's doctrine. It is clear, and requires no further proof that the
+inner meaning of both doctrines is entirely the same; that both explain
+the visible world as a manifestation, which in itself is nothing, and
+which only has meaning and a borrowed reality through that which expresses
+itself in it (in the one case the thing-in-itself, in the other the Idea).
+To this last, which has true being, all the forms of that phenomenal
+existence, even the most universal and essential, are, according to both
+doctrines, entirely foreign. In order to disown these forms Kant has
+directly expressed them even in abstract terms, and distinctly refused
+time, space, and causality as mere forms of the phenomenon to the
+thing-in-itself. Plato, on the other hand, did not attain to the fullest
+expression, and has only distinctly refused these forms to his Ideas in
+that he denies of the Ideas what is only possible through these forms,
+multiplicity of similar things, coming into being and passing away. Though
+it is perhaps superfluous, I should like to illustrate this remarkable and
+important agreement by an example. There stands before us, let us suppose,
+an animal in the full activity of life. Plato would say, "This animal has
+no true existence, but merely an apparent existence, a constant becoming,
+a relative existence which may just as well be called non-being as being.
+Only the Idea which expresses itself in that animal is truly 'being,' or
+the animal in-itself ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}), which is dependent upon nothing,
+but is in and for itself ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}); it has not become, it
+will not end, but always is in the same way ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}). If now we recognise its Idea in this animal,
+it is all one and of no importance whether we have this animal now before
+us or its progenitor of a thousand years ago, whether it is here or in a
+distant land, whether it presents itself in this or that manner, position,
+or action; whether, lastly, it is this or any other individual of the same
+species; all this is nothing, and only concerns the phenomenon; the Idea
+of the animal alone has true being, and is the object of real knowledge."
+So Plato; Kant would say something of this kind, "This animal is a
+phenomenon in time, space, and causality, which are collectively the
+conditions _a priori_ of the possibility of experience, lying in our
+faculty of knowledge, not determinations of the thing-in-itself. Therefore
+this animal as we perceive it at this definite point of time, in this
+particular place, as an individual in the connection of experience
+(_i.e._, in the chain of causes and effects), which has come into being,
+and will just as necessarily pass away, is not a thing-in-itself, but a
+phenomenon which only exists in relation to our knowledge. To know it as
+what it may be in itself, that is to say, independent of all the
+determinations which lie in time, space, and causality, would demand
+another kind of knowledge than that which is possible for us through the
+senses and the understanding."
+
+In order to bring Kant's mode of expression nearer the Platonic, we might
+say: Time, space, and causality are that arrangement of our intellect by
+virtue of which the _one_ being of each kind which alone really is,
+manifests itself to us as a multiplicity of similar beings, constantly
+appearing and disappearing in endless succession. The apprehension of
+things by means of and in accordance with this arrangement is _immanent_
+knowledge; that, on the other hand, which is conscious of the true state
+of the case, is _transcendental_ knowledge. The latter is obtained _in
+abstracto_ through the criticism of pure reason, but in exceptional cases
+it may also appear intuitively. This last is an addition of my own, which
+I am endeavouring in this Third Book to explain.
+
+If the doctrine of Kant had ever been properly understood and grasped, and
+since Kant's time that of Plato, if men had truly and earnestly reflected
+on the inner meaning and content of the teaching of these two great
+masters, instead of involving themselves in the technicalities of the one
+and writing parodies of the style of the other, they could not have failed
+to discern long ago to what an extent these two great philosophers agree,
+and that the true meaning, the aim of both systems, is the same. Not only
+would they have refrained from constantly comparing Plato to Leibnitz, on
+whom his spirit certainly did not rest, or indeed to a well-known
+gentleman who is still alive,(44) as if they wanted to mock the manes of
+the great thinker of the past; but they would have advanced much farther
+in general, or rather they would not have fallen so disgracefully far
+behind as they have in the last forty years. They would not have let
+themselves be led by the nose, to-day by one vain boaster and to-morrow by
+another, nor would they have opened the nineteenth century, which promised
+so much in Germany, with the philosophical farces that were performed over
+the grave of Kant (as the ancients sometimes did at the funeral obsequies
+of their dead), and which deservedly called forth the derision of other
+nations, for such things least become the earnest and strait-laced German.
+But so small is the chosen public of true philosophers, that even students
+who understand are but scantily brought them by the centuries--{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} (_Thyrsigeri quidem multi,
+Baachi vero pauci_). {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} (_Eam ob
+rem philosophia in infamiam incidit, quad non pro dignitate ipsam
+attingunt: neque enim a spuriis, sad a legitimis erat
+attrectanda_).--Plato.
+
+Men followed the words,--such words as "_a priori_ ideas," "forms of
+perception and thought existing in consciousness independently of
+experience," "fundamental conceptions of the pure understanding," &c.,
+&c.,--and asked whether Plato's Ideas, which were also original
+conceptions, and besides this were supposed to be reminiscences of a
+perception before life of the truly real things, were in some way the same
+as Kant's forms of perception and thought, which lie _a priori_ in our
+consciousness. On account of some slight resemblance in the expression of
+these two entirely different doctrines, the Kantian doctrine of the forms
+which limit the knowledge of the individual to the phenomenon, and the
+Platonic doctrine of Ideas, the knowledge of which these very forms
+expressly deny, these so far diametrically opposed doctrines were
+carefully compared, and men deliberated and disputed as to whether they
+were identical, found at last that they were not the same, and concluded
+that Plato's doctrine of Ideas and Kant's "Critique of Reason" had nothing
+in common. But enough of this.(45)
+
+§ 32. It follows from our consideration of the subject, that, for us, Idea
+and thing-in-itself are not entirely one and the same, in spite of the
+inner agreement between Kant and Plato, and the identity of the aim they
+had before them, or the conception of the world which roused them and led
+them to philosophise. The Idea is for us rather the direct, and therefore
+adequate, objectivity of the thing-in-itself, which is, however, itself
+the _will_--the will as not yet objectified, not yet become idea. For the
+thing-in-itself must, even according to Kant, be free from all the forms
+connected with knowing as such; and it is merely an error on his part (as
+is shown in the Appendix) that he did not count among these forms, before
+all others, that of being object for a subject, for it is the first and
+most universal form of all phenomena, _i.e._, of all idea; he should
+therefore have distinctly denied objective existence to his
+thing-in-itself, which would have saved him from a great inconsistency
+that was soon discovered. The Platonic Idea, on the other hand, is
+necessarily object, something known, an idea, and in that respect is
+different from the thing-in-itself, but in that respect only. It has
+merely laid aside the subordinate forms of the phenomenon, all of which we
+include in the principle of sufficient reason, or rather it has not yet
+assumed them; but it has retained the first and most universal form, that
+of the idea in general, the form of being object for a subject. It is the
+forms which are subordinate to this (whose general expression is the
+principle of sufficient reason) that multiply the Idea in particular
+transitory individuals, whose number is a matter of complete indifference
+to the Idea. The principle of sufficient reason is thus again the form
+into which the Idea enters when it appears in the knowledge of the subject
+as individual. The particular thing that manifests itself in accordance
+with the principle of sufficient reason is thus only an indirect
+objectification of the thing-in-itself (which is the will), for between it
+and the thing-in-itself stands the Idea as the only direct objectivity of
+the will, because it has assumed none of the special forms of knowledge as
+such, except that of the idea in general, _i.e._, the form of being object
+for a subject. Therefore it alone is the most _adequate objectivity_ of
+the will or thing-in-itself which is possible; indeed it is the whole
+thing-in-itself, only under the form of the idea; and here lies the ground
+of the great agreement between Plato and Kant, although, in strict
+accuracy, that of which they speak is not the same. But the particular
+things are no really adequate objectivity of the will, for in them it is
+obscured by those forms whose general expression is the principle of
+sufficient reason, but which are conditions of the knowledge which belongs
+to the individual as such. If it is allowable to draw conclusions from an
+impossible presupposition, we would, in fact, no longer know particular
+things, nor events, nor change, nor multiplicity, but would comprehend
+only Ideas,--only the grades of the objectification of that one will, of
+the thing-in-itself, in pure unclouded knowledge. Consequently our world
+would be a _nunc stans_, if it were not that, as knowing subjects, we are
+also individuals, _i.e._, our perceptions come to us through the medium of
+a body, from the affections of which they proceed, and which is itself
+only concrete willing, objectivity of the will, and thus is an object
+among objects, and as such comes into the knowing consciousness in the
+only way in which an object can, through the forms of the principle of
+sufficient reason, and consequently already presupposes, and therefore
+brings in, time, and all other forms which that principle expresses. Time
+is only the broken and piecemeal view which the individual being has of
+the Ideas, which are outside time, and consequently _eternal_. Therefore
+Plato says time is the moving picture of eternity: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}.(46)
+
+§ 33. Since now, as individuals, we have no other knowledge than that
+which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and this form of
+knowledge excludes the Ideas, it is certain that if it is possible for us
+to raise ourselves from the knowledge of particular things to that of the
+Ideas, this can only happen by an alteration taking place in the subject
+which is analogous and corresponds to the great change of the whole nature
+of the object, and by virtue of which the subject, so far as it knows an
+Idea, is no more individual.
+
+It will be remembered from the preceding book that knowledge in general
+belongs to the objectification of will at its higher grades, and
+sensibility, nerves, and brain, just like the other parts of the organised
+being, are the expression of the will at this stage of its objectivity,
+and therefore the idea which appears through them is also in the same way
+bound to the service of will as a means ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}) for the attainment of its
+now complicated ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}) aims for sustaining a being of manifold
+requirements. Thus originally and according to its nature, knowledge is
+completely subject to the will, and, like the immediate object, which, by
+means of the application of the law of causality, is its starting-point,
+all knowledge which proceeds in accordance with the principle of
+sufficient reason remains in a closer or more distant relation to the
+will. For the individual finds his body as an object among objects, to all
+of which it is related and connected according to the principle of
+sufficient reason. Thus all investigations of these relations and
+connections lead back to his body, and consequently to his will. Since it
+is the principle of sufficient reason which places the objects in this
+relation to the body, and, through it, to the will, the one endeavour of
+the knowledge which is subject to this principle will be to find out the
+relations in which objects are placed to each other through this
+principle, and thus to trace their innumerable connections in space, time,
+and causality. For only through these is the object _interesting_ to the
+individual, _i.e._, related to the will. Therefore the knowledge which is
+subject to the will knows nothing further of objects than their relations,
+knows the objects only so far as they exist at this time, in this place,
+under these circumstances, from these causes, and with these effects--in a
+word, as particular things; and if all these relations were to be taken
+away, the objects would also have disappeared for it, because it knew
+nothing more about them. We must not disguise the fact that what the
+sciences consider in things is also in reality nothing more than this;
+their relations, the connections of time and space, the causes of natural
+changes, the resemblance of forms, the motives of actions,--thus merely
+relations. What distinguishes science from ordinary knowledge is merely
+its systematic form, the facilitating of knowledge by the comprehension of
+all particulars in the universal, by means of the subordination of
+concepts, and the completeness of knowledge which is thereby attained. All
+relation has itself only a relative existence; for example, all being in
+time is also non-being; for time is only that by means of which opposite
+determinations can belong to the same thing; therefore every phenomenon
+which is in time again is not, for what separates its beginning from its
+end is only time, which is essentially a fleeting, inconstant, and
+relative thing, here called duration. But time is the most universal form
+of all objects of the knowledge which is subject to the will, and the
+prototype of its other forms.
+
+Knowledge now, as a rule, remains always subordinate to the service of the
+will, as indeed it originated for this service, and grew, so to speak, to
+the will, as the head to the body. In the case of the brutes this
+subjection of knowledge to the will can never be abolished. In the case of
+men it can be abolished only in exceptional cases, which we shall
+presently consider more closely. This distinction between man and brute is
+outwardly expressed by the difference of the relation of the head to the
+body. In the case of the lower brutes both are deformed: in all brutes the
+head is directed towards the earth, where the objects of its will lie;
+even in the higher species the head and the body are still far more one
+than in the case of man, whose head seems freely set upon his body, as if
+only carried by and not serving it. This human excellence is exhibited in
+the highest degree by the Apollo of Belvedere; the head of the god of the
+Muses, with eyes fixed on the far distance, stands so freely on his
+shoulders that it seems wholly delivered from the body, and no more
+subject to its cares.
+
+§ 34. The transition which we have referred to as possible, but yet to be
+regarded as only exceptional, from the common knowledge of particular
+things to the knowledge of the Idea, takes place suddenly; for knowledge
+breaks free from the service of the will, by the subject ceasing to be
+merely individual, and thus becoming the pure will-less subject of
+knowledge, which no longer traces relations in accordance with the
+principle of sufficient reason, but rests in fixed contemplation of the
+object presented to it, out of its connection with all others, and rises
+into it.
+
+A full explanation is necessary to make this clear, and the reader must
+suspend his surprise for a while, till he has grasped the whole thought
+expressed in this work, and then it will vanish of itself.
+
+If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the common way of
+looking at things, gives up tracing, under the guidance of the forms of
+the principle of sufficient reason, their relations to each other, the
+final goal of which is always a relation to his own will; if he thus
+ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of
+things, and looks simply and solely at the _what_; if, further, he does
+not allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession
+of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of
+his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his whole
+consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object
+actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or
+whatever it may be; inasmuch as he _loses_ himself in this object (to use
+a pregnant German idiom), _i.e._, forgets even his individuality, his
+will, and only continues to exist as the pure subject, the clear mirror of
+the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there, without any
+one to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the
+perception, but both have become one, because the whole consciousness is
+filled and occupied with one single sensuous picture; if thus the object
+has to such an extent passed out of all relation to something outside it,
+and the subject out of all relation to the will, then that which is so
+known is no longer the particular thing as such; but it is the _Idea_, the
+eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade; and,
+therefore, he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, for
+in such perception the individual has lost himself; but he is _pure_,
+will-less, painless, timeless _subject of knowledge_. This, which in
+itself is so remarkable (which I well know confirms the saying that
+originated with Thomas Paine, _Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un
+pas_), will by degrees become clearer and less surprising from what
+follows. It was this that was running in Spinoza's mind when he wrote:
+_Meus æterna est, quatenus res sub æternitatis specie __ concipit_ (Eth.
+V. pr. 31, Schol.)(47) In such contemplation the particular thing becomes
+at once the _Idea_ of its species, and the perceiving individual becomes
+_pure subject of knowledge_. The individual, as such, knows only
+particular things; the pure subject of knowledge knows only Ideas. For the
+individual is the subject of knowledge in its relation to a definite
+particular manifestation of will, and in subjection to this. This
+particular manifestation of will is, as such, subordinated to the
+principle of sufficient reason in all its forms; therefore, all knowledge
+which relates itself to it also follows the principle of sufficient
+reason, and no other kind of knowledge is fitted to be of use to the will
+but this, which always consists merely of relations to the object. The
+knowing individual as such, and the particular things known by him, are
+always in some place, at some time, and are links in the chain of causes
+and effects. The pure subject of knowledge and his correlative, the Idea,
+have passed out of all these forms of the principle of sufficient reason:
+time, place, the individual that knows, and the individual that is known,
+have for them no meaning. When an individual knower has raised himself in
+the manner described to be pure subject of knowledge, and at the same time
+has raised the observed object to the Platonic Idea, the _world as idea_
+appears complete and pure, and the full objectification of the will takes
+place, for the Platonic Idea alone is its _adequate objectivity_. The Idea
+includes object and subject in like manner in itself, for they are its one
+form; but in it they are absolutely of equal importance; for as the object
+is here, as elsewhere, simply the idea of the subject, the subject, which
+passes entirely into the perceived object has thus become this object
+itself, for the whole consciousness is nothing but its perfectly distinct
+picture. Now this consciousness constitutes the whole _world as idea_, for
+one imagines the whole of the Platonic Ideas, or grades of the objectivity
+of will, in their series passing through it. The particular things of all
+time and space are nothing but Ideas multiplied through the principle of
+sufficient reason (the form of the knowledge of the individual as such),
+and thus obscured as regards their pure objectivity. When the Platonic
+Idea appears, in it subject and object are no longer to be distinguished,
+for the Platonic Idea, the adequate objectivity of will, the true world as
+idea, arises only when the subject and object reciprocally fill and
+penetrate each other completely; and in the same way the knowing and the
+known individuals, as things in themselves, are not to be distinguished.
+For if we look entirely away from the true _world as idea_, there remains
+nothing but the _world as will_. The will is the "in-itself" of the
+Platonic Idea, which fully objectifies it; it is also the "in-itself" of
+the particular thing and of the individual that knows it, which objectify
+it incompletely. As will, outside the idea and all its forms, it is one
+and the same in the object contemplated and in the individual, who soars
+aloft in this contemplation, and becomes conscious of himself as pure
+subject. These two are, therefore, in themselves not different, for in
+themselves they are will, which here knows itself; and multiplicity and
+difference exist only as the way in which this knowledge comes to the
+will, _i.e._, only in the phenomenon, on account of its form, the
+principle of sufficient reason.
+
+Now the known thing, without me as the subject of knowledge, is just as
+little an object, and not mere will, blind effort, as without the object,
+without the idea, I am a knowing subject and not mere blind will. This
+will is in itself, _i.e._, outside the idea, one and the same with mine:
+only in the world as idea, whose form is always at least that of subject
+and object, we are separated as the known and the knowing individual. As
+soon as knowledge, the world as idea, is abolished, there remains nothing
+but mere will, blind effort. That it should receive objectivity, become
+idea, supposes at once both subject and object; but that this should be
+pure, complete, and adequate objectivity of the will, supposes the object
+as Platonic Idea, free from the forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason, and the subject as the pure subject of knowledge, free from
+individuality and subjection to the will.
+
+Whoever now, has, after the manner referred to, become so absorbed and
+lost in the perception of nature that he only continues to exist as the
+pure knowing subject, becomes in this way directly conscious that, as
+such, he is the condition, that is, the supporter, of the world and all
+objective existence; for this now shows itself as dependent upon his
+existence. Thus he draws nature into himself, so that he sees it to be
+merely an accident of his own being. In this sense Byron says--
+
+
+    "Are not the mountains, waves, and skies, a part
+      Of me and of my soul, as I of them?"
+
+
+But how shall he who feels this, regard himself as absolutely transitory,
+in contrast to imperishable nature? Such a man will rather be filled with
+the consciousness, which the Upanishad of the Veda expresses: _Hæ omnes
+creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter me aliud ens non est_ (Oupnek'hat, i.
+122).(48)
+
+§ 35. In order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of the world, it
+is absolutely necessary that we should learn to distinguish the will as
+thing-in-itself from its adequate objectivity, and also the different
+grades in which this appears more and more distinctly and fully, _i.e._,
+the Ideas themselves, from the merely phenomenal existence of these Ideas
+in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, the restricted method
+of knowledge of the individual. We shall then agree with Plato when he
+attributes actual being only to the Ideas, and allows only an illusive,
+dream-like existence to things in space and time, the real world for the
+individual. Then we shall understand how one and the same Idea reveals
+itself in so many phenomena, and presents its nature only bit by bit to
+the individual, one side after another. Then we shall also distinguish the
+Idea itself from the way in which its manifestation appears in the
+observation of the individual, and recognise the former as essential and
+the latter as unessential. Let us consider this with the help of examples
+taken from the most insignificant things, and also from the greatest. When
+the clouds move, the figures which they form are not essential, but
+indifferent to them; but that as elastic vapour they are pressed together,
+drifted along, spread out, or torn asunder by the force of the wind: this
+is their nature, the essence of the forces which objectify themselves in
+them, the Idea; their actual forms are only for the individual observer.
+To the brook that flows over stones, the eddies, the waves, the
+foam-flakes which it forms are indifferent and unessential; but that it
+follows the attraction of gravity, and behaves as inelastic, perfectly
+mobile, formless, transparent fluid: this is its nature; this, _if known
+through perception_, is its Idea; these accidental forms are only for us
+so long as we know as individuals. The ice on the window-pane forms itself
+into crystals according to the laws of crystallisation, which reveal the
+essence of the force of nature that appears here, exhibit the Idea; but
+the trees and flowers which it traces on the pane are unessential, and are
+only there for us. What appears in the clouds, the brook, and the crystal
+is the weakest echo of that will which appears more fully in the plant,
+more fully still in the beast, and most fully in man. But only the
+essential in all these grades of its objectification constitutes the Idea;
+on the other hand, its unfolding or development, because broken up in the
+forms of the principle of sufficient reason into a multiplicity of
+many-sided phenomena, is unessential to the Idea, lies merely in the kind
+of knowledge that belongs to the individual and has reality only for this.
+The same thing necessarily holds good of the unfolding of that Idea which
+is the completest objectivity of will. Therefore, the history of the human
+race, the throng of events, the change of times, the multifarious forms of
+human life in different lands and countries, all this is only the
+accidental form of the manifestation of the Idea, does not belong to the
+Idea itself, in which alone lies the adequate objectivity of the will, but
+only to the phenomenon which appears in the knowledge of the individual,
+and is just as foreign, unessential, and indifferent to the Idea itself as
+the figures which they assume are to the clouds, the form of its eddies
+and foam-flakes to the brook, or its trees and flowers to the ice.
+
+To him who has thoroughly grasped this, and can distinguish between the
+will and the Idea, and between the Idea and its manifestation, the events
+of the world will have significance only so far as they are the letters
+out of which we may read the Idea of man, but not in and for themselves.
+He will not believe with the vulgar that time may produce something
+actually new and significant; that through it, or in it, something
+absolutely real may attain to existence, or indeed that it itself as a
+whole has beginning and end, plan and development, and in some way has for
+its final aim the highest perfection (according to their conception) of
+the last generation of man, whose life is a brief thirty years. Therefore
+he will just as little, with Homer, people a whole Olympus with gods to
+guide the events of time, as, with Ossian, he will take the forms of the
+clouds for individual beings; for, as we have said, both have just as much
+meaning as regards the Idea which appears in them. In the manifold forms
+of human life and in the unceasing change of events, he will regard the
+Idea only as the abiding and essential, in which the will to live has its
+fullest objectivity, and which shows its different sides in the
+capacities, the passions, the errors and the excellences of the human
+race; in self-interest, hatred, love, fear, boldness, frivolity,
+stupidity, slyness, wit, genius, and so forth, all of which crowding
+together and combining in thousands of forms (individuals), continually
+create the history of the great and the little world, in which it is all
+the same whether they are set in motion by nuts or by crowns. Finally, he
+will find that in the world it is the same as in the dramas of Gozzi, in
+all of which the same persons appear, with like intention, and with a like
+fate; the motives and incidents are certainly different in each piece, but
+the spirit of the incidents is the same; the actors in one piece know
+nothing of the incidents of another, although they performed in it
+themselves; therefore, after all experience of former pieces, Pantaloon
+has become no more agile or generous, Tartaglia no more conscientious,
+Brighella no more courageous, and Columbine no more modest.
+
+Suppose we were allowed for once a clearer glance into the kingdom of the
+possible, and over the whole chain of causes and effects; if the
+earth-spirit appeared and showed us in a picture all the greatest men,
+enlighteners of the world, and heroes, that chance destroyed before they
+were ripe for their work; then the great events that would have changed
+the history of the world and brought in periods of the highest culture and
+enlightenment, but which the blindest chance, the most insignificant
+accident, hindered at the outset; lastly, the splendid powers of great
+men, that would have enriched whole ages of the world, but which, either
+misled by error or passion, or compelled by necessity, they squandered
+uselessly on unworthy or unfruitful objects, or even wasted in play. If we
+saw all this, we would shudder and lament at the thought of the lost
+treasures of whole periods of the world. But the earth-spirit would smile
+and say, "The source from which the individuals and their powers proceed
+is inexhaustible and unending as time and space; for, like these forms of
+all phenomena, they also are only phenomena, visibility of the will. No
+finite measure can exhaust that infinite source; therefore an undiminished
+eternity is always open for the return of any event or work that was
+nipped in the bud. In this world of phenomena true loss is just as little
+possible as true gain. The will alone is; it is the thing in-itself, and
+the source of all these phenomena. Its self-knowledge and its assertion or
+denial, which is then decided upon, is the only event in-itself."(49)
+
+§ 36. History follows the thread of events; it is pragmatic so far as it
+deduces them in accordance with the law of motivation, a law that
+determines the self-manifesting will wherever it is enlightened by
+knowledge. At the lowest grades of its objectivity, where it still acts
+without knowledge, natural science, in the form of etiology, treats of the
+laws of the changes of its phenomena, and, in the form of morphology, of
+what is permanent in them. This almost endless task is lightened by the
+aid of concepts, which comprehend what is general in order that we may
+deduce what is particular from it. Lastly, mathematics treats of the mere
+forms, time and space, in which the Ideas, broken up into multiplicity,
+appear for the knowledge of the subject as individual. All these, of which
+the common name is science, proceed according to the principle of
+sufficient reason in its different forms, and their theme is always the
+phenomenon, its laws, connections, and the relations which result from
+them. But what kind of knowledge is concerned with that which is outside
+and independent of all relations, that which alone is really essential to
+the world, the true content of its phenomena, that which is subject to no
+change, and therefore is known with equal truth for all time, in a word,
+the _Ideas_, which are the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing
+in-itself, the will? We answer, _Art_, the work of genius. It repeats or
+reproduces the eternal Ideas grasped through pure contemplation, the
+essential and abiding in all the phenomena of the world; and according to
+what the material is in which it reproduces, it is sculpture or painting,
+poetry or music. Its one source is the knowledge of Ideas; its one aim the
+communication of this knowledge. While science, following the unresting
+and inconstant stream of the fourfold forms of reason and consequent, with
+each end attained sees further, and can never reach a final goal nor
+attain full satisfaction, any more than by running we can reach the place
+where the clouds touch the horizon; art, on the contrary, is everywhere at
+its goal. For it plucks the object of its contemplation out of the stream
+of the world's course, and has it isolated before it. And this particular
+thing, which in that stream was a small perishing part, becomes to art the
+representative of the whole, an equivalent of the endless multitude in
+space and time. It therefore pauses at this particular thing; the course
+of time stops; the relations vanish for it; only the essential, the Idea,
+is its object. We may, therefore, accurately define it as the _way of
+viewing things independent of the principle of sufficient reason_, in
+opposition to the way of viewing them which proceeds in accordance with
+that principle, and which is the method of experience and of science. This
+last method of considering things may be compared to a line infinitely
+extended in a horizontal direction, and the former to a vertical line
+which cuts it at any point. The method of viewing things which proceeds in
+accordance with the principle of sufficient reason is the rational method,
+and it alone is valid and of use in practical life and in science. The
+method which looks away from the content of this principle is the method
+of genius, which is only valid and of use in art. The first is the method
+of Aristotle; the second is, on the whole, that of Plato. The first is
+like the mighty storm, that rushes along without beginning and without
+aim, bending, agitating, and carrying away everything before it; the
+second is like the silent sunbeam, that pierces through the storm quite
+unaffected by it. The first is like the innumerable showering drops of the
+waterfall, which, constantly changing, never rest for an instant; the
+second is like the rainbow, quietly resting on this raging torrent. Only
+through the pure contemplation described above, which ends entirely in the
+object, can Ideas be comprehended; and the nature of _genius_ consists in
+pre-eminent capacity for such contemplation. Now, as this requires that a
+man should entirely forget himself and the relations in which he stands,
+_genius_ is simply the completest _objectivity_, _i.e._, the objective
+tendency of the mind, as opposed to the subjective, which is directed to
+one's own self--in other words, to the will. Thus genius is the faculty of
+continuing in the state of pure perception, of losing oneself in
+perception, and of enlisting in this service the knowledge which
+originally existed only for the service of the will; that is to say,
+genius is the power of leaving one's own interests, wishes, and aims
+entirely out of sight, thus of entirely renouncing one's own personality
+for a time, so as to remain _pure knowing subject_, clear vision of the
+world; and this not merely at moments, but for a sufficient length of
+time, and with sufficient consciousness, to enable one to reproduce by
+deliberate art what has thus been apprehended, and "to fix in lasting
+thoughts the wavering images that float before the mind." It is as if,
+when genius appears in an individual, a far larger measure of the power of
+knowledge falls to his lot than is necessary for the service of an
+individual will; and this superfluity of knowledge, being free, now
+becomes subject purified from will, a clear mirror of the inner nature of
+the world. This explains the activity, amounting even to disquietude, of
+men of genius, for the present can seldom satisfy them, because it does
+not fill their consciousness. This gives them that restless aspiration,
+that unceasing desire for new things, and for the contemplation of lofty
+things, and also that longing that is hardly ever satisfied, for men of
+similar nature and of like stature, to whom they might communicate
+themselves; whilst the common mortal, entirely filled and satisfied by the
+common present, ends in it, and finding everywhere his like, enjoys that
+peculiar satisfaction in daily life that is denied to genius.
+
+Imagination has rightly been recognised as an essential element of genius;
+it has sometimes even been regarded as identical with it; but this is a
+mistake. As the objects of genius are the eternal Ideas, the permanent,
+essential forms of the world and all its phenomena, and as the knowledge
+of the Idea is necessarily knowledge through perception, is not abstract,
+the knowledge of the genius would be limited to the Ideas of the objects
+actually present to his person, and dependent upon the chain of
+circumstances that brought these objects to him, if his imagination did
+not extend his horizon far beyond the limits of his actual personal
+existence, and thus enable him to construct the whole out of the little
+that comes into his own actual apperception, and so to let almost all
+possible scenes of life pass before him in his own consciousness. Further,
+the actual objects are almost always very imperfect copies of the Ideas
+expressed in them; therefore the man of genius requires imagination in
+order to see in things, not that which Nature has actually made, but that
+which she endeavoured to make, yet could not because of that conflict of
+her forms among themselves which we referred to in the last book. We shall
+return to this farther on in treating of sculpture. The imagination then
+extends the intellectual horizon of the man of genius beyond the objects
+which actually present themselves to him, both as regards quality and
+quantity. Therefore extraordinary strength of imagination accompanies, and
+is indeed a necessary condition of genius. But the converse does not hold,
+for strength of imagination does not indicate genius; on the contrary, men
+who have no touch of genius may have much imagination. For as it is
+possible to consider a real object in two opposite ways, purely
+objectively, the way of genius grasping its Idea, or in the common way,
+merely in the relations in which it stands to other objects and to one's
+own will, in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, it is
+also possible to perceive an imaginary object in both of these ways.
+Regarded in the first way, it is a means to the knowledge of the Idea, the
+communication of which is the work of art; in the second case, the
+imaginary object is used to build castles in the air congenial to egotism
+and the individual humour, and which for the moment delude and gratify;
+thus only the relations of the phantasies so linked together are known.
+The man who indulges in such an amusement is a dreamer; he will easily
+mingle those fancies that delight his solitude with reality, and so unfit
+himself for real life: perhaps he will write them down, and then we shall
+have the ordinary novel of every description, which entertains those who
+are like him and the public at large, for the readers imagine themselves
+in the place of the hero, and then find the story very agreeable.
+
+The common mortal, that manufacture of Nature which she produces by the
+thousand every day, is, as we have said, not capable, at least not
+continuously so, of observation that in every sense is wholly
+disinterested, as sensuous contemplation, strictly so called, is. He can
+turn his attention to things only so far as they have some relation to his
+will, however indirect it may be. Since in this respect, which never
+demands anything but the knowledge of relations, the abstract conception
+of the thing is sufficient, and for the most part even better adapted for
+use; the ordinary man does not linger long over the mere perception, does
+not fix his attention long on one object, but in all that is presented to
+him hastily seeks merely the concept under which it is to be brought, as
+the lazy man seeks a chair, and then it interests him no further. This is
+why he is so soon done with everything, with works of art, objects of
+natural beauty, and indeed everywhere with the truly significant
+contemplation of all the scenes of life. He does not linger; only seeks to
+know his own way in life, together with all that might at any time become
+his way. Thus he makes topographical notes in the widest sense; over the
+consideration of life itself as such he wastes no time. The man of genius,
+on the other hand, whose excessive power of knowledge frees it at times
+from the service of will, dwells on the consideration of life itself,
+strives to comprehend the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other
+things; and in doing this he often forgets to consider his own path in
+life, and therefore for the most part pursues it awkwardly enough. While
+to the ordinary man his faculty of knowledge is a lamp to lighten his
+path, to the man of genius it is the sun which reveals the world. This
+great diversity in their way of looking at life soon becomes visible in
+the outward appearance both of the man of genius and of the ordinary
+mortal. The man in whom genius lives and works is easily distinguished by
+his glance, which is both keen and steady, and bears the stamp of
+perception, of contemplation. This is easily seen from the likenesses of
+the few men of genius whom Nature has produced here and there among
+countless millions. On the other hand, in the case of an ordinary man, the
+true object of his contemplation, what he is prying into, can be easily
+seen from his glance, if indeed it is not quite stupid and vacant, as is
+generally the case. Therefore the expression of genius in a face consists
+in this, that in it a decided predominance of knowledge over will is
+visible, and consequently there also shows itself in it a knowledge that
+is entirely devoid of relation to will, _i.e._, _pure knowing_. On the
+contrary, in ordinary countenances there is a predominant expression of
+will; and we see that knowledge only comes into activity under the impulse
+of will, and thus is directed merely by motives.
+
+Since the knowledge that pertains to genius, or the knowledge of Ideas, is
+that knowledge which does not follow the principle of sufficient reason,
+so, on the other hand, the knowledge which does follow that principle is
+that which gives us prudence and rationality in life, and which creates
+the sciences. Thus men of genius are affected with the deficiencies
+entailed in the neglect of this latter kind of knowledge. Yet what I say
+in this regard is subject to the limitation that it only concerns them in
+so far as and while they are actually engaged in that kind of knowledge
+which is peculiar to genius; and this is by no means at every moment of
+their lives, for the great though spontaneous exertion which is demanded
+for the comprehension of Ideas free from will must necessarily relax, and
+there are long intervals during which men of genius are placed in very
+much the same position as ordinary mortals, both as regards advantages and
+deficiencies. On this account the action of genius has always been
+regarded as an inspiration, as indeed the name indicates, as the action of
+a superhuman being distinct from the individual himself, and which takes
+possession of him only periodically. The disinclination of men of genius
+to direct their attention to the content of the principle of sufficient
+reason will first show itself, with regard to the ground of being, as
+dislike of mathematics; for its procedure is based upon the most universal
+forms of the phenomenon space and time, which are themselves merely modes
+of the principle of sufficient reason, and is consequently precisely the
+opposite of that method of thought which seeks merely the content of the
+phenomenon, the Idea which expresses itself in it apart from all
+relations. The logical method of mathematics is also antagonistic to
+genius, for it does not satisfy but obstructs true insight, and presents
+merely a chain of conclusions in accordance with the principle of the
+ground of knowing. The mental faculty upon which it makes the greatest
+claim is memory, for it is necessary to recollect all the earlier
+propositions which are referred to. Experience has also proved that men of
+great artistic genius have no faculty for mathematics; no man was ever
+very distinguished for both. Alfieri relates that he was never able to
+understand the fourth proposition of Euclid. Goethe was constantly
+reproached with his want of mathematical knowledge by the ignorant
+opponents of his theory of colours. Here certainly, where it was not a
+question of calculation and measurement upon hypothetical data, but of
+direct knowledge by the understanding of causes and effects, this reproach
+was so utterly absurd and inappropriate, that by making it they have
+exposed their entire want of judgment, just as much as by the rest of
+their ridiculous arguments. The fact that up to the present day, nearly
+half a century after the appearance of Goethe's theory of colours, even in
+Germany the Newtonian fallacies still have undisturbed possession of the
+professorial chair, and men continue to speak quite seriously of the seven
+homogeneous rays of light and their different refrangibility, will some
+day be numbered among the great intellectual peculiarities of men
+generally, and especially of Germans. From the same cause as we have
+referred to above, may be explained the equally well-known fact that,
+conversely, admirable mathematicians have very little susceptibility for
+works of fine art. This is very naïvely expressed in the well-known
+anecdote of the French mathematician, who, after having read Racine's
+"Iphigenia," shrugged his shoulders and asked, "_Qu'est ce que cela
+prouve?_" Further, as quick comprehension of relations in accordance with
+the laws of causality and motivation is what specially constitutes
+prudence or sagacity, a prudent man, so far as and while he is so, will
+not be a genius, and a man of genius, so far as and while he is so, will
+not be a prudent man. Lastly, perceptive knowledge generally, in the
+province of which the Idea always lies, is directly opposed to rational or
+abstract knowledge, which is guided by the principle of the ground of
+knowing. It is also well known that we seldom find great genius united
+with pre-eminent reasonableness; on the contrary, persons of genius are
+often subject to violent emotions and irrational passions. But the ground
+of this is not weakness of reason, but partly unwonted energy of that
+whole phenomenon of will--the man of genius--which expresses itself through
+the violence of all his acts of will, and partly preponderance of the
+knowledge of perception through the senses and understanding over abstract
+knowledge, producing a decided tendency to the perceptible, the
+exceedingly lively impressions of which so far outshine colourless
+concepts, that they take their place in the guidance of action, which
+consequently becomes irrational. Accordingly the impression of the present
+moment is very strong with such persons, and carries them away into
+unconsidered action, violent emotions and passions. Moreover, since, in
+general, the knowledge of persons of genius has to some extent freed
+itself from the service of will, they will not in conversation think so
+much of the person they are addressing as of the thing they are speaking
+about, which is vividly present to them; and therefore they are likely to
+judge or narrate things too objectively for their own interests; they will
+not pass over in silence what would more prudently be concealed, and so
+forth. Finally, they are given to soliloquising, and in general may
+exhibit certain weaknesses which are actually akin to madness. It has
+often been remarked that there is a side at which genius and madness
+touch, and even pass over into each other, and indeed poetical inspiration
+has been called a kind of madness: _amabilis insania_, Horace calls it
+(Od. iii. 4), and Wieland in the introduction to "Oberon" speaks of it as
+"amiable madness." Even Aristotle, as quoted by Seneca (De Tranq. Animi,
+15, 16), is reported to have said: _Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura
+dementiæ fuit_. Plato expresses it in the figure of the dark cave,
+referred to above (De Rep. 7), when he says: "Those who, outside the cave,
+have seen the true sunlight and the things that have true being (Ideas),
+cannot afterwards see properly down in the cave, because their eyes are
+not accustomed to the darkness; they cannot distinguish the shadows, and
+are jeered at for their mistakes by those who have never left the cave and
+its shadows." In the "Phædrus" also (p. 317), he distinctly says that
+there can be no true poet without a certain madness; in fact, (p. 327),
+that every one appears mad who recognises the eternal Ideas in fleeting
+things. Cicero also quotes: _Negat enim sine furore, Democritus, quemquam
+poetam magnum esse posse; quod idem dicit Plato_ (De Divin., i. 37). And,
+lastly, Pope says--
+
+
+    "Great wits to madness sure are near allied,
+    And thin partitions do their bounds divide."
+
+
+Especially instructive in this respect is Goethe's "Torquato Tasso," in
+which he shows us not only the suffering, the martyrdom of genius as such,
+but also how it constantly passes into madness. Finally, the fact of the
+direct connection of genius and madness is established by the biographies
+of great men of genius, such as Rousseau, Byron, and Alfieri, and by
+anecdotes from the lives of others. On the other hand, I must mention
+that, by a diligent search in lunatic asylums, I have found individual
+cases of patients who were unquestionably endowed with great talents, and
+whose genius distinctly appeared through their madness, which, however,
+had completely gained the upper hand. Now this cannot be ascribed to
+chance, for on the one hand the number of mad persons is relatively very
+small, and on the other hand a person of genius is a phenomenon which is
+rare beyond all ordinary estimation, and only appears in nature as the
+greatest exception. It will be sufficient to convince us of this if we
+compare the number of really great men of genius that the whole of
+civilised Europe has produced, both in ancient and modern times, with the
+two hundred and fifty millions who are always living in Europe, and who
+change entirely every thirty years. In estimating the number of men of
+outstanding genius, we must of course only count those who have produced
+works which have retained through all time an enduring value for mankind.
+I shall not refrain from mentioning, that I have known some persons of
+decided, though not remarkable, mental superiority, who also showed a
+slight trace of insanity. It might seem from this that every advance of
+intellect beyond the ordinary measure, as an abnormal development,
+disposes to madness. In the meantime, however, I will explain as briefly
+as possible my view of the purely intellectual ground of the relation
+between genius and madness, for this will certainly assist the explanation
+of the real nature of genius, that is to say, of that mental endowment
+which alone can produce genuine works of art. But this necessitates a
+brief explanation of madness itself.(50)
+
+A clear and complete insight into the nature of madness, a correct and
+distinct conception of what constitutes the difference between the sane
+and the insane, has, as far as I know, not as yet been found. Neither
+reason nor understanding can be denied to madmen, for they talk and
+understand, and often draw very accurate conclusions; they also, as a
+rule, perceive what is present quite correctly, and apprehend the
+connection between cause and effect. Visions, like the phantasies of
+delirium, are no ordinary symptom of madness: delirium falsifies
+perception, madness the thoughts. For the most part, madmen do not err in
+the knowledge of what is immediately _present_; their raving always
+relates to what is _absent_ and _past_, and only through these to their
+connection with what is present. Therefore it seems to me that their
+malady specially concerns the memory; not indeed that memory fails them
+entirely, for many of them know a great deal by heart, and sometimes
+recognise persons whom they have not seen for a long time; but rather that
+the thread of memory is broken, the continuity of its connection
+destroyed, and no uniformly connected recollection of the past is
+possible. Particular scenes of the past are known correctly, just like the
+particular present; but there are gaps in their recollection which they
+fill up with fictions, and these are either always the same, in which case
+they become fixed ideas, and the madness that results is called monomania
+or melancholy; or they are always different, momentary fancies, and then
+it is called folly, _fatuitas_. This is why it is so difficult to find out
+their former life from lunatics when they enter an asylum. The true and
+the false are always mixed up in their memory. Although the immediate
+present is correctly known, it becomes falsified through its fictitious
+connection with an imaginary past; they therefore regard themselves and
+others as identical with persons who exist only in their imaginary past;
+they do not recognise some of their acquaintances at all, and thus while
+they perceive correctly what is actually present, they have only false
+conceptions of its relations to what is absent. If the madness reaches a
+high degree, there is complete absence of memory, so that the madman is
+quite incapable of any reference to what is absent or past, and is only
+determined by the caprice of the moment in connection with the fictions
+which, in his mind, fill the past. In such a case, we are never for a
+moment safe from violence or murder, unless we constantly make the madman
+aware of the presence of superior force. The knowledge of the madman has
+this in common with that of the brute, both are confined to the present.
+What distinguishes them is that the brute has really no idea of the past
+as such, though the past acts upon it through the medium of custom, so
+that, for example, the dog recognises its former master even after years,
+that is to say, it receives the wonted impression at the sight of him; but
+of the time that has passed since it saw him it has no recollection. The
+madman, on the other hand, always carries about in his reason an abstract
+past, but it is a false past, which exists only for him, and that either
+constantly, or only for the moment. The influence of this false past
+prevents the use of the true knowledge of the present which the brute is
+able to make. The fact that violent mental suffering or unexpected and
+terrible calamities should often produce madness, I explain in the
+following manner. All such suffering is as an actual event confined to the
+present. It is thus merely transitory, and is consequently never
+excessively heavy; it only becomes unendurably great when it is lasting
+pain; but as such it exists only in thought, and therefore lies in the
+_memory_. If now such a sorrow, such painful knowledge or reflection, is
+so bitter that it becomes altogether unbearable, and the individual is
+prostrated under it, then, terrified Nature seizes upon _madness_ as the
+last resource of life; the mind so fearfully tortured at once destroys the
+thread of its memory, fills up the gaps with fictions, and thus seeks
+refuge in madness from the mental suffering that exceeds its strength,
+just as we cut off a mortified limb and replace it with a wooden one. The
+distracted Ajax, King Lear, and Ophelia may be taken as examples; for the
+creations of true genius, to which alone we can refer here, as universally
+known, are equal in truth to real persons; besides, in this case, frequent
+actual experience shows the same thing. A faint analogy of this kind of
+transition from pain to madness is to be found in the way in which all of
+us often seek, as it were mechanically, to drive away a painful thought
+that suddenly occurs to us by some loud exclamation or quick movement--to
+turn ourselves from it, to distract our minds by force.
+
+We see, from what has been said, that the madman has a true knowledge of
+what is actually present, and also of certain particulars of the past, but
+that he mistakes the connection, the relations, and therefore falls into
+error and talks nonsense. Now this is exactly the point at which he comes
+into contact with the man of genius; for he also leaves out of sight the
+knowledge of the connection of things, since he neglects that knowledge of
+relations which conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, in order
+to see in things only their Ideas, and to seek to comprehend their true
+nature, which manifests itself to perception, and in regard to which _one
+thing_ represents its whole species, in which way, as Goethe says, one
+case is valid for a thousand. The particular object of his contemplation,
+or the present which is perceived by him with extraordinary vividness,
+appear in so strong a light that the other links of the chain to which
+they belong are at once thrown into the shade, and this gives rise to
+phenomena which have long been recognised as resembling those of madness.
+That which in particular given things exists only incompletely and
+weakened by modifications, is raised by the man of genius, through his way
+of contemplating it, to the Idea of the thing, to completeness: he
+therefore sees everywhere extremes, and therefore his own action tends to
+extremes; he cannot hit the mean, he lacks soberness, and the result is
+what we have said. He knows the Ideas completely but not the individuals.
+Therefore it has been said that a poet may know mankind deeply and
+thoroughly, and may yet have a very imperfect knowledge of men. He is
+easily deceived, and is a tool in the hands of the crafty.
+
+§ 37. Genius, then, consists, according to our explanation, in the
+capacity for knowing, independently of the principle of sufficient reason,
+not individual things, which have their existence only in their relations,
+but the Ideas of such things, and of being oneself the correlative of the
+Idea, and thus no longer an individual, but the pure subject of knowledge.
+Yet this faculty must exist in all men in a smaller and different degree;
+for if not, they would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art as of
+producing them; they would have no susceptibility for the beautiful or the
+sublime; indeed, these words could have no meaning for them. We must
+therefore assume that there exists in all men this power of knowing the
+Ideas in things, and consequently of transcending their personality for
+the moment, unless indeed there are some men who are capable of no
+æsthetic pleasure at all. The man of genius excels ordinary men only by
+possessing this kind of knowledge in a far higher degree and more
+continuously. Thus, while under its influence he retains the presence of
+mind which is necessary to enable him to repeat in a voluntary and
+intentional work what he has learned in this manner; and this repetition
+is the work of art. Through this he communicates to others the Idea he has
+grasped. This Idea remains unchanged and the same, so that æsthetic
+pleasure is one and the same whether it is called forth by a work of art
+or directly by the contemplation of nature and life. The work of art is
+only a means of facilitating the knowledge in which this pleasure
+consists. That the Idea comes to us more easily from the work of art than
+directly from nature and the real world, arises from the fact that the
+artist, who knew only the Idea, no longer the actual, has reproduced in
+his work the pure Idea, has abstracted it from the actual, omitting all
+disturbing accidents. The artist lets us see the world through his eyes.
+That he has these eyes, that he knows the inner nature of things apart
+from all their relations, is the gift of genius, is inborn; but that he is
+able to lend us this gift, to let us see with his eyes, is acquired, and
+is the technical side of art. Therefore, after the account which I have
+given in the preceding pages of the inner nature of æsthetical knowledge
+in its most general outlines, the following more exact philosophical
+treatment of the beautiful and the sublime will explain them both, in
+nature and in art, without separating them further. First of all we shall
+consider what takes place in a man when he is affected by the beautiful
+and the sublime; whether he derives this emotion directly from nature,
+from life, or partakes of it only through the medium of art, does not make
+any essential, but merely an external, difference.
+
+§ 38. In the æsthetical mode of contemplation we have found _two
+inseparable constituent parts_--the knowledge of the object, not as
+individual thing but as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of
+this whole species of things; and the self-consciousness of the knowing
+person, not as individual, but as _pure will-less subject of knowledge_.
+The condition under which both these constituent parts appear always
+united was found to be the abandonment of the method of knowing which is
+bound to the principle of sufficient reason, and which, on the other hand,
+is the only kind of knowledge that is of value for the service of the will
+and also for science. Moreover, we shall see that the pleasure which is
+produced by the contemplation of the beautiful arises from these two
+constituent parts, sometimes more from the one, sometimes more from the
+other, according to what the object of the æsthetical contemplation may
+be.
+
+All _willing_ arises from want, therefore from deficiency, and therefore
+from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends it; yet for one wish that
+is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied. Further, the
+desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and
+scantily measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only
+apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new one; both are
+illusions; the one is known to be so, the other not yet. No attained
+object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but merely a fleeting
+gratification; it is like the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him
+alive to-day that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. Therefore,
+so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are
+given up to the throng of desires with their constant hopes and fears, so
+long as we are the subject of willing, we can never have lasting happiness
+nor peace. It is essentially all the same whether we pursue or flee, fear
+injury or seek enjoyment; the care for the constant demands of the will,
+in whatever form it may be, continually occupies and sways the
+consciousness; but without peace no true well-being is possible. The
+subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the revolving wheel of
+Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the Danaids, is the ever-longing
+Tantalus.
+
+But when some external cause or inward disposition lifts us suddenly out
+of the endless stream of willing, delivers knowledge from the slavery of
+the will, the attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing,
+but comprehends things free from their relation to the will, and thus
+observes them without personal interest, without subjectivity, purely
+objectively, gives itself entirely up to them so far as they are ideas,
+but not in so far as they are motives. Then all at once the peace which we
+were always seeking, but which always fled from us on the former path of
+the desires, comes to us of its own accord, and it is well with us. It is
+the painless state which Epicurus prized as the highest good and as the
+state of the gods; for we are for the moment set free from the miserable
+striving of the will; we keep the Sabbath of the penal servitude of
+willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still.
+
+But this is just the state which I described above as necessary for the
+knowledge of the Idea, as pure contemplation, as sinking oneself in
+perception, losing oneself in the object, forgetting all individuality,
+surrendering that kind of knowledge which follows the principle of
+sufficient reason, and comprehends only relations; the state by means of
+which at once and inseparably the perceived particular thing is raised to
+the Idea of its whole species, and the knowing individual to the pure
+subject of will-less knowledge, and as such they are both taken out of the
+stream of time and all other relations. It is then all one whether we see
+the sun set from the prison or from the palace.
+
+Inward disposition, the predominance of knowing over willing, can produce
+this state under any circumstances. This is shown by those admirable Dutch
+artists who directed this purely objective perception to the most
+insignificant objects, and established a lasting monument of their
+objectivity and spiritual peace in their pictures of _still life_, which
+the æsthetic beholder does not look on without emotion; for they present
+to him the peaceful, still, frame of mind of the artist, free from will,
+which was needed to contemplate such insignificant things so objectively,
+to observe them so attentively, and to repeat this perception so
+intelligently; and as the picture enables the onlooker to participate in
+this state, his emotion is often increased by the contrast between it and
+the unquiet frame of mind, disturbed by vehement willing, in which he
+finds himself. In the same spirit, landscape-painters, and particularly
+Ruisdael, have often painted very insignificant country scenes, which
+produce the same effect even more agreeably.
+
+All this is accomplished by the inner power of an artistic nature alone;
+but that purely objective disposition is facilitated and assisted from
+without by suitable objects, by the abundance of natural beauty which
+invites contemplation, and even presses itself upon us. Whenever it
+discloses itself suddenly to our view, it almost always succeeds in
+delivering us, though it may be only for a moment, from subjectivity, from
+the slavery of the will, and in raising us to the state of pure knowing.
+This is why the man who is tormented by passion, or want, or care, is so
+suddenly revived, cheered, and restored by a single free glance into
+nature: the storm of passion, the pressure of desire and fear, and all the
+miseries of willing are then at once, and in a marvellous manner, calmed
+and appeased. For at the moment at which, freed from the will, we give
+ourselves up to pure will-less knowing, we pass into a world from which
+everything is absent that influenced our will and moved us so violently
+through it. This freeing of knowledge lifts us as wholly and entirely away
+from all that, as do sleep and dreams; happiness and unhappiness have
+disappeared; we are no longer individual; the individual is forgotten; we
+are only pure subject of knowledge; we are only that _one_ eye of the
+world which looks out from all knowing creatures, but which can become
+perfectly free from the service of will in man alone. Thus all difference
+of individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the same whether
+the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar; for
+neither joy nor complaining can pass that boundary with us. So near us
+always lies a sphere in which we escape from all our misery; but who has
+the strength to continue long in it? As soon as any single relation to our
+will, to our person, even of these objects of our pure contemplation,
+comes again into consciousness, the magic is at an end; we fall back into
+the knowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient reason; we
+know no longer the Idea, but the particular thing, the link of a chain to
+which we also belong, and we are again abandoned to all our woe. Most men
+remain almost always at this standpoint because they entirely lack
+objectivity, _i.e._, genius. Therefore they have no pleasure in being
+alone with nature; they need company, or at least a book. For their
+knowledge remains subject to their will; they seek, therefore, in objects,
+only some relation to their will, and whenever they see anything that has
+no such relation, there sounds within them, like a ground bass in music,
+the constant inconsolable cry, "It is of no use to me;" thus in solitude
+the most beautiful surroundings have for them a desolate, dark, strange,
+and hostile appearance.
+
+Lastly, it is this blessedness of will-less perception which casts an
+enchanting glamour over the past and distant, and presents them to us in
+so fair a light by means of self-deception. For as we think of days long
+gone by, days in which we lived in a distant place, it is only the objects
+which our fancy recalls, not the subject of will, which bore about with it
+then its incurable sorrows just as it bears them now; but they are
+forgotten, because since then they have often given place to others. Now,
+objective perception acts with regard to what is remembered just as it
+would in what is present, if we let it have influence over us, if we
+surrendered ourselves to it free from will. Hence it arises that,
+especially when we are more than ordinarily disturbed by some want, the
+remembrance of past and distant scenes suddenly flits across our minds
+like a lost paradise. The fancy recalls only what was objective, not what
+was individually subjective, and we imagine that that objective stood
+before us then just as pure and undisturbed by any relation to the will as
+its image stands in our fancy now; while in reality the relation of the
+objects to our will gave us pain then just as it does now. We can deliver
+ourselves from all suffering just as well through present objects as
+through distant ones whenever we raise ourselves to a purely objective
+contemplation of them, and so are able to bring about the illusion that
+only the objects are present and not we ourselves. Then, as the pure
+subject of knowledge, freed from the miserable self, we become entirely
+one with these objects, and, for the moment, our wants are as foreign to
+us as they are to them. The world as idea alone remains, and the world as
+will has disappeared.
+
+In all these reflections it has been my object to bring out clearly the
+nature and the scope of the subjective element in æsthetic pleasure; the
+deliverance of knowledge from the service of the will, the forgetting of
+self as an individual, and the raising of the consciousness to the pure
+will-less, timeless, subject of knowledge, independent of all relations.
+With this subjective side of æsthetic contemplation, there must always
+appear as its necessary correlative the objective side, the intuitive
+comprehension of the Platonic Idea. But before we turn to the closer
+consideration of this, and to the achievements of art in relation to it,
+it is better that we should pause for a little at the subjective side of
+æsthetic pleasure, in order to complete our treatment of this by
+explaining the impression of the _sublime_ which depends altogether upon
+it, and arises from a modification of it. After that we shall complete our
+investigation of æsthetic pleasure by considering its objective side.
+
+But we must first add the following remarks to what has been said. Light
+is the pleasantest and most gladdening of things; it has become the symbol
+of all that is good and salutary. In all religions it symbolises
+salvation, while darkness symbolises damnation. Ormuzd dwells in the
+purest light, Ahrimines in eternal night. Dante's Paradise would look very
+much like Vauxhall in London, for all the blessed spirits appear as points
+of light and arrange themselves in regular figures. The very absence of
+light makes us sad; its return cheers us. Colours excite directly a keen
+delight, which reaches its highest degree when they are transparent. All
+this depends entirely upon the fact that light is the correlative and
+condition of the most perfect kind of knowledge of perception, the only
+knowledge which does not in any way affect the will. For sight, unlike the
+affections of the other senses, cannot, in itself, directly and through
+its sensuous effect, make the _sensation_ of the special organ agreeable
+or disagreeable; that is, it has no immediate connection with the will.
+Such a quality can only belong to the perception which arises in the
+understanding, and then it lies in the relation of the object to the will.
+In the case of hearing this is to some extent otherwise; sounds can give
+pain directly, and they may also be sensuously agreeable, directly and
+without regard to harmony or melody. Touch, as one with the feeling of the
+whole body, is still more subordinated to this direct influence upon the
+will; and yet there is such a thing as a sensation of touch which is
+neither painful nor pleasant. But smells are always either agreeable or
+disagreeable, and tastes still more so. Thus the last two senses are most
+closely related to the will, and therefore they are always the most
+ignoble, and have been called by Kant the subjective senses. The pleasure
+which we experience from light is in fact only the pleasure which arises
+from the objective possibility of the purest and fullest perceptive
+knowledge, and as such it may be traced to the fact that pure knowledge,
+freed and delivered from all will, is in the highest degree pleasant, and
+of itself constitutes a large part of æsthetic enjoyment. Again, we must
+refer to this view of light the incredible beauty which we associate with
+the reflection of objects in water. That lightest, quickest, finest
+species of the action of bodies upon each other, that to which we owe by
+far the completest and purest of our perceptions, the action of reflected
+rays of light, is here brought clearly before our eyes, distinct and
+perfect, in cause and in effect, and indeed in its entirety, hence the
+æsthetic delight it gives us, which, in the most important aspect, is
+entirely based on the subjective ground of æsthetic pleasure, and is
+delight in pure knowing and its method.
+
+§ 39. All these reflections are intended to bring out the subjective part
+of æsthetic pleasure; that is to say, that pleasure so far as it consists
+simply of delight in perceptive knowledge as such, in opposition to will.
+And as directly connected with this, there naturally follows the
+explanation of that disposition or frame of mind which has been called the
+sense of the _sublime_.
+
+We have already remarked above that the transition to the state of pure
+perception takes place most easily when the objects bend themselves to it,
+that is, when by their manifold and yet definite and distinct form they
+easily become representatives of their Ideas, in which beauty, in the
+objective sense, consists. This quality belongs pre-eminently to natural
+beauty, which thus affords even to the most insensible at least a fleeting
+æsthetic satisfaction: indeed it is so remarkable how especially the
+vegetable world invites æsthetic observation, and, as it were, presses
+itself upon it, that one might say, that these advances are connected with
+the fact that these organisms, unlike the bodies of animals, are not
+themselves immediate objects of knowledge, and therefore require the
+assistance of a foreign intelligent individual in order to rise out of the
+world of blind will and enter the world of idea, and that thus they long,
+as it were, for this entrance, that they may attain at least indirectly
+what is denied them directly. But I leave this suggestion which I have
+hazarded, and which borders perhaps upon extravagance, entirely undecided,
+for only a very intimate and devoted consideration of nature can raise or
+justify it.(51) As long as that which raises us from the knowledge of mere
+relations subject to the will, to æsthetic contemplation, and thereby
+exalts us to the position of the subject of knowledge free from will, is
+this fittingness of nature, this significance and distinctness of its
+forms, on account of which the Ideas individualised in them readily
+present themselves to us; so long is it merely _beauty_ that affects us
+and the sense of the _beautiful_ that is excited. But if these very
+objects whose significant forms invite us to pure contemplation, have a
+hostile relation to the human will in general, as it exhibits itself in
+its objectivity, the human body, if they are opposed to it, so that it is
+menaced by the irresistible predominance of their power, or sinks into
+insignificance before their immeasurable greatness; if, nevertheless, the
+beholder does not direct his attention to this eminently hostile relation
+to his will, but, although perceiving and recognising it, turns
+consciously away from it, forcibly detaches himself from his will and its
+relations, and, giving himself up entirely to knowledge, quietly
+contemplates those very objects that are so terrible to the will,
+comprehends only their Idea, which is foreign to all relation, so that he
+lingers gladly over its contemplation, and is thereby raised above
+himself, his person, his will, and all will:--in that case he is filled
+with the sense of the _sublime_, he is in the state of spiritual
+exaltation, and therefore the object producing such a state is called
+_sublime_. Thus what distinguishes the sense of the sublime from that of
+the beautiful is this: in the case of the beautiful, pure knowledge has
+gained the upper hand without a struggle, for the beauty of the object,
+_i.e._, that property which facilitates the knowledge of its Idea, has
+removed from consciousness without resistance, and therefore
+imperceptibly, the will and the knowledge of relations which is subject to
+it, so that what is left is the pure subject of knowledge without even a
+remembrance of will. On the other hand, in the case of the sublime that
+state of pure knowledge is only attained by a conscious and forcible
+breaking away from the relations of the same object to the will, which are
+recognised as unfavourable, by a free and conscious transcending of the
+will and the knowledge related to it.
+
+This exaltation must not only be consciously won, but also consciously
+retained, and it is therefore accompanied by a constant remembrance of
+will; yet not of a single particular volition, such as fear or desire, but
+of human volition in general, so far as it is universally expressed in its
+objectivity the human body. If a single real act of will were to come into
+consciousness, through actual personal pressure and danger from the
+object, then the individual will thus actually influenced would at once
+gain the upper hand, the peace of contemplation would become impossible,
+the impression of the sublime would be lost, because it yields to the
+anxiety, in which the effort of the individual to right itself has sunk
+every other thought. A few examples will help very much to elucidate this
+theory of the æsthetic sublime and remove all doubt with regard to it; at
+the same time they will bring out the different degrees of this sense of
+the sublime. It is in the main identical with that of the beautiful, with
+pure will-less knowing, and the knowledge, that necessarily accompanies it
+of Ideas out of all relation determined by the principle of sufficient
+reason, and it is distinguished from the sense of the beautiful only by
+the additional quality that it rises above the known hostile relation of
+the object contemplated to the will in general. Thus there come to be
+various degrees of the sublime, and transitions from the beautiful to the
+sublime, according as this additional quality is strong, bold, urgent,
+near, or weak, distant, and merely indicated. I think it is more in
+keeping with the plan of my treatise, first to give examples of these
+transitions, and of the weaker degrees of the impression of the sublime,
+although persons whose æsthetical susceptibility in general is not very
+great, and whose imagination is not very lively, will only understand the
+examples given later of the higher and more distinct grades of that
+impression; and they should therefore confine themselves to these, and
+pass over the examples of the very weak degrees of the sublime that are to
+be given first.
+
+As man is at once impetuous and blind striving of will (whose pole or
+focus lies in the genital organs), and eternal, free, serene subject of
+pure knowing (whose pole is the brain); so, corresponding to this
+antithesis, the sun is both the source of _light_, the condition of the
+most perfect kind of knowledge, and therefore of the most delightful of
+things--and the source of _warmth_, the first condition of life, _i.e._, of
+all phenomena of will in its higher grades. Therefore, what warmth is for
+the will, light is for knowledge. Light is the largest gem in the crown of
+beauty, and has the most marked influence on the knowledge of every
+beautiful object. Its presence is an indispensable condition of beauty;
+its favourable disposition increases the beauty of the most beautiful.
+Architectural beauty more than any other object is enhanced by favourable
+light, though even the most insignificant things become through its
+influence most beautiful. If, in the dead of winter, when all nature is
+frozen and stiff, we see the rays of the setting sun reflected by masses
+of stone, illuminating without warming, and thus favourable only to the
+purest kind of knowledge, not to the will; the contemplation of the
+beautiful effect of the light upon these masses lifts us, as does all
+beauty, into a state of pure knowing. But, in this case, a certain
+transcending of the interests of the will is needed to enable us to rise
+into the state of pure knowing, because there is a faint recollection of
+the lack of warmth from these rays, that is, an absence of the principle
+of life; there is a slight challenge to persist in pure knowing, and to
+refrain from all willing, and therefore it is an example of a transition
+from the sense of the beautiful to that of the sublime. It is the faintest
+trace of the sublime in the beautiful; and beauty itself is indeed present
+only in a slight degree. The following is almost as weak an example.
+
+Let us imagine ourselves transported to a very lonely place, with unbroken
+horizon, under a cloudless sky, trees and plants in the perfectly
+motionless air, no animals, no men, no running water, the deepest silence.
+Such surroundings are, as it were, a call to seriousness and
+contemplation, apart from all will and its cravings; but this is just what
+imparts to such a scene of desolate stillness a touch of the sublime. For,
+because it affords no object, either favourable or unfavourable, for the
+will which is constantly in need of striving and attaining, there only
+remains the state of pure contemplation, and whoever is incapable of this,
+is ignominiously abandoned to the vacancy of unoccupied will, and the
+misery of ennui. So far it is a test of our intellectual worth, of which,
+generally speaking, the degree of our power of enduring solitude, or our
+love of it, is a good criterion. The scene we have sketched affords us,
+then, an example of the sublime in a low degree, for in it, with the state
+of pure knowing in its peace and all-sufficiency, there is mingled, by way
+of contrast, the recollection of the dependence and poverty of the will
+which stands in need of constant action. This is the species of the
+sublime for which the sight of the boundless prairies of the interior of
+North America is celebrated.
+
+But let us suppose such a scene, stripped also of vegetation, and showing
+only naked rocks; then from the entire absence of that organic life which
+is necessary for existence, the will at once becomes uneasy, the desert
+assumes a terrible aspect, our mood becomes more tragic; the elevation to
+the sphere of pure knowing takes place with a more decided tearing of
+ourselves away from the interests of the will; and because we persist in
+continuing in the state of pure knowing, the sense of the sublime
+distinctly appears.
+
+The following situation may occasion this feeling in a still higher
+degree: Nature convulsed by a storm; the sky darkened by black threatening
+thunder-clouds; stupendous, naked, overhanging cliffs, completely shutting
+out the view; rushing, foaming torrents; absolute desert; the wail of the
+wind sweeping through the clefts of the rocks. Our dependence, our strife
+with hostile nature, our will broken in the conflict, now appears visibly
+before our eyes. Yet, so long as the personal pressure does not gain the
+upper hand, but we continue in æsthetic contemplation, the pure subject of
+knowing gazes unshaken and unconcerned through that strife of nature,
+through that picture of the broken will, and quietly comprehends the Ideas
+even of those objects which are threatening and terrible to the will. In
+this contrast lies the sense of the sublime.
+
+But the impression becomes still stronger, if, when we have before our
+eyes, on a large scale, the battle of the raging elements, in such a scene
+we are prevented from hearing the sound of our own voice by the noise of a
+falling stream; or, if we are abroad in the storm of tempestuous seas,
+where the mountainous waves rise and fall, dash themselves furiously
+against steep cliffs, and toss their spray high into the air; the storm
+howls, the sea boils, the lightning flashes from black clouds, and the
+peals of thunder drown the voice of storm and sea. Then, in the undismayed
+beholder, the two-fold nature of his consciousness reaches the highest
+degree of distinctness. He perceives himself, on the one hand, as an
+individual, as the frail phenomenon of will, which the slightest touch of
+these forces can utterly destroy, helpless against powerful nature,
+dependent, the victim of chance, a vanishing nothing in the presence of
+stupendous might; and, on the other hand, as the eternal, peaceful,
+knowing subject, the condition of the object, and, therefore, the
+supporter of this whole world; the terrific strife of nature only his
+idea; the subject itself free and apart from all desires and necessities,
+in the quiet comprehension of the Ideas. This is the complete impression
+of the sublime. Here he obtains a glimpse of a power beyond all comparison
+superior to the individual, threatening it with annihilation.
+
+The impression of the sublime may be produced in quite another way, by
+presenting a mere immensity in space and time; its immeasurable greatness
+dwindles the individual to nothing. Adhering to Kant's nomenclature and
+his accurate division, we may call the first kind the dynamical, and the
+second the mathematical sublime, although we entirely dissent from his
+explanation of the inner nature of the impression, and can allow no share
+in it either to moral reflections, or to hypostases from scholastic
+philosophy.
+
+If we lose ourselves in the contemplation of the infinite greatness of the
+universe in space and time, meditate on the thousands of years that are
+past or to come, or if the heavens at night actually bring before our eyes
+innumerable worlds and so force upon our consciousness the immensity of
+the universe, we feel ourselves dwindle to nothing; as individuals, as
+living bodies, as transient phenomena of will, we feel ourselves pass away
+and vanish into nothing like drops in the ocean. But at once there rises
+against this ghost of our own nothingness, against such lying
+impossibility, the immediate consciousness that all these worlds exist
+only as our idea, only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure
+knowing, which we find ourselves to be as soon as we forget our
+individuality, and which is the necessary supporter of all worlds and all
+times the condition of their possibility. The vastness of the world which
+disquieted us before, rests now in us; our dependence upon it is annulled
+by its dependence upon us. All this, however, does not come at once into
+reflection, but shows itself merely as the felt consciousness that in some
+sense or other (which philosophy alone can explain) we are one with the
+world, and therefore not oppressed, but exalted by its immensity. It is
+the felt consciousness of this that the Upanishads of the Vedas repeatedly
+express in such a multitude of different ways; very admirably in the
+saying already quoted: _Hæ omnes creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter me
+aliud ens non est_ (Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 122.) It is the transcending of
+our own individuality, the sense of the sublime.
+
+We receive this impression of the mathematical-sublime, quite directly, by
+means of a space which is small indeed as compared with the world, but
+which has become directly perceptible to us, and affects us with its whole
+extent in all its three dimensions, so as to make our own body seem almost
+infinitely small. An empty space can never be thus perceived, and
+therefore never an open space, but only space that is directly perceptible
+in all its dimensions by means of the limits which enclose it; thus for
+example a very high, vast dome, like that of St. Peter's at Rome, or St.
+Paul's in London. The sense of the sublime here arises through the
+consciousness of the vanishing nothingness of our own body in the presence
+of a vastness which, from another point of view, itself exists only in our
+idea, and of which we are as knowing subject, the supporter. Thus here as
+everywhere it arises from the contrast between the insignificance and
+dependence of ourselves as individuals, as phenomena of will, and the
+consciousness of ourselves as pure subject of knowing. Even the vault of
+the starry heaven produces this if it is contemplated without reflection;
+but just in the same way as the vault of stone, and only by its apparent,
+not its real extent. Some objects of our perception excite in us the
+feeling of the sublime because, not only on account of their spatial
+vastness, but also of their great age, that is, their temporal duration,
+we feel ourselves dwarfed to insignificance in their presence, and yet
+revel in the pleasure of contemplating them: of this kind are very high
+mountains, the Egyptian pyramids, and colossal ruins of great antiquity.
+
+Our explanation of the sublime applies also to the ethical, to what is
+called the sublime character. Such a character arises from this, that the
+will is not excited by objects which are well calculated to excite it, but
+that knowledge retains the upper hand in their presence. A man of sublime
+character will accordingly consider men in a purely objective way, and not
+with reference to the relations which they might have to his will; he
+will, for example, observe their faults, even their hatred and injustice
+to himself, without being himself excited to hatred; he will behold their
+happiness without envy; he will recognise their good qualities without
+desiring any closer relations with them; he will perceive the beauty of
+women, but he will not desire them. His personal happiness or unhappiness
+will not greatly affect him, he will rather be as Hamlet describes
+Horatio:--
+
+
+            "... for thou hast been,
+    As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing;
+    A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
+    Hast ta'en with equal thanks," &c. (A. 3. Sc. 2.)
+
+
+For in the course of his own life and its misfortunes, he will consider
+less his individual lot than that of humanity in general, and will
+therefore conduct himself in its regard, rather as knowing than as
+suffering.
+
+§ 40. Opposites throw light upon each other, and therefore the remark may
+be in place here, that the proper opposite of the sublime is something
+which would not at the first glance be recognised, as such: _the charming_
+or _attractive_. By this, however, I understand, that which excites the
+will by presenting to it directly its fulfilment, its satisfaction. We saw
+that the feeling of the sublime arises from the fact, that something
+entirely unfavourable to the will, becomes the object of pure
+contemplation, so that such contemplation can only be maintained by
+persistently turning away from the will, and transcending its interests;
+this constitutes the sublimity of the character. The charming or
+attractive, on the contrary, draws the beholder away from the pure
+contemplation which is demanded by all apprehension of the beautiful,
+because it necessarily excites this will, by objects which directly appeal
+to it, and thus he no longer remains pure subject of knowing, but becomes
+the needy and dependent subject of will. That every beautiful thing which
+is bright or cheering should be called charming, is the result of a too
+general concept, which arises from a want of accurate discrimination, and
+which I must entirely set aside, and indeed condemn. But in the sense of
+the word which has been given and explained, I find only two species of
+the charming or attractive in the province of art, and both of them are
+unworthy of it. The one species, a very low one, is found in Dutch
+paintings of still life, when they err by representing articles of food,
+which by their deceptive likeness necessarily excite the appetite for the
+things they represent, and this is just an excitement of the will, which
+puts an end to all æsthetic contemplation of the object. Painted fruit is
+yet admissible, because we may regard it as the further development of the
+flower, and as a beautiful product of nature in form and colour, without
+being obliged to think of it as eatable; but unfortunately we often find,
+represented with deceptive naturalness, prepared and served dishes,
+oysters, herrings, crabs, bread and butter, beer, wine, and so forth,
+which is altogether to be condemned. In historical painting and in
+sculpture the charming consists in naked figures, whose position, drapery,
+and general treatment are calculated to excite the passions of the
+beholder, and thus pure æsthetical contemplation is at once annihilated,
+and the aim of art is defeated. This mistake corresponds exactly to that
+which we have just censured in the Dutch paintings. The ancients are
+almost always free from this fault in their representations of beauty and
+complete nakedness of form, because the artist himself created them in a
+purely objective spirit, filled with ideal beauty, not in the spirit of
+subjective, and base sensuality. The charming is thus everywhere to be
+avoided in art.
+
+There is also a negative species of the charming or exciting which is even
+more reprehensible than the positive form which has been discussed; this
+is the disgusting or the loathsome. It arouses the will of the beholder,
+just as what is properly speaking charming, and therefore disturbs pure
+æsthetic contemplation. But it is an active aversion and opposition which
+is excited by it; it arouses the will by presenting to it objects which it
+abhors. Therefore it has always been recognised that it is altogether
+inadmissible in art, where even what is ugly, when it is not disgusting,
+is allowable in its proper place, as we shall see later.
+
+§ 41. The course of the discussion has made it necessary to insert at this
+point the treatment of the sublime, though we have only half done with the
+beautiful, as we have considered its subjective side only. For it was
+merely a special modification of this subjective side that distinguished
+the beautiful from the sublime. This difference was found to depend upon
+whether the state of pure will-less knowing, which is presupposed and
+demanded by all æsthetic contemplation, was reached without opposition, by
+the mere disappearance of the will from consciousness, because the object
+invited and drew us towards it; or whether it was only attained through
+the free, conscious transcending of the will, to which the object
+contemplated had an unfavourable and even hostile relation, which would
+destroy contemplation altogether, if we were to give ourselves up to it.
+This is the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. In the
+object they are not essentially different, for in every case the object of
+æsthetical contemplation is not the individual thing, but the Idea in it
+which is striving to reveal itself; that is to say, adequate objectivity
+of will at a particular grade. Its necessary correlative, independent,
+like itself of the principle of sufficient reason, is the pure subject of
+knowing; just as the correlative of the particular thing is the knowing
+individual, both of which lie within the province of the principle of
+sufficient reason.
+
+When we say that a thing is _beautiful_, we thereby assert that it is an
+object of our æsthetic contemplation, and this has a double meaning; on
+the one hand it means that the sight of the thing makes us _objective_,
+that is to say, that in contemplating it we are no longer conscious of
+ourselves as individuals, but as pure will-less subjects of knowledge; and
+on the other hand it means that we recognise in the object, not the
+particular thing, but an Idea; and this can only happen, so far as our
+contemplation of it is not subordinated to the principle of sufficient
+reason, does not follow the relation of the object to anything outside it
+(which is always ultimately connected with relations to our own will), but
+rests in the object itself. For the Idea and the pure subject of knowledge
+always appear at once in consciousness as necessary correlatives, and on
+their appearance all distinction of time vanishes, for they are both
+entirely foreign to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms,
+and lie outside the relations which are imposed by it; they may be
+compared to the rainbow and the sun, which have no part in the constant
+movement and succession of the falling drops. Therefore, if, for example,
+I contemplate a tree æsthetically, _i.e._, with artistic eyes, and thus
+recognise, not it, but its Idea, it becomes at once of no consequence
+whether it is this tree or its predecessor which flourished a thousand
+years ago, and whether the observer is this individual or any other that
+lived anywhere and at any time; the particular thing and the knowing
+individual are abolished with the principle of sufficient reason, and
+there remains nothing but the Idea and the pure subject of knowing, which
+together constitute the adequate objectivity of will at this grade. And
+the Idea dispenses not only with time, but also with space, for the Idea
+proper is not this special form which appears before me but its
+expression, its pure significance, its inner being, which discloses itself
+to me and appeals to me, and which may be quite the same though the
+spatial relations of its form be very different.
+
+Since, on the one hand, every given thing may be observed in a. purely
+objective manner and apart from all relations; and since, on the other
+hand, the will manifests itself in everything at some grade of its
+objectivity, so that everything is the expression of an Idea; it follows
+that everything is also _beautiful_. That even the most insignificant
+things admit of pure objective and will-less contemplation, and thus prove
+that they are beautiful, is shown by what was said above in this reference
+about the Dutch pictures of still-life (§ 38). But one thing is more
+beautiful than another, because it makes this pure objective contemplation
+easier, it lends itself to it, and, so to speak, even compels it, and then
+we call it very beautiful. This is the case sometimes because, as an
+individual thing, it expresses in its purity the Idea of its species by
+the very distinct, clearly defined, and significant relation of its parts,
+and also fully reveals that Idea through the completeness of all the
+possible expressions of its species united in it, so that it makes the
+transition from the individual thing to the Idea, and therefore also the
+condition of pure contemplation, very easy for the beholder. Sometimes
+this possession of special beauty in an object lies in the fact that the
+Idea itself which appeals to us in it is a high grade of the objectivity
+of will, and therefore very significant and expressive. Therefore it is
+that man is more beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation of
+his nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and expression are the
+most important objects of plastic art, and human action the most important
+object of poetry. Yet each thing has its own peculiar beauty, not only
+every organism which expresses itself in the unity of an individual being,
+but also everything unorganised and formless, and even every manufactured
+article. For all these reveal the Ideas through which the will objectifies
+itself at its lowest grades, they give, as it were, the deepest resounding
+bass-notes of nature. Gravity, rigidity, fluidity, light, and so forth,
+are the Ideas which express themselves in rocks, in buildings, in waters.
+Landscape-gardening or architecture can do no more than assist them to
+unfold their qualities distinctly, fully, and variously; they can only
+give them the opportunity of expressing themselves purely, so that they
+lend themselves to æsthetic contemplation and make it easier. Inferior
+buildings or ill-favoured localities, on the contrary, which nature has
+neglected or art has spoiled, perform this task in a very slight degree or
+not at all; yet even from them these universal, fundamental Ideas of
+nature cannot altogether disappear. To the careful observer they present
+themselves here also, and even bad buildings and the like are capable of
+being æsthetically considered; the Ideas of the most universal properties
+of their materials are still recognisable in them, only the artificial
+form which has been given them does not assist but hinders æsthetic
+contemplation. Manufactured articles also serve to express Ideas, only it
+is not the Idea of the manufactured article which speaks in them, but the
+Idea of the material to which this artificial form has been given. This
+may be very conveniently expressed in two words, in the language of the
+schoolmen, thus,--the manufactured article expresses the Idea of its _forma
+substantialis_, but not that of its _forma accidentalis_; the latter leads
+to no Idea, but only to a human conception of which it is the result. It
+is needless to say that by manufactured article no work of plastic art is
+meant. The schoolmen understand, in fact, by _forma substantialis_ that
+which I call the grade of the objectification of will in a thing. We shall
+return immediately, when we treat of architecture, to the Idea of the
+material. Our view, then, cannot be reconciled with that of Plato if he is
+of opinion that a table or a chair express the Idea of a table or a chair
+(De Rep., x., pp. 284, 285, et Parmen., p. 79, ed. Bip.), but we say that
+they express the Ideas which are already expressed in their mere material
+as such. According to Aristotle (Metap. xi., chap. 3), however, Plato
+himself only maintained Ideas of natural objects: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} (_Plato dixit, quod ideæ eorum sunt, quæ natura sunt_),
+and in chap. 5 he says that, according to the Platonists, there are no
+Ideas of house and ring. In any case, Plato's earliest disciples, as
+Alcinous informs us (_Introductio __ in Platonicam Philosophiam_, chap.
+9), denied that there were any ideas of manufactured articles. He says:
+{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} (_Definiunt autem_
+IDEAM _exemplar æternum eorum, quæ secundum naturam existunt. Nam plurimis
+ex iis, qui Platonem secuti sunt, minime placuit, arte factorum ideas
+esse, ut clypei atque lyræ; neque rursus eorum, quæ prætor naturam, ut
+febris et choleræ, neque particularium, ceu Socratis et Platonis; neque
+etiam rerum vilium, veluti sordium et festucæ; neque relationum, ut
+majoris et excedentis: esse namque ideas intellectiones dei æternas, ac
+seipsis perfectas_). We may take this opportunity of mentioning another
+point in which our doctrine of Ideas differs very much from that of Plato.
+He teaches (De Rep., x., p. 288) that the object which art tries to
+express, the ideal of painting and poetry, is not the Idea but the
+particular thing. Our whole exposition hitherto has maintained exactly the
+opposite, and Plato's opinion is the less likely to lead us astray,
+inasmuch as it is the source of one of the greatest and best known errors
+of this great man, his depreciation and rejection of art, and especially
+poetry; he directly connects his false judgment in reference to this with
+the passage quoted.
+
+§ 42. I return to the exposition of the æsthetic impression. The knowledge
+of the beautiful always supposes at once and inseparably the pure knowing
+subject and the known Idea as object. Yet the source of æsthetic
+satisfaction will sometimes lie more in the comprehension of the known
+Idea, sometimes more in the blessedness and spiritual peace of the pure
+knowing subject freed from all willing, and therefore from all
+individuality, and the pain that proceeds from it. And, indeed, this
+predominance of one or the other constituent part of æsthetic feeling will
+depend upon whether the intuitively grasped Idea is a higher or a lower
+grade of the objectivity of will. Thus in æsthetic contemplation (in the
+real, or through the medium of art) of the beauty of nature in the
+inorganic and vegetable worlds, or in works of architecture, the pleasure
+of pure will-less knowing will predominate, because the Ideas which are
+here apprehended are only low grades of the objectivity of will, and are
+therefore not manifestations of deep significance and rich content. On the
+other hand, if animals and man are the objects of æsthetic contemplation
+or representation, the pleasure will consist rather in the comprehension
+of these Ideas, which are the most distinct revelation of will; for they
+exhibit the greatest multiplicity of forms, the greatest richness and deep
+significance of phenomena, and reveal to us most completely the nature of
+will, whether in its violence, its terribleness, its satisfaction or its
+aberration (the latter in tragic situations), or finally in its change and
+self-surrender, which is the peculiar theme of christian painting; as the
+Idea of the will enlightened by full knowledge is the object of historical
+painting in general, and of the drama. We shall now go through the fine
+arts one by one, and this will give completeness and distinctness to the
+theory of the beautiful which we have advanced.
+
+§ 43. Matter as such cannot be the expression of an Idea. For, as we found
+in the first book, it is throughout nothing but causality: its being
+consists in its casual action. But causality is a form of the principle of
+sufficient reason; knowledge of the Idea, on the other hand, absolutely
+excludes the content of that principle. We also found, in the second book,
+that matter is the common substratum of all particular phenomena of the
+Ideas, and consequently is the connecting link between the Idea and the
+phenomenon, or the particular thing. Accordingly for both of these reasons
+it is impossible that matter can for itself express any Idea. This is
+confirmed _a posteriori_ by the fact that it is impossible to have a
+perceptible idea of matter as such, but only an abstract conception; in
+the former, _i.e._, in perceptible ideas are exhibited only the forms and
+qualities of which matter is the supporter, and in all of which Ideas
+reveal themselves. This corresponds also with the fact, that causality
+(the whole essence of matter) cannot for itself be presented perceptibly,
+but is merely a definite casual connection. On the other hand, _every
+phenomenon_ of an Idea, because as such it has entered the form of the
+principle of sufficient reason, or the _principium individuationis_, must
+exhibit itself in matter, as one of its qualities. So far then matter is,
+as we have said, the connecting link between the Idea and the _principium
+individuationis_, which is the form of knowledge of the individual, or the
+principle of sufficient reason. Plato is therefore perfectly right in his
+enumeration, for after the Idea and the phenomenon, which include all
+other things in the world, he gives matter only, as a third thing which is
+different from both (Timaus, p. 345). The individual, as a phenomenon of
+the Idea, is always matter. Every quality of matter is also the phenomenon
+of an Idea, and as such it may always be an object of æsthetic
+contemplation, _i.e._, the Idea expressed in it may always be recognised.
+This holds good of even the most universal qualities of matter, without
+which it never appears, and which are the weakest objectivity of will.
+Such are gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, sensitiveness to light,
+and so forth.
+
+If now we consider _architecture_ simply as a fine art and apart from its
+application to useful ends, in which it serves the will and not pure
+knowledge, and therefore ceases to be art in our sense; we can assign to
+it no other aim than that of bringing to greater distinctness some of
+those ideas, which are the lowest grades of the objectivity of will; such
+as gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, those universal qualities of
+stone, those first, simplest, most inarticulate manifestations of will;
+the bass notes of nature; and after these light, which in many respects is
+their opposite. Even at these low grades of the objectivity of will we see
+its nature revealing itself in discord; for properly speaking the conflict
+between gravity and rigidity is the sole æsthetic material of
+architecture; its problem is to make this conflict appear with perfect
+distinctness in a multitude of different ways. It solves it by depriving
+these indestructible forces of the shortest way to their satisfaction, and
+conducting them to it by a circuitous route, so that the conflict is
+lengthened and the inexhaustible efforts of both forces become visible in
+many different ways. The whole mass of the building, if left to its
+original tendency, would exhibit a mere heap or clump, bound as closely as
+possible to the earth, to which gravity, the form in which the will
+appears here, continually presses, while rigidity, also objectivity of
+will, resists. But this very tendency, this effort, is hindered by
+architecture from obtaining direct satisfaction, and only allowed to reach
+it indirectly and by roundabout ways. The roof, for example, can only
+press the earth through columns, the arch must support itself, and can
+only satisfy its tendency towards the earth through the medium of the
+pillars, and so forth. But just by these enforced digressions, just by
+these restrictions, the forces which reside in the crude mass of stone
+unfold themselves in the most distinct and multifarious ways; and the
+purely æsthetic aim of architecture can go no further than this. Therefore
+the beauty, at any rate, of a building lies in the obvious adaptation of
+every part, not to the outward arbitrary end of man (so far the work
+belongs to practical architecture), but directly to the stability of the
+whole, to which the position, dimensions, and form of every part must have
+so necessary a relation that, where it is possible, if any one part were
+taken away, the whole would fall to pieces. For just because each part
+bears just as much as it conveniently can, and each is supported just
+where it requires to be and just to the necessary extent, this opposition
+unfolds itself, this conflict between rigidity and gravity, which
+constitutes the life, the manifestation of will, in the stone, becomes
+completely visible, and these lowest grades of the objectivity of will
+reveal themselves distinctly. In the same way the form of each part must
+not be determined arbitrarily, but by its end, and its relation to the
+whole. The column is the simplest form of support, determined simply by
+its end: the twisted column is tasteless; the four-cornered pillar is in
+fact not so simple as the round column, though it happens that it is
+easier to make it. The forms also of frieze, rafter, roof, and dome are
+entirely determined by their immediate end, and explain themselves from
+it. The decoration of capitals, &c., belongs to sculpture, not to
+architecture, which admits it merely as extraneous ornament, and could
+dispense with it. According to what has been said, it is absolutely
+necessary, in order to understand the æsthetic satisfaction afforded by a
+work of architecture, to have immediate knowledge through perception of
+its matter as regards its weight, rigidity, and cohesion, and our pleasure
+in such a work would suddenly be very much diminished by the discovery
+that the material used was pumice-stone; for then it would appear to us as
+a kind of sham building. We would be affected in almost the same way if we
+were told that it was made of wood, when we had supposed it to be of
+stone, just because this alters and destroys the relation between rigidity
+and gravity, and consequently the significance and necessity of all the
+parts, for these natural forces reveal themselves in a far weaker degree
+in a wooden building. Therefore no real work of architecture as a fine art
+can be made of wood, although it assumes all forms so easily; this can
+only be explained by our theory. If we were distinctly told that a
+building, the sight of which gave us pleasure, was made of different kinds
+of material of very unequal weight and consistency, but not
+distinguishable to the eye, the whole building would become as utterly
+incapable of affording us pleasure as a poem in an unknown language. All
+this proves that architecture does not affect us mathematically, but also
+dynamically, and that what speaks to us through it, is not mere form and
+symmetry, but rather those fundamental forces of nature, those first
+Ideas, those lowest grades of the objectivity of will. The regularity of
+the building and its parts is partly produced by the direct adaptation of
+each member to the stability of the whole, partly it serves to facilitate
+the survey and comprehension of the whole, and finally, regular figures to
+some extent enhance the beauty because they reveal the constitution of
+space as such. But all this is of subordinate value and necessity, and by
+no means the chief concern; indeed, symmetry is not invariably demanded,
+as ruins are still beautiful.
+
+Works of architecture have further quite a special relation to light; they
+gain a double beauty in the full sunshine, with the blue sky as a
+background, and again they have quite a different effect by moonlight.
+Therefore, when a beautiful work of architecture is to be erected, special
+attention is always paid to the effects of the light and to the climate.
+The reason of all this is, indeed, principally that all the parts and
+their relations are only made clearly visible by a bright, strong light;
+but besides this I am of opinion that it is the function of architecture
+to reveal the nature of light just as it reveals that of things so
+opposite to it as gravity and rigidity. For the light is intercepted,
+confined, and reflected by the great opaque, sharply outlined, and
+variously formed masses of stone, and thus it unfolds its nature and
+qualities in the purest and clearest way, to the great pleasure of the
+beholders, for light is the most joy-giving of things, as the condition
+and the objective correlative of the most perfect kind of knowledge of
+perception.
+
+Now, because the Ideas which architecture brings to clear perception, are
+the lowest grades of the objectivity of will, and consequently their
+objective significance, which architecture reveals to us, is comparatively
+small; the æsthetic pleasure of looking at a beautiful building in a good
+light will lie, not so much in the comprehension of the Idea, as in the
+subjective correlative which accompanies this comprehension; it will
+consist pre-eminently in the fact that the beholder, set free from the
+kind of knowledge that belongs to the individual, and which serves the
+will and follows the principle of sufficient reason, is raised to that of
+the pure subject of knowing free from will. It will consist then
+principally in pure contemplation itself, free from all the suffering of
+will and of individuality. In this respect the opposite of architecture,
+and the other extreme of the series of the fine arts, is the drama, which
+brings to knowledge the most significant Ideas. Therefore in the æsthetic
+pleasure afforded by the drama the objective side is throughout
+predominant.
+
+Architecture has this distinction from plastic art and poetry: it does not
+give us a copy but the thing itself. It does not repeat, as they do, the
+known Idea, so that the artist lends his eyes to the beholder, but in it
+the artist merely presents the object to the beholder, and facilitates for
+him the comprehension of the Idea by bringing the actual, individual
+object to a distinct and complete expression of its nature.
+
+Unlike the works of the other arts, those of architecture are very seldom
+executed for purely æsthetic ends. These are generally subordinated to
+other useful ends which are foreign to art itself. Thus the great merit of
+the architect consists in achieving and attaining the pure æsthetic ends,
+in spite of their subordination to other ends which are foreign to them.
+This he does by cleverly adapting them in a variety of ways to the
+arbitrary ends in view, and by rightly judging which form of æsthetical
+architectonic beauty is compatible and may be associated with a temple,
+which with a palace, which with a prison, and so forth. The more a harsh
+climate increases these demands of necessity and utility, determines them
+definitely, and prescribes them more inevitably, the less free play has
+beauty in architecture. In the mild climate of India, Egypt, Greece, and
+Rome, where the demands of necessity were fewer and less definite,
+architecture could follow its æsthetic ends with the greatest freedom. But
+under a northern sky this was sorely hindered. Here, when caissons,
+pointed roofs and towers were what was demanded, architecture could only
+unfold its own beauty within very narrow limits, and therefore it was
+obliged to make amends by resorting all the more to the borrowed ornaments
+of sculpture, as is seen in Gothic architecture.
+
+We thus see that architecture is greatly restricted by the demands of
+necessity and utility; but on the other hand it has in them a very
+powerful support, for, on account of the magnitude and costliness of its
+works, and the narrow sphere of its æsthetic effect, it could not continue
+to exist merely as a fine art, if it had not also, as a useful and
+necessary profession, a firm and honourable place among the occupations of
+men. It is the want of this that prevents another art from taking its
+place beside architecture as a sister art, although in an æsthetical point
+of view it is quite properly to be classed along with it as its
+counterpart; I mean artistic arrangements of water. For what architecture
+accomplishes for the Idea of gravity when it appears in connection with
+that of rigidity, hydraulics accomplishes for the same Idea, when it is
+connected with fluidity, _i.e._, formlessness, the greatest mobility and
+transparency. Leaping waterfalls foaming and tumbling over rocks,
+cataracts dispersed into floating spray, springs gushing up as high
+columns of water, and clear reflecting lakes, reveal the Ideas of fluid
+and heavy matter, in precisely the same way as the works of architecture
+unfold the Ideas of rigid matter. Artistic hydraulics, however, obtains no
+support from practical hydraulics, for, as a rule, their ends cannot be
+combined; yet, in exceptional cases, this happens; for example, in the
+Cascata di Trevi at Rome.(52)
+
+§ 44. What the two arts we have spoken of accomplish for these lowest
+grades of the objectivity of will, is performed for the higher grades of
+vegetable nature by artistic horticulture. The landscape beauty of a scene
+consists, for the most part, in the multiplicity of natural objects which
+are present in it, and then in the fact that they are clearly separated,
+appear distinctly, and yet exhibit a fitting connection and alternation.
+These two conditions are assisted and promoted by landscape-gardening, but
+it has by no means such a mastery over its material as architecture, and
+therefore its effect is limited. The beauty with which it is concerned
+belongs almost exclusively to nature; it has done little for it; and, on
+the other hand, it can do little against unfavourable nature, and when
+nature works, not for it, but against it, its achievements are small.
+
+The vegetable world offers itself everywhere for æsthetic enjoyment
+without the medium of art; but so far as it is an object of art, it
+belongs principally to landscape-painting; to the province of which all
+the rest of unconscious nature also belongs. In paintings of still life,
+and of mere architecture, ruins, interiors of churches, &c., the
+subjective side of æsthetic pleasure is predominant, _i.e._, our
+satisfaction does not lie principally in the direct comprehension of the
+represented Ideas, but rather in the subjective correlative of this
+comprehension, pure, will-less knowing. For, because the painter lets us
+see these things through his eyes, we at once receive a sympathetic and
+reflected sense of the deep spiritual peace and absolute silence of the
+will, which were necessary in order to enter with knowledge so entirely
+into these lifeless objects, and comprehend them with such love, _i.e._,
+in this case with such a degree of objectivity. The effect of
+landscape-painting proper is indeed, as a whole, of this kind; but because
+the Ideas expressed are more distinct and significant, as higher grades of
+the objectivity of will, the objective side of æsthetic pleasure already
+comes more to the front and assumes as much importance as the subjective
+side. Pure knowing as such is no longer the paramount consideration, for
+we are equally affected by the known Platonic Idea, the world as idea at
+an important grade of the objectification of will.
+
+But a far higher grade is revealed by animal painting and sculpture. Of
+the latter we have some important antique remains; for example, horses at
+Venice, on Monte Cavallo, and on the Elgin Marbles, also at Florence in
+bronze and marble; the ancient boar, howling wolves, the lions in the
+arsenal at Venice, also in the Vatican a whole room almost filled with
+ancient animals, &c. In these representations the objective side of
+æsthetic pleasure obtains a marked predominance over the subjective. The
+peace of the subject which knows these Ideas, which has silenced its own
+will, is indeed present, as it is in all æsthetic contemplation; but its
+effect is not felt, for we are occupied with the restlessness and
+impetuosity of the will represented. It is that very will, which
+constitutes our own nature, that here appears to us in forms, in which its
+manifestation is not, as in us, controlled and tempered by intellect, but
+exhibits itself in stronger traits, and with a distinctness that borders
+on the grotesque and monstrous. For this very reason there is no
+concealment; it is free, naïve, open as the day, and this is the cause of
+our interest in animals. The characteristics of species appeared already
+in the representation of plants, but showed itself only in the forms; here
+it becomes much more distinct, and expresses itself not only in the form,
+but in the action, position, and mien, yet always merely as the character
+of the species, not of the individual. This knowledge of the Ideas of
+higher grades, which in painting we receive through extraneous means, we
+may gain directly by the pure contemplative perception of plants, and
+observation of beasts, and indeed of the latter in their free, natural,
+and unrestrained state. The objective contemplation of their manifold and
+marvellous forms, and of their actions and behaviour, is an instructive
+lesson from the great book of nature, it is a deciphering of the true
+_signatura rerum_.(53) We see in them the manifold grades and modes of the
+manifestation of will, which in all beings of one and the same grade,
+wills always in the same way, which objectifies itself as life, as
+existence in such endless variety, and such different forms, which are all
+adaptations to the different external circumstances, and may be compared
+to many variations on the same theme. But if we had to communicate to the
+observer, for reflection, and in a word, the explanation of their inner
+nature, it would be best to make use of that Sanscrit formula which occurs
+so often in the sacred books of the Hindoos, and is called Mahavakya,
+i.e., the great word: "_Tat twam asi_," which means, "this living thing
+art thou."
+
+§ 45. The great problem of historical painting and sculpture is to express
+directly and for perception the Idea in which the will reaches the highest
+grade of its objectification. The objective side of the pleasure afforded
+by the beautiful is here always predominant, and the subjective side has
+retired into the background. It is further to be observed that at the next
+grade below this, animal painting, the characteristic is entirely one with
+the beautiful; the most characteristic lion, wolf, horse, sheep, or ox,
+was always the most beautiful also. The reason of this is that animals
+have only the character of their species, no individual character. In the
+representation of men the character of the species is separated from that
+of the individual; the former is now called beauty (entirely in the
+objective sense), but the latter retains the name, character, or
+expression, and the new difficulty arises of representing both, at once
+and completely, in the same individual.
+
+_Human beauty_ is an objective expression, which means the fullest
+objectification of will at the highest grade at which it is knowable, the
+Idea of man in general, completely expressed in the sensible form. But
+however much the objective side of the beautiful appears here, the
+subjective side still always accompanies it. And just because no object
+transports us so quickly into pure æsthetic contemplation, as the most
+beautiful human countenance and form, at the sight of which we are
+instantly filled with unspeakable satisfaction, and raised above ourselves
+and all that troubles us; this is only possible because this most distinct
+and purest knowledge of will raises us most easily and quickly to the
+state of pure knowing, in which our personality, our will with its
+constant pain, disappears, so long as the pure æsthetic pleasure lasts.
+Therefore it is that Goethe says: "No evil can touch him who looks on
+human beauty; he feels himself at one with himself and with the world."
+That a beautiful human form is produced by nature must be explained in
+this way. At this its highest grade the will objectifies itself in an
+individual; and therefore through circumstances and its own power it
+completely overcomes all the hindrances and opposition which the phenomena
+of the lower grades present to it. Such are the forces of nature, from
+which the will must always first extort and win back the matter that
+belongs to all its manifestations. Further, the phenomenon of will at its
+higher grades always has multiplicity in its form. Even the tree is only a
+systematic aggregate of innumerably repeated sprouting fibres. This
+combination assumes greater complexity in higher forms, and the human body
+is an exceedingly complex system of different parts, each of which has a
+peculiar life of its own, _vita propria_, subordinate to the whole. Now
+that all these parts are in the proper fashion subordinate to the whole,
+and co-ordinate to each other, that they all work together harmoniously
+for the expression of the whole, nothing superfluous, nothing restricted;
+all these are the rare conditions, whose result is beauty, the completely
+expressed character of the species. So is it in nature. But how in art?
+One would suppose that art achieved the beautiful by imitating nature. But
+how is the artist to recognise the perfect work which is to be imitated,
+and distinguish it from the failures, if he does not anticipate the
+beautiful _before experience_? And besides this, has nature ever produced
+a human being perfectly beautiful in all his parts? It has accordingly
+been thought that the artist must seek out the beautiful parts,
+distributed among a number of different human beings, and out of them
+construct a beautiful whole; a perverse and foolish opinion. For it will
+be asked, how is he to know that just these forms and not others are
+beautiful? We also see what kind of success attended the efforts of the
+old German painters to achieve the beautiful by imitating nature. Observe
+their naked figures. No knowledge of the beautiful is possible purely _a
+posteriori_, and from mere experience; it is always, at least in part, _a
+priori_, although quite different in kind, from the forms of the principle
+of sufficient reason, of which we are conscious _a priori_. These concern
+the universal form of phenomena as such, as it constitutes the possibility
+of knowledge in general, the universal _how_ of all phenomena, and from
+this knowledge proceed mathematics and pure natural science. But this
+other kind of knowledge _a priori_, which makes it possible to express the
+beautiful, concerns, not the form but the content of phenomena, not the
+_how_ but the _what_ of the phenomenon. That we all recognise human beauty
+when we see it, but that in the true artist this takes place with such
+clearness that he shows it as he has never seen it, and surpasses nature
+in his representation; this is only possible because _we ourselves are_
+the will whose adequate objectification at its highest grade is here to be
+judged and discovered. Thus alone have we in fact an anticipation of that
+which nature (which is just the will that constitutes our own being)
+strives to express. And in the true genius this anticipation is
+accompanied by so great a degree of intelligence that he recognises the
+Idea in the particular thing, and thus, as it were, _understands the
+half-uttered speech of nature_, and articulates clearly what she only
+stammered forth. He expresses in the hard marble that beauty of form which
+in a thousand attempts she failed to produce, he presents it to nature,
+saying, as it were, to her, "That is what you wanted to say!" And whoever
+is able to judge replies, "Yes, that is it." Only in this way was it
+possible for the genius of the Greeks to find the type of human beauty and
+establish it as a canon for the school of sculpture; and only by virtue of
+such an anticipation is it possible for all of us to recognise beauty,
+when it has actually been achieved by nature in the particular case. This
+anticipation is the _Ideal_. It is the _Idea_ so far as it is known _a
+priori_, at least half, and it becomes practical for art, because it
+corresponds to and completes what is given _a posteriori_ through nature.
+The possibility of such an anticipation of the beautiful _a priori_ in the
+artist, and of its recognition _a posteriori_ by the critic, lies in the
+fact that the artist and the critic are themselves the "in-itself" of
+nature, the will which objectifies itself. For, as Empedocles said, like
+can only be known by like: only nature can understand itself: only nature
+can fathom itself: but only spirit also can understand spirit.(54)
+
+The opinion, which is absurd, although expressed by the Socrates of
+Xenophon (Stobæi Floril, vol. ii. p. 384) that the Greeks discovered the
+established ideal of human beauty empirically, by collecting particular
+beautiful parts, uncovering and noting here a knee, there an arm, has an
+exact parallel in the art of poetry. The view is entertained, that
+Shakespeare, for example, observed, and then gave forth from his own
+experience of life, the innumerable variety of the characters in his
+dramas, so true, so sustained, so profoundly worked out. The impossibility
+and absurdity of such an assumption need not be dwelt upon. It is obvious
+that the man of genius produces the works of poetic art by means of an
+anticipation of what is characteristic, just as he produces the works of
+plastic and pictorial art by means of a prophetic anticipation of the
+beautiful; yet both require experience as a pattern or model, for thus
+alone can that which is dimly known _a priori_ be called into clear
+consciousness, and an intelligent representation of it becomes possible.
+
+Human beauty was explained above as the fullest objectification of will at
+the highest grade at which it is knowable. It expresses itself through the
+form; and this lies in space alone, and has no necessary connection with
+time, as, for example, motion has. Thus far then we may say: the adequate
+objectification of will through a merely spatial phenomenon is beauty, in
+the objective sense. A plant is nothing but such a merely spatial
+phenomenon of will; for no motion, and consequently no relation to time
+(regarded apart from its development), belongs to the expression of its
+nature; its mere form expresses its whole being and displays it openly.
+But brutes and men require, further, for the full revelation of the will
+which is manifested in them, a series of actions, and thus the
+manifestation in them takes on a direct relation to time. All this has
+already been explained in the preceding book; it is related to what we are
+considering at present in the following way. As the merely spatial
+manifestation of will can objectify it fully or defectively at each
+definite grade,--and it is this which constitutes beauty or ugliness,--so
+the temporal objectification of will, _i.e._, the action, and indeed the
+direct action, the movement, may correspond to the will, which objectifies
+itself in it, purely and fully without foreign admixture, without
+superfluity, without defect, only expressing exactly the act of will
+determined in each case;--or the converse of all this may occur. In the
+first case the movement is made with _grace_, in the second case without
+it. Thus as beauty is the adequate representation of will generally,
+through its merely spatial manifestation; _grace_ is the adequate
+representation of will through its temporal manifestation, that is to say,
+the perfectly accurate and fitting expression of each act of will, through
+the movement and position which objectify it. Since movement and position
+presuppose the body, Winckelmann's expression is very true and suitable,
+when he says, "Grace is the proper relation of the acting person to the
+action" (Works, vol. i. p. 258). It is thus evident that beauty may be
+attributed to a plant, but no grace, unless in a figurative sense; but to
+brutes and men, both beauty and grace. Grace consists, according to what
+has been said, in every movement being performed, and every position
+assumed, in the easiest, most appropriate and convenient way, and
+therefore being the pure, adequate expression of its intention, or of the
+act of will, without any superfluity, which exhibits itself as aimless,
+meaningless bustle, or as wooden stiffness. Grace presupposes as its
+condition a true proportion of all the limbs, and a symmetrical,
+harmonious figure; for complete ease and evident appropriateness of all
+positions and movements are only possible by means of these. Grace is
+therefore never without a certain degree of beauty of person. The two,
+complete and united, are the most distinct manifestation of will at the
+highest grade of its objectification.
+
+It was mentioned above that in order rightly to portray man, it is
+necessary to separate the character of the species from that of the
+individual, so that to a certain extent every man expresses an Idea
+peculiar to himself, as was said in the last book. Therefore the arts
+whose aim is the representation of the Idea of man, have as their problem,
+not only beauty, the character of the species, but also the character of
+the individual, which is called, _par excellence_, _character_. But this
+is only the case in so far as this character is to be regarded, not as
+something accidental and quite peculiar to the man as a single individual,
+but as a side of the Idea of humanity which is specially apparent in this
+individual, and the representation of which is therefore of assistance in
+revealing this Idea. Thus the character, although as such it is
+individual, must yet be Ideal, that is, its significance in relation to
+the Idea of humanity generally (the objectifying of which it assists in
+its own way) must be comprehended and expressed with special prominence.
+Apart from this the representation is a portrait, a copy of the individual
+as such, with all his accidental qualities. And even the portrait ought to
+be, as Winckelmann says, the ideal of the individual.
+
+That _character_ which is to be ideally comprehended, as the prominence of
+a special side of the Idea of humanity, expresses itself visibly, partly
+through permanent physiognomy and bodily form, partly through passing
+emotion and passion, the reciprocal modification of knowing and willing by
+each other, which is all exhibited in the mien and movements. Since the
+individual always belongs to humanity, and, on the other hand, humanity
+always reveals itself in the individual with what is indeed peculiar ideal
+significance, beauty must not be destroyed by character nor character by
+beauty. For if the character of the species is annulled by that of the
+individual, the result is caricature; and if the character of the
+individual is annulled by that of the species, the result is an absence of
+meaning. Therefore the representation which aims at beauty, as sculpture
+principally does, will yet always modify this (the character of the
+species), in some respect, by the individual character, and will always
+express the Idea of man in a definite individual manner, giving prominence
+to a special side of it. For the human individual as such has to a certain
+extent the dignity of a special Idea, and it is essential to the Idea of
+man that it should express itself in individuals of special significance.
+Therefore we find in the works of the ancients, that the beauty distinctly
+comprehended by them, is not expressed in one form, but in many forms of
+different character. It is always apprehended, as it were, from a
+different side, and expressed in one way in Apollo, in another way in
+Bacchus, in another in Hercules, in another in Antinous; indeed the
+characteristic may limit the beautiful, and finally extend even to
+hideousness, in the drunken Silenus, in the Faun, &c. If the
+characteristic goes so far as actually to annul the character of the
+species, if it extends to the unnatural, it becomes caricature. But we can
+far less afford to allow grace to be interfered with by what is
+characteristic than even beauty, for graceful position and movement are
+demanded for the expression of the character also; but yet it must be
+achieved in the way which is most fitting, appropriate, and easy for the
+person. This will be observed, not only by the sculptor and the painter,
+but also by every good actor; otherwise caricature will appear here also
+as grimace or distortion.
+
+In sculpture, beauty and grace are the principal concern. The special
+character of the mind, appearing in emotion, passion, alternations of
+knowing and willing, which can only be represented by the expression of
+the countenance and the gestures, is the peculiar sphere of _painting_.
+For although eyes and colour, which lie outside the province of sculpture,
+contribute much to beauty, they are yet far more essential to character.
+Further, beauty unfolds itself more completely when it is contemplated
+from various points of view; but the expression, the character, can only
+be completely comprehended from _one_ point of view.
+
+Because beauty is obviously the chief aim of sculpture, Lessing tried to
+explain the fact that the _Laocoon does not cry out_, by saying that
+crying out is incompatible with beauty. The Laocoon formed for Lessing the
+theme, or at least the text of a work of his own, and both before and
+after him a great deal has been written on the subject. I may therefore be
+allowed to express my views about it in passing, although so special a
+discussion does not properly belong to the scheme of this work, which is
+throughout concerned with what is general.
+
+§ 46. That Laocoon, in the celebrated group, does not cry out is obvious,
+and the universal and ever-renewed surprise at this must be occasioned by
+the fact that any of us would cry out if we were in his place. And nature
+demands that it should be so; for in the case of the acutest physical
+pain, and the sudden seizure by the greatest bodily fear, all reflection,
+that might have inculcated silent endurance, is entirely expelled from
+consciousness, and nature relieves itself by crying out, thus expressing
+both the pain and the fear, summoning the deliverer and terrifying the
+assailer. Thus Winckelmann missed the expression of crying out; but as he
+wished to justify the artist he turned Laocoon into a Stoic, who
+considered it beneath his dignity to cry out _secundum naturam_, but added
+to his pain the useless constraint of suppressing all utterance of it.
+Winckelmann therefore sees in him "the tried spirit of a great man, who
+writhes in agony, and yet seeks to suppress the utterance of his feeling,
+and to lock it up in himself. He does not break forth into loud cries, as
+in Virgil, but only anxious sighs escape him," &c. (Works, vol. vii. p.
+98, and at greater length in vol. vi. p. 104). Now Lessing criticised this
+opinion of Winckelmann's in his Laocoon, and improved it in the way
+mentioned above. In place of the psychological he gave the purely æsthetic
+reason that beauty, the principle of ancient art, does not admit of the
+expression of crying out. Another argument which he added to this, that a
+merely passing state incapable of duration ought not to be represented in
+motionless works of art, has a hundred examples of most excellent figures
+against it, which are fixed in merely transitory movements, dancing,
+wrestling, catching, &c. Indeed Goethe, in the essay on the Laocoon, which
+opens the Propylaen (p. 8), holds that the choice of such a merely
+fleeting movement is absolutely necessary. In our own day Hirt (Horen,
+1797, tenth St.) finally decided the point, deducing everything from the
+highest truth of expression, that Laocoon does not cry out, because he can
+no longer do so, as he is at the point of death from choking. Lastly,
+Fernow ("Römische Studien," vol. i. p. 246) expounded and weighed all
+these opinions; he added, however, no new one of his own, but combined
+these three eclectically.
+
+I cannot but wonder that such thoughtful and acute men should laboriously
+bring far-fetched and insufficient reasons, should resort to psychological
+and physiological arguments, to explain a matter the reason of which lies
+so near at hand, and is obvious at once to the unprejudiced; and
+especially I wonder that Lessing, who came so near the true explanation,
+should yet have entirely missed the real point.
+
+Before all psychological and physiological inquiries as to whether Laocoon
+would cry out in his position or not (and I certainly affirm that he
+would), it must be decided as regards the group in question, that crying
+out ought not to be expressed in it, for the simple reason that its
+expression lies quite outside the province of sculpture. A shrieking
+Laocoon could not be produced in marble, but only a figure with the mouth
+open vainly endeavouring to shriek; a Laocoon whose voice has stuck in his
+throat, _vox faucibus haesit_. The essence of shrieking, and consequently
+its effect upon the onlooker, lies entirely in sound; not in the
+distortion of the mouth. This phenomenon, which necessarily accompanies
+shrieking, derives motive and justification only from the sound produced
+by means of it; then it is permissible and indeed necessary, as
+characteristic of the action, even though it interferes with beauty. But
+in plastic art, to which the representation of shrieking is quite foreign
+and impossible, it would be actual folly to represent the medium of
+violent shrieking, the distorted mouth, which would disturb all the
+features and the remainder of the expression; for thus at the sacrifice of
+many other things the means would be represented, while its end, the
+shrieking itself, and its effect upon our feelings, would be left out. Nay
+more, there would be produced the spectacle of a continuous effort without
+effect, which is always ridiculous, and may really be compared to what
+happened when some one for a joke stopped the horn of a night watchman
+with wax while he was asleep, and then awoke him with the cry of fire, and
+amused himself by watching his vain endeavours to blow the horn. When, on
+the other hand, the expression of shrieking lies in the province of poetic
+or histrionic art, it is quite admissible, because it helps to express the
+truth, _i.e._, the complete expression of the Idea. Thus it is with
+poetry, which claims the assistance of the imagination of the reader, in
+order to enable it to represent things perceptibly. Therefore Virgil makes
+Laocoon cry out like the bellowing of an ox that has broken loose after
+being struck by the axe; and Homer (Il. xx. 48-53) makes Mars and Minerva
+shriek horribly, without derogating from their divine dignity or beauty.
+The same with acting; Laocoon on the stage would certainly have to shriek.
+Sophocles makes Philoctetus cry out, and, on the ancient stage at any
+rate, he must actually have done so. As a case in point, I remember having
+seen in London the great actor Kemble play in a piece called Pizarro,
+translated from the German. He took the part of the American, a
+half-savage, but of very noble character. When he was wounded he cried out
+loudly and wildly, which had a great and admirable effect, for it was
+exceedingly characteristic and therefore assisted the truth of the
+representation very much. On the other hand, a painted or sculptured model
+of a man shrieking, would be much more absurd than the painted music which
+is censured in Goethe's Propylaen. For shrieking does far more injury to
+the expression and beauty of the whole than music, which at the most only
+occupies the hands and arms, and is to be looked upon as an occupation
+characteristic of the person; indeed thus far it may quite rightly be
+painted, as long as it demands no violent movement of the body, or
+distortion of the mouth: for example, St. Cecilia at the organ, Raphael's
+violin-player in the Sciarra Gallery at Rome, and others. Since then, on
+account of the limits of the art, the pain of Laocoon must not be
+expressed by shrieking, the artist was obliged to employ every other
+expression of pain; this he has done in the most perfect manner, as is
+ably described by Winckelmann (Works, vol. vi. p. 104), whose admirable
+account thus retains its full value and truth, as soon as we abstract from
+the stoical view which underlies it.(55)
+
+§ 47. Because beauty accompanied with grace is the principal object of
+sculpture, it loves nakedness, and allows clothing only so far as it does
+not conceal the form. It makes use of drapery, not as a covering, but as a
+means of exhibiting the form, a method of exposition that gives much
+exercise to the understanding, for it can only arrive at a perception of
+the cause, the form of the body, through the only directly given effect,
+the drapery. Thus to a certain extent drapery is in sculpture what
+fore-shortening is in painting. Both are suggestions, yet not symbolical,
+but such that, if they are successful, they force the understanding
+directly to perceive what is suggested, just as if it were actually given.
+
+I may be allowed, in passing, to insert here a comparison that is very
+pertinent to the arts we are discussing. It is this: as the beautiful
+bodily form is seen to the greatest advantage when clothed in the lightest
+way, or indeed without any clothing at all, and therefore a very handsome
+man, if he had also taste and the courage to follow it, would go about
+almost naked, clothed only after the manner of the ancients; so every one
+who possesses a beautiful and rich mind will always express himself in the
+most natural, direct, and simple way, concerned, if it be possible, to
+communicate his thoughts to others, and thus relieve the loneliness that
+he must feel in such a world as this. And conversely, poverty of mind,
+confusion, and perversity of thought, will clothe itself in the most
+far-fetched expressions and the obscurest forms of speech, in order to
+wrap up in difficult and pompous phraseology small, trifling, insipid, or
+commonplace thoughts; like a man who has lost the majesty of beauty, and
+trying to make up for the deficiency by means of clothing, seeks to hide
+the insignificance or ugliness of his person under barbaric finery,
+tinsel, feathers, ruffles, cuffs, and mantles. Many an author, if
+compelled to translate his pompous and obscure book into its little clear
+content, would be as utterly spoilt as this man if he had to go naked.
+
+§ 48. _Historical painting_ has for its principal object, besides beauty
+and grace, character. By character we mean generally, the representation
+of will at the highest grade of its objectification, when the individual,
+as giving prominence to a particular side of the Idea of humanity, has
+special significance, and shows this not merely by his form, but makes it
+visible in his bearing and occupation, by action of every kind, and the
+modifications of knowing and willing that occasion and accompany it. The
+Idea of man must be exhibited in these circumstances, and therefore the
+unfolding of its many-sidedness must be brought before our eyes by means
+of representative individuals, and these individuals can only be made
+visible in their significance through various scenes, events, and actions.
+This is the endless problem of the historical painter, and he solves it by
+placing before us scenes of life of every kind, of greater or less
+significance. No individual and no action can be without significance; in
+all and through all the Idea of man unfolds itself more and more.
+Therefore no event of human life is excluded from the sphere of painting.
+It is thus a great injustice to the excellent painters of the Dutch
+school, to prize merely their technical skill, and to look down upon them
+in other respects, because, for the most part, they represent objects of
+common life, whereas it is assumed that only the events of the history of
+the world, or the incidents of biblical story, have significance. We ought
+first to bethink ourselves that the inward significance of an action is
+quite different from its outward significance, and that these are often
+separated from each other. The outward significance is the importance of
+an action in relation to its result for and in the actual world; thus
+according to the principle of sufficient reason. The inward significance
+is the depth of the insight into the Idea of man which it reveals, in that
+it brings to light sides of that Idea which rarely appear, by making
+individuals who assert themselves distinctly and decidedly, disclose their
+peculiar characteristics by means of appropriately arranged circumstances.
+Only the inward significance concerns art; the outward belongs to history.
+They are both completely independent of each other; they may appear
+together, but may each appear alone. An action which is of the highest
+significance for history may in inward significance be a very ordinary and
+common one; and conversely, a scene of ordinary daily life may be of great
+inward significance, if human individuals, and the inmost recesses of
+human action and will, appear in it in a clear and distinct light.
+Further, the outward and the inward significance of a scene may be equal
+and yet very different. Thus, for example, it is all the same, as far as
+inward significance is concerned, whether ministers discuss the fate of
+countries and nations over a map, or boors wrangle in a beer-house over
+cards and dice, just as it is all the same whether we play chess with
+golden or wooden pieces. But apart from this, the scenes and events that
+make up the life of so many millions of men, their actions, their sorrows,
+their joys, are on that account important enough to be the object of art,
+and by their rich variety they must afford material enough for unfolding
+the many-sided Idea of man. Indeed the very transitoriness of the moment
+which art has fixed in such a picture (now called _genre_-painting)
+excites a slight and peculiar sensation; for to fix the fleeting,
+ever-changing world in the enduring picture of a single event, which yet
+represents the whole, is an achievement of the art of painting by which it
+seems to bring time itself to a standstill, for it raises the individual
+to the Idea of its species. Finally, the historical and outwardly
+significant subjects of painting have often the disadvantage that just
+what is significant in them cannot be presented to perception, but must be
+arrived at by thought. In this respect the nominal significance of the
+picture must be distinguished from its real significance. The former is
+the outward significance, which, however, can only be reached as a
+conception; the latter is that side of the Idea of man which is made
+visible to the onlooker in the picture. For example, Moses found by the
+Egyptian princess is the nominal significance of a painting; it represents
+a moment of the greatest importance in history; the real significance, on
+the other hand, that which is really given to the onlooker, is a foundling
+child rescued from its floating cradle by a great lady, an incident which
+may have happened more than once. The costume alone can here indicate the
+particular historical case to the learned; but the costume is only of
+importance to the nominal significance, and is a matter of indifference to
+the real significance; for the latter knows only the human being as such,
+not the arbitrary forms. Subjects taken from history have no advantage
+over those which are taken from mere possibility, and which are therefore
+to be called, not individual, but merely general. For what is peculiarly
+significant in the former is not the individual, not the particular event
+as such, but the universal in it, the side of the Idea of humanity which
+expresses itself through it. But, on the other hand, definite historical
+subjects are not on this account to be rejected, only the really artistic
+view of such subjects, both in the painter and in the beholder, is never
+directed to the individual particulars in them, which properly constitute
+the historical, but to the universal which expresses itself in them, to
+the Idea. And only those historical subjects are to be chosen the chief
+point of which can actually be represented, and not merely arrived at by
+thought, otherwise the nominal significance is too remote from the real;
+what is merely thought in connection with the picture becomes of most
+importance, and interferes with what is perceived. If even on the stage it
+is not right that the chief incident of the plot should take place behind
+the scenes (as in French tragedies), it is clearly a far greater fault in
+a picture. Historical subjects are distinctly disadvantageous only when
+they confine the painter to a field which has not been chosen for artistic
+but for other reasons, and especially when this field is poor in
+picturesque and significant objects--if, for example, it is the history of
+a small, isolated, capricious, hierarchical (_i.e._, ruled by error),
+obscure people, like the Jews, despised by the great contemporary nations
+of the East and the West. Since the wandering of the tribes lies between
+us and all ancient nations, as the change of the bed of the ocean lies
+between the earth's surface as it is to-day and as it was when those
+organisations existed which we only know from fossil remains, it is to be
+regarded generally as a great misfortune that the people whose culture was
+to be the principal basis of our own were not the Indians or the Greeks,
+or even the Romans, but these very Jews. But it was especially a great
+misfortune for the Italian painters of genius in the fifteenth and
+sixteenth centuries that, in the narrow sphere to which they were
+arbitrarily driven for the choice of subjects, they were obliged to have
+recourse to miserable beings of every kind. For the New Testament, as
+regards its historical part, is almost more unsuitable for painting than
+the Old, and the subsequent history of martyrs and doctors of the church
+is a very unfortunate subject. Yet of the pictures, whose subject is the
+history or mythology of Judaism and Christianity, we must carefully
+distinguish those in which the peculiar, _i.e._, the ethical spirit of
+Christianity is revealed for perception, by the representation of men who
+are full of this spirit. These representations are in fact the highest and
+most admirable achievements of the art of painting; and only the greatest
+masters of this art succeeded in this, particularly Raphael and Correggio,
+and especially in their earlier pictures. Pictures of this kind are not
+properly to be classed as historical: for, as a rule, they represent no
+event, no action; but are merely groups of saints, with the Saviour
+himself, often still a child, with His mother, angels, &c. In their
+countenances, and especially in the eyes, we see the expression, the
+reflection, of the completest knowledge, that which is not directed to
+particular things, but has fully grasped the Ideas, and thus the whole
+nature of the world and life. And this knowledge in them, reacting upon
+the will, does not, like other knowledge, convey _motives_ to it, but on
+the contrary has become a _quieter_ of all will, from which proceeded the
+complete resignation, which is the innermost spirit of Christianity, as of
+the Indian philosophy; the surrender of all volition, conversion, the
+suppression of will, and with it of the whole inner being of this world,
+that is to say, salvation. Thus these masters of art, worthy of eternal
+praise, expressed perceptibly in their works the highest wisdom. And this
+is the summit of all art. It has followed the will in its adequate
+objectivity, the Ideas, through all its grades, in which it is affected
+and its nature unfolded in so many ways, first by causes, then by stimuli,
+and finally by motives. And now art ends with the representation of the
+free self-suppression of will, by means of the great peace which it gains
+from the perfect knowledge of its own nature.(56)
+
+§ 49. The truth which lies at the foundation of all that we have hitherto
+said about art, is that the object of art, the representation of which is
+the aim of the artist, and the knowledge of which must therefore precede
+his work as its germ and source, is an Idea in Plato's sense, and never
+anything else; not the particular thing, the object of common
+apprehension, and not the concept, the object of rational thought and of
+science. Although the Idea and the concept have something in common,
+because both represent as unity a multiplicity of real things; yet the
+great difference between them has no doubt been made clear and evident
+enough by what we have said about concepts in the first book, and about
+Ideas in this book. I by no means wish to assert, however, that Plato
+really distinctly comprehended this difference; indeed many of his
+examples of Ideas, and his discussions of them, are applicable only to
+concepts. Meanwhile we leave this question alone and go on our own way,
+glad when we come upon traces of any great and noble mind, yet not
+following his footsteps but our own aim. The _concept_ is abstract,
+discursive, undetermined within its own sphere, only determined by its
+limits, attainable and comprehensible by him who has only reason,
+communicable by words without any other assistance, entirely exhausted by
+its definition. The _Idea_ on the contrary, although defined as the
+adequate representative of the concept, is always object of perception,
+and although representing an infinite number of particular things, is yet
+thoroughly determined. It is never known by the individual as such, but
+only by him who has raised himself above all willing and all individuality
+to the pure subject of knowing. Thus it is only attainable by the man of
+genius, and by him who, for the most part through the assistance of the
+works of genius, has reached an exalted frame of mind, by increasing his
+power of pure knowing. It is therefore not absolutely but only
+conditionally communicable, because the Idea, comprehended and repeated in
+the work of art, appeals to every one only according to the measure of his
+own intellectual worth. So that just the most excellent works of every
+art, the noblest productions of genius, must always remain sealed books to
+the dull majority of men, inaccessible to them, separated from them by a
+wide gulf, just as the society of princes is inaccessible to the common
+people. It is true that even the dullest of them accept on authority
+recognisedly great works, lest otherwise they should argue their own
+incompetence; but they wait in silence, always ready to express their
+condemnation, as soon as they are allowed to hope that they may do so
+without being left to stand alone; and then their long-restrained hatred
+against all that is great and beautiful, and against the authors of it,
+gladly relieves itself; for such things never appealed to them, and for
+that very reason were humiliating to them. For as a rule a man must have
+worth in himself in order to recognise it and believe in it willingly and
+freely in others. On this rests the necessity of modesty in all merit, and
+the disproportionately loud praise of this virtue, which alone of all its
+sisters is always included in the eulogy of every one who ventures to
+praise any distinguished man, in order to appease and quiet the wrath of
+the unworthy. What then is modesty but hypocritical humility, by means of
+which, in a world swelling with base envy, a man seeks to obtain pardon
+for excellences and merits from those who have none? For whoever
+attributes to himself no merits, because he actually has none, is not
+modest but merely honest.
+
+The _Idea_ is the unity that falls into multiplicity on account of the
+temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension; the _concept_, on
+the contrary, is the unity reconstructed out of multiplicity by the
+abstraction of our reason; the latter may be defined as _unitas post rem_,
+the former as _unitas ante rem_. Finally, we may express the distinction
+between the Idea and the concept, by a comparison, thus: the _concept_ is
+like a dead receptacle, in which, whatever has been put, actually lies
+side by side, but out of which no more can be taken (by analytical
+judgment) than was put in (by synthetical reflection); the (Platonic)
+_Idea_, on the other hand, develops, in him who has comprehended it, ideas
+which are new as regards the concept of the same name; it resembles a
+living organism, developing itself and possessed of the power of
+reproduction, which brings forth what was not put into it.
+
+It follows from all that has been said, that the concept, useful as it is
+in life, and serviceable, necessary and productive as it is in science, is
+yet always barren and unfruitful in art. The comprehended Idea, on the
+contrary, is the true and only source of every work of art. In its
+powerful originality it is only derived from life itself, from nature,
+from the world, and that only by the true genius, or by him whose
+momentary inspiration reaches the point of genius. Genuine and immortal
+works of art spring only from such direct apprehension. Just because the
+Idea is and remains object of perception, the artist is not conscious in
+the abstract of the intention and aim of his work; not a concept, but an
+Idea floats before his mind; therefore he can give no justification of
+what he does. He works, as people say, from pure feeling, and
+unconsciously, indeed instinctively. On the contrary, imitators,
+mannerists, _imitatores, servum pecus_, start, in art, from the concept;
+they observe what pleases and affects us in true works of art; understand
+it clearly, fix it in a concept, and thus abstractly, and then imitate it,
+openly or disguisedly, with dexterity and intentionally. They suck their
+nourishment, like parasite plants, from the works of others, and like
+polypi, they become the colour of their food. We might carry comparison
+further, and say that they are like machines which mince fine and mingle
+together whatever is put into them, but can never digest it, so that the
+different constituent parts may always be found again if they are sought
+out and separated from the mixture; the man of genius alone resembles the
+organised, assimilating, transforming and reproducing body. For he is
+indeed educated and cultured by his predecessors and their works; but he
+is really fructified only by life and the world directly, through the
+impression of what he perceives; therefore the highest culture never
+interferes with his originality. All imitators, all mannerists, apprehend
+in concepts the nature of representative works of art; but concepts can
+never impart inner life to a work. The age, _i.e._, the dull multitude of
+every time, knows only concepts, and sticks to them, and therefore
+receives mannered works of art with ready and loud applause: but after a
+few years these works become insipid, because the spirit of the age,
+_i.e._, the prevailing concepts, in which alone they could take root, have
+changed. Only true works of art, which are drawn directly from nature and
+life, have eternal youth and enduring power, like nature and life
+themselves. For they belong to no age, but to humanity, and as on that
+account they are coldly received by their own age, to which they disdain
+to link themselves closely, and because indirectly and negatively they
+expose the existing errors, they are slowly and unwillingly recognised; on
+the other hand, they cannot grow old, but appear to us ever fresh and new
+down to the latest ages. Then they are no longer exposed to neglect and
+ignorance, for they are crowned and sanctioned by the praise of the few
+men capable of judging, who appear singly and rarely in the course of
+ages,(57) and give in their votes, whose slowly growing number constitutes
+the authority, which alone is the judgment-seat we mean when we appeal to
+posterity. It is these successively appearing individuals, for the mass of
+posterity will always be and remain just as perverse and dull as the mass
+of contemporaries always was and always is. We read the complaints of
+great men in every century about the customs of their age. They always
+sound as if they referred to our own age, for the race is always the same.
+At every time and in every art, mannerisms have taken the place of the
+spirit, which was always the possession of a few individuals, but
+mannerisms are just the old cast-off garments of the last manifestation of
+the spirit that existed and was recognised. From all this it appears that,
+as a rule, the praise of posterity can only be gained at the cost of the
+praise of one's contemporaries, and _vice versa_.(58)
+
+§ 50. If the aim of all art is the communication of the comprehended Idea,
+which through the mind of the artist appears in such a form that it is
+purged and isolated from all that is foreign to it, and may now be grasped
+by the man of weaker comprehension and no productive faculty; if further,
+it is forbidden in art to start from the concept, we shall not be able to
+consent to the intentional and avowed employment of a work of art for the
+expression of a concept; this is the case in the _Allegory_. An allegory
+is a work of art which means something different from what it represents.
+But the object of perception, and consequently also the Idea, expresses
+itself directly and completely, and does not require the medium of
+something else which implies or indicates it. Thus, that which in this way
+is indicated and represented by something entirely different, because it
+cannot itself be made object of perception, is always a concept. Therefore
+through the allegory a conception has always to be signified, and
+consequently the mind of the beholder has to be drawn away from the
+expressed perceptible idea to one which is entirely different, abstract
+and not perceptible, and which lies quite outside the work of art. The
+picture or statue is intended to accomplish here what is accomplished far
+more fully by a book. Now, what we hold is the end of art, representation
+of a perceivable, comprehensible Idea, is not here the end. No great
+completeness in the work of art is demanded for what is aimed at here. It
+is only necessary that we should see what the thing is meant to be, for,
+as soon as this has been discovered, the end is reached, and the mind is
+now led away to quite a different kind of idea to an abstract conception,
+which is the end that was in view. Allegories in plastic and pictorial art
+are, therefore, nothing but hieroglyphics; the artistic value which they
+may have as perceptible representations, belongs to them not as
+allegories, but otherwise. That the "Night" of Correggio, the "Genius of
+Fame" of Hannibal Caracci, and the "Hours" of Poussin, are very beautiful
+pictures, is to be separated altogether from the fact that they are
+allegories. As allegories they do not accomplish more than a legend,
+indeed rather less. We are here again reminded of the distinction drawn
+above between the real and the nominal significance of a picture. The
+nominal is here the allegorical as such, for example, the "Genius of
+Fame." The real is what is actually represented, in this case a beautiful
+winged youth, surrounded by beautiful boys; this expresses an Idea. But
+this real significance affects us only so long as we forget the nominal,
+allegorical significance; if we think of the latter, we forsake the
+perception, and the mind is occupied with an abstract conception; but the
+transition from the Idea to the conception is always a fall. Indeed, that
+nominal significance, that allegorical intention, often injures the real
+significance, the perceptible truth. For example, the unnatural light in
+the "Night" of Correggio, which, though beautifully executed, has yet a
+merely allegorical motive, and is really impossible. If then an
+allegorical picture has artistic value, it is quite separate from and
+independent of what it accomplishes as allegory. Such a work of art serves
+two ends at once, the expression of a conception and the expression of an
+Idea. Only the latter can be an end of art; the other is a foreign end,
+the trifling amusement of making a picture also do service as a legend, as
+a hieroglyphic, invented for the pleasure of those to whom the true nature
+of art can never appeal. It is the same thing as when a work of art is
+also a useful implement of some kind, in which case it also serves two
+ends; for example, a statue which is at the same time a candelabrum or a
+caryatide; or a bas-relief, which is also the shield of Achilles. True
+lovers of art will allow neither the one nor the other. It is true that an
+allegorical picture may, because of this quality, produce a vivid
+impression upon the feelings; but when this is the case, a legend would
+under the same circumstances produce the same effect. For example, if the
+desire of fame were firmly and lastingly rooted in the heart of a man,
+because he regarded it as his rightful possession, which is only withheld
+from him so long as he has not produced the charter of his ownership; and
+if the Genius of Fame, with his laurel crown, were to appear to such a
+man, his whole mind would be excited, and his powers called into activity;
+but the same effect would be produced if he were suddenly to see the word
+"fame," in large distinct letters on the wall. Or if a man has made known
+a truth, which is of importance either as a maxim for practical life, or
+as insight for science, but it has not been believed; an allegorical
+picture representing time as it lifts the veil, and discloses the naked
+figure of Truth, will affect him powerfully; but the same effect would be
+produced by the legend: "_Le temps découvre la vérité._" For what really
+produces the effect here is the abstract thought, not the object of
+perception.
+
+If then, in accordance with what has been said, allegory in plastic and
+pictorial art is a mistaken effort, serving an end which is entirely
+foreign to art, it becomes quite unbearable when it leads so far astray
+that the representation of forced and violently introduced subtilties
+degenerates into absurdity. Such, for example, is a tortoise, to represent
+feminine seclusion; the downward glance of Nemesis into the drapery of her
+bosom, signifying that she can see into what is hidden; the explanation of
+Bellori that Hannibal Carracci represents voluptuousness clothed in a
+yellow robe, because he wishes to indicate that her lovers soon fade and
+become yellow as straw. If there is absolutely no connection between the
+representation and the conception signified by it, founded on subsumption
+under the concept, or association of Ideas; but the signs and the things
+signified are combined in a purely conventional manner, by positive,
+accidentally introduced laws; then I call this degenerate kind of allegory
+_Symbolism_. Thus the rose is the symbol of secrecy, the laurel is the
+symbol of fame, the palm is the symbol of peace, the scallop-shell is the
+symbol of pilgrimage, the cross is the symbol of the Christian religion.
+To this class also belongs all significance of mere colour, as yellow is
+the colour of falseness, and blue is the colour of fidelity. Such symbols
+may often be of use in life, but their value is foreign to art. They are
+simply to be regarded as hieroglyphics, or like Chinese word-writing, and
+really belong to the same class as armorial bearings, the bush that
+indicates a public-house, the key of the chamberlain, or the leather of
+the mountaineer. If, finally, certain historical or mythical persons, or
+personified conceptions, are represented by certain fixed symbols, these
+are properly called _emblems_. Such are the beasts of the Evangelist, the
+owl of Minerva, the apple of Paris, the Anchor of Hope, &c. For the most
+part, however, we understand by emblems those simple allegorical
+representations explained by a motto, which are meant to express a moral
+truth, and of which large collections have been made by J. Camerarius,
+Alciatus, and others. They form the transition to poetical allegory, of
+which we shall have more to say later. Greek sculpture devotes itself to
+the perception, and therefore it is _æsthetical_; Indian sculpture devotes
+itself to the conception, and therefore it is merely _symbolical_.
+
+This conclusion in regard to allegory, which is founded on our
+consideration of the nature of art and quite consistent with it, is
+directly opposed to the opinion of Winckelmann, who, far from explaining
+allegory, as we do, as something quite foreign to the end of art, and
+often interfering with it, always speaks in favour of it, and indeed
+(Works, vol. i. p. 55) places the highest aim of art in the
+"representation of universal conceptions, and non-sensuous things." We
+leave it to every one to adhere to whichever view he pleases. Only the
+truth became very clear to me from these and similar views of Winckelmann
+connected with his peculiar metaphysic of the beautiful, that one may have
+the greatest susceptibility for artistic beauty, and the soundest judgment
+in regard to it, without being able to give an abstract and strictly
+philosophical justification of the nature of the beautiful; just as one
+may be very noble and virtuous, and may have a tender conscience, which
+decides with perfect accuracy in particular cases, without on that account
+being in a position to investigate and explain in the abstract the ethical
+significance of action.
+
+Allegory has an entirely different relation to poetry from that which it
+has to plastic and pictorial art, and although it is to be rejected in the
+latter, it is not only permissible, but very serviceable to the former.
+For in plastic and pictorial art it leads away from what is perceptibly
+given, the proper object of all art, to abstract thoughts; but in poetry
+the relation is reversed; for here what is directly given in words is the
+concept, and the first aim is to lead from this to the object of
+perception, the representation of which must be undertaken by the
+imagination of the hearer. If in plastic and pictorial art we are led from
+what is immediately given to something else, this must always be a
+conception, because here only the abstract cannot be given directly; but a
+conception must never be the source, and its communication must never be
+the end of a work of art. In poetry, on the contrary, the conception is
+the material, the immediately given, and therefore we may very well leave
+it, in order to call up perceptions which are quite different, and in
+which the end is reached. Many a conception or abstract thought may be
+quite indispensable to the connection of a poem, which is yet, in itself
+and directly, quite incapable of being perceived; and then it is often
+made perceptible by means of some example which is subsumed under it. This
+takes place in every trope, every metaphor, simile, parable, and allegory,
+all of which differ only in the length and completeness of their
+expression. Therefore, in the arts which employ language as their medium,
+similes and allegories are of striking effect. How beautifully Cervantes
+says of sleep in order to express the fact that it frees us from all
+spiritual and bodily suffering, "It is a mantle that covers all mankind."
+How beautifully Kleist expresses allegorically the thought that
+philosophers and men of science enlighten mankind, in the line, "Those
+whose midnight lamp lights the world." How strongly and sensuously Homer
+describes the harmful Ate when he says: "She has tender feet, for she
+walks not on the hard earth, but treads on the heads of men" (Il. xix.
+91.) How forcibly we are struck by Menenius Agrippa's fable of the belly
+and the limbs, addressed to the people of Rome when they seceded. How
+beautifully Plato's figure of the Cave, at the beginning of the seventh
+book of the "Republic" to which we have already referred, expresses a very
+abstract philosophical dogma. The fable of Persephone is also to be
+regarded as a deeply significant allegory of philosophical tendency, for
+she became subject to the nether world by tasting a pomegranate. This
+becomes peculiarly enlightening from Goethe's treatment of the fable, as
+an episode in the _Triumph der Empfindsamkeit_, which is beyond all
+praise. Three detailed allegorical works are known to me, one, open and
+avowed, is the incomparable "Criticon" of Balthasar Gracian. It consists
+of a great rich web of connected and highly ingenious allegories, that
+serve here as the fair clothing of moral truths, to which he thus imparts
+the most perceptible form, and astonishes us by the richness of his
+invention. The two others are concealed allegories, "Don Quixote" and
+"Gulliver's Travels." The first is an allegory of the life of every man,
+who will not, like others, be careful, merely for his own welfare, but
+follows some objective, ideal end, which has taken possession of his
+thoughts and will; and certainly, in this world, he has then a strange
+appearance. In the case of Gulliver we have only to take everything
+physical as spiritual or intellectual, in order to see what the "satirical
+rogue," as Hamlet would call him, meant by it. Such, then, in the poetical
+allegory, the conception is always the given, which it tries to make
+perceptible by means of a picture; it may sometimes be expressed or
+assisted by a painted picture. Such a picture will not be regarded as a
+work of art, but only as a significant symbol, and it makes no claim to
+pictorial, but only to poetical worth. Such is that beautiful allegorical
+vignette of Lavater's, which must be so heartening to every defender of
+truth: a hand holding a light is stung by a wasp, while gnats are burning
+themselves in the flame above; underneath is the motto:
+
+
+    "And although it singes the wings of the gnats,
+    Destroys their heads and all their little brains,
+                  Light is still light;
+    And although I am stung by the angriest wasp,
+                  I will not let it go."
+
+
+To this class also belongs the gravestone with the burnt-out, smoking
+candle, and the inscription--
+
+
+    "When it is out, it becomes clear
+    Whether the candle was tallow or wax."
+
+
+Finally, of this kind is an old German genealogical tree, in which the
+last representative of a very ancient family thus expresses his
+determination to live his life to the end in abstinence and perfect
+chastity, and therefore to let his race die out; he represents himself at
+the root of the high-branching tree cutting it over himself with shears.
+In general all those symbols referred to above, commonly called emblems,
+which might also be defined as short painted fables with obvious morals,
+belong to this class. Allegories of this kind are always to be regarded as
+belonging to poetry, not to painting, and as justified thereby; moreover,
+the pictorial execution is here always a matter of secondary importance,
+and no more is demanded of it than that it shall represent the thing so
+that we can recognise it. But in poetry, as in plastic art, the allegory
+passes into the symbol if there is merely an arbitrary connection between
+what it presented to perception and the abstract significance of it. For
+as all symbolism rests, at bottom, on an agreement, the symbol has this
+among other disadvantages, that in time its meaning is forgotten, and then
+it is dumb. Who would guess why the fish is a symbol of Christianity if he
+did not know? Only a Champollion; for it is entirely a phonetic
+hieroglyphic. Therefore, as a poetical allegory, the Revelation of John
+stands much in the same position as the reliefs with _Magnus Deus sol
+Mithra_, which are still constantly being explained.
+
+§ 51. If now, with the exposition which has been given of art in general,
+we turn from plastic and pictorial art to poetry, we shall have no doubt
+that its aim also is the revelation of the Ideas, the grades of the
+objectification of will, and the communication of them to the hearer with
+the distinctness and vividness with which the poetical sense comprehends
+them. Ideas are essentially perceptible; if, therefore, in poetry only
+abstract conceptions are directly communicated through words, it is yet
+clearly the intention to make the hearer perceive the Ideas of life in the
+representatives of these conceptions, and this can only take place through
+the assistance of his own imagination. But in order to set the imagination
+to work for the accomplishment of this end, the abstract conceptions,
+which are the immediate material of poetry as of dry prose, must be so
+arranged that their spheres intersect each other in such a way that none
+of them can remain in its abstract universality; but, instead of it, a
+perceptible representative appears to the imagination; and this is always
+further modified by the words of the poet according to what his intention
+may be. As the chemist obtains solid precipitates by combining perfectly
+clear and transparent fluids; the poet understands how to precipitate, as
+it were, the concrete, the individual, the perceptible idea, out of the
+abstract and transparent universality of the concepts by the manner in
+which he combines them. For the Idea can only be known by perception; and
+knowledge of the Idea is the end of art. The skill of a master, in poetry
+as in chemistry, enables us always to obtain the precise precipitate we
+intended. This end is assisted by the numerous epithets in poetry, by
+means of which the universality of every concept is narrowed more and more
+till we reach the perceptible. Homer attaches to almost every substantive
+an adjective, whose concept intersects and considerably diminishes the
+sphere of the concept of the substantive, which is thus brought so much
+the nearer to perception: for example--
+
+
+    "{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~},
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}."
+
+    ("Occidit vero in Oceanum splendidum lumen solis,
+    Trahens noctem nigram super almam terram.")
+
+
+And--
+
+
+    "Where gentle winds from the blue heavens sigh,
+    There stand the myrtles still, the laurel high,"--
+
+
+calls up before the imagination by means of a few concepts the whole
+delight of a southern clime.
+
+Rhythm and rhyme are quite peculiar aids to poetry. I can give no other
+explanation of their incredibly powerful effect than that our faculties of
+perception have received from time, to which they are essentially bound,
+some quality on account of which we inwardly follow, and, as it were,
+consent to each regularly recurring sound. In this way rhythm and rhyme
+are partly a means of holding our attention, because we willingly follow
+the poem read, and partly they produce in us a blind consent to what is
+read prior to any judgment, and this gives the poem a certain emphatic
+power of convincing independent of all reasons.
+
+From the general nature of the material, that is, the concepts, which
+poetry uses to communicate the Ideas, the extent of its province is very
+great. The whole of nature, the Ideas of all grades, can be represented by
+means of it, for it proceeds according to the Idea it has to impart, so
+that its representations are sometimes descriptive, sometimes narrative,
+and sometimes directly dramatic. If, in the representation of the lower
+grades of the objectivity of will, plastic and pictorial art generally
+surpass it, because lifeless nature, and even brute nature, reveals almost
+its whole being in a single well-chosen moment; man, on the contrary, so
+far as he does not express himself by the mere form and expression of his
+person, but through a series of actions and the accompanying thoughts and
+emotions, is the principal object of poetry, in which no other art can
+compete with it, for here the progress or movement which cannot be
+represented in plastic or pictorial art just suits its purpose.
+
+The revelation of the Idea, which is the highest grade of the objectivity
+of will, the representation of man in the connected series of his efforts
+and actions, is thus the great problem of poetry. It is true that both
+experience and history teach us to know man; yet oftener men than man,
+_i.e._, they give us empirical notes of the behaviour of men to each
+other, from which we may frame rules for our own conduct, oftener than
+they afford us deep glimpses of the inner nature of man. The latter
+function, however, is by no means entirely denied them; but as often as it
+is the nature of mankind itself that discloses itself to us in history or
+in our own experience, we have comprehended our experience, and the
+historian has comprehended history, with artistic eyes, poetically,
+_i.e._, according to the Idea, not the phenomenon, in its inner nature,
+not in its relations. Our own experience is the indispensable condition of
+understanding poetry as of understanding history; for it is, so to speak,
+the dictionary of the language that both speak. But history is related to
+poetry as portrait-painting is related to historical painting; the one
+gives us the true in the individual, the other the true in the universal;
+the one has the truth of the phenomenon, and can therefore verify it from
+the phenomenal, the other has the truth of the Idea, which can be found in
+no particular phenomenon, but yet speaks to us from them all. The poet
+from deliberate choice represents significant characters in significant
+situations; the historian takes both as they come. Indeed, he must regard
+and select the circumstances and the persons, not with reference to their
+inward and true significance, which expresses the Idea, but according to
+the outward, apparent, and relatively important significance with regard
+to the connection and the consequences. He must consider nothing in and
+for itself in its essential character and expression, but must look at
+everything in its relations, in its connection, in its influence upon what
+follows, and especially upon its own age. Therefore he will not overlook
+an action of a king, though of little significance, and in itself quite
+common, because it has results and influence. And, on the other hand,
+actions of the highest significance of particular and very eminent
+individuals are not to be recorded by him if they have no consequences.
+For his treatment follows the principle of sufficient reason, and
+apprehends the phenomenon, of which this principle is the form. But the
+poet comprehends the Idea, the inner nature of man apart from all
+relations, outside all time, the adequate objectivity of the
+thing-in-itself, at its highest grade. Even in that method of treatment
+which is necessary for the historian, the inner nature and significance of
+the phenomena, the kernel of all these shells, can never be entirely lost.
+He who seeks for it, at any rate, may find it and recognise it. Yet that
+which is significant in itself, not in its relations, the real unfolding
+of the Idea, will be found far more accurately and distinctly in poetry
+than in history, and, therefore, however paradoxical it may sound, far
+more really genuine inner truth is to be attributed to poetry than to
+history. For the historian must accurately follow the particular event
+according to life, as it develops itself in time in the manifold tangled
+chains of causes and effects. It is, however, impossible that he can have
+all the data for this; he cannot have seen all and discovered all. He is
+forsaken at every moment by the original of his picture, or a false one
+substitutes itself for it, and this so constantly that I think I may
+assume that in all history the false outweighs the true. The poet, on the
+contrary, has comprehended the Idea of man from some definite side which
+is to be represented; thus it is the nature of his own self that
+objectifies itself in it for him. His knowledge, as we explained above
+when speaking of sculpture, is half _a priori_; his ideal stands before
+his mind firm, distinct, brightly illuminated, and cannot forsake him;
+therefore he shows us, in the mirror of his mind, the Idea pure and
+distinct, and his delineation of it down to the minutest particular is
+true as life itself.(59) The great ancient historians are, therefore, in
+those particulars in which their data fail them, for example, in the
+speeches of their heroes--poets; indeed their whole manner of handling
+their material approaches to the epic. But this gives their
+representations unity, and enables them to retain inner truth, even when
+outward truth was not accessible, or indeed was falsified. And as we
+compared history to portrait-painting, in contradistinction to poetry,
+which corresponds to historical painting, we find that Winckelmann's
+maxim, that the portrait ought to be the ideal of the individual, was
+followed by the ancient historians, for they represent the individual in
+such a way as to bring out that side of the Idea of man which is expressed
+in it. Modern historians, on the contrary, with few exceptions, give us in
+general only "a dust-bin and a lumber-room, and at the most a chronicle of
+the principal political events." Therefore, whoever desires to know man in
+his inner nature, identical in all its phenomena and developments, to know
+him according to the Idea, will find that the works of the great, immortal
+poet present a far truer, more distinct picture, than the historians can
+ever give. For even the best of the historians are, as poets, far from the
+first; and moreover their hands are tied. In this aspect the relation
+between the historian and the poet may be illustrated by the following
+comparison. The mere, pure historian, who works only according to data, is
+like a man, who without any knowledge of mathematics, has investigated the
+relations of certain figures, which he has accidentally found, by
+measuring them; and the problem thus empirically solved is affected of
+course by all the errors of the drawn figure. The poet, on the other hand,
+is like the mathematician, who constructs these relations _a priori_ in
+pure perception, and expresses them not as they actually are in the drawn
+figure, but as they are in the Idea, which the drawing is intended to
+render for the senses. Therefore Schiller says:--
+
+
+    "What has never anywhere come to pass,
+    That alone never grows old."
+
+
+Indeed I must attribute greater value to biographies, and especially to
+autobiographies, in relation to the knowledge of the nature of man, than
+to history proper, at least as it is commonly handled. Partly because in
+the former the data can be collected more accurately and completely than
+in the latter; partly, because in history proper, it is not so much men as
+nations and heroes that act, and the individuals who do appear, seem so
+far off, surrounded with such pomp and circumstance, clothed in the stiff
+robes of state, or heavy, inflexible armour, that it is really hard
+through all this to recognise the human movements. On the other hand, the
+life of the individual when described with truth, in a narrow sphere,
+shows the conduct of men in all its forms and subtilties, the excellence,
+the virtue, and even holiness of a few, the perversity, meanness, and
+knavery of most, the dissolute profligacy of some. Besides, in the only
+aspect we are considering here, that of the inner significance of the
+phenomenal, it is quite the same whether the objects with which the action
+is concerned, are, relatively considered, trifling or important,
+farm-houses or kingdoms: for all these things in themselves are without
+significance, and obtain it only in so far as the will is moved by them.
+The motive has significance only through its relation to the will, while
+the relation which it has as a thing to other things like itself, does not
+concern us here. As a circle of one inch in diameter, and a circle of
+forty million miles in diameter, have precisely the same geometrical
+properties, so are the events and the history of a village and a kingdom
+essentially the same; and we may study and learn to know mankind as well
+in the one as in the other. It is also a mistake to suppose that
+autobiographies are full of deceit and dissimulation. On the contrary,
+lying (though always possible) is perhaps more difficult there than
+elsewhere. Dissimulation is easiest in mere conversation; indeed, though
+it may sound paradoxical, it is really more difficult even in a letter.
+For in the case of a letter the writer is alone, and looks into himself,
+and not out on the world, so that what is strange and distant does not
+easily approach him; and he has not the test of the impression made upon
+another before his eyes. But the receiver of the letter peruses it quietly
+in a mood unknown to the writer, reads it repeatedly and at different
+times, and thus easily finds out the concealed intention. We also get to
+know an author as a man most easily from his books, because all these
+circumstances act here still more strongly and permanently. And in an
+autobiography it is so difficult to dissimulate, that perhaps there does
+not exist a single one that is not, as a whole, more true, than any
+history that ever was written. The man who writes his own life surveys it
+as a whole, the particular becomes small, the near becomes distant, the
+distant becomes near again, the motives that influenced him shrink; he
+seats himself at the confessional, and has done so of his own free will;
+the spirit of lying does not so easily take hold of him here, for there is
+also in every man an inclination to truth which has first to be overcome
+whenever he lies, and which here has taken up a specially strong position.
+The relation between biography and the history of nations may be made
+clear for perception by means of the following comparison: History shows
+us mankind as a view from a high mountain shows us nature; we see much at
+a time, wide stretches, great masses, but nothing is distinct nor
+recognisable in all the details of its own peculiar nature. On the other
+hand, the representation of the life of the individual shows us the man,
+as we see nature if we go about among her trees, plants, rocks, and
+waters. But in landscape-painting, in which the artist lets us look at
+nature with his eyes, the knowledge of the Ideas, and the condition of
+pure will-less knowing, which is demanded by these, is made much easier
+for us; and, in the same way, poetry is far superior both to history and
+biography, in the representation of the Ideas which may be looked for in
+all three. For here also genius holds up to us the magic glass, in which
+all that is essential and significant appears before us collected and
+placed in the clearest light, and what is accidental and foreign is left
+out.(60)
+
+The representation of the Idea of man, which is the work of the poet, may
+be performed, so that what is represented is also the representer. This is
+the case in lyrical poetry, in songs, properly so called, in which the
+poet only perceives vividly his own state and describes it. Thus a certain
+subjectivity is essential to this kind of poetry from the nature of its
+object. Again, what is to be represented may be entirely different from
+him who represents it, as is the case in all other kinds of poetry, in
+which the poet more or less conceals himself behind his representation,
+and at last disappears altogether. In the ballad the poet still expresses
+to some extent his own state through the tone and proportion of the whole;
+therefore, though much more objective than the lyric, it has yet something
+subjective. This becomes less in the idyll, still less in the romantic
+poem, almost entirely disappears in the true epic, and even to the last
+vestige in the drama, which is the most objective and, in more than one
+respect, the completest and most difficult form of poetry. The lyrical
+form of poetry is consequently the easiest, and although art, as a whole,
+belongs only to the true man of genius, who so rarely appears, even a man
+who is not in general very remarkable may produce a beautiful song if, by
+actual strong excitement from without, some inspiration raises his mental
+powers; for all that is required for this is a lively perception of his
+own state at a moment of emotional excitement. This is proved by the
+existence of many single songs by individuals who have otherwise remained
+unknown; especially the German national songs, of which we have an
+exquisite collection in the "Wunderhorn;" and also by innumerable
+love-songs and other songs of the people in all languages;--for to seize
+the mood of a moment and embody it in a song is the whole achievement of
+this kind of poetry. Yet in the lyrics of true poets the inner nature of
+all mankind is reflected, and all that millions of past, present, and
+future men have found, or will find, in the same situations, which are
+constantly recurring, finds its exact expression in them. And because
+these situations, by constant recurrence, are permanent as man himself and
+always call up the same sensations, the lyrical productions of genuine
+poets remain through thousands of years true, powerful, and fresh. But if
+the poet is always the universal man, then all that has ever moved a human
+heart, all that human nature in any situation has ever produced from
+itself, all that dwells and broods in any human breast--is his theme and
+his material, and also all the rest of nature. Therefore the poet may just
+as well sing of voluptuousness as of mysticism, be Anacreon or Angelus
+Silesius, write tragedies or comedies, represent the sublime or the common
+mind--according to humour or vocation. And no one has the right to
+prescribe to the poet what he ought to be--noble and sublime, moral, pious,
+Christian, one thing or another, still less to reproach him because he is
+one thing and not another. He is the mirror of mankind, and brings to its
+consciousness what it feels and does.
+
+If we now consider more closely the nature of the lyric proper, and select
+as examples exquisite and pure models, not those that approach in any way
+to some other form of poetry, such as the ballad, the elegy, the hymn, the
+epigram, &c., we shall find that the peculiar nature of the lyric, in the
+narrowest sense, is this: It is the subject of will, _i.e._, his own
+volition, which the consciousness of the singer feels; often as a released
+and satisfied desire (joy), but still oftener as a restricted desire
+(grief), always as an emotion, a passion, a moved frame of mind. Besides
+this, however, and along with it, by the sight of surrounding nature, the
+singer becomes conscious of himself as the subject of pure, will-less
+knowing, whose unbroken blissful peace now appears, in contrast to the
+stress of desire which is always restricted and always needy. The feeling
+of this contrast, this alternation, is really what the lyric as a whole
+expresses, and what principally constitutes the lyrical state of mind. In
+it pure knowing comes to us, as it were, to deliver us from desire and its
+stain; we follow, but only for an instant; desire, the remembrance of our
+own personal ends, tears us anew from peaceful contemplation; yet ever
+again the next beautiful surrounding in which the pure will-less knowledge
+presents itself to us, allures us away from desire. Therefore, in the
+lyric and the lyrical mood, desire (the personal interest of the ends),
+and pure perception of the surrounding presented, are wonderfully mingled
+with each other; connections between them are sought for and imagined; the
+subjective disposition, the affection of the will, imparts its own hue to
+the perceived surrounding, and conversely, the surroundings communicate
+the reflex of their colour to the will. The true lyric is the expression
+of the whole of this mingled and divided state of mind. In order to make
+clear by examples this abstract analysis of a frame of mind that is very
+far from all abstraction, any of the immortal songs of Goethe may be
+taken. As specially adapted for this end I shall recommend only a few:
+"The Shepherd's Lament," "Welcome and Farewell," "To the Moon," "On the
+Lake," "Autumn;" also the songs in the "Wunderhorn" are excellent
+examples; particularly the one which begins, "O Bremen, I must now leave
+thee." As a comical and happy parody of the lyrical character a song of
+Voss strikes me as remarkable. It describes the feeling of a drunk plumber
+falling from a tower, who observes in passing that the clock on the tower
+is at half-past eleven, a remark which is quite foreign to his condition,
+and thus belongs to knowledge free from will. Whoever accepts the view
+that has been expressed of the lyrical frame of mind, will also allow,
+that it is the sensuous and poetical knowledge of the principle which I
+established in my essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and have
+also referred to in this work, that the identity of the subject of knowing
+with that of willing may be called the miracle {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; so that the
+poetical effect of the lyric rests finally on the truth of that principle.
+In the course of life these two subjects, or, in popular language, head
+and heart, are ever becoming further apart; men are always separating more
+between their subjective feeling and their objective knowledge. In the
+child the two are still entirely blended together; it scarcely knows how
+to distinguish itself from its surroundings, it is at one with them. In
+the young man all perception chiefly affects feeling and mood, and even
+mingles with it, as Byron very beautifully expresses--
+
+
+    "I live not in myself, but I become
+    Portion of that around me; and to me
+    High mountains are a feeling."
+
+
+This is why the youth clings so closely to the perceptible and outward
+side of things; this is why he is only fit for lyrical poetry, and only
+the full-grown man is capable of the drama. The old man we can think of as
+at the most an epic poet, like Ossian, and Homer, for narration is
+characteristic of old age.
+
+In the more objective kinds of poetry, especially in the romance, the
+epic, and the drama, the end, the revelation of the Idea of man, is
+principally attained by two means, by true and profound representation of
+significant characters, and by the invention of pregnant situations in
+which they disclose themselves. For as it is incumbent upon the chemist
+not only to exhibit the simple elements, pure and genuine, and their
+principal compounds, but also to expose them to the influence of such
+reagents as will clearly and strikingly bring out their peculiar
+qualities, so is it incumbent on the poet not only to present to us
+significant characters truly and faithfully as nature itself; but, in
+order that we may get to know them, he must place them in those situations
+in which their peculiar qualities will fully unfold themselves, and appear
+distinctly in sharp outline; situations which are therefore called
+significant. In real life, and in history, situations of this kind are
+rarely brought about by chance, and they stand alone, lost and concealed
+in the multitude of those which are insignificant. The complete
+significance of the situations ought to distinguish the romance, the epic,
+and the drama from real life as completely as the arrangement and
+selection of significant characters. In both, however, absolute truth is a
+necessary condition of their effect, and want of unity in the characters,
+contradiction either of themselves or of the nature of humanity in
+general, as well as impossibility, or very great improbability in the
+events, even in mere accessories, offend just as much in poetry as badly
+drawn figures, false perspective, or wrong lighting in painting. For both
+in poetry and painting we demand the faithful mirror of life, of man, of
+the world, only made more clear by the representation, and more
+significant by the arrangement. For there is only one end of all the arts,
+the representation of the Ideas; and their essential difference lies
+simply in the different grades of the objectification of will to which the
+Ideas that are to be represented belong. This also determines the material
+of the representation. Thus the arts which are most widely separated may
+yet throw light on each other. For example, in order to comprehend fully
+the Ideas of water it is not sufficient to see it in the quiet pond or in
+the evenly-flowing stream; but these Ideas disclose themselves fully only
+when the water appears under all circumstances and exposed to all kinds of
+obstacles. The effects of the varied circumstances and obstacles give it
+the opportunity of fully exhibiting all its qualities. This is why we find
+it beautiful when it tumbles, rushes, and foams, or leaps into the air, or
+falls in a cataract of spray; or, lastly, if artificially confined it
+springs up in a fountain. Thus showing itself different under different
+circumstances, it yet always faithfully asserts its character; it is just
+as natural to it to spout up as to lie in glassy stillness; it is as ready
+for the one as for the other as soon as the circumstances appear. Now,
+what the engineer achieves with the fluid matter of water, the architect
+achieves with the rigid matter of stone, and just this the epic or
+dramatic poet achieves with the Idea of man. Unfolding and rendering
+distinct the Idea expressing itself in the object of every art, the Idea
+of the will which objectifies itself at each grade, is the common end of
+all the arts. The life of man, as it shows itself for the most part in the
+real world, is like the water, as it is generally seen in the pond and the
+river; but in the epic, the romance, the tragedy, selected characters are
+placed in those circumstances in which all their special qualities unfold
+themselves, the depths of the human heart are revealed, and become visible
+in extraordinary and very significant actions. Thus poetry objectifies the
+Idea of man, an Idea which has the peculiarity of expressing itself in
+highly individual characters.
+
+Tragedy is to be regarded, and is recognised as the summit of poetical
+art, both on account of the greatness of its effect and the difficulty of
+its achievement. It is very significant for our whole system, and well
+worthy of observation, that the end of this highest poetical achievement
+is the representation of the terrible side of life. The unspeakable pain,
+the wail of humanity, the triumph of evil, the scornful mastery of chance,
+and the irretrievable fall of the just and innocent, is here presented to
+us; and in this lies a significant hint of the nature of the world and of
+existence. It is the strife of will with itself, which here, completely
+unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity, comes into fearful
+prominence. It becomes visible in the suffering of men, which is now
+introduced, partly through chance and error, which appear as the rulers of
+the world, personified as fate, on account of their insidiousness, which
+even reaches the appearance of design; partly it proceeds from man
+himself, through the self-mortifying efforts of a few, through the
+wickedness and perversity of most. It is one and the same will that lives
+and appears in them all, but whose phenomena fight against each other and
+destroy each other. In one individual it appears powerfully, in another
+more weakly; in one more subject to reason, and softened by the light of
+knowledge, in another less so, till at last, in some single case, this
+knowledge, purified and heightened by suffering itself, reaches the point
+at which the phenomenon, the veil of Mâya, no longer deceives it. It sees
+through the form of the phenomenon, the _principium individuationis_. The
+egoism which rests on this perishes with it, so that now the _motives_
+that were so powerful before have lost their might, and instead of them
+the complete knowledge of the nature of the world, which has a _quieting_
+effect on the will, produces resignation, the surrender not merely of
+life, but of the very will to live. Thus we see in tragedies the noblest
+men, after long conflict and suffering, at last renounce the ends they
+have so keenly followed, and all the pleasures of life for ever, or else
+freely and joyfully surrender life itself. So is it with the steadfast
+prince of Calderon; with Gretchen in "Faust;" with Hamlet, whom his friend
+Horatio would willingly follow, but is bade remain a while, and in this
+harsh world draw his breath in pain, to tell the story of Hamlet, and
+clear his memory; so also is it with the Maid of Orleans, the Bride of
+Messina; they all die purified by suffering, _i.e._, after the will to
+live which was formerly in them is dead. In the "Mohammed" of Voltaire
+this is actually expressed in the concluding words which the dying Palmira
+addresses to Mohammad: "The world is for tyrants: live!" On the other
+hand, the demand for so-called poetical justice rests on entire
+misconception of the nature of tragedy, and, indeed, of the nature of the
+world itself. It boldly appears in all its dulness in the criticisms which
+Dr. Samuel Johnson made on particular plays of Shakespeare, for he very
+naïvely laments its entire absence. And its absence is certainly obvious,
+for in what has Ophelia, Desdemona, or Cordelia offended? But only the
+dull, optimistic, Protestant-rationalistic, or peculiarly Jewish view of
+life will make the demand for poetical justice, and find satisfaction in
+it. The true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight, that it is not his
+own individual sins that the hero atones for, but original sin, _i.e._,
+the crime of existence itself:
+
+
+    "Pues el delito mayor
+    Del hombre es haber nacido;"
+
+    ("For the greatest crime of man
+    Is that he was born;")
+
+
+as Calderon exactly expresses it.
+
+I shall allow myself only one remark, more closely concerning the
+treatment of tragedy. The representation of a great misfortune is alone
+essential to tragedy. But the many different ways in which this is
+introduced by the poet may be brought under three specific conceptions. It
+may happen by means of a character of extraordinary wickedness, touching
+the utmost limits of possibility, who becomes the author of the
+misfortune; examples of this kind are Richard III., Iago in "Othello,"
+Shylock in "The Merchant of Venice," Franz Moor, Phædra of Euripides,
+Creon in the "Antigone," &c., &c. Secondly, it may happen through blind
+fate, _i.e._, chance and error; a true pattern of this kind is the OEdipus
+Rex of Sophocles, the "Trachiniæ" also; and in general most of the
+tragedies of the ancients belong to this class. Among modern tragedies,
+"Romeo and Juliet," "Tancred" by Voltaire, and "The Bride of Messina," are
+examples. Lastly, the misfortune may be brought about by the mere position
+of the _dramatis personæ_ with regard to each other, through their
+relations; so that there is no need either for a tremendous error or an
+unheard-of accident, nor yet for a character whose wickedness reaches the
+limits of human possibility; but characters of ordinary morality, under
+circumstances such as often occur, are so situated with regard to each
+other that their position compels them, knowingly and with their eyes
+open, to do each other the greatest injury, without any one of them being
+entirely in the wrong. This last kind of tragedy seems to me far to
+surpass the other two, for it shows us the greatest misfortune, not as an
+exception, not as something occasioned by rare circumstances or monstrous
+characters, but as arising easily and of itself out of the actions and
+characters of men, indeed almost as essential to them, and thus brings it
+terribly near to us. In the other two kinds we may look on the prodigious
+fate and the horrible wickedness as terrible powers which certainly
+threaten us, but only from afar, which we may very well escape without
+taking refuge in renunciation. But in the last kind of tragedy we see that
+those powers which destroy happiness and life are such that their path to
+us also is open at every moment; we see the greatest sufferings brought
+about by entanglements that our fate might also partake of, and through
+actions that perhaps we also are capable of performing, and so could not
+complain of injustice; then shuddering we feel ourselves already in the
+midst of hell. This last kind of tragedy is also the most difficult of
+achievement; for the greatest effect has to be produced in it with the
+least use of means and causes of movement, merely through the position and
+distribution of the characters; therefore even in many of the best
+tragedies this difficulty is evaded. Yet one tragedy may be referred to as
+a perfect model of this kind, a tragedy which in other respects is far
+surpassed by more than one work of the same great master; it is "Clavigo."
+"Hamlet" belongs to a certain extent to this class, as far as the relation
+of Hamlet to Laertes and Ophelia is concerned. "Wallenstein" has also this
+excellence. "Faust" belongs entirely to this class, if we regard the
+events connected with Gretchen and her brother as the principal action;
+also the "Cid" of Corneille, only that it lacks the tragic conclusion,
+while on the contrary the analogous relation of Max to Thecla has it.(61)
+
+§ 52. Now that we have considered all the fine arts in the general way
+that is suitable to our point of view, beginning with architecture, the
+peculiar end of which is to elucidate the objectification of will at the
+lowest grades of its visibility, in which it shows itself as the dumb
+unconscious tendency of the mass in accordance with laws, and yet already
+reveals a breach of the unity of will with itself in a conflict between
+gravity and rigidity--and ending with the consideration of tragedy, which
+presents to us at the highest grades of the objectification of will this
+very conflict with itself in terrible magnitude and distinctness; we find
+that there is still another fine art which has been excluded from our
+consideration, and had to be excluded, for in the systematic connection of
+our exposition there was no fitting place for it--I mean _music_. It stands
+alone, quite cut off from all the other arts. In it we do not recognise
+the copy or repetition of any Idea of existence in the world. Yet it is
+such a great and exceedingly noble art, its effect on the inmost nature of
+man is so powerful, and it is so entirely and deeply understood by him in
+his inmost consciousness as a perfectly universal language, the
+distinctness of which surpasses even that of the perceptible world itself,
+that we certainly have more to look for in it than an _exercitum
+arithmeticæ occultum nescientis se numerare animi_,(62) which Leibnitz
+called it. Yet he was perfectly right, as he considered only its immediate
+external significance, its form. But if it were nothing more, the
+satisfaction which it affords would be like that which we feel when a sum
+in arithmetic comes out right, and could not be that intense pleasure with
+which we see the deepest recesses of our nature find utterance. From our
+standpoint, therefore, at which the æsthetic effect is the criterion, we
+must attribute to music a far more serious and deep significance,
+connected with the inmost nature of the world and our own self, and in
+reference to which the arithmetical proportions, to which it may be
+reduced, are related, not as the thing signified, but merely as the sign.
+That in some sense music must be related to the world as the
+representation to the thing represented, as the copy to the original, we
+may conclude from the analogy of the other arts, all of which possess this
+character, and affect us on the whole in the same way as it does, only
+that the effect of music is stronger, quicker, more necessary and
+infallible. Further, its representative relation to the world must be very
+deep, absolutely true, and strikingly accurate, because it is instantly
+understood by every one, and has the appearance of a certain
+infallibility, because its form may be reduced to perfectly definite rules
+expressed in numbers, from which it cannot free itself without entirely
+ceasing to be music. Yet the point of comparison between music and the
+world, the respect in which it stands to the world in the relation of a
+copy or repetition, is very obscure. Men have practised music in all ages
+without being able to account for this; content to understand it directly,
+they renounce all claim to an abstract conception of this direct
+understanding itself.
+
+I gave my mind entirely up to the impression of music in all its forms,
+and then returned to reflection and the system of thought expressed in the
+present work, and thus I arrived at an explanation of the inner nature of
+music and of the nature of its imitative relation to the world--which from
+analogy had necessarily to be presupposed--an explanation which is quite
+sufficient for myself, and satisfactory to my investigation, and which
+will doubtless be equally evident to any one who has followed me thus far
+and has agreed with my view of the world. Yet I recognise the fact that it
+is essentially impossible to prove this explanation, for it assumes and
+establishes a relation of music, as idea, to that which from its nature
+can never be idea, and music will have to be regarded as the copy of an
+original which can never itself be directly presented as idea. I can
+therefore do no more than state here, at the conclusion of this third
+book, which has been principally devoted to the consideration of the arts,
+the explanation of the marvellous art of music which satisfies myself, and
+I must leave the acceptance or denial of my view to the effect produced
+upon each of my readers both by music itself and by the whole system of
+thought communicated in this work. Moreover, I regard it as necessary, in
+order to be able to assent with full conviction to the exposition of the
+significance of music I am about to give, that one should often listen to
+music with constant reflection upon my theory concerning it, and for this
+again it is necessary to be very familiar with the whole of my system of
+thought.
+
+The (Platonic) Ideas are the adequate objectification of will. To excite
+or suggest the knowledge of these by means of the representation of
+particular things (for works of art themselves are always representations
+of particular things) is the end of all the other arts, which can only be
+attained by a corresponding change in the knowing subject. Thus all these
+arts objectify the will indirectly only by means of the Ideas; and since
+our world is nothing but the manifestation of the Ideas in multiplicity,
+though their entrance into the _principium individuationis_ (the form of
+the knowledge possible for the individual as such), music also, since it
+passes over the Ideas, is entirely independent of the phenomenal world,
+ignores it altogether, could to a certain extent exist if there was no
+world at all, which cannot be said of the other arts. Music is as _direct_
+an objectification and copy of the whole _will_ as the world itself, nay,
+even as the Ideas, whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the world of
+individual things. Music is thus by no means like the other arts, the copy
+of the Ideas, but the _copy of the will itself_, whose objectivity the
+Ideas are. This is why the effect of music is so much more powerful and
+penetrating than that of the other arts, for they speak only of shadows,
+but it speaks of the thing itself. Since, however, it is the same will
+which objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in music, though in quite
+different ways, there must be, not indeed a direct likeness, but yet a
+parallel, an analogy, between music and the Ideas whose manifestation in
+multiplicity and incompleteness is the visible world. The establishing of
+this analogy will facilitate, as an illustration, the understanding of
+this exposition, which is so difficult on account of the obscurity of the
+subject.
+
+I recognise in the deepest tones of harmony, in the bass, the lowest
+grades of the objectification of will, unorganised nature, the mass of the
+planet. It is well known that all the high notes which are easily sounded,
+and die away more quickly, are produced by the vibration in their vicinity
+of the deep bass-notes. When, also, the low notes sound, the high notes
+always sound faintly, and it is a law of harmony that only those high
+notes may accompany a bass-note which actually already sound along with it
+of themselves (its _sons harmoniques_) on account of its vibration. This
+is analogous to the fact that the whole of the bodies and organisations of
+nature must be regarded as having come into existence through gradual
+development out of the mass of the planet; this is both their supporter
+and their source, and the same relation subsists between the high notes
+and the bass. There is a limit of depth, below which no sound is audible.
+This corresponds to the fact that no matter can be perceived without form
+and quality, _i.e._, without the manifestation of a force which cannot be
+further explained, in which an Idea expresses itself, and, more generally,
+that no matter can be entirely without will. Thus, as a certain pitch is
+inseparable from the note as such, so a certain grade of the manifestation
+of will is inseparable from matter. Bass is thus, for us, in harmony what
+unorganised nature, the crudest mass, upon which all rests, and from which
+everything originates and develops, is in the world. Now, further, in the
+whole of the complemental parts which make up the harmony between the bass
+and the leading voice singing the melody, I recognise the whole gradation
+of the Ideas in which the will objectifies itself. Those nearer to the
+bass are the lower of these grades, the still unorganised, but yet
+manifold phenomenal things; the higher represent to me the world of plants
+and beasts. The definite intervals of the scale are parallel to the
+definite grades of the objectification of will, the definite species in
+nature. The departure from the arithmetical correctness of the intervals,
+through some temperament, or produced by the key selected, is analogous to
+the departure of the individual from the type of the species. Indeed, even
+the impure discords, which give no definite interval, may be compared to
+the monstrous abortions produced by beasts of two species, or by man and
+beast. But to all these bass and complemental parts which make up the
+_harmony_ there is wanting that connected progress which belongs only to
+the high voice singing the melody, and it alone moves quickly and lightly
+in modulations and runs, while all these others have only a slower
+movement without a connection in each part for itself. The deep bass moves
+most slowly, the representative of the crudest mass. Its rising and
+falling occurs only by large intervals, in thirds, fourths, fifths, never
+by _one_ tone, unless it is a base inverted by double counterpoint. This
+slow movement is also physically essential to it; a quick run or shake in
+the low notes cannot even be imagined. The higher complemental parts,
+which are parallel to animal life, move more quickly, but yet without
+melodious connection and significant progress. The disconnected course of
+all the complemental parts, and their regulation by definite laws, is
+analogous to the fact that in the whole irrational world, from the crystal
+to the most perfect animal, no being has a connected consciousness of its
+own which would make its life into a significant whole, and none
+experiences a succession of mental developments, none perfects itself by
+culture, but everything exists always in the same way according to its
+kind, determined by fixed law. Lastly, in the _melody_, in the high,
+singing, principal voice leading the whole and progressing with
+unrestrained freedom, in the unbroken significant connection of _one_
+thought from beginning to end representing a whole, I recognise the
+highest grade of the objectification of will, the intellectual life and
+effort of man. As he alone, because endowed with reason, constantly looks
+before and after on the path of his actual life and its innumerable
+possibilities, and so achieves a course of life which is intellectual, and
+therefore connected as a whole; corresponding to this, I say, the _melody_
+has significant intentional connection from beginning to end. It records,
+therefore, the history of the intellectually enlightened will. This will
+expresses itself in the actual world as the series of its deeds; but
+melody says more, it records the most secret history of this
+intellectually-enlightened will, pictures every excitement, every effort,
+every movement of it, all that which the reason collects under the wide
+and negative concept of feeling, and which it cannot apprehend further
+through its abstract concepts. Therefore it has always been said that
+music is the language of feeling and of passion, as words are the language
+of reason. Plato explains it as {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} (_melodiarum motus, animi affectus imitans_),
+De Leg. vii.; and also Aristotle says: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} (_cur numeri musici et modi, qui voces sunt, moribus
+similes sese exhibent?_): Probl. c. 19.
+
+Now the nature of man consists in this, that his will strives, is
+satisfied and strives anew, and so on for ever. Indeed, his happiness and
+well-being consist simply in the quick transition from wish to
+satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new wish. For the absence of
+satisfaction is suffering, the empty longing for a new wish, languor,
+_ennui_. And corresponding to this the nature of melody is a constant
+digression and deviation from the key-note in a thousand ways, not only to
+the harmonious intervals to the third and dominant, but to every tone, to
+the dissonant sevenths and to the superfluous degrees; yet there always
+follows a constant return to the key-note. In all these deviations melody
+expresses the multifarious efforts of will, but always its satisfaction
+also by the final return to an harmonious interval, and still more, to the
+key-note. The composition of melody, the disclosure in it of all the
+deepest secrets of human willing and feeling, is the work of genius, whose
+action, which is more apparent here than anywhere else, lies far from all
+reflection and conscious intention, and may be called an inspiration. The
+conception is here, as everywhere in art, unfruitful. The composer reveals
+the inner nature of the world, and expresses the deepest wisdom in a
+language which his reason does not understand; as a person under the
+influence of mesmerism tells things of which he has no conception when he
+awakes. Therefore in the composer, more than in any other artist, the man
+is entirely separated and distinct from the artist. Even in the
+explanation of this wonderful art, the concept shows its poverty and
+limitation. I shall try, however, to complete our analogy. As quick
+transition from wish to satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new wish,
+is happiness and well-being, so quick melodies without great deviations
+are cheerful; slow melodies, striking painful discords, and only winding
+back through many bars to the keynote are, as analogous to the delayed and
+hardly won satisfaction, sad. The delay of the new excitement of will,
+languor, could have no other expression than the sustained keynote, the
+effect of which would soon be unbearable; very monotonous and unmeaning
+melodies approach this effect. The short intelligible subjects of quick
+dance-music seem to speak only of easily attained common pleasure. On the
+other hand, the _Allegro maestoso_, in elaborate movements, long passages,
+and wide deviations, signifies a greater, nobler effort towards a more
+distant end, and its final attainment. The _Adagio_ speaks of the pain of
+a great and noble effort which despises all trifling happiness. But how
+wonderful is the effect of the _minor_ and _major_! How astounding that
+the change of half a tone, the entrance of a minor third instead of a
+major, at once and inevitably forces upon us an anxious painful feeling,
+from which again we are just as instantaneously delivered by the major.
+The _Adagio_ lengthens in the minor the expression of the keenest pain,
+and becomes even a convulsive wail. Dance-music in the minor seems to
+indicate the failure of that trifling happiness which we ought rather to
+despise, seems to speak of the attainment of a lower end with toil and
+trouble. The inexhaustibleness of possible melodies corresponds to the
+inexhaustibleness of Nature in difference of individuals, physiognomies,
+and courses of life. The transition from one key to an entirely different
+one, since it altogether breaks the connection with what went before, is
+like death, for the individual ends in it; but the will which appeared in
+this individual lives after him as before him, appearing in other
+individuals, whose consciousness, however, has no connection with his.
+
+But it must never be forgotten, in the investigation of all these
+analogies I have pointed out, that music has no direct, but merely an
+indirect relation to them, for it never expresses the phenomenon, but only
+the inner nature, the in-itself of all phenomena, the will itself. It does
+not therefore express this or that particular and definite joy, this or
+that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or delight, or merriment, or peace of
+mind; but joy, sorrow, pain, horror, delight, merriment, peace of mind
+_themselves_, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature,
+without accessories, and therefore without their motives. Yet we
+completely understand them in this extracted quintessence. Hence it arises
+that our imagination is so easily excited by music, and now seeks to give
+form to that invisible yet actively moved spirit-world which speaks to us
+directly, and clothe it with flesh and blood, _i.e._, to embody it in an
+analogous example. This is the origin of the song with words, and finally
+of the opera, the text of which should therefore never forsake that
+subordinate position in order to make itself the chief thing and the music
+a mere means of expressing it, which is a great misconception and a piece
+of utter perversity; for music always expresses only the quintessence of
+life and its events, never these themselves, and therefore their
+differences do not always affect it. It is precisely this universality,
+which belongs exclusively to it, together with the greatest
+determinateness, that gives music the high worth which it has as the
+panacea for all our woes. Thus, if music is too closely united to the
+words, and tries to form itself according to the events, it is striving to
+speak a language which is not its own. No one has kept so free from this
+mistake as Rossini; therefore his music speaks _its own language_ so
+distinctly and purely that it requires no words, and produces its full
+effect when rendered by instruments alone.
+
+According to all this, we may regard the phenomenal world, or nature, and
+music as two different expressions of the same thing, which is therefore
+itself the only medium of their analogy, so that a knowledge of it is
+demanded in order to understand that analogy. Music, therefore, if
+regarded as an expression of the world, is in the highest degree a
+universal language, which is related indeed to the universality of
+concepts, much as they are related to the particular things. Its
+universality, however, is by no means that empty universality of
+abstraction, but quite of a different kind, and is united with thorough
+and distinct definiteness. In this respect it resembles geometrical
+figures and numbers, which are the universal forms of all possible objects
+of experience and applicable to them all _a priori_, and yet are not
+abstract but perceptible and thoroughly determined. All possible efforts,
+excitements, and manifestations of will, all that goes on in the heart of
+man and that reason includes in the wide, negative concept of feeling, may
+be expressed by the infinite number of possible melodies, but always in
+the universal, in the mere form, without the material, always according to
+the thing-in-itself, not the phenomenon, the inmost soul, as it were, of
+the phenomenon, without the body. This deep relation which music has to
+the true nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable music
+played to any scene, action, event, or surrounding seems to disclose to us
+its most secret meaning, and appears as the most accurate and distinct
+commentary upon it. This is so truly the case, that whoever gives himself
+up entirely to the impression of a symphony, seems to see all the possible
+events of life and the world take place in himself, yet if he reflects, he
+can find no likeness between the music and the things that passed before
+his mind. For, as we have said, music is distinguished from all the other
+arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or, more
+accurately, the adequate objectivity of will, but is the direct copy of
+the will itself, and therefore exhibits itself as the metaphysical to
+everything physical in the world, and as the thing-in-itself to every
+phenomenon. We might, therefore, just as well call the world embodied
+music as embodied will; and this is the reason why music makes every
+picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of the world, at once
+appear with higher significance, certainly all the more in proportion as
+its melody is analogous to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon. It
+rests upon this that we are able to set a poem to music as a song, or a
+perceptible representation as a pantomime, or both as an opera. Such
+particular pictures of human life, set to the universal language of music,
+are never bound to it or correspond to it with stringent necessity; but
+they stand to it only in the relation of an example chosen at will to a
+general concept. In the determinateness of the real, they represent that
+which music expresses in the universality of mere form. For melodies are
+to a certain extent, like general concepts, an abstraction from the
+actual. This actual world, then, the world of particular things, affords
+the object of perception, the special and individual, the particular case,
+both to the universality of the concepts and to the universality of the
+melodies. But these two universalities are in a certain respect opposed to
+each other; for the concepts contain particulars only as the first forms
+abstracted from perception, as it were, the separated shell of things;
+thus they are, strictly speaking, _abstracta_; music, on the other hand,
+gives the inmost kernel which precedes all forms, or the heart of things.
+This relation may be very well expressed in the language of the schoolmen
+by saying the concepts are the _universalia post rem_, but music gives the
+_universalia ante rem_, and the real world the _universalia in re_. To the
+universal significance of a melody to which a poem has been set, it is
+quite possible to set other equally arbitrarily selected examples of the
+universal expressed in this poem corresponding to the significance of the
+melody in the same degree. This is why the same composition is suitable to
+many verses; and this is also what makes the _vaudeville_ possible. But
+that in general a relation is possible between a composition and a
+perceptible representation rests, as we have said, upon the fact that both
+are simply different expressions of the same inner being of the world.
+When now, in the particular case, such a relation is actually given, that
+is to say, when the composer has been able to express in the universal
+language of music the emotions of will which constitute the heart of an
+event, then the melody of the song, the music of the opera, is expressive.
+But the analogy discovered by the composer between the two must have
+proceeded from the direct knowledge of the nature of the world unknown to
+his reason, and must not be an imitation produced with conscious intention
+by means of conceptions, otherwise the music does not express the inner
+nature of the will itself, but merely gives an inadequate imitation of its
+phenomenon. All specially imitative music does this; for example, "The
+Seasons," by Haydn; also many passages of his "Creation," in which
+phenomena of the external world are directly imitated; also all
+battle-pieces. Such music is entirely to be rejected.
+
+The unutterable depth of all music by virtue of which it floats through
+our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in yet ever
+distant from us, and by which also it is so fully understood and yet so
+inexplicable, rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of
+our inmost nature, but entirely without reality and far removed from their
+pain. So also the seriousness which is essential to it, which excludes the
+absurd from its direct and peculiar province, is to be explained by the
+fact that its object is not the idea, with reference to which alone
+deception and absurdity are possible; but its object is directly the will,
+and this is essentially the most serious of all things, for it is that on
+which all depends. How rich in content and full of significance the
+language of music is, we see from the repetitions, as well as the _Da
+capo_, the like of which would be unbearable in works composed in a
+language of words, but in music are very appropriate and beneficial, for,
+in order to comprehend it fully, we must hear it twice.
+
+In the whole of this exposition of music I have been trying to bring out
+clearly that it expresses in a perfectly universal language, in a
+homogeneous material, mere tones, and with the greatest determinateness
+and truth, the inner nature, the in-itself of the world, which we think
+under the concept of will, because will is its most distinct
+manifestation. Further, according to my view and contention, philosophy is
+nothing but a complete and accurate repetition or expression of the nature
+of the world in very general concepts, for only in such is it possible to
+get a view of that whole nature which will everywhere be adequate and
+applicable. Thus, whoever has followed me and entered into my mode of
+thought, will not think it so very paradoxical if I say, that supposing it
+were possible to give a perfectly accurate, complete explanation of music,
+extending even to particulars, that is to say, a detailed repetition in
+concepts of what it expresses, this would also be a sufficient repetition
+and explanation of the world in concepts, or at least entirely parallel to
+such an explanation, and thus it would be the true philosophy.
+Consequently the saying of Leibnitz quoted above, which is quite accurate
+from a lower standpoint, may be parodied in the following way to suit our
+higher view of music: _Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum
+nescientis se philosophari animi_; for _scire_, to know, always means to
+have fixed in abstract concepts. But further, on account of the truth of
+the saying of Leibnitz, which is confirmed in various ways, music,
+regarded apart from its æsthetic or inner significance, and looked at
+merely externally and purely empirically, is simply the means of
+comprehending directly and in the concrete large numbers and complex
+relations of numbers, which otherwise we could only know indirectly by
+fixing them in concepts. Therefore by the union of these two very
+different but correct views of music we may arrive at a conception of the
+possibility of a philosophy of number, such as that of Pythagoras and of
+the Chinese in Y-King, and then interpret in this sense the saying of the
+Pythagoreans which Sextus Empiricus quotes (adv. Math., L. vii.): {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_numero cuncta assimilantur_). And if,
+finally, we apply this view to the interpretation of harmony and melody
+given above, we shall find that a mere moral philosophy without an
+explanation of Nature, such as Socrates wanted to introduce, is precisely
+analogous to a mere melody without harmony, which Rousseau exclusively
+desired; and, in opposition to this mere physics and metaphysics without
+ethics, will correspond to mere harmony without melody. Allow me to add to
+these cursory observations a few more remarks concerning the analogy of
+music with the phenomenal world. We found in the second book that the
+highest grade of the objectification of will, man, could not appear alone
+and isolated, but presupposed the grades below him, as these again
+presupposed the grades lower still. In the same way music, which directly
+objectifies the will, just as the world does, is complete only in full
+harmony. In order to achieve its full effect, the high leading voice of
+the melody requires the accompaniment of all the other voices, even to the
+lowest bass, which is to be regarded as the origin of all. The melody
+itself enters as an integral part into the harmony, as the harmony enters
+into it, and only thus, in the full harmonious whole, music expresses what
+it aims at expressing. Thus also the one will outside of time finds its
+full objectification only in the complete union of all the steps which
+reveal its nature in the innumerable ascending grades of distinctness. The
+following analogy is also very remarkable. We have seen in the preceding
+book that notwithstanding the self-adaptation of all the phenomena of will
+to each other as regards their species, which constitutes their
+teleological aspect, there yet remains an unceasing conflict between those
+phenomena as individuals, which is visible at every grade, and makes the
+world a constant battle-field of all those manifestations of one and the
+same will, whose inner contradiction with itself becomes visible through
+it. In music also there is something corresponding to this. A complete,
+pure, harmonious system of tones is not only physically but arithmetically
+impossible. The numbers themselves by which the tones are expressed have
+inextricable irrationality. There is no scale in which, when it is
+counted, every fifth will be related to the keynote as 2 to 3, every major
+third as 4 to 5, every minor third as 5 to 6, and so on. For if they are
+correctly related to the keynote, they can no longer be so to each other;
+because, for example, the fifth must be the minor third to the third, &c.
+For the notes of the scale may be compared to actors who must play now one
+part, now another. Therefore a perfectly accurate system of music cannot
+even be thought, far less worked out; and on this account all possible
+music deviates from perfect purity; it can only conceal the discords
+essential to it by dividing them among all the notes, _i.e._, by
+temperament. On this see Chladni's "Akustik," § 30, and his "Kurze
+Uebersicht der Schall- und Klanglehre."(63)
+
+I might still have something to say about the way in which music is
+perceived, namely, in and through time alone, with absolute exclusion of
+space, and also apart from the influence of the knowledge of causality,
+thus without understanding; for the tones make the æsthetic impression as
+effect, and without obliging us to go back to their causes, as in the case
+of perception. I do not wish, however, to lengthen this discussion, as I
+have perhaps already gone too much into detail with regard to some things
+in this Third Book, or have dwelt too much on particulars. But my aim made
+it necessary, and it will be the less disapproved if the importance and
+high worth of art, which is seldom sufficiently recognised, be kept in
+mind. For if, according to our view, the whole visible world is just the
+objectification, the mirror, of the will, conducting it to knowledge of
+itself, and, indeed, as we shall soon see, to the possibility of its
+deliverance; and if, at the same time, the world as idea, if we regard it
+in isolation, and, freeing ourselves from all volition, allow it alone to
+take possession of our consciousness, is the most joy-giving and the only
+innocent side of life; we must regard art as the higher ascent, the more
+complete development of all this, for it achieves essentially just what is
+achieved by the visible world itself, only with greater concentration,
+more perfectly, with intention and intelligence, and therefore may be
+called, in the full significance of the word, the flower of life. If the
+whole world as idea is only the visibility of will, the work of art is to
+render this visibility more distinct. It is the _camera obscura_ which
+shows the objects more purely, and enables us to survey them and
+comprehend them better. It is the play within the play, the stage upon the
+stage in "Hamlet."
+
+The pleasure we receive from all beauty, the consolation which art
+affords, the enthusiasm of the artist, which enables him to forget the
+cares of life,--the latter an advantage of the man of genius over other
+men, which alone repays him for the suffering that increases in proportion
+to the clearness of consciousness, and for the desert loneliness among men
+of a different race,--all this rests on the fact that the in-itself of
+life, the will, existence itself, is, as we shall see farther on, a
+constant sorrow, partly miserable, partly terrible; while, on the
+contrary, as idea alone, purely contemplated, or copied by art, free from
+pain, it presents to us a drama full of significance. This purely knowable
+side of the world, and the copy of it in any art, is the element of the
+artist. He is chained to the contemplation of the play, the
+objectification of will; he remains beside it, does not get tired of
+contemplating it and representing it in copies; and meanwhile he bears
+himself the cost of the production of that play, _i.e._, he himself is the
+will which objectifies itself, and remains in constant suffering. That
+pure, true, and deep knowledge of the inner nature of the world becomes
+now for him an end in itself: he stops there. Therefore it does not become
+to him a quieter of the will, as, we shall see in the next book, it does
+in the case of the saint who has attained to resignation; it does not
+deliver him for ever from life, but only at moments, and is therefore not
+for him a path out of life, but only an occasional consolation in it, till
+his power, increased by this contemplation and at last tired of the play,
+lays hold on the real. The St. Cecilia of Raphael may be regarded as a
+representation of this transition. To the real, then, we now turn in the
+following book.
+
+
+
+
+
+FOURTH BOOK. THE WORLD AS WILL.
+
+
+
+
+Second Aspect. The Assertion And Denial Of The Will To Live, When
+Self-Consciousness Has Been Attained.
+
+
+    Tempore quo cognitio simul advenit, amor e medio
+                supersurrexit.--_Oupnek'hat,_
+    _Studio Anquetil Duperron_, vol. ii. p. 216.
+
+
+§ 53. The last part of our work presents itself as the most serious, for
+it relates to the action of men, the matter which concerns every one
+directly and can be foreign or indifferent to none. It is indeed so
+characteristic of the nature of man to relate everything else to action,
+that in every systematic investigation he will always treat the part that
+has to do with action as the result or outcome of the whole work, so far,
+at least, as it interests him, and will therefore give his most serious
+attention to this part, even if to no other. In this respect the following
+part of our work would, in ordinary language, be called practical
+philosophy, in opposition to the theoretical, which has occupied us
+hitherto. But, in my opinion, all philosophy is theoretical, because it is
+essential to it that it should retain a purely contemplative attitude, and
+should investigate, not prescribe. To become, on the contrary, practical,
+to guide conduct, to transform character, are old claims, which with
+fuller insight it ought finally to give up. For here, where the worth or
+worthlessness of an existence, where salvation or damnation are in
+question, the dead conceptions of philosophy do not decide the matter, but
+the inmost nature of man himself, the Dæmon that guides him and that has
+not chosen him, but been chosen by him, as Plato would say; his
+intelligible character, as Kant expresses himself. Virtue cannot be taught
+any more than genius; indeed, for it the concept is just as unfruitful as
+it is in art, and in both cases can only be used as an instrument. It
+would, therefore, be just as absurd to expect that our moral systems and
+ethics will produce virtuous, noble, and holy men, as that our æsthetics
+will produce poets, painters, and musicians.
+
+Philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain what is given. It
+can only bring to distinct abstract knowledge of the reason the nature of
+the world which in the concrete, that is, as feeling, expresses itself
+comprehensibly to every one. This, however, it does in every possible
+reference and from every point of view. Now, as this attempt has been made
+from other points of view in the three preceding books with the generality
+that is proper to philosophy, in this book the action of men will be
+considered in the same way; and this side of the world might, indeed, be
+considered the most important of all, not only subjectively, as I remarked
+above, but also objectively. In considering it I shall faithfully adhere
+to the method I have hitherto followed, and shall support myself by
+presupposing all that has already been advanced. There is, indeed, just
+one thought which forms the content of this whole work. I have endeavoured
+to work it out in all other spheres, and I shall now do so with regard to
+human action. I shall then have done all that is in my power to
+communicate it as fully as possible.
+
+The given point of view, and the method of treatment announced, are
+themselves sufficient to indicate that in this ethical book no precepts,
+no doctrine of duty must be looked for; still less will a general moral
+principle be given, an universal receipt, as it were, for the production
+of all the virtues. Neither shall we talk of an "_absolute ought_," for
+this contains a contradiction, as is explained in the Appendix; nor yet of
+a "_law of freedom_," which is in the same position. In general, we shall
+not speak at all of "ought," for this is how one speaks to children and to
+nations still in their childhood, but not to those who have appropriated
+all the culture of a full-grown age. It is a palpable contradiction to
+call the will free, and yet to prescribe laws for it according to which it
+ought to will. "Ought to will!"--wooden iron! But it follows from the point
+of view of our system that the will is not only free, but almighty. From
+it proceeds not only its action, but also its world; and as the will is,
+so does its action and its world become. Both are the self-knowledge of
+the will and nothing more. The will determines itself, and at the same
+time both its action and its world; for besides it there is nothing, and
+these are the will itself. Only thus is the will truly autonomous, and
+from every other point of view it is heteronomous. Our philosophical
+endeavours can only extend to exhibiting and explaining the action of men
+in its inner nature and content, the various and even opposite maxims,
+whose living expression it is. This we shall do in connection with the
+preceding portion of our work, and in precisely the same way as we have
+hitherto explained the other phenomena of the world, and have sought to
+bring their inmost nature to distinct abstract knowledge. Our philosophy
+will maintain the same _immanency_ in the case of action, as in all that
+we have hitherto considered. Notwithstanding Kant's great doctrine, it
+will not attempt to use the forms of the phenomenon, the universal
+expression of which is the principle of sufficient reason, as a
+leaping-pole to jump over the phenomenon itself, which alone gives meaning
+to these forms, and land in the boundless sphere of empty fictions. But
+this actual world of experience, in which we are, and which is in us,
+remains both the material and the limits of our consideration: a world
+which is so rich in content that even the most searching investigation of
+which the human mind is capable could not exhaust it. Since then the real
+world of experience will never fail to afford material and reality to our
+ethical investigations, any more than to those we have already conducted,
+nothing will be less needful than to take refuge in negative conceptions
+void of content, and then somehow or other make even ourselves believe
+that we are saying something when we speak with lifted eyebrows of
+"absolutes," "infinites," "supersensibles," and whatever other mere
+negations of this sort there may be ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~},
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}--_nihil est, nisi negationis nomen, cum obscura
+notione_.--Jul. or. 5), instead of which it would be shorter to say at once
+cloud-cuckoo-town ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}): we shall not require to serve up
+covered empty dishes of this kind. Finally, we shall not in this book, any
+more than in those which have preceded it, narrate histories and give them
+out as philosophy. For we are of opinion that whoever supposes that the
+inner nature of the world can in any way, however plausibly disguised, be
+_historically_ comprehended, is infinitely far from a philosophical
+knowledge of the world. Yet this is what is supposed whenever a
+"becoming," or a "having become," or an "about to become" enters into a
+theory of the nature of the world, whenever an earlier or a later has the
+least place in it; and in this way a beginning and an end of the world,
+and the path it pursues between them, is, either openly or disguisedly,
+both sought for and found, and the individual who philosophises even
+recognises his own position on that path. Such _historical philosophising_
+in most cases produces a cosmogony which admits of many varieties, or else
+a system of emanations, a doctrine of successive disengagements from one
+being; or, finally, driven in despair from fruitless efforts upon these
+paths to the last path of all, it takes refuge in the converse doctrine of
+a constant becoming, springing up, arising, coming to light out of
+darkness, out of the hidden ground source or groundlessness, or whatever
+other nonsense of this sort there may be, which is most shortly disposed
+of with the remark that at the present moment a whole eternity, _i.e._, an
+endless time, has already passed, so that everything that can or ought to
+become must have already done so. For all such historical philosophy,
+whatever airs it may give itself, regards _time_ just as if Kant had never
+lived, as a quality of the thing-in-itself, and thus stops at that which
+Kant calls the phenomenon in opposition to the thing-in-itself; which
+Plato calls the becoming and never being, in opposition to the being and
+never becoming; and which, finally, is called in the Indian philosophy the
+web of Mâya. It is just the knowledge which belongs to the principle of
+sufficient reason, with which no one can penetrate to the inner nature of
+things, but endlessly pursues phenomena, moving without end or aim, like a
+squirrel in its wheel, till, tired out at last, he stops at some point or
+other arbitrarily chosen, and now desires to extort respect for it from
+others also. The genuine philosophical consideration of the world, _i.e._,
+the consideration that affords us a knowledge of its inner nature, and so
+leads us beyond the phenomenon, is precisely that method which does not
+concern itself with the whence, the whither, and the why of the world, but
+always and everywhere demands only the what; the method which considers
+things not according to any relation, not as becoming and passing away, in
+short, not according to one of the four forms of the principle of
+sufficient reason; but, on the contrary, just that which remains when all
+that belongs to the form of knowledge proper to that principle has been
+abstracted, the inner nature of the world, which always appears unchanged
+in all the relations, but is itself never subject to them, and has the
+Ideas of the world as its object or material. From such knowledge as this
+proceeds philosophy, like art, and also, as we shall see in this book,
+that disposition of mind which alone leads to true holiness and to
+deliverance from the world.
+
+§ 54. The first three books will, it is hoped, have conveyed the distinct
+and certain knowledge that the world as idea is the complete mirror of the
+will, in which it knows itself in ascending grades of distinctness and
+completeness, the highest of which is man, whose nature, however, receives
+its complete expression only through the whole connected series of his
+actions. The self-conscious connection of these actions is made possible
+by reason, which enables a man constantly to survey the whole in the
+abstract.
+
+The will, which, considered purely in itself, is without knowledge, and is
+merely a blind incessant impulse, as we see it appear in unorganised and
+vegetable nature and their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our
+own life, receives through the addition of the world as idea, which is
+developed in subjection to it, the knowledge of its own willing and of
+what it is that it wills. And this is nothing else than the world as idea,
+life, precisely as it exists. Therefore we called the phenomenal world the
+mirror of the will, its objectivity. And since what the will wills is
+always life, just because life is nothing but the representation of that
+willing for the idea, it is all one and a mere pleonism if, instead of
+simply saying "the will," we say "the will to live."
+
+Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world.
+Life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will.
+Therefore life accompanies the will as inseparably as the shadow
+accompanies the body; and if will exists, so will life, the world, exist.
+Life is, therefore, assured to the will to live; and so long as we are
+filled with the will to live we need have no fear for our existence, even
+in the presence of death. It is true we see the individual come into being
+and pass away; but the individual is only phenomenal, exists only for the
+knowledge which is bound to the principle of sufficient reason, to the
+_principio individuationis_. Certainly, for this kind of knowledge, the
+individual receives his life as a gift, rises out of nothing, then suffers
+the loss of this gift through death, and returns again to nothing. But we
+desire to consider life philosophically, _i.e._, according to its Ideas,
+and in this sphere we shall find that neither the will, the
+thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject of knowing, that which
+perceives all phenomena, is affected at all by birth or by death. Birth
+and death belong merely to the phenomenon of will, thus to life; and it is
+essential to this to exhibit itself in individuals which come into being
+and pass away, as fleeting phenomena appearing in the form of
+time--phenomena of that which in itself knows no time, but must exhibit
+itself precisely in the way we have said, in order to objectify its
+peculiar nature. Birth and death belong in like manner to life, and hold
+the balance as reciprocal conditions of each other, or, if one likes the
+expression, as poles of the whole phenomenon of life. The wisest of all
+mythologies, the Indian, expresses this by giving to the very god that
+symbolises destruction, death (as Brahma, the most sinful and the lowest
+god of the Trimurti, symbolises generation, coming into being, and Vishnu
+maintaining or preserving), by giving, I say, to Siva as an attribute not
+only the necklace of skulls, but also the lingam, the symbol of
+generation, which appears here as the counterpart of death, thus
+signifying that generation and death are essentially correlatives, which
+reciprocally neutralise and annul each other. It was precisely the same
+sentiment that led the Greeks and Romans to adorn their costly sarcophagi,
+just as we see them now, with feasts, dances, marriages, the chase, fights
+of wild beasts, bacchanalians, &c.; thus with representations of the full
+ardour of life, which they place before us not only in such revels and
+sports, but also in sensual groups, and even go so far as to represent the
+sexual intercourse of satyrs and goats. Clearly the aim was to point in
+the most impressive manner away from the death of the mourned individual
+to the immortal life of nature, and thus to indicate, though without
+abstract knowledge, that the whole of nature is the phenomenon and also
+the fulfilment of the will to live. The form of this phenomenon is time,
+space, and causality, and by means of these individuation, which carries
+with it that the individual must come into being and pass away. But this
+no more affects the will to live, of whose manifestation the individual
+is, as it were, only a particular example or specimen, than the death of
+an individual injures the whole of nature. For it is not the individual,
+but only the species that Nature cares for, and for the preservation of
+which she so earnestly strives, providing for it with the utmost
+prodigality through the vast surplus of the seed and the great strength of
+the fructifying impulse. The individual, on the contrary, neither has nor
+can have any value for Nature, for her kingdom is infinite time and
+infinite space, and in these infinite multiplicity of possible
+individuals. Therefore she is always ready to let the individual fall, and
+hence it is not only exposed to destruction in a thousand ways by the most
+insignificant accident, but originally destined for it, and conducted
+towards it by Nature herself from the moment it has served its end of
+maintaining the species. Thus Nature naïvely expresses the great truth
+that only the Ideas, not the individuals, have, properly speaking,
+reality, _i.e._, are complete objectivity of the will. Now, since man is
+Nature itself, and indeed Nature at the highest grade of its
+self-consciousness, but Nature is only the objectified will to live, the
+man who has comprehended and retained this point of view may well console
+himself, when contemplating his own death and that of his friends, by
+turning his eyes to the immortal life of Nature, which he himself is. This
+is the significance of Siva with the lingam, and of those ancient
+sarcophagi with their pictures of glowing life, which say to the mourning
+beholder, _Natura non contristatur_.
+
+That generation and death are to be regarded as something belonging to
+life, and essential to this phenomenon of the will, arises also from the
+fact that they both exhibit themselves merely as higher powers of the
+expression of that in which all the rest of life consists. This is through
+and through nothing else than the constant change of matter in the fixed
+permanence of form; and this is what constitutes the transitoriness of the
+individual and the permanence of the species. Constant nourishment and
+renewal differ from generation only in degree, and constant excretion
+differs only in degree from death. The first shows itself most simply and
+distinctly in the plant. The plant is throughout a constant recurrence of
+the same impulse of its simplest fibre, which groups itself into leaf and
+branch. It is a systematic aggregate of similar plants supporting each
+other, whose constant reproduction is its single impulse. It ascends to
+the full satisfaction of this tendency through the grades of its
+metamorphosis, finally to the blossom and fruit, that compendium of its
+existence and effort in which it now attains, by a short way, to that
+which is its single aim, and at a stroke produces a thousand-fold what, up
+till then, it effected only in the particular case--the repetition of
+itself. Its earlier growth and development stands in the same relation to
+its fruit as writing stands to printing. With the animal it is clearly
+quite the same. The process of nourishing is a constant reproduction; the
+process of reproduction is a higher power of nourishing. The pleasure
+which accompanies the act of procreation is a higher power of the
+agreeableness of the sense of life. On the other hand, excretion, the
+constant exhalation and throwing off of matter, is the same as that which,
+at a higher power, death, is the contrary of generation. And if here we
+are always content to retain the form without lamenting the discarded
+matter, we ought to bear ourselves in the same way if in death the same
+thing happens, in a higher degree and to the whole, as takes place daily
+and hourly in a partial manner in excretion: if we are indifferent to the
+one, we ought not to shrink from the other. Therefore, from this point of
+view, it appears just as perverse to desire the continuance of an
+individuality which will be replaced by other individuals as to desire the
+permanence of matter which will be replaced by other matter. It appears
+just as foolish to embalm the body as it would be carefully to preserve
+its excrement. As to the individual consciousness which is bound to the
+individual body, it is absolutely interrupted every day by sleep. Deep
+sleep is, while it lasts, in no way different from death, into which, in
+fact, it often passes continuously, as in the case of freezing to death.
+It differs only with regard to the future, the awaking. Death is a sleep
+in which individuality is forgotten; everything else wakes again, or
+rather never slept.(64)
+
+Above all things, we must distinctly recognise that the form of the
+phenomenon of will, the form of life or reality, is really only the
+_present_, not the future nor the past. The latter are only in the
+conception, exist only in the connection of knowledge, so far as it
+follows the principle of sufficient reason. No man has ever lived in the
+past, and none will live in the future; the _present_ alone is the form of
+all life, and is its sure possession which can never be taken from it. The
+present always exists, together with its content. Both remain fixed
+without wavering, like the rainbow on the waterfall. For life is firm and
+certain in the will, and the present is firm and certain in life.
+Certainly, if we reflect on the thousands of years that are past, of the
+millions of men who lived in them, we ask, What were they? what has become
+of them? But, on the other hand, we need only recall our own past life and
+renew its scenes vividly in our imagination, and then ask again, What was
+all this? what has become of it? As it is with it, so is it with the life
+of those millions. Or should we suppose that the past could receive a new
+existence because it has been sealed by death? Our own past, the most
+recent part of it, and even yesterday, is now no more than an empty dream
+of the fancy, and such is the past of all those millions. What was? What
+is? The will, of which life is the mirror, and knowledge free from will,
+which beholds it clearly in that mirror. Whoever has not yet recognised
+this, or will not recognise it, must add to the question asked above as to
+the fate of past generations of men this question also: Why he, the
+questioner, is so fortunate as to be conscious of this costly, fleeting,
+and only real present, while those hundreds of generations of men, even
+the heroes and philosophers of those ages, have sunk into the night of the
+past, and have thus become nothing; but he, his insignificant ego,
+actually exists? or more shortly, though somewhat strangely: Why this now,
+his now, _is_ just now and _was_ not long ago? Since he asks such strange
+questions, he regards his existence and his time as independent of each
+other, and the former as projected into the latter. He assumes indeed two
+nows--one which belongs to the object, the other which belongs to the
+subject, and marvels at the happy accident of their coincidence. But in
+truth, only the point of contact of the object, the form of which is time,
+with the subject, which has no mode of the principle of sufficient reason
+as its form, constitutes the present, as is shown in the essay on the
+principle of sufficient reason. Now all object is the will so far as it
+has become idea, and the subject is the necessary correlative of the
+object. But real objects are only in the present; the past and the future
+contain only conceptions and fancies, therefore the present is the
+essential form of the phenomenon of the will, and inseparable from it. The
+present alone is that which always exists and remains immovable. That
+which, empirically apprehended, is the most transitory of all, presents
+itself to the metaphysical vision, which sees beyond the forms of
+empirical perception, as that which alone endures, the _nunc stans_ of the
+schoolmen. The source and the supporter of its content is the will to live
+or the thing-in-itself,--which we are. That which constantly becomes and
+passes away, in that it has either already been or is still to be, belongs
+to the phenomenon as such on account of its forms, which make coming into
+being and passing away possible. Accordingly, we must think:--_Quid
+fuit?_--_Quod est._ _Quid erit?_--_Quod fuit;_ and take it in the strict
+meaning of the words; thus understand not _simile_ but _idem_. For life is
+certain to the will, and the present is certain to life. Thus it is that
+every one can say, "I am once for all lord of the present, and through all
+eternity it will accompany me as my shadow: therefore I do not wonder
+where it has come from, and how it happens that it is exactly now." We
+might compare time to a constantly revolving sphere; the half that was
+always sinking would be the past, that which was always rising would be
+the future; but the indivisible point at the top, where the tangent
+touches, would be the extensionless present. As the tangent does not
+revolve with the sphere, neither does the present, the point of contact of
+the object, the form of which is time, with the subject, which has no
+form, because it does not belong to the knowable, but is the condition of
+all that is knowable. Or, time is like an unceasing stream, and the
+present a rock on which the stream breaks itself, but does not carry away
+with it. The will, as thing-in-itself, is just as little subordinate to
+the principle of sufficient reason as the subject of knowledge, which,
+finally, in a certain regard is the will itself or its expression. And as
+life, its own phenomenon, is assured to the will, so is the present, the
+single form of real life. Therefore we have not to investigate the past
+before life, nor the future after death: we have rather to know the
+_present_, the one form in which the will manifests itself.(65) It will
+not escape from the will, but neither will the will escape from it. If,
+therefore, life as it is satisfies, whoever affirms it in every way may
+regard it with confidence as endless, and banish the fear of death as an
+illusion that inspires him with the foolish dread that he can ever be
+robbed of the present, and foreshadows a time in which there is no
+present; an illusion with regard to time analogous to the illusion with
+regard to space through which every one imagines the position on the globe
+he happens to occupy as above, and all other places as below. In the same
+way every one links the present to his own individuality, and imagines
+that all present is extinguished with it; that then past and future might
+be without a present. But as on the surface of the globe every place is
+above, so the form of all life is the _present_, and to fear death because
+it robs us of the present, is just as foolish as to fear that we may slip
+down from the round globe upon which we have now the good fortune to
+occupy the upper surface. The present is the form essential to the
+objectification of the will. It cuts time, which extends infinitely in
+both directions, as a mathematical point, and stands immovably fixed, like
+an everlasting mid-day with no cool evening, as the actual sun burns
+without intermission, while it only seems to sink into the bosom of night.
+Therefore, if a man fears death as his annihilation, it is just as if he
+were to think that the sun cries out at evening, "Woe is me! for I go down
+into eternal night."(66) And conversely, whoever is oppressed with the
+burden of life, whoever desires life and affirms it, but abhors its
+torments, and especially can no longer endure the hard lot that has fallen
+to himself, such a man has no deliverance to hope for from death, and
+cannot right himself by suicide. The cool shades of Orcus allure him only
+with the false appearance of a haven of rest. The earth rolls from day
+into night, the individual dies, but the sun itself shines without
+intermission, an eternal noon. Life is assured to the will to live; the
+form of life is an endless present, no matter how the individuals, the
+phenomena of the Idea, arise and pass away in time, like fleeting dreams.
+Thus even already suicide appears to us as a vain and therefore a foolish
+action; when we have carried our investigation further it will appear to
+us in a still less favourable light.
+
+Dogmas change and our knowledge is deceptive; but Nature never errs, her
+procedure is sure, and she never conceals it. Everything is entirely in
+Nature, and Nature is entire in everything. She has her centre in every
+brute. It has surely found its way into existence, and it will surely find
+its way out of it. In the meantime it lives, fearless and without care, in
+the presence of annihilation, supported by the consciousness that it is
+Nature herself, and imperishable as she is. Man alone carries about with
+him, in abstract conceptions, the certainty of his death; yet this can
+only trouble him very rarely, when for a single moment some occasion calls
+it up to his imagination. Against the mighty voice of Nature reflection
+can do little. In man, as in the brute which does not think, the certainty
+that springs from his inmost consciousness that he himself is Nature, the
+world, predominates as a lasting frame of mind; and on account of this no
+man is observably disturbed by the thought of certain and never-distant
+death, but lives as if he would live for ever. Indeed this is carried so
+far that we may say that no one has really a lively conviction of the
+certainty of his death, otherwise there would be no great difference
+between his frame of mind and that of a condemned criminal. Every one
+recognises that certainty in the abstract and theoretically, but lays it
+aside like other theoretical truths which are not applicable to practice,
+without really receiving it into his living consciousness. Whoever
+carefully considers this peculiarity of human character will see that the
+psychological explanations of it, from habit and acquiescence in the
+inevitable, are by no means sufficient, and that its true explanation lies
+in the deeper ground we have given. The same fact explains the
+circumstance that at all times and among all peoples dogmas of some kind
+or other relating to the continued existence of the individual after death
+arise, and are believed in, although the evidence in support of them must
+always be very insufficient, and the evidence against them forcible and
+varied. But, in truth, this really requires no proof, but is recognised by
+the healthy understanding as a fact, and confirmed by the confidence that
+Nature never lies any more than she errs, but openly exhibits and naïvely
+expresses her action and her nature, while only we ourselves obscure it by
+our folly, in order to establish what is agreeable to our limited point of
+view.
+
+But this that we have brought to clearest consciousness, that although the
+particular phenomenon of the will has a temporal beginning and end, the
+will itself as thing-in-itself is not affected by it, nor yet the
+correlative of all object, the knowing but never known subject, and that
+life is always assured to the will to live--this is not to be numbered with
+the doctrines of immortality. For permanence has no more to do with the
+will or with the pure subject of knowing, the eternal eye of the world,
+than transitoriness, for both are predicates that are only valid in time,
+and the will and the pure subject of knowing lie outside time. Therefore
+the egoism of the individual (this particular phenomenon of will
+enlightened by the subject of knowing) can extract as little nourishment
+and consolation for his wish to endure through endless time from the view
+we have expressed, as he could from the knowledge that after his death the
+rest of the eternal world would continue to exist, which is just the
+expression of the same view considered objectively, and therefore
+temporally. For every individual is transitory only as phenomenon, but as
+thing-in-itself is timeless, and therefore endless. But it is also only as
+phenomenon that an individual is distinguished from the other things of
+the world; as thing-in-itself he is the will which appears in all, and
+death destroys the illusion which separates his consciousness from that of
+the rest: this is immortality. His exemption from death, which belongs to
+him only as thing-in-itself, is for the phenomenon one with the
+immortality of the rest of the external world.(67) Hence also, it arises
+that although the inward and merely felt consciousness of that which we
+have raised to distinct knowledge is indeed, as we have said, sufficient
+to prevent the thought of death from poisoning the life of the rational
+being, because this consciousness is the basis of that love of life which
+maintains everything living, and enables it to live on at ease as if there
+were no such thing as death, so long as it is face to face with life, and
+turns its attention to it, yet it will not prevent the individual from
+being seized with the fear of death, and trying in every way to escape
+from it, when it presents itself to him in some particular real case, or
+even only in his imagination, and he is compelled to contemplate it. For
+just as, so long as his knowledge was directed to life as such, he was
+obliged to recognise immortality in it, so when death is brought before
+his eyes, he is obliged to recognise it as that which it is, the temporal
+end of the particular temporal phenomenon. What we fear in death is by no
+means the pain, for it lies clearly on this side of death, and, moreover,
+we often take refuge in death from pain, just as, on the contrary, we
+sometimes endure the most fearful suffering merely to escape death for a
+while, although it would be quick and easy. Thus we distinguish pain and
+death as two entirely different evils. What we fear in death is the end of
+the individual, which it openly professes itself to be, and since the
+individual is a particular objectification of the will to live itself, its
+whole nature struggles against death. Now when feeling thus exposes us
+helpless, reason can yet step in and for the most part overcome its
+adverse influence, for it places us upon a higher standpoint, from which
+we no longer contemplate the particular but the whole. Therefore a
+philosophical knowledge of the nature of the world, which extended to the
+point we have now reached in this work but went no farther, could even at
+this point of view overcome the terror of death in the measure in which
+reflection had power over direct feeling in the given individual. A man
+who had thoroughly assimilated the truths we have already advanced, but
+had not come to know, either from his own experience or from a deeper
+insight, that constant suffering is essential to life, who found
+satisfaction and all that he wished in life, and could calmly and
+deliberately desire that his life, as he had hitherto known it, should
+endure for ever or repeat itself ever anew, and whose love of life was so
+great that he willingly and gladly accepted all the hardships and miseries
+to which it is exposed for the sake of its pleasures,--such a man would
+stand "with firm-knit bones on the well-rounded, enduring earth," and
+would have nothing to fear. Armed with the knowledge we have given him, he
+would await with indifference the death that hastens towards him on the
+wings of time. He would regard it as a false illusion, an impotent
+spectre, which frightens the weak but has no power over him who knows that
+he is himself the will of which the whole world is the objectification or
+copy, and that therefore he is always certain of life, and also of the
+present, the peculiar and only form of the phenomenon of the will. He
+could not be terrified by an endless past or future in which he would not
+be, for this he would regard as the empty delusion of the web of Mâya.
+Thus he would no more fear death than the sun fears the night. In the
+"Bhagavad-Gita" Krishna thus raises the mind of his young pupil Arjuna,
+when, seized with compunction at the sight of the arrayed hosts (somewhat
+as Xerxes was), he loses heart and desires to give up the battle in order
+to avert the death of so many thousands. Krishna leads him to this point
+of view, and the death of those thousands can no longer restrain him; he
+gives the sign for battle. This point of view is also expressed by
+Goethe's Prometheus, especially when he says--
+
+
+    "Here sit I, form mankind
+    In my own image,
+    A race like to myself,
+    To suffer and to weep,
+    Rejoice, enjoy,
+    And heed thee not,
+    As I."
+
+
+The philosophy of Bruno and that of Spinoza might also lead any one to
+this point of view whose conviction was not shaken and weakened by their
+errors and imperfections. That of Bruno has properly no ethical theory at
+all, and the theory contained in the philosophy of Spinoza does not really
+proceed from the inner nature of his doctrine, but is merely tacked on to
+it by means of weak and palpable sophisms, though in itself it is
+praiseworthy and beautiful. Finally, there are many men who would occupy
+this point of view if their knowledge kept pace with their will, _i.e._,
+if, free from all illusion, they were in a position to become clearly and
+distinctly themselves. For this is, for knowledge, the point of view of
+the complete _assertion of the will to live_.
+
+That the will asserts itself means, that while in its objectivity, _i.e._,
+in the world and life, its own nature is completely and distinctly given
+it as idea, this knowledge does not by any means check its volition; but
+this very life, so known, is willed as such by the will with knowledge,
+consciously and deliberately, just as up to this point it willed it as
+blind effort without knowledge. The opposite of this, the _denial of the
+will to live_, shows itself if, when that knowledge is attained, volition
+ends, because the particular known phenomena no longer act as _motives_
+for willing, but the whole knowledge of the nature of the world, the
+mirror of the will, which has grown up through the comprehension of the
+_Ideas_, becomes a _quieter_ of the will; and thus free, the will
+suppresses itself. These quite unfamiliar conceptions are difficult to
+understand when expressed in this general way, but it is hoped they will
+become clear through the exposition we shall give presently, with special
+reference to action, of the phenomena in which, on the one hand, the
+assertion in its different grades, and, on the other hand, the denial,
+expresses itself. For both proceed from knowledge, yet not from abstract
+knowledge, which is expressed in words, but from living knowledge, which
+is expressed in action and behaviour alone, and is independent of the
+dogmas which at the same time occupy the reason as abstract knowledge. To
+exhibit them both, and bring them to distinct knowledge of the reason, can
+alone be my aim, and not to prescribe or recommend the one or the other,
+which would be as foolish as it would be useless; for the will in itself
+is absolutely free and entirely self-determining, and for it there is no
+law. But before we go on to the exposition referred to, we must first
+explain and more exactly define this _freedom_ and its relation to
+necessity. And also, with regard to the life, the assertion and denial of
+which is our problem, we must insert a few general remarks connected with
+the will and its objects. Through all this we shall facilitate the
+apprehension of the inmost nature of the knowledge we are aiming at, of
+the ethical significance of methods of action.
+
+Since, as has been said, this whole work is only the unfolding of a single
+thought, it follows that all its parts have the most intimate connection
+with each other. Not merely that each part stands in a necessary relation
+to what immediately precedes it, and only presupposes a recollection of
+that by the reader, as is the case with all philosophies which consist
+merely of a series of inferences, but that every part of the whole work is
+related to every other part and presupposes it. It is, therefore,
+necessary that the reader should remember not only what has just been
+said, but all the earlier parts of the work, so that he may be able to
+connect them with what he is reading, however much may have intervened.
+Plato also makes this demand upon his readers through the intricate
+digressions of his dialogues, in which he only returns to the leading
+thought after long episodes, which illustrate and explain it. In our case
+this demand is necessary; for the breaking up of our one single thought
+into its many aspects is indeed the only means of imparting it, though not
+essential to the thought itself, but merely an artificial form. The
+division of four principal points of view into four books, and the most
+careful bringing together of all that is related and homogeneous, assists
+the exposition and its comprehension; yet the material absolutely does not
+admit of an advance in a straight line, such as the progress of history,
+but necessitates a more complicated exposition. This again makes a
+repeated study of the book necessary, for thus alone does the connection
+of all the parts with each other become distinct, and only then do they
+all mutually throw light upon each other and become quite clear.(68)
+
+§ 55. That the will as such is _free_, follows from the fact that,
+according to our view, it is the thing-in-itself, the content of all
+phenomena. The phenomena, on the other hand, we recognise as absolutely
+subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms. And
+since we know that necessity is throughout identical with following from
+given grounds, and that these are convertible conceptions, all that
+belongs to the phenomenon, _i.e._, all that is object for the knowing
+subject as individual, is in one aspect reason, and in another aspect
+consequent; and in this last capacity is determined with absolute
+necessity, and can, therefore, in no respect be other than it is. The
+whole content of Nature, the collective sum of its phenomena, is thus
+throughout necessary, and the necessity of every part, of every
+phenomenon, of every event, can always be proved, because it must be
+possible to find the reason from which it follows as a consequent. This
+admits of no exception: it follows from the unrestricted validity of the
+principle of sufficient reason. In another aspect, however, the same world
+is for us, in all its phenomena, objectivity of will. And the will, since
+it is not phenomenon, is not idea or object, but thing-in-itself, and is
+not subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of all
+object; thus is not determined as a consequent through any reason, knows
+no necessity, _i.e._, is _free_. The concept of freedom is thus properly a
+negative concept, for its content is merely the denial of necessity,
+_i.e._, the relation of consequent to its reason, according to the
+principle of sufficient reason. Now here lies before us in its most
+distinct form the solution of that great contradiction, the union of
+freedom with necessity, which has so often been discussed in recent times,
+yet, so far as I know, never clearly and adequately. Everything is as
+phenomenon, as object, absolutely necessary: _in itself_ it is will, which
+is perfectly free to all eternity. The phenomenon, the object, is
+necessarily and unalterably determined in that chain of causes and effects
+which admits of no interruption. But the existence in general of this
+object, and its specific nature, _i.e._, the Idea which reveals itself in
+it, or, in other words, its character, is a direct manifestation of will.
+Thus, in conformity with the freedom of this will, the object might not be
+at all, or it might be originally and essentially something quite
+different from what it is, in which case, however, the whole chain of
+which it is a link, and which is itself a manifestation of the same will,
+would be quite different also. But once there and existing, it has entered
+the chain of causes and effects, is always necessarily determined in it,
+and can, therefore, neither become something else, _i.e._, change itself,
+nor yet escape from the chain, _i.e._, vanish. Man, like every other part
+of Nature, is objectivity of the will; therefore all that has been said
+holds good of him. As everything in Nature has its forces and qualities,
+which react in a definite way when definitely affected, and constitute its
+character, man also has his _character_, from which the motives call forth
+his actions with necessity. In this manner of conduct his empirical
+character reveals itself, but in this again his intelligible character,
+the will in itself, whose determined phenomenon he is. But man is the most
+complete phenomenon of will, and, as we explained in the Second Book, he
+had to be enlightened with so high a degree of knowledge in order to
+maintain himself in existence, that in it a perfectly adequate copy or
+repetition of the nature of the world under the form of the idea became
+possible: this is the comprehension of the Ideas, the pure mirror of the
+world, as we learnt in the Third Book. Thus in man the will can attain to
+full self-consciousness, to distinct and exhaustive knowledge of its own
+nature, as it mirrors itself in the whole world. We saw in the preceding
+book that art springs from the actual presence of this degree of
+knowledge; and at the end of our whole work it will further appear that,
+through the same knowledge, in that the will relates it to itself, a
+suppression and self-denial of the will in its most perfect manifestation
+is possible. So that the freedom which otherwise, as belonging to the
+thing-in-itself, can never show itself in the phenomenon, in such a case
+does also appear in it, and, by abolishing the nature which lies at the
+foundation of the phenomenon, while the latter itself still continues to
+exist in time, it brings about a contradiction of the phenomenon with
+itself, and in this way exhibits the phenomena of holiness and
+self-renunciation. But all this can only be fully understood at the end of
+this book. What has just been said merely affords a preliminary and
+general indication of how man is distinguished from all the other
+phenomena of will by the fact that freedom, _i.e._, independence of the
+principle of sufficient reason, which only belongs to the will as
+thing-in-itself, and contradicts the phenomenon, may yet possibly, in his
+case, appear in the phenomenon also, where, however, it necessarily
+exhibits itself as a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself. In this
+sense, not only the will in itself, but man also may certainly be called
+free, and thus distinguished from all other beings. But how this is to be
+understood can only become clear through all that is to follow, and for
+the present we must turn away from it altogether. For, in the first place,
+we must beware of the error that the action of the individual definite man
+is subject to no necessity, _i.e._, that the power of the motive is less
+certain than the power of the cause, or the following of the conclusion
+from the premises. The freedom of the will as thing-in-itself, if, as has
+been said, we abstract from the entirely exceptional case mentioned above,
+by no means extends directly to its phenomenon, not even in the case in
+which this reaches the highest made of its visibility, and thus does not
+extend to the rational animal endowed with individual character, _i.e._,
+the person. The person is never free although he is the phenomenon of a
+free will; for he is already the determined phenomenon of the free
+volition of this will, and, because he enters the form of every object,
+the principle of sufficient reason, he develops indeed the unity of that
+will in a multiplicity of actions, but on account of the timeless unity of
+that volition in itself, this multiplicity exhibits in itself the regular
+conformity to law of a force of Nature. Since, however, it is that free
+volition that becomes visible in the person and the whole of his conduct,
+relating itself to him as the concept to the definition, every individual
+action of the person is to be ascribed to the free will, and directly
+proclaims itself as such in consciousness. Therefore, as was said in the
+Second Book, every one regards himself _a priori_ (_i.e._, here in this
+original feeling) as free in his individual actions, in the sense that in
+every given case every action is possible for him, and he only recognises
+_a posteriori_ from experience and reflection upon experience that his
+actions take place with absolute necessity from the coincidence of his
+character with his motives. Hence it arises that every uncultured man,
+following his feeling, ardently defends complete freedom in particular
+actions, while the great thinkers of all ages, and indeed the more
+profound systems of religion, have denied it. But whoever has come to see
+clearly that the whole nature of man is will, and he himself only a
+phenomenon of this will, and that such a phenomenon has, even from the
+subject itself, the principle of sufficient reason as its necessary form,
+which here appears as the law of motivation,--such a man will regard it as
+just as absurd to doubt the inevitable nature of an action when the motive
+is presented to a given character, as to doubt that the three angles of
+any triangle are together equal to two right angles. Priestley has very
+sufficiently proved the necessity of the individual action in his
+"Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity;" but Kant, whose merit in this
+respect is specially great, first proved the coexistence of this necessity
+with the freedom of the will in itself, _i.e._, apart from the
+phenomenon,(69) by establishing the distinction between the intelligible
+and the empirical character. I entirely adhere to this distinction, for
+the former is the will as thing-in-itself so far as it appears in a
+definite individual in a definite grade, and the latter is this phenomenon
+itself as it exhibits itself in time in the mode of action, and in space
+in the physical structure. In order to make the relation of the two
+comprehensible, the best expression is that which I have already used in
+the introductory essay, that the intelligible character of every man is to
+be regarded as an act of will outside time, and therefore indivisible and
+unchangeable, and the manifestation of this act of will developed and
+broken up in time and space and all the forms of the principle of
+sufficient reason is the empirical character as it exhibits itself for
+experience in the whole conduct and life of this man. As the whole tree is
+only the constantly repeated manifestation of one and the same tendency,
+which exhibits itself in its simplest form in the fibre, and recurs and is
+easily recognised in the construction of the leaf, shoot, branch, and
+trunk, so all a man's deeds are merely the constantly repeated expression,
+somewhat varied in form, of his intelligible character, and the induction
+based on the sum of all these expressions gives us his empirical
+character. For the rest, I shall not at this point repeat in my own words
+Kant's masterly exposition, but presuppose it as known.
+
+In the year 1840 I dealt with the important chapter on the freedom of the
+will, thoroughly and in detail, in my crowned prize-essay upon the
+subject, and exposed the reason of the delusion which led men to imagine
+that they found an empirically given absolute freedom of the will, that is
+to say, a _liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ_, as a fact in
+self-consciousness; for the question propounded for the essay was with
+great insight directed to this point. Therefore, as I refer the reader to
+that work, and also to the tenth paragraph of the prize-essay on the basis
+of morals, which was published along with it under the title "The Two
+Fundamental Problems of Ethics," I now omit the incomplete exposition of
+the necessity of the act of will, which was given at this place in the
+first edition. Instead of it I shall explain the delusion mentioned above
+in a brief discussion which is presupposed in the nineteenth chapter of
+the supplement to the present work, and therefore could not be given in
+the prize-essay referred to.
+
+Apart from the fact that the will as the true thing-in-itself is actually
+original and independent, and that the feeling of its originality and
+absoluteness must accompany its acts in self-consciousness, though here
+they are already determined, there arises the illusion of an empirical
+freedom of the will (instead of the transcendental freedom which alone is
+to be attributed to it), and thus a freedom of its particular actions,
+from that attitude of the intellect towards the will which is explained,
+separated, and subordinated in the nineteenth chapter of the supplement,
+especially under No. 3. The intellect knows the conclusions of the will
+only _a posteriori_ and empirically; therefore when a choice is presented,
+it has no data as to how the will is to decide. For the intelligible
+character, by virtue of which, when motives are given, only _one_ decision
+is possible and is therefore necessary, does not come within the knowledge
+of the intellect, but merely the empirical character is known to it
+through the succession of its particular acts. Therefore it seems to the
+intellect that in a given case two opposite decisions are possible for the
+will. But this is just the same thing as if we were to say of a
+perpendicular beam that has lost its balance, and is hesitating which way
+to fall, "It can fall either to the right hand or the left." This _can_
+has merely a subjective significance, and really means "as far as the data
+known to us are concerned." Objectively, the direction of the fall is
+necessarily determined as soon as the equilibrium is lost. Accordingly,
+the decision of one's own will is undetermined only to the beholder, one's
+own intellect, and thus merely relatively and subjectively for the subject
+of knowing. In itself and objectively, on the other hand, in every choice
+presented to it, its decision is at once determined and necessary. But
+this determination only comes into consciousness through the decision that
+follows upon it. Indeed, we receive an empirical proof of this when any
+difficult and important choice lies before us, but only under a condition
+which is not yet present, but merely hoped for, so that in the meanwhile
+we can do nothing, but must remain passive. Now we consider how we shall
+decide when the circumstances occur that will give us a free activity and
+choice. Generally the foresight of rational deliberation recommends one
+decision, while direct inclination leans rather to the other. So long as
+we are compelled to remain passive, the side of reason seems to wish to
+keep the upper hand; but we see beforehand how strongly the other side
+will influence us when the opportunity for action arises. Till then we are
+eagerly concerned to place the motives on both sides in the clearest
+light, by calm meditation on the _pro et contra_, so that every motive may
+exert its full influence upon the will when the time arrives, and it may
+not be misled by a mistake on the part of the intellect to decide
+otherwise than it would have done if all the motives had their due
+influence upon it. But this distinct unfolding of the motives on both
+sides is all that the intellect can do to assist the choice. It awaits the
+real decision just as passively and with the same intense curiosity as if
+it were that of a foreign will. Therefore from its point of view both
+decisions must seem to it equally possible; and this is just the illusion
+of the empirical freedom of the will. Certainly the decision enters the
+sphere of the intellect altogether empirically, as the final conclusion of
+the matter; but yet it proceeded from the inner nature, the intelligible
+character, of the individual will in its conflict with given motives, and
+therefore with complete necessity. The intellect can do nothing more than
+bring out clearly and fully the nature of the motives; it cannot determine
+the will itself; for the will is quite inaccessible to it, and, as we have
+seen, cannot be investigated.
+
+If, under the same circumstances, a man could act now one way and now
+another, it would be necessary that his will itself should have changed in
+the meantime, and thus that it should lie in time, for change is only
+possible in time; but then either the will would be a mere phenomenon, or
+time would be a condition of the thing-in-itself. Accordingly the dispute
+as to the freedom of the particular action, the _liberum arbitrium
+indifferentiæ_, really turns on the question whether the will lies in time
+or not. If, as both Kant's doctrine and the whole of my system
+necessitates, the will is the thing-in-itself outside time and outside
+every form of the principle of sufficient reason, not only must the
+individual act in the same way in the same circumstances, and not only
+must every bad action be the sure warrant of innumerable others, which the
+individual _must_ perform and _cannot_ leave, but, as Kant said, if only
+the empirical character and the motives were completely given, it would be
+possible to calculate the future conduct of a man just as we can calculate
+an eclipse of the sun or moon. As Nature is consistent, so is the
+character; every action must take place in accordance with it, just as
+every phenomenon takes place according to a law of Nature: the causes in
+the latter case and the motives in the former are merely the occasional
+causes, as was shown in the Second Book. The will, whose phenomenon is the
+whole being and life of man, cannot deny itself in the particular case,
+and what the man wills on the whole, that will he also will in the
+particular case.
+
+The assertion of an empirical freedom of the will, a _liberum arbitrium
+indifferentiæ_, agrees precisely with the doctrine that places the inner
+nature of man in a _soul_, which is originally a _knowing_, and indeed
+really an abstract _thinking_ nature, and only in consequence of this a
+_willing_ nature--a doctrine which thus regards the will as of a secondary
+or derivative nature, instead of knowledge which is really so. The will
+indeed came to be regarded as an act of thought, and to be identified with
+the judgment, especially by Descartes and Spinoza. According to this
+doctrine every man must become what he is only through his knowledge; he
+must enter the world as a moral cipher come to know the things in it, and
+thereupon determine to be this or that, to act thus or thus, and may also
+through new knowledge achieve a new course of action, that is to say,
+become another person. Further, he must first know a thing to be _good_,
+and in consequence of this will it, instead of first _willing_ it, and in
+consequence of this calling it _good_. According to my fundamental point
+of view, all this is a reversal of the true relation. Will is first and
+original; knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument belonging to
+the phenomenon of will. Therefore every man is what he is through his
+will, and his character is original, for willing is the basis of his
+nature. Through the knowledge which is added to it he comes to know in the
+course of experience _what he is_, _i.e._, he learns his character. Thus
+he _knows_ himself in consequence of and in accordance with the nature of
+his will, instead of _willing_ in consequence of and in accordance with
+his knowing. According to the latter view, he would only require to
+consider how he would like best to be, and he would be it; that is its
+doctrine of the freedom of the will. Thus it consists really in this, that
+a man is his own work guided by the light of knowledge. I, on the
+contrary, say that he is his own work before all knowledge, and knowledge
+is merely added to it to enlighten it. Therefore he cannot resolve to be
+this or that, nor can he become other than he is; but he _is_ once for
+all, and he knows in the course of experience _what_ he is. According to
+one doctrine he _wills_ what he knows, and according to the other he
+_knows_ what he wills.
+
+The Greeks called the character {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, and its expression, _i.e._, morals,
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}. But this word comes from {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, custom; they chose it in order to
+express metaphorically the constancy of character through the constancy of
+custom. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}. {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} (_a voce_ {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, _i.e._, _consuetudo_ {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} _est
+appellatum: ethica ergo dicta est_ {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, _sivi ab
+assuescendo_) says Aristotle (Eth. Magna, i. 6, p. 1186, and Eth. Eud., p.
+1220, and Eth. Nic., p. 1103, ed. Ber.) Stobæus quotes: {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} (_Stoici
+autem, Zenonis castra sequentes, metaphorice ethos definiunt vitæ fontem,
+e quo singulæ manant actiones_), ii. ch. 7. In Christian theology we find
+the dogma of predestination in consequence of election and non-election
+(Rom. ix. 11-24), clearly originating from the knowledge that man does not
+change himself, but his life and conduct, _i.e._, his empirical character,
+is only the unfolding of his intelligible character, the development of
+decided and unchangeable natural dispositions recognisable even in the
+child; therefore, as it were, even at his birth his conduct is firmly
+determined, and remains essentially the same to the end. This we entirely
+agree with; but certainly the consequences which followed from the union
+of this perfectly correct insight with the dogmas that already existed in
+Jewish theology, and which now gave rise to the great difficulty, the
+Gordian knot upon which most of the controversies of the Church turned, I
+do not undertake to defend, for even the Apostle Paul scarcely succeeded
+in doing so by means of his simile of the potter's vessels which he
+invented for the purpose, for the result he finally arrived at was nothing
+else than this:--
+
+
+    "Let mankind
+    Fear the gods!
+    They hold the power
+    In everlasting hands:
+    And they can use it
+    As seems good to them."
+
+
+Such considerations, however, are really foreign to our subject. Some
+explanation as to the relation between the character and the knowledge in
+which all its motives lie, will now be more to the point.
+
+The motives which determine the manifestation of the character or conduct
+influence it through the medium of knowledge. But knowledge is changeable,
+and often vacillates between truth and error, yet, as a rule, is rectified
+more and more in the course of life, though certainly in very different
+degrees. Therefore the conduct of a man may be observably altered without
+justifying us in concluding that his character has been changed. What the
+man really and in general wills, the striving of his inmost nature, and
+the end he pursues in accordance with it, this we can never change by
+influence upon him from without by instruction, otherwise we could
+transform him. Seneca says admirably, _velle non discitur_; whereby he
+preferred truth to his Stoic philosophers, who taught {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_doceri posse virtutem_). From without the will can only be
+affected by motives. But these can never change the will itself; for they
+have power over it only under the presupposition that it is precisely such
+as it is. All that they can do is thus to alter the direction of its
+effort, _i.e._, bring it about that it shall seek in another way than it
+has hitherto done that which it invariably seeks. Therefore instruction,
+improved knowledge, in other words, influence from without, may indeed
+teach the will that it erred in the means it employed, and can therefore
+bring it about that the end after which it strives once for all according
+to its inner nature shall be pursued on an entirely different path and in
+an entirely different object from what has hitherto been the case. But it
+can never bring about that the will shall will something actually
+different from what it has hitherto willed; this remains unchangeable, for
+the will is simply this willing itself, which would have to be abolished.
+The former, however, the possible modification of knowledge, and through
+knowledge of conduct, extends so far that the will seeks to attain its
+unalterable end, for example, Mohammed's paradise, at one time in the real
+world, at another time in a world of imagination, adapting the means to
+each, and thus in the first case applying prudence, might, and fraud, and
+in the second case, abstinence, justice, alms, and pilgrimages to Mecca.
+But its effort itself has not therefore changed, still less the will
+itself. Thus, although its action certainly shows itself very different at
+different times, its willing has yet remained precisely the same. _Velle
+non discitur._
+
+For motives to act, it is necessary not only that they should be present,
+but that they should be known; for, according to a very good expression of
+the schoolmen, which we referred to once before, _causa finalis movet non
+secundum suum esse reale; sed secundum esse cognitum_. For example, in
+order that the relation may appear that exists in a given man between
+egoism and sympathy, it is not sufficient that he should possess wealth
+and see others in want, but he must also know what he can do with his
+wealth, both for himself and for others: not only must the suffering of
+others be presented to him, but he must know both what suffering and also
+what pleasure is. Perhaps, on a first occasion, he did not know all this
+so well as on a second; and if, on a similar occasion, he acts
+differently, this arises simply from the fact that the circumstances were
+really different, as regards the part of them that depends on his knowing
+them, although they seem to be the same. As ignorance of actually existing
+circumstances robs them of their influence, so, on the other hand,
+entirely imaginary circumstances may act as if they were real, not only in
+the case of a particular deception, but also in general and continuously.
+For example, if a man is firmly persuaded that every good action will be
+repaid him a hundredfold in a future life, such a conviction affects him
+in precisely the same way as a good bill of exchange at a very long date,
+and he can give from mere egoism, as from another point of view he would
+take from egoism. He has not changed himself: _velle non discitur._ It is
+on account of this great influence of knowledge upon action, while the
+will remains unchangeable, that the character develops and its different
+features appear only little by little. Therefore it shows itself different
+at every period of life, and an impetuous, wild youth may be succeeded by
+a staid, sober, manly age. Especially what is bad in the character will
+always come out more strongly with time, yet sometimes it occurs that
+passions which a man gave way to in his youth are afterwards voluntarily
+restrained, simply because the motives opposed to them have only then come
+into knowledge. Hence, also, we are all innocent to begin with, and this
+merely means that neither we nor others know the evil of our own nature;
+it only appears with the motives, and only in time do the motives appear
+in knowledge. Finally we come to know ourselves as quite different from
+what _a priori_ we supposed ourselves to be, and then we are often
+terrified at ourselves.
+
+Repentance never proceeds from a change of the will (which is impossible),
+but from a change of knowledge. The essential and peculiar in what I have
+always willed I must still continue to will; for I myself am this will
+which lies outside time and change. I can therefore never repent of what I
+have willed, though I can repent of what I have done; because, led by
+false conceptions, I did something that was not in conformity with my
+will. The discovery of this through fuller knowledge is _repentance_. This
+extends not merely to worldly wisdom, to the choice of the means, and the
+judgment of the appropriateness of the end to my own will, but also to
+what is properly ethical. For example, I may have acted more egotistically
+than is in accordance with my character, led astray by exaggerated ideas
+of the need in which I myself stood, or of the craft, falseness, and
+wickedness of others, or because I hurried too much, _i.e._, acted without
+deliberation, determined not by motives distinctly known _in abstracto_,
+but by merely perceived motives, by the present and the emotion which it
+excited, and which was so strong that I had not properly the use of my
+reason; but the return of reflection is thus here also merely corrected
+knowledge, and from this repentance may proceed, which always proclaims
+itself by making amends for the past, as far as is possible. Yet it must
+be observed that, in order to deceive themselves, men prearrange what seem
+to be hasty errors, but are really secretly considered actions. For we
+deceive and flatter no one through such fine devices as ourselves. The
+converse of the case we have given may also occur. I may be misled by too
+good an opinion of others, or want of knowledge of the relative value of
+the good things of life, or some abstract dogma in which I have since lost
+faith, and thus I may act less egotistically than is in keeping with my
+character, and lay up for myself repentance of another kind. Thus
+repentance is always corrected knowledge of the relation of an act to its
+special intention. When the will reveals its Ideas in space alone, _i.e._,
+through mere form, the matter in which other Ideas--in this case natural
+forces--already reign, resists the will, and seldom allows the form that is
+striving after visibility to appear in perfect purity and distinctness,
+_i.e._, in perfect beauty. And there is an analogous hindrance to the will
+as it reveals itself in time alone, _i.e._, through actions, in the
+knowledge which seldom gives it the data quite correctly, so that the
+action which takes place does not accurately correspond to the will, and
+leads to repentance. Repentance thus always proceeds from corrected
+knowledge, not from the change of the will, which is impossible. Anguish
+of conscience for past deeds is anything but repentance. It is pain at the
+knowledge of oneself in one's inmost nature, _i.e._, as will. It rests
+precisely on the certainty that we have still the same will. If the will
+were changed, and therefore the anguish of conscience mere repentance, it
+would cease to exist. The past could then no longer give us pain, for it
+exhibited the expressions of a will which is no longer that of him who has
+repented. We shall explain the significance of anguish of conscience in
+detail farther on.
+
+The influence which knowledge, as the medium of motives, exerts, not
+indeed upon the will itself, but upon its appearance in actions, is also
+the source of the principal distinction between the action of men and that
+of brutes, for their methods of knowledge are different. The brute has
+only knowledge of perception, the man, through reason, has also abstract
+ideas, conceptions. Now, although man and brute are with equal necessity
+determined by their motives, yet man, as distinguished from the brute, has
+a complete _choice_, which has often been regarded as a freedom of the
+will in particular actions, although it is nothing but the possibility of
+a thoroughly-fought-out battle between several motives, the strongest of
+which then determines it with necessity. For this the motives must have
+assumed the form of abstract thoughts, because it is really only by means
+of these that deliberation, _i.e._, a weighing of opposite reasons for
+action, is possible. In the case of the brute there can only be a choice
+between perceptible motives presented to it, so that the choice is limited
+to the narrow sphere of its present sensuous perception. Therefore the
+necessity of the determination of the will by the motive, which is like
+that of the effect by the cause, can be exhibited perceptibly and directly
+only in the case of the brutes, because here the spectator has the motives
+just as directly before his eyes as their effect; while in the case of man
+the motives are almost always abstract ideas, which are not communicated
+to the spectator, and even for the actor himself the necessity of their
+effect is hidden behind their conflict. For only _in abstracto_ can
+several ideas, as judgments and chains of conclusions, lie beside each
+other in consciousness, and then, free from all determination of time,
+work against each other till the stronger overcomes the rest and
+determines the will. This is the complete _choice_ or power of
+deliberation which man has as distinguished from the brutes, and on
+account of which freedom of the will has been attributed to him, in the
+belief that his willing is a mere result of the operations of his
+intellect, without a definite tendency which serves as its basis; while,
+in truth, the motives only work on the foundation and under the
+presupposition of his definite tendency, which in his case is individual,
+_i.e._, a character. A fuller exposition of this power of deliberation,
+and the difference between human and brute choice which is introduced by
+it, will be found in the "Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics" (1st
+edition, p. 35, _et seq._; 2d edition, p. 34, _et seq._), to which I
+therefore refer. For the rest, this power of deliberation which man
+possesses is one of those things that makes his existence so much more
+miserable than that of the brute. For in general our greatest sufferings
+do not lie in the present as ideas of perception or as immediate feelings;
+but in the reason, as abstract conceptions, painful thoughts, from which
+the brute, which lives only in the present, and therefore in enviable
+carelessness, is entirely free.
+
+It seems to have been the dependence, which we have shown, of the human
+power of deliberation upon the faculty of abstract thinking, and thus also
+of judging and drawing conclusions also, that led both Descartes and
+Spinoza to identify the decisions of the will with the faculty of
+asserting and denying (the faculty of judgment). From this Descartes
+deduced the doctrine that the will, which, according to him, is
+indifferently free, is the source of sin, and also of all theoretical
+error. And Spinoza, on the other hand, concluded that the will is
+necessarily determined by the motives, as the judgment is by the
+reasons.(70) The latter doctrine is in a sense true, but it appears as a
+true conclusion from false premises.
+
+The distinction we have established between the ways in which the brutes
+and man are respectively moved by motives exerts a very wide influence
+upon the nature of both, and has most to do with the complete and obvious
+differences of their existence. While an idea of perception is in every
+case the motive which determines the brute, the man strives to exclude
+this kind of motivation altogether, and to determine himself entirely by
+abstract ideas. Thus he uses his prerogative of reason to the greatest
+possible advantage. Independent of the present, he neither chooses nor
+avoids the passing pleasure or pain, but reflects on the consequences of
+both. In most cases, setting aside quite insignificant actions, we are
+determined by abstract, thought motives, not present impressions.
+Therefore all particular privation for the moment is for us comparatively
+light, but all renunciation is terribly hard; for the former only concerns
+the fleeting present, but the latter concerns the future, and includes in
+itself innumerable privations, of which it is the equivalent. The causes
+of our pain, as of our pleasure, lie for the most part, not in the real
+present, but merely in abstract thoughts. It is these which are often
+unbearable to us--inflict torments in comparison with which all the
+sufferings of the animal world are very small; for even our own physical
+pain is not felt at all when they are present. Indeed, in the case of keen
+mental suffering, we even inflict physical suffering on ourselves merely
+to distract our attention from the former to the latter. This is why, in
+great mental anguish, men tear their hair, beat their breasts, lacerate
+their faces, or roll on the floor, for all these are in reality only
+violent means of diverting the mind from an unbearable thought. Just
+because mental pain, being much greater, makes us insensible to physical
+pain, suicide is very easy to the person who is in despair, or who is
+consumed by morbid depression, even though formerly, in comfortable
+circumstances, he recoiled at the thought of it. In the same way care and
+passion (thus the play of thought) wear out the body oftener and more than
+physical hardships. And in accordance with this Epictetus rightly says:
+{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+(_Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus decreta_) (V.); and
+Seneca: _Plura sunt quæ nos terrent, quam quæ premunt, et sæpius opinione
+quam re laboramus_ (Ep. 5). Eulenspiegel also admirably bantered human
+nature, for going uphill he laughed, and going downhill he wept. Indeed,
+children who have hurt themselves often cry, not at the pain, but at the
+thought of the pain which is awakened when some one condoles with them.
+Such great differences in conduct and in life arise from the diversity
+between the methods of knowledge of the brutes and man. Further, the
+appearance of the distinct and decided individual character, the principal
+distinction between man and the brute, which has scarcely more than the
+character of the species, is conditioned by the choice between several
+motives, which is only possible through abstract conceptions. For only
+after a choice has been made are the resolutions, which vary in different
+individuals, an indication of the individual character which is different
+in each; while the action of the brute depends only upon the presence or
+absence of the impression, supposing this impression to be in general a
+motive for its species. And, finally, in the case of man, only the
+resolve, and not the mere wish, is a valid indication of his character
+both for himself and for others; but the resolve becomes for himself, as
+for others, a certain fact only through the deed. The wish is merely the
+necessary consequence of the present impression, whether of the outward
+stimulus, or the inward passing mood; and is therefore as immediately
+necessary and devoid of consideration as the action of the brutes.
+Therefore, like the action of the brutes, it merely expresses the
+character of the species, not that of the individual, _i.e._, it indicates
+merely what _man in general_, not what the individual who experiences the
+wish, is capable of doing. The deed alone,--because as human action it
+always requires a certain deliberation, and because as a rule a man has
+command of his reason, is considerate, _i.e._, decides in accordance with
+considered and abstract motives,--is the expression of the intelligible
+maxims of his conduct, the result of his inmost willing, and is related as
+a letter to the word that stands for his empirical character, itself
+merely the temporal expression of his intelligible character. In a healthy
+mind, therefore, only deeds oppress the conscience, not wishes and
+thoughts; for it is only our deeds that hold up to us the mirror of our
+will. The deed referred to above, that is entirely unconsidered and is
+really committed in blind passion, is to a certain extent an intermediate
+thing between the mere wish and the resolve.
+
+Therefore, by true repentance, which, however, shows itself as action
+also, it can be obliterated, as a falsely drawn line, from that picture of
+our will which our course of life is. I may insert the remark here, as a
+very good comparison, that the relation between wish and deed has a purely
+accidental but accurate analogy with that between the accumulation and
+discharge of electricity.
+
+As the result of the whole of this discussion of the freedom of the will
+and what relates to it, we find that although the will may, in itself and
+apart from the phenomenon, be called free and even omnipotent, yet in its
+particular phenomena enlightened by knowledge, as in men and brutes, it is
+determined by motives to which the special character regularly and
+necessarily responds, and always in the same way. We see that because of
+the possession on his part of abstract or rational knowledge, man, as
+distinguished from the brutes, has a _choice_, which only makes him the
+scene of the conflict of his motives, without withdrawing him from their
+control. This choice is therefore certainly the condition of the
+possibility of the complete expression of the individual character, but is
+by no means to be regarded as freedom of the particular volition, _i.e._,
+independence of the law of causality, the necessity of which extends to
+man as to every other phenomenon. Thus the difference between human
+volition and that of the brutes, which is introduced by reason or
+knowledge through concepts, extends to the point we have indicated, and no
+farther. But, what is quite a different thing, there may arise a
+phenomenon of the human will which is quite impossible in the brute
+creation, if man altogether lays aside the knowledge of particular things
+as such which is subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, and by
+means of his knowledge of the Ideas sees through the _principium
+individuationis_. Then an actual appearance of the real freedom of the
+will as a thing-in-itself is possible, by which the phenomenon comes into
+a sort of contradiction with itself, as is indicated by the word
+self-renunciation; and, finally, the "in-itself" of its nature suppresses
+itself. But this, the one, real, and direct expression of the freedom of
+the will in itself in the phenomenon, cannot be distinctly explained here,
+but will form the subject of the concluding part of our work.
+
+Now that we have shown clearly in these pages the unalterable nature of
+the empirical character, which is just the unfolding of the intelligible
+character that lies outside time, together with the necessity with which
+actions follow upon its contact with motives, we hasten to anticipate an
+argument which may very easily be drawn from this in the interest of bad
+dispositions. Our character is to be regarded as the temporal unfolding of
+an extra-temporal, and therefore indivisible and unalterable, act of will,
+or an intelligible character. This necessarily determines all that is
+essential in our conduct in life, _i.e._, its ethical content, which must
+express itself in accordance with it in its phenomenal appearance, the
+empirical character; while only what is unessential in this, the outward
+form of our course of life, depends upon the forms in which the motives
+present themselves. It might, therefore, be inferred that it is a waste of
+trouble to endeavour to improve one's character, and that it is wiser to
+submit to the inevitable, and gratify every inclination at once, even if
+it is bad. But this is precisely the same thing as the theory of an
+inevitable fate which is called {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, and in more recent times
+Turkish faith. Its true refutation, as it is supposed to have been given
+by Chrysippus, is explained by Cicero in his book _De Fato_, ch. 12, 13.
+
+Though everything may be regarded as irrevocably predetermined by fate,
+yet it is so only through the medium of the chain of causes; therefore in
+no case can it be determined that an effect shall appear without its
+cause. Thus it is not simply the event that is predetermined, but the
+event as the consequence of preceding causes; so that fate does not decide
+the consequence alone, but also the means as the consequence of which it
+is destined to appear. Accordingly, if some means is not present, it is
+certain that the consequence also will not be present: each is always
+present in accordance with the determination of fate, but this is never
+known to us till afterwards.
+
+As events always take place according to fate, _i.e._, according to the
+infinite concatenation of causes, so our actions always take place
+according to our intelligible character. But just as we do not know the
+former beforehand, so no _a priori_ insight is given us into the latter,
+but we only come to know ourselves as we come to know other persons _a
+posteriori_ through experience. If the intelligible character involved
+that we could only form a good resolution after a long conflict with a bad
+disposition, this conflict would have to come first and be waited for.
+Reflection on the unalterable nature of the character, on the unity of the
+source from which all our actions flow, must not mislead us into claiming
+the decision of the character in favour of one side or the other; it is in
+the resolve that follows that we shall see what manner of men we are, and
+mirror ourselves in our actions. This is the explanation of the
+satisfaction or the anguish of soul with which we look back on the course
+of our past life. Both are experienced, not because these past deeds have
+still an existence; they are past, they have been, and now are no more;
+but their great importance for us lies in their significance, lies in the
+fact that these deeds are the expression of the character, the mirror of
+the will, in which we look and recognise our inmost self, the kernel of
+our will. Because we experience this not before, but only after, it
+behoves us to strive and fight in time, in order that the picture we
+produce by our deeds may be such that the contemplation of it may calm us
+as much as possible, instead of harassing us. The significance of this
+consolation or anguish of soul will, as we have said, be inquired into
+farther on; but to this place there belongs the inquiry which follows, and
+which stands by itself.
+
+Besides the intelligible and the empirical character, we must mention a
+third which is different from them both, the _acquired character_, which
+one only receives in life through contact with the world, and which is
+referred to when one is praised as a man of character or censured as being
+without character. Certainly one might suppose that, since the empirical
+character, as the phenomenon of the intelligible, is unalterable, and,
+like every natural phenomenon, is consistent with itself, man would always
+have to appear like himself and consistent, and would therefore have no
+need to acquire a character artificially by experience and reflection. But
+the case is otherwise, and although a man is always the same, yet he does
+not always understand himself, but often mistakes himself, till he has in
+some degree acquired real self-knowledge. The empirical character, as a
+mere natural tendency, is in itself irrational; nay, more, its expressions
+are disturbed by reason, all the more so the more intellect and power of
+thought the man has; for these always keep before him what becomes _man in
+general_ as the character of the species, and what is possible for him
+both in will and in deed. This makes it the more difficult for him to see
+how much his individuality enables him to will and to accomplish. He finds
+in himself the germs of all the various human pursuits and powers, but the
+difference of degree in which they exist in his individuality is not clear
+to him in the absence of experience; and if he now applies himself to the
+pursuits which alone correspond to his character, he yet feels, especially
+at particular moments and in particular moods, the inclination to directly
+opposite pursuits which cannot be combined with them, but must be entirely
+suppressed if he desires to follow the former undisturbed. For as our
+physical path upon earth is always merely a line, not an extended surface,
+so in life, if we desire to grasp and possess one thing, we must renounce
+and leave innumerable others on the right hand and on the left. If we
+cannot make up our minds to this, but, like children at the fair, snatch
+at everything that attracts us in passing, we are making the perverse
+endeavour to change the line of our path into an extended surface; we run
+in a zigzag, skip about like a will o' the wisp, and attain to nothing.
+Or, to use another comparison, as, according to Hobbes' philosophy of law,
+every one has an original right to everything but an exclusive right to
+nothing, yet can obtain an exclusive right to particular things by
+renouncing his right to all the rest, while others, on their part, do
+likewise with regard to what he has chosen; so is it in life, in which
+some definite pursuit, whether it be pleasure, honour, wealth, science,
+art, or virtue, can only be followed with seriousness and success when all
+claims that are foreign to it are given up, when everything else is
+renounced. Accordingly, the mere will and the mere ability are not
+sufficient, but a man must also _know_ what he wills, and _know_ what he
+can do; only then will he show character, and only then can he accomplish
+something right. Until he attains to that, notwithstanding the natural
+consistency of the empirical character, he is without character. And
+although, on the whole, he must remain true to himself, and fulfil his
+course, led by his dæmon, yet his path will not be a straight line, but
+wavering and uneven. He will hesitate, deviate, turn back, lay up for
+himself repentance and pain. And all this is because, in great and small,
+he sees before him all that is possible and attainable for man in general,
+but does not know what part of all this is alone suitable for him, can be
+accomplished by him, and is alone enjoyable by him. He will, therefore,
+envy many men on account of a position and circumstances which are yet
+only suitable to their characters and not to his, and in which he would
+feel unhappy, if indeed he found them endurable at all. For as a fish is
+only at home in water, a bird in the air, a mole in the earth, so every
+man is only at home in the atmosphere suitable to him. For example, not
+all men can breathe the air of court life. From deficiency of proper
+insight into all this, many a man will make all kinds of abortive
+attempts, will do violence to his character in particulars, and yet, on
+the whole, will have to yield to it again; and what he thus painfully
+attains will give him no pleasure; what he thus learns will remain dead;
+even in an ethical regard, a deed that is too noble for his character,
+that has not sprung from pure, direct impulse, but from a concept, a
+dogma, will lose all merit, even in his own eyes, through subsequent
+egoistical repentance. _Velle non discitur._ We only become conscious of
+the inflexibility of another person's character through experience, and
+till then we childishly believe that it is possible, by means of rational
+ideas, by prayers and entreaties, by example and noble-mindedness, ever to
+persuade any one to leave his own way, to change his course of conduct, to
+depart from his mode of thinking, or even to extend his capacities: so is
+it also with ourselves. We must first learn from experience what we desire
+and what we can do. Till then we know it not, we are without character,
+and must often be driven back to our own way by hard blows from without.
+But if we have finally learnt it, then we have attained to what in the
+world is called character, the _acquired character_. This is accordingly
+nothing but the most perfect knowledge possible of our own individuality.
+It is the abstract, and consequently distinct, knowledge of the
+unalterable qualities of our own empirical character, and of the measure
+and direction of our mental and physical powers, and thus of the whole
+strength and weakness of our own individuality. This places us in a
+position to carry out deliberately and methodically the rôle which belongs
+to our own person, and to fill up the gaps which caprices or weaknesses
+produce in it, under the guidance of fixed conceptions. This rôle is in
+itself unchangeably determined once for all, but hitherto we have allowed
+it to follow its natural course without any rule. We have now brought to
+distinct conscious maxims which are always present to us the form of
+conduct which is necessarily determined by our own individual nature, and
+now we conduct it in accordance with them as deliberately as if we had
+learned it; without ever falling into error through the passing influence
+of the mood or the impression of the present, without being checked by the
+bitterness or sweetness of some particular thing we meet with on our path,
+without delay, without hesitation, without inconsistency. We shall now no
+longer, as novices, wait, attempt, and grope about in order to see what we
+really desire and are able to do, but we know this once for all, and in
+every choice we have only to apply general principles to particular cases,
+and arrive at once at a decision. We know our will in general, and do not
+allow ourselves to be led by the passing mood or by solicitations from
+without to resolve in particular cases what is contrary to it as a whole.
+We know in the same way the nature and the measure of our strength and our
+weakness, and thereby are spared much suffering. For we experience no real
+pleasure except in the use and feeling of our own powers, and the greatest
+pain is the conscious deficiency of our powers where we need them. If,
+now, we have discovered where our strength and our weakness lie, we will
+endeavour to cultivate, employ, and in every way make use of those talents
+which are naturally prominent in us. We will always turn to those
+occupations in which they are valuable and to the purpose, and entirely
+avoid, even with self-renunciation, those pursuits for which we have
+naturally little aptitude; we will beware of attempting that in which we
+have no chance of succeeding. Only he who has attained to this will
+constantly and with full consciousness be completely himself, and will
+never fail himself at the critical moment, because he will always have
+known what he could expect from himself. He will often enjoy the
+satisfaction of feeling his strength, and seldom experience the pain of
+being reminded of his weakness. The latter is mortification, which causes
+perhaps the greatest of mental sufferings; therefore it is far more
+endurable to have our misfortune brought clearly before us than our
+incapacity. And, further, if we are thus fully acquainted with our
+strength and our weakness, we will not attempt to make a show of powers
+which we do not possess; we will not play with base coin, for all such
+dissimulation misses the mark in the end. For since the whole man is only
+the phenomenon of his will, nothing can be more perverse than to try, by
+means of reflection, to become something else than one is, for this is a
+direct contradiction of the will with itself. The imitation of the
+qualities and idiosyncrasies of others is much more shameful than to dress
+in other people's clothes; for it is the judgment of our own worthlessness
+pronounced by ourselves. Knowledge of our own mind and its capacities of
+every kind, and their unalterable limits, is in this respect the surest
+way to the attainment of the greatest possible contentment with ourselves.
+For it holds good of inward as of outward circumstances that there is for
+us no consolation so effective as the complete certainty of unalterable
+necessity. No evil that befalls us pains us so much as the thought of the
+circumstances by which it might have been warded off. Therefore nothing
+comforts us so effectually as the consideration of what has happened from
+the standpoint of necessity, from which all accidents appear as tools in
+the hand of an overruling fate, and we therefore recognise the evil that
+has come to us as inevitably produced by the conflict of inner and outer
+circumstances; in other words, fatalism. We really only complain and storm
+so long as we hope either to affect others or to excite ourselves to
+unheard-of efforts. But children and grown-up people know very well to
+yield contentedly as soon as they clearly see that it absolutely cannot be
+otherwise:--{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} (_Animo in
+pectoribus nostro domito necessitate_). We are like the entrapped
+elephants, that rage and struggle for many days, till they see that it is
+useless, and then suddenly offer their necks quietly to the yoke, tamed
+for ever. We are like King David, who, as long as his son still lived,
+unceasingly importuned Jehovah with prayers, and behaved himself as if in
+despair; but as soon as his son was dead, thought no longer about it.
+Hence it arises that innumerable permanent ills, such as lameness,
+poverty, low estate, ugliness, a disagreeable dwelling-place, are borne
+with indifference by innumerable persons, and are no longer felt, like
+healed wounds, just because these persons know that inward or outward
+necessity renders it impossible that any change can take place in these
+things; while those who are more fortunate cannot understand how such
+misfortunes can be borne. Now as with outward necessity, so also with
+inward; nothing reconciles so thoroughly as a distinct knowledge of it. If
+we have once for all distinctly recognised not only our good qualities and
+our strength, but also our defects and weakness, established our aim
+accordingly, and rest satisfied concerning what cannot be attained, we
+thus escape in the surest way, as far as our individuality permits, the
+bitterest of all sorrows, discontentment with ourselves, which is the
+inevitable result of ignorance of our own individuality, of false conceit
+and the audacity that proceeds from it. To the bitter chapter of the
+self-knowledge here recommended the lines of Ovid admit of excellent
+application--
+
+
+    "_Optimus ille animi vindex lædentia pectus,_
+    _Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel._"
+
+
+So much with regard to the _acquired character_, which, indeed, is not of
+so much importance for ethics proper as for life in the world. But its
+investigation was related as that of a third species to the investigation
+of the intelligible and the empirical character, in regard to which we
+were obliged to enter upon a somewhat detailed inquiry in order to bring
+out clearly how in all its phenomena the will is subject to necessity,
+while yet in itself it may be called free and even omnipotent.
+
+§ 56. This freedom, this omnipotence, as the expression of which the whole
+visible world exists and progressively develops in accordance with the
+laws which belong to the form of knowledge, can now, at the point at which
+in its most perfect manifestation it has attained to the completely
+adequate knowledge of its own nature, express itself anew in two ways.
+Either it wills here, at the summit of mental endowment and
+self-consciousness, simply what it willed before blindly and
+unconsciously, and if so, knowledge always remains its _motive_ in the
+whole as in the particular case. Or, conversely, this knowledge becomes
+for it a _quieter_, which appeases and suppresses all willing. This is
+that assertion and denial of the will to live which was stated above in
+general terms. As, in the reference of individual conduct, a general, not
+a particular manifestation of will, it does not disturb and modify the
+development of the character, nor does it find its expression in
+particular actions; but, either by an ever more marked appearance of the
+whole method of action it has followed hitherto, or conversely by the
+entire suppression of it, it expresses in a living form the maxims which
+the will has freely adopted in accordance with the knowledge it has now
+attained to. By the explanations we have just given of freedom, necessity,
+and character, we have somewhat facilitated and prepared the way for the
+clearer development of all this, which is the principal subject of this
+last book. But we shall have done so still more when we have turned our
+attention to life itself, the willing or not willing of which is the great
+question, and have endeavoured to find out generally what the will itself,
+which is everywhere the inmost nature of this life, will really attain by
+its assertion--in what way and to what extent this assertion satisfies or
+can satisfy the will; in short, what is generally and mainly to be
+regarded as its position in this its own world, which in every relation
+belongs to it.
+
+First of all, I wish the reader to recall the passage with which we closed
+the Second Book,--a passage occasioned by the question, which met us then,
+as to the end and aim of the will. Instead of the answer to this question,
+it appeared clearly before us how, in all the grades of its manifestation,
+from the lowest to the highest, the will dispenses altogether with a final
+goal and aim. It always strives, for striving is its sole nature, which no
+attained goal can put an end to. Therefore it is not susceptible of any
+final satisfaction, but can only be restrained by hindrances, while in
+itself it goes on for ever. We see this in the simplest of all natural
+phenomena, gravity, which does not cease to strive and press towards a
+mathematical centre to reach which would be the annihilation both of
+itself and matter, and would not cease even if the whole universe were
+already rolled into one ball. We see it in the other simple natural
+phenomena. A solid tends towards fluidity either by melting or dissolving,
+for only so will its chemical forces be free; rigidity is the imprisonment
+in which it is held by cold. The fluid tends towards the gaseous state,
+into which it passes at once as soon as all pressure is removed from it.
+No body is without relationship, _i.e._, without tendency or without
+desire and longing, as Jacob Böhme would say. Electricity transmits its
+inner self-repulsion to infinity, though the mass of the earth absorbs the
+effect. Galvanism is certainly, so long as the pile is working, an
+aimless, unceasingly repeated act of repulsion and attraction. The
+existence of the plant is just such a restless, never satisfied striving,
+a ceaseless tendency through ever-ascending forms, till the end, the seed,
+becomes a new starting-point; and this repeated _ad infinitum_--nowhere an
+end, nowhere a final satisfaction, nowhere a resting-place. It will also
+be remembered, from the Second Book, that the multitude of natural forces
+and organised forms everywhere strive with each other for the matter in
+which they desire to appear, for each of them only possesses what it has
+wrested from the others; and thus a constant internecine war is waged,
+from which, for the most part, arises the resistance through which that
+striving, which constitutes the inner nature of everything, is at all
+points hindered; struggles in vain, yet, from its nature, cannot leave
+off; toils on laboriously till this phenomenon dies, when others eagerly
+seize its place and its matter.
+
+We have long since recognised this striving, which constitutes the kernel
+and in-itself of everything, as identical with that which in us, where it
+manifests itself most distinctly in the light of the fullest
+consciousness, is called _will_. Its hindrance through an obstacle which
+places itself between it and its temporary aim we call _suffering_, and,
+on the other hand, its attainment of the end satisfaction, wellbeing,
+happiness. We may also transfer this terminology to the phenomena of the
+unconscious world, for though weaker in degree, they are identical in
+nature. Then we see them involved in constant suffering, and without any
+continuing happiness. For all effort springs from defect--from discontent
+with one's estate--is thus suffering so long as it is not satisfied; but no
+satisfaction is lasting, rather it is always merely the starting-point of
+a new effort. The striving we see everywhere hindered in many ways,
+everywhere in conflict, and therefore always under the form of suffering.
+Thus, if there is no final end of striving, there is no measure and end of
+suffering.
+
+But what we only discover in unconscious Nature by sharpened observation,
+and with an effort, presents itself distinctly to us in the intelligent
+world in the life of animals, whose constant suffering is easily proved.
+But without lingering over these intermediate grades, we shall turn to the
+life of man, in which all this appears with the greatest distinctness,
+illuminated by the clearest knowledge; for as the phenomenon of will
+becomes more complete, the suffering also becomes more and more apparent.
+In the plant there is as yet no sensibility, and therefore no pain. A
+certain very small degree of suffering is experienced by the lowest
+species of animal life--infusoria and radiata; even in insects the capacity
+to feel and suffer is still limited. It first appears in a high degree
+with the complete nervous system of vertebrate animals, and always in a
+higher degree the more intelligence develops. Thus, in proportion as
+knowledge attains to distinctness, as consciousness ascends, pain also
+increases, and therefore reaches its highest degree in man. And then,
+again, the more distinctly a man knows, the more intelligent he is, the
+more pain he has; the man who is gifted with genius suffers most of all.
+In this sense, that is, with reference to the degree of knowledge in
+general, not mere abstract rational knowledge, I understand and use here
+that saying of the Preacher: _Qui auget scientiam, auget at dolorem._ That
+philosophical painter or painting philosopher, Tischbein, has very
+beautifully expressed the accurate relation between the degree of
+consciousness and that of suffering by exhibiting it in a visible and
+clear form in a drawing. The upper half of his drawing represents women
+whose children have been stolen, and who in different groups and
+attitudes, express in many ways deep maternal pain, anguish, and despair.
+The lower half of the drawing represents sheep whose lambs have been taken
+away. They are arranged and grouped in precisely the same way; so that
+every human head, every human attitude of the upper half, has below a
+brute head and attitude corresponding to it. Thus we see distinctly how
+the pain which is possible in the dull brute consciousness is related to
+the violent grief, which only becomes possible through distinctness of
+knowledge and clearness of consciousness.
+
+We desire to consider in this way, in _human existence_, the inner and
+essential destiny of will. Every one will easily recognise that same
+destiny expressed in various degrees in the life of the brutes, only more
+weakly, and may also convince himself to his own satisfaction, from the
+suffering animal world, _how essential to all life is suffering_.
+
+§ 57. At every grade that is enlightened by knowledge, the will appears as
+an individual. The human individual finds himself as finite in infinite
+space and time, and consequently as a vanishing quantity compared with
+them. He is projected into them, and, on account of their unlimited
+nature, he has always a merely relative, never absolute _when_ and _where_
+of his existence; for his place and duration are finite parts of what is
+infinite and boundless. His real existence is only in the present, whose
+unchecked flight into the past is a constant transition into death, a
+constant dying. For his past life, apart from its possible consequences
+for the present, and the testimony regarding the will that is expressed in
+it, is now entirely done with, dead, and no longer anything; and,
+therefore, it must be, as a matter of reason, indifferent to him whether
+the content of that past was pain or pleasure. But the present is always
+passing through his hands into the past; the future is quite uncertain and
+always short. Thus his existence, even when we consider only its formal
+side, is a constant hurrying of the present into the dead past, a constant
+dying. But if we look at it from the physical side; it is clear that, as
+our walking is admittedly merely a constantly prevented falling, the life
+of our body is only a constantly prevented dying, an ever-postponed death:
+finally, in the same way, the activity of our mind is a constantly
+deferred ennui. Every breath we draw wards off the death that is
+constantly intruding upon us. In this way we fight with it every moment,
+and again, at longer intervals, through every meal we eat, every sleep we
+take, every time we warm ourselves, &c. In the end, death must conquer,
+for we became subject to him through birth, and he only plays for a little
+while with his prey before he swallows it up. We pursue our life, however,
+with great interest and much solicitude as long as possible, as we blow
+out a soap-bubble as long and as large as possible, although we know
+perfectly well that it will burst.
+
+We saw that the inner being of unconscious nature is a constant striving
+without end and without rest. And this appears to us much more distinctly
+when we consider the nature of brutes and man. Willing and striving is its
+whole being, which may be very well compared to an unquenchable thirst.
+But the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain.
+Consequently, the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally
+and through its very being. If, on the other hand, it lacks objects of
+desire, because it is at once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction,
+a terrible void and ennui comes over it, _i.e._, its being and existence
+itself becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus its life swings like a
+pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui. This has also had
+to express itself very oddly in this way; after man had transferred all
+pain and torments to hell, there then remained nothing over for heaven but
+ennui.
+
+But the constant striving which constitutes the inner nature of every
+manifestation of will obtains its primary and most general foundation at
+the higher grades of objectification, from the fact that here the will
+manifests itself as a living body, with the iron command to nourish it;
+and what gives strength to this command is just that this body is nothing
+but the objectified will to live itself. Man, as the most complete
+objectification of that will, is in like measure also the most necessitous
+of all beings: he is through and through concrete willing and needing; he
+is a concretion of a thousand necessities. With these he stands upon the
+earth, left to himself, uncertain about everything except his own need and
+misery. Consequently the care for the maintenance of that existence under
+exacting demands, which are renewed every day, occupies, as a rule, the
+whole of human life. To this is directly related the second claim, that of
+the propagation of the species. At the same time he is threatened from all
+sides by the most different kinds of dangers, from which it requires
+constant watchfulness to escape. With cautious steps and casting anxious
+glances round him he pursues his path, for a thousand accidents and a
+thousand enemies lie in wait for him. Thus he went while yet a savage,
+thus he goes in civilised life; there is no security for him.
+
+
+    "_Qualibus in tenebris vitæ, quantisque periclis_
+    _Degitur hocc' ævi, quodcunque est!_"--LUCR. ii. 15.
+
+
+The life of the great majority is only a constant struggle for this
+existence itself, with the certainty of losing it at last. But what
+enables them to endure this wearisome battle is not so much the love of
+life as the fear of death, which yet stands in the background as
+inevitable, and may come upon them at any moment. Life itself is a sea,
+full of rocks and whirlpools, which man avoids with the greatest care and
+solicitude, although he knows that even if he succeeds in getting through
+with all his efforts and skill, he yet by doing so comes nearer at every
+step to the greatest, the total, inevitable, and irremediable shipwreck,
+death; nay, even steers right upon it: this is the final goal of the
+laborious voyage, and worse for him than all the rocks from which he has
+escaped.
+
+Now it is well worth observing that, on the one hand, the suffering and
+misery of life may easily increase to such an extent that death itself, in
+the flight from which the whole of life consists, becomes desirable, and
+we hasten towards it voluntarily; and again, on the other hand, that as
+soon as want and suffering permit rest to a man, ennui is at once so near
+that he necessarily requires diversion. The striving after existence is
+what occupies all living things and maintains them in motion. But when
+existence is assured, then they know not what to do with it; thus the
+second thing that sets them in motion is the effort to get free from the
+burden of existence, to make it cease to be felt, "to kill time," _i.e._,
+to escape from ennui. Accordingly we see that almost all men who are
+secure from want and care, now that at last they have thrown off all other
+burdens, become a burden to themselves, and regard as a gain every hour
+they succeed in getting through; and thus every diminution of the very
+life which, till then, they have employed all their powers to maintain as
+long as possible. Ennui is by no means an evil to be lightly esteemed; in
+the end it depicts on the countenance real despair. It makes beings who
+love each other so little as men do, seek each other eagerly, and thus
+becomes the source of social intercourse. Moreover, even from motives of
+policy, public precautions are everywhere taken against it, as against
+other universal calamities. For this evil may drive men to the greatest
+excesses, just as much as its opposite extreme, famine: the people require
+_panem et circenses_. The strict penitentiary system of Philadelphia makes
+use of ennui alone as a means of punishment, through solitary confinement
+and idleness, and it is found so terrible that it has even led prisoners
+to commit suicide. As want is the constant scourge of the people, so ennui
+is that of the fashionable world. In middle-class life ennui is
+represented by the Sunday, and want by the six week-days.
+
+Thus between desiring and attaining all human life flows on throughout.
+The wish is, in its nature, pain; the attainment soon begets satiety: the
+end was only apparent; possession takes away the charm; the wish, the
+need, presents itself under a new form; when it does not, then follows
+desolateness, emptiness, ennui, against which the conflict is just as
+painful as against want. That wish and satisfaction should follow each
+other neither too quickly nor too slowly reduces the suffering, which both
+occasion to the smallest amount, and constitutes the happiest life. For
+that which we might otherwise call the most beautiful part of life, its
+purest joy, if it were only because it lifts us out of real existence and
+transforms us into disinterested spectators of it--that is, pure knowledge,
+which is foreign to all willing, the pleasure of the beautiful, the true
+delight in art--this is granted only to a very few, because it demands rare
+talents, and to these few only as a passing dream. And then, even these
+few, on account of their higher intellectual power, are made susceptible
+of far greater suffering than duller minds can ever feel, and are also
+placed in lonely isolation by a nature which is obviously different from
+that of others; thus here also accounts are squared. But to the great
+majority of men purely intellectual pleasures are not accessible. They are
+almost quite incapable of the joys which lie in pure knowledge. They are
+entirely given up to willing. If, therefore, anything is to win their
+sympathy, to be _interesting_ to them, it must (as is implied in the
+meaning of the word) in some way excite their _will_, even if it is only
+through a distant and merely problematical relation to it; the will must
+not be left altogether out of the question, for their existence lies far
+more in willing than in knowing,--action and reaction is their one element.
+We may find in trifles and everyday occurrences the naïve expressions of
+this quality. Thus, for example, at any place worth seeing they may visit,
+they write their names, in order thus to react, to affect the place since
+it does not affect them. Again, when they see a strange rare animal, they
+cannot easily confine themselves to merely observing it; they must rouse
+it, tease it, play with it, merely to experience action and reaction; but
+this need for excitement of the will manifests itself very specially in
+the discovery and support of card-playing, which is quite peculiarly the
+expression of the miserable side of humanity.
+
+But whatever nature and fortune may have done, whoever a man be and
+whatever he may possess, the pain which is essential to life cannot be
+thrown off:--{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_Pelides autem
+ejulavit, intuitus in cælum latum_). And again:--{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+{~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_Jovis quidem filius eram
+Saturnii; verum ærumnam habebam infinitam_). The ceaseless efforts to
+banish suffering accomplish no more than to make it change its form. It is
+essentially deficiency, want, care for the maintenance of life. If we
+succeed, which is very difficult, in removing pain in this form, it
+immediately assumes a thousand others, varying according to age and
+circumstances, such as lust, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred,
+anxiety, ambition, covetousness, sickness, &c., &c. If at last it can find
+entrance in no other form, it comes in the sad, grey garments of
+tediousness and ennui, against which we then strive in various ways. If
+finally we succeed in driving this away, we shall hardly do so without
+letting pain enter in one of its earlier forms, and the dance begin again
+from the beginning; for all human life is tossed backwards and forwards
+between pain and ennui. Depressing as this view of life is, I will draw
+attention, by the way, to an aspect of it from which consolation may be
+drawn, and perhaps even a stoical indifference to one's own present ills
+may be attained. For our impatience at these arises for the most part from
+the fact that we regard them as brought about by a chain of causes which
+might easily be different. We do not generally grieve over ills which are
+directly necessary and quite universal; for example, the necessity of age
+and of death, and many daily inconveniences. It is rather the
+consideration of the accidental nature of the circumstances that brought
+some sorrow just to us, that gives it its sting. But if we have recognised
+that pain, as such, is inevitable and essential to life, and that nothing
+depends upon chance but its mere fashion, the form under which it presents
+itself, that thus our present sorrow fills a place that, without it, would
+at once be occupied by another which now is excluded by it, and that
+therefore fate can affect us little in what is essential; such a
+reflection, if it were to become a living conviction, might produce a
+considerable degree of stoical equanimity, and very much lessen the
+anxious care for our own well-being. But, in fact, such a powerful control
+of reason over directly felt suffering seldom or never occurs.
+
+Besides, through this view of the inevitableness of pain, of the
+supplanting of one pain by another, and the introduction of a new pain
+through the passing away of that which preceded it, one might be led to
+the paradoxical but not absurd hypothesis, that in every individual the
+measure of the pain essential to him was determined once for all by his
+nature, a measure which could neither remain empty, nor be more than
+filled, however much the form of the suffering might change. Thus his
+suffering and well-being would by no means be determined from without, but
+only through that measure, that natural disposition, which indeed might
+experience certain additions and diminutions from the physical condition
+at different times, but yet, on the whole, would remain the same, and
+would just be what is called the temperament, or, more accurately, the
+degree in which he might be {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} or {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, as Plato expresses it in
+the First Book of the Republic, _i.e._, in an easy or difficult mood. This
+hypothesis is supported not only by the well-known experience that great
+suffering makes all lesser ills cease to be felt, and conversely that
+freedom from great suffering makes even the most trifling inconveniences
+torment us and put us out of humour; but experience also teaches that if a
+great misfortune, at the mere thought of which we shuddered, actually
+befalls us, as soon as we have overcome the first pain of it, our
+disposition remains for the most part unchanged; and, conversely, that
+after the attainment of some happiness we have long desired, we do not
+feel ourselves on the whole and permanently very much better off and
+agreeably situated than before. Only the moment at which these changes
+occur affects us with unusual strength, as deep sorrow or exulting joy,
+but both soon pass away, for they are based upon illusion. For they do not
+spring from the immediately present pleasure or pain, but only from the
+opening up of a new future which is anticipated in them. Only by borrowing
+from the future could pain or pleasure be heightened so abnormally, and
+consequently not enduringly. It would follow, from the hypothesis
+advanced, that a large part of the feeling of suffering and of well-being
+would be subjective and determined _a priori_, as is the case with
+knowing; and we may add the following remarks as evidence in favour of it.
+Human cheerfulness or dejection are manifestly not determined by external
+circumstances, such as wealth and position, for we see at least as many
+glad faces among the poor as among the rich. Further, the motives which
+induce suicide are so very different, that we can assign no motive that is
+so great as to bring it about, even with great probability, in every
+character, and few that would be so small that the like of them had never
+caused it. Now although the degree of our serenity or sadness is not at
+all times the same, yet, in consequence of this view, we shall not
+attribute it to the change of outward circumstances, but to that of the
+inner condition, the physical state. For when an actual, though only
+temporary, increase of our serenity, even to the extent of joyfulness,
+takes place, it usually appears without any external occasion. It is true
+that we often see our pain arise only from some definite external
+relation, and are visibly oppressed and saddened by this only. Then we
+believe that if only this were taken away, the greatest contentment would
+necessarily ensue. But this is illusion. The measure of our pain and our
+happiness is on the whole, according to our hypothesis, subjectively
+determined for each point of time, and the motive for sadness is related
+to that, just as a blister which draws to a head all the bad humours
+otherwise distributed is related to the body. The pain which is at that
+period of time essential to our nature, and therefore cannot be shaken
+off, would, without the definite external cause of our suffering, be
+divided at a hundred points, and appear in the form of a hundred little
+annoyances and cares about things which we now entirely overlook, because
+our capacity for pain is already filled by that chief evil which has
+concentrated in a point all the suffering otherwise dispersed. This
+corresponds also to the observation that if a great and pressing care is
+lifted from our breast by its fortunate issue, another immediately takes
+its place, the whole material of which was already there before, yet could
+not come into consciousness as care because there was no capacity left for
+it, and therefore this material of care remained indistinct and unobserved
+in a cloudy form on the farthest horizon of consciousness. But now that
+there is room, this prepared material at once comes forward and occupies
+the throne of the reigning care of the day ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}). And if it is
+very much lighter in its matter than the material of the care which has
+vanished, it knows how to blow itself out so as apparently to equal it in
+size, and thus, as the chief care of the day, completely fills the throne.
+
+Excessive joy and very keen suffering always occur in the same person, for
+they condition each other reciprocally, and are also in common conditioned
+by great activity of the mind. Both are produced, as we have just seen,
+not by what is really present, but by the anticipation of the future. But
+since pain is essential to life, and its degree is also determined by the
+nature of the subject, sudden changes, because they are always external,
+cannot really alter its degree. Thus an error and delusion always lies at
+the foundation of immoderate joy or grief, and consequently both these
+excessive strainings of the mind can be avoided by knowledge. Every
+immoderate joy (_exultatio, insolens lætitia_) always rests on the
+delusion that one has found in life what can never be found there--lasting
+satisfaction of the harassing desires and cares, which are constantly
+breeding new ones. From every particular delusion of this kind one must
+inevitably be brought back later, and then when it vanishes must pay for
+it with pain as bitter as the joy its entrance caused was keen. So far,
+then, it is precisely like a height from which one can come down only by a
+fall. Therefore one ought to avoid them; and every sudden excessive grief
+is just a fall from some such height, the vanishing of such a delusion,
+and so conditioned by it. Consequently we might avoid them both if we had
+sufficient control over ourselves to survey things always with perfect
+clearness as a whole and in their connection, and steadfastly to guard
+against really lending them the colours which we wish they had. The
+principal effort of the Stoical ethics was to free the mind from all such
+delusion and its consequences, and to give it instead an equanimity that
+could not be disturbed. It is this insight that inspires Horace in the
+well-known ode--
+
+
+    "_Æquam memento rebus in arduiis_
+    Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
+        _Ab insolenti temperatam_
+          _Lætitia._"
+
+
+For the most part, however, we close our minds against the knowledge,
+which may be compared to a bitter medicine, that suffering is essential to
+life, and therefore does not flow in upon us from without, but that every
+one carries about with him its perennial source in his own heart. We
+rather seek constantly for an external particular cause, as it were, a
+pretext for the pain which never leaves us, just as the free man makes
+himself an idol, in order to have a master. For we unweariedly strive from
+wish to wish; and although every satisfaction, however much it promised,
+when attained fails to satisfy us, but for the most part comes presently
+to be an error of which we are ashamed, yet we do not see that we draw
+water with the sieve of the Danaides, but ever hasten to new desires.
+
+
+    "_Sed, dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur_
+    _Cætera; post aliud, quum contigit illud, avemus;_
+    _Et sitis æqua tenet vitai semper hiantes._"--LUCR. iii. 1095.
+
+
+Thus it either goes on for ever, or, what is more rare and presupposes a
+certain strength of character, till we reach a wish which is not satisfied
+and yet cannot be given up. In that case we have, as it were, found what
+we sought, something that we can always blame, instead of our own nature,
+as the source of our suffering. And thus, although we are now at variance
+with our fate, we are reconciled to our existence, for the knowledge is
+again put far from us that suffering is essential to this existence
+itself, and true satisfaction impossible. The result of this form of
+development is a somewhat melancholy disposition, the constant endurance
+of a single great pain, and the contempt for all lesser sorrows or joys
+that proceeds from it; consequently an already nobler phenomenon than that
+constant seizing upon ever-new forms of illusion, which is much more
+common.
+
+§ 58. All satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is always
+really and essentially only _negative_, and never positive. It is not an
+original gratification coming to us of itself, but must always be the
+satisfaction of a wish. The wish, _i.e._, some want, is the condition
+which precedes every pleasure. But with the satisfaction the wish and
+therefore the pleasure cease. Thus the satisfaction or the pleasing can
+never be more than the deliverance from a pain, from a want; for such is
+not only every actual, open sorrow, but every desire, the importunity of
+which disturbs our peace, and, indeed, the deadening ennui also that makes
+life a burden to us. It is, however, so hard to attain or achieve
+anything; difficulties and troubles without end are opposed to every
+purpose, and at every step hindrances accumulate. But when finally
+everything is overcome and attained, nothing can ever be gained but
+deliverance from some sorrow or desire, so that we find ourselves just in
+the same position as we occupied before this sorrow or desire appeared.
+All that is even directly given us is merely the want, _i.e._, the pain.
+The satisfaction and the pleasure we can only know indirectly through the
+remembrance of the preceding suffering and want, which ceases with its
+appearance. Hence it arises that we are not properly conscious of the
+blessings and advantages we actually possess, nor do we prize them, but
+think of them merely as a matter of course, for they gratify us only
+negatively by restraining suffering. Only when we have lost them do we
+become sensible of their value; for the want, the privation, the sorrow,
+is the positive, communicating itself directly to us. Thus also we are
+pleased by the remembrance of past need, sickness, want, and such like,
+because this is the only means of enjoying the present blessings. And,
+further, it cannot be denied that in this respect, and from this
+standpoint of egoism, which is the form of the will to live, the sight or
+the description of the sufferings of others affords us satisfaction and
+pleasure in precisely the way Lucretius beautifully and frankly expresses
+it in the beginning of the Second Book--
+
+
+    "_Suave, mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis,_
+    _E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem:_
+    _Non, quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas;_
+    _Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est._"
+
+
+Yet we shall see farther on that this kind of pleasure, through knowledge
+of our own well-being obtained in this way, lies very near the source of
+real, positive wickedness.
+
+That all happiness is only of a negative not a positive nature, that just
+on this account it cannot be lasting satisfaction and gratification, but
+merely delivers us from some pain or want which must be followed either by
+a new pain, or by languor, empty longing, and ennui; this finds support in
+art, that true mirror of the world and life, and especially in poetry.
+Every epic and dramatic poem can only represent a struggle, an effort, and
+fight for happiness, never enduring and complete happiness itself. It
+conducts its heroes through a thousand difficulties and dangers to the
+goal; as soon as this is reached, it hastens to let the curtain fall; for
+now there would remain nothing for it to do but to show that the
+glittering goal in which the hero expected to find happiness had only
+disappointed him, and that after its attainment he was no better off than
+before. Because a genuine enduring happiness is not possible, it cannot be
+the subject of art. Certainly the aim of the idyll is the description of
+such a happiness, but one also sees that the idyll as such cannot
+continue. The poet always finds that it either becomes epical in his
+hands, and in this case it is a very insignificant epic, made up of
+trifling sorrows, trifling delights, and trifling efforts--this is the
+commonest case--or else it becomes a merely descriptive poem, describing
+the beauty of nature, _i.e._, pure knowing free from will, which
+certainly, as a matter of fact, is the only pure happiness, which is
+neither preceded by suffering or want, nor necessarily followed by
+repentance, sorrow, emptiness, or satiety; but this happiness cannot fill
+the whole life, but is only possible at moments. What we see in poetry we
+find again in music; in the melodies of which we have recognised the
+universal expression of the inmost history of the self-conscious will, the
+most secret life, longing, suffering, and delight; the ebb and flow of the
+human heart. Melody is always a deviation from the keynote through a
+thousand capricious wanderings, even to the most painful discord, and then
+a final return to the keynote which expresses the satisfaction and
+appeasing of the will, but with which nothing more can then be done, and
+the continuance of which any longer would only be a wearisome and
+unmeaning monotony corresponding to ennui.
+
+All that we intend to bring out clearly through these investigations, the
+impossibility of attaining lasting satisfaction and the negative nature of
+all happiness, finds its explanation in what is shown at the conclusion of
+the Second Book: that the will, of which human life, like every
+phenomenon, is the objectification, is a striving without aim or end. We
+find the stamp of this endlessness imprinted upon all the parts of its
+whole manifestation, from its most universal form, endless time and space,
+up to the most perfect of all phenomena, the life and efforts of man. We
+may theoretically assume three extremes of human life, and treat them as
+elements of actual human life. First, the powerful will, the strong
+passions (Radscha-Guna). It appears in great historical characters; it is
+described in the epic and the drama. But it can also show itself in the
+little world, for the size of the objects is measured here by the degree
+in which they influence the will, not according to their external
+relations. Secondly, pure knowing, the comprehension of the Ideas,
+conditioned by the freeing of knowledge from the service of will: the life
+of genius (Satwa-Guna). Thirdly and lastly, the greatest lethargy of the
+will, and also of the knowledge attaching to it, empty longing,
+life-benumbing languor (Tama-Guna). The life of the individual, far from
+becoming permanently fixed in one of these extremes, seldom touches any of
+them, and is for the most part only a weak and wavering approach to one or
+the other side, a needy desiring of trifling objects, constantly
+recurring, and so escaping ennui. It is really incredible how meaningless
+and void of significance when looked at from without, how dull and
+unenlightened by intellect when felt from within, is the course of the
+life of the great majority of men. It is a weary longing and complaining,
+a dream-like staggering through the four ages of life to death,
+accompanied by a series of trivial thoughts. Such men are like clockwork,
+which is wound up, and goes it knows not why; and every time a man is
+begotten and born, the clock of human life is wound up anew, to repeat the
+same old piece it has played innumerable times before, passage after
+passage, measure after measure, with insignificant variations. Every
+individual, every human being and his course of life, is but another short
+dream of the endless spirit of nature, of the persistent will to live; is
+only another fleeting form, which it carelessly sketches on its infinite
+page, space and time; allows to remain for a time so short that it
+vanishes into nothing in comparison with these, and then obliterates to
+make new room. And yet, and here lies the serious side of life, every one
+of these fleeting forms, these empty fancies, must be paid for by the
+whole will to live, in all its activity, with many and deep sufferings,
+and finally with a bitter death, long feared and coming at last. This is
+why the sight of a corpse makes us suddenly so serious.
+
+The life of every individual, if we survey it as a whole and in general,
+and only lay stress upon its most significant features, is really always a
+tragedy, but gone through in detail, it has the character of a comedy. For
+the deeds and vexations of the day, the restless irritation of the moment,
+the desires and fears of the week, the mishaps of every hour, are all
+through chance, which is ever bent upon some jest, scenes of a comedy. But
+the never-satisfied wishes, the frustrated efforts, the hopes unmercifully
+crushed by fate, the unfortunate errors of the whole life, with increasing
+suffering and death at the end, are always a tragedy. Thus, as if fate
+would add derision to the misery of our existence, our life must contain
+all the woes of tragedy, and yet we cannot even assert the dignity of
+tragic characters, but in the broad detail of life must inevitably be the
+foolish characters of a comedy.
+
+But however much great and small trials may fill human life, they are not
+able to conceal its insufficiency to satisfy the spirit; they cannot hide
+the emptiness and superficiality of existence, nor exclude ennui, which is
+always ready to fill up every pause that care may allow. Hence it arises
+that the human mind, not content with the cares, anxieties, and
+occupations which the actual world lays upon it, creates for itself an
+imaginary world also in the form of a thousand different superstitions,
+then finds all manner of employment with this, and wastes time and
+strength upon it, as soon as the real world is willing to grant it the
+rest which it is quite incapable of enjoying. This is accordingly most
+markedly the case with nations for which life is made easy by the
+congenial nature of the climate and the soil, most of all with the Hindus,
+then with the Greeks, the Romans, and later with the Italians, the
+Spaniards, &c. Demons, gods, and saints man creates in his own image; and
+to them he must then unceasingly bring offerings, prayers, temple
+decorations, vows and their fulfilment, pilgrimages, salutations,
+ornaments for their images, &c. Their service mingles everywhere with the
+real, and, indeed, obscures it. Every event of life is regarded as the
+work of these beings; the intercourse with them occupies half the time of
+life, constantly sustains hope, and by the charm of illusion often becomes
+more interesting than intercourse with real beings. It is the expression
+and symptom of the actual need of mankind, partly for help and support,
+partly for occupation and diversion; and if it often works in direct
+opposition to the first need, because when accidents and dangers arise
+valuable time and strength, instead of being directed to warding them off,
+are uselessly wasted on prayers and offerings; it serves the second end
+all the better by this imaginary converse with a visionary spirit world;
+and this is the by no means contemptible gain of all superstitions.
+
+§ 59. If we have so far convinced ourselves _a priori_, by the most
+general consideration, by investigation of the primary and elemental
+features of human life, that in its whole plan it is capable of no true
+blessedness, but is in its very nature suffering in various forms, and
+throughout a state of misery, we might now awaken this conviction much
+more vividly within us if, proceeding more _a posteriori_, we were to turn
+to more definite instances, call up pictures to the fancy, and illustrate
+by examples the unspeakable misery which experience and history present,
+wherever one may look and in whatever direction one may seek. But the
+chapter would have no end, and would carry us far from the standpoint of
+the universal, which is essential to philosophy; and, moreover, such a
+description might easily be taken for a mere declamation on human misery,
+such as has often been given, and, as such, might be charged with
+one-sidedness, because it started from particular facts. From such a
+reproach and suspicion our perfectly cold and philosophical investigation
+of the inevitable suffering which is founded in the nature of life is
+free, for it starts from the universal and is conducted _a priori_. But
+confirmation _a posteriori_ is everywhere easily obtained. Every one who
+has awakened from the first dream of youth, who has considered his own
+experience and that of others, who has studied himself in life, in the
+history of the past and of his own time, and finally in the works of the
+great poets, will, if his judgment is not paralysed by some indelibly
+imprinted prejudice, certainly arrive at the conclusion that this human
+world is the kingdom of chance and error, which rule without mercy in
+great things and in small, and along with which folly and wickedness also
+wield the scourge. Hence it arises that everything better only struggles
+through with difficulty; what is noble and wise seldom attains to
+expression, becomes effective and claims attention, but the absurd and the
+perverse in the sphere of thought, the dull and tasteless in the sphere of
+art, the wicked and deceitful in the sphere of action, really assert a
+supremacy, only disturbed by short interruptions. On the other hand,
+everything that is excellent is always a mere exception, one case in
+millions, and therefore, if it presents itself in a lasting work, this,
+when it has outlived the enmity of its contemporaries, exists in
+isolation, is preserved like a meteoric stone, sprung from an order of
+things different from that which prevails here. But as far as the life of
+the individual is concerned, every biography is the history of suffering,
+for every life is, as a rule, a continual series of great and small
+misfortunes, which each one conceals as much as possible, because he knows
+that others can seldom feel sympathy or compassion, but almost always
+satisfaction at the sight of the woes from which they are themselves for
+the moment exempt. But perhaps at the end of life, if a man is sincere and
+in full possession of his faculties, he will never wish to have it to live
+over again, but rather than this, he will much prefer absolute
+annihilation. The essential content of the famous soliloquy in "Hamlet" is
+briefly this: Our state is so wretched that absolute annihilation would be
+decidedly preferable. If suicide really offered us this, so that the
+alternative "to be or not to be," in the full sense of the word, was
+placed before us, then it would be unconditionally to be chosen as "a
+consummation devoutly to be wished." But there is something in us which
+tells us that this is not the case: suicide is not the end; death is not
+absolute annihilation. In like manner, what was said by the father of
+history(71) has not since him been contradicted, that no man has ever
+lived who has not wished more than once that he had not to live the
+following day. According to this, the brevity of life, which is so
+constantly lamented, may be the best quality it possesses. If, finally, we
+should bring clearly to a man's sight the terrible sufferings and miseries
+to which his life is constantly exposed, he would be seized with horror;
+and if we were to conduct the confirmed optimist through the hospitals,
+infirmaries, and surgical operating-rooms, through the prisons,
+torture-chambers, and slave-kennels, over battle-fields and places of
+execution; if we were to open to him all the dark abodes of misery, where
+it hides itself from the glance of cold curiosity, and, finally, allow him
+to glance into the starving dungeon of Ugolino, he, too, would understand
+at last the nature of this "best of possible worlds." For whence did Dante
+take the materials for his hell but from this our actual world? And yet he
+made a very proper hell of it. And when, on the other hand, he came to the
+task of describing heaven and its delights, he had an insurmountable
+difficulty before him, for our world affords no materials at all for this.
+Therefore there remained nothing for him to do but, instead of describing
+the joys of paradise, to repeat to us the instruction given him there by
+his ancestor, by Beatrice, and by various saints. But from this it is
+sufficiently clear what manner of world it is. Certainly human life, like
+all bad ware, is covered over with a false lustre: what suffers always
+conceals itself; on the other hand, whatever pomp or splendour any one can
+get, he makes a show of openly, and the more inner contentment deserts
+him, the more he desires to exist as fortunate in the opinion of others:
+to such an extent does folly go, and the opinion of others is a chief aim
+of the efforts of every one, although the utter nothingness of it is
+expressed in the fact that in almost all languages vanity, _vanitas_,
+originally signifies emptiness and nothingness. But under all this false
+show, the miseries of life can so increase--and this happens every day--that
+the death which hitherto has been feared above all things is eagerly
+seized upon. Indeed, if fate will show its whole malice, even this refuge
+is denied to the sufferer, and, in the hands of enraged enemies, he may
+remain exposed to terrible and slow tortures without remedy. In vain the
+sufferer then calls on his gods for help; he remains exposed to his fate
+without grace. But this irremediableness is only the mirror of the
+invincible nature of his will, of which his person is the objectivity. As
+little as an external power can change or suppress this will, so little
+can a foreign power deliver it from the miseries which proceed from the
+life which is the phenomenal appearance of that will. In the principal
+matter, as in everything else, a man is always thrown back upon himself.
+In vain does he make to himself gods in order to get from them by prayers
+and flattery what can only be accomplished by his own will-power. The Old
+Testament made the world and man the work of a god, but the New Testament
+saw that, in order to teach that holiness and salvation from the sorrows
+of this world can only come from the world itself, it was necessary that
+this god should become man. It is and remains the will of man upon which
+everything depends for him. Fanatics, martyrs, saints of every faith and
+name, have voluntarily and gladly endured every torture, because in them
+the will to live had suppressed itself; and then even the slow destruction
+of its phenomenon was welcome to them. But I do not wish to anticipate the
+later exposition. For the rest, I cannot here avoid the statement that, to
+me, _optimism_, when it is not merely the thoughtless talk of such as
+harbour nothing but words under their low foreheads, appears not merely as
+an absurd, but also as a really _wicked_ way of thinking, as a bitter
+mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity. Let no one think that
+Christianity is favourable to optimism; for, on the contrary, in the
+Gospels world and evil are used as almost synonymous.(72)
+
+§ 60. We have now completed the two expositions it was necessary to
+insert; the exposition of the freedom of the will in itself together with
+the necessity of its phenomenon, and the exposition of its lot in the
+world which reflects its own nature, and upon the knowledge of which it
+has to assert or deny itself. Therefore we can now proceed to bring out
+more clearly the nature of this assertion and denial itself, which was
+referred to and explained in a merely general way above. This we shall do
+by exhibiting the conduct in which alone it finds its expression, and
+considering it in its inner significance.
+
+The _assertion of the will_ is the continuous willing itself, undisturbed
+by any knowledge, as it fills the life of man in general. For even the
+body of a man is the objectivity of the will, as it appears at this grade
+and in this individual. And thus his willing which develops itself in time
+is, as it were, a paraphrase of his body, an elucidation of the
+significance of the whole and its parts; it is another way of exhibiting
+the same thing-in-itself, of which the body is already the phenomenon.
+Therefore, instead of saying assertion of the will, we may say assertion
+of the body. The fundamental theme or subject of all the multifarious acts
+of will is the satisfaction of the wants which are inseparable from the
+existence of the body in health, they already have their expression in it,
+and may be referred to the maintenance of the individual and the
+propagation of the species. But indirectly the most different kinds of
+motives obtain in this way power over the will, and bring about the most
+multifarious acts of will. Each of these is only an example, an instance,
+of the will which here manifests itself generally. Of what nature this
+example may be, what form the motive may have and impart to it, is not
+essential; the important point here is that something is willed in general
+and the degree of intensity with which it is so willed. The will can only
+become visible in the motives, as the eye only manifests its power of
+seeing in the light. The motive in general stands before the will in
+protean forms. It constantly promises complete satisfaction, the quenching
+of the thirst of will. But whenever it is attained it at once appears in
+another form, and thus influences the will anew, always according to the
+degree of the intensity of this will, and its relation to knowledge which
+are revealed as empirical character, in these very examples and instances.
+
+From the first appearance of consciousness, a man finds himself a willing
+being, and as a rule, his knowledge remains in constant relation to his
+will. He first seeks to know thoroughly the objects of his desire, and
+then the means of attaining them. Now he knows what he has to do, and, as
+a rule, he does not strive after other knowledge. He moves and acts; his
+consciousness keeps him always working directly and actively towards the
+aims of his will; his thought is concerned with the choice of motives.
+Such is life for almost all men; they wish, they know what they wish, and
+they strive after it, with sufficient success to keep them from despair,
+and sufficient failure to keep them from ennui and its consequences. From
+this proceeds a certain serenity, or at least indifference, which cannot
+be affected by wealth or poverty; for the rich and the poor do not enjoy
+what they have, for this, as we have shown, acts in a purely negative way,
+but what they hope to attain to by their efforts. They press forward with
+much earnestness, and indeed with an air of importance; thus children also
+pursue their play. It is always an exception if such a life suffers
+interruption from the fact that either the æsthetic demand for
+contemplation or the ethical demand for renunciation proceed from a
+knowledge which is independent of the service of the will, and directed to
+the nature of the world in general. Most men are pursued by want all
+through life, without ever being allowed to come to their senses. On the
+other hand, the will is often inflamed to a degree that far transcends the
+assertion of the body, and then violent emotions and powerful passions
+show themselves, in which the individual not only asserts his own
+existence, but denies and seeks to suppress that of others when it stands
+in his way.
+
+The maintenance of the body through its own powers is so small a degree of
+the assertion of will, that if it voluntarily remains at this degree, we
+might assume that, with the death of this body, the will also which
+appeared in it would be extinguished. But even the satisfaction of the
+sexual passions goes beyond the assertion of one's own existence, which
+fills so short a time, and asserts life for an indefinite time after the
+death of the individual. Nature, always true and consistent, here even
+naïve, exhibits to us openly the inner significance of the act of
+generation. Our own consciousness, the intensity of the impulse, teaches
+us that in this act the most decided _assertion of the will to live_
+expresses itself, pure and without further addition (any denial of other
+individuals); and now, as the consequence of this act, a new life appears
+in time and the causal series, _i.e._, in nature; the begotten appears
+before the begetter, different as regards the phenomenon, but in himself,
+_i.e._, according to the Idea, identical with him. Therefore it is this
+act through which every species of living creature binds itself to a whole
+and is perpetuated. Generation is, with reference to the begetter, only
+the expression, the symptom, of his decided assertion of the will to live:
+with reference to the begotten, it is not the cause of the will which
+appears in him, for the will in itself knows neither cause nor effect,
+but, like all causes, it is merely the occasional cause of the phenomenal
+appearance of this will at this time in this place. As thing-in-itself,
+the will of the begetter and that of the begotten are not different, for
+only the phenomenon, not the thing-in-itself, is subordinate to the
+_principim individuationis_. With that assertion beyond our own body and
+extending to the production of a new body, suffering and death, as
+belonging to the phenomenon of life, have also been asserted anew, and the
+possibility of salvation, introduced by the completest capability of
+knowledge, has for this time been shown to be fruitless. Here lies the
+profound reason of the shame connected with the process of generation.
+This view is mythically expressed in the dogma of Christian theology that
+we are all partakers in Adam's first transgression (which is clearly just
+the satisfaction of sexual passion), and through it are guilty of
+suffering and death. In this theology goes beyond the consideration of
+things according to the principle of sufficient reason, and recognises the
+Idea of man, the unity of which is re-established out of its dispersion
+into innumerable individuals through the bond of generation which holds
+them all together. Accordingly it regards every individual as on one side
+identical with Adam, the representative of the assertion of life, and, so
+far, as subject to sin (original sin), suffering, and death; on the other
+side, the knowledge of the Idea of man enables it to regard every
+individual as identical with the saviour, the representative of the denial
+of the will to live, and, so far as a partaker of his sacrifice of
+himself, saved through his merits, and delivered from the bands of sin and
+death, _i.e._, the world (Rom. v. 12-21).
+
+Another mythical exposition of our view of sexual pleasure as the
+assertion of the will to live beyond the individual life, as an attainment
+to life which is brought about for the first time by this means, or as it
+were a renewed assignment of life, is the Greek myth of Proserpine, who
+might return from the lower world so long as she had not tasted its fruit,
+but who became subject to it altogether through eating the pomegranate.
+This meaning appears very clearly in Goethe's incomparable presentation of
+this myth, especially when, as soon as she has tasted the pomegranate, the
+invisible chorus of the Fates--
+
+
+                    "Thou art ours!
+    Fasting shouldest thou return:
+    And the bite of the apple makes thee ours!"
+
+
+It is worth noticing that Clement of Alexandria (Strom. iii. c. 15)
+illustrates the matter with the same image and the same expression: {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~},
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}; (_Qui se castrarunt ab
+omni peccato propter regnum coelorum, ii sunt beati, a mundo jejunantes_).
+
+The sexual impulse also proves itself the decided and strongest assertion
+of life by the fact that to man in a state of nature, as to the brutes, it
+is the final end, the highest goal of life. Self-maintenance is his first
+effort, and as soon as he has made provision for that, he only strives
+after the propagation of the species: as a merely natural being he can
+attempt no more. Nature also, the inner being of which is the will to live
+itself, impels with all her power both man and the brute towards
+propagation. Then it has attained its end with the individual, and is
+quite indifferent to its death, for, as the will to live, it cares only
+for the preservation of the species, the individual is nothing to it.
+Because the will to live expresses itself most strongly in the sexual
+impulse, the inner being of nature, the old poets and philosophers--Hesiod
+and Parmenides--said very significantly that Eros is the first, the
+creator, the principle from which all things proceed. (Cf. Arist. Metaph.,
+i. 4.) Pherecydes said: {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_Jovem, cum mundum fabricare vellet, in cupidinem sese
+transformasse_). _Proclus ad Plat. Tim._, l. iii. A complete treatment of
+this subject we have recently received from G. F. Schoemann, "_De Cupidine
+Cosmogonico_," 1852. The Mâya of the Hindus, whose work and web is the
+whole world of illusion, is also symbolised by love.
+
+The genital organs are, far more than any other external member of the
+body, subject merely to the will, and not at all to knowledge. Indeed, the
+will shows itself here almost as independent of knowledge, as in those
+parts which, acting merely in consequence of stimuli, are subservient to
+vegetative life and reproduction, in which the will works blindly as in
+unconscious nature. For generation is only reproduction passing over to a
+new individual, as it were reproduction at the second power, as death is
+only excretion at the second power. According to all this, the genitals
+are properly the _focus_ of will, and consequently the opposite pole of
+the brain, the representative of knowledge, _i.e._, the other side of the
+world, the world as idea. The former are the life-sustaining principle
+ensuring endless life to time. In this respect they were worshipped by the
+Greeks in the _phallus_, and by the Hindus in the _lingam_, which are thus
+the symbol of the assertion of the will. Knowledge, on the other hand,
+affords the possibility of the suppression of willing, of salvation
+through freedom, of conquest and annihilation of the world.
+
+We already considered fully at the beginning of this Fourth Book how the
+will to live in its assertion must regard its relation to death. We saw
+that death does not trouble it, because it exists as something included in
+life itself and belonging to it. Its opposite, generation, completely
+counterbalances it; and, in spite of the death of the individual, ensures
+and guarantees life to the will to live through all time. To express this
+the Hindus made the _lingam_ an attribute of Siva, the god of death. We
+also fully explained there how he who with full consciousness occupies the
+standpoint of the decided assertion of life awaits death without fear. We
+shall therefore say nothing more about this here. Without clear
+consciousness most men occupy this standpoint and continually assert life.
+The world exists as the mirror of this assertion, with innumerable
+individuals in infinite time and space, in infinite suffering, between
+generation and death without end. Yet from no side is a complaint to be
+further raised about this; for the will conducts the great tragedy and
+comedy at its own expense, and is also its own spectator. The world is
+just what it is because the will, whose manifestation it is, is what it
+is, because it so wills. The justification of suffering is, that in this
+phenomenon also the will asserts itself; and this assertion is justified
+and balanced by the fact that the will bears the suffering. Here we get a
+glimpse of _eternal justice_ in the whole: we shall recognise it later
+more definitely and distinctly, and also in the particular. But first we
+must consider temporal or human justice.(73)
+
+§ 61. It may be remembered from the Second Book that in the whole of
+nature, at all the grades of the objectification of will, there was a
+necessary and constant conflict between the individuals of all species;
+and in this way was expressed the inner contradiction of the will to live
+with itself. At the highest grade of the objectification, this phenomenon,
+like all others, will exhibit itself with greater distinctness, and will
+therefore be more easily explained. With this aim we shall next attempt to
+trace the source of _egoism_ as the starting-point of all conflict.
+
+We have called time and space the _principium individuationis_, because
+only through them and in them is multiplicity of the homogeneous possible.
+They are the essential forms of natural knowledge, _i.e._, knowledge
+springing from the will. Therefore the will everywhere manifests itself in
+the multiplicity of individuals. But this multiplicity does not concern
+the will as thing-in-itself, but only its phenomena. The will itself is
+present, whole and undivided, in every one of these, and beholds around it
+the innumerably repeated image of its own nature; but this nature itself,
+the actually real, it finds directly only in its inner self. Therefore
+every one desires everything for himself, desires to possess, or at least
+to control, everything, and whatever opposes it it would like to destroy.
+To this is added, in the case of such beings as have knowledge, that the
+individual is the supporter of the knowing subject, and the knowing
+subject is the supporter of the world, _i.e._, that the whole of Nature
+outside the knowing subject, and thus also all other individuals, exist
+only in its idea; it is only conscious of them as its idea, thus merely
+indirectly as something which is dependent on its own nature and
+existence; for with its consciousness the world necessarily disappears for
+it, _i.e._, its being and non-being become synonymous and
+indistinguishable. Every knowing individual is thus in truth, and finds
+itself as the whole will to live, or the inner being of the world itself,
+and also as the complemental condition of the world as idea, consequently
+as a microcosm which is of equal value with the macrocosm. Nature itself,
+which is everywhere and always truthful, gives him this knowledge,
+originally and independently of all reflection, with simple and direct
+certainty. Now from these two necessary properties we have given the fact
+may be explained that every individual, though vanishing altogether and
+diminished to nothing in the boundless world, yet makes itself the centre
+of the world, has regard for its own existence and well-being before
+everything else; indeed, from the natural standpoint, is ready to
+sacrifice everything else for this--is ready to annihilate the world in
+order to maintain its own self, this drop in the ocean, a little longer.
+This disposition is _egoism_, which is essential to everything in Nature.
+Yet it is just through egoism that the inner conflict of the will with
+itself attains to such a terrible revelation; for this egoism has its
+continuance and being in that opposition of the microcosm and macrocosm,
+or in the fact that the objectification of will has the _principium
+individuationis_ for its form, through which the will manifests itself in
+the same way in innumerable individuals, and indeed entire and completely
+in both aspects (will and idea) in each. Thus, while each individual is
+given to itself directly as the whole will and the whole subject of ideas,
+other individuals are only given it as ideas. Therefore its own being, and
+the maintenance of it, is of more importance to it than that of all others
+together. Every one looks upon his own death as upon the end of the world,
+while he accepts the death of his acquaintances as a matter of comparative
+indifference, if he is not in some way affected by it. In the
+consciousness that has reached the highest grade, that of man, egoism, as
+well as knowledge, pain and pleasure, must have reached its highest grade
+also, and the conflict of individuals which is conditioned by it must
+appear in its most terrible form. And indeed we see this everywhere before
+our eyes, in small things as in great. Now we see its terrible side in the
+lives of great tyrants and miscreants, and in world-desolating wars; now
+its absurd side, in which it is the theme of comedy, and very specially
+appears as self-conceit and vanity. Rochefoucault understood this better
+than any one else, and presented it in the abstract. We see it both in the
+history of the world and in our own experience. But it appears most
+distinctly of all when any mob of men is set free from all law and order;
+then there shows itself at once in the distinctest form the _bellum omnium
+contra omnes_, which Hobbes has so admirably described in the first
+chapter _De Cive_. We see not only how every one tries to seize from the
+other what he wants himself, but how often one will destroy the whole
+happiness or life of another for the sake of an insignificant addition to
+his own happiness. This is the highest expression of egoism, the
+manifestations of which in this regard are only surpassed by those of
+actual wickedness, which seeks, quite disinterestedly, the hurt and
+suffering of others, without any advantage to itself. Of this we shall
+speak soon. With this exhibition of the source of egoism the reader should
+compare the presentation of it in my prize-essay on the basis of morals, §
+14.
+
+A chief source of that suffering which we found above to be essential and
+inevitable to all life is, when it really appears in a definite form, that
+_Eris_, the conflict of all individuals, the expression of the
+contradiction, with which the will to live is affected in its inner self,
+and which attains a visible form through the _principium individuationis_.
+Wild-beast fights are the most cruel means of showing this directly and
+vividly. In this original discord lies an unquenchable source of
+suffering, in spite of the precautions that have been taken against it,
+and which we shall now consider more closely.
+
+§ 62. It has already been explained that the first and simplest assertion
+of the will to live is only the assertion of one's own body, _i.e._, the
+exhibition of the will through acts in time, so far as the body, in its
+form and design, exhibits the same will in space, and no further. This
+assertion shows itself as maintenance of the body, by means of the
+application of its own powers. To it is directly related the satisfaction
+of the sexual impulse; indeed this belongs to it, because the genitals
+belong to the body. Therefore _voluntary_ renunciation of the satisfaction
+of that impulse, based upon no _motive_, is already a denial of the will
+to live, is a voluntary self-suppression of it, upon the entrance of
+knowledge which acts as a _quieter_. Accordingly such denial of one's own
+body exhibits itself as a contradiction by the will of its own phenomenon.
+For although here also the body objectifies in the genitals the will to
+perpetuate the species, yet this is not willed. Just on this account,
+because it is a denial or suppression of the will to live, such a
+renunciation is a hard and painful self-conquest; but of this later. But
+since the will exhibits that _self-assertion_ of one's own body in
+innumerable individuals beside each other, it very easily extends in one
+individual, on account of the egoism peculiar to them all, beyond this
+assertion to the _denial_ of the same will appearing in another
+individual. The will of the first breaks through the limits of the
+assertion of will of another, because the individual either destroys or
+injures this other body itself, or else because it compels the powers of
+the other body to serve _its own_ will, instead of the will which
+manifests itself in that other body. Thus if, from the will manifesting
+itself as another body, it withdraws the powers of this body, and so
+increases the power serving its own will beyond that of its own body, it
+consequently asserts its own will beyond its own body by means of the
+negation of the will appearing in another body. This breaking through the
+limits of the assertion of will of another has always been distinctly
+recognised, and its concept denoted by the word _wrong_. For both sides
+recognise the fact instantly, not, indeed, as we do here in distinct
+abstraction, but as feeling. He who suffers wrong feels the transgression
+into the sphere of the assertion of his own body, through the denial of it
+by another individual, as a direct and mental pain which is entirely
+separated and different from the accompanying physical suffering
+experienced from the act or the vexation at the loss. To the doer of
+wrong, on the other hand, the knowledge presents itself that he is in
+himself the same will which appears in that body also, and which asserts
+itself with such vehemence; the one phenomenon that, transgressing the
+limits of its own body and its powers, it extends to the denial of this
+very will in another phenomenon, and so, regarded as will in itself, it
+strives against itself by this vehemence and rends itself. Moreover, this
+knowledge presents itself to him instantly, not _in abstracto_, but as an
+obscure feeling; and this is called remorse, or, more accurately in this
+case, the feeling of _wrong committed_.
+
+_Wrong_, the conception of which we have thus analysed in its most general
+and abstract form, expresses itself in the concrete most completely,
+peculiarly, and palpably in cannibalism. This is its most distinct and
+evident type, the terrible picture of the greatest conflict of the will
+with itself at the highest grade of its objectification, which is man.
+Next to this, it expresses itself most distinctly in murder; and therefore
+the committal of murder is followed instantly and with fearful
+distinctness by remorse, the abstract and dry significance of which we
+have just given, which inflicts a wound on our peace of mind that a
+lifetime cannot heal. For our horror at the murder committed, as also our
+shrinking from the committal of it, corresponds to that infinite clinging
+to life with which everything living, as phenomenon of the will to live,
+is penetrated. (We shall analyse this feeling which accompanies the doing
+of wrong and evil, in other words, the pangs of conscience, more fully
+later on, and raise its concept to distinctness.) Mutilation, or mere
+injury of another body, indeed every blow, is to be regarded as in its
+nature the same as murder, and differing from it only in degree. Further,
+wrong shows itself in the subjugation of another individual, in forcing
+him into slavery, and, finally, in the seizure of another's goods, which,
+so far as these goods are regarded as the fruit of his labour, is just the
+same thing as making him a slave, and is related to this as mere injury is
+to murder.
+
+For _property_, which is not taken from a man without _wrong_, can,
+according to our explanation of wrong, only be that which has been
+produced by his own powers. Therefore by taking this we really take the
+powers of his body from the will objectified in it, to make them subject
+to the will objectified in another body. For only so does the wrong-doer,
+by seizing, not the body of another, but a lifeless thing quite different
+from it, break into the sphere of the assertion of will of another person,
+because the powers, the work of this other body, are, as it were,
+incorporated and identified with this thing. It follows from this that all
+true, _i.e._, moral, right of property is based simply and solely on work,
+as was pretty generally assumed before Kant, and is distinctly and
+beautifully expressed in the oldest of all codes of law: "Wise men who
+know the past explain that a cultured field is the property of him who cut
+down the wood and cleared and ploughed it, as an antelope belongs to the
+first hunter who mortally wounds it" (Laws of Manu, ix. 44). Kant's
+philosophy of law is an extraordinary concatenation of errors all leading
+to each other, and he bases the right of property upon first occupation.
+To me this is only explicable on the supposition that his powers were
+failing through old age. For how should the mere avowal of my will to
+exclude others from the use of a thing at once give me a _right_ to it?
+Clearly such an avowal itself requires a foundation of right, instead of
+being one, as Kant assumes. And how would he act unjustly _in se_, _i.e._,
+morally, who does not respect that claim to the sole possession of a thing
+which is based upon nothing but its own avowal? How should his conscience
+trouble him about it? For it is so clear and easy to understand that there
+can be absolutely no such thing as a just seizure of anything, but only a
+just conversion or acquired possession of it, by spending our own original
+powers upon it. When, by any foreign labour, however little, a thing has
+been cultivated, improved, kept from harm or preserved, even if this
+labour were only the plucking or picking up from the ground of fruit that
+has grown wild; the person who forcibly seizes such a thing clearly
+deprives the other of the result of his labour expended upon it, makes the
+body of this other serve his will instead of its own, asserts his will
+beyond its own phenomenon to the denial of that of the other, _i.e._, does
+injustice or wrong.(74) On the other hand, the mere enjoyment of a thing,
+without any cultivation or preservation of it from destruction, gives just
+as little right to it as the mere avowal of our desire for its sole
+possession. Therefore, though one family has hunted a district alone, even
+for a hundred years, but has done nothing for its improvement; if a
+stranger comes and desires to hunt there, it cannot prevent him from doing
+so without moral injustice. Thus the so-called right of preoccupation,
+according to which, for the mere past enjoyment of a thing, there is
+demanded the further recompense of the exclusive right to its future
+enjoyment, is morally entirely without foundation. A new-comer might with
+far better right reply to him who was depending upon such a right, "Just
+because you have so long enjoyed, it is right that others should now enjoy
+also." No moral right can be established to the sole possession of
+anything upon which labour cannot be expended, either in improving it or
+in preserving it from harm, unless it be through a voluntary surrender on
+the part of others, as a reward for other services. This, however, already
+presupposes a community regulated by agreement--the State. The morally
+established right of property, as we have deduced it above, gives, from
+its nature, to the owner of a thing, the same unlimited power over it
+which he has over his own body; and hence it follows that he can part with
+his possessions to others either in exchange or as a gift, and they then
+possess them with the same moral right as he did.
+
+As regards the doing of wrong generally, it occurs either through violence
+or through craft; it matters not which as far as what is morally essential
+is concerned. First, in the case of murder, it is a matter of indifference
+whether I make use of a dagger or of poison; and the case of every bodily
+injury is analogous. Other cases of wrong can all be reduced to the fact
+that I, as the doer of wrong, compel another individual to serve my will
+instead of his own, to act according to my will instead of according to
+his own. On the path of violence I attain this end through physical
+causality, but on the path of craft by means of motivation, _i.e._, by
+means of causality through knowledge; for I present to his will illusive
+motives, on account of which he follows my will, while he believes he is
+following his own. Since the medium in which the motives lie is knowledge,
+I can only accomplish this by falsifying his knowledge, and this is the
+_lie_. The lie always aims at influencing another's will, not merely his
+knowledge, for itself and as such, but only as a means, so far as it
+determines his will. For my lying itself, inasmuch as it proceeds from my
+will, requires a motive; and only the will of another can be such a
+motive, not his knowledge in and for itself; for as such it can never have
+an influence upon _my_ will, therefore it can never move it, can never be
+a motive of its aim. But only the willing and doing of another can be
+this, and his knowledge indirectly through it. This holds good not only of
+all lies that have manifestly sprung from self-interest, but also of those
+which proceed from pure wickedness, which seeks enjoyment in the painful
+consequences of the error into which it has led another. Indeed, mere
+empty boasting aims at influencing the will and action of others more or
+less, by increasing their respect or improving their opinion of the
+boaster. The mere refusal of a truth, _i.e._, of an assertion generally,
+is in itself no wrong, but every imposing of a lie is certainly a wrong.
+He who refuses to show the strayed traveller the right road does him no
+wrong, but he who directs him to a false road certainly does. It follows
+from what has been said, that every _lie_, like every act of violence, is
+as such _wrong_, because as such it has for its aim the extension of the
+authority of my will to other individuals, and so the assertion of my will
+through the denial of theirs, just as much as violence has. But the most
+complete lie is the _broken contract_, because here all the conditions
+mentioned are completely and distinctly present together. For when I enter
+into a contract, the promised performance of the other individual is
+directly and confessedly the motive for my reciprocal performance. The
+promises were deliberately and formally exchanged. The fulfilment of the
+declarations made is, it is assumed, in the power of each. If the other
+breaks the covenant, he has deceived me, and by introducing merely
+illusory motives into my knowledge, he has bent my will according to his
+intention; he has extended the control of his will to another individual,
+and thus has committed a distinct wrong. On this is founded the moral
+lawfulness and validity of the _contract_.
+
+Wrong through violence is not so _shameful_ to the doer of it as wrong
+through craft; for the former arises from physical power, which under all
+circumstances impresses mankind; while the latter, by the use of
+subterfuge, betrays weakness, and lowers man at once as a physical and
+moral being. This is further the case because lying and deception can only
+succeed if he who employs them expresses at the same time horror and
+contempt of them in order to win confidence, and his victory rests on the
+fact that men credit him with honesty which he does not possess. The deep
+horror which is always excited by cunning, faithlessness, and treachery
+rests on the fact that good faith and honesty are the bond which
+externally binds into a unity the will which has been broken up into the
+multiplicity of individuals, and thereby limits the consequences of the
+egoism which results from that dispersion. Faithlessness and treachery
+break this outward bond asunder, and thus give boundless scope to the
+consequences of egoism.
+
+In the connection of our system we have found that the content of the
+concept of _wrong_ is that quality of the conduct of an individual in
+which he extends the assertion of the will appearing in his own body so
+far that it becomes the denial of the will appearing in the bodies of
+others. We have also laid down, by means of very general examples, the
+limits at which the province of wrong begins; for we have at once defined
+its gradations, from the highest degree to the lowest, by means of a few
+leading conceptions. According to this, the concept of wrong is the
+original and positive, and the concept of right, which is opposed to it,
+is the derivative and negative; for we must keep to the concepts, and not
+to the words. As a matter of fact, there would be no talk of right if
+there were no such thing as wrong. The concept right contains merely the
+negation of wrong, and every action is subsumed under it which does not
+transgress the limit laid down above, _i.e._, is not a denial of the will
+of another for the stronger assertion of our own. That limit, therefore,
+divides, as regards a purely _moral_ definition, the whole province of
+possible actions into such as are wrong or right. Whenever an action does
+not encroach, in the way explained above, on the sphere of the assertion
+of will of another, denying it, it is not wrong. Therefore, for example,
+the refusal of help to another in great need, the quiet contemplation of
+the death of another from starvation while we ourselves have more than
+enough, is certainly cruel and fiendish, but it is not wrong; only it can
+be affirmed with certainty that whoever is capable of carrying unkindness
+and hardness to such a degree will certainly also commit every wrong
+whenever his wishes demand it and no compulsion prevents it.
+
+But the conception of right as the negation of wrong finds its principal
+application, and no doubt its origin, in cases in which an attempted wrong
+by violence is warded off. This warding off cannot itself be wrong, and
+consequently is right, although the violence it requires, regarded in
+itself and in isolation, would be wrong, and is here only justified by the
+motive, _i.e._, becomes right. If an individual goes so far in the
+assertion of his own will that he encroaches upon the assertion of will
+which is essential to my person as such, and denies it, then my warding
+off of that encroachment is only the denial of that denial, and thus from
+my side is nothing more than the assertion of the will which essentially
+and originally appears in my body, and is already implicitly expressed by
+the mere appearance of this body; consequently is not wrong, but right.
+That is to say: I have then a right to deny that denial of another with
+the force necessary to overcome it, and it is easy to see that this may
+extend to the killing of the other individual, whose encroachment as
+external violence pressing upon me may be warded off by a somewhat
+stronger counteraction, entirely without wrong, consequently with right.
+For all that happens from my side lies always within the sphere of the
+assertion of will essential to my person as such, and already expressed by
+it (which is the scene of the conflict), and does not encroach on that of
+the other, consequently is only negation of the negation, and thus
+affirmation, not itself negation. Thus if the will of another denies my
+will, as this appears in my body and the use of its powers for its
+maintenance, without denial of any foreign will which observes a like
+limitation, I can _without wrong_ compel it to desist from such denial,
+_i.e._, I have so far a _right of compulsion_.
+
+In all cases in which I have a right of compulsion, a complete right to
+use _violence_ against another, I may, according to the circumstances,
+just as well oppose the violence of the other with _craft_ without doing
+any wrong, and accordingly I have an actual _right to lie precisely so far
+as I have a right of compulsion_. Therefore a man acts with perfect right
+who assures a highway robber who is searching him that he has nothing more
+upon him; or, if a burglar has broken into his house by night, induces him
+by a lie to enter a cellar and then locks him in. A man who has been
+captured and carried off by robbers, for example by pirates, has the right
+to kill them not only by violence but also by craft, in order to regain
+his freedom. Thus, also, a promise is certainly not binding when it has
+been extorted by direct bodily violence, because he who suffers such
+compulsion may with full right free himself by killing, and, _a fortiori_,
+by deceiving his oppressor. Whoever cannot recover through force the
+property which has been stolen from him, commits no wrong if he can
+accomplish it through craft. Indeed, if some one plays with me for money
+he has stolen from me, I have the right to use false dice against him,
+because all that I win from him already belongs to me. Whoever would deny
+this must still more deny the justifiableness of stratagem in war, which
+is just an acted lie, and is a proof of the saying of Queen Christina of
+Sweden, "The words of men are to be esteemed as nothing; scarcely are
+their deeds to be trusted." So sharply does the limit of right border upon
+that of wrong. For the rest, I regard it as superfluous to show that all
+this completely agrees with what was said above about the unlawfulness of
+the lie and of violence. It may also serve to explain the peculiar theory
+of the lie told under pressure.(75)
+
+In accordance with what has been said, wrong and right are merely moral
+determinations, _i.e._, such as are valid with regard to the consideration
+of human action as such, and in relation _to the inner significance of
+this action in itself_. This asserts itself directly in consciousness
+through the fact that the doing of wrong is accompanied by an inward pain,
+which is the merely felt consciousness of the wrong-doer of the excessive
+strength of the assertion of will in itself, which extends even to the
+denial of the manifestation of the will of another, and also the
+consciousness that although he is different from the person suffering
+wrong as far as the manifestation is concerned, yet in himself he is
+identical with him. The further explanation of this inner significance of
+all pain of conscience cannot be given till later. He who suffers wrong
+is, on the other hand, painfully conscious of the denial of his will, as
+it is expressed through the body and its natural requirements, for the
+satisfaction of which nature refers him to the powers of his body; and at
+the same time he is conscious that without doing wrong he might ward off
+that denial by every means unless he lacks the power. This purely moral
+significance is the only one which right and wrong have for men as men,
+not as members of the State, and which consequently remains even when man
+is in a state of nature without any positive law. It constitutes the basis
+and the content of all that has on this account been named _natural law_,
+though it is better called moral law, for its validity does not extend to
+suffering, to the external reality, but only to the action of man and the
+self-knowledge of his individual will which grows up in him from his
+action, and which is called _conscience_. It cannot, however, in a state
+of nature, assert itself in all cases, and outwardly upon other
+individuals, and prevent might from reigning instead of right. In a state
+of nature it depends upon every one merely to see that in every case he
+_does_ no wrong, but by no means to see that in every case he _suffers_ no
+wrong, for this depends on the accident of his outward power. Therefore
+the concepts right and wrong, even in a state of nature, are certainly
+valid and by no means conventional, but there they are valid merely as
+_moral_ concepts, for the self-knowledge of one's own will in each. They
+are a fixed point in the scale of the very different degrees of strength
+with which the will to live asserts itself in human individuals, like the
+freezing-point on the thermometer; the point at which the assertion of
+one's own will becomes the denial of the will of another, _i.e._,
+specifies through wrong-doing the degree of its intensity, combined with
+the degree in which knowledge is involved in the _principium
+individuationis_ (which is the form of all knowledge that is subject to
+the will). But whoever wants to set aside the purely moral consideration
+of human action, or denies it, and wishes to regard conduct merely in its
+outward effects and their consequences, may certainly, with Hobbes,
+explain right and wrong as conventional definitions arbitrarily assumed,
+and therefore not existing outside positive law, and we can never show him
+through external experience what does not belong to such experience.
+Hobbes himself characterises his completely empirical method of thought
+very remarkably by the fact that in his book "_De Principiis Geometrarum_"
+he denies all pure mathematics properly so called, and obstinately
+maintains that the point has extension and the line has breadth, and we
+can never show him a point without extension or a line without breadth.
+Thus we can just as little impart to him the _a priori_ nature of
+mathematics as the _a priori_ nature of right, because he shuts himself
+out from all knowledge which is not empirical.
+
+The pure doctrine of right is thus a chapter of ethics, and is directly
+related only to _action_, not to _suffering_; for only the former is the
+expression of will, and this alone is considered by ethics. Suffering is
+mere occurrence. Ethics can only have regard to suffering indirectly,
+merely to show that what takes place merely to avoid suffering wrong is
+itself no infliction of wrong. The working out of this chapter of ethics
+would contain the precise definition of the limits to which an individual
+may go in the assertion of the will already objectified in his body
+without denying the same will as it appears in another individual; and
+also the actions which transgress these limits, which consequently are
+wrong, and therefore in their turn may be warded off without wrong. Thus
+our own _action_ always remains the point of view of the investigation.
+
+But the _suffering of wrong_ appears as an event in outward experience,
+and in it is manifested, as we have said, more distinctly than anywhere
+else, the phenomenon of the conflict of the will to live with itself,
+arising from the multiplicity of individuals and from egoism, both of
+which are conditioned through the _principium individuationis_, which is
+the form of the world as idea for the knowledge of the individual. We also
+saw above that a very large part of the suffering essential to human life
+has its perennial source in that conflict of individuals.
+
+The reason, however, which is common to all these individuals, and which
+enables them to know not merely the particular case, as the brutes do, but
+also the whole abstractly in its connection, has also taught them to
+discern the source of that suffering, and induced them to consider the
+means of diminishing it, or, when possible, of suppressing it by a common
+sacrifice, which is, however, more than counterbalanced by the common
+advantage that proceeds from it. However agreeable it is to the egoism of
+the individual to inflict wrong in particular cases, this has yet a
+necessary correlative in the suffering of wrong of another individual, to
+whom it is a great pain. And because the reason which surveys the whole
+left the one-sided point of view of the individual to which it belongs,
+and freed itself for the moment from its dependence upon it, it saw the
+pleasure of an individual in inflicting wrong always outweighed by the
+relatively greater pain of the other who suffered the wrong; and it found
+further, that because here everything was left to chance, every one had to
+fear that the pleasure of conveniently inflicting wrong would far more
+rarely fall to his lot than the pain of enduring it. From this reason
+recognised that both in order to diminish the suffering which is
+everywhere disseminated, and as far as possible to divide it equally, the
+best and only means was to spare all the pain of suffering wrong by
+renouncing all the pleasure to be obtained by inflicting it. This means is
+the _contract of the state_ or _law_. It is easily conceived, and little
+by little carried out by the egoism, which, through the use of reason,
+proceeds methodically and forsakes its one-sided point of view. This
+origin of the state and of law I have indicated was already exhibited as
+such by Plato in the "Republic." In fact, it is the essential and only
+origin, determined by the nature of the matter. Moreover, in no land can
+the state have ever had a different origin, because it is just this mode
+of originating this aim that makes it a state. But it is a matter of
+indifference whether, in each particular nation, the condition which
+preceded it was that of a horde of savages independent of each other
+(anarchy), or that of a horde of slaves ruled at will by the stronger
+(despotism). In both cases there existed as yet no state; it first arose
+through that common agreement; and according as that agreement is more or
+less free from anarchy or despotism, the state is more or less perfect.
+Republics tend to anarchy, monarchies to despotism, and the mean of
+constitutional monarchy, which was therefore devised, tends to government
+by factions. In order to found a perfect state, we must begin by providing
+beings whose nature allows them always to sacrifice their own to the
+public good. Till then, however, something may be attained through the
+existence of _one_ family whose good is quite inseparable from that of the
+country; so that, at least in matters of importance, it can never advance
+the one without the other. On this rests the power and the advantage of
+the hereditary monarchy.
+
+Now as ethics was concerned exclusively with right and wrong doing, and
+could accurately point out the limits of his action to whoever was
+resolved to do no wrong; politics, on the contrary, the theory of
+legislation, is exclusively concerned with the _suffering_ of wrong, and
+would never trouble itself with wrong-doing at all if it were not on
+account of its ever-necessary correlative, the suffering of wrong, which
+it always keeps in view as the enemy it opposes. Indeed, if it were
+possible to conceive an infliction of wrong with which no suffering of
+wrong on the part of another was connected, the state would, consistently,
+by no means prohibit it. And because in ethics the will, the disposition,
+is the object of consideration, and the only real thing, the firm will to
+do wrong, which is only restrained and rendered ineffective by external
+might, and the actually committed wrong, are to it quite the same, and it
+condemns him who so wills as unjust at its tribunal. On the other hand,
+will and disposition, merely as such, do not concern the state at all, but
+only the _deed_ (whether it is merely attempted or carried out), on
+account of its correlative, the _suffering_ on the part of another. Thus
+for the state the deed, the event, is the only real; the disposition, the
+intention, is only investigated so far as the significance of the deed
+becomes known through it. Therefore the state will forbid no one to carry
+about in his thought murder and poison against another, so long as it
+knows certainly that the fear of the sword and the wheel will always
+restrain the effects of that will. The state has also by no means to
+eradicate the foolish purpose, the inclination to wrong-doing, the wicked
+disposition; but merely always to place beside every possible motive for
+doing a wrong a more powerful motive for leaving it undone in the
+inevitable punishment that will ensue. Therefore the criminal code is as
+complete a register as possible of motives against every criminal action
+that can possibly be imagined--both _in abstracto_, in order to make any
+case that occurs an application _in concreto_. Politics or legislation
+will therefore for this end borrow from that chapter of ethics which is
+the doctrine of right, and which, besides the inner significance of right
+and wrong, determines the exact limits between them. Yet it will only do
+so for the purpose of making use of its reverse side, and regarding all
+the limits which ethics lays down as not to be transgressed, if we are to
+avoid _doing_ wrong, from the other side, as the limits which we must not
+allow others to transgress if we do not wish to _suffer_ wrong, and from
+which we have therefore a _right_ to drive others back. Therefore these
+limits are, as much as possible, from the passive side, barricaded by
+laws. It is evident that as an historian has very wittily been called an
+inverted prophet, the professor of law is an inverted moralist, and
+therefore law itself, in its proper sense, _i.e._, the doctrine of the
+_right_, which we ought to maintain, is inverted ethics in that chapter of
+it in which the rights are laid down which we ought not to violate. The
+concept of wrong and its negation, that of right, which is originally
+_ethical_, becomes _juridical_ by the transference of the starting-point
+from the active to the passive side, and thus by inversion. This, as well
+as Kant's theory of law, which very falsely deduces the institution of the
+state as a moral duty from his categorical imperative, has, even in the
+most recent times, repeatedly occasioned the very extraordinary error that
+the state is an institution for furthering morality; that it arises from
+the endeavour after this, and is, consequently, directed against egoism.
+As if the inward disposition, to which alone morality or immorality
+belongs, the externally free will, would allow itself to be modified from
+without and changed by influences exerted upon it! Still more perverse is
+the theory that the state is the condition of freedom in the moral sense,
+and in this way the condition of morality; for freedom lies beyond the
+phenomenon, and indeed beyond human arrangements. The state is, as we have
+said, so little directed against egoism in general and as such, that, on
+the contrary, it has sprung from egoism and exists only in its service--an
+egoism that well understands itself, proceeds methodically and forsakes
+the one-sided for the universal point of view, and so by addition is the
+common egoism of all. The state is thus instituted under the correct
+presupposition that pure morality, _i.e._, right action from moral
+grounds, is not to be expected; if this were not the case, it would itself
+be superfluous. Thus the state, which aims at well-being, is by no means
+directed against egoism, but only against the disadvantageous consequences
+which arise from the multiplicity of egoistic individuals, and
+reciprocally affect them all and disturb their well-being. Therefore it
+was already said by Aristotle (De. Rep. iii.): {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} (_Finis civitatis est bene
+vivere, hoc autem est beate et pulchre vivere_). Hobbes also has
+accurately and excellently expounded this origin and end of the state; and
+that old first principle of all state policy, _salus publica prima lex
+esto_, indicates the same thing. If the state completely attains its end,
+it will produce the same outward result as if perfect justice of
+disposition prevailed everywhere. But the inner nature and origin of both
+phenomena will be the converse. Thus in the second case it would be that
+no one wished to _do_ wrong, and in the first that no one wished to
+_suffer_ wrong, and the means appropriate to this end had been fully
+employed. Thus the same line may be drawn from opposite directions, and a
+beast of prey with a muzzle is as harmless as a graminivorous animal. But
+beyond this point the state cannot go. It cannot exhibit a phenomenon such
+as would spring from universal mutual well-wishing and love. For just as
+we found that from its nature it would not forbid the doing of a wrong
+which involved no corresponding suffering of wrong on the part of another,
+and prohibits all wrong-doing only because this is impossible; so
+conversely, in accordance with its tendency towards the well-being of all,
+it would very gladly take care that every benevolent action and work of
+human love should be _experienced_, if it were not that these also have an
+inevitable correlative in the _performance_ of acts of benevolence and
+works of love, and every member of the state would wish to assume the
+passive and none the active rôle, and there would be no reason for
+exacting the latter from one member of the state rather than from another.
+Accordingly only the negative, which is just the _right_, not the
+positive, which has been comprehended under the name of obligations of
+love, or, less completely, duties, _can be exacted by force_.
+
+Legislation, as we have said, borrows the pure philosophy of right, or the
+doctrine of the nature and limits of right and wrong, from ethics, in
+order to apply it from the reverse side to its own ends, which are
+different from those of ethics, and to institute positive legislation and
+the means of supporting it, _i.e._, the state, in accordance with it.
+Positive legislation is thus the inverted application of the purely moral
+doctrine of right. This application may be made with reference to the
+peculiar relations and circumstances of a particular people. But only if
+the positive legislation is, in essential matters, throughout determined
+in accordance with the guidance of the pure theory of right, and for each
+of its propositions a ground can be established in the pure theory of
+right, is the legislation which has arisen a _positive right_ and the
+state a community _based upon right_, a _state_ in the proper meaning of
+the word, a morally permissible, not immoral institution. Otherwise the
+positive legislation is, on the contrary, the establishment of a _positive
+wrong_; it is itself an openly avowed enforced wrong. Such is every
+despotism, the constitution of most Mohammedan kingdoms; and indeed
+various parts of many constitutions are also of this kind; for example,
+serfdom, vassalage, and many such institutions. The pure theory of right
+or natural right--better, moral right--though always reversed, lies at the
+foundation of every just positive legislation, as pure mathematics lies at
+the foundation of every branch of applied mathematics. The most important
+points of the doctrine of right, as philosophy has to supply it for that
+end to legislation, are the following: 1. The explanation of the inner and
+real significance both of the origin of the conceptions of wrong and
+right, and of their application and position in ethics. 2. The deduction
+of the law of property. 3. The deduction of the moral validity of
+contracts; for this is the moral basis of the contract of the state. 4.
+The explanation of the origin and the aim of the state, of the relation of
+this aim to ethics, and of the intentional transference of the ethical
+doctrine of right, by reversing it, to legislation, in consequence of this
+relation. 5. The deduction of the right of punishment. The remaining
+content of the doctrine of right is mere application of these principles,
+mere accurate definition of the limits of right and wrong for all possible
+relations of life, which are consequently united and distributed under
+certain points of view and titles. In these special doctrines the books
+which treat of pure law are fairly at one; it is only in the principles
+that they differ much, for these are always connected with some
+philosophical system. In connection with our system, we have explained the
+first four of these principal points shortly and generally, yet definitely
+and distinctly, and it remains for us to speak in the same way of the
+right of punishment.
+
+Kant makes the fundamentally false assertion that apart from the state
+there would be no complete right of property. It follows from our
+deduction, as given above, that even in a state of nature there is
+property with complete natural, _i.e._, moral right, which cannot be
+injured without wrong, but may without wrong be defended to the uttermost.
+On the other hand, it is certain that apart from the state there is no
+right of punishment. All right to punish is based upon the positive law
+alone, which _before_ the offence has determined a punishment for it, the
+threat of which, as a counter-motive, is intended to outweigh all possible
+motives for the offence. This positive law is to be regarded as sanctioned
+and recognised by all the members of the state. It is thus based upon a
+common contract which the members of the state are in duty bound to
+fulfil, and thus, on the one hand, to inflict the punishment, and, on the
+other hand, to endure it; thus the endurance of the punishment may with
+right be enforced. Consequently the immediate _end of punishment_ is, in
+the particular case, _the fulfilment of the law as a contract_. But the
+one end of the _law_ is _deterrence_ from the infringement of the rights
+of others. For, in order that every one may be protected from suffering
+wrong, men have combined to form a state, have renounced the doing of
+wrong, and assumed the task of maintaining the state. Thus the law and the
+fulfilment of it, the punishment, are essentially directed to the
+_future_, not to the _past_. This distinguishes _punishment_ from
+_revenge_; for the motives which instigate the latter are solely concerned
+with what has happened, and thus with the past as such. All requital of
+wrong by the infliction of pain, without any aim for the future, is
+revenge, and can have no other end than consolation for the suffering one
+has borne by the sight of the suffering one has inflicted upon another.
+This is wickedness and cruelty, and cannot be morally justified. Wrong
+which some one has inflicted upon me by no means entitles me to inflict
+wrong upon him. The requital of evil with evil without further intention
+is neither morally nor otherwise through any rational ground to be
+justified, and the _jus talionis_ set up as the absolute, final principle
+of the right of punishment, is meaningless. Therefore Kant's theory of
+punishment as mere requital for requital's sake is a completely groundless
+and perverse view. Yet it is always appearing in the writings of many
+jurists, under all kinds of lofty phrases, which amount to nothing but
+empty words, as: Through the punishment the crime is expiated or
+neutralised and abolished, and many such. But no man has the right to set
+himself up as a purely moral judge and requiter, and punish the misdeeds
+of another with pains which he inflicts upon him, and so to impose penance
+upon him for his sins. Nay, this would rather be the most presumptuous
+arrogance; and therefore the Bible says, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay,
+saith the Lord." But man has the right to care for the safety of society;
+and this can only be done by interdicting all actions which are denoted by
+the word "criminal," in order to prevent them by means of counter-motives,
+which are the threatened punishments. And this threat can only be made
+effective by carrying it out when a case occurs in spite of it.
+Accordingly that the end of punishment, or more accurately of penal law,
+is the deterrence from crime, is a truth so generally recognised and
+indeed self-evident, that in England it is expressed in the very old form
+of indictment which is still served by the counsel for the Crown in
+criminal actions, for it concludes with the words, "If this be proved,
+you, the said N. N., ought to be punished with pains of law, to deter
+others from the like crimes in all time coming." If a prince desires to
+extend mercy to a criminal who has justly been condemned, his Ministers
+will represent to him that, if he does, this crime will soon be repeated.
+An end for the future distinguishes punishment from revenge, and
+punishment only has this end when it is inflicted _in fulfilment of a
+law_. It thus announces itself as inevitable in every future case, and
+thus the law obtains the power to deter, in which its end really consists.
+Now here a Kantian would inevitably reply that certainly according to this
+view the punished criminal would be used "merely as a means." This
+proposition, so unweariedly repeated by all the Kantians, "Man must always
+be treated as an end, never as a means," certainly sounds significant, and
+is therefore a very suitable proposition for those who like to have a
+formula which saves them all further thought; but looked at in the light,
+it is an exceedingly vague, indefinite assertion, which reaches its aim
+quite indirectly, requires to be explained, defined, and modified in every
+case of its application, and, if taken generally, is insufficient, meagre,
+and moreover problematical. The murderer who has been condemned to the
+punishment of death according to law must now, at any rate, and with
+complete right, be used as a mere means. For public security, the chief
+end of the state, is disturbed by him; indeed it is abolished if the law
+is not carried out. The murderer, his life, his person, must now be the
+means of fulfilling the law, and thereby of re-establishing the public
+security. And he is made such a means with perfect right, in fulfilment of
+the contract of the state, which was entered into by him because he was a
+citizen, and in accordance with which, in order to enjoy security for his
+life, freedom, and property, he has pledged his life, his freedom, and his
+property for the security of all, which pledge has now been forfeited.
+
+This theory of punishment which we have established, the theory which is
+directly supported by sound reason, is certainly in the main no new
+thought; but it is a thought which was almost supplanted by new errors,
+and therefore it was necessary to exhibit it as distinctly as possible.
+The same thing is in its essence contained in what Puffendorf says on the
+subject, "_De Officio Hominis et Civis_" (Bk. ii. chap. 12). Hobbes also
+agrees with it, "Leviathan" (chaps. 15-28). In our own day Feurbach is
+well known to have maintained it. Indeed, it occurs even in the utterances
+of the ancient philosophers. Plato expresses it clearly in the
+"Protagoras" (p. 114, edit. Bip.), also in the "Gorgias" (p. 168), and
+lastly in the eleventh book of the "Laws" (p. 165). Seneca expresses
+Plato's opinion and the theory of all punishment in the short sentence,
+"_Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est; sed ne peccetur_" (De Ira, i.
+16).
+
+Thus we have come to recognise in the state the means by which egoism
+endowed with reason seeks to escape from its own evil consequences which
+turn against itself, and now each promotes the well-being of all because
+he sees that his own well-being is involved in it. If the state attained
+its end completely, then to a certain extent something approaching to an
+Utopia might finally, by the removal of all kinds of evil, be brought
+about. For by the human powers united in it, it is able to make the rest
+of nature more and more serviceable. But as yet the state has always
+remained very far from this goal. And even if it attained to it,
+innumerable evils essential to all life would still keep it in suffering;
+and finally, if they were all removed, ennui would at once occupy every
+place they left. And besides, the strife of individuals is never
+completely abolished by the state, for it vexes in trifles when it is
+prohibited in greater things. Finally, Eris, happily expelled from within,
+turns to what is without; as the conflict of individuals, she is banished
+by the institution of the state; but she reappears from without as the war
+of nations, and now demands in bulk and at once, as an accumulated debt,
+the bloody sacrifice which by wise precautions has been denied her in the
+particular. And even supposing that all this were finally overcome and
+removed, by wisdom founded on the experience of thousands of years, at the
+end the result would be the actual over-population of the whole planet,
+the terrible evil of which only a bold imagination can now realise.(76)
+
+§ 63. We have recognised _temporal justice_, which has its seat in the
+state, as requiting and punishing, and have seen that this only becomes
+justice through a reference to the _future_. For without this reference
+all punishing and requiting would be an outrage without justification, and
+indeed merely the addition of another evil to that which has already
+occurred, without meaning or significance. But it is quite otherwise with
+_eternal justice_, which was referred to before, and which rules not the
+state but the world, is not dependent upon human institutions, is not
+subject to chance and deception, is not uncertain, wavering, and erring,
+but infallible, fixed, and sure. The conception of requital implies that
+of time; therefore _eternal justice_ cannot be requital. Thus it cannot,
+like temporal justice, admit of respite and delay, and require time in
+order to triumph, equalising the evil deed by the evil consequences only
+by means of time. The punishment must here be so bound up with the offence
+that both are one.
+
+
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER CHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}? {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~},
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~},
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ZETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}; {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA~} {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}
+    {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER BETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK KORONIS~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}.
+
+    Eurip. ap. Stob. Ecl., i. c. 4.
+
+    ("Volare pennis scelera ad ætherias domus
+    Putatis, illic in Jovis tabularia
+    Scripto referri; tum Jovem lectis super
+    Sententiam proferre?--sed mortalium
+    Facinora coeli, quantaquanta est, regia
+    Nequit tenere: nec legendis Juppiter
+    Et puniendis par est. Est tamen ultio,
+    Et, si intuemur, illa nos habitat prope.")
+
+
+Now that such an eternal justice really lies in the nature of the world
+will soon become completely evident to whoever has grasped the whole of
+the thought which we have hitherto been developing.
+
+The world, in all the multiplicity of its parts and forms, is the
+manifestation, the objectivity, of the one will to live. Existence itself,
+and the kind of existence, both as a collective whole and in every part,
+proceeds from the will alone. The will is free, the will is almighty. The
+will appears in everything, just as it determines itself in itself and
+outside time. The world is only the mirror of this willing; and all
+finitude, all suffering, all miseries, which it contains, belong to the
+expression of that which the will wills, are as they are because the will
+so wills. Accordingly with perfect right every being supports existence in
+general, and also the existence of its species and its peculiar
+individuality, entirely as it is and in circumstances as they are, in a
+world such as it is, swayed by chance and error, transient, ephemeral, and
+constantly suffering; and in all that it experiences, or indeed can
+experience, it always gets its due. For the will belongs to it; and as the
+will is, so is the world. Only this world itself can bear the
+responsibility of its own existence and nature--no other; for by what means
+could another have assumed it? Do we desire to know what men, morally
+considered, are worth as a whole and in general, we have only to consider
+their fate as a whole and in general. This is want, wretchedness,
+affliction, misery, and death. Eternal justice reigns; if they were not,
+as a whole, worthless, their fate, as a whole, would not be so sad. In
+this sense we may say, the world itself is the judgment of the world. If
+we could lay all the misery of the world in one scale of the balance, and
+all the guilt of the world in the other, the needle would certainly point
+to the centre.
+
+Certainly, however, the world does not exhibit itself to the knowledge of
+the individual as such, developed for the service of the will, as it
+finally reveals itself to the inquirer as the objectivity of the one and
+only will to live, which he himself is. But the sight of the uncultured
+individual is clouded, as the Hindus say, by the veil of Mâyâ. He sees not
+the thing-in-itself but the phenomenon in time and space, the _principium
+individuationis_, and in the other forms of the principle of sufficient
+reason. And in this form of his limited knowledge he sees not the inner
+nature of things, which is one, but its phenomena as separated, disunited,
+innumerable, very different, and indeed opposed. For to him pleasure
+appears as one thing and pain as quite another thing: one man as a
+tormentor and a murderer, another as a martyr and a victim; wickedness as
+one thing and evil as another. He sees one man live in joy, abundance, and
+pleasure, and even at his door another die miserably of want and cold.
+Then he asks, Where is the retribution? And he himself, in the vehement,
+pressure of will which is his origin and his nature, seizes upon the
+pleasures and enjoyments of life, firmly embraces them, and knows not that
+by this very act of his will he seizes and hugs all those pains and
+sorrows at the sight of which he shudders. He sees the ills and he sees
+the wickedness in the world, but far from knowing that both of these are
+but different sides of the manifestation of the one will to live, he
+regards them as very different, and indeed quite opposed, and often seeks
+to escape by wickedness, _i.e._, by causing the suffering of another, from
+ills, from the suffering of his own individuality, for he is involved in
+the _principium individuationis_, deluded by the veil of Mâyâ. Just as a
+sailor sits in a boat trusting to his frail barque in a stormy sea,
+unbounded in every direction, rising and falling with the howling
+mountainous waves; so in the midst of a world of sorrows the individual
+man sits quietly, supported by and trusting to the _principium
+individuationis_, or the way in which the individual knows things as
+phenomena. The boundless world, everywhere full of suffering in the
+infinite past, in the infinite future, is strange to him, indeed is to him
+but a fable; his ephemeral person, his extensionless present, his
+momentary satisfaction, this alone has reality for him; and he does all to
+maintain this, so long as his eyes are not opened by a better knowledge.
+Till then, there lives only in the inmost depths of his consciousness a
+very obscure presentiment that all that is after all not really so strange
+to him, but has a connection with him, from which the _principium
+individuationis_ cannot protect him. From this presentiment arises that
+ineradicable _awe_ common to all men (and indeed perhaps even to the most
+sensible of the brutes) which suddenly seizes them if by any chance they
+become puzzled about the _principium individuationis_, because the
+principle of sufficient reason in some one of its forms seems to admit of
+an exception. For example, if it seems as if some change took place
+without a cause, or some one who is dead appears again, or if in any other
+way the past or the future becomes present or the distant becomes near.
+The fearful terror at anything of the kind is founded on the fact that
+they suddenly become puzzled about the forms of knowledge of the
+phenomenon, which alone separate their own individuality from the rest of
+the world. But even this separation lies only in the phenomenon, and not
+in the thing-in-itself; and on this rests eternal justice. In fact, all
+temporal happiness stands, and all prudence proceeds, upon ground that is
+undermined. They defend the person from accidents and supply its
+pleasures; but the person is merely phenomenon, and its difference from
+other individuals, and exemption from the sufferings which they endure,
+rests merely in the form of the phenomenon, the _principium
+individuationis_. According to the true nature of things, every one has
+all the suffering of the world as his own, and indeed has to regard all
+merely possible suffering as for him actual, so long as he is the fixed
+will to live, _i.e._, asserts life with all his power. For the knowledge
+that sees through the _principium individuationis_, a happy life in time,
+the gift of chance or won by prudence, amid the sorrows of innumerable
+others, is only the dream of a beggar in which he is a king, but from
+which he must awake and learn from experience that only a fleeting
+illusion had separated him from the suffering of his life.
+
+Eternal justice withdraws itself from the vision that is involved in the
+knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason in the
+_principium individuationis_; such vision misses it altogether unless it
+vindicates it in some way by fictions. It sees the bad, after misdeeds and
+cruelties of every kind, live in happiness and leave the world unpunished.
+It sees the oppressed drag out a life full of suffering to the end without
+an avenger, a requiter appearing. But that man only will grasp and
+comprehend eternal justice who raises himself above the knowledge that
+proceeds under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, bound
+to the particular thing, and recognises the Ideas, sees through the
+_principium individuationis_, and becomes conscious that the forms of the
+phenomenon do not apply to the thing-in-itself. Moreover, he alone, by
+virtue of the same knowledge, can understand the true nature of virtue, as
+it will soon disclose itself to us in connection with the present inquiry,
+although for the practice of virtue this knowledge in the abstract is by
+no means demanded. Thus it becomes clear to whoever has attained to the
+knowledge referred to, that because the will is the in-itself of all
+phenomena, the misery which is awarded to others and that which he
+experiences himself, the bad and the evil, always concerns only that one
+inner being which is everywhere the same, although the phenomena in which
+the one and the other exhibits itself exist as quite different
+individuals, and are widely separated by time and space. He sees that the
+difference between him who inflicts the suffering and him who must bear it
+is only the phenomenon, and does not concern the thing-in-itself, for this
+is the will living in both, which here, deceived by the knowledge which is
+bound to its service, does not recognise itself, and seeking an increased
+happiness in _one_ of its phenomena, produces great suffering in
+_another_, and thus, in the pressure of excitement, buries its teeth in
+its own flesh, not knowing that it always injures only itself, revealing
+in this form, through the medium of individuality, the conflict with
+itself which it bears in its inner nature. The inflicter of suffering and
+the sufferer are one. The former errs in that he believes he is not a
+partaker in the suffering; the latter, in that he believes he is not a
+partaker in the guilt. If the eyes of both were opened, the inflicter of
+suffering would see that he lives in all that suffers pain in the wide
+world, and which, if endowed with reason, in vain asks why it was called
+into existence for such great suffering, its desert of which it does not
+understand. And the sufferer would see that all the wickedness which is or
+ever was committed in the world proceeds from that will which constitutes
+_his_ own nature also, appears also in _him_, and that through this
+phenomenon and its assertion he has taken upon himself all the sufferings
+which proceed from such a will and bears them as his due, so long as he is
+this will. From this knowledge speaks the profound poet Calderon in "Life
+a Dream"--
+
+
+    "Pues el delito mayor
+    Del hombre es haber nacido."
+
+    ("For the greatest crime of man
+    Is that he ever was born.")
+
+
+Why should it not be a crime, since, according to an eternal law, death
+follows upon it? Calderon has merely expressed in these lines the
+Christian dogma of original sin.
+
+The living knowledge of eternal justice, of the balance that inseparably
+binds together the _malum culpæ_ with the _malum poenæ_, demands the
+complete transcending of individuality and the principle of its
+possibility. Therefore it will always remain unattainable to the majority
+of men, as will also be the case with the pure and distinct knowledge of
+the nature of all virtue, which is akin to it, and which we are about to
+explain. Accordingly the wise ancestors of the Hindu people have directly
+expressed it in the Vedas, which are only allowed to the three regenerate
+castes, or in their esoteric teaching, so far at any rate as conception
+and language comprehend it, and their method of exposition, which always
+remains pictorial and even rhapsodical, admits; but in the religion of the
+people, or exoteric teaching, they only communicate it by means of myths.
+The direct exposition we find in the Vedas, the fruit of the highest human
+knowledge and wisdom, the kernel of which has at last reached us in the
+Upanishads as the greatest gift of this century. It is expressed in
+various ways, but especially by making all the beings in the world, living
+and lifeless, pass successively before the view of the student, and
+pronouncing over every one of them that word which has become a formula,
+and as such has been called the Mahavakya: Tatoumes,--more correctly, Tat
+twam asi,--which means, "This thou art."(77) But for the people, that great
+truth, so far as in their limited condition they could comprehend it, was
+translated into the form of knowledge which follows the principle of
+sufficient reason. This form of knowledge is indeed, from its nature,
+quite incapable of apprehending that truth pure and in itself, and even
+stands in contradiction to it, yet in the form of a myth it received a
+substitute for it which was sufficient as a guide for conduct. For the
+myth enables the method of knowledge, in accordance with the principle of
+sufficient reason, to comprehend by figurative representation the ethical
+significance of conduct, which itself is ever foreign to it. This is the
+aim of all systems of religion, for as a whole they are the mythical
+clothing of the truth which is unattainable to the uncultured human
+intellect. In this sense this myth might, in Kant's language, be called a
+postulate of the practical reason; but regarded as such, it has the great
+advantage that it contains absolutely no elements but such as lie before
+our eyes in the course of actual experience, and can therefore support all
+its conceptions with perceptions. What is here referred to is the myth of
+the transmigration of souls. It teaches that all sufferings which in life
+one inflicts upon other beings must be expiated in a subsequent life in
+this world, through precisely the same sufferings; and this extends so
+far, that he who only kills a brute must, some time in endless time, be
+born as the same kind of brute and suffer the same death. It teaches that
+wicked conduct involves a future life in this world in suffering and
+despised creatures, and, accordingly, that one will then be born again in
+lower castes, or as a woman, or as a brute, as Pariah or Tschandala, as a
+leper, or as a crocodile, and so forth. All the pains which the myth
+threatens it supports with perceptions from actual life, through suffering
+creatures which do not know how they have merited their misery, and it
+does not require to call in the assistance of any other hell. As a reward,
+on the other hand, it promises re-birth in better, nobler forms, as
+Brahmans, wise men, or saints. The highest reward, which awaits the
+noblest deeds and the completest resignation, which is also given to the
+woman who in seven successive lives has voluntarily died on the funeral
+pile of her husband, and not less to the man whose pure mouth has never
+uttered a single lie,--this reward the myth can only express negatively in
+the language of this world by the promise, which is so often repeated,
+that they shall never be born again, _Non adsumes iterum existentiam
+apparentem_; or, as the Buddhists, who recognise neither Vedas nor castes,
+express it, "Thou shalt attain to Nirvâna," _i.e._, to a state in which
+four things no longer exist--birth, age, sickness, and death.
+
+Never has a myth entered, and never will one enter, more closely into the
+philosophical truth which is attainable to so few than this primitive
+doctrine of the noblest and most ancient nation. Broken up as this nation
+now is into many parts, this myth yet reigns as the universal belief of
+the people, and has the most decided influence upon life to-day, as four
+thousand years ago. Therefore Pythagoras and Plato have seized with
+admiration on that _ne plus ultra_ of mythical representation, received it
+from India or Egypt, honoured it, made use of it, and, we know not how
+far, even believed it. We, on the contrary, now send the Brahmans English
+clergymen and evangelical linen-weavers to set them right out of sympathy,
+and to show them that they are created out of nothing, and ought
+thankfully to rejoice in the fact. But it is just the same as if we fired
+a bullet against a cliff. In India our religions will never take root. The
+ancient wisdom of the human race will not be displaced by what happened in
+Galilee. On the contrary, Indian philosophy streams back to Europe, and
+will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought.
+
+§ 64. From our exposition of eternal justice, which is not mythical but
+philosophical, we will now proceed to the kindred investigation of the
+ethical significance of conduct and of conscience, which is the merely
+felt knowledge of that significance. But first I wish at this point to
+draw attention to two peculiarities of human nature, that might help to
+make clear how the nature of that eternal justice, and the unity and
+identity of the will in all its phenomena upon which it rests, is known to
+every one, at least as an obscure feeling.
+
+When a bad deed has been done, it affords satisfaction not only to the
+sufferer, who for the most part feels the desire of revenge, but also to
+the perfectly indifferent spectator, to see that he who caused another
+pain suffers himself a like measure of pain; and this quite independently
+of the end which we have shown the state has in view in punishment, and
+which is the foundation of penal law. It seems to me that what expresses
+itself here is nothing but the consciousness of that eternal justice,
+which is, nevertheless, at once misunderstood and falsified by the
+unenlightened mind, for, involved in the _principium individuationis_, it
+produces an amphiboly of the concepts and demands from the phenomenon what
+only belongs to the thing in itself. It does not see how far in themselves
+the offender and the offended are one, and that it is the same being
+which, not recognising itself in its own manifestation, bears both the
+pain and the guilt, but it desires rather to see the pain also in the
+particular individual to whom the guilt belongs. Therefore, most persons
+would demand that a man who had a very high degree of wickedness which
+might yet occur in many others, only not matched with other qualities such
+as are found in him, a man who also far surpassed others by extraordinary
+intellectual powers, and who inflicted unspeakable sufferings upon
+millions of others--for example, as a conqueror,--most persons, I say, would
+demand that such a man should at some time and in some place expiate all
+these sufferings by a like amount of pain; for they do not recognise how
+in themselves the inflicter of suffering and the sufferers are one, and
+that it is the same will through which the latter exist and live which
+also appears in the former, and just through him attains to a distinct
+revelation of its nature, and which likewise suffers both in the oppressed
+and the oppressor; and indeed in the latter in a greater measure, as the
+consciousness has attained a higher degree of clearness and distinctness
+and the will has greater vehemence. But that the deeper knowledge, which
+is no longer involved in the _principium individuationis_, from which all
+virtue and nobleness proceed, no longer retains the disposition which
+demands requital, is shown by the Christian ethics, which absolutely
+forbids all requital of evil with evil, and allows eternal justice to
+proceed in the sphere of the thing-in-itself, which is different from that
+of the phenomenon. ("Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the
+Lord,"--Rom. xii. 19.)
+
+A much more striking, but also a much rarer, characteristic of human
+nature, which expresses that desire to draw eternal justice into the
+province of experience, _i.e._, of individuality, and at the same time
+indicates a felt consciousness that, as I have expressed it above, the
+will to live conducts at its own cost the great tragedy and comedy, and
+that the same one will lives in all manifestations,--such a characteristic,
+I say, is the following. We sometimes see a man so deeply moved by a great
+injury which he has experienced, or, it may be, only witnessed, that he
+deliberately and irretrievably stakes his own life in order to take
+vengeance on the perpetrator of that wrong. We see him seek for some
+mighty oppressor through long years, murder him at last, and then himself
+die on the scaffold, as he had foreseen, and often, it may be, did not
+seek to avoid, for his life had value for him only as a means of
+vengeance. We find examples of this especially among the Spaniards.(78)
+If, now, we consider the spirit of that desire for retribution carefully,
+we find that it is very different from common revenge, which seeks to
+mitigate the suffering, endured by the sight of the suffering inflicted;
+indeed, we find that what it aims at deserves to be called, not so much
+revenge as punishment. For in it there really lies the intention of an
+effect upon the future through the example, and that without any selfish
+aim, either for the avenging person, for it costs him his life, or for a
+society which secures its own safety by laws. For that punishment is
+carried out by individuals, not by the state, nor is it in fulfilment of a
+law, but, on the contrary, always concerns a deed which the state either
+would not or could not punish, and the punishment of which it condemns. It
+seems to me that the indignation which carries such a man so far beyond
+the limits of all self-love springs from the deepest consciousness that he
+himself is the whole will to live, which appears in all beings through all
+time, and that therefore the most distant future belongs to him just as
+the present, and cannot be indifferent to him. Asserting this will, he yet
+desires that in the drama which represents its nature no such fearful
+wrong shall ever appear again, and wishes to frighten ever future
+wrong-doer by the example of a vengeance against which there is no means
+of defence, since the avenger is not deterred by the fear of death. The
+will to live, though still asserting itself, does not here depend any
+longer upon the particular phenomenon, the individual, but comprehends the
+Idea of man, and wishes to keep its manifestation pure from such a fearful
+and shocking wrong. It is a rare, very significant, and even sublime trait
+of character through which the individual sacrifices himself by striving
+to make himself the arm of eternal justice, of the true nature of which he
+is yet ignorant.
+
+§ 65. In all the preceding investigations of human action, we have been
+leading up to the final investigation, and have to a considerable extent
+lightened the task of raising to abstract and philosophical clearness, and
+exhibiting as a branch of our central thought that special ethical
+significance of action which in life is with perfect understanding denoted
+by the words _good_ and _bad_.
+
+First, however, I wish to trace back to their real meaning those
+conceptions of _good_ and _bad_ which have been treated by the
+philosophical writers of the day, very extraordinarily, as simple
+conceptions, and thus incapable of analysis; so that the reader may not
+remain involved in the senseless delusion that they contain more than is
+actually the case, and express in and for themselves all that is here
+necessary. I am in a position to do this because in ethics I am no more
+disposed to take refuge behind the word _good_ than formerly behind the
+words _beautiful_ and _true_, in order that by the adding a "ness," which
+at the present day is supposed to have a special {~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, and therefore
+to be of assistance in various cases, and by assuming an air of solemnity,
+I might induce the belief that by uttering three such words I had done
+more than denote three very wide and abstract, and consequently empty
+conceptions, of very different origin and significance. Who is there,
+indeed, who has made himself acquainted with the books of our own day to
+whom these three words, admirable as are the things to which they
+originally refer, have not become an aversion after he has seen for the
+thousandth time how those who are least capable of thinking believe that
+they have only to utter these three words with open mouth and the air of
+an intelligent sheep, in order to have spoken the greatest wisdom?
+
+The explanation of the concept _true_ has already been given in the essay
+on the principle of sufficient reason, chap. v. § 29 _et seq._ The content
+of the concept _beautiful_ found for the first time its proper explanation
+through the whole of the Third Book of the present work. We now wish to
+discover the significance of the concept _good_, which can be done with
+very little trouble. This concept is essentially relative, and signifies
+_the conformity of an object to any definite effort of the will_.
+Accordingly everything that corresponds to the will in any of its
+expressions and fulfils its end is thought through the concept _good_,
+however different such things may be in other respects. Thus we speak of
+good eating, good roads, good weather, good weapons, good omens, and so
+on; in short, we call everything good that is just as we wish it to be;
+and therefore that may be good in the eyes of one man which is just the
+reverse in those of another. The conception of the good divides itself
+into two sub-species--that of the direct and present satisfaction of any
+volition, and that of its indirect satisfaction which has reference to the
+future, _i.e._, the agreeable and the useful. The conception of the
+opposite, so long as we are speaking of unconscious existence, is
+expressed by the word _bad_, more rarely and abstractly by the word
+_evil_, which thus denotes everything that does not correspond to any
+effort of the will. Like all other things that can come into relation to
+the will, men who are favourable to the ends which happen to be desired,
+who further and befriend them, are called good, in the same sense, and
+always with that relative limitation, which shows itself, for example, in
+the expression, "I find this good, but you don't." Those, however, who are
+naturally disposed not to hinder the endeavours of others, but rather to
+assist them, and who are thus consistently helpful, benevolent, friendly,
+and charitable, are called _good_ men, on account of this relation of
+their conduct to the will of others in general. In the case of conscious
+beings (brutes and men) the contrary conception is denoted in German, and,
+within the last hundred years or so, in French also, by a different word
+from that which is used in speaking of unconscious existence; in German,
+_böse_; in French, _méchant_; while in almost all other languages this
+distinction does not exist; and {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}, _malus_, _cattivo_, _bad_, are used
+of men, as of lifeless things, which are opposed to the ends of a definite
+individual will. Thus, having started entirely from the passive element in
+the good, the inquiry could only proceed later to the active element, and
+investigate the conduct of the man who is called good, no longer with
+reference to others, but to himself; specially setting itself the task of
+explaining both the purely objective respect which such conduct produces
+in others, and the peculiar contentment with himself which it clearly
+produces in the man himself, since he purchases it with sacrifices of
+another kind; and also, on the other hand, the inner pain which
+accompanies the bad disposition, whatever outward advantages it brings to
+him who entertains it. It was from this source that the ethical systems,
+both the philosophical and those which are supported by systems of
+religion, took their rise. Both seek constantly in some way or other to
+connect happiness with virtue, the former either by means of the principle
+of contradiction or that of sufficient reason, and thus to make happiness
+either identical with or the consequence of virtue, always sophistically;
+the latter, by asserting the existence of other worlds than that which
+alone can be known to experience.(79) In our system, on the contrary,
+virtue will show itself, not as a striving after happiness, that is,
+well-being and life, but as an effort in quite an opposite direction.
+
+It follows from what has been said above, that the _good_ is, according to
+its concept, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}; thus every good is essentially relative, for its
+being consists in its relation to a desiring will. _Absolute good_ is,
+therefore, a contradiction in terms; highest good, _summum bonum_, really
+signifies the same thing--a final satisfaction of the will, after which no
+new desire could arise,--a last motive, the attainment of which would
+afford enduring satisfaction of the will. But, according to the
+investigations which have already been conducted in this Fourth Book, such
+a consummation is not even thinkable. The will can just as little cease
+from willing altogether on account of some particular satisfaction, as
+time can end or begin; for it there is no such thing as a permanent
+fulfilment which shall completely and for ever satisfy its craving. It is
+the vessel of the Danaides; for it there is no highest good, no absolute
+good, but always a merely temporary good. If, however, we wish to give an
+honorary position, as it were emeritus, to an old expression, which from
+custom we do not like to discard altogether, we may, metaphorically and
+figuratively, call the complete self-effacement and denial of the will,
+the true absence of will, which alone for ever stills and silences its
+struggle, alone gives that contentment which can never again be disturbed,
+alone redeems the world, and which we shall now soon consider at the close
+of our whole investigation--the absolute good, the _summum bonum_--and
+regard it as the only radical cure of the disease of which all other means
+are only palliations or anodynes. In this sense the Greek {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} and also
+_finis bonorum_ correspond to the thing still better. So much for the
+words _good_ and _bad_; now for the thing itself.
+
+If a man is always disposed to do _wrong_ whenever the opportunity
+presents itself, and there is no external power to restrain him, we call
+him _bad_. According to our doctrine of wrong, this means that such a man
+does not merely assert the will to live as it appears in his own body, but
+in this assertion goes so far that he denies the will which appears in
+other individuals. This is shown by the fact that he desires their powers
+for the service of his own will, and seeks to destroy their existence when
+they stand in the way of its efforts. The ultimate source of this is a
+high degree of egoism, the nature of which has been already explained. Two
+things are here apparent. In the first place, that in such a man an
+excessively vehement will to live expresses itself, extending far beyond
+the assertion of his own body; and, in the second place, that his
+knowledge, entirely given up to the principle of sufficient reason and
+involved in the _principium individuationis_, cannot get beyond the
+difference which this latter principle establishes between his own person
+and every one else. Therefore he seeks his own well-being alone,
+completely indifferent to that of all others, whose existence is to him
+altogether foreign and divided from his own by a wide gulf, and who are
+indeed regarded by him as mere masks with no reality behind them. And
+these two qualities are the constituent elements of the bad character.
+
+This great intensity of will is in itself and directly a constant source
+of suffering. In the first place, because all volition as such arises from
+want; that is, suffering. (Therefore, as will be remembered, from the
+Third Book, the momentary cessation of all volition, which takes place
+whenever we give ourselves up to æsthetic contemplation, as pure will-less
+subject of knowledge, the correlative of the Idea, is one of the principal
+elements in our pleasure in the beautiful.) Secondly, because, through the
+causal connection of things, most of our desires must remain unfulfilled,
+and the will is oftener crossed than satisfied, and therefore much intense
+volition carries with it much intense suffering. For all suffering is
+simply unfulfilled and crossed volition; and even the pain of the body
+when it is injured or destroyed is as such only possible through the fact
+that the body is nothing but the will itself become object. Now on this
+account, because much intense suffering is inseparable from much intense
+volition, very bad men bear the stamp of inward suffering in the very
+expression of the countenance; even when they have attained every external
+happiness, they always look unhappy so long as they are not transported by
+some momentary ecstasy and are not dissembling. From this inward torment,
+which is absolutely and directly essential to them, there finally proceeds
+that delight in the suffering of others which does not spring from mere
+egoism, but is disinterested, and which constitutes _wickedness_ proper,
+rising to the pitch of _cruelty_. For this the suffering of others is not
+a means for the attainment of the ends of its own will, but an end in
+itself. The more definite explanation of this phenomenon is as
+follows:--Since man is a manifestation of will illuminated by the clearest
+knowledge, he is always contrasting the actual and felt satisfaction of
+his will with the merely possible satisfaction of it which knowledge
+presents to him. Hence arises envy: every privation is infinitely
+increased by the enjoyment of others, and relieved by the knowledge that
+others also suffer the same privation. Those ills which are common to all
+and inseparable from human life trouble us little, just as those which
+belong to the climate, to the whole country. The recollection of greater
+sufferings than our own stills our pain; the sight of the sufferings of
+others soothes our own. If, now, a man is filled with an exceptionally
+intense pressure of will,--if with burning eagerness he seeks to accumulate
+everything to slake the thirst of his egoism, and thus experiences, as he
+inevitably must, that all satisfaction is merely apparent, that the
+attained end never fulfils the promise of the desired object, the final
+appeasing of the fierce pressure of will, but that when fulfilled the wish
+only changes its form, and now torments him in a new one; and indeed that
+if at last all wishes are exhausted, the pressure of will itself remains
+without any conscious motive, and makes itself known to him with fearful
+pain as a feeling of terrible desolation and emptiness; if from all this,
+which in the case of the ordinary degrees of volition is only felt in a
+small measure, and only produces the ordinary degree of melancholy, in the
+case of him who is a manifestation of will reaching the point of
+extraordinary wickedness, there necessarily springs an excessive inward
+misery, an eternal unrest, an incurable pain; he seeks indirectly the
+alleviation which directly is denied him,--seeks to mitigate his own
+suffering by the sight of the suffering of others, which at the same time
+he recognises as an expression of his power. The suffering of others now
+becomes for him an end in itself, and is a spectacle in which he delights;
+and thus arises the phenomenon of pure cruelty, blood-thirstiness, which
+history exhibits so often in the Neros and Domitians, in the African Deis,
+in Robespierre, and the like.
+
+The desire of revenge is closely related to wickedness. It recompenses
+evil with evil, not with reference to the future, which is the character
+of punishment, but merely on account of what has happened, what is past,
+as such, thus disinterestedly, not as a means, but as an end, in order to
+revel in the torment which the avenger himself has inflicted on the
+offender. What distinguishes revenge from pure wickedness, and to some
+extent excuses it, is an appearance of justice. For if the same act, which
+is now revenge, were to be done legally, that is, according to a
+previously determined and known rule, and in a society which had
+sanctioned this rule, it would be punishment, and thus justice.
+
+Besides the suffering which has been described, and which is inseparable
+from wickedness, because it springs from the same root, excessive
+vehemence of will, another specific pain quite different from this is
+connected with wickedness, which is felt in the case of every bad action,
+whether it be merely injustice proceeding from egoism or pure wickedness,
+and according to the length of its duration is called _the sting of
+conscience_ or _remorse_. Now, whoever remembers and has present in his
+mind the content of the preceding portion of this Fourth Book, and
+especially the truth explained at the beginning of it, that life itself is
+always assured to the will to live, as its mere copy or mirror, and also
+the exposition of eternal justice, will find that the sting of conscience
+can have no other meaning than the following, _i.e._, its content,
+abstractly expressed, is what follows, in which two parts are
+distinguished, which again, however, entirely coincide, and must be
+thought as completely united.
+
+However closely the veil of Mâyâ may envelop the mind of the bad man,
+_i.e._, however firmly he may be involved in the _principium
+individuationis_, according to which he regards his person as absolutely
+different and separated by a wide gulf from all others, a knowledge to
+which he clings with all his might, as it alone suits and supports his
+egoism, so that knowledge is almost always corrupted by will, yet there
+arises in the inmost depths of his consciousness the secret presentiment
+that such an order of things is only phenomenal, and that their real
+constitution is quite different. He has a dim foreboding that, however
+much time and space may separate him from other individuals and the
+innumerable miseries which they suffer, and even suffer through him, and
+may represent them as quite foreign to him, yet in themselves, and apart
+from the idea and its forms, it is the one will to live appearing in them
+all, which here failing to recognise itself, turns its weapons against
+itself, and, by seeking increased happiness in one of its phenomena,
+imposes the greatest suffering upon another. He dimly sees that he, the
+bad man, is himself this whole will; that consequently he is not only the
+inflicter of pain but also the endurer of it, from whose suffering he is
+only separated and exempted by an illusive dream, the form of which is
+space and time, which, however, vanishes away; that he must in reality pay
+for the pleasure with the pain, and that all suffering which he only knows
+as possible really concerns him as the will to live, inasmuch as the
+possible and actual, the near and the distant in time and space, are only
+different for the knowledge of the individual, only by means of the
+_principium individuationis_, not in themselves. This is the truth which
+mythically, _i.e._, adapted to the principle of sufficient reason, and so
+translated into the form of the phenomenal, is expressed in the
+transmigration of souls. Yet it has its purest expression, free from all
+foreign admixture, in that obscurely felt yet inconsolable misery called
+remorse. But this springs also from a second immediate knowledge, which is
+closely bound to the first--the knowledge of the strength with which the
+will to live asserts itself in the wicked individual, which extends far
+beyond his own individual phenomenon, to the absolute denial of the same
+will appearing in other individuals. Consequently the inward horror of the
+wicked man at his own deed, which he himself tries to conceal, contains,
+besides that presentment of the nothingness, the mere illusiveness of the
+_principium individuationis_, and of the distinction established by it
+between him and others; also the knowledge of the vehemence of his own
+will, the intensity with which he has seized upon life and attached
+himself closely to it, even that life whose terrible side he sees before
+him in the misery of those who are oppressed by him, and with which he is
+yet so firmly united, that just on this account the greatest atrocity
+proceeds from him himself, as a means for the fuller assertion of his own
+will. He recognises himself as the concentrated manifestation of the will
+to live, feels to what degree he is given up to life, and with it also to
+innumerable sufferings which are essential to it, for it has infinite time
+and infinite space to abolish the distinction between the possible and the
+actual, and to change all the sufferings which as yet are merely _known_
+to him into sufferings he has _experienced_. The millions of years of
+constant rebirth certainly exist, like the whole past and future, only in
+conception; occupied time, the form of the phenomenon of the will, is only
+the present, and for the individual time is ever new: it seems to him
+always as if he had newly come into being. For life is inseparable from
+the will to live, and the only form of life is the present. Death (the
+repetition of the comparison must be excused) is like the setting of the
+sun, which is only apparently swallowed up by the night, but in reality,
+itself the source of all light, burns without intermission, brings new
+days to new worlds, is always rising and always setting. Beginning and end
+only concern the individual through time, the form of the phenomenon for
+the idea. Outside time lies only the will, Kant's thing-in-itself, and its
+adequate objectification, the Idea of Plato. Therefore suicide affords no
+escape; what every one in his inmost consciousness _wills_, that must he
+_be_; and what every one _is_, that he _wills_. Thus, besides the merely
+felt knowledge of the illusiveness and nothingness of the forms of the
+idea which separate individuals, it is the self-knowledge of one's own
+will and its degree that gives the sting to conscience. The course of life
+draws the image of the empirical character, whose original is the
+intelligible character, and horrifies the wicked man by this image. He is
+horrified all the same whether the image is depicted in large characters,
+so that the world shares his horror, or in such small ones that he alone
+sees it, for it only concerns him directly. The past would be a matter of
+indifference, and could not pain the conscience if the character did not
+feel itself free from all time and unalterable by it, so long as it does
+not deny itself. Therefore things which are long past still weigh on the
+conscience. The prayer, "Lead me not into temptation," means, "Let me not
+see what manner of person I am." In the might with which the bad man
+asserts life, and which exhibits itself to him in the sufferings which he
+inflicts on others, he measures how far he is from the surrender and
+denial of that will, the only possible deliverance from the world and its
+miseries. He sees how far he belongs to it, and how firmly he is bound to
+it; the _known_ suffering of others has no power to move him; he is given
+up to life and _felt_ suffering. It remains hidden whether this will ever
+break and overcome the vehemence of his will.
+
+This exposition of the significance and inner nature of the _bad_, which
+as mere feeling, _i.e._, not as distinct, abstract knowledge, is the
+content of _remorse_, will gain distinctness and completeness by the
+similar consideration of the _good_ as a quality of human will, and
+finally of absolute resignation and holiness, which proceeds from it when
+it has attained its highest grade. For opposites always throw light upon
+each other, and the day at once reveals both itself and the night, as
+Spinoza admirably remarks.
+
+§ 66. A theory of morals without proof, that is, mere moralising, can
+effect nothing, because it does not act as a motive. A theory of morals
+which does act as a motive can do so only by working on self-love. But
+what springs from this source has no moral worth. It follows from this
+that no genuine virtue can be produced through moral theory or abstract
+knowledge in general, but that such virtue must spring from that intuitive
+knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same nature
+as in our own.
+
+For virtue certainly proceeds from knowledge, but not from the abstract
+knowledge that can be communicated through words. If it were so, virtue
+could be taught, and by here expressing in abstract language its nature
+and the knowledge which lies at its foundation, we should make every one
+who comprehends this even ethically better. But this is by no means the
+case. On the contrary, ethical discourses and preaching will just as
+little produce a virtuous man as all the systems of æsthetics from
+Aristotle downwards have succeeded in producing a poet. For the real inner
+nature of virtue the concept is unfruitful, just as it is in art, and it
+is only in a completely subordinate position that it can be of use as a
+tool in the elaboration and preserving of what has been ascertained and
+inferred by other means. _Velle non discitur._ Abstract dogmas are, in
+fact, without influence upon virtue, _i.e._, upon the goodness of the
+disposition. False dogmas do not disturb it; true ones will scarcely
+assist it. It would, in fact, be a bad look-out if the cardinal fact in
+the life of man, his ethical worth, that worth which counts for eternity,
+were dependent upon anything the attainment of which is so much a matter
+of chance as is the case with dogmas, religious doctrines, and
+philosophical theories. For morality dogmas have this value only: The man
+who has become virtuous from knowledge of another kind, which is presently
+to be considered, possesses in them a scheme or formula according to which
+he accounts to his own reason, for the most part fictitiously, for his
+non-egoistical action, the nature of which it, _i.e._, he himself, does
+not comprehend, and with which account he has accustomed it to be content.
+
+Upon conduct, outward action, dogmas may certainly exercise a powerful
+influence, as also custom and example (the last because the ordinary man
+does not trust his judgment, of the weakness of which he is conscious, but
+only follows his own or some one else's experience), but the disposition
+is not altered in this way.(80) All abstract knowledge gives only motives;
+but, as was shown above, motives can only alter the direction of the will,
+not the will itself. All communicable knowledge, however, can only affect
+the will as a motive. Thus when dogmas lead it, what the man really and in
+general wills remains still the same. He has only received different
+thoughts as to the ways in which it is to be attained, and imaginary
+motives guide him just like real ones. Therefore, for example, it is all
+one, as regards his ethical worth, whether he gives large gifts to the
+poor, firmly persuaded that he will receive everything tenfold in a future
+life, or expends the same sum on the improvement of an estate which will
+yield interest, certainly late, but all the more surely and largely. And
+he who for the sake of orthodoxy commits the heretic to the flames is as
+much a murderer as the bandit who does it for gain; and indeed, as regards
+inward circumstances, so also was he who slaughtered the Turks in the Holy
+Land, if, like the burner of heretics, he really did so because he thought
+that he would thereby gain a place in heaven. For these are careful only
+for themselves, for their own egoism, just like the bandit, from whom they
+are only distinguished by the absurdity of their means. From without, as
+has been said, the will can only be reached through motives, and these
+only alter the way in which it expresses itself, never the will itself.
+_Velle non discitur._
+
+In the case of good deeds, however, the doer of which appeals to dogmas,
+we must always distinguish whether these dogmas really are the motives
+which lead to the good deeds, or whether, as was said above, they are
+merely the illusive account of them with which he seeks to satisfy his own
+reason with regard to a good deed which really flows from quite a
+different source, a deed which he does because he is good, though he does
+not understand how to explain it rightly, and yet wishes to think
+something with regard to it. But this distinction is very hard to make,
+because it lies in the heart of a man. Therefore we can scarcely ever pass
+a correct moral judgment on the action of others, and very seldom on our
+own. The deeds and conduct of an individual and of a nation may be very
+much modified through dogmas, example, and custom. But in themselves all
+deeds (_opera operata_) are merely empty forms, and only the disposition
+which leads to them gives them moral significance. This disposition,
+however, may be quite the same when its outward manifestation is very
+different. With an equal degree of wickedness, one man may die on the
+wheel, and another in the bosom of his family. It may be the same grade of
+wickedness which expresses itself in one nation in the coarse
+characteristics of murder and cannibalism, and in another finely and
+softly in miniature, in court intrigues, oppressions, and delicate plots
+of every kind; the inner nature remains the same. It is conceivable that a
+perfect state, or perhaps indeed a complete and firmly believed doctrine
+of rewards and punishments after death, might prevent every crime;
+politically much would be gained thereby; morally, nothing; only the
+expression of the will in life would be restricted.
+
+Thus genuine goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue, and pure
+nobility do not proceed from abstract knowledge. Yet they do proceed from
+knowledge; but it is a direct intuitive knowledge, which can neither be
+reasoned away, nor arrived at by reasoning, a knowledge which, just
+because it is not abstract, cannot be communicated, but must arise in each
+for himself, which therefore finds its real and adequate expression not in
+words, but only in deeds, in conduct, in the course of the life of man. We
+who here seek the theory of virtue, and have therefore also to express
+abstractly the nature of the knowledge which lies at its foundation, will
+yet be unable to convey that knowledge itself in this expression. We can
+only give the concept of this knowledge, and thus always start from action
+in which alone it becomes visible, and refer to action as its only
+adequate expression. We can only explain and interpret action, _i.e._,
+express abstractly what really takes place in it.
+
+Before we speak of the _good_ proper, in opposition to the _bad_, which
+has been explained, we must touch on an intermediate grade, the mere
+negation of the bad: this is _justice_. The nature of right and wrong has
+been fully explained above; therefore we may briefly say here, that he who
+voluntarily recognises and observes those merely moral limits between
+wrong and right, even where this is not secured by the state or any other
+external power, thus he who, according to our explanation, never carries
+the assertion of his own will so far as to deny the will appearing in
+another individual, is _just_. Thus, in order to increase his own
+well-being, he will not inflict suffering upon others, _i.e._, he will
+commit no crime, he will respect the rights and the property of others. We
+see that for such a just man the _principium individuationis_ is no
+longer, as in the case of the bad man, an absolute wall of partition. We
+see that he does not, like the bad man, merely assert his own
+manifestation of will and deny all others; that other persons are not for
+him mere masks, whose nature is quite different from his own; but he shows
+in his conduct that he also recognises his own nature--the will to live as
+a thing-in-itself, in the foreign manifestation which is only given to him
+as idea. Thus he finds himself again in that other manifestation, up to a
+certain point, that of doing no wrong, _i.e._, abstaining from injury. To
+this extent, therefore, he sees through the _principium individuationis_,
+the veil of Mâyâ; so far he sets the being external to him on a level with
+his own--he does it no injury.
+
+If we examine the inmost nature of this justice, there already lies in it
+the resolution not to go so far in the assertion of one's own will as to
+deny the manifestations of will of others, by compelling them to serve
+one's own. One will therefore wish to render to others as much as one
+receives from them. The highest degree of this justice of disposition,
+which is, however, always united with goodness proper, whose character is
+no longer merely negative, extends so far that a man doubts his right to
+inherited property, wishes to support his body only by his own powers,
+mental and physical, feels every service of others and every luxury a
+reproach, and finally embraces voluntary poverty. Thus we see how Pascal,
+when he became an ascetic, would no longer permit any services to be
+rendered him, although he had servants enough; in spite of his constant
+bad health he made his bed himself, brought his own food from the kitchen,
+&c. ("Vie de Pascal, par sa Soeur," p. 19). Quite in keeping with this, it
+is reported that many Hindus, even Rajas with great wealth, expend it
+merely on the maintenance of their position, their court and attendants,
+and themselves observe with the greatest scrupulousness the maxim that a
+man should eat nothing that he has not himself both sowed and reaped. Yet
+a certain misunderstanding lies at the bottom of this; for one man, just
+because he is rich and powerful, can render such signal services to the
+whole of human society that they counterbalance the wealth he has
+inherited, for the secure possession of which he is indebted to society.
+In reality that excessive justice of such Hindus is already more than
+justice; it is actual renunciation, denial of the will to
+live,--asceticism, of which we shall speak last. On the other hand, pure
+idleness and living through the exertions of others, in the case of
+inherited wealth, without accomplishing anything, may be regarded as
+morally wrong, even if it must remain right according to positive laws.
+
+We have found that voluntary justice has its inmost source in a certain
+degree of penetration of the _principium individuationis_, while the
+unjust remain entirely involved in this principle. This penetration may
+exist not only in the degree which is required for justice, but also in
+the higher degree which leads to benevolence and well-doing, to love of
+mankind. And this may take place however strong and energetic in itself
+the will which appears in such an individual may be. Knowledge can always
+counterbalance it in him, teach him to resist the tendency to wrong, and
+even produce in him every degree of goodness, and indeed of resignation.
+Thus the good man is by no means to be regarded as originally a weaker
+manifestation of will than the bad man, but it is knowledge which in him
+masters the blind striving of will. There are certainly individuals who
+merely seem to have a good disposition on account of the weakness of the
+will appearing in them, but what they are soon appears from the fact that
+they are not capable of any remarkable self-conquest in order to perform a
+just or good deed.
+
+If, however, as a rare exception, we meet a man who possesses a
+considerable income, but uses very little of it for himself and gives all
+the rest to the poor, while he denies himself many pleasures and comforts,
+and we seek to explain the action of this man, we shall find, apart
+altogether from the dogmas through which he tries to make his action
+intelligible to his reason, that the simplest general expression and the
+essential character of his conduct is that _he makes less distinction than
+is usually made between himself and others_. This distinction is so great
+in the eyes of many that the suffering of others is a direct pleasure to
+the wicked and a welcome means of happiness to the unjust. The merely just
+man is content not to cause it; and, in general, most men know and are
+acquainted with innumerable sufferings of others in their vicinity, but do
+not determine to mitigate them, because to do so would involve some
+self-denial on their part. Thus, in each of all these a strong distinction
+seems to prevail between his own ego and that of others; on the other
+hand, to the noble man we have imagined, this distinction is not so
+significant. The _principium individuationis_, the form of the phenomenon,
+no longer holds him so tightly in its grasp, but the suffering which he
+sees in others touches him almost as closely as his own. He therefore
+tries to strike a balance between them, denies himself pleasures,
+practises renunciation, in order to mitigate the sufferings of others. He
+sees that the distinction between himself and others, which to the bad man
+is so great a gulf, only belongs to a fleeting and illusive phenomenon. He
+recognises directly and without reasoning that the in-itself of his own
+manifestation is also that of others, the will to live, which constitutes
+the inner nature of everything and lives in all; indeed, that this applies
+also to the brutes and the whole of nature, and therefore he will not
+cause suffering even to a brute.(81)
+
+He is now just as little likely to allow others to starve, while he
+himself has enough and to spare, as any one would be to suffer hunger one
+day in order to have more the next day than he could enjoy. For to him who
+does works of love the veil of Mâyâ has become transparent, the illusion
+of the _principium individuationis_ has left him. He recognises himself,
+his will, in every being, and consequently also in the sufferer. He is now
+free from the perversity with which the will to live, not recognising
+itself, here in one individual enjoys a fleeting and precarious pleasure,
+and there in another pays for it with suffering and starvation, and thus
+both inflicts and endures misery, not knowing that, like Thyestes, it
+eagerly devours its own flesh; and then, on the one hand, laments its
+undeserved suffering, and on the other hand transgresses without fear of
+Nemesis, always merely because, involved in the _principium
+individuationis_, thus generally in the kind of knowledge which is
+governed by the principle of sufficient reason, it does not recognise
+itself in the foreign phenomenon, and therefore does not perceive eternal
+justice. To be cured of this illusion and deception of Mâyâ, and to do
+works of love, are one and the same. But the latter is the necessary and
+inevitable symptom of that knowledge.
+
+The opposite of the sting of conscience, the origin and significance of
+which is explained above, is the _good conscience_, the satisfaction which
+we experience after every disinterested deed. It arises from the fact that
+such a deed, as it proceeds from the direct recognition of our own inner
+being in the phenomenon of another, affords us also the verification of
+this knowledge, the knowledge that our true self exists not only in our
+own person, this particular manifestation, but in everything that lives.
+By this the heart feels itself enlarged, as by egoism it is contracted.
+For as the latter concentrates our interest upon the particular
+manifestation of our own individuality, upon which knowledge always
+presents to us the innumerable dangers which constantly threaten this
+manifestation, and anxiety and care becomes the key-note of our
+disposition; the knowledge that everything living is just as much our own
+inner nature, as is our own person, extends our interest to everything
+living; and in this way the heart is enlarged. Thus through the diminished
+interest in our own self, the anxious care for the self is attacked at its
+very root and limited; hence the peace, the unbroken serenity, which a
+virtuous disposition and a good conscience affords, and the more distinct
+appearance of this with every good deed, for it proves to ourselves the
+depth of that disposition. The egoist feels himself surrounded by strange
+and hostile individuals, and all his hope is centred in his own good. The
+good man lives in a world of friendly individuals, the well-being of any
+of whom he regards as his own. Therefore, although the knowledge of the
+lot of mankind generally does not make his disposition a joyful one, yet
+the permanent knowledge of his own nature in all living beings, gives him
+a certain evenness, and even serenity of disposition. For the interest
+which is extended to innumerable manifestations cannot cause such anxiety
+as that which is concentrated upon one. The accidents which concern
+individuals collectively, equalise themselves, while those which happen to
+the particular individual constitute good or bad fortune.
+
+Thus, though others have set up moral principles which they give out as
+prescriptions for virtue, and laws which it was necessary to follow, I, as
+has already been said, cannot do this because I have no "ought" or law to
+prescribe to the eternally free-will. Yet on the other hand, in the
+connection of my system, what to a certain extent corresponds and is
+analogous to that undertaking is the purely theoretical truth, of which my
+whole exposition may be regarded as merely an elaboration, that the will
+is the in-itself of every phenomenon but itself, as such, is free from the
+forms of the phenomenal, and consequently from multiplicity; a truth,
+which, with reference to action, I do not know how to express better than
+by the formula of the Vedas already quoted: "Tat twam asi!" (This thou
+art!) Whoever is able to say this to himself, with regard to every being
+with whom he comes in contact, with clear knowledge and firm inward
+conviction, is certain of all virtue and blessedness, and is on the direct
+road to salvation.
+
+But before I go further, and, as the conclusion of my exposition, show how
+love, the origin and nature of which we recognised as the penetration of
+the _principium individuationis_, leads to salvation, to the entire
+surrender of the will to live, _i.e._, of all volition, and also how
+another path, less soft but more frequented, leads men to the same goal, a
+paradoxical proposition must first be stated and explained; not because it
+is paradoxical, but because it is true, and is necessary to the
+completeness of the thought I have present. It is this: "All love ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~},
+_caritas_) is sympathy."
+
+§ 67. We have seen how justice proceeds from the penetration of the
+_principium individuationis_ in a less degree, and how from its
+penetration in a higher degree there arises goodness of disposition
+proper, which shows itself as pure, _i.e._, disinterested love towards
+others. When now the latter becomes perfect, it places other individuals
+and their fate completely on a level with itself and its own fate. Further
+than this it cannot go, for there exists no reason for preferring the
+individuality of another to its own. Yet the number of other individuals
+whose whole happiness or life is in danger may outweigh the regard for
+one's own particular well-being. In such a case, the character that has
+attained to the highest goodness and perfect nobility will entirely
+sacrifice its own well-being, and even its life, for the well-being of
+many others. So died Codrus, and Leonidas, and Regulus, and Decius Mus,
+and Arnold von Winkelried; so dies every one who voluntarily and
+consciously faces certain death for his friends or his country. And they
+also stand on the same level who voluntarily submit to suffering and death
+for maintaining what conduces and rightly belongs to the welfare of all
+mankind; that is, for maintaining universal and important truths and
+destroying great errors. So died Socrates and Giordano Bruno, and so many
+a hero of the truth suffered death at the stake at the hands of the
+priests.
+
+Now, however, I must remind the reader, with reference to the paradox
+stated above, that we found before that suffering is essential to life as
+a whole, and inseparable from it. And that we saw that every wish proceeds
+from a need, from a want, from suffering, and that therefore every
+satisfaction is only the removal of a pain, and brings no positive
+happiness; that the joys certainly lie to the wish, presenting themselves
+as a positive good, but in truth they have only a negative nature, and are
+only the end of an evil. Therefore what goodness, love, and nobleness do
+for others, is always merely an alleviation of their suffering, and
+consequently all that can influence them to good deeds and works of love,
+is simply the _knowledge of the suffering of others_, which is directly
+understood from their own suffering and placed on a level with it. But it
+follows from this that pure love ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}, _caritas_) is in its nature
+sympathy; whether the suffering it mitigates, to which every unsatisfied
+wish belongs, be great or small. Therefore we shall have no hesitation, in
+direct contradiction to Kant, who will only recognise all true goodness
+and all virtue to be such, if it has proceeded from abstract reflection,
+and indeed from the conception of duty and of the categorical imperative,
+and explains felt sympathy as weakness, and by no means virtue, we shall
+have no hesitation, I say, in direct contradiction to Kant, in saying: the
+mere concept is for genuine virtue just as unfruitful as it is for genuine
+art: all true and pure love is sympathy, and all love which is not
+sympathy is selfishness. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} is selfishness, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} is sympathy.
+Combinations of the two frequently occur. Indeed genuine friendship is
+always a mixture of selfishness and sympathy; the former lies in the
+pleasure experienced in the presence of the friend, whose individuality
+corresponds to our own, and this almost always constitutes the greatest
+part; sympathy shows itself in the sincere participation in his joy and
+grief, and the disinterested sacrifices made in respect of the latter.
+Thus Spinoza says: _Benevolentia nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas ex
+commiseratione orta_ (Eth. iii. pr. 27, cor. 3, schol.) As a confirmation
+of our paradoxical proposition it may be observed that the tone and words
+of the language and caresses of pure love, entirely coincide with the
+tones of sympathy; and we may also remark in passing that in Italian
+sympathy and true love are denoted by the same word _pietà_.
+
+This is also the place to explain one of the most striking peculiarities
+of human nature, _weeping_, which, like laughter, belongs to those
+qualities which distinguish man from the brutes. Weeping is by no means a
+direct expression of pain, for it occurs where there is very little pain.
+In my opinion, indeed, we never weep directly on account of the pain we
+experience, but always merely on account of its repetition in reflection.
+We pass from the felt pain, even when it is physical, to a mere idea of
+it, and then find our own state so deserving of sympathy that we are
+firmly and sincerely convinced that if another were the sufferer, we would
+be full of sympathy, and love to relieve him. But now we ourselves are the
+object of our own sympathy; with the most benevolent disposition we are
+ourselves most in need of help; we feel that we suffer more than we could
+see another suffer; and in this very complex frame of mind, in which the
+directly felt suffering only comes to perception by a doubly circuitous
+route, imagined as the suffering of another, sympathised with as such, and
+then suddenly perceived again as directly our own,--in this complex frame
+of mind, I say, Nature relieves itself through that remarkable physical
+conflict. _Weeping_ is accordingly _sympathy with our own selves_, or
+sympathy directed back on its source. It is therefore conditional upon the
+capacity for love and sympathy, and also upon imagination. Therefore men
+who are either hard-hearted or unimaginative do not weep easily, and
+weeping is even always regarded as a sign of a certain degree of goodness
+of character, and disarms anger, because it is felt that whoever can still
+weep, must necessarily always be capable of love, _i.e._, sympathy towards
+others, for this enters in the manner described into the disposition that
+leads to weeping. The description which Petrarch gives of the rising of
+his own tears, naïvely and truly expressing his feeling, entirely agrees
+with the explanation we have given--
+
+
+    "I vo pensando: e nel pensar m' assale
+    _Una pietà si forte di me stesso_,
+    Che mi conduce spesso,
+    Ad alto lagrimar, ch'i non soleva."(82)
+
+
+What has been said is also confirmed by the fact that children who have
+been hurt generally do not cry till some one commiserates them; thus not
+on account of the pain, but on account of the idea of it. When we are
+moved to tears, not through our own suffering but through that of another,
+this happens as follows. Either we vividly put ourselves in the place of
+the sufferer by imagination, or see in his fate the lot of humanity as a
+whole, and consequently, first of all, our own lot; and thus, in a very
+roundabout way, it is yet always about ourselves that we weep, sympathy
+with ourselves which we feel. This seems to be the principal reason of the
+universal, and thus natural, weeping in the case of death. The mourner
+does not weep for his loss; he would be ashamed of such egotistical tears,
+instead of which he is sometimes ashamed of not weeping. First of all he
+certainly weeps for the fate of the dead, but he also weeps when, after
+long, heavy, and incurable suffering, death was to this man a wished-for
+deliverance. Thus, principally, he is seized with sympathy for the lot of
+all mankind, which is necessarily finite, so that every life, however
+aspiring, and often rich in deeds, must be extinguished and become
+nothing. But in this lot of mankind the mourner sees first of all his own,
+and this all the more, the more closely he is related to him who has died,
+thus most of all if it is his father. Although to his father his life was
+misery through age and sickness, and though his helplessness was a heavy
+burden to his son, yet that son weeps bitterly over the death of his
+father for the reason which has been given.(83)
+
+§ 68. After this digression about the identity of pure love and sympathy,
+the final return of which upon our own individuality has, as its symptom,
+the phenomenon of weeping, I now take up the thread of our discussion of
+the ethical significance of action, in order to show how, from the same
+source from which all goodness, love, virtue, and nobility of character
+spring, there finally arises that which I call the denial of the will to
+live.
+
+We saw before that hatred and wickedness are conditioned by egoism, and
+egoism rests on the entanglement of knowledge in the _principium
+individuationis_. Thus we found that the penetration of that _principium
+individuationis_ is the source and the nature of justice, and when it is
+carried further, even to its fullest extent, it is the source and nature
+of love and nobility of character. For this penetration alone, by
+abolishing the distinction between our own individuality and that of
+others, renders possible and explains perfect goodness of disposition,
+extending to disinterested love and the most generous self-sacrifice for
+others.
+
+If, however, this penetration of the _principium individuationis_, this
+direct knowledge of the identity of will in all its manifestations, is
+present in a high degree of distinctness, it will at once show an
+influence upon the will which extends still further. If that veil of Mâyâ,
+the _principium individuationis_, is lifted from the eyes of a man to such
+an extent that he no longer makes the egotistical distinction between his
+person and that of others, but takes as much interest in the sufferings of
+other individuals as in his own, and therefore is not only benevolent in
+the highest degree, but even ready to sacrifice his own individuality
+whenever such a sacrifice will save a number of other persons, then it
+clearly follows that such a man, who recognises in all beings his own
+inmost and true self, must also regard the infinite suffering of all
+suffering beings as his own, and take on himself the pain of the whole
+world. No suffering is any longer strange to him. All the miseries of
+others which he sees and is so seldom able to alleviate, all the miseries
+he knows directly, and even those which he only knows as possible, work
+upon his mind like his own. It is no longer the changing joy and sorrow of
+his own person that he has in view, as is the case with him who is still
+involved in egoism; but, since he sees through the _principium
+individuationis_, all lies equally near him. He knows the whole,
+comprehends its nature, and finds that it consists in a constant passing
+away, vain striving, inward conflict, and continual suffering. He sees
+wherever he looks suffering humanity, the suffering brute creation, and a
+world that passes away. But all this now lies as near him as his own
+person lies to the egoist. Why should he now, with such knowledge of the
+world, assert this very life through constant acts of will, and thereby
+bind himself ever more closely to it, press it ever more firmly to
+himself? Thus he who is still involved in the _principium
+individuationis_, in egoism, only knows particular things and their
+relation to his own person, and these constantly become new _motives_ of
+his volition. But, on the other hand, that knowledge of the whole, of the
+nature of the thing-in-itself which has been described, becomes a
+_quieter_ of all and every volition. The will now turns away from life; it
+now shudders at the pleasures in which it recognises the assertion of
+life. Man now attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation,
+true indifference, and perfect will-lessness. If at times, in the hard
+experience of our own suffering, or in the vivid recognition of that of
+others, the knowledge of the vanity and bitterness of life draws nigh to
+us also who are still wrapt in the veil of Mâyâ, and we would like to
+destroy the sting of the desires, close the entrance against all
+suffering, and purify and sanctify ourselves by complete and final
+renunciation; yet the illusion of the phenomenon soon entangles us again,
+and its motives influence the will anew; we cannot tear ourselves free.
+The allurement of hope, the flattery of the present, the sweetness of
+pleasure, the well-being which falls to our lot, amid the lamentations of
+a suffering world governed by chance and error, draws us back to it and
+rivets our bonds anew. Therefore Jesus says: "It is easier for a camel to
+go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the
+kingdom of God."
+
+If we compare life to a course or path through which we must unceasingly
+run--a path of red-hot coals, with a few cool places here and there; then
+he who is entangled in delusion is consoled by the cool places, on which
+he now stands, or which he sees near him, and sets out to run through the
+course. But he who sees through the _principium individuationis_, and
+recognises the real nature of the thing-in-itself, and thus the whole, is
+no longer susceptible of such consolation; he sees himself in all places
+at once, and withdraws. His will turns round, no longer asserts its own
+nature, which is reflected in the phenomenon, but denies it. The
+phenomenon by which this change is marked, is the transition from virtue
+to asceticism. That is to say, it no longer suffices for such a man to
+love others as himself, and to do as much for them as for himself; but
+there arises within him a horror of the nature of which his own phenomenal
+existence is an expression, the will to live, the kernel and inner nature
+of that world which is recognised as full of misery. He therefore disowns
+this nature which appears in him, and is already expressed through his
+body, and his action gives the lie to his phenomenal existence, and
+appears in open contradiction to it. Essentially nothing else but a
+manifestation of will, he ceases to will anything, guards against
+attaching his will to anything, and seeks to confirm in himself the
+greatest indifference to everything. His body, healthy and strong,
+expresses through the genitals, the sexual impulse; but he denies the will
+and gives the lie to the body; he desires no sensual gratification under
+any condition. Voluntary and complete chastity is the first step in
+asceticism or the denial of the will to live. It thereby denies the
+assertion of the will which extends beyond the individual life, and gives
+the assurance that with the life of this body, the will, whose
+manifestation it is, ceases. Nature, always true and naïve, declares that
+if this maxim became universal, the human race would die out; and I think
+I may assume, in accordance with what was said in the Second Book about
+the connection of all manifestations of will, that with its highest
+manifestation, the weaker reflection of it would also pass away, as the
+twilight vanishes along with the full light. With the entire abolition of
+knowledge, the rest of the world would of itself vanish into nothing; for
+without a subject there is no object. I should like here to refer to a
+passage in the Vedas, where it is said: "As in this world hungry infants
+press round their mother; so do all beings await the holy oblation."
+(Asiatic Researches, vol. viii.; Colebrooke, On the Vedas, Abstract of the
+Sama-Veda; also in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays, vol. i. p. 79.)
+Sacrifice means resignation generally, and the rest of nature must look
+for its salvation to man who is at once the priest and the sacrifice.
+Indeed it deserves to be noticed as very remarkable, that this thought has
+also been expressed by the admirable and unfathomably profound Angelus
+Silesius, in the little poem entitled, "Man brings all to God;" it runs,
+"Man! all loves thee; around thee great is the throng. All things flee to
+thee that they may attain to God." But a yet greater mystic, Meister
+Eckhard, whose wonderful writings are at last accessible (1857) through
+the edition of Franz Pfeiffer, says the same thing (p. 459) quite in the
+sense explained here: "I bear witness to the saying of Christ. I, if I be
+lifted up from the earth, will draw all things unto me (John xii. 32). So
+shall the good man draw all things up to God, to the source whence they
+first came. The Masters certify to us that all creatures are made for the
+sake of man. This is proved in all created things, by the fact that the
+one makes the use of the other; the ox makes use of the grass, the fish of
+the water, the bird of the air, the wild beast of the forest. Thus, all
+created things become of use to the good man. A good man brings to God the
+one created thing in the other." He means to say, that man makes use of
+the brutes in this life because, in and with himself, he saves them also.
+It also seems to me that that difficult passage in the Bible, Rom. viii.
+21-24, must be interpreted in this sense.
+
+In Buddhism also, there is no lack of expressions of this truth. For
+example, when Buddha, still as Bodisatwa, has his horse saddled for the
+last time, for his flight into the wilderness from his father's house, he
+says these lines to the horse: "Long hast thou existed in life and in
+death, but now thou shalt cease from carrying and drawing. Bear me but
+this once more, O Kantakana, away from here, and when I have attained to
+the Law (have become Buddha) I will not forget thee" (Foe Koue Ki, trad.
+p. Abel Rémusat, p. 233).
+
+Asceticism then shows itself further in voluntary and intentional poverty,
+which not only arises _per accidens_, because the possessions are given
+away to mitigate the sufferings of others, but is here an end in itself,
+is meant to serve as a constant mortification of will, so that the
+satisfaction of the wishes, the sweet of life, shall not again arouse the
+will, against which self-knowledge has conceived a horror. He who has
+attained to this point, still always feels, as a living body, as concrete
+manifestation of will, the natural disposition for every kind of volition;
+but he intentionally suppresses it, for he compels himself to refrain from
+doing all that he would like to do, and to do all that he would like not
+to do, even if this has no further end than that of serving as a
+mortification of will. Since he himself denies the will which appears in
+his own person, he will not resist if another does the same, _i.e._,
+inflicts wrongs upon him. Therefore every suffering coming to him from
+without, through chance or the wickedness of others, is welcome to him,
+every injury, ignominy, and insult; he receives them gladly as the
+opportunity of learning with certainty that he no longer asserts the will,
+but gladly sides with every enemy of the manifestation of will which is
+his own person. Therefore he bears such ignominy and suffering with
+inexhaustible patience and meekness, returns good for evil without
+ostentation, and allows the fire of anger to rise within him just as
+little as that of the desires. And he mortifies not only the will itself,
+but also its visible form, its objectivity, the body. He nourishes it
+sparingly, lest its excessive vigour and prosperity should animate and
+excite more strongly the will, of which it is merely the expression and
+the mirror. So he practises fasting, and even resorts to chastisement and
+self-inflicted torture, in order that, by constant privation and
+suffering, he may more and more break down and destroy the will, which he
+recognises and abhors as the source of his own suffering existence and
+that of the world. If at last death comes, which puts an end to this
+manifestation of that will, whose existence here has long since perished
+through free-denial of itself, with the exception of the weak residue of
+it which appears as the life of this body; it is most welcome, and is
+gladly received as a longed-for deliverance. Here it is not, as in the
+case of others, merely the manifestation which ends with death; but the
+inner nature itself is abolished, which here existed only in the
+manifestation, and that in a very weak degree;(84) this last slight bond
+is now broken. For him who thus ends, the world has ended also.
+
+And what I have here described with feeble tongue and only in general
+terms, is no philosophical fable, invented by myself, and only of to-day;
+no, it was the enviable life of so many saints and beautiful souls among
+Christians, and still more among Hindus and Buddhists, and also among the
+believers of other religions. However different were the dogmas impressed
+on their reason, the same inward, direct, intuitive knowledge, from which
+alone all virtue and holiness proceed, expressed itself in precisely the
+same way in the conduct of life. For here also the great distinction
+between intuitive and abstract knowledge shows itself; a distinction which
+is of such importance and universal application in our whole
+investigation, and which has hitherto been too little attended to. There
+is a wide gulf between the two, which can only be crossed by the aid of
+philosophy, as regards the knowledge of the nature of the world.
+Intuitively or _in concreto_, every man is really conscious of all
+philosophical truths, but to bring them to abstract knowledge, to
+reflection, is the work of philosophy, which neither ought nor is able to
+do more than this.
+
+Thus it may be that the inner nature of holiness, self-renunciation,
+mortification of our own will, asceticism, is here for the first time
+expressed abstractly, and free from all mythical elements, as _denial of
+the will to live_, appearing after the complete knowledge of its own
+nature has become a quieter of all volition. On the other hand, it has
+been known directly and realised in practice by saints and ascetics, who
+had all the same inward knowledge, though they used very different
+language with regard to it, according to the dogmas which their reason had
+accepted, and in consequence of which an Indian, a Christian, or a Lama
+saint must each give a very different account of his conduct, which is,
+however, of no importance as regards the fact. A saint may be full of the
+absurdest superstition, or, on the contrary, he may be a philosopher, it
+is all the same. His conduct alone certifies that he is a saint, for, in a
+moral regard, it proceeds from knowledge of the world and its nature,
+which is not abstractly but intuitively and directly apprehended, and is
+only expressed by him in any dogma for the satisfaction of his reason. It
+is therefore just as little needful that a saint should be a philosopher
+as that a philosopher should be a saint; just as it is not necessary that
+a perfectly beautiful man should be a great sculptor, or that a great
+sculptor should himself be a beautiful man. In general, it is a strange
+demand upon a moralist that he should teach no other virtue than that
+which he himself possesses. To repeat the whole nature of the world
+abstractly, universally, and distinctly in concepts, and thus to store up,
+as it were, a reflected image of it in permanent concepts always at the
+command of the reason; this and nothing else is philosophy. I refer the
+reader to the passage quoted from Bacon in the First Book.
+
+But the description I have given above of the denial of the will to live,
+of the conduct of a beautiful soul, of a resigned and voluntarily
+expiating saint, is merely abstract and general, and therefore cold. As
+the knowledge from which the denial of the will proceeds is intuitive and
+not abstract, it finds its most perfect expression, not in abstract
+conceptions, but in deeds and conduct. Therefore, in order to understand
+fully what we philosophically express as denial of the will to live, one
+must come to know examples of it in experience and actual life. Certainly
+they are not to be met with in daily experience: _Nam omnia præclara tam
+difficilia quam rara sunt_, Spinoza admirably says. Therefore, unless by a
+specially happy fate we are made eye-witnesses, we have to content
+ourselves with descriptions of the lives of such men. Indian literature,
+as we see from the little that we as yet know through translations, is
+very rich in descriptions of the lives of saints, penitents, Samanas or
+ascetics, Sannyâsis or mendicants, and whatever else they may be called.
+Even the well-known "Mythologie des Indous, par Mad. de Polier," though by
+no means to be commended in every respect, contains many excellent
+examples of this kind (especially in ch. 13, vol. ii.) Among Christians
+also there is no lack of examples which afford us the illustrations we
+desire. See the biographies, for the most part badly written, of those
+persons who are sometimes called saintly souls, sometimes pietists,
+quietists, devout enthusiasts, and so forth. Collections of such
+biographies have been made at various times, such as Tersteegen's "Leben
+heiliger Seelen," Reiz's "Geschichte der Wiedergeborennen," in our own
+day, a collection by Kanne, which, with much that is bad, yet contains
+some good, and especially the "Leben der Beata Sturmin." To this category
+very properly belongs the life of St. Francis of Assisi, that true
+personification of the ascetic, and prototype of all mendicant friars. His
+life, described by his younger contemporary, St. Bonaventura, also famous
+as a scholastic, has recently been republished. "Vita S. Francisci a S.
+Bonaventura concinnata" (Soest, 1847), though shortly before a painstaking
+and detailed biography, making use of all sources of information, appeared
+in France, "Histoire de S. François d'Assise, par Chavin de Mallan"
+(1845). As an Oriental parallel of these monastic writings we have the
+very valuable work of Spence Hardy, "Eastern Monachism; an Account of the
+Order of Mendicants founded by Gotama Budha" (1850). It shows us the same
+thing in another dress. We also see what a matter of indifference it is
+whether it proceeds from a theistical or an atheistical religion. But as a
+special and exceedingly full example and practical illustration of the
+conceptions I have established, I can thoroughly recommend the
+"Autobiography of Madame de Guion." To become acquainted with this great
+and beautiful soul, the very thought of whom always fills me with
+reverence, and to do justice to the excellence of her disposition while
+making allowance for the superstition of her reason, must be just as
+delightful to every man of the better sort as with vulgar thinkers,
+_i.e._, the majority, that book will always stand in bad repute. For it is
+the case with regard to everything, that each man can only prize that
+which to a certain extent is analogous to him and for which he has at
+least a slight inclination. This holds good of ethical concerns as well as
+of intellectual. We might to a certain extent regard the well-known French
+biography of Spinoza as a case in point, if we used as a key to it that
+noble introduction to his very insufficient essay, "De Emendatione
+Intellectus," a passage which I can also recommend as the most effectual
+means I know of stilling the storm of the passions. Finally, even the
+great Goethe, Greek as he is, did not think it below his dignity to show
+us this most beautiful side of humanity in the magic mirror of poetic art,
+for he represented the life of Fräulein Klettenberg in an idealised form
+in his "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul," and later, in his own biography,
+gave us also an historical account of it. Besides this, he twice told the
+story of the life of St. Philippo Neri. The history of the world, will,
+and indeed must, keep silence about the men whose conduct is the best and
+only adequate illustration of this important point of our investigation,
+for the material of the history of the world is quite different, and
+indeed opposed to this. It is not the denial of the will to live, but its
+assertion and its manifestation in innumerable individuals in which its
+conflict with itself at the highest grade of its objectification appears
+with perfect distinctness, and brings before our eyes, now the ascendancy
+of the individual through prudence, now the might of the many through
+their mass, now the might of chance personified as fate, always the vanity
+and emptiness of the whole effort. We, however, do not follow here the
+course of phenomena in time, but, as philosophers, we seek to investigate
+the ethical significance of action, and take this as the only criterion of
+what for us is significant and important. Thus we will not be withheld by
+any fear of the constant numerical superiority of vulgarity and dulness
+from acknowledging that the greatest, most important, and most significant
+phenomenon that the world can show is not the conqueror of the world, but
+the subduer of it; is nothing but the quiet, unobserved life of a man who
+has attained to the knowledge in consequence of which he surrenders and
+denies that will to live which fills everything and strives and strains in
+all, and which first gains freedom here in him alone, so that his conduct
+becomes the exact opposite of that of other men. In this respect,
+therefore, for the philosopher, these accounts of the lives of holy,
+self-denying men, badly as they are generally written, and mixed as they
+are with superstition and nonsense, are, because of the significance of
+the material, immeasurably more instructive and important than even
+Plutarch and Livy.
+
+It will further assist us much in obtaining a more definite and full
+knowledge of what we have expressed abstractly and generally, according to
+our method of exposition, as the denial of the will to live, if we
+consider the moral teaching that has been imparted with this intention,
+and by men who were full of this spirit; and this will also show how old
+our view is, though the pure philosophical expression of it may be quite
+new. The teaching of this kind which lies nearest to hand is Christianity,
+the ethics of which are entirely in the spirit indicated, and lead not
+only to the highest degrees of human love, but also to renunciation. The
+germ of this last side of it is certainly distinctly present in the
+writings of the Apostles, but it was only fully developed and expressed
+later. We find the Apostles enjoining the love of our neighbour as
+ourselves, benevolence, the requital of hatred with love and well-doing,
+patience, meekness, the endurance of all possible injuries without
+resistance, abstemiousness in nourishment to keep down lust, resistance to
+sensual desire, if possible, altogether. We already see here the first
+degrees of asceticism, or denial of the will proper. This last expression
+denotes that which in the Gospels is called denying ourselves and taking
+up the cross (Matt. xvi. 24, 25; Mark viii. 34, 35; Luke ix. 23, 24, xiv.
+26, 27, 33). This tendency soon developed itself more and more, and was
+the origin of hermits, anchorites, and monasticism--an origin which in
+itself was pure and holy, but for that very reason unsuitable for the
+great majority of men; therefore what developed out of it could only be
+hypocrisy and wickedness, for _abusus optimi pessimus_. In more developed
+Christianity, we see that seed of asceticism unfold into the full flower
+in the writings of the Christian saints and mystics. These preach, besides
+the purest love, complete resignation, voluntary and absolute poverty,
+genuine calmness, perfect indifference to all worldly things, dying to our
+own will and being born again in God, entire forgetting of our own person,
+and sinking ourselves in the contemplation of God. A full exposition of
+this will be found in Fénélon's "Explication des Maximes des Saints sur la
+Vie Interieure." But the spirit of this development of Christianity is
+certainly nowhere so fully and powerfully expressed as in the writings of
+the German mystics, in the works of Meister Eckhard, and in that justly
+famous book "Die Deutsche Theologie," of which Luther says in the
+introduction to it which he wrote, that with the exception of the Bible
+and St. Augustine, he had learnt more from it of what God, Christ, and man
+are than from any other book. Yet we only got the genuine and correct text
+of it in the year 1851, in the Stuttgart edition by Pfeiffer. The precepts
+and doctrines which are laid down there are the most perfect exposition,
+sprung from deep inward conviction of what I have presented as the denial
+of the will. It should therefore be studied more closely in that form
+before it is dogmatised about with Jewish-Protestant assurance. Tauler's
+"Nachfolgung des armen Leben Christi," and also his "Medulla Animæ," are
+written in the same admirable spirit, though not quite equal in value to
+that work. In my opinion the teaching of these genuine Christian mystics,
+when compared with the teaching of the New Testament, is as alcohol to
+wine, or what becomes visible in the New Testament as through a veil and
+mist appears to us in the works of the mystics without cloak or disguise,
+in full clearness and distinctness. Finally, the New Testament might be
+regarded as the first initiation, the mystics as the second,--{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}.
+
+We find, however, that which we have called the denial of the will to live
+more fully developed, more variously expressed, and more vividly
+represented in the ancient Sanscrit writings than could be the case in the
+Christian Church and the Western world. That this important ethical view
+of life could here attain to a fuller development and a more distinct
+expression is perhaps principally to be ascribed to the fact that it was
+not confined by an element quite foreign to it, as Christianity is by the
+Jewish theology, to which its sublime author had necessarily to adopt and
+accommodate it, partly consciously, partly, it may be, unconsciously. Thus
+Christianity is made up of two very different constituent parts, and I
+should like to call the purely ethical part especially and indeed
+exclusively Christian, and distinguish it from the Jewish dogmatism with
+which it is combined. If, as has often been feared, and especially at the
+present time, that excellent and salutary religion should altogether
+decline, I should look for the reason of this simply in the fact that it
+does not consist of one single element, but of two originally different
+elements, which have only been combined through the accident of history.
+In such a case dissolution had to follow through the separation of these
+elements, arising from their different relationship to and reaction
+against the progressive spirit of the age. But even after this dissolution
+the purely ethical part must always remain uninjured, because it is
+indestructible. Our knowledge of Hindu literature is still very imperfect.
+Yet, as we find their ethical teaching variously and powerfully expressed
+in the Vedas, Puranas, poems, myths, legends of their saints, maxims and
+precepts,(85) we see that it inculcates love of our neighbour with
+complete renunciation of self-love; love generally, not confined to
+mankind, but including all living creatures; benevolence, even to the
+giving away of the hard-won wages of daily toil; unlimited patience
+towards all who injure us; the requital of all wickedness, however base,
+with goodness and love; voluntary and glad endurance of all ignominy;
+abstinence from all animal food; perfect chastity and renunciation of all
+sensual pleasure for him who strives after true holiness; the surrender of
+all possessions, the forsaking of every dwelling-place and of all
+relatives; deep unbroken solitude, spent in silent contemplation, with
+voluntary penance and terrible slow self-torture for the absolute
+mortification of the will, torture which extends to voluntary death by
+starvation, or by men giving themselves up to crocodiles, or flinging
+themselves over the sacred precipice in the Himalayas, or being buried
+alive, or, finally, by flinging themselves under the wheels of the huge
+car of an idol drawn along amid the singing, shouting, and dancing of
+bayaderes. And even yet these precepts, whose origin reaches back more
+than four thousand years, are carried out in practice, in some cases even
+to the utmost extreme,(86) and this notwithstanding the fact that the
+Hindu nation has been broken up into so many parts. A religion which
+demands the greatest sacrifices, and which has yet remained so long in
+practice in a nation that embraces so many millions of persons, cannot be
+an arbitrarily invented superstition, but must have its foundation in the
+nature of man. But besides this, if we read the life of a Christian
+penitent or saint, and also that of a Hindu saint, we cannot sufficiently
+wonder at the harmony we find between them. In the case of such radically
+different dogmas, customs, and circumstances, the inward life and effort
+of both is the same. And the same harmony prevails in the maxims
+prescribed for both of them. For example, Tauler speaks of the absolute
+poverty which one ought to seek, and which consists in giving away and
+divesting oneself completely of everything from which one might draw
+comfort or worldly pleasure, clearly because all this constantly affords
+new nourishment to the will, which it is intended to destroy entirely. And
+as an Indian counterpart of this, we find in the precepts of Fo that the
+Saniassi, who ought to be without a dwelling and entirely without
+property, is further finally enjoined not to lay himself down often under
+the same tree, lest he should acquire a preference or inclination for it
+above other trees. The Christian mystic and the teacher of the Vedanta
+philosophy agree in this respect also, they both regard all outward works
+and religious exercises as superfluous for him who has attained to
+perfection. So much agreement in the case of such different ages and
+nations is a practical proof that what is expressed here is not, as
+optimistic dulness likes to assert, an eccentricity and perversity of the
+mind, but an essential side of human nature, which only appears so rarely
+because of its excellence.
+
+I have now indicated the sources from which there may be obtained a direct
+knowledge, drawn from life itself, of the phenomena in which the denial of
+the will to live exhibits itself. In some respects this is the most
+important point of our whole work; yet I have only explained it quite
+generally, for it is better to refer to those who speak from direct
+experience, than to increase the size of this book unduly by weak
+repetitions of what is said by them.
+
+I only wish to add a little to the general indication of the nature of
+this state. We saw above that the wicked man, by the vehemence of his
+volition, suffers constant, consuming, inward pain, and finally, if all
+objects of volition are exhausted, quenches the fiery thirst of his
+self-will by the sight of the suffering of others. He, on the contrary,
+who has attained to the denial of the will to live, however poor, joyless,
+and full of privation his condition may appear when looked at externally,
+is yet filled with inward joy and the true peace of heaven. It is not the
+restless strain of life, the jubilant delight which has keen suffering as
+its preceding or succeeding condition, in the experience of the man who
+loves life; but it is a peace that cannot be shaken, a deep rest and
+inward serenity, a state which we cannot behold without the greatest
+longing when it is brought before our eyes or our imagination, because we
+at once recognise it as that which alone is right, infinitely surpassing
+everything else, upon which our better self cries within us the great
+_sapere aude_. Then we feel that every gratification of our wishes won
+from the world is merely like the alms which the beggar receives from life
+to-day that he may hunger again on the morrow; resignation, on the
+contrary, is like an inherited estate, it frees the owner for ever from
+all care.
+
+It will be remembered from the Third Book that the æsthetic pleasure in
+the beautiful consists in great measure in the fact that in entering the
+state of pure contemplation we are lifted for the moment above all
+willing, _i.e._, all wishes and cares; we become, as it were, freed from
+ourselves. We are no longer the individual whose knowledge is subordinated
+to the service of its constant willing, the correlative of the particular
+thing to which objects are motives, but the eternal subject of knowing
+purified from will, the correlative of the Platonic Idea. And we know that
+these moments in which, delivered from the ardent strain of will, we seem
+to rise out of the heavy atmosphere of earth, are the happiest which we
+experience. From this we can understand how blessed the life of a man must
+be whose will is silenced, not merely for a moment, as in the enjoyment of
+the beautiful, but for ever, indeed altogether extinguished, except as
+regards the last glimmering spark that retains the body in life, and will
+be extinguished with its death. Such a man, who, after many bitter
+struggles with his own nature, has finally conquered entirely, continues
+to exist only as a pure, knowing being, the undimmed mirror of the world.
+Nothing can trouble him more, nothing can move him, for he has cut all the
+thousand cords of will which hold us bound to the world, and, as desire,
+fear, envy, anger, drag us hither and thither in constant pain. He now
+looks back smiling and at rest on the delusions of this world, which once
+were able to move and agonise his spirit also, but which now stand before
+him as utterly indifferent to him, as the chess-men when the game is
+ended, or as, in the morning, the cast-off masquerading dress which
+worried and disquieted us in a night in Carnival. Life and its forms now
+pass before him as a fleeting illusion, as a light morning dream before
+half-waking eyes, the real world already shining through it so that it can
+no longer deceive; and like this morning dream, they finally vanish
+altogether without any violent transition. From this we can understand the
+meaning of Madame Guion when towards the end of her autobiography she
+often expresses herself thus: "Everything is alike to me; I _cannot_ will
+anything more: often I know not whether I exist or not." In order to
+express how, after the extinction of the will, the death of the body
+(which is indeed only the manifestation of the will, and therefore loses
+all significance when the will is abolished) can no longer have any
+bitterness, but is very welcome, I may be allowed to quote the words of
+that holy penitent, although they are not very elegantly turned: "_Midi de
+la gloire; jour où il n'y a plus de nuit; vie qui ne craint plus la mort,
+dans la mort même: parceque la mort a vaincu la mort, et que celui qui a
+souffert la première mort, ne goutera plus la seconde mort_" (Vie de Mad.
+de Guion, vol. ii. p. 13).
+
+We must not, however, suppose that when, by means of the knowledge which
+acts as a quieter of will, the denial of the will to live has once
+appeared, it never wavers or vacillates, and that we can rest upon it as
+on an assured possession. Rather, it must ever anew be attained by a
+constant battle. For since the body is the will itself only in the form of
+objectivity or as manifestation in the world as idea, so long as the body
+lives, the whole will to live exists potentially, and constantly strives
+to become actual, and to burn again with all its ardour. Therefore that
+peace and blessedness in the life of holy men which we have described is
+only found as the flower which proceeds from the constant victory over the
+will, and the ground in which it grows is the constant battle with the
+will to live, for no one can have lasting peace upon earth. We therefore
+see the histories of the inner life of saints full of spiritual conflicts,
+temptations, and absence of grace, _i.e._, the kind of knowledge which
+makes all motives ineffectual, and as an universal quieter silences all
+volition, gives the deepest peace and opens the door of freedom. Therefore
+also we see those who have once attained to the denial of the will to live
+strive with all their might to keep upon this path, by enforced
+renunciation of every kind, by penance and severity of life, and by
+selecting whatever is disagreeable to them, all in order to suppress the
+will, which is constantly springing up anew. Hence, finally, because they
+already know the value of salvation, their anxious carefulness to retain
+the hard-won blessing, their scruples of conscience about every innocent
+pleasure, or about every little excitement of their vanity, which here
+also dies last, the most immovable, the most active, and the most foolish
+of all the inclinations of man. By the term _asceticism_, which I have
+used so often, I mean in its narrower sense this _intentional_ breaking of
+the will by the refusal of what is agreeable and the selection of what is
+disagreeable, the voluntarily chosen life of penance and self-chastisement
+for the continual mortification of the will.
+
+We see this practised by him who has attained to the denial of the will in
+order to enable him to persist in it; but suffering in general, as it is
+inflicted by fate, is a second way ({~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}(87)) of attaining to
+that denial. Indeed, we may assume that most men only attain to it in this
+way, and that it is the suffering which is personally experienced, not
+that which is merely known, which most frequently produces complete
+resignation, often only at the approach of death. For only in the case of
+a few is the mere knowledge which, seeing through the _principium
+individuationis_, first produces perfect goodness of disposition and
+universal love of humanity, and finally enables them to regard all the
+suffering of the world as their own; only in the case of a few, I say, is
+this knowledge sufficient to bring about the denial of the will. Even with
+him who approaches this point, it is almost invariably the case that the
+tolerable condition of his own body, the flattery of the moment, the
+delusion of hope, and the satisfaction of the will, which is ever
+presenting itself anew, _i.e._, lust, is a constant hindrance to the
+denial of the will, and a constant temptation to the renewed assertion of
+it. Therefore in this respect all these illusions have been personified as
+the devil. Thus in most cases the will must be broken by great personal
+suffering before its self-conquest appears. Then we see the man who has
+passed through all the increasing degrees of affliction with the most
+vehement resistance, and is finally brought to the verge of despair,
+suddenly retire into himself, know himself and the world, change his whole
+nature, rise above himself and all suffering, as if purified and
+sanctified by it, in inviolable peace, blessedness, and sublimity,
+willingly renounce everything he previously desired with all his might,
+and joyfully embrace death. It is the refined silver of the denial of the
+will to live that suddenly comes forth from the purifying flame of
+suffering. It is salvation. Sometimes we see even those who were very
+wicked purified to this degree by great grief; they have become new beings
+and are completely changed. Therefore their former misdeeds trouble their
+consciences no more, yet they willingly atone for them by death, and
+gladly see the end of the manifestation of that will which is now foreign
+to them and abhorred by them. The great Goethe has given us a distinct and
+visible representation of this denial of the will, brought about by great
+misfortunes and despair of all deliverance, in his immortal masterpiece
+"Faust," in the story of the sufferings of Gretchen. I know no parallel to
+this in poetry. It is a perfect example of the second path that leads to
+the denial of the will, not, as the first, through the mere knowledge of
+the sufferings of a whole world which one has voluntarily acquired, but
+through excessive suffering experienced in one's own person. Many
+tragedies certainly end by conducting their strong-willed heroes to the
+point of entire resignation, and then generally the will to live and its
+manifestation end together, but no representation that is known to me
+brings what is essential to that change so distinctly before us, free from
+all that is extraneous, as the part of "Faust" I have referred to.
+
+In actual life we see that those unfortunate persons who have to drink to
+the dregs the greatest cup of suffering, since when all hope is taken from
+them they have to face with full consciousness a shameful, violent, and
+often painful death on the scaffold, are very frequently changed in this
+way. We must not indeed assume that there is so great a difference between
+their character and that of most men as their fate would seem to indicate,
+but must attribute the latter for the most part to circumstances; yet they
+are guilty and to a considerable degree bad. We see, however, many of
+them, when they have entirely lost hope, changed in the way referred to.
+They now show actual goodness and purity of disposition, true abhorrence
+of doing any act in the least degree bad or unkind. They forgive their
+enemies, even if it is through them that they innocently suffer; and not
+with words merely and a sort of hypocritical fear of the judges of the
+lower world, but in reality and with inward earnestness and no desire for
+revenge. Indeed, their sufferings and death at last becomes dear to them,
+for the denial of the will to live has appeared; they often decline the
+deliverance when it is offered, and die gladly, peacefully, and happily.
+To them the last secret of life has revealed itself in their excessive
+pain; the secret that misery and wickedness, sorrow and hate, the sufferer
+and the inflicter of suffering, however different they may appear to the
+knowledge which follows the principle of sufficient reason, are in
+themselves one, the manifestation of that one will to live which
+objectifies its conflict with itself by means of the _principium
+individuationis_. They have learned to know both sides in full measure,
+the badness and the misery; and since at last they see the identity of the
+two, they reject them both at once; they deny the will to live. In what
+myths and dogmas they account to their reason for this intuitive and
+direct knowledge and for their own change is, as has been said, a matter
+of no importance.
+
+Matthias Claudius must without doubt have witnessed a change of mind of
+this description when he wrote the remarkable essay in the "Wandsbecker
+Boten" (pt. i. p. 115) with the title "Bekehrungsgeschichte des ***"
+("History of the Conversion of ***"), which concludes thus: "Man's way of
+thinking may pass from one point of the periphery to the opposite point,
+and again back to the former point, if circumstances mark out for him the
+path. And these changes in a man are really nothing great or interesting,
+but that _remarkable, catholic, transcendental change_ in which the whole
+circle is irreparably broken up and all the laws of psychology become vain
+and empty when the coat is stripped from the shoulders, or at least turned
+outside in, and as it were scales fall from a man's eyes, is such that
+every one who has breath in his nostrils forsakes father and mother if he
+can hear or experience something certain about it."
+
+The approach of death and hopelessness are in other respects not
+absolutely necessary for such a purification through suffering. Even
+without them the knowledge of the contradiction of the will to live with
+itself can, through great misfortune and pain, force an entrance, and the
+vanity of all striving become recognised. Hence it has often happened that
+men who have led a very restless life in the full strain of the passions,
+kings, heroes, and adventurers, suddenly change, betake themselves to
+resignation and penance, become hermits or monks. To this class belong all
+true accounts of conversions; for example, that of Raymond Lully, who had
+long wooed a fair lady, and was at last admitted to her chamber,
+anticipating the fulfilment of all his wishes, when she, opening her
+bodice, showed him her bosom frightfully eaten with cancer. From that
+moment, as if he had looked into hell, he was changed; he forsook the
+court of the king of Majorca, and went into the desert to do penance.(88)
+This conversion is very like that of the Abbé Rancé, which I have briefly
+related in the 48th chapter of the Supplement. If we consider how in both
+cases the transition from the pleasure to the horror of life was the
+occasion of it, this throws some light upon the remarkable fact that it is
+among the French, the most cheerful, gay, sensuous, and frivolous nation
+in Europe, that by far the strictest of all monastic orders, the
+Trappists, arose, was re-established by Rancé after its fall, and has
+maintained itself to the present day in all its purity and strictness, in
+spite of revolutions, Church reformations, and encroachments of
+infidelity.
+
+But a knowledge such as that referred to above of the nature of this
+existence may leave us again along with the occasion of it and the will to
+live, and with it the previous character may reappear. Thus we see that
+the passionate Benvenuto Cellini was changed in this way, once when he was
+in prison, and again when very ill; but when the suffering passed over, he
+fell back again into his old state. In general, the denial of the will to
+live by no means proceeds from suffering with the necessity of an effect
+from its cause, but the will remains free; for this is indeed the one
+point at which its freedom appears directly in the phenomenon; hence the
+astonishment which Asmus expresses so strongly at the "transcendental
+change." In the case of every suffering, it is always possible to conceive
+a will which exceeds it in intensity and is therefore unconquered by it.
+Thus Plato speaks in the "Phædon" of men who up to the moment of their
+execution feast, drink, and indulge in sensuous pleasure, asserting life
+even to the death. Shakespeare shows us in Cardinal Beaufort the fearful
+end of a profligate, who dies full of despair, for no suffering or death
+can break his will, which is vehement to the extreme of wickedness.(89)
+
+The more intense the will is, the more glaring is the conflict of its
+manifestation, and thus the greater is the suffering. A world which was
+the manifestation of a far more intense will to live than this world
+manifests would produce so much the greater suffering; would thus be a
+hell.
+
+All suffering, since it is a mortification and a call to resignation, has
+potentially a sanctifying power. This is the explanation of the fact that
+every great misfortune or deep pain inspires a certain awe. But the
+sufferer only really becomes an object of reverence when, surveying the
+course of his life as a chain of sorrows, or mourning some great and
+incurable misfortune, he does not really look at the special combination
+of circumstances which has plunged his own life into suffering, nor stops
+at the single great misfortune that has befallen him; for in so doing his
+knowledge still follows the principle of sufficient reason, and clings to
+the particular phenomenon; he still wills life only not under the
+conditions which have happened to him; but only then, I say, he is truly
+worthy of reverence when he raises his glance from the particular to the
+universal, when he regards his suffering as merely an example of the
+whole, and for him, since in a moral regard he partakes of genius, one
+case stands for a thousand, so that the whole of life conceived as
+essentially suffering brings him to resignation. Therefore it inspires
+reverence when in Goethe's "Torquato Tasso" the princess speaks of how her
+own life and that of her relations has always been sad and joyless, and
+yet regards the matter from an entirely universal point of view.
+
+A very noble character we always imagine with a certain trace of quiet
+sadness, which is anything but a constant fretfulness at daily annoyances
+(this would be an ignoble trait, and lead us to fear a bad disposition),
+but is a consciousness derived from knowledge of the vanity of all
+possessions, of the suffering of all life, not merely of his own. But such
+knowledge may primarily be awakened by the personal experience of
+suffering, especially some one great sorrow, as a single unfulfilled wish
+brought Petrarch to that state of resigned sadness concerning the whole of
+life which appeals to us so pathetically in his works; for the Daphne he
+pursued had to flee from his hands in order to leave him, instead of
+herself, the immortal laurel. When through some such great and irrevocable
+denial of fate the will is to some extent broken, almost nothing else is
+desired, and the character shows itself mild, just, noble, and resigned.
+When, finally, grief has no definite object, but extends itself over the
+whole of life, then it is to a certain extent a going into itself, a
+withdrawal, a gradual disappearance of the will, whose visible
+manifestation, the body, it imperceptibly but surely undermines, so that a
+man feels a certain loosening of his bonds, a mild foretaste of that death
+which promises to be the abolition at once of the body and of the will.
+Therefore a secret pleasure accompanies this grief, and it is this, as I
+believe, which the most melancholy of all nations has called "the joy of
+grief." But here also lies the danger of _sentimentality_, both in life
+itself and in the representation of it in poetry; when a man is always
+mourning and lamenting without courageously rising to resignation. In this
+way we lose both earth and heaven, and retain merely a watery
+sentimentality. Only if suffering assumes the form of pure knowledge, and
+this, acting as a _quieter of the will_, brings about resignation, is it
+worthy of reverence. In this regard, however, we feel a certain respect at
+the sight of every great sufferer which is akin to the feeling excited by
+virtue and nobility of character, and also seems like a reproach of our
+own happy condition. We cannot help regarding every sorrow, both our own
+and those of others, as at least a potential advance towards virtue and
+holiness, and, on the contrary, pleasures and worldly satisfactions as a
+retrogression from them. This goes so far, that every man who endures a
+great bodily or mental suffering, indeed every one who merely performs
+some physical labour which demands the greatest exertion, in the sweat of
+his brow and with evident exhaustion, yet with patience and without
+murmuring, every such man, I say, if we consider him with close attention,
+appears to us like a sick man who tries a painful cure, and who willingly,
+and even with satisfaction, endures the suffering it causes him, because
+he knows that the more he suffers the more the cause of his disease is
+affected, and that therefore the present suffering is the measure of his
+cure.
+
+According to what has been said, the denial of the will to live, which is
+just what is called absolute, entire resignation, or holiness, always
+proceeds from that quieter of the will which the knowledge of its inner
+conflict and essential vanity, expressing themselves in the suffering of
+all living things, becomes. The difference, which we have represented as
+two paths, consists in whether that knowledge is called up by suffering
+which is merely and purely _known_, and is freely appropriated by means of
+the penetration of the _principium individuationis_, or by suffering which
+is directly _felt_ by a man himself. True salvation, deliverance from life
+and suffering, cannot even be imagined without complete denial of the
+will. Till then, every one is simply this will itself, whose manifestation
+is an ephemeral existence, a constantly vain and empty striving, and the
+world full of suffering we have represented, to which all irrevocably and
+in like manner belong. For we found above that life is always assured to
+the will to live, and its one real form is the present, from which they
+can never escape, since birth and death reign in the phenomenal world. The
+Indian mythus expresses this by saying "they are born again." The great
+ethical difference of character means this, that the bad man is infinitely
+far from the attainment of the knowledge from which the denial of the will
+proceeds, and therefore he is in truth _actually_ exposed to all the
+miseries which appear in life as _possible_; for even the present
+fortunate condition of his personality is merely a phenomenon produced by
+the _principium individuationis_, and a delusion of Mâyâ, the happy dream
+of a beggar. The sufferings which in the vehemence and ardour of his will
+he inflicts upon others are the measure of the suffering, the experience
+of which in his own person cannot break his will, and plainly lead it to
+the denial of itself. All true and pure love, on the other hand, and even
+all free justice, proceed from the penetration of the _principium
+individuationis_, which, if it appears with its full power, results in
+perfect sanctification and salvation, the phenomenon of which is the state
+of resignation described above, the unbroken peace which accompanies it,
+and the greatest delight in death.(90)
+
+§ 69. Suicide, the actual doing away with the individual manifestation of
+will, differs most widely from the denial of the will to live, which is
+the single outstanding act of free-will in the manifestation, and is
+therefore, as Asmus calls it, the transcendental change. This last has
+been fully considered in the course of our work. Far from being denial of
+the will, suicide is a phenomenon of strong assertion of will; for the
+essence of negation lies in this, that the joys of life are shunned, not
+its sorrows. The suicide wills life, and is only dissatisfied with the
+conditions under which it has presented itself to him. He therefore by no
+means surrenders the will to live, but only life, in that he destroys the
+individual manifestation. He wills life--wills the unrestricted existence
+and assertion of the body; but the complication of circumstances does not
+allow this, and there results for him great suffering. The very will to
+live finds itself so much hampered in this particular manifestation that
+it cannot put forth its energies. It therefore comes to such a
+determination as is in conformity with its own nature, which lies outside
+the conditions of the principle of sufficient reason, and to which,
+therefore, all particular manifestations are alike indifferent, inasmuch
+as it itself remains unaffected by all appearing and passing away, and is
+the inner life of all things; for that firm inward assurance by reason of
+which we all live free from the constant dread of death, the assurance
+that a phenomenal existence can never be wanting to the will, supports our
+action even in the case of suicide. Thus the will to live appears just as
+much in suicide (Siva) as in the satisfaction of self-preservation
+(Vishnu) and in the sensual pleasure of procreation (Brahma). This is the
+inner meaning of the unity of the Trimurtis, which is embodied in its
+entirety in every human being, though in time it raises now one, now
+another, of its three heads. Suicide stands in the same relation to the
+denial of the will as the individual thing does to the Idea. The suicide
+denies only the individual, not the species. We have already seen that as
+life is always assured to the will to live, and as sorrow is inseparable
+from life, suicide, the wilful destruction of the single phenomenal
+existence, is a vain and foolish act; for the thing-in-itself remains
+unaffected by it, even as the rainbow endures however fast the drops which
+support it for the moment may change. But, more than this, it is also the
+masterpiece of Mâyâ, as the most flagrant example of the contradiction of
+the will to live with itself. As we found this contradiction in the case
+of the lowest manifestations of will, in the permanent struggle of all the
+forces of nature, and of all organic individuals for matter and time and
+space; and as we saw this antagonism come ever more to the front with
+terrible distinctness in the ascending grades of the objectification of
+the will, so at last in the highest grade, the Idea of man, it reaches the
+point at which, not only the individuals which express the same Idea
+extirpate each other, but even the same individual declares war against
+itself. The vehemence with which it wills life, and revolts against what
+hinders it, namely, suffering, brings it to the point of destroying
+itself; so that the individual will, by its own act, puts an end to that
+body which is merely its particular visible expression, rather than permit
+suffering to break the will. Just because the suicide cannot give up
+willing, he gives up living. The will asserts itself here even in putting
+an end to its own manifestation, because it can no longer assert itself
+otherwise. As, however, it was just the suffering which it so shuns that
+was able, as mortification of the will, to bring it to the denial of
+itself, and hence to freedom, so in this respect the suicide is like a
+sick man, who, after a painful operation which would entirely cure him has
+been begun, will not allow it to be completed, but prefers to retain his
+disease. Suffering approaches and reveals itself as the possibility of the
+denial of will; but the will rejects it, in that it destroys the body, the
+manifestation of itself, in order that it may remain unbroken. This is the
+reason why almost all ethical teachers, whether philosophical or
+religious, condemn suicide, although they themselves can only give
+far-fetched sophistical reasons for their opinion. But if a human being
+was ever restrained from committing suicide by purely moral motives, the
+inmost meaning of this self-conquest (in whatever ideas his reason may
+have clothed it) was this: "I will not shun suffering, in order that it
+may help to put an end to the will to live, whose manifestation is so
+wretched, by so strengthening the knowledge of the real nature of the
+world which is already beginning to dawn upon me, that it may become the
+final quieter of my will, and may free me for ever."
+
+It is well known that from time to time cases occur in which the act of
+suicide extends to the children. The father first kills the children he
+loves, and then himself. Now, if we consider that conscience, religion,
+and all influencing ideas teach him to look upon murder as the greatest of
+crimes, and that, in spite of this, he yet commits it, in the hour of his
+own death, and when he is altogether uninfluenced by any egotistical
+motive, such a deed can only be explained in the following manner: in this
+case, the will of the individual, the father, recognises itself
+immediately in the children, though involved in the delusion of mistaking
+the appearance for the true nature; and as he is at the same time deeply
+impressed with the knowledge of the misery of all life, he now thinks to
+put an end to the inner nature itself, along with the appearance, and thus
+seeks to deliver from existence and its misery both himself and his
+children, in whom he discerns himself as living again. It would be an
+error precisely analogous to this to suppose that one may reach the same
+end as is attained through voluntary chastity by frustrating the aim of
+nature in fecundation; or indeed if, in consideration of the unendurable
+suffering of life, parents were to use means for the destruction of their
+new-born children, instead of doing everything possible to ensure life to
+that which is struggling into it. For if the will to live is there, as it
+is the only metaphysical reality, or the thing-in-itself, no physical
+force can break it, but can only destroy its manifestation at this place
+and time. It itself can never be transcended except through knowledge.
+Thus the only way of salvation is, that the will shall manifest itself
+unrestrictedly, in order that in this individual manifestation it may come
+to apprehend its own nature. Only as the result of this knowledge can the
+will transcend itself, and thereby end the suffering which is inseparable
+from its manifestation. It is quite impossible to accomplish this end by
+physical force, as by destroying the germ, or by killing the new-born
+child, or by committing suicide. Nature guides the will to the light, just
+because it is only in the light that it can work out its salvation.
+Therefore the aims of Nature are to be promoted in every way as soon as
+the will to live, which is its inner being, has determined itself.
+
+There is a species of suicide which seems to be quite distinct from the
+common kind, though its occurrence has perhaps not yet been fully
+established. It is starvation, voluntarily chosen on the ground of extreme
+asceticism. All instances of it, however, have been accompanied and
+obscured by much religious fanaticism, and even superstition. Yet it seems
+that the absolute denial of will may reach the point at which the will
+shall be wanting to take the necessary nourishment for the support of the
+natural life. This kind of suicide is so far from being the result of the
+will to live, that such a completely resigned ascetic only ceases to live
+because he has already altogether ceased to will. No other death than that
+by starvation is in this case conceivable (unless it were the result of
+some special superstition); for the intention to cut short the torment
+would itself be a stage in the assertion of will. The dogmas which satisfy
+the reason of such a penitent delude him with the idea that a being of a
+higher nature has inculcated the fasting to which his own inner tendency
+drives him. Old examples of this may be found in the "Breslauer Sammlung
+von Natur- und Medicin-Geschichten," September 1799, p. 363; in Bayle's
+"Nouvelles de la République des Lettres," February 1685, p. 189; in
+Zimmermann, "Ueber die Einsamkeit," vol. i. p. 182; in the "Histoire de
+l'Académie des Sciences" for 1764, an account by Houttuyn, which is quoted
+in the "Sammlung für praktische Aerzte," vol. i. p. 69. More recent
+accounts may be found in Hufeland's "Journal für praktische Heilkunde,"
+vol. x. p. 181, and vol. xlviii. p. 95; also in Nasse's "Zeitschrift für
+psychische Aerzte," 1819, part iii. p. 460; and in the "Edinburgh Medical
+and Surgical Journal," 1809, vol. v. p. 319. In the year 1833 all the
+papers announced that the English historian, Dr. Lingard, had died in
+January at Dover of voluntary starvation; according to later accounts, it
+was not he himself, but a relation of his who died. Still in these
+accounts the persons were generally described as insane, and it is no
+longer possible to find out how far this was the case. But I will give
+here a more recent case of this kind, if it were only to ensure the
+preservation of one of the rare instances of this striking and
+extraordinary phenomenon of human nature, which, to all appearance at any
+rate, belongs to the category to which I wish to assign it and could
+hardly be explained in any other way. This case is reported in the
+"Nürnberger Correspondenten" of the 29th July 1813, in these words:--"We
+hear from Bern that in a thick wood near Thurnen a hut has been discovered
+in which was lying the body of a man who had been dead about a month. His
+clothes gave little or no clue to his social position. Two very fine
+shirts lay beside him. The most important article, however, was a Bible
+interleaved with white paper, part of which had been written upon by the
+deceased. In this writing he gives the date of his departure from home
+(but does not mention where his home was). He then says that he was driven
+by the Spirit of God into the wilderness to pray and fast. During his
+journey he had fasted seven days and then he had again taken food. After
+this he had begun again to fast, and continued to do so for the same
+number of days as before. From this point we find each day marked with a
+stroke, and of these there are five, at the expiration of which the
+pilgrim presumably died. There was further found a letter to a clergyman
+about a sermon which the deceased heard him preach, but the letter was not
+addressed." Between this voluntary death arising from extreme asceticism
+and the common suicide resulting from despair there may be various
+intermediate species and combinations, though this is hard to find out.
+But human nature has depths, obscurities, and perplexities, the analysis
+and elucidation of which is a matter of the very greatest difficulty.
+
+§ 70. It might be supposed that the entire exposition (now terminated) of
+that which I call the denial of the will is irreconcilable with the
+earlier explanation of necessity, which belongs just as much to motivation
+as to every other form of the principle of sufficient reason, and
+according to which, motives, like all causes, are only occasional causes,
+upon which the character unfolds its nature and reveals it with the
+necessity of a natural law, on account of which we absolutely denied
+freedom as _liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ_. But far from suppressing
+this here, I would call it to mind. In truth, real freedom, _i.e._,
+independence of the principle of sufficient reason, belongs to the will
+only as a thing-in-itself, not to its manifestation, whose essential form
+is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason, the element or sphere of
+necessity. But the one case in which that freedom can become directly
+visible in the manifestation is that in which it makes an end of what
+manifests itself, and because the mere manifestation, as a link in the
+chain of causes, the living body in time, which contains only phenomena,
+still continues to exist, the will which manifests itself through this
+phenomenon then stands in contradiction to it, for it denies what the
+phenomenon expresses. In such a case the organs of generation, for
+example, as the visible form of the sexual impulse, are there and in
+health; but yet, in the inmost consciousness, no sensual gratification is
+desired; and although the whole body is only the visible expression of the
+will to live, yet the motives which correspond to this will no longer act;
+indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end of the individual, and in
+this way the greatest check to the natural will, is welcome and desired.
+Now, the contradiction between our assertions of the necessity of the
+determination of the will by motives, in accordance with the character, on
+the one hand, and of the possibility of the entire suppression of the will
+whereby the motives become powerless, on the other hand, is only the
+repetition in the reflection of philosophy of this _real_ contradiction
+which arises from the direct encroachment of the freedom of the
+will-in-itself, which knows no necessity, into the sphere of the necessity
+of its manifestation. But the key to the solution of these contradictions
+lies in the fact that the state in which the character is withdrawn from
+the power of motives does not proceed directly from the will, but from a
+changed form of knowledge. So long as the knowledge is merely that which
+is involved in the _principium individuationis_ and exclusively follows
+the principle of sufficient reason, the strength of the motives is
+irresistible. But when the _principium individuationis_ is seen through,
+when the Ideas, and indeed the inner nature of the thing-in-itself, as the
+same will in all, are directly recognised, and from this knowledge an
+universal quieter of volition arises, then the particular motives become
+ineffective, because the kind of knowledge which corresponds to them is
+obscured and thrown into the background by quite another kind. Therefore
+the character can never partially change, but must, with the consistency
+of a law of Nature, carry out in the particular the will which it
+manifests as a whole. But this whole, the character itself, may be
+completely suppressed or abolished through the change of knowledge
+referred to above. It is this suppression or abolition which Asmus, as
+quoted above, marvels at and denotes the "catholic, transcendental
+change;" and in the Christian Church it has very aptly been called the
+_new birth_, and the knowledge from which it springs, the _work of grace_.
+Therefore it is not a question of a change, but of an entire suppression
+of the character; and hence it arises that, however different the
+characters which experience the suppression may have been before it, after
+it they show a great similarity in their conduct, though every one still
+speaks very differently according to his conceptions and dogmas.
+
+In this sense, then, the old philosophical doctrine of the freedom of the
+will, which has constantly been contested and constantly maintained, is
+not without ground, and the dogma of the Church of the work of grace and
+the new birth is not without meaning and significance. But we now
+unexpectedly see both united in one, and we can also now understand in
+what sense the excellent Malebranche could say, "_La liberté est un
+mystère_," and was right. For precisely what the Christian mystics call
+_the work of grace_ and _the new birth_, is for us the single direct
+expression of _the freedom of the will_. It only appears if the will,
+having attained to a knowledge of its own real nature, receives from this
+a _quieter_, by means of which the motives are deprived of their effect,
+which belongs to the province of another kind of knowledge, the objects of
+which are merely phenomena. The possibility of the freedom which thus
+expresses itself is the greatest prerogative of man, which is for ever
+wanting to the brute, because the condition of it is the deliberation of
+reason, which enables him to survey the whole of life independent of the
+impression of the present. The brute is entirely without the possibility
+of freedom, as, indeed, it is without the possibility of a proper or
+deliberate choice following upon a completed conflict of motives, which
+for this purpose would have to be abstract ideas. Therefore with the same
+necessity with which the stone falls to the earth, the hungry wolf buries
+its fangs in the flesh of its prey, without the possibility of the
+knowledge that it is itself the destroyed as well as the destroyer.
+_Necessity is the kingdom of nature; freedom is the kingdom of grace._
+
+Now because, as we have seen, that _self-suppression of the will_ proceeds
+from knowledge, and all knowledge is involuntary, that denial of will
+also, that entrance into freedom, cannot be forcibly attained to by
+intention or design, but proceeds from the inmost relation of knowing and
+volition in the man, and therefore comes suddenly, as if spontaneously
+from without. This is why the Church has called it _the work of grace_;
+and that it still regards it as independent of the acceptance of grace
+corresponds to the fact that the effect of the quieter is finally a free
+act of will. And because, in consequence of such a work of grace, the
+whole nature of man is changed and reversed from its foundation, so that
+he no longer wills anything of all that he previously willed so intensely,
+so that it is as if a new man actually took the place of the old, the
+Church has called this consequence of the work of grace the _new birth_.
+For what it calls the _natural man_, to which it denies all capacity for
+good, is just the will to live, which must be denied if deliverance from
+an existence such as ours is to be attained. Behind our existence lies
+something else, which is only accessible to us if we have shaken off this
+world.
+
+Having regard, not to the individuals according to the principle of
+sufficient reason, but to the Idea of man in its unity, Christian theology
+symbolises _nature_, the _assertion of the will to live_ in Adam, whose
+sin, inherited by us, _i.e._, our unity with him in the Idea, which is
+represented in time by the bond of procreation, makes us all partakers of
+suffering and eternal death. On the other hand, it symbolises _grace_, the
+_denial of the will_, _salvation_, in the incarnate God, who, as free from
+all sin, that is, from all willing of life, cannot, like us, have
+proceeded from the most pronounced assertion of the will, nor can he, like
+us, have a body which is through and through simply concrete will,
+manifestation of the will; but born of a pure virgin, he has only a
+phantom body. This last is the doctrine of the Docetæ, _i.e._, certain
+Church Fathers, who in this respect are very consistent. It is especially
+taught by Apelles, against whom and his followers Tertullian wrote. But
+even Augustine comments thus on the passage, Rom. viii. 3, "God sent his
+Son in the likeness of sinful flesh:" "_Non enim caro peccati erat, quæ
+non de carnali delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei similitudo
+carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat_" (Liber 83, _quæst. qu._ 66). He
+also teaches in his work entitled "_Opus Imperfectum_," i. 47, that
+inherited sin is both sin and punishment at once. It is already present in
+new-born children, but only shows itself if they grow up. Yet the origin
+of this sin is to be referred to the will of the sinner. This sinner was
+Adam, but we all existed in him; Adam became miserable, and in him we have
+all become miserable. Certainly the doctrine of original sin (assertion of
+the will) and of salvation (denial of the will) is the great truth which
+constitutes the essence of Christianity, while most of what remains is
+only the clothing of it, the husk or accessories. Therefore Jesus Christ
+ought always to be conceived in the universal, as the symbol or
+personification of the denial of the will to live, but never as an
+individual, whether according to his mythical history given in the
+Gospels, or according to the probably true history which lies at the
+foundation of this. For neither the one nor the other will easily satisfy
+us entirely. It is merely the vehicle of that conception for the people,
+who always demand something actual. That in recent times Christianity has
+forgotten its true significance, and degenerated into dull optimism, does
+not concern us here.
+
+It is further an original and evangelical doctrine of Christianity--which
+Augustine, with the consent of the leaders of the Church, defended against
+the platitudes of the Pelagians, and which it was the principal aim of
+Luther's endeavour to purify from error and re-establish, as he expressly
+declares in his book, "_De Servo Arbitrio_,"--the doctrine that _the will
+is not free_, but originally subject to the inclination to evil. Therefore
+according to this doctrine the deeds of the will are always sinful and
+imperfect, and can never fully satisfy justice; and, finally, these works
+can never save us, but faith alone, a faith which itself does not spring
+from resolution and free will, but from the work of grace, without our
+co-operation, comes to us as from without.
+
+Not only the dogmas referred to before, but also this last genuine
+evangelical dogma belongs to those which at the present day an ignorant
+and dull opinion rejects as absurd or hides. For, in spite of Augustine
+and Luther, it adheres to the vulgar Pelagianism, which the rationalism of
+the day really is, and treats as antiquated those deeply significant
+dogmas which are peculiar and essential to Christianity in the strictest
+sense; while, on the other hand, it holds fast and regards as the
+principal matter only the dogma that originates in Judaism, and has been
+retained from it, and is merely historically connected with
+Christianity.(91) We, however, recognise in the doctrine referred to above
+the truth completely agreeing with the result of our own investigations.
+We see that true virtue and holiness of disposition have their origin not
+in deliberate choice (works), but in knowledge (faith); just as we have in
+like manner developed it from our leading thought. If it were works, which
+spring from motives and deliberate intention, that led to salvation, then,
+however one may turn it, virtue would always be a prudent, methodical,
+far-seeing egoism. But the faith to which the Christian Church promises
+salvation is this: that as through the fall of the first man we are all
+partakers of sin and subject to death and perdition, through the divine
+substitute, through grace and the taking upon himself of our fearful
+guilt, we are all saved, without any merit of our own (of the person);
+since that which can proceed from the intentional (determined by motives)
+action of the person, works, can never justify us, from its very nature,
+just because it is _intentional_, action induced by motives, _opus
+operatum_. Thus in this faith there is implied, first of all, that our
+condition is originally and essentially an incurable one, from which we
+need _salvation_; then, that we ourselves essentially belong to evil, and
+are so firmly bound to it that our works according to law and precept,
+_i.e._, according to motives, can never satisfy justice nor save us; but
+salvation is only obtained through faith, _i.e._, through a changed mode
+of knowing, and this faith can only come through grace, thus as from
+without. This means that the salvation is one which is quite foreign to
+our person, and points to a denial and surrender of this person necessary
+to salvation. Works, the result of the law as such, can never justify,
+because they are always action following upon motives. Luther demands (in
+his book "_De Libertate Christiana_") that after the entrance of faith the
+good works shall proceed from it entirely of themselves, as symptoms, as
+fruits of it; yet by no means as constituting in themselves a claim to
+merit, justification, or reward, but taking place quite voluntarily and
+gratuitously. So we also hold that from the ever-clearer penetration of
+the _principium individuationis_ proceeds, first, merely free justice,
+then love, extending to the complete abolition of egoism, and finally
+resignation or denial of the will.
+
+I have here introduced these dogmas of Christian theology, which in
+themselves are foreign to philosophy, merely for the purpose of showing
+that the ethical doctrine which proceeds from our whole investigation, and
+is in complete agreement and connection with all its parts, although new
+and unprecedented in its expression, is by no means so in its real nature,
+but fully agrees with the Christian dogmas properly so called, and indeed,
+as regards its essence, was contained and present in them. It also agrees
+quite as accurately with the doctrines and ethical teachings of the sacred
+books of India, which in their turn are presented in quite different
+forms. At the same time the calling to mind of the dogmas of the Christian
+Church serves to explain and illustrate the apparent contradiction between
+the necessity of all expressions of character when motives are presented
+(the kingdom of Nature) on the one hand, and the freedom of the will in
+itself, to deny itself, and abolish the character with all the necessity
+of the motives based upon it (the kingdom of grace) on the other hand.
+
+§ 71. I now end the general account of ethics, and with it the whole
+development of that one thought which it has been my object to impart; and
+I by no means desire to conceal here an objection which concerns this last
+part of my exposition, but rather to point out that it lies in the nature
+of the question, and that it is quite impossible to remove it. It is this,
+that after our investigation has brought us to the point at which we have
+before our eyes perfect holiness, the denial and surrender of all
+volition, and thus the deliverance from a world whose whole existence we
+have found to be suffering, this appears to us as a passing away into
+empty nothingness.
+
+On this I must first remark, that the conception of nothing is essentially
+relative, and always refers to a definite something which it negatives.
+This quality has been attributed (by Kant) merely to the _nihil
+privativum_, which is indicated by - as opposed to +, which -, from an
+opposite point of view, might become +, and in opposition to this _nihil
+privativum_ the _nihil negativum_ has been set up, which would in every
+reference be nothing, and as an example of this the logical contradiction
+which does away with itself has been given. But more closely considered,
+no absolute nothing, no proper _nihil negativum_ is even thinkable; but
+everything of this kind, when considered from a higher standpoint or
+subsumed under a wider concept, is always merely a _nihil privativum_.
+Every nothing is thought as such only in relation to something, and
+presupposes this relation, and thus also this something. Even a logical
+contradiction is only a relative nothing. It is no thought of the reason,
+but it is not on that account an absolute nothing; for it is a combination
+of words; it is an example of the unthinkable, which is necessary in logic
+in order to prove the laws of thought. Therefore if for this end such an
+example is sought, we will stick to the nonsense as the positive which we
+are in search of, and pass over the sense as the negative. Thus every
+_nihil negativum_, if subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a
+mere _nihil privativum_ or relative nothing, which can, moreover, always
+exchange signs with what it negatives, so that that would then be thought
+as negation, and it itself as assertion. This also agrees with the result
+of the difficult dialectical investigation of the meaning of nothing which
+Plato gives in the "Sophist" (pp. 277-287): {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} (_Cum enim ostenderemus,
+alterius ipsius naturam esse perque omnia entia divisam atque dispersam in
+vicem; tunc partem ejus oppositam ei, quod cujusque ens est, esse ipsum
+revera non ens asseruimus_).
+
+That which is generally received as positive, which we call the real, and
+the negation of which the concept nothing in its most general significance
+expresses, is just the world as idea, which I have shown to be the
+objectivity and mirror of the will. Moreover, we ourselves are just this
+will and this world, and to them belongs the idea in general, as one
+aspect of them. The form of the idea is space and time, therefore for this
+point of view all that is real must be in some place and at some time.
+Denial, abolition, conversion of the will, is also the abolition and the
+vanishing of the world, its mirror. If we no longer perceive it in this
+mirror, we ask in vain where it has gone, and then, because it has no
+longer any where and when, complain that it has vanished into nothing.
+
+A reversed point of view, if it were possible for us, would reverse the
+signs and show the real for us as nothing, and that nothing as the real.
+But as long as we ourselves are the will to live, this last--nothing as the
+real--can only be known and signified by us negatively, because the old
+saying of Empedocles, that like can only be known by like, deprives us
+here of all knowledge, as, conversely, upon it finally rests the
+possibility of all our actual knowledge, _i.e._, the world as idea; for
+the world is the self-knowledge of the will.
+
+If, however, it should be absolutely insisted upon that in some way or
+other a positive knowledge should be attained of that which philosophy can
+only express negatively as the denial of the will, there would be nothing
+for it but to refer to that state which all those who have attained to
+complete denial of the will have experienced, and which has been variously
+denoted by the names ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and
+so forth; a state, however, which cannot properly be called knowledge,
+because it has not the form of subject and object, and is, moreover, only
+attainable in one's own experience and cannot be further communicated.
+
+We, however, who consistently occupy the standpoint of philosophy, must be
+satisfied here with negative knowledge, content to have reached the utmost
+limit of the positive. We have recognised the inmost nature of the world
+as will, and all its phenomena as only the objectivity of will; and we
+have followed this objectivity from the unconscious working of obscure
+forces of Nature up to the completely conscious action of man. Therefore
+we shall by no means evade the consequence, that with the free denial, the
+surrender of the will, all those phenomena are also abolished; that
+constant strain and effort without end and without rest at all the grades
+of objectivity, in which and through which the world consists; the
+multifarious forms succeeding each other in gradation; the whole
+manifestation of the will; and, finally, also the universal forms of this
+manifestation, time and space, and also its last fundamental form, subject
+and object; all are abolished. No will: no idea, no world.
+
+Before us there is certainly only nothingness. But that which resists this
+passing into nothing, our nature, is indeed just the will to live, which
+we ourselves are as it is our world. That we abhor annihilation so
+greatly, is simply another expression of the fact that we so strenuously
+will life, and are nothing but this will, and know nothing besides it. But
+if we turn our glance from our own needy and embarrassed condition to
+those who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having attained to
+perfect self-knowledge, found itself again in all, and then freely denied
+itself, and who then merely wait to see the last trace of it vanish with
+the body which it animates; then, instead of the restless striving and
+effort, instead of the constant transition from wish to fruition, and from
+joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope which
+constitutes the life of the man who wills, we shall see that peace which
+is above all reason, that perfect calm of the spirit, that deep rest, that
+inviolable confidence and serenity, the mere reflection of which in the
+countenance, as Raphael and Correggio have represented it, is an entire
+and certain gospel; only knowledge remains, the will has vanished. We look
+with deep and painful longing upon this state, beside which the misery and
+wretchedness of our own is brought out clearly by the contrast. Yet this
+is the only consideration which can afford us lasting consolation, when,
+on the one hand, we have recognised incurable suffering and endless misery
+as essential to the manifestation of will, the world; and, on the other
+hand, see the world pass away with the abolition of will, and retain
+before us only empty nothingness. Thus, in this way, by contemplation of
+the life and conduct of saints, whom it is certainly rarely granted us to
+meet with in our own experience, but who are brought before our eyes by
+their written history, and, with the stamp of inner truth, by art, we must
+banish the dark impression of that nothingness which we discern behind all
+virtue and holiness as their final goal, and which we fear as children
+fear the dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, through myths
+and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahma or the Nirvana of
+the Buddhists. Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the
+entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will
+certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned
+and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns
+and milky-ways--is nothing.(92)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+
+    1 F. H. Jacobi.
+
+    2 The Hegelian Philosophy.
+
+    3 Fichte and Schelling.
+
+    4 Hegel.
+
+    5 Kant is the only writer who has confused this idea of reason, and in
+      this connection I refer the reader to the Appendix, and also to my
+      "Grundprobleme der Ethik": Grundl. dd. Moral. § 6, pp. 148-154,
+      first and second editions.
+
+    6 Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo
+      sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat. _Seneca_,
+      epist. 81.
+
+    7 It is shown in the Appendix that matter and substance are one.
+
+    8 This shows the ground of the Kantian explanation of matter, that it
+      is "that which is movable in space," for motion consists simply in
+      the union of space and time.
+
+    9 Not, as Kant holds, from the knowledge of time, as will be explained
+      in the Appendix.
+
+   10 On this see "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient
+      Reason," § 49.
+
+   11 The first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books
+      belong to these seven paragraphs.
+
+   12 Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and 27 of the third edition of the
+      essay on the principle of sufficient reason.
+
+   13 Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the Supplement.
+
+   14 Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the Supplement.
+
+   15 Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.
+
+   16 I am therefore of opinion that a science of physiognomy cannot, with
+      certainty, go further than to lay down a few quite general rules.
+      For example, the intellectual qualities are to be read in the
+      forehead and the eyes; the moral qualities, the expression of will,
+      in the mouth and lower part of the face. The forehead and the eyes
+      interpret each other; either of them seen alone can only be half
+      understood. Genius is never without a high, broad, finely-arched
+      brow; but such a brow often occurs where there is no genius. A
+      clever-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be so the
+      uglier the face is; and a stupid-looking person may the more
+      certainly be judged to be stupid the more beautiful the face is; for
+      beauty, as the approximation to the type of humanity, carries in and
+      for itself the expression of mental clearness; the opposite is the
+      case with ugliness, and so forth.
+
+   17 Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.
+
+   18 Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.
+
+   19 Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.
+
+   20 Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.
+
+   21 The reader must not think here of Kant's misuse of these Greek
+      terms, which is condemned in the Appendix.
+
+   22 Spinoza, who always boasts that he proceeds _more geometrico_, has
+      actually done so more than he himself was aware. For what he knew
+      with certainty and decision from the immediate, perceptive
+      apprehension of the nature of the world, he seeks to demonstrate
+      logically without reference to this knowledge. He only arrives at
+      the intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary
+      concepts framed by himself (_substantia causa sui_, &c.), and in the
+      demonstrations he allows himself all the freedom of choice for which
+      the nature of the wide concept-spheres afford such convenient
+      opportunity. That his doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in
+      his case, as in that of geometry, quite independent of the
+      demonstrations of it. Cf. ch. 13 of supplementary volume.
+
+   23 Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.
+
+   24 Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc.,
+      4, 6. {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}
+      {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} (Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus
+      opiniones). Epictet., c. v.
+
+   25 {~GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}, {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~}
+      {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PSI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER KAPPA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER SIGMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER THETA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PHI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER XI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} (Hæc est
+      causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare
+      singularibus). Epict. dissert., ii., 26.
+
+   26 Cf. Ch. 16 of Supplement.
+
+   27 Cf. Ch. xviii. of the Supplement.
+
+   28 We can thus by no means agree with Bacon if he (De Augm. Scient., L.
+      iv. in fine.) thinks that all mechanical and physical movement of
+      bodies has always been preceded by perception in these bodies;
+      though a glimmering of truth lies at the bottom of this false
+      proposition. This is also the case with Kepler's opinion, expressed
+      in his essay _De Planeta Martis_, that the planets must have
+      knowledge in order to keep their elliptical courses so correctly,
+      and to regulate the velocity of their motion so that the triangle of
+      the plane of their course always remains proportional to the time in
+      which they pass through its base.
+
+   29 Cf. Ch. xix. of the Supplement.
+
+   30 Cf. Ch. xx. of the Supplement, and also in my work, "_Ueber den
+      Willen in der Natur_," the chapters on Physiology and Comparative
+      Anatomy, where the subject I have only touched upon here is fully
+      discussed.
+
+   31 This is specially treated in the 27th Ch. of the Supplement.
+
+   32 This subject is fully worked out in my prize essay on the freedom of
+      the will, in which therefore (pp. 29-44 of the "Grundprobleme der
+      Ethik") the relation of _cause_, _stimulus_, and _motive_ has also
+      been fully explained.
+
+   33 Cf. Ch. xxiii. of the Supplement, and also the Ch. on the physiology
+      of plants in my work "Ueber den Willen in der Natur," and the Ch. on
+      physical astronomy, which is of great importance with regard to the
+      kernel of my metaphysic.
+
+   34 Wenzel, De Structura Cerebri Hominis et Brutorum, 1812, ch. iii.;
+      Cuvier, Leçons d'Anat., comp. leçon 9, arts. 4 and 5; Vic. d'Azyr,
+      Hist. de l'Acad. de Sc. de Paris, 1783, pp. 470 and 483.
+
+   35 On the 16th of September 1840, at a lecture upon Egyptian Archæology
+      delivered by Mr. Pettigrew at the Literary and Scientific Institute
+      of London, he showed some corns of wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had
+      found in a grave at Thebes, in which they must have lain for three
+      thousand years. They were found in an hermetically sealed vase. Mr.
+      Pettigrew had sowed twelve grains, and obtained a plant which grew
+      five feet high, and the seeds of which were now quite ripe.--_Times_,
+      21st September 1840. In the same way in 1830 Mr. Haulton produced in
+      the Medical Botanical Society of London a bulbous root which was
+      found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy, in which it was probably put
+      in observance of some religious rite, and which must have been at
+      least two thousand years old. He had planted it in a flower-pot, in
+      which it grew up and flourished. This is quoted from the Medical
+      Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institute of Great
+      Britain, October 1830, p. 196.--"In the garden of Mr. Grimstone of
+      the Herbarium, Highgate, London, is a pea in full fruit, which has
+      sprung from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officials of the
+      British Museum took out of a vase which had been found in an
+      Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain 2844 years."--_Times_,
+      16th August 1844. Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead
+      to the conclusion that even animal life is capable of such a
+      suspension for thousands of years, if this is begun in the dormant
+      period and maintained by special circumstances.
+
+   36 Cf. Chap. xxii. of the Supplement, and also my work "Ueber den
+      Willen in der Natur," p. 54 _et seq._, and pp. 70-79 of the first
+      edition, or p. 46 _et seq._, and pp. 63-72 of the second, or p. 48
+      _et seq._, and pp. 69-77 of the third edition.
+
+   37 The Scholastics therefore said very truly: _Causa finalis movet non
+      secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum._ Cf. Suarez,
+      Disp. Metaph. disp. xxiii., sec. 7 and 8.
+
+   38 Cf. "Critique of Pure Reason. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of
+      the Totality of the Deduction of the Events in the Universe," pp.
+      560-586 of the fifth, and p. 532 and following of first edition; and
+      "Critique of Practical Reason," fourth edition, pp. 169-179;
+      Rosenkranz' edition, p. 224 and following. Cf. my Essay on the
+      Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 43.
+
+   39 Cf. "Ueber den Willen in der Natur," at the end of the section on
+      Comparative Anatomy.
+
+   40 Cf. "Ueber den Willen in der Natur," the section on Comparative
+      Anatomy.
+
+   41 Chatin, Sur la Valisneria Spiralis, in the Comptes Rendus de l'Acad.
+      de Sc., No. 13, 1855.
+
+   42 Cf. Chaps. xxvi. and xxvii. of the Supplement.
+
+   43 Cf. Chap. xxviii. of the Supplement.
+
+   44 F. H. Jacobi.
+
+   45 See for example, "Immanuel Kant, a Reminiscence, by Fr. Bouterweck,"
+      pg. 49, and Buhle's "History of Philosophy," vol. vi. pp. 802-815
+      and 823.
+
+   46 Cf. Chap. xxix. of Supplement.
+
+   47 I also recommend the perusal of what Spinoza says in his Ethics
+      (Book II., Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and Book V., Props. 25-38),
+      concerning the _cognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva_, in
+      illustration of the kind of knowledge we are considering, and very
+      specially Prop. 29, Schol.; prop. 36, Schol., and Prop. 38, Demonst.
+      et Schol.
+
+   48 Cf. Chap. xxx. of the Supplement.
+
+   49 This last sentence cannot be understood without some acquaintance
+      with the next book.
+
+   50 Cf. Chap. xxxi. of the Supplement.
+
+   51 I am all the more delighted and astonished, forty years after I so
+      timidly and hesitatingly advanced this thought, to discover that it
+      has already been expressed by St. Augustine: _Arbusta formas suas
+      varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est,
+      sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quod_ NOSSE _non possunt,
+      quasi_ INNOTESCERE _velle videantur_.--_De civ. Dei, xi._ 27.
+
+   52 Cf. Chap. 35 of Supplement.
+
+   53 Jakob Böhm in his book, "de Signatura Rerum," ch. i., § 13-15, says,
+      "There is nothing in nature that does not manifest its internal form
+      externally; for the internal continually labours to manifest
+      itself.... Everything has its language by which to reveal itself....
+      And this is the language of nature when everything speaks out of its
+      own property, and continually manifests and declares itself, ... for
+      each thing reveals its mother, which thus gives _the essence and the
+      will_ to the form."
+
+   54 The last sentence is the German of the _il n'y a que l'esprit qui
+      sente l'esprit_, of Helvetius. In the first edition there was no
+      occasion to point this out, but since then the age has become so
+      degraded and ignorant through the stupefying influence of the
+      Hegelian sophistry, that some might quite likely say that an
+      antithesis was intended here between "spirit and nature." I am
+      therefore obliged to guard myself in express terms against the
+      suspicion of such vulgar sophisms.
+
+   55 This digression is worked out more fully in the 36th Chapter of the
+      Supplement.
+
+   56 In order to understand this passage it is necessary to have read the
+      whole of the next book.
+
+_   57 Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto._
+
+   58 Cf. Ch. xxxiv. of Supplement.
+
+   59 It is scarcely necessary to say that wherever I speak of poets I
+      refer exclusively to that rare phenomenon the great true poet. I
+      mean no one else; least of all that dull insipid tribe, the mediocre
+      poets, rhymsters, and inventors of fables, that flourishes so
+      luxuriantly at the present day in Germany. They ought rather to have
+      the words shouted in their ears unceasingly from all sides--
+
+      _Mediocribus esse poëtis_
+      _ Non homines, non Dî, non concessere columnæ._
+
+      It is worthy of serious consideration what an amount of time--both
+      their own and other people's--and paper is lost by this swarm of
+      mediocre poets, and how injurious is their influence. For the public
+      always seizes on what is new, and has naturally a greater proneness
+      to what is perverse and dull as akin to itself. Therefore these
+      works of the mediocre poets draw it away and hold it back from the
+      true masterpieces and the education they afford, and thus working in
+      direct antagonism to the benign influence of genius, they ruin taste
+      more and more, and retard the progress of the age. Such poets should
+      therefore be scourged with criticism and satire without indulgence
+      or sympathy till they are induced, for their own good, to apply
+      their muse rather to reading what is good than to writing what is
+      bad. For if the bungling of the incompetent so raised the wrath of
+      the gentle Apollo that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what
+      the mediocre poets will base their claim to tolerance.
+
+   60 Cf. Ch. xxxviii. of Supplement.
+
+   61 Cf. Ch. xxxvii. of the Supplement.
+
+   62 Leibnitii epistolæ, collectio Kortholti, ep. 154.
+
+   63 Cf. Ch. xxxix. of Supplement.
+
+   64 The following remark may assist those for whom it is not too subtle
+      to understand clearly that the individual is only the phenomenon,
+      not the thing in itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the
+      subject of knowing, _i.e._, the complemental condition of the
+      possibility of the whole objective world, and, on the other hand, a
+      particular phenomenon of will, the same will which objectifies
+      itself in everything. But this double nature of our being does not
+      rest upon a self-existing unity, otherwise it would be possible for
+      us to be conscious of ourselves _in ourselves, and independent of
+      the objects of knowledge and will_. Now this is by no means
+      possible, for as soon as we turn into ourselves to make the attempt,
+      and seek for once to know ourselves fully by means of introspective
+      reflection, we are lost in a bottomless void; we find ourselves like
+      the hollow glass globe, from out of which a voice speaks whose cause
+      is not to be found in it, and whereas we desired to comprehend
+      ourselves, we find, with a shudder, nothing but a vanishing spectre.
+
+   65 "Scholastici docuerunt, quod æternitas non sit temporis sine fine
+      aut principio successio; sed _Nunc stans_, _i.e._, idem nobis _Nunc
+      esse_, quod erat _Nunc Adamo_, _i.e._, inter _nunc_ et _tunc_ nullam
+      esse differentiam."--Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 46.
+
+   66 In Eckermann's "Conversations of Goethe" (vol. i. p. 161), Goethe
+      says: "Our spirit is a being of a nature quite indestructible, and
+      its activity continues from eternity to eternity. It is like the
+      sun, which seems to set only to our earthly eyes, but which, in
+      reality, never sets, but shines on unceasingly." Goethe has taken
+      the simile from me; not I from him. Without doubt he used it in this
+      conversation, which was held in 1824, in consequence of a (possibly
+      unconscious) reminiscence of the above passage, for it occurs in the
+      first edition, p. 401, in exactly the same words, and it is also
+      repeated at p. 528 of that edition, as at the close of § 65 of the
+      present work. The first edition was sent to him in December 1818,
+      and in March 1819, when I was at Naples, he sent me his
+      congratulations by letter, through my sister, and enclosed a piece
+      of paper upon which he had noted the places of certain passages
+      which had specially pleased him. Thus he had read my book.
+
+   67 This is expressed in the Veda by saying, that when a man dies his
+      sight becomes one with the sun, his smell with the earth, his taste
+      with water, his hearing with the air, his speech with fire, &c., &c.
+      (Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 249 _et seq._) And also by the fact that, in
+      a special ceremony, the dying man gives over his senses and all his
+      faculties singly to his son, in whom they are now supposed to live
+      on (Oupnek'hat, vol. ii. p. 82 _et seq._)
+
+   68 Cf. Chap. xli.-xliv. of Supplement.
+
+   69 "Critique of Pure Reason," first edition, pp. 532-558; fifth
+      edition, pp. 560-586; and "Critique of Practical Reason," fourth
+      edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz's edition, pp. 224-231.
+
+   70 Cart. Medit. 4.--Spin. Eth., pt. ii. prop. 48 et 49, cæt.
+
+   71 Herodot. vii. 46.
+
+   72 Cf. Ch. xlvi. of Supplement.
+
+   73 Cf. Ch. xlv. of the Supplement.
+
+   74 Thus the basis of natural right of property does not require the
+      assumption of two grounds of right beside each other, that based on
+      _detention_ and that based on _formation_; but the latter is itself
+      sufficient. Only the name _formation_ is not very suitable, for the
+      spending of any labour upon a thing does not need to be a forming or
+      fashioning of it.
+
+   75 The further exposition of the philosophy of law here laid down will
+      be found in my prize-essay, "Ueber das Fundament der Moral," § 17,
+      pp. 221-230 of 1st ed., pp. 216-226 of 2d ed.
+
+   76 Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement.
+
+   77 Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 60 et seq.
+
+   78 That Spanish bishop who, in the last war, poisoned both himself and
+      the French generals at his own table, is an instance of this; and
+      also various incidents in that war. Examples are also to be found in
+      Montaigne, Bk. ii. ch. 12.
+
+   79 Observe, in passing, that what gives every positive system of
+      religion its great strength, the point of contact through which it
+      takes possession of the soul, is entirely its ethical side. Not,
+      however, the ethical side directly as such, but as it appears firmly
+      united and interwoven with the element of mythical dogma which is
+      present in every system of religion, and as intelligible only by
+      means of this. So much is this the case, that although the ethical
+      significance of action cannot be explained in accordance with the
+      principle of sufficient reason, yet since every mythus follows this
+      principle, believers regard the ethical significance of action as
+      quite inseparable, and indeed as absolutely identical, and regard
+      every attack upon the mythus as an attack upon right and virtue.
+      This goes so far that among monotheistic nations atheism or
+      godlessness has become synonymous with the absence of all morality.
+      To the priests such confusions of conceptions are welcome, and only
+      in consequence of them could that horrible monstrosity fanaticism
+      arise and govern, not merely single individuals who happen to be
+      specially perverse and bad, but whole nations, and finally embody
+      itself in the Western world as the Inquisition (to the honour of
+      mankind be it said that this only happened once in their history),
+      which, according to the latest and most authentic accounts, in
+      Madrid alone (in the rest of Spain there were many more such
+      ecclesiastical dens of murderers) in 300 years put 300,000 human
+      beings to a painful death at the stake on theological grounds--a fact
+      of which every zealot ought to be reminded whenever he begins to
+      make himself heard.
+
+   80 The Church would say that these are merely _opera operata_, which do
+      not avail unless grace gives the faith which leads to the new birth.
+      But of this farther on.
+
+   81 The right of man over the life and powers of the brutes rests on the
+      fact that, because with the growing clearness of consciousness
+      suffering increases in like measure; the pain which the brute
+      suffers through death or work is not so great as man would suffer by
+      merely denying himself the flesh, or the powers of the brutes.
+      Therefore man may carry the assertion of his existence to the extent
+      of denying the existence of the brute, and the will to live as a
+      whole endures less suffering in this way than if the opposite course
+      were adopted. This at once determines the extent of the use man may
+      make of the powers of the brutes without wrong; a limit, however,
+      which is often transgressed, especially in the case of beasts of
+      burden and dogs used in the chase; to which the activity of
+      societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals is principally
+      devoted. In my opinion, that right does not extend to vivisection,
+      particularly of the higher animals. On the other hand, the insect
+      does not suffer so much through its death as a man suffers from its
+      sting. The Hindus do not understand this.
+
+   82 As I wander sunk in thought, so strong a sympathy with myself comes
+      over me that I must often weep aloud, which otherwise I am not wont
+      to do.
+
+   83 Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement. It is scarcely necessary to remind the
+      reader that the whole ethical doctrine given in outline in §§ 61-67
+      has been explained fully and in detail in my prize-essay on the
+      foundation of morals.
+
+   84 This thought is expressed by a beautiful simile in the ancient
+      philosophical Sanscrit writing, "Sankhya Karica:" "Yet the soul
+      remains a while invested with body; as the potter's wheel continues
+      whirling after the pot has been fashioned, by force of the impulse
+      previously given to it. When separation of the informed soul from
+      its corporeal frame at length takes place and nature in respect of
+      it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished."
+      Colebrooke, "On the Philosophy of the Hindus: Miscellaneous Essays,"
+      vol i. p. 271. Also in the "Sankhya Karica by Horace Wilson," § 67,
+      p. 184.
+
+   85 See, for example, "Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron," vol. ii.,
+      Nos. 138, 144, 145, 146. "Mythologie des Indous," par Mad. de
+      Polier, vol. ii., ch. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. "Asiatisches Magazin," by
+      Klaproth: in the first volume, "Ueber die Fo-Religion," also
+      "Baghnat Geeta" or "Gespräche zwischen Krishna und Arjoon;" in the
+      second volume, "Moha-Mudgava." Also, "Institutes of Hindu Law, or
+      the Ordinances of Manu," from the Sanscrit, by Sir William Jones
+      (German by Hüttner, 1797), especially the sixth and twelfth
+      chapters. Finally, many passages in the "Asiatic Researches." (In
+      the last forty years Indian literature has grown so much in Europe,
+      that if I were now to complete this note to the first edition, it
+      would occupy several pages.)
+
+   86 At the procession of Jagganath in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw
+      themselves under the wheels, and were instantly killed. (Letter of
+      an East Indian proprietor in the _Times_ of 30th December 1840.)
+
+   87 On {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER TAU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER PI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER LAMDA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA~} cf. Stob. Floril., vol. ii. p. 374.
+
+   88 Bruckeri Hist. Philos., tomi iv. pars. i. p. 10.
+
+   89 Henry VI., Part ii. act 3, sc. 3.
+
+   90 Cf. Ch. xlviii. of the Supplement.
+
+   91 How truly this is the case may be seen from the fact that all the
+      contradictions and inconceivabilities contained in the Christian
+      dogmatics, consistently systematised by Augustine, which have led to
+      the Pelagian insipidity which is opposed to them, vanish as soon as
+      we abstract from the fundamental Jewish dogma, and recognize that
+      man is not the work of another, but of his own will. Then all is at
+      once clear and correct: then there is no need of freedom in the
+      _operari_, for it lies in the _esse_; and there also lies the sin as
+      original sin. The work of grace is, however, our own. To the
+      rationalistic point of view of the day, on the contrary, many
+      doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics, founded on the New
+      Testament, appear quite untenable, and indeed revolting; for
+      example, predestination. Accordingly Christianity proper is
+      rejected, and a return is made to crude Judaism. But the
+      miscalculation or the original weakness of Christian dogmatics
+      lies--where it is never sought--precisely in that which is withdrawn
+      from all investigation as established and certain. Take this away
+      and the whole of dogmatics is rational; for this dogma destroys
+      theology as it does all other sciences. If any one studies the
+      Augustinian theology in the books "_De Civitate Dei_" (especially in
+      the Fourteenth Book), he experiences something analogous to the
+      feeling of one who tries to make a body stand whose centre of
+      gravity falls outside it; however he may turn it and place it, it
+      always tumbles over again. So here, in spite of all the efforts and
+      sophisms of Augustine, the guilt and misery of the world always
+      falls back on God, who made everything and everything that is in
+      everything, and also knew how all things would go. That Augustine
+      himself was conscious of the difficulty, and puzzled by it, I have
+      already shown in my prize-essay on the Freedom of the Will (ch. iv.
+      pp. 66-68 of the first and second editions). In the same way, the
+      contradiction between the goodness of God and the misery of the
+      world, and also between the freedom of the will and the
+      foreknowledge of God, is the inexhaustible theme of a controversy
+      which lasted nearly a hundred years between the Cartesians,
+      Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld, and many others. The
+      only dogma which was regarded as fixed by all parties was the
+      existence and attributes of God, and they all unceasingly move in a
+      circle, because they seek to bring these things into harmony,
+      _i.e._, to solve a sum that will not come right, but always shows a
+      remainder at some new place whenever we have concealed it elsewhere.
+      But it does not occur to any one to seek for the source of the
+      difficulty in the fundamental assumption, although it palpably
+      obtrudes itself. Bayle alone shows that he saw this.
+
+   92 This is also just the Prajna--Paramita of the Buddhists, the "beyond
+      all knowledge," _i.e._, the point at which subject and object are no
+      more. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt, "Ueber das Mahajana und
+      Pratschna-Paramita.")
+
+
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA (VOL. 1 OF 3)***
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