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+ margin-left: 0em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3em; + } + +.poem span.i1 { + display: block; + margin-left: 0em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3.25em; + } + +.poem span.i2 { + display: block; + margin-left: 2em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3em; + } + +.poem span.i4 { + display: block; + margin-left: 4em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3em; + } + +.poem span.i6 { + display: block; + margin-left: 6em; + padding-left: 3em; + text-indent: -3em; + } + +/* Transcriber notes */ +ins {text-decoration:none; + border-bottom: thin dotted gray;} + +.tnote {border: dashed 1px; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + padding-bottom: .5em; + padding-top: .5em; + padding-left: .5em; padding-right: .5em;} + + </style> + </head> + +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of International Congress of Arts and Science, +Volume I, by Various + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume I + Philosophy and Metaphysics + +Author: Various + +Editor: Howard J. Rogers + +Release Date: December 10, 2011 [EBook #38267] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INT'L CONGRESS--ARTS, SCIENCE, VOL I *** + + + + +Produced by Robin Monks, Carol Brown, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive. + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<div class="figcenter"> + <img src="images/i0001.jpg" + width="333" height="500" alt="Illustration: Book Cover" + title="Book Cover" /> +</div> + +<div class="figcenter"> + <img src="images/i0007.jpg" + width="317" height="500" alt="Illustration: Title Page" + title="Title Page" /> +</div> + +<p class="p4 center"><i>OF THE</i></p> + +<h3>Cambridge Edition</h3> + +<p class="center"><i>There have been printed seven hundred and fifty +sets of which this is copy</i></p> + +<p class="center add4"><i>No.</i> <ins title="handwritten in the +original">337</ins></p> + +<h1 class="add4">INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS<br /> +OF ARTS AND SCIENCE</h1> + +<div class="figcenter"> + <a name="Alma"></a> <img src="images/i0012.jpg" + width="396" height="500" alt="Illustration: Alma Mater" + title="Alma Mater" /> + <p class="caption center">ALMA MATER</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Photogravure of the Statue by Daniel C. +French</i></p> + +<p class="caption">The colossal figure of French's Alma Mater adorns the +fine suite of stone steps leading up to the picturesque library building +of Columbia University. It is a bronze statue, gilded with pure gold. +The female figure typifying "Alma Mater" is represented as sitting in a +chair of classic shape, her elbows resting on the arms of the chair. +Both hands are raised. The right hand holds and is supported by a +sceptre. On her head is a classic wreath, and on her lap lies an open +book, from which her eyes seem to have just been raised in meditation. +Drapery falls in semi-classic folds from her neck to her sandalled feet, +only the arms and neck being left bare.</p> + +<p class="caption">Every University man cherishes a kindly feeling for +his Alma Mater, and the famous American sculptor, Daniel C. French, has +been most successful in his artistic creation of the "Fostering Mother" +spiritualized—the familiar ideal of the mother of minds trained to +thought and consecrated to intellectual service.</p> +</div> + +<h1 class="p4">INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS</h1> + +<h3>OF</h3> + +<h1 class="add2">ARTS AND SCIENCE</h1> + +<h5><i>EDITED BY</i></h5> + +<h2>HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.</h2> + +<p class="center add4"><span class="smcap">director of +congresses</span></p> + +<h4>VOLUME I</h4> + +<h3>PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS</h3> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">comprising</span></p> + +<h4 class="center add4">Lectures on Philosophy in the Nineteenth +Century,<br /> +Philosophy of Religion, Sciences of the<br /> +Ideal, Problems of Metaphysics,<br /> +The Theory of Science,<br /> +and Logic</h4> + +<div class="figcenter"> + <img src="images/i0015.png" + width="250" height="228" alt="Illustration: University Alliance logo" + title="University Alliance logo" /> +</div> + +<h3>UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE</h3> +<p><span class="justl">LONDON</span><span class="justr">NEW YORK</span></p> + +<p class="p4 center"><span class="smcap">Copyright 1906 by Houghton, +Mifflin & Co.</span><br /> + +<span class="smcap">all rights reserved</span><br/> + +<span class="smcap">Copyright 1908 by University Alliance</span></p> + +<p class="p4 center"><i>ILLUSTRATIONS</i></p> + +<p class="p2 center">VOLUME I</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="1" + summary="Illustrations"> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><span class="smcap">facing<br +/>page </span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Alma Mater</span></td><td +class="right"><a href="#Alma"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">Photogravure from the statue by +Daniel C. French<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Howard J. +Rogers</span></td><td class="right"><a href="#Rogers">1</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">Photogravure from a +photograph<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Simon +Newcomb</span></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Newcomb">135</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">Photogravure from a +photograph<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">The University of Paris in the +Nineteenth Century</span></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Paris">168</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">Photogravure from the painting by +<span class="smcap">Otto Knille</span></td></tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p4 center"><i>TABLE OF CONTENTS</i></p> + +<p class="p2 center">VOLUME I</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="5" summary="Table of +Contents"> + +<tr><td class="left">THE HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS</td><td +class="right"><a href="#History">1</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Howard J. Rogers, +A.M., LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">Programme</span></td><td +class="right"><a href="#Programme">47</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">Purpose and Plan of the +Congress</span></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Purpose">50</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">Organization of the +Congress</span></td><td class="right"><a href="#Orgn">52</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">Officers of the +Congress</span></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Officers">53</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">Speakers and +Chairmen</span></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Speakers">54</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">Chronological Order of +Proceedings</span></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Chron">77</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">Programme of Social +Events</span></td><td class="right"><a href="#Social">81</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><span class="smcap">List of Ten-Minute +Speakers</span><p></p></td><td class="right"><a +href="#TenMin">82</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">THE SCIENTIFIC PLAN OF THE CONGRESS</td><td +class="right"><a href="#Scientific">85</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Hugo +Muensterberg, Ph.D., LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Introductory Address.</span> +</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Evolution of the Scientific +Investigator</i></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Intro">135</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Simon Newcomb, +Ph.D., LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">NORMATIVE SCIENCE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Sciences of the Ideal</i></td><td +class="right"><a href="#Ideal">151</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. Josiah +Royce, Ph.D., LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Philosophy.</span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>Philosophy: Its Fundamental Conceptions and +its Methods</i></td><td class="right"><a href="#Phil1">173</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. George +Holmes Howison, LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Development of Philosophy in the +Nineteenth Century</i></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Phil2">194</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. George +Trumbull Ladd, D.D., LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Metaphysics.</span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Relations Between Metaphysics and the +Other Sciences</i></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Meta1">227</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. Alfred +Edward Taylor, M.A.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Present Problems of +Metaphysics</i></td><td class="right"><a href="#Meta2">246</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. +Alexander Thomas Ormond, Ph.D., Ll.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Philosophy of +Religion.</span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to +the Other Sciences</i></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Rel1">263</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. Otto +Pfleiderer, D.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>Main Problems of the Philosophy of Religion: +Psychology and Theory Of Knowledge in the Science of +Religion</i></td><td class="right"><a href="#Rel2">275</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. Ernst +Troeltsch, D.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>Some Roots and Factors of +Religion</i></td><td class="right"><a href="#Rel3">289</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. +Alexander T. Ormond.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Logic.</span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Relations of Logic to Other +Disciplines</i></td><td class="right"><a +href="#Logic1">296</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. William +Alexander Hammond, Ph.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Field of Logic</i></td><td +class="right"><a href="#Logic2">313</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. +Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Methodology of +Science.</span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>On the Theory of Science</i></td><td +class="right"><a href="#Theory">333</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. Wilhelm +Ostwald, LL.D.</span><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="indent1"><i>The Content and Validity of the Causal +Law</i></td><td class="right"><a href="#Causal">353</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">By Prof. Benno +Erdmann, Ph.D.</span></td></tr> + +</table> + +<div class="figcenter p4"> + <a name="Rogers"></a> <img src="images/i0022.jpg" + width="374" height="500" alt="Illustration: Howard J. Rogers" + title="Howard J. Rogers" /> + <p class="caption center"><i>HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.</i></p> + +<p class="caption">Howard Jason Rogers, born Stephentown, Rensselaer +Co., N. Y., November 16, 1861; graduated from Williams College, 1884; +admitted to bar, 1877; Superintendent New York State Exhibit World's +Columbian Exposition, 1893; Deputy State Superintendent Public +Institution, 1895-1899; Republican Director Department of Education and +Social Economy of U. S. Commission to Paris Exposition 1900; Chief +Department of Education, St. Louis Exposition, 1904; First. Asst. +Commissioner State Department of Education, N. Y., since 1904, when he +received degree of A.M. from Columbia and degree of LL.D. from +Northwestern University. He is an officer of the Legion of Honor of +France; Chevalier of San Maurice and Lazare, Italy; Chevalier de +l'Etoile Polaire, Sweden; Chevalier Nat. order of Leopold, Belgium; and +officer of the Red Eagle, Germany.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="History"></a>THE HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS</h3> + +<p class="center">BY HOWARD J. ROGERS A.M., LL.D.</p> + +<p class="p2">The forces which bring to a common point the thousandfold +energies of a universal exposition can best promote an international +congress of ideas. Under national patronage and under the spur of +international competition the best products and the latest inventions of +man in science, in literature, and in art are grouped together in +orderly classification. Whether the motive underlying the exhibits be +the promotion of commerce and trade, or whether it be individual +ambition, or whether it be national pride and loyalty, the resultant is +the same. The space within the boundaries of the exposition is a forum +of the nations where equal rights are guaranteed to every representative +from any quarter of the globe, and where the sovereignty of each nation +is recognized whenever its flag floats over a national pavilion or an +exhibit area. The productive genius of every governed people contends in +peaceful rivalry for world recognition, and the exposition becomes an +international clearing-house for practical ideas.</p> + +<p>For the demonstration of the value of these products men thoroughly +skilled in their development and use are sent by the various exhibitors. +The exposition by the logic of its creation thus gathers to itself the +expert representatives of every art and industry. For at least two +months in the exposition period there are present the members of the +international jury of awards, selected specially by the different +governments for their thorough knowledge, theoretical and practical, of +the departments to which they are assigned, and selected further for +their ability to impress upon others the correctness of their views. The +renown of a universal exposition brings, as visitors, students and +investigators bent upon the solution of problems and anxious to know the +latest contributions to the facts and the theories which underlie every +phase of the world's development.</p> + +<p>The material therefore is ready at hand with which to construct the +framework of a conference of parts, or a congress of the whole of any +subject. It was a natural and logical step to accompany the study of the +exhibits with a debate on their excellence, an analysis of their growth, +and an argument for their future. Hence the congress. The exposition and +the congress are correlative terms. The former concentres the visible +products of the brain and hand of man; the congress is the literary +embodiment of its activities.</p> + +<p>Yet it was not till the Paris Exposition of 1889 that the idea of a +series of congresses, international in membership and universal in +scope, was fully developed. The three preceding expositions, Paris, +1878, Philadelphia, 1876, and Vienna, 1873, had held under their +auspices many conferences and congresses, and indeed the germ of the +congress idea may be said to have been the establishment of the +International Scientific Commission in connection with the Paris +Exposition of 1867; but all of these meetings were unrelated and +sometimes almost accidental in their organization, although many were of +great scientific interest and value.</p> + +<p>The success of the series of seventy congresses in Paris in 1889 led +the authorities of the World's Columbian Exposition in 1893 to establish +the World's Congress Auxiliary designed "to supplement the exhibit of +material progress by the Exposition, by a portrayal of the wonderful +achievements of the new age in science, literature, education, +government, jurisprudence, morals, charity, religion, and other +departments of human activity, as the most effective means of increasing +the fraternity, progress, prosperity, and peace of mankind." The +widespread interest in this series of meetings is a matter easily within +recollection, but they were in no wise interrelated to each other, nor +more than ordinarily comprehensive in their scope.</p> + +<p>It remained for the Paris Exposition of 1900 to bring to a perfect +organization this type of congress development. By ministerial decree +issued two years prior to the exposition the conduct of the department +was set forth to the minutest detail. One hundred twenty-five +congresses, each with its separate secretary and organizing committee, +were authorized and grouped under twelve sections corresponding closely +to the exhibit classification. The principal delegate, M. Gariel, +reported to a special commission, which was directly responsible to the +government. The department was admirably conducted and reached as high a +degree of success as a highly diversified, ably administered, but +unrelated system of international conferences could. And yet the +attendance on a majority of these congresses was disappointing, and in +many there was scarcely any one present outside the immediate circle of +those concerned in its development. If this condition could prevail in +Paris, the home of arts and letters, in the immediate centre of the +great constituency of the University and of many scientific circles and +learned societies, and within easy traveling distance of other European +university and literary centres, it was fair to presume that the +usefulness of this class of congress was decreasing. It certainly was +safe to assume, on the part of the authorities of the St. Louis +Exposition of 1904, that such a series could not be a success in that +city, owing to its geographical position and the limited number of +university and scientific circles within a reasonable traveling +distance. Something more than a repetition of the stereotyped form of +conference was admitted to be necessary in order to arouse interest +among scholars and to bring credit to the Exposition.</p> + +<p>This was the serious problem which confronted the Exposition of St. +Louis. No exposition was ever better fitted to serve as the groundwork +of a congress of ideas than that of St. Louis. The ideal of the +Exposition, which was created in time and fixed in place to commemorate +a great historic event, was its educational influence. Its appeal to the +citizens of the United States for support, to the Federal Congress for +appropriations, and to foreign governments for coöperation, was made +purely on this basis. For the first time in the history of expositions +the educational influence was made the dominant factor and the +classification and installation of exhibits made contributory to that +principle. The main purpose of the Exposition was to place within reach +of the investigator the objective thought of the world, so classified as +to show its relations to all similar phases of human endeavor, and so +arranged as to be practically available for reference and study. As a +part of the organic scheme a congress plan was contemplated which should +be correlative with the exhibit features of the Exposition, and whose +published proceedings should stand as a monument to the breadth and +enterprise of the Exposition long after its buildings had disappeared +and its commercial achievements grown dim in the minds of men.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p>The Department of Congresses, to which was to be intrusted this +difficult task, was not formed until the latter part of 1902, although +the question was for a year previous the subject of many discussions and +conferences between the President of the Exposition, Mr. Francis; the +Director of Exhibits, Mr. Skiff; the Chief of the Department of +Education, Mr. Rogers; President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia +University, and President William R. Harper of Chicago University. To +the disinterested and valuable advice of the two last-named gentlemen +during the entire history of the Congress the Exposition is under heavy +obligations. During this period proposals had been made to two men of +international reputation to give all their time for two years to the +organization of a plan of congresses which should accomplish the +ultimate purpose of the Exposition authorities. Neither one, however, +could arrange to be relieved of the pressure of his regular duties, and +the entire scheme of supervision was consequently changed. The plan +adopted was based upon the idea of an advisory board composed of men of +high literary and scientific standing who should consider and recommend +the kind of congress most worthy of promotion, and the details of its +development.</p> + +<p>In November, 1902, Howard J. Rogers, LL.D., was appointed Director of +Congresses, and the members of the Advisory (afterwards termed +Administrative) Board selected as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Chairman: Nicholas Murray Butler, Ph.D.</span>, +LL.D., President Columbia University.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">William R. Harper, Ph.D.</span>, LL.D., President +University of Chicago.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Honorable Frederick W. Holls</span>, A.M., LL.B., +New York.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">R. H. Jesse, Ph.D.</span>, LL.D., President +University of Missouri.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Henry S. Pritchett, Ph.D.</span>, LL.D., +President Massachusetts Institute of Technology.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Herbert Putnam, Litt.D.</span>, LL<ins +title="period missing in original">.</ins>D., Librarian of Congress.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Frederick J. V. Skiff</span>, A.M., Director of +Field Columbian Museum.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>The action of the Executive Committee of the Exposition, approved by +the President, was as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>There shall be appointed by the President of the Exposition Company +a Director of Congresses who shall report to the President of the +Exposition Company.</p> + +<p>There shall be appointed by the President of the Exposition Company +an Advisory Board of seven persons, the chairman to be named by the +President, who shall meet at the call of the Director of Congresses, or +the Chairman of the Advisory Board.</p> + +<p>The expenses of the members of the Advisory Board while on business +of the Exposition shall be a charge against the funds of the Exposition +Company.</p> + +<p>The duties of the said Advisory Board shall be: to consider and make +recommendations to the Director of Congresses on all matters submitted +to them; to determine the number and the extent of the congresses; the +emphasis to be placed upon special features; the prominent men to be +invited to participate; the character of the programmes; and the methods +for successfully carrying out the enterprise.</p> + +<p>There shall be set aside from the Exposition funds for the +maintenance of the congresses the sum of two hundred thousand dollars +($200,000).</p> +</div> + +<p>The standing Committee on Congresses from the Exposition board of +directors was shortly afterwards appointed and was composed of five of +the most prominent men in St. Louis:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Chairman: Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann</span>, +Attorney at Law.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Breckenridge Jones</span>, Banker.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Charles W. Knapp</span>, Editor of <i>The St. +Louis Republic</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">John Schroers</span>, Manager of the <i>Westliche +Post</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A. F. Shapleigh</span>, Merchant.</p> + +<p>To this committee were referred for consideration by the President +all matters of policy submitted by the Director of Congresses. This +committee had jurisdiction over all congress matters, including not only +the Congress of Arts and Science, but also the many miscellaneous +congresses and conventions, and a great part of the success of the +congresses is due to their broad-minded and liberal determination of the +questions laid before them.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">IDEA OF THE CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE</p> + +<p>It is impossible to ascribe the original idea of the Congress of +Arts and Science to any one person. It was a matter of slow growth +from the many conferences which had been held for a year by men +of many occupations, and as finally worked out bore little resemblance +to the original plans under discussion. The germ of the idea may fairly +be said to have been contained in Director Skiff's insistence to the +Executive Committee of the Exposition that the congress work +stand for something more than an unrelated series of independent +gatherings, and that some project be authorized which would at once +be distinctive and of real scientific worth. To support this view +Director Skiff brought the Executive Committee to the view of +expending $200,000, if need be, to insure the project. Starting from +this suggestion many plans were brought forward, but one which +seems to belong of right to the late Honorable Frederick W. Holls, +of New York City, contained perhaps the next recognizable step in +advance. This thought was, briefly, that a series of lectures on +scientific and literary topics by men prominent in their respective +fields be delivered at the Exposition and that the Exposition pay +the speakers for their services. This point was thoroughly discussed +by Mr. Holls and President Butler, and the next step in the evolution +of the Congress was the idea of bringing these lecturers together at +the Exposition at about the same time or all during one month. At +this stage Professor Hugo Münsterberg, who was the guest of Mr. +Holls and an invited participant in the conference, made the important +suggestion that such a series of unrelated lectures, even though +given by most eminent men, would have little or no scientific value, +but that if some relation, or underlying thought, could be introduced +into the addresses, then the best work could be done, which +would be of real value to the scientific world. He further stated that +only in this case would scientific leaders be likely to favor the plan +of a St. Louis congress, as they would feel attracted not so much +through the honorariums to be given for their services as through +the valuable opportunity of developing such a contribution to scientific +thought. Subsequently Professor Münsterberg was asked by +Mr. Holls to formulate his ideas in a manner to be submitted to the +Exposition authorities. This was done in a communication under +date of October 20, 1902, which contained logically presented the +foundation of the plan afterwards worked out in detail. At this +juncture the Department of Congresses was organized, as has been +stated, the Director named, and the Administrative Board appointed, +and on December 27, 1902, the first meeting of the Director with +the Administrative Board took place in New York City.</p> + +<p>A thorough canvass of the subject was made at this meeting and +as a result the following recommendations were made to the Exposition +authorities:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p>(1) That the sessions of this Congress be held within a period +of four weeks, beginning September 15, 1904.</p> + +<p>(2) That the various groups of learned men who may come together +be asked to discuss their several sciences or professions with reference +to some theme of universal human interest, in order that thereby +a certain unity of interest and of action may be had. Under such a +plan the groups of men who come together would thus form sections +of a single Congress rather than separate congresses.</p> + +<p>(3) As a subject which has universal significance, and one likely to +serve as a connecting thread for all of the discussions of the Congress, +the theme "The Progress of Man since the Louisiana Purchase" was +considered by the Administrative Board fit and suggestive. It is +believed that discussions by leaders of thought in the various branches +of pure and applied science, in philosophy, in politics, and in +religion, from the standpoint of man's progress in the century which has +elapsed, would be fruitful, not only in clearing the thoughts of men not +trained in science and in government, but also in preparing the way for +new advances.</p> + +<p>(4) The Administrative Board further recommends that the Congress be +made up from men of thought and of action, whose work would probably +fall under the following general heads:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="indent1"><i>a.</i> The Natural Sciences (such as Astronomy, +Biology, Mathematics, etc.).</p> + +<p class="indent1"><i>b.</i> The Historical, Sociological, and Economic +group of studies (History, Political Economy, etc.).</p> + +<p class="indent1"><i>c.</i> Philosophy and Religion.</p> + +<p class="indent1"><i>d.</i> Medicine and Surgery.</p> + +<p class="indent1"><i>e.</i> Law, Politics, and Government (including +development and history of the colonies, their government, revenue and +prosperity, arbitration, etc.).</p> + +<p class="indent1"><i>f.</i> Applied Science (including the various +branches of engineering).</p> + +<p>(5) The Administrative Board recommends further referring to a +special committee of seven the problem of indicating in detail the +method in which this plan can best be carried out. To this committee is +assigned the duty of choosing the general divisions of the Congress, the +various branches of science and of study in these divisions, and of +recommending to the Administrative Board a detailed plan of the sections +in which, in their judgment, those who come to the Congress may be most +effectively grouped, with a view not only to bring out the central +theme, but also to represent in a helpful way and in a suggestive manner +the present boundary of knowledge in the various lines of study and +investigation which the committee may think wise to accept.</p> + +<p>These recommendations were transmitted by the Director of Congresses +to the Committee on Congresses, approved by them, and afterwards +approved by the Executive Committee and the President. The first four +recommendations were of a preliminary character, but the fifth contained +a distinct advance in the formation of a Committee on Plan and Scope +which should be composed of eminent scientists capable of developing the +fundamental idea into a plan which should harmonize with the scientific +work in every field. The committee selected were as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Dr. Simon Newcomb, Ph.D.</span>, LL.D., Retired +Professor of Mathematics, U. S. Navy.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, Ph.D.</span>, LL.D., +Professor of Psychology, Harvard University.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Prof. John Bassett Moore</span>, LL.D., +ex-assistant Secretary of State, and Professor of International Law and +Diplomacy, Columbia University.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Prof. Albion W. Small, Ph.D.</span>, Professor of +Sociology, University of Chicago.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Dr. William H. Welch</span>, M.D., LL.D., +Professor of Pathology, Johns Hopkins University.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Hon. Elihu Thomson</span>, Consulting Engineer +General Electric Company.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Prof. George F. Moore</span>, D.D., LL.D., +Professor of Comparative Religion, Harvard University.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>In response to a letter from President Butler, Chairman of the +Administrative Board, giving a complete résumé of the growth of the idea +of the Congress to that time, all of the members of the committee, with +the exception of Mr. Thomson, met at the Hotel Manhattan on January 10, +1903, for a preliminary discussion. The entire field was canvassed, +using the recommendations of the Administrative Board and the +aforementioned letter of Professor Münsterberg's to Mr. Holls as a +basis, and an adjournment taken until January 17 for the preparation of +detailed recommendations.</p> + +<p>The Committee on Plan and Scope again met, all members +being present, at the Hotel Manhattan on January 17, and arrived at +definite conclusions, which were embodied in the report to the +Administrative Board, a meeting of which had been called at the Hotel +Manhattan for January 19, 1903. The report of the Committee on Plan and +Scope is of such historic importance in the development of the Congress +that it is given as follows, although many points were afterwards +materially modified:—</p> + +<p class="blockquote justr0 p1"><span class="smcap">New York</span>, +January 19, 1903.</p> + +<p class="blockquote p2">President Nicholas Murray Butler,</p> + +<p class="blockquote indent2ab">Chairman Administrative Board of World's +Congress at</p> + +<p class="blockquote indent4c">The Louisiana Purchase Exposition:</p> + +<p class="blockquote">Dear Sir,—The undersigned, appointed by your +Board a committee on the scope and plan of the proposed World's +Congress, at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, have the honor to submit +the following report:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="blockquote">The authority under which the Committee acted is +found in a communication addressed to its members by the Chairman of the +Administrative Board. A subsequent communication to the Chairman of the +Committee indicated that the widest scope was allowed to it in preparing +its plan. Under this authority the Committee met on January 10, 1903, +and again on January 17. The Committee was, from the beginning, +unanimous in accepting the general plan of the Administrative Board, +that there should be but a single congress, which, however, might be +divided and subdivided, in accord with the general plan, into divisions, +departments, and sections, as its deliberations proceed.</p> + +<p class="p2 smaller center">PLANS OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p class="blockquote">As a basis of discussion two plans were drawn up +by members of the Committee and submitted to it. The one, by Professor +Münsterberg, started from a comprehensive classification and review of +human achievement in advancing knowledge, the other, by Professor Small, +from an equally comprehensive review of the great public questions +involved in human progress.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">Professor Münsterberg proposed a congress having +the definite task of bringing out the unity of knowledge with a view of +correlating the scattered theoretical and practical scientific work of +our day. This plan proposed that the congress should continue through +one week. The first day was to be devoted to the discussion of the most +general problem of knowledge in one comprehensive discussion and four +general divisions. On the second day the congress was to divide into +several groups and on the remaining days into yet more specialized +groups, as set forth in detail in the plan.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">The plan by Professor Small proposed a congress +which would exhibit not merely the scholar's interpretation of progress +in scholarship, but rather the scholar's interpretation of progress in +civilization in general. The proposal was based on a division of human +interests into six great groups:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span><br /> + + I. The Promotion of Health.<br /> + + II. The Production of Wealth.<br /> + +III. The Harmonizing of Human Relations.<br /> + +IV. Discovery and Spread of Knowledge.<br /> + + V. Progress in the Fine Arts.<br /> + +VI. Progress in Religion.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">The plan agreed with the other in beginning with a +general discussion and then subdividing the congress into divisions and +groups.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">As a third plan the Chairman of the Committee +suggested the idea of a congress of publicists and representative men of +all nations and of all civilized peoples, which should discuss relations +of each to all the others and throw light on the question of promoting +the unity and progress of the race.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">After due consideration of these plans the +Committee reached the conclusion that the ends aimed at in the second +and third plans could be attained by taking the first plan as a basis, +and including in its subdivisions, so far as was deemed advisable, the +subjects proposed in the second and third plans. They accordingly +adopted a resolution that "Mr. Münsterberg's plan be adopted as setting +forth the general object of the Congress and defining the scope of its +work, and that Mr. Small's plan be communicated to the General Committee +as containing suggestions as to details, but without recommending its +adoption as a whole."</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">DATE OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p class="blockquote">Your Committee is of opinion that, in view of the +climatic conditions at St. Louis during the summer and early autumn, it +is desirable that the meeting of this general Congress be held during +the six days beginning on Monday, September 19, 1904, and continuing +until the Saturday following. Special associations choosing St. Louis as +their meeting-place may then convene at such other dates as may be +deemed fit; but it is suggested that learned societies whose field is +connected with that of the Congress should meet during the week +beginning September 26.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">The sectional discussions of the Congress will +then be continued by these societies, the whole forming a continuous +discussion of human progress during the last century.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">PLAN OF ADDRESSES</p> + +<p class="blockquote">The Committee believe that in order to carry out +the proposed plan in the most effective way it is necessary that the +addresses be prepared by the highest living authorities in each and +every branch. In the last subdivisions, each section embraces two +papers; one on the history of the subject during the last one hundred +years and the other on the problems of to-day.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">The programme of papers suggested by the Committee +as embraced in Professor Münsterberg's plan may be summarized as +follows:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="blockquote">On the first day four papers will be read on the +general subject, and four on each of the four large divisions, twenty in +all. On the second day those four divisions will be divided into twenty +groups, or departments, each of which will have four papers referring to +the divisions and relations of the sciences, eighty in all. On the last +four days, two papers in each of the 120 sections, 240 in all, thus +making a total of 340 papers.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">In view of the fact that the men who will make the +addresses should not be expected to bear all the expense of their +attendance at the Congress, it seems advisable that the authorities of +the Fair should provide for the expenses necessarily incurred in the +journey, as well as pay a small honorarium for the addresses. The +Committee suggest, therefore, that each American invited be offered $100 +for his traveling expenses and each European $400. In addition to this +that each receive $150 as an honorarium. Assuming that one half of those +invited to deliver addresses will be Americans and one half Europeans, +this arrangement will involve the expenditure of $136,000. This estimate +will be reduced if the same person prepares more than one address. It +will also be reduced if more than half of the speakers are Americans, +and increased in the opposite case.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">As the Committee is not advised of the amount +which the management of the Exposition may appropriate for the purpose +of the Congress, it cannot, at present, enter further into details of +adjustment, but it records its opinion that the sum suggested is the +least by which the ends sought to be attained by the Congress can be +accomplished. To this must be added the expenses of administration and +publication.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">All addresses paid for by the Congress should be +regarded as its property, and be printed and published together, thus +constituting a comprehensive work exhibiting the unity, progress, and +present state of knowledge.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">This plan does not preclude the delivery of more +than one address by a single scholar. The directors of the Exposition +may sometimes find it advisable to ask the same scholar to deliver two +addresses, possibly even three.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">The Committee recommends that full liberty be +allowed to each section of the Congress in arranging the general +character and programme of its discussions within the field +proposed.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">As an example of how the plan will work in the +case of any one section, the Committee take the case of a neurologist +desiring to profit by those discussions which relate to his branch of +medicine. This falls under C of the four main divisions as related to +the physical sciences. His interest on the first day will therefore be +centred in Division C, where he may hear the general discussion of the +physical sciences and the relations to the other sciences. On the second +day he will hear four papers in Group 18 on the Subjects embraced in the +general science of anthropology; one on its fundamental conceptions; one +on its methods and two on the relation of anthropology to the sciences +most closely connected with it. During the remaining four days he will +meet with the representatives of medicine and its related subjects, who +will divide into sections, and listen to four papers in each section. +One paper will consider the progress of that section in the last one +hundred years, one paper will be devoted to the problems of to-day, +leaving room for such contributions and discussions as may seem +appropriate during the remainder of the day.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">COÖPERATION OF LEARNED SOCIETIES +INVOKED</p> + +<p class="blockquote">In presenting this general plan, your Committee +wishes to point out the difficulty of deciding in advance what subjects +should be included in every section. Therefore, the Committee deems it +of the utmost importance to secure the advice and assistance of learned +societies in this country in perfecting the details of the proposed +plan, especially the selection of speakers and the programme of work in +each section. It will facilitate the latter purpose if such societies be +invited and encouraged to hold meetings at St. Louis during the week +immediately preceding, or, preferably, the week following the General +Congress. The selection of speakers should be made as soon as possible, +and, in any case, before the end of the present academic year, in order +that formal invitations may be issued and final arrangements made with +the speakers a year in advance of the Congress.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS</p> + +<p class="blockquote">With the view of securing the coöperation of the +governments and leading scholars of the principal countries of Western +and Central Europe in the proposed Congress, it seems advisable to send +two commissioners to these countries for this purpose. It seems +unnecessary to extend the operations of this commission outside the +European continent or to other than the leading countries. In other +cases arrangements can be made by correspondence.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">It is the opinion of the Committee that an +American of world-wide reputation as a scholar should be selected to +preside over the Congress.</p> + +<p class="blockquote">All which is respectfully submitted.</p> + +<p class="center smaller">(Signed)</p> + +<div class="quotesig smaller"> +<p class="p1"><span class="smcap">Simon Newcomb</span>,</p> + +<p class="quotesigindent">Chairman;</p> + +<p class="p1"><span class="smcap">George F. Moore</span>,</p> + +<p class="p1"><span class="smcap">John B. Moore</span>,</p> + +<p class="p1"><span class="smcap">Hugo Münsterberg</span>,</p> + +<p class="p1"><span class="smcap">Albion W. Small</span>,</p> + +<p class="p1"><span class="smcap">William H. Welch</span>,</p> + +<p class="p1"><span class="smcap">Elihu Thomson</span>,</p> + +<p class="quotesigindent">Committee.</p> +</div> + +<p>The Administrative Board met on January 19 to receive the report of +the Committee on Plan and Scope which was presented by Dr. Newcomb. +Professor Münsterberg and Professor John Bassett Moore were also present +by invitation to discuss the details of the scheme. In the afternoon the +Board went into executive session, and the following recommendations +were adopted and transmitted by the Director of Congresses to the +Committee on Congresses of the Exposition and to the President and +Executive Committee, who duly approved them.</p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>To the Director of Congresses:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p>The Administrative Board have the honor to make the following +recommendations in reference to the Department of Congresses:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p>(1) That there be held in connection with the Universal Exposition of +St. Louis in 1904, an International Congress of Arts and Science.</p> + +<p>(2) That the plan recommended by the Committee on Plan and Scope for +a general congress of Arts and Science, to be held during the six days +beginning on Monday, September 19, 1904, be approved and adopted, +subject to such revision in point of detail as may be advisable, +preserving its fundamental principles.</p> + +<p>(3) That Simon Newcomb, LL.D., of Washington, D. C., be named for +President of the International Congress of Arts and Science, provided +for in the foregoing resolution.</p> + +<p>(4) That Professor Münsterberg, of Harvard University, and Professor +Albion W. Small, of the University of Chicago, be invited to act as +Vice-Presidents of the Congress.</p> + +<p>(5) That the Directors of the World's Fair be requested to change the +name of this Board from the "Advisory Board" to the "Administrative +Board of the International Congress of Arts and Science."</p> + +<p>(6) That the detailed arrangements for the Congress be intrusted to a +committee consisting of the President and two Vice-Presidents already +named, subject to the general oversight and control of the +Administrative Board, and that the Directors of the Exposition be +requested to make appropriate provision for their compensation and +necessary expenses.</p> + +<p>(7) That it be recommended to the Directors of the World's Fair that +appropriate provision should be made in the office of the Department of +Congresses for an executive secretary and such clerical assistance as +may be needed.</p> + +<p>(8) That the following payment be recommended to those scholars who +accept invitations to participate and do a specified piece of work, or +submit a specified contribution in the International Congress of Arts +and Science: For traveling expenses for a European scholar, $500. For +traveling expenses for an American scholar, $150.</p> + +<p>(9) That provision be made for the publication of the proceedings of +the Congress in suitable form to constitute a permanent memorial of the +work of the World's Fair for the promotion of science and art, under +competent editorial supervision.</p> + +<p>(10) That an appropriation of $200,000 be made to cover expenses of +the Department of Congresses, of which sum $130,000 be specifically +appropriated for an International Congress of Arts and Science, and the +remainder to cover all expenses connected with the publication of the +proceedings of said International Congress of Arts and Science, and the +expenses for promotion of all other congresses.</p> </div> + +<p>In addition to the foregoing recommendations, Professor Münsterberg +was requested at his earliest convenience to furnish each member with a +revised plan of his classification, which would reduce as far as +possible the number of sections into which the Congress was finally to +be divided.</p> + +<p>With the adjournment of the Board on January 19 the Congress may be +fairly said to have been launched upon its definite course, and such +changes as were thereafter made in the programme did not in any wise +affect the principle upon which the Congress was based, but were due to +the demands of time, of expediency, and in some cases to the accidents +attending the participation. The organization of the Congress and the +personnel of its officers from this time on remained unchanged, and the +history of the meeting is one of steady and progressive development. The +Committee on Plan and Scope were discharged of their duties, with a vote +of thanks for the laborious and painstaking work which they had +accomplished and the thoroughly scientific and novel plan for an +international congress which they had recommended.</p> + +<p>It was determined by the Administrative Board to keep the services of +three of the members of the Committee on Plan and Scope, who should act +as a scientific organizing committee and who should also be the +presiding officers of the Congress. The choice for President of the +Congress fell without debate to the dean of American scientific circles, +whose eminent services to the Government of the United States and whose +recognized position in foreign and domestic scientific circles made him +particularly fitted to preside over such an international gathering of +the leading scientists of the world, Dr. Simon Newcomb, retired +Professor of Mathematics, United States Navy. Professor Hugo +Münsterberg, of Harvard University, and Professor Albion W. Small, of +the University of Chicago, were designated as the first and second +Vice-Presidents respectively.</p> + +<p>The work of the succeeding spring, with both the Organizing Committee +and the Administrative Board, was devoted to the perfecting of the +programme and the selection of foreign scientists to be invited to +participate in the Congress. The theory of the development of the +programme and its logical bases are fully and forcibly treated by +Professor Münsterberg in the succeeding chapter, and therefore will not +be touched upon in this record of facts. As an illustration of the +growth of the programme, however, it is interesting to compare its form, +which was adopted at the next meeting of the Organizing Committee on +February 23, 1903, in New York City, with its final form as given in the +completed programme presented at St. Louis in September, 1904 (pp. +47-49). No better illustration can be given of the immense amount of +labor and painstaking adjustment, both to scientific and to physical +conditions, and of the admirable adaptability of the original plan to +the exigencies of actual practice. At the meeting of February 23, 1903, +which was attended by all of the members of the Organizing Committee and +by President Butler of the Administrative Board, it was determined that +the number of Departments should be sixteen, with the following +designations:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div> <table border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Departments1"> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>A. NORMATIVE +SCIENCES</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">1.</td><td></td><td class="left">Philosophical +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">2.</td><td></td><td class="left">Mathematical +Sciences.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>B. HISTORICAL +SCIENCES</b><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">3.</td><td></td><td class="left">Political +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">4.</td><td></td><td class="left">Legal +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">5.</td><td></td><td class="left">Economic +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">6.</td><td></td><td class="left">Philological +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">7.</td><td></td><td class="left">Pedagogical +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">8.</td><td></td><td class="left">Æsthetic +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">9.</td><td></td><td class="left">Theological +Sciences.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>C. PHYSICAL +SCIENCES</b><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">10.</td><td></td><td class="left">General Physical +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">11.</td><td></td><td class="left">Astronomical +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">12.</td><td></td><td class="left">Geological +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">13.</td><td></td><td class="left">Biological +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">14.</td><td></td><td class="left">Anthropological +Sciences.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>D. MENTAL +SCIENCES</b><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">15.</td><td></td><td class="left">Psychological +Sciences.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">16.</td><td></td><td class="left">Sociological +Sciences.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>SECTIONS</b><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">1.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Metaphysics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Logic.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Ethics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td +class="left">Æsthetics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">2.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Algebra.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Geometry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Statistical +Methods.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">3.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Classical Political History of Asia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Classical +Political History of Europe.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Medieval +Political History of Europe.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Modern +Political History of Europe.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Political +History of America.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">4.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">History of Roman Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">History of +Common Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td +class="left">Constitutional Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>bb</i></td><td class="left">Criminal +Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>cc</i></td><td class="left">Civil +Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>dd</i></td><td class="left">History of +International Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">5.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">History of Economic Institutions.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">History of +Economic Theories.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Economic +Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td +class="left">Finance.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>bb</i></td><td class="left">Commerce +and Transportation.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>cc</i></td><td +class="left">Labor.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">6.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Indo-Iranian Languages.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Semitic +Languages.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Classical +Languages.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Modern +Languages.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">7.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">History of Education.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td +class="left">Educational Institutions.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">8.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">History of Architecture.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">History of +Fine Arts.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">History of +Music.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Oriental +Literature.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Classical +Literature.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td class="left">Modern +Literature.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td +class="left">Architecture.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>bb</i></td><td class="left">Fine +Arts.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>cc</i></td><td +class="left">Music.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">9.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Primitive Religions.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Asiatic +Religions.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Semitic +Religions.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td +class="left">Christianity.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td class="left">Religious +Institutions.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">10.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Mechanics and Sound.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Light and +Heat.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Electricity.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Inorganic +Chemistry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Organic +Chemistry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td class="left">Physical +Chemistry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td class="left">Mechanical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>bb</i></td><td class="left">Optical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>cc</i></td><td class="left">Electrical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>dd</i></td><td class="left">Chemical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">11.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Theoretical Astronomy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"> <i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Astrophysics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">12.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Geodesy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"> <i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Geology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"> <i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Mineralogy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"> <i>d</i></td><td +class="left">Physiography.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"> <i>e</i></td><td +class="left">Meteorology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td +class="left">Surveying.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>bb</i></td><td +class="left">Metallurgy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">13.</td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Botany.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Plant +Physiology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Ecology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td +class="left">Bacteriology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td +class="left">Zoölogy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td +class="left">Embryology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>g</i></td><td class="left">Comparative +Anatomy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>h</i></td><td +class="left">Physiology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td +class="left">Agronomy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>bb</i></td><td class="left">Veterinary +Medicine.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">14.</td><td></td><td class="left">Anthropological +Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">Human +Anatomy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Human +Physiology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Neurology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Physical +Chemistry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td +class="left">Pathology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td +class="left">Raceomatology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td +class="left">Hygiene.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>bb</i></td><td class="left">Contagious +Diseases.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>cc</i></td><td class="left">Internal +Medicine.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>dd</i></td><td +class="left">Surgery.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>ee</i></td><td +class="left">Gynecology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>ff</i></td><td +class="left">Ophthalmology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>gg</i></td><td +class="left">Therapeutics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>hh</i></td><td +class="left">Dentistry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">15.</td><td></td><td class="left">Psychological +Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">General +Psychology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Experimental Psychology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Comparative +Psychology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Child +Psychology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Abnormal +Psychology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">16.</td><td></td><td class="left">Sociological +Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">Social +Morphology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Social +Psychology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Laws of +Civilization.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Laws of +Language and Myths.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td +class="left">Ethnology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>aa</i></td><td class="left">Social +Technology.</td></tr> + +</table></div> + +<p>It was also resolved, that the discussion of subjects falling under +the first four divisions should be held in the forenoon of each of the +four days, from Wednesday until Saturday, and those relating to the +three divisions of Practical Science in the afternoon of the same days. +The programme was thus rearranged by the addition of the following:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div> <table border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="10" +summary="Departments2"> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>E. UTILITARIAN +SCIENCES</b><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">17.</td><td></td><td class="left">Medical +Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Hygiene.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Sanitation.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Contagious +Diseases.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Internal +Medicine.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td +class="left">Psychiatry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td +class="left">Surgery.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>g</i></td><td +class="left">Gynecology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>h</i></td><td +class="left">Ophthalmology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>i</i></td><td +class="left">Otology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>j</i></td><td +class="left">Therapeutics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>k</i></td><td +class="left">Dentistry.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">18.</td><td></td><td class="left">Practical +Economic Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">Extractive +Productions of Wealth.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Transportation.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Commerce.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Postal +Service.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Money and +Banking.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">19.</td><td></td><td class="left">Technological +Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">Mechanical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Electrical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Chemical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Optical +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td +class="left">Surveying.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td +class="left">Metallurgy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>g</i></td><td +class="left">Agronomy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>h</i></td><td class="left">Veterinary +Medicine.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>F. REGULATIVE +SCIENCES</b><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">20.</td><td></td><td class="left">Practical +Political Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">Internal +Practical Politics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">National +Practical Politics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Tariff.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td +class="left">Taxation.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Municipal +Practical Politics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td class="left">Colonial +Practical Politics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">21.</td><td></td><td class="left">Practical Legal +Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">International Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td +class="left">Constitutional Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Criminal +Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Civil +Law.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">22.</td><td></td><td class="left">Practical Social +Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">Treatment +of the Poor.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Treatment +of the Defective.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td class="left">Treatment +of the Dependent.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Treatment +of Vice and Crime.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Problems of +Labor.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td class="left">Problems of +the Family.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><b>G. CULTURAL +SCIENCES</b><p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">23.</td><td></td><td class="left">Practical +Educational Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Kindergarten and Home.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Primary +Education.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Universities and Research—Secondary.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Moral +Education.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>e</i></td><td class="left">Æsthetic +Education.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>f</i></td><td class="left">Manual +Training.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>g</i></td><td +class="left">University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>h</i></td><td +class="left">Libraries.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>i</i></td><td +class="left">Museums.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>j</i></td><td +class="left">Publications.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">24.</td><td></td><td class="left">Practical +Æsthetic Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td +class="left">Architecture.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Fine +Arts.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Music.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Landscape +Architecture.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">25.</td><td></td><td class="left">Practical +Religious Sciences:</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>a</i></td><td class="left">Religious +Education.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>b</i></td><td class="left">Training +for Religious Service.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>c</i></td><td +class="left">Missions.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="right"><i>d</i></td><td class="left">Religious +Influence.</td></tr> + +</table></div> + +<p>The programme was again thoroughly revised at the meeting of the +Organizing Committee on April 9, 1903, at Hotel Manhattan, and as thus +amended was submitted to the Administrative Board at a meeting held in +New York on April 11. A careful consideration of the programme at this +meeting, and a final revision made at the meeting of the Administrative +Board at the St. Louis Club April 30, 1903, brought it practically into +its final shape, with such minor changes as were found necessary in the +latter days of the Congress due to the unexpected declinations of +foreign speakers at the last moment. The continuous and exacting work +done in perfecting the programme by each member of the Organizing +Committee and by the Chairman of the Administrative Board deserves +special mention, and was productive of the best results by its logical +appeal to the scientific world. The programme as finally worked out in +orderly detail, shortened in many departments by various exigencies, may +be found on pages 47 to 49 of this volume.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT</p> + +<p>The general plan of the Congress having been determined and the +programme practically perfected by May 1, 1903, two most important +questions demanded the attention of the Administrative Board: first, the +participation in the Congress, both foreign and domestic; second, the +support of the scientific public. At a meeting of the Board held in New +York City April 11, 1903, these points were given full consideration. It +was determined that the list of speakers both foreign and domestic +should be made up on the advice of men of letters and of scientific +thought in this country, and accordingly there was sent to the officers +of the various scientific societies in the United States, to heads of +university departments and to every prominent exponent of science and +art in this country, a printed announcement and tentative programme of +the Congress, and a letter asking advice as to the scientists best +fitted in view of the object of the Congress to prepare an address. From +the hundreds of replies received in response to this appeal were made up +the original lists of invited speakers, and only those were placed +thereon who were the choice of a fair majority of the representatives of +the particular science under selection. The Administrative Board +reserved to itself the full right to reject any of these names or to +change them so as to promote the best interests of the Congress, but in +nearly every instance it would be safe to say that the person selected +was highly satisfactory to the great majority of his fellow scientists +in this country. Many changes were unavoidably made at the last moment +to meet the situation caused by withdrawals and declinations, but the +list of second choices was so complete, and in many cases there was such +a delicate balance between the first and second choice, that there was +no difficulty in keeping the standard of the programme to its original +high plane.</p> + +<p>It was early determined that the seven Division speakers and the +forty-eight Department speakers, which occupied the first two days of +the programme, should be Americans, and that these Division and +Department addresses should be a contribution of American scholarship to +the general scientific thought of the world. This decision commended +itself to the scientific public both at home and abroad, and it was so +carried out. It was further determined that the Division and Department +speakers and the foreign speakers should be selected during the summer +of 1903, and that the American participation in the Section addresses +should be determined after it was definitely known what the foreign +participation would be. In view of the importance of the Congress, it +was deemed inadvisable to attempt to interest foreign scientific circles +by correspondence, and it was further decided to pay a special +compliment to each invited speaker by sending an invitation at the hands +of special delegates. Arrangements were therefore made for Dr. Newcomb +and Professors Münsterberg and Small to proceed to Europe during the +summer of 1903, and to present in person to the scientific circles of +Europe and to the scientists specially desired to deliver addresses the +complete plan and scope of the Congress and an invitation to +participate.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">INVITATIONS TO FOREIGN SPEAKERS</p> + +<p>The members of the Organizing Committee, armed with very strong +credentials from the State Department to the diplomatic service abroad, +sailed in the early summer of 1903 to present the invitation of the +Exposition to the selected scientists. Dr. Newcomb sailed May 6, +Professor Münsterberg May 30, and Professor Small June 6. A general +interest in the project had at this time become aroused, and there was +assured a respectful hearing. Both the President of the United States +and the Emperor of Germany expressed their warm interest in the plan, +and the State Department at Washington gave to the Congress both on this +occasion and on succeeding occasions its effective aid. The Director of +Congresses wishes to express his obligations both to the late Secretary +Hay and to Assistant-Secretary Loomis for their valuable suggestions and +courteous coöperation in all matters relating to the foreign +participation. Strong support was also given the Committee and the plan +of the Congress by Commissioner-General Lewald of Germany, and +Commissioner-General Lagrave of France. Throughout the entire Congress +period, both of these energetic Commissioners-General placed themselves +actively at the disposition of the Department in promoting the +attendance of scientists from their respective countries.</p> + +<p>Geographically the division between the three members of the +Organizing Committee gave to Dr. Newcomb, France; to Professor +Münsterberg, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; and to Professor Small, +England, Russia, Italy, and a part of Austria. It was also agreed that +Dr. Newcomb should have special oversight of the departments of +Mathematics, Physics, Astronomy, Biology, and Technology; Professor +Münsterberg, special charge of Philosophy, Philology, Art, Education, +Psychology, and Medicine; and that Professor Small should look after +Politics, Law, Economics, Theology, Sociology, and Religion. The +Committee worked independently of each other, but met once during the +summer at Munich to compare results and to determine their closing +movements.</p> + +<p>The public and even the Exposition authorities have probably never +realized the delicacy and the extremely careful adjustment exercised by +the Organizing Committee in their summer's campaign. Scientists are as a +class sensitive, jealous of their reputations, and loath to undertake +long journeys to a distant country for congress purposes. The amount of +labor devolving upon the Committee to find the scientists scattered over +all Europe; the careful and painstaking presentation to each of the plan +of the Congress; the appeal to their scientific pride; the hearing of a +thousand objections, and the answering of each; the disappointments +incurred; the substitutions made necessary at the last moment;—all +sum up a task of the greatest difficulty and of enormous labor. The +remarkable success with which the mission was crowned stands out the +more prominently in view of these conditions. When the Committee +returned in the latter part of September, they had visited every +important country of Europe, delivered more than one hundred fifty +personal invitations, and for the one hundred twenty-eight sections had +secured one hundred seventeen acceptances.</p> + +<p>At a meeting of the Administrative Board, which met with the +Organizing Committee on October 13, 1903, a full report of the European +trip was received and ways and means considered for insuring the +attendance from abroad. A list of the foreign acceptances was ordered +printed at once for general distribution, and the Chairman of the +Administrative Board was requested to address a letter to each of the +foreign scientists confirming the action of the special delegates and +giving additional information as to the length of addresses, and rules +and details governing the administration of the Congress.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">DEATH OF FREDERICK W. HOLLS</p> + +<p>The number of the Administrative Board was decreased during the +summer by the sudden death of the Hon. Frederick W. Holls, on July 23, +1903. Mr. Holls had been intensely interested in the development of the +Congress from its earliest days, and was very instrumental in +determining the form in which it was finally promoted. His great +influence abroad as a member of the Hague Conference, and his high +standing in legal and literary circles in this country, rendered him one +of the most prominent members of the Board. A resolution of regret at +his untimely death was spread upon the minutes of the Administrative +Board at the meeting in October, and it was decided that his place upon +the Board should remain unfilled.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">DOMESTIC PARTICIPATION</p> + +<p>At this same meeting of October 13, active measures were taken to +forward the American participation in the Congress. The necessity was +now very evident that our strongest men of science must be induced to +take part, in order to compare favorably with the leading minds which +Europe was sending. The Organizing Committee were instructed to consult +the American scientific societies and associations regarding the +selection of American speakers, and also in reference to presiding +officials for each section. Six weeks was considered sufficient for this +task, and the Committee were asked to submit to the Administrative Board +at a meeting in New York, on December 3 and 4, their recommendations for +American speakers.</p> + +<p>An immense amount of detailed labor, in the way of correspondence, +now devolved upon the Organizing Committee as well as upon the Director +of Congresses, and a branch office was established in Washington +equipped with clerks and stenographers under the charge of Dr. Newcomb, +who devoted the greater portion of his time for the next six months to +the many details connected with the selection of foreign and American +speakers and chairmen. The meeting of the Administrative Board in New +York in December, and a similar meeting with the Organizing Committee +held at the St. Louis Club on December 28, were given over entirely to +perfecting the personnel of the programme. Great care was exerted in +selecting the chairmen of the departments and sections, inasmuch as they +must be men of international reputation and conceded strength. For the +secretaryships younger men of promise and ability were selected, chiefly +from university circles. Both the chairmen and secretaries served +without compensation.</p> + +<p>The work of the late winter was a continuance of the perfecting of +details, and at a meeting of the Administrative Board held in New York +in February, 1904, a final approval was given to the programme and the +speakers. The imminent approach of the Exposition and the work of the +college commencement season made it impossible for further general +meetings, and on June 1 the Organizing Committee was constituted a +committee with power to fill vacancies in the programme or to amend the +programme as circumstances might demand. All suggestions with reference +to details were to be made directly to the Director of Congresses, upon +whom devolved from this time forward the entire executive control of the +Congress.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">ASSEMBLY HALLS</p> + +<p>The highly diversified nature of the Congress and the holding of one +hundred twenty-eight section meetings in four days' time rendered +necessary a large number of meeting-places centrally located. The +Exposition was fortunate in having the use of the new plant of the +Washington University, nine large buildings of which had been erected. +Many of these buildings contained lecture halls and assembly rooms, +seating from one hundred fifty to fifteen hundred people. Sixteen halls +were necessary to accommodate the full number of sections running at any +one time, and of this number twelve were available in the group of +University Buildings; the other four were found in the lecture halls of +the Education Building, Mines and Metallurgy Building, Agriculture +Building, and the Transportation Building. The opening exercises, at +which the entire Congress was assembled, was held in Festival Hall, +capable of seating three thousand people. In the assignment of halls +care was taken so far as possible to assign the larger halls to the more +popular subjects, but it often happened that a great speaker was of +necessity assigned to a smaller hall. Two of the halls also proved bad +for speaking owing to the traffic of the Intramural Railway, and there +was lacking in nearly all of the halls that academic peace and quiet +which usually surrounds gatherings of a scientific nature. This, +however, was to be expected in an exposition atmosphere, and was readily +acquiesced in by the speakers themselves, and very little objection was +heard to the halls as assigned. Every one seemed to recognize the fact +that the immediate value of the meeting lay in the commingling and +fellowship, and that the addresses, of which one could hear at most only +one in sixteen, could not be judged in the proper light until their +publication.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">SUPPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC PUBLIC</p> + +<p>A strong effort was made by the Organizing Committee to secure the +attendance of an audience which should not only in its proportions be +complimentary to the eminence of the speakers, but also be thoroughly +appreciative of the addresses and conversant with the topic under +discussion. Letters were therefore sent to all of the prominent +scientific societies in the United States, asking that wherever possible +the meetings of the society be set for the Congress week in St. Louis, +and wherever this was not possible that the societies send special +delegates to attend the Congress, and urge their membership to make an +effort to be present. Personal letters were also sent to the leading +members of the different professions and sciences, to the faculties of +universities and colleges, urging them to attend, and pointing out the +necessity of the support of the American scientific public.</p> + +<p>Special invitations were also sent in the name of the Organizing +Committee to the leading authorities of the various subjects under +discussion in the Congress, asking them to contribute a ten-minute paper +to any section in which they were particularly interested. The result of +this careful campaign, in addition to the general exploitation which the +Congress received, was such a flattering attendance of American +scientists, as to be both a compliment to the European speakers and a +benefit to scientific thought. Many societies, such as the American +Neurological Association, American Philological Association, American +Mathematical Society, Physical and Chemical Societies of America, +American Astronomical Society, Germanic Congress, American +Electro-Therapeutic Association, held their annual meetings during the +week of the Congress, although the date rendered it impossible for the +majority of the associations to meet at that time. The eighth +International Geographic Congress adjourned from Washington to St. Louis +to meet with the Congress of Arts and Science. In response to the +special invitations, two hundred forty-seven ten-minute addresses were +promised and one hundred two actually read.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">RECEPTION OF FOREIGN GUESTS</p> + +<p>Every effort was made by the Department of Congresses to assist the +foreign speakers in their traveling arrangements and to make matters as +easy and comfortable as possible. A letter of advice was mailed to each +speaker prior to his departure, carefully setting forth the conditions +of American travel, routes to be followed, reception committees to be +met, and other essential details. The official badge of the Congress was +also mailed, so that those wearing them might be easily identified by +the reception committees both in New York and St. Louis. Nine tenths of +the speakers came by the way of New York, and in order to facilitate the +clearance of their baggage and to provide for their fitting +entertainment in New York, a special reception committee was formed +composed of the following members:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="indent2a">F. P. Keppel, Columbia University, New York City, +Chairman.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. Herbert V. Abbott, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">R. Arrowsmith, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">C. William Beebe, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">George Bendelari, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Edward W. Berry, Passaic.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">J. Fuller Berry, Old Forge.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Rev. H. C. Birckhead, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. James H. Canfield, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Rev. G. A. Carstenson, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. H. S. Crampton, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Sanford L. Cutler, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Israel Davidson, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">William H. Davis, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. James C. Egbert, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Haven Emerson, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. T. S. Fiske, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">J. D. Fitz-Gerald, II, Newark.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">W. D. Forbes, Hoboken.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Clyde Furst, Yonkers.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">William K. Gregory, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">George C. O. Haas, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. W. A. Hervey, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Carl Herzog, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Robert Hoguet, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Percy Hughes, Brooklyn.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. A. V. W. Jackson, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Albert J. W. Kern, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. Charles F. Kroh, Orange.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. George F. Kunz, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. L. A. Lousseaux, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Frederic L. Luqueer, Brooklyn.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">R. A. V. Minckwitz, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Charles A. Nelson, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Harry B. Penhollow, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. E. D. Perry, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">John Pohlman, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Ernest Richard, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. K. E. Richter, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Edward Russ, Hoboken.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. C. L. Speranza, Oak Ridge.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. Francis H. Stoddard, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Anthony Spitzka, Goodground.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Harvey W. Thayer, Brooklyn.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Prof. H. A. Todd, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. E. M. Wahl, New York.</p> + +<p class="indent2c">Prof. F. H. Wilkens, New York.</p> + +<p>To each foreign speaker was extended the courtesies of the Century +and the University clubs while remaining in New York City. Mention +should also be made of the assistance of the Treasury Department and of +the courtesy of Collector of the Port, Hon. N. N. Stranahan, through +whom special privileges of the Port were extended to the members of the +Congress. The work of the reception committee was most satisfactorily +and efficiently performed, and was highly appreciated by the foreign +guests. Special acknowledgment is due Mr. F. P. Keppel, of Columbia +University, for his painstaking and efficient management of the affairs +of the committee in New York. Many of the speakers proceeded singly to +St. Louis, stopping at various places, but the great majority went +directly to the University of Chicago, where they were entertained +during the week preceding the Congress by President Harper and Professor +Small, of the University of Chicago. The arrivals at St. Louis were made +on Saturday the 17th and Sunday the 18th of September. Many of the +participants had arrived at earlier dates, and fully twenty of the +speakers were members of the International Jury of Awards for their +respective countries, and had been in St. Louis since September 1, the +beginning of the Jury work.</p> + +<p>A reception committee similar to that in New York was also formed at +St. Louis from the members of the University Club, and their duties were +to meet all incoming trains and conduct the members of the Congress +personally to their stopping-places, and assist them in all matters of +detail. This committee was comprised of the following members, nearly +all of the University Club, who performed their work efficiently and +enthusiastically to the great satisfaction of the Exposition and to the +thorough appreciation of the foreign guests:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="indent2a">V. M. Porter, Chairman,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">E. H. Angert,</p><p class="indent12a">St. Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Gouverneur Calhoun,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">W. M. Chauvenet,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">H. G. Cleveland,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. M. B. Clopton,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Walter Fischel,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">W. L. R. Gifford,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">E. M. Grossman,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">L. W. Hagerman,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Louis La Beaume,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Carl H. Lagenburg,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Sears Lehmann,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">G. F. Paddock,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">T. G. Rutledge,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Luther Ely Smith,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">J. Clarence Taussig,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">C. E. L. Thomas,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">W. M. Tompkins,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">G. T. Weitzel,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Tyrrell Williams,</p><p class="indent12a">St. +Louis.</p> + +<p>The itinerary of the foreign speakers after leaving St. Louis at the +end of the Congress took them on appointed trains to Washington, where +they were given an official reception by President Roosevelt and a +reception by Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress. From here +they proceeded to Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., where they were +given a reception by Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, and were entertained as +guests of Harvard University. Thence the great majority of the speakers +returned to New York, where they were the guests of Columbia University, +and were given a farewell dinner by the Association of Old German +Students. Many of the speakers, however, visited other portions of the +country before returning to Europe.</p> + +<p>The foreign speakers while in St. Louis were considered the guests of +the Exposition Company, and were relieved from all care and expense for +rooms and entertainment. Those who were accompanied by their wives and +daughters were entertained by prominent St. Louis families, and those +who came singly were quartered in the dormitory of the Washington +University, which was set aside for this purpose during the week of the +Congress. The dormitory arrangement proved a very happy circumstance, as +nearly one hundred foreign and American scientists of the highest rank +were thrown in contact, much after the fashion of their student days, +and thoroughly enjoyed the novelty and fellowship of the plan. The +dormitory contained ninety-six rooms newly fitted up with much care and +with all modern conveniences. Light breakfasts were served in the rooms, +and special service provided at the call of the occupants. The situation +of the dormitory also in the Exposition grounds in close proximity to +the assembly halls was highly appreciated, and although at times there +were minor matters which did not run so smoothly, the almost unanimous +expression of the guests of the Exposition was one of delight and +appreciation of the arrangements. Special mention ought in justice to be +made to those residents of St. Louis who sustained the time-honored name +of the city for hospitality and courtesy by entertaining those foreign +members of the Congress who were accompanied by the immediate members of +their family. They were as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="indent2a">Dr. C. Barek</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. William Bartlett</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Judge W. F. Boyle</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Robert Brookings</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mrs. J. T. Davis</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Samuel Dodd</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. L. D. Dozier</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. W. E. Fischel</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Louis Fusz</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. August Gehner</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. M. A. Goldstein</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Charles H. Huttig</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Ernest Jonas</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. R. McKittrick Jones</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. F. W. Lehmann</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Robert Luedeking</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Edward Mallinckrodt</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. George D. Markham</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Thomas McKittrick</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Theodore Meier</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. S. J. Niccolls</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. W. F. Nolker</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. S. J. Schwab</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Henry Schwartz</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Corwin H. Spencer</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. William Taussig</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. G. H. Tenbroek</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Dr. Herman Tuholske</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hon. Rolla Wells</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Edwards Whitaker</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Mr. Charles Wuelfing</p> + +<p class="indent2c">Mr. Max Wuelfing.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">DETAIL OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p>The immense amount of detail work which devolved upon the Department +in the matter of preparing halls for the meetings, receiving guests, +providing for their comfort, issuing the programmes, managing the detail +of the receptions, banquets, invitations, etc., providing for +registration, payment of honorariums, and furnishing information on +every conceivable topic, rendered necessary the formation of a special +bureau which was placed in charge of Dr. L. O. Howard of Washington, D. +C., as Executive Secretary. Dr. Howard's long experience as Secretary of +the American Association for the Advancement of Science rendered him +particularly well qualified to assume this laborious and thankless task. +By mutual arrangement the Director of Congresses and the Executive +Secretary divided the field of labor. The Director had, in addition to +the general oversight of the Congress, special supervision of the local +reception committee, the entertainment of the guests, official banquets +and entertainments, and all financial details. The Executive Secretary +took entire charge of the programme, assignment of rooms in the +dormitory, care and supervision of the dormitory, assignment of halls +for speakers, registration books and bureau of information. Dr. Howard +arrived on September 1 to begin his duties, and remained until September +30.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">WEEK OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p>The opening session of the Congress was set for Monday afternoon. +September 19, at 2.30 o'clock in Festival Hall. The main programme of +the Congress began Tuesday morning. The sessions were held in the +mornings and afternoons, the evenings being left free for social +affairs. The list of functions authorized in honor of the Congress of +Arts and Science were as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p>Monday evening, September 19, grand fête night in honor of the guests +of the Congress, with special musical programme about the Grand Basin +and lagoons, boat rides and lagoon fête; this function was unfortunately +somewhat marred by inclement weather. It was the only evening free in +the entire week, however, for members of the Congress to witness the +illuminations and decorative evening effects.</p> + +<p>Banquet given by the St. Louis Chemical Society at the Southern Hotel +to members of the chemical sections of the Congress.</p> + +<p>Tuesday evening, September 20, general reception by the Board of Lady +Managers to the officers and speakers of the Congress and Officials of +the Exposition.</p> + +<p>Wednesday afternoon, September 21, garden fête given to the members +of the Congress at the French National Pavilion by the +Commissioner-General from France. The gardens of the miniature Grand +Trianon were never more beautiful than on this brilliant afternoon, and +the presence of the Garde Républicaine band and the entire official +representation of the Exposition, lent a color and spirit to the affair +unsurpassed during the Exposition period.</p> + +<p>Wednesday evening, reception by the Imperial German +Commissioner-General to the officers and speakers of the Congress and +the officials of the Exposition, at the German State House. The +magnificent hospitality which characterized this building during the +entire Exposition period was fairly outdone on this occasion, and the +function stands prominent as one of the brilliant successes of the +Exposition period.</p> + +<p>Thursday evening, September 22, Shaw banquet at the Buckingham Club +to the foreign delegates and officers of the Congress. Through the +courtesy of the trustees of Shaw's Garden and of the officers of +Washington University, the annual banquet provided for men of science, +letters, and affairs, by the will of Henry B. Shaw, founder of the +Missouri Botanical Gardens, was given during this week as a compliment +to the noted foreign scientists who were the guests of the city of St. +Louis.</p> + +<p>Friday evening, September 23, official banquet given by the +Exposition to the speakers and officials of the Congress and the +officials of the Exposition, in the banquet hall of the Tyrolean +Alps.</p> + +<p>Saturday evening, September 24, banquet at the St. Louis Club given +by the Round Table of St. Louis, to the foreign members of the Congress. +The Round Table is a literary club which meets at banquet six times +annually for discussion of topics of interest to the literary and +scientific world.</p> + +<p>Banquet given by the Imperial Commissioner-General from Japan to the +Japanese delegation to the Congress and to the Exposition officials and +Chiefs of Departments.</p> + +<p>Dinner given by Commissioner-General from Great Britain to the +English members of the Congress.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">OPENING OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p>The assembling of the Congress on the afternoon of September 19, in +the magnificent auditorium of Festival Hall which crowned Cascade Hill +and the Terrace of States, was marked with simple ceremonies and +impressive dignity. The great organ pealed the national hymns of the +countries participating and closed with the national anthem of the +United States. In the audience were the members of the Congress +representing the selected talent of the world in their field of +scientific endeavor, and about them were grouped an audience drawn from +every part of the United States to promote by their presence the success +of the Congress and to do honor to the noted personages who were the +guests of the Exposition and of the Nation. On the stage were seated the +officials of the Congress, the honorary vice-presidents from foreign +nations, and the officials of the Exposition.</p> + +<p>At the appointed hour the Director of Congresses, Dr. Howard J. +Rogers, called the meeting to order, and outlined in a few words the +object of the Congress, welcomed the foreign delegates, and presented +the members, both foreign and American, to the President of the +Exposition, Hon. David R. Francis.</p> + +<p>The President spoke as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> <p>What an ambitious undertaking is a universal +exposition! But how worthy it is of the highest effort! And, if +successful, how far-reaching are its results, how lasting its benefits! +Who shall pass judgment on that success? On what evidence, by what +standards shall their verdicts be formed? The development of society, +the advancement of civilization, involve many problems, encounter many +and serious difficulties, and have met with deplorable reactions which +decades and centuries were required to repair. The proper study of +mankind is man, and any progress in science that ignores or loses sight +of his welfare and happiness, however admirable and wonderful such +progress may be, disturbs the equilibrium of society.</p> + +<p>The tendency of the times toward centralization or unification is, +from an economic standpoint, a drifting in the right direction, but the +piloting must be done by skillful hands, under the supervision and +control of far-seeing minds, who will remember that the masses are human +beings whose education and expanding intelligence are constantly +broadening and emphasizing their individuality. A universal exposition +affords to its visitors, and these who systematically study its exhibits +and its phases, an unequaled opportunity to view the general progress +and development of all countries and all races. Every line of human +endeavor is here represented.</p> + +<p>The conventions heretofore held on these grounds and many planned to +be held—aggregating over three hundred—have been confined in +their deliberations to special lines of thought or activity. This +international congress of arts and sciences is the most comprehensive in +its plan and scope of any ever held, and is the first of its kind. The +lines of its organization, I shall leave the Director of Exhibits, who +is also a member of the administrative board of this congress, to +explain. You who are members are already advised as to its scope, and +your almost universal and prompt acceptance of the invitations extended +to you to participate, implies an approval which we appreciate, and +indicates a willingness and a desire to coöperate in an effort to bring +into intelligent and beneficial correlation all branches of science, all +lines of thought. You need no argument to convince you of the eminent +fitness of making such a congress a prominent feature of a universal +exposition in which education is the dominant feature.</p> + +<p>The administrative board and the organizing committee have discharged +their onerous and responsible tasks with signal fidelity and ability, +and the success that has rewarded their efforts is a lasting monument to +their wisdom. The management of the Exposition tenders to them, +collectively and individually, its grateful acknowledgments. The +membership in this congress represents the world's elect in research and +in thought. The participants were selected after a careful survey of the +entire field; no limitations of national boundaries or racial +affiliations have been observed. The Universal Exposition of 1904, the +city of St. Louis, the Louisiana territory whose acquisition we are +celebrating, the entire country, and all participating in or visiting +this Exposition are grateful for your coming, and feel honored by your +presence.</p> + +<p>We are proud to welcome you to a scene where are presented the best +and highest material products of all countries and of every +civilization, participated in by all peoples, from the most primitive to +the most highly cultured—a marker in the progress of the world, +and of which the International Congress of Arts and Science is the +crowning feature.</p> + +<p>May the atmosphere of this universal exposition, charged as it is +with the restless energies of every phase of human activity and +permeated by that ineffable sentiment of universal brotherhood +engendered by the intelligent sons of God, congregating for the friendly +rivalries of peace, inspire you with even higher thoughts—imbue +you with still broader sympathies, to the end that by your future labors +you may be still more helpful to the human race and place your fellow +men under yet deeper obligations.</p> </div> + +<p>Director Frederick J. V. Skiff was then introduced by the President +as representing the Division of Exhibits, whose untiring labors had +filled the magnificent Exposition palaces surrounding the Festival Hall +with the visible products of those sciences and arts, the theory, +progress, and problems of which the Congress was assembled to +consider.</p> + +<p>Mr. Skiff spoke as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>The division of exhibits of the Universal Exposition of 1904 has +looked forward to this time, when the work it has performed is to be +reviewed and discussed by this distinguished body. I do not, of course, +intend to convey the idea that the international congress is to inspect +or criticise the exhibitions, but I do mean to say that the +deliberations of this organization are contemporaneous with and share +the responsibility for the accomplishments of which the exhibitions made +are the visible evidences.</p> + +<p>The great educational yield of a universal exposition comes from the +intellectual more than from the mechanical processes. It is the material +condition of the times. It is as well the duty of the responsible +authorities to go yet further and record the thoughts and theories, the +investigations, experiments, and observations of which these material +things are the tangible results.</p> + +<p>A congress of arts and science, whose membership is drawn from all +educational as well as geographical zones, not only accounts for and +analyzes the philosophy of conditions, but points the way for further +advance along the lines consistent with demonstration. Its contribution +to the hour is at once a history and a prophecy.</p> + +<p>The extent to which the deliberations and utterances of this congress +may regulate the development of society or give impulse to succeeding +generations, it is impossible to estimate, but not unreasonable to +anticipate. The plans of the congress matured in the minds of the best +scholars; the classification of its purpose, the scope, the selection of +its distinguished participants, gave to the hopes and ambitions of the +management of the Exposition inspiration of a most exalted degree. At +first these ambitions were—not without reason—regarded as +too high. The plane upon which the congress had been inaugurated, the +aim, the broad intent, seemed beyond the merits, if not beyond the +capacity, of this hitherto not widely recognized intellectual centre. +But the courage of the inception, the loftiness of the purpose, appealed +so profoundly to the toilers for truth and the apostles of fact, that we +find gathered here to-day in the heart of the new Western continent the +great minds whose impress on society has rendered possible the +intellectual heights to which this age has ascended and now beckon +forward the students of the world to limitless possibilities.</p> + +<p>While international congresses of literature, science, art, and +industry have been accomplished by previous expositions, yet to classify +and select the topics in sympathy with the classification and +installation of the exhibits material is a step considerably in advance +of the custom. The men who build an exposition must by temperament, if +not by characteristic, be educators. They must be in sympathy with the +welfare of humanity and its higher destiny. The exhibitions at this +Exposition are not the haphazard gatherings of convenient material, but +the outline of a plan to illustrate the productiveness of mankind at +this particular time, carefully digested, thoroughly thought out, and +conscientiously executed. The exhibit, therefore, in each of the +departments of the classification, as well as in the groups of the +different departments, are of such character, and so arranged as to +reflect the best that the world can do along departmental lines, and the +best that different peoples can do along group lines. The congresses +accord with the exhibits, and the exhibits give expression to the +congresses.</p> + +<p>Education has been the keynote of this Exposition. Were it not for +the educational idea, the acts of government providing vast sums of +money for the up-building of this Exposition would have been impossible. +This congress reflects one idea vastly outstripping others, and that is, +in the unity of thought in the universal concert of purpose. It is the +first time, I believe, that there has been an international gathering of +the authorities of all the sciences, and in that respect the congress +initiates and establishes the universal brotherhood of scholars.</p> + +<p>A thought uncommunicated is of little value. An unrecorded +achievement is not an asset of society. The real lasting value of this +congress will consist of the printed record of its proceedings. The +delivery of the addresses, reaching and appealing to, as must +necessarily be the case, a very limited number of people, can be +considered as only a method of reaching the lasting and perpetual good +of civilization.</p> + +<p>In just the degree that this Exposition in its various divisions +shall make a record of accomplishments, and lead the way to further +advance, this enterprise has reached the expectations of its +contributors and the hopes of its promoters. This congress is the peak +of the mountain that this Exposition has builded on the highway of +progress. From its heights we contemplate the past, record the present, +and gaze into the future.</p> + +<p>This universal exposition is a world's university. The International +Congress of Arts and Science constitutes the faculty; the material on +exhibition are the laboratories and the museums; the students are +mankind.</p> + +<p>That in response to invitation of the splendid committee of patriotic +men, to whom all praise is due for their efforts in this crowning glory +of the Exposition, so eminent a gathering of the scholars and savants of +the world has resulted, speaks unmistakably for the fraternity of the +world, for the sympathy of its citizenship, and for the patriotism of +its people.</p> + +</div> + +<p>In reply to these addresses of the officials of the Exposition, the +honorary Vice-Presidents for Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, +Austria, Italy, and Japan made brief responses in behalf of their +respective countries.</p> + +<p>Sir William Ramsay of London spoke in the place of Hon. James +Bryce, extending England's thanks for the courtesy which had been +shown her representatives and declaring that England, particularly +in the scientific field, looked upon America as a relative and not as +a foreign country.</p> + +<p>France was represented by Professor Jean Gaston Darboux, Perpetual +Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of Paris, who spoke as +follows:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Mr. President, Ladies and +Gentlemen</span>,—My first word will be to thank you for the honor +which you have been so courteous as to pay my country in reserving for +her one of the vice-presidencies of the Congress. Since the time of +Franklin, who received at the hands of France the welcome which justice +and his own personal genius and worth demanded, most affectionate +relations have not ceased to unite the scientists of France and the +scientists of America. The distinction which you have here accorded to +us will contribute still further to render these relations more intimate +and more fraternal. In choosing me among so many of the better fitted +delegates sent by my country, you have without doubt wished to pay +special honor to the Académie des Sciences and to the Institut de +France, which I have the honor of representing in the position of +Perpetual Secretary. Permit me therefore to thank you in the name of +these great societies, which are happy to count in the number of their +foreign associates and of their correspondents so many of the scholars +of America. In like manner as the Institut de France, so the Congress +which opens to-day seeks to unite at the same time letters, science, and +arts. We shall be happy and proud to take part in this work and +contribute to its success.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Germany was represented by Professor Wilhelm Waldeyer, of the +University of Berlin, who replied as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Mr. President, Honored +Assemblage</span>,—The esteemed invitation which has been offered +to me in this significant hour of the opening of the Congress of Arts +and Science to greet the members of this congress, and particularly my +esteemed compatriots, I have had no desire to decline. I have been for a +fortnight under the free sky of this mighty city—so I must express +myself, since enclosing walls are unknown in the United States—and +this fact, together with the hospitality offered me in such delightful +manner by the Chairman of the Committee on Congresses, Mr. Frederick W. +Lehmann, has almost made me a St. Louis man. Therefore I may perhaps +take it upon myself to greet you here.</p> + +<p>I confess that I arrived here with some misgiving—some doubts +as to whether the great task which was here undertaken under most +difficult circumstances could be accomplished with even creditable +success. These doubts entirely disappeared the first time I entered the +grounds of the World's Fair and obtained a general view of the method, +beautiful as well as practical, by which the treasures gathered from the +whole world were arranged and displayed. I trust you, too, will have a +like experience; and will soon recognize that a most earnest and good +work is here accomplished.</p> + +<p>And I must remark at this time that we Germans may indeed be well +satisfied here; the unanimous and complete recognition which our +coöperation in this great work has received is almost disconcerting.</p> + +<p>What can be said of the whole Exposition with reference to its extent +and the order in which everything is arranged, I may well say concerning +the departments of science, especially interesting to us. In this hour +in which the Congress of Arts and Science is being opened, we shall not +express any thanks to those who took this part of the work upon their +shoulders—a more difficult task indeed than all the others, for +here the problem is not to manage materials, but heads and minds. And as +I see here assembled a large number of German professors—I, too, +belong to the profession—of whom it is said, I know not with how +much justice, that they are hard to lead, the labors of the Directors +and Presidents of the Congress could not have been, and are not now, +small. Neither shall we to-day prophesy into what the Congress may +develop. The greater number of speakers cannot expect to have large +audiences, but even to-day we can safely say this: the imposing row of +volumes in which shall be given to posterity the reviews here to be +presented concerning the present condition, and future problems of the +sciences and arts as they appear to the scientific world at the +beginning of the twentieth century, will provide a monumental work of +lasting value. This we may confidently expect. The thanks which we +to-day do not wish to anticipate in words, let us show by our actions to +our kind American hosts, and especially to the directors of the World's +Fair and of this Congress. With exalted mind, forgetting all little +annoyances which may and will come, let us go forward courageously to +the work, and let us do our best. Let us grasp heartily the open hand +honestly extended to us.</p> + +<p>May this Congress of Arts and Science worthily take part in the great +and undisputed success which even to-day we must acknowledge the World's +Fair at St. Louis.</p> + +</div> + +<p>For Austria Dr. Theodore Escherich, of the University of Vienna, +responded as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>In the name of the many Austrians present at the Congress I express +the thanks of my compatriots to the Committee which summoned us, for +their invitation and the hospitality so cordially extended....</p> + +<p>I congratulate the authorities upon the idea of opening this +Congress. How many world-expositions have already been held without an +attempt having been made to exhibit the spirit that has created this +world of beautiful and useful things? It was reserved for these to find +the form in which the highest results of human +thought—Science—presented in the persons of her +representatives, could be incorporated in the compass of the World's +Fair. The conception of this International Congress of all Sciences in +its originality and audacity, in its universality and comprehensive +organization, is truly a child of the "young-American spirit."...</p> + +<p>After this Congress has come to a close and the collection of the +lectures delivered, an unparalleled encyclopedia of human knowledge, +both in extent and content, will have appeared. We may say that this +Fair has become of epochal importance, not alone for trade and +manufactures, but also for science. These proud palaces will long have +disappeared and been forgotten when this work, a <i>monumentum aere +perennius</i>, shall still testify to future generations the standard of +scientific attainment at the beginning of the twentieth century.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Short acknowledgments were then made for Russia by Dr. Oscar +Backlund, of the Astronomical Observatory at Pulkowa, Russia, and for +Japan by Prof. Nobushige Hozumi, of the Imperial University at Tokio, +Japan.</p> + +<p>The last of the Vice-Presidents to respond to the addresses of +welcome was Signor Attilio Brunialti, Councilor of State for Italy, who +after a few formal words in English broke into impassioned eloquence in +his native tongue, and in brilliant diction and graceful periods +expressed the deep feeling and profound joy which Italy, the mother of +arts, felt in participating in an occasion so historic and so +magnificent. Signor Brunialti said in part:</p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>I thank you, gentlemen, for the honor you have paid both to my +country and myself by electing me a Vice-President of this great +scientific assembly. Would that I could thank you in words in which +vibrate the heart of Rome, the scientific spirit of my land, and all +that it has given to the world for the progress of science, literature, +and art. You know Italy, gentlemen, you admire her, and therefore it is +for this also that my thanks are due to you. What ancient Rome has +contributed to the common patrimony of civilization is also reflected +here in a thousand ways, and a classical education, held in such honor, +by a young and practical people such as yours, excites our admiration +and also our astonishment. By giant strides you are reviving the +activity of Italy at the epoch of the Communes, when all were animated +by unwearying activity and our manufactures and arts held the first +place in Europe. I have already praised here the courageous spirit which +has suggested the meeting of this Congress—a Congress that will +remain famous in the annals of science. Many things in your country have +aroused in me growing surprise, but nothing has struck me more, I assure +you, than this homage to science which is pushing all the wealthy +classes to a noble rivalry for the increase of education and mental +cultivation.</p> + +<p>You have already large libraries and richly endowed universities, and +every kind of school, where the works of Greece and Rome are perhaps +even more appreciated and adapted to modern improvements than with us +old classical nations. Full of energy, activity, and wealth, you have +before you perpetual progress, and what, up to this, your youth has not +allowed you to give to the world, you will surely be able to give in the +future. Use freely all the treasures of civilization, art, and science +that centuries have accumulated in the old world, and especially in my +beloved Italy; fructify them with your youthful initiation and with your +powerful energy. By so doing you will contribute to peace, and then we +may say with truth that we have prepared your route by the work of +centuries; and like unto those who from old age are prevented from +following the bold young man of Longfellow in his course, we will +accompany you with our greetings and our alterable affection.</p> + +<p>By my voice, the native country of Columbus, of Galileo, of +Michelangelo and Raphael, of Macchiavelli and Volta, salutes and with +open arms hails as her hopeful daughter young America,—thanking +and blessing her for the road she has opened to the sons of Italy, +workmen and artists, to civilization, to science, and to modern research +and thought.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The Chairman of the Administrative Board, President Nicholas +Murray Butler, of Columbia University, was prevented by illness in +his family from being present at the Congress, and in place of the +address to have been delivered by him on the idea and development +of the Congress and the work of the Administrative Board, President +William R. Harper, of the University of Chicago, spoke on the same +subject as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>I have been asked within a few hours by those in authority to present +to you on behalf of the Administrative Board of this International +Congress a statement concerning the origin and purpose of the congress. +It is surely a source of great disappointment to all concerned that the +chairman of the board, President Butler, is prevented from being +present.</p> + +<p>Many of us recall the fact that at the Paris Exposition of 1889 the +first attempt was made to do something systematic in the way of +congresses. This attempt was the natural outcome of the opinion which +had come to exist that so splendid an opportunity as was afforded by the +coming together of leaders in every department of activity should not be +suffered to pass by unimproved. What could be more natural in the +stimulating and thought-provoking atmosphere of an exposition than the +proposal to make provision for a consideration and discussion of some of +the problems so closely related to the interests represented by the +exposition?</p> + +<p>The results achieved at the Paris Exposition of 1889 were so striking +as to lead those in charge of the World's Columbian Exposition in +Chicago, 1893, to organize what was called the World's Congress +Auxiliary, including a series of congresses, in which, to use the +language of the original decree, "the best workers in general science, +philosophy, literature, art, agriculture, trade, and labor were to meet +to present their experiences and results obtained in all those various +lines of thought up to the present time." Seven years later, in +connection with the Paris Exposition of 1900, there was held another +similar series of international congresses. The general idea had in this +way slowly but surely gained recognition.</p> + +<p>The authorities of the Universal Exposition at St. Louis, from the +first, recognized the desirability of providing for a congress which +should exceed in its scope those that had before been attempted. In the +earliest days of the preparation for this Exposition Mr. Frederick J. V. +Skiff, the Director of the Field Columbian Museum, my nearest neighbor +in the city of Chicago, took occasion to present this idea, and +particularly to emphasize the specific point that something should be +undertaken which not only might add dignity and glory to the great name +of the Exposition, but also constitute a permanent and valuable +contribution to the sum of human knowledge. After a consideration of the +whole question, which extended over many months, the committee on +international congresses resolved to establish an administrative board +of seven members, to which should be committed the responsibility of +suggesting a plan in detail for the attainment of the ends desired. This +Board was appointed in November, 1902, and consisted of President +Nicholas Murray Butler, of Columbia University, New York; President R. +H. Jesse, of the University of Missouri; President Henry S. Pritchett, +of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Herbert Putnam, +Librarian of Congress; Mr. Frederick J. V. Skiff, of the Field Columbian +Museum, Chicago; Frederick G. Holls, of New York City, and the present +speaker.</p> + +<p>This Board held several meetings for the study of the questions and +problems involved in the great undertaking. Much valuable counsel was +received and considered. The Board was especially indebted, however, to +Prof. Hugo Münsterberg of Harvard University for specific material which +he placed at their disposal—material which, with modification, +served as the basis of the plans adopted by the Board, and recommended +to the members of the Exposition.</p> + +<p>At the same time the Administrative Board recommended the appointment +of Dr. Howard J. Rogers as the Director of Congresses, and nominated +Prof. Simon Newcomb of the United States Navy to be President of the +Congress, and Professors Hugo Münsterberg of Harvard University and +Albion W. Small of the University of Chicago to be Vice-Presidents of +the Congress; the three to constitute the Organizing Committee of the +Congress. This Organizing Committee was later empowered to visit foreign +countries and to extend personal invitations to men distinguished in the +arts and sciences to participate in the Congress. The reception accorded +to these, our representatives, was most cordial. Of the 150 invitations +thus extended, 117 were accepted; and of the 117 learned savants who +accepted the invitation, 96 are here in person this afternoon to testify +by their presence the interest they have felt in this great concourse of +the world's leaders. I am compelled by necessity this afternoon to omit +many points of interest in relation to the origin and history of the +undertaking, all of which will be published in due time.</p> + +<p>After many months of expectancy we have at last come together from +all the nations of the world. But for what purpose? I do not know that +to the statement already published in the programme of the Congress +anything can be added which will really improve that statement. The +purpose, as it has seemed to some of us, is threefold:</p> + +<p>In the first place, to secure such a general survey of the various +fields of learning, with all their "subdivisions and multiplication of +specialties," as will at the same time set forth their mutual relations +and connections, and likewise constitute an effort toward the +unification of knowledge. This idea of unity has perhaps been uppermost +in the minds of all concerned with the work of organizing the +Congress.</p> + +<p>In the second place, to provide a platform from which might be +presented the various problems, a solution of which will be expected of +the scholarship of the future. This includes a recognition of the +fundamental principles and conception that underlie these mutual +relations, and therefore serve necessarily as the basis of all such +future work. Here again the controlling idea is that of unity and law, +in other words, universal law.</p> + +<p>In the third place, to bring together in person and spirit +distinguished investigators and scholars from all the countries of the +world, in order that by contact of one with another a mutual sympathy +may be promoted, and a practical coöperation may be effected among those +whose lifework leads them far apart. Here, still again, unity of result +is sought for.</p> + +<p>As we now take up the work of this convention, which already gives +sure promise of being notable among the conventions that have called +together men of different nations, let us confidently assure ourselves +that the great purpose which has throughout controlled in the different +stages of its organization will be realized; that because the Congress +has been held, the nations of the earth will find themselves drawn more +closely together; that human thought will possess a more unified +organization and human life a more unified expression.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Following these addresses of welcome and of response came the first +paper of the specific programme, designed to be introductory to the +division, department, and section addresses of the week. This address, +which will be found in full in its proper place, on pages 135 to 147 of +this volume, was given by Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress +and Chairman of the Organizing Committee, whose labors for fifteen +months were thus brought to a brilliant conclusion.</p> + +<p>At the close of Dr. Newcomb's address the assembly was dismissed by a +few words of President Francis, in which he placed at the disposition of +the members of the Congress the courtesies and privileges of the +Exposition, and expressed the hope and belief that their presence and +the purpose for which they were assembled, would be the crowning glory +of the Universal Exposition of 1904.</p> + +<p>On Tuesday, September 20, the seven division addresses and the +twenty-four department addresses were given, all the speakers being +Americans: Royce, in Normative Science; Wilson, in Historical Science; +Woodward, in Physical Science; Hall, in Mental Science; Jordan, in +Utilitarian Science; Lowell, in Social Regulation; and Harris, in Social +Culture, treating the main divisions of science and their applications, +each dwelling particularly on the scope of the great field included in +his address and the unification of the work therein. The forty-eight +department speakers divided the field of knowledge, one address in each +department giving the fundamental conceptions and methods, the other the +history and development of the work of the department during the last +century.</p> + +<p>With Wednesday the international participation began, and in the one +hundred twenty-eight sections into which the departments were divided +one half of the speakers were drawn, so far as circumstances permitted, +from foreign scientific circles. With the exception of the last two +sections, Religious Influence Personal, and Religious Influence Social, +the work of the Congress closed on Saturday afternoon. These two +sections having four speakers each were placed, one on Sunday morning +and one on Sunday afternoon, in Festival Hall, and passes to the grounds +given upon application to any one desiring to attend. Large numbers +availed themselves of the privilege, and the closing hours of the +Congress were eminently suitable and worthy of its high success. At the +end of the afternoon session in Festival Hall, Vice-President of the +Congress, Dr. Albion W. Small, reviewed in a few words the work of the +week, its meaning to science, its possible effect upon American thought, +and then formally announced the Congress closed.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">OFFICIAL BANQUET</p> + +<p>The official banquet given by the Exposition to all participants, +members, and officials of the Congress, on Friday evening, at the +Tyrolean Alps banquet hall, proved a charming conclusion to the labors +of the week. No better place could be imagined for holding it, within +the grounds of an exposition, than the magnificently proportioned music +and dining hall of the "Alps." A room 160 feet by 105 feet, capable of +seating fifteen hundred banqueters; the spacious, oval, orchestral stage +at the south end; the galleries and boxes along the sides of the hall +done in solid German oak; the beautiful and impressive mural +decorations, the work of the best painters of Germany; the excellence of +the cuisine, and the thoroughly drilled corps of waiters, rendered the +physical accessories of a banquet as nearly perfect as possible in a +function so extensive.</p> + +<p>The banquet was the largest held during the Exposition period, eight +hundred invitations being issued and nearly seven hundred persons +present. The music was furnished by the famous Garde Républicaine Band +of France, as the Exposition orchestra was obliged to fill its regular +weekly assignment at Festival Hall. The decorations of the hall, the +lights and flowers, the musical programme, the galleries and boxes +filled with ladies representing the official and social life of the +Exposition, and the distinguished body of the Congress, formed a picture +which appealed to the admiration and enthusiasm of every one alike. No +attempt was made to assign seats to the banqueters outside the speakers' +table, and little coteries and clusters of scientists, many of whom were +making acquaintances and intellectual alliances during this week which +would endure for a lifetime, were scattered about the hall, giving an +interest and an animation to the scene quite beyond the powers of +description. In one corner were Harnack, Budde, Jean Réville, and +Cuthbert Hall, chatting as animatedly as though their religious theories +were not as far apart as the poles; in another, Waldeyer, Escherich, +Jacobi, Allbutt, and Kitasato formed a medical group, the counterpart of +which would be hard to find unless in another part of this same hall; +still again were Erdmann, Sorley, Ladd, Royce, and Creighton as the +centre of a group of philosophers of world renown. So in every part of +the picture which met the eye were focused the leaders of thought and +action in their respective fields. The <i>tout ensemble</i> of the +Congress was here brought out in its strongest effect, as, with the +exception of the opening exercises at Festival Hall at which time many +had not arrived, it was the only time when the entire membership was +together. The banquet coming at the close of the week was also +fortunate, as by this time the acquaintances made, and the common +incidents and anecdotes experienced, heightened the enjoyment of +all.</p> + +<p>The toastmaster of the banquet and presiding officer, Hon. David R. +Francis, was never in a happier vein than when he assumed the gavel and +proposed the health of the President of the United States and the rulers +of all nations represented at the board.</p> + +<p>President Francis said:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Members of the International Congress of Arts and +Science</span>:</p> + +<p>On the façade at the base of the Louisiana Monument, which is the +central feature of this Exposition picture, is a group of Livingston, +Monroe, and Marbois. It represents the signing of the treaty, which by +peaceful negotiation transferred an empire from France to the United +States. Upon the inscription are the words of Livingston, "We have lived +long and accomplished much, but this is the crowning act of our +lives."</p> + +<p>It is that transfer of an empire which this Exposition is held to +commemorate. And paraphrasing the words of Livingston, permit me to say +that I have presided over many dinners, but this is the crowning act of +my career.</p> + +<p>In opening the deliberations of the International Congress of Arts +and Science, I made the statement that a Universal Exposition is an +ambitious undertaking. I stated also that the International Congress of +Arts and Science is the crowning feature of this Exposition. I did not +venture the assertion then which I have the presumption to make now, +that the most difficult task in connection with this Universal +Exposition was the assembling of an International Congress of Arts and +Science. I venture to make the statement now, because I feel that I am +justified in doing so by the success which up to the present has +attended your deliberations. Any congregation of the leaders of thought +in the world is a memorable occasion. This is the first systematic one +that has ever been attempted. Whether it proves successful or not, it +will be long remembered in the history of the civilized countries that +have participated in it. If it be but the precursor of other like +assemblages it will still be long remembered, and in that event it will +be entitled to unspeakable credit if it accomplishes anything toward the +realization of the very laudable objects which prompted its +assembling.</p> + +<p>The effort to unify all human knowledge and to establish the +inter-relations thereof is a bold conception, and requires the courage +that characterizes the people who live in the western section of the +United States. If it be the last effort of the kind it will still be +remembered, and this Universal Exposition, if it had done nothing else +to endear it to cultured people of this and other countries, will not be +forgotten. The savants assembled by the call of this Exposition have +pursued their respective lines of thought and research, prompted by no +desire other than one to find a solution of the problem which confronts +humanity. By bringing you together and making an effort to determine and +establish the relations between all lines of human knowledge, we have +certainly made an advance in the right direction. If your researches, if +the results of your studies, can be utilized by the human race, then we +who have been the instruments of that great blessing will be entitled to +credit secondary only to the men who are the discoverers of the +scientific knowledge whose relations we are endeavoring to establish. +The Management of the Universal Exposition of 1904 salutes the +International Congress of Arts and Science. We drink to the perpetuation +of that organization, and I shall call upon its distinguished President, +Professor Newcomb, to respond to the Sentiment.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Dr. Newcomb in a few words thanked the members of the Congress for +their participation, which had made possible the brilliant success of +the enterprise, portrayed its effect and the influence of its +perpetuation, and then extended to all the invitation from the President +of the United States to attend the reception at the White House on the +following Tuesday.</p> + +<p>In responding to these toasts the senior Honorary Vice-President, +Hon. James Bryce, of Great Britain, spoke in matchless form and held the +attention of the vast hall closely while he portrayed in a few words the +chief glories of England in the field of science, and the pride the +English nation felt in the glorious record made by her eldest daughter, +the United States. Mr. Bryce spoke extemporaneously, and his remarks +cannot be given in full.</p> + +<p>For Germany, Commissioner-General Lewald responded in an eloquent +address, in which, after thanking the Exposition and the American +Government for the high honor done the German nation in selecting so +large a percentage of the speakers from German scientific circles, he +enlarged upon the close relations which had existed between German +university thought and methods and American thought and practice, due to +the vast number of American students who had pursued their post-graduate +courses in the universities of Germany. He dwelt upon the pride that +Germany felt in this sincerest form of tribute to German supremacy in +scientific thought, and of the satisfaction which the influence in this +country of German-trained students afforded. He described at length the +great exhibit made by German universities in the education department of +the Exposition, and pointed to it as demonstrating the supremacy of +German scientific thought and accurate methods. Dr. Lewald closed with a +brilliant peroration, in which he referred to the immense service done +for the cause of science in the last fifty years of German history and +to the patronage and support of the Emperor, not only to science in +general, but to this great international gathering of scientific +experts, and drank to the continued cordial relations of Germany and +America through its university circles and scientific endeavors.</p> + +<p>For the response from France, Prof. Gaston Darboux was delegated by +Commissioner-General Gerald, who was unable to be present on account of +sickness. In one of the most beautiful and polished addresses of the +evening, Professor Darboux spoke in French, of which the following is a +translation:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Gentlemen</span>,—Graciously invited to +respond in the name of the delegates of France who have accept the +invitation of the American Government, I consider it my duty in the +first place to thank this great nation for the honor which it has paid +to us, and for the welcome, which it has extended to us. Those of you +who are doing me the honor to listen, know of that disagreeable feeling +of isolation which at times the traveler in the midst of a strange +people experiences;—that feeling I know only from hearsay. We have +not had a moment of time to experience it. They are accustomed in Europe +to portray the Americans as exclusively occupied with business affairs. +They throw in our faces the famous proverb, 'Business is Business,' and +give it to us as the rule of conduct for Americans. We are able to +testify entirely to the contrary, since the inhabitants of this +beautiful country are always seeking to extend to strangers a thousand +courtesies. Above all, we have encountered no one who has not been +anxious to go out of his way to give to us, even before we had asked it, +such information as it was necessary for us to have. And what shall I +say of the welcome which we have received here at the hands of our +American confrères,—Monsieur the President of the Exposition, +Monsieur the Director of Congresses and other worthy <ins title="not +hyphenated in the original">co-laborers</ins>? The authorities of the +Exposition and the inhabitants of St. Louis have rivaled each other in +making our stay agreeable and our ways pleasant in the heart of this +magnificent Exposition, of which we shall ever preserve the most +enchanting memory.</p> + +<p>We should have wished to see in a more leisurely manner, and to make +acquaintance with the attractions without number with which the +Exposition literally swarms (men of letters and men of science love at +times to disport themselves) and to study the exhibits classified in a +method so exact in the palaces of an architecture so original and so +impressive. But Monsieur Newcomb has not permitted this. The Congress of +which he is the illustrious President offers so much in the way of +attractions,—of a kind a little rigorous it is true,—and so +much of work to be accomplished, that to our very great regret we have +had to refuse many invitations which it would have been most agreeable +to accept. The Americans will pardon us for this, I am sure; they know +better than any one else the value of time, but they know also that +human strength has some limits, especially among us poor Europeans, for +I doubt whether an American ever knows the meaning of fatigue.</p> + +<p>Messieurs, the Congress which is about to terminate to-morrow has +been truly a very great event. It is the first time, I believe, that +there has been seen assembled in one grand international reunion that +which our great minister, Colbert, had in mind, and that which we have +realized for the first time in our Institut de France,—the union +of letters, science, and arts. That this union shall maintain itself in +the future is the dearest wish of my heart.</p> + +<p>Science is a unit, even as the Universe. The aspects which it +presents know neither boundaries of states nor the political divisions +established between peoples. In all civilized countries they calculate +with the same figures, they measure with the same instruments, they +employ the same classifications, they study the same historic facts, +economics, and morals. If there exists among the different nations some +differences in methods, these difference are slight. They are a benefit +at the same time as well as a necessity. For the doing of the immense +amount of work of research imposed on that part of humanity which +thinks, it is necessary that the subjects of study should not be +identically the same, or better, if they are identical, that the +difference between the points of view from which they are considered in +the different countries contribute to our better knowledge of their +nature, their results, and their applications. It is necessary then that +each people preserve their distinctive genius, their particular methods +which they use to develop the qualities they have inherited. In exactly +the same way that it is important in an orchestra that each instrument +play in the most perfect manner, and with the timbre which accords with +its nature, the part which is given to it, so in science as in music, +the harmony between the players is a necessary condition, which each one +ought to exert himself to realize. Let us endeavor then in scientific +research to execute in the most perfect manner that part of the task +which fate has devolved upon us, but let us endeavor also to maintain +that accord which is a necessary condition to the harmony which will +alone be able in the future to assure the progress of humanity.</p> + +<p>Gentlemen, in this international reunion it would not be fitting that +I dwell upon the services which my country has been able to render to +science; and on the other hand it would be difficult for me to say to +you exactly what part America is called upon to take in this concert of +civilized nations; but I am certain that the part will be worthy of the +great nation which has given to itself a constitution so liberal and +which in so short a space of time has known how to conquer, and measure +in value, a territory so immense that it extends from ocean to ocean. I +lift my glass to the honor of American science; I drink to the future of +that great nation, for which we, as well as all other Frenchmen, hold so +much of common remembrance, so much of close and living sympathy, and so +much of profound admiration. I am the more happy to do this in this most +beautiful territory of Louisiana, which France in a former age ceded +freely to America.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Perhaps the treat of the evening was the response made in behalf of +the Empire of Japan by Professor Hozumi, of the Faculty of Law of the +University of Tokio.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately this response was not preserved in full, but Professor +Hozumi dwelt with much feeling on the world-wide significance of the +Congress and the common plane upon which all nations might meet in the +pursuit of science and the manifold applications of scientific +principles. He paid a beautiful tribute to the educational system of the +United States and to the great debt which Japan owed to American +scholars and to American teachers for their aid in establishing modern +educational principles and methods in the Empire of Japan. The impetus +given to scientific study in Japan by the Japanese students trained in +American universities was also earnestly dwelt upon, and the close +relations which had always existed between Japanese and American +students and instructors feelingly described. In the field of science +Japan was yet young, but she had shown herself a close and apt pupil, +and her period of initiative and original research was at hand. In +bacteriology, in medicine, in seismology, oceanography, and other +fields, Japan has made valuable contributions to science and established +the right to recognition in an international gathering of this nature. +It was with peculiar and grateful pride and pleasure that the Japanese +Government had sent its delegation to this Congress of selected experts +in response to the invitation of the American Government. Near the close +of his address Professor Hozumi made a gracious and happy allusion, +based upon the conflict with Russia, in which he said that of all places +where men meet, and of all places sunned by the light of heaven, this +great Congress, built on the high plane of the brotherhood of science +and the fellowship of scholars, was the only place where a Japanese and +a Russian could meet in mutual accord, with a common purpose, and clasp +hands in unity of thought. This chivalrous and beautiful idea, given +here so imperfectly from memory, brought the great assembly to its feet +in rounds of cheers. In closing, Professor Hozumi expressed the earnest +belief that the benefits of science from a gathering of this nature +would quickly be felt, by a closer coöperation in the application of +theory and practical principles and a simultaneous advance in all parts +of the world.</p> + +<p>The closing response of the evening for the foreign members was made +for Italy by Signor Attilio Brunialti, whose brilliant eloquence at many +times during the week had won the admiration of the members of the +Congress. Under the inspiration of this assemblage he fairly surpassed +himself, and the following translation of his remarks but poorly +indicates the grace and brilliant diction of the original:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>I have had the good fortune to be present in this wonderful country +at three international Congresses, that of science, the peace +parliament, and the geographic. I wish to record the impression they +have excited in my mind, already so favorably inclined by your +never-to-be-forgotten and gracious reception. You must, please, allow me +to address you in my own language, because the Latin tongue inspires me, +because I wish to affirm more solemnly my nationality, and also, because +I cannot express my feelings well in a language not familiar to me. My +country, the land of Columbus, of Galileo, the nation that more than all +others in Europe is an element of peace, is already in itself the +synthesis of the three Congresses. And I can call to mind that this land +is indebted to geography for the fact of its being made known to the +world, because the immortal Genoese pointed it out to people fighting in +the old world for a small territory, and opened to mortals new and +extensive countries destined to receive the valiant and the audacious of +the entire world and to rise like yours to immortal glory.</p> + +<p>Thus the poet can sing,<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +</div> + +<div class="poem blockquote"> + <span class="i6">L'avanza, l'avanza</span><br /> + <span class="i6">Divino straniero,</span><br /> + <span class="i6">Conosci la stanza</span><br /> + <span class="i6">Che i fati ti diero;</span><br /> + <span class="i6">Se lutti, se lagrime</span><br /> + <span class="i6">Ancora rinterra</span><br /> + <span class="i6">L'giovin la terra.</span><br /> +</div> + +<div class="blockquote"><p>Thus Columbus of old could point out to +men—who run down each other, disputing even love for fear that man +may become a wolf for man—the vast and endless wastes awaiting +laborers, and give to man the treasures of the fruitful land. 'Tis in +the name of peace that I greet modern science in all its forms, and I +say to you chemists: "Invent new means of destruction;" and to you +mechanics and shipbuilders: "Give us invulnerable men-of-war and such +perfect cannons, that your own progress may contribute to make war rarer +in the world." Then will men, amazed at their own destructive progress, +be drawn together by brotherly love, by the development of common +knowledge and sympathy, and by the study of geography be led to know +that there is plenty of room for every one in the world to contribute to +progress and civilization.</p> + +<p>Americans! these sentiments are graven in your country; in point of +fact, it is a proof of the harmony that reigns in this Congress between +guests come from all parts of the world, that I, an Italian, am allowed +to address you in my own language on American ground, near the Tyrolean +Alps, greeted by the music of the Républicaine French Garde, united in +eternal bonds of friendship by the two great goddesses of the modern +world,—Science and Peace.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The last speaker of the evening was Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann, +Chairman of the Exposition Committee on Congresses, who in eloquent +periods set forth the ambition of the city of St. Louis and the +Exposition of 1904 in creating a Congress of intellect on the same high +plane that had characterized the educational ideals of the Exposition, +and the intense satisfaction which the officials of the Congress felt in +its brilliant outcome, and the possibilities which it promised for an +unequaled contribution to scientific literature.</p> + +<p>At the close of these addresses the members of the Congress and the +spectators in the gallery sang, in full chorus and under the lead of the +Garde Républicaine Band, the various national anthems, closing with "The +Star Spangled Banner."</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT</p> + +<p>In accordance with the recommendation of the Administrative Board to +the Committee on Congresses, the Executive Committee appointed Dr. +Howard J. Rogers, Director of Congresses, editor of the proceedings of +the Congress of Arts and Science. The Congress records were removed from +St. Louis to Albany, New York, the home of the Director, from which +place the publication has been prepared. Upon collecting the papers it +was found that they could be divided logically, and with a fair degree +of similarity in size, into eight volumes, each of which should cover a +definite and distinct portion of the programme. These are as +follows:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Report Programme"> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 1.</td><td class="left">History of the +Congress, Scientific Plan of the Congress, Philosophy, +Mathematics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 2.</td><td class="left">Political and +Economic History, History of Law, History of Religion.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 3.</td><td class="left">History of Language, +History of Literature, History of Art.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 4.</td><td class="left">Physics, Chemistry, +Astronomy, Sciences of the Earth.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 5.</td><td class="left">Biology, +Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 6.</td><td class="left">Medicine, +Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 7.</td><td class="left">Economics, Politics, +Jurisprudence, Social Science.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Volume 8.</td><td class="left">Education, +Religion.</td></tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p0">The details and specifications of the volumes were +prepared for competitive bids and submitted to twelve of the prominent +publishers of the country. The most advantageous bid was received from +Houghton, Mifflin & Company of Boston, Mass., and was accepted by +the Exposition Company. The Administrative Board and the authorities Of +the Exposition feel deeply pleased at the result, inasmuch as the +imprint of this firm guarantees a work in full accord with the high +plane upon which the Congress has been conducted.</p> + +<p>It was determined to print the entire proceedings in the English +language, inasmuch as the Congress was held in an English-speaking +country and the vast majority of the papers were read in that language. +The consent of every foreign speaker was obtained for this procedure. It +was found, after collecting, that the number of addresses to be +translated was forty-four. The translators were selected by the editor +upon the advice of the members of the Administrative Board and +Organizing Committee, and great care was taken to find persons not only +thoroughly trained in the two languages and possessing a good English +style, but also persons who were thoroughly conversant with the subject +on which the paper treated. Many of the translators were suggested by +the foreign speakers themselves. As a result of this careful selection, +the editor feels confident that the original value of the papers has +been in no wise detracted from, and that both in form and content the +translations are thoroughly satisfactory.</p> + +<p>It will be found that some addresses are not closely related to the +scheme of the Congress. Either through some misunderstanding of the +exact purpose of the Congress, or through too close devotion to their +own particular phase of investigation, some half-dozen speakers +submitted papers dealing with special lines of work. These, while +valuable and scholarly from their standpoint, do not accord with a +series of papers prepared with a view to general relations and +historical perspective. The exceptions are so few, however, as not +seriously to interfere with the unity of the plan.</p> + +<p>In the arrangement of the papers the order of the official programme +is followed exactly, with the exception that, under Historical Science, +Departments 3, 4, and 8, covering History of Politics, Law, and +Religion, are combined in one volume; and Departments 5, 6, and 7, +covering History of Language, Literature, and Art, are combined in the +succeeding volume. In volume one, the first chapter is devoted to the +history of the Congress, written by the editor, in which is set forth +the plain narrative of the growth and development of the Congress, as +much for the benefit of similar undertakings in the future as for the +interest of those participating in this Congress. The second chapter +contains the scientific introduction, written by Prof. Hugo Münsterberg +of Harvard University, First Vice-President of the Congress and Member +of the Organizing Committee. This is written for the purpose of giving +in detail the principles upon which the classification was based, and +the relations which the different sections and departments held to each +other.</p> + +<p>Each paper is prefaced by a very short biographical note in +categorical form, for the purpose of insuring the identity of the +speaker as long in the future as the volumes may exist. Appended to the +addresses of each department is a short bibliography, which is essential +for a general study of the subject in question. These are in no wise +exhaustive or complete, but are rather designed to be a small, valuable, +working reference library for students. The bibliographies have been +prepared by eminent experts in the departments of the Congress, but are +necessarily somewhat uneven, as some of the writers have gone into the +subject more thoroughly than others. The general arrangement of the +bibliographies is: 1. Historical books and standard works dealing with +the subject. 2. General books for the whole department. 3. Books for +sections of departments.</p> + +<p>Appended also to the addresses of each department and sections are +résumés of the ten-minute addresses delivered by invitation at the +meeting of the department or section. Many of these papers are of high +value; but inasmuch as very few of them were written in accord with the +plan of the Congress, and with the main thought to be developed by the +Congress, but deal rather with some interesting and detached phase of +the subject, it has been deemed best not to print them in full, but to +indicate in brief the subject and the treatment given it by the writer. +Those which do accord with the plan of the Congress are given more +extensive treatment.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">CONCLUSION</p> + +<p>What the results of the Congress will be; what influence it may have; +was it worth the work and cost, are questions often fairly asked.</p> + +<p>The lasting results and influences are of course problematical. They +depend upon the character and soundness of the addresses, and whether +the uniform strength of the publication will make the work as a whole, +what it undoubtedly is in parts, a source-book for the future on the +bases of scientific theory at the beginning of the twentieth century, +and a reliable sketch of the growth of science during the nineteenth +century. Critical study of the addresses will alone determine this, but +from the favorable reception of those already published in reviews, and +from editorial acquaintance with the others, it seems assured. That +portion of the section addresses which deals with the inter-relations of +science and demonstrates both its unity and variety of processes is new +and authoritative thought, and will be the basis of much discussion and +remodeling of theories in the future. The immediate results of the +Congress are highly satisfactory, and fully repay the work and the cost +both from a scientific and an exposition standpoint. As an +acknowledgment of the prominence of scientific methods, as a public +recognition of the work of scientists, as the means of bringing to one +place the most noted assemblage of thinkers the world has ever seen, as +an opportunity for scholars to meet and know each other better, the +Congress was an unqualified success and of enduring reputation. From the +Exposition point of view, it was equally a success; not financially, nor +was there ever a thought that it would be. Probably not more than seven +thousand persons outside of St. Louis came primarily to attend the +Congress, and their admission fees were a bagatelle; the revenue derived +from the sale of the <i>Proceedings</i> will not meet the cost of +printing. There has been no money value sought for in the +Congress,—none received. Its value to the Exposition lies solely +in the fact that it is the final argument to the world of the initial +claims of the officials of the Exposition that its purpose was purely +educational. Coördinate with the material exhibits, sought, classified, +and installed on a rigidly scientific classification, the Congress, +which relates, illumines, and defends the principles upon which the +material portion was founded, has triumphantly vindicated the good +faith, the wisdom, and the foresight of the Universal Exposition of +1904. This printed record of its proceedings will be a monument not only +to the spirit of Science, but to the spirit of the Exposition, which +will endure as long as the records of man are preserved.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>In conclusion, the editor wishes to express his obligations to the +many speakers and officers of the Congress, who have evinced great +interest in the publication and assisted by valuable suggestions and +advice. In particular, he acknowledges the help of President Butler of +Columbia University, Professor Münsterberg of Harvard University, and +Professor Small of the University of Chicago. Acknowledgments are with +justice and pleasure made to the Committee on Congresses of the +Exposition, and the able chairman, Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann, for their +unwavering and prompt support on all matters of policy and detail, +without which the full measure of success could not have been achieved. +To the efficient secretary of the Department of Congresses, Mr. James +Green Cotchett, an expression of obligation is due for his indefatigable +labors during the Congress period, and for his able and painstaking work +in compiling the detailed records of this publication.</p> + +<p>At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Exposition on January +3, 1905, there was unanimously voted the following resolution, +recommended by the Administrative Board and approved by the Committee on +Congresses:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Moved</span>: that a vote of thanks and an +expression of deepest obligation be tendered to Dr. Simon Newcomb, +President of the Congress, Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, vice-president of the +Congress, and Prof. Albion W. Small, vice-president of the Congress, for +their efficient, thorough, and comprehensive work in connection with the +programme of the Congress, the selection and invitation of speakers, and +the attention to detail in its execution. That, in view of the enormous +amount of labor devolving upon these three gentlemen for the past +eighteen months, to the exclusion of all opportunities for literary and +other work outside their college departments, an honorarium of +twenty-five hundred dollars be tendered to each of them.</p> + +<p>At a subsequent meeting the following resolution was also +passed:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Moved</span>: that the Directors of the Louisiana +Purchase Exposition Company place upon the record an expression of their +appreciation of the invaluable aid so freely given by the Administrative +Board of the Congress of Arts and Science. In organization, guidance, +and results the Congress was the most notable of its kind in history. +For the important part performed wisely and zealously by the +Administrative Board the Exposition Management extends this +acknowledgment.</p> + +<p class="center">SUMMARY OF EXPENSES OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Expenses of +Congress"> + +<tr><td class="left">Office expenses</td><td +class="right">$7,025</td><td class="left">82</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Travel</td><td class="right">3,847</td><td +class="left">24</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Exploitation, Organizing Committee abroad</td><td +class="right">8,663</td><td class="left">16</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Traveling expenses, American Speakers</td><td +class="right">31,350</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Traveling expenses, Foreign Speakers</td><td +class="right">49,000</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Honorariums</td><td class="right">7,500</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Banquet</td><td class="right">3,500</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Expenses for editing proceedings</td><td +class="right">5,875</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Estimated cost of printing proceedings</td><td +class="right">22,000</td><td></td><td class="left">$138,761</td><td +class="left">22</td></tr> + +</table> + +<h3 class="p4">INTERNATIONAL</h3> + +<h2>CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE</h2> + +<h3>UNIVERSAL EXPOSITION ST. LOUIS</h3> + +<h4>SEPTEMBER 19-25 1904</h4> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<h4>PROGRAMME AND LIST OF SPEAKERS</h4> + +<p class="p4 center"><a name="Programme"></a><b>PROGRAMME</b></p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="p1 indent6"><b>Purpose and Plan of the Congress</b></p> + +<p class="p1 indent6"><b>Organization of the Congress</b></p> + +<p class="p1 indent6"><b>Speakers and Chairmen</b></p> + +<p class="p1 indent6"><b>Chronological Order of Proceedings</b></p> + +<p class="p1 indent6"><b>Programme of Social Events</b></p> + +<p class="p1 indent6"><b>List of Ten-minute Speakers</b></p> + +<p class="p1 indent6"><b>List of Chairmen and Principal Speakers</b></p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="p2 center"><b>INDEX SUBJECTS</b></p> + +<div> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Programme Listing"> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><b>Division A. Normative +Science</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 1. Philosophy</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Metaphysics</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Philosophy of +Religion</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Logic</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Methodology of +Science</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Ethics</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td +class="left">Æsthetics<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 2. Mathematics</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Algebra and Analysis</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Geometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Applied +Mathematics<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><b>Division B. Historical +Science</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 3. Political and Economic +History</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">History of Asia</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">History of Greece +and Rome</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Mediæval +History</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Modern History of +Europe</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">History of +America</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td class="left">History of +Economic Institutions<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 4. History of +Law</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">History of Roman Law</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">History of Common +Law</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Comparative +Law<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 5. History of +Language</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Comparative Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Semitic +Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Indo-Iranian +Languages</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Greek +Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Latin +Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td class="left">English +Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">G.</td><td class="left">Romance +Languages</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">H.</td><td class="left">Germanic +Languages<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 6. History of +Literature</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Indo-Iranian Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Classical +Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">English +Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Romance +Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Germanic +Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td class="left">Slavic +Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">G.</td><td +class="left">Belles-Lettres<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 7. History of +Art</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Classical Art</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Modern +Architecture</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Modern +Painting<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 8. History of +Religion</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Brahminism and Buddhism</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td +class="left">Mohammedism</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Old +Testament</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">New +Testament</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">History of the +Christian Church<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><b>Division C. Physical +Science</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 9. Physics</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Physics of Matter</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Physics of +Ether</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Physics of the +Electron<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 10. Chemistry</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Inorganic Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Organic +Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Physical +Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Physiological +Chemistry<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 11. Astronomy</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Astrometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td +class="left">Astrophysics<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 12. Sciences of the +Earth</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Geophysics</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Geology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td +class="left">Palæontology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Petrology and +Mineralogy</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td +class="left">Physiography</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td +class="left">Geography</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">G.</td><td +class="left">Oceanography</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">H.</td><td class="left">Cosmical +Physics<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 13. Biology</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Phylogeny</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Plant +Morphology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Plant +Physiology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Plant +Pathology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Ecology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td +class="left">Bacteriology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">G.</td><td class="left">Animal +Morphology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">H.</td><td +class="left">Embryology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">I.</td><td class="left">Comparative +Anatomy</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">J.</td><td class="left">Human +Anatomy</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">K.</td><td +class="left">Physiology<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 14. +Anthropology</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Somatology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td +class="left">Archæology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td +class="left">Ethnology<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><b>Division D. Mental +Science</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 15. Psychology</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">General Psychology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Experimental +Psychology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Comparative and +Genetic Psychology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Abnormal +Psychology<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 16. Sociology</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left"><ins title="was 'B' in +original">A</ins>.</td><td class="left">Social Structure</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><ins title="was 'C' in +original">B</ins>.</td><td class="left">Social +Psychology<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><b>Division E. Utilitarian +Sciences</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 17. Medicine</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Public Health</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Preventive +Medicine</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td +class="left">Pathology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Therapeutics and +Pharmacology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Internal +Medicine</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td +class="left">Neurology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">G.</td><td +class="left">Psychiatry</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">H.</td><td class="left">Surgery</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">I.</td><td +class="left">Gynecology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">J.</td><td +class="left">Ophthalmology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">K.</td><td class="left">Otology and +Laryngology</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">L.</td><td +class="left">Pediatrics<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 18. Technology</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Civil Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Mechanical +Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Electrical +Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Mining +Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Technical +Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td +class="left">Agriculture<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 19. Economic</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Economic Theory</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td +class="left">Transportation</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Commerce and +Exchange</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Money and +Credit</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Public +Finance</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td +class="left">Insurance<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><b>Division F. Social +Regulation</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 20. Politics</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Political Theory</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td +class="left">Diplomacy</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">National +Administration</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Colonial +Administration</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Municipal +Administration<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 21. +Jurisprudence</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">International Law</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Constitutional +Law</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Private +Law<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 22. Social +Science</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">The Family</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">The Rural +Community</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">The Urban +Community</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">The Industrial +Group</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">The Dependent +Group</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td class="left">The Criminal +Group<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><b>Division G. Social +Culture</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 23. Education</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">Educational Theory</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">The +School</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">The +College</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">The +University</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">The +Library<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td colspan="2"><b>Department 24. Religion</b></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">Sec.</td><td class="left">A.</td><td +class="left">General Religious Education</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">B.</td><td class="left">Professional +Religious Education</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">C.</td><td class="left">Religious +Agencies</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">D.</td><td class="left">Religious +Work</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">E.</td><td class="left">Religious +Influence: PersonaG</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">F.</td><td class="left">Religious +Influence: Social</td></tr> + +</table> + +</div> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Purpose"></a>PURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE +CONGRESS</h3> + +<p class="p2">The idea of the Congress grows out of the thought that the +subdivision and multiplication of specialties in science has reached a +stage at which investigators and scholars may derive both inspiration +and profit from a general survey of the various fields of learning, +planned with a view of bringing the scattered sciences into closer +mutual relations. The central purpose is the unification of knowledge, +an effort toward which seems appropriate on an occasion when the nations +bring together an exhibit of their arts and industries. An assemblage is +therefore to be convened at which leading representatives of theoretical +and applied sciences shall set forth those general principles and +fundamental conceptions which connect groups of sciences, review the +historical development of special sciences, show their mutual relations +and discuss their present problems.</p> + +<p>The speakers to treat the various themes are selected in advance from +the European and American continents. The discussions will be arranged +on the following general plan:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p>After the opening of the Congress on Monday afternoon, September 19, +will follow, on Tuesday forenoon, addresses on main divisions of science +and its applications, the general theme being the unification of each of +the fields treated. These will be followed by two addresses on each of +the twenty-four great departments of knowledge. The theme of one address +in each case will be the Fundamental Conceptions and Methods, while the +other will set forth the progress during the last century. The preceding +addresses will be delivered by Americans, making the work of the first +two days the contribution of American scholars.</p> + +<p>On the third day, with the opening of the sections, the international +work will begin. One hundred twenty-eight sectional meetings will be +held on the four remaining days of the Congress, at each of which two +papers will be read, the theme of one being suggested by the relations +of the special branch treated to other branches; the other by its +present problems. Three hours will be devoted to each sectional meeting, +thus enabling each hearer to attend eight such meetings, if he so +desires. The programme is so arranged that related subjects will be +treated, as far as possible, at different times. The length of the +principal addresses being limited to forty-five minutes each, there will +remain at least one hour for five or six brief communications in each +section. The addresses in each department will be collected and +published in a special volume.</p> + +<p>It is hoped that the living influence of this meeting will be yet +more important than the formal addresses, and that the scholars whose +names are announced in the following programme of speakers and chairmen +will form only a nucleus for the gathering of thousands who feel in +sympathy with the efforts to bring unity into the world of +knowledge.</p> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Orgn"></a><b>ORGANIZATION OF THE +CONGRESS</b></h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center"><b>PRESIDENT OF THE EXPOSITION:</b><br /> +HON. DAVID R. FRANCIS, A.M., LL.D.</p> + +<p class="center add2"><b>DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSES,</b><br /> +HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.<br /> +<i>Universal Exposition, 1904.</i></p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<h3 class="p2"><b>ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD</b></h3> + +<p class="center">NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, PH.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>President of Columbia University, Chairman.</i></p> + +<p class="center">WILLIAM R. HARPER, PH.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>President of the University of Chicago.</i></p> + +<p class="center">R. H. JESSE, PH.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>President of the University of Missouri.</i></p> + +<p class="center">HENRY S. PRITCHETT, PH.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.</i></p> + +<p class="center">HERBERT PUTNAM, LITT.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>Librarian of Congress.</i></p> + +<p class="center add2">FREDERICK J. V. SKIFF, A.M.<br /> +<i>Director of the Field Columbian Museum.</i></p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<h3 class="p2"><a name="Officers"></a>OFFICERS OF THE CONGRESS</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center"><b>PRESIDENT:</b><br /> +SIMON NEWCOMB, PH.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>Retired Professor U. S. N.</i></p> + +<p class="center"><b>VICE-PRESIDENTS:</b><br /> +HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, PH.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>Professor of Psychology in Harvard University.</i></p> + +<p class="center">ALBION W. SMALL, PH.D., LL.D.<br /> +<i>Professor of Sociology in The University of Chicago.</i></p> + +<p class="center"><b>HONORARY VICE-PRESIDENTS:</b><br /> +RIGHT HONORABLE JAMES BRYCE, M.P.<br /> +<span class="smcap">Great Britain</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">M. GASTON DARBOUX,<br /> +<span class="smcap">France</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">PROFESSOR WILHELM WALDEYER,<br /> +<span class="smcap">Germany</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">DR. OSKAR BACKLUND,<br /> +<span class="smcap">Russia</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">PROFESSOR THEODORE ESCHERICH,<br /> +<span class="smcap">Austria</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">SIGNOR ATTILIO BRUNIALTI,<br /> +<span class="smcap">Italy</span>.</p> + +<p class="center">PROFESSOR N. HOZUMI,<br /> +<span class="smcap">Japan</span>.</p> + +<p class="center"><b>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY:</b><br /> +DR. L. O. HOWARD,<br /> +<i>Permanent Secretary American Association<br /> +for the Advancement of Science</i>.</p> + +<h3 class="p4 center"><a name="Speakers"></a>SPEAKERS AND CHAIRMEN</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<div> <table class="bold" border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Speakers +and Chairmen"> + +<tr><th class="center" colspan="2">DIVISION A—NORMATIVE +SCIENCE</th></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Josiah Royce</span>, Harvard +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 6, September 20, 10 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c10" /></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +1—PHILOSOPHY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 6, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Borden P. Bowne</span>, +Boston University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George H. Howison</span>, +University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George T. +Ladd</span>, Yale University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. METAPHYSICS.</b> (<i>Hall +6, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. C. Armstrong</span>, +Wesleyan University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. E. Taylor</span>, McGill +University, Montreal.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Alexander T. +Ormond</span>, Princeton University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. O. Lovejoy</span>, +Washington University,<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. PHILOSOPHY OF +RELIGION.</b> (<i>Hall 1, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Thomas C. Hall</span>, Union +Theological Seminary, N. Y.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Otto Pfleiderer</span>, +University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ernst +Troeltsch</span>, University of Heidelberg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. P. Montague</span>, Columbia +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. LOGIC.</b> (<i>Hall 6, +September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George M. Duncan</span>, Yale +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William A. Hammond</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frederick J. +E. Woodbridge</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. H. Sheldon</span>, Columbia +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. METHODOLOGY OF +SCIENCE.</b> (<i>Hall 6, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James E. Creighton</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Wilhelm Ostwald</span>, +University of Leipzig.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Benno +Erdmann</span>, University of Bonn.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. R. B. Perry</span>, Harvard +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. ETHICS.</b> (<i>Hall 6, +September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George H. Palmer</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William R. Sorley</span>, +University of Cambridge.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Paul +Hensel</span>, University of Erlangen.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. C. Sharp</span>, +University of Wisconsin.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. AESTHETICS.</b> (<i>Hall +4, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James H. Tufts</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Henry Rutgers Marshall</span>, New +York City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Max +Dessoir</span>, University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Max Meyer</span>, University +of Missouri.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +2—MATHEMATICS</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 7, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry S. White</span>, +Northwestern University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Maxime Bocher</span>, Harvard +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James P. +Pierpont</span>, Yale University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. ALGEBRA AND ANALYSIS.</b> +(<i>Hall 9, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor E. H. Moore</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Emile Picard</span>, the +Sorbonne; Member of the Institute of France.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Heinrich +Maschke</span>, University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor G. A. Bliss</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. GEOMETRY.</b> (<i>Hall 9, +September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor M. W. Haskell</span>, +University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">M. Gaston Darboux</span>, Perpetual +Secretary of The Academy of Sciences, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Edward +Kasner</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Thomas J. Holgate</span>, +Northwestern University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. APPLIED MATHEMATICS.</b> +(<i>Hall 7, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Arthur G. Webster</span>, +Clark University, Worcester, Mass.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ludwig Boltzmann</span>, +University of Vienna.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henri +Poincaré</span>, the Sorbonne; Member of the Institute of +France.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry T. Eddy</span>, +University of Minnesota.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c33" /></td></tr> + +<tr><th class="center" colspan="2">DIVISION B—HISTORICAL +SCIENCE</th></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 3, September 20, 10 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td><span +class="smcap">President Woodrow Wilson</span>, Princeton +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c10" /></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 3—POLITICAL AND +ECONOMIC HISTORY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 4, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William M. Sloane</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James +H. Robinson</span>, Columbia University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTIONS A AND B. HISTORY OF GREECE, +ROME, AND ASIA.</b> +(<i>Hall 3, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>) +</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Thomas D. Seymour</span>, +Yale University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John P. Mahaffy</span>, +University of Dublin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ettore +Pais</span>, University of Naples. Director of the National Museum of +Antiquities, Naples.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henri +Cordier</span>, Ecole Des Langues Vivantes Orientales, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward Capps</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. MEDIAEVAL HISTORY.</b> +(<i>Hall 6, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor Charles H. Haskins</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor Karl Lamprecht</span>, +University of Leipzig.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Professor George B. +Adams</span>, Yale University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Earle W. Dow</span>, +University of Michigan.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. MODERN HISTORY OF +EUROPE.</b> (<i>Hall 3, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable James B. Perkins</span>, +Rochester, N. Y.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor J. B. Bury</span>, +University of Cambridge.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Professor Charles W. +Colby</span>, Mcgill University, Montreal.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ferdinand Schwill</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. HISTORY OF AMERICA.</b> +(<i>Hall 1, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Dr. James Schouler</span>, +Boston.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor Frederic J. Turner</span>, +University of Wisconsin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Professor Edward G. +Bourne</span>, Yale University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Evarts B. Greene</span>, +University of Illinois.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC +INSTITUTIONS.</b> +(<i>Hall 2, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td +></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor Frank A. Fetter</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor J. E. Conrad</span>, +University of Halle.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Professor Simon N. +Patten</span>, University of Pennsylvania.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. J. Pease Norton</span>, Yale +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 4—HISTORY OF +LAW</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 5, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable David J. Brewer</span>, +Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable Emlin McClain</span>, Judge +of the Supreme Court of Iowa, Iowa City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Nathan +Abbott</span>, Leland Stanford Jr. University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW.</b> +(<i>Hall 11, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. W. H. Buckler</span>, Baltimore, +Md.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Professor Munroe +Smith</span>, Columbia University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. HISTORY OF COMMON +LAW.</b> (<i>Hall 11, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John D. Lawson</span>, +University of Missouri.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable Simeon E. Baldwin</span>, +Judge of the Supreme Court of Errors, New Haven, Conn.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John H. +Wigmore</span>, Northwestern University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor C. H. Huberich</span>, +University of Texas.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. COMPARATIVE LAW.</b> +(<i>Hall 14, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable Jacob M. Dickinson</span>, +Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Nobushige Hozumi</span>, +University of Tokio.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Alfred +Nerincx</span>, University of Louvain.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 5—HISTORY OF +LANGUAGE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 4, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George Hempl</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor T. R. Lounsbury</span>, Yale +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">President Benjamin Ide +Wheeler</span>, University of California.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. COMPARATIVE LANGUAGE.</b> +(<i>Hall 4, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Francis A. March</span>, +Lafayette College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Carl D. Buck</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Hans +Oertel</span>, Yale University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor E. W. Fay</span>, University +of Texas, Austin, Texas.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. SEMITIC LANGUAGES.</b> +(<i>Hall 4, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor G. F. Moore</span>, Harvard +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James A. Craig</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Crawford H. +Toy</span>, Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. INDO-IRANIAN +LANGUAGES.</b> (<i>Hall 8, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Sylvain Lévi</span>, Collège +de France, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Arthur A. +Macdonell</span>, University of Oxford.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. GREEK LANGUAGE.</b> +(<i>Hall 3, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Martin L. D'ooge</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Herbert W. Smyth</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Milton W. +Humphreys</span>, University of Virginia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor J. E. Harry</span>, +University of Cincinnati.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. LATIN LANGUAGE.</b> +(<i>Hall 9, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Maurice Hutton</span>, +University of Toronto.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor E. A. Sonnenschein</span>, +University of Birmingham.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William G. +Hale</span>, University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. W. Shipley</span>, +Washington University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. ENGLISH LANGUAGE.</b> +(<i>Hall 3, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles M. Gayley</span>, +University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Otto Jespersen</span>, +University of Copenhagen.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George L. +Kittredge</span>, Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION G. ROMANCE LANGUAGES.</b> +(<i>Hall 5, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Paul Meyer</span>, Collège de +France, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry A. +Todd</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor E. E. Brandon</span>, Miami +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION H. GERMANIC LANGUAGES.</b> +(<i>Hall 3, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Gustaf E. Karsten</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Eduard Sievers</span>, +University of Leipzig.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Herman +Collitz</span>, Bryn Mawr College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 6—HISTORY OF +LITERATURE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 6, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James A. Harrison</span>, +University of Virginia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor +Charles M. Gayley</span>, University of California.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. INDO-IRANIAN +LITERATURE.</b> (<i>Hall 8, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Maurice Bloomfield</span>, +Johns Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. V. W. Jackson</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. CLASSICAL LITERATURE.</b> +(<i>Hall 3, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Andrew F. West</span>, +Princeton University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Paul Shorey</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John H. +Wright</span>, Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. G. Moore</span>, Dartmouth +College.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. ENGLISH LITERATURE.</b> +(<i>Hall 1, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Francis B. Gummere</span>, +Haverford College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John +Hoops</span>, University of Heidelberg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. ROMANCE LITERATURE.</b> +(<i>Hall 8, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Adolphe Cohn</span>, Columbia +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Pio Rajna</span>, Institute +of Higher Studies, Florence, Italy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Alcée +Fortier</span>, Tulane University, New Orleans.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Comfort</span>, Haverford +College.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. GERMANIC LITERATURE.</b> +(<i>Hall 3, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Kuno Francke</span>, Harvard +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor August Sauer</span>, +University of Prague.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor J. +Minor</span>, University of Vienna.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor D. K. Jessen</span>, Bryn +Mawr College.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. SLAVIC LITERATURE.</b> +(<i>Hall 8, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Charles R. Crane</span>, +Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Leo Wiener</span>, Harvard +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Paul +Boyer</span>, Ecole Des Langues Vivantes Orientales, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. S. N. Harper</span>, University of +Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION G. BELLES-LETTRES.</b> +(<i>Hall 3, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Robert Herrick</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry Schofield</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Brander +Matthews</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 7—HISTORY OF +ART</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 8, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Halsey C. Ives</span>, +Washington University, St. Louis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Rufus B. Richardson</span>, +New York, N. Y.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John C. van +Dyke</span>, Rutgers College.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. CLASSICAL ART.</b> +(<i>Hall 12, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Rufus B. Richardson</span>, +New York City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Adolph Furtwangler</span>, +University Of Munich.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frank B. +Tarbell</span>, University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. P. Baur</span>, Yale +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. MODERN ARCHITECTURE.</b> +(<i>Hall 7, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Charles F. McKim</span>, New York +City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor C. Enlart</span>, University +of Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Alfred D. F. +Hamlin</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Guy Lowell</span>, Boston, +Mass.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. MODERN PAINTING.</b> +(<i>Hall 4, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Richard Muther</span>, +University of Breslau.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Okakura +Kakuzo</span>, Japan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 8—HISTORY OF +RELIGION</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 5, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Rev. Wm. Eliot Griffis</span>, Ithaca, +N. Y.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George F. Moore</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor +Nathaniel Schmidt</span>, Cornell University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. BRAHMANISM AND +BUDDHISM.</b> (<i>Hall 8, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Hermann Oldenberg</span>, +University of Kiel.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Maurice +Bloomfield</span>, Johns Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Reginald C. Robbins</span>, Harvard +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. MOHAMMEDISM.</b> (<i>Hall +8, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James R. Jewett</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ignaz Goldziher</span>, +University of Budapest.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Duncan B. +Macdonald</span>, Hartford Theological Seminary.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. OLD TESTAMENT.</b> +(<i>Hall 4, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. S. Carrier</span>, +McCormick Theological Seminary.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James F. McCurdy</span>, +University College of Toronto.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Karl +Budde</span>, University of Marburg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James A. Kelso</span>, +Western Theological Seminary, Allegheny, Pa.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. NEW TESTAMENT.</b> +(<i>Hall 1, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Andrew C. Zenos</span>, +McCormick Theological Seminary.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Benjamin W. Bacon</span>, +Yale University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ernest D. +Burton</span>, University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Clyde W. Votaw</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN +CHURCH.</b> (<i>Hall 2, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Eri Baker Hulbert</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Adolf Harnack</span>, +University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Jean +Réville</span>, Faculty of Protestant Theology, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c33" /></td></tr> + +<tr><th class="center" colspan="2">DIVISION C—PHYSICAL +SCIENCE</th></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 4, September 20, 10 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Robert S. Woodward</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c10" /></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 9—PHYSICS</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 6, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry Crew</span>, +Northwestern University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward L. Nichols</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Carl +Barus</span>, Brown University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. PHYSICS OF MATTER.</b> +(<i>Hall 11, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Samuel W. Stratton</span>, +Director of The National Bureau of Standards, Washington.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Arthur L. Kimball</span>, +Amherst College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Francis E. +Nipher</span>, Washington University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor R. A. Milliken</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. PHYSICS OF ETHER.</b> +(<i>Hall 11, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry Crew</span>, +Northwestern University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Dewitt B. Brace</span>, +University of Nebraska.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Augustus Trowbridge</span>, +University of Wisconsin.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. PHYSICS OF THE +ELECTRON.</b> (<i>Hall 5, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. G. Webster</span>r, Clark +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor P. Langevin</span>, Collège +de France.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ernest +Rutherfurd</span>, McGill University, Montreal.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor W. J. Humphreys</span>, +University of Virginia.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +10—CHEMISTRY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 5, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James M. Crafts</span>, +Massachusetts Institute of Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John U. Nef</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frank W. +Clarke</span>, Chief Chemist, U. S. Geological Survey.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. INORGANIC CHEMISTRY.</b> +(<i>Hall 16, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John W. Mallet</span>, +University of Virginia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henri Moissan</span>, the +Sorbonne; Member of the Institute of France.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Sir William +Ramsay</span>, K.C.B., Royal Institution, London.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William L. Dudley</span>, +Vanderbilt University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY.</b> +(<i>Hall 16, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Albert B. Prescott</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Julius Stieglitz</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William A. +Noyes</span>, National Bureau of Standards.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY.</b> +(<i>Hall 16, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Wilder D. Bancroft</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor J. H. Van t'hoff</span>, +University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Arthur A. +Noyes</span>, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. W. R. Whitney</span>, Schenectady, +N. Y.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. PHYSIOLOGICAL +CHEMISTRY.</b> (<i>Hall 16, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Wilder O. Atwater</span>, +Wesleyan University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor O. Cohnheim</span>, +University of Heidelberg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Russell H. +Chittenden</span>, Yale University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. C. L. Alsberg</span>, Harvard +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +11—ASTRONOMY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 8, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George C. Comstock</span>, +Director of the Observatory, Madison, Wisconsin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Lewis Boss</span>, Director +of Dudley Observatory.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward C. +Pickering</span>, Director of Harvard Observatory.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. ASTROMETRY.</b> (<i>Hall +9, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ormond Stone</span>, +University of Virginia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Oskar Backlund</span>, Director of +the Observatory, Pulkowa, Russia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John C. +Kapteyn</span>, University of Groningen, Holland.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor W. S. Eichelberger</span>, U. +S. Naval Observatory.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. ASTROPHYSICS.</b> +(<i>Hall 9, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George E. Hale</span>, +Director of the Yerkes Observatory.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Herbert H. Turner</span>, +F.R.S., University of Oxford.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William W. +Campbell</span>, Director of The Lick Observatory, Mt. Hamilton, +California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. W. S. Adams</span>, Yerkes +Observatory.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 12—SCIENCES OF THE +EARTH</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 3, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. G. K. Gilbert</span>, U. S. +Geological Survey.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Thomas C. Chamberlin</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William M. +Davis</span>, Harvard University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. GEOPHYSICS.</b> (<i>Hall +14, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Christopher W. Hall</span>, +University of Minnesota.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. George F. Becker</span>, Geologist, +U. S. Geological Survey.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor E. M. Lehnerts</span>, +Minnesota State Normal School.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. GEOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall 14, +September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor T. C. Chamberlin</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President Charles R. Van Hise</span>, +University of Wisconsin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor R. D. Salisbury</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. PALAEONTOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 11, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William B. Scott</span>, +Princeton University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. A. S. Woodward</span>, F.R.S., +British Museum Of Natural History, London.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry F. +Osborn</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. John M. Clarke</span>, Albany, N. +Y.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. PETROLOGY AND +MINERALOGY.</b> (<i>Hall 9, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Oliver C. Farrington</span>, Field +Columbian Museum, Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. Zirkel</span>, University +of Leipzig.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. PHYSIOGRAPHY.</b> +(<i>Hall 12, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Henry Gannett</span>, United States +Geological Survey.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Albrecht Penck</span>, +University of Vienna.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Israel C. +Russell</span>, University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. John M. Clarke</span>, Albany, N. +Y.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. GEOGRAPHY.</b> (<i>Hall +11, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Israel C. Russell</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Hugh R. Mill</span>, Director +British Rainfall Organization, London.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor H. Yule +Oldham</span>, Cambridge, England.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor R. D. Salisbury</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION G. OCEANOGRAPHY.</b> +(<i>Hall 8, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Rear-<ins title="lower case in the +original">A</ins>dmiral John R. Bartlett</span>, United States +Navy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Sir John Murray</span>, K.C.B., F.R.S., +Edinburgh.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor K. +Mitsukuri</span>, University of Tokio.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION H. COSMICAL PHYSICS.</b> +(<i>Hall 10, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Francis E. Nipher</span>, +Washington University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Svante Arrhenius</span>, +University of Stockholm, Stockholm.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Abbott L. +Rotch</span>, Blue Hill Observatory.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. L. A. +Bauer</span>, Washington, D. C.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 13—BIOLOGY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 2, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William G. Farlow</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John M. Coulter</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Jacques +Loeb</span>, University of California.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. PHYLOGENY.</b> (<i>Hall +2, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor T. H. Morgan</span>, Columbia +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Hugo de Vries</span>, +University of Amsterdam.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles O. +Whitman</span>, University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. PLANT MORPHOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 2, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William Trelease</span>, +Washington University, St. Louis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frederick O. Bower</span>, +University of Glasgow.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Karl F. +Goebel</span>, University of Munich.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. E. Lloyd</span>, Columbia +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. PLANT PHYSIOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 4, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles R. Barnes</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Julius Wiesner</span>, +University of Vienna.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Benjamin M. +Duggar</span>, University of Missouri.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. C. Newcomb</span>, +University of Michigan.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. PLANT PATHOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 7, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Chas. E. Bessey</span>, +University of Nebraska.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Joseph C. Arthur</span>, +Purdue University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Merton B. +Waite</span>, U. S. Department of Agriculture.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. C. S. Shear</span>, U. S. +Department of Agriculture.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. ECOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall 7, +September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Oskar Drude</span>, Kön. +Technische Hochschule, Dresden.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Benjamin +Robinson</span>, Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. E. Clements</span>, +University of Nebraska.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. BACTERIOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 15, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Harold C. Ernst</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edwin O. Jordan</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Theobald +Smith</span>, Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. P. H. Hiss, Jr.</span>, Columbia +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION G. ANIMAL MORPHOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 2, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Leland O. Howard</span>, Department +of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles B. Davenport</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Alfred +Giard</span>, the Sorbonne; Member of the Institute of France.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor C. H. Herrick</span>, +Dennison University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION H. EMBRYOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +9, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Simon H. Gage</span>, Cornell +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Oskar Hertwig</span>, +University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William K. +Brooks</span>, Johns Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor T. G. Lee</span>, University +of Minnesota.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION I. COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.</b> +(<i>Hall 2, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James P. McMurrich</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William E. Ritter</span>, +University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Yves +Delage</span>, the Sorbonne; Member of the Institute of +France.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry B. Ward</span>, +University of Nebraska.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION J. HUMAN ANATOMY.</b> +(<i>Hall 2, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George A. Piersol</span>, +University of Pennsylvania.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Wilhelm Waldeyer</span>, +University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor H. H. +Donaldson</span>, University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. R. J. Terry</span>, Washington +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION K. PHYSIOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +4, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. S. J. Meltzer</span>, New +York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Max Verworn</span>, +University of Göttingen.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William H. +Howell</span>, Johns Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Reid Hunt</span>, +Washington.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +14—ANTHROPOLOGY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 8, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frederic W. Putnam</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. J. McGee</span>, President +American Anthropological Association, Washington, D. C.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Franz +Boas</span>, Columbia University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. SOMATOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +16, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Edward C. Spitzka</span>, New York +City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor L. Manouvrier</span>, School +of Anthropology, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. George A. +Dorsey</span>, Field Columbian Museum, Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. E. A. Spitzka</span>, New York +City.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. ARCHAEOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +16, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. M. H. Saville</span>, American +Museum of Natural History, New York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Señor Alfredo Chavero</span>, Inspector +of the National Museum, Mexico.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edouard +Seler</span>, University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William C. Mills</span>, Ohio +State University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. ETHNOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +16, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Miss Alice C. Fletcher</span>, +President of the Washington Anthropological Society.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frederick Starr</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. C. +Haddon</span>, University of Cambridge.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. W. Shipley</span>, +Washington University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="center"><hr class="c33" /></td></tr> + +<tr><th class="center" colspan="2">DIVISION D—MENTAL +SCIENCE</th></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 7, September 20, 10 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President G. Stanley Hall</span>, Clark +University, Worcester, Mass.</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="center"><hr class="c10" /></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +15—PSYCHOLOGY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 7, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James McK. Cattell</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor J. Mark +Baldwin</span>, Johns Hopkins University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 6, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Jos. Royce</span>, Harvard +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Harald Hoeffding</span>, +University of Copenhagen.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James +Ward</span>, University of Cambridge, England.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. H. Davis</span>, Lehigh +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. EXPERIMENTAL +PSYCHOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall 2, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward A. Pace</span>, +Catholic University of America.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Robert MacDougal</span>, New +York University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward B. +Titchener</span>, Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. R. S. Woodworth</span>, Columbia +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. COMPARATIVE AND GENETIC +PSYCHOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall 6, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edmund C. Sanford</span>, +Clark University, Worcester, Mass.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Principal C. Lloyd Morgan</span>, +University College, Bristol.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Mary W. +Calkins</span>, Wellesley College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. R. M. Yerkes</span>, Harvard +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 6, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Edward Cowles</span>, Waverley, +Mass.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Pierre Janet</span>, Collège de +France, Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Morton +Prince</span>, Boston.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Adolph Meyer</span>, New York +City.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +16—SOCIOLOGY</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 7, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frank W. Blackmar</span>, +University of Kansas.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Franklin H. Giddings</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George E. +Vincent</span>, University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. SOCIAL STRUCTURE.</b> +(<i>Hall 15, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frederick W. Moore</span>, +Vanderbilt University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Field Marshal Gustav +Ratzenhofer</span>, Vienna.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor F. +Toennies</span>, University of Kiel.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Lester F. +Ward</span>, U. S. National Museum.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Jerome Dowd</span>, +University of Wisconsin.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 15, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles A. Ellwood</span>, +University of Missouri.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Wm. I. Thomas</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward A. +Ross</span>, University of Nebraska.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor E. C. Hayes</span>, Miami +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c33" /></td></tr> + +<tr><th class="center" colspan="2">DIVISION E—UTILITARIAN +SCIENCES</th></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 1, September 20, 10 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President David Starr Jordan</span>, +Leland Stanford Jr. University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c10" /></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +17—MEDICINE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 1, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. William Osler</span>, Johns Hopkins +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. William T. Councilman</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Frank +Billings</span>, University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. PUBLIC HEALTH.</b> +(<i>Hall 13, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Walter Wyman</span>, +Surgeon-General of the U. S. Marine Hospital Service.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William T. Sedgwick</span>, +Massachusetts Institute of Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Ernst J. +Lederle</span>, Former Commissioner of Health, New York City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. H. M. Bracken</span>, St. Paul, +Minn.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE.</b> +(<i>Hall 13, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Joseph M. Mathews</span>, President +of the State Board of Health, Louisville, Ky.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor Ronald Ross</span>, F.R.S., +School of Tropical Medicine, University College, Liverpool.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. J. N. Hurty</span>, Indianapolis, +Ind.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. PATHOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +13, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Simon Flexner</span>, +Director of the Rockefeller Institute.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ludwig Hektoen</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Johannes +Orth</span>, University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Shibasaburo +Kitasato</span>, University of Tokio.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. McN. Miller</span>, University +of Missouri.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. THERAPEUTICS AND +PHARMACOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 13, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>) +</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Hobart A. Hare</span>, Jefferson +Medical College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Oscar Liebreich</span>, +University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Sir Lauder +Brunton</span>, F.R.S., London.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. H. B. Favill</span>, Chicago, +Ill.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. INTERNAL MEDICINE.</b> +(<i>Hall 13, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frederick C. Shattuck</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor T. Clifford Allbutt</span>, +F.R.S., University of Cambridge.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William S. +Thayer</span>, Johns Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. R. C. Cabot</span>, Boston, +Mass.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. NEUROLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +13, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Lewellyn F. Barker</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap"> Professor James J. Putnam</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION G. PSYCHIATRY.</b> (<i>Hall +7, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Charles L. Dana</span>, Cornell +University, New York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Edward +Cowles</span>, Boston.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. C. G. Chadddock</span>, St. Louis, +Mo.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION H. SURGERY.</b> (<i>Hall 13, +September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Carl Beck</span>, +Post-Graduate Medical School, New York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Frederic S. Dennis</span>, +F.R.C.S., Cornell Medical College, New York City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Johannes +Orth</span>, University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. J. F. Binnie</span>, Kansas City, +Mo.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION I. GYNECOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall +13, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Howard A. Kelly</span>, Johns +Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor J. Clarence Webster</span>, +Rush Medical College, Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. G. H. Noble</span>, Atlanta, +Ga.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION J. OPHTHALMOLOGY.</b> +(<i>Hall 7, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. George C. Harlan</span>, +Philadelphia, Pa.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Edward Jackson</span>, Denver, +Col.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. George M. +Gould</span>, Philadelphia, Pa.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Wm. M. Sweet</span>, Jefferson +Medical College, Philadelphia, Pa.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION K. OTOLOGY AND +LARYNGOLOGY.</b> (<i>Hall 7, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William C. Glasgow</span>, +Washington University, St. Louis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Sir Felix Semon</span>, C.V.O., +Physician Extraordinary to His Majesty, the King, London.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. S. Spencer</span>, Allenhurst, N. +J.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION L. PEDIATRICS.</b> (<i>Hall +7, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Thomas M. Rotch</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Theodore Escherich</span>, +University of Vienna.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Abraham +Jacobi</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Samuel S. Adams</span>, Washington, +D. C.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +18—TECHNOLOGY.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 3, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Chancellor Winfield S. Chaplin</span>, +Washington University, St. Louis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry T. Bovey</span>, +F.R.S., McGill University, Montreal.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. CIVIL ENGINEERING.</b> +(<i>Hall 10, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William H. Burr</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. J. A. L. Waddell</span>, Consulting +Engineer, Kansas City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Lewis M. +Haupt</span>, Consulting Engineer, Philadelphia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. MECHANICAL +ENGINEERING.</b> (<i>Hall 10, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James E. Denton</span>, +Stevens Institute of Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Albert W. Smith</span>, +Leland Stanford Jr. University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. George Dinkel, Jr.</span>, Jersey +City.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. ELECTRICAL +ENGINEERING.</b> (<i>Hall 10, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td> +</tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Arthur E. Kennelly</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Michael I. +Pupin</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Carl Hering</span>, Philadelphia, +Pa.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. MINING ENGINEERING.</b> +(<i>Hall 11, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. John Hays Hammond</span>, New York +City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Robert H. Richards</span>, +Massachusetts Institute of Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Samuel B. +Christy</span>, University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Joseph Struthers</span>, New York +City.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. TECHNICAL CHEMISTRY.</b> +(<i>Hall 16, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. H. W. Wiley</span>, Department of +Agriculture.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles E. Munroe</span>, +George Washington University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William H. +Walker</span>, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Marcus Benjamin</span>, U. S. +National Museum.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. AGRICULTURE.</b> (<i>Hall +10, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor H. J. Wheeler</span>, +Kingston, R. I.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles W. Dabney, +Jr.</span>, University of Cincinnati.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Liberty H. +Bailey</span>, Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William Hill</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +19—ECONOMICS</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 1, September 20, 11.15 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Emory R. Johnson</span>, +University of Pennsylvania.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frank A. Fetter</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Adolph C. +Miller</span>, University of California.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. ECONOMIC THEORY.</b> +(<i>Hall 15, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John B. Clark</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Jacob H. +Hollander</span>, Johns Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Jesse E. Pope</span>, +University of Missouri.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. TRANSPORTATION.</b> +(<i>Hall 10, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor J. Lawrence Laughlin</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Eugene Von +Philippovich</span>, University of Vienna.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William Z. +Ripley</span>, Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. George G. Tunell</span>, +Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. COMMERCE AND +EXCHANGE.</b> (<i>Hall 10, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor E. D. Jones</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Carl +Plehn</span>, University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. MONEY AND CREDIT.</b> +(<i>Hall 5, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. B. E. Walker</span>, Canadian Bank +of Commerce, Toronto.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Horace White</span>, New York +City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor J. Lawrence +Laughlin</span>, University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John Cummings</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. PUBLIC FINANCE.</b> +(<i>Hall 1, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry C. Adams</span>, +University of Michigan.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edwin R. A. +Seligman</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. INSURANCE.</b> (<i>Hall +10, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Emory McClintock</span>, Actuary, +Mutual Life Insurance</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left">Company, New York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Frederick L. Hoffman</span>, +Statistician, Prudential Insurance Company, Newark.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Balthasar H. +Meyer</span>, University of Wisconsin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c33" /></td></tr> + +<tr><th class="center" colspan="2">DIVISION F—SOCIAL +REGULATION</th></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 2, September 20, 10 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Abbott L. Lowell</span>, +Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c10" /></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +20—POLITICS</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 2, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William A. Dunning</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chancellor E. Benjamin +Andrews</span>, University of Nebraska.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTIONS A AND C. POLITICAL THEORY +AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION.</b> (<i>Hall 15, September 22, 3 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor W. W. Willoughby</span>, +Johns Hopkins University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George G. +Wilson</span>, Brown University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Right Hon. James +Bryce</span>, London, England.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Charles E. Merriam</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. DIPLOMACY.</b> (<i>Hall +1, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable John W. Foster</span>, +Ex-Secretary of State.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable David Jayne +Hill</span>, Minister of the United States to Switzerland.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. COLONIAL +ADMINISTRATION.</b> (<i>Hall 4, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>) +</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Harry P. Judson</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Bernard J. Moses</span>, +University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Paul S. +Reinsch</span>, University of Wisconsin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. MUNICIPAL +ADMINISTRATION.</b> (<i>Hall 15, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>) +</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Albert Shaw</span>, Editor American +Monthly Review of Reviews.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Miss Jane +Addams</span>, Hull House, Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John A. Fairlie</span>, +University of Michigan.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +21—JURISPRUDENCE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 3, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George W. Kirchwey</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President Charles W. Needham</span>, +Columbian University, Washington.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Joseph H. +Beale</span>, Harvard University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. INTERNATIONAL LAW.</b> +(<i>Hall 14, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James B. Scott</span>, +Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor H. Lafontaine</span>, Member +of the Senate, Brussels, Belgium.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles +Noble Gregory</span>, University of Iowa.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Count Albert +Apponyi</span>, Hungary.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. C. Dennis</span>, Leland +Stanford Jr. University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.</b> +(<i>Hall 14, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Henry St. George +Tucker</span>, George Washington University, Washington.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Signor Attilio Brunialti</span>, +Councilor of State, Rome.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor John W. +Burgess</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ferdinand +Larnaude</span>, University of Paris.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. PRIVATE LAW.</b> (<i>Hall +14, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James B. Ames</span>, Dean, +Harvard Law School.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ernst Freund</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable Edward B. +Whitney</span>, New York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dean William Draper Lewis</span>, +University of Pennsylvania.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT 22—SOCIAL +SCIENCE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 1, September 20, 2 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Walter L. Sheldon</span>, Ethical +Society, St. Louis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Felix Adler</span>, Columbia +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Graham +Taylor</span>, Chicago Theological Seminary.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. THE FAMILY.</b> (<i>Hall +5, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Samuel G. Smith</span>, +University of Minnesota.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Samuel W. Dike</span>, Auburndale, +Mass.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George +Elliott Howard</span>, University of Nebraska.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. THE RURAL COMMUNITY.</b> +(<i>Hall 5, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Hon. Aaron Jones</span>, Master of +National Grange, South Bend, Ind.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Max Weber</span>, University +of Heidelberg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">President Kenyon L. +Butterfield</span>, Rhode Island State Agricultural College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William Hill</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. THE URBAN COMMUNITY.</b> +(<i>Hall 5, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor T. Jastrow</span>, University +of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Louis +Wuarin</span>, University of Geneva.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. THE INDUSTRIAL GROUP.</b> +(<i>Hall 14, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Werner Sombart</span>, +University of Breslau.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Richard T. +Ely</span>, University of Wisconsin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Thomas S. Adams</span>, +Madison, Wis.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. THE DEPENDENT GROUP.</b> +(<i>Hall 5, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Robert W. Deforest</span>, New York +City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles R. Henderson</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Emil +Münsterberg</span>, President City Charities, Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. THE CRIMINAL GROUP.</b> +(<i>Hall 5, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Frederick H. Wines</span>, +Secretary State Charities Aid Association, Upper Montclair, N. +J.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c33" /></td></tr> + +<tr><th class="center" colspan="2">DIVISION G—SOCIAL +CULTURE</th></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 5, September 20, 10 a. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Honorable William T. Harris</span>, +United States Commissioner of Education.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><hr class="c10" /></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +23—EDUCATION</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 2, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President Arthur T. Hadley</span>, Yale +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">The Right Rev. John L. +Spalding</span>, Bishop of Peoria.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. EDUCATIONAL THEORY.</b> +(<i>Hall 12, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Charles DeGarmo</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Wilhelm Rein</span>, +University of Jena.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Elmer E. +Brown</span>, University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. G. M. Whittle</span>, Cornell +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. THE SCHOOL.</b> (<i>Hall +12, September 23, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. F. Louis Soldan</span>, +Superintendent Public Schools, St. Louis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Michael E. Sadler</span>, +University of Manchester.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. William H. +Maxwell</span>, Superintendent Public Schools, New York City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. S. Langsdorf</span>, +Washington University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. THE COLLEGE.</b> (<i>Hall +12, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President W. S. Chaplin</span>, +Washington University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President William DeWitt Hyde</span>, +Bowdoin College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">President M. Carey +Thomas</span>, Bryn Mawr College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor H. H. Horne</span>, Dartmouth +College.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. THE UNIVERSITY.</b> +(<i>Hall 12, September 24, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor C. Chabot</span>, University +of Lyons.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward +Delavan Perry</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. THE LIBRARY.</b> (<i>Hall +12, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. Frederick M. Crunden</span>, +Librarian St. Louis Public Library.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. William A. E. Axon</span>, +Manchester, England.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Guido +Biagi</span>, Royal Librarian, Florence.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Mr. C. P. Pettus</span>, Washington +University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">DEPARTMENT +24—RELIGION</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">(<i>Hall 4, September 20, 4.15 p. +m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Bishop John H. Vincent</span>, +Chautauqua, N. Y.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President Henry C. King</span>, Oberlin +College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Francis G. +Peabody</span>, Harvard University.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION A. GENERAL RELIGIOUS +EDUCATION.</b> +(<i>Hall 11, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>) +</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edwin D. Starbuck</span>, +Earlham College, Richmond, Ind.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George A. Coe</span>, +Northwestern University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Walter L. +Hervey</span>, Examiner Board of Education, New York City.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION B. PROFESSIONAL RELIGIOUS +EDUCATION.</b> +(<i>Hall 1, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</td +></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman:</span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President Charles Cuthbert Hall</span>, +Union Theological Seminary.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Frank K. +Sanders</span>, Yale University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Herbert L. Willett</span>, +Disciples Divinity House, Chicago, Ill.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION C. RELIGIOUS AGENCIES.</b> +(<i>Hall 15, September 23, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President Edgar C. Mullins</span>, +Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Rev. Washington Gladden</span>, +Columbus, Ohio.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Rev. James M. +Buckley</span>, Editor The Christian Advocate, New York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Ira Landrith</span>, General +Secretary Religious Education Association, Chicago, +Ill.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION D. RELIGIOUS WORK.</b> +(<i>Hall 1, September 24, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Rt. Rev. Thomas F. Gailor</span>, +Memphis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Rev. Floyd W. Tomkins</span>, Church of +the Holy Trinity, Philadelphia.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Rev. Henry C. +Mabie</span>, Corresponding Secretary American Baptist Missionary +Union.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span +class="smcap">Secretary</span>:<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION E. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: +PERSONAL.</b> (<i>Festival Hall, +September 25, 10 a. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Chancellor J. H. Kirkland</span>, +Vanderbilt University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Rev. Hugh Black</span>, Edinburgh, +Scotland.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Professor John E. +McFadyen</span>, Knox College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Rev. Samuel +Eliot</span>, Boston, Mass.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Rev. Edward B. +Pollard</span>, Georgetown, Ky.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Clyde W. Votaw</span>, +University of Chicago.<p></p></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left" colspan="2"><b>SECTION F. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: +SOCIAL.</b> (<i>Festival Hall, +September 25, 3 p. m.</i>)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"> <span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. J. H. Garrison</span>, St. +Louis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">President Joseph Swain</span>, +Swarthmore College.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Emil G. +Hirsch</span>, Chicago, Ill.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Edward C. +Moore</span>, Harvard University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. Josiah +Strong</span>, League for Social Service, New York.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Clyde W. Votaw</span>, +University of Chicago.</td></tr> + +</table></div> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Chron"></a>CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF +PROCEEDINGS</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center p2"><span class="smcap">monday, september +19</span>.</p> + +<p>3 P. M. Opening exercises of the Congress. Festival Hall (Hall +17).</p> + +<p>The Congress will be called to order by the Director of Congresses, +who will introduce the President of the Exposition.</p> + +<p>Welcoming addresses will be delivered by the President of the +Exposition and other officials.</p> + +<p>A reply to these addresses of welcome will be made on behalf of the +Congress by the Honorary Vice-President for Great Britain.</p> + +<p>The Chairman of the Administrative Board will give an account of the +origin and purpose of the Congress.</p> + +<p>The President of the Congress will then be introduced and will +deliver an introductory address, after which adjournment will +follow.</p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center p2"><span class="smcap">tuesday, september +20.</span></p> + +<p>10.00 A. M. Meetings of the seven Divisions. The Divisional +addresses will be given as follows:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Utilitarian Sciences.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Social Regulation.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Historical Science.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Physical Science.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, Social Culture.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Normative Science.</p> + +<p class="indent2c">Hall 7, Mental Science.</p> + +<p>11.15 to 6.00 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span> Meetings of the +Departments, with addresses:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 11.15 <span class="smcap">a. +m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4b"><span class="smcap">departments.</span></p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Economics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Biology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Sciences of the Earth.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Political History.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, History of Law.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Philosophy.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Mathematics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, History of Art.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 1 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 2 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4b"><span class="smcap">departments.</span></p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Social Science.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Politics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Technology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, History of Language.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, History of Religion.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Physics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Psychology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Anthropology.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 3.45 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 4.15 <span class="smcap">p. m. +</span></p> + +<p class="indent4b"><span class="smcap">departments.</span></p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Medicine.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Education.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Jurisprudence.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Religion.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, Chemistry.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, History of Literature.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Sociology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Astronomy.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 6. <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<p>On the four days following, the Sectional meetings will be held. The +duration of each session will be three hours. The morning sessions will +extend from 10 <span class="smcap">a. m.</span> until 1 <span +class="smcap">p. m.</span>; the afternoon sessions from 3 <span +class="smcap">p. m.</span> to 6 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span> +</p> + +<p>The meetings of some of the religious sections will be held on +Sunday, September 25, in Festival Hall. Further announcements concerning +these Sunday Meetings will be made in Registration Hall, in the daily +press of St. Louis, and in the World's Fair Official Programme.</p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<p class="center p2"><span class="smcap">wednesday, september +21.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 10 <span class="smcap">a. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Public Finance.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Animal Morphology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, History of Greece, Rome, and Asia.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Comparative Language.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, The Family.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Metaphysics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Otology and Laryngology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Slavic Literature.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 9, Astrometry.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Civil Engineering.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 11, History of Common Law.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 12, Physiography.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Public Health.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 14, Geophysics.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 15, Social Structure.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Inorganic Chemistry.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 1 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 3 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Philosophy of Religion.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Phylogeny.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Classical Literature.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Semitic Languages.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, The Rural Community.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Medieval History.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Pediatrics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Oceanography.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 9, Astrophysics.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Insurance.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 11, History of Roman Law.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Preventive Medicine.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 14, Geology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Organic Chemistry.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 6 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<p>Immediately following the Section of Geophysics in the morning, and +the Section of Geology in the afternoon, in Room 14, the Eighth +International Geographic Congress will hold sessions in the same room, +Hall 14, Mines and Metallurgy Building.</p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<p class="center p2"><span class="smcap">thursday, september +22.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 10 <span class="smcap">a. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, English Literature.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Plant Morphology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Modern History of Europe.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Old Testament.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, The Urban Community.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Logic.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Psychiatry.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Indo-Iranian Languages.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 9, Algebra and Analysis.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Cosmical Physics.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 11, Palæontology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 12, Classical Art.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Pathology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 14, International Law.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 15, Economic Theory.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Physical Chemistry.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 1 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 3 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Professional Religious Education.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Human Anatomy.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Greek Language.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Plant Physiology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, Physics of the Electron.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Methodology of Science.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Modern Architecture.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Romance Literature.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 9, Petrology and Mineralogy.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Electrical Engineering.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 11, Geography.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 12, The Library.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Neurology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 14, The Industrial Group.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 15, Political Theory and National +Administration.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Physiological Chemistry.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 6 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<p class="center p2"><span class="smcap">friday, september +23.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 10 <span class="smcap">a. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, New Testament.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Experimental Psychology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Germanic Literature.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Physiology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, The Dependent Group.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Ethics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Plant Pathology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Brahmanism and Buddhism.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 9, Latin Language.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Transportation.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 11, Physics of Matter.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 12, The School.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Surgery.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 15, Social Psychology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Technical Chemistry.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 1 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 3 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Diplomacy.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, History of Economic Institutions.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, English Language.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Æsthetics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, The Criminal Group.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, General Psychology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Ecology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Mohammedism.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 9, Embryology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Mechanical Engineering.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 11, Physics of Ether.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 12, The College.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Internal Medicine.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 14, Private Law.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 15, Religious Agencies.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Somatology.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 6 <span class="smcap">p. +p.</span></p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<p class="center p2"><span class="smcap">saturday. september +24.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 10 <span class="smcap">a. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, History of America.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, History of the Christian Church.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Belles-Lettres.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Colonial Administration.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, Romance Languages.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Comparative and Genetic Psychology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Ophthalmology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, History of Asia.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 9, Geometry.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Commerce and Exchange.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 11, Mining Engineering.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 12, The University.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Gynecology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 14, Constitutional Law.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 15, Bacteriology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Archæology.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 1 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 3 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Hall 1, Religious Work.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 2, Comparative Anatomy.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 3, Germanic Languages.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 4, Modern Painting.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 5, Money and Credit.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 6, Abnormal Psychology.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 7, Applied Mathematics.</p> + +<p class="indent2b">Hall 8, Indo-Iranian Literature.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 10, Agriculture.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall +11, . . . . . . . . .</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 12, Educational Theory.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 13, Therapeutics and Pharmacology.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 14, Comparative Law.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 15, Municipal Administration.</p> + +<p class="indent2bb">Hall 16, Ethnology.</p> + +<p class="indent4b">Adjournment at 6 <span class="smcap">p. +m.</span></p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<p class="center p2"><span class="smcap">sunday, september +25.</span></p> + +<p class="center"><i>Festival Hall.</i></p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 10 <span class="smcap">a. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Religious Influence: Personal.</p> + +<p class="indent4a">Meeting at 3 <span class="smcap">p. m.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent2a">Religious Influence: Social.</p> + +<h3 class="p4 center"><a name="Social"></a>PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL +EVENTS</h3> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p class="p2"><span class="smcap">Monday Evening, September +19.</span>—Grand Fête night in honor of the Congress of Arts and +Science. Special illuminations about the Grand Basin. Lagoon fête.</p> + +<p>Banquet by the St. Louis Chemical Society, at the Southern Hotel, to +the members of the Chemical Sections.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Tuesday Evening, September +20.</span>—General Reception by Board of Lady Managers to the +officers and speakers of the Congress and officials of the +Exposition.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wednesday Afternoon, September +21.</span>—Garden fête to be given to the members of the Congress +of Arts and Science, at the French Pavilion, by the Commissioner-General +from France.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wednesday Evening, September +21.</span>—General reception by the German Imperial +Commissioner-General to the members of the Congress of Arts and Science, +at the German State House.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Thursday Evening.</span>—Shaw banquet at +the Buckingham Club to the foreign delegates.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Friday Evening, September +23.</span>—General banquet to the speakers and officials of the +Congress of Arts and Science in the banquet<ins title="hyphenated in the +original"> </ins>hall of the Tyrolean Alps. 8 P. M.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Saturday Evening, September +24.</span>—Banquet at St. Louis Club by Round Table of St. Louis, +to the foreign members of the Congress.</p> + +<p>Banquet given by Imperial Commissioner-General from Japan to the +Japanese delegation to the Congress and Exposition officials.</p> + +<p>Dinner given by Commissioner-General from Great Britain to the +English members of the Congress.</p> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="TenMin"></a>ALPHABETICAL LIST OF MEMBERS<br /> +WHO MADE 10-MINUTE ADDRESSES</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p>The following list differs from the original programme, in that it +contains the names only of those who actually read addresses. It was +planned that each Section should meet for three hours. When authors of +ten-minute papers were not present, and where not enough of these +shorter papers were offered to fill out the time, the Chairmen invited +discussions from the floor until the time was filled.</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Alpha Ten Minute Addresses"> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor R. G. Aitken</td><td class="left">Lick +Observatory</td><td class="left">Astronomy</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">James W. Alexander, Esq.</td><td class="left">New +York City</td><td class="left">Insurance</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Frederick Almy</td><td class="left">Buffalo, N. +Y.</td><td class="left">Social Science</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor S. G. Ashmore</td><td class="left">Union +College</td><td class="left">Latin Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor L. A. Bauer</td><td class="left">Carnegie +Institute</td><td class="left">Cosmical Physics</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Marcus Benjamin</td><td class="left">National +Museum</td><td class="left">Technical Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. T. Blickfeldt</td><td +class="left">Leland Stanford Univ.</td><td +class="left">Geometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Ernest W. Brown</td><td +class="left">Haverford College</td><td class="left">Lunar +Theory</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Henry Dickson Bruns</td><td class="left">New +Orleans</td><td class="left">Municipal Administration</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. F. K. Cameron</td><td class="left">Dep't of +Agriculture</td><td class="left">Physical Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Rear-Admiral C. M. Chester, +U. S. N.</td><td class="left">United States Naval +Observatory</td><td class="left">Astronomy</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">H. H. Clayton, Esq.</td><td class="left">Blue Hill +Observatory</td><td class="left">Cosmical Physics</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Charles A. Coffin</td><td +class="left">New York City</td><td class="left">Modern +Painting</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. George Coronilas</td><td class="left">Athens, +Greece</td><td class="left">Tuberculosis</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor J. E. Denton</td><td class="left">Stevens +Institute</td><td class="left">Mechanical Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor L. W. Dowling</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Wisconsin</td><td class="left">Geometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. C. Elmer</td><td class="left">Cornell +Univ.</td><td class="left">Latin Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor A. Emch</td><td class="left">Univ. of +Colorado</td><td class="left">Geometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. R. Fanclough</td><td +class="left">Leland Stanford Univ.</td><td class="left">Classical +Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor W. S. Ferguson</td><td class="left">Univ. +of California</td><td class="left">History of Greece, Rome, and +Asia</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Carlos Finley</td><td +class="left">Havana</td><td class="left">Pathology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. C. E. Fisk</td><td class="left">Centralia, +Ill.</td><td class="left">History of America</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Homer Folks, Esq.</td><td class="left">New York +City</td><td class="left">Social Science</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor F. C. French</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Nebraska</td><td class="left">Philosophy of Religion</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">H. L. Gannt, Esq.</td><td class="left">Schenectady, +N. Y.</td><td class="left">Mechanical Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. F. P. Gorham</td><td class="left">Brown +Univ.</td><td class="left">Bacteriology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Evarts B. Greene</td><td +class="left">Univ. of Illinois</td><td class="left">History of +America</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Stansbury Hagar, Esq.</td><td +class="left">Brooklyn, N.Y.</td><td class="left">Ethnology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">J. D. Hague, Esq.</td><td class="left">New York +City</td><td class="left">Mining Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor G. B. Halstead</td><td +class="left">Kenyon College</td><td class="left">Geometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor A. D. F. Hamlin</td><td +class="left">Columbia Univ.</td><td class="left">Æsthetics</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. Hancock</td><td class="left">Univ. of +Cincinnati</td><td class="left">Geometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor J. A. Harris</td><td class="left">St. +Louis, Mo.</td><td class="left">Plant Morphology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor M. W. Haskell</td><td class="left">Univ. +of California</td><td class="left">Algebra and Analysis</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor J. T. Hatfield</td><td +class="left">Northwestern Univ.</td><td class="left">Germanic +Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor E. C. Hayes</td><td class="left">Miami +Univ.</td><td class="left">Social Psychology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor W. E. Heidel</td><td class="left">Iowa +College</td><td class="left">Greek Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. C. L. Herrick</td><td class="left">Granville, +Ohio</td><td class="left">Neurology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. C. Judson Herrick</td><td +class="left">Granville, Ohio</td><td class="left">Animal +Morphology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor W. H. Hobbs</td><td class="left">Univ. of +Wisconsin</td><td class="left">Petrology and Mineralogy</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor A. R. Hohlfeld</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Wisconsin</td><td class="left">Germanic Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. H. Horne</td><td +class="left">Dartmouth College</td><td class="left">Educational +Theory</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. E. V. Huntington</td><td class="left">Harvard +Univ.</td><td class="left">Algebra and Analysis</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Reid Hunt</td><td class="left">U. S. Marine +Hospital</td><td class="left">Alcohol, etc.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. J. N. Hurty</td><td class="left">Indianapolis, +Ind.</td><td class="left">Public Health</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor J. J. Hutchinson</td><td +class="left">Cornell Univ.</td><td class="left">Algebra and +Analysis</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Rev. Thomas E. Judge</td><td class="left">Catholic +Review of Reviews</td><td class="left">General Religious +Education</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor L. Kahlenburg</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Wisconsin</td><td class="left">Physical Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Albert G. Keller</td><td +class="left">Yale University</td><td class="left">Municipal +Administration</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor George Lefevre</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Missouri</td><td class="left">Comparative Anatomy</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">President Henry C. King</td><td +class="left">Oberlin College</td><td class="left">Education, The +College</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Ira Landrith</td><td class="left">Belmont +College</td><td class="left">Religious Agencies</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor M. D. Learned</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Pennsylvania</td><td class="left">Germanic Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor A. O. Leuschner</td><td +class="left">Univ. of California</td><td +class="left">Astronomy</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. E. P. Lyon</td><td class="left">St. Louis +Univ.</td><td class="left">Physiology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Duncan B. Macdonald</td><td +class="left">Hartford Theological Seminary</td><td class="left">Semitic +Languages</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor A. MacFarlane</td><td +class="left">Chatham, Ontario</td><td class="left">Applied +Mathematics</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor James McMahon</td><td +class="left">Cornell Univ.</td><td class="left">Applied +Mathematics</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Mr. Edward Mallinckrodt</td><td class="left">St. +Louis, Mo.</td><td class="left">Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. P. Manning</td><td class="left">Brown +Univ.</td><td class="left">Geometry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor G. A. Miller</td><td class="left">Leland +Stanford Univ.</td><td class="left">Algebra and Analysis.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. W. C. Mills</td><td class="left">Ohio State +Univ.</td><td class="left">Archæology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor W. S. Milner</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Toronto</td><td class="left">Classical Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor F. G. Moore</td><td +class="left">Dartmouth College</td><td class="left">Classical +Literature</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. W. P. Montague</td><td class="left">Columbia +Univ.</td><td class="left">Metaphysics</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Clarence B. Moore, Esq.</td><td +class="left">Philadelphia</td><td class="left">Archæology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor F. R. Moulton</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Chicago</td><td class="left">Astronomy.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. J. G. Needham</td><td class="left">Lake Forest +Univ.</td><td class="left">Animal Morphology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Alex. T. Ormond</td><td +class="left">Princeton Univ.</td><td class="left">Philosophy of +Religion</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Frederic L. Paxton</td><td +class="left">Univ. of Colorado</td><td class="left">History of +America</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Carl Pfister</td><td class="left">St. Mark's +Hospital, New York City</td><td class="left">Surgery</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor M. B. Porter</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Texas</td><td class="left">Algebra and Analysis</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. A. J. Reynolds</td><td +class="left">Chicago</td><td class="left">Public Health</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor S. P. Sadtler</td><td +class="left">Philadelphia College of Pharmacy</td><td +class="left">Technical Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. John A. Sampson</td><td class="left">Albany, N. +Y.</td><td class="left">Gynæcology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Oswald Schreiner, Esq.</td><td class="left">U. S. +Dep't of Agriculture</td><td class="left">Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Rev. Frank Sewall</td><td class="left">Washington, +D. C.</td><td class="left">Social Science, The Family</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. C. Sheldon</td><td class="left">Boston +Univ.</td><td class="left">History of the Christian Church</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Frank C. Sharp</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Wisconsin</td><td class="left">Ethics</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor J. B. Shaw</td><td class="left">Milliken +Univ.</td><td class="left">Algebra and Analysis</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor W. B. Smith</td><td class="left">Tulane +Univ.</td><td class="left">New Testament</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Marshall S. Snow</td><td +class="left">Washington Univ.</td><td class="left">History of +America</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Henry Snyder</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Minnesota</td><td class="left">Social Science</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Edwain D. Starbuck</td><td +class="left">Earlham College</td><td class="left">General +Religious</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor George B. Stewart</td><td +class="left">Auburn Theological Seminary</td><td +class="left">Professional Religious Education</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">John M. Stahl</td><td class="left">Quincy, +Ill.</td><td class="left">The Rural Community</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor J. Stieglitz</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Chicago</td><td class="left">Chemistry</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Robert Stein</td><td class="left">U. S. +Geological Survey</td><td class="left">Comparative Language</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Mr. Teitaro Suzuki</td><td class="left">La Salle, +Ill.</td><td class="left">Brahmanism and Buddhism</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Col. T. W. Symonds, U. S. A.</td><td +class="left">Washington, D. C.</td><td class="left">Civil +Engineering</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Teissier</td><td class="left">Lyons, +France</td><td class="left">Pathology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Judge W. H. Thomas</td><td class="left">Montgomery, +Ala.</td><td class="left">Private Law</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor O. H. Tittmann</td><td class="left">U. S. +C. and G. Survey</td><td class="left">Astronomy</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Alfred M. Tozzer</td><td +class="left">Peabody Museum</td><td class="left">Anthropology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Dr. Benjamin F. Trueblood</td><td +class="left">Univ. of Missouri</td><td class="left">Medieval +History</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor Clyde W. Votaw</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Chicago</td><td class="left">New Testament</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor John B. Watson</td><td class="left">Univ. +of Chicago</td><td class="left">Psychology</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">Professor H. L. Willett</td><td +class="left">Disciples Divinity House, Chicago</td><td +class="left">Professional Religious Education</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">President Mary E. Woolley</td><td class="left">Mt. +Holyoke College</td><td class="left">Education, The College</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left">H. Zwaarddemaker</td><td +class="left">Utrecht</td><td class="left">Otology and +Laryngology</td></tr> + +</table> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Scientific"></a>THE SCIENTIFIC PLAN OF THE +CONGRESS</h3> + +<h4>BY PROF. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG</h4> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center">I</p> + +<p class="center">THE PURPOSE OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p class="center">1. <i>The Centralization of the Congress</i></p> + +<p>The history of the Congress has been told. It remains to +set forth the principles which controlled the work of the Congress week, +and thus scientifically to introduce the scholarly undertaking, the +results of which are to speak for themselves in the eight volumes of +this publication. Yet in a certain way this scientific introduction has +once more to use the language of history. It does not deal with the +external development of the Congress, and the story which it has to tell +is thus not one of dates and names and events. But the principles which +shaped the whole undertaking have themselves a claim to historical +treatment; they do not lie before us simply as the subject for a logical +disputation or as a plea for a future work. That was the situation of +three years ago. At that time various ideas and opposing principles +entered into the arena of discussion; but now, since the work is +completed, the question can be only of what principles, right or wrong, +have really determined the programme. We have thus to interpret that +state of mind out of which the purposes and the scientific arrangement +of the Congress resulted; and no after-thought of to-day would be a +desirable addition. Whatever possible improvements of the plan may +suggest themselves in the retrospect can be given only a closing word. +It was certainly easy to learn from experience, but first the experience +had to be passed through. We have here to interpret the view from that +standpoint from which the experience of the Congress was still a matter +of the future, and of an uncertain future indeed, full of doubts and +fears, and yet full of hopes and possibilities.</p> + +<p>The St. Louis World's Fair promised, through the vast extent of its +grounds, through the beautiful plans of the buildings, through the +eagerness of the United States, through the participation of all +countries on earth, and through the gigantic outlines of the internal +plans, to become the most monumental expression of the energies with +which the twentieth century entered on its course. Commerce and +industry, art and social work, politics and education, war and peace, +country and city. Orient and Occident, were all to be focussed for a few +summer months in the ivory city of the Mississippi Valley. It seemed +most natural that science and productive scholarship should also find +its characteristic place among the factors of our modern civilization. +Of course the scientist had his word to say on almost every square foot +of the Exposition. Whether the building was devoted to electricity or to +chemistry, to anthropology or to metallurgy, to civic administration or +to medicine, to transportation or to industrial arts, it was everywhere +the work of the scientist which was to win the triumph; and the Palace +of Education, the first in any universal exposition, was to combine +under its roof not only the school work of all countries, but the +visible record of the world's universities and technical schools as +well. And yet it seemed not enough to gather the products and records of +science and to make science serve with its tools and inventions. Modern +art, too, was to reign over every hall and to beautify every palace, and +yet demanded its own unfolding in the gallery of paintings and +sculptures. In the same way it was not enough for science to penetrate a +hundred exhibitions and turn the wheels in every hall, but it must also +seek to concentrate all its energies in one spot and show the +cross-section of human knowledge in our time, and, above all, its own +methods.</p> + +<p>An exhibition of scholarship cannot be arranged for the eyes. The +great work which grows day by day in quiet libraries and laboratories, +and on a thousand university platforms, can express itself only through +words. Yet heaped up printed volumes would be dead to a World's Fair +spectator; how to make such words living was the problem. Above all, +scholarship does not really exhibit its methods, if it does not show +itself in production. It is no longer scholarship which speaks of a +truth-seeking that has been performed instead of going on with the +search for further truth. If the world's science was to be exhibited, a +form had to be sought in which the scholarly work on the spot would +serve the ideals of knowledge, would add to the storehouse of truth, and +would thus work in the service of human progress at the same moment in +which it contributed to the completeness of the exhibition.</p> + +<p>The effort was not without precedent. Scholarly production had been +connected with earlier expositions, and the large gatherings of scholars +at the Paris Exposition were still in vivid memory. A large number of +scientific congresses of specialists had been held there, and many +hundred scholarly papers had been read. Yet the results hardly suggested +the repetition of such an experiment. Every one felt too strongly that +the outcome of such disconnected congresses of specialists is hardly +comparable with the glorious showing which the arts and industries have +made and were to make again. In every other department of the World's +Fair the most careful preparation secured an harmonious effect. The +scholarly meetings alone failed even to aim at harmony and unity. Not +only did the congresses themselves stand apart without any inner +relation, grouped together by calendar dates or by their alphabetical +order from Anthropology to Zoölogy; but in every congress, again, the +papers read and the manuscripts presented were disconnected pieces +without any programme or correlation. Worse than that, they could not +even be expected in their isolatedness to add anything which would not +have been worked out and communicated to the world just as well without +any congress. The speaker at such a meeting is asked to contribute +anything he has at hand, and he accepts the invitation because he has by +chance a completed paper or a research ready for publication. In the +best case it would have appeared in the next number of the specialistic +magazine, in not infrequent cases it has appeared already in the last +number. Such a congress is then only an accident and does not itself +serve the progress of knowledge.</p> + +<p>Even that would be acceptable if at least the best scholars would +come out with their latest investigations, or, still more delightful, if +they would enter into an important discussion. But experience has too +often shown that the conditions are most favorable for the opposite +outcome. The leading scholars stay away partly to give beginners the +chance to be heard, partly not to be grouped with those who habitually +have the floor at such gatherings. These are either the men whose day +has gone by or those whose day has not yet come; and both groups +tyrannize alike an unwilling audience. Yet it may be said that in +scientific meetings of specialists the reading of papers is +non-essential and no harm is done even if they do not contribute +anything to the status of scholarship; their great value lies in the +personal contact of fellow workers and in the discussions and informal +exchange of opinions. All that is true, and completely justifies the +yearly meetings of scholarly associations. But these advantages are much +diminished whenever such gatherings take on an international character, +and thus introduce the confusion of tongues. And hardly any one can +doubt that the turmoil of a world's fair is about the worst possible +background for such exchange of thought, which demands repose and +quietude. Yet even with the certainty of all these disadvantages the +city of Paris, with its large body of scholars, with its venerable +scholarly traditions, and with its incomparable attractions, could +overcome every resistance, and its convenient location made it natural +that in vacation time, in an exposition summer, the scholars should +gather there, not on account of, but in spite of, the hundred +congresses. With this the city of St. Louis could make no claim to +rivalry. Its recent growth, its minimum of scholarly tradition, its +great distance from the old centres of knowledge even in the New World, +the apathy of the East and the climatic fears of Europe, all together +made it clear that a mere repetition of unrelated congresses would be +not only useless, but a disastrous failure. These very fears, however, +themselves suggested the remedy.</p> + +<p>If the scholarly work of our time was to be represented at St. Louis, +something had to be attempted which should be not simply an imitation of +the branch-congresses which every scientific specialty in every country +is calling every year. Scholarship was to be asked to show itself really +in process, and to produce for the World's Fair meeting something which +without it would remain undone. To invite the scholars of the world for +their leisurely enjoyment and reposeful discussion of work done +elsewhere is one thing; to call them together for work which they would +not do otherwise, and which ought to be done, is a very different thing. +The first had in St. Louis all odds against it; it seemed worth while to +try the second. And it seemed not only worth while in the interest of +scholarship, it seemed, above all, the only way to give to the +scholarship of our time a chance for the complete demonstration of its +productive energies.</p> + +<p>The plan of unrelated congresses, with chance combinations of papers +prepared at random, was therefore definitively replaced by the plan of +only one representative gathering, bound together by one underlying +thought, given thus the unity of one scholarly aim, whose fulfillment is +demanded by the scientific needs of our time, and is hardly to be +reached by other methods. Every arbitrary and individual choice was then +to be eliminated and every effort was to be controlled by the one +central purpose; the work thus to be organized and prepared with the +same carefulness of adjustment and elaboration which was doubtless to be +applied in the admirable exhibitions of the United States Government or +in the art exhibition. The open question was, of course, what topic +could fulfill these various demands most completely; wherein lay the +greatest scholarly need of our time; what task could be least realized +by the casual efforts of scholarship at random; where was the unity of a +world organization most needed?</p> + +<p>One thought was very naturally suggested by the external +circumstances. St. Louis had asked the nations of the world to a +celebration of the Louisiana Purchase. Historical thoughts thus gave +meaning and importance to the whole undertaking. The pride of one +century's development had stimulated the gigantic work from its +inception. An immense territory had been transformed from a half +wilderness into a land with a rich civilization, and with a central city +in which eight thousand factories are at work. No thought lay nearer +than to ask how far this century was of similar importance for the +changes in the world of thought. How have the sciences developed +themselves since the days of the Louisiana Purchase? That is a topic +which with complete uniformity might be asked from every special +science, and which might thus offer a certain unity of aim to scholars +of all scientific denominations. There was indeed no doubt that such an +historical question would have to be raised if we were to live up to the +commemorative idea of the whole Fair. And yet it seemed still more +certain that the retrospective problem did not justify itself as a +central topic for a World's Congress. There were sciences for which the +story of the last hundred years was merely the last chapter of a history +of three thousand years and other sciences whose life history did not +begin until one or two decades ago. It would thus be a very external +uniformity; the question would have a very different meaning for the +various branches of knowledge, and the treatment would be of very +unequal interest and importance. More than that, it would not abolish +the unrelated character of the endeavors; while the same topic might be +given everywhere, yet every science would remain isolated; there would +be no internal unity, and thus no inner reason for bringing together the +best workers of all spheres. And finally the mere retrospective attitude +brings with it the depressing mood of perfunctory activity. Certainly to +look back on the advance of a century can be most suggestive for a +better understanding of the way which lies before us; and we felt indeed +that the occasion for such a backward glance ought not to be missed. Yet +there would be something lifeless if the whole meeting were devoted to +the consideration of work that had been completed; a kind of +necrological sentiment would pervade the whole ceremony, while our chief +aim was to serve the progress of knowledge and thus to stimulate living +interests.</p> + +<p>This language of life spoke indeed in the programme of another plan +which seemed also to be suggested by the character of the Exposition. +The St. Louis Fair desired not merely to look backward and to revive the +historical interest in the Louisiana purchase, but its first aim seemed +to be to bring into sharp relief the factors which serve to-day the +practical welfare and the achievements of human society. If all the +scholars of all sciences were to convene under one flag, would it not +thus seem most harmonious with the occasion, if, as the one controlling +topic, the question were proposed, "What does your science contribute to +the practical progress of mankind?" No one can deny that such a +formulation would fit in well with the lingering thoughts of every +World's Fair visitor. Whoever wanders through the aisles of exhibition +palaces and sees amassed the marvelous achievements of industry and +commerce, and the thousand practical arts of modern society, may indeed +turn most naturally to a gathering of scholars with the question, "What +have you to offer of similar import?" All your thinking and speaking and +writing, are they merely words on words, or do you also turn the wheels +of this gigantic civilization?</p> + +<p>Such a question would give a noble opening indeed to almost every +science. Who would say that the opportunity is confined to the man of +technical science? Does not the biologist also prepare the achievements +of modern medicine, does not the mathematician play his most important +rôle in our mastery over stubborn nature, do we not need language for +our social intercourse, and law and religion for our practical social +improvement? Yes, is there any science which has not directly or +indirectly something to contribute to the practical development of the +modern man and his civilization? All this is true, and yet the +perspective of this truth, too, appears at once utterly distorted if we +take the standpoint of science itself. The one end of knowledge is to +reach the truth. The belief in the absolute value of truth gives to it +meaning and significance. This value remains the controlling influence +even where the problem to be solved is itself a practical one, and the +spirit of science remains thus essentially theoretical even in the +so-called applied sciences. But incomparably more intense in that +respect is the spirit of all theoretical disciplines. Philosophy and +mathematics, history and philology, chemistry and biology, astronomy and +geology, may be and ought to be helpful to practical civilization +everywhere; and every step forward which they take will be an advance +for man's practical life too. And yet their real meaning never lies in +their technical by-product. It is not the scholar who peers in the +direction of practical use who is most loyal to the deepest demand of +scholarship, and every relation to practical achievement is more or less +accidental or even artificial for the real life interests of productive +scholarship.</p> + +<p>But if the contrast between his real intention and his social +technical successes may not appear striking to the physicist or chemist, +it would appear at least embarrassing to the scholars in many other +departments and directly bewildering to not a few. Perhaps two thirds of +the sciences to which the best thinkers of our time are faithfully +devoted would then be grouped together and relegated to a distant +corner, their only practical technical function would be to contribute +material to the education of the cultured man. For what else do we study +Sanscrit or medieval history or epistemology? And finally even the +uniform topic of practical use would not have brought the different +sciences nearer to each other; the Congress would still have remained a +budget of disconnected records of scholarship. If the practical side of +the Exposition was to suggest anything, it should then not be more than +an appeal not to overlook the importance of the applied sciences which +too often play the rôle of a mere appendix to the system of knowledge. +The logical one-sidedness which considers practical needs as below the +dignity of pure science was indeed to be excluded, but to choose +practical service as the one controlling topic would be far more +anti-scientific.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">2. <i>The Unity of Knowledge</i></p> + +<p>There was another side of the Exposition plan which suggested a +stronger topic. The World's Fair was not only an historical memorial +work, and was not only a show of the practical tools of technical +civilization; its deepest aim was after all the effort to bring the +energies of our time into inner relation. The peoples of the whole +globe, separated by oceans and mountains, by language and custom, by +politics and prejudice, were here to come in contact and to be brought +into correlation by better mutual understanding of the best features of +their respective cultures. The various industries and arts, the most +antagonistic efforts of commerce and production, separated by the +rivalry of the market and by the diversity of economic interests were +here to be brought together in harmony, were to be correlated for the +eye of the spectator. It was a near-lying thought to choose correlation +as the controlling thought of a scientific World's Congress too. That +was the topic which was finally agreed upon: the inner relation of the +sciences of our day.</p> + +<p>The fitness and the external advantages of such a scheme are evident. +First of all, the danger of disconnectedness now disappears completely. +If the sciences are to examine what binds them together, their usual +isolation must be given up for the time being and a concerted effort +must control the day. The bringing together of scholars of all +scientific specialties is then no longer a doubtful accidental feature, +but becomes a condition of the whole undertaking. More than that, such a +topic, with all that it involves, makes it a matter of course that the +call goes out to the really leading scholars of the time. To aim at a +correlation of sciences means to seek for the fundamental principles in +each territory of knowledge and to look with far-seeing eye beyond the +limits of its field; but just this excludes from the outset those who +like to be the self-appointed speakers in routine gatherings. It +excludes from the first the narrow specialist who does not care for +anything but for his latest research, and ought to exclude not less the +vague spirits who generalize about facts of which they have no concrete +substantial knowledge, as their suggestions towards correlation would +lack inner productiveness and outer authority. Such a plan has room only +for those men who stand high enough to see the whole field and who have +yet the full authority of the specialistic investigator; they must +combine the concentration on specialized productive work with the +inspiration that comes from looking over vast regions. With such a topic +the usual question does not come up whether one or another strong man +would feel attracted to take part in the gathering, but it would be +justified and necessary to confine the active participation from the +outset to those who are leaders, and thus to guarantee from the +beginning a representation of science equal in dignity to the best +efforts of the exhibiting countries in all other departments. In this +way such a plan had the advantage of justifying through its topic the +administrative desire to bring all sciences to the same spot, and at the +same time of excluding all participants but the best scholars: with +isolated gatherings or with second-rate men, this subject would have +been simply impossible.</p> + +<p>Yet all these halfway external advantages count little compared with +the significance and importance of the topic for the inner life of +scientific thought of our time. We all felt it was the one topic which +the beginning of the twentieth century demanded and which could not be +dealt with otherwise than by the combined labors of all nations and of +all sciences. The World's Fair was the one great opportunity to make a +first effort in this direction; we had no right to miss this +opportunity. Thus it was decided to have a congress with the definite +purpose of working towards the unity of human knowledge, and with the +one mission, in this time of scattered specializing work, of bringing to +the consciousness of the world the too<ins title="hyphenated in the +original"> </ins>much neglected idea of the unity of truth. To quote +from our first tentative programme: "Let the rush of the world's work +stop for one moment for us to consider what are the underlying +principles, what are their relations to one another and to the whole, +what are their values and purposes; in short, let us for once give to +the world's sciences a holiday. The workaday functions are much better +fulfilled in separation, when each scholar works in his own laboratory +or in his library; but this holiday task of bringing out the underlying +unity, this synthetic work, this demands really the coöperation of all, +this demands that once at least all sciences come together in one place +at one time."</p> + +<p>Yet if our work stands for the unity of knowledge, aims to consider +the fundamental conceptions which bind together all the specialistic +results, and seeks to inquire into the methods which are common to +various fields, all this is after all merely a symptom of the whole +spirit of our times. A reaction against the narrowness of mere +fact-diggers has set in. A mere heaping up of disconnected, unshaped +facts begins to disappoint the world; it is felt too vividly that a mere +dictionary of phenomena, of events and laws, makes our knowledge larger +but not deeper, makes our life more complex but not more valuable, makes +our science more difficult but not more harmonious. Our time longs for a +new synthesis and looks towards science no longer merely with a desire +for technical prescriptions and new inventions in the interest of +comfort and exchange. It waits for knowledge to fulfill its higher +mission, it waits for science to satisfy our higher needs for a view of +the world which shall give unity to our scattered experience. The +indications of this change are visible to every one who observes the +gradual turning to philosophical discussion in the most different fields +of scientific life.</p> + +<p>When after the first third of the nineteenth century the great +philosophic movement which found its climax in Hegelianism came to +disaster in consequence of its absurd neglect of hard solid facts, the +era of naturalism began its triumph with contempt for all philosophy and +for all deeper unity. Idealism and philosophy were stigmatized as the +enemies of true science and natural science had its great day. The rapid +progress of physics and chemistry fascinated the world and produced +modern technique; the sciences of life, physiology, biology, medicine, +followed; and the scientific method was carried over from body to mind, +and gave us at the end of the nineteenth century modern psychology and +sociology. The lifeless and the living, the physical and the mental, the +individual and the social, all had been conquered by analytical methods. +But just when the climax was reached and all had been analyzed and +explained, the time was ripe for disillusion, and the lack of deeper +unity began to be felt with alarm in every quarter. For seventy years +there had been nowhere so much philosophizing going on as suddenly +sprung up among the scientists of the last decade. The physicists and +the mathematicians, the chemists and the biologists, the geologists and +the astronomers, and, on the other side, the historians and the +economists, the psychologists and the sociologists, the jurists and the +theologians—all suddenly found themselves again in the midst of +discussions on fundamental principles and methods, on general categories +and conditions of knowledge, in short, in the midst of the despised +philosophy. And with those discussions has come the demand for +correlation. Everywhere have arisen leaders who have brought unconnected +sciences together and emphasized the unity of large divisions. The time +seems to have come again when the wave of naturalism and realism is +ebbing, and a new idealistic philosophical tide is swelling, just as +they have always alternated in the civilization of two thousand +years.</p> + +<p>No one dreams, of course, that the great synthetic apperception, for +which our modern time seems ripe, will come through the delivery of some +hundred addresses, or the discussions of some hundred audiences. An +ultimate unity demands the gigantic thought of a single genius, and the +work of the many can, after all, be merely the preparation for the final +work of the one. And yet history shows that the one will never come if +the many have not done their share. What is needed is to fill the +sciences of our time with the growing consciousness of belonging +together, with the longing for fundamental principles, with the +conviction that the desire for correlation is not the fancy of dreamers, +but the immediate need of the leaders of thought. And in this +preparatory work the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science seemed +indeed called for an important part when it was committed to this topic +of correlation.</p> + +<p>To call the scholars of the world together for concerted action +towards the correlation of knowledge meant, of course, first of all, to +work out a detailed programme, and to select the best authorities for +every special part of the whole scheme. Nothing could be left to chance +methods and to casual contributions. The preparation needed the same +administrative strictness which would be demanded for an encyclopedia, +and the same scholarly thoroughness which would be demanded for the most +scientific research. A plan was to be devised in which every possible +striving for truth would find its place, and in which every section +would have its definite position in the system. And such a ground-plan +given, topics were to be assigned to every department and +sub-department, the treatment of which would bring out the fundamental +principles and the inner relations in such a way that the papers would +finally form a close-woven intellectual fabric. There would be plenty of +room for a retrospective glance at the historical development of the +sciences and plenty of room for emphasis on their practical +achievements; but the central place would always belong to the effort +towards unity and internal harmonization.</p> + +<p>We thus divided human knowledge into large parts, and the parts into +divisions, and the divisions into departments, and the departments into +sections. As the topic of the general divisions—we proposed seven +of them—it was decided to discuss the Unity of the whole field. As +topic for the departments—we had twenty-four of them—the +addresses were to discuss the fundamental Conceptions and Methods and +the Progress during the last century; and in the sections, +finally—our plan provided for one hundred and twenty-eight of +them—the topics were in every one the Relation of the special +branch to other branches, and those most important Present Problems +which are essential for the deeper principles of the special field. In +this way the ground-plan itself suggested the unity of the practically +separated sciences; and, moreover, our plan provided from the first that +this logical relation should express itself externally in the time order +of the work. We were to begin with the meetings of the large divisions, +the meetings of the departments were to follow, and the meetings of the +sections and their ramifications would follow the departmental +gatherings.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">3. <i>The Objections to the Plan</i></p> + +<p>It was evident that even the most modest success of that gigantic +undertaking depended upon the right choice of speakers, upon the value +of the ground-plan, and upon many external conditions; thus no one was +in doubt as to the difficulty in realizing such a scheme. Yet there were +from the scholarly side itself objections to the principles involved, +objections which might hold even if those other conditions were +successfully met. The most immediate reason for reluctance lies in the +specializing tendencies of our time. Those who devote all their working +energy as loyal sons of our analyzing period of science to the minute +detail of research come easily into the habit of a nervous fear with +regard to any wider general outlook. The man of research sees too often +how ignorance hides itself behind generalities. He knows too well how +much easier it is to formulate vague generalities than to contribute a +new fact to human knowledge, and how often untrained youngsters succeed +with popular text-books which are rightly forgotten the next day. +Methodical science must thus almost encourage this aversion to any +deviation from the path of painstaking specialistic labor. Then, of +course, it seems almost a scientific duty to declare war against an +undertaking which explicitly asks everywhere for the wide perspectives +and the last principles, and does not aim at adding at this moment to +the mere treasury of information.</p> + +<p>But such a view is utterly one-sided, and to fight against such +one-sidedness and to overcome the specializing narrowness of the +scattered sciences was the one central idea of the plan. If there +existed no scholars who despise the philosophizing connection, there +would have hardly been any need for this whole undertaking; but to yield +to such philosophy-phobia means to declare the analytic movement of +science permanent, and to postpone a synthetic movement indefinitely. +Our time has just to emphasize, and the leaders of thought daily +emphasize it more, that a mere heaping up of information can be merely a +preparation for knowledge, and that the final aim is a +<i>Weltanschauung</i>, a unified view of the whole of reality. All that +our Congress had to secure was thus merely that the generalizing +discussion of principles should not be left to men who generalized +because they lacked the substantial knowledge which is necessary to +specialize. The thinkers we needed were those who through specialistic +work were themselves led to a point where the discussion of general +principles becomes unavoidable. Our plan was by no means antagonistic to +the patient labors of analysis; the aim was merely to overcome its +one-sidedness and to stimulate the synthesis as a necessary +supplement.</p> + +<p>But the objections against a generalizing plan were not confined to +the mistaken fear that we sought to antagonize the productive work of +the specialist. They not seldom took the form of a general aversion to +the logical side of the ground-plan. It was often said that such a +scheme has after all interest only for the logician, for whom science as +such is an object of study, and who must thus indeed classify the +sciences and determine their logical relation. The real scientist, it +was said, does not care for such methodological operations, and should +be suspicious from the first of such philosophical high-handedness. The +scientist cannot forget how often in the history of civilization science +was the loser when it trusted its problems to the metaphysical thinker +who substituted his lofty speculations for the hard work of the +investigator. The true scholar will thus not only object to generalizing +"commonplaces" as against solid information, but he will object as well +to logical demarcation lines and systematization as against the +practical scientific work which does not want to be hampered by such +philosophical subtleties. Yet all these fears and suspicions were still +more mistaken.</p> + +<p>Nothing was further from our intentions than a substitution of +metaphysics for concrete science. It was not by chance that we took such +pains to find the best specialists for every section. No one was invited +to enter into logical discussions and to consider the relations of +science merely from a dialectic point of view. The topic was everywhere +the whole living manifoldness of actual relations, and the logician had +nothing else to do than to prepare the programme. The outlines of the +programme demanded, of course, a certain logical scheme. If hundreds of +sciences are to take part, they have to be grouped somehow, if a merely +alphabetical order is not adopted; and even if we were to proceed +alphabetically, we should have to decide beforehand what part of +knowledge is to be recognized as a special science. But the logical +order of the ground-plan refers, of course, merely to the simple +relation of coördination, subordination, and superordination, and the +logician is satisfied with such a classification. But the endless +variety of internal relations is no longer to be dealt with from the +point of view of mere logic. We may work out the ground-plan in such a +way that we understand that logically zoölogy is coördinated to botany +and subordinated to mechanics and superordinated to ichthyology; but +this minimum of determination gives, of course, not even a hint of that +world of relations which exists from the standpoint of the biologist +between the science of zoölogy and the science of botany, or between the +biological and the mechanical studies. To discuss these relations of +real scientific life is the work of the biologist and not at all of the +logician.</p> + +<p>The foregoing answers also at once an objection which might seem more +justified at the first glance. It has been said that we were undertaking +the work of bringing about a synthesis of scientific endeavors, and that +we yet had that synthesis already completed in the programme on which +the work was to be based. The scholars to be invited would be bound by +the programme, and would therefore have no other possibility than to say +with more words what the programme had settled beforehand. The whole +effort would then seem determined from the start by the arbitrariness of +the proposed ground-plan. Now it cannot be denied indeed that a certain +factor of arbitrariness has to enter into a programme. We have already +referred to the fact that some one must decide beforehand what fraction +of science is to be acknowledged as a self-dependent discipline. If a +biologist were to work out the scheme, he might decide that the whole of +philosophy was just one science; while the philosopher might claim a +large number of sections for logic and ethics and philosophy of +religion, and so on. And the philosopher, on the other hand, might treat +the whole of medicine as one part in itself, while the physician might +hold that even otology has to be separated from rhinology. A certain +subjectivity of standpoint is unavoidable, and we know very well that +instead of the one hundred and twenty-eight sections of our programme we +might have been satisfied with half that number or might have indulged +in double that number. And yet there was no possible plan which would +have allowed us to invite the speakers without defining beforehand the +sectional field which each was to represent. A certain courage of +opinion was then necessary, and sometimes also a certain adjustment to +external conditions.</p> + +<p>Quite similar was the question of classification. Just as we had to +take the responsibility for the staking-out of every section, we had +also to decide in favor of a certain grouping, if we desired to organize +the Congress and not simply to bring out haphazard results. The +principles which are sufficient for a mere directory would never allow +the shaping of a programme which can be the basis for synthetic work. +Even a university catalogue begins with a certain classification, and +yet no one fancies that such catalogue grouping inhibits the freedom of +the university lecturer. It is easy to say, as has been said, that the +essential trait of the scientific life of to-day is its +live-and-let-live character. Certainly it is. In the regular work in our +libraries and laboratories the year round, everything depends upon this +democratic freedom in which every one goes his own way, hardly asking +what his neighbor is doing. It is that which has made the specialistic +sciences of our day as strong as they are. But it has brought about at +the same time this extreme tendency to unrelated specialization with its +discouraging lack of unity; this heaping up of information without an +outer harmonious view of the world; and if we were really at least once +to satisfy the desire for unity, then we had not the right to yield +fully to this live-and-let-live tendency. Therefore some principle of +grouping had to be accepted, and whatever principle had been chosen, it +would certainly have been open to the criticism that it was a product of +arbitrary decision, inasmuch as other principles might have been +possible.</p> + +<p>A classification which in itself expresses all the practical +relations in which sciences stand to each other is, of course, +absolutely impossible. A programme which should try to arrange the place +of a special discipline in such a way that it would become the neighbor +of all those other sciences with which it has internal relation is +unthinkable. On the other hand, only if we had tried to construct a +scheme of such exaggerated ambitions should we have been really guilty +of anticipating a part of that which the specialistic scholars were to +tell us. The Congress had to leave it to the invited participants to +discuss the totality of relations which practically exist between their +fields and others, and the organizers confined themselves to that +minimum of classification which just indicates the pure logical +relations, a minimum which every editor of encyclopedic work would be +asked to initiate without awakening suspicions of interference with the +ideas of his contributors.</p> + +<p>The only justified demand which could be met was that a system of +division and classification should be proposed which should give fair +play to every existing scientific tendency. The minimum of +classification was to be combined with the maximum of freedom, and to +secure that a careful consideration of principles was indeed necessary. +To bring logical order into the sciences which stand out clearly with +traditional rights is not difficult; but the chances are too great that +certain tendencies of thought might fail to find recognition or might be +suppressed by scientific prejudice. Any serious omission would indeed +have necessarily inhibited the freedom of expression. To secure thus the +greatest inner fullness of the programme, seemed indeed the most +important task in the elaboration of the ground-plan. The fears that we +might offer empty generalization instead of scholarly facts, or that we +might simply heap up encyclopedic information instead of gaining wide +perspectives, or that we might interfere with the living connections of +sciences by the logical demarcation lines, or that we might disturb the +scholar in his freedom by determining beforehand his place in the +classification,—all these fears and objections, which were +repeatedly raised when the plan was first proposed, seemed indeed +unimportant compared with the fear that the programme might be unable to +include all scientific tendencies of the time.</p> + +<p>That would have been, indeed, the one fundamental mistake, as the +whole Congress work was planned in the service of the great synthetic +movement which pervades the intellectual life of to-day. The undertaking +would be useless and even hindering if it were not just the newer and +deeper tendencies that came to most complete expression in it. +Everything depended, therefore, upon the fullest possible representation +of scientific endeavors in the plan. But no one can become aware of this +manifoldness and of the logical relations who does not go back to the +ultimate principles of the human search for truth. We have, therefore, +to enter now into a full discussion of the principles which have +controlled the classification and subdivision of the whole work. The +discussion is necessarily in its essence a philosophical one, as it was +earlier made plain that philosophy must lay out the plan, while in the +realization of the plan through concrete work the scientist alone, and +not the logician, has to speak. Yet here again it may be said that while +our discussion of principles in its essence is logical, in another +respect it is a merely historical account. The question is not what +principles of classification are to be acknowledged as valuable now that +the work of the Congress lies behind us, but what principles were +accepted and really led to the organization of the work in that form in +which it presents itself in the records of the following volumes.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">II</p> + +<p class="center">THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES</p> + +<p class="center">1. <i>The Development of Classification</i></p> + +<p>The problem of dividing and subdividing the whole of human knowledge +and of thus bringing order into the manifoldness of scientific efforts +has fascinated the leading thinkers of all ages. It may often be +difficult to say how far the new principles of classification themselves +open the way for new scientific progress and how far the great forward +movements of thought in the special sciences have in turn influenced the +principles of classification. In any case every productive age has +demanded the expression of its deepest energy in a new ordering of human +science. The history of these efforts leads from Plato and Aristotle to +Bacon and Locke, to Bentham and Ampère, to Kant and Hegel, to Comte and +Spencer, to Wundt and Windelband. And yet we can hardly speak of a real +historical continuity. In a certain way every period took up the problem +anew, and the new aspects resulted not only from the development of the +sciences themselves which were to be classified, but still more from the +differences of logical interest. Sometimes the classification referred +to the material, sometimes to the method of treatment, sometimes to the +mental energies involved, and sometimes to the ends to be reached. The +reference to the mental faculties was certainly the earliest method of +bringing order into human knowledge, for the distinction of the Platonic +philosophy between dialectics, physics, and ethics pointed to the +threefold character of the mind, to reason, perception, and desire; and +it was on the threshold of the modern time, again, when Bacon divided +the intellectual globe into three large parts according to three +fundamental psychical faculties: memory, imagination, and reason. The +memory gives us history; the imagination, poetry; the reason, +philosophy, or the sciences. History was further divided into natural +and civil history; natural history into normal, abnormal, and artificial +phenomena; civil history into political, literary, and ecclesiastical +history. The field of reason was subdivided into man, nature, and God; +the domain of man gives, first, civil philosophy, parted off into +intercourse, business, and government, and secondly, the philosophy of +humanity, divided into that of body and of soul, wherein medicine and +athletics belong to the body, logic and ethics to the soul. Nature, on +the other hand, was divided into speculative and applied +science,—the speculative containing both physics and metaphysics; +the applied, mechanics and magic. All this was full of artificial +constructions, and yet still more marked by deep insight into the needs +of Bacon's time, and not every modification of later classifiers was +logically a step forward.</p> + +<p>Yet modern efforts had to seek quite different methods, and the +energies which have been most effective for the ordering of knowledge in +the last decades spring unquestionably from the system of Comte and his +successors. He did not aim at a system of ramifications; his problem was +to show how the fundamental sciences depend on each other. A series was +to be constructed in which each member should presuppose the foregoing. +The result was a simplicity which is certainly tempting, but this +simplicity was reached only by an artificial emphasis which corresponded +completely to the one-sidedness of naturalistic thought. It was a +philosophy of positivism, the background for the gigantic work of +natural science and technique in the last two thirds of the nineteenth +century. Comte's fundamental thought is that the science of Morals, in +which we study human nature for the government of human life, is +dependent on sociology. Sociology, however, depends on biology; this on +chemistry; this on physics; this on astronomy; and this finally on +mathematics. In this way, all mental and moral sciences, history and +philology, jurisprudence and theology, economics and politics, are +considered as sociological phenomena, as dealing with functions of the +human being. But as man is a living organism, and thus certainly falls +under biology, all the branches of knowledge from history to ethics, +from jurisprudence to æsthetics, can be nothing but subdivisions of +biology. The living organism, on the other hand, is merely one type of +the physical bodies on earth, and biology is thus itself merely a +department of physics. But as the earthly bodies are merely a part of +the cosmic totality, physics is thus a part of astronomy; and as the +whole universe is controlled by mathematical laws, mathematics must be +superordinated to all sciences.</p> + +<p>But there followed a time which overcame this thinly disguised +example of materialism. It was a time when the categories of the +physiologist lost slightly in credit and the categories of the +psychologist won repute. This newer movement held that it is artificial +to consider ethical and logical life, historic and legal action, +literary and religious emotions, merely as physiological functions of +the living organism. The mental life, however necessarily connected with +brain processes, has a positive reality of its own. The psychical facts +represent a world of phenomena which in its nature is absolutely +different from that of material phenomena, and, while it is true that +every ethical action and every logical thought can, from the standpoint +of the biologist, be considered as a property of matter, it is not less +true that the sciences of mental phenomena, considered impartially, form +a sphere of knowledge closed in itself, and must thus be coördinated, +not subordinated, to the knowledge of the physical world. We should say +thus: all knowledge falls into two classes, the physical sciences and +the mental sciences. In the circle of physical sciences we have the +general sciences, like physics and chemistry, the particular sciences of +special objects, like astronomy, geology, mineralogy, biology, and the +formal sciences, like mathematics. In the circle of mental sciences we +have correspondingly, as a general science, psychology, and as the +particular sciences all those special mental and moral sciences which +deal with man's inner life, like history or jurisprudence, logic or +ethics, and all the rest. Such a classification, which had its +philosophical defenders about twenty years ago, penetrated the popular +thought as fully as the positivism of the foregoing generation, and was +certainly superior to its materialistic forerunner.</p> + +<p>Of course it was not the first time in the history of civilization +that materialism was replaced by dualism, that biologism was replaced by +psychologism; and it was also not the first time that the development of +civilization led again beyond this point: that is, led beyond the +psychologizing period. There is no doubt that our time presses on, with +all its powerful internal energies, away from this <i>Weltanschauung</i> +of yesterday. The materialism was anti-philosophic, the psychological +dualism was unphilosophic. To-day the philosophical movement has set in. +The one-sidedness of the nineteenth century creed is felt in the deeper +thought all over the world: popular movements and scholarly efforts +alike show the signs of a coming idealism, which has something better +and deeper to say than merely that our life is a series of causal +phenomena. Our time longs for a new interpretation of reality; from the +depths of every science wherein for decades philosophizing was despised, +the best scholars turn again to a discussion of fundamental conceptions +and general principles. Historical thinking begins again to take the +leadership which for half a century belonged to naturalistic thinking; +specialistic research demands increasingly from day to day the +readjustment toward higher unities, and the technical progress which +charmed the world becomes more and more simply a factor in an ideal +progress. The appearance of this unifying congress itself is merely one +of a thousand symptoms of this change appearing in our public life, and +if the scientific philosophy is producing to-day book upon book to prove +that the world of phenomena must be supplemented by the world of values, +that description must yield to interpretation, and that explanation must +be harmonized with appreciation: it is but echoing in technical terms +the one great emotion of our time.</p> + +<p>This certainly does not mean that any step of the gigantic +materialistic, technical, and psychological development will be +reversed, or that progress in any one of these directions ought to +cease. On the contrary, no time was ever more ready to put its immense +energies into the service of naturalistic work; but it does mean that +our time recognizes the one-sidedness of these movements, recognizes +that they belong only to one aspect of reality, and that another aspect +is possible; yes, that the other aspect is that of our immediate life, +with its purposes and its ideals, its historical relations and its +logical aims. The claim of materialism, that all psychical facts are +merely functions of the organism, was no argument against psychology, +because, though the biological view was possible, yet the other aspect +is certainly a necessary supplement. In the same way it is no argument +against the newer view that all purposes and ideals, all historical +actions and logical thoughts, can be considered as psychological +phenomena. Of course we can consider them as such, and we must go on +doing so in the service of the psychological and sociological sciences; +but we ought not to imagine that we have expressed and understood the +real character of our historical or moral, our logical or religious life +when we have described and explained it as a series of phenomena. Its +immediate reality expresses itself above all in the fact that it has a +meaning, that it is a purpose which we want to understand, not by +considering its causes and effects, but by interpreting its aims and +appreciating its ideals.</p> + +<p>We should say, therefore, to-day that it is most interesting and +important for the scientist to consider human life with all its +strivings and creations from a biological, psychological, sociological +point of view; that is, to consider it as a system of causal phenomena; +and many problems worthy of the highest energies have still to be solved +in these sciences. But that which the jurist or the theologian, the +student of art or of history, of literature or of politics, of education +or of morality, is dealing with, refers to the other aspect in which +inner life is not a phenomenon but a system of purposes, not to be +explained but to be interpreted, to be approached not by causal but by +teleological methods. In this case the historical sciences are no longer +sub-sections of psychological or of sociological sciences; the +conception of science is no longer identical with the conception of the +science of phenomena. There exist sciences which do not deal with the +description or explanation of phenomena at all, but with the internal +relation and connection, the interpretation and appreciation of purpose. +In this way modern thought demands that sciences of purpose be +coördinated with sciences of phenomena. Only if all these tendencies of +our time are fully acknowledged can the outer framework of our +classification offer a fair field to every scientific thought, while a +positivistic system would cripple the most promising tendencies of the +twentieth century.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">2. <i>The Four Theoretical Divisions</i></p> + +<p>We have first to determine the underlying structure of the +classification, that is, we have to seek the chief Divisions, of which +our plan shows seven; four theoretical and three practical ones. It will +be a secondary task to subdivide them later into the 24 Departments and +128 Sections. We desire to divide the whole of knowledge in a +fundamental way, and we must therefore start with the question of +principle:—what is knowledge? This question belongs to +epistemology, and thus falls, indeed, into the domain of philosophy. The +positivist is easily inclined to substitute for the philosophical +problem the empirical question: how did that which we call knowledge +grow and develop itself in our individual mind, or in the mind of the +nations? The question becomes, then, of course, one which must be +answered by psychology, by sociology, and perhaps by biology. Such +genetic inquiries are certainly very important, and the problem of how +the processes of judging and conceiving and thinking are produced in the +individual or social consciousness, and how they are to be explained +through physical and psychical causes, deserves fullest attention. But +its solution cannot even help us as regards the fundamental problem, +what we mean by knowledge, and what the ultimate value of knowledge may +be, and why we seek it. This deeper logical inquiry must be answered +somehow before those genetic studies of the psychological and the +sociological positivists can claim any truth at all, and thus any value, +for their outcome. To explain our present knowledge genetically from its +foregoing causes means merely to connect the present experience, which +we know, with a past experience, which we remember, or with earlier +phenomena which we construct on the basis of theories and hypotheses; +but in any case with facts which we value as parts of our knowledge and +which thus presuppose the acknowledgment of the value of knowledge. We +cannot determine by linking one part of knowledge with another part of +knowledge whether we have a right to speak of knowledge at all and to +rely on it.</p> + +<p>We can thus not start from the childhood of man, or from the +beginning of humanity, or from any other object of knowledge, but we +must begin with the state which logically precedes all knowledge; that +is, with our immediate experience of real life. Here, in the naïve +experience in which we do not know ourselves as objects which we +perceive, but where we feel ourselves in our subjective attitudes as +agents of will, as personalities, here we find the original reality not +yet shaped and remoulded by scientific conceptions and by the demands of +knowledge. And from this basis of primary, naïve reality we must ask +ourselves what we mean by seeking knowledge, and how this demand of ours +is different from the other activities in which we work out the meaning +and the ideals of our life.</p> + +<p>One thing is certain, we cannot go back to the old dogmatic +standpoint, whether rationalistic or sensualistic. In both cases +dogmatism took for granted that there is a real world of things which +exist in themselves independent of our subjective attitudes, and that +our knowledge has to give us a mirror picture of that self-dependent +world. Sensualism averred that we get this knowledge through our +perceptions; rationalism, that we get it by reasoning. The one asserted +that experience gives us the data which mere abstract reasoning can +never supply; the other asserted that our knowledge speaks of necessity +which no mere perception can find out. Our modern time has gone through +the school of philosophical criticism, and the dogmatic ideas have lost +for us their meaning. We know that the world which we think as +independent cannot be independent of the forms of our thinking, and that +no science has reference to any other world than the world which is +determined by the categories of our apperception. There cannot be +anything more real than the immediate pure experience, and if we seek +the truth of knowledge, we do not set out to discover something which is +hidden behind our experience, but we set out simply to make something +out of our experience which satisfies certain demands. Our immediate +experience does not contain an objective thing and a subjective picture +of it, but they are completely one and the same piece of experience. We +have the object of our immediate knowledge not in the double form of an +outer object independent of ourselves and an idea in us, but we have it +as our object there in the practical world before science for its +special purposes has broken up that bit of reality into the physical +material thing and the psychical content of consciousness. And if this +doubleness does not hold for the immediate reality of pure experience, +it cannot enter through that reshaping and reconstructing and connecting +and interpreting of pure experience which we call our knowledge. All +that science gives to us is just such an endlessly enlarged experience, +of which every particle remains objective and independent, inasmuch as +it is not in us as psychical individuals, while yet completely dependent +upon the forms of our subjective experience. The ideal of truth is thus +not to gain by reason or by observation ideas in ourselves which +correspond as well as possible to absolute things, but to reconstruct +the given experience in the service of certain purposes. Everything +which completely fulfills the purposes of this intentional +reconstruction is true.</p> + +<p>What are these purposes? One thing is clear from the first: There +cannot be a purpose where there is not a will. If we come from pure +experience to knowledge by a purposive transformation, we must +acknowledge the reality of will in ourselves, or rather, we must find +ourselves as will in the midst of pure experience before we reach any +knowledge. And so it is indeed. We can abstract from all those +reconstructions which the sciences suggest to us and go back to the most +immediate naïve experience; but we can never reach an experience which +does not contain the doubleness of subject and object, of will and +world. That doubleness has nothing whatever to do with the difference of +physical and psychical; both the physical thing and the psychical idea +are objects. The antithesis is not that between two kinds of objects, +since we have seen that in the immediate experience the objects are not +at all split up into the two groups of material and mental things; it is +rather the antithesis between the object in its undifferentiated state +on the one side and the subject in its will-attitude on the other side. +Yes, even if we speak of the subject which stands as a unity behind the +will-attitudes, we are already reconstructing the real experience in the +interest of the purposes of knowledge. In the immediate experience, we +have the will-attitudes themselves, and not a subject which wills +them.</p> + +<p>If we ask ourselves finally what is then the ultimate difference +between those two elements of our pure experience, between the object +and the will-attitude, we stand before the ultimate data: we call that +element which exists merely through a reference to its opposite, the +object, and we call that element of our experience which is complete in +itself, the attitude of the will. If we experienced liking or disliking, +affirming or denying, approving or disapproving in the same way in which +we experience the red and the green, the sweet and the sour, the rock +and the tree and the moon, we should know objects only. But we do +experience them in quite a different way. The rock and the tree do not +point to anything else, but the approval has no reality if it does not +point to its opposition in disapproval, and the denial has no meaning if +it is not meant in relation to the affirmative. This doubleness of our +primary experience, this having of objects and of antagonistic attitudes +must be acknowledged wherever we speak of experience at all. We know no +object without attitude, and no attitude without object. The two are one +state; object and attitude form a unity which we resolve by the +different way in which we experience these two features of the one +state: we find the object and we live through the attitude. It is a +different kind of awareness, the having of the object and the taking of +the attitude. In real life our will is never an object which we simply +perceive. The psychologist may treat the will as such, but in the +immediate experience of real life, we are certain of our action by doing +it and not by perceiving our doing; and this our performing and +rejecting is really our self which we posit as absolute reality, not by +knowing it, but by willing it. This corner-stone of the Fichtean +philosophy was forgotten throughout the uncritical and unphilosophical +decades of a mere naturalistic age. But our time has finally come to +give attention to it again.</p> + +<p>Our pure experience thus contains will-attitudes and objects of will, +and the different attitudes of the will give the fundamental classes of +human activity. We can easily recognize four different types of +will-relation towards the world. Our will submits itself to the world; +our will approves the world as it is; our will approves the changes in +the world; our will transcends the world. Yet we must make at once one +more most important discrimination. We have up to this point simplified +our pure experience too much. It is not true that we experience only +objects and our own will-attitudes. Our will reaches out not only to +objects, but also to other subjects. In our most immediate experience, +not reshaped at all by theoretical science, our will is in agreement or +disagreement with other wills; tries to influence them, and receives +influences and suggestions from them. The pseudo-philosophy of +naturalism must say of course that the will does not stand in any direct +relation to another will, but that the other persons are for us simply +material objects which we perceive, like other objects, and into which +we project mental phenomena like those which we find in ourselves by the +mere conclusion of analogy. But the complex reconstructions of +physiological psychology are therein substituted for the primary +experience. If we have to express the agreement or disagreement of wills +in the terms of causal science, we may indeed be obliged to transform +the real experience into such artificial constructions; but in our +immediate consciousness, and thus at the starting-point of our theory of +knowledge, we have certainly to acknowledge that we understand the other +person, accept or do not accept his suggestion, agree or disagree with +him, before we know anything of a difference between physical and mental +objects.</p> + +<p>We cannot agree with an object. We agree directly with a will, which +does not come to us as a foreign phenomenon, but as a proposition which +we accept or decline. In our immediate experience will thus reaches +will, and we are aware of the difference between our will-attitude as +merely individual and our will-attitude as act of agreement with the +will-attitude of other individuals. We can go still further. The circle +of other individuals whose will we express in our own will-act may be +narrow or wide, may be our friends or the nation, and this relation +clearly constitutes the historical significance of our attitude. In the +one case our act is a merely personal choice for personal purposes +without any general meaning; in the other case it is the expression of +general tendencies and historical movements. Yet our will-decisions can +have connections still wider than those with our social community or our +nation, or even with all living men of to-day. It can seek a relation to +the totality of those whom we aim to acknowledge as real subjects. It +thus becomes independent of the chance experience of this or that man, +or this or that movement, which appeals to us, but involves in an +independent way the reference to every one who is to be acknowledged as +a subject at all. Such reference, which is no longer bound to any +special group of historical individuals, thus becomes strictly +over-individual. We can then discriminate three stages: our merely +individual will; secondly, our will as bound by other historical +individuals; and thirdly, our over-individual will, which is not +influenced by any special individual, but by the general demands for the +idea of a personality.</p> + +<p>Each of those four great types of will-attitude which we insisted +on—that is, of submitting, of approving the given, of approving +change, and of transcending—can be carried out on these three +stages, that is, as individual act, as historical act, and as +over-individual act. And we may say at once that only if we submit and +approve and change and transcend in an over-individual act, do we have +Truth and Beauty and Morality and Conviction. If we approve, for +instance, a given experience in an individual will-act, we have simply +personal enjoyment and its object is simply agreeable; if we approve it +in harmony with other individuals, we reach a higher attitude, yet one +which cannot claim absolute value, as it is dependent on historical +considerations and on the tastes and desires of a special group or a +school or a nation or an age. But if we approve the given object just as +it is in an over-individual will-act, then we have before us a thing of +beauty, whose value is not dependent upon our personal enjoyment as +individuals, but is demanded as a joy forever, by every one whom we +acknowledge at all as a complete subject. In exactly the same way, we +may approve a change in the world from any individual point of view: we +have then to do with technical, practical achievements; or we may +approve it in agreement with others: we then enter into the historical +interests of our time. Or we may approve it, finally, in an +over-individual way, without any reference to any special personality: +then only is it valuable for all time, then only is it morally good. And +if our will is transcending experience in an individual way, it can +again claim no more than a subjective satisfaction furnished by any +superstition or hope. But if the transcending will is over-individual, +it reaches the absolute values of religion and metaphysics.</p> + +<p>Exactly the same differences, finally, must occur when our will +submits itself to experience. This submission may be, again, an +individual decision for individual purposes; no absolute value belongs +to it. Or it may be again a yielding to the suggestions of other +individuals; or it may, finally, again be an over-individual submission, +which seeks no longer a personal interest. This submission is not to the +authority of others, and is without reference to any individual; we +assume that every one who is to share with us our world of experience +has to share this submission too. That alone is a submission to truth, +and experience, considered in so far as we submit ourselves to it +over-individually, constitutes our knowledge.</p> + +<p>The system of knowledge is thus the system of experience with all +that is involved in it in so far as it demands submission from our +over-individual will, and the classification which we are seeking must +be thus a division and subdivision of our over-individual submissions. +But the submission itself can be of very different characters and these +various types must give the deepest logical principles of scientific +classification. To point at once to the fundamental differences: our +will acknowledges the demands of other wills and of objects. We cannot +live our life—and this is not meant in a biological sense, but, +first of all, in a teleological sense—our life becomes +meaningless, if our will does not respect the reality of will-demands +and of objects of will. Now we have seen that the will which demands our +decision may be either the individual will of other subjects or the +over-individual will, which belongs to every subject as such and is +independent of any individuality. We can say at once that in the same +way we are led to acknowledge that the object has partly an +over-individual character, that is, necessarily belongs to the world of +objects of every possible subject, and partly an individual character, +as our personal object. We have thus four large groups of experiences to +which we submit ourselves: over-individual will-acts, individual +will-acts, over-individual objects, individual objects. They constitute +the first four large divisions of our system.</p> + +<p>The over-individual will-acts, which are as such teleologically +binding for every subject and therefore norms for his will, give us the +Normative Sciences. The individual will-acts in the world of historical +manifoldness give us the Historical Sciences. The objects, in so far as +they belong to every individual, make up the physical world, and thus +give us the Physical Sciences; and finally the objects, in so far as +they belong to the individual, are the contents of consciousness, and +thus give us the Mental Sciences. We have then the demarcation lines of +our first four large divisions: the Normative, the Historical, the +Physical, and the Mental Sciences. Yet their meaning and method and +difference must be characterized more fully. We must understand why we +have here to deal with four absolutely different types of scientific +systems, why the over-individual objects lead us to general laws and to +the determination of the future, while the study of the individual +will-acts, for instance, gives us the system of history, which turns +merely to the past and does not seek natural laws; and why the study of +the norms gives us another kind of system in which neither a causal nor +an historical, but a purely logical connection prevails. Yet all these +methodological differences result necessarily from the material with +which these four different groups of sciences are working.</p> + +<p>Let us start again from the consideration of our original logical +purpose. We feel ourselves bound and limited in our will by physical +things, by psychical contents, by the demands of other subjects, and by +norms. The purpose of all our knowledge is to develop completely all +that is involved in this bondage. We want to develop in an +over-individual way all the obligations for our submission which are +necessarily included in the given objects and the given demands of +subjects. We start of course everywhere and in every direction from the +actual experience, but we expand the experience by seeking those objects +and those demands to which, as necessarily following from the +immediately given experience, we must also submit. And in thus +developing the whole system of submissions, the interpretation of the +experience itself becomes transformed: the physicist may perhaps +substitute imperceptible atoms for the physical object and the +psychologist may substitute sensations for the real idea, and the +historian may substitute combinations of influences for the real +personality, and the student of norms may substitute combinations of +conflicting demands for the one complete duty; yet in every case the +substitution is logically necessary and furnishes us what we call truth +inasmuch as it is needed to develop the concrete system of our +submissions and thus to express our confidence in the order-lines of +reality. And each of these substitutions and supplementations becomes, +as material of knowledge, itself a part of the world of experience.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">3. <i>The Physical and the Mental Sciences</i></p> + +<p>The physicist, we said, speaks of the world of objects in so far as +they belong to every possible subject, and are material for a merely +passive spectator. Of course the pure experience does not offer us +anything of that kind. We insisted that the objects of our real life are +objects of our will and of our attitudes, and are at the same time +undifferentiated into the physical things outside of us and the +psychical ideas in us. To reach the abstraction of the physicist, we +have thus to cut loose the objects from our will and to separate the +over-individual elements from the individual elements. Both +transformations are clearly demanded by our logical aims. As to the +cutting loose from our will, it means considering the object as if it +existed for itself, as if it were a mere passively given material and +not a material of our personal interests. But just that is needed. We +want to find out how far we have to submit ourselves to the object. If +we want to live our life, we must adjust our attitudes to things, and, +as we know our will, we must seek to understand the other factor in the +complex experience, the object of our will, and we must find out what it +involves in itself. But we do not understand the object and the +submission which it demands if we do not completely understand its +relation to our desires. Our total submission to the thing thus involves +our acknowledgment of all that we have to expect from it. And although +the real experience is a unity of will and thing, we have thus the most +immediate interest in considering what we have to expect from the thing +in itself, without reference to our will. That means finding out the +effects of the given object with a subject as the passive spectator. We +eliminate artificially, therefore, the activity of the subject and +construct as presupposition for this circle of knowledge a nowhere +existing subject without activity, for which the thing exists merely as +a cause of the effects which it produces.</p> + +<p>The first step towards natural science is, therefore, to dissolve the +real experience into thing and personality; that is, into object and +active subject, and to eliminate in an artificial abstraction the +activity of the subject, making the object material of merely passive +awareness, and related no longer to the will but merely to other +objects. It may be more difficult to understand the second step which +naturalism has to take before a natural science is possible. It must +dissolve the object of will into an over-individual and an individual +part and must eliminate the individual. That part of my objects which +belongs to me alone is their psychical side; that which belongs to all +of us and is the object of ever new experience is the physical object. +As a physicist, in the widest sense of the word, I have to ignore the +objects in so far as they are my ideas and have to consider the stones +and the stars, the inorganic and the organic objects, as they are +outside of me, material for every one. The logical purpose of this +second abstraction may be perhaps formulated in the following way.</p> + +<p>We have seen that the purpose of the study of the objects is to find +out what we have to expect from them; that is, to what effects of the +given thing we have to submit ourselves in anticipation. The ideal aim +is thus to understand completely how present objects and future +objects—that is, how causes and effects—are connected. The +first stage in such knowledge of causal connections is, of course, the +observation of empirical consequences. Our feeling of expectation grows +with the regularity of observed succession; yet the ideal aim can never +be fulfilled in that way. The mere observation of regularities can help +us to reduce a particular case to a frequently observed type, but what +we seek to understand is the necessity of the process. Of course we have +to formulate laws, and as soon as we acknowledge a special law to be +expressive of a necessity, the subsumption of the particular case under +the law will satisfy us even if the necessity of the connection is not +recognized in the particular case. We are satisfied because the +acknowledgment of the law involved all possible cases. But we do not at +all feel that we have furnished a real explanation if the law means to +us merely a generalization of routine experiences, and if thus no +absolute validity is attached to the law. This necessity between cause +and effect must thus have its ultimate reason in our own understanding. +We must be logically obliged to connect the objects in such a way, and +wherever observation seems to contradict that which is logically +necessary, we must reshape our idea of the object till the demands of +reason are fulfilled. That is, we must substitute for the given object +an abstraction which serves the purpose of a logically necessary +connection. That demand is clearly not satisfied if we simply group the +totality of such causal judgments under the single name, Causality, and +designate thus all these judgments as results of a special disposition +of the understanding. We never understand why just this cause demands +just this effect so long as we rely on such vague and mystical power of +our reason to link the world by causality.</p> + +<p>But the situation changes at once if we go still further back in the +categories of our understanding. While a mere demand for causality never +explains what cause is to be linked with what effect, the vagueness +disappears when we understand this demand for causality itself as the +product of a more fundamental demand for identity. That an object +remains identical with itself does not need for us any further +interpretation. That is the ultimate presupposition of our thought, and +where a complete identity is found nothing demands further explanation. +All scientific effort aims at so rethinking different experiences that +they can be regarded as partially identical, and every discovery of +necessary connection is ultimately a demonstration of identity. If we +seek connections with the final aim to understand them as necessary, we +must conceive the world of our objects in such a way that it is possible +to consider the successive experiences as parts of a self-identical +world; that is, as parts of a world in which no substance and no energy +can disappear or appear anew. To reach this end it is obviously needed +that we eliminate from the world of objects all that cannot be conceived +as identically returning in a new experience; that is, all that belongs +to the present experience only. We do eliminate this by taking it up +conceptually into the subject and calling it psychical, and thus leaving +to the object merely that which is conceived as belonging to the world +of everybody's experience, that is, of over-individual experience. The +whole history of natural science is first of all the gigantic +development of this transformation, resolution, and reconstruction. The +objects of experience are re-thought till everything is eliminated which +cannot be conceived as identical with itself in the experiences of all +individuals and thus as belonging to the over-individual world. All the +substitutions of atoms for the real thing, and of energies for the real +changes, are merely conceptional schemes to satisfy this demand.</p> + +<p>The logically primary step is thus not the separation of the physical +and the psychical things plus the secondary demand to connect the +physical things causally; the order is exactly opposite. The primary +desire is to connect the real objects and to understand them as causes +and effects. This understanding demands not only empirical observation, +but insight into the necessary connection. Necessary connection, on the +other hand, exists merely for identical objects and identical qualities. +But in the various experiences only that is identical which is +independent of the momentary individual experiences, and therefore we +need as the ultimate aim a reconstruction of the object into the two +parts, the one perceptional, which refers to our individual experience; +and the other conceptional, which expresses that which can be conceived +as identical in every new experience. The ideal of this constructed +world is the mechanical universe in which every atom moves by causal +necessity because there is nothing in that universe, no element of +substance and no element of energy, which will not remain identical in +all changes of the universe which are possibly to be expected. It +becomes completely determinable by anticipation and the system of our +submissions to the object can be completely constructed. The totality of +intellectual efforts to reconstruct such a causally connected +over-individual world of objects clearly represents a unity of its own. +It is the system of physical sciences.</p> + +<p>The physical universe is thus not the totality of our objects. It is +a substitution for our real objects, constructed by eliminating the +individual parts of our objects of experience. These individual parts +are the psychical aspects of our objective experience, and they clearly +awake our scientific interest too. The physical sciences need thus as +counterpart a division of mental sciences. Their aim must be the same. +We want to foresee the psychical results and to understand causally the +psychical experience. Yet it is clear that the plan of the mental +sciences must be quite different in principle from that of the sciences +of nature. The causal connection of the physical universe was ultimately +anchored in the identity of the object through various experiences; +while the object of experience was psychical for us just in so far as it +could never be conceived as identical in different phases of reality. +The psychical object is an ever new creation; my idea can never be your +idea. Their meaning may be identical, but the psychical stuff, the +content of my consciousness, can never be object for any one else, and +even in myself the idea of to-day is never the idea of yesterday or +to-morrow. But if there cannot be identity in different psychical +experiences, it is logically impossible to connect them directly by +necessity. If we yet want to master their successive appearance, we must +substitute an indirect connection for the direct one, and must describe +and explain the psychical phenomena through reference to the physical +world. It is in this way that modern psychology has substituted +elementary sensations for the real contents of consciousness and has +constructed relations between these elementary mental states on the +basis of processes in the organism, especially brain processes. Here, +again, reality is left behind and a mere conceptional construction is +put in its place. But this construction fulfills its purpose and thus +gives us truth; and if the basis is once given, the psychological +sciences can build up a causal system of the conscious processes in the +individual man and in society.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">4. <i>The Historical and the Normative +Sciences</i></p> + +<p>The two divisions of the physical and mental sciences represent our +systematized submission to objects. But we saw from the first that it is +an artificial abstraction to consider in our real experience the object +alone. We saw clearly that we, as acting personalities, in our will and +in our attitudes, do not feel ourselves in relation to objects, merely, +but to will-acts; and that these will-acts were the individual ones of +other subjects or the over-individual ones which come to us in our +consciousness of norms. The sciences which deal with our submissions to +the individual will-acts of others are the Historical Sciences. Their +starting-point is the same as that of the object sciences, the immediate +experience. But the other subjects reach our individuality from the +start in a different way from the objects. The wills of other subjects +come to us as propositions with which we have to agree or disagree; as +suggestions, which we are to imitate or to resist; and they carry in +themselves that reference to an opposite which, as we saw, characterizes +all will-activity. The rock or the tree in our surroundings may +stimulate our reactions, but does not claim to be in itself a decision +with an alternative. But the political or legal or artistic or social or +religious will of my neighbors not only demands my agreement or +disagreement, but presents itself to me in its own meaning as a free +decision which rejects the opposite, and its whole meaning is destroyed +if I consider it like the tree or the rock as a mere phenomenon, as an +object in the world of objects. Whoever has clearly understood that +politics and religion and knowledge and art and law come to me from the +first quite differently from objects, can never doubt that their +systematic connection must be most sharply separated from all the +sciences which connect impressions of objects, and is falsified if the +historical disciplines are treated simply as parts of the sciences of +phenomena—for instance, as parts of sociology, the science of +society as a psycho-physical object.</p> + +<p>Just as natural science transcends the immediately experienced object +and works out the whole system of our necessary submissions to the world +of objects, so the historical sciences transcend the social will-acts +which approach us in our immediate experience, and again seek to find +what we are really submitting to if we accept the suggestions of our +social surroundings. And yet this similar demand has most dissimilar +consequences. We submit to an object and want to find out what we are +really submitting to. That cannot mean anything else, as we have seen, +than to seek the effects of the object and thus to look forward to what +we have to expect from the object. On the other hand, if we want to find +out what we are really submitting to if we agree with the decision of +our neighbor, the only meaning of the question can be to ask what our +neighbor really is deciding on, what is contained in his decision; and +as his decision must mean an agreement or disagreement with the will-act +of another subject, we cannot understand the suggestion which comes to +us without understanding in respect to what propositions of others it +takes a stand. Our interest is in this case thus led from those subjects +of will which enter into our immediate experience to other subjects +whose purposes stand in the relation of suggestion and demand to the +present ones. And if we try to develop the system of these relations, we +come to an endless chain of will-relations, in which one individual will +always points back in its decisions to another individual will with +which it agrees or disagrees, which it imitates or overcomes by a new +attitude of will; and the whole network of these will-relations is the +political or religious or artistic or social history of mankind. This +system of history as a system of teleologically connected will-attitudes +is elaborated from the will-propositions which reach us in immediate +experience, with the same necessity with which the mechanical universe +of natural science is worked out from the objects of our immediate +experience.</p> + +<p>The historical system of will-connections is similar to the system of +object-connections, not only in its starting in the immediate +experience, but further in its also seeking identities. Without this +feature history would not offer to our understanding real connections. +We must link the will-attitudes of men by showing the identity of the +alternatives. Just as the physical thing is substituted by a large +number of atoms which remain identical in the causal changes, in the +same way the personality is substituted by an endless manifoldness of +decisions and becomes linked with the historical community by the +thought that each of these partial decisions refers to an alternative +which is identical with that of other persons. And yet there remains a +most essential difference between the historical and the causal +connection. In a world of things the mere identical continuity is +sufficient to determine the phenomena of any given moment. In a world of +will the identity of alternatives cannot determine beforehand the actual +decision; that belongs to the free activity of the subject. If this +factor of freedom were left out, man would be made an object and history +a mere appendix of natural science. The connection of the historian can +therefore never be a necessary one, however much we may observe +empirical regularities. If there were no identities, our reason could +not find connection in history; but if the historical connections were +necessary, like the causal ones, it would not be history. The historian +is, therefore, unable and without the ambition to look into the future +like the naturalist; his domain is the past.</p> + +<p>Yet will-attitudes and will-acts can also be brought into necessary +connection; that is, we can conceive will-acts as teleologically +identical with each other and exempt from the freedom of the individual. +That is clearly possible only if they are conceived as beyond the +freedom of individual decision and related to the over-individual +subject. The question is then no longer how this special man wills and +decides, but how far a certain will-decision binds every possible +individual who performs this act if he is to share our common world of +will and meaning. Such an over-individual connection of will-acts is +what we call the logical connection. It shares with all other +connections the dependence upon the category of identity. The logical +connection shows how far one act or combination of acts involves, and +thus is partially identical with, a new combination. This logical +connection has, in common with the causal connection, necessity; and in +common with the historical connection, teleological character. Any +individual will-act of historical life may be treated for certain +purposes as such a starting-point of over-individual relations; it would +then lead to that scientific treatment which gives us an interpretation, +for instance, of law. Such interpretative sciences belong to the system +of history in the widest sense of the word.</p> + +<p>The chief interest, however, must belong to the logical connections +of those will<ins title="not hyphenated in the original">-</ins>acts +which themselves have over-individual character. A merely individual +proposition can lead to necessary logical connection, but cannot claim +that scientific importance which belongs to the logical connection of +those propositions which are necessary for the constitution of every +real experience: the science of chess cannot stand on the same level +with the science of geometry, the science of local legal statutes not on +the same level with the system of ethics. The logical connections of the +over-individual attitudes thus constitute the fourth large division +besides the physical, the mental, and the historical sciences. It must +thus comprise the systems of all those propositions which are +presuppositions of our common reality, independent of the free +individual decision. Here belong the acts of approval—the ethical +approval of changes and achievements, as well as the æsthetic approval +of the given world; the acts of conviction—the religious +convictions of a superstructure of the world as well as the metaphysical +convictions of a substructure; and above all, the acts of affirmation +and submission, the logical as well as the mathematical. But to be +consistent we must really demand that merely the over-individual logical +connections are treated in this division. If we deal, for instance, with +the æsthetical or ethical acts as psychological experiences, or as +historical propositions, they belong to the psychical or historical +division. Only the philosophical system of ethics or æsthetics finds its +place in this division. It is difficult to find a suitable name for this +whole system of logical connections of over-individual attitudes. +Perhaps it would be most correct to call it the Sciences of Values, +inasmuch as every one of these over-individual decisions constitutes a +value in our world which our individual will finds as an absolute datum +like the objects of experience. Seen from another point of view, these +values appear as norms which bind our practical will inasmuch as these +absolute values demand of our will to realize them, and it may thus be +permitted to designate this whole group of sciences as a Division of +Normative Sciences.</p> + +<p>Our logical explanation of the meaning of these four divisions +naturally began with the interpretation of that science which usually +takes precedence in popular thought—with the science of nature, +that is, and passed then to those groups whose methodological situation +is seen rather vaguely by our positivistic age. But as soon as we have +once defined and worked out the boundary lines of each of these four +divisions, it would appear more logical to change their order and to +begin with that division whose material is those over-individual +will-acts on which all possible knowledge must depend, and then to turn +to those individual will-acts which determine the formulation of our +present-day knowledge, and then only to go to the objects of knowledge, +the over-individual and the individual ones. In short, we must begin +with the normative sciences, consider in the second place the historical +sciences, in the third place the physical sciences, and in the fourth +place the psychical sciences. There cannot be a scientific judgment +which must not find its place somewhere in one of these four groups. And +yet can we really say that these four great divisions complete the +totality of scientific efforts? The plan of our Congress contains three +important divisions besides these.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">5. <i>The Three Divisions of Practical +Sciences</i></p> + +<p>The three divisions which still lie before us represent Practical +Knowledge. Have we a logical right to put them on an equal level with +the four large divisions which we have considered so far? Might it not +rather be said that all that is knowledge in those practical sciences +must find its place somewhere in the theoretical field, and that +everything outside of it is not knowledge, but art? It cannot be denied +indeed that the logical position of the practical sciences presents +serious problems. That the function of the engineer or of the physician, +of the lawyer or of the minister, of the diplomat or of the teacher, +contains elements of an art cannot be doubted. They all need not only +knowledge, but a certain instinct and power and skill, and their +schooling thus demands a training and discipline through imitation which +cannot be substituted by mere learning. Yet when it comes to the +classification of sciences, it seems very doubtful whether practical +sciences have to be acknowledged as special divisions, inasmuch as the +factor of art must have been eliminated at the moment they are presented +as sciences. The auscultation of the physician certainly demands skill +and training, yet this practical activity itself does not enter into the +science of medicine as presented in medical writings. As soon as the +physician begins to deal with it scientifically, he needs, as does any +scholar, not the stethoscope, but the pen. He must formulate judgments; +and as soon as he simply describes and analyzes and explains and +interprets his stethoscopic experiences, his statements become a system +of theoretical ideas.</p> + +<p>We can say in general that the science of medicine or of engineering, +of jurisprudence or of education, contains, as science, no element of +art, but merely theoretical judgments which, as such, can find their +place somewhere in the complete systems of the theoretical sciences. If +the physician describes a disease, its symptoms, the means of examining +them, the remedies, their therapeutical effects, and the prophylaxis, in +short, everything which the physician needs for his art, he does not +record anything which would not belong to an ideally complete +description and explanation of the processes in the human body. In the +same way it can be said that if the engineer characterizes the +conditions under which an iron bridge will be safe, it is evident that +he cannot introduce any facts which would not find their logical place +in an ideally complete description of the properties of inorganic +nature; and finally, the same is true for the statements of the +politician, the jurist, the pedagogue, or the minister. Whatever is said +about their art is a theoretical judgment which connects facts of the +ideally complete system of theoretical science; in their case the facts +of course belong in first line to the realm of the psychological, +historical, and normative sciences. There never has been or can be +practical advice in the form of words, which is not in principle a +statement of facts which belong to the absolute totality of theoretical +knowledge. Seen from this point of view, it is evident that all our +knowledge is fundamentally theoretical, and that the conception of +practical knowledge is logically unprecise.</p> + +<p>But the opposite point of view might also be taken. It might be said +that after all every kind of knowledge is practical, and our own +deduction of the meaning of science might be said to suggest such +interpretation. We acknowledged at the outset that the so-called +theoretical knowledge is by no means a passive mirror<ins +title="hyphenated in the original"> </ins>picture of an independent +outside world; but that in every judgment real experience is remoulded +and reshaped in the service of certain purposes of will. Here lies the +true core of that growing popular philosophy of to-day which, under the +name of pragmatism, or under other titles, mingles the purposive +character of our knowledge and the evolutionary theories of modern +biology in the vague notion that men created knowledge because the +biological struggle for existence led to such views of the world; and +that we call true that correlation of our experiences which has approved +itself through its harmony with the phylogenetic development. Certainly +we must reject such circle philosophies. We must see clearly that the +whole conception of a biological development and of a struggle of +organisms is itself only a part of our construction of causal knowledge. +We must have knowledge to conceive ourselves as products of a +phylogenetic history, and thus cannot deduce from it the fact, and, +still less, the justification of knowledge. Yet one element of this +theory remains valuable: knowledge is indeed a purposive activity, a +reconstruction of the world in the service of ideals of the will. We +have thus from one side the suggestion that all knowledge is merely +theoretical, from the other side the claim that all knowledge is +practical activity. It seems as if both sides might agree that it is +superfluous and unjustified to make a demarcation line through the field +of knowledge and to separate two sorts of knowledge, theoretical and +practical. For both theories demand that all knowledge be of one kind, +and they disagree only as to whether we ought to call it all theoretical +or all practical.</p> + +<p>Yet the true situation is not characterized by such an antithesis. If +we say that all knowledge is ultimately practical, we are speaking from +an epistemological point of view, inasmuch as we take it then as a +reconstruction of the world through the purposive activity of the +over-individual subject. On the other hand it is an empirical point of +view from which ultimately all knowledge, that of the physician and +engineer and lawyer, as well as that of the astronomer, appears +theoretical. But this antithesis can, therefore, not decide the further +empirical question, whether or not in the midst of theoretical knowledge +two kinds of sciences may be discriminated, of which the one refers to +empirical practical purposes and the other not. Such an inquiry would +have nothing to do with the epistemological problem of pragmatism; it +would be strictly non-philosophical, just as the separation of chemistry +into organic and inorganic chemistry. This empirical question is indeed +to be answered in the affirmative. If we ask what causes bring about a +certain effect, for the sake of a practical purpose of ours,—for +instance, the curing a patient of disease,—no one can state facts +which are not in principle to be included in the complete system of +physical causes and effects and thus in the system of physical sciences. +And yet it may well be that the physical sciences, as such, have not the +slightest reason to mention the effect of that special drug on that +special pathological alteration of the tissues of the organism. The +descriptions and explanations of science are not a mere heaping up of +material, but a steady selection in the interest of the special aim of +the science. No physical science describes every special pebble on the +beach; no historical science deals with the chance happenings in the +daily life of any member of the crowd. And we already well know the +point of view from which the selection is to be performed. We want to +know in the physical and psychical sciences whatever is involved in the +object of our experience, and in the historical and normative sciences +whatever is involved in the demands which reach our will. But whether we +have to do with the objects or with the demands, in both cases we have +systems before us which are determined only by the objects or demands +themselves, without any relation to our individual will and our own +practical activity. Theoretically, of course, our will, our activity, +our organism, our personality is included in the complete system; and if +we knew absolutely everything of the empirical effects of the object or +of the consequences of these demands, we should find among them their +relation to our individual interests; but that relation would be but one +chance case among innumerable others, and the sciences would not have +the slightest interest in giving any attention to that particular case. +Thus if our knowledge of chemical substances were complete, we should +certainly have to know theoretically that a few grains of antipyrine +introduced into the organism have an influence on those brain centres +which regulate the temperature of the human body. Yet if the chemist +does not share the interest of the physician who wants to fight a fever, +he would have hardly any reason for examining this particular relation, +as it hardly throws light on the chemical constitution as such. In this +way we might say in general that the relation of the world to us as +acting individuals is in principle contained in the total system of the +relations of our world of experience, but has a strictly accidental +place there and can never be in itself a centre around which the +scientific data are clustered, and science will hardly have an interest +in giving any attention to its details.</p> + +<p>This relation of the world, the physical, the psychical, the +historical, and the normative world, to our individual, practical +purposes can, however, indeed become the centre of scientific interest, +and it is evident that the whole inquiry receives thereupon a perfectly +new direction which demands not only a completely new grouping of facts +and relations, but also a very different shading in elaboration. As long +as the purpose was to understand the world without relation to our +individual aims, science had to gather endless details which are for us +now quite indifferent, as they do not touch our aims; and in other +respects science was satisfied with broad generalizations and +abstractions where we have now to examine the most minute details. In +short, the shifting of the centre of gravity creates perfectly new +sciences which must be distinguished; and if we call them again +theoretical and practical sciences, it is clear that this difference has +then no longer anything to do with the philosophical problems from which +we started.</p> + +<p>The term practical may be preferable to the other term which is +sometimes used: Applied Science. If we construct the antithesis of +theoretical and applied science, the underlying idea is clearly that we +have to do on the practical side with a discipline which teaches how to +apply a science which logically exists as such beforehand. Engineering, +for instance, is an applied science because it applies the science of +physics; but this is not really our deepest meaning here. Our practical +sciences are not meant as mere applications of theoretical sciences. +They are logically somewhat degraded if they are treated in such a way. +Their real logical meaning comes out only if they are acknowledged as +self-dependent sciences whose material is differentiated from that of +the theoretical sciences by the different point of view and purpose. +They are methodologically perfectly independent, and the fact that a +large part or theoretically even everything of their teaching overlaps +the teaching of certain theoretical sciences ought not to have any +influence on their logical standing. The practical sciences could be +conceived as completely self-dependent, without the existence of any +so-called theoretical sciences; that is, the relations of the world of +experience to our individual aims might be brought into complete systems +without working out in principle the system of independent experience. +We might have a science of engineering without acknowledging an +independent science of theoretical physics besides it. To be sure, such +a science of engineering would finally develop itself into a system +which would contain very much that might just as well be called +theoretical physics; yet all would be held together by the point of view +of the engineer, and that part of theoretical physics which the engineer +applies might just as well be considered as depracticalized engineering. +If this logical self-dependence of the practical science holds true even +for such technological disciplines, it is still more evident that it +would cripple the meaning and independent character of jurisprudence and +social science, or of pedagogy and theology, to treat them simply as +applied sciences, that is, as applications of theoretical science.</p> + +<p>This point of view determines, also, of course, the classification of +the Practical Sciences. If they were really merely applied sciences it +would be most natural to group them according to the classification of +the theoretical sciences which are to be applied. We should then have +applied physical sciences, applied psychological sciences, applied +historical sciences, and applied normative sciences. Yet even from the +standpoint of practice, we should come at once into difficulties, and +indeed much of the superficiality of practical sciences to-day results +from the hasty tendency to consider them as applied sciences only, and +thus to be determined by the points of view of the theoretical +discipline which is to be applied. Then, for instance, pedagogy becomes +simply applied psychology, and the psychological point of view is +substituted for the educational one. Pedagogy then becomes simply a +selection of those chapters in psychology which deal with the mental +functions of the child. Yet as soon as we really take the teachers' +point of view, we understand at once that it is utterly artificial to +substitute the categories of the psychologist for those of immediate +practical will-relations and to consider the child in the class-room as +a causal system of <ins title="'pyscho' in the +original">psycho</ins>-physical elements instead of a personality which +is teleologically to be interpreted, and whose aims are not to be +connected with causal effects but with over-individual attitudes. In +this way the historical relation and the normative relation have to play +at least as important a rôle in the pedagogical system as the +psycho-physical relation, and we might quite as well call education +applied history and applied ethics.</p> + +<p>Almost every practical science can be shown in this way to apply a +number of theoretical sciences; it synthesizes them to a new unity. But +better, we ought to say, that it is a unity in itself from the start, +and that it only overlaps with a number of theoretical sciences. If we +want to classify the practical sciences, we have thus only the one +logical principle at our disposal: we must classify them in accordance +with the group of human individual aims which control those different +disciplines. If all practical sciences deal with the relation of the +world of experience to our individual practical ends, the classes of +those ends are the classes of our practical sciences, whatever +combinations of applied theoretical sciences may enter into the group. +Of course a special classification of these aims must remain somewhat +arbitrary; yet it may seem most natural to separate three large +divisions. We called them the Utilitarian Sciences, the Sciences of +Social Regulation, and the Sciences of Social Culture. Utilitarian we +may call those sciences in which our practical aim refers to the world +of things; it may be the technical mastery of nature or the treatment of +the body, or the production, distribution, and consumption of the means +of support. The second division contains everything in which our aim +does not refer to the thing, but to the other subjects; here naturally +belong the sciences which deal with the political, legal, and social +purposes. And finally the sciences of culture refer to those aims in +which not the individual relations to things or to other subjects are in +the foreground, but the purposes of the teleological development of the +subject himself; education, art, and religion here find their place. It +is, of course, evident that the material of these sciences frequently +allows the emphasis of different aspects. For instance, education, which +aims primarily at self-development, might quite well be considered also +from the point of view of social regulation; and still more naturally +could the utilitarian sciences of the economic distribution of the means +of support be considered from this point of view. Yet a classification +of sciences nowhere suggests by its boundary lines that there are no +relations and connections between the different parts; on the contrary, +it is just the manifoldness of these given connections which makes it so +desirable to become conscious of the principles involved, and thus to +emphasize logical demarcation lines, which of course must be obliterated +as soon as any material is to be treated from every possible point of +view. It may thus well be that, for instance, a certain industrial +problem could be treated in the Normative Sciences from the point of +view of ethics; in the Historical Sciences, from the point of view of +the history of economic institutions; in the Physical Sciences, from the +point of view of physics or chemistry; in the Mental Sciences, from the +point of view of sociology; in the Utilitarian Sciences, from the point +of view of medicine or of engineering, or of commerce and +transportation; and finally in the Regulative Sciences, from the point +of view of political administration, or in the Social Sciences, from the +standpoint of the urban community, and so on. The more complex the +relations are, the more necessary is it to make clean distinctions +between the different logical purposes with which the scientific +inquiries start. Practical life may demand a combination of historical, +sociological, psychological, economical, social, and ethical +considerations; but not one of these sciences can contribute its best if +the consciousness of these differences is lost and the deliberate +combination is replaced by a vague mixture of the problems.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">6. <i>The Subdivisions</i></p> + +<p>We have now before us the ground-plan of the scheme, the four +theoretical divisions, and the three practical divisions; every +additional comment on the classification must be of secondary +importance, as it has to refer to the smaller subdivisions, which cannot +change the principles of the plan, and which have not seldom, indeed, +been a result of practical considerations. If, for instance, our +Division of Cultural Sciences shows in the final plan merely the +departments of Education and of Religion, while the originally planned +Department of Art is left out, there was no logical reason for it, but +merely the practical ground that it seemed difficult to bring such a +practical art section to a desirable scientific level; we confine art, +therefore, to the normative æsthetic and historical points of view. Or, +to choose another illustration, if it happened that the normative +sciences were finally organized without a section for the philosophy of +law, this resulted from the fact that the American jurists, in contrast +with their Continental European colleagues, showed a general lack of +appreciation for such a section. A few sections had to be left out even +for the chance reason that the leading speakers were obliged to withdraw +at a time when it was too late to ask substitutes to work up addresses. +And almost everywhere there had to be something arbitrary in the +limitation of the special sections. Though Otology and Laryngology were +brought together into one section, they might just as well have been +placed in two; and Rhinology, which was left out, might have been added +as a third in that company. As to this subtler ramification, the plan +has been changed several times during the period of the practical +preparation of the plan, and much is the result of adjustment to +questions of personalities. No one claims, thus, any special logical +value for the final formulation of the sectional details, for which our +chief aim was not to go beyond eight times sixteen, that is 128, +sections, inasmuch as it was planned to have the meetings at eight +different time-periods in sixteen different halls. If we had fulfilled +all the wishes which were expressed by specialists, the number would +have been quickly doubled.</p> + +<p>Yet a few remarks may be devoted to the branching off within the +seven divisions, as a short discussion of some of these details may +throw additional light on the general principles of the whole plan. If +we thus begin with the Normative Sciences, we stand at once before one +feature of the plan which has been in an especially high degree a matter +of both approval and criticism: the fact that Mathematics is grouped +with Philosophy. The Division was to contain, as we have seen, the +systems of logically connected will-acts of the over-individual subject. +That Ethics or Logic or Æsthetics or Philosophy of Religion deals with +such over-individual attitudes cannot be doubted; but have we a right to +coördinate the mathematical sciences with these philosophical sciences? +Has Mathematics not a more natural place among the physical sciences +coördinated with and introductory to Mechanics, Physics, and Astronomy? +The mathematicians themselves would often be inclined to accept without +hesitation this neighborhood of the physical sciences. They would say +that the mathematical objects are independent realities whose properties +we study like those of nature, whose relations we "observe," whose +existence we "discover," and in which we are interested because they +belong to the real world. All this is true, and yet the objects of the +mathematician are objects made by the logical will only, and thus +different from all phenomena into which sensation enters. The +mathematician, of course, does not reflect on the purely logical origin +of the objects which he studies, but the system of knowledge must give +to the study of the mathematical objects its place in the group where +the functions and products of the over-individual attitudes are +classified. The mathematical object is a free creation, and a creation +not only as to the combination of elements—that would be the case +with many laboratory substances of the chemist too—but a creation +as to the elements themselves, and the value of that creation, its +"mathematical interest," is to be judged by ideals of thought; that is, +by logical purposes. No doubt this logical purpose is its application in +the world of objects and the mathematical concepts must thus fit the +objective world so absolutely that mathematics can be conceived as a +description of the world after abstracting not only from the +will-relations, as physics does, but also from the content. Mathematics +would, then, be the phenomenalistic science of the form and order of the +world. In this way, mathematics has indeed a claim to places in both +divisions: among the physical sciences if we emphasize its applicability +to the world, and among the teleological sciences if we emphasize the +free creation of the objects by the logical will. But if we really go +back to epistemological principles, our system has to prefer the latter +emphasis; that is, we must coördinate mathematics with logic and not +with physics.</p> + +<p>As to the subdivision of philosophy, it is most essential for us to +point to the negative fact that of course psychology cannot have a place +in the philosophical department, as part of the Normative Division. +There is perhaps no science whose position in the system of knowledge +offers so many methodological difficulties as psychology. Historical +tradition of course links it with philosophy; throughout a great part of +its present endeavors it is, on the other hand, linked with physiology. +Thus we find it sometimes coördinated with logic and ethics, and +sometimes, especially in the classical positivistic systems, coördinated +with the sciences of the organic functions. We have seen why a really +logical treatment has to disregard those historical and practical +relations and has to separate the psychological sciences from the +philosophical and the biological sciences. Yet even this does not +complete the list of problems which must be settled, inasmuch as modern +thinkers have frequently insisted that psychology itself allows a +twofold aspect. We can have a psychology which describes and explains +the mental life by analyzing it into its elements and by connecting +these elements through causality. But there may be another psychology +which treats inner life in that immediate unity in which we experience +it and seeks to interpret it as the free function of personality. This +latter kind of psychology has been called voluntaristic psychology as +against the phenomenalistic psychology which seeks description and +explanation. Such voluntaristic psychology would clearly belong again to +a different division. It would be a theory of individual life as a +function of will, and would thus be introductory to the historical +sciences and to the normative sciences too. Yet we left out this +teleological psychology from our programme, as such a science is as yet +a programme only. Wherever an effort is made to realize it, it becomes +an odd mixture of an inconsistent phenomenalistic psychology on the one +side, and philosophy of history, logic, ethics, and æsthetics on the +other side. The only science which really has a right to call itself +psychology is the one which seeks to describe and to explain inner life +and treats it therefore as a system of psychical objects, that is, as +contents of consciousness, that is, as phenomena. Psychology belongs, +then, in the general division of psychical sciences as over against +physical sciences, and both deal with objects as over against philosophy +and history, which deal with subjects of will.</p> + +<p>The subdivision of the Historical Sciences offers no methodological +difficulty as soon as those epistemological arguments are acknowledged +by which we sharply distinguish history from the Physical and Mental +Sciences. If history is a system of will-relations which is in +teleological connection with the will-demands that surround us, then +political history loses its predominant rôle, and the history of law and +of literature, of language and of economy, of art and religion, become +coördinated with political development, while the mere anthropological +aspect of man is relegated to the physical sciences. The more complete +original scheme was here again finally condensed for practical reasons; +for instance, the planned departments on the History of Education, on +the History of Science, and on the History of Philosophy were +sacrificed, and the department of Economic History was joined to that of +Political History. In the same way we felt obliged to omit in the end +many important sections in the departments; we had, for instance, in the +History of Language at first a section on Slavic Languages; yet the +number of scholars interested was too small to justify its existence +beside a section on Slavic Literature. Also the History of Music was +omitted from the History of Art; and the History of Law was planned at +first with a fuller ramification.</p> + +<p>The division of Physical Sciences naturally suggested that kind of +subdivision which the positivistic classification presents as a complete +system of sciences. Considering physics and chemistry as the two +fundamental sciences of general laws, we turn first to astronomy, then +from the science of the whole universe to the one planet, to the +sciences of the earth; thence to the living organisms on the earth; and +from biology to the still narrower circle of anthropology. The special +classification of physics offers a certain difficulty. To divide it in +text-book fashion into sound, light, electricity, etc., seems hardly in +harmony with the effort to seek logical principles in the other parts of +the classification. The three groups which we finally formed, Physics of +Matter, Physics of Ether, and Physics of Electron, may appear somewhat +too much influenced by the latest theories of to-day, yet it seemed +preferable to other principles. In the biological department, criticism +seems justified in view of the fact that we constructed a special +section, Human Anatomy. A strictly logical scheme might have +acknowledged that human anatomy is to-day not a separate science, and +that it has resolved itself into comparative anatomy. Sections of +Invertebrate and Vertebrate Anatomy might have been more satisfactory. +The final arrangement was a concession to the practical interests of the +physicians, who have naturally to emphasize the anatomy of the human +organism.</p> + +<p>In the division of Mental Sciences, we have the Department of +Sociology. We were, of course, aware that the sociological interest +includes not only the psychological, but also the physiological life of +society, and that it thus has relations to the physical sciences too. +Yet these relations are logically not more fundamental than those of the +individual mental life to the functions of the individual organism. Much +of the physiological side was further to be handed over to the +Department of Anthropology, and thus we felt justified in grouping +sociology with psychology under the Mental Sciences, as the psychology +of the social organism. Here, too, a larger number of sections was +intended and only the two most essential ones, Social Structure and +Social Psychology, were finally admitted.</p> + +<p>The ramifications of the practical sciences had to follow the general +principle that their character is determined by purpose and not by +material. The difficulty was here merely in the extreme specialization +of the practical disciplines, which suggests on the whole the forming of +very small units, while our plan was to provide for fifty practical +sections only. It seemed, therefore, incongruous to have the whole of +Internal Medicine or the whole of Private Law condensed into one +section. Yet as the purpose of the scheme was a theoretical and not a +practical one, even where the theory of practical sciences was in +question, we felt justified in constructing coördinated sections, even +where the practical importance was very unequal. On the other hand, some +glaring defects just here are due merely to chance circumstances. That +there were, for instance, no sections on Criminal Law or Ecclesiastical +Law in the Department of Jurisprudence, nor on Legal Procedure, resulted +from the unfortunate accident that in these cases the speakers who were +to come from Europe were withheld by illness or public duties. The +absence of the Department of Art in the Division of Social Culture, and +thus of the Sections on the theory and practice of the different arts, +has been explained before. It is evident that also in the Economical +Department the practical development has interfered with the original +symmetrical arrangement of the sections. This is not true of the +Religious Department, whose six sections express the tendencies of the +original plan. The frequently expressed criticism that the different +religions and their denominations ought to have found place there shows +a misconception of our purpose; a Parliament of Religion did not belong +to this plan.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">III</p> + +<p class="center">THE RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS</p> + +<p class="p2">The programme of the Congress, as outlined in the previous +pages, was in this case somewhat more than a mere programme. It not only +invited to do a piece of work, but it sought to contribute to the work +itself. Yet the chief work had to be done by others, and their part +needed careful preparation. Yet very little of the preparation showed +itself to the eyes of the larger public, and few were fully aware what a +complex organization was growing up and how many persons of mark were +coöperating.</p> + +<p>It was essential to find for every address the best man. Specialists +only could suggest to the committees where to find him. It has been told +before how our invitations were brought to the foreigners first till the +desired number of foreign participants was secured, and how the +Americans followed. As could not be otherwise expected, interferences of +all kinds disturbed the ideal configuration of the first list of +acceptances; substitutes had sometimes to be relied on; and yet, when on +the nineteenth of September President Francis welcomed the Congress of +Arts and Science in the gigantic Festival Hall of the St. Louis +Exposition, the Committee knew that almost four hundred speakers had +completed their manuscripts, and that it was a galaxy which far +surpassed in importance that of any previous international congress. And +the list of those who stood for the success of the work was not confined +to the official speakers. Each Department and each Section had its own +honorary President, who was also chosen by the consent of leading +specialists and whose introductory remarks were to give additional +importance to the gathering. At their side stood the hundred and thirty +Secretaries, carefully chosen from among the productive scholars of the +younger generation. And a large number of informal, yet officially +invited contributors, had announced valuable discussions and addresses +for almost every Section. Invitations to membership finally had been +sent to the universities and scholarly societies of all countries.</p> + +<p>That the turmoil of a world's fair is out of harmony with the +scholar's longing for repose and quietude is a natural presupposition, +which has not been disproved by the experience of St. Louis. When +Professor Newcomb, our President, spoke to the opening assembly on the +dignity of scholarship, the scholar's peaceful address was accentuated +by the thunder of the cannons with which Boer and British forces were +playing at war near by. The roaring of the Pike overpowered many a quiet +session, and the patient speaker had not seldom to fight heroically with +a brass band on the next lawn. The trains were delayed, trunks were +mixed up, and the sultry St. Louis weather stirred much secret longing +for the seashore and the mountains, which most had to leave too early +for that pilgrimage to the Mississippi Valley. Yet all this could have +been easily foreseen, and every one knew that all this would soon be +forgotten. These slight discomforts were many times made up for by the +overwhelming beauty of that ivory city in which the civilization of the +world was focused by the united energy of the nations, and it seemed +well worth while to cross the ocean for the delight of that enchantment +which came with every evening's myriad illumination. And every day +brought interesting festivities. No one will forget the receptions of +the foreign commissioners, or the charming hospitality of the leading +citizens of St. Louis, or the enthusiastic banquet which brought one +thousand speakers and presidents and official members of the Congress +together as guests of the master mind of the Exposition, President +Francis.</p> + +<p>While the discomfort of external shortcomings was thus easily +balanced, it is more doubtful whether the internal shortcomings of the +work can be considered as fully compensated for. It would be impossible +to overlook these defects in the realization of our plans, even if it +may be acknowledged that they were unavoidable under the given +conditions. The principal difficulty has been that many speakers have +not really treated the topic for the discussion of which they were +invited. This deviation from the plan took various forms. There was in +some cases a fundamental attitude taken which did not harmonize with +those logical principles which had led to the classification; for +instance, we had sharply separated, for reasons fully stated above, the +Division of History from the Division of Mental Sciences, including +sociology; yet some papers for the Division of History clearly indicated +sympathy with the traditional positivistic view, according to which +history becomes simply a part of sociology. And similar variations of +the general plan occur in almost every division. But there cannot be any +objection to this secondary variety as long as the whole framework gives +the primary uniformity. Certainly no one of the contributors is to be +blamed for it; no one was pledged to the philosophy of the general plan, +and probably few would have agreed if any one had had the idea of +demanding from every contributor an identical background of general +convictions. Such monotony would have been even harmful, as the work +would have become inexpressive of the richness of tendencies in the +scholarly life of our time. This was not an occasion where educated +clerks were to work up in a secondhand way a report whose general trend +was determined beforehand; the work demanded original thinkers, with +whom every word grows out of a rich individual view of the totality. If +every paper had been meant merely as a detailed amplification of the +logical principles on which the whole plan was based, it would have been +wiser to set young Doctor candidates to work, who might have elaborated +the hint of the general scheme. To invite the leaders of knowledge meant +to give them complete freedom and to confine the demands of the plan to +a most general direction.</p> + +<p>The same freedom, which every one was to have as to the general +standpoint, was intended also for all with regard to the arrangement and +limitation of the topic. All the sectional addresses were supposed to +deal either with relations or with fundamental problems of to-day. It +would have been absurd to demand that in every case the totality of +relations or of problems should be covered or even touched. The result +would have become perfunctory and insignificant. No one intended to +produce a cyclopedia. It was essential everywhere to select that which +was most characteristic of the tendencies of the age and most promising +for the science of the twentieth century. Those problems were to be +emphasized whose solution is most demanded for the immediate progress of +knowledge, and those relations had to be selected through which new +connections, new synthetic thoughts prepare themselves to-day. That this +selection had to be left to the speaker was a matter of course.</p> + +<p>Yet it may be said that in all these directions, with reference to +the general standpoint and with reference to problems and relations, the +Organizing Committee had somewhat prepared the choice through the +selection of the speakers themselves. As the standpoints of the leading +speakers were well known, it was not difficult to invite as far as +possible for every place a scholar whose general views would be least +out of harmony with the principles of the plan. For instance, when we +had the task before us of selecting the divisional speakers for the +Normative and for the Mental Sciences, it was only natural to invite for +the first a philosopher of idealistic type and for the latter a +philosopher of positivistic stamp, inasmuch as the whole scheme gave to +the mental sciences the same place which they would have had in a +positivistic scheme, while the normative sciences would have lost the +meaning which they had in our plan if a positivist had simply +psychologized them. In the same way we gave preference as far as +possible, for the addresses on relations, to those scholars whose +previous work was concerned with new synthetic movements, and as +speakers on problems those were invited who were in any case engaged in +the solution of those problems which seemed central in the present state +of science. Thus it was that on the whole the expectation was justified +that the most characteristic relations and the most characteristic +problems would be selected if every invited speaker spoke essentially on +those relations and on those problems with which his own special work +was engaged.</p> + +<p>Yet there is no doubt that this expectation was sometimes fulfilled +beyond our anticipation, in an amount of specialization which was no +longer entirely in harmony with the general character of the +undertaking. The general problem has become sometimes only the +starting-point or almost the pretext for speaking on some relation or +problem so detailed that it can hardly stand as a representative symbol +of the whole movement in that sectional field. Especially in the +practical sciences more room was sometimes taken for particular hobbies +and chance aspects than in the eyes of the originators the occasion may +have called for. Yet on the whole this was the exception. The +overwhelming majority of the addresses fulfilled nobly the high hopes of +the Boards, and even in those exceptional cases where the speaker went +his own way, it was usually such an original and stimulating expression +of a strong personality that no one would care to miss this tone in the +symphony of science.</p> + +<p>Even now of course, though the Congress days have passed, and only +typewritten manuscripts are left from all those September meetings, it +would be easy to provide, by editorial efforts, for a greater uniformity +and a smoother harmonization. Most of the authors would have been quite +willing to retouch their addresses in the interest of greater objective +uniformity and to accept the hint of an editorial committee in +elaborating more fully some points and in condensing or eliminating +others. Much was written in the desire to bring a certain thought for +discussion before such an eminent audience, while the speaker would be +ready to substitute other features of the subject for the permanent form +of the printed volume. Yet such editorial supervision and transformation +would be not only immodest but dangerous. We might risk gaining some +external uniformity, but only to lose much of the freshness and +immediacy and brilliancy of the first presentation. And who would dare +to play the critical judge when the international contributors are the +leaders of thought? There was therefore not the slightest effort made to +suggest revision of the manuscripts, for which the whole responsibility +must thus fall to the particular author. The reduction to a uniform +language seemed, on the other hand, most natural, and those who had +delivered their addresses in French, German, or Italian themselves +welcomed the idea that their papers should be translated into English by +competent specialists. The short bibliographies, selected mostly through +the chairman of the departments, and the very full index with references +may add to the general usefulness of the eight volumes in which the work +is to be presented.</p> + +<p>But the significance of the Congress of Arts and Science ought not to +be measured and valued only by reference to this printed result. Its +less visible side-effects seem in no way less important for scholarship, +and they are fourfold. There was, first, the personal contact between +the scholarly public and the leaders of thought; there was, secondly, +the first academic alliance between the United States and Europe; there +was, thirdly, the first demonstration of a world congress crystallized +about one problem; there was, fourthly, the unique accentuation of the +thought of unity in all human science; and each of these four movements +will be continued and reinforced by the publication of these +proceedings.</p> + +<p>The first of these four features, the contact of the scholarly public +with the best thinkers of our time, had, to be sure, its limitations. It +was not sought to create a really popular congress. Neither the level of +the addresses, nor the size of the halls, nor the number of invitations +sent out, nor the general conditions of a world's fair at which the +expense of living is high and the distractions thousandfold, favored the +attendance of crowds. It was planned from the first that on the whole +scholars and specialists should attend and that the army should be made +up essentially of officers. If in an astronomical section perhaps thirty +men were present, among whom practically every one was among the best +known directors of observatories or professors of mathematics, +astronomy, or physics, from all countries of the globe, much more was +gained than if three thousand had been in the audience, brought together +by an interest of curiosity in moon and stars. For the most part there +must have been between a hundred and two hundred in each of the 128 +sectional meetings, and that was more than the organizers expected. This +direct influence on the interested public is now to be expanded a +thousandfold by the mission work of these volumes. The concentration of +these hundreds of addresses into a few days made it in any case +impossible to listen to more than to a small fraction; these volumes +will bring at last all speakers to coördinated effectiveness; and while +one hall suffered from bad acoustics, another from bad ventilation, and +a third from the passing of the intermural trains, here at least is an +audience in which nothing will disturb the sensitive nerves of the +willing follower.</p> + +<p>But much more emphasis is due to the second feature. The Congress was +an epoch-making event for the international world of scholarship from +the fact that it was the first great undertaking in which the Old and +the New Worlds stood on equal levels and in which Europe really became +acquainted with the scientific life of these United States. The contact +of scholarship between America and Europe has, indeed, grown in +importance through many decades. Many American students had studied in +European and especially in German universities and had come back to fill +the professorial chairs of the leading academic institutions. The spirit +of the Graduate School and the work towards the Doctor's degree, yes, +the whole productive scholarship of recent decades had been influenced +by European ideals, and the results were no longer ignored at the seats +of learning throughout the whole world. European scholars had here and +there come as visiting lecturers or as assimilated instructors, and a +few American scholars belonged to the leading European Academies. Yet, +whoever knew the real development of American post-graduate university +life, the rapid advance of genuine American scholarship, the +incomparable progress of the scientific institutions of the New World, +of their libraries and laboratories, museums and associations, was well +aware that Europe had hardly noticed and certainly not fully understood +the gigantic strides of the country which seemed a rival only on +commercial and industrial ground. Europe was satisfied with the +traditional ideas of America's scientific standing which reflected the +situation of thirty years ago, and did not understand that the changes +of a few lustres mean in the New World more than under the firmer +traditions of Europe. American scientific literature was still +neglected; American universities treated in a condescending and +patronizing spirit and with hardly any awareness of the fundamental +differences in the institutions of the two sides. Those European +scholars who crossed the ocean did it with missionary, or perhaps with +less unselfish, intentions, and the Americans who attended European +congresses were mostly treated with the friendliness which the +self-satisfied teacher shows to a promising pupil. The time had really +come when the contrast between the real situation and the traditional +construction became a danger for the scientific life of the time. Both +sides had to suffer from it. The Americans felt that their serious and +important achievements did not come to their fullest effectiveness +through the insistent neglect of those who by the tradition of centuries +had become the habitual guardians of scientific thought. A kind of +feeling of dependency as it usually develops in weak colonies too often +depressed the conscientious scholarship on American soil as the result +of this undue condescension. Yet the greater harm was to the other side. +Once before Europe had had the experience of surprise when American +successes presented themselves where nothing of that kind was +anticipated in the Old World. It was in the field of economic life that +Europe looked down patronizingly on America's industrial efforts, and +yet before she was fully aware how the change resulted, suddenly the +warning signal of the "American danger" was heard everywhere. The +surprise in the intellectual field will not be less. The unpreparedness +was certainly the same. Of course, there cannot be any danger of rivalry +in the scientific field, inasmuch as science knows no competition but +only coöperation. And yet it cannot be without danger for European +science if it willfully neglects and recklessly ignores this eager +working of the modern America. For both sides a change in the situation +was thus not only desirable, but necessary; and to prepare this change, +to substitute knowledge for ignorance, nothing could have been more +effective than this Congress of Arts and Science.</p> + +<p>Even if we abstract from the not inconsiderable number of those +European scholars who followed naturally in the path of the invited +guests, and if we consider merely the function of these invited +participants, the importance of the procedure is evident. More than a +hundred leading scholars from all European countries came under +conditions where academic fellowship on an equal footing was a necessary +part of the work. There was not the slightest premium held out which +might have attracted them had not real inter<ins title="not hyphenated +in the original">-</ins>academic interest brought them over the ocean, +and no missionary spirit was appealed to, as everything was equally +divided between American and foreign contributors. It was a real feast +of international scholarship, in which the importance and the number of +foreigners stamped it as the first significant alliance of the spirit of +learning in the New and the Old Worlds. And it was essentially for this +purpose that the week of personal intermingling in St. Louis itself was +preceded and followed by happy weeks of visits to leading universities. +Almost every one of those one hundred European scholars visited Harvard +and Yale, Chicago and Johns Hopkins, Columbia and Pennsylvania, saw the +treasures of Washington and examined the exhibitions of American +scholarship in the World's Fair itself. The change of opinion, the +disappearance of prejudice, the growth of confidence, the personal +intercollegiate ties which resulted from all that, have been evident +since those days all over Europe. And it is not surprising that it is +just the most famous and most important of the visitors, famous and +important through their width and depth of view, whose expression of +appreciation and admiration for the new achievements has been +loudest.</p> + +<p>We insisted that the effectiveness of the Congress showed itself in +two other directions still: on the one side, there was at last a +congress with a unified programme, a congress which stood for a definite +thought, and which brought all its efforts to bear on the solution of +one problem. There seemed a far-reaching agreement of opinion that this +new principle of congress administration had successfully withstood the +test of practical realization. Mere conglomerations of unconnected +meetings with casual programmes and unrelated papers cannot claim any +longer to represent the only possible form of international gatherings +of scholars. More than that, their superfluous and disheartening +character will be felt in future more strongly than before. No congress +will appear fully justified whose printed proceedings do not show a real +plan in its programme. And the consciousness of this mission of the +Congress will certainly be again reinforced by the publication of these +volumes, inasmuch as it is evident that they represent a substantial +contribution to the knowledge of our time which would not have been made +without the special stimulating occasion of the Congress.</p> + +<p class="add4">And, finally, whether such a congress is held again or not, the +impulse of this one cannot be lost on account of the special end to +which all its efforts have been directed: the unity of scientific +knowledge. We had emphasized from the first that here was the centre of +our purposes in a time whose scientific specialization necessarily +involves a scattering of scholarly work and which yet in its deepest +meaning strives for a new synthesis, for a new unity, which is to give +to all this scattered labor a real dignity and significance; truly +nothing was more needed than an intense accentuation of the internal +harmony of all human knowledge. But for that it is not enough that the +masses feel instinctively the deep need of such unifying movements, nor +is it enough that the philosophers point with logical arguments towards +the new synthesis. The philosopher can only stand by and point the way; +the specialists themselves must go the way. And here at last they have +done so. Leaders of thought have interrupted their specialistic work and +have left their detailed inquiries to seek the fundamental conceptions +and methods and principles which bind all knowledge together, and thus +to work towards that unity from which all special work derives its +meaning. Whether or not their coöperation has produced anything which is +final is a question almost insignificant compared with the fundamental +fact that they coöperated at all for this ideal synthetic purpose. This +fact can never lose its influence on the scholarly effort of our age, +and will certainly find its strongest reinforcement in this unified +publication. It has fulfilled its noblest purpose if it adds strength to +the deepest movement of our time, the movement towards unity of meaning +in the scattered manifoldness of scientific endeavor with which the +twentieth century has opened.</p> + +<div class="figcenter p4"> + <a name="Newcomb"></a> <img src="images/i0160.jpg" + width="382" height="500" alt="Illustration: Simon Newcomb" + title="Simon Newcomb" /> +<p class="caption center"><i>Simon Newcomb, Ph.D., LL.D.</i></p> + +<p class="caption">Dr. Newcomb, the famous Astronomer, is conceded to be +the Dean of American scientists. His eminent services to the Government +of the United States, and his recognized position in foreign and +domestic scientific circles, made him peculiarly fitted to deliver the +introductory address, and to officiate as President of an International +Congress of the leading scientists of the world.</p> + +<p class="caption">He has been the recipient of honorary degrees from +six American and ten European Universities, and he is a member of almost +every important Academy of Science in Europe and America. He is an +officer of the Legion of Honour, and is the only native American besides +Benjamin Franklin who has been elected an Associate of the Institute de +France. From 1861 to 1897 he was Professor of Mathematics in the United +States Navy. He also lectured on Mathematics and Astronomy at Johns +Hopkins, and is now a Professor Emeritus in the Faculty of Arts of that +university. Dr. Newcomb is the author of numerous works on Astronomy and +other scientific subjects.</p> </div> + +<h3 class="p4 center"><a name="Intro"></a>PROCEEDINGS OF THE +CONGRESS</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="p2 center">INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><span class="smcap">delivered at the opening +exercises at festival hall by professor simon newcomb, president of the +congress</span></p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="p2 center">THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATOR</p> + +<p class="p2">As we look at the assemblage gathered in this hall, +comprising so many names of widest renown in every branch of +learning,—we might almost say in every field of human +endeavor,—the first inquiry suggested must be after the object of +our meeting. The answer is, that our purpose corresponds to the eminence +of the assemblage. We aim at nothing less than a survey of the realm of +knowledge, as comprehensive as is permitted by the limitations of time +and space. The organizers of our Congress have honored me with the +charge of presenting such preliminary view of its field as may make +clear the spirit of our undertaking.</p> + +<p>Certain tendencies characteristic of the science of our day clearly +suggest the direction of our thoughts most appropriate to the occasion. +Among the strongest of these is one toward laying greater stress on +questions of the beginning of things, and regarding a knowledge of the +laws of development of any object of study as necessary to the +understanding of its present form. It may be conceded that the principle +here involved is as applicable in the broad field before us as in a +special research into the properties of the minutest organism. It +therefore seems meet that we should begin by inquiring what agency has +brought about the remarkable development of science to which the world +of to-day bears witness. This view is recognized in the plan of our +proceedings, by providing for each great department of knowledge a +review of its progress during the century that has elapsed since the +great event commemorated by the scenes outside this hall. But such +reviews do not make up that general survey of science at large which is +necessary to the development of our theme, and which must include the +action of causes that had their origin long before our time. The +movement which culminated in making the nineteenth century ever +memorable in history is the outcome of a long series of causes, acting +through many centuries, which are worthy of especial attention on such +an occasion as this. In setting them forth we should avoid laying stress +on those visible manifestations which, striking the eye of every +beholder, are in no danger of being overlooked, and search rather for +those agencies whose activities underlie the whole visible scene, but +which are liable to be blotted out of sight by the very brilliancy of +the results to which they have given rise. It is easy to draw attention +to the wonderful qualities of the oak; but from that very fact, it may +be needful to point out that the real wonder lies concealed in the acorn +from which it grew.</p> + +<p>Our inquiry into the logical order of the causes which have made our +civilization what it is to-day will be facilitated by bringing to mind +certain elementary considerations—ideas so familiar that setting +them forth may seem like citing a body of truisms—and yet so +frequently overlooked, not only individually, but in their relation to +each other, that the conclusion to which they lead may be lost to sight. +One of these propositions is that psychical rather than material causes +are those which we should regard as fundamental in directing the +development of the social organism. The human intellect is the really +active agent in every branch of endeavor,—the <i>primum mobile</i> +of civilization,—and all those material manifestations to which +our attention is so often directed are to be regarded as secondary to +this first agency. If it be true that "in the world is nothing great but +man; in man is nothing great but mind," then should the keynote of our +discourse be the recognition of this first and greatest of powers.</p> + +<p>Another well-known fact is that those applications of the forces of +nature to the promotion of human welfare which have made our age what it +is, are of such comparatively recent origin that we need go back only a +single century to antedate their most important features, and scarcely +more than four centuries to find their beginning. It follows that the +subject of our inquiry should be the commencement, not many centuries +ago, of a certain new form of intellectual activity.</p> + +<p>Having gained this point of view, our next inquiry will be into the +nature of that activity, and its relation to the stages of progress +which preceded and followed its beginning. The superficial observer, who +sees the oak but forgets the acorn, might tell us that the special +qualities which have brought out such great results are expert +scientific knowledge and rare ingenuity, directed to the application of +the powers of steam and electricity. From this point of view the great +inventors and the great captains of industry were the first agents in +bringing about the modern era. But the more careful inquirer will see +that the work of these men was possible only through a knowledge of the +laws of nature, which had been gained by men whose work took precedence +of theirs in logical order, and that success in invention has been +measured by completeness in such knowledge. While giving all due honor +to the great inventors, let us remember that the first place is that of +the great investigators, whose forceful intellects opened the way to +secrets previously hidden from men. Let it be an honor and not a +reproach to these men, that they were not actuated by the love of gain, +and did not keep utilitarian ends in view in the pursuit of their +researches. If it seems that in neglecting such ends they were leaving +undone the most important part of their work, let us remember that +nature turns a forbidding face to those who pay her court with the hope +of gain, and is responsive only to those suitors whose love for her is +pure and undefiled. Not only is the special genius required in the +investigator not that generally best adapted to applying the discoveries +which he makes, but the result of his having sordid ends in view would +be to narrow the field of his efforts, and exercise a depressing effect +upon his activities. The true man of science has no such expression in +his vocabulary as "useful knowledge." His domain is as wide as nature +itself, and he best fulfills his mission when he leaves to others the +task of applying the knowledge he gives to the world.</p> + +<p>We have here the explanation of the well-known fact that the +functions of the investigator of the laws of nature, and of the inventor +who applies these laws to utilitarian purposes, are rarely united in the +same person. If the one conspicuous exception which the past century +presents to this rule is not unique, we should probably have to go back +to Watt to find another.</p> + +<p>From this viewpoint it is clear that the primary agent in the +movement which has elevated man to the masterful position he now +occupies, is the scientific investigator. He it is whose work has +deprived plague and pestilence of their terrors, alleviated human +suffering, girdled the earth with the electric wire, bound the continent +with the iron way, and made neighbors of the most distant nations. As +the first agent which has made possible this meeting of his +representatives, let his evolution be this day our worthy theme. As we +follow the evolution of an organism by studying the stages of its +growth, so we have to show how the work of the scientific investigator +is related to the ineffectual efforts of his predecessors.</p> + +<p>In our time we think of the process of development in nature as one +going continuously forward through the combination of the opposite +processes of evolution and dissolution. The tendency of our thought has +been in the direction of banishing cataclysms to the theological limbo, +and viewing nature as a sleepless plodder, endowed with infinite +patience, waiting through long ages for results. I do not contest the +truth of the principle of continuity on which this view is based. But it +fails to make known to us the whole truth. The building of a ship from +the time that her keel is laid until she is making her way across the +ocean is a slow and gradual process; yet there is a cataclysmic epoch +opening up a new era in her history. It is the moment when, after lying +for months or years a dead, inert, immovable mass, she is suddenly +endowed with the power of motion, and, as if imbued with life, glides +into the stream, eager to begin the career for which she was +designed.</p> + +<p>I think it is thus in the development of humanity. Long ages may pass +during which a race, to all external observation, appears to be making +no real progress. Additions may be made to learning, and the records of +history may constantly grow, but there is nothing in its sphere of +thought, or in the features of its life, that can be called essentially +new. Yet, nature may have been all along slowly working in a way which +evades our scrutiny until the result of her operations suddenly appears +in a new and revolutionary movement, carrying the race to a higher plane +of civilization.</p> + +<p>It is not difficult to point out such epochs in human progress. The +greatest of all, because it was the first, is one of which we find no +record either in written or geological history. It was the epoch when +our progenitors first took conscious thought of the morrow, first used +the crude weapons which nature had placed within their reach to kill +their prey, first built a fire to warm their bodies and cook their food. +I love to fancy that there was some one first man, the Adam of +evolution, who did all this, and who used the power thus acquired to +show his fellows how they might profit by his example. When the members +of the tribe or community which he gathered around him began to conceive +of life as a whole,—to include yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow in +the same mental grasp—to think how they might apply the gifts of +nature to their own uses,—a movement was begun which should +ultimately lead to civilization.</p> + +<p>Long indeed must have been the ages required for the development of +this rudest primitive community into the civilization revealed to us by +the most ancient tablets of Egypt and Assyria. After spoken language was +developed, and after the rude representation of ideas by visible marks +drawn to resemble them had long been practiced, some Cadmus must have +invented an alphabet. When the use of written language was thus +introduced, the word of command ceased to be confined to the range of +the human voice, and it became possible for master minds to extend their +influence as far as a written message could be carried. Then were +communities gathered into provinces; provinces into kingdoms; kingdoms +into the great empires of antiquity. Then arose a stage of civilization +which we find pictured in the most ancient records,—a stage in +which men were governed by laws that were perhaps as wisely adapted to +their conditions as our laws are to ours,—in which the phenomena +of nature were rudely observed, and striking occurrences in the earth or +in the heavens recorded in the annals of the nation.</p> + +<p>Vast was the progress of knowledge during the interval between these +empires and the century in which modern science began. Yet, if I am +right in making a distinction between the slow and regular steps of +progress, each growing naturally out of that which preceded it, and the +entrance of the mind at some fairly definite epoch into an entirely new +sphere of activity, it would appear that there was only one such epoch +during the entire interval. This was when abstract geometrical reasoning +commenced, and astronomical observations aiming at precision were +recorded, compared, and discussed. Closely associated with it must have +been the construction of the forms of logic. The radical difference +between the demonstration of a theorem of geometry and the reasoning of +every-day life which the masses of men must have practiced from the +beginning, and which few even to-day ever get beyond, is so evident at a +glance that I need not dwell upon it. The principal feature of this +advance is that, by one of those antinomies of the human intellect of +which examples are not wanting even in our own time, the development of +abstract ideas preceded the concrete knowledge of natural phenomena. +When we reflect that in the geometry of Euclid the science of space was +brought to such logical perfection that even to-day its teachers are not +agreed as to the practicability of any great improvement upon it, we +cannot avoid the feeling that a very slight change in the direction of +the intellectual activity of the Greeks would have led to the beginning +of natural science. But it would seem that the very purity and +perfection which was aimed at in their system of geometry stood in the +way of any extension or application of its methods and spirit to the +field of nature. One example of this is worthy of attention. In modern +teaching the idea of magnitude as generated by motion is freely +introduced. A line is described by a moving point; a plane by a moving +line; a solid by a moving plane. It may, at first sight, seem singular +that this conception finds no place in the Euclidian system. But we may +regard the omission as a mark of logical purity and rigor. Had the real +or supposed advantages of introducing motion into geometrical +conceptions been suggested to Euclid, we may suppose him to have replied +that the theorems of space are independent of time; that the idea of +motion necessarily implies time, and that, in consequence, to avail +ourselves of it would be to introduce an extraneous element into +geometry.</p> + +<p>It is quite possible that the contempt of the ancient philosophers +for the practical application of their science, which has continued in +some form to our own time, and which is not altogether unwholesome, was +a powerful factor in the same direction. The result was that, in keeping +geometry pure from ideas which did not belong to it, it failed to form +what might otherwise have been the basis of physical science. Its +founders missed the discovery that methods similar to those of geometric +demonstration could be extended into other and wider fields than that of +space. Thus not only the development of applied geometry, but the +reduction of other conceptions to a rigorous mathematical form was +indefinitely postponed.</p> + +<p>Astronomy is necessarily a science of observation pure and simple, in +which experiment can have no place except as an auxiliary. The vague +accounts of striking celestial phenomena handed down by the priests and +astrologers of antiquity were followed in the time of the Greeks by +observations having, in form at least, a rude approach to precision, +though nothing like the degree of precision that the astronomer of +to-day would reach with the naked eye, aided by such instruments as he +could fashion from the tools at the command of the ancients.</p> + +<p>The rude observations commenced by the Babylonians were continued +with gradually improving instruments,—first by the Greeks and +afterward by the Arabs,—but the results failed to afford any +insight into the true relation of the earth to the heavens. What was +most remarkable in this failure is that, to take a first step forward +which would have led on to success, no more was necessary than a course +of abstract thinking vastly easier than that required for working out +the problems of geometry. That space is infinite is an unexpressed +axiom, tacitly assumed by Euclid and his successors. Combining this with +the most elementary consideration of the properties of the triangle, it +would be seen that a body of any given size could be placed at such a +distance in space as to appear to us like a point. Hence a body as large +as our earth, which was known to be a globe from the time that the +ancient Phœnicians navigated the Mediterranean, if placed in the +heavens at a sufficient distance, would look like a star. The obvious +conclusion that the stars might be bodies like our globe, shining either +by their own light or by that of the sun, would have been a first step +to the understanding of the true system of the world.</p> + +<p>There is historic evidence that this deduction did not wholly escape +the Greek thinkers. It is true that the critical student will assign +little weight to the current belief that the vague theory of +Pythagoras—that fire was at the centre of all things—implies +a conception of the heliocentric theory of the solar system. But the +testimony of Archimedes, confused though it is in form, leaves no +serious doubt that Aristarchus of Samos not only propounded the view +that the earth revolves both on its own axis and around the sun, but +that he correctly removed the great stumbling-block in the way of this +theory by adding that the distance of the fixed stars was infinitely +greater than the dimensions of the earth's orbit. Even the world of +philosophy was not yet ready for this conception, and, so far from +seeing the reasonableness of the explanation, we find Ptolemy arguing +against the rotation of the earth on grounds which careful observations +of the phenomena around him would have shown to be ill-founded.</p> + +<p>Physical science, if we can apply that term to an uncoördinated body +of facts, was successfully cultivated from the earliest times. Something +must have been known of the properties of metals, and the art of +extracting them from their ores must have been practiced, from the time +that coins and medals were first stamped. The properties of the most +common compounds were discovered by alchemists in their vain search for +the philosopher's stone, but no actual progress worthy of the name +rewarded the practitioners of the black art.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the first approach to a correct method was that of +Archimedes, who by much thinking worked out the law of the lever, +reached the conception of the centre of gravity, and demonstrated the +first principles of hydrostatics. It is remarkable that he did not +extend his researches into the phenomena of motion, whether spontaneous +or produced by force. The stationary condition of the human intellect is +most strikingly illustrated by the fact that not until the time of +Leonardo was any substantial advance made on his discovery. To sum up in +one sentence the most characteristic feature of ancient and medieval +science, we see a notable contrast between the precision of thought +implied in the construction and demonstration of geometrical theorems +and the vague indefinite character of the ideas of natural phenomena +generally, a contrast which did not disappear until the foundations of +modern science began to be laid.</p> + +<p>We should miss the most essential point of the difference between +medieval and modern learning if we looked upon it as mainly a difference +either in the precision or the amount of knowledge. The development of +both of these qualities would, under any circumstances, have been slow +and gradual, but sure. We can hardly suppose that any one generation, or +even any one century, would have seen the complete substitution of exact +for inexact ideas. Slowness of growth is as inevitable in the case of +knowledge as in that of a growing organism. The most essential point of +difference is one of those seemingly slight ones, the importance of +which we are too apt to overlook. It was like the drop of blood in the +wrong place, which some one has told us makes all the difference between +a philosopher and a maniac. It was all the difference between a living +tree and a dead one, between an inert mass and a growing organism. The +transition of knowledge from the dead to the living form must, in any +complete review of the subject, be looked upon as the really great event +of modern times. Before this event the intellect was bound down by a +scholasticism which regarded knowledge as a rounded whole, the parts of +which were written in books and carried in the minds of learned men. The +student was taught from the beginning of his work to look upon authority +as the foundation of his beliefs. The older the authority the greater +the weight it carried. So effective was this teaching that it seems +never to have occurred to individual men that they had all the +opportunities ever enjoyed by Aristotle of discovering truth, with the +added advantage of all his knowledge to begin with. Advanced as was the +development of formal logic, that practical logic was wanting which +could see that the last of a series of authorities, every one of which +rested on those which preceded it, could never form a surer foundation +for any doctrine than that supplied by its original propounder.</p> + +<p>The result of this view of knowledge was that, although during the +fifteen centuries following the death of the geometer of Syracuse great +universities were founded at which generations of professors expounded +all the learning of their time, neither professor nor student ever +suspected what latent possibilities of good were concealed in the most +familiar operations of nature. Every one felt the wind blow, saw water +boil, and heard the thunder crash, but never thought of investigating +the forces here at play. Up to the middle of the fifteenth century the +most acute observer could scarcely have seen the dawn of a new era.</p> + +<p>In view of this state of things, it must be regarded as one of the +most remarkable facts in evolutionary history that four or five men, +whose mental constitution was either typical of the new order of things +or who were powerful agents in bringing it about, were all born during +the fifteenth century, four of them at least at so nearly the same time +as to be contemporaries.</p> + +<p>Leonardo da Vinci, whose artistic genius has charmed succeeding +generations, was also the first practical engineer of his time, and the +first man after Archimedes to make a substantial advance in developing +the laws of motion. That the world was not prepared to make use of his +scientific discoveries does not detract from the significance which must +attach to the period of his birth.</p> + +<p>Shortly after him was born the great navigator whose bold spirit was +to make known a new world, thus giving to commercial enterprise that +impetus which was so powerful an agent in bringing about a revolution in +the thoughts of men.</p> + +<p>The birth of Columbus was soon followed by that of Copernicus, the +first after Aristarchus to demonstrate the true system of the world. In +him more than in any of his contemporaries do we see the struggle +between the old forms of thought and the new. It seems almost pathetic +and is certainly most suggestive of the general view of knowledge taken +at that time that, instead of claiming credit for bringing to light +great truths before unknown, he made a labored attempt to show that, +after all, there was nothing really new in his system, which he claimed +to date from Pythagoras and Philolaus. In this connection it is curious +that he makes no mention of Aristarchus, who I think will be regarded by +conservative historians as his only demonstrated predecessor. To the +hold of the older ideas upon his mind we must attribute the fact that in +constructing his system he took great pains to make as little change as +possible in ancient conceptions.</p> + +<p>Luther, the greatest thought-stirrer of them all, practically of the +same generation with Copernicus, Leonardo, and Columbus, does not come +in as a scientific investigator, but as the great loosener of chains +which had so fettered the intellect of men that they dared not think +otherwise than as the authorities thought.</p> + +<p>Almost coeval with the advent of these intellects was the invention +of printing with movable type. Gutenberg was born during the first +decade of the century, and his associates and others credited with the +invention not many years afterward. If we accept the principle on which +I am basing my argument, that we should assign the first place to the +birth of those psychic agencies which started men on new lines of +thought, then surely was the fifteenth the wonderful century.</p> + +<p>Let us not forget that, in assigning the actors then born to their +places, we are not narrating history, but studying a special phase of +evolution. It matters not for us that no university invited Leonardo to +its halls, and that his science was valued by his contemporaries only as +an adjunct to the art of engineering. The great fact still is that he +was the first of mankind to propound laws of motion. It is not for +anything in Luther's doctrines that he finds a place in our scheme. No +matter for us whether they were sound or not. What he did toward the +evolution of the scientific investigator was to show by his example that +a man might question the best-established and most venerable authority +and still live—still preserve his intellectual +integrity—still command a hearing from nations and their rulers. +It matters not for us whether Columbus ever knew that he had discovered +a new continent. His work was to teach that neither hydra, chimera, nor +abyss—neither divine injunction nor infernal machination—was +in the way of men visiting every part of the globe, and that the problem +of conquering the world reduced itself to one of sails and rigging, hull +and compass. The better part of Copernicus was to direct man to a +viewpoint whence he should see that the heavens were of like matter with +the earth. All this done, the acorn was planted from which the oak of +our civilization should spring. The mad quest for gold which followed +the discovery of Columbus, the questionings which absorbed the attention +of the learned, the indignation excited by the seeming vagaries of a +Paracelsus, the fear and trembling lest the strange doctrine of +Copernicus should undermine the faith of centuries, were all helps to +the germination of the seed—stimuli to thought which urged it on +to explore the new fields opened up to its occupation. This given, all +that has since followed came out in regular order of development, and +need be here considered only in those phases having a special relation +to the purpose of our present meeting.</p> + +<p>So slow was the growth at first that the sixteenth century may +scarcely have recognized the inauguration of a new era. Torricelli and +Benedetti were of the third generation after Leonardo, and Galileo, the +first to make a substantial advance upon his theory, was born more than +a century after him. Only two or three men appeared in a generation who, +working alone, could make real progress in discovery, and even these +could do little in leavening the minds of their fellow men with the new +ideas.</p> + +<p>Up to the middle of the seventeenth century an agent which all +experience since that time shows to be necessary to the most productive +intellectual activity was wanting. This was the attraction of like +minds, making suggestions to each other, criticising, comparing, and +reasoning. This element was introduced by the organization of the Royal +Society of London and the Academy of Sciences of Paris.</p> + +<p>The members of these two bodies seem like ingenious youth suddenly +thrown into a new world of interesting objects, the purposes and +relations of which they had to discover. The novelty of the situation is +strikingly shown in the questions which occupied the minds of the +incipient investigators. One natural result of British maritime +enterprise was that the aspirations of the Fellows of the Royal Society +were not confined to any continent or hemisphere. Inquiries were sent +all the way to Batavia to know "whether there be a hill in Sumatra which +burneth continually, and a fountain which runneth pure balsam." The +astronomical precision with which it seemed possible that physiological +operations might go on was evinced by the inquiry whether the Indians +can so prepare that stupefying herb Datura that "they make it lie +several days, months, years, according as they will, in a man's body +without doing him any harm, and at the end kill him without missing an +hour's time." Of this continent one of the inquiries was whether there +be a tree in Mexico that yields water, wine, vinegar, milk, honey, wax, +thread, and needles.</p> + +<p>Among the problems before the Paris Academy of Sciences those of +physiology and biology took a prominent place. The distillation of +compounds had long been practiced, and the fact that the more spirituous +elements of certain substances were thus separated naturally led to the +question whether the essential essences of life might not be +discoverable in the same way. In order that all might participate in the +experiments, they were conducted in open session of the Academy, thus +guarding against the danger of any one member obtaining for his +exclusive personal use a possible elixir of life. A wide range of the +animal and vegetable kingdom, including cats, dogs, and birds of various +species, were thus analyzed. The practice of dissection was introduced +on a large scale. That of the cadaver of an elephant occupied several +sessions, and was of such interest that the monarch himself was a +spectator.</p> + +<p>To the same epoch with the formation and first work of these two +bodies belongs the invention of a mathematical method which in its +importance to the advance of exact science may be classed with the +invention of the alphabet in its relation to the progress of society at +large. The use of algebraic symbols to represent quantities had its +origin before the commencement of the new era, and gradually grew into a +highly developed form during the first two centuries of that era. But +this method could represent quantities only as fixed. It is true that +the elasticity inherent in the use of such symbols permitted of their +being applied to any and every quantity; yet, in any one application, +the quantity was considered as fixed and definite. But most of the +magnitudes of nature are in a state of continual variation; indeed, +since all motion is variation, the latter is a universal characteristic +of all phenomena. No serious advance could be made in the application of +algebraic language to the expression of physical phenomena until it +could be so extended as to express variation in quantities, as well as +the quantities themselves. This extension, worked out independently by +Newton and Leibnitz, may be classed as the most fruitful of conceptions +in exact science. With it the way was opened for the unimpeded and +continually accelerated progress of the last two centuries.</p> + +<p>The feature of this period which has the closest relation to the +purpose of our coming together is the seemingly unending subdivision of +knowledge into specialties, many of which are becoming so minute and so +isolated that they seem to have no interest for any but their few +pursuers. Happily science itself has afforded a corrective for its own +tendency in this direction. The careful thinker will see that in these +seemingly diverging branches common elements and common principles are +coming more and more to light. There is an increasing recognition of +methods of research, and of deduction, which are common to large +branches, or to the whole of science. We are more and more recognizing +the principle that progress in knowledge implies its reduction to more +exact forms, and the expression of its ideas in language more or less +mathematical. The problem before the organizers of this Congress was, +therefore, to bring the sciences together, and seek for the unity which +we believe underlies their infinite diversity.</p> + +<p>The assembling of such a body as now fills this hall was scarcely +possible in any preceding generation, and is made possible now only +through the agency of science itself. It differs from all preceding +international meetings by the universality of its scope, which aims to +include the whole of knowledge. It is also unique in that none but +leaders have been sought out as members. It is unique in that so many +lands have delegated their choicest intellects to carry on its work. +They come from the country to which our republic is indebted for a third +of its territory, including the ground on which we stand; from the land +which has taught us that the most scholarly devotion to the languages +and learning of the cloistered past is compatible with leadership in the +practical application of modern science to the arts of life; from the +island whose language and literature have found a new field and a +vigorous growth in this region; from the last seat of the holy Roman +Empire; from the country which, remembering a monarch who made an +astronomical observation at the Greenwich Observatory, has enthroned +science in one of the highest places in its government; from the +peninsula so learned that we have invited one of its scholars to come +and tell us of our own language; from the land which gave birth to +Leonardo, Galileo, Torricelli, Columbus, Volta—what an array of +immortal names!—from the little republic of glorious history +which, breeding men rugged as its eternal snow-peaks, has yet been the +seat of scientific investigation since the day of the Bernoullis; from +the land whose heroic dwellers did not hesitate to use the ocean itself +to protect it against invaders, and which now makes us marvel at the +amount of erudition compressed within its little area; from the nation +across the Pacific, which, by half a century of unequaled progress in +the arts of life, has made an important contribution to evolutionary +science through demonstrating the falsity of the theory that the most +ancient races are doomed to be left in the rear of the advancing +age—in a word, from every great centre of intellectual activity on +the globe I see before me eminent representatives of that world-advance +in knowledge which we have met to celebrate. May we not confidently hope +that the discussions of such an assemblage will prove pregnant of a +future for science which shall outshine even its brilliant past?</p> + +<p>Gentlemen and scholars all! You do not visit our shores to find great +collections in which centuries of humanity have given expression on +canvas and in marble to their hopes, fears, and aspirations. Nor do you +expect institutions and buildings hoary with age. But as you feel the +vigor latent in the fresh air of these expansive prairies, which has +collected the products of human genius by which we are here surrounded, +and, I may add, brought us together; as you study the institutions which +we have founded for the benefit, not only of our own people, but of +humanity at large; as you meet the men who, in the short space of one +century, have transformed this valley from a savage wilderness into what +it is to-day—then may you find compensation for the want of a past +like yours by seeing with prophetic eye a future world-power of which +this region shall be the seat. If such is to be the outcome of the +institutions which we are now building up, then may your present visit +be a blessing both to your posterity and ours by making that power one +for good to all mankind. Your deliberations will help to demonstrate to +us and to the world at large that the reign of law must supplant that of +brute force in the relations of the nations, just as it has supplanted +it in the relations of individuals. You will help to show that the war +which science is now waging against the sources of diseases, pain, and +misery offers an even nobler field for the exercise of heroic qualities +than can that of battle. We hope that when, after your all too fleeting +sojourn in our midst, you return to your own shores, you will long feel +the influence of the new air you have breathed in an infusion of +increased vigor in pursuing your varied labors. And if a new impetus is +thus given to the great intellectual movement of the past century, +resulting not only in promoting the unification of knowledge, but in +widening its field through new combinations of effort on the part of its +votaries, the projectors, organizers, and supporters of this Congress of +Arts and Science will be justified of their labors.</p> + +<h2 class="p4 center">DIVISION A—NORMATIVE SCIENCE</h2> + +<h3 class="p4 center">DIVISION A—NORMATIVE SCIENCE</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Speaker</span>: <span +class="smcap">Professor Josiah Royce</span>, Harvard University</p> + +<p class="center">(<i>Hall 6, September 20, 10 a. m.</i>)</p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<h3><a name="Ideal"></a>THE SCIENCES OF THE IDEAL</h3> + +<h4>BY JOSIAH ROYCE</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> <p>[<b>Josiah Royce</b>, Professor of History +of Philosophy, Harvard University, since 1892. b. Grass Valley, Nevada +County, California, November 20, 1855. A.B. University of California, +1875; Ph.D. Johns Hopkins 1878; LL.D. University of Aberdeen, Scotland; +LL.D. Johns Hopkins. Instructor in English Literature and Logic, +University of California, 1878-82. Instructor and Assistant Professor, +Harvard University, 1882-92. <b>Author of</b> <i>Religious Aspect of +Philosophy</i>; <i>History of California</i>; <i>The Feud of Oakfield +Creek</i>; <i>The Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i>; <i>Studies of Good +and Evil</i>; <i>The World and the Individual</i>; <i>Gifford +Lectures</i>; and numerous other works and memoirs.]</p> </div> + +<p class="p2">I shall not attempt, in this address, either to justify or +to criticise the name, normative science, under which the doctrines +which constitute this division are grouped. It is enough for my purpose +to recognize at the outset that I am required, by the plans of this +Congress, to explain what scientific interests seem to me to be common +to the work of the philosophers and of the mathematicians. The task is +one which makes severe demands upon the indulgence of the listener, and +upon the expository powers of the speaker, but it is a task for which +the present age has well prepared the way. The spirit which Descartes +and Leibnitz illustrated seems likely soon to become, in a new and +higher sense, prominent in science. The mathematicians are becoming more +and more philosophical. The philosophers, in the near future, will +become, I believe, more and more mathematical. It is my office to +indicate, as well as the brief time and my poor powers may permit, why +this ought to be so.</p> + +<p>To this end I shall first point out what is that most general +community of interest which unites all the sciences that belong to our +division. Then I shall indicate what type of recent and special +scientific work most obviously bears upon the tasks of all of us alike. +Thirdly, I shall state some results and problems to which this type of +scientific work has given rise, and shall try to show what promise we +have of an early increase of insight regarding our common interests.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">I</p> + +<p>The most general community of interest which unites the various +scientific activities that belong to our division is this: We are all +concerned with what may be called ideal truth, as distinct from physical +truth. Some of us also have a strong interest in physical truth; but +none of us lack a notable and scientific concern for the realm of ideas, +viewed as ideas.</p> + +<p>Let me explain what I mean by these terms. Whoever studies physical +truth (taking that term in its most general sense) seeks to observe, to +collate, and, in the end, to control, facts which he regards as external +to his own thought. But instead of thus looking mainly without, it is +possible for a man chiefly to take account, let us say, of the +consequences of his own hypothetical assumptions—assumptions which +may possess but a very remote relation to the physical world. Or again, +it is possible for such a student to be mainly devoted to reflecting +upon the formal validity of his own inferences, or upon the meaning of +his own presuppositions, or upon the value and the interrelation of +human ideals. Any such scientific work, reflective, considerate +principally of the thinker's own constructions and purposes, or of the +constructions and purposes of humanity in general, is a pursuit of ideal +truth. The searcher who is mainly devoted to the inquiry into what he +regards as external facts, is indeed active; but his activity is moulded +by an order of existence which he conceives as complete apart from his +activity. He is thoughtful; but a power not himself assigns to him the +problems about which he thinks. He is guided by ideals; but his +principal ideal takes the form of an acceptance of the world as it is, +independently of his ideals. His dealings are with nature. His aim is +the conquest of a foreign realm. But the student of what may be called, +in general terms, ideal truth, while he is devoted as his fellow, the +observer of outer nature, to the general purpose of being faithful to +the verity as he finds it, is still aware that his own way of finding, +or his own creative activity as an inventor of hypotheses, or his own +powers of inference, or his conscious ideals, constitute in the main the +object into which he is inquiring, and so form an essential aspect of +the sort of verity which he is endeavoring to discover. The guide, then, +of such a student is, in a peculiar sense, his own reason. His goal is +the comprehension of his own meaning, the conscious and thoughtful +conquest of himself. His great enemy is not the mystery of outer nature, +but the imperfection of his reflective powers. He is, indeed, as +unwilling as is any scientific worker to trust private caprices. He +feels as little as does the observer of outer facts, that he is merely +noting down, as they pass, the chance products of his arbitrary fantasy. +For him, as for any scientific student, truth is indeed objective; and +the standards to which he conforms are eternal. But his method is that +of an inner considerateness rather than of a curiosity about external +phenomena. His objective world is at the same time an essentially ideal +world, and the eternal verity in whose light he seeks to live has, +throughout his undertakings, a peculiarly intimate relation to the +purposes of his own constructive will.</p> + +<p>One may then sum up the difference of attitude which is here in +question by saying that, while the student of outer nature is explicitly +conforming his plans of action, his ideas, his ideals, to an order of +truth which he takes to be foreign to himself—the student of the +other sort of truth, here especially in question, is attempting to +understand his own plans of action, that is, to develop his ideas, or to +define his ideals, or else to do both these things.</p> + +<p>Now it is not hard to see that this search for some sort of ideal +truth is indeed characteristic of every one of the investigations which +have been grouped together in our division of the normative sciences. +Pure mathematics shares in common with philosophy this type of +scientific interest in ideal, as distinct from physical or phenomenal +truth. There is, to be sure, a marked contrast between the ways in which +the mathematician and the philosopher approach, select, and elaborate +their respective sorts of problems. But there is also a close relation +between the two types of investigation in question. Let us next consider +both the contrast and the analogy in some of their other most general +features.</p> + +<p>Pure mathematics is concerned with the investigation of the logical +consequences of certain exactly stateable postulates or +hypotheses—such, for instance, as the postulates upon which +arithmetic and analysis are founded, or such as the postulates that lie +at the basis of any type of geometry. For the pure mathematician, the +truth of these hypotheses or postulates depends, not upon the fact that +physical nature contains phenomena answering to the postulates, but +solely upon the fact that the mathematician is able, with rational +consistency, to state these assumed first principles, and to develop +their consequences. Dedekind, in his famous essay, "Was Sind und Was +Sollen die Zahlen," called the whole numbers "freie Schöpfungen des +Menschlichen Geistes;" and, in fact, we need not enter into any +discussion of the psychology of our number concept in order to be able +to assert that, however we men first came by our conception of the whole +numbers, for the mathematician the theory of numerical truth must appear +simply as the logical development of the consequences of a few +fundamental first principles, such as those which Dedekind himself, or +Peano, or other recent writers upon this topic, have, in various forms, +stated. A similar formal freedom marks the development of any other +theory in the realm of pure mathematics. Pure geometry, from the modern +point of view, is neither a doctrine forced upon the human mind by the +constitution of any primal form of intuition, nor yet a branch of +physical science, limited to describing the spatial arrangement of +phenomena in the external world. Pure geometry is the theory of the +consequences of certain postulates which the geometer is at liberty +consistently to make; so that there are as many types of geometry as +there are consistent systems of postulates of that generic type of which +the geometer takes account. As is also now well known, it has long been +impossible to define pure mathematics as the science of quantity, or to +limit the range of the exactly stateable hypotheses or postulates with +which the mathematician deals to the world of those objects which, +ideally speaking, can be viewed as measurable. For the ideally defined +measurable objects are by no means the only ones whose properties can be +stated in the form of exact postulates or hypotheses; and the possible +range of pure mathematics, if taken in the abstract, and viewed apart +from any question as to the value of given lines of research, appears to +be identical with the whole realm of the consequences of exactly +stateable ideal hypotheses of every type.</p> + +<p>One limitation must, however, be mentioned, to which the assertion +just made is, in practice, obviously subject. And this is, indeed, a +momentous limitation. The exactly stated ideal hypotheses whose +consequences the mathematician develops must possess, as is sometimes +said, sufficient intrinsic importance to be worthy of scientific +treatment. They must not be trivial hypotheses. The mathematician is +not, like the solver of chess problems, merely displaying his skill in +dealing with the arbitrary fictions of an ideal game. His truth is, +indeed, ideal; his world is, indeed, treated by his science as if this +world were the creation of his postulates a "freie Schöpfung." But he +does not thus create for mere sport. On the contrary, he reports a +significant order of truth. As a fact, the ideal systems of the pure +mathematician are customarily defined with an obvious, even though often +highly abstract and remote, relation to the structure of our ordinary +empirical world. Thus the various algebras which have been actually +developed have, in the main, definite relations to the structure of the +space world of our physical experience. The different systems of ideal +geometry, even in all their ideality, still cluster, so to speak, about +the suggestions which our daily experience of space and of matter give +us. Yet I suppose that no mathematician would be disposed, at the +present time, to accept any brief definition of the degree of closeness +or remoteness of relation to ordinary experience which shall serve to +distinguish a trivial from a genuinely significant branch of +mathematical theory. In general, a mathematician who is devoted to the +theory of functions, or to group theory, appears to spend little time in +attempting to show why the development of the consequences of his +postulates is a significant enterprise. The concrete mathematical +interest of his inquiry sustains him in his labors, and wins for him the +sympathy of his fellows. To the questions, "Why consider the ideal +structure of just this system of object at all?" "Why study various +sorts of numbers, or the properties of functions, or of groups, or the +system of points in projective geometry?"—the pure mathematician +in general, cares to reply only, that the topic of his special +investigation appears to him to possess sufficient mathematical +interest. The freedom of his science thus justifies his enterprise. Yet, +as I just pointed out, this freedom is never mere caprice. This ideal +interest is not without a general relation to the concerns even of +common sense. In brief, as it seems at once fair to say, the pure +mathematician is working under the influence of more or less clearly +conscious philosophical motives. He does not usually attempt to define +what distinguishes a significant from a trivial system of postulates, or +what constitutes a problem worth attacking from the point of view of +pure mathematics. But he practically recognizes such a distinction +between the trivial and the significant regions of the world of ideal +truth, and since philosophy is concerned with the significance of ideas, +this recognition brings the mathematician near in spirit to the +philosopher.</p> + +<p>Such, then, is the position of the pure mathematician. What, by way +of contrast, is that of the philosopher? We may reply that to state the +formal consequences of exact assumptions is one thing; to reflect upon +the mutual relations, and the whole significance of such assumptions, +does indeed involve other interests; and these other interests are the +ones which directly carry us over to the realm of philosophy. If the +theory of numbers belongs to pure mathematics, the study of the place of +the number concept in the system of human ideas belongs to philosophy. +Like the mathematician, the philosopher deals directly with a realm of +ideal truth. But to unify our knowledge, to comprehend its sources, its +meaning, and its relations to the whole of human life, these aims +constitute the proper goal of the philosopher. In order, however, to +accomplish his aims, the philosopher must, indeed, take account of the +results of the special physical science; but he must also turn from the +world of outer phenomena to an ideal world. For the unity of things is +never, for us mortals, anything that we find given in our experience. +You cannot see the unity of knowledge; you cannot describe it as a +phenomenon. It is for us now, an ideal. And precisely so, the meaning of +things, the relation of knowledge to life, the significance of our +ideals, their bearing upon one another—these are never, for us +men, phenomenally present data. Hence the philosopher, however much he +ought, as indeed he ought, to take account of phenomena, and of the +results of the special physical sciences, is quite as deeply interested +in his own way, as the mathematician is interested in his way, in the +consideration of an ideal realm. Only, unlike the mathematician, the +philosopher does not first abstract from the empirical suggestions upon +which his exact ideas are actually based, and then content himself +merely with developing the logical consequences of these ideas. On the +contrary, his main interest is not in any idea or fact in so far as it +is viewed by itself, but rather in the interrelations, in the common +significance, in the unity, of all fundamental ideas, and in their +relations both to the phenomenal facts and to life! On the whole, he, +therefore, neither consents, like the student of a special science of +experience, to seek his freedom solely through conformity to the +phenomena which are to be described; nor is he content, like the pure +mathematician, to win his truth solely through the exact definition of +the formal consequences of his freely defined hypotheses. He is making +an effort to discover the sense and the unity of the business of his own +life.</p> + +<p>It is no part of my purpose to attempt to show here how this general +philosophical interest differentiates into the various interests of +metaphysics, of the philosophy of religion, of ethics, of æsthetics, of +logic. Enough—I have tried to illustrate how, while both the +philosopher and the mathematician have an interest in the meaning of +ideas rather than in the description of external facts, still there is a +contrast which does, indeed, keep their work in large measure asunder, +namely, the contrast due to the fact that the mathematician is directly +concerned with developing the consequences of certain freely assumed +systems of postulates or hypotheses; while the philosopher is interested +in the significance, in the unity, and in the relation to life, of all +the fundamental ideals and postulates of the human mind.</p> + +<p>Yet not even thus do we sufficiently state how closely related the +two tasks are. For this very contrast, as we have also suggested, is, +even within its own limits, no final or perfectly sharp contrast. There +is a deep analogy between the two tasks. For the mathematician, as we +have just seen, is not evenly interested in developing the consequences +of any and every system of freely assumed postulates. He is no mere +solver of arbitrary ideal puzzles in general. His systems of postulates +are so chosen as to be not trivial, but significant. They are, +therefore, in fact, but abstractly defined aspects of the very system of +eternal truth whose expression is the universe. In this sense the +mathematician is as genuinely interested as is the philosopher in the +significant use of his scientific freedom. On the other hand, the +philosopher, in reflecting upon the significance and the unity of +fundamental ideas, can only do so with success in case he makes due +inquiry into the logical consequences of given ideas. And this he can +accomplish only if, upon occasion, he employs the exact methods of the +mathematician, and develops his systems of ideal truth with the +precision of which only mathematical research is capable. As a fact, +then, the mathematician and the philosopher deal with ideal truth in +ways which are not only contrasted, but profoundly interconnected. The +mathematician, in so far as he consciously distinguishes significant +from trivial problems, and ideal systems, is a philosopher. The +philosopher, in so far as he seeks exactness of logical method, in his +reflection, must meanwhile aim to be, within his own limits, a +mathematician. He, indeed, will not in future, like Spinoza, seek to +reduce philosophy to the mere development, in mathematical form, of the +consequences of certain arbitrary hypotheses. He will distinguish +between a reflection upon the unity of the system of truth and an +abstract development of this or that selected aspect of the system. But +he will see more and more that, in so far as he undertakes to be exact, +he must aim to become, in his own way, and with due regard to his own +purposes, mathematical; and thus the union of mathematical and +philosophical inquiries, in the future, will tend to become closer and +closer.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">II</p> + +<p>So far, then, I have dwelt upon extremely general considerations +relating to the unity and the contrast of mathematical and philosophical +inquiries. I can well conceive, however, that the individual worker in +any one of the numerous branches of investigation which are represented +by the body of students whom I am privileged to address, may at this +point mentally interpose the objection that all these considerations +are, indeed, far too general to be of practical interest to any of us. +Of course, all we who study these so-called normative sciences are, +indeed, interested in ideas, for their own sakes—in ideas so +distinct from, although of course also somehow related to, phenomena. Of +course, some of us are rather devoted to the development of the +consequences of exactly stated ideal hypotheses, and others to +reflecting as we can upon what certain ideas and ideals are good for, +and upon what the unity is of all ideas and ideals. Of course, if we are +wise enough to do so, we have much to learn from one another. But, you +will say, the assertion of all these things is a commonplace. The +expression of the desire for further mutual coöperation is a pious wish. +You will insist upon asking further: "Is there just now any concrete +instance in a modern type of research which furnishes results such as +are of interest to all of us? Are we actually doing any productive work +in common? Are the philosophers contributing anything to human knowledge +which has a genuine bearing upon the interests of mathematical science? +Are the mathematicians contributing anything to philosophy?"</p> + +<p>These questions are perfectly fair. Moreover, as it happens, they can +be distinctly answered in the affirmative. The present age is one of a +rapid advance in the actual unification of the fields of investigation +which are included within the scope of this present division. What +little time remains to me must be devoted to indicating, as well as I +can, in what sense this is true. I shall have still to deal in very +broad generalities. I shall try to make these generalities definite +enough to be not wholly unfruitful.</p> + +<p>We have already emphasized one question which may be said to +interest, in a very direct way, both the mathematician and the +philosopher. The ideal postulates, whose consequences mathematical +science undertakes to develop, must be, we have said, significant +postulates, involving ideas whose exact definition and exposition repay +the labor of scientific scrutiny. Number, space, continuity, functional +correspondence or dependence, group-structure—these are examples +of such significant ideas; the postulates or ideal assumptions upon +which the theory of such ideas depends are significant postulates, and +are not the mere conventions of an arbitrary game. But now what +constitutes the significance of an idea, or of an abstract mathematical +theory? What gives an idea a worthy place in the whole scheme of human +ideas? Is it the possibility of finding a physical application for a +mathematical theory which for us decides what is the value of the +theory? No, the theory of functions, the theory of numbers, group +theory, have a significance which no mathematician would consent to +measure in terms of the present applicability or non-applicability of +these theories in physical science? In vain, then, does one attempt to +use the test of applied mathematics as the main criticism of the value +of a theory of pure mathematics. The value of an idea, for the sciences +which constitute our division, is dependent upon the place which this +idea occupies in the whole organized scheme or system of human ideas. +The idea of number, for instance, familiar as its applications are, does +not derive its main value from the fact that eggs and dollars and +star-clusters can be counted, but rather from the fact that the idea of +numbers has those relations to other fundamental ideas which recent +logical theory has made prominent—relations, for instance, to the +concept of order, to the theory of classes or collections of objects +viewed in general, and to the metaphysical concept of the self. +Relations of this sort, which the discussions of the number concept by +Dedekind, Cantor, Peano, and Russell have recently brought to +light—such relations, I say, constitute what truly justified Gauss +in calling the theory of numbers a "divine science." As against such +deeper relations, the countless applications of the number concept in +ordinary life, and in science, are, from the truly philosophical point +of view, of comparatively small moment. What we want, in the work of our +division of the sciences, is to bring to light the unity of truth, +either, as in mathematics, by developing systems of truth which are +significant by virtue of their actual relations to this unity, or, as in +philosophy, by explicitly seeking the central idea about which all the +many ideas cluster.</p> + +<p>Now, an ancient and fundamental problem for the philosophers is that +which has been called the problem of the categories. This problem of the +categories is simply the more formal aspect of the whole philosophical +problem just defined. The philosopher aims to comprehend the unity of +the system of human ideas and ideals. Well, then, what are the primal +ideas? Upon what group of concepts do the other concepts of human +science logically depend? About what central interests is the system of +human ideals clustered? In ancient thought Aristotle already approached +this problem in one way. Kant, in the eighteenth century, dealt with it +in another. We students of philosophy are accustomed to regret what we +call the excessive formalism of Kant, to lament that Kant was so much +the slave of his own relatively superficial and accidental table of +categories, and that he made the treatment of every sort of +philosophical problem turn upon his own schematism. Yet we cannot doubt +that Kant was right in maintaining that philosophy needs, for the +successful development of every one of its departments, a well-devised +and substantially complete system of categories. Our objection to Kant's +over-confidence in the virtues of his own schematism is due to the fact +that we do not now accept his table of categories as an adequate view of +the fundamental concepts. The efforts of philosophers since Kant have +been repeatedly devoted to the task of replacing his scheme of +categories by a more adequate one. I am far from regarding these purely +philosophical efforts made since Kant as fruitless, but they have +remained, so far, very incomplete, and they have been held back from +their due fullness of success by the lack of a sufficiently careful +survey and analysis of the processes of thought as these have come to be +embodied in the living sciences. Such concepts as number, quantity, +space, time, cause, continuity, have been dealt with by the pure +philosophers far too summarily and superficially. A more thoroughgoing +analysis has been needed. But now, in comparatively recent times, there +has developed a region of inquiry which one may call by the general name +of modern logic. To the constitution of this new region of inquiry men +have principally contributed who began as mathematicians, but who, in +the course of their work, have been led to become more and more +philosophers. Of late, however, various philosophers, who were +originally in no sense mathematicians, becoming aware of the importance +of the new type of research, are in their turn attempting both to +assimilate and to supplement the undertakings which were begun from the +mathematical side. As a result, the logical problem of the categories +has to-day become almost equally a problem for the logicians of +mathematics and for those students of philosophy who take any serious +interest in exactness of method in their own branch of work. The result +of this actual coöperation of men from both sides is that, as I think, +we are to-day, for the first time, in sight of what is still, as I +freely admit, a somewhat distant goal, namely, the relatively complete +rational analysis and tabulation of the fundamental categories of human +thought. That the student of ethics is as much interested in such an +investigation as is the metaphysician, that the philosopher of religion +needs a well-completed table of categories quite as much as does the +pure logician, every competent student of such topics ought to admit. +And that the enterprise in question keenly interests the mathematicians +is shown by the prominent part which some of them have taken in the +researches in question. Here, then, is the type of recent scientific +work whose results most obviously bear upon the tasks of all of us +alike.</p> + +<p>A catalogue of the names of the workers in this wide field of modern +logic would be out of place here. Yet one must, indeed, indicate what +lines of research are especially in question. From the purely +mathematical side, the investigations of the type to which I now refer +may be viewed (somewhat arbitrarily) as beginning with that famous +examination into one of the postulates of Euclid's geometry which gave +rise to the so-called non-Euclidean geometry. The question here +originally at issue was one of a comparatively limited scope, namely, +the question whether Euclid's parallel-line postulate was a logical +consequence of the other geometrical principles. But the investigation +rapidly develops into a general study of the foundations of +geometry—a study to which contributions are still almost +constantly appearing. Somewhat independently of this line of inquiry +there grew up, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, that +reëxamination of the bases of arithmetic and analysis which is +associated with the names of Dedekind, Weierstrass, and George Cantor. +At the present time, the labors of a number of other inquirers (amongst +whom we may mention the school of Peano and Pieri in Italy, and men such +as Poincaré and Couturat in France, Hilbert in Germany, Bertrand Russell +and Whitehead in England, and an energetic group of our American +mathematicians—men such as Professor Moore, Professor Halsted, Dr. +Huntington, Dr. Veblen, and a considerable number of others) have been +added to the earlier researches. The result is that we have recently +come for the first time to be able to see, with some completeness, what +the assumed first principles of pure mathematics actually are. As was to +be expected, these principles are capable of more than one formulation, +according as they are approached from one side or from another. As was +also to be expected, the entire edifice of pure mathematics, so far as +it has yet been erected, actually rests upon a very few fundamental +concepts and postulates, however you may formulate them. What was not +observed, however, by the earlier, and especially by the philosophical, +students of the categories, is the form which these postulates tend to +assume when they are rigidly analyzed.</p> + +<p>This form depends upon the precise definition and classification of +certain types of relations. The whole of geometry, for instance, +including metrical geometry, can be developed from a set of postulates +which demand the existence of points that stand in certain ordinal +relationships. The ordinal relationships can be reduced, according as +the series of points considered is open or closed, either to the +well-known relationship in which three points stand when one is between +the other two upon a right line, or else to the ordinal relationship in +which four points stand when they are separated by pairs; and these two +ordinal relationships, by means of various logical devices, can be +regarded as variations of a single fundamental form. Cayley and Klein +founded the logical theory of geometry here in question. Russell, and in +another way Dr. Veblen, have given it its most recent expressions. In +the same way, the theory of whole numbers can be reduced to sets of +principles which demand the existence of certain ideal objects in +certain simple ordinal relations. Dedekind and Peano have worked out +such ordinal theories of the number concept. In another development of +the theory of the cardinal whole numbers, which Russell and Whitehead +have worked out, ordinal concepts are introduced only secondarily, and +the theory depends upon the fundamental relation of the equivalence or +nonequivalence of collections of objects. But here also a certain simple +type of relation determines the definitions and the development of the +whole theory.</p> + +<p>Two results follow from such a fashion of logically analyzing the +first principles of mathematical science. In the first place, as just +pointed out, we learn <i>how few and simple are the conceptions and +postulates</i> upon which the actual edifice of exact science rests. +Pure mathematics, we have said, is free to assume what it chooses. Yet +the assumptions whose presence as the foundation principles of the +actually existent pure mathematics an exhaustive examination thus +reveals, show by their fewness that the ideal freedom of the +mathematician to assume and to construct what he pleases, is indeed, in +practice, a very decidedly limited freedom. The limitation is, as we +have already seen, a limitation which has to do with the essential +significance of the fundamental concepts in question. And so the result +of this analysis of the bases of the actually developed and significant +branches of mathematics, constitutes a sort of empirical revelation of +what categories the exact sciences have practically found to be of such +significance as to be worthy of exhaustive treatment. Thus the +instinctive sense for significant truth, which has all along been +guiding the development of mathematics, comes at least to a clear and +philosophical consciousness. And meanwhile the essential categories of +thought are seen in a new light.</p> + +<p>The second result still more directly concerns a philosophical logic. +It is this: Since the few types of relations which this sort of analysis +reveals as the fundamental ones in exact science are of such importance, +the logic of the present day is especially required to face the +questions: <i>What is the nature of our concept of relations?</i> What +are the various possible types of relations? Upon what does the variety +of these types depend? What unity lies beneath the variety?</p> + +<p>As a fact, logic, in its modern forms, namely, first that symbolic +logic which Boole first formulated, which Mr. Charles S. Peirce and his +pupils have in this country already so highly developed, and which +Schroeder in Germany, Peano's school in Italy, and a number of recent +English writers have so effectively furthered—and secondly, the +logic of scientific method, which is now so actively pursued, in France, +in Germany, and in the English-speaking countries—this whole +movement in modern logic, as I hold, is rapidly approaching <i>new +solutions of the problem of the fundamental nature and the logic of +relations</i>. The problem is one in which we are all equally +interested. To De Morgan in England, in an earlier generation, and, in +our time, to Charles Peirce in this country, very important stages in +the growth of these problems are due. Russell, in his work on the +<i>Principles of Mathematics</i> has very lately undertaken to sum up +the results of the logic of relations, as thus far developed, and to add +his own interpretations. Yet I think that Russell has failed to get as +near to the foundations of the theory of relations as the present state +of the discussion permits. For Russell has failed to take account of +what I hold to be the most fundamentally important generalization yet +reached in the general theory of relations. This is the generalization +set forth as early as 1890, by Mr. A. B. Kempe, of London, in a pair of +wonderful but too much neglected, papers, entitled, respectively, <i>The +Theory of Mathematical Form</i>, and <i>The Analogy between the Logical +Theory of Classes and the Geometrical Theory of Points</i>. A mere hint +first as to the more precise formulation of the problem at issue, and +then later as to Kempe's special contribution to that problem, may be in +order here, despite the impossibility of any adequate statement.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">III</p> + +<p>The two most obviously and universally important kinds of relations +known to the exact sciences, as these sciences at present exist, are: +(1) The relations of the type of equality or equivalence; and (2) the +relations of the type of before and after, or greater and less. The +first of these two classes of relations, namely, the class represented, +although by no means exhausted, by the various relations actually +called, in different branches of science by the one name equality, this +class I say, might well be named, as I myself have proposed, the +leveling relations. A collection of objects between any two of which +some one relation of this type holds, may be said to be a collection +whose members, in some defined sense or other, are on the same level. +The second of these two classes of relations, namely, those of the type +of before and after, or greater and less—this class of relations, +I say, consists of what are nowadays often called the serial relations. +And a collection of objects such that, if any pair of these objects be +chosen, a determinate one of this pair stands to the other one of the +same pair in some determinate relation of this second type, and in a +relation which remains constant for all the pairs that can be thus +formed out of the members of this collection—any such collection, +I say, constitutes a one-dimensional open series. Thus, in case of a +file of men, if you choose any pair of men belonging to the file, a +determinate one of them is, in the file, before the other. In the number +series, of any two numbers, a determinate one is greater than the other. +Wherever such a state of affairs exists, one has a series.</p> + +<p>Now these two classes of relations, the leveling relations and the +serial relations, agree with one another, and differ from one another in +very momentous ways. They <i>agree</i> with one another in that both the +leveling and the serial relations are what is technically called +<i>transitive</i>; that is, both classes conform to what Professor James +has called the law of "skipped intermediaries." Thus, if <i>A</i> is +equal to <i>B</i>, and <i>B</i> is equal to <i>C</i>, it follows that +<i>A</i> is equal to <i>C</i>. If <i>A</i> is before <i>B</i>, and +<i>B</i> is before <i>C</i>, then <i>A</i> is before <i>C</i>. And this +property, which enables you in your reasonings about these relations to +skip middle terms, and so to perform some operation of elimination, is +the property which is meant when one calls relations of this type +transitive. But, on the other hand, these two classes of relations +<i>differ</i> from each other in that the leveling relations are, while +the serial relations are not, <i>symmetrical</i> or reciprocal. Thus, if +<i>A</i> is equal to <i>B</i>, <i>B</i> is equal to <i>A</i>. But if +<i>X</i> is greater than <i>Y</i>, then <i>Y</i> is not greater than +<i>X</i>, but less than <i>X</i>. So the leveling relations are +symmetrical transitive relations. But the serial relations are +transitive relations which are not symmetrical.</p> + +<p>All this is now well known. It is notable, however, that nearly all +the processes of our exact sciences, as at present developed, can be +said to be essentially such as lead either to the placing of sets or +classes of objects on the same level, by means of the use of symmetrical +transitive relations, or else to the arranging of objects in orderly +rows or series, by means of the use of transitive relations which are +not symmetrical. This holds also of all the applications of the exact +sciences. Whatever else you do in science (or, for that matter, in art), +you always lead, in the end, either to the arranging of objects, or of +ideas, or of acts, or of movements, in rows or series, or else to the +placing of objects or ideas of some sort on the same level, by virtue of +some equivalence, or of some invariant character. Thus numbers, +functions, lines in geometry, give you examples of serial relations. +Equations in mathematics are classic instances of leveling relations. +So, of course, are invariants. Thus, again, the whole modern theory of +energy consists of two parts, one of which has to do with levels of +energy, in so far as the quantity of energy of a closed system remains +invariant through all the transformations of the system, while the other +part has to do with the irreversible serial order of the transformations +of energy themselves, which follow a set of unsymmetrical relations, in +so far as energy tends to fall from higher to lower levels of intensity +within the same system.</p> + +<p>The entire conceivable universe then, and all of our present exact +science, can be viewed, if you choose, as a collection of objects or of +ideas that, whatever other types of relations may exist, are at least +largely characterized either by the leveling relations, or by the serial +relations, or by complexes of both sorts of relations. Here, then, we +are plainly dealing with very fundamental categories. The "between" +relations of geometry can of course be defined, if you choose, in terms +of transitive relations that are not symmetrical. There are, to be sure, +some other relations present in exact science, but the two types, the +serial and leveling relations, are especially notable.</p> + +<p>So far the modern logicians have for some time been in substantial +agreement. Russell's brilliant book is a development of the logic of +mathematics very largely in terms of the two types of relations which, +in my own way, I have just characterized; although Russell gives due +regard, of course, to certain other types of relations.</p> + +<p>But hereupon the question arises, "Are these two types of relations +what Russell holds them to be, namely, ultimate and irreducible logical +facts, unanalyzable categories—mere data for the thinker?<ins +title="close quote missing in the original">"</ins> Or can we reduce +them still further, and thus simplify yet again our view of the +categories?</p> + +<p>Here is where Kempe's generalization begins to come into sight. These +two categories, in at least one very fundamental realm of exact thought, +can be reduced to one. There is, namely, a world of ideal objects which +especially interest the logician. It is the world of a <i>totality of +possible logical classes</i>, or again, it is the ideal world, +equivalent in formal structure to the foregoing, but composed of a +<i>totality of possible statements</i>, or thirdly, it is the world, +equivalent once more, in formal structure, to the foregoing, but +consisting of a <i>totality of possible acts of will</i>, of possible +decisions. When we proceed to consider the relational structure of such +a world, taken merely in the abstract as such a structure, a relation +comes into sight which at once appears to be peculiarly general in its +nature. It is the so-called illative relation, the relation which +obtains between two classes when one is subsumed under the other, or +between two statements, or two decisions, when one implies or entails +the other. This relation is transitive, but may be either symmetrical or +not symmetrical; so that, according as it is symmetrical or not, it may +be used either to establish levels or to generate series. In the order +system of the logician's world, the relational structure is thus, in any +case, a highly general and fundamental one.</p> + +<p>But this is not all. In this the logician's world of classes, or of +statements, or of decisions, there is also another relation observable. +This is the relation of exclusion or mutual opposition. This is a purely +symmetrical or reciprocal relation. It has two forms—obverse or +contradictory opposition, that is, negation proper, and contrary +opposition. But both these forms are purely symmetrical. And by proper +devices each of them can be stated in terms of the other, or reduced to +the other. And further, as Kempe incidentally shows, and as Mrs. Ladd +Franklin has also substantially shown in her important theory of the +syllogism, <i>it is possible to state every proposition, or complex of +propositions involving the illative relation, in terms of this purely +symmetrical relation of opposition</i>. Hence, so far as mere relational +form is concerned, the illative relation itself may be wholly reduced to +the symmetrical relation of opposition. This is our first result as to +the relational structure of the realm of pure logic, that is, the realm +of classes, of statements, or of decisions.</p> + +<p>It follows that, in describing the logician's world of possible +classes or of possible decisions, <i>all unsymmetrical, and so all +serial, relations can be stated solely in terms of symmetrical +relations, and can be entirely reduced to such relations</i>. Moreover, +as Kempe has also very prettily shown, the relation of opposition, in +its two forms, just mentioned, need not be interpreted as obtaining +merely between pairs of objects. It may and does obtain between triads, +tetrads, <i>n</i>-ads of logical entities; and so all that is true of +the relations of logical classes may consequently be stated merely by +ascribing certain perfectly symmetrical and homogeneous predicates to +pairs, triads, tetrads, n-ads of logical objects. The essential contrast +between symmetrical and unsymmetrical relations thus, in this ideal +realm of the logician, simply vanishes. The categories of the logician's +world of classes, of statements, or of decisions, are marvelously +simple. All the relations present may be viewed as variations of the +mere conception of opposition as distinct from non-opposition.</p> + +<p>All this holds, of course, so far, merely for the logician's world of +classes or of decisions. There, at least, all serial order can actually +be derived from wholly symmetrical relations. But Kempe now very +beautifully shows (and here lies his great and original contribution to +our topic)—he shows, I say, that the ordinal relations of +geometry, as well as of the number <ins title="hyphenated in the +original"> </ins>system, can all be regarded as indistinguishable from +<i>mere variations of those relations which, in pure logic, one finds to +be the symmetrical relations obtaining within pairs or triads of classes +or of statements</i>. The formal identity of the geometrical relation +called "between" with a purely logical relation which one can define as +existing or as not existing amongst the members of a given triad of +logical classes, or of logical statements, is shown by Kempe in a +fashion that I cannot here attempt to expound. But Kempe's result thus +enables one, as I believe, to simplify the theory of relations far +beyond the point which Russell in his brilliant book has reached. For +Kempe's triadic relation in question can be stated, in what he calls its +obverse form, in perfectly symmetrical terms. And he proves very exactly +that the resulting logical relation is precisely identical, in all its +properties, with the fundamental ordinal relation of geometry.</p> + +<p>Thus the order-systems of geometry and analysis appear simply as +special cases of the more general order-system of pure logic. The whole, +both of analysis and of geometry, can be regarded as a description of +certain selected groups of entities, which are chosen, according to +special rules, from a single ideal world. This general and inclusive +ideal world consists simply of <i>all the objects which can stand to one +another in those symmetrical relations wherein the pure logician finds +various statements, or various decisions inevitably standing</i>. "Let +me," says in substance Kempe, "choose from the logician's ideal world of +classes or decisions, what entities I will; and I will show you a +collection of objects that are in their relational structure, precisely +identical with the points of a geometer's space of <i>n</i> dimensions." +In other words, all of the geometer's figures and relations can be +precisely pictured by the relational structure of a selected system of +classes or of statements, whose relations are wholly and explicitly +logical relations, such as opposition, and whose relations may all be +regarded, accordingly, as reducible to a single type of purely +symmetrical relation.</p> + +<p>Thus, for <i>all</i> exact science, and not merely for the logician's +special realm, the contrast between symmetrical and unsymmetrical +relations proves to be, after all, superficial and derived. The purely +logical categories, such as opposition, and such as hold within the +calculus of statements, are, apparently, the basal categories of all the +exact science that has yet been developed. Series and levels are +relational structures that, sharply as they are contrasted, can be +derived from a single root.</p> + +<p>I have restated Kempe's generalization in my own way. I think it the +most promising step towards new light as to the categories that we have +made for some generations.</p> + +<p>In the field of modern logic, I say, then, work is doing which is +rapidly tending towards the unification of the tasks of our entire +division. For this problem of the categories, in all its abstractness, +is still a common problem for all of us. Do you ask, however, what such +researches can do to furnish more special aid to the workers in +metaphysics, in the philosophy of religion, in ethics, or in æsthetics, +beyond merely helping towards the formulation of a table of +categories—then I reply that we are already not without evidence +that such general researches, abstract though they may seem, are bearing +fruits which have much more than a merely special interest. Apart from +its most general problems, that analysis of mathematical concepts to +which I have referred has in any case revealed numerous unexpected +connections between departments of thought which had seemed to be very +widely sundered. One instance of such a connection I myself have +elsewhere discussed at length, in its general metaphysical bearings. I +refer to the logical identity which Dedekind first pointed out between +the mathematical concept of the ordinal number of series and the +philosophical concept of the formal structure of an ideally completed +self. I have maintained that this formal identity throws light upon +problems which have as genuine an interest for the student of the +philosophy of religion as for the logician of arithmetic. In the same +connection it may be remarked that, as Couturat and Russell, amongst +other writers, have very clearly and beautifully shown, the argument of +the Kantian mathematical antinomies needs to be explicitly and totally +revised in the light of Cantor's modern theory of infinite collections. +To pass at once to another, and a very different instance: The modern +mathematical conceptions of what is called group theory have already +received very wide and significant applications, and promise to bring +into unity regions of research which, until recently, appeared to have +little or nothing to do with one another. Quite lately, however, there +are signs that group theory will soon prove to be of importance for the +definition of some of the fundamental concepts of that most refractory +branch of philosophical inquiry, æsthetics. Dr. Emch, in an important +paper in the <i>Monist</i>, called attention, some time since, to the +symmetry groups to which certain æsthetically pleasing forms belong, and +endeavored to point out the empirical relations between these groups and +the æsthetic effects in question. The grounds for such a connection +between the groups in question and the observed æsthetic effects, +seemed, in the paper of Dr. Emch to be left largely in the dark. But +certain papers recently published in the country by Miss Ethel Puffer, +bearing upon the psychology of the beautiful (although the author has +approached the subject without being in the least consciously +influenced, as I understand, by the conceptions of the mathematical +group theory), still actually lead, if I correctly grasp the writer's +meaning, to the doctrine that the æsthetic object, viewed as a +psychological whole, must possess a structure closely, if not precisely, +equivalent to the ideal structure of what the mathematician calls a +group. I myself have no authority regarding æsthetic concepts, and speak +subject to correction. But the unexpected, and in case of Miss Puffer's +research, quite unintended, appearance of group theory in recent +æsthetic analysis is to me an impressive instance of the use of +relatively new mathematical conceptions in philosophical regions which +<i>seem</i>, at first sight, very remote from mathematics.</p> + +<p>That both the group concept and the concept of the self just +suggested are sure to have also a wide application in the ethics of the +future, I am myself well convinced. In fact, no branch of philosophy is +without close relations to all such studies of fundamental +categories.</p> + +<p class="add4">These are but hints and examples. They suffice, I hope, +to show that the workers in this division have deep common interests, +and will do well, in future, to study the arts of coöperation, and to +regard one another's progress with a watchful and cordial sympathy. In a +word: Our common problem is the theory of the categories. That problem +can be solved only by the coöperation of the mathematicians and of the +philosophers.</p> + +<div class="figcenter"> + <a name="Paris"></a> <img src="images/i0199.jpg" +width="600" height="354" alt="Illustration: University of Paris in the +Thirteenth Century" + title="University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century" /> +<p class="caption center"><i>THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS IN THE THIRTEENTH +CENTURY</i></p> + +<p class="caption center"><i>Hand-painted Photogravure from a Painting +by Otto Knille. Reproduced<br /> from a Photograph of the Painting by +permission of the<br /> Berlin Photograph Co.</i></p> + +<p class="caption">This famous painting is now in the University of +Berlin. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest of the scholastic +philosophers, surnamed the "Angelic Doctor," is delivering a learned +discourse before King Louis IX. To the right of the King stands +Joinville, the French chronicler. The Dominican monk with his hand to +his face is Guillaume de Saint Amour, and Vincent de Beauvais, and +another Dominican are seated with their backs to the platform desk from +which Thomas Aquinas is making his animated address. The picture is +thoroughly characteristic of a University disputation at the close of +the Middle Ages.</p> + +</div> + +<h3 class="p4 center">DEPARTMENT I—PHILOSOPHY</h3> + +<h3 class="p4 center">DEPARTMENT I—PHILOSOPHY</h3> + +<p class="center">(<i>Hall 6, September 20, 11.15 a. m.</i>)</p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<table class="bold" border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Philosophy +Speakers"> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Borden P. Bowne</span>, +Boston University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George H. Howison</span>, +University of California.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George T. +Ladd</span>, Yale University.</td></tr> + +</table> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p>In opening the Department of Philosophy, the Chairman, Professor +Borden P. Bowne, LL.D., of Boston University, made an interesting +address on the Philosophical Outlook. Professor Bowne said in part:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>I congratulate the members of the Philosophical Section on the +improved outlook in philosophy. In the generation just passed, +philosophy was somewhat at a discount. The great and rapid development +of physical science and invention, together with the profound changes in +biological thought, produced for a time a kind of chaos. New facts were +showered upon us in great abundance, and we had no adequate +philosophical preparation for dealing with them. Such a condition is +always disturbing. The old mental equilibrium is overthrown and +readjustment is a slow process. Besides, the shallow sense philosophy of +that time readily lent itself to mechanical and materialistic +interpretations, and for a while it seemed as if all the higher faiths +of humanity were permanently discredited. All this has passed away. +Philosophical criticism began its work and the naïve dogmatism of +materialistic naturalism was soon disposed of. It quickly appeared that +our trouble was not due to the new facts, but to the superficial +philosophy by which they had been interpreted. Now that we have a better +philosophy, we have come to live in perfect peace with the facts once +thought disturbing, and even to welcome them as valuable additions to +knowledge....</p> + +<p>The brief naturalistic episode was not without instruction for us. It +showed conclusively the great practical importance of philosophy. Had we +had thirty years ago the current philosophical insight, the great +development of the physical and biological sciences would have made no +disturbance whatever. But being interpreted by a crude scheme of +thought, it produced somewhat of a storm. Philosophy may not contribute +much of positive value, but it certainly has an important negative +function in the way of suppressing pretentious dogmatism and fictitious +knowledge, which often lead men astray. It is these things which produce +conflicts of science and religion or which find in evolution the solvent +of all mysteries and the source of all knowledge.</p> + +<p>Concerning the partition of territory between science and philosophy, +there are two distinct questions respecting the facts of experience. +First, we need to know the facts in their temporal and spatial order, +and the way they hang together in a system of law. To get this knowledge +is the function of science, and in this work science has inalienable +rights and a most important practical function. This work cannot be done +by speculation nor interfered with by authority of any kind. It is not +surprising, then, that scientists in their sense of contact with reality +should be indignant with, or feel contempt for, any who seek to limit or +proscribe their research. But supposing this work all done, there +remains another question respecting the causality and interpretation of +the facts. This question belongs to philosophy. Science describes and +registers the facts with their temporal and spatial laws; philosophy +studies their causality and significance. And while the scientist justly +ignores the philosopher who interferes with his inquiries, so the +philosopher may justly reproach the scientist who fails to see that the +scientific question does not touch the philosophic one....</p> + +<p>In the field of metaphysics proper I note a strong tendency toward +personal idealism, or as it might be called, Personalism; that is, the +doctrine that substantial reality can be conceived only under the +personal form and that all else is phenomenal. This is quite distinct +from the traditional idealisms of mere conceptionism. It holds the +essential fact to be a community of persons with a Supreme Person at +their head while the phenomenal world is only expression and means of +communication. And to this view we are led by the failure of +philosophizing on the impersonal plane, which is sure to lose itself in +contradiction and impossibility. Under the form of mechanical +naturalism, with its tendencies to materialism and atheism, +impersonalism has once more been judged and found wanting. We are not +likely to have a recurrence of this view unless there be a return to +philosophical barbarism. But impersonalism at the opposite pole in the +form of abstract categories of being, causality, unity, identity, +continuity, sufficient reason, etc., is equally untenable. Criticism +shows that these categories when abstractly and impersonally taken +cancel themselves. On the impersonal plane we can never reach unity from +plurality, or plurality from unity; and we can never find change in +identity, or identity in change. Continuity in time becomes mere +succession without the notion of potentiality, and this in turn is +empty. Existence itself is dispersed into nothingness through the +infinite divisibility of space and time, while the law of the sufficient +reason loses itself in barren tautology and the infinite regress. The +necessary logical equivalence of cause and effect in any impersonal +scheme makes all real explanation and progress impossible, and shuts us +up to an unintelligible oscillation between potentiality and actuality, +to which there is no corresponding thought....</p> + +<p>Philosophy is still militant and has much work before it, but the +omens are auspicious, the problems are better understood, and we are +coming to a synthesis of the results of past generations of thinking +which will be a very distinct progress. Philosophy has already done good +service, and never better than in recent times, by destroying pretended +knowledge and making room for the higher faiths of humanity. It has also +done good service in helping these faiths to better rational form, and +thus securing them against the defilements of superstition and the +cavilings of hostile critics. With all its aberrations and shortcomings, +philosophy deserves well of humanity.</p> + +</div> + +<h3 class="p4 center"><a name="Phil1"></a>PHILOSOPHY: ITS FUNDAMENTAL +CONCEPTIONS AND ITS METHODS</h3> + +<h4>BY GEORGE HOLMES HOWISON</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>George Holmes Howison</b>, Mills Professor of Intellectual and +Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity, University of California. b. +Montgomery County, Maryland, 1834. A.B. Marietta College, 1852; M.A. +1855; LL.D. <i>ibid.</i> 1883. Post-graduate, Lane Theological Seminary, +University of Berlin, and Oxford. Headmaster High School, Salem, Mass., +1862-64; Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Washington University, St. +Louis, 1864-66; Tileston Professor of Political Economy, <i>ibid.</i> +1866-69; Professor of Logic and the Philosophy of Science, Massachusetts +Institute of Technology, 1871-79; Lecturer on Ethics, Harvard +University, 1879-80; <b>Lecturer</b> on Logic and Speculative +Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1883-84. Member and vice-president +St. Louis Philosophical Society; member California Historical Society; +American Historical Association; American Association for the +Advancement of Science; National Geographic Society, etc. <b>Author +of</b> <i>Treatise on Analytic Geometry</i>, 1869; <i>The Limits of +Evolution</i>, 1901, 2d edition, 1904; joint author and editor of <i>The +Conception of God</i>, 1897, etc. <b>Editor</b> Philosophical +Publications of University of California; American Editorial +Representative <i>Hibbert Journal</i>, London.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">The duty has been assigned me, honored colleagues, of +addressing you on the Fundamental Conceptions and the Methods of our +common pursuit—philosophy. In endeavoring to deal with the subject +in a way not unworthy of its depth and its extent, I have found it +impossible to bring the essential material within less compass than +would occupy, in reading, at least four times the period granted by our +programme. I have therefore complied with the rule of the Congress which +directs that, if a more extended writing be left with the authorities +for publication, the reading must be restricted to such a portion of it +as will not exceed the allotted time. I will accordingly read to you, +first, a brief summary of my entire discussion, by way of introduction, +and then an excerpt from the larger document, which may serve for a +<i>specimen</i>, as our scholastic predecessors used to say, of the +whole inquiry I have carried out. The impression will, of course, be +fragmentary, and I must ask beforehand for your most benevolent +allowances, to prevent a judgment too unfavorable.</p> + +<p>The discussion naturally falls into two main parts: the first dealing +with the Fundamental Conceptions; and the second, with the Methods.</p> + +<p>In the former, after presenting the conception of philosophy itself, +as <i>the consideration of things in the light of the whole</i>, I take +up the involved Fundamental Concepts in the following order:<span +style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="5" summary="Concepts"> + +<tr><td class="right">I.</td><td class="left">Whole and Part;</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">II.</td><td class="left">Subject and Object +(Knowing and Being, Mind and Matter; Dualism, Materialism, +Idealism);</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">III.</td><td class="left">Reality and Appearance +(Noumenon and Phenomenon);</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">IV.</td><td class="left">Cause and Effect +(Ground and Consequence; Causal System);</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">V.</td><td class="left">One and Many (Number +System; Monism and Pluralism);</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">VI.</td><td class="left">Time and Space (their +relation to Number; their Origin and Real Meaning);</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">VII.</td><td class="left">Unconditioned and +Conditioned (Soul, World, God; their Reinterpretation in terms of +Pluralism);</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">VIII.</td><td class="left">The True, the +Beautiful, the Good (their relation to the question between Monism and +Pluralism).</td></tr> + +</table> + +<p class="less2">These are successively dealt with as they rise one +out of the other in the process of interpreting them and applying them +in the actual creation of philosophy, as this goes on in the historic +schools. The theoretic progress of philosophy is in this way explained +by them, in its movement from natural dualism, or realism, through the +successive forms of monism, materialistic, agnostic, and idealistic, +until it reaches the issue, now coming so strongly forward within the +school of idealism, between the adherents of monism and those of +pluralism.</p> + +<p>The importance of the Fundamental Concepts is shown to increase as we +pass along the list, till on reaching Cause and Effect, and entering +upon its full interpretation into the complete System of Causes, we +arrive at the very significant conception of the <span +class="smcap">Reciprocity of First Causes</span>, and through it come to +the <span class="smcap">Primacy of Final Cause</span>, and the +derivative position of the other forms of cause, Material, Formal, +Efficient. The philosophic strength of idealism, but especially of +idealistic pluralism, comes into clear light as the result of this stage +of the inquiry. But it appears yet more decidedly when One and Many, +Time and Space, and their interrelations, are subjected to analysis. So +the discussion next passes to the higher conceptions, Soul, World, God, +by the pathway of the correlation Unconditioned and Conditioned, and its +kindred contrasts Absolute and Relative, Necessary and Contingent, +Infinite and Finite, corroborating and reinforcing the import of +idealism, and, still more decidedly, that of its plural form. Finally, +the strong and favorable bearing of this last on the dissolution of +agnosticism and the habilitation of the ideals, the True, the Beautiful, +and the Good, in a heightened meaning, is brought out.</p> + +<p>This carries the inquiry to the second part of it, that of the +Philosophical Methods. Here I recount these in a series of six: the +Dogmatic, the Skeptical, the Critical, the Pragmatic, the Genetic, the +Dialectic. These, I show, in spite of the tendency of the earlier +members in the series to over-emphasis, all have their place and +function in the development of a complete philosophy, and in fact form +an ascending series in methodic effectiveness, all that precede the last +being taken up into the comprehensive Critical Rationalism of the last. +Methodology thus passes upward, over the ascending and widening roadways +of (1) Intuition and Deduction; (2) Experience and Induction; (3) +Intuition and Experience adjusted by Critical Limits; (4) Skepticism +reinforced and made <i>quasi</i>-affirmative by Desire and Will; (5) +Empiricism enlarged by substitution of cosmic and psychic history for +subjective consciousness; (6) Enlightened return to a Rationalism +critically established by the inclusion of the preceding elements, and +by the sifting and the grading of the Fundamental Concepts through their +behavior when tested by the effort to make them universal. In this way, +the methods fall into a System, the organic principle of which is this +principle of Dialectic, which proves itself alone able to establish +<i>necessary</i> truths; that is, <i>truths indeed</i>,—judgments +that are seen to exclude their opposites, because, in the attempt to +substitute the opposite, the place of it is still filled by the judgment +which it aims to dislodge.</p> + +<p>And now, with your favoring leave, I will read the excerpt from my +larger text.</p> + +<p>The task to which, in an especial sense, the cultivators of +philosophy are summoned by the plans of the present Congress of Arts and +Science, is certainly such as to stir an ambition to achieve it. At the +same time, it tempers eagerness by its vast difficulty, and the +apprehension lest this may prove insuperable. The task, the officers of +the Congress tell us, is no less than to promote the unification of all +human knowledge. It requires, then, the reduction of the enormous detail +in our present miscellany of sciences and arts, which to a general +glance, or even to a more intimate view, presents a confusion of +differences that seems overwhelming, to a system nevertheless clearly +harmonious,—founded, that is to say, upon universal principles +which control all differences by explaining them, and which therefore, +in the last resort, themselves flow lucidly from a single supreme +principle. Simply to state this meaning of the task set us, is enough to +awaken the doubt of its practicability.</p> + +<p>This doubt, we are bound to confess, has more and more impressed +itself upon the general mind, the farther this has advanced in the +experience of scientific discovery. The very increase in the +multiplicity and complexity of facts and their causal groupings +increases the feeling that at the root of things there is "a final +inexplicability"—total reality seems, more and more, too vast, too +profound, for us to grasp or to fathom. And yet, strangely enough, this +increasing sense of mysterious vastness has not in the least prevented +the modern mind from more and more asserting, with a steadily increasing +insistence, the essential and unchangeable unity of that whole of things +which to our ordinary experience, and even to all our sciences, appears +such an endless and impenetrable complex of differences,—yes, of +contradictions. In fact, this assertion of the unity of all things, +under the favorite name of the Unity of Nature, is the pet dogma of +modern science; or, rather, to speak with right accuracy, it is the +stock-in-trade of a <i>philosophy</i> of science, current among many of +the leaders of modern science; for every such assertion, covering, as it +tacitly and unavoidably does, a view about the absolute whole, is an +assertion belonging to the province of philosophy, before whose tribunal +it must come for the assessment of its value. The presuppositions of all +the special sciences, and, above all, this presupposition of the Unity +and Uniformity of Nature, common to all of them, must thus come back for +justification and requisite definition to philosophy—that +uppermost and all-inclusive form of cognition which addresses itself to +the whole as whole. In their common assertion of the Unity of Nature, +the exponents of modern science come unawares out of their own province +into quite another and a higher; and in doing so they show how unawares +they come, by presenting in most instances the curious spectacle of +proclaiming at once their increasing belief in the unity of things, and +their increasing disbelief in its penetrability by our +intelligence:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<div class="poem"> + <span class="i6"><i>In's Innere der Natur,</i></span><br /> + <span class="i6"><i>Dringt kein erschaffner Geist,</i></span><br /> +</div> + +<p>is their chosen poet's expression of their philosophic mood. Curious +we have the right to call this state of the scientific mind, because it +is to critical reflection so certainly self-contradictory. How can there +be a real unity belonging to what is inscrutable?—what evidence of +unity can there be, except in intelligible and explanatory +continuity?</p> + +<p>But, at all events, this very mood of agnostic self-contradiction, +into which the development of the sciences casts such a multitude of +minds, brings them,—brings all of us,—as already indicated, +into that court of philosophy where alone such issues lawfully belong, +and where alone they can be adjudicated. If the unification of the +sciences can be made out to be real by making out its sole sufficient +condition, namely, that there is a genuine, and not a merely nominal, +unity in the whole of reality itself,—a unity that explains +because it is itself, not simply intelligible, but the only completely +intelligible of things,—this desirable result must be the work of +philosophy. However difficult the task may be, it is rightly put upon us +who belong to the Department listed first among the twenty-four in the +programme of this representative Congress.</p> + +<p>I cannot but express my own satisfaction, as a member of this +Department, nor fail to extend my congratulations to you who are my +colleagues in it, that the Congress, in its programme, takes openly the +affirmative on this question of the possible unification of knowledge. +The Congress has thus declared beforehand for the practicability of the +task it sets. It has even declared for its not distant accomplishment; +indeed, not impossibly, its accomplishment through the transactions of +the Congress itself; and it indicates, by no uncertain signs, the +leading, the determining part that philosophy must have in the +achievement. In fact, the authorities of the Congress themselves suggest +a solution of their own for their problem. In their programme we see a +renewed Hierarchy of the Sciences, and at the summit of this appears now +again, after so long a period of humiliating obscuration, the figure of +Philosophy, raised anew to that supremacy, as Queen of the Sciences, +which had been hers from the days of Plato to those of Copernicus, but +which she began to lose when modern physical and historical research +entered upon its course of sudden development, and which, until +recently, she has continued more and more to lose as the sciences have +advanced in their career of discoveries,—ever more unexpected, +more astonishing, yet more convincing and more helpful to the welfare of +mankind. May this sign of her recovered empire not fail! If we rejoice +at the token, the Congress has made it our part to see that the title is +vindicated. It is ours to show this normative function of philosophy, +this power to reign as the unifying discipline in the entire realm of +our possible knowledge; to show it by showing that the very nature of +philosophy—its elemental concepts and its directing ideals, its +methods taken in their systematic succession—is such as must +result in a view of universal reality that will supply the principle at +once giving rise to all the sciences and connecting them all into one +harmonious whole.</p> + +<p>Such, and so grave, my honored colleagues, is the duty assigned to +this hour. Sincerely can I say, Would it had fallen to stronger hands +than mine! But since to mine it has been committed, I will undertake it +in no disheartened spirit; rather, in that temper of animated hope in +which the whole Congress has been conceived and planned. And I draw +encouragement from the place, and its associations, where we are +assembled—from its historic connections not only with the external +expansion of our country, but with its growth in culture, and especially +with its growth in the cultivation of philosophy. For your speaker, at +least, can never forget that here in St. Louis, the metropolis of the +region by which our national domain was in the Louisiana Purchase so +enlarged,—here was the centre of a movement in philosophic study +that has proved to be of national import. It is fitting that we all, +here to-day, near to the scene itself, commemorate the public service +done by our present National Commissioner of Education and his group of +enthusiastic associates, in beginning here, in the middle years of the +preceding century, those studies of Kant and his great idealistic +successors that unexpectedly became the nucleus of a wider and more +penetrating study of philosophy in all parts of our country. It is with +quickened memories belonging to the spot where, more than +five-and-thirty years ago, it was my happy fortune to take some part +with Dr. Harris and his companions, that I begin the task assigned me. +The undertaking seems less hopeless when I can here recall the names and +the congenial labors of Harris, of Davidson, of Brockmeyer, of Snider, +of Watters, of Jones,—half of them now gone from life. They +"builded better than they knew;" and, humbly as they may themselves have +estimated their ingenuous efforts to gain acquaintance with the greatest +thoughts, history will not fail to take note of what they did, as +marking one of the turning-points in the culture of our nation. The +publication of the <i>Journal of Speculative Philosophy</i>, granting +all the subtractions claimed by its critics on the score of defects (of +which its conductors were perhaps only too sensible), was an influence +that told in all our circles of philosophical study, and thence in the +whole of our social as well as our academic life.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>[Here I enter upon the discussion of the subject proper, beginning, +as above indicated, with the Fundamental Conceptions. Having followed +these through the contrasts Whole and Part, Subject and Object, Reality +and Appearance (or Noumenon and Phenomenon), and developed the bearing +of these on the procedure of thought from the dualism of natural realism +to materialism and thence to idealism, with the issue now coming on, in +this last, between monism and pluralism, I strike into the contrast +Cause and Effect, and, noting its unfolding into the more comprehensive +form of Ground and Consequence, go on thence as follows:]</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>It is plain that the contrast Ground and Consequence will enable us +to state the new issue with closer precision and pertinence than Reality +and Appearance, Noumenon and Phenomenon, can supply; while, at the same +time, Ground and Consequence exhibits Cause and Effect as presenting a +contrast that only fulfills what Noumenon and Phenomenon foretold and +strove towards; in fact, what was more remotely, but not less surely, +also indicated by Whole and Part, Knowing and Being, Subject and Object. +For in penetrating to the coherent meaning of these conceptions, the +philosophic movement, as we saw, advanced steadily to the fuller and +fuller translating of each of them into the reality that unifies <i>by +explanation</i>, instead of pretending to explain by merely unifying; +and this, of course, will now be put forward explicitly, in the +clarified category of Cause and Effect, transfigured from a physical +into a purely logical relation. What idealism now says, in terms of +this, is that the Cause (or, as we now read it, the Ground) of all that +exists is the Subject; is Mind, the intelligently Self-conscious; and +that all things else, the mere objects, material things, are its +Consequence, its Outcome,—in that sense its Effect. And what the +new pluralistic idealism says, is that the <i>assemblage of individual +minds</i>—intelligence being essentially personal and individual, +and never merely universal and collective—is the true total Cause +of all, and that every mind thus belongs to the order of First Causes; +nevertheless, that part, and the most significant part, of the nature of +every mind, essential to its personality and its reason, is <i>its +recognition of other minds in the very act of its own +self-definition</i>. That is to say, a mind by its spontaneous nature as +intelligence, by its intrinsic rational or logical genius, puts itself +as member of a <i>system</i> of minds; all minds are put by each other +as Ends—completely standard and sacred Objects, as much parts of +the system of true Causes as each is, in its capacity of Subject; and we +have a noumenal Reality that is properly to be described as the eternal +Federal Republic of Spirits.</p> + +<p>Consequently, the relation of Cause and Effect now expands and +heightens into a system of the <span class="smcap">Reciprocity of First +Causes</span>; causes, that is, which, while all coefficients in the +existence and explanation of that natural world of experience which +forms their passive effect, their objects of mere perception, are +themselves related only in the higher way of Final Causes—that is, +Defining-Bases and Ends—of each other, making them the logical +Complements, and the Objects of conduct, all for each, and each for all. +Hence, the system of causation undergoes a signal transformation, and +proves to be organized by Final Cause as its basis and root, instead of +by Efficient Cause, or Originating Ground, as the earlier stages of +thinking had always assumed.</p> + +<p>The causal relation between the absolute or primary realities being +purely Final, or Defining and Purposive; that is to say, the uncoercive +influence of recognition and ideality; all the other forms of cause, as +grouped by Aristotle,—Material, Formal, and Efficient,—are +seen to be the derivatives of Final Cause, as being supplied by the +action of the minds that, as absolute or underived realities, exist only +in the relation of mutual Complements and Ends. Accordingly, Efficient +Cause operates only from minds, as noumena, to matter, as their +phenomenon, their presented contents of experience; or, in a secondary +and derivative sense, from one phenomenon to another, or from one group +of phenomena to another group, these playing the part of transmitters, +or (as some logicians would say) Instrumental Causes, or Means. Cause, +as Material, is hence defined as the elementary phenomenon, and the +combinations of this; and therefore, strictly taken, is merely Effect +(or Outcome) of the self-active consciousness, whose spontaneous forms +of conception and perception become the Formal Cause that organizes the +sum of phenomena into cosmic harmony or unity.</p> + +<p>Here, accordingly, comes into view the further and in some respects +deeper conceptual pair, Many and One. The history of philosophic thought +proves that this antithesis is darkly obscure and deeply ambiguous; for +about it have centred a large part of the conflicts of doctrine. This +pair has already been used, implicitly, in exhibiting the development of +the preceding group, Cause and Effect; and in so using it we have +supplied ourselves with a partial clarification of it, and with one +possible solution of its ambiguity. We have seen, namely, how our strong +natural persuasion that philosophy guided by the fundamental concept +Cause must become the search for the One amid the wilderness of the +Many, and that this search cannot be satisfied and ended except in an +all-inclusive Unit, in which the Many is embraced as the integral and +originated parts, completely determined, subjected, and controlled, may +give way to another and less oppressive conception of unity; a +conception of it as the harmony among many free and independent primary +realities, a harmony founded on their intelligent and reasonable mutual +recognition. This conception casts at least <i>some</i> clearing light +upon the long and dreary disputes over the Many and the One; for it +exposes, plainly, the main source of them. They have arisen out of two +chief ambiguities,—the ambiguity of the concept One, and the +ambiguity of the concept Cause in its supreme meaning. The normal +contrast between the One and the Many is a clear and simple contrast: +the One is the single unit, and the Many is the repetition of the unit, +or is the collection of the several units. But if we go on to suppose +that there is a collection or sum of all possible units, and call this +the Whole, then, since there can be no second such, we call it also +"one" (or the One, by way of preëminence), overlooking the fact that it +differs from the simple one, or unit, <i>in genere</i>; that it is in +fact not a unit at all, not an elementary member of a series, but the +annulment of all series; that our name "one" has profoundly changed its +meaning, and now stands for the Sole, the Only. Thus, by our +forgetfulness of differences, we fall into deep water, and, with the +confused illusions of the drowning, dream of the One and All as the +single <i>punctum originationis</i> of all things, the Source and +Begetter of the very units of which it is in reality only the resultant +and the derivative. Or, from another point of view, and in another mood, +we rightly enough take the One to mean the coherent, the intelligible, +the consistent, the harmonious; and putting the Many, on the misleading +hint of its contrast to the unit, in antithesis to this One of harmony, +we fall into the belief that the Many cannot be harmonious, is +intrinsically a cluster of repulsions or of collisions, incapable of +giving rise to accord; indeed, essentially hostile to it. So, as accord +is the aim and the essence of our reason, we are caught in the snare of +monism, pluralism having apparently become the equivalent of chaos, and +thus the <i>bête noir</i> of rational metaphysics. Nay, in the opposed +camp itself, some of the most ardent adherents of pluralism, the +liveliest of wit, the most exuberant in literary resources, are the +abjectest believers in the hopeless disjunction and capriciousness of +the plural, and hold there is a rift in the texture of reality that no +intelligence, "even though you dub it 'the Absolute,'" can mend or reach +across. Yet surely there is nothing in the Many, as a sum of units, the +least at war with the One as a system of harmony. On the contrary, even +in the pure form of the Number Series, the Many is impossible except on +the principle of harmony,—the units can be collected and summed +(that is, constitute the Many), only if they cohere in a community of +intrinsic kindred. Consequently the whole question of the chaotic or the +harmonic nature of a plural world turns on the nature of the genus which +we find characteristic of the absolutely (<i>i. e.</i>, the +unreservedly) real, and which is to be taken as the common denomination +enabling us to count them and to sum them. When minds are seen to be +necessarily the primary realities, but <i>also necessarily federal</i> +as well as individual, the illusion about the essential disjunction and +non-coherence of the plurally real dissolves away, and a primordial +world of manifold persons is seen to involve no fundamental or hopeless +anarchy of individualism, irreducible in caprice, but an indwelling +principle of harmony, rather, that from the springs of individual being +intends the control and composure of all the disorders that mark the +world of experiential appearance, and so must tend perpetually to effect +this.</p> + +<p>The other main source of our confusions over the Many and the One is +the variety of meaning hidden in the concept Cause, and our propensity +to take its most obvious but least significant sense for its supreme +intent. Closest at hand, in experience, is our productive causation of +changes in our sense-world, and hence most obvious is that reading of +Cause which takes it as the producer of changes and, with a deeper +comprehension of it, of the inalterable linkage between changes, whereby +one follows regularly and surely upon another. Thus what we have in +philosophy agreed to call Efficient Cause comes to be mistaken for the +profoundest and the supreme form of cause, and all the other modes of +cause, the Material (or Stuff), the Form (or Conception), and the End +(or Purpose), its consequent and derivative auxiliaries. Under the +influence of this strong impression, we either assume total reality to +be One Whole, all-embracing and all-producing of its manifold modes, or +else view it as a duality, consisting of One Creator and his manifold +creatures. So it has come about that metaphysics has hitherto been +chiefly a contention between pantheism and monotheism, or, as the latter +should for greater accuracy be called, monarchotheism; and, it must be +acknowledged, this struggle has been attended by a continued (though not +continual) decline of this later dualistic theory before the steadfast +front and unyielding advance of the older monism. Thus persistent has +been the assumption that harmony can only be assured by the unity given +in some single productive causation: the only serious uncertainty has +been about the most rational way of conceiving the operation of this +Sole Cause; and this doubt has thus far, on the whole, declined in favor +of the Elder Oriental or monistic conception, as against the Hebraic +conception of extraneous creation by fiat. The frankly confessed mystery +of the latter, its open appeal to miracle, places it at a fatal +disadvantage with the Elder Orientalism, when the appeal is to reason +and intelligibility. It is therefore no occasion for wonder that, +especially since the rise of the scientific doctrine of Evolution, with +its postulate of a universal unity, self-varying yet self-fulfilling, +even the leaders of theology are more and more falling into the monistic +line and swelling the ever-growing ranks of pantheism. If it be asked +here, <i>And why not?</i>—<i>where is the harm of +it?</i>—<i>is not the whole question simply of what is true</i>? +the answer is, <i>The mortal harm of the destruction of personality, +which lives or dies with the preservation or destruction of individual +responsibility; while the completer truth is, that there are other and +profounder (or, if you please, higher) truths than this of explanation +by Efficient Cause</i>. In fact, there is a higher conception of Cause +itself than this of production, or efficiency; for, of course, as we +well might say, that alone can be the supreme conception of Cause which +can subsist between absolute or unreserved realities, and such must +exclude their production or their necessitating control by others. So +that we ought long since to have realized that Final Cause, the +recognized presence to each other as unconditioned realities, or +Defining Auxiliaries and Ends, is the sole causal relation that can hold +among primary realities; though among such it <i>can</i> hold, and in +fact must.</p> + +<p>For the absolute reality of personal intelligences, at once +individual and universally recognizant of others, is called for by other +conceptions fundamental to philosophy. These other fundamental concepts +can no more be counted out or ignored than those we have hitherto +considered; and when we take them up, we shall see how vastly more +significant they are. They alone will prove supreme, truly organizing, +normative; they alone can introduce gradation in truths, for they alone +introduce the judgment of worth, of valuation; they alone can give us +counsels of perfection, for they alone rise from those elements in our +being which deal with ideals and with veritable Ideas. So let us proceed +to them.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>Our path into their presence, however, is through another pair, not +so plainly antithetic as those we have thus far considered. This pair +that I now mean is Time and Space, which, though not obviously +antinomic, yet owes its existence, as can now be shown, to that +profoundest of concept-contrasts which we earlier considered under the +head of Subject and Object, when the Object takes on its only adequate +form of Other Subject. But in passing from the contrast One and Many +towards its rational transformation into the moral society of Mind and +Companion Minds, we break into this pair of Time and Space, and must +make our way through it by taking in its full meaning.</p> + +<p>Time and Space play an enormous part in all our empirical thinking, +our actual use of thought in our sense-perceptive life. And no wonder; +for, in coöperation, they form the postulate and condition of all our +possible sensuous consciousness. Only on them as backgrounds can thought +take on the peculiar clearness of an image or a picture; only on the +screens which they supply can we literally <i>depict</i> an object. And +this clarity of outline and boundary is so dear to our ordinary +consciousness, that we are prone to say there is no sufficient, no real +clearness, unless we can clarify by the bounds either of place or of +date, or of both. In this mood, we are led to deny the reality and +validity of thought altogether, when it cannot be defined in the metes +and bounds afforded by Time or by Space: that which has no date nor +place, we say,—no extent and no duration,—cannot be real; it +is but a pseudo-thought, a pretense and a delusion. Here is the +extremely plausible foundation of the philosophy known as sensationism, +the refined or second-thought form of materialism, in which it begins +its euthanasia into idealism.</p> + +<p>Without delaying here to criticise this, let us notice the part that +Time and Space play in reference to the conceptual pair we last +considered, the One and the Many; for not otherwise shall we find our +way beyond them to the still more fundamental conceptions which we are +now aiming to reach. Indeed, it is through our surface-apprehension of +the pair One and Many, as this illumines experience, that we most +naturally come at the pair Time and Space; so that these are at first +taken for mere generalizations and abstractions, the purely nominal +representatives of the actual distinctions between the members of the +Many by our sense<ins title="hyphenated in the original"> +</ins>perception of this from that, of here from there, of now from +then. It is not till our reflective attention is fixed on the fact that +<i>there</i> and <i>here</i>, <i>now</i> and <i>then</i>, are +<i>peculiar</i> distinctions, wholly different from other contrasts of +this with that,—which may be made in all sorts of ways, by +difference of quality, or of quantity, or of relations quite other than +place and date,—it is not till we realize this <i>peculiar</i> +character of the Time-contrast and the Space-contrast, that we see these +singular differential <i>qualia</i> cannot be derived from others, not +even from the contrast One and Many, but are independent, are themselves +underived and spontaneous utterances of our intelligent, our percipient +nature. But when Kant first helped mankind to the realization of this +spontaneous (or <i>a priori</i>) character of this pair of perceptive +conditions, or Sense-Forms, he fell into the persuasion, and led the +philosophic world into it, that though Time and Space are not +derivatives of the One and the Many read as the numerical aspect of our +perceptive experiences, yet there <i>is</i> between the two pairs a +connection of dependence as intimate as that first supposed, but in +exactly the opposite sense; namely, that the One and the Many are +conditioned by Time and Space, or, when it comes to the last resort, are +at any rate completely dependent upon Time. By a series of units, this +view means, we really understand a set of items discriminated and +related either as points or as instants: in the last analysis, as +instants: that is, it is impossible to apprehend a unit, or to count and +sum units, unless the unit is taken as an instant, and the units as so +many instants. Numbers, Kant holds, are no doubt pure (or quite +unsensuous) percepts,—discerned particulars,—therefore +spontaneous products of the mind <i>a priori</i>, but made possible only +by the primary pure percept Time, or, again, through the mediation of +this, by the conjoined pure percept Space; so that the numbers, in their +own pure character, are simply the instants in their series. As the +instants, and therefore the numbers, are pure +percepts,—particulars discerned without the help of +sense,—so pure percepts, in a primal and comprehensive sense, +argues Kant, must their conditioning postulates Time and Space be, to +supply the "element," or "medium," that will render such pure percepts +possible.</p> + +<p>This doctrine of Kant's is certainly plausible; indeed, it is +impressively so; and it has taken a vast hold in the world of science, +and has reinforced the popular belief in the unreality of thought apart +from Time and Space; an unreality which it is an essential part of +Kant's system to establish critically. But as a graver result, it has +certainly tended to discredit the belief in personal identity as an +abiding and immutable reality, enthroned over the mutations of things in +Time and Space; since all that is in these is numbered and is mutable, +and is rather many than one, yet nothing is believed real except as it +falls under them, at any rate under Time. And with this decline of the +belief in a changeless self, has declined, almost as rapidly and +extensively, the belief in immortality. Or, rather, the permanence and +the identity of the person has faded into a question regarded as +unanswerable; though none the less does this agnostic state of belief +tend to take personality, in any responsible sense of the word, out of +the region of practical concern. With what is unknowable, even if +existing, we can have no active traffic; 't is for our conduct as if it +were not.</p> + +<p>So it behooves us to search if this prevalent view about the relation +of One and Many to Time and Space is trustworthy and exact. What place +and function in philosophy must Space and Time be given?—for they +certainly have a place and function; they certainly are among the +inexpugnable conceptions with which thought has to concern itself when +it undertakes to gain a view of the whole. But it may be easy to give +them a larger place and function than belong to them by right. Is it +true, then, that the One and the Many—that the system of Numbers, +in short—are unthinkable except as in Space and Time, or, at any +rate, in Time? Or, to put the question more exactly, as well as more +gravely and more pertinently, Are Space and Time the true <i>principia +individui</i>, and is Time preëminently the ultimate <i>principium +individuationis</i>? Is there accordingly no individuality, and no +society, no associative assemblage, except in the fleeting world of +phenomena, dated and placed? Simply to ask the question, and thus bring +out the full drift of this Kantian doctrine, is almost to expose the +absurdity of it. Such a doctrine, though it may be wisely refusing to +confound personality, true individuality, with the mere logical +singular; nay, worse, with a limited and special illustration of the +singular, the one <i>here</i> or the one <i>there</i>, the one +<i>now</i> or the one <i>then</i>; nevertheless, by confining +numerability to things material and sensible, makes personal identity +something unmeaning or impossible, and destroys part of the foundation +for the relations of moral responsibility. Though the vital trait of the +person, his genuine individuality, doubtless lies, not in his being +exactly numerable, but in his being aboriginal and originative; in a +word, in his self-activity, in his being a centre of autonomous social +recognition; yet exactly numerable he indeed is, and must be, not +confusable with any other, else his professed autonomy, his claim of +rights and his sense of duty, can have no significance, must vanish in +the universal confusion belonging to the indefinite. Nor, on the other +hand, is it at all true that a number has to be a point or an instant, +nor that things when numbered and counted are implicitly pinned upon +points or, at all events, upon instants. It may well enough be the fact +that in our empirical use of number we have to employ Time, or even +Space, but it is a gaping <i>non sequitur</i> to conclude that we +therefore can count nothing but the placed and the dated. Certainly we +count whenever we <i>distinguish</i>,—by whatever means, on +whatever ground. To think is, in general, at least to "distinguish the +things that differ;" but this will not avail except we keep account of +the differences; hence the One and the Many lie in the very bosom of +intelligence, and this fundamental and spontaneous contrast can not only +rive Time and Space into expressions of it, in instants and in points, +but travels with thought from its start to its goal, and as organic +factor in mathematical science does indeed, as Plato in the +<i>Republic</i> said, deal with absolute being, if yet dreamwise; so +that One and Many, and Many as the sum of the ones, makes part of the +measure of that primally real world which the world of minds alone can +be. If the contrast One and Many can pass the bounds of the merely +phenomenal, by passing the temporal and the spatial; if it applies to +universal being, to the noumenal as well as to the phenomenal; then the +absolutely real world, so far as concerns this essential condition, can +be a world of genuine individuals, identifiable, free, abiding, +responsible, and there can be a real moral order; if not, then there can +be no such moral world, and the deeper thought-conceptions to which we +now approach must be regarded, at the best, as fair illusions, bare +ideals, which the serious devotee of truth must shun, except in such +moments of vacancy and leisure as he may venture to surrender, at +intervals, to purely hedonic uses. But if the One and the Many are not +dependent on Time and Space, their universal validity is possible; and +it has already been shown that they are not so dependent, are not thus +restricted.</p> + +<p>And now it remains to show their actual universality, by exhibiting +their place in the structure of the absolutely real; since nobody calls +in question their pertinence to the world of phenomena. But their +noumenal applicability follows from their essential implication with all +and every difference: no difference, no distinction, that does not carry +counting; and this is quite as true as that there can be no counting +without difference. The One and the Many thus root in Identity and +Difference, pass up into fuller expression in Universal and Particular, +hold forward into Cause and Effect, attain their commanding presentation +in the Reciprocity of First Causes, and so keep record of the contrast +between Necessity and Contingency. In short, they are founded in, and in +their turn help (indispensably) to express, <i>all</i> the +categories,—Quality, Quantity, Relation, Modality. Nor do they +suffer arrest there; they hold in the ideals, the True, the Beautiful, +the Good, and in the primary Ideas, the Self, the World, and God. For +all of these differ, however close their logical linkage may be; and in +so far as they differ, each of them is a counted unit, and so they are +many. And, most profoundly of all, One and Many take footing in absolute +reality so soon as we realize that nothing short of intelligent being +can be primordially real, underived, and truly causal, and that +intelligence is, by its idea, at once an <i>I</i>-thinking and a +universal recognizant outlook upon others that think <i>I</i>.</p> + +<p>Hence Number, so far from being the derivative of Time and Space, +founds, at the bottom, in the self-definition and social recognition of +intelligent beings, and so finds <i>a priori</i> a valid expression in +Time and in Space, as well as in every other primitive and spontaneous +form in which intelligence utters itself. The Pythagorean doctrine of +the rank of Number in the scale of realities is only one remove from the +truth: though the numbers are indeed not the Prime Beings, they do enter +into the essential nature of the Prime Beings; are, so to speak, the +organ of their definite reality and identity, and for that reason go +forward into the entire defining procedure by which these intelligences +organize their world of experiences. And the popular impression that +Time and Space are derivatives from Number, is in one aspect the truth, +rather than the doctrine of Kant is; for though they are not mere +generalizations and abstractions from numbered dates and durations, +places and extents, they do exist as relating-principles which minds +simply <i>put</i>, as the conditions <i>of perceptive experiences</i>; +which by the nature of intelligence they must number in order to have +and to master; while Number itself, the contrast of One and Many, enters +into the very being of minds, and therefore still holds in Time and in +Space, which are the organs, or <i>media</i>, not of the whole being of +the mind, but only of that region of it constituted by +sensation,—the material, the disjunct, the empirical. Besides, the +logical priority of Number is implied in the fact that minds in putting +Time and Space <i>a priori</i> must count them as two, since they +discriminate them with complete clearness, so that it is impossible to +work up Space out of Time (as Berkeley and Stuart Mill so adroitly, but +so vainly, attempted to do), or Time out of Space (as Hegel, with so +little adroitness and such patent failure, attempted to do). No; there +Time and Space stand, fixed and inconfusable, incapable of mutual +transmutation, and thus the ground of an abiding difference between the +inner or psychic sense-world and the outer or physical, between the +subjective and the (sensibly) objective. By means of them, the world of +minds discerns and bounds securely between the privacy of each and the +publicity, the life "out of doors," which is common to all; between the +cohering isolation of the individual and the communicating action of the +society. Indeed, as from this attained point of view we can now clearly +see, the real ground of the difference between Time and Space, and hence +between subjective perception and the objective existence of physical +things, is in the fact that a mind, in <i>being</i> such,—in its +very act of self-definition,—correlates itself with a +<i>society</i> of minds, and so, to fulfill its nature, in so far as +this includes a world of experiences, must form its experience socially +as well as privately, and hence will put forth a condition of sensuous +communication, as well as a condition of inner sensation. Thus the +dualization of the sense-world into inner and outer, psychic and +physical, subjective and objective, rests at last on the intrinsically +social nature of conscious being; rests on the twofold structure, +logically dichotomous, of the self-defining act; and we get the +explanation, from the nature of intelligence as such, why the +Sense-Forms are necessarily two, and only two. It is no accident that we +experience all things sensible in Time or in Space, or in both together; +it is the natural expression of our primally intelligent being, +concerned as that is, directly and only, with our self and its logically +necessary complement, the other selves; and so the natural order, in its +two discriminated but complemental portions, the inner and the outer, is +founded in that moral order which is given in the fundamental act of our +intelligence. It is this resting of Space upon our veritable Objects, +the Other Subjects, that imparts to it its externalizing quality, so +that things in it are referred to the testing of all minds, not to ours +only, and are reckoned external because measured by that which is alone +indeed other than we.</p> + +<p>In this way we may burst the restricting limit which so much of +philosophy, and so much more of ordinary opinion, has drawn about our +mental powers in view of this contrast Time and Space, especially with +reference to the One and the Many, and to the persuasion that plural +distinctions, at any rate, cannot belong in the region of absolute +reality. Ordinary opinion either inclines to support a philosophy that +is skeptical of either Unity or Plurality being pertinent beyond Time +and Space, and thus to hold by agnosticism, or, if it affects +affirmative metaphysics, tends to prefer monism to pluralism, when the +number-category is carried up into immutable regions: to represent the +absolutely real as One, somehow seems less contradictory of the "fitness +of things" than to represent it as Many; moreover, carrying the Many +into that supreme region, by implying the belonging there of mortals +such as we, seems shocking to customary piety, and full of extravagant +presumption. Still, nothing short of this can really satisfy our deep +demand for a moral order, a personal responsibility, nay, an adequate +logical fulfillment of our conception of a self as an +<i>intelligence</i>; while the clarification which a rational pluralism +supplies for such ingrained puzzles in the theory of knowledge as that +of the source and finality of the contrast Time and Space, to mention no +others, should afford a strong corroborative evidence in its behalf. +And, as already said, this view enables us to pass the limit which Time +and Space are so often supposed to put, hopelessly, upon our concepts of +the ideal grade, the springs of all our aspiration. To these, then, we +may now pass.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>We reach them through the doorways of the Necessary <i>vs.</i> the +Contingent, the Unconditioned <i>vs.</i> the Conditioned, the Infinite +<i>vs.</i> the Finite, the Absolute <i>vs.</i> the Relative; and we +recognize them as our profoundest foundation-concepts, alone deserving, +as Kant so pertinently said, the name of <span +class="smcap">Ideas</span>,—the Soul, the World, and God. +Associated with them are what we may call our three Forms of the +Ideal,—the True, the Beautiful, the Good. These Ideas and their +affiliated ideals have the highest directive and settling function in +the organization of philosophy; they determine its schools and its +history, by forming the centre of all its controlling problems; they +prescribe its great subdivisions, breaking it up into Metaphysics, +Æsthetics, and Ethics, and Metaphysics, again, into Psychology +Cosmology, and Ontology,—or Theology in the classic sense, which, +in the modern sense, becomes the Philosophy of Religion; they call into +existence, as essential preparatory and auxiliary disciplines, Logic and +the Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology. They thus provide the true +distinctions between philosophy and the sciences of experience, and +present these sciences as the carrying out, upon experiential details, +of the methodological principles which philosophy alone can supply; +hence they lead us to view all the sciences as in fact the applied +branches, the completing organs of philosophy, instead of its hostile +competitors.</p> + +<p>As for the controlling questions which they start, these are such as +follow: Are the ideals but bare ideals, serving only to cast "a light +that never was, on land or sea?"—are the Ideas only bare ideas, +without any objective being of their own, without any footing in the +real, serving only to enhance the dull facts of experience with auroral +illusions? The philosophic thinker answers affirmatively, or with +complete skeptical dubiety, or with a convinced and uplifting negative, +according to his less or greater penetration into the real meaning of +these deepest concepts, and depending on his view into the nature and +thought-effect of the Necessary and the Contingent, the Unconditioned +and the Conditioned, the Infinite and the Finite, the Absolute and the +Relative.</p> + +<p>And what, now, are the accurate, the adequate meanings of the three +Ideas?—what <i>does</i> our profoundest thought intend by the +Soul, by the World, by God? We know how Kant construed them, in +consequence of the course by which he came critically (as he supposed) +upon them,—as respectively the paramount Subject of experiences; +the paramount Object of experiences, or the Causal Unity of the possible +series of sensible objects; and the complete Totality of Conditions for +experience and its objects, itself therefore the Unconditioned. It is +worth our notice, that especially by his construing the idea of God in +this way, thus rehabilitating the classical and scholastic conception of +God as the Sum of all Realities, he laid the foundation for that very +transfiguration of mysticism, that idealistic monism, which he himself +repudiated, but which his three noted successors in their several ways +so ardently accepted, and which has since so pervaded the philosophic +world. But suppose Kant's alleged critical analysis of the three Ideas +and their logical basis is in fact far from critical, far from "exactly +discriminative,"—and I believe there is the clearest warrant for +declaring that it is,—then the assumed "undeniable critical basis" +for idealistic monism will be dislodged, and it will be open to us to +interpret the Ideas with accuracy and consistency—an +interpretation which may prove to establish, not at all any monism, but +a rational pluralism. And this will also reveal to us, I think, that our +prevalent construing of the Unconditioned and the Conditioned, the +Necessary and the Contingent, the Infinite and the Finite, the Absolute +and the Relative, suffers from an equal inaccuracy of analysis, and +precisely for this reason gives a plausible but in fact untrustworthy +support to the monistic interpretation of God, and Soul, and World; or, +as Hegel and his chief adherents prefer to name them, God, Mind, and +Nature. If the Kantian analysis stands, then it seems to follow, clearly +enough, that God is the Inclusive Unit which at once embraces Mind and +Nature, Soul and World, expresses itself in them, and imparts to them +their meaning; and the plain dictate then is, that Kant's personal +prejudice, and the personal prejudices of others like him, in favor of a +transcendent God, must give way to that conception of the Divine, as +immanent and inclusive, which is alone consistent with its being indeed +the Totality of Conditions,—the Necessary Postulate, and the +Sufficient Reason, for both Subject and Object.</p> + +<p>But will Kant's analysis stand? Have we not here another of his few +but fatal slips,—like his doctrine of the dependence of Number +upon Time and Space, and its consequent subjection to them? It surely +seems so. If the veritable postulate of categorical syllogizing be, as +Kant thinks it is, merely the Subject, the self as experiencer of +presented phenomena, in contrast to the Object, the causally united sum +of possible phenomena; and if the true postulate of conditional +syllogizing is this cosmic Object, as contrasted with the correlate +Subject, then it would seem we cannot avoid certain pertinent questions. +Is such a postulate Subject any fit and adequate account of the whole +Self, of the Soul?—is there not a vital difference between this +subject-self and the Self as Person?—does not Kant himself imply +so, in his doctrine of the primacy of the Practical Reason? Again: Is +not the World, as explained in Kant's analysis, and as afterwards made +by him the solution of the Cosmological Antinomies, simply the +supplemental factor necessarily correlate to the subjective aspect of +the conscious life, and reduced from its uncritical rôle of +thing-in-itself to the intelligible subordination required by Kant's +theory of Transcendental Idealism?—and can this be any adequate +account of the Idea that is to stand in sufficing contrast to the whole +Self, the Person?—what less than the Society of Persons can meet +the World-Idea for that? Further: If with Kant we take the World to mean +no more than this object-factor in self-consciousness, must not the +Soul, the total Self, from which, according to Kant's Transcendental +Idealism, both Space and Time issue, supplying the basis for the +immutable contrast between the experiencing subject and the really +experienced objects,—must not this <i>whole</i> Self be the real +meaning of the "Totality of Conditions, itself unconditioned," which +comes into view as simply the postulate of disjunctive syllogizing? How +in the world can disjunctive syllogizing, the confessed act of the +<i>I</i>-thinking intelligence, really postulate anything as Totality of +Conditions, in any other sense than the total of conditions for such +syllogizing?—namely, the conditioning <i>I</i> that organizes and +does the reasoning? There is surely no warrant for calling this total, +which simply transcends and conditions the subject and the object of +sensible experiences, by any loftier name than that which Kant had +already given it in the Deduction of the Categories, when he designated +it the "originally synthetic unity of apperception +(self-consciousness)," or "the <i>I</i>-thinking (<i>das ich-denke</i>) +that must accompany all my mental presentations,"—that is to say, +the whole Self, or thinking Person, idealistically interpreted. The use +of the name God in this connection, where Kant is in fact only seeking +the roots of the three orders of the syllogism <i>when reasoning has by +supposition been restricted to the subject-matter of experience</i>, is +assuredly without warrant; yes, without excuse. In fact, it is because +Kant sees that the third Idea, as reached through his analysis, is +intrinsically immanent,—resident in the self that syllogizes +disjunctively, and, because so resident, incapable of passing the bounds +of possible experience,—while he also sees that the idea of God +should mean a Being transcendent of every other thinker, himself a +distinct individual consciousness, though not an empirically limited +one,—it is, I say, precisely because he sees all this, that he +pronounces the Idea, though named with the name of God, utterly without +pertinence to indicate God's existence, and so enters upon that part of +his Transcendental Dialectic which is, in chief, directed to exposing +the transcendental illusion involved in the celebrated Ontological +Proof. Consistently, Kant in this famous analytic of the syllogism +should be talking, not of the Soul, the World, and God, but of the +Subject (as uniting-principle of its sense-<i>perceptions</i>), the +Object (as uniting-principle of all possible sense-<i>percepts</i>), and +the Self (the whole <i>I</i> presiding over experience in both its +aspects, as these are discriminated in Time and Space). By what rational +title—even granting for the sake of argument that they are the +genuine postulates of categorical and of conditional +syllogizing—can this Subject and this Object, these correlate +factors in the Self, rank as Ideas with the Idea of their conditioning +Whole—the Self, that in its still unaltered identity fulfills, in +Practical Reason, the high rôle of Person? If <i>this</i> no more than +meets the standard of Idea, how can <i>they</i> meet it? How can two +somethings, neither of which is the Totality of Conditions, and both of +which are therefore in fact conditioned, deserve the same title with +that which is intrinsically the Totality of Conditions, and, as such, +unconditioned? To call the conditioned and the unconditioned alike Ideas +is a confounding of dignities that Pure Reason should not tolerate, +whether the procedure be read as a leveling down or a leveling up. +Distributing the titles conferred by Pure Reason in this democratic +fashion reminds us too much, unhappily for Kant, of the Cartesian +performances with Substance; whereby God, mind, and matter became alike +"substances," though only God could in truth be said to "require nothing +for his existence save himself," while mind and matter, though +absolutely dependent on God, and derivative from him, were still to be +called substances in the "modified" and Pickwickian sense of being +underived from each other.</p> + +<p>But if Kant's naming his third syllogistic postulate the Idea of God +is inconsequent upon his analysis; or if, when the analysis is made +consequent by taking the third Idea to mean the whole Self, the first +and second postulates sink in conceptual rank, so that they cannot with +any pertinence be called Ideas, unless we are willing to keep the same +name when its meaning must be changed <i>in genere</i>,—a +procedure that can only encumber philosophy instead of clearing its +way,—these difficulties do not close the account; we shall find +other curious things in this noted passage, upon which part of the +characteristic outcome of Kant's philosophizing so much depends. Besides +the misnaming of the third Idea, we have already had to question, in +view of the path by which he reaches it, the fitness of his calling the +first by the title of the Soul; and likewise, though for other and +higher reasons, of his calling the second by the name of the World. In +fact, it comes home to us that all of the Ideas are, in one way or +another, misnomers; Kant's whole procedure with them, in fine, has +already appeared inexact, inconsistent, and therefore uncritical. But +now we shall become aware of certain other inconsistencies. In coming to +the Subject, as the postulate of categorical syllogizing, Kant, you +remember, does so by the path of the relation Subject and Predicate, +arguing that the chain of categorical prosyllogisms has for its limiting +concept and logical motor the notion of an absolute subject that cannot +be a predicate; and as no subject of a judgment can of itself give +assurance of fulfilling this condition, he concludes this motor-limit of +judgment-subjects to be identical with the Subject as thinker, upon +whom, at the last, all judgments depend, and who, therefore, and who +alone, can never be a predicate merely. In similar fashion, he finds as +the motor-limit of the series of conditional prosyllogisms, which is +governed by the relation Cause and Effect, the notion of an absolute +cause—a cause, that is, incapable of being an effect; and this, as +undiscoverable in the chain of phenomenal causes, which are all in turn +effects, he concludes is a pure Idea, the reason's native conception of +a necessary linkage among all changes in Space, or of a Cosmic Unity +among physical phenomena. In both conceptions, then, whether of the +unity of the Subject or of the World, we seem to have a case of the +unconditioned, as each, surely, is a totality of conditions: the one, +for all possible syllogisms by Subject and Predicate; the other, for all +possible syllogisms from Cause and Effect. Until it can be shown that +the syllogisms of the first sort and the syllogisms of the second are +both conditioned by the system of disjunctive syllogisms, so that the +Idea alleged to be the totality of conditions for this system becomes +the conditioning principle for both the others, there appears to be no +ground for contrasting the totality of conditions presented in it with +those presented in the others, as if it were the absolute Totality of +all Conditions, while the two others are only "relative +totalities,"—which would be as much as to say they were only +pseudo-totalities, both being conditioned instead of being +unconditioned. But there seems to be no evidence, not even an +indication, that disjunctive reasoning conditions categorical or +conditional—that it constitutes the whole kingdom, in which the +other two orders of reasoning form dependent provinces, or that for +final validation these must appeal to the disjunctive series and the +Idea that controls it. On the contrary, any such relation seems +disproved by the fact that the three types of syllogism apply alike in +all subject-matter, psychic or physical, subjective or objective, +concerning the Self or concerning the World,—yes, concerning other +Selves or even concerning God; whereas, if the relation were a fact, it +would require that only disjunctive reasoning can deal with the +Unconditioned, and that conditional must confine itself to cosmic +material, while categorical pertains only to the things of inner +sense.</p> + +<p>Such considerations cannot but shake our confidence in the +inquisition to which Kant has submitted the Ideas of Reason, both as +regards what they really mean and how they are to be correlated. At all +events, the analysis of logical procedure and connection on which his +account of them is based is full of the confusions and oversights that +have now been pointed out, and justifies us in saying that his case is +not established. Hence we are not bound to follow when his three +successors, or their later adherents, proceed in acceptance of his +results, and advance into various forms of idealism, all of the monistic +type, as if the general relation between the three Ideas had been +demonstrably settled by Kant in the monist sense, despite his not +knowing this, and that all we have to do is to disregard his recorded +protests, and render his results consistent, and our idealism +"absolute," by casting out from his doctrine the distinction between the +Theoretical and the Practical Reason, with the "primacy" of the latter, +through making an end of his assumed world of <i>Dinge an sich</i>, or +"things in themselves." This movement, I repeat, we are not bound to +follow: a rectification of view as to the meaning of the three Ideas +becomes possible as soon as we are freed from Kant's entangled method of +discovering and defining them; and when this rectification is effected, +we shall find that the question between monism and rational or harmonic +pluralism is at least open, to say no more. Nay, we are not to forget +that by the results of our analysis of the concepts One and Many, Time +and Space, and the real relation between them, plural metaphysics has +already won a precedence in this contest.</p> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Phil2"></a>THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE +NINETEENTH CENTURY</h3> + +<h4>BY GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>George Trumbull Ladd</b>, Professor of Philosophy, Yale +University. b. January 19, 1842, Painesville, Ohio. B.A. Western Reserve +College, 1864; B.D. Andover Theological Seminary, 1869; D.D. Western +Reserve, 1879; M.A. Yale, 1881; LL.D. Western Reserve, 1895; LL.D. +Princeton, 1896. Decorated with the 3d Degree of the Order of the Rising +Sun of Japan, 1899; Pastor, Edinburg, Ohio, 1869-71; <i>ibid.</i>, +Milwaukee, Wis., 1871-79; Professor of Philosophy, Bowdoin College, +1879-81; <i>ibid.</i>, Yale University, 1881—; <b>Lecturer</b>, +Harvard, Tokio, Bombay, etc., 1885—, Member American Psychological +Association, American Society of Naturalists, American Philosophical +Association, American Oriental Society, Imperial Educational Society of +Japan, Connecticut Academy. <b>Author of</b> <i>Elements of +Physiological Psychology</i>; <i>Philosophy of Knowledge</i>; +<i>Philosophy of Mind</i>; <i>A Theory of Reality</i>; and many other +noted scientific works and papers.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">The history of man's critical and reflective thought upon +the more ultimate problems of nature and of his own life has, indeed, +its period of quickened progress, relative stagnation, and apparent +decline. Great thinkers are born and die, "schools of philosophy," +so-called, arise, flourish, and become discredited; and tendencies of +various characteristics mark the national or more general Zeitgeist of +the particular centuries. And always, a certain deep undercurrent, or +powerful stream of the rational evolution of humanity, flows silently +onward. But these periods of philosophical development do not correspond +to those which have been marked off for man by the rhythmic motion of +the heavenly bodies, or by himself for purposes of greater convenience +in practical affairs. The proposal, therefore, to treat any century of +philosophical development as though it could be taken out of, and +considered apart from, this constant unfolding of man's rational life +is, of necessity, doomed to failure. And, indeed, the nineteenth century +is no exception to the general truth.</p> + +<p>There is, however, one important and historical fact which makes more +definite, and more feasible, the attempt to present in outline the +history of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century. This +fact is the death of Immanuel Kant, February 12, 1804. In a very unusual +way this event marks the close of the development of philosophy in the +eighteenth century. In a yet more unusual way the same event defines the +beginning of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century. +The proposal is, therefore, not artificial, but in accordance with the +truth of history, if we consider the problems, movements, results, and +present condition of this development, so far as the fulfillment of our +general purpose is concerned, in the light of the critical philosophy of +Kant. This purpose may then be further defined in the following way: to +trace the history of the evolution of critical and reflective thought +over the more ultimate problems of Nature and of human life, in the +Western World during the last hundred years, and from the standpoint of +the conclusions, both negative and positive, which are best embodied in +the works of the philosopher of Königsberg. This purpose we shall try to +fulfill in these four divisions of our theme: (1) A statement of the +problems of philosophy as they were given over to the nineteenth century +by the Kantian Critique; (2) a brief description of the lines of +movement along which the attempts at the improved solution of these +problems have proceeded, and of the principal influences contributing to +these attempts; (3) a summary of the principal results of these +movements—the items, so to say, of progress in philosophy which +may be credited to the last century; and finally, (4) a survey of the +present state of these problems as they are now to be handed down by the +nineteenth to the twentieth century. Truly an immensely difficult, if +not an impossible task, is involved in this purpose!</p> + +<p>I. The problems which the critical philosophy undertook definitively +to solve may be divided into three classes. The first is the +epistemological problem, or the problem offered by human +knowledge—its essential nature, its fixed limitations, if such +there be, and its ontological validity. It was this problem which Kant +brought to the front in such a manner that certain subsequent writers on +philosophy have claimed it to be, not only the primary and most +important branch of philosophical discipline, but to comprise the +sum-total of what human reflection and critical thought can successfully +compass. "We call philosophy self-knowledge," says one of these writers. +"The theory of knowledge is the true <i>prima philosophia</i>," says +another. Kant himself regarded it as the most imperative demand of +reason to establish a science that shall "determine <i>a priori</i> the +possibility, the principles, and the extent of all cognitions." The +burden of the epistemological problem has pressed heavily upon the +thought of the nineteenth century; the different attitudes toward this +problem, and its different alleged solutions, have been most influential +factors in determining the philosophical discussions, divisions, +schools, and permanent or transitory achievements of the century.</p> + +<p>In the epistemological problem as offered by the Kantian philosophy +of cognition there is involved the subordinate but highly important +question as to the proper method of philosophy. Is the method of +criticism, as that method was employed in the three Critiques of Kant, +the exclusive, the sole appropriate and productive way of advancing +human philosophical thought? I do not think that the experience of the +nineteenth century warrants an affirmative answer to this question of +method. This experience has certainly, however, resulted in +demonstrating the need of a more thorough, consistent, and fundamental +use of the critical method than that in which it was employed by Kant. +And this improved use of the critical method has induced a more profound +study of the psychology of cognition, and of the historical development +of philosophy in the branch of epistemology. More especially, however, +it has led to the reinstatement of the value-judgments, as means of +cognition, in their right relations of harmony with the judgments of +fact and of law.</p> + +<p>The second of the greater problems which the critical philosophy of +the eighteenth handed on to the nineteenth century is the ontological +problem. This problem, even far more than the epistemological, has +excited the intensest interest, and called for the profoundest thought, +of reflective minds during the last hundred years. This problem engages +in the inquiry as to what Reality is; for to define philosophy from the +ontological point of view renders it "the rational science of reality;" +or, at least, "the science of the supreme and most important realities." +In spite of the fact that the period immediately following the +conclusion of the Kantian criticism was the age when the people were +singing</p> + +<div class="poem"> + <span class="i1">"<i>Da die Metaphysik vor Kurzem unbeerbt + abging,</i></span><br /> + <span class="i0"><i>Werden die Dinge an sich jetzo sub hasta + verkauft,</i>"</span><br /> +</div> + +<p>the cultivation of the ontological problem, and the growth of +systematic metaphysics in the nineteenth century, had never previously +been surpassed. In spite of, or rather because of, the fact that Kant +left the ancient body of metaphysics so dismembered and discredited, and +his own ontological structure, in such hopeless confusion, all the +several buildings both of Idealism and of Realism either rose quickly or +were erected upon the foundations made bare by the critical +philosophy.</p> + +<p>But especially unsatisfactory to the thought of the first quarter of +the nineteenth century was the Kantian position with reference to the +problem in which, after all, both the few who cultivate philosophy and +the multitude who share in its fruits are always most truly interested; +and this is the ethico-religious problem. In the judgment of the +generation which followed him, Kant had achieved for those who accepted +his points of view, his method of philosophizing, and his results, much +greater success in "removing knowledge" than in "finding room for +faith." For he seemed to have left the positive truths of Ethics so +involved in the negative positions of his critique of knowledge as +greatly to endanger them; and to have entangled the conceptions of +religion with those of morality in a manner to throw doubt upon them +both.</p> + +<p>The breach between the human cognitive faculties and the ontological +doctrines and conceptions on which morality and religion had been +supposed to rest firmly, the elaborately argued distrust and skepticism +which had been aimed against the ability of human reason to reach +reality, and the consequent danger which threatened the most precious +judgments of worth and the ontological value of ethical and æsthetical +sentiments, could not remain unnoticed, or fail to promote ceaseless and +earnest efforts to heal it. The hitherto accepted solutions of the +problems of cognition, of being, and of man's ethico-religious +experience, could not survive the critical philosophy. But the solutions +which the critical philosophy itself offered could not fail to excite +opposition and to stimulate further criticism. Moreover, certain factors +in human nature, certain interests in human social life, and certain +needs of humanity, not fully recognized and indeed scarcely noticed by +criticism, could not fail to revive and to enforce their ancient, +perennial, and valid claims.</p> + +<p>In a word, Kant left the main problems of philosophy involved in +numerous contradictions. The result of his penetrating but excessive +analysis was unwarrantably to contrast sense with understanding; to +divide reason as constitutive from reason as regulative; to divorce the +moral law from our concrete experience of the results of good and bad +conduct, true morality from many of the noblest desires and sentiments, +and to set in opposition phenomena and noumena, order and freedom, +knowledge and faith, science and religion. Now the highest aim of +philosophy is reconciliation. What wonder, then, that the beginning of +the last century felt the stimulus of the unreconciled condition of the +problems of philosophy at the end of the preceding century! The +greatest, most stimulating inheritance of the philosophy of the +nineteenth century from the philosophy of the eighteenth century was the +"post-Kantian problems."</p> + +<p>II. The lines of the movement of philosophical thought and the +principal contributory influences which belong to the nineteenth century +may be roughly divided into two classes; namely, (1) those which tended +in the direction of carrying to the utmost extreme the negative and +destructive criticism of Kant, and (2) those which, either mainly +favoring or mainly antagonizing the conclusions of the Kantian +criticism, endeavored to place the positive answer to all three of these +great problems of philosophy upon more comprehensive, scientifically +defensible, and permanently sure foundations. The one class so far +completed the attempt to remove the knowledge at which philosophy aims +as, by the end of the first half of the century, to have left no +rational ground for any kind of faith. The other class had not, even by +the end of the second half of the century, as yet agreed upon any one +scheme for harmonizing the various theories of knowledge, of reality, +and of the ground of morality and religion. There appeared, +however,—especially during the last two decades of the +century,—certain signs of convergence upon positions, to occupy +which is favorable for agreement upon such a scheme, and which now +promise a new constructive era for philosophy. The terminus of the +destructive movement has been reached in our present-day positivism and +philosophical skepticism. For this movement there would appear to be no +more beyond in the same direction. The terminus of the other movement +can only be somewhat dimly descried. It may perhaps be predicted with a +reasonable degree of confidence as some form of ontological Idealism (if +we may use such a phrase) that shall be at once more thoroughly grounded +in man's total experience, as interpreted by modern science, and also +more satisfactory to human ethical, æsthetical, and religious ideals, +than any form of systematic philosophy has hitherto been. But to say +even this much is perhaps unduly to anticipate.</p> + +<p>If we attempt to fathom and estimate the force of the various streams +of influence which have shaped the history of the philosophical +development of the nineteenth century, I think there can be no doubt +that the profoundest and the most powerful is the one influence which +must be recognized and reckoned with in all the centuries. This +influence is humanity's undying interest in its moral, civil, and +religious ideals, and in the civil and religious institutions which give +a faithful but temporary expression to these ideals. In the long run, +every fragmentary or systematic attempt at the solution of the problem +of philosophy must sustain the test of an ability to contribute +something of value to the realization of these ideals. The test which +the past century has proposed for its own thinkers, and for its various +schools of philosophy, is by far the severest which has ever been +proposed. For the most part unostentatiously and in large measure +silently, the thoughtful few and the comparatively thoughtless multitude +have been contributing, either destructively or constructively, to the +effort at satisfaction for the rising spiritual life of man. And if in +some vague but impressive manner we speak of this thirst for spiritual +satisfaction as characteristic of any period of human history, we may +say, I believe, that it has been peculiarly characteristic and +especially powerful as an influence during the last hundred years. The +opinions, sentiments, and ideals which shape the development of the +institutions of the church and state, and the freer activities of the +same opinions, sentiments, and ideals, have been in this century, as +they have been in every century, the principal factors in determining +the character of its philosophical development.</p> + +<p>But a more definite and visible kind of influence has constantly +proceeded from the centres of the higher education. The +universities—especially of Germany, next, perhaps of Scotland, but +also of England and the United States, and even in less degree of France +and Italy—have both fostered and shaped the evolution of critical +and reflective thought, and of its product as philosophy. In Germany +during the eighteenth century the greater universities had been +emancipating themselves from the stricter forms of political and court +favoritism and of ecclesiastical protection and control. This +emancipation had already operated at the beginning of the nineteenth +century, and it continued more and more to operate throughout this +century, for participation in that free thought whose spirit is +absolutely essential to the flourishing of true philosophy. All the +other colleges and universities can scarcely repay the debt which modern +philosophy owes to the universities of Germany. The institutions of the +higher education which are moulded after this spirit, and which have a +generous share of this spirit, have everywhere been <i>schools of +thought</i> as well as schools of learning and research. Without the +increasing numbers and growing encouragement of such centres for the +cultivation of the discipline of critical and reflective thinking, it is +difficult to conjecture how much the philosophical development of the +nineteenth century would have lost. <i>Libertas docendi</i> and +<i>Academische Freiheit</i>—without these philosophy has one of +its wings fatally wounded or severely clipped.</p> + +<p>Not all the philosophy of the last century, however, was born and +developed in academical centres and under academical influences. In +Germany, Great Britain, and France, the various so-called "Academies" or +other unacademical associations of men of scientific interests and +attainments—notably, the Berlin Academy, which has been called +"the seat of an anti-scholastic popular philosophy"—were during +the first half of the nineteenth century contributing by their +conspicuous failures as well as by their less conspicuous successes, +important factors to the constructive new thought of the latter half of +the nineteenth century. In general, although these men decried system +and were themselves inadequately prepared to treat the problems of +philosophy, whether from the historical or the speculative and critical +point of view, they cannot be wholly neglected in estimating its +development. Clever reasoning, and witty and epigrammatic writing on +scientific or other allied subjects, cannot indeed be called +<i>philosophy</i> in the stricter meaning of the word. But this +so-called "popular philosophy" has greatly helped in a way to free +thought from its too close bondage to scholastic tradition. And even the +despite of philosophy, and sneering references to its "barrenness," +which formerly characterized the meetings and the writings of this class +of its critics, but which now are happily much less frequent, have been +on the whole both a valuable check and a stimulus to her devotees. He +would be too narrow and sour a disciple of scholastic metaphysics and +systematic philosophy, who, because of the levity or scorning of +"outsiders," should refuse them all credit. Indeed, the lesson of the +close of the nineteenth century may well enough be the motto for the +beginning of the twentieth century: <i>In philosophy—since to +philosophize is natural and inevitable for all rational +beings—there really are no outsiders.</i></p> + +<p>In this connection it is most interesting to notice how men of the +type just referred to, were at the end of the eighteenth century found +grouped around such thinkers as Mendelssohn, Lessing, F. +Nicolai,—representing a somewhat decided reaction from the French +realism to the German idealism. The work of the Academicians in the +criticism of Kant was carried forward by Jacobi, who, at the time of his +death, was the pensioned president of the Academy at Munich. Some of +these same critics of the Kantian philosophy showed a rather decided +preference for the "commonsense" philosophy of the Scottish School.</p> + +<p>But both inside and outside of the Universities and Academies the +scientific spirit and acquisitions of the nineteenth century have most +profoundly, and on the whole favorably, affected the development of its +philosophy. In the wider meaning of the word, "science,"—the +meaning, namely, in which science = +<i>Wissenschaft</i>,—philosophy aims to be scientific; and science +can never be indifferent to philosophy. In their common aim at a +rational and unitary system of principles, which shall explain and give +its due significance to the totality of human experience, science and +philosophy can never remain long in antagonism; they ought never even +temporarily to be divided in interests, or in the spirit which leads +each generously to recognize the importance of the other. The early part +of the last century was, indeed, too much under the influence of that +almost exclusively speculative <i>Natur-philosophie</i>, of which +Schelling and Hegel were the most prominent exponents. On the other +hand, the conception of nature as a vast interconnected and unitary +system of a rational order, unfolding itself in accordance with +teleological principles,—however manifold and obscure,—is a +noble conception and not destined to pass away.</p> + +<p>On the continent—at least in France, where it had attained its +highest development—the scientific spirit was, at the close of the +eighteenth century, on the whole opposed to systematization. The impulse +to both science and philosophy during both the eighteenth and the +nineteenth centuries, over the entire continent of Europe, was chiefly +due to the epoch-making work of that greatest of all titles in the +modern scientific development of the Western World, the <i>Principia</i> +of Newton. In mathematics and the physical sciences, during the early +third or half of the last century, Great Britain also has a roll of +distinguished names which compares most favorably with that of either +France or Germany. But in England, France, and the United States, during +the whole century, science has lacked the breadth and philosophic spirit +which it had in Germany during the first three quarters of this period. +During all that time the German man of science was, as a rule, a +scholar, an investigator, a teacher, <i>and a philosopher</i>. Science +and philosophy thrived better, however, in Scotland than elsewhere +outside of Germany, so far as their relations in interdependence were +concerned. Into the Scottish universities Playfair introduced some of +the continental suggestions toward the end of the eighteenth century, so +that there was less of exclusiveness and unfriendly rivalry between +science and philosophy; and both profited thereby. In the United States, +during the first half or more of the century, so dominant were the +theological and practical interests and influences that there was little +free development of either science or philosophy,—if we interpret +the one as the equivalent of <i>Wissenschaft</i> and understand the +other in the stricter meaning of the word.</p> + +<p>The history of the development of the scientific spirit and of the +achievements of the particular sciences is not the theme of this paper. +To trace in detail, or even in its large outlines, the reciprocal +influence of science and philosophy during the past hundred years, would +itself require far more than the space allotted to me. It must suffice +to say that the various advances in the efforts of the particular +sciences to enlarge and to define the conceptions and principles +employed to portray the Being of the World in its totality, have +somewhat steadily grown more and more completely metaphysical, and more +and more of positive importance for the reconstruction of systematic +philosophy. The latter has not simply been disciplined by science, +compelled to improve its method, and to examine all its previous claims. +But philosophy has also been greatly enriched by science with respect to +its material awaiting synthesis, and it has been not a little profited +by the unsuccessful attempts of the current scientific theories to give +themselves a truly satisfactory account of that Ultimate Reality which, +to understand the better, is no unworthy aim of their combined +efforts.</p> + +<p>During the nineteenth century science has seen many important +additions to that Ideal of Nature and her processes, to form which in a +unitary and harmonizing but comprehensive way is the philosophical goal +of science. The gross mechanical conception of nature which prevailed in +the earlier part of the eighteenth century has long since been +abandoned, as quite inadequate to our experience with her facts, forces, +and laws. The kinetic view, which began with Huygens, Euler, and Ampère, +and which was so amplified by Lord Kelvin and Clerk-Maxwell in England, +and by Helmholtz and others in Germany, on account of its success in +explaining the phenomena of light, of gases, etc., very naturally led to +the attempt to develop a kinetic theory, a doctrine of energetics, which +should explain all phenomena. But the conception of "that which moves," +the experience of important and persistent qualitative +<i>differentiae</i>, and the need of assuming ends and purposes served +by the movement, are troublesome obstacles in the way of giving such a +completeness to this theory of the Being of the World. Yet again the +amazing success which the theory of evolution has shown in explaining +the phenomena with which the various biological sciences concern +themselves, has lent favor during the latter half of the century to the +vitalistic and genetic view of nature. For all our most elaborate and +advanced kinetic theories seem utterly to fail us as explanatory when +we, through the higher powers of the microscope, stand wondering and +face to face with the evolution of a single living cell. But from such a +view of the essential Being of the World as evolution suggests to the +psycho-physical theory of nature is not an impassable gulf. And thus, +under its growing wealth of knowledge, science may be leading up to an +Ideal of the Ultimate Reality, in which philosophy will gratefully and +gladly coincide. At any rate, the modern conception of nature and the +modern conception of God are not so far apart from each other, as either +of these conceptions is now removed from the conceptions covered by the +same terms, some centuries gone by.</p> + +<p>There is one of the positive sciences, however, with which the +development of philosophy during the last century has been particularly +allied. This science is psychology. To speak of its history is not the +theme of this paper. But it should be noted in passing how the +development of psychology has brought into connection with the physical +and biological sciences the development of philosophy. This union, +whether it be for better or for worse,—and, on the whole, I +believe it to be for better rather than for worse,—has been in a +very special way the result of the last century. In tracing its details +we should have to speak of the dependence of certain branches of +psychology on physiology, and upon Sir Charles Bell's discovery of the +difference between the sensory and the motor nerves. This discovery was +the contribution of the beginning of the century to an entire line of +discoveries, which have ended at the close of the century with putting +the localization of cerebral function upon a firm experimental basis. Of +scarcely less importance has been the cellular theory as applied (1838) +by Matthias Schleiden, a pupil of Fries in philosophy, to plants, and by +Theodor Schwann about the same time to animal organisms. To these must +be added the researches of Johannes Müller (1801-1858), the great +biologist, a listener to Hegel's lectures, whose law of <i>specific +energies</i> brings him into connection with psychology and, through +psychology, to philosophy. Even more true is this of Helmholtz, whose +<i>Lehre von den Tonempfindungen</i> (1862) and <i>Physiologische +Optik</i> (1867) placed him in even closer, though still mediate, +relations to philosophy. But perhaps especially Gustav Theodor Fechner +(1801-1887), whose researches in psycho-physics laid the foundations of +whatever, either as psychology or as philosophy, goes under this name; +and whether the doctrine have reference to the relation of man's mind +and body, or to the wider relations of spirit and matter.</p> + +<p>In my judgment it cannot be affirmed that the attempts of the latter +half of the nineteenth century to develop an experimental science of +psychology in independence of philosophical criticism and metaphysical +assumption, or the claims of this science to have thrown any wholly new +light upon the statement, or upon the solution of philosophical +problems, have been largely successful. But certain more definitely +psychological questions have been to a commendable degree better +analyzed and elucidated; the new experimental methods, where confined +within their legitimate sphere, have been amply justified; and certain +<i>quasi</i>-metaphysical views respecting the nature of the human mind, +and even, if you will, the nature of the Spirit in general—have +been placed in a more favorable and scientifically engaging attitude +toward speculative philosophy. This seems to me to be especially true +with respect to two problems in which both empirical psychology and +philosophy have a common and profound interest. These are (1) the +complex synthesis of mental functions involved in every act of true +cognition, together with the bearing which the psychology of cognition +has upon epistemological problems; and (2) the yet more complex and +profound analysis, from the psychological point of view, of what it is +to be a self-conscious and self-determining Will, a true Self, together +with the bearing which the psychology of selfhood has upon all the +problems of ethics, æsthetics, and religion.</p> + +<p>The more obvious and easily traceable influences which have operated +to incite and direct the philosophical development of the nineteenth +century are, of course, dependent upon the teachings and writings of +philosophers, and the schools of philosophy which they have founded. To +speak of these influences even in outline would be to write a manual of +the history of philosophy during that hundred of years, which has been +of all others by far the most fruitful in material results, whatever +estimate may be put upon the separate or combined values of the +individual thinkers and their so-called schools. No fewer than seven or +eight relatively independent or partially antagonistic movements, which +may be traced back either directly or more indirectly to the critical +philosophy, and to the form in which the problems of philosophy were +left by Kant, sprung up during the century. In Germany chiefly, there +arose the Faith-philosophy, the Romantic School, and Rational Idealism; +in France, Eclecticism and Positivism (if, indeed, the latter can be +called <i>a</i> philosophy); in Scotland, a naïve and crude form of +Realism, which served well for the time as an antagonist of a skeptical +idealism, but which itself contributed to an improved form of Idealism; +and in the United States, or rather in New England, a peculiar kind of +Transcendentalism of the sentimental type. But all these movements of +thought, and others lying somewhere midway between, in a pair composed +of any two, together with a steadfast remainder of almost every sort of +Dogmatism, and all degrees and kinds of Skepticism, have been intermixed +and contending with one another, in all these countries. Such has been +the varied, undefinable, and yet intensely stimulating and interesting +character of the development of systematic and scholastic philosophy, +during the nineteenth century.</p> + +<p>The early opposition to Kant in Germany was, in the main, <ins +title="hyphenated in the original">twofold</ins>:—both to his +peculiar extreme analysis with its philosophical conclusions, and also +to all systematic as distinguished from a more popular and literary form +of philosophizing. Toward the close of the eighteenth century a group of +men had been writing upon philosophical questions in a spirit and method +quite foreign to that held in respect by the critical philosophy. It is +not wholly without significance that Lessing, whose aim had been to use +common sense and literary skill in clearing up obscure ideas and +improving and illumining the life of man, died in the very year of the +appearance of Kant's <i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</i>. Of this class of +men an historian dealing with this period has said, "There is hardly one +who does not quote somewhere or other Pope's saying, 'The proper study +of mankind is man.'" To this class belong Hamann (1730-1788), the +inspirer of Herder and Jacobi. The former, who was essentially a poet +and a friend of Goethe, controverted Kant with regard to his doctrine of +reason, his antithesis between the individual and the race, and his +schism between things as empirically known and the known unity in the +Ground of their being and becoming. Herder's path to truth was highly +colored with flowers of rhetoric; but the promise was that he would lead +men back to the heavenly city. Jacobi, too, with due allowance made for +the injury wrought by his divorce of the two philosophies,—that of +faith and that of science,—and his excessive estimate of the +value-judgments which repose in the mist of a feeling-faith, added +something of worth by way of exposing the barrenness of the Kantian +doctrine of an unknowable "Thing-in-itself."</p> + +<p>From men like Fr. Schlegel (1772-1829), whose valid protest against +the sharp separation of speculative philosophy from the æsthetical, +social, and ethical life, assumed the "standpoint of irony," little real +result in the discovery of truth could be expected. But Schleiermacher +(1768-1834), in spite of that mixture of unfused elements which has made +his philosophy "a rendezvous for the most diverse systems," contributed +valuable factors to the century's philosophical development, both of a +negative and of a positive character. This thinker was peculiarly +fortunate in the enrichment of the conception of experience as +warranting a justifiable confidence in the ontological value of ethical, +æsthetical, and religious sentiment and ideas; but he was most +unfortunate in reviving and perpetuating the unjustifiable Kantian +distinction between cognition and faith in the field of experience. On +the whole, therefore, the Faith-philosophy and the Romantic School can +easily be said to have contributed more than a negative and modifying +influence to the development of the philosophy of the nineteenth +century. Its more modern revival toward the close of the same century, +and its continued hold upon certain minds of the present day, are +evidences of the positive but partial truth which its tenets, however +vaguely and unsystematically, continue to maintain in an æsthetically +and practically attractive way.</p> + +<p>The admirers of Kant strove earnestly and with varied success to +remedy the defects of his system. Among the earlier, less celebrated and +yet important members of this group, were K. G. Reinhold (1758-1823), +and Maimon (died, 1800). The former, like Descartes, in that he was +educated by the Jesuits, began the attempt, after rejecting some of the +arbitrary distinctions of Kant and his barren and self-contradictory +"Thing-in-itself," to unify the critical philosophy by reducing it to +some one principle. The latter really transcended Kant in his +philosophical skepticism, and anticipated the Hamiltonian form of the +so-called principle of relativity. Fries (1773-1843), and Hermes +(1775-1831)—the latter of whom saw in empirical psychology the +only true propædeutic to philosophy—should be mentioned in this +connection. In the same group was another, both mathematician and +philosopher, who strove more successfully than others of this group to +accept the critical standpoint of Kant and yet to transcend his negative +conclusions with regard to a theory of knowledge. I refer to Bolzano +(Prague, 1781-1848), who stands in the same line of succession with +Fries and Hermes, and whose works on the <i>Science of Religion</i> (4 +vols. 1834) and his <i>Science of Knowledge</i> (4 vols. 1837) are +noteworthy contributions to epistemological doctrine. In the latter we +have developed at great length the important thought that the illative +character of propositional judgments implies an objective relation; and +that in all truths the subject-idea must be objective. In the work on +religion there is found as thoroughly dispassionate and rational a +defense of Catholic doctrine as exists anywhere in philosophical +literature. The limited influence of these works, due in part to their +bulk and their technical character, is on the whole, I think, sincerely +to be regretted.</p> + +<p>It was, however, chiefly that remarkable series of philosophers which +may be grouped under the rubric of a "rational Idealism," who filled so +full and made so rich the philosophical life of Germany during the first +half of the last century; whose philosophical thoughts and systems have +spread over the entire Western World, and who are most potent influences +in shaping the development of philosophy down to the present hour. Of +these we need do little more than that we can do—mention their +names. At their head, in time, stands Fichte, who—although Kant is +reported to have complained of this disciple because he lied about him +so much—really divined a truth which seems to be hovering in the +clouds above the master's head, but which, if the critical philosophy +truly meant to teach it, needed helpful deliverance in order to appear +in perfectly clear light. Fichte, although he divined this truth, did +not, however, free it from internal confusion and self-contradiction. It +<i>is</i> his truth, nevertheless, that in the Self, as a self-positing +and self-determining activity, must somehow be found the Ground of all +experience and of all Reality.</p> + +<p>The important note which Schelling sounded was the demand that +philosophy should recognize "Nature" as belonging to the sphere of +Reality, and as requiring a measure of reflective thought which should +in some sort put it on equal terms with the Ego, for the construction of +our conception of the Being of the World. To Schelling it seemed +impossible to deduce, as Fichte had done, all the rich concrete +development of the world of things from the subjective needs and +constitutional forms of functioning which belong to the finite Self. +And, indeed, the doctrine which limits the origin, existence, and value +of all that is known about this sphere of experience to these needs, and +which finds the sufficient account of all experience with nature in +these forms of functioning, must always seem inadequate and even +grotesque in the sight of the natural sciences. Both Nature and Spirit, +thought Schelling, must be allowed to claim actual existence and equally +real value; while at the same time philosophy must reconcile the seeming +opposition of their claims and unite them in an harmonious and +self-explanatory way. In some common substratum, in which, to adopt +Hegel's sarcastic criticism, as in the darkness of the night "all cows +are black,"—that is in the Absolute, as an Identical Basis of +Differences,—the reconciliation was to be accomplished.</p> + +<p>But the constructive idealistic movement, in which Fichte and +Schelling bore so important a part, could not be satisfied with the +positions reached by either of these two philosophers. Neither the +physical and psychological sciences, nor the speculative interests of +religion, ethics, art, and social life, permitted this movement to stop +at this point. In all the subsequent developments of philosophy during +the first half or three quarters of the nineteenth century, undoubtedly +the influence of Hegel was greatest of all individual thinkers. His +<i>motif</i> and plan are revealed in his letter of November 2, 1800, to +Schelling, namely, to transform what had hitherto been an ideal into a +thoroughly elaborate system. And in spite of his obvious obscurities of +thought and style, there is real ground for his claim to be the champion +of the common consciousness. It is undoubtedly in Hegel's +<i>Phänomenologie des Geistes</i> (1807), that the distinctive features +of the philosophy of the first half of the last century most clearly +define themselves. The forces of reflection now abandon the abstract +analytic method and positions of the Kantian Critique, and concentrate +themselves upon the study of man's spiritual life as an historical +evolution, in a more concrete, face-to-face manner. Two important and, +in the main, valid assumptions underlie and guide this reflective study: +(1) The Ultimate Reality, or principle of all realities, is Mind or +Spirit, which is to be recognized and known in its essence, not by +analysis into its formal elements (the categories), but as a living +development; (2) those formal elements, or categories to which Kant gave +validity merely as constitutional forms of the functioning of the human +understanding, represent, the rather, the essential structure of +Reality.</p> + +<p>In spite of these true thoughts, fault was justly found by the +particular sciences with both the speculative method of Hegel, which +consists in the smooth, harmonious, and systematic arrangement of +conceptions in logical or ideal relations to one another; and also with +the result, which reduces the Being of the World to terms of thought and +dialectical processes merely, and neglects or overlooks the other +aspects of racial experience. Therefore, the idealistic movement could +not remain satisfied with the Hegelian dialectic. Especially did both +the religious and the philosophical party revolt against the important +thought underlying Hegel's philosophy of religion; namely, that "the +more philosophy approximates to a complete development, the more it +exhibits the same need, the same interest, and the same content, as +religion itself." This, as they interpreted it, meant the absorption of +religion in philosophy.</p> + +<p>Next after Hegel, among the great names of this period, stand the +names of Herbart and Schopenhauer. The former contributes in an +important way to the proper conception of the task and the method of +philosophy, and influences greatly the development of psychology, both +as a science that is pedagogic to philosophy, and as laying the basis +for pedagogical principles and practice. But Herbart commits again the +ancient fallacy, under the spell of which so much of the Kantian +criticism was bound; and which identifies contradictions that belong to +the imperfect or illusory conceptions of individual thinkers with +insoluble antinomies inherent in reason itself. In spite of the little +worth and misleading character of his view of perception, and the quite +complete inadequacy of the method by which, at a single leap, he reaches +the one all-explanatory principle of his philosophy, Schopenhauer made a +most important contribution to the reflective thought of the century. It +is true, as Kuno Fischer has said, that it seems to have occurred to +Schopenhauer only twenty-five years after he had propounded his theory, +that will, as it appears in consciousness, is as truly phenomenal as is +intellect. It is also true that his theory of knowledge and his +conception of Reality, as measured by their power to satisfy and explain +our total experience, are inflicted with irreconcilable contradictions. +Neither can we accord firm confidence or high praise to the "Way of +Salvation" which somehow Will can attain to follow by æsthetic +contemplation and ascetic self-denial. Yet the philosophy of +Schopenhauer rightly insists upon our Idealistic construction of Reality +having regard to aspects of experience which his predecessors had quite +too much neglected; and even its spiteful and exaggerated reminders of +the facts which contradict the tendency of all Idealism to construct a +smooth, regular, and altogether pleasing conception of the Being of the +World, have been of great benefit to the development of the latter half +of the nineteenth century.</p> + +<p>In estimating the thoughts and the products of modern Idealism we +ought not to forget the larger multitude of thoughtful men, both in +Germany and elsewhere, who have contributed toward shaping the course of +reflection in the attempt to answer the problems which the critical +philosophy left to the nineteenth century. It is a singular comment upon +the caprices of fame that, in philosophy as in science, politics, and +art, some of those who have really reasoned most soundly and acutely, if +not also effectively upon these problems, are little known even by name +in the history of the philosophical development of the century. Among +the earlier members of this group, did space permit, we should wish to +mention Berger, Solger, Steffens, and others, who strove to reconcile +the positions of a subjective idealism with a realistic but pantheistic +conception of the Being of the World. There are others, who like Weisse, +I. H. Fichte, C. P. Fischer, and Braniss, more or less bitterly or +moderately and reasonably, opposed the method and the conclusions of the +Hegelian dialectic. Still another group earned for themselves the +supposedly opprobrious but decidedly vague title of "Dualists," by +rejecting what they conceived to be the pantheism of Hegel. Still +others, like Fries and Beneke and their successors, strove to parallel +philosophy with the particular sciences by grounding it in an empirical +but scientific psychology; and thus they instituted a line of closely +connected development, to which reference has already been made.</p> + +<p>Hegel himself believed that he had permanently effected that +reconciliation of the orthodox creed with the cognition of Ultimate +Reality at which his dialectic aimed. In all such attempts at +reconciliation three great questions are chiefly concerned: (1) the +Being of God; (2) the nature of man; (3) the actual and the ideally +satisfactory relations between the two. But, as might have been +expected, a period of wild, irregular, and confused contention met the +attempt to establish this claim. In this conflict of more or less noisy +and popular as well as of thoughtful and scholastic philosophy, +Hegelians of various degrees of fidelity, anti-Hegelians of various +degrees of hostility, and ultra-Hegelians of various degrees of +eccentricity, all took a valiant and conspicuous part. We cannot follow +its history; but we can learn its lesson. Polemical philosophy, as +distinguished from quiet, reflective, and critical but constructive +philosophy involves a most uneconomical use of mental force. Yet out of +this period of conflict, and in a measure as its result, there came a +period of improved relations between science and philosophy and between +philosophy and theology, which was the dawn, toward the close of the +nineteenth century, of that better illumined day into the middle of +which we hope that we are proceeding.</p> + +<p>Before leaving this idealistic movement in Germany, and elsewhere as +influenced largely by German philosophy, one other name deserves +mention. This name is that of Lotze, who combined elements from many +previous thinkers with those derived from his own studies and +thoughts,—the conceptions of mechanism as applied to physical +existences and to psychical life, with the search for some monistic +Principle that shall satisfy the æsthetical and ethical, as well as the +scientific demands of the human mind. This variety of interests and of +culture led to the result of his making important contributions to +psychology, logic, metaphysics, and æsthetics. If we find his system of +thinking—as I think we must—lacking in certain important +elements of consistency and obscured in places by doubts as to his real +meaning, this does not prevent us from assigning to Lotze a position +which, for versatility of interests, genial quality of reflection and +criticism, suggestiveness of thought and charm of style, is second to no +other in the history of nineteenth century philosophical +development.</p> + +<p>In France and in England the first quarter of the last century was +far from being productive of great thinkers or great thoughts in the +sphere of philosophy. De Biran (1766-1824), in several important +respects the forerunner of modern psychology, after revolting from his +earlier complacent acceptance of the vagaries of Condillac and Cabanis, +made the discovery that the "immediate consciousness of self-activity is +the primitive and fundamental principle of human cognition." Meantime it +was only a little group of Academicians who were being introduced, in a +somewhat superficial way, to the thoughts of the Scottish and the German +idealistic Schools by Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, Cousin, and others. A +more independent and characteristic movement was that inaugurated by +Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who, having felt the marked influence of +Saint-Simon when he was only a boy of twenty, in a letter to his friend +Valat, in the year 1824, declares: "I shall devote my whole life and all +my powers to the founding of positive philosophy." In spite of the +impossibility of harmonizing with this point of view the vague and +mystical elements which characterize the later thought of Comte, or with +its carrying into effect the not altogether intelligent recognition of +the synthetic activity of the mind (<i>tout se réduit toujours à +lier</i>) and certain hints as to "first principles;" and in spite of +the small positive contribution to philosophy which Comtism could claim +to have made; it has in a way represented the value of two ideas. These +are (1) the necessity for philosophy of studying the actual historical +forces which have been at work and which are displayed in the facts of +history; and (2) the determination not to go by mere unsupported +speculation beyond experience in order to discover knowable Reality. +There is, however, a kind of subtle irony in the fact that the word +"Positivism" should have come to stand so largely for <i>negative</i> +conclusions, in the very spheres of philosophy, morals, and religion +where <i>affirmative</i> conclusions are so much desired and sought.</p> + +<p>That philosophy in Great Britain was in a nearly complete condition +of decadence during the first half or three quarters of the nineteenth +century was the combined testimony of writers from such different points +of view as Carlyle, Sir William Hamilton, and John Stuart Mill. And yet +these very names are also witnesses to the fact that this decadence was +not quite complete. In the first quarter of the century Coleridge, +although he had failed, on account of weakness both of mind and of +character, in his attempt to reconcile religion to the thought of his +own age, on the basis of the Kantian distinction between reason and the +intellect, had sowed certain seed-thoughts which became fertile in the +soil of minds more vigorous, logical, and practical than his own. This +was, perhaps, especially true in America, where inquirers after truth +were seeking for something more satisfactory than the French skepticism +of the revolutionary and following period. Carlyle's mocking sarcasm was +also not without wholesome effect.</p> + +<p>But it was Sir William Hamilton and John Stuart Mill whose thoughts +exercised a more powerful formative influence over the minds of the +younger men. The one was the flower of the Scottish Realism, the other +of the movement started by Bentham and the elder Mill.</p> + +<p>That the Scottish Realism should end by such a combination with the +skepticism of the critical philosophy as is implied in Hamilton's law of +the relativity of all knowledge, is one of the most curious and +interesting turns in the history of modern philosophy. And when this law +was so interpreted by Dean Mansel in its application to the fundamental +cognitions of religion as to lay the foundations upon which the most +imposing structure of agnosticism was built by Herbert Spencer, surely +the entire swing around the circle, from Kant to Kant again, has been +made complete. The attempt of Hamilton failed, as every similar attempt +must always fail. Neither speculative philosophy nor religious faith is +satisfied with an abstract conception, about the correlate of which in +Reality nothing is known or ever can be known. But every important +attempt of this sort serves the double purpose of stimulating other +efforts to reconstruct the answer to the problem of philosophy, on a +basis of positive experience of an enlarged type; and also of acting as +a real, if only temporary practical support to certain value-judgments +which the faiths of morality, art, and religion both implicate and, in a +measure, validate.</p> + +<p>The influence of John Stuart Mill, as it was exerted not only in his +conduct of life while a servant of the East India Company, but also in +his writings on Logic, Politics, and Philosophy, was, on the whole, a +valuable contribution to his generation. In the additions which he made +to the Utilitarianism of Bentham we have done, I believe, all that ever +can be done in defense of this principle of ethics. And his posthumous +confessions of faith in the ontological value of certain great +conceptions of religion are the more valuable because of the nature of +the man, and of the experience which is their source. Perhaps the most +permanent contribution which Mill made to the development of philosophy +proper, outside of the sphere of logic, ethics, and politics, was his +vigorous polemical criticism of Hamilton's claim for the necessity of +faith in an "Unconditioned" whose conception is "only a fasciculus of +negations of the Conditioned in its opposite extremes, and bound +together merely by the aid of language and their common character of +incomprehensibility."</p> + +<p>The history of the development of philosophy in America during the +nineteenth century, as during the preceding century, has been +characterized in the main by three principal tendencies. These may be +called the theological, the social, and the eclectic. From the beginning +down to the present time the religious influence and the interest in +political and social problems have been dominant. And yet withal, the +student of these problems in the atmosphere of this country likes, in a +way, to do his own thinking and to make his own choices of the thoughts +that seem to him true and best fitted for the best form of life. In +spite of the fact that the different streams of European thought have +flowed in upon us somewhat freely, there has been comparatively little +either of the adherence to schools of European philosophy or of the +attempt to develop a national school. Doubtless the influence of English +and Scottish thinking upon the academical circles of America was +greatest for more than one hundred and fifty years after the gift in +1714 by Governor Yale of a copy of Locke's Essay to the college which +bore his name,—and especially upon the reflections and published +works of Jonathan Edwards touching the fundamental problems of +epistemology, ethics, and religion. During the early part of this +century these views awakened antagonism from such writers as Dana, +Whedon, Hazard, Nathaniel Taylor, Jeremiah Day, Henry P. Tappan, and +other opponents of the Edwardean theology, and also from such advocates +of so-called "free-thinking," as had derived their <i>motifs</i> and +their views from English deistical writers like Shaftesbury, or from the +skepticism of Hume.</p> + +<p>A more definite philosophical movement, however, which had +established itself somewhat firmly in scholastic centres by the year +1825, and which maintained itself for more than half a century, went +back to the arrival in this country of John Witherspoon, in 1768, to be +the president of Princeton, bringing with him a library of three hundred +books. It was the appeal of the Scottish School to the "plain man's +consciousness" and to so-called "common sense," which was relied upon to +controvert all forms of philosophy which seemed to threaten the +foundations of religion and of the ethics of politics and sociology. But +even during this period, which was characterized by relatively little +independent thinking in scholastic circles, a more pronounced +productivity was shown by such writers as Francis Wayland, and others; +but, perhaps, especially by Laurens P. Hickok, whose works on psychology +and cosmology deserve especial recognition: while in psychology, as +related to philosophical problems, the principal names of this period +are undoubtedly the presidents of Yale and Princeton,—Noah Porter +and James McCosh,—both of whom (but especially the former) had +their views modified by the more scientific psychology of Europe and the +profounder thinking of Germany.</p> + +<p>It was Germany's influence, however, both directly and indirectly +through Coleridge and a few other English writers, that caused a ferment +of impressions and ideas which, in their effort to work themselves +clear, resulted in what is known as New England "Transcendentalism." In +America this movement can scarcely be called definitely philosophical; +much less can it be said to have resulted in a system, or even in a +school, of philosophy. It must also be said to have been "inspired but +not borrowed" from abroad. Its principal, if not sole, literary survival +is to be found in the works of Emerson. As expounded by him, it is not +precisely Pantheism—certainly not a consistent and critical +development of the pantheistic theory of the Being of the World; it is, +rather, a vague, poetical, and pantheistical Idealism of a decidedly +mystical type.</p> + +<p>The introduction of German philosophy proper, in its nature form, and +essential being, to the few interested seriously in critical and +reflective thinking upon the ultimate problems of nature and of human +life, began with the founding of the <i>Journal of Speculative +Philosophy</i>, in 1867, under the direction of William T. Harris, then +Superintendent of Schools in this city.</p> + +<p>With the work of Darwin, and his predecessors and successors, there +began a mighty movement of thought which, although it is primarily +scientific and more definitely available in biological science, has +already exercised, and is doubtless destined to exercise in the future, +an enormous influence upon philosophy. Indeed, we are already in the +midst of the preliminary confusions and contentions, but most fruitful +considerations and discoveries belonging to a so-called philosophy of +evolution.</p> + +<p>This development has, in the sphere of systematic philosophy, reached +its highest expression in the voluminous works produced through the +latter half of the nineteenth century by Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose +recent death seems to mark the close of the period we have under +consideration. The metaphysical assumptions and ontological value of the +system of Spencer, as he wished it to be understood and interpreted, +have perhaps, though not unnaturally, been quite too much submerged in +the more obvious expressions of its agnostic positivism. In its +psychology, however, the assumption of "some underlying substance in +contrast to all changing forms," distinguishes it from a pure positivism +in a very radical way. But more especially in philosophy, the +metaphysical postulate of a mysterious Unity of Force that somehow +manages to reveal itself, and the law of its operations, to the +developed cognition of the nineteenth century philosopher, however much +it seems to involve the system in internal contradictions, certainly +forbids that we should identify it with the positivism of Auguste Comte. +In our judgment, however, it is in his ethical good sense and integrity +of judgment,—a good sense and integrity which commits to ethics +rather than to sociology the task of determining the highest type of +human life,—and in basing the conditions for the prevalence and +the development of the highest type of life upon ethical principles and +upon the adherence to ethical ideas, that Herbert Spencer will be found +most clearly entitled to a lasting honor.</p> + +<p>III. The third number of our difficult tasks is to summarize the +principal results, to inventory the net profits, as it were, of the +development of philosophy during the nineteenth century. This task is +made the more difficult by the heterogeneous nature and as yet +unclassified condition of the development. With the quickening and +diversifying of all kinds and means of intercourse, there has come the +breaking<ins title="hyphenated in the original"> </ins>down of national +schools and idiosyncrasies of method and of thought. In philosophy, +Germany, France, Great Britain, and indeed, Italy, have come to +intermingle their streams of influence; and from all these countries +these streams have been flowing in upon America. In psychology, +especially, as well as in all the other sciences, but also to some +degree in philosophy, returning streams of influence from America have, +during the last decade or two, been felt in Europe itself.</p> + +<p>It must also be admitted that the attempts at a reconstruction of +systematic philosophy which have followed the rapid disintegration of +the Hegelian system, and the enormous accumulations of new material due +to the extension of historical studies and of the particular +sciences,—including especially the so-called "new +psychology,"—have not as yet been fruitful of large results. In +philosophy, as in art, politics, and even scientific theory, the spirit +and the opportunity of the time are more favorable to the gathering of +material and to the projecting of a bewildering variety of new opinions, +or old opinions put forth under new names, than to that candid, patient, +and prolonged reflection and balancing of judgment which a worthy +system-building inexorably requires. The age of breaking up the old, +without assimilating the new, has not yet passed away. And whatever is +new, startling, large, even monstrous, has in many quarters the seeming +preference, in philosophy's building as in other architecture. To the +confusion which reigns even in scholastic circles, contributions have +been arriving from the outside, from philosophers like Nietzsche, and +from men great in literature like Tolstoi. Nor has the matter been +helped by the more recent extreme developments of positivism and +skepticism, which often enough, without any consciousness of their +origin and without the respect for morality and religion which Kant +always evinced, really go back to the critical philosophy.</p> + +<p>In spite of all this, however, the last two decades or more have +shown certain hopeful tendencies and notable achievements, looking +toward the reconstruction of systematic philosophy. In this attempt to +bring order out of confusion, to enable calm, prolonged, and reflective +thinking to build into its structure the riches of the new material +which the evolution of the race has secured, a place of honor ought to +be given to France, where so much has been done of late to blend with +clearness of style and independence of thought that calm reflective and +critical judgment which looks all sides of human experience +sympathetically but bravely in the face. In psychology Ribot, and in +philosophy, Fouillée, Renouvier, Secrétan, and others, deserve grateful +recognition. No friend of philosophy can, I think, fail to recognize the +probable benefits to be derived from that movement with which such names +as Mach and Ostwald in Germany are connected, and which is sounding the +call to the men of science to clear up the really distressing obscurity +and confusion which has so long clung to their fundamental conceptions; +and to examine anew the significance of their assumptions, with a view +to the construction of a new and improved doctrine of the Being of the +World. And if to these names we add those of the numerous distinguished +investigators of psychology as pedagogic to philosophy, and, in +philosophy, of Deussen, Eucken, von Hartmann, Riehl, Wundt, and others, +we may well affirm that new light will continue to break forth from that +country which so powerfully aroused the whole Western World at the end +of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In Great +Britain the name and works of Thomas Hill Green have influenced the +attempts at a reconstruction of systematic philosophy in a manner to +satisfy at one and the same time both the facts and laws of science and +the æsthetical, ethical, and religious ideals of the age, in a very +considerable degree. And in this attempt, both as it expresses itself in +theoretical psychology and in the various branches of philosophical +discipline, writers like Bradley, Fraser, Flint, Hodgson, Seth, Stout, +Ward, and others, have taken a conspicuous part. Nor are there wanting +in Holland, Italy, and even in Sweden and Russia, thinkers equally +worthy of recognition, and recognized, in however limited and unworthy +fashion, in their own land. The names of those in America who have +labored most faithfully, and succeeded best, in this enormous task of +reconstructing philosophy in a systematic way, and upon a basis of +history and of modern science, I do not need to mention; they are known, +or they surely ought to be known, to us all.</p> + +<p>In attempting to summarize the gains of philosophy during the last +hundred years, we should remind ourselves that progress in philosophy +does not consist in the final settlement, and so in the "solving" of any +of its great problems. Indeed, the relations of philosophy to its +grounds in experience, and the nature of its method and of its ideal, +are such that its progress can never be expected to put an end to +itself. But the content of the total experience of humanity has been +greatly enriched during the last century; and the critical and +reflective thought of trained minds has been led toward a more profound +and comprehensive theory of Reality, and toward a doctrine of values +that shall be more available for the improvement of man's political, +social, and religious life.</p> + +<p>In view of this truth respecting the limitations of systematic +philosophy, I think we may hold that certain negative results, which are +customarily adduced as unfavorable to the claims of philosophical +progress, are really signs of improvement during the latter half of the +nineteenth century. One is an increased spirit of reserve and caution, +and an increased modesty of claims. This result is perhaps significant +of riper wisdom and more trustworthy maturity. Kant believed himself to +have established for philosophy a system of apodeictic conclusions, +which were as completely forever to have displaced the old dogmatism as +Copernicus had displaced the Ptolemaic astronomy. But the steady +pressure of historical and scientific studies has made it increasingly +difficult for any sane thinker to claim for any system of thinking such +demonstrable validity. May we not hope that the students of the +particular sciences, to whom philosophy owes so much of its enforced +sanity and sane modesty, will themselves soon share freely of the +philosophic spirit with regard to their own metaphysics and ethical and +religious standpoints, touching the Ultimate Reality? Even when the +recoil from the overweening self-satisfaction and crass complacency of +the earlier part of the last century takes the form of melancholy, or of +acute sadness, or even of a mild despair of philosophy, I am not sure +that the last state of that man is not better than the first.</p> + +<p>In connection with this improvement in spirit, we may also note an +improvement in the method of philosophy. The purely speculative method, +with its intensely interesting but indefensible disregard of concrete +facts, and of the conclusions of the particular sciences, is no longer +in favor even among the most ardent devotees and advocates of the +superiority of philosophy to those sciences. At the same time, +philosophy may quite properly continue to maintain its position of +independent critic, as well as of docile pupil, toward the particular +sciences.</p> + +<p>In the same connection must be mentioned the hopeful fact that the +last two or three decades have shown a decided improvement in the +relations of philosophy toward the positive sciences. There are plain +signs of late that the attitude of antagonism, or of neglect, which +prevailed so largely during the second and third quarters of the +nineteenth century, is to be replaced by one of friendship and mutual +helpfulness. And, indeed, science and philosophy cannot long or greatly +flourish without reciprocal aid, if by science we mean a true +<i>Wissenschaft</i> and if we also mean to base philosophy upon our +total experience. For science and philosophy are really engaged upon the +same task,—to <i>understand and to appreciate the totality of +man's</i> <i>experience</i>. They, therefore, have essential and +permanent relations of dependence for material, for inspiration and +correction, and for other forms of helpfulness. While, then, their +respective spheres have been more clearly delimited during the last +century, their interdependence has been more forcefully exhibited. Both +of them have been developing a systematic exposition of the universe. +Both of them desire to enlarge and deepen the conception of the Being of +the World, as made known to the totality of human experience, in its +Unity of nature and significance. We cannot believe that the end of the +nineteenth century would sustain the charge which Fontenelle made in the +closing years of the seventeenth century: "<i>L'Académie des Sciences ne +prend la nature que par petites parcelles</i>." Science itself now bids +us regard the Universe as a dynamical Unity, teleologically conceived, +because in a process of evolution under the control of immanent ideas. +Philosophy assumes the same point of view, rather at the beginning than +at the end of defining its purpose; and so feels a certain glad leap at +its heart-strings, and an impulse to hold out the hand to science, when +it hears such an utterance as that of Poincaré: <i>Ce n'est pas le +méchanisme le vrai, le seul but; c'est l'unité</i>.</p> + +<p>Shall we not say, then, that this double-faced but wholly true lesson +has been learned: namely, that the so-called philosophy of nature has no +sound foundation and no safeguard against vagaries of every sort, unless +it follows the lead of the positive sciences of nature; but that the +sciences themselves can never afford a full satisfaction to the +legitimate aspirations of human reason unless they, too, contribute to +the philosophy of nature—writ large and conceived of as a +real-ideal Unity.</p> + +<p>That nature, as known and knowable by man, is a great artist, and +that man's æsthetical consciousness may be trusted as having a certain +ontological value, is the postulate properly derived from the +considerations advanced in the latest, and in some respects the most +satisfactory, of the three Critiques of Kant. The ideal way of looking +at natural phenomena which so delighted the mind of Goethe has now been +placed on broad and sound foundations by the fruitful industries of many +workmen,—such as Karl Ernst von Baer and Charles +Darwin,—whose morphological and evolutionary conceptions of the +universe have transformed the current conceptions of cosmic processes. +But the world of physical and natural phenomena has thereby been +rendered not less, but more, of a Cosmos, an orderly totality.</p> + +<p>In addition to these more general but somewhat vague evaluations of +the progress of philosophy during the nineteenth century, we are +certainly called upon to face the question whether, after all, any +advance has been made toward the more satisfactory solution of the +definite problems which the Kantian criticism left unsolved. To this +question I believe an affirmative answer may be given in accordance with +the facts of history. It will be remembered that the first of these +problems was the epistemological. Certainly no little improvement has +been made in the psychology of cognition. We can no longer repeat the +mistakes of Kant, either with respect to the uncritical assumptions he +makes regarding the origin of knowledge in the so-called "faculties" of +the human mind or regarding the analysis of those faculties and their +interdependent relations. It is not the Scottish philosophy alone which +has led to the conclusion that, in the word of the late Professor +Adamson, "What are called acts or states of consciousness are <i>not</i> +rightly conceived of as having for their objects their own modes of +existence as ways in which a subject is modified." And in the larger +manner both science and philosophy, in their negations and their +affirmations, and even in their points of view, have better grounds for +the faith of human reason in its power progressively to master the +knowledge of Reality than was the case a hundred years ago. Nor has the +skepticism of the same era, whether by shallow scoffing at repeated +failures, or by pious sighs over the limitations of human reason, or by +critical analysis of the cognitive faculties "according to +well-established principles," succeeded in limiting our speculative +pretensions to the sphere of possible experience,—in the Kantian +meaning both of "principles" and of "experience." But what both science +and philosophy are compelled to agree upon as a common underlying +principle is this: The proof of the most fundamental presuppositions, as +well as of the latest more scientifically established conclusions, of +both science and philosophy, is the assistance they afford in the +satisfactory explanation of the totality of racial experience.</p> + +<p>In the evolution of the ontological problem, as compared with the +form in which it was left by the critical philosophy, the past century +has also made some notable advances. To deny this would be to discredit +the development of human knowledge so far as to say that we know no more +about what nature is, and man is, than was known a hundred years ago. To +say this, however, would not be to speak truth of fact. And here we may +not unnaturally grow somewhat impatient with that metaphysical fallacy +which places an impassable gulf between Reality and Experience. No +reality is, of course, cognizable or believable by man which does not +somehow show its presence in his total experience. But no growth of +experience is possible without involving increase of knowledge +representing Reality. For Reality is no absent and dead, or statical, +Ding-an-Sich. Cognition itself is a commerce of realities. And are there +not plain signs that the more thoughtful men of science are becoming +less averse to the recognition of the truth of ontological philosophy; +namely, that the deeper meaning of their own studies is grasped only +when they recognize that they are ever face to face with what they call +Energy and we call Will, and with what they call laws and we call Mind +as significant of the progressive realization of immanent ideas. This +Ultimate Reality is so profound that neither science nor philosophy will +ever sound all its depths, and so comprehensive as more than to justify +all the categories of both.</p> + +<p>Probably, on the whole, there has been less progress made toward a +satisfactory solution of the problems offered by the value-judgments of +ethics and religion, in the form in which these problems were left by +the critical philosophy. The century has illustrated the truth of +Falckenberg's statement: "In periods which have given birth to a +skeptical philosophy, one never looks in vain for the complementary +phenomenon of mysticism." Twice during the century the so-called +"faith-philosophy," or philosophy of feeling, has been borne to the +front, to raise a bulwark against the advancing hosts of +agnostics—occasioned in the first period by the negations of the +Kantian criticism, and in the second by the positive conclusions of the +physical and biological sciences. This form of protesting against the +neglect or disparagement of important factors which belong to man's +æsthetical, ethical, and religious experience, is reasonable and must be +heard. But the extravagances with which these neglected factors have +been posited and appraised, to the neglect of the more definitively +scientific and strictly logical, is to be deplored. The great work +before the philosophy of the present age is the reconciliation of the +historical and scientific conceptions of the Universe with the +legitimate sentiments and ideals of art, morality, and religion. But +surely neither rationalism nor "faith-philosophy" is justified in +pouring out the living child with the muddy water of the bath.</p> + +<p>IV. The attempt to survey the present situation of philosophy, and to +predict its immediate future, is embarrassed by the fact that we are all +immersed in it, are a part of its spirit and present form. But if +nearness has its embarrassments, it has also its benefits. Those who are +amidst the tides of life may know better, in a way, how these tides are +tending and what is their present strength, than do those who survey +them from distant, cool, and exalted heights. "<i>Für jeden einzelnen +bildet der Vater und der Sohn eine greifbare Kette von Lebensereignungen +und Erfahrungen.</i>" The very intensely vital and formative but +unformed condition of systematic philosophy—its protoplasmic +character—contains promises of a new life. If we may believe the +view of Hegel that the systematizing of the thought of any age marks the +time when the peculiar living thought of that age is passing into a +period of decay, we may certainly claim for our present age the prospect +of a prolonged vitality.</p> + +<p>The nineteenth century has left us with a vast widening of the +horizon,—outward into space, backward in time, inward toward the +secrets of life, and downward into the depths of Reality. With this +there has been an increase in the profundity of the conviction of the +spiritual unity of the race. In the consideration of all of its problems +in the immediate future and in the coming century—so far as we can +see forward into this century—philosophy will have to reckon with +certain marked characteristics of the human spirit which form at the +same time inspiring stimuli and limiting conditions of its endeavors and +achievements. Chief among these are the greater and more firmly +established principles of the positive sciences, and the prevalence of +the historical spirit and method in the investigation of all manner of +problems. These influences have given shape to the conception which, +although it is as yet by no means in its final or even in thoroughly +self-consistent form, is destined powerfully to affect our philosophical +as well as our scientific theories. This conception is that of +Development. But philosophy, considered as the product of critical and +reflective thinking over the more ultimate problems of nature and of +human life, is itself a development. And it is now, more than ever +before, a development interdependently connected with all the other +great developments.</p> + +<p>Philosophy, in order to adapt itself to the spirit of the age, must +welcome and cultivate the freest critical inquiry into its own methods +and results, and must cheerfully submit itself to the demand for +evidences which has its roots in the common and essential experience of +the race. Moreover, the growth of the spirit of democracy, which, on the +one hand, is distinctly unfavorable to any system of philosophy whose +tenets and formulas seem to have only an academic validity or a merely +esoteric value, and which, on the other hand, requires for its +satisfaction a more tenable, helpful, and universally applicable theory +of life and reality, cannot fail, in my judgment, to influence favorably +the development of philosophy. In the union of the speculative and the +practical; in the harmonizing of the interests of the positive sciences, +with their judgments of fact and law, and the interests of art, +morality, and religion, with their value-judgments and ideals; in the +synthesis of the truths of Realism and Idealism, as they have existed +hitherto and now exist in separateness or antagonism; in a union that is +not accomplished by a shallow eclecticism, but by a sincere attempt to +base philosophy upon the totality of human experience;—in such a +union as this must we look for the real progress of philosophy in the +coming century.</p> + +<p>Just now there seem to be two somewhat heterogeneous and not +altogether well-defined tendencies toward the reconstruction of +systematic philosophy, both of which are powerful and represent real +truths conquered by ages of intellectual industry and conflict. These +two, however, need to be internally harmonized, in order to obtain a +satisfactory statement of the development of the last century. They may +be called the evolutionary and the idealistic. The one tendency lays +emphasis on mechanism, the other on spirit. Yet it is most interesting +to notice how many of the early workmen in the investigation of the +principle of the conservation and correlation of energy took their point +of departure from distinctly teleological and spiritual conceptions. "I +was led," said Colding,—to take an extreme case,—at the +Natural Science Congress at Innsbruck, 1869, "to the idea of the +constancy of national forces by the religious conception of life." And +even Moleschott, in his <i>Autobiography</i>, posthumously published, +declares: "I myself was well aware that the whole conception might be +converted; for since all matter is a bearer of force, endowed with force +or penetrated with spirit, it would be just as correct to call it a +spiritualistic conception." On the other hand, the modern, better +instructed Idealism is much inclined, both from the psychological and +from the more purely philosophical points of view, to regard with duly +profound respect all the facts and laws of that mechanism of Reality, +which certainly is not merely the dependent construction of the human +mind functioning according to a constitution that excludes it from +Reality, but is rather the ever increasingly more trustworthy revealer +of Reality. This tendency to a union of the claims of both Realism and +Idealism is profoundly influencing the solution of each one of these +problems which the Kantian criticism left to the philosophy of the +nineteenth century. In respect of the epistemological problem, +philosophy—as I have already said—is not likely again to +repeat the mistakes either of Kant or of the dogmatism which his +criticism so effectually overthrew. It was a wise remark of the +physician Johann Benjamin Erhard, in a letter dated May 19, 1794, <i>à +propos</i> of Fichte: "The philosophy which <i>proceeds</i> from a +<i>single</i> fundamental principle, and pretends to deduce everything +from it, is and always will remain a piece of artificial sophistry: only +that philosophy which <i>ascends</i> to the highest principle and +exhibits everything else in perfect harmony with it, is the true one." +This at least ought—one would say—to have been made clear by +the century of discussion over the epistemological problem, since Kant. +You cannot <i>deduce</i> the Idea from the Reality, or the Reality from +the Idea. The problem of knowledge is not, as Fichte held in the form of +a fundamental assumption, an alternative of this sort. The Idea +<i>and</i> Reality are, the rather already there, and to be recognized +as in a living unity, in every cognitive experience. Psychology is +constantly adding something toward the problem of cognition as a problem +in synthesis; and is then in a way contributing to the better scientific +understanding of the philosophical postulate which is the confidence of +human reason in its ability, by the harmonious use of all its powers, +progressively to reach a better and fuller knowledge of Reality.</p> + +<p>The ontological problem will necessarily always remain the unsolved, +in the sense of the very incompletely solved problem of philosophy. But +as long as human experience develops, and as long as philosophy bestows +upon experience the earnest and candid efforts of reflecting minds, the +solution of the ontological problem will be approached, but never fully +reached. That Being of the World which Kant, in the negative and +critical part of his work, left as an X, unknown and unknowable, the +last century has filled with a new and far richer content than it ever +had before. Especially has this century changed the conception of the +Unity of the Universe in such manner that it can never return again to +its ancient form. On the one hand, this Unity cannot be made +comprehensible in terms of any one scientific or philosophical principle +or law. Science and philosophy are both moving farther and farther away +from the hope of comprehending the variety and infinite manifoldness of +the Absolute in terms of any one side or aspect of man's complex +experience. But, on the other hand, the confidence in this essential +Unity is not diminished, but is the rather confirmed. As humanity itself +develops, as the Selfhood of man grows in the experience of the world +which is its own environment, and of the world within which it is its +own true Self, humanity may reasonably hope to win an increased, and +increasingly valid, cognition of the Being of the World as the Absolute +Self.</p> + +<p>Closely connected, and in a way essentially identical with the +ontological problem, is that of the origin, validity, and rational value +of the ideas of humanity. May it not be said that the nineteenth century +transfers to the twentieth an increased interest in and a heightened +appreciation of the so-called practical problems of philosophy. Science +and philosophy certainly ought to combine—and are they not ready +to combine?—in the effort to secure a more nearly satisfactory +understanding and solution of the problems afforded by the æsthetical, +ethical, and religious sentiments and ideals of the race. To philosophy +this combination means that it shall be more fruitful than ever before +in promoting the uplift and betterment of mankind. The fulfillment of +the practical mission of philosophy involves the application of its +conceptions and principles to education, politics, morals, as a matter +of law and of custom, and to religion as matter both of rational faith +and of the conduct of life.</p> + +<p>How, then, can this brief and imperfect sketch of the outline of the +development of philosophy in the nineteenth century better come to a +close than by words of encouragement and of exhortation as well. There +are, in my judgment, the plainest signs that the somewhat too +destructive and even nihilistic tendencies of the second and third +quarters of the nineteenth century have reached their limit; that the +strife of science and philosophy, and of both with religion, is +lessening, and is being rapidly displaced by the spirit of mutual +fairness and reciprocal helpfulness; and that reasonable hopes of a new +and a splendid era of reconstruction in philosophy may be entertained. +For I cannot agree with the <i>dictum</i> of a recent writer on the +subject, that "the sciences are coming less and less to admit of a +synthesis, and not at all of a synthetic philosopher."</p> + +<p>On the contrary, I hold that, with an increased confidence in the +capacity of human reason to discover and validate the most secret and +profound, as well as the most comprehensive, of truths, philosophy may +well put aside some of its shyness and hesitancy, and may resume more of +that audacity of imagination, sustained by ontological convictions, +which characterized its work during the first half of the nineteenth +century. And if the latter half of the twentieth century does for the +constructions of the first half of the same century, what the latter +half of the nineteenth century did for the first half of that century, +this new criticism will only be to illustrate the way in which the human +spirit makes every form of its progress.</p> + +<p>Therefore, a summons of all helpers, in critical but fraternal +spirit, to this work of reconstruction, for which two generations of +enormous advance in the positive sciences has gathered new material, and +for the better accomplishment of which both the successes and the +failures of the philosophy of the nineteenth century have prepared the +men of the twentieth century, is the winsome and imperative voice of the +hour.</p> + +<h3 class="p4 center">SECTION A—METAPHYSICS</h3> + +<h3 class="p4 center">SECTION A—METAPHYSICS</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center">(<i>Hall 6, September 21, 10 a. m.</i>)</p> + +<table class="bold" border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Metaphysics +Speakers"> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. C. Armstrong</span>, +Wesleyan University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. E. Taylor</span>, McGill +University, Montreal.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Alexander T. +Ormond</span>, Princeton University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor A. O. Lovejoy</span>, +Washington University.</td></tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p2">The Chairman of the Section, Professor A. C. Armstrong, of +Wesleyan University, in opening the meeting referred to the continued +vitality of metaphysics as shown by its repeated revivals after the many +destructive attacks upon it in the later modern times: he congratulated +the Section on the fact that the principal speakers were scholars who +had made notable contributions to metaphysical theory.</p> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Meta1"></a>THE RELATIONS BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND +THE OTHER SCIENCES</h3> + +<h4>BY PROFESSOR ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>Alfred Edward Taylor</b>, Frothingham Professor of Philosophy, +McGill University, Montreal, Canada. b. Oundle, England, December 22, +1869. M.A. Oxford. Fellow, Merton College, Oxford, 1891-98, 1902-; +Lecturer in Greek and Philosophy, Owens College, Manchester, 1896-1903; +Assistant Examiner to University of Wales, 1899-1903; Green Moral +Philosophy Prizeman, Oxford, 1899; Frothingham Professor of Philosophy, +McGill University, 1903-; Member Philosophical Society, Owens College, +American Philosophical Association. Author of <i>The Problem of +Conduct</i>; <i>Elements of Metaphysics</i>.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">When we seek to determine the place of metaphysics in the +general scheme of human knowledge, we are at once confronted by an +initial difficulty of some magnitude. There seems, in fact, to be no one +universally accepted definition of our study, and even no very general +consensus among its votaries as to the problems with which the +metaphysician ought to concern himself. This difficulty, serious as it +is, does not, however, justify the suspicion that our science is, like +alchemy or astrology, an illusion, and its high-sounding title a mere +"idol of the market-place," one of those <i>nomina rerum quae non +sunt</i> against which the Chancellor Bacon has so eloquently warned +mankind. If it is hard to determine precisely the scope of metaphysics, +it is no less difficult to do the same thing for the undoubtedly +legitimate sciences of logic and mathematics. And in all three cases the +absence of definition merely shows that we are dealing with branches of +knowledge which are, so to say, still in the making. It is not until the +first principles of science are already firmly laid beyond the +possibility of cavil that we must look for general agreement as to its +boundary lines, though excellent work may be done, long before this +point has been reached, in the establishment of individual principles +and deduction of consequences from them. To revert to the parallel cases +I have just cited, many mathematical principles of the highest +importance are formulated in the <i>Elements</i> of Euclid, and many +logical principles in the <i>Organon</i> of Aristotle; yet it is only in +our own time that it has become possible to offer a general definition +either of logic or of mathematics, and even now it would probably be +true to say that the majority of logicians and mathematicians trouble +themselves very little about the precise definition of their respective +studies.</p> + +<p>The state of our science then compels me to begin this address with a +more or less arbitrary, because provisional, definition of the term +metaphysics, for which I claim no more than that it may serve to +indicate with approximate accuracy the class of problems which I shall +have in view in my subsequent use of the word. By metaphysics, then, I +propose to understand the inquiry which used formerly to be known as +ontology, that is, the investigation into the general character which +belongs to real Being as such, the science, in Aristotelian phraseology, +of <ins title="onta hê onta">ὄντα ᾗ ὄντα</ins>. Or, if the term "real" +be objected against as ambiguous, I would suggest as an alternative +account the statement that metaphysics is the inquiry into the general +character by which the content of <i>true</i> assertions is +distinguished from that of <i>false</i> assertions. The two definitions +here offered will, I think, be found equivalent when it is borne in mind +that what the second of them speaks of is exclusively the <i>content</i> +which is asserted as true in a true proposition, not the process of true +assertion, which, like all other processes in the highest cerebral +centres, falls under the consideration of the vastly different sciences +of psychology and cerebral physiology. Of the two equivalent forms of +statement, the former has perhaps the advantage of making it most clear +that it is ultimately upon the objective distinction between the reality +and the unreality of that which is asserted for truth, and not upon any +psychological peculiarity in the process of assertion itself that the +distinction between true and untrue rests, while the second may be +useful in guarding against misconceptions that might be suggested by too +narrow an interpretation of the term "reality," such as, <i>e. g.</i>, +the identification of the "real" with what is revealed by sensuous +perception.</p> + +<p>From the acceptance of such a definition two important consequences +would follow. (1) The first is that metaphysics is at once sharply +discriminated from any study of the psychical <i>process</i> of +knowledge, if indeed, there can be any such study distinct from the +psychology of conception and belief, which is clearly not itself the +science we have in view. For the psychological laws of the formation of +concepts and beliefs are exemplified equally in the discovery and +propagation of truth and of error. And thus it is in vain to look to +them for any explanation of the difference between the two. Nor does the +otherwise promising extension of Darwinian conceptions of the "struggle +for existence" and the "survival of the fittest" to the field of +opinions and convictions appear to affect this conclusion. Such +considerations may indeed assist us to understand how true convictions +in virtue of their "usefulness" gradually come to be established and +extended, but they require to presume the truth of these convictions as +an antecedent condition of their "usefulness" and consequent +establishment. I should infer, then, that it is a mistake in principle +to seek to replace ontology by a "theory of knowledge," and should even +be inclined to question the very possibility of such a theory as +distinct from metaphysics on the one hand and empirical psychology on +the other. (2) The second consequence is of even greater importance. The +inquiry into the general character by which the contents of true +assertions are discriminated from the contents of false assertions must +be carefully distinguished from any investigation into the truth or +falsehood of special assertions. To ask how in the end truth differs +from falsehood is to raise an entirely different problem from that +created by asking whether a given statement is to be regarded as true or +false. The distinction becomes particularly important when we have to +deal with what Locke would call assertions of "real existence," <i>i. +e.</i>, assertions as to the occurrence of particular events in the +temporal order. All such assertions depend, in part at least, upon the +admission of what we may style "empirical" evidence, the immediate +unanalyzed witness of simple apprehension to the occurrence of an +alleged matter of fact. Thus it would follow from our proposed +conception of metaphysics that metaphysics is in principle incapable +either of establishing or refuting any assertion as to the details of +our immediate experience of empirical fact, though it may have important +bearings upon any theory of the general nature of true Being which we +may seek to found upon our alleged experiences. In a word, if our +conception be the correct one, the functions of a science of metaphysics +in respect of our knowledge of the temporal sequence of events psychical +and physical must be purely critical, never constructive,—a point +to which I shall presently have to recur.</p> + +<p>One more general reflection, and we may pass to the consideration of +the relation of metaphysics to the various already <ins +title="'organzied' in the original">organized</ins> branches of human +knowledge more in detail. The admission that there is, or may be, such a +study as we have described, seems of itself to involve the recognition +that definite knowledge about the character of what really "is," is +attainable, and thus to commit us to a position of sharp opposition both +to consistent and thorough-going agnosticism and also to the latent +agnosticism of Kantian and neo-Kantian "critical philosophy." In +recognizing ontology as a legitimate investigation, we revert in +principle to the "dogmatist" position common, <i>e. g.</i>, to Plato, to +Spinoza and to Leibniz, that there is genuine truth which can be known, +and that this genuine truth is not confined to statements about the +process of knowing itself. In fact, the "critical" view that the only +certain truth is truth about the process of knowing seems to be +inherently self-contradictory. For the knowledge that such a proposition +as, <i>e. g.</i>, "I know only the laws of my own apprehending +activity," is true, would itself be knowledge not about the process of +knowing but about the content known. Thus metaphysics, conceived as the +science of the general character which distinguishes truth from +falsehood, presupposes throughout all knowledge the presence of what we +may call a "transcendent object," that is, a content which is never +identical with the process by which it is apprehended, though it may no +doubt be maintained that the two, the process and its content, if +distinct, are yet not ultimately separable. That they are in point of +fact not ultimately separable would seem to be the doctrine which, under +various forms of statement, is common to and characteristic of all the +"idealistic" systems of metaphysics. So much then in defense of a +metaphysical point of view which seems to be closely akin to that of Mr. +Bradley and of Professor Royce, to mention only two names of +contemporary philosophers, and which might, I think, for the purpose of +putting it in sharp opposition to the "neo-Kantian" view, not unfairly +be called, if it is held to need a name, "neo-Leibnizian."</p> + +<p>In passing on to discuss in brief the nature of the boundary lines +which divide metaphysics from other branches of study, it seems +necessary to start with a clear distinction between the "pure" or +"formal" and the "applied" or "empirical" sciences, the more so as in +the loose current employment of language the name "science" is +frequently given exclusively to the latter. In every-day life, when we +are told that a certain person is a "man of science," or as the +detestable jargon of our time likes to say, a "scientist," we expect to +find that he is, <i>e. g.</i>, a geologist, a chemist, a biologist, or +an electrician. We should be a little surprised to find on inquiry that +our "man of science" was a pure mathematician, and probably more than a +little to learn that he was a formal logician. The distinction between +the pure and the empirical sciences may be roughly indicated by saying +that the latter class comprises all those sciences which yield +information about the particular details of the temporal order of events +physical and psychical, whereas the pure sciences deal solely with the +general characteristics either of all truths, or of all truths of some +well-defined class. More exactly we may say that the marks by which an +empirical is distinguished from a pure science are two. (1) The +empirical sciences one and all imply the presence among their premises +of empirical propositions, that is, propositions which assert the actual +occurrence of some temporal fact, and depend upon the witness of +immediate apprehension, either in the form of sense<ins +title="hyphenated in the original"> </ins>perception or in that of what +is commonly called self-consciousness. In the vague language made +current by Kant, they involve an appeal to some form of unanalyzed +"intuition." The pure sciences, on the other hand, contain no empirical +propositions either among their premises or their conclusions. The +principles which form their premises are self-evidently true +propositions, containing no reference to the actual occurrence of any +event in the temporal order, and thus involving no appeal to any form of +"intuition." And the conclusions established in a pure science are all +rigidly logical deductions from such self-evident premises. That the +universality of this distinction is still often overlooked even by +professed writers on scientific method seems explicable by two simple +considerations. On the one hand, it is easy to overlook the important +distinction between a principle which is self-evident, that is, which +cannot be denied without explicit falsehood, and a proposition affirmed +on the warrant of the senses, because, though its denial cannot be seen +to be obviously false, the senses appear on each fresh appeal to +substantiate the assertion. Thus the Euclidean postulate about parallels +was long falsely supposed to possess exactly the same kind of +self-evidence as the <i>dictum de omni</i> and the principle of identity +which are part of the foundations of all logic. And further Kant, +writing under the influence of this very confusion, has given wide +popularity to the view that the best known of the pure sciences, that of +mathematics, depends upon the admission of empirical premises in the +form of an appeal to intuition of the kind just described. Fortunately +the recent developments of arithmetic at the hands of such men as +Weierstrass, Cantor, and Dedekind seem to have definitely refuted the +Kantian view as far as general arithmetic, the pure science of number, +is concerned, by proving that one and all of its propositions are +<i>analytic</i> in the strict sense of the word, that is, that they are +capable of rigid deduction from self-evident premises, so that, in what +regards arithmetic, we may say with Schröder that the famous Kantian +question "how are synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i> possible?" is now +known to be meaningless. As regards geometry, the case appears to a +non-mathematician like myself more doubtful. Those who hold with +Schröder that geometry essentially involves, as Kant thought it did, an +appeal to principles not self-evident and dependent upon an appeal to +sensuous "intuition," are logically bound to conclude with him that +geometry is an "empirical," or as W. K. Clifford called it, a "physical" +science, different in no way from mechanics except in the relative +paucity of the empirical premises presupposed, and to class it with the +applied sciences. On the other hand, if Mr. Bertrand Russell should be +successful in his promised demonstration that all the principles of +geometry are deducible from a few premises which include nothing of the +nature of an appeal to sensuous diagrams, geometry too would take its +place among the pure sciences, but only on condition of our recognizing +that its truths, like those of arithmetic, are one and all, as Leibniz +held, strictly analytical. Thus we obtain as a first distinction between +the pure and the empirical sciences the principle that the propositions +of the former class are all analytical, those of the latter all +synthetic. It is not the least of the services which France is now +rendering to the study of philosophy that we are at last being placed by +the labors of M. Couturat in a position to appreciate at their full +worth the views of the first and greatest of German philosophers on this +distinction, and to understand how marvelously they have been confirmed +by the subsequent history of mathematics and of logic.</p> + +<p>(2) A consequence of this distinction is that only the pure or formal +sciences can be matter of rigid logical demonstration. Since the +empirical or applied sciences one and all contain empirical premises, +<i>i. e.</i>, premises which we admit as true only because they have +always appeared to be confirmed by the appeal to "intuition," and not +because the denial of them can be shown to lead to falsehood, the +conclusions to which they conduct us must one and all depend, in part at +least, upon induction from actual observation of particular temporal +sequences. This is as much as to say that all propositions in the +applied sciences involve somewhere in the course of the reasoning by +which they are established the appeal to the calculus of Probabilities, +which is our one method of eliciting general results from the statistics +supplied by observation or experiment. That this is the case with the +more concrete among such applied sciences has long been universally +acknowledged. That it is no less true of sciences of such wide range as +mechanics may be said, I think, to have been definitely established in +our own day by the work of such eminent physicists as Kirchhoff and +Mach. In fact, the recent developments of the science of pure number, to +which reference has been made in a preceding paragraph, combined with +the creation of the "descriptive" theory of mechanics, may fairly be +said to have finally vindicated the distinction drawn by Leibniz long +ago between the truths of reason and the truths of empirical fact, a +distinction which the Kantian trend of philosophical speculation tended +during the greater part of the nineteenth century to obscure, while it +was absolutely ignored by the empiricist opponents of metaphysics both +in England and in Germany. The philosophical consequences of a revival +of the distinction are, I conceive, of far-reaching importance. On the +one side, recognition of the empirical and contingent character of all +general propositions established by induction appears absolutely fatal +to the current mechanistic conception of the universe as a realm of +purposeless sequences unequivocally determined by unalterable "laws of +nature," a result which has in recent years been admirably illustrated +for the English-speaking world by Professor Ward's well-known Gifford +lectures on "Naturalism and Agnosticism." Laws of physical nature, on +the empiristic view of applied science, can mean no more than observed +regularities, obtained by the application of the doctrine of +chances,—regularities which we are indeed justified in accepting +with confidence as the basis for calculation of the future course of +temporal sequence, but which we have no logical warrant for treating as +ultimate truths about the final constitution of things. Thus, for +example, take the common assumption that our physical environment is +composed of a multitude of particles each in every respect the exact +counterpart of every other. Reflection upon the nature of the evidence +by which this conclusion, if supported at all, has to be supported, +should convince us that at most all that the statement ought to mean is +that individual differences between the elementary constituents of the +physical world need not be allowed for in devising practical formulae +for the intelligent anticipation of events. When the proposition is put +forward as an absolute truth and treated as a reason for denying the +ultimate spirituality of the world, we are well within our rights in +declining the consequence on the logical ground that conclusions from an +empirical premise must in their own nature be themselves empirical and +contingent.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the extreme empiricism which treats all knowledge +whatsoever as merely relative to the total psychical state of the +knower, and therefore in the end problematic, must, I apprehend, go down +before any serious investigation into the nature of the analytic truths +of arithmetic, a consequence which seems to be of some relevance in +connection with the philosophic view popularly known as Pragmatism. Thus +I should look to the coming regeneration of metaphysics, of which there +are so many signs at the moment, on the one hand, for emphatic +insistence on the right, <i>e. g.</i>, of physics and biology and +psychology to be treated as purely empirical sciences, and as such freed +from the last vestiges of any domination by metaphysical presuppositions +and foregone conclusions, and on the other, for an equally salutary +purgation of formal studies like logic and arithmetic from the taint of +corruption by the irrelevant intrusion of considerations of empirical +psychology.</p> + +<p>We cannot too persistently bear in mind that there is, corresponding +to the logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic +proposition, a deep and broad general difference between the wants of +our nature ministered to by the formal and the applied sciences +respectively. The formal sciences, incapable of adding anything to our +detailed knowledge of the course of events, as we have seen, enlighten +us solely as to the general laws of interconnection by which all +conceivable systems of true assertions are permeated and bound together. +In a different connection it would be interesting to develop further the +reflection that the necessity of appealing to such formal principles in +all reasoning about empirical matters of fact contains the explanation +of the famous Platonic assertion that the "Idea of Good" or supreme +principle of organization and order in the universe, is itself not an +existent, but something <ins title="eti epekeina tês ousias">ἔτι +ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας</ins>, "transcending even existence," and the very +similar declaration of Hegel that the question whether "God"—in +the sense of such a supreme principle—exists is frivolous, +inasmuch as existence (<i>Dasein</i>) is a category entirely inadequate +to express the Divine nature. For my present purpose it is enough to +remark that the need to which the formal sciences minister is the demand +for that purely speculative satisfaction which arises from insight into +the order of interconnection between the various truths which compose +the totality of true knowledge. Hence it seems a mistake to say, as some +theorists have done, that were we born with a complete knowledge of the +course of temporal sequences throughout the universe, and a faultless +memory, we should have no need of logic or metaphysics, or in fact of +inference. For even a mind already in possession of all true +propositions concerning the course of events, would still lack one of +the requisites for complete intellectual satisfaction unless it were +also aware, not only of the individual truths, but of the order of their +interdependence. What Aristotle said long ago with reference to a +particular instance may be equally said universally of all our empirical +knowledge; "even if we stood on the moon and saw the earth intercepting +the light of the sun, we should still have to ask for the reason +<i>why</i>." The purposes ministered to by the empirical sciences, on +the other hand, always include some reference to the actual manipulation +in advance by human agency of the stream of events. We study mechanics, +for instance, not merely that we may perceive the interdependence of +truths, but that we may learn how to maintain a system of bodies in +equilibrium, or how to move masses in a given direction with a given +momentum. Hence it is true of applied science, though untrue of science +as a whole, that it would become useless if the whole past and future +course of events were from the first familiar to us. And, incidentally +it may be observed, it is for the same reason untrue of inference, +though true of inductive inference, that it is essentially a passage +from the known to the unknown.</p> + +<p>In dealing with the relation of metaphysics to the formal sciences +generally, the great difficulty which confronts us is that of +determining exactly the boundaries which separate one from another. +Among such pure sciences we have by universal admission to include at +least two, pure formal logic and pure mathematics, as distinguished from +the special applications of logic and mathematics to an empirical +material. Whether we ought also to recognize ethics and æsthetics, in +the sense of the general determination of the nature of the good and the +beautiful, as non-empirical sciences, seems to be a more difficult +question. It seems clear, for instance, that ethical discussions, such +as bulk so largely in our contemporary literature, as to what is the +right course of conduct under various conditions, are concerned +throughout with an empirical material, namely, the existing +peculiarities of human nature as we find it, and must therefore be +regarded as capable only of an empirical and therefore problematic +solution. Accordingly I was at one time myself tempted to regard ethics +as a purely empirical science, and even published a lengthy treatise in +defense of that point of view and in opposition to the whole Kantian +conception of the possibility of a constructive <i>Metaphysik der +Sitten</i>. It seems, however, possible to hold that in the question +"What do we mean by good?" as distinguished from the question "What in +particular is it right to do?" there is no more of a reference to the +empirical facts of human psychology than in the question "What do we +mean by truth?" and that there must therefore be a non-empirical answer +to the problem. The same would of course hold equally true of the +question "What <i>is</i> beauty?" If there are, however, such a pure +science of ethics and again of æsthetics, it must at least be allowed +that for the most part these sciences are still undiscovered, and that +the ethical and æsthetical results hitherto established are in the main +of an empirical nature, and this must be my excuse for confining the +remarks of the next two paragraphs to the two great pure sciences of +which the general principles may be taken to be now in large measure +known.</p> + +<p>That metaphysics and logic should sometimes have been absolutely +identified, as for instance by Hegel, will not surprise us when we +consider how hard it becomes on the view here defended to draw any hard +and fast boundary line between them. For metaphysics, according to this +conception of its scope, deals with the formulation of the self-evident +principles implied, in there being such a thing as truth and the +deductions which these principles warrant us in drawing. Thus it might +be fairly said to be the supreme science of <i>order</i>, and it would +not be hard to show that all the special questions commonly included in +its range, as to the nature of space, time, causation, continuity, and +so forth, are all branches of the general question, how many types of +order among concepts are there, and what is their nature. A completed +metaphysics would thus appear as the realization of Plato's splendid +conception of dialectic as the ultimate reduction of the contents of +knowledge to order by their continuous deduction from a supreme +principle (or, we may add, principles). Now such a view seems to make it +almost impossible to draw any ultimate distinction between logic and +metaphysics. For logic is strictly the science of the mutual implication +of propositions, as we see as soon as we carefully exclude from it all +psychological accretions. In the question what are the conditions under +which one proposition or group of propositions imply another, we exhaust +the whole scope of logic pure and proper, as distinguished from its +various empirical applications. This is the important point which is so +commonly forgotten when logic is defined as being in some way a study of +"psychical processes," or when the reference to the presence of "minds" +in which propositions exist, is intended into logical science. We cannot +too strongly insist that for logic the question so constantly raised in +a multitude of text-books, what processes actually take place when we +pass from the assertion of the premises to the assertion of the +conclusion, is an irrelevant one, and that the only logical problem +raised by inference is whether the assertion of the premises as true +<i>warrants</i> the further assertion of the conclusion, supposing it to +be made. (At the risk of a little digression I cannot help pointing out +that the confusion between a logical and a psychological problem is +committed whenever we attempt, as is so often done, to make the +self-evidence of a principle identical with our psychological inability +to believe the contradictory. From the strictly logical point of view, +all that is to be said about the two sides of such an ultimate +contradiction is that the one is true and the other is false. Whether it +is or is not possible, as a matter of psychical fact for me to affirm +with equal conviction, both sides of a contradiction, knowing that I am +doing so, is a question of empirical psychology which is possibly +insoluble, and at any rate seems not to have received from the +psychologists the attention it deserves. But the logician, so far as I +can see, has no interest as a logician in its solution. For him it would +still be the case even though all mankind should actually and +consciously affirm both sides of a given contradiction, that one of the +affirmations would be true, and the other untrue.) Logic thus seems to +become either the whole or an integral part of the science of order, and +there remain only two possible ways of distinguishing it from +metaphysics. It might be suggested that logical order, the order of +implication between truths, is only one species of a wider genus, order +in general by the side, for example, of spatial, temporal, and numerical +order, and thus that logic is one subordinate branch of the wider +science of metaphysics. Such a view, of course, implies that there are a +plurality of ultimately independent forms of order irreducible to a +single type. Whether this is the case, I must confess myself at present +incompetent to decide, though the signal success with which the +principles of number have already been deduced from the fundamental +definitions and axioms of symbolic logic, and number itself defined, as +by Mr. Russell, in terms of the purely logical concept of +class-relation, seems to afford some presumption to the contrary. Or it +may be held that the difference is purely one of the degree of +completeness with which the inquiry into order is pursued. Thus the +ordinary symbolic logic of what Schröder has called the "identical +calculus," or "calculus of domains," consists of a series of deductions +from the fundamental concepts of class and number, identical equality, +totality or the "logical 1," zero or the null-class, and the three +principles of identity, subsumption, and negation. The moment you cease +to accept these data in their totality as the given material for your +science, and to inquire into their mutual coherence, by asking for +instance whether any one of them could be denied, and yet a body of +consistent results deduced from the rest, your inquiry, it might be +said, becomes metaphysics. So, again, the discussion of the well-known +contradictions which arise when we try to apply these principles in +their entirety and without modification to classes of classes instead of +classes of individuals, or of the problem raised by Peano and Russell, +whether the assertions "Socrates is a man" and "the Greeks are men" +affirm the same or a different relation between their subject and +predicate (which seems indeed to be the same question differently +stated), would generally be allowed to be metaphysical. And the same +thing seems to be equally true of the introduction of time<ins +title="hyphenated in the original"> </ins>relations into the +interpretation of our symbols for predication employed by Boole in his +treatment of hypotheticals, and subsequently adopted by his successors +as the foundation of the "calculus of equivalent statements."</p> + +<p>However we may decide such questions, we seem at least driven by +their existence to the recognition of two important conclusions. (1) The +relation between logical and metaphysical problems is so close that you +cannot in consistency deny the possibility of a science of metaphysics +unless you are prepared with the absolute skeptic to go the length of +denying the possibility of logic also, and reducing the first principles +of inference to the level of formulae which have happened hitherto to +prove useful but are, for all we know, just as likely to fail us in +future application as not. (Any appeal to the doctrine of chances would +be out of place here, as that doctrine is itself based on the very +principles at stake.) (2) The existence of fundamental problems of this +kind which remained almost or wholly unsuspected until revealed in our +own time by the creation of a science of symbolic logic should console +us if ever we are tempted to suspect that metaphysics is at any rate a +science in which all the main constructive work has already been +accomplished by the great thinkers of the past. To me it appears, on the +contrary, that the recent enormous developments in the purely formal +sciences of logic and mathematics, with the host of fundamental problems +they open up, give promise of an approaching era of fresh speculative +construction which bids fair to be no less rich in results than any of +the great "golden" periods in the past history of our science. Indeed, +but that I would avoid the slightest suspicion of a desire to advertise +personal friends, I fancy I might even venture to name some of those to +whom we may reasonably look for the work to be done.</p> + +<p>Of the relation of metaphysics to pure mathematics it would be +impertinent for any but a trained mathematician to say very much. I must +therefore be content to point out that the same difficulty in drawing +boundary lines meets us here as in the case of logic. Not so long ago +this difficulty might have been ignored, as it still is by too many +writers on the philosophy of science. Until recently mathematics would +have been thought to be adequately defined as the science of numerical +and quantitative relations, and adequately distinguished from +metaphysics by the non-quantitative and non-numerical character of the +latter, though it would probably have been admitted that the problem of +the definition of quantity and number themselves is a metaphysical one. +But in the present state of our knowledge such an account seems doubly +unsatisfactory. On the one hand, we have to recognize the existence of +branches of mathematics, such as the so-called descriptive geometry, +which are neither quantitative nor numerical, and, on the other, +quantity as distinct from number appears to play no part in mathematical +science, while number itself, thanks to the labors of such men as Cantor +and Dedekind, seems, as I have said before, to be known now to be only a +special type of order in a series. Thus there appears to be ground for +regarding serial order as the fundamental category of mathematics, and +we are thrown back once more upon the difficult task of deciding how +many ultimately irreducible types of order there may be before we can +undertake any precise discrimination between mathematical and +metaphysical science. However we may regard the problem, it is at least +certain that the recent researches of mathematicians into the meaning of +such concepts as continuity and infinity have, besides opening up new +metaphysical problems, done much to transfigure the familiar ones, as +all readers of Professor Royce must be aware. For instance I imagine all +of us here present, even the youngest, were brought up on the +Aristotelian doctrine that there is and can be no such thing as an +actually existing infinite collection, but which of us would care to +defend that time-honored position to-day? Similarly with continuity all +of us were probably once on a time instructed that whereas "quantity" is +continuous, number is essentially "discrete," and is indeed the typical +instance of what we mean by the non-continuous. To-day we know that it +is in the number<ins title="hyphenated in the original"> </ins>series +that we have our one certain and familiar instance of a perfect +continuum. Still a third illustration of the transforming light which is +thrown upon old standing metaphysical puzzles by the increasing formal +development of mathematics may be found in the difficulties attendant +upon the conception of the "infinitely little," once regarded as the +logical foundation of the so-called Differential Calculus. With the +demonstration, which maybe found in Mr. Russell's important work, that +"infinitesimal," unlike "infinite," is a purely relative term, and that +there are no infinitesimal real numbers, the supposed logical +significance of the concept seems simply to disappear. Instances of this +kind could easily be multiplied almost indefinitely, but those already +cited should be sufficient to show how important are the metaphysical +results which may be anticipated from contemporary mathematical +research, and how grave a mistake it would be to regard existing +metaphysical construction, <i>e. g.</i>, that of the Hegelian system, as +adequate in principle to the present state of our organized knowledge. +In fact, all the materials for a new <i>Kategorienlehre</i>, which may +be to the knowledge of our day what Hegel's <i>Logic</i> was to that of +eighty years ago, appear to lie ready to hand when it may please +Providence to send us the metaphysician who knows how to avail himself +of them. The proof, given since this address was delivered, by E. +Zermelo, that every assemblage can be well ordered, is an even more +startling illustration of the remarks in the text.</p> + +<p>It remains to say something of the relation of metaphysical +speculation to the various sciences which make use of empirical +premises. On this topic I maybe allowed to be all the more brief, as I +have quite recently expressed my views at fair length in an extended +treatise (<i>Elements of Metaphysics</i>, Bks. 3 and 4), and have +nothing of consequence to add to what has been there said. The empirical +sciences, as previously defined, appear to fall into two main classes, +distinguished by a difference which corresponds to that often taken in +the past as the criterion by which science is to be separated from +philosophy. We may study the facts of temporal sequence either with a +view to the actual control of future sequences or with a view to +detecting under the sequence some coherent purpose. It is in the former +way that we deal with facts in mechanics, for instance, or in chemistry, +in the latter that we treat them when we study history for the purpose +of gaining insight into national aims and character. We may, if we +please, with Professor Royce, distinguish the two attitudes toward fact +as the attitude respectively of description and of appreciation or +evaluation. Now as regards the descriptive sciences, the position to +which, as I believe, metaphysicians are more and more tending is that +here metaphysics has, strictly speaking, no right at all to interfere. +Just because of the absence from metaphysics itself of all empirical +premises, it can be no business of the metaphysician to determine what +the course of events will be or to prescribe to the sciences what +methods and hypotheses they shall employ in the work of such +determination. Within these sciences any and every hypothesis is +sufficiently justified, whatever its nature, so long as it enables us +more efficiently than any other to perform the actual task of +calculation and prediction. And it was owing to neglect of this caution +that the <i>Naturphilosophie</i> of the early nineteenth century +speedily fell into a disrepute fully merited by its ignorant +presumption. As regards the physical sciences, the metaphysician has +indeed by this time probably learned his lesson. We are not likely +to-day to repeat the mistake of supposing that it is for us as +metaphysicians to dictate what shall be the physicist's or chemist's +definition of matter or mass or elementary substance or energy, or how +he shall formulate the laws of motion or of chemical composition. Here, +at any rate, we can see that the metaphysician's work is done when his +analysis has made it clear that we are dealing with no self-evident +truths such as the laws of number, but with inductive, and therefore +problematic and provisional results of empirical assumptions as to the +course of facts, assumptions made not because of their inherent +necessity, but because of their practical utility for the special task +of calculation. It is only when such empirical assumptions are treated +as self-evident axioms, in fact when mechanical science gives itself out +as a mechanistic philosophy, that the metaphysician obtains a right to +speak, and then only for the purpose of showing by analysis that the +presence of the empirical postulates which is characteristic of the +natural sciences of itself excludes their erection into a philosophy of +first principles.</p> + +<p>What is important in this connection is that we should recognize +quite clearly that psychology stands in this respect on precisely the +same logical footing as physics or chemistry. It is tempting to suppose +that in psychology, at any rate, we are dealing throughout with absolute +certainties, realities which "consciousness" apprehends just as they are +without any of that artificial selection and construction which, as we +are beginning to see, is imposed upon the study of physical nature by +the limitations of our purpose of submitting the course of events to +calculation and manipulation. And it is a natural consequence of this +point of view to infer that since psychology deals directly with +realities, it must be taken as the foundation of the metaphysical +constructions which aim at understanding the general character of the +real as such. The consequence, indeed, disappears at once if the views +maintained in this address as to the intimate relation of metaphysics +and logic, and the radical expulsion from logic of all discussion of +mental processes as such, be admitted. But it is still important to note +that the premises from which the conclusion in question was drawn are +themselves false. We must never allow ourselves to forget that, as the +ever-increasing domination of psychology by the highly artificial +methods of observation and experiment introduced by Fechner and Wundt is +daily making more apparent, psychology itself, like physics, deals not +directly with the concrete realities of individual experience, but with +an abstract selected from that experience, or rather a set of artificial +symbols only partially corresponding with the realities symbolized, and +devised for the special object of submitting the realm of mental +sequences to mathematical calculation. We might, in fact, have based +this inference upon the single reflection that every psychological "law" +is obtained, like physical laws, by the statistical method of +elimination of individual peculiarities, and the taking of an average +from an extended series of measurements. For this very reason, no +psychological law can possibly describe the unique realities of +individual experience. We have in psychology, as in the physical +sciences, the duty of suspecting <i>exact</i> correspondence between the +single case and the general "law" to be of itself proof of error +somewhere in the course of our computation. These views, which I suppose +I learned in the first instance from Mr. F. H. Bradley's paper called +<i>A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology</i>, may now, I think, be +taken as finally established beyond doubt by the exhaustive analysis of +Professor Münsterberg's <i>Grundzüge der Psychologie</i>. They possess +the double advantage of freeing the psychologist once for all from any +interference by the metaphysician in the prosecution of his proper +study, and delivering metaphysics from the danger of having assumptions +whose sole justification lies in their utility for the purpose of +statistical computation thrust upon it as self-evident principles. For +their full discussion I may perhaps be allowed to refer to the first +three chapters of the concluding book of my <i>Elements of +Metaphysics</i>.</p> + +<p>When we turn to the sciences which aim at the appreciation or +evaluation of empirical fact, the case seems rather different. It may +fairly be regarded as incumbent on the metaphysician to consider how far +the general conception he has formed of the character of reality can be +substantiated and filled in by our empirical knowledge of the actual +course of temporal sequence. And thus the way seems to lie open to the +construction of what may fairly be called a Philosophy of Nature and +History. For instance, a metaphysician who has rightly or wrongly +convinced himself that the universe can only be coherently conceived as +a society of souls or wills may reasonably go on to ask what views seem +best in accord with our knowledge of human character and animal +intelligence as to the varying degrees of organized intelligence +manifested by the members of such a hierarchy of souls, and the nature +and amount of mutual intercourse between them. And again, he may fairly +ask what general way of conceiving what we loosely call the inanimate +world would at once be true to fundamental metaphysical principles and +free from disagreement with the actual state of our physical hypotheses. +Only he will need to bear in mind that since conclusions on these points +involve appeal to the present results of the inductive sciences, and +thus to purely empirical postulates, any views he may adopt must of +necessity share in the problematic and provisional character of the +empirical sciences themselves, and can have no claim to be regarded as +definitely demonstrated in respect of their details. I will here only +indicate very briefly two lines of inquiry to which these reflections +appear applicable. The growth of evolutionary science, with the new +light it has thrown upon the processes by which useful variations may be +established without the need for presupposing conscious preëxisting +design, naturally gives rise to the question whether such unconscious +factors are of themselves sufficient to account for the actual course of +development so far as it can be traced, or whether the actual history of +the world offers instances of results which, so far as we can see, can +only have issued from deliberate design. And thus we seem justified in +regarding the problem of the presence of ends in Nature as an +intelligible and legitimate one for the philosophy of the future. I +would only suggest that such an inquiry must be prosecuted throughout by +the same empirical methods, and with the same consciousness of the +provisional character of any conclusions we may reach which would be +recognized as in place if we were called on to decide whether some +peculiar characteristic of an animal group or some singular social +practice in a recently discovered tribe does or does not indicate +definite purpose on the part of breeders or legislators.</p> + +<p>The same remarks, in my opinion, apply to the familiar problems of +Natural Theology relative to the existence and activity of such +non-human intelligences as are commonly understood by the names "God" or +"gods." Hume and Kant, as it seems to me, have definitely shown between +them that the old-fashioned attempts to demonstrate from self-evident +principles the existence of a supreme personal intelligence as a +condition of the very being of truth all involve unavoidable logical +paralogisms. I should myself, indeed, be prepared to go further, and to +say that the conception of a single personality as the ground of truth +and reality can be demonstrated to involve contradiction, but this I +know is a question upon which some philosophers for whom I entertain the +profoundest respect hold a contrary opinion. The more modest question, +however, whether the actual course of human history affords probable +ground for believing in the activity of one or more non-human +personalities as agents in the development of our species I cannot but +think a perfectly proper subject for empirical investigation, if only it +be borne in mind that any conclusion upon such a point is inevitably +affected by the provisional character of our information as to empirical +facts themselves, and can claim in consequence nothing more than a +certain grade of probability. With this proviso, I cannot but regard the +question as to the existence of a God or of gods as one upon which we +may reasonably hope for greater certainty as our knowledge of the +empirical facts of the world's history increases. And I should be +inclined only to object to any attempt to foreclose examination by +forcing a conclusion either in the theistic or in the atheistic sense on +alleged grounds of <i>a priori</i> metaphysics. In a word, I would +maintain not only with Kant that the "physico-theological" argument is +specially deserving of our regard, but with Boole that it is with it +that Natural Theology must stand or fall.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller">NOTE ON EXTENSION AND INTENSION OF +TERMS</p> + +<p>Among the numerous difficulties which beset the teaching of the +elements of formal logic to beginners, one of the earliest is that of +deciding whether all names shall be considered to have meaning both in +extension and intension. As we all know, the problem arises in +connection with two classes of names, (1) proper names of individuals, +(2) abstract terms. I should like to indicate what seems to me the true +solution of the difficulty, though I do not remember to have seen it +advocated anywhere in just the form I should prefer.</p> + +<p>(1) As to proper names. It seems clear that those who regard the true +proper name as a meaningless label are nearer the truth than those who +assert with Jevons that a proper name has for its intension all the +predicates which can be truly ascribed to the object named. As has often +been observed, it is a sufficient proof that, for example, John does not +<i>mean</i> "a human being of the male sex," to note that he who names +his daughter, his dog, or his canoe John, makes no false assertion, +though he may commit a solecism. So far the followers of Mill seem to +have a satisfactory answer to Jevons, when they say, for example, that +he confuses the intension of a term with its accidental or acquired +associations. (So, again, we can see that Socrates cannot <i>mean</i> +"the wisest of the Greek philosophers," by considering that I may +perfectly well understand the statement "there goes Socrates" without +being aware that Socrates is wise or a Greek or a philosopher.) And if +we objected that no proper name actually in use is ever without some +associations which in part determine its meaning by restricting its +applicability, it would be a valid rejoinder that in pure logic we have +to consider not the actual usages of language, but those that would +prevail in an ideal language purged of all elements of irrelevancy. In +such an ideal scientific language, it might be said, the proper name +would be reduced to the level of a mere mark serviceable for +identification, but conveying no implication whatever as to the special +nature of the thing identified. Thus it would be indifferent <i>what</i> +mark we attach to any particular individual, just as in mathematics it +is indifferent what alphabetical symbol we appropriate to stand for a +given class or number. I think, however, that even in such an ideal +scientific language the proper name would have a certain intension. In +the first place, the use of proper name seems to inform us that the +thing named is not unique, is not the only member of a class. To a +monotheist, for instance, the name "God" is no true proper name, nor can +he consistently give a proper name to his Deity. It is only where one +member of a class has to be distinguished from others that the bestowal +of a proper name has a meaning. And, further, to give a thing a proper +name seems to imply that the thing is itself not a class. In logic we +have, of course, occasion to form the concept of classes which have +other classes for their individual members. But the classes which +compose such classes of classes could not themselves be identified by +means of proper names. Thus the employment of a proper name seems to +indicate that the thing named is not the only member of its class, and +further that it is not itself a class of individuals. Beyond this it +seems to be a mere question of linguistic convention what information +the use of a proper name shall convey. Hence it ought to be said, not +that the proper name has no intension, but that it represents a limiting +case in which intension is at a minimum.</p> + +<p>(2) As to abstract terms. Ought we to say, with so many English +formal logicians, that an abstract term is always singular and +non-intensional? The case for asserting that such terms are all +singular, I own, seems unanswerable. For it is clear that if the name of +an attribute or relation is equally the name of another attribute or +relation, it is ambiguous and thus not properly one term at all. To say, +for example, that whiteness means two or more distinct qualities seems +to amount to saying that it has no one definite meaning. Of course, it +is true that milk is white, paper is white, and snow is white, and yet +the color-tones of the three are distinct. But what we assert here is, +not that there are different whitenesses, but only that there are +different degrees of approximation to a single ideal standard or type of +whiteness. It is just because the whiteness we have in view is one and +not many that we can intelligibly assert, for example, that newly fallen +snow is <i>whiter</i> than any paper. All the instances produced by Mill +to show that abstract terms may be general seem to me either to involve +confusion between difference of kind and difference in degree of +approximation to type, or else to depend upon treating as abstract a +term which is really concrete. Thus when we say red, blue, green, are +different kinds of color, surely what we mean is different kinds of +colored surface. Quà colored, they are not different; I mean just as +much and no more when I say "a red thing is colored," or "has color," as +when I say "a green thing is colored." If Mill were right, the +proposition "red is a color" ought to mean exactly the same as "red is +red." Or, to put it in another way, it would become impossible to form +in thought any concept of a single class of colored things.</p> + +<p>But need we infer because abstract terms are singular that therefore +they have no intension and are mere meaningless marks? Commonly as this +inference is made, it seems to me clearly mistaken. It seems, in fact, +to rest upon the vague and ill-defined principle that an attribute can +have no attributes of its own. That it is false is shown, I think, by +the simple reflection that scientific definitions are one and all +statements as to the meaning of abstract names of attributes and +relations. For example, the definition of a circle is a statement as to +the meaning of circularity, the legal definition of responsible persons +a statement as to the meaning of the abstraction "responsibility," and +so on. (We only evade the point if we argue that abstract terms when +used as the subjects of propositions are really being employed +concretely. For "cruelty is odious," for instance, does not merely mean +that cruel acts are odious acts, but that they are odious <i>because</i> +they are cruel.) In fact, the doctrine that abstract terms have no +intension would seem, if thought out, to lead to the view that there are +only classes of individuals, but no classes of classes. Thus to say +"cruel acts are odious because cruel" implies, not only that I can form +the concept of a class of cruel acts, but also that of classes of odious +acts of which the class of cruel acts in its turn is a member. And to +admit as much as this is to admit that the class of cruel acts, +considered as a member of the class of odious acts, shares the common +predicate of odiousness with the other classes of acts composing the +higher class. Hence the true account of abstract terms seems to me to be +that we have in them another limiting case, a case in which the +extension and the intension are coincident. Incidentally, by +illustrating the ambiguity of the principle that attributes have no +attributes of their own, our discussion seems to indicate the advantage +of taking the purely extensional view is opposed to the predicative view +of the import of propositions as the basis of an elementary treatment of +logical doctrine.</p> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Meta2"></a>THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF +METAPHYSICS</h3> + +<h4>BY ALEXANDER T. ORMOND</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>Alexander Thomas Ormond</b>, McCosh Professor of Philosophy, +Princeton University, since 1897. b. 1847, Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. +Mental Science Fellow, Princeton, 1877-78; Post-grad. Bonn and Berlin, +1884-85; Ph.D. Princeton, 1880; A.B. <i>ibid.</i> 1877; LL.D. Miami, +1899. Professor of Philosophy and History, University of Minnesota, +1880-83; Professor of Mental Science and Logic, Princeton University, +1883-97. Member American Philosophical Association, American +Psychological Association.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2 center">I</p> + +<p class="center">THE PRELIMINARY QUESTION</p> + +<p>The living problems of any science arise out of two sources: (1) out +of what men may think of it, in view of its nature and claims, and (2) +the problems that at any period are vital to it, and in the solution of +which it realizes the purpose of its existence. Now if we distinguish +the body of the sciences which deal with aspects of the world's +phenomena—and here I would include both the psychic and the +physical—from metaphysics, which professes to go behind the +phenomenon and determine the world in terms of its inner, and, +therefore, <i>ultimate</i> reality, it may be truly said of the body of +the sciences that they are in a position to disregard in a great measure +questions that arise out of the first source, inasmuch as the data from +which they make their departure are obvious to common observation. Our +world is all around us, and its phenomena either press upon us or are +patent to our observation. Lying thus within the field of observation, +it does not occur to the average mind to question either the legitimacy +or the possibility of that effort of reflection which is devoted to +their investigation and interpretation. Metaphysics, however, enjoys no +such immunity as this, but its claims are liable to be met with +skepticism or denial at the outset, and this is due partly to the nature +of its initial claims, and partly to the fact that its real data are +less open to observation than are those of the sciences. I say partly to +the nature of the initial claims of metaphysics, for it is +characteristic of metaphysics that it refuses to regard the distinction +between phenomena and ground or inner nature, on which the sciences +rest, as final, and is committed from the outset to the claim that the +real is in its inner nature one and to be interpreted in the light of, +or in terms of, its inner unity; whereas, science has so indoctrinated +the modern mind with the supposition that only the outer movements of +things are open to knowledge, while their inner and real nature must +forever remain inaccessible to our powers; I say that the modern mind +has been so imbued with this pretension as to have almost completely +forgotten the fact that the distinction of phenomenon and ground is one +of science's own making. Neither the plain man nor the cultured man, if +he happens not to be tinctured with science, finds his world a duality. +The things he deals with are the realities, and it is only when his +naïve realism begins to break down before the complex demands of his +growing life, that the thought occurs to him that his world may be more +complex than he has dreamed. It is clear, then, that the distinction of +our world into phenomena and ground, on which science so largely rests, +is a first product of reflection, and not a fact of observation at +all.</p> + +<p>If this be the case, it may be possible and even necessary for +reflection at some stage to transcend this distinction. At least, there +can be no reason except an arbitrary one for taking this first step of +reflection to be a finality. And there would be the same justification +for a second step that would transcend this dualism, as for the initial +step out of which the distinction arose; provided, it should be found +that the initial distinction does not supply an adequate basis for a +rational interpretation of the world that can be taken as final. Now, it +is precisely because the dualistic distinction of the sciences does fail +in this regard, that a further demand for a reflective transformation of +the data arises. Let us bear in mind that the data of the sciences are +not the simple facts of observation, but rather those facts transformed +by an act of reflection by virtue of which they become phenomena +distinguished from a more fundamental nature on which they depend and +which itself is not open to observation. The real data of science are +found only when the world of observation has been thus transformed by an +act of reflection. If then at some stage in our effort to interpret our +world it should become clear that the sciences of phenomena, whatever +value their results may possess, are not giving us an interpretation in +terms that can be taken as final, and that in order to ground such an +interpretation a further transformation of our data becomes necessary, I +do not see why any of the sciences should feel that they have cause to +demur. In truth, it is out of just such a situation as this that the +metaphysical interpretation arises (as I propose very briefly here to +show), a situation that supplies a genuine demand in the light of which +the effort of metaphysics to understand its world seems to possess as +high a claim to legitimacy as that of the sciences of phenomena. Let us +take our stand with the plain man or the child, within the world of +unmodified observation. The things of observation, in this world, are +the realities, and at first we may suppose have undergone little +reflective transformation. The first reflective effort to change this +world in any way will, no doubt, be an effort to <i>number</i> or +<i>count</i> the things that present themselves to observation, and out +of this effort will arise the transformation of the world that results +from considering it under the concepts and categories of number. In +short, to mathematical reflection of this simple sort, the things of +observation will resolve themselves into a plurality of countable +things, which the numbering reflection becoming explicit in its ordinal +and cardinal moments will translate into a system that will be regarded +as a whole made up of the sum of its parts. The very first step, then, +in the reflective transformation of things resolves them into a dual +system, the world conceived as a cardinal whole that is made up of its +ordinal parts, and exactly equal to them. This mathematical conception +is moreover purely quantitative; involving the exact and stable +equivalence of its parts or units and that of the sum of the parts with +the whole. Now it is with this purely quantitative transformation that +mathematics and the mathematical sciences begin. We may ask, then, why +should there be any other than mathematical science,<a name="fnanchor_1" +id="fnanchor_1"></a><a href="#footnote_1" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[1]</sup></a> and what ground can non-mathematical +science point to as substantiating its claims? I confess I can see no +other final reason than this, that mathematical science does not meet +the whole demand we feel obliged to make on our world. If mathematics +were asked to vindicate itself, it no doubt would do so by claiming that +things present quantitative aspects on which it founds its procedure. In +like manner non-mathematical, or, as we may call it, physical or natural +science, will seek to substantiate its claims by pointing to certain +ultra-quantitative or qualitative aspects of things. It is true that, so +far as things are merely <i>numerable</i>, they are purely quantitative; +but mathematics abstracts from the content and character of its units +and aggregates, which may and do change, so that a relation of stable +equivalence is not maintained among them. In fact, the basis of these +sciences is found in the tendency of things to be always changing and +becoming different from what they were before. The problem of these +sciences is how to ground a rational scheme of knowledge in connection +with a fickle world like that of qualitative change. It is here that +reflection finds its problem, and noticing that the tendency of this +world of change is for <i>a</i> to pass into <i>b</i> and thus to lose +its own identity, the act of reflection that rationalizes the situation +is one that connects <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> by relating them to a common +ground <i>x</i> of which they stand as successive manifestations or +symbols. <i>X</i> thus supplies the thread of identity that binds the +two changes <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> into a relation to which the name +causation may be applied. And just as quantitative equivalence is the +principle of relationship among the parts of the simple mathematical +world, so here in the world of the dynamic or natural sciences, the +principle of relation is natural causation.<a name="fnanchor_2" +id="fnanchor_2"></a><a href="#footnote_2" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[2]</sup></a> We find, then, that the +non-mathematical sciences rest on a basis that is constituted by a +<i>second act of reflection</i>; one that translates our world into a +system of phenomena causally inter-related and connected with their +underlying grounds.</p> + +<p>We have now reached a point where it will be possible in a few +sentences to indicate the rise of the metaphysical reflection and the +ground on which it rests. If we consider both the mathematical and the +physical ways of looking at things, we will find that they possess this +feature in common,—they are purely external, having nothing to say +respecting the <i>inner</i> and, therefore, <i>real</i> nature of the +things with which they deal. Or, if we concede the latest claims of some +of the physical speculators and agree that the aim of physics is an +ultimate physical explanation of reality, it will still be true that the +whole standpoint of this explanation will be external. Let me explain +briefly what I mean substantially by the term <i>external</i> as I use +it here. Every interpretation of a world is a function of some knowing +consciousness, and consequently of some knowing self. This is too +obvious to need proof. A system will be <i>external</i> to such a knower +just to the extent that the knower finds it dominated and determined by +categories that are different from those of its own determination. A +world physically interpreted is one that is brought completely under the +rubrics of physics and mathematics; whose movements yield themselves +completely, therefore, to a mechanical calculus that gives rise to +purely descriptive formulæ; <i>or</i> to the control of a dynamic +principle; that of natural causation, by virtue of which everything is +determined without thought of its own, by the impulse of another, which +impulse itself is not directly traceable to any thought or purpose. Now, +the occasion for the metaphysical reflection arises when this situation +that brings us face to face, with, nay, makes us part and parcel of, an +alien system of things, becomes intolerable, and the knower begins to +demand a closer kinship with his world. The knower finds the categories +of his own central and characteristic activity in experience. Here he is +conscious of being an agent going out in forms of activity for the +realization of his world. The determining categories of the activity he +is most fully conscious of, are interest, idea, prevision, purpose, and +that selective activity which goes to its termination in some achieved +end. The metaphysical interpretation arises out of the demand that the +world shall be brought into bonds of kinship with the knower. And this +is effected by generalizing the categories of consciousness and applying +them as principles of interpretation to the world. The act of reflection +on which the metaphysical interpretation proceeds is one, then, in which +the world of science is further transformed by bringing the inner nature +of things out of its isolation and translating the world-movements into +process the terms of which are no longer <i>phenomena and hidden +ground</i>, but rather inception and realization, or, more specifically, +<i>Idea</i> and <i>Reality</i>. And the point to be noted here is the +fact that these metaphysical categories are led up to positivity by an +act of reflection that has for its guiding aim an interpretation of the +world that will be more ultimately satisfactory to the knower than that +of the physical or natural sciences; while negatively, it is led up to +by the refusal of the knowing consciousness to rest in a world alien to +its own nature and in which it is subordinated to the physical and made +a mere epiphenomenon.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">II</p> + +<p class="center smaller">QUESTIONS OF POINT OF VIEW, PRINCIPLE AND +METHOD OF METAPHYSICS</p> + +<p>It is clear from what has been said that the metaphysical +interpretation proceeds on a presupposition radically different from +that of mathematical and physical science. The presumption of these +sciences is that the world is physical, that the physical categories +supply the norms of reality, and that consciousness and the psychic, in +general, are subordinate and phenomenal to the physical. On the +contrary, metaphysics arises out of a revolt from these presumptions +toward the opposite presumption, namely, that <i>consciousness itself is +the great reality</i>, and that the norms of an ultimate interpretation +of things are to be sought in its categories. This is the great +transformation that conditions the possibility and value of all +metaphysics. It is the Copernican revolution which the mind must pass +through, a revolution in which matter and the physical world yields the +primacy to mind; a revolution in which consciousness becomes central, +its categories and analogies supplying the principles of final +world-interpretation. Let us consider then, in the light of this great +Copernican revolution, the questions of the <i>point of view</i>, +<i>principle</i>, and <i>method</i> of metaphysics. And here the utmost +brevity must be observed. If consciousness be the great reality, then +its own central activity, that effort by which it realizes its world, +will determine for us the <i>point of view</i> or departure of which we +are in quest. This will be <i>inner</i> rather than <i>outer</i>; it +will be motived by <i>interest</i>, will shape itself into +interest-directed effort. This effort will be cognitive; dominated by an +<i>idea</i> which will be an anticipation of the <i>goal</i> of the +effort. It will, therefore, become <i>directive</i>, <i>selective</i>, +and will stand as the <i>end</i> or <i>aim</i> of the completed effort. +The whole movement will thus take the form, genetically, of a developing +<i>purpose informed by an idea</i>, or <i>teleologically</i>, of a +<i>purpose going on to its fulfillment</i> in some <i>aim</i> which is +also its <i>motive</i>. Now, metaphysics determines its point of view in +the following reasoning: if in consciousness we find the type of the +inner nature of things, then the point of view for the interpretation of +this inner nature will be to seek by generalizing the standpoint of +consciously determined effort and asserting that this is the true point +of view from which the <i>meaning</i> of the world is to be sought.</p> + +<p>Having determined the metaphysical point of view, the next question +of vital importance is that of its <i>principle</i>. And we may cut +matters short here by saying at once that the principle we are seeking +is that of <i>sufficient reason</i>, and we may say that a reason will +be sufficient when it adequately expresses the world-view or concept +under which an investigation is being prosecuted. Let us suppose that +this world-view is that of simple mathematics, the principle of +sufficient reason here will be that of <i>quantitative equivalence</i> +of parts; or, from the standpoint of the whole, that of <i>infinite +divisibility</i>. Whereas, if we take the world of the +ultra-mathematical science, which is determined by the notion of +<i>phenomena depending on underlying ground</i>, we will find that the +sufficient reason in this sphere takes the form of <i>adequate cause or +condition</i>. The determining condition or causes of any physical +phenomenon supply, from that point of view, the <i>ratio sufficiens</i> +of its existence. We have seen that the sufficiency of a reason in the +above cases has been determined in view of that notion which defines the +kind of world the investigation is dealing with. Let us apply this +insight to the problem of the principle of metaphysics, and we will soon +conclude that no reason can be metaphysically sufficient that does not +satisfy the requirements of a world conceived under the notion of +<i>inception</i> and <i>realization</i>; or, more specifically, +<i>idea</i> and <i>reality</i>. In short, the <i>reason</i> of +metaphysics will refuse to regard its world as a mechanism that is +devoid of thought and intention; that lacks, in short, the motives of +internal determination and movement, and will in all cases insist that +an explanation or interpretation can be metaphysically adequate only +when its ultimate reference is to an idea that is in the process of +<i>purposive</i> fulfillment. Such an explanation we call +<i>teleological</i> or <i>rational</i>, rather than merely mechanical, +and such a principle is alone adequate to embody the <i>ratio +sufficiens</i> of metaphysics.</p> + +<p>Having determined the point of view and principle of metaphysics, the +question of metaphysical <i>method</i> will be divested of some of its +greatest difficulties. It will be clear to any one who reflects that the +very first problem in regard to the method of metaphysics will be that +of its starting-point and the kind of results it is to look for. And +little can be accomplished here until it has been settled that +consciousness is to have the primacy, and that its prerogative is to +supply both standpoint and principle of the investigation. We have gone +a long way toward mastering our method when we have settled these +points: (1) that the metaphysical world is a world of consciousness; (2) +that the conscious form of effort rather than the mechanical is the +species of activity or movement with which we have to deal; and, (3) +that the world it is seeking to interpret is ultimately one of +<i>idea</i> and <i>reality</i> in which the processes take the +<i>purposive</i> form. In view of this, the important steps of method +(and we use the term method here in the most fundamental sense) will be +(1) the question of the <i>form</i> of metaphysical activity or agency +as contrasted with that of the physical sciences. This may be brought +out in the contrast of the two terms <i>finality</i> and <i>mere +efficiency</i>, in which by mere efficiency is meant an agency that is +presumed to be thoughtless and purposeless, and consequently without +<i>foresight</i>. All this is embodied in the term <i>force</i> or +physical energy, and less explicitly in that of <i>natural +causation</i>. Contrasted with this, <i>finality</i> is a term that +involves the forward impulse of <i>idea</i>, <i>prevision</i>, and +<i>purpose</i>. Anything that is capable of any sort of <i>foretaste</i> +has in it a principle of prevision, selection, choice, and purpose. The +impulse that motives and runs it, that also stands out as the <i>end</i> +of its fulfillment, is a foretaste, an <i>Ahnung</i>, an anticipation, +and the whole process or movement, as well as every part of it, will +take on this character. (2) The second question of method will be that +of the nature of this category of which <i>finality</i> is the form. +What is its content, pure idea or pure will, or a synthesis that +includes both? We have here the three alternatives of <i>pure +rationalism</i>, <i>voluntarism</i>, and a doctrine hard to characterize +in a single word; that rests on a <i>synthesis</i> of the norms of both +rationalism and voluntarism. Without debating these alternatives, I +propose here briefly to characterize the <i>synthetic</i> concept as +supplying what I conceive to be the most satisfactory doctrine. The +principle of <i>pure rationalism</i> is one of insight but is lacking in +practical energy, whereas, that of <i>voluntarism</i> supplies practical +energy, but is lacking in insight. Pure voluntarism is <i>blind</i>, +while pure rationalism is <i>powerless</i>. But the synthesis of +<i>idea</i> and <i>will</i>, provided we go a step further (as I think +we must) and presuppose also a germ of <i>feeling</i> as +<i>interest</i>, supplies both <i>insight</i> and <i>energy</i>. So that +the spring out of which our world is to arise may be described as either +the <i>idea informed with purposive energy</i>, or <i>purpose or will +informed and guided by the idea</i>. It makes no difference which form +of conception we use. In either case if we include feeling as interest +we are able to conceive movements originating in some species of +apprehension, taking the dynamic form of purpose, and motived and +selected, so to speak, by interest; and in describing such activity we +are simply describing these normal movements of consciousness with which +our experience makes us most familiar. (3) The third question of method +involves the relation or correlation of the metaphysical interpretation +with that of the natural or physical science. Two points are fundamental +here. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is the same +world with which the plain man, the man of science, and the +metaphysician are concerned. We cannot partition off the external world +to the plain man, the atoms and ethers to the man of science, leaving +the metaphysician in exclusive and solitary possession of the world of +consciousness. It is the same world for all. The metaphysician cannot +shift the physical world, with its oceans and icebergs, its vast +planetary systems and milky ways, on to the shoulders of the physicist. +This is the metaphysician's own recalcitrant world, which will doubtless +task all his resources to explain. In the <i>second</i> place, though it +is the same world that is clamoring for interpretation, it is a world +that passes through successive transformations, in order to adapt itself +to progressive modes of interpretation. The plain man is called to pass +through a species of Copernican revolution that subordinates the +phenomenon to its ground, before he can become a man of science. In +turn, the man of science must go through the Copernican process, and +learn to subordinate his atoms and ethers to consciousness before he can +become a metaphysician. And it is this transformation that marks one of +the most fundamental steps in the method of metaphysics. The world must +experience this transformation, and it must become habitual to the +thinker to subordinate the physical to the mental before the +metaphysical point of view can be other than foreign to him. If, then, +it be the same content with which the sciences and metaphysics are +called on to deal, it is clear that we have on our hands another problem +on the answer to which the fate of metaphysics vitally depends; the +question of the <i>correlation</i> of its method with that of the +sciences so that it may stand vindicated as the final interpretation of +things.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">III</p> + +<p class="center smaller">QUESTION OF THE CORRELATION OF METAPHYSICS +WITH THE SCIENCES</p> + +<p>We have reached two conclusions that are vital here: (1) that the +metaphysical way of looking at the world involves a transformation of +the world of physical science; (2) that it is the same world that lies +open to both science and metaphysics. Out of this arises the problem of +the <i>correlation</i> of the two views; the two interpretations of the +world. If science be right in conceiving the world under such categories +as quantity and natural causation; if science be right in seeking a +mechanical explanation of phenomena (that is, one that excludes +prevision, purpose, and aim); and if metaphysics be right in refusing to +accept this explanation as final and in insisting that the principle of +ultimate interpretation is teleological, that it falls under the +categories of prevision, purpose, and aim; then it is clear that the +problem of correlation is on our hands. In dealing with this problem, it +will be convenient to separate it into two questions: (1) that of the +fact; (2) that of its rationale. The fact of the correlation is a thing +of common experience. We have but to consider the way in which this +Congress of Science has been brought about in order to have an +exhibition of the method of correlation. Originating first in the sphere +of thought and purpose, the design has been actualized through the +operation of mechanical agencies which it has somehow contributed to +liberate. On the scale of individual experience we have the classic +instance of the arm moving through space in obedience to a hidden will. +There can be no question as to the fact and the great difficulty of +metaphysics does not arise in the task of generalizing the fact and +conceiving the world as a system of thought-purposes working out into +forms of the actual through mechanical agencies. This generalization +somehow lies at the foundation of all metaphysical faith, and, this +being the case, the real task here, aside from the profounder question +of the <i>rationale</i>, is that of exhibiting the actual points of +correlation; those points in the various stages of the sciences from +physics to ethics and religion, at which the last category or result of +science is found to hold as its immediate implication some first term of +the more ultimate construction of metaphysics. The working out of this +task is of the utmost importance, inasmuch as it makes clear to both the +man of science and the metaphysician the intrinsic necessity of the +correlation. It is a task analogous to the Kantian deduction of the +categories.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">IV</p> + +<p class="center smaller">QUESTIONS OF THE ULTIMATE NATURE OF +REALITY</p> + +<p>We come, then, to the question of the rationale of this correlation, +and it is clear here that we are dealing with a phase of the problem of +the ultimate nature of reality. For the question of the correlation now +is how it is possible that our thoughts should affect things so that +they move in response; how mind influences body or the reverse, how, +when we will, the arm moves through space. And without going into +details of discussion here, let us say at once, that whatever the +situation may be for any science,—and it may be that some form of +<i>dualism</i> is a necessary presupposition of science,—for +metaphysics it is clear that no dualism of substances or orders can be +regarded as final. The life of metaphysics depends on finding the one +for the many; the one that when found will also ground the many. If, +then, the phenomenon of <i>mind and body</i> presents the appearance of +a correspondence of two different and, so far as can be determined, +mutually exclusive agencies, the problem of metaphysics is the reduction +of these agencies to one species. Here we come upon the issue between +materialism and immaterialism. But inasmuch as the notion of metaphysics +itself seems to exclude materialism, the vital alternative is that of +immaterialism. Again, if psycho-physics presents as its basal category a +<i>parallelism</i> between two orders of phenomena, psychic and +physical, it is the business of metaphysics to seek the explanation of +this dualism in some more ultimate and unitary conception. Now, since +the very notion of metaphysics again excludes the physical alternative +from the category of finality, we are left with the psychic term as the +one that, by virtue of the fact that it embodies a form of +<i>conscious</i> activity, promises to be most fruitful for metaphysics. +From one point of view, then, we have reduced our world to +immaterialism; from another, to some form or analogue of the psychic. +Now it is not necessary here to carry the inquiry further in this +direction. For what metaphysics is interested in, specially, is the fact +that the world must be reduced to one kind of being and one type of +agency. If this be done, it is clear that the dualism of <i>body and +mind</i> and the <i>parallel orders</i> of psycho-physics cannot be +regarded as final, but must take their places as phenomena that are +relative and reducible to a more fundamental unity. The metaphysician +will say that the arm moves through space in response to the will, and +that everywhere the correlation between mechanical and teleological +agency takes place because in the last analysis <i>there is only one +type of agency</i>; an agency that finds its initiative in interest, +thought, purpose, design, and thus works out its results in the fields +of space and mechanical activities.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, on the question to which these considerations lead up; +that of the ultimate interpretation we are to put on the reality of the +world, the issue is not so indeterminate as it might seem from some +points of view. Taking it that the very notion of metaphysics excludes +the material and the physical as ultimate types of the real, we are left +with the notions of the immaterial and the psychic; and while the former +is indefinite, it is a fact that in the psychic and especially in the +form of it which man realizes in his own experience, he finds an +intelligible type and the only one that is available to him for the +definition of the immaterial. He has his choice, then, either to regard +the world as <i>absolutely opaque</i>, showing nothing but its +phenomenal dress which ceases to have any meaning; or to apply to the +world's inner nature the intelligible types and analogies of his own +form of being. That this is the alternative that is embodied in the +existence of metaphysics is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the +metaphysical interpretation embodies itself in the categories of +<i>reason</i>, <i>design</i>, <i>purpose</i>, and <i>aim</i>. Whatever +difficulties we may encounter, then, in the <i>use</i> and application +of the <i>psychic analogy</i> in determining the nature of the real, it +is clear that its employment is inevitable and indispensable. Let us, +then, employ the term <i>rational</i> to that characterization of the +nature of things which to metaphysics is thus inevitable and +indispensable. The world must in the last analysis be <i>rational</i> in +its constitution, and its agencies and forms of being must be construed +as <i>rational</i> in their type.</p> + +<p>And here we come upon the last question in this field, that of the +<i>ultimate being of the world</i>. We have already concluded that the +<i>real</i> is in the last analysis rational. But we have not answered +the question whether there shall be one rational or many. Now it has +become clear that with metaphysics <i>unity</i> is a cardinal interest; +that, therefore, the world must be <i>one</i> in <i>thought</i>, +<i>purpose</i>, <i>aim</i>. And it is on this insight that the +metaphysical doctrine of the <i>absolute</i> rests. There must be +<i>one</i> being whose thought and purpose are all-inclusive, in order +that the world may be one and that it may have meaning as a whole. But +the world presents itself as a plurality of finite <i>existents</i> +which our metaphysics requires us to reduce in the last analysis to the +psychic type. What of this plurality of psychic existents? It is on this +basis that metaphysics constructs its doctrine of <i>individuality</i>. +Allowing for latitude of opinion here, the trend of metaphysical +reflection sets strongly toward a doctrine of reality that grounds the +world in an Absolute whose all-comprehending thought and purpose utters +or realizes itself in the plurality of finite individuals that +constitutes the world; the degree of reality that shall be ascribed to +the plurality of individuals being a point in debate, giving rise to the +contemporary form of the issue between idealism and realism. Allowing +for minor differences, however, there is among metaphysicians a fair +degree of assent to the doctrine that in order to be completely rational +the world of individual plurality must be regarded as implying an +<i>Absolute</i>, which, whether it is to be conceived as an individual +or not, is the author and bearer of the thought and design of the world +as a whole.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">V</p> + +<p class="center smaller">QUESTIONS OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE AND +ULTIMATE CRITERIA OF TRUTH</p> + +<p>We have only time to speak very briefly, in conclusion, of two vital +problems in metaphysics: (1) that of the nature and limits of +metaphysical knowledge; (2) that of the ultimate criteria of truth. In +regard to the question of knowledge, we may either <i>identify thought +with reality</i>, or we may regard thought as <i>wholly inadequate to +represent the real</i>; in one case we will be <i>gnostic</i>, in the +other <i>agnostic</i>. Now whatever may be urged in favor of the gnostic +alternative, it remains true that <i>our</i> thought, in order to follow +along intelligible lines, must be guided by the categories and analogies +of our own experience. This fixes a limit, so that the thought of man is +never in a position to grasp the real completely. Again, whatever may be +urged in behalf of the agnostic alternative, it is to be borne in mind +that our experience does supply us with intelligible types and +categories; and that under the impulse of the <i>infinite</i> and +<i>absolute</i>, or the transcendent, to which our thought responds (to +put it no stronger), a dialectical activity arises; on the one hand, the +application of the experience-analogies to determine the real; on the +other, the incessant removal of limits by the impulse of transcendence +(as we may call it). Thus arises a <i>movement of approximation</i> +which while it never completely compasses its goal, yet proceeds along +intelligent lines; constitutes the mind's effort to know; and results in +an <i>approximating series of intelligible and relatively adequate +conceptions</i>. Metaphysically, we are ever approximating to ultimate +knowledge; though it can never be said that we have attained it. The +type of metaphysical knowledge cannot be characterized, therefore, as +either gnostic or agnostic.</p> + +<p>As to the question of ultimate <i>criteria</i>, it is clear that we +are here touching one of the living issues of our present-day thought. +Shall the judgment of truth, on which certitude must found, exclude +practical considerations of value, or shall the consideration of value +have weight in the balance of certitude? On this issue we have at the +opposite extremes (1) the <i>pure rationalist</i> who insists on the +rigid exclusion from the epistemological scale of every consideration +except that of pure logic. The truth of a thing, he urges, is always a +purely logical consideration. On the other hand, we have (2) the <i>pure +pragmatist</i>, who insists on the "<i>will to believe</i>" as a +legitimate datum or factor in the determination of certitude. The +pragmatic platform has two planks: (1) the <i>ontological</i>—we +select our world that we call real at the behest of our interests; (2) +the <i>ethical</i>—in such a world practical interest has the +right of way in determining what we are to accept as true as well as +what we are to choose as good. It is my purpose in thus outlining the +extremes of doctrine to close with a suggestion or two toward less +ultra-conclusions. It is a sufficient criticism on the <i>pure +rationalist's</i> position to point out the fact that his separation of +practical and theoretic interests is a pure fiction that is never +realized anywhere. The motives of science and the motives of practice +are so blended that interest in the conclusion always enters as a factor +in the process. A conclusion reached by the pure rationalist's method +would be one that would only interest the pure rationalist in so far as +he could divest himself of all motives except the bare love of fact for +its own sake. The <i>pure pragmatist</i> is, I think, still more +vulnerable. He must, to start with, be a pure subjective idealist, +otherwise he would find his world at many points recalcitrant to his +ontology. Furthermore, the mere <i>will to believe</i> is arbitrary and +involves the suppression of reason. In order that the will to believe +may work <i>real</i> conviction, the point believed must at least amount +to a postulate of the practical reason; it must become somehow evident +that the refusal to believe would create a situation that would be +theoretically unsound or irrational; as, for instance, if we assume that +the immortality of the soul is a <i>real postulate</i> of practical +reason, it must be so because the negative of it would involve the +irrationality of our world; and therefore a degree of theoretic +imperfection or confusion. Personally I believe the lines here converge +in such a way that the ideal of truth will always be found to have +practical value; and <i>conversely</i>, as to practical ideals, that a +sound practical postulate will have weight in the theoretic scales. And +it is doubtless true, as Professor Royce urges in his presidential +address on <i>The Eternal and The Practical</i>, that all judgments must +find their final warrant at the Court of the Eternal where, so far as we +can see, the theoretical and practical coalesce into one.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_1" id="footnote_1"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_1">[1]</a> I do not raise the question of qualitative +mathematics at all. It is clear that the first mathematical reflection +will be quantitative.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_2" id="footnote_2"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_2">[2]</a> By natural causation I mean such a +relationship between <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> in a phenomenal system as +enables <i>a</i> through its connection with its ground to determine +<i>b</i>.</p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<p>At the close of the work of this Section and upon the invitation of +Dr. Armstrong, a number of distinguished members in attendance joined +freely in the discussion, to the great pleasure of the many specialists +who were present. Among those participating were Professor Boltzmann of +Vienna, Professor Hoeffding of Copenhagen, Professor Calkins of +Wellesley, and Professor French of the University of Nebraska, to whom +replies were made by the principal speakers, Messrs. Taylor and +Ormond.</p> + +<p class="p4 center">SHORT PAPERS</p> + +<p class="p2">A short paper was contributed to the work of the Section +by Professor W. P. Montague of Columbia University, on the "Physical +Reality of Secondary Qualities." The speaker said that from the +beginning of modern philosophy there has existed a strong tendency among +all schools of thought—monists of the idealistic or materialistic +types, as well as outspoken dualists—to treat the distinction +between primary and secondary qualities as coincident, so far as it +goes, with the distinction between physical and psychical. Colors, +sounds, odors, etc., are regarded as purely subjective or mental in +their nature, and as having no true membership in the physical order; +while correlatively all special forms and relations have been in their +turn extruded from the field of the psychical. Let it be noted that +introspection offers little or nothing in support of this view. There is +nothing, for example, about the color red that would make it appear more +distinctively psychical or subjective than a figure or a motion. The +perception of a square or a triangle is not a square or triangular +perception; but neither is the perception of red or blue a red or blue +perception. Now with the affective or emotional contents of experience +the case is quite different.</p> + +<p>A feeling of pain is a painful feeling, a consciousness of anger is +an angry consciousness. Pains are more and less painful, according as we +are more and less aware of them. With feelings and volitions <i>esse</i> +is indeed <i>percipi</i>. Colors and other secondary qualities, however, +do not seem thus to increase or diminish in their reality concomitantly +with our perceptions of them. Red is red, neither more nor less, +regardless of the amount to which we attend to it. And yet it remains +true that, notwithstanding this seeming objectivity, the secondary +qualities have long been contrasted with the primary, and classed along +with the affective and volitional states as purely subjective facts. It +has always seemed curious that a view so important as this in its +consequences, and so radically at variance, not only with Pre-Cartesian +philosophy, but also with our instinctive beliefs, should have won its +way to the position of an accepted dogma; and the purpose of this paper +was first to examine the grounds upon which this belief rests, and +second to show that the problem of the independent reality of the +physical world and the problem of the relation of physical and psychical +appear in a clearer and more hopeful light when disentangled from the +quite different problem of the relation of primary and secondary +qualities.</p> + +<p>There were two reasons why the older or Pre-Cartesian view of this +question should give place to the modern doctrine. First, because of the +rediscovery of the idea of mechanism, without which predictive science +had been virtually impossible. The second reason for reducing the +secondary qualities to a merely subjective status lay in the fact that +they are much more dependent than the primary qualities upon the bodily +organism of the one who perceives them. In closing Professor Montague +said:<span style="white-space:nowrap;">—</span></p> + +<p>"I wish in closing to point out two consequences of the view which I +have been opposing. First, the present paradoxical status of the eternal +world; second, the equally paradoxical status of the relation of that +world to the world of mind. Berkeley was the first thinker clearly to +perceive the unsubstantial nature of a world made up solely of primary +qualities. Indeed, in the last analysis, a world of primary qualities, +and nothing else, is a world of relations without terms, a geometrical +fiction, the objective (or, for that matter, the subjective) existence +of which the idealist would be right in denying. In Biology we have +abandoned obscurantist methods, and no longer attribute the distinctive +vital functions of growth and reproduction to a vital force or vital +substance, but solely to the peculiar configuration of the material +elements of a cell. Why may we not in psychology with equal propriety +attribute the distinctively psychical functions of subjectivity or +consciousness, not to the action of a hyper-psychical soul-substance, +nor to the presence of a transcendental ego, but simply to that peculiar +configuration of sensory elements which constitutes a what we call +psychosis?"</p> + +<h3 class="p4">SECTION B—PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION</h3> + +<h3 class="p4">SECTION B<br /> + +PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center">(<i>Hall 1, September 21, 3 p. m.</i>)</p> + +<table class="bold" border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Phil Religion +Speakers"> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Thomas C. Hall</span>, Union +Theological Seminary, N. Y.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Otto Pfleiderer</span>, +University of Berlin.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Ernst +Troeltsch</span>, University of Heidelberg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. P. Montague</span>, Columbia +University.</td></tr> + +</table> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Rel1"></a>THE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF +RELIGION TO THE OTHER SCIENCES</h3> + +<h4>BY PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>D. Otto Pfleiderer</b>, Professor of Theology, University of +Berlin since 1875. b. September 1, 1839, Stetten, Würtemberg. +<b>Grad.</b> Tübingen, 1857-61. <b>Post-grad.</b> <i>ibid.</i> 1864-68. +City Professor, Heilbronn, 1868-69; Superintendent, Jena, 1869-70; +Professor of Theology, Jena, 1870-75. <b>Author of</b> <i>Religion and +its Essential Characteristics</i>; <i>Religious Philosophy upon +Historical Foundation</i>; and many other works and papers on +Theology.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">In order to answer this question, we need to consider a +preliminary question, namely, whether religion can be regarded as the +object of scientific knowledge in the same manner as other processes of +the intellectual life of the race, such as law, history, and art. It is +well known that this question has not always received an affirmative +answer, and indeed it can never be answered in the affirmative so long +as the position is maintained that the only religion is that of the +Christian Church, whose doctrines and teachings rest upon an immediate +divine revelation, and that these must be accepted by men in blind +belief. Under the position of an authoritative ecclesiastical faith +there can indeed exist a theoretical consideration of the doctrines of +faith, as it was the case with the scholastic theology of the Middle +Ages, which with great earnestness sought to harmonize faith and +knowledge; nevertheless, no one of the present day would give to the +scholastic theology the name of science with the modern meaning of the +term science. The scholastic theology used great formal acuteness and +skill in the work of defining and defending ecclesiastical traditions, +still there was lacking that which for us is the essential condition of +scientific knowledge, the free examination of tradition according to the +laws of human thought and the analogy of the general experience of +humanity. The great hindrance to the progress of the knowledge of +religion was the accepted position that the truth of the ecclesiastical +doctrines was beyond human reason and outside of human examination, +since their truth rested upon an immediate divine revelation. Whether +this supernatural authority was ascribed to the Church or the Bible +makes very little difference, for in either case the assumption of such +an authority is a hindrance to the free examination of that which claims +to be the divine revealed truth.</p> + +<p>But is this assumption really justifiable in the nature of the case? +Do the doctrines of the Church rest upon a supernatural divine +revelation? So soon as this question was really earnestly considered, +and the thinking mind could not always avoid the consideration, then +there was revealed the inadequacy of the assumption. Two ways of +examination led to a common critical result, the philosophical analysis +of the religious consciousness and the historical comparison of various +religions. The first to enter upon these ways and at the same time to +become the founder of the modern science of religion was the keen Scotch +thinker David Hume. Truly the thought of Hume was still a one-sided, +disorganizing skepticism; even as his theory of knowledge disturbed the +truth of all our previous commonsense opinions and conceptions, so also +his philosophy of religion sought to demonstrate that all religion +cannot be proved and is full of doubt, and that the origin of religion +was neither to be found in divine revelation nor in the reason of man, +but in the passions of the heart and in the illusions of imagination. As +unsatisfactory as this result was, nevertheless it gave an important +advance to the rational study of religion in two directions, in that of +religion being an experience of the inner life of the soul and in that +of religion being a fact of human history.</p> + +<p>Kant added the positive criticism of reason to the negative +skepticism of Hume; that is, Kant showed that the human intellect moved +independently in the formation of theoretical and practical judgments, +and that the various materials of thought, desire, and feelings were +regulated by the intellect according to innate original ideas of the +true and good and beautiful. Thus as a natural result there came the +conception that the doctrines of belief arose not as complete truths, +given by divine revelation, but, like every other form of conscious +knowledge, these came to us through the activity of our own mind, and +that therefore these doctrines cannot be regarded as of absolute +authority for all time, but that we are to seek to understand their +origin in historical and psychical motives. So far as one looked at the +ceremonial forms of positive religion, these motives indeed were found +according to Kant in irrational conceptions, but as far as the essence +of religion was concerned they were rather found to be rooted in the +moral nature of man. This is the consciousness of obligation of the +practical reason or of the conscience, which raises man to a faith in +the moral government of the world, in immortality and God. With the +reduction of religion from all external forms, doctrines, and ceremonies +and the finding of the real essence of religion in the human mind and +spirit, the way was opened to a knowledge of religion free from all +external authority. Those philosophers who came after Kant followed +essentially this course, though here and there they may separate in +their opinions according to their thought of the psychological function +of religion. When Kant had emphasized the close connection between +religion and the moral obligation, then came Schleiermacher, who +emphasized the feeling of our dependence upon the Eternal, and who +sought to find the explanation of all religious thoughts and conceptions +in the many relations of the feeling to religious experience. Hegel on +the other hand sought the truth of religion in the thought of the +absolute spirit as found in the finite spirit. Thus Hegel made religion +a sort of popular philosophy.</p> + +<p>At present all agree that all sides of the soul-life have part in +religion; now one side may be the more prominent, now another, according +to the peculiarity of certain religions or the individual temperaments. +The philosophy of religion has, in common with scientific psychology, +the question of the relation of feeling to the intellect and the will, +and as yet there may be many views of this question. Altogether the +philosophy of religion is looking for important solutions to many of its +problems from the realm of the present scientific psychology. +Experiences, such as religious conversions, appear under this point of +view as ethical changes in which the aim of a personal life is changed +from a carnal and selfish end to that of a spiritual and altruistic +purpose. These are extraordinary and seemingly supernatural processes; +nevertheless in them there can still be found a certain development of +the soul-life according to law. Modern psychology especially has thrown +light upon the abnormal conditions of consciousness which have so often +been made manifest in the religious experience of all times. That which +religious history records concerning inspiration, visions, ecstasy, and +revelation, we now classify with the well-known appearances of +hypnotism, the induction of conceptions and motives of the will through +foreign suggestion or through self-suggestion, of the division of +consciousness in different egos, and in the union of several +consciousnesses into one common mediumistic fusion of thought and will. +The explanation of these experiences may not yet be satisfactory, but +nevertheless we do not doubt the possibility of a future explanation +from the general laws controlling the life of the soul. The fact that we +can through psychological experiments produce such abnormal conditions +of consciousness justifies us in taking the position, that certain +psychical laws are at the foundation of these conditions which in their +kind are as natural and regular in their functions as the physical laws +which we observe in physical experiments. These solutions which modern +psychology so far has given, and hopes still further to give, are of +great importance to the philosophy of religion. They are an indorsement +of the general principle which one hundred years ago had been advanced +by critical speculation, namely, that in all experiences of the +religious life the same principles which control the human mind in all +other intellectual and emotional fields shall hold sway. Nothing +therefore should hinder us in scientific research from following the +well-defined maxims of thought, and unreservedly applying the same +methods of scientific analysis in theology as is done generally in the +other sciences.</p> + +<p>The claim of the Church to infallibility and divine inspiration of +its dogmas is weakened under this view of the work of the philosophy of +religion. Prophetical inspiration and ecstasy, which usually were +thought to be supernatural revelations, are now declared by the present +psychology to come under the category of other analogous experiences, +such as the action of mental powers which, under definite conditions of +individual gifts and on historical occasions, have manifested themselves +in extraordinary forms of consciousness. However, these enthusiastic +forms of prophetical consciousness cannot be accepted for a higher form +of knowledge or even as of divine origin and as an infallible +proclamation of the truth; on the contrary, these forms are to be judged +as pathological appearances, which may be more harmful than beneficent +for the ethical value of the prophetical intuition. At least, it has +come to pass that all forms of revelation must come under the +examination of a psychological analysis and of an analogical judgment. +Hence their traditional nimbus of unique, supernatural, and absolute +authority is for all time destroyed.</p> + +<p>We are carried to the same result by the comparative study of the +history of religions. The study shows us that the Christian Church, with +its dogma of the divine inspiration of the Bible, does not stand alone; +that before and after Christianity other religions made exactly the same +claims for their sacred scriptures. By the pious Brahman the Veda is +regarded as infallible and eternal; he believes the hymns of the old +seers were not composed by the seers themselves, but were taken from an +original copy in heaven. The Buddhist sees in the sayings of his sacred +book "Dhammapadam" the exact inheritance of the infallible words of his +omniscient teacher Buddha. For the confessor of Ahuramazda the +Zendavesta contains the scriptural revelation of the good spirit unto +the prophet Zarathustra; according to the rabbis the laws revealed unto +Moses on Mount Sinai were even before the creation of the world the +object of the observation of God; for the faithful Mohammedan the Koran +is the copy of an ever-present original in heaven, the contents of which +were dictated word for word to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel. Whoever +ponders the similar claims of all these religions for the infallibility +of their sacred books, to him it becomes difficult to hold the dogma of +the Christian Church concerning the inspiration and infallibility of the +Bible as alone true and the similar dogmas of other religions as being +false. Rather he will accept the view that in all these examples there +are found the same motives of the religious mind, that here is given an +expression to the same need common to all seeking for an absolute and +abiding basis for their faith.</p> + +<p>The study of the comparison of religions has discovered in religions +other than that of Christianity many very striking parallels to many +narratives and teachings of the Bible. It may be well to recall very +briefly some of the important points. Owing to the fact that the +Assyrian cuneiform writings have now been deciphered, there has been +found a story of the creation which has many characteristics in common +with those of the Bible. There is found a story of a flood, which in its +very details can be regarded as the forerunner of the story of the flood +in the Bible. There have been found Assyrian penitential psalms, which, +in consciousness of guilt and in earnestness of prayer for forgiveness, +can well be compared with many psalms of the Bible. Recently the Code of +the Assyrian King Hammurabi, who reigned two thousand three hundred +years before Christ, has been discovered. The similarity of this Code +with many of the early Mosaic Laws has called general attention to this +fact. In the Persian religion there are found teachings of the Kingdom +of God, of the good spirits who surround the throne of God, of the +Spirit hostile to God and of an army of his demons, of the judgment of +each soul after death, of a heaven with eternal light and of the dark +abyss of hell, of the future struggle of the multitudes of good and bad +spirits and the victory over the bad through a divine hero and saviour, +of the general resurrection of the dead, of the awful destruction of the +world and the creation of a new and better world,—teachings which +are also found in the later Jewish theology and apocalypse, so that the +acceptance of a dependence of Jewish upon corresponding Persian teaching +can hardly be avoided. Also Grecian influence is observed in later +Jewish literature, in proverbs, in the wisdom of Solomon and the Son of +Sirach; especially in the Alexandrian Jewish theology are found Platonic +thoughts of an eternal, ideal world, of the heavenly home of the soul, +and the Stoic conception of a world-ruling divine Logos.</p> + +<p>It is from this source that the Logos to which Philo had already +ascribed the meaning of the Son of God and the Bringer of a divine +revelation crossed over into Christian theology and became the +foundation of the dogma of the Church concerning the person of Christ. +Of still greater importance than even all this was the opening of the +Indian and especially the Buddhistic religious writings. In these we +have, five hundred years before Christianity, the revelation of +redemptive religion, resting upon the ethical foundation of the +abnegation of self and the withdrawal from the world. In the centre of +this religion is Gautama Buddha, the ideal teacher of redeeming truth, +whose human life was adorned by the faith of his followers with a crown +of wonderful legends; from an abode in heaven, out of mercy to the +world, he descended into the world, conceived and born of a virgin +mother, greeted and entertained by heavenly spirits, recognized +beforehand by a pious seer as the future redeemer of the world; as a +youth he manifested a wisdom beyond that of his teachers. Then after the +reception of an illuminating revelation, he victoriously overcomes the +temptation of the devil, who would cause him to become faithless to his +call to redemption. Then he begins to preach of the coming of the +Kingdom of Justice, and sends forth his disciples, two by two, as +messengers of his gospel to all people. Although he declares that it is +not his calling to perform miracles, nevertheless the legends indeed +tell how many sick were healed, how with the contents of a small basket +hundreds were fed, how possessed of all knowledge he reveals hidden +things; how overcoming the limitations of space and time, swaying in the +air, being transfigured in a heavenly light, he reveals himself to his +disciples just before his death. And at last, in the faith of his +followers, having passed from the position of a human teacher to that of +an eternal heavenly spirit and lord of the world, he is exalted as the +object of prayer and reverence, to many millions of the human race in +Southern and Eastern Asia.</p> + +<p>It is hardly possible that the knowledge of this parallel from India +to the New Testament, and of the Babylonian and Persian parallel to the +Old Testament, can be without influence upon the religious thought of +Christian people. Although we may be ever so much convinced concerning +the essential superiority of our religion over all other religions, +nevertheless the dogmatic contrast between absolute truth on the one +side and complete falsity on the other can no more be maintained. In +place of this view there must enter the view of a relative grade of +differences between the higher and lower stages of development. No +longer can we see in other religions only mistakes and fiction, but +under the husk of their legends many precious kernels of truth must be +seen, expressions of inner religious feelings and of noble ethical +sentiments. One should therefore accept the position not to object to +the same discrimination between husk and kernel in the matter of one's +own religion, and to recognize in its inherited traditions and dogmas +legendary elements, the explanation of which is to be found in psychical +motives and in historical surroundings, even as they are found in the +corresponding parts of religions other than the Christian religion. +Therefore the historical comparison of religions takes us away from an +absolute dogmatic positivism to a relative evolutionary manner of study, +placing all religions without exception under the laws of time +progression and under the causal connection of the law of cause and +effect. The isolation of religion therefore is no more. It is regarded +as being a part of other human historical affairs, and must yield to the +test of a thorough unhindered research. The value of the Christian +religion can never suffer in the view of a reasonable man, when it is +not accepted in blind faith, but as the result of discriminating +comparison.</p> + +<p>As the evolutionary philosophy of religion uses the method of science +without exception in the case of all historical religions, so also it +does not shrink from taking up the question of the beginning of +religion, but believes that here also is found the key in the +analytical, critical, and comparative method. And here is found the +assistance of the comparative study of languages, ethnology, and +paleontology.</p> + +<p>The celebrated Sanscrit scholar, Max Müller, sought in the +comparative study of mythology to prove the etymological relation of +many of the Grecian gods and heroes with those of the mythology of India +and to trace the common origin of all these mythical beings and legends +in the personification of the movements of the heavenly bodies, the +thunder and lightning, the tempest and the rain. All mythical belief in +gods of the Indo-Germanic peoples seems to have arisen out of a poetical +view and dramatic personification of the powers of nature. Suggestive as +this hypothesis is, it is not by any means sufficient to give us a +complete explanation of the subject. In fact, others have shown that +primitive religion does not altogether consist in mythical conceptions, +but mainly in reverential actions, sacrifices, sacraments, vows, and +other similar cults, which have very little to do with the atmospherical +powers of nature, but rather with the social life of primitive people. +And when once the sight was clearly directed to the social meaning of +the religious rites, it was then observed that even the earliest legends +concerning the gods were connected far more closely with the habits and +customs of early society than with the facts of nature. Tyler's +celebrated book concerning "Primitive Civilization" is written from this +standpoint, an epoch-making book, showing the original close connection +of religion with the entire civilization of humanity, with the views of +life and death, the social customs, the forms of law, their strivings in +art and science; a book with a large amount of information, brought +together from observation on all sides. In this channel are found all +the researches which to-day are classified under the name of Folklore; +seeking to gather the still existing characteristic customs and forms, +legends, stories, and sayings, in order to compose these and to discover +the survivals of earliest religion, poetry, and civilization of +humanity. The gain of this study pursued with so great diligence is not +to be underrated. These studies show that all that, which at one time +existed as faith in the spirit of humanity, possessed within its very +nature the strongest power of continuance, so that in new and strange +conditions and in other forms it continued to remain. Under all changes +and progress of history there is still found an unbroken connection of +constant development.</p> + +<p>As important, however, as the possession of a general knowledge of +historical forms of development is to the philosophy of religion, +nevertheless the possession of this knowledge is not wholly a +fulfillment of the purpose of the philosophy of religion. To understand +a development means not merely to know how one thing follows as the +result of the other, but also to understand the law which lies at the +foundation of all empirical changes and at the same time controls the +end of the development. If this principle holds good in the +understanding of the development in the processes of nature, much more +does the principle hold good in understanding the processes of +intellectual development of humanity, which have for us not only a +theoretical, but at the same time an eminently practical interest. The +philosopher of religion sees in religious history not merely the coming +together of similar forms, but an advance from the lowest stage of +childlike ignorance to an ever purer and richer realization of the idea +of religion, a divinely ordained progress for the education of humanity +from the slavery of nature to the freedom of the spirit. The question +now arises: where do we find the principle and law of this ever-rising +development? Where do we find the measure of judgment for the relative +value of religious appearances? It is clear that the general principle +of the complete development cannot be found in a single fact which is +only one of the many manifestations of the general principle, and it is +just as clear that the absolute norm of judgment is not found in a +single fact always relative, presenting to us the object of judgment and +therefore being impossible to stand as the norm of judgment. Therefore +the principle of religious development and the norm of its judgment can +only be found in the inner being of the spirit of humanity, namely, in +the necessary striving of the mind into an harmonious arrangement of all +our conceptions, or the idea of the truth, and into the complete order +of all our purposes, or the idea of the good. These ideas unite in the +highest unity, in the Idea of God. Therefore the consciousness of God is +the revelation of the original innate longing of reason after complete +unity as a principle of universal harmony and consistence in all our +thinking and willing. Hence, in the first place, arises the result that +the development of the consciousness of God in the history of religion +is always dependent upon the existing conditions of the two united +sides, the theoretical perception of the truth and the moral standard of +life. In the second place the result arises that the judgment of the +value of all appearances in the history of religion depends as to +whether and how far these appearances agree with the idea of the true +and the good, and correspond with the demands of reason and conscience. +That science which is engaged with the idea of the good we name Ethics; +that which is engaged with the last principles of the perception of +truth, using the expression of Aristotle, we may name Metaphysics, or +following Plato—Dialectic. Recognizing then in the idea of God the +synthesis of the idea of the true and the good, the philosophy of +religion is closely related with both, Ethics and Metaphysics.</p> + +<p>At present the relation of religion to morality is an object of much +controversy. There are many who hold that morality without religion is +not only possible but also very desirable; since they are of the opinion +that moral strength is weakened, the will is without freedom, and its +motives corrupted on account of religious conceptions. On the other +hand, the Church, considering the experience of history, finds that +religion has ever proved itself to be the strongest and most necessary +aid to morality. In this contest the philosophy of religion occupies the +position of a judge who is called upon to adjust the relative rights of +the parties. The philosophy of religion brings to light the historical +fact that from the very beginnings of human civilization, social life +and morality were closely connected with religious conceptions and +usages, and indeed always so interchangeable in their influence that the +position of social civilization on the one side corresponded with the +position of religious civilization on the other, just as the water-level +in two communicating pipes. Therefore it follows that it is unjust and +not historical to blame religion on account of the defects of a national +and temporal morality; for these defects of morality, with the +corresponding errors of religion, find a common ground in a low stage of +development of the entire civilization of the people of the time and +age. Further, it becomes the task of the philosophy of religion to +examine whether this correspondence of religion and morality, recognized +in history, is also found in the very nature of morality and religion. +This question in the main is answered without doubt in the affirmative, +for it is clear that the religious feeling of dependence upon one +all-ruling power is well adapted not only to make keen the moral +consciousness of obligation and to deepen the feeling of responsibility, +but also to endow moral courage with power and to strengthen the hope of +the solution of moral purposes. The clearer religious faith comprehends +the relation of man to God, so much the more will that faith prove +itself as a strong motive and a great incentive of the moral life. Such +a conception will not make the moral will unfree but truly free, not in +the sense of a selfish choice, but in the sense of a love that serves, +knowing itself as an instrument of the divine will, who binds us all +into a social organism, the kingdom of God. And, on the other hand, the +more ideal the moral view of life, the higher and greater its aims, the +more it recognizes its great task to care for the welfare not only of +the individual but of all, to coöperate in the welfare and development +of all forms of society, the more earnestly the moral mind will need a +sincere faith that this is God's world, that above all the changes of +time an eternal will is on the throne, whose all-wise guidance causes +everything to be for the best unto those who love him.</p> + +<p>A like middle position of arbitration falls to the philosophy of +religion in the matter of the relation of religion to science. The first +demand of science is freedom of thought, according to its own logical +laws, and its fundamental assumption is the possibility of the knowledge +of the world on the basis of the unchangeable laws of all existence and +events. With this fundamental demand science places itself in opposition +to the formal character of ecclesiastical doctrine so far as the +doctrine claims infallible authority resting upon a divine revelation. +And the fundamental assumption of the regular law of the course of the +world is in opposition to the contents of ecclesiastical doctrine +concerning the miraculous interposition in the course of nature and of +history. To the superficial observer there appears therefore to exist an +irreconcilable conflict between science and religion. Here is the work +of the philosophy of religion, to take away the appearance of an +irreconcilable opposition between science and religion, in that the +philosophy of religion teaches first of all to distinguish between the +essence of religion and the ecclesiastical doctrines of a certain +religion, and to comprehend the historical origin of these doctrines in +the forms of thought of past times. To this purpose the method of +psychological analysis and of historical comparison mentioned above is +of service. When, then, by this critical process religion is traced to +its real essence in the emotional consciousness of God, to which the +dogmatic doctrines stand as secondary products and varied symbols, then +it remains to show that between the essence of religion and that which +science demands and presupposes, there exists not conflict but harmony. +When the idea of God is recognized as the synthesis of the ideas of the +true and the good, so then must all truth as sought by science, even as +the highest good, which the system of ethics places as the purpose of +all action—these must be recognized as the revelation of God in +his eternal reason and goodness. The laws of our rational thinking then +cannot be in conflict with divine revelation in history, and the laws of +the natural order of the world can no more stand in conflict with the +world-governing Omnipotence; but both, the laws of our thinking and +those of the real world, reveal themselves as the harmonious revelations +of the creative reason of God, which, according to Plato's fitting word, +is the efficient ground of being as well as of knowing. It is therefore +not merely a demand of religious belief that there is real truth in our +God-consciousness, that there should be an activity and revelation of +God himself in the human mind; it is also in the same manner a demand of +science considering its last principles, that the world, in order to be +known by us as a rational, regulated order, must have for its principle +an eternal creative reason. Long ago the old master of thinking, +Aristotle, recognized this fact clearly, when he said that order in the +world without a principle of order could be as little thinkable as the +order of an army without a commanding general.</p> + +<p>But while it is true that science, as the ground of the possibility +of its knowledge of the truth, must presuppose the same general +principle of intellectual knowledge which religion has as the object of +its practical belief, then by principle the apprehension is excluded +that any possible progress on the part of science in its knowledge of +the world can ever destroy religion. We are rather the more justified in +the hope that all true knowledge of science will be a help to religion, +and will serve as the means of purifying religion from the dross of +superstition.</p> + +<p>Truly it can easily be shown that a divine government of the world +breaking through, and now and then suspending the regular order of +nature through miraculous intervention, would not be more majestic, but +far more limited and human, than such a government which reveals itself +as everywhere and always the same in and through its own ordained laws +in the world. And again, that a revelation prescribing secret and +incomprehensible doctrines and rites, demanding from humanity a blind +faith, would far less be in harmony with the guiding wisdom and love of +God, and far less could work for the intellectual liberty and perfection +of humanity, than such a revelation which is working in and through the +reason and conscience of humanity, and is realizing its purpose in the +progressive development of our intellectual and moral capacities and +powers. When therefore science raises critical misgivings against the +supernatural and irrational doctrines of positive religion, then the +real and rightly understood interests of religion are not harmed but +rather advanced; for this criticism serves religion in helping it to +become free from the unintellectual inheritance of its early days, in +helping religion to consider its true intellectual and moral essence, +and to bring to a full display all the blessed powers which are +concealed within its nature, to press through the narrow walls of an +ecclesiasticism out into the full life of humanity, and to work as +leaven for the ennoblement of humanity. Not in conflict with science and +moral culture, but only in harmony with these, can religion come nearer +to the attainment of its ideal, which consists in the worship of God in +spirit and in truth. Even though they may not be conscious of their +purpose, but nevertheless in fact all honest work of science and all the +endeavors of social and ethical humanity have part in the attainment of +this ideal.</p> + +<p>It is the work of the philosophy of religion to make clear that all +work of the thinking and striving spirit of humanity, in its deepest +meaning, is a work in the kingdom of God, as service to God, who is +truth and goodness. It is the work of the philosophy of religion to +explain various misunderstandings, to bring together opposing sides, and +so to prepare the way for a more harmonious coöperation of all, and for +an always hopeful progress of all on the road to the high aims of a +humanity fraternally united in the divine spirit.</p> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Rel2"></a>MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF +RELIGION: PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCE OF +RELIGION</h3> + +<h4>BY PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH</h4> + +<p class="center">(<i>Translated from the German by Dr. J. H. Woods, +Harvard University.</i>)</p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>Ernst Troeltsch</b>, Professor of Systematic Theology, University +of Heidelberg, since 1894. b. February 17 1865, Augsburg, Bavaria. +Doctor of Theology. Professor University of Bonn, 1892-94. <b>Author +of</b> <i>John Gerhard and Melanchthon</i>; <i>Richard Rubbe</i>; <i>The +Scientific Attitude and its Demands on Theology</i>; <i>The Absoluteness +of Christianity, and of the History of Religion</i>; <i>Political Ethics +and Christianity</i>; <i>The Historic Element in Kant's Religious +Philosophy</i>.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">The philosophy of religion of to-day is philosophy of +religion so far only, and in such a sense, as this word means science of +religion or philosophy with reference to religion. The science of +religion of former days was first dogmatic theology, deriving its dogmas +from the Bible and from Church tradition, expounding them apologetically +with the metaphysical speculation of the later period of antiquity, and +regarding the non-Christian religions as sinful derangements and obscure +fragments of the primitive revelation. This lasted sixteen centuries, +and is confined to-day to strictly ecclesiastical circles. Next, science +of religion became natural theology, which proved the existence of God +by the nature of thought and by the constitution of reality, and also +the immortality of the soul by the concept of the soul and by moral +demands, thus constructing natural or rational dogmas and putting these +dogmas into more or less friendly relations with traditional +Christianity. This lasted about two centuries, and is to-day of the not +strictly ecclesiastical or pietistic circles, which still wish to hold +fast to religion. Both kinds of science of religion exist no longer for +the strict science. The first was, in reality, supernaturalistic +dogmatics, the second was, in reality, a substitution of philosophy for +religion. The first was demolished by the criticism of miracles in the +eighteenth century, the second by the criticism of knowledge in the +nineteenth century, which, in its turn, rests upon Hume and Kant.</p> + +<p>The science of religion of to-day keeps in touch with that which +without doubt factually exists and is an object of actual experience, +<i>the subjective religious consciousness</i>. The distrust of +ecclesiastical and rationalistic dogmas has made, in the thought of the +present, every other treatment impossible. So the spirit of empiricism +has here as at other points completely prevailed. But empiricism in this +field means psychological analysis. This analysis is pursued by the +present to the widest extent: on the one side by anthropologists and +archæologists, who investigate the life of the soul in primitive peoples +and thus indicate the particular function and condition of religion in +these states; on the other side, by the modern experimental +psychologists and psychological empiricists, who, by self-observation, +and especially by the collection of observations by others and of +personal testimony, study religion, and then, from the point of view of +the concepts of experimental psychology, examine the main phenomena thus +found.</p> + +<p>Now, such an empirical psychology of religion has been constructed +with considerable success. In this German literature, it is true, has +coöperated to a slight degree only. The German theologians have held to +the older statements of the psychology of Kant, of Schleiermacher, of +Hegel, and of Fries, alone, which, in principle, were on the right path, +but which combined the purely psychological with metaphysical and +epistemological problems to such a degree that it was impossible to +reach a really unprejudiced attitude. German psychologists remain, +furthermore, under the spell of psycho-physiology and of quantitative +statements of measure, and have, consequently, not liked to advance into +this field, which is inaccessible to such statements. More productive +than the German psychology for this subject is the French, which has +attacked the complex facts far more courageously. Here, however, under +the predominance of positivism, there prevails, on the whole, the +tendency to regard religion, in its essence, anthropologically or +medically and pathologically in connection with bodily conditions. This +is the confusion of conditions and origins with the essence of the thing +itself, which can be determined only by the thing, and is, by no means, +bound exclusively to these conditions. Notwithstanding, the works of +Marillier, Murisier, and Flournoy have considerably aided the problem. +More impartially than all of these, the English and American psychology +has investigated our subject. Here we have a masterpiece in the Gifford +Lectures of William James, which collects into a single reservoir +similar investigations such as have been carried on by Coe and Starbuck. +There is here no tendency to a mechanism of consciousness, or to the +dogma of the causal and necessary structure of consciousness. And to +just this is due the freshness and impartiality of the analyses which +James gives out of his enviable knowledge of characteristic cases. James +rightly emphasizes the endlessly different intensity of religious +experiences, and the great number of points of view and of judgments +which thereby results. He also rightly emphasizes the connection of this +different intensity with irreducible typical constitutions of the soul's +life, with the optimistic and the melancholy disposition; hence there +arise constantly, even within the same religion, essentially different +types of religiousness. Limiting himself, then, to the most intense +experiences, he decides that the characteristic of religious states is +the sense of presence of the divine, which one might perhaps describe in +other terms, but which still continues the specifically divine, with the +opposed emotional effects of a solemn sense of contrast and of +enthusiastic exaltation. He pictures these senses of presence, and +illustrates them by visionary and hallucinatory representations of the +abstract. With this are connected impulsive and inhibitive conditions +for the appearance of these senses of presence and of reality, +descriptions of the effects upon the emotional life and action, and, +above all, the analysis of the event usually called conversion, in which +the religious experience out of subconscious antecedents becomes, in +various ways, the centre of the soul's life. All this is description, +but it is based upon a mass of examples and explained by general +psychological categories which, by the occurrence of the religious event +only, receive a thoroughly specific coloring. It is a description after +the manner of Kirchhoff's mechanics; permanent and similar types, and, +likewise, similar conditions for their relations to the rest of the +soul's life are sought out everywhere, without maintaining to have +proven at the same time, in this way, an intellectual necessity for the +connection. But the characteristic peculiarity of religious phenomena is +thus conceived as in no other previous analysis.</p> + +<p>All this is still, however, nothing more than psychologic. For the +science of religion it accomplishes nothing more than the psychological +determination of the peculiarity of the phenomenon, of its environment, +its relations and consequences. It is evident that the phenomenon occurs +in an indefinite number of varieties; and the chosen point of departure, +in unusual and excessive cases, frequently diffuses over religion itself +the character of the bizarre and abnormal. Consequently nothing whatever +is said about the amount of truth or of reality in these cases. This, by +the very principles of such a psychology, is impossible. It analyzes, +produces types and categories, points out comparatively constant +connections and interactions. But this cannot be the last word for the +science of religion. It demands, above all, empirical knowledge of the +phenomenon; but it demands this only in order, on the basis of this +knowledge, to be able to answer the question of the amount of truth. But +this leads to an entirely different problem, that of the <i>theory of +knowledge</i>, which has its own conditions of solution. It is +impossible to stop at a merely empirical psychology. The question is not +merely of given facts, but of the amount of knowledge in these facts. +But pure empiricism will not succeed in answering this question. The +question with regard to the amount of truth is always a question of +validity. The question with regard to validity can, however, be decided +only by logical and by general, conceptual investigations. Thus we pass +over from the ground of empiricism to that of rationalism, and the +question is, what the theory of knowledge or rationalism signifies for +the science of religion.</p> + +<p>Such a synthesis of the rational and irrational, of the psychological +and the theory of knowledge, is the main problem raised by the teaching +of Kant, and the significance of Kant is that he clearly and once for +all raised the problem in this way. He had the same strong mind for the +empirical and actual as for the rational and conceptual elements of +human knowledge, and constructed science as a balance between the two. +(He destroyed forever the <i>a priori</i> speculative rationalism of the +necessary ideas of thought, and the analytical deductions from them, +which undertakes to call reality out of the necessity of thought as +such. He restricted regressive rationalism to metaphysical hypotheses +and probabilities, the evidence for which rests upon the inevitability +of the logical operations which leads to them, which, however, apply +general concepts without reference to experience, and therefore become +empty, and thus afford no real knowledge.) On the other hand, he +proclaimed the formal, immanent rationalism of experience, in attempting +to unite Hume's truth with the truth of Leibnitz and of Plato. In this +way he succeeded in grasping the great problem of thought by the root, +and in putting attempts at solutions on the right basis. So it is not a +mere national custom of German philosophizing, if we take our bearings, +for the most part, from this greatest of German thinkers, but it is, +absolutely, the most fruitful and keenest way of putting the problem. It +is true, the solutions which Kant made, and which are closely connected +with the classical mechanics of that time, with the undeveloped +condition of the psychology of that time, and with the incompleteness of +historical thinking then just beginning, have been, meantime, more than +once given up again. A simple return to him is therefore impossible. But +the problem was put by him in a fundamental way, and his solutions need +nothing more than modification and completion.</p> + +<p>Now all this is especially true in the case of the science of +religion. Here also Kant took the same course, which seemed to me right +for the theoretical knowledge of the natural sciences and for +anthropology. In practical philosophy also, to which he rightly counts +philosophy of religion, he seeks laws of the practical reason analogous +to the laws of theoretical reason, axioms of the ethical, æsthetic, and +religious consciousness which are already contained <i>a priori</i> in +the elementary appearances in these fields, and, in application to +concrete reality, produce just these activities of the reason. Here also +one should grasp reason only as contained in life itself, the <i>a +priori</i> law itself already effective in the diversity of the +appearances should make one's self clear-sighted and so competent for a +criticism of the stream of the soul's appearances. Seizing upon itself +in the practical reality, the practical reason criticises the +psychological complex, rejects as illusion and error that which cannot +be comprehended in an <i>a priori</i> law, selects that part of the same +which needs basis and centre and requires only clearness with regard to +itself, clears the way for revelations of a life consciousness of its +own legality and becomes capable of the development of critically +purified experience.</p> + +<p>If this is, in principle, valid, the Kantian thought, in the further +detail, is maintained in principle only and as a whole. The elaboration +itself will have to be quite different from that of his own. Even by +Kant himself, on this very point, the synthesis of empiricism and +rationalism is far from being elaborated with the necessary rigor and +consistency. And to-day we have a quite differently developed psychology +of religion, in contrast with which that presupposed by Kant is bare and +thin. Finally, there remain in the whole method of the critical system +unsolved problems; by failure to solve these, or by too hasty solution, +science of religion, especially, is affected.</p> + +<p>To make clear the present condition of the problem, one ought, above +all, to indicate the modifications to which the Kantian theory of +religion must submit,—must submit, especially, by reason of a more +delicate psychology, such as we have, with remarkable richness, in James +and the American psychologists connected with him. There are <i>four</i> +points with regard to this question.</p> + +<p>The first is the question of the relation of psychology and theory of +knowledge in the very establishment of the laws of the theory of +knowledge. Are not the search for and discovery of the laws of the +theory of knowledge themselves possible only by way of psychological +ascertainment of facts, itself then a psychological undertaking and +consequently dependent upon all its conditions? It is the much discussed +question of the circle which itself lies at the outset of the critical +system. The answer to this is that this circle lies in the very being of +all knowledge, and must therefore be resolutely committed. It signifies +nothing more than the presupposition of all thought, the trust in a +reason which establishes itself only by making use of itself. The +unmistakable elements of the logical assert themselves as logical in +distinction from the psychological, and from this point on reason must +be trusted in all its confusions and entanglements to recognize itself +within the psychological. It is the courage of thought, as Hegel says, +which may presuppose that the self-knowledge of reason may trust itself, +presuppose that reason is contained within the psychological; or it is +the ethical and teleological presupposition of all thought, as Lotze +says, which believes in knowledge and the validity of its laws for the +sake of a connected meaning for reality, and which, therefore, trusts to +recognize itself out of the psychological mass. The establishment, +therefore, of the laws of the theory of knowledge is not itself a +psychological analysis, but a knowledge of self by the logical by virtue +of which it extricates itself out of the psychological mass. Theory of +knowledge, like every rationalism, includes, it is true, very real +presuppositions with regard to the significant, rational, and +teleologically connective character of reality, and without this +presupposition it is untenable; in it lies its root. It is insight of +former days, the importance of which, however, must constantly be +emphasized anew, that discusses the validity of the rational as opposed +to the merely empirical. But still more important than this thesis are +several <i>inferences</i> which are given with it.</p> + +<p>The establishment of the laws of consciousness, in which we produce +experience, is a selection of the laws out of experience itself, a +knowledge of itself by the reason contained in the very experience by +way of the analysis which extracts it. It is then an endless task, +completed by constantly renewed attacks, and always only approximately +solvable. The complete separation of the merely psychological and actual +and of the logical and necessary will never be completely accomplished, +but will always be open to doubt; one can only attempt always to limit +more vigorously the field of what is doubtful. And with this something +further is connected.</p> + +<p>The inexhaustible production of life becomes constantly, in the +latent amount of reason, richer than the analysis discerns, or, in other +words, the laws which are brought into the light of logic will always be +less the amount of reason not brought into consciousness, and conscious +logic will always be obliged to correct itself and enrich itself out of +the unartificial logical operations arising in contact with the object. +So a finished system of <i>a priori</i> principles, but this system will +always be in growth, will be obliged unceasingly to correct itself, and +to contain open spaces.</p> + +<p>Finally, and above all, in case of this separation, there remains +within the psychologically conditioned appearance, a residuum, which is +either not conceived, but is later reduced to law and thereby a +conceived phenomenon, or which never can be so, and is therefore +illusion and error. If the psychological and the theoretical for +knowledge are to be separated, then that can occur, not merely to show +that both must always be together, and form real experience only when +together, but there must also be a rejection of that which is merely +psychological and not rational since it is illusion and error. The +distinction between the apparent and the real was the point of departure +which made the whole theory necessary, and, accordingly, the merely +psychological must remain appearance and error side by side with that +which is psychological and, at the same time, theoretical for knowledge. +There always remains in consciousness a residuum of the inconceivable, +that is, inconceivable since it is illusion and error. This amounts to +saying that reality is never fully rational, but is engaged in a +struggle between the rational and anti-rational. The anti-rational or +irrational, in the sense of psychological illusion and error, belongs +also to the real, and strives against the rational. The true and +rational reality to be attained by thought is always in conjunction with +the untrue reality, the psychological, that containing illusion and +error.</p> + +<p>All this signifies that the rationalism of the theory of knowledge +must be conditional, partly owing to the corrective and enriching +fecundation by primitive and naïve thought, partly owing to never quite +separable admixture of illusion and error. So, long ago, the system of +categorical forms, as Kant constructed it for theoretical and practical +reason, began to change, and can never again acquire the rigidity which +Kant's rationalism intended to give it forevermore. And thus the +critical system's rational reality of law produced by reason always +contains below itself and beside itself the merely psychological reality +of the factual, to which also illusion and error belong,—a reality +which can never be rationalized, but only set aside. This, too, is also +true for the philosophy of religion: the rational reduction of the +psychological facts of religion to the general laws of consciousness +which prevail among them is a task constantly to be resumed anew by the +study of reality, and follows the movements of primitive religion in +order to find there first the rational basis; the reduction is, however, +always approximate, can comprehend the main points only, and must leave +much open, the rational ground for which is not or not yet evident; +finally it has unceasingly to reckon with the irrational as illusion and +error, which attaches to the rational, and yet is not explainable by it. +The two realities, which the critical system must recognize at its very +foundation, continue in strife with each other, and this strife as the +strife of divine truth with human illusion is for the science of +religion of still more importance.</p> + +<p>The second correction of the Kantian teaching is only a further +consequence from this state of things. If the attitude of psychology and +theory of knowledge requires a strict separation, it requires it only +for the purpose of more correct relation. The laws of the theory of +knowledge are separated from the merely psychological actuality, but +still can be produced only out of it. Thus, as a matter of fact, +psychological analysis is always the presupposition for the correct +conception of all these laws. Psychology is the entrance gate to theory +of knowledge. This is true for theoretical logic as well as for the +practical logic of the moral, the æsthetical, and the religious. But +just at this point the present, on the basis of its psychological +investigation, presses far beyond the original form of the Kantian +teaching. This is not the place to describe this, more closely, with +reference to the first of the subjects just mentioned. But it is +important to insist that this is especially true with respect to the +Kantian doctrine of religion. The Kantian doctrine of religion is +founded on the moral and religious psychology of Deism, which had made +the connection, frequent in experience, of moral feelings with religious +emotion the sole basis of the philosophy of religion, and had, in the +manner of the psychology of the eighteenth century, immediately changed +this connection into intellectual reflections, in accord with which the +moral law demands its originator and guarantee. Kant accepted this +psychology of religion without proof and built upon it his main law of +the religious consciousness, in accordance with which a synthetic +judgment <i>a priori</i> is operative in religion (arising in the moral +experience of freedom), which requires that the world be regarded as +subject to the purposes of freedom. It is, however, extremely one-sided, +to give religion its place just between the elements, and a rather +violent translation of the religious constitution into reflection. The +error of this psychology of religion had been discovered and corrected +already by Schleiermacher. But Schleiermacher, for his part too, also +failed to deny himself an altogether too sudden metaphysical +interpretation of the religious <i>a priori</i> which he had +demonstrated, since he not only described the <i>a priori</i> judgment +of things, from the point of view of absolute dependence upon God, as a +vague feeling, but raised this feeling, by reason of the supposed lack +of difference, in it, between thought and will, reason and being, to a +world-principle, and interpreted the idea of God contained in this +feeling in the terms of his Spinozism, the lack of difference between +God and Nature within the Absolute. A real theory of knowledge of +religion must keep itself much more independent of all metaphysical +presuppositions and inferences, and must admit that the essence of the +religious <i>a priori</i> is extorted from a thoroughly impartial +psychological analysis. And this is always the place where works, such +as those of James, come into play. Religion as a special category or +form of psychical constitution, the result of a more or less vague +presence of the divine in the soul, the feeling of presence and reality +with reference to the superhuman or infinite, that is without any doubt +a much more correct point of departure for the analysis of the rational +<i>a priori</i> of religion, and it remains to make this new psychology +fruitful for the theory of knowledge of religion. That will be one of +the chief tasks of the future.</p> + +<p>The third change relates to the distinction of the empirical and +intelligible Ego, which Kant connected closely, almost indissolubly with +his main epistemological thought of the formal rationalisms immanent in +experience. Kant rationalized the whole outer and inner experience, by +means of <i>a priori</i> laws, into a totality, conforming to law, +appearing in intuitive forms of space and time, causally and necessarily +rigidly connected. The freedom autonomously determining itself out of +the logical idea, and contrasting itself with the psychological stream, +produces out of the confused psycholican reality this scientific +formation of the true reality. The product of thought, however, swallows +its own maker. For the same acts of freedom, which autonomously produced +the formation of the reality of law, remain themselves in the temporal +sequence of psychical events, and, therefore, themselves, with that +formation, lapse into the sequence which is under mechanical law. The +intelligible Ego creates the world of law, and finds itself therein, +with its activity, as empirical Ego, that is, as product of the great +world-mechanism and of its causal sequence. It is an intolerable, +violent contradiction, and it is no solution of this contradiction to +refer the empirical Ego to appearance, and the intelligible Ego to +actuality existing in itself, if the operations of the intelligible Ego, +also a constituent part of what takes place in the soul, occur in time +and so relapse irrecoverably into phenomenality and its mechanism. All +the ingenuity of modern interpretation of Kant has not succeeded in +making this circle more tolerable, all shifting of one and the same +thing to different points of view has only enriched scientific +terminology with masterpieces of parenthetical caution, but not removed +the objection that two different points of view do not, as a matter of +fact, exist side by side, but conflict within the same object.</p> + +<p>This circle is especially intolerable for the psychology of religion +and its application to the theory of knowledge. The psychology of +religion certainly shows us that the deeper feeling of all religion is +not a product of the mechanical sequence, but an effect of the +supersensuous itself as it is felt there; it believes that it arises in +the intelligible Ego by way of some kind of connection with the +supersensuous world. This, however, becomes completely impossible for +the Kantian theory of the empirical Ego, and all distinctions of a +double point of view in no wise change the fact that these points of +view are mutually absolutely exclusive. Here we have the results of +psychology which the expression of religious emotion confirms, in that +religion can be causally reduced to nothing else, totally opposed to the +consequences of such a theory of knowledge. Kant had himself often +enough practically felt this, and spoke then of freedom as an experience +of communion with the supersensuous as a possible but unprovable affair, +while all that, in case of a strict adherence to the phenomenality of +time and of the theory of the empirical Ego, which is a consequence of +it, is completely impossible. Nothing can be of any assistance here +except a decisive renunciation of those epistemological positions which +contradict the results of psychology, and which are themselves only +doctrinaire consequences from other positions. Nothing else is possible +but the modification of the phenomenality of time, in such a way that by +no means everything which belongs to time belongs also as a matter of +course to phenomenality, but that the autonomous rational acts which +occur in the time series of consciousness possess their own intelligible +time-form. At the same time the concept of causality closely connected +with the concept of time is to be modified so that there should be not +only an immanent and phenomenal causal connection, but also a regular +interaction between phenomenal and intelligible, psychological and +rational, conscious reality. At the same time the conclusion is also +given up, that the Ego submits unconditionally and directly to +phenomenality and to causal necessity, while the same Ego, once more, in +the same way, as a whole, from another point of view, is subordinate to +freedom and autonomy, that is, self-constitutive through ideas. The two +Egos must lie not side by side, but in and over one another. It must be +possible that, within the phenomenal Ego by a creative act of the +intelligible Ego in it, the personality should be formed and developed +as a realization of the autonomous reason, so that the intelligible +issues from the phenomenal, the rational from the psychological, the +former elaborates and shapes the latter, and between both a relation of +regular interaction, but not of causal constraint, takes place. This +rather deep, incisive modification is, in its turn, an approach of the +Kantian teaching to empiricism, but still at the same time, in the +destruction and subordination of the phenomenal and intelligible world, +in the emphasis upon the single personality issuing from the act of +reason, an adherence to rationalism. But since the distinction and the +interrelation between the rational and the empirical forms the point of +departure for the critical system, and this point of departure requires +at the same time the moulding and shaping of the empirical by the +rational and the rejection of the psychological appearance; a mere +parallelism is altogether impossible, but an interrelation is included, +and a task set for the effort and labor which constantly makes the +rational penetrate the empirical. At the very outset we have the +exclusion of the parallelism and the assertion of the interrelation. The +interrelation, by its very nature, asserts the interruption of the +causal necessity and the penetration of autonomous reason in this +sequence, without being itself produced by this sequence, although it +can be stimulated and helped or inhibited and weakened by it. Thus, in +such a case as this, the irrational is recognized by the side of and in +the rational. In this case the irrational of the event without causal +compulsion by some antecedent, or of the self-determination by the +autonomous idea alone, is the irrational of freedom. It is the +irrational of the creative procedure which constitutes the idea out of +itself and produces the consequences of the reason out of the +constituted idea. But this irrational plays everywhere in the whole life +of the soul an essential part, and is not less than decisive in the case +of religion, which must be quite different from what it is if it did not +have the right to maintain that which it declares to be true of itself, +namely, that it is an act of freedom and a gift of grace, an effect of +the supersensuous permeating the natural phenomenal life of the soul and +an act of free devotion the natural motivation.</p> + +<p>The fourth problem arises, when we examine the rational law of the +religious nature or of the having of religion which lies in the being +and organization of the reason. The having of religion may be +demonstrated as a law of the normal consciousness from the immanent +feeling of necessity and obligation which properly belongs to religion, +and from its organic place in the economy of consciousness, which +receives its concentration and its relation to an objective world-reason +only from religion. But precisely because religion is reduced to this, +it is clear that this is only a reduction which abstracts from the +empirical actuality just as the categories of pure reason do. This +abstraction, then, should under no circumstances itself be regarded as +the real religion. It is only the rational <i>a priori</i> of the +psychical appearances, but not the replacement of appearances by the +truth free from confusion. The psychical reality in which alone the +truth is effective should never be forgotten out of regard for the +truth. This is, however, the fact in the Kantian theory of religion in +<i>two</i> directions.</p> + +<p>It is always noticeable that the <i>a priori</i> of the practical +reason is treated by Kant quite differently from the theoretical. In +case of the latter the main idea of the synthesis, immanent in +experience, of rationalism and empiricism, is retained, and the <i>a +priori</i> of the pure forms of intuition and of the pure categories is +nothing without the contents of concrete reality which become shaped in +it. It may be very difficult actually to grasp the coöperation of the +<i>a priori</i> and the empirical in the single case, and Kant's theory +of the categories may have to be entirely reshaped and approximated to +<i>a priori</i> hypotheses requiring verification, but the principle +itself is always the disposition of the real and genuine problem of all +knowledge. In case of the practical <i>a priori</i> Kant did, it is +true, firmly emphasize the formal character of the ethical, æsthetical, +and religious law, but, in doing this, does not lose quite out of sight +the psychical reality. They appear not as empty forms which attain to +their reality only when filled with the concrete ethical tasks, the +artistic creations, and the religious states, but as abstract truths of +reason, which have to take the place of the intricacies of usual +consciousness. At this point one has always been right in feeling a +relapse on the part of Kant into the abstract, analytical, conceptual, +rationalism, and for this very reason Kant's statements about these +things are of great sublimity and rigor of principle, but scanty in +content. It is more important in case also of this <i>a priori</i> of +the practical reason to keep in mind that it is a purely formal <i>a +priori</i> and in reality must constantly be in relation with the +psychical content, in order to give this content the firm core of the +real and the principle of the critical regulation of self. So the <i>a +priori</i> of morals is not to be represented abstractly merely by +itself, but it is to be conceived in its relation to all the tasks which +we feel as obligatory, and it extends itself from that point outwards +over the total expanse of the activity of reason. Likewise the <i>a +priori</i> of art is not to be denoted in the abstract idea of the unity +of freedom and necessity, but to be shown in the whole expanse which is +present to the soul as artistic form or conception. Thus, in especial +degree, religion is not to be reduced to the belief of reason in a moral +world-order, and simply contrasted with all supposed religion of any +other kind, but the religious <i>a priori</i> should only serve in order +to establish the essential in the empirical appearance, but without +stripping off this appearance altogether, and from this point of the +essential to correct the intricacies and narrowness, the errors and +false combinations of the psychical situation. Kant, by his original +thought of the <i>a priori</i>, was urged in different ways to such a +view, and construed epistemologically the empirical psychological +religion as imaginary illustrations of the <i>a priori</i>. But that is +occasional only and does not dominate Kant's real view of religion. This +is and still remains only a translation of the usual moral and +theological rationalism from the formula of Locke and Wolff into the +formula of the critical philosophy.</p> + +<p>The same revision occurs in quite a different direction. If religion +is an <i>a priori</i> of reason, it is, once for all, established +together with reason, and all religion is everywhere and always +religious in the same proposition as it is in any way realized. +Schleiermacher expressly stated this in his development of the Kantian +theory, and, in so far as the practical reason is always penetrated with +freedom, and consequently religion itself is established with the act of +moral freedom, this was also asserted by Kant himself. Such an +assertion, however, contradicts every psychological observation +whatsoever. It is true such observation can prove that religious +emotions adjust themselves easily to all activities of reason, but it +must sharply distinguish what is nothing more than the religiousness of +vague feeling of supersensual regulations, which usually are joined with +art and morals, from real and characteristic religiousness, in which, +each single time, a purely personal relation of presence to the +supersensuous takes place. But this whole problem signifies nothing else +than the actualizing of the religious <i>a priori</i>, which actualizing +always occurs in quite specific and, in spite of all difference, +essentially similar psychical experiences and states. This problem of +the actualizing of the religious <i>a priori</i> and of its connection +with concrete individual psychical phenomena, Kant completely overlooked +in his abstract concept of religion, or rather, deliberately ignored, +because, as he wrote to Jacobi, he saw all the dangers of mysticism +lurking in it. This fear was justified; for, as a matter of fact, all +the specific occurrences of mysticism, from conversion, prayer, and +contemplation to enthusiasm, vision, and ecstasy, do lurk in it. But +without this mysticism there is no real religion, and the psychology of +religion shows most clearly how the real pulse of religion beats in the +mystical experiences. A religion without it is only a preliminary step, +or a reverberation of real and actual religion. Moreover, the states are +easily conceived in a theory of knowledge, if one sees in them the +actualizing of the religious <i>a priori</i>, the production of actual +religion in the fusion of the rational law with the concrete individual +psychical fact. The mysticism recognized as essential by the psychology +of religion must find its place in the theory of knowledge, and it finds +it as the psychological actualizing of the religious <i>a priori</i>, in +which alone that interlacing of the necessary, the rational, the +conformable to law, and the factual occurs, which characterizes real +religion. The dangers of such a mysticism, which are recognized a +thousandfold in experience, cannot be dispelled altogether by the +displacement of mysticism, for that would mean to displace religion +itself. It would be the same, if one should try to avoid the dangers of +illusion and error, by keeping to the pure categories alone, and ceasing +to employ them in the actual thinking of experience. Rather, they can be +dispelled only in that the actualizing of the rational <i>a priori</i> +is recognized in the mystical occurrences, and thus the intricacies and +one-sidedness of the mere psychological stream of religiousness be +avoided. The psychological reality of religion must always remember the +rational substance of religion, and always bring religion as central in +the system of consciousness into fruitful and adjusted contact with the +total life of the reason. Thus the psychological reality corrects and +purifies itself out of its own <i>a priori</i>, without, however, +destroying itself; or rather, the actual religion in the psychical +category of the mystical occurrences will subside to a more or less +degree. Thus we have the irrational prevailing here in its third form, +which like the two others was contained in the very outset of the +critical system, in the form of the once-occurring, factual, and +individual, which, of course, has a rational basis or a rational element +in itself, but is besides a pure fact and reality. Just this is the +excellence of the rationalism immanent in experience (the critical +system), that it makes room for this feature beside the general and +conceptual rationality. It did not make room for it to the extent really +required, and it especially left no space for it in its abstract +philosophy of religion. This space must again be opened by the theory of +the actualizing of the religious <i>a priori</i>, and there again lies +another improvement of the critical system under the influence of modern +psychology.</p> + +<p>If we summarize all this, we have a quantity of concessions by the +formal epistemological rationalism to the irrationality of the +psychological facts and a repeated breaking down of the over-rigorous +Kantian rationalism. Contrariwise, however, the pure psychological +investigation is also compelled to withdraw from the unlimited quantity +and the absolute irrationality of the multifarious (and of the confusion +of appearance and truth) to a rational criterium, which can be found in +the rational <i>a priori</i> of the reason only, and in the organic +position of this <i>a priori</i> in the system of consciousness in +general. By this rationalism alone may the true validity of religion be +founded, and by this alone the uncultivated psychical life may be +critically regulated. Religion will be conceived in its concrete +vitality and not mutilated; it will constantly be brought out of the +jumble of its distortions, blendings, one-sidedness, narrowness, and +exuberance back again to its original content, and to its organic +relations to the totality of the life of reason, to the scientific moral +and artistic accomplishments. That is everything that science can do for +it, but is not this service great enough and indispensable enough to +justify the work of such a science? We do not stop with nothing more +than "varieties of religious experience" which is the result of James's +method; but neither do we stop with nothing more than a rational idea of +religion, which overpowers experience, as was still so in the case of +Kant. But we must learn how intimately to combine the empirical and +psychological with the critical and normative. The ideas of Hume and of +Leibnitz must once more be brought into relation with the continuations +of Kant's work, and the combination of the Anglo-Saxon sense for reality +with the German spirit of speculation is still the task for the new +century as well as for the century past.</p> + +<p class="p4 center"><a name="Rel3"></a>SHORT PAPERS</p> + +<p class="p2">A short paper was contributed to this Section by Professor +Alexander T. Ormond, of Princeton University, on "Some Roots and Factors +of Religion." The speaker said that religion, like everything else +human, has its rise in man's experience. It has also doubtless had a +history that will present the outlines of a development, if but the +course of that development can be traced. "But in the case of religion +our theory of development will be largely qualified by our judgment as +to its origin; while, regarding origin itself, we have to depend on +hypotheses constructed from our more or less imperfect acquaintance with +the races, and especially the savage races, of the present. The +primitive pre-religious man is a construction from present data, and +will always remain more or less hypothetical. This will partially +explain, and at the same time partially excuse, what we will agree is +the unsatisfactory character of the anthropological theories as accounts +of the origin of religion. But there are other reasons for this partial +failure that are less excusable. One of these is the rather singular +failure of the leading anthropologists, in dealing with the origin of +religion, to distinguish between <i>fundamental</i> and merely tributary +causes. For instance, if we suppose that man has in some way come into +possession of a germ of religiousness, many things will become genuine +tributaries to its development that when urged as explanations of the +germ itself would be obviously futile. There must be a cause for the +pretty general failure to note this distinction which is vital to +religious theory, and I am convinced that the principal cause is a +certain lack of psychological insight and of philosophical grasp in +dealing with the problem of the first data and primary roots of religion +in man's nature.</p> + +<p>"In the first place, it is needful in dealing with the religion of +the hypothetical man that we should have some idea of what constitutes +religion in the actual man. Now, back of all the outward manifestations +of religion, will stand the religious consciousness of the man and the +community, and it will be this that will determine the idea of religion +in its most essential form. The developed idea of religion, therefore, +arising out of this germinal impression, would take the form of a sense +(we may now call it concept) of relatedness to some being <i>akin</i> to +man himself, and yet transcending him in some real though undetermined +respects. Anything short of this would, I think, leave religion in some +respects unaccounted for; while anything more would perhaps exclude some +genuine manifestations of religion.</p> + +<p>"If the idea of religion arises out of an <i>impression</i>, then it +will not be possible to deny to it an intellectual root. I make this +statement with some diffidence, because if I do not misinterpret them, +some recent psychologists have practically denied the intellectual root +in their doctrine that religion can have no original intellectual +content. If I am not further misled, however, these writers would admit +that a content is achieved by the symbolic use of experience. This is +perhaps all I need argue for here; since our epistemology is teaching us +that the distinction between symbolism and perception is only that +between the direct and the indirect; while here it is clear that its use +in developing the significance of the religious impression would have +all the directness and, therefore, all the cogency of an immediate +inference.</p> + +<p>"Let us now restore the intellectual and emotional elements of +religion to their place in a synthesis; we will then have a concrete +religious experience out of which may be analyzed at least two +fundamental factors. The first of these is what we may call the +<i>personal</i> factor in religion. We are treading in the footsteps of +the anthropologists when we find among the most undeveloped savages a +tendency to personify the objects of their worship. When it comes to the +question of determining the rôle that this personalizing tendency has +actually played in the development of religion, the anthropologists +divide into two camps, one of these, led by Max Müller, regarding it as +a symbolic interpretation put upon the impression of some great natural +or cosmic object or phenomenon; while others, including Herbert Spencer +and Mr. Tylor, prefer to seek the originals of religion in ancestral +dream-images and ghostly apparitions. These writers thus start with +completely anthropomorphic terms, and their problem is to +de-anthropomorphize the elements to the extent necessary to constitute +them data of religion. The second factor standing over against the +personal, as its opposite, is that of transcendence. By transcendence I +mean that deifying, infinitating process that is ever working contra to +the anthropomorphic influence in the sphere of religious conceptions. +The School of Spencer regard this as the only legitimate tendency in +religion. We do not argue this point here, but agree that it is as +legitimate and real a factor as that of personality. The root of this +factor, if our diagnosis of the idea of religion be correct, is to be +sought in the original impression of religion, and it no doubt has its +origin in man's feeling-reaction from that impression. We have pointed +to submission as one of the religious emotions. Now submission rests on +some deeper feeling-attitude, which some have translated into the +feeling or sense of dependence. This, however, is not adequate, since +men have the sense of social dependence on finite beings, and we have it +with reference to the floor we are standing on. Rather, it seems to me, +we must translate it into the stronger and more unconditional feeling of +helplessness. One real ground of our religious consciousness is the +sense or feeling of helplessness toward God; the sense that we have no +standing in being as against the Deity. This radical feeling utters +itself in every note of the religious scale, from the lowest +superstitious terror to the highest mystical self-annihilation.</p> + +<p>"These two factors, the forces of personalization and transcendence, +are inseparable. They constitute the terms of a dialectic within the +religious consciousness, by virtue of which in one phase our religious +conceptions are becoming ever more adequate and satisfying, while from +another point of view their insufficiency grows more and more apparent. +And, on the broader field of religious history, they embody themselves +in a law of tendency, which Spencer has only half-expressed, by virtue +of which the objects of religion are on one hand becoming ever more +intelligible; on the other, ever more transcendent of our +conceptions."</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>A short paper was read by Professor F. C. French, Professor of +Philosophy in the University of Nebraska, on "The Bearing of Certain +Aspects of the Newer Psychology on the Philosophy of Religion." The +speaker said in part:</p> + +<p>"The relation of science to religion has received, to be sure, much +study, but to most minds hitherto this has meant the relation of only +the physical sciences to religion. The older psychology was largely +speculative and metaphysical in character. There were, of course, some +who employed the empirical method in psychology, but they were so far +from comprehending the full scope of mental phenomena that, at best, +their work gave the promise of a science rather than a science +itself.</p> + +<p><ins title="open quote missing in the original">"</ins>It is not the +fact that the newer psychology takes account of the physiological +conditions of mental life; it is not the fact that the subject is now +pursued in laboratories with instruments of precision, that gives it its +full standing as a science: it is much more the fact that the psychology +of to-day has found a place in the natural system of mental things for +those strange and relatively unusual phenomena of consciousness which to +the scientifically minded seemed totally unreal and to the superstitious +manifestations of the supernatural....</p> + +<p>"In showing that the abnormal can be explained in terms of the +normal, psychology does now for the phenomena of mind what the physical +sciences have long done for the phenomena of nature....</p> + +<p>"Psychology as a science postulates the reign of natural law in the +subjective sphere just as rigorously as physics postulates the reign of +law in the objective sphere....</p> + +<p>"It is not in the unusual and the abnormal that the reflective mind +is to see God. It is not through gaps in nature that we are to get +glimpses of the supernatural. Rather is it in the very nature of nature, +rational, harmonious, law-conforming, subject to scientific +interpretation, that we have the best evidence that the world is made +mind-wise, that it is the work of an intelligent mind, that there is a +rational spirit at the care of the universe.</p> + +<p>"For science the transcendent does not enter into the perceptual +realm external or internal. It is, indeed, hard for the religious mind +to admit this fact in all its fullness. Until it does, however, religion +must always stand more or less in fear of science. Once give up the +perceptual, in all its bearings, to science, and religion will find that +it has lost a weak support only to gain a stronger one. Ultimately, I +believe, we shall find that the full acceptance of science in the mental +domain as well as in the physical will strengthen the rational grounds +of theistic belief."</p> + +<h3 class="p4">SECTION C—LOGIC</h3> + +<h3 class="p4 center">SECTION C—LOGIC</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center">(<i>Hall 6, September 22, 10 a. m.</i>)</p> + +<table class="bold" border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Logic Speakers"> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor George M. Duncan</span>, Yale +University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor William A. Hammond</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Fredrick J. +E. Woodbridge</span>, Columbia University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. W. H. Sheldon</span>, Columbia +University.</td></tr> + +</table> + +<p class="p2">The Chairman of this Section, Professor George M. Duncan, +Professor of Logic and Mathematics at Yale University, in introducing +the speakers spoke briefly of the scope and importance of the subject +assigned to the Section; expressed, on behalf of those in attendance, +regret at the inability of Professor Wilhelm Windelband to be present +and take part in the work of the Section, as had been expected; +congratulated the Section on the papers to be presented and the speakers +who were to present them; and announced the final programme of the +Section.</p> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<h3 class="p4"><a name="Logic1"></a>THE RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER +DISCIPLINES</h3> + +<h4>BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>William Alexander Hammond</b>, Assistant Professor of Ancient and +Medieval Philosophy and Æsthetics, Cornell University. b. May 20, 1861, +New Athens, Ohio. A.B. Harvard, 1885; Ph.D. Leipzig, 1891. Lecturer on +Classics, King's College, Windsor, N. S., 1885-88; Secretary of the +University Faculty, Cornell; Member American Psychological Association, +American Philosophical Association. <b>Author of</b> <i>The Characters +of Theophrastus</i>, translated with Introduction; <i>Aristotle's +Psychology</i>, translated with Introduction.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">In 1787, in the preface to the second edition of the +<i>Kr. d. r. V.</i>, Kant wrote the following words: "That logic, from +the earliest times, has followed that secure method" (namely, the secure +method of a science witnessed by the unanimity of its workers and the +stability of its results) "may be seen from the fact that since +Aristotle it has not had to retrace a single step, unless we choose to +consider as improvements the removal of some unnecessary subtleties, or +the clearer definition of its matter, both of which refer to the +elegance rather than to the solidity of the science. It is remarkable, +also, that to the present day, it has not been able to make one step in +advance, so that to all appearances it may be considered as completed +and perfect. If some modern philosophers thought to enlarge it, by +introducing <i>psychological</i> chapters on the different faculties of +knowledge (faculty of imagination, wit, etc.), or <i>metaphysical</i> +chapters on the origin of knowledge or different degrees of certainty +according to the difference of objects (idealism, skepticism, etc.), or, +lastly, <i>anthropological</i> chapters on prejudices, their causes and +remedies, this could only arise from their ignorance of the peculiar +nature of logical science. We do not enlarge, but we only disfigure the +sciences, if we allow their respective limits to be confounded; and the +limits of logic are definitely fixed by the fact that it is a science +which has nothing to do but fully to exhibit and strictly to prove the +formal rules of all thought (whether it be <i>a priori</i> or empirical, +whatever be its origin or its object, and whatever be the impediments, +accidental or natural, which it has to encounter in the human +mind)."—[Translated by Max Müller.] Scarcely more than half a +century after the publication of this statement of Kant's, John Stuart +Mill (Introduction to <i>System of Logic</i>) wrote: "There is as great +diversity among authors in the modes which they have adopted of defining +logic, as in their treatment of the details of it. This is what might +naturally be expected on any subject on which writers have availed +themselves of the same language as a means of delivering different +ideas.... This diversity is not so much an evil to be complained of, as +an inevitable, and in some degree a proper result of the imperfect state +of those sciences" (that is, of logic, jurisprudence, and ethics). "It +is not to be expected that there should be agreement about the +definition of anything, until there is agreement about the thing +itself." This remarkable disparity of opinion is due partly to the +changes in the treatment of logic from Kant to Mill, and partly to the +fact that both statements are extreme. That the science of logic was +"completed and perfect" in the time of Kant could only with any degree +of accuracy be said of the treatment of syllogistic proof or the +deductive logic of Aristotle. That the diversity was so great as +pictured by Mill is not historically exact, but could be said only of +the new epistemological and psychological treatment of logic and not of +the traditional formal logic. The confusion in logic is no doubt largely +due to disagreement in the delimitation of its proper territory and to +the consequent variety of opinions as to its relations to other +disciplines. The rise of inductive logic, coincident with the rise and +growth of physical science and empiricism, forced the consideration of +the question as to the relation of formal thought to reality, and the +consequent entanglement of logic in a triple alliance of logic, +psychology, and metaphysics. How logic can maintain friendly relations +with both of these and yet avoid endangering its territorial integrity +has not been made clear by logicians or psychologists or metaphysicians, +and that, too, in spite of persistent attempts justly to settle the +issue as to their respective spheres of influence. Until modern logic +definitely settles the question of its aims and legitimate problems, it +is difficult to see how any agreement can be reached as to its relation +to the other disciplines. The situation as it confronts one in the +discussion of the relations of logic to allied subjects may be analyzed +as follows:</p> + +<p class="indent1d">1. The relation of logic as science to logic as +art.</p> + +<p class="indent1d">2. The relation of logic to psychology.</p> + +<p class="indent1d">3. The relation of logic to metaphysics.</p> + +<p>The development of nineteenth century logic has made an answer to the +last two of the foregoing problems exceedingly difficult. Indeed, one +may say that the evolution of modern epistemology has had a centrifugal +influence on logic, and instead of growth towards unity of conception we +have a chaos of diverse and discordant theories. The apple of discord +has been the theory of knowledge. A score of years ago when Adamson +wrote his admirable article in the <i>Encyclopædia Britannica</i> +(article "Logic," 1882), he found the conditions much the same as I now +find them. "Looking to the chaotic state of logical text-books at the +present time, one would be inclined to say that there does not exist +anywhere a recognized currently received body of speculations to which +the title logic can be unambiguously assigned, and that we must +therefore resign the hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of +the received doctrine a precise determination of the nature and limits +of logical theory." I do not, however, take quite so despondent a view +of the logical chaos as the late Professor Adamson; rather, I believe +with Professor Stratton (<i>Psy. Rev.</i> vol. III) that something is to +be gained for unity and consistency by more exact delimitation of the +subject-matter of the philosophical disciplines and their +interrelations, which precision, if secured, would assist in bringing +into clear relief the real problems of the several departments of +inquiry, and facilitate the proper classification of the disciplines +themselves.</p> + +<p>The attempt to delimit the spheres of the disciplines, to state their +interrelations and classify them, was made early in the history of +philosophy, at the very beginning of the development of logic as a +science by Aristotle. In Plato's philosophy, logic is not separated from +epistemology and metaphysics. The key to his metaphysics is given +essentially in his theory of the reality of the concept, which offers an +interesting analogy to the position of logic in modern idealism. Before +Plato there was no formulation of logical theory, and in his dialogues +it is only contained in solution. The nearest approach to any +formulation is to be found in an applied logic set forth in the precepts +and rules of the rhetoricians and sophists. Properly speaking, Aristotle +made the first attempt to define the subject of logic and to determine +its relations to the other sciences. In a certain sense logic for +Aristotle is not a science at all. For science is concerned with some +<i>ens</i>, some branch of reality, while logic is concerned with the +methodology of knowing, with the formal processes of thought whereby an +<i>ens</i> or a reality is ascertained and appropriated to knowledge. In +the sense of a method whereby all scientific knowledge is secured, logic +is a propædeutic to the sciences. In the idealism of the Eleatics and +Plato, thought and being are ultimately identical, and the laws of +thought are the laws of being. In Aristotle's conception, while the +processes of thought furnish a knowledge of reality or being, their +formal operation constitutes the technique of investigation, and their +systematic explanation and description constitute logic. Logic and +metaphysics are distinguished as the science of being and the doctrine +of the thought<ins title="hyphenated in the original"> </ins>processes +whereby being is known. Logic is the doctrine of the organon of science, +and when applied is the organon of science. The logic of Aristotle is +not a purely formal logic. He is not interested in the merely schematic +character of the thought<ins title="hyphenated in the original"> +</ins>processes, but in their function as mediators of apodictic truth. +He begins with the assumption that in the conjunction and disjunction of +correctly formed judgments the conjunction or disjunction of reality is +mirrored. Aristotle does not here examine into the powers of the mind as +a whole; that is done, though fragmentarily, in the <i>De Anima</i> and +<i>Parva Naturalia</i>, where the mental powers are regarded as phases +of the processes of nature without reference to normation; but in his +logic he inquires only into those forms and laws of thinking which +mediate proof. Scientific proof, in his conception, is furnished in the +form of the syllogism, whose component elements are terms and +propositions. In the little tract <i>On Interpretation</i> (<i>i. e.</i> +on the judgment as <i>interpreter</i> of thought), if it is genuine, the +proposition is considered in its logical bearing. The treatise on the +<i>Categories</i>, which discusses the nature of the most general terms, +forms a connecting link between logic and metaphysics. The categories +are the most general concepts or universal modes under which we have +knowledge of the world. They are not simply logical relations; they are +existential forms, being not only the modes under which thought regards +being, but the modes under which being exists. Aristotle's theory of the +methodology of science is intimately connected with his view of +knowledge. Scientific knowledge in his opinion refers to the essence of +things; for example, to those universal aspects of reality which are +given in particulars, but which remain self-identical amidst the +variation and passing of particulars. The universal, however, is known +only through and after particulars. There is no such thing as innate +knowledge or Platonic reminiscence. Knowledge, if not entirely +empirical, has its basis in empirical reality. Causes are known only +through effects. The universals have no existence apart from things, +although they exist <i>realiter</i> in things. Empirical knowledge of +particulars must, therefore, precede in time the conceptual or +scientific knowledge of universals. In the evolution of scientific +knowledge in the individual mind, the body of particulars or of +sense-experience is to its conceptual transformation as potentiality is +to actuality, matter to form, the completed end of the former being +realized in the latter. Only in the sense of this power to transform and +conceptualize, does the mind have knowledge within itself. The genetic +content is experiential; the developed concept, judgment, or inference +is <i>in form</i> noëtic. Knowledge is, therefore, not a mere +"precipitate of experience," nor is Aristotle a complete empiricist. The +conceptual form of knowledge is not immediately given in things +experienced, but is a product of noëtic discrimination and combination. +Of a sensible object as such there is no concept; the object of a +concept is the generic essence of a thing; and the concept itself is the +thought of this generic essence. The individual is generalized; every +concept does or can embrace several individuals. It is an "aggregate of +distinguishing marks," and is expressed in a definition. The concept as +such is neither true nor false. Truth first arises in the form of a +judgment or proposition, wherein a subject is coupled with a predicate, +and something is said about something. A judgment is true when the +thought (whose inward process is the judgment and the expression in +vocal symbols is the proposition) regards as conjoined or divided that +which is conjoined or divided in actuality; in other words, when the +thought is congruous with the real. While Aristotle does not ignore +induction as a scientific method, (how could he when he regards the +self-subsistent individual as the only real?) yet he says that, as a +method, it labors under the defect of being only proximate; a complete +induction from <i>all</i> particulars is not possible, and therefore +cannot furnish demonstration. Only the deductive process proceeding +syllogistically from the universal (or essential truth) to the +particular is scientifically cogent or apodictic. Consequently Aristotle +developed the science of logic mainly as a syllogistic technique or +instrument of demonstration. From this brief sketch of Aristotle's +logical views it will be seen that the epistemological and metaphysical +relations of logic which involve its greatest difficulty and cause the +greatest diversity in its modern exponents, were present in undeveloped +form to the mind of the first logician. It would require a mighty +optimism to suppose that this difficulty and diversity, which has +increased rather than diminished in the progress of historical +philosophy, should suddenly be made to vanish by some magic of +restatement of subject-matter, or theoretical delimitation of the +discipline. As Fichte said of philosophy, "The sort of a philosophy that +a man has, depends on the kind of man he is;" so one might almost say of +logic, "The sort of logic that a man has, depends on the kind of +philosopher he is." If the blight of discord is ever removed from +epistemology, we may expect agreement as to the relations of logic to +metaphysics. Meanwhile logic has the great body of scientific results +deposited in the physical sciences on which to build and test, with some +assurance, its doctrine of methodology; and as philosophy moves forward +persistently to the final solution of its problems, logic may justly +expect to be a beneficiary in its established theories.</p> + +<p>After Aristotle's death logic lapsed into a formalism more and more +removed from any vital connection with reality and oblivious to the +profound epistemological and methodological questions that Aristotle had +at least raised. In the Middle Ages it became a highly developed +exercise in inference applied to the traditional dogmas of theology and +science as premises, with mainly apologetic or polemical functions. Its +chief importance is found in its application to the problem of realism +and nominalism, the question as to the nature of universals. At the +height of scholasticism realism gained its victory by syllogistically +showing the congruity of its premises with certain fundamental dogmas of +the Church, especially with the dogma of the unity and reality of the +Godhead. The heretical conclusion involved in nominalism is equivalent +(the accepted dogma of the Church being axiomatic) to <i>reductio ad +absurdum</i>. A use of logic such as this, tending to conserve rather +than to increase the body of knowledge, was bound to meet with attack on +the awakening of post-renaissance interest in the physical world, and +the acquirement of a body of truth to which the scholastic formal logic +had no relation. The anti-scholastic movement in logic was inaugurated +by Francis Bacon, who sought in his <i>Novum Organum</i> to give science +a real content through the application of induction to experience and +the discovery of universal truths from particular instances. The +syllogism is rejected as a scientific instrument, because it does not +lead <i>to</i> principles, but proceeds only <i>from</i> principles, and +is therefore not useful for discovery. It permits at most only +refinements on knowledge already possessed, but cannot be regarded as +creative or productive. The Baconian theory of induction regarded the +accumulation of facts and the derivation of general principles and laws +from them as the true and fruitful method of science. In England this +empirical view of logic has been altogether dominant, and the most +illustrious English exponents of logical theory, Herschel, Whewell, and +Mill, have stood on that ground. Since the introduction of German +idealism in the last half century a new logic has grown up whose chief +business is with the theory of knowledge.</p> + +<p>Kant's departure in logic is based on an epistemological examination +of the nature of judgment, and on the answer to his own question, "How +are synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i> possible?" The <i>a priori</i> +elements in knowledge make knowledge of the real nature of things +impossible. Human knowledge extends to the phenomenal world, which is +seen under the <i>a priori</i> forms of the understanding. Logic for +Kant is the science of the formal and necessary laws of thought, apart +from any reference to objects. Pure or universal logic aims to +understand the forms of thought without regard to metaphysical or +psychological relations, and this position of Kant is the historical +beginning of the subjective formal logic.</p> + +<p>In the metaphysical logic of Hegel, which rests on a panlogistic +basis, being and thought, form and content, are identical. Logical +necessity is the measure and criterion of objective reality. The body of +reality is developed through the dialectic self-movement of the idea. In +such an idealistic monism, formal and real logic are by the metaphysical +postulate coincident.</p> + +<p>Schleiermacher in his dialectic regards logic from the standpoint of +epistemological realism, in which the real deliverances of the senses +are conceptually transformed by the spontaneous activity of reason. This +spirit of realism is similar to that of Aristotle, in which the +one-sided <i>a priori</i> view of knowledge is controverted. Space and +time are forms of the existence of things, and not merely <i>a +priori</i> forms of knowing. Logic he divides into dialectic and +technical logic. The former regards the idea of knowledge as such; the +formal or technical regards knowledge in the process of becoming or the +idea of knowledge in motion. The forms of this process are induction and +deduction. The Hegelian theory of the generation of knowledge out of the +processes of pure thought is emphatically rejected.</p> + +<p>Lotze, who is undoubtedly one of the most influential and fruitful +writers on logic in the last century, attempts to bring logic into +closer relations with contemporary science, and is an antagonist of +one-sided formal logics. For him logic falls into the three parts of (1) +pure logic or the logic of thought; (2) applied logic or the logic of +investigation; (3) the logic of knowledge or methodology; and this +classification of the matter and problems of logic has had an important +influence on subsequent treatises on the discipline. His logic is +formal, as he describes it himself, in the sense of setting forth the +modes of the operation of thought and its logical structure; it is real +in the sense that these forms are dependent on the nature of things and +not something independently given in the mind. While he aims to maintain +the distinct separation of logic and metaphysics, he says (in the +discussion of the relations between formal and real logical meaning) the +question of meaning naturally raises a metaphysical problem: "Ich thue +besser der Metaphysik die weitere Erörterung dieses wichtigen Punktes zu +überlassen." (<i>Log.</i> 2d ed. p. 571.) How could it be otherwise when +his whole view of the relations and validity of knowledge is inseparable +from his realism or teleological idealism, as he himself characterizes +his own standpoint?</p> + +<p>Drobisch, a follower of Herbart, is one of the most thoroughgoing +formalists in modern logical theory. He attempts to maintain strictly +the distinction between thought and knowledge. Logic is the science of +thought. He holds that there may be formal truth, for example, logically +valid truth, which is materially false. Logic, in other words, is purely +formal; material truth is matter for metaphysics or science. Drobisch +holds, therefore, that the falsity of the judgment expressed in the +premise from which a formally correct syllogism may be deduced, is not +subject-matter for logic. The sphere of logic is limited to the region +of inference and forms of procedure, his view of the nature and function +of logic being determined largely by the bias of his mathematical +standpoint. The congruity of thought with itself, judgments, +conclusions, analyses, etc., is the sole logical truth, as against +Trendelenburg, who took the Aristotelian position that logical truth is +the "agreement of thought with the object of thought."</p> + +<p>Sigwart looks at logic mainly from the standpoint of the technology +of science, in which, however, he discovers the implications of a +teleological metaphysic. Between the processes of consciousness and +external changes he finds a causal relation and not parallelism. +Inasmuch as thought sometimes misses its aim, as is shown by the fact +that error and dispute exist, there is need of a discipline whose +purpose is to show us how to attain and establish truth and avoid error. +This is the practical aim of logic, as distinguished from the +psychological treatment of thought, where the distinction between true +and false has no more place than the distinction between good and bad. +Logic presupposes the impulse to discover truth, and it therefore sets +forth the criteria of true thinking, and endeavors to describe those +normative operations whose aim is validity of judgment. Consequently +logic falls into the two parts of (1) critical, (2) technical, the +former having meaning only in reference to the latter; the main value of +logic is to be sought in its function as art. "Methodology, therefore, +which is generally made to take a subordinate place, should be regarded +as the special, final, and chief aim of our science." (<i>Logic</i>, +vol. i, p. 21, Eng. Tr.) As an art, logic undertakes to determine under +what conditions and prescriptions judgments are valid, but does not +undertake to pass upon the validity of the content of given judgments. +Its prescriptions have regard only to formal correctness and not to the +material truth of results. Logic is, therefore, a formal discipline. Its +business is with the due procedure of thought, and it attempts to show +no more than how we may advance in the reasoning process in such way +that each step is valid and necessary. If logic were to tell us +<i>what</i> to think or give us the content of thought, it would be +commensurate with the whole of science. Sigwart, however, does not mean +by formal thought independence of content, for it is not possible to +disregard the particular manner in which the materials and content of +thought are delivered through sensation and formed into ideas. Further, +logic having for its chief business the methodology of science, the +development of knowledge from empirical data, it ought to include a +theory of knowledge, but it should not so far depart from its subjective +limits as to include within its province the discussion of metaphysical +implications or a theory of being. For this reason, Sigwart relegates to +a postscript his discussion of teleology, but he gives an elaborate +treatment of epistemology extending through vol. <span +class="smcap">i</span> and develops his account of methodology in vol. +<span class="smcap">ii</span>. The question regarding the relation +between necessity, the element in which logical thought moves, and +freedom, the postulate of the will, carries one beyond the confines of +logic and is, in his opinion, the profoundest problem of metaphysics, +whose function is to deal with the ultimate relation between "subject +and object, the world and the individual, and this is not only basal for +logic and all science, but is the crown and end of them all."</p> + +<p>Wundt's psychological and methodological treatment of logic stands +midway between the purely formal treatises on the one hand, and the +metaphysical treatises on the other hand. The general standpoint of +Wundt is similar to that of Sigwart, in that he discovers the function +of logic in the exposition of the formation and methods of scientific +knowledge; for example, in epistemology and methodology. Logic must +conform to the conditions under which scientific inquiry is actually +carried on; the forms of thought, therefore, cannot be separate from or +indifferent to the content of knowledge; for it is a fundamental +principle of science that its particular methods are determined by the +nature of its particular subject-matter. Scientific logic must reject +the theory that identifies thought and being (Hegel) and the theory of +parallelism between thought and reality (Schleiermacher, Trendelenburg, +and Ueberweg), in which the ultimate identity of the two is only +concealed. Both of these theories base logic on a metaphysics, which +makes it necessary to construe the real in terms of thought, and logic, +so divorced from empirical reality, is powerless to explain the methods +of scientific procedure. One cannot, however, avoid the acceptance of +thought as a competent organ for the interpretation of reality, unless +one abandons all question of validity and accepts agnosticism or +skepticism. This interpretative power of thought or congruity with +reality is translated by metaphysical logic into identity. Metaphysical +logic concerns itself fundamentally with the content of knowledge, not +with its evidential or formal logical aspects, but with being and the +laws of being. It is the business of metaphysics to construct its +notions and theories of reality out of the deliverances of the special +sciences and inferences derived therefrom. The aim of metaphysics is the +development of a world-view free from internal contradictions, a view +that shall unite all particular and plural knowledges into a whole. +Logic stands in more intimate relation to the special sciences, for here +the relations are reciprocal and immediate; for example, from actual +scientific procedure logic abstracts its general laws and results, and +these in turn it delivers to the sciences as their formulated +methodology. In the history of science the winning of knowledge precedes +the formulation of the rules employed, that is, precedes any scientific +methodology. Logic, as methodology, is not an <i>a priori</i> +construction, but has its genesis in the growth of science itself and in +the discovery of those tests and criteria of truth which are found to +possess an actual heuristic or evidential value. It is not practicable +to separate epistemology and logic, for such concepts as causality, +analogy, validity, etc., are fundamental in logical method, and yet they +belong to the territory of epistemology, are epistemological in nature, +as one may indeed say of all the general laws of thought. A formal logic +that is merely propædeutic, a logic that aims to free itself from the +quarrels of epistemology, is scientifically useless. Its norms are +valueless, in so far as they can only teach the arrangement of knowledge +already possessed, and teach nothing as to how to secure it or test its +real validity. While formal logic aims to put itself outside of +philosophy, metaphysical logic would usurp the place of philosophy. +Formal logic is inadequate, because it neither shows how the laws of +thought originate, why they are valid, nor in what sense they are +applicable to concrete investigation. Wundt, therefore, develops a logic +which one may call epistemological methodological, and which stands +between the extremes of formal logic and metaphysical logic. The laws of +logic must be derived from the processes of psychic experience and the +procedure of the sciences. "Logic therefore needs," as he says, +"epistemology for its foundation and the doctrine of methods for its +completion."</p> + +<p>Lipps takes the view outright that logic is a branch of psychology; +Husserl in his latest book goes to the other extreme of a purely formal +and technical logic, and devotes almost his entire first volume to the +complete sundering of psychology and logic.</p> + +<p>Bradley bases his logic on the theory of the judgment. The logical +judgment is entirely different from the psychological. The logical +judgment is a qualification of reality by means of an idea. The +predicate is an adjective or attribute which in the judgment is ascribed +to reality. The aim of truth is to qualify reality by general notions. +But inasmuch as reality is individual and self-existent, whereas truth +is universal, truth and reality are not coincident. Bradley's +metaphysical solution of the disparity between thought and reality is +put forward in his theory of the unitary Absolute, whose concrete +content is the totality of experience. But as thought is not the whole +of experience, judgments cannot compass the whole of reality. Bosanquet +objects to this, and maintains that reality must not be regarded as an +ideal construction. The real world is the world to which our concepts +and judgments refer. In the former we have a world of isolated +individuals of definite content; in the latter, we have a world of +definitely systematized and organized content. Under the title of the +Morphology of Knowledge Bosanquet considers the evolution of judgment +and inference in their varied forms. "Logic starts from the individual +mind, as that within which we have the actual facts of intelligence, +which we are attempting to interpret into a system" (<i>Logic</i>, vol. +i, p. 247). The real world for every individual is <i>his</i> world. +"The work of intellectually constituting that totality which we call the +real world is the work of knowledge. The work of analyzing the process +of this constitution or determination is the work of logic, which might +be described ... as the reflection of knowledge upon itself" +(<i>Logic</i>, vol. i, p. 3). "The relation of logic to truth consists +in examining the characteristics by which the various phases of the one +intellectual function are fitted for their place in the intellectual +totality which constitutes knowledge" (<i>ibid.</i>). The real world is +the intelligible world; reality is something to which we attain by a +constructive process. We have here a type of logic which is essentially +a metaphysic. Indeed, Bosanquet says in the course of his first volume: +"I entertain no doubt that in content logic is one with metaphysics, and +differs, if at all, simply in mode of treatment—in tracing the +evolution of knowledge in the light of its value and import, instead of +attempting to summarize its value and import apart from the details of +its evolution" (<i>Logic</i>, vol. i, 247).</p> + +<p>Dewey (<i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, p. 5) describes the +essential function of logic as the inquiry into the relations of thought +as such to reality as such. Although such an inquiry may involve the +investigation of psychological processes and of the concrete methods of +science and verification, a description and analysis of the forms of +thought, conception, judgment, and inference, yet its concern with these +is subordinate to its main concern, namely, the relation of "thought at +large to reality at large." Logic is not reflection on thought, either +on its nature as such or on its forms, but on its relations to the real. +In Dewey's philosophy, logical theory is a description of thought as a +mode of adaptation to its own conditions, and validity is judged in +terms of the efficiency of thought in the solution of its own problems +and difficulties. The problem of logic is more than epistemological. +Wherever there is striving there are obstacles; and wherever there is +thinking there is a "material-in-question." Dewey's logic is a theory of +reflective experience regarded functionally, or a pragmatic view of the +discipline. This logic of experience aims to evaluate the significance +of social research, psychology, fine and industrial art, and religious +aspiration in the form of scientific statement, and to accomplish for +social values in general what the physical sciences have done for the +physical world. In Dewey's teleological pragmatic logic the judgment is +essentially instrumental, the whole of thinking is functional, and the +meaning of things is identical with valid meaning (<i>Studies in Logical +Theory</i>, cf. pp. 48, 82, 128). The real world is not a self-existent +world outside of knowledge, but simply the totality of experience; and +experience is a complex of strains, tensions, checks, and attitudes. The +function of logic is the redintegration of this experience. "Thinking is +adaptation <i>to</i> an end <i>through</i> the adjustment of particular +objective contents" (<i>ibid.</i> p. 81). Logic here becomes a large +part, if not the whole, of a metaphysics of experience; its nature and +function are entirely determined by the theory of reality.</p> + +<p>In this brief and fragmentary <i>résumé</i> are exhibited certain +characteristic movements in the development of logical theory, the +construction put upon its subject-matter and its relation to other +disciplines. The <i>résumé</i> has had in view only the making of the +diversity of opinion on these questions historically salient. There are +three distinct types of logic noticed here: (1) formal, whose concern is +merely with the structural aspect of inferential thought, and its +validity in terms of internal congruity; (2) metaphysical logic whose +concern is with the functional aspect of thought, its validity in terms +of objective reference, and its relation to reality; (3) epistemological +and methodological logic, whose concern is with the genesis, nature, and +laws of logical thinking as forms of scientific knowledge, and with +their technological application to the sciences as methodology. I am not +at present concerned with a criticism of these various viewpoints, +excepting in so far as they affect the problem of the interrelationship +of logic and the allied disciplines.</p> + +<p>For my present purpose I reject the extreme metaphysical and formal +positions, and assume that logic is a discipline whose business is to +describe and systematize the formal processes of inferential thought and +to apply them as practical principles to the body of real knowledge.</p> + +<p>I wish now to take up <i>seriatim</i> the several questions touching +the various relations of logic enumerated above, and first of all the +question of the relation of logic as science to logic as art.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">I. <i>Logic as science and logic as art.</i></p> + +<p>It seems true that the founder of logic, Aristotle, regarded logic +not as a science, but rather as propædeutic to science, and not as an +end in itself, but rather technically and heuristically as an +instrument. In other words, logic was conceived by him rather in its +application or as an art, than as a science, and so it continued to be +regarded until the close of the Middle Ages, being characterized indeed +as the <i>ars artium</i>; for even the <i>logica docens</i> of the +Scholastics was merely the formulation of that body of precepts which +are of practical service in the syllogistic arrangement of premises, and +the Port Royal Logic aims to furnish <i>l'art de penser</i>. This +technical aspect of the science has clung to it down to the present day, +and is no doubt a legitimate description of a part of its function. But +no one would now say that logic <i>is</i> an art; rather it is a body of +theory which may be technically applied. Mill, in his examination of Sir +William Hamilton's Philosophy (p. 391), says of logic that it "is the +art of thinking, which means of correct thinking, and the science of the +conditions of correct thinking," and indeed, he goes so far as to say +(<i>System of Logic</i>, Introd. § 7): "The extension of logic as a +science is determined by its necessities as an art." Strictly speaking, +logic as a science is purely theoretical, for the function of science as +such is merely to know. It is an organized system of knowledge, namely, +an organized system of the principles and conditions of correct +thinking. But because correct thinking is an art, it does not follow +that a knowledge of the methods and conditions of correct thinking is +art, which would be a glaring case of <ins title="metabasis eis allo +genos">μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος</ins>. The art-bearings of the science +are given in the normative character of its subject-matter. As a science +logic is descriptive and explanatory, that is, it describes and +formulates the norms of valid thought, although as science it is not +normative, save in the sense that the principles formulated in it may be +normatively or regulatively applied, in which case they become precepts. +What is principle in science becomes precept in application, and it is +only when technically applied that principles assume a mandatory +character. Validity is not created by logic. Logic merely investigates +and states the conditions and criteria of validity, being in this +reference a science of evidence. In the very fact, however, that logic +is normative in the sense of describing and explaining the norms of +correct thinking, its practical or applied character is given. Its +principles as known are science; its principles as applied are art. +There is, therefore, no reason to sunder these two things or to call +logic an art merely or a science merely; for it is both when regarded +from different viewpoints, although one must insist on the fact that the +rules for practical guidance are, so far as the science is concerned, +quite <i>ab extra</i>. Logic, ethics, and æsthetics are all commonly +(and rightly) called normative disciplines: they are all concerned with +values and standards; logic with validity and evidence, or values for +cognition; ethics with motives and moral quality in conduct, or values +for volition; æsthetics with the standards of beauty, or values for +appreciation and feeling. Yet none of them is or can be merely +normative, or indeed as science normative at all; if that were so, they +would not be bodies of organized knowledge, but bodies of rules. They +might be well-arranged codes of legislation on conduct, fine art, and +evidence, but not sciences. Strictly regarded, it is the descriptive and +explanatory aspect of logic that constitutes its scientific character, +while it is the specific normative aspect that constitutes its logical +character. Values, whether ethical or logical, without an examination +and formulation of their ground, relations, origin, and interconnection, +would be merely rules of thumb, popular phrases, or pastoral precepts. +The actual methodology of the sciences or applied logic is logic as +art.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">II. <i>Relation of logic to psychology.</i></p> + +<p>The differentiation of logic and psychology in such way as to be of +practical value in the discussion of the disciplines has always been a +difficult matter. John Stuart Mill was disposed to merge logic in +psychology, and Hobhouse, his latest notable apologete, draws no fixed +distinction between psychology and logic, merely saying that they have +different centres of interest, and that their provinces overlap. Lipps, +in his <i>Grundzüge der Logik</i> (p. 2), goes the length of saying that +"Logic is a psychological discipline, as certainly as knowledge occurs +only in the Psyche, and thought, which is developed in knowledge, is a +psychical event." Now, if we were to take such extreme ground as this, +their ethics, æsthetics, and pure mathematics would become at once +branches of psychology and not coördinate disciplines with it, for +volitions, the feelings of appreciation, and the reasoning of pure +mathematics are psychical events. Such a theory plainly carries us too +far and would involve us in confusion. That the demarcation between the +two disciplines is not a chasmic cleavage, but a line, and that, too, an +historically shifting line, is apparent from the foregoing historical +<i>résumé</i>.</p> + +<p>The four main phases of logical theory include: (1) the concept +(although some logicians begin with the judgment as temporally prior in +the evolution of language), (2) judgment, (3) inference, (4) the +methodology of the sciences. The entire concern of logic is, indeed, +with psychical processes, but with psychical processes regarded from a +specific standpoint, a standpoint different from that of psychology. In +the first place psychology in a certain sense is much wider than logic, +being concerned with the whole of psychosis as such, including the +feelings and will and the entire structure of cognition, whereas logic +is concerned with the particular cognitive processes enumerated above +(concept, judgment, inference), and that, too, merely from the point of +view of validity and the grounds of validity. In another sense +psychology is narrower than logic, being concerned purely with the +description and explanation of a particular field of phenomena, whereas +logic is concerned with the procedure of all the sciences and is +practically related to them as their formulated method. The compass and +aims of the two disciplines are different; for while psychology is in +different references both wider and narrower than logic, it is also +different in the problems it sets itself, its aim being to describe and +explain the phenomena of mind in the spirit of empirical science, +whereas the aim of logic is only to explain and establish the laws of +evidence and standards of validity. Logic is, therefore, selective and +particular in the treatment of mental phenomena, whereas psychology is +universal, that is, it covers the entire range of mental processes as a +phenomenalistic science; logic dealing with definite elements as a +normative science. By this it is not meant that the territory of +judgment and inference should be delivered from the psychologist into +the care of the logician; through such a division of labor both +disciplines would suffer. The two disciplines handle to some extent the +same subjects, so far as names are concerned; but the essence of the +logical problem is not touched by psychology, and should not be mixed up +with it, to the confusion and detriment of both disciplines. The field +of psychology, as we have said, is the whole of psychical phenomena; the +aim of individual psychology in the investigation of its field is: (1) +to give a genetic account of cognition, feeling, and will, or whatever +be the elements into which consciousness is analyzed; (2) to explain +their interconnections causally; (3) as a chemistry of mental life to +analyze its complexes into their simplest elements; (4) to explain the +totality structurally (or functionally) out of the elements; (5) to +carry on its investigation and set forth its results as a purely +empirical science; (6) psychology makes no attempt to evaluate the +processes of mind either in terms of false and true, or good and bad. +From this description of the field and function of psychology, based on +the expressions of its modern exponents, it will be found impossible to +shelter logic under it as a subordinate discipline. If one were to +enlarge the scope of psychology to mean rational psychology, in the +sense which Professor Howison advocates (<i>Psychological Review</i>, +vol. iii, p. 652), such a subordination might be possible, but it would +entail the loss of all that the new psychology has gained by the sharper +delimitation of its sphere and problems, and would carry us back to the +position of Mill, who appears to identify psychology with philosophy at +large and with metaphysics.</p> + +<p>In contradistinction to the aims of psychology as described in the +foregoing, the sphere and problems of logic may be summarily +characterized as follows: (1) All concepts and judgments are +psychological complexes and processes and may be genetically and +structurally described; that is the business of psychology. They also +have a meaning value, or objective reference, that is, they may be +correct or incorrect, congruous or incongruous with reality. The +meaning, aspect of thought, or its content as truth is the business of +logic. This subject-matter is got by regarding a single aspect in the +total psychological complex. (2) Its aim is not to describe factual +thought or the whole of thought, or the natural processes of thought, +but only certain ideals of thinking, namely, the norms of correct +thinking. Its object is not a datum, but an ideal. (3) While psychology +is concerned with the natural history of reasoning, logic is concerned +with the warrants of inferential reasoning. In the terminology of +Hamilton it is the nomology of discursive thought. To use an often +employed analogy, psychology is the physics of thought, logic an ethics +of thought. (4) Logic implies an epistemology or theory of cognition in +so far as epistemology discusses the concept and judgment and their +relations to the real world, and here is to be found its closest +connection with psychology. A purely formal logic, which is concerned +merely with the internal order of knowledge and does not undertake to +show how the laws of thought originate, why they hold good as the +measures of evidence, or in what way they are applicable to concrete +reality, would be as barren as scholasticism. (5) While logic thus goes +back to epistemology for its bases and for the theoretical determination +of the interrelation of knowledge and truth, it goes forward in its +application to the practical service of the sciences as their +methodology. Apart of its subject-matter is therefore the actual +procedure of the sciences, which it attempts to organize into systematic +statements as principles and formulæ. This body of rules given +implicitly or explicitly in the workings and structure of the special +sciences, consisting in classification, analysis, experiment, induction, +deduction, nomenclature, etc., logic regards as a concrete deposit of +inferential experience. It abstracts these principles from the content +and method of the sciences, describes and explains them, erects them +into a systematic methodology, and so creates the practical branch of +real logic. Formal logic, therefore, according to the foregoing account, +would embrace the questions of the internal congruity and +self-consistency of thought and the schematic arrangement of judgments +to insure formally valid conclusions; real logic would embrace the +epistemological questions of how knowledge is related to reality, and +how it is built up out of experience, on the one hand, and the +methodological procedure of science, on the other. The importance of +mathematical logic seems to be mainly in the facilitation of logical +expression through symbols. It is rather with the machinery of the +science than with its content and real problem that the logical +algorithm or calculus is concerned. In these condensed paragraphs +sufficient has been said, I think, to show that logic and psychology +should be regarded as coördinate disciplines; for their aims and +subject-matter differ too widely to subordinate the former under the +latter without confusion to both.</p> + +<p>I wish now to add a brief note on the relation of logic to another +discipline.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">III. <i>Relation of logic to metaphysics.</i></p> + +<p>As currently expounded, logic either abuts immediately on the +territory of metaphysics at certain points or is entirely absorbed in it +as an integral part of the metaphysical subject-matter. I regard the +former view as not only the more tenable theoretically, but as +practically advantageous for working purposes, and necessary for an +intelligible classification of the philosophical disciplines. The +business of metaphysics, as I understand it, is with the nature of +reality; logic is concerned with the nature of validity, or with the +relations of the elements of thought within themselves +(self-consistency) and with the relations of thought to its object (real +truth), but not with the nature of the objective world or reality as +such. Further, metaphysics is concerned with the unification of the +totality of knowledge in the form of a scientific cosmology; logic is +concerned merely with the inferential and methodological processes +whereby this result is reached. The former is a science of content; the +latter is a science of procedure and relations. Now, inasmuch as +procedure and relations apply to some reality and differ with different +forms of reality, logic necessitates in its implications a theory of +being, but such implications are in no wise to be identified with its +subject-matter or with its own proper problems. Their consideration +falls within the sphere of metaphysics or a broadly conceived +epistemology, whose business it is to solve the ultimate questions of +subject and object, thought and thing, mind and matter, that are implied +and pointed to rather than formulated by logic. Inasmuch as the logical +judgment says something about something, the scientific impulse drives +us to investigate what the latter something ultimately is; but this is +not necessary for logic, nor is it one of logic's legitimate problems, +any more than it is the proper business of the physicist to investigate +the mental implications of his scientific judgments and hypotheses or +the ultimate nature of the theorizing and perceiving mind, or of +causality to his world of matter and motion, although a general +scientific interest may drive him to seek a solution of these ultimate +metaphysical problems. Scientifically the end of logic and of every +discipline is in itself; it is a territorial unity, and its government +is administered with a unitary aim. Logic is purely a science of +evidential values, not a science of content (in the meaning of +particular reality, as in the special sciences, or of ultimate reality, +as in metaphysics); its sole aim and purpose, as I conceive it, is to +formulate the laws and grounds of evidence, the principles of method, +and the conditions and forms of inferential thinking. When it has done +this, it has, as a single science, done its whole work. When one looks +at the present tendencies of logical theory, one is inclined to believe +that the discipline is in danger of becoming an +"<i>Allerleiwissenschaft</i>," whose vast undefined territory is the +land of "<i>Weissnichtwo</i>." The strict delimitation of the field and +problems of science is demanded in the interest of a serviceable +division of scientific labor and in the interest of an intelligible +classification of the accumulated products of research.</p> + +<h3 class="p4 center"><a name="Logic2"></a>THE FIELD OF LOGIC</h3> + +<h4>BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE</h4> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>Frederick J. E. Woodbridge</b>, Johnsonian Professor of +Philosophy in Columbia University, New York, N. Y., since 1902. b. +Windsor, Ontario, Canada, March 26, 1867. A.B. Amherst College, 1889; +Union Theological Seminary, 1892; A.M. 1898, LL.D. 1903, Amherst +College. Post-grad. Berlin University. Instructor in Philosophy, +University of Minnesota, 1894-95; Professor of Philosophy and head of +department, 1895-1902. Member of American Association for the +Advancement of Science, American Philosophical Association, American +<ins title="'Pyschological' in the original">Psychological</ins> +Association. <b>Editor</b> of the <i>Journal of Philosophy</i>, +<i>Psychology and Scientific Methods</i>.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">Current tendencies in logical theory make a determination +of the field of logic fundamental to any statement of the general +problems of the science. In view of this fact, I propose in this paper +to attempt such a determination by a general discussion of the relation +of logic to mathematics, psychology, and biology, especially noting in +connection with biology the tendency known as pragmatism. In conclusion, +I shall indicate what the resulting general problems appear to be.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">I</p> + +<p>There may appear, at first, little to distinguish mathematics in its +most abstract, formal, and symbolic type from logic. Indeed, mathematics +as the universal method of all knowledge has been the ideal of many +philosophers, and its right to be such has been claimed of late with +renewed force. The recent notable advances in the science have done much +to make this claim plausible. A logician, a non-mathematical one, might +be tempted to say that, in so far as mathematics is the method of +thought in general, it has ceased to be mathematics; but, I suppose, one +ought not to quarrel too much with a definition, but should let +mathematics mean knowledge simply, if the mathematicians wish it. I +shall not, therefore, enter the controversy regarding the proper limits +of mathematical inquiry. I wish to note, however, a tendency in the +identification of logic and mathematics which seems to me to be +inconsistent with the real significance of knowledge. I refer to the +exaltation of the freedom of thought in the construction of conceptions, +definitions, and hypotheses.</p> + +<p>The assertion that mathematics is a "pure" science is often taken to +mean that it is in no way dependent on experience in the construction of +its basal concepts. The space with which geometry deals may be Euclidean +or not, as we please; it may be the real space of experience or not; the +properties of it and the conclusions reached about it may hold in the +real world or they may not; for the mind is free to construct its +conception and definition of space in accordance with its own aims. +Whether geometry is to be ultimately a science of this type must be +left, I suppose, for the mathematicians to decide. A logician may +suggest, however, that the propriety of calling all these conceptions +"space" is not as clear as it ought to be. Still further, there seems to +underlie all arbitrary spaces, as their foundation, a good deal of the +solid material of empirical knowledge, gained by human beings through +contact with an environing world, the environing character of which +seems to be quite independent of the freedom of their thought. However +that may be, it is evident, I think, that the generalization of the +principle involved in this idea of the freedom of thought in framing its +conception of space, would, if extended to logic, give us a science of +knowledge which would have no necessary relation to the real things of +experience, although these are the things with which all concrete +knowledge is most evidently concerned. It would inform us about the +conclusions which necessarily follow from accepted conceptions, but it +could not inform us in any way about the real truth of these +conclusions. It would, thus, always leave a gap between our knowledge +and its objects which logic itself would be quite impotent to close. +Truth would thus become an entirely extra-logical matter. So far as the +science of knowledge is concerned, it would be an accident if knowledge +fitted the world to which it refers. Such a conception of the science of +knowledge is not the property of a few mathematicians exclusively, +although they have, perhaps, done more than others to give it its +present revived vitality. It is the classic doctrine that logic is the +science of thought as thought, meaning thereby thought in independence +of any specific object whatever.</p> + +<p>In regard to this doctrine, I would not even admit that such a +science of knowledge is possible. You cannot, by a process of +generalization or free construction, rid thought of connection with +objects; and there is no such thing as a general content or as +content-in-general. Generalization simply reduces the richness of +content and, consequently, of implication. It deals with concrete +subject-matter as much and as directly as if the content were individual +and specialized. "Things equal to the same thing are equal to each +other," is a truth, not about thought, but about things. The conclusions +about a fourth dimension follow, not from the fact that we have thought +of one, but from the conception about it which we have framed. Neither +generalization nor free construction can reveal the operations of +thought in transcendental independence.</p> + +<p>It may be urged, however, that nothing of this sort was ever claimed. +The bondage of thought to content must be admitted, but generalization +and free construction, just because they give us the power to vary +conditions as we please, give us thinking in a relative independence of +content, and thus show us how thought operates irrespective of, although +not independent of, its content. The binomial theorem operates +irrespective of the values substituted for its symbols. But I can find +no gain in this restatement of the position. It is true, in a sense, +that we may determine the way thought operates irrespective of any +specific content by the processes of generalization and free +construction; but it is important to know in what sense. Can we claim +that such irrespective operation means that we have discovered certain +logical constants, which now stand out as the distinctive tools of +thought? Or does it rather mean that this process of varying the content +of thought as we please reveals certain real constants, certain ultimate +characters of reality, which no amount of generalization or free +construction can possibly alter? The second alternative seems to me to +be the correct one. Whether it is or not may be left here undecided. +What I wish to emphasize is the fact that the decision is one of the +things of vital interest for logic, and properly belongs in that +science. Clearly, we can never know the significance of ultimate +constants for our thinking until we know what their real character is. +To determine that character we must most certainly pass out of the realm +of generalization and free construction; logic must become other than +simply mathematical or symbolic.</p> + +<p>There is another sense in which the determination of the operations +of thought irrespective of its specific content is interpreted in +connection with the exaltation of generalization and free construction. +Knowledge, it is said, is solely a matter of implication, and logic, +therefore, is the science of implication simply. If this is so, it would +appear possible to develop the whole doctrine of implication by the use +of symbols, and thus free the doctrine from dependence on the question +as to how far these symbols are themselves related to the real things of +the world. If, for instance, <i>a</i> implies <i>b</i>, then, if +<i>a</i> is true, <i>b</i> is true, and this quite irrespective of the +real truth of <i>a</i> or <i>b</i>. It is to be urged, however, in +opposition to this view, that knowledge is concerned ultimately only +with the real truth of <i>a</i> and <i>b</i>, and that the implication +is of no significance whatever apart from this truth. There is no virtue +in the mere implication. Still further, the supposition that there can +be a doctrine of implication, simply, seems to be based on a +misconception. For even so-called formal implication gets its +significance only on the supposed truth of the terms with which it +deals. We suppose that <i>a</i> <i>does</i> imply <i>b</i>, and that +<i>a</i> <i>is</i> true. In other words, we can state this law of +implication only as we first have valid instances of it given in +specific, concrete cases. The law is a generalization and nothing more. +The formal statement gives only an apparent freedom from experience. +Moreover, there is no reason for saying that <i>a</i> implies <i>b</i> +unless it does so either really or by supposition. If <i>a</i> really +implies <i>b</i>, then the implication is clearly not a matter of +thinking it; and to suppose the implication is to feign a reality, the +implications of which are equally free from the processes by which they +are thought. Ultimately, therefore, logic must take account of real +implications. We cannot avoid this through the use of a symbolism which +virtually implies them. Implication can have a logical character only +because it has first a metaphysical one.</p> + +<p>The supposition underlying the conception of logic I have been +examining is, itself, open to doubt and seriously questioned. That +supposition was the so-called freedom of thought. The argument has +already shown that there is certainly a very definite limit to this +freedom, even when logic is conceived in a very abstract and formal way. +The processes of knowledge are bound up with their contents, and have +their character largely determined thereby. When, moreover, we view +knowledge in its genesis, when we take into consideration the +contributions which psychology and biology have made to our general view +of what knowledge is, we seem forced to conclude that the conceptions +which we frame are very far from being our own free creations. They +have, on the contrary, been laboriously worked out through the same +processes of successful adaptation which have resulted in other +products. Knowledge has grown up in connection with the unfolding +processes of reality, and has, by no means, freely played over its +surface. That is why even the most abstract of all mathematics is yet +grounded in the evolution of human experience.</p> + +<p>In the remaining parts of this paper, I shall discuss further the +claims of psychology and biology. The conclusion I would draw here is +that the field of logic cannot be restricted to a realm where the +operations of thought are supposed to move freely, independent or +irrespective of their contents and the objects of a real world; and that +mathematics, instead of giving us any support for the supposition that +it can, carries us, by the processes of symbolization and formal +implication, to recognize that logic must ultimately find its field +where implications are real, independent of the processes by which they +are thought, and irrespective of the conceptions we choose to frame.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">II</p> + +<p>The processes involved in the acquisition and systematization of +knowledge may, undoubtedly, be regarded as mental processes and fall +thus within the province of psychology. It may be claimed, therefore, +that every logical process is also a psychological one. The important +question is, however, is it nothing more? Do its logical and +psychological characters simply coincide? Or, to put the question in +still another form, as a psychological process simply, does it also +serve as a logical one? The answers to these questions can be determined +only by first noting what psychology can say about it as a mental +process.</p> + +<p>In the first place, psychology can analyze it, and so determine its +elements and their connections. It can thus distinguish it from all +other mental processes by pointing out its unique elements or their +unique and characteristic connection. No one will deny that a judgment +is different from an emotion, or that an act of reasoning is different +from a volition; and no one will claim that these differences are +entirely beyond the psychologist's power to ascertain accurately and +precisely. Still further, it appears possible for him to determine with +the same accuracy and precision the distinction in content and +connection between processes which are true and those which are false. +For, as mental processes, it is natural to suppose that they contain +distinct differences of character which are ascertainable. The states of +mind called belief, certainty, conviction, correctness, truth, are thus, +doubtless, all distinguishable as mental states. It may be admitted, +therefore, that there can be a thoroughgoing psychology of logical +processes.</p> + +<p>Yet it is quite evident to me that the characterization of a mental +process as logical is not a psychological characterization. In fact, I +think it may be claimed that the characterization of any mental process +in a specific way, say as an emotion, is extra-psychological. Judgments +and inferences are, in short, not judgments and inferences because they +admit of psychological analysis and explanation, any more than space is +space because the perception of it can be worked out by genetic +psychology. In other words, knowledge is first <i>knowledge</i>, and +only later a set of processes for psychological analysis. That is why, +as it seems to me, all psychological logicians, from Locke to our own +day, have signally failed in dealing with the problem of knowledge. The +attempt to construct knowledge out of mental states, the relations +between ideas, and the relation of ideas to things, has been, as I read +the history, decidedly without profit. Confusion and divergent opinion +have resulted instead of agreement and confidence. On precisely the same +psychological foundation, we have such divergent views of knowledge as +idealism, phenomenalism, and agnosticism, with many other strange +mixtures of logic, psychology, and metaphysics. The lesson of these +perplexing theories seems to be that logic, as logic, must be divorced +from psychology.</p> + +<p>It is also of importance to note, in this connection, that the +determination of a process as mental and as thus falling within the +domain of psychology strictly, has by no means been worked out to the +general satisfaction of psychologists themselves. Recent literature +abounds in elaborate discussion of the distinction between what is a +mental fact and what not, with a prevailing tendency to draw the +remarkable conclusion that all facts are somehow mental or experienced +facts. The situation would be worse for psychology than it is, if that +vigorous science had not learned from other sciences the valuable knack +of isolating concrete problems and attacking them directly, without the +burden of previous logical or metaphysical speculation. Thus knowledge, +which is the peculiar province of logic, is increased, while we wait for +the acceptable definition of a mental fact. But definitions, be it +remembered, are themselves logical matters. Indeed, some psychologists +have gone so far as to claim that the distinction of a fact as mental is +a purely logical distinction. This is significant as indicating that the +time has not yet come for the identification of logic and +psychology.</p> + +<p>In refreshingly sharp contrast to the vagueness and uncertainty which +beset the definition of a mental fact are the palpable concreteness and +definiteness of knowledge itself. Every science, even history and +philosophy, are instances of it. What constitutes a knowledge ought to +be as definite and precise a question as could be asked. That logic has +made no more progress than it has in the answer to it appears to be due +to the fact that it has not sufficiently grasped the significance of its +own simplicity. Knowledge has been the important business of thinking +man, and he ought to be able to tell what he does in order to know, as +readily as he tells what he does in order to build a house. And that is +why the Aristotelian logic has held its own so long. In that logic, "the +master of them that know" simply rehearsed the way he had systematized +his own stores of knowledge. Naturally we, so far as we have followed +his methods, have had practically nothing to add. In our efforts to +improve on him, we have too often left the right way and followed the +impossible method inaugurated by Locke. Had we examined with greater +persistence our own methods of making science, we should have profited +more. The introduction of psychology, instead of helping the situation, +only confuses it.</p> + +<p>Let it be granted, however, in spite of the vagueness of what is +meant by a mental fact, that logical processes are also mental +processes. This fact has, as I have already suggested, an important +bearing on their genesis, and sets very definite limits to the freedom +of thought in creating. It is not, however, as mental processes that +they have the value of knowledge. A mental process which is knowledge +purports to be connected with something other than itself, something +which may not be a mental process at all. This connection should be +investigated, but the investigation of it belongs, not to psychology, +but to logic.</p> + +<p>I am well aware that this conclusion runs counter to some +metaphysical doctrines, and especially to idealism in all its forms, +with the epistemologies based thereon. It is, of course, impossible here +to defend my position by an elaborate analysis of these metaphysical +systems. But I will say this. I am in entire agreement with idealism in +its claim that questions of knowledge and of the nature of reality +cannot ultimately be separated, because we can know reality only as we +know it. But the general question as to how we know reality can still be +raised. By this I do not mean the question, how is it possible for us to +have knowledge at all, or how it is possible for reality to be known at +all, but how, as a matter of fact, we actually do know it? That we +really do know it, I would most emphatically claim. Still further, I +would claim that what we know about it is determined, not by the fact +that we can know in general, but by the way reality, as distinct from +our knowledge, has determined. These ways appear to me to be +ascertainable, and form, thus, undoubtedly, a section of metaphysics. +But the metaphysics will naturally be realistic rather than +idealistic.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">III</p> + +<p>Just as logical processes may be regarded as, at the same time, +psychological processes, so they may be regarded, with equal right, as +vital processes, coming thus under the categories of evolution. The +tendency so to regard them is very marked at the present day, especially +in France and in this country. In France, the movement has perhaps +received the clearer definition. In America the union of logic and +biology is complicated—and at times even lost sight of—by +emphasis on the idea of evolution generally. It is not my intention to +trace the history of this movement, but I should like to call attention +to its historic motive in order to get it in a clear light.</p> + +<p>That the theory of evolution, even Darwinism itself, has radically +transformed our historical, scientific, and philosophical methods, is +quite evident. Add to this the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, +with its own doctrine of development, and one finds the causes of the +rather striking unanimity which is discoverable in many ways between +Hegelian idealists, on the one hand, and philosophers of evolution of +Spencer's type, on the other. Although two men would, perhaps, not +appear more radically different at first sight than Hegel and Spencer, I +am inclined to believe that we shall come to recognize more and more in +them an identity of philosophical conception. The pragmatism of the day +is a striking confirmation of this opinion, for it is often the +expression of Hegelian ideas in Darwinian and Spencerian terminology. +The claims of idealism and of evolutionary science and philosophy have +thus sought reconciliation. Logic has been, naturally, the last of the +sciences to yield to evolutionary and genetic treatment. It could not +escape long, especially when the idea of evolution had been so +successful in its handling of ethics. If morality can be brought under +the categories of evolution, why not thinking also? In answer to that +question we have the theory that thinking is an adaptation, judgment is +instrumental. But I would not leave the impression that this is true of +pragmatism alone, or that it has been developed only through pragmatic +tendencies. It is naturally the result also of the extension of +biological philosophy. In the biological conception of logic, we have, +then, an interesting coincidence in the results of tendencies differing +widely in their genesis.</p> + +<p>It would be hazardous to deny, without any qualifications, the +importance of genetic considerations. Indeed, the fact that evolution in +the hands of a thinker like Huxley, for instance, should make +consciousness and thinking apparently useless epiphenomena, in a +developing world, has seemed like a most contradictory evolutionary +philosophy. It was difficult to make consciousness a real function in +development so long as it was regarded as only cognitive in character. +Evolutionary philosophy, coupled with physics, had built up a sort of +closed system with which consciousness could not interfere, but which it +could know, and know with all the assurance of a traditional logic. If, +however, we were to be consistent evolutionists, we could not abide by +such a remarkable result. The whole process of thinking must be brought +within evolution, so that knowledge, even the knowledge of the +evolutionary hypothesis itself, must appear as an instance of +adaptation. In order to do this, however, consciousness must not be +conceived as only cognitive. Judgment, the core of logical processes, +must be regarded as an instrument and as a mode of adaptation.</p> + +<p>The desire for completeness and consistency in an evolutionary +philosophy is not the only thing which makes the denial of genetic +considerations hazardous. Strictly biological considerations furnish +reasons of equal weight for caution. For instance, one will hardly deny +that the whole sensory apparatus is a striking instance of adaptation. +Our perceptions of the world would thus appear to be determined by this +adaptation, to be instances of adjustment. They might conceivably have +been different, and in the case of many other creatures, the perceptions +of the world are undoubtedly different. All our logical processes, +referring ultimately as they do to our perceptions, would thus appear +finally to depend on the adaptation exhibited in the development of our +sensory apparatus. So-called laws of thought would seem to be but +abstract statements or formulations of the results of this adjustment. +It would be absurd to suppose that a man thinks in a sense radically +different from that in which he digests, or a flower blossoms, or that +two and two are four in a sense radically different from that in which a +flower has a given number of petals. Thinking, like digesting and +blossoming, is an effect, a product, possibly a structure.</p> + +<p>I am not at all interested in denying the force of these +considerations. They have, to my mind, the greatest importance, and due +weight has, as yet, not been given to them. To one at all committed to a +unitary and evolutionary view of the world, it must indeed seem strange +if thinking itself should not be the result of evolution, or that, in +thinking, parts of the world had not become adjusted in a new way. But +while I am ready to admit this, I am by no means ready to admit some of +the conclusions for logic and metaphysics which are often drawn from the +admission. Just because thought, as a product of evolution, is +functional and judgment instrumental, it by no means follows that logic +is but a branch of biology, or that knowledge of the world is but a +temporary adjustment, which, as knowledge, might have been radically +different. In these conclusions, often drawn with Protagorean assurance, +two considerations of crucial importance seem to be overlooked, first, +that adaptation is itself metaphysical in character, and secondly, that +while knowledge may be functional and judgment instrumental, the +character of the functioning has the character of knowledge, which sets +it off sharply from all other functions.</p> + +<p>It seems strange to me that the admission that knowledge is a matter +of adaptation, and thus a relative matter, should, in these days, be +regarded as in any way destroying the claims of knowledge to +metaphysical certainty. Yet, somehow, the opinion widely prevails that +the doctrine of relativity necessarily involves the surrender of +anything like absolute truth. "All our knowledge is relative, and, +therefore, only partial, incomplete, and but practically trustworthy," +is a statement repeatedly made. The fact that, if our development had +been different, our knowledge would have been different, is taken to +involve the conclusion that our knowledge cannot possibly disclose the +real constitution of things, that it is essentially conditional, that it +is only a mental device for getting results, that any other system of +knowledge which would get results equally well would be equally true; in +short, that there can be no such thing as metaphysical or +epistemological truth. These conclusions do indeed seem strange, and +especially strange on the basis of evolution. For while the evolutionary +process might, conceivably, have been different, its results are, in any +case, the results of the process. They are not arbitrary. We might have +digested without stomachs, but the fact that we use stomachs in this +important process ought not to free us from metaphysical respect for the +organ. As M. Rey suggests, in the <i>Revue Philosophique</i> for June, +1904, a creature without the sense of smell would have no geometry, but +that does not make geometry essentially hypothetical, a mere mental +construction; for we have geometry because of the working out of +nature's laws. Indeed, instead of issuing in a relativistic metaphysics +of knowledge, the doctrine of relativity should issue in the recognition +of the finality of knowledge in every case of ascertainably complete +adaptation. In other words, adaptation is itself metaphysical in +character. Adjustment is always adjustment between things, and yields +only what it does yield. The things or elements get into the state which +is their adjustment, and this adjustment purports to be their actual and +unequivocal ordering in relation to one another. Different conditions +might have produced a different ordering, but, again, this ordering +would be equally actual and unequivocal, equally the <i>one</i> ordering +to issue from them. To suppose or admit that the course of events might +have been and might be different is not at all to suppose or admit that +it was or is different; it is, rather, to suppose and admit that we have +real knowledge of what that course really was and is. This seems to be +very obvious.</p> + +<p>Yet the evolutionist often thinks that he is not a metaphysician, +even when he brings all his conceptions systematically under the +conception of evolution. This must be due to some temporary lack of +clearness. If evolution is not a metaphysical doctrine when extended to +apply to all science, all morality, all logic, in short, all things, +then it is quite meaningless for evolutionists to pronounce a +metaphysical sentence on logical processes. But if evolution is a +metaphysics, then its sentence is metaphysical, and in every case of +adjustment or adaptation we have a revelation of the nature of reality +in a definite and unequivocal form. This conclusion applies to logical +processes as well as to others. The recognition that they are vital +processes can, therefore, have little significance for these processes +in their distinctive character as logical. They are like all other vital +processes in that they are vital and subject to evolution. They are +unlike all others in that thought is unlike digestion or breathing. To +regard logical processes as vital processes does not in any way, +therefore, invalidate them as logical processes or make it superfluous +to consider their claim to give us real knowledge of a real world. +Indeed, it makes such a consideration more necessary and important.</p> + +<p>A second consideration overlooked by the Protagorean tendencies of +the day is that judgment, even if it is instrumental, purports to give +us knowledge, that is, it claims to reveal what is independent of the +judging process. Perhaps I ought not to say that this consideration is +overlooked, but rather that it is denied significance. It is even denied +to be essential to judgment. It is claimed that, instead of revealing +anything independent of the judging process, judgment is just the +adjustment and no more. It is a reorganization of experience, an attempt +at control. All this looks to me like a misstatement of the facts. +Judgment <i>claims</i> to be no such thing. It does not function as such +a thing. When I make any judgment, even the simplest, I may make it as +the result of tension, because of a demand for reorganization, in order +to secure control of experience; but the judgment <i>means</i> for me +something quite different. It means decidedly and unequivocally that in +reality, apart from the judging process, things exist and operate just +as the judgment declares. If it is claimed that this meaning is +illusory, I eagerly desire to know on what solid ground its illusoriness +can be established. When the conclusion was reached that gravitation +varies directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance, +it was doubtless reached in an evolutionary and pragmatic way; but it +claimed to disclose a fact which prevailed before the conclusion was +reached, and in spite of the conclusion. Knowledge has been born of the +travail of living, but it has been born as knowledge.</p> + +<p>When the knowledge character of judgment is insisted on, it seems +almost incredible that any one would think of denying or overlooking it. +Indeed, current discussions are far from clear on the subject. +Pragmatists are constantly denying that they hold the conclusions that +their critics almost unanimously draw. There is, therefore, a good deal +of confusion of thought yet to be dispelled. Yet there seems to be +current a pronounced determination to banish the epistemological problem +from logic. This is, to my mind, suspicious, even when epistemology is +defined in a way which most epistemologists would not approve. It is +suspicious just because we must always ask eventually that most +epistemological and metaphysical question: "Is knowledge true?" To +answer, it is true when it functions in a way to satisfy the needs which +generated its activity, is, no doubt, correct, but it is by no means +adequate. The same answer can be made to the inquiry after the +efficiency of any vital process whatever, and is, therefore, not +distinctive. We have still to inquire into the specific character of the +needs which originate judgments and of the consequent satisfaction. Just +here is where the uniqueness of the logical problem is disclosed. With +conscious beings, the success of the things they do has become +increasingly dependent on their ability to discover what takes place in +independence of the knowing process. That is the need which generates +judgment. The satisfaction is, of course, the attainment of the +discovery. Now to make the judgment itself and not the consequent action +the instrumental factor seems to me to misstate the facts of the case. +Nothing is clearer than that there is no necessity for knowledge to +issue in adjustment. And it is clear to me that increased control of +experience, while resulting from knowledge, does not give to it its +character. Omniscience could idly view the transformations of reality +and yet remain omniscient. Knowledge works, but it is not, therefore, +knowledge.</p> + +<p>These considerations have peculiar force when applied to that branch +of knowledge which is knowledge itself. Is the biological account of +knowledge correct? That question we must evidently ask, especially when +we are urged to accept the account. Can we, to put the question in its +most general form, accept as an adequate account of the logical process +a theory which is bound up with some other specific department of human +knowledge? It seems to me that we cannot. Here we must be +epistemologists and metaphysicians, or give up the problem entirely. +This by no means involves the attempt to conceive pure thought set over +against pure reality—the kind of epistemology and metaphysics +justly ridiculed by the pragmatist—for knowledge, as already +stated, is given to us in concrete instances. How knowledge in general +is possible is, therefore, as useless and meaningless a question as how +reality in general is possible. The knowledge is given as a fact of +life, and what we have to determine is not its non-logical antecedents +or its practical consequences, but its constitution as knowledge and its +validity. It may be admitted that the question of validity is settled +pragmatically. No knowledge is true unless it yields results which can +be verified, unless it <i>can</i> issue in increased control of +experience. But I insist again that that fact is not sufficient for an +account of what knowledge claims to be. It claims to issue in control +because it is true in independence of the control. And it is just this +assurance that is needed to distinguish knowledge from what is not +knowledge. It is the necessity of exhibiting this assurance which makes +it impossible to subordinate logical problems, and forces us at last to +questions of epistemology and metaphysics.</p> + +<p>As I am interested here primarily in determining the field of logic, +it is somewhat outside my province to consider the details of logical +theory. Yet the point just raised is of so much importance in connection +with the main question that I venture the following general +considerations. This is, perhaps, the more necessary because the +pragmatic doctrine finds in the concession made regarding the test of +validity one of its strongest defenses.</p> + +<p>Of course a judgment is not true simply because it is a judgment. It +may be false. The only way to settle its validity is to discover whether +experience actually provides what the judgment promises, that is, +whether the conclusions drawn from it really enable us to control +experience. No mere speculation will yield the desired result, no matter +with how much formal validity the conclusions may be drawn. That merely +formal validity is not the essential thing, I have pointed out in +discussing the relation of logic to mathematics. The test of truth is +pragmatic. It is apparent, therefore, that the formal validity does not +determine the actual validity. What is this but the statement that the +process of judgment is not itself the determining factor in its real +validity? It is, in short, only valid judgments that can really give us +control of experience. The implications taken up in the judgment must, +therefore, be real implications which, as such, have nothing to do with +the judging process, and which, most certainly, are not brought about by +it. And what is this but the claim that judgment as such is never +instrumental? In other words, a judgment which effected its own content +would only by the merest accident function as valid knowledge. We have +valid knowledge, then, only when the implications of the judgment are +found to be independent of the judging process. We have knowledge only +at the risk of error. The pragmatic test of validity, instead of proving +the instrumental character of judgment, would thus appear to prove just +the reverse.</p> + +<p>Valid knowledge has, therefore, for its content a system of real, not +judged or hypothetical implications. The central problem of logic which +results from this fact is not how a knowledge of real implications is +then possible, but what are the ascertainable types of real +implications. But, it may be urged, we need some criterion to determine +what a real implication is. I venture to reply that we need none, if by +such is meant anything else than the facts with which we are dealing. I +need no other criterion than the circle to determine whether its +diameters are really equal. And, in general, I need no other criterion +than the facts dealt with to determine whether they really imply what I +judge them to imply. Logic appears to me to be really as simple as this. +Yet there can be profound problems involved in the working out of this +simple procedure. There is the problem already stated of the most +general types of real implication, or, in other words, the time-honored +doctrine of categories. Whether there are categories or basal types of +existence seems to me to be ascertainable. When ascertained, it is also +possible to discover the types of inference or implication which they +afford. This is by no means the whole of logic, but it appears to me to +be its central problem.</p> + +<p>These considerations will, I hope, throw light on the statement that +while knowledge works, it is not therefore knowledge. It works because +its content existed before its discovery by the knowledge process, and +because its content was not effected or brought about by that process. +Judgment was the instrument of its discovery, not the instrument which +fashioned it. While, therefore, willing to admit that logical processes +are vital processes, I am not willing to admit that the problem of logic +is radically changed thereby in its formulation or solution, for the +vital processes in question have the unique character of knowledge, the +content of which is what it claims to be, a system of real implications +which existed prior to its discovery.</p> + +<p>In the psychological and biological tendencies in logic, there is, +however, I think, a distinct gain for logical theory. The insistence +that logical processes are both mental and vital has done much to take +them out of the transcendental aloofness from reality in which they have +often been placed, especially since Kant. So long as thought and object +were so separated that they could never be brought together, and so long +as logical processes were conceived wholly in terms of ideas set over +against objects, there was no hope of escape from the realm of pure +hypothesis and conjecture. Locke's axiom that "the mind, in all its +thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own +ideas," an axiom which Kant did so much to sanctify, and which has been +the basal principle of the greater part of modern logic and metaphysics, +is most certainly subversive of logical theory. The transition from +ideas to anything else is rendered impossible by it. Now it is just this +axiom which the biological tendencies in logic have done so much to +destroy. They have insisted, with the greatest right, that logical +processes are not set over against their content as idea against object, +as appearance against reality, but are processes of reality itself. Just +as reality can and does function in a physical or a physiological way, +so also it functions in a logical way. The state we call knowledge +becomes, thus, as much a part of the system of things as the state we +call chemical combination. The problem how thought can know anything +becomes, therefore, as irrelevant as the problem how elements can +combine at all. The recognition of this is a great gain, and the promise +of it most fruitful for both logic and metaphysics.</p> + +<p>But, as I have tried to point out, all this surrendering of pure +thought as opposed to pure reality, does not at all necessitate our +regarding judgment as a process which makes reality different from what +it was before. Of course there is one difference, namely, the logical +one; for reality prior to logical processes is unknown. As a result of +these processes it becomes known. These processes are, therefore, +responsible for a known as distinct from an unknown reality. But what is +the transformation which reality undergoes in becoming known? When it +becomes known that water seeks its own level, what change has taken +place in the water? It would appear that we must answer, none. The water +which seeks its own level has not been transformed into ideas or even +into a human experience. It appears to remain, as water, precisely what +it was before. The transformation which takes place, takes place in the +one who knows, a transformation from ignorance to knowledge. Psychology +and biology can afford us the natural history of this transformation, +but they cannot inform us in the least as to why it should have its +specific character. That is given and not deduced. The attempts to +deduce it have, without exception, been futile. That is why we are +forced to take it as ultimate in the same way we take as ultimate the +specific character of any definite transformation. To my mind, there is +needed a fuller and more cordial recognition of this fact. The +conditions under which we, as individuals, know are certainly +discoverable, just as much as the conditions under which we breathe or +digest. And what happens to things when we know them is also as +discoverable as what happens to them when we breathe them or digest +them.</p> + +<p>But here the idealist may interpose that we can never know what +happens to things when we know them, because we can never know them +before they become known. I suppose I ought to wrestle with this +objection. It is an obvious one, but, to my mind, it is without force. +The objection, if pursued, can carry us only in a circle. The problem of +knowledge is still on our hands, and every logician of whatever school, +the offerer of this objection also, has, nevertheless, attempted to show +what the transformation is that thought works, for all admit that it +works some. Are we, therefore, engaged in a hopeless task? Or have we +failed to grasp the significance of our problem? I think the latter. We +fail to recognize that, in one way or other, we do solve the problem, +and that our attempts to solve it show quite clearly that the objection +under consideration is without force. Take, for instance, any concrete +case of knowledge, the water seeking its own level, again. Follow the +process of knowledge to the fullest extent, we never find a single +problem which is not solvable by reference to the concrete things with +which we are dealing, nor a single solution which is not forced upon us +by these things rather than by the fact that we deal with them. The +transformation wrought is thus discovered, in the progress of knowledge +itself, to be wrought solely in the inquiring individual, and wrought by +repeated contact with the things with which he deals. In other words, +all knowledge discloses the fact that its content is not created by +itself, but by the things with which it is concerned.</p> + +<p>It is quite possible, therefore, that knowledge should be what we +call transcendent and yet not involve us in a transcendental logic. That +we should be able to know without altering the things we know is no more +and no less remarkable and mysterious than that we should be able to +digest by altering the things we digest. In other words, the fact that +digestion alters the things is no reason that knowledge should alter +them, even if we admit that logical processes are vital and subject to +evolution. Indeed, if evolution teaches us anything on this point, it is +that knowledge processes are real just as they exist, as real as growth +and digestion, and must have their character described in accordance +with what they are. The recognition that knowledge can be transcendent +and yet its processes vital seems to throw light on the difficulty +evolution has encountered in accounting for consciousness and knowledge. +All the reactions of the individual seem to be expressible in terms of +chemistry and physics without calling in consciousness as an operating +factor. What is this but the recognition of its transcendence, +especially when the conditions of conscious activity are quite likely +expressible in chemical and physical terms? While, therefore, biological +considerations result in the great gain of giving concrete reality to +the processes of knowledge, the gain is lost, if knowledge itself is +denied the transcendence which it so evidently discloses.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">IV</p> + +<p>The argument advanced in this discussion has had the aim of +emphasizing the fact that in knowledge we have actually given, as +content, reality as it is in independence of the act of knowing, that +the real world is self-existent, independent of the judgments we make +about it. This fact has been emphasized in order to confine the field of +logic to the field of knowledge as thus understood. In the course of the +argument, I have occasionally indicated what some of the resulting +problems of logic are. These I wish now to state in a somewhat more +systematic way.</p> + +<p>The basal problem of logic becomes, undoubtedly, the metaphysics of +knowledge, the determination of the nature of knowledge and its relation +to reality. It is quite evident that this is just the problem which the +current tendencies criticised have sought, not to solve, but to avoid or +set aside. Their motives for so doing have been mainly the difficulties +which have arisen from the Kantian philosophy in its development into +transcendentalism, and the desire to extend the category of evolution to +embrace the whole of reality, knowledge included. I confess to feeling +the force of these motives as strongly as any advocate of the criticised +opinions. But I do not see my way clear to satisfying them by denying or +explaining away the evident character of knowledge itself. It appears +far better to admit that a metaphysics of knowledge is as yet hopeless, +rather than so to transform knowledge as to get rid of the problem; for +we must ultimately ask after the truth of the transformation. But I am +far from believing that a metaphysics of knowledge is hopeless. The +biological tendencies themselves seem to furnish us with much material +for at least the beginnings of one. Reality known is to be set over +against reality unknown or independent of knowledge, not as image to +original, idea to thing, phenomena to noumena, appearance to reality; +but reality as known is a new stage in the development of reality +itself. It is not an external mind which knows reality by means of its +own ideas, but reality itself becomes known through its own expanding +and readjusting processes. So far I am in entire agreement with the +tendencies I have criticised. But what change is effected by this +expansion and readjustment? I can find no other answer than this simple +one: the change to knowledge. And by this I mean to assert unequivocally +that the addition of knowledge to a reality hitherto without it is +simply an addition to it and not a transformation of it. Such a view may +appear to make knowledge a wholly useless addition, but I see no +inherent necessity in such a conclusion. Nor do I see any inherent +necessity of supposing that knowledge must be a useful addition. Yet I +would not be so foolish as to deny the usefulness of knowledge. We have, +of course, the most palpable evidences of its use. As we examine them, I +think we find, without exception, that knowledge is useful just in +proportion as we find that reality is not transformed by being known. If +it really were transformed in that process, could anything else than +confusion result from the multitude of knowing individuals?</p> + +<p>To me, therefore, the metaphysics of the situation resolves itself +into the realistic position that a developing reality develops, under +ascertainable conditions, into a known reality without undergoing any +other transformation, and that this new stage marks an advance in the +efficiency of reality in its adaptations. My confidence steadily grows +that this whole process can be scientifically worked out. It is +impossible here to justify my confidence in detail, and I must leave the +matter with the following suggestion. The point from which knowledge +starts and to which it ultimately returns is always some portion of +reality where there is consciousness, the things, namely, which, we are +wont to say, are in consciousness. These things are not ideas +representing other things outside of consciousness, but real things, +which, by being in consciousness, have the capacity of representing +<i>each other</i>, of standing for or implying each other. Knowledge is +not the creation of these implications, but their successful +systematization. It will be found, I think, that this general statement +is true of every concrete case of knowledge which we possess. Its +detailed working out would be a metaphysics of knowledge, an +epistemology.</p> + +<p>Since knowledge is the successful systematization of the implications +which are disclosed in things by virtue of consciousness, a second +logical problem of fundamental importance is the determination of the +most general types of implication with the categories which underlie +them. The execution of this problem would naturally involve, as +subsidiary, the greater part of formal and symbolic logic. Indeed, vital +doctrines of the syllogism, of definition, of formal inference, of the +calculus of classes and propositions, of the logic of relations, appear +to be bound up ultimately with a doctrine of categories; for it is only +a recognition of basal types of existence with their implications that +can save these doctrines from mere formalism. These types of existence +or categories are not to be regarded as free creations or as the +contributions of the mind to experience. There is no deduction of them +possible. They must be discovered in the actual progress of knowledge +itself, and I see no reason to suppose that their number is necessarily +fixed, or that we should necessarily be in possession of all of them. It +is requisite, however, that in every case categories should be incapable +of reduction to each other.</p> + +<p>A doctrine of categories seems to me to be of the greatest importance +in the systematization of knowledge, for no problem of relation is even +stateable correctly before the type of existence to which its terms +belong has been first determined. I submit one illustration to reinforce +this general statement, namely, the relation of mind to body. If mind +and body belong to the same type of existence, we have one set of +problems on our hands; but if they do not, we have an entirely different +set. Yet volumes of discussion written on this subject have abounded in +confusion, simply because they have regarded mind and body as belonging +to radically different types of existence and yet related in terms of +the type to which one of them belongs. The doctrine of parallelism is, +perhaps, the epitome of this confusion.</p> + +<p>The doctrine of categories will involve not only the greater part of +formal and symbolic logic, but will undoubtedly carry the logician into +the doctrine of method. Here it is to be hoped that recent tendencies +will result in effectively breaking down the artificial distinctions +which have prevailed between deduction and induction. Differences in +method do not result from differences in points of departure, or between +the universal and the particular, but from the categories, again, which +give the method direction and aim, and result in different types of +synthesis. In this direction, the logician may hope for an approximately +correct classification of the various departments of knowledge. Such a +classification is, perhaps, the ideal of logical theory.</p> + +<h3 class="p4 center">SECTION D—METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE</h3> + +<h3 class="p4 center">SECTION D—METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE</h3> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<p class="center">(<i>Hall 6, September 22, 3 p. m.</i>)</p> + +<table class="bold" border="0" cellpadding="1" summary="Science +Speakers"> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Chairman</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor James E. Creighton</span>, +Cornell University.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Speakers</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Wilhelm Ostwald</span>, +University of Leipzig.</td></tr> + +<tr><td></td><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Professor Benno +Erdmann</span>, University of Bonn.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="left"><span class="smcap">Secretary</span>:</td><td +class="left"><span class="smcap">Dr. R. B. Perry</span>, Harvard +University.</td></tr> + +</table> + +<hr class="c33" /> + +<h3 class="p4 center"><a name="Theory"></a>ON THE THEORY OF SCIENCE</h3> + +<h4>BY WILHELM OSTWALD</h4> + +<p class="center">(<i>Translated from the German by Dr. R. M. Yerkes, +Harvard University</i>)</p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>Wilhelm Ostwald</b>, Professor of Physical Chemistry, University +of Leipzig, since 1887. b. September 2, 1853, Riga, Russia. <b>Grad.</b> +Candidate Chemistry, 1877; Master Chemistry, 1878; Doctor Chemistry, +Dorpat. Dr. Hon. Halle and Cambridge; Privy Councilor; Assistant, +Dorpat, 1875-81; Regular Professor, Riga 1881-87. Member various learned +and scientific societies. <b>Author of</b> <i>Manual of General +Chemistry</i>; <i>Electro Chemistry</i>; <i>Foundation of Inorganic +Chemistry</i>; <i>Lectures on Philosophy of Nature</i>; <i>Artist's +Letters</i>; <i>Essays and Lectures</i>; and many other noted works and +papers on Chemistry and Philosophy.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">One of the few points on which the philosophy of to-day is +united is the knowledge that the only thing completely certain and +undoubted for each one is the content of his own consciousness; and here +the certainty is to be ascribed not to the content of consciousness in +general, but only to the momentary content.</p> + +<p>This momentary content we divide into two large groups, which we +refer to the inner and outer world. If we call any kind of content of +consciousness an experience, then we ascribe to the outer world such +experiences as arise without the activity of our will and cannot be +called forth by its activity alone. Such experiences never arise without +the activity of certain parts of our body, which we call sense organs. +In other words, the outer world is that which reaches our consciousness +through the senses.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, we ascribe to our inner world all experiences +which arise without the immediate assistance of a sense organ. Here, +first of all, belong all experiences which we call remembering and +thinking. An exact and complete differentiation of the two territories +is not intended here, for our purpose does not demand that this task be +undertaken. For this purpose the general orientation in which every one +recognizes familiar facts of his consciousness is sufficient.</p> + +<p>Each experience has the characteristic of uniqueness. None of us +doubts that the expression of the poet "Everything is only repeated in +life" is really just the opposite of the truth, and that in fact nothing +is repeated in life. But to express such a judgment we must be in +position to compare different experiences with each other, and this +possibility rests upon a fundamental phenomenon of our consciousness, +memory. Memory alone enables us to put various experiences in relation +to each other, so that the question as to their likeness or difference +can be asked.</p> + +<p>We find the simpler relations here in the inner experiences. A +certain thought, such as twice two is four, I can bring up in my +consciousness as often as I wish, and in addition to the content of the +thought I experience the further consciousness that I have already had +this thought before, that it is familiar to me.</p> + +<p>A similar but somewhat more complex phenomenon appears in the +experiences in which the outer world takes part. After I have eaten an +apple, I can repeat the experience in two ways. First, as an inner +experience, I can remember that I have eaten the apple and by an effort +of my will I can re-create in myself, although with diminished strength +and intensity, a part of the former experience—the part which +belonged to my inner world. Another part, the sense impression which +belonged to that experience, I cannot re-create by an effort of my will, +but I must again eat an apple in order to have a similar experience of +this sort. This is a complete repetition of the experience to which the +external world also contributes. Such a repetition does not depend +altogether on my own powers, for it is necessary that I have an apple, +that is, that certain conditions which are independent of me and belong +to the outer world be fulfilled.</p> + +<p>Whether the outer world takes part in the repetition of an experience +or not has no influence upon the possibility of the content of +consciousness which we call memory. From this it follows that this +content depends upon the inner experience alone, and that we remember an +external event only by means of its inner constituents. The mere +repetition of corresponding sense impressions is not sufficient for +this, for we can see the same person repeatedly without recognizing him, +if the inner accompanying phenomena were so insignificant, as a result +of lack of interest, that their repetition does not produce the content +of consciousness known as memory. If we see him quite frequently, the +frequent repetition of the external impression finally causes the memory +of the corresponding inner experience.</p> + +<p>From this it results that for the "memory"-reaction a certain +intensity of the inner experience is necessary. This threshold can be +attained either at once or by continued repetition. The repetitions are +the more effective the more rapidly they follow each other. From this we +may conclude that the memory-value of an experience, or its capacity for +calling forth the "memory"-reaction by repetition, decreases with the +lapse of time. Further, we must consider the fact mentioned above, that +an experience is never exactly repeated, and that therefore the +"memory"-reaction occurs even where there is only resemblance or partial +agreement in place of complete agreement. Here, too, there are different +degrees; memory takes place more easily the more perfectly the two +experiences agree, and <i>vice versa</i>.</p> + +<p>If we look at these phenomena from the physiological side, we may say +we have two kinds of apparatus or organs, one of which does not depend +upon our will, whereas the other does. The former are the sense organs. +The latter constitutes the organ of thought. Only the activities of the +latter constitute our experiences or the content of our +consciousness.</p> + +<p>The activities of the former may call forth the corresponding +processes of the latter, but this is not always necessary. Our sense +organs can be influenced without our "noticing" it, that is, without the +thinking apparatus being involved. An especially important reaction of +the thinking apparatus is memory, that is, the consciousness that an +experience which we have just had possesses more or less agreement with +former experiences. With reference to the organ of thought, it is the +expression of the general physiological fact that every process +influences the organ in such a way that it has a different relation to +the repetition of this process, from the first time, and moreover that +the repetition is rendered easier. This influence decreases with +time.</p> + +<p>It is chiefly upon these phenomena that experience rests. Experience +results from the fact that all events consist of a complete series of +simultaneous and successive components. When a connection between some +of those parts has become familiar to us by the repetition of similar +occurrences (for instance, the succession of day and night), we do not +feel such an occurrence as something completely new, but as something +partially familiar, and the single parts or phases of it do not surprise +us, but rather we anticipate their coming or expect them. From +expectation to prediction is only a short step, and so experience +enables us to prophesy the future from the past and present.</p> + +<p>Now this is also the road to science: for science is nothing but +systematized experience, that is, experience reduced to its simplest and +clearest forms. Its purposes to predict from a part of a phenomenon +which is known another part which is not yet known. Here it may be a +question of spatial as well as of temporal phenomena. Thus the +scientific zoölogist knows how to "determine," that is, to tell, from +the skull of an animal, the nature of the other parts of the animal to +which the skull belongs; likewise the astronomer is able to indicate the +future, situation of a planet from a few observations of its present +situation; and the more exact the first observations were, the more +distant the future for which he can predict. All such scientific +predictions are limited, therefore, with reference to their number and +their accuracy. If the skull shown to the zoölogist is that of a +chicken, then he will probably be able to indicate the general +characteristics of chickens, and also perhaps whether the chicken had a +top-knot or not; but not its color, and only uncertainly its age and its +size. Both facts, the possibility of prediction and its limitation in +content and amount, are an expression for the two fundamental facts, +that among our experiences there is similarity, but not complete +agreement.</p> + +<p>The foregoing considerations deserve to be discussed and extended in +several directions. First, the objection will be made that a chicken or +a planet is not an experience; we call them rather by the most general +name of thing. But our knowledge of the chicken begins with the +experiencing of certain visual impressions, to which are added, perhaps, +certain impressions of hearing and touch. The sight impressions (to +discuss these first) by no means completely agree. We see the chicken +large or small, according to the distance; and according to its position +and movement its outline is very different. As we have seen, however, +these differences are continually grading into one other and do not +reach beyond certain limits; we neglect to observe them and rest +contented with the fact that certain other peculiarities (legs, wings, +eyes, bill, comb, etc.) remain and do not change. The constant +properties we group together as a thing, and the changing ones we call +the states of this thing. Among the changing properties, we distinguish +further those which depend upon us (for example, the distance) and those +upon which we have no immediate influence (for instance, the position or +motion): the first is called the subjective changeable part of our +experience, while the second is called the objective mutability of the +thing.</p> + +<p>This omission of both the subjectively and objectively changeable +portion of the experience in connection with the retention of the +constant portion and the gathering together of the latter into a unity +is one of the most important operations which we perform with our +experiences. We call it the process of abstraction, and its product, the +permanent unity, we call a concept. Plainly this procedure contains +arbitrary as well as necessary factors. Arbitrary or accidental is the +circumstance that quite different phases of a given experience come to +consciousness according to our attention, the amount of practice we have +had, indeed according to our whole intellectual nature. We may overlook +constant factors and attend to changeable ones. The objective factors, +however, become necessary as soon as we have noticed them; after we have +seen that the chicken is black, it is not in our power to see it red. +Accordingly, in general, our knowledge of that which agrees must be less +than it actually could be, since we have not been able to observe every +agreement, and our concept is always poorer in constituents at any given +time than it might be. To seek out such elements of concepts as have +been overlooked, and to prove that they are necessary factors of the +corresponding experiences, is one of the never-ending tasks of science. +The other case, namely, that elements have been received in the concept +which do not prove to be constant, also happens, and leads to another +task. One can then leave that element out of the concept, if further +experiences show that the other elements are found in them, or one can +form a new concept which contains the former elements, leaving out those +that have been recognized as unessential. For a long time the white +color belonged to the concept swan. When the Dutch black swans became +known, it was possible either to drop the element white from the concept +swan (as actually happened), or to make a new concept for the bird which +is similar to the swan but black. Which choice is made in a given case +is largely arbitrary, and is determined by considerations of +expediency.</p> + +<p>Into the formation of concepts, therefore, two factors are operative, +an objective empirical factor, and a subjective or purposive factor. The +fitness of a concept is seen in relation to its purpose, which we shall +now consider.</p> + +<p>The purpose of a concept is its use for prediction. The old logic set +up the syllogism as the type of thought-activity, and its simplest +example is the well-known</p> + +<div class="poem"> + <span class="i2">All men are mortal,</span><br /> + <span class="i2">Caius is a man,</span><br /> + <span class="i2">Therefore Caius is mortal.</span><br /> +</div> + +<p>In general, the scheme runs</p> + +<div class="poem"> + <span class="i0">To the concept M belongs the element B,</span><br /> + <span class="i0">C belongs under the concept M,</span><br /> + <span class="i0">Therefore the element B is found in C.</span><br /> +</div> + +<p>One can say that this method of reasoning is in regular use even to +this day. It must be added, however, that this use is of a quite +different nature from that of the ancients. Whereas formerly the setting +up of the first proposition or the major premise was considered the most +important thing, and the establishment of the second proposition or +minor premise was thought to be a rather trifling matter, now the +relation is reversed. The major premise contains the description of a +concept, the minor makes the assertion that a certain thing belongs +under this concept. What right exists for such an assertion? The most +palpable reply would be, since all the elements of the concept M +(including B) are found in C, C belongs under the concept M. Such a +conclusion would indeed be binding, but at the same time quite +worthless, for it only repeats the minor premise. Actually the method of +reasoning is essentially different, for the minor premise is not +obtained by showing that all the elements of the concept M are found in +C, but only some of them. The conclusion is not necessary, but only +probable, and the whole process of reasoning runs: Certain elements are +frequently found together, therefore they are united in the concept M. +Certain of these elements are recognized in the thing C, therefore +probably the other elements of the concept M will be found in C.</p> + +<p>The old logic, also, was familiar with this kind of conclusion. It +was branded, however, as the worst of all, by the name of incomplete +induction, since the absolute certainty demanded of the syllogism did +not belong to its results. One must admit, however, that the whole of +modern science makes use of no other form of reasoning than incomplete +induction, for it alone admits of a prediction, that is, an indication +of relations which have not been immediately observed.</p> + +<p>How does science get along with the defective certainty of this +process of reasoning? The answer is, that the probability of the +conclusion can run through all degrees from mere conjecture to the +maximum probability, which is practically indistinguishable from +certainty. The probability is the greater the more frequently an +incomplete induction of this kind has proven correct in later +experience. Accordingly we have at our command a number of expressions +which in their simplest and most general form have the appearance: If an +element A is met within a thing, then the element B is also found in it +(in spatial or temporal relationship).</p> + +<p>If the relation is temporal, this general statement is known by some +such name as the law of causality. If it is spatial, one talks of the +idea (in the Platonic sense), or the type of the thing, of substance, +etc.</p> + +<p>From the considerations here presented we get an easy answer to many +questions which are frequently discussed in very different senses. +First, the question concerning the general validity of the law of +causality. All attempts to prove such a validity have failed, and there +has remained only the indication that without this law we should feel an +unbearable uncertainty in reference to the world. From this, however, we +see very plainly that here it is merely a question of expediency. From +the continuous flux of our experiences we hunt out those groups which +can always be found again, in order to be able to conclude that if the +element A is given, the element B will be present. We do not find this +relationship as "given," but we put it into our experiences, in that we +consider the parts which correspond to the relationship as belonging +together.</p> + +<p>The very same thing may be said of spatial complexes. Such factors as +are always, or at any rate often, found together are taken by us as +"belonging together," and out of them a concept is formed which embraces +these factors. A question as to the why has here, as with the temporal +complexes, no definite meaning. There are countless things that happen +together once to which we pay no attention because they happen only once +or but seldom. The knowledge of the fact that such a single concurrence +exists amounts to nothing, since from the presence of one factor it does +not lead to a conclusion as to the presence of another, and therefore +does not make possible prediction. Of all the possible, and even actual +combinations, only those interest us which are repeated, and this +arbitrary but expedient selection produces the impression that the world +consists only of combinations that can be repeated; that, in other +words, the law of causality or of the type is a general one. However +general or limited application those laws have, is more a question of +our skill in finding the constant combinations among those that are +present than a question of objective natural fact.</p> + +<p>Thus we see the development and pursuit of all sciences going on in +such a way that on the one hand more and more constant combinations are +discovered, and on the other hand more inclusive relations of this kind +are found out, by means of which elements are united with each other +which before no one had even tried to bring together. So sciences are +increasing both in the sense of an increasing complication and in an +increasing unification.</p> + +<p>If we consider from this standpoint the development and procedure of +the various sciences, we find a rational division of the sum total of +science in the question as to the scope and multiplicity of the +combinations or groups treated of in them. These two properties are in a +certain sense antithetical. The simpler a complex is, that is, the fewer +elements brought together in it, the more frequently it is met with, and +<i>vice versa</i>. One can therefore arrange all the sciences in such a +way that one begins with the least multiplicity and the greatest scope, +and ends with the greatest multiplicity and the least scope. The first +science will be the most general, and will therefore contain the most +general and therefore the most barren concepts; the last will contain +the most specific and therefore the richest.</p> + +<p>What are these limiting concepts? The most general is the concept of +<i>thing</i>, that is, any piece of experience, seized arbitrarily from +the flux of our experiences, which can be repeated. The most specific +and richest is the concept of <i>human intercourse</i>. Between the +science of things and the science of human intercourse, all the other +sciences are found arranged in regular gradation. If one follows out the +scheme the following outline results:</p> + +<table class="bold" border="0" cellpadding="0" summary="Method of +Science"> + +<tr><td class="right">1.</td><td class="left">Theory of order.</td><td +class="right">⎫</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">2.</td><td class="left">Theory of numbers, or +arithmetic.</td><td class="right">⎬</td><td +class="left">Mathematics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">3.</td><td class="left">Theory of time.</td><td +class="right">⎪</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">4.</td><td class="left">Theory of space, or +geometry.</td><td class="right">⎭</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">5.</td><td class="left">Mechanics.</td><td +class="right">⎫</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">6.</td><td class="left">Physics.</td><td +class="right">⎬</td><td class="left">Energetics.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">7.</td><td class="left">Chemistry.</td><td +class="right">⎭</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">8.</td><td class="left">Physiology.</td><td +class="right">⎫</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">9.</td><td class="left">Psychology.</td><td +class="right">⎬</td><td class="left">Biology.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="right">10.</td><td class="left">Sociology.</td><td +class="right">⎭</td></tr> + +</table> + +<p>This table is arbitrary in so far as the grades assumed can be +increased or diminished according to need. For example, mechanics and +physics could be taken together; or between physics and chemistry, +physical chemistry could be inserted. Likewise between physiology and +psychology, anthropology might find a place; or the first five sciences +might be united under mathematics. How one makes these divisions is +entirely a practical question, which will be answered at any time in +accordance with the purposes of division; and dispute concerning the +matter is almost useless.</p> + +<p>I should like, however, to call attention to the three great groups +of mathematics, energetics, and biology (in the wider sense). They +represent the decisive regulative thought which humanity has evolved, +contributed up to this time, toward the scientific mastery of its +experiences. Arrangement is the fundamental thought of mathematics. From +mechanics to chemistry the concept of energy is the most important; and +for the last three sciences it is the concept of life. Mathematics, +energetics, and biology, therefore, embrace the totality of the +sciences.</p> + +<p>Before we enter upon the closer consideration of these sciences, it +will be well to anticipate another objection which can be raised on the +basis of the following fact. Besides the sciences named (and those which +lie between them) there are many others, as geology, history, medicine, +philology, which we find difficulty in arranging in the above scheme, +which must, however, be taken into consideration in some way or other. +They are often characterized by the fact that they stand in relation +with several of the sciences named, but even more by the following +circumstance. Their task is not, as is true of the pure sciences above +named, the discovery of general relationships, but they relate rather to +existing complex objects whose origin, scope, extent, etc., in short, +whose temporal and spatial relationships they have to discover or to +"explain." For this purpose they make use of relations which are placed +at their disposal by the first-named pure sciences. These sciences, +therefore, had better be called applied sciences. However, in this +connection we should not think only or even chiefly of technical +applications; rather the expression is used to indicate that the +reciprocal relations of the parts of an object are to be called to mind +by the application of the general rules found in pure science.</p> + +<p>While in such a task the abstraction process of pure science is not +applicable (for the omission of certain parts and the concentration upon +others which is characteristic of these is excluded by the nature of the +task), yet in a given case usually the necessity of bringing in various +pure sciences for the purpose of explanation is evident.</p> + +<p>Astronomy is one of these applied sciences. Primarily it rests upon +mechanics, and in its instrumental portion, upon optics; in its present +development on the spectroscopic side, however, it borrows considerably +of chemistry. In like manner history is applied sociology and +psychology. Medicine makes use of all the sciences before mentioned, up +to psychology, etc.</p> + +<p>It is important to get clearly in mind the nature of these sciences, +since, on account of their compound nature, they resist arrangement +amongst the pure sciences, while, on account of their practical +significance, they still demand consideration. The latter fact gives +them also a sort of arbitrary or accidental character, since their +development is largely conditioned by the special needs of the time. +Their number, speaking in general, is very large, since each pure +science may be turned into an applied science in various ways; and since +in addition we have combinations of two, three, or more sciences. +Moreover, the method of procedure in the applied sciences is +fundamentally different from that in the pure sciences. In the first it +is a question of the greatest possible analysis of a single given +complex into its scientifically comprehensible parts; while pure +science, on the other hand, considers many complexes together in order +to separate out from them their common element, but expressly disclaims +the complete analysis of a single complex.</p> + +<p>In scientific work, as it appears in practice, pure and applied +science are by no means sharply separated. On the one hand the +auxiliaries of investigations, such as apparatus, books, etc., demand of +the pure investigator knowledge and application in applied science; and, +on the other hand, the applied scientist is frequently unable to +accomplish his task unless he himself becomes for the time being a pure +investigator and ascertains or discovers the missing general +relationships which he needs for his task. A separation and +differentiation of the two forms of science was necessary, however, +since the method and the aim of each present essential differences.</p> + +<p>In order to consider the method of procedure of pure science more +carefully, let us turn back to the table on pages 339, 340, and attend +to the single sciences separately. The theory of arrangement was +mentioned first, although this place is usually assigned to mathematics. +However, mathematics has to do with the concepts of number and magnitude +as fundamentals, while the theory of arrangement does not make use of +these. Here the fundamental concept is rather the thing or object of +which nothing more is demanded or considered than that it is a fragment +of our experience which can be isolated and will remain so. It must not +be an arbitrary combination; such a thing would have only momentary +duration, and the task of science, to learn the unknown from the given, +could not find application. Rather must this element have such a nature +that it can be characterized and recognized again, that is, it must +already have a conceptual nature. Therefore only parts of our experience +which can be repeated (which alone can be objects of science) can be +characterized as things or objects. But in saying this we have said all +that was demanded of them. In other respects they may be just as +different as is conceivable.</p> + +<p>If the question is asked, What can be said scientifically about +indefinite things of this sort? it is especially the relations of +arrangement and association which yield an answer. If we call any +definite combination of such things a group, we can arrange such a group +in different ways, that is, we can determine for each thing the relation +in which it is to stand to the neighboring thing. From every such +arrangement result not only the relationships indicated, but a great +number of new ones, and it appears that when the first relationships are +given the others always follow in like manner. This, however, is the +type of the scientific proposition or natural law (page 335). From the +presence of certain relations of arrangement we can deduce the presence +of others which we have not yet demonstrated.</p> + +<p>To illustrate this fact by an example, let us think of the things +arranged in a simple row, while we choose one thing as a first member +and associate another with it as following it; with the latter another +is associated, etc. Thereby the position of each thing in the row is +determined only in relation to the immediately preceding thing. +Nevertheless, the position of every member in the whole row, and +therefore its relation to every other member, is determined by this. +This is seen in a number of special laws. If we differentiate former and +latter members we can formulate the proposition, among others, if B is a +later member with reference to A, and C with reference to B, then C is +also a later member with reference to A.</p> + +<p>The correctness and validity of this proposition seems to us beyond +all doubt. But this is only a result of the fact that we are able to +demonstrate it very easily in countless single cases, and have so +demonstrated it. We know only cases which correspond to the proposition, +and have never experienced a contradictory case. To call such a +proposition, however, a necessity of thinking, does not appear to me +correct. For the expression necessity of thinking can only rest upon the +fact that every time the proposition is thought, that is, every time one +remembers its demonstration, its confirmation always arises. But every +sort of false proposition is also thinkable. An undeniable proof of this +is the fact that so much which is false is actually thought. But to base +the proof for the correctness of a proposition upon the impossibility of +thinking its opposite is an impossible undertaking, because every sort +of nonsense can be thought: where the proof was thought to have been +given, there has always been a confusion of thought and intuition, proof +or inspection.</p> + +<p>With this one proposition of course the theory of order is not +exhausted, for here it is not a question of the development of this +theory, but of an example of the nature of the problems of science. Of +the further questions we shall briefly discuss the problem of +association.</p> + +<p>If we have two groups A and B given, one can associate with every +member of A one of B; that is, we determine that certain operations +which can be carried on with the members of A are also to be carried on +with those of B. Now we can begin by simply carrying out the +association, member for member. Then we shall have one of three results: +A will be exhausted while there are still members of B left, or B will +be exhausted first, or finally A and B will be exhausted at the same +time. In the first case we call A poorer than B; in the second B poorer +than A; in the third both quantities are alike.</p> + +<p>Here for the first time we come upon the scientific concept of +equality, which calls for discussion. There can be no question of a +complete identity of the two groups which have been denominated equal, +for we have made the assumption that the members of both groups can be +of any nature whatever. They can then be as different as possible, +considered singly, but they are alike as groups. However I may arrange +the members of A, I can make a similar arrangement of the members of B, +since every member of A has one of B associated with it; and with +reference to the property of arrangement there is no difference to be +observed between A and B. If, however, A is poorer or richer than B, +this possibility ceases, for then one of the groups has members to which +none of the members in the other group corresponds; so that the +operations carried out with these members cannot be carried out with +those of the other group.</p> + +<p>Equality in the scientific sense, therefore, means equivalence, or +the possibility of substitution in quite definite operations or for +quite definite relations. Beyond this the things which are called like +may show any differences whatever. The general scientific process of +abstraction is again easily seen in this special case.</p> + +<p>On the basis of the definitions just given, we can establish further +propositions. If group A equals B, and B equals C, then A also equals C. +The proof of this is that we can relate every member of A to a +corresponding member of B and by hypothesis no member will be left. Then +C is arranged with reference to B, and here also no member is left. By +this process every member of A, through the connecting link of a member +of B, is associated with a member of C, and this association is +preserved even if we cut out the group B. Therefore A and C are equal. +The same process of reasoning can be carried out for any number of +groups.</p> + +<p>Likewise it can be demonstrated that if A is poorer than B and B +poorer than C, then A is also poorer than C. For in the association of B +with A some members of B are left over by hypothesis, and likewise some +members of C are left over if one associates C with B. Therefore in the +association of C with A, not only those members are left over which +could not be associated with B, but also those members of C which extend +beyond B. This proposition can be extended to any number of groups, and +permits the arrangement of a number of different groups in a simple +series by beginning with the poorest and choosing each following so that +it is richer than the preceding but poorer than the following. From the +proposition just established, it follows that every group is so arranged +with reference to all other groups that it is richer than all the +preceding and poorer than all the following.<a name="fnanchor_3" +id="fnanchor_3"></a><a href="#footnote_3" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[3]</sup></a></p> + +<p>In this derivation of scientific proposition or laws of the simplest +kinds, the process of derivation and the nature of the result becomes +particularly clear. We arrive at such a proposition by performing an +operation and expressing the result of it. This expression enables us to +avoid the repetition of the operation in the future, since in accordance +with the law we can indicate the result immediately. Thus an +abbreviation and therefore, a facilitation of the problem is attained +which is the more considerable the larger the number of operations +saved.</p> + +<p>If we have a number of equal groups, we know by the process of +association that all of the operations with reference to arrangement +which we can perform with one of them can be performed with all the +others. It is sufficient, therefore, to determine the properties of +arrangement of one of these groups in order to know forthwith the +properties of all the others. This is an extremely important +proposition, which is continually employed for the most various +purposes. All speaking, writing, and reading rests upon the association +of thoughts with sounds and symbols, and by arranging the signs in +accordance with our thoughts we bring it to pass that our hearers or +readers think like thoughts in like order. In a similar fashion we make +use of various systems of formulæ in the different sciences, especially +in the simpler sciences; and these formulæ we correlate with phenomena +and use in place of the phenomena themselves, and can therefore derive +from them certain characteristics of phenomena without being compelled +to use the latter. The force of this process appears very strikingly in +astronomy where, by the use of definite formulæ associated with the +different heavenly bodies, we can foretell the future positions of these +bodies with a high degree of approximation.</p> + +<p>From the theory of order we come to the theory of number or +arithmetic by the systematic arrangement or development of an operation +just indicated (page 343). We can arrange any number of groups in such a +way that a richer always follows a poorer. But the complex obtained in +this manner is always accidental with reference to the number and the +richness of its members. A regular and complete structure of all +possible groups is evidently obtained only if we start from a group of +one member or from a simple thing, and by the addition of one member at +a time make further groups out of those that we have. Thus we obtain +different groups arranged according to an increasing richness, and since +we have advanced one member at a time, that is, made the smallest step +which is possible, we are certain that we have left out no possible +group which is poorer than the richest to which the operation has been +carried.</p> + +<p>This whole process is familiar; it gives the series of the positive +whole numbers, that is, the cardinal numbers. It is to be noted that the +concept of quantity has not yet been considered; what we have gained is +the concept of number. The single things or members in this number are +quite arbitrary, and especially they do not need to be alike in any +manner. Every number forms a group-type, and arithmetic or the science +of numbers has the task of investigating the properties of these +different types with reference to their division and combination. If +this is done in general form, without attention to the special amount of +the number, the corresponding science is called algebra. On the other +hand, by the application of formal rules of formation, the number system +has had one extension after another beyond the territory of its original +validity. Thus counting backward led to zero and to the negative +numbers; the inversion of involution to the imaginary numbers. For the +group-type of the positive whole numbers is the simplest but by no means +the only possible one, and for the purpose of representing other +manifolds than those which are met with in experience, these new types +have proved themselves very useful.</p> + +<p>At the same time the number series gives us an extremely useful type +of arrangement. In the process of arising it is already ordered, and we +make use of it for the purpose of arranging other groups. Thus, we are +accustomed to furnish the pages in a book, the seats in a theatre, and +countless other groups which we wish to make use of in any kind of order +with the signs of the number series, and thereby we make the tacit +assumption that the use of that corresponding group shall take place in +the same order as the natural numbers follow each other. The ordinal +numbers arising therefrom do not represent quantities, nor do they +represent the only possible type of arrangement, but they are again the +simplest of all. We come to the concept of magnitude only in the theory +of time and space. The theory of time has not been developed as a +special science; on the contrary, what we have to say about time first +appears in mechanics. Meantime we can present the fundamental concepts, +which arise in this connection, with reference to such well-known +characteristics of time that the lack of a special science of time is no +disadvantage.</p> + +<p>The first and most important characteristic of time (and of space, +too) is that it is a continuous manifold; that is, every portion of time +chosen can be divided at any place whatever. In the number series this +is not the case; it can be divided only between the single numbers. The +series one to ten has only nine places of division and no more. A +minute, or a second, on the other hand, has an unlimited number of +places of division. In other words, there is nothing in the lapse of any +time which hinders us from separating or distinguishing in thought at +any given instant the time which has elapsed till then from the +following time. It is just the same with space, except that time is a +simple manifold and space a threefold, continuous manifold.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, when we measure them, we are accustomed to indicate +times and spaces with numbers. If we first examine, for example, the +process of measuring a length, it consists in our applying to the +distance to be measured a length conceived as unchangeable, the unit of +measure, until we have passed over the distance. The number of these +applications gives us the measure or magnitude of the distance. The +result is that by the indication of arbitrarily chosen points upon the +continuous distance, we place upon it an artificial discontinuity which +enables us to associate it with the discontinuous number series.</p> + +<p>A still further assumption, however, belongs to the concept of +measuring, namely, that the parts of the distance cut off by the unit +used as a measure be equal, and it is taken for granted that this +requirement will be fulfilled to whatever place the unit of measure is +shifted. As may be seen, this is a definition of equality carried +further than the former, for one cannot actually replace a part of the +distance by another in order to convince one's self that it has not +changed. Just as little can one assert or prove that the unit of measure +in changing its place in space remains of the same length; we can only +say that such distances as are determined by the unit of measure in +different places are declared or defined as equal. Actually, for our +eye, the unit of measure becomes smaller in perspective the farther away +from it we find ourselves.</p> + +<p>From this example we see again the great contribution which +arbitrariness or free choice has made to all our structure of science. +We could develop a geometry in which distances which seem subjectively +equal to our eye are called equal, and upon this assumption we would be +able to develop a self-consistent system or science. Such a geometry, +however, would have an extremely complex and impractical structure for +objective purposes (as, for example, land measurement), and so we strive +to develop a science as free as possible from subjective factors. +Historically, we have before us a process of this sort in the astronomy +of Ptolemy and that of Copernicus. The former corresponded to the +subjective appearances in the assumption that all heavenly bodies +revolved around the earth, but proved to be very complicated when +confronted with the task of mastering these movements with figures. The +latter gave up the subjective standpoint of the observer, who looked +upon himself as the centre, and attained a tremendous simplification by +placing the centre of revolution in the sun.</p> + +<p>A few words are to be said here about the application of arithmetic +and algebra to geometry. It is well known that under definite +assumptions (coördinates), geometrical figures can be represented by +means of algebraic formulæ, so that the geometrical properties of the +figure can be deduced from the arithmetical properties of the formulæ, +and <i>vice versa</i>. The question must be asked how such a close and +univocal relationship is possible between things of such different +nature. The answer is, that here is an especially clear case of +association. The manifold of numbers is much greater than that of +surface or space, for while the latter are determined by two or three +independent measurements, one can have any number of independent number +series working together. Therefore the manifold of numbers is +arbitrarily limited to two or three independent series, and in so far +determines their mutual relations (by means of the laws of cosine) that +there results a manifold, corresponding to the spatial, which can be +completely associated with the spatial manifold. Then we have two +manifolds of the same manifold character, and all characteristics of +arrangement and size of the one find their likeness in the other.</p> + +<p>This again characterizes an extremely important scientific procedure +which consists, namely, in constructing a formal manifold for the +content of experience of a certain field, to which one attributes the +same manifold character which the former possesses. Every science +reaches by this means a sort of formal language of corresponding +completeness, which depends upon how accurately the manifold character +of the object is recognized and how judiciously the formulæ have been +chosen. While in arithmetic and algebra this task has been performed +fairly well (though by no means absolutely perfectly), the chemical +formulæ, for instance, express only a relatively small part of the +manifold to be represented; and in biology as far as sociology, scarcely +the first attempts have been made in the accomplishment of this +task.</p> + +<p>Language especially serves as such a universal manifold to represent +the manifolds of experience. As a result of its development from a time +of less culture, it has by no means sufficient regularity and +completeness to accomplish its purpose adequately and conveniently. +Rather, it is just as unsystematic as the events in the lives of single +peoples have been, and the necessity of expressing the endlessly +different particulars of daily life has only allowed it to develop so +that the correspondence between word and concept is kept rather +indefinite and changeable, according to need within somewhat wide +limits. Thus all work in those sciences which must make vital use of +these means, as especially psychology and sociology, or philosophy in +general, is made extremely difficult by the ceaseless struggle with the +indefiniteness and ambiguity of language. An improvement of this +condition can be effected only by introducing signs in place of words +for the representation of concepts, as the progress of science allows +it, and equipping these signs with the manifold which from experience +belongs to the concept.</p> + +<p>An intermediate position in this respect is taken by the sciences +which were indicated above as parts of energetics. In this realm there +is added to the concepts order, number, size, space, and time, a new +concept, that of energy, which finds application to every single +phenomenon in this whole field, just as do those more general concepts. +This is due to the fact that a certain quantity, which is known to us +most familiarly as mechanical work, on account of its qualitative +transformability and quantitative constancy, can be shown to be a +constituent of every physical phenomenon, that is, every phenomenon +which belongs to the field of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. In +other words, one can perfectly characterize every physical event by +indicating what amounts and kinds of energy have been present in it and +into what energies they have been transformed. Accordingly, it is +logical to designate the so-called physical phenomena as +energetical.</p> + +<p>That such a conception is possible is now generally admitted. On the +other hand, its expediency is frequently questioned, and there is at +present so much the more reason for this because a thorough presentation +of the physical sciences in the energetical sense has not yet been made. +If one applies to this question the criterion of the scientific system +given above, the completeness of the correspondence between the +representing manifold and that to be represented, there is no doubt that +all previous systematizations in the form of hypotheses which have been +tried in these sciences are defective in this respect. Formerly, for the +purpose of representing experiences, manifolds whose character +corresponded to the character of the manifold to be represented only in +certain salient points without consideration of any rigid agreement, +indeed, even without definite question as to such an agreement, have +been employed.</p> + +<p>The energetical conception admits of that definiteness of +representation which the condition of science demands and renders +possible. For each special manifold character of the field a special +kind of energy presents itself: science has long distinguished +mechanical, electric, thermal, chemical, etc., energies. All of these +different kinds hold together by the law of transformation with the +maintenance of the quantitative amount, and in so far are united. On the +other hand, it has been possible to fix upon the corresponding +energetical expression for every empirically discovered manifold. As a +future system of united energetics, we have then a table of possible +manifolds of which energy is capable. In this we must keep in mind the +fact that, in accordance with the law of the conservation, energy is a +necessarily positive quantity which also is furnished with the property +of unlimited possibility of addition; therefore, every particular kind +of energy must have this character.</p> + +<p>The very small manifold which seems to lack this condition is much +widened by the fact that every kind of energy can be separated into two +factors, which are only subject to the limitation that their product, +the energy, fulfills the conditions mentioned while they themselves are +much freer. For example, one factor of a kind of enemy can become +negative as well as positive; it is only necessary that at the same time +the other factor should become negative, viz., positive.</p> + +<p>Thus it seems possible to make a table of all possible forms of +energy, by attributing all thinkable manifold characteristics to the +factors of the energy and then combining them by pairs and cutting out +those products which do not fulfill the above-mentioned conditions. For +a number of years I have tried from time to time to carry out this +programme, but I have not yet got far enough to justify publication of +the results obtained.</p> + +<p>If we turn to the biological sciences, in them the phenomenon of life +appears to us as new. If we stick to the observed facts, keeping +ourselves free from all hypotheses, we observe as the general +characteristics of the phenomena of life the continuous stream of energy +which courses through a relatively constant structure. Change of +substance is only a part, although a very important part, of this +stream. Especially in plants we can observe at first hand the great +importance of energy in its most incorporeal form, the sun's rays. Along +with this, self-preservation and development and reproduction, the +begetting of offspring of like nature, are characteristic. All of these +properties must be present in order that an organism may come into +existence; they must also be present if the reflecting man is to be able +by repeated experience to form a concept of any definite organism, +whether of a lion or of a mushroom. Other organisms are met with which +do not fulfill these conditions; on account of their rarity, however, +they do not lead to a species concept, but are excluded from scientific +consideration (except for special purposes) as deformities or +monsters.</p> + +<p>While organisms usually work with kinds of energy which we know well +from the inorganic world, organs are found in the higher forms which +without doubt cause or assist transfers of energy, but we cannot yet say +definitely what particular kind of energy is active in them. These +organs are called nerves, and their function is regularly that, after +certain forms of energy have acted upon one end of them, they should act +at the other end and release the energies stored up there which then act +in their special manner. That energetical transformations also take +place in the nerve during the process of nervous transmission can be +looked upon as demonstrated. We shall thus be justified in speaking of a +nerve energy, while leaving it undecided whether there is here an energy +of a particular kind, or perhaps chemical energy, or finally a +combination of several energies.</p> + +<p>While these processes can be shown objectively by the stimulation of +the nerve and its corresponding releasing reaction in the end apparatus +(for instance, a muscle), we find in ourselves, connected with certain +nervous processes, a phenomenon of a new sort which we call +self-consciousness. From the agreement of our reactions with those of +other people we conclude with scientific probability that they also have +self-consciousness; and we are justified in making the same conclusion +with regard to some higher animals. How far down something similar to +this is present cannot be determined by the means at hand, since the +analogy of organization and of behavior diminishes very quickly; but the +line is probably not very long, in view of the great leap from man to +animal. Moreover, there are many reasons for the view that the gray +cortical substance in the brain, with its characteristic pyramidal cell, +is the anatomical substratum of this kind of nervous activity.</p> + +<p>The study of the processes of self-consciousness constitutes the +chief task of psychology. To this science belong those fields which are +generally allotted to philosophy, especially logic and epistemology, +while æsthetics, and still more ethics, are to be reckoned with the +social sciences.</p> + +<p>The latter have to do with living beings in so far as they can be +united in groups with common functions. Here in place of the individual +mind appears a collective mind, which owing to the adjustment of the +differences of the members of society shows simpler conditions than +that. From this comes especially the task of the historical sciences. +The happenings in the world accessible to us are conditioned partly by +physical, partly by psychological factors, and both show a temporal +mutability in one direction. Thus arises on the one hand a history of +heaven and earth, on the other hand a history of organisms up to +man.</p> + +<p>All history has primarily the task of fixing past events through the +effects which have remained from them. Where such are not accessible, +only analogy is left, a very doubtful means for gaining a conception of +those events. But it must be kept in mind that an event which has left +no evident traces has no sort of interest for us, for our interest is +directly proportional to the amount of change which that event has +caused in what we have before us. The task of historical science is just +as little exhausted, however, with the fixing of former events as, for +instance, the task of physics with the establishment of a single fact, +as the temperature of a given place at a given time. Rather the +individual facts must serve to bring out the general characteristics of +the collective mind, and the much<ins title="hyphenated in the +original"> </ins>discussed historical laws are laws of collective +psychology. Just as physical and chemical laws are deduced in order with +their help to predict the course of future physical events (to be called +forth either experimentally or technically), so should the historical +laws contribute to the formation and control of social and political +development. We see that the great statesmen of all time have eagerly +studied history for this purpose, and from that we derive the assurance +that there are historical laws in spite of the objections of numerous +scholars.</p> + +<p>After this brief survey, if we look back over the road we have come, +we observe the following general facts. In every case the development of +a science consists in the formation of concepts by certain abstractions +from experience, and setting of these concepts in relation with each +other so that a systematical control of certain sides of our experience +is made possible. These relations, according to their generality and +reliability, are called rules or laws. A law is the more important the +more it definitely expresses concerning the greatest possible number of +things, and the more accurately, therefore, it enables us to predict the +future. Every law rests upon an incomplete induction, and is therefore +subject to modification by experience. From this there results a double +process in the development of science.</p> + +<p>First, the actual conditions are investigated to find out whether, +besides those already known, new rules or laws, that is, constant +relations between individual peculiarities, cannot be discovered between +them. This is the inductive process, and the induction is always an +incomplete one on account of the limitlessness of all possible +experience.</p> + +<p>Immediately the relationship found inductively is applied to cases +which have not yet been investigated. Especially such cases are +investigated as result from a combination of several inductive laws. If +these are perfectly certain, and the combination is also properly made, +the result has claim to unconditional validity. This is the limit which +all sciences are striving to reach. It has almost been reached in the +simpler sciences: in mathematics and in certain parts of mechanics. This +is called the deductive process.</p> + +<p>In the actual working of every science the two methods of +investigation are continually changing. The best means of finding new +successful inductions is in the making of a deduction on a very +insufficient basis, perhaps, and subsequently testing it in experience. +Sometimes the elements of his deductions do not come into the +investigator's consciousness; in such cases we speak of scientific +instinct. On the other hand we have much evidence from great +mathematicians that they were accustomed to find their general laws by +the method of induction, by trying and considering single cases; and +that the deductive derivation from other known laws is an independent +operation which sometimes does not succeed until much later. Indeed +there is to-day a number of mathematical propositions which have not yet +reached the second stage and therefore have at present a purely +inductive empirical character. The proportion of such laws in science +increases very quickly with the rise in the scale (page 339).</p> + +<p>Another peculiarity which may be mentioned here is that in the scale +all previous sciences have the character of applied sciences (page 341) +with reference to those which follow, since they are everywhere +necessary in the technique of the latter, yet do not serve to increase +their own field but are merely auxiliaries to the latter.</p> + +<p>If we ask finally what influence upon the shaping of the future such +investigations as those which have been sketched in outline above can +have, the following can be said. Up till now it has been considered a +completely uncontrollable event whether and where a great and +influential man of science has developed. It is obvious that such a man +is among the most costly treasures which a people (and, indeed, +humanity) can possess. The conscious and regular breeding of such +rarities has not been considered possible. While this is still the case +for the very exceptional genius, we see in the countries of the older +civilization, especially in Germany at present, a system of education in +vogue in the universities by which a regular harvest of young scientific +men is gained who not only have a mastery of knowledge handed down, but +also of the technique of discovery. Thereby the growth of science is +made certain and regular, and its pursuit is raised to a higher plane. +These results were formerly attained chiefly by empirically and +oftentimes by accidental processes. It is a task of scientific theory to +make this activity also regular and systematic, so that success is no +more dependent solely upon a special capacity for the founding of a +"school" but can also be attained by less original minds. By the mastery +of methods the way to considerably higher performances than he could +otherwise attain will be open for the exceptionally gifted.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_3" id="footnote_3"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_3">[3]</a> Equal groups cannot be distinguished +here, and therefore represent only a group.</p> + +<h3 class="p4 center"><a name="Causal"></a>THE CONTENT AND VALIDITY OF +THE CAUSAL LAW</h3> + +<h4>BY BENNO ERDMANN</h4> + +<p class="center">(<i>Translated from the German by Professor Walter T. +Marvin, Western Reserve University</i>)</p> + +<div class="blockquote"> + +<p>[<b>Benno Erdmann</b>, Professor of Philosophy, University of Bonn, +since 1898. b. October 5, 1851, Glogau in Schlesien, Germany. Ph.D.; +Privy Councilor. Academical Lecturer, Berlin, 1876- ; Special Professor, +Kiel, 1878-79; Regular Professor, <i>ibid.</i> 1879-84; <i>ibid.</i> +Breslau, 1884-90; <i>ibid.</i> Halle, 1890-98. Member various scientific +and learned societies. <b>Author of</b> <i>The Axioms of Geometry</i>; +<i>Kant's Criticism</i>; <i>Logic</i>; <i>Psychological Researches on +Reading</i> (together with Prof. Ramon Dodge); <i>The Psychology of the +Child and the School</i>; <i>Historical Researches an Kant's +Prolegomena</i>, and many other works and papers in Philosophy.]</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2">We have learned to regard the real, which we endeavor to +apprehend scientifically in universally valid judgments, as a whole that +is connected continuously in time and in space and by causation, and +that is accordingly continuously self-evolving. This continuity of +connection has the following result, namely, every attempt to classify +the sum total of the sciences on the basis of the difference of their +objects leads merely to representative types, that is, to species which +glide into one another. We find no gaps by means of which we can +separate sharply physics and chemistry, botany and zoölogy, political +and economic history and the histories of art and religion, or, again, +history, philology, and the study of the prehistoric.</p> + +<p>As are the objects, so also are the methods of science. They are +separable one from another only through a division into representative +types; for the variety of these methods is dependent upon the variety of +the objects of our knowledge, and is, at the same time, determined by +the difference between the manifold forms of our thought, itself a part +of the real, with its elements also gliding into One another.<a +name="fnanchor_4" id="fnanchor_4"></a><a href="#footnote_4" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[4]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The threads which join the general methodology of scientific thought +with neighboring fields of knowledge run in two main directions. In the +one direction they make up a closely packed cable, whereas in the other +their course diverges into all the dimensions of scientific thought. +That is to say, first, methodology has its roots in logic, in the +narrower sense, namely, in the science of the elementary forms of our +thought which enter into the make-up of all scientific methods. +Secondly, methodology has its source in the methods themselves which +actually, and therefore technically, develop in the various fields of +our knowledge out of the problems peculiar to those fields.</p> + +<p>It is the office of scientific thought to interpret validly the +objects that are presented to us in outer and inner perception, and that +can be derived from both these sources. We accomplish this +interpretation entirely through judgments and combinations of judgments +of manifold sorts. The concepts, which the older logic regarded as the +true elementary forms of our thinking, are only certain selected types +of judgment, such stereotyped judgments as those which make up +definitions and classifications, and which appear independent and +fundamental because their subject-matter, that is, their intension or +extension, is connected through the act of naming with certain words. +Scientific methods, then, are the ways and means by which our thought +can accomplish and set forth, in accordance with its ideal, this +universally valid interpretation.</p> + +<p>There belongs, accordingly, to methodology a list of problems which +we can divide, to be sure only <i>in abstracto</i>, into three separate +groups. First, methodology has to analyze the methods which have been +technically developed in the different fields of knowledge into the +elementary forms of our thinking from which they have been built up. +Next to this work of <i>analyzing</i>, there comes a second task which +may be called a <i>normative</i> one; for it follows that we must set +forth and deduce systematically from their sources the nature of these +manifold elements, their resulting connection, and their validity. To +these two offices must be added a third that we may call <i>a +potiori</i> a <i>synthetic</i> one; for finally we must reconstruct out +of the elements of our thinking, as revealed by analysis, the methods +belonging to the different fields of knowledge and also determine their +different scope and validity.</p> + +<p>The beginning of another conception of the office of methodology can +be found in those thoughts which have become significant, especially in +Leibnitz's fragments and drafts of a <i>calculus ratiocinator</i> or a +<i>spécieuse générale</i>. The foregoing discussion has set aside all +hope that these beginnings and their recent development may give, of the +possibility of constructing the manifold possible methods <i>a +priori</i>, that is, before or independent of experience. However, it +remains entirely undecided, as it should in this our preliminary account +of the office of general methodology, whether or not all methods of our +scientific thought will prove to be ultimately but branches of one and +the same universal method, a thought contained in the undertakings just +referred to. Although modern empiricism, affiliated as it is with +natural science, tends to answer this question in the affirmative even +more definitely and dogmatically than any type of the older rationalism, +still the question is one that can be decided only in the course of +methodological research.</p> + +<p>The conception of a methodology of scientific thought can be said to +be almost as old as scientific thought itself; for it is already +contained essentially, though undifferentiated, in the Socratic +challenge of knowledge. None the less, the history of methodology, as +the history of every other science, went through the course of which +Kant has given a classical description. "No one attempts to construct a +science unless he can base it on some idea; but in the elaboration of it +the schema, nay, even the definition which he gives in the beginning of +his science, corresponds very seldom to his idea, which, like a germ, +lies hidden in the reason, and all the parts of which are still +enveloped and hardly distinguishable even under microscopical +observation."<a name="fnanchor_5" id="fnanchor_5"></a><a +href="#footnote_5" class="fnanchor"><sup>[5]</sup></a></p> + +<p>We are indebted to the Greek, and especially to the +Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy for important contributions to the +understanding of the deductive method of mathematical thought. It was +precisely this trend of philosophic endeavor which, though furnishing +for the most part the foundation of methodological doctrine well on into +the seventeenth century, offered no means of differentiating the methods +that are authoritative for our knowledge of facts. What Socrates was +perhaps the first to call "induction," is essentially different, as +regards its source and aim, from the inductive methods that direct our +research in natural and mental science. For it is into these two fields +that we have to divide the totality of the sciences of facts, the +material sciences, let us call them, in opposition to the formal or +mathematical sciences,—that is, if we are to do justice to the +difference between sense and self<ins title="hyphenated in the +original"> </ins>perception, or "outer" and "inner" perception.</p> + +<p>Two closely connected forces especially led astray the methodological +opinions regarding the material sciences till the end of the eighteenth +century, and in part until the beginning of the nineteenth century. We +refer, in the first place, to that direction of thought which gives us +the right to characterize the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy as a +"concept philosophy;" namely, the circumstance that Aristotelian logic +caused the "concept" to be set before the "judgment." In short, we refer +to that tendency in thought which directs the attention not to the +permanent in the world's occurrences, the uniform connections of events, +but rather to the seemingly permanent in the things, their essential +attributes or essences. Thus the concept philosophy, as a result of its +tendency to hypostasize, finds in the abstract general concepts of +things, the ideas, the eternal absolute reality that constitutes the +foundation of things and is contained in them beside the accidental and +changing properties.<a name="fnanchor_6" id="fnanchor_6"></a><a +href="#footnote_6" class="fnanchor"><sup>[6]</sup></a> Here we have at +once the second force which inspired the ancient methodology. These +ideas, like the fundamentally real, constitute that which ultimately +alone acts in all the coming into existence and the going out of +existence of the manifold things. In the Aristotelian theory of +causation, this thought is made a principle; and we formulate only what +is contained in it, when we say that, according to it, the efficient and +at the same time final causes can be deduced through mere analysis from +the essential content of the effects; that, in fact, the possible +effects of every cause can be deduced from the content of its +definition. The conceptual determination of the causal relation, and +with it in principle the sum total of the methods in the material +sciences, becomes a logical, analytical, and deductive one. These +sciences remain entirely independent of the particular content of +experience as this broadens, and so do also the methods under +discussion.</p> + +<p>As a consequence, every essential difference between mathematical +thought and the science of causes is done away with in favor of a +rationalistic construction of the methods of material science. +Accordingly, throughout the seventeenth century, the ideal of all +scientific method becomes, not the inductive method that founded the new +epoch of the science of to-day, but the deductive mathematical method +applied to natural scientific research. The flourish of trumpets with +which Francis Bacon hailed the onslaught of the inductive methods in the +natural science of the time, helped in no way; for he failed to remodel +the traditional, Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of cause, and, +accordingly, failed to understand both the problem of induction and the +meaning of the inductive methods of the day.<a name="fnanchor_7" +id="fnanchor_7"></a><a href="#footnote_7" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and +related thinkers develop their <i>mathesis universalis</i> after the +pattern of geometrical thinking. Leibnitz tries to adapt his +<i>spécieuse générale</i> to the thought of mathematical analysis. The +old methodological conviction gains its clear-cut expression in +Spinoza's doctrine: "<i>Aliquid efficitur ab aliqua re</i>" means +"<i>aliquid sequitur ex ejus definitione</i>."</p> + +<p>The logically straight path is seldom the one taken in the course of +the history of thought. The new formulation and solution of problems +influence us first through their evident significance and consequences, +not through the traditional presuppositions upon which they are founded. +Thus, in the middle of the seventeenth century, when insight into the +precise difference between mental and physical events gave rise to +pressing need for its definite formulation, no question arose concerning +the dogmatic presupposition of a purely logical (<i>analytisch</i>) +relationship between cause and effect; but, on the contrary, this +presupposition was then for the first time brought clearly before +consciousness. It was necessary to take the roundabout way through +occasionalism and the preëstablished harmony, including the latter's +retreat to the omnipotence of God, before it was possible to miss the +question of the validity of the presupposition that the connection +between cause and effect is analytic and rational.</p> + +<p>Among the leading thinkers of the period this problem was recognized +as the cardinal problem of contemporaneous philosophy. It is further +evidence how thoroughly established this problem must have been among +the more deeply conceived problems of the time in the middle of the +eighteenth century, that Hume and Kant were forced to face it, led on, +seemingly independently of each other, and surely from quite different +presuppositions and along entirely different ways. The historical +evolution of that which from the beginning has seemed to philosophy the +solving of her true problem has come to pass in a way not essentially +different from that of the historical evolution in all other departments +of human knowledge. Thus, in the last third of the seventeenth century, +Newton and Leibnitz succeeded in setting forth the elements of the +infinitesimal calculus; and, in the fifth decade of the nineteenth +century, Robert Mayer, Helmholtz, and perhaps Joule, formulated the law +of the conservation of energy. In one essential respect Hume and Kant +are agreed in the solution of the new, and hence contemporaneously +misunderstood, problem. Both realized that the connection between the +various causes and effects is not a rational analytic, but an empirical +synthetic one. However, the difference in their presuppositions as well +as method caused this common result to make its appearance in very +different light and surroundings. In Hume's empiricism the connection +between cause and effect appears as the mere empirical result of +association; whereas in Kant's rationalism this general relation between +cause and effect becomes the fundamental condition of all possible +experience, and is, as a consequence, independent of all experience. It +rests, as a means of connecting our ideas, upon an inborn uniformity of +our thought.</p> + +<p>Thus the way was opened for a fundamental separation of the inductive +material scientific from the deductive mathematical method. For Hume +mathematics becomes the science of the relations of ideas, as opposed to +the sciences of facts. For Kant philosophical knowledge is the knowledge +of the reason arising from concepts, whereas the mathematical is that +arising from the construction of concepts. The former, therefore, +studies the particular only in the universal; the latter, the universal +in the particular, nay, rather in the individual.</p> + +<p>Both solutions of the new problem which in the eighteenth century +supplant the old and seemingly self-evident presupposition, appear +accordingly embedded in the opposition between the rationalistic and +empiristic interpretation of the origin and validity of our knowledge, +the same opposition that from antiquity runs through the historical +development of philosophy in ever new digressions.</p> + +<p>Even to-day the question regarding the meaning and the validity of +the causal connection stands between these contrary directions of +epistemological research; and the ways leading to its answer separate +more sharply than ever before. It is therefore more pressing in our day +than it was in earlier times to find a basis upon which we may build +further epistemologically and therefore methodologically. The purpose of +the present paper is to seek such a basis for the different methods +employed in the sciences of facts.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>As has already been said, the contents of our consciousness, which +are given us immediately in outer and inner perception, constitute the +raw material of the sciences of facts. From these various facts of +perception we derive the judgments through which we predict, guide, and +shape our future perception in the course of possible experience. These +judgments exist in the form of reproductive ideational processes, which, +if logically explicit, become <i>inductive inferences</i> in the broader +sense. These inferences may be said to be of two sorts, though +fundamentally only two sides of one and the same process of thought; +they are in part analogical inferences and in part <i>inductive +inferences in the narrower sense</i>. The former infers from the +particular in a present perception, <i>which in previous perceptions was +uniformly connected with other particular contents of perception</i>, to +a particular that resembles <i>those other contents of perception</i>. +In short, they are inferences from a particular to a particular. After +the manner of such inferences we logically formulate, for example, the +reproductive processes, whose conclusions run: "This man whom I see +before me, is attentive, feels pain, will die;" "this meteor will prove +to have a chemical composition similar to known meteors, and also to +have corresponding changes on its surface as the result of its rapid +passage through our atmosphere." The inductive inferences in the +narrower sense argue, on the contrary, from the perceptions of a series +of uniform phenomena to a universal, which includes the given and +likewise all possible cases, in which a member of the particular content +of the earlier perceptions is presupposed as given. In short, they are +conclusions from a particular to a universal that is more extensive than +the sum of the given particulars. For example: "All men have minds, will +die;" "all meteoric stones will prove to have this chemical composition +and those changes of surface."</p> + +<p>There is no controversy regarding the inner similarity of both these +types of inference or regarding their outward structure; or, again, +regarding their outward difference from the deductive inferences, which +proceed not from a particular to a particular or general, but from a +general to a particular.</p> + +<p>There is, however, difference of opinion regarding their inner +structure and their inner relation to the deductive inferences. Both +questions depend upon the decision regarding the meaning and validity of +the causal relation. The contending parties are recruited essentially +from the positions of traditional empiricism and rationalism and from +their modern offshoots.</p> + +<p>We maintain first of all:</p> + +<p>1. The <i>presupposition</i> of all inductive inferences, from now on +to be taken in their more general sense, is, that the contents of +perception are given to us <i>uniformly</i> in repeated perceptions, +that is, in uniform components and uniform relations.</p> + +<p>2. The <i>condition</i> of the validity of the inductive inferences +lies in the thoughts that <i>the same causes will be present</i> in the +unobserved realities as in the observed ones, and that <i>these same +causes will bring forth the same effects</i>.</p> + +<p>3. The <i>conclusions</i> of all inductive inferences have, logically +speaking, purely <i>problematic</i> validity, that is, their +contradictory opposite remains equally thinkable. They are, accurately +expressed, merely <i>hypotheses</i>, whose validity needs verification +through future experience.</p> + +<p>The first-mentioned <i>presupposition</i> of inductive inference must +not be misunderstood. The paradox that nothing really repeats itself, +that each stage in nature's process comes but once, is just as much and +just as little justified as the assertion, everything has already +existed. It does not deny the fact that we can discriminate in the +contents of our perceptions the uniformities of their components and +relations, in short, that similar elements are present in these ever new +complexes. This fact makes it possible that our manifold perceptions +combine to make up one continuous experience. Even our paradox +presupposes that the different contents of our perceptions are +comparable with one another, and reveal accordingly some sort of common +nature. All this is not only a matter of course for empiricism, which +founds the whole constitution of our knowledge upon habits, but must +also be granted by every rationalistic interpretation of the structure +of knowledge. Every one that is well informed knows that what we +ordinarily refer to as facts already includes a theory regarding them. +Kant judges in this matter precisely as Hume did before him and Stuart +Mill after him. "If cinnabar were sometimes red and sometimes black, +sometimes light and sometimes heavy, if a man could be changed now into +this, now into another animal shape, if on the longest day the fields +were sometimes covered with fruit, sometimes with ice and snow, the +faculty of my empirical imagination would never be in a position, when +representing red color, to think of heavy cinnabar."<a name="fnanchor_8" +id="fnanchor_8"></a><a href="#footnote_8" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[8]</sup></a></p> + +<p>The assumption that in recurring perceptions similar elements of +content, as well as of relation, are given, is a necessary condition of +the possibility of experience itself, and accordingly of all those +processes of thought which lead us, under the guidance of previous +perceptions, from the contents of one given perception to the contents +of possible perceptions.</p> + +<p>A tradition from Hume down has accustomed us to associate the +relation of cause and effect not so much with the uniformity of +coexistence as with the uniformity of sequence. Let us for the present +keep to this tradition. Its first corollary is that the relation of +cause and effect is to be sought in the uninterrupted flow and +connection of events and changes. The cause becomes the uniformly +preceding event, the constant <i>antecedens</i>, the effect the +uniformly following, the constant <i>consequens</i>, in the course of +the changes that are presented to consciousness as a result of foregoing +changes in our sensorium.</p> + +<p>According to this tradition that we have taken as our point of +departure, the uniformity of the sequence of events is a necessary +presupposition of the relation between cause and effect. This uniformity +is given us as an element of our experience; for we actually find +uniform successions in the course of the changing contents of +perception. Further, as all our perceptions are in the first instance +sense<ins title="hyphenated in the original"> </ins>perceptions, we may +call them the sensory presupposition of the possibility of the causal +relation.</p> + +<p>In this presupposition, however, there is much more involved than the +name just chosen would indicate. The uniformity of sequence lies, as we +saw, not in the contents of perception as such, which are immediately +given to us. It arises rather through the fact that, in the course of +repeated perceptions, we apprehend through abstraction the uniformities +of their temporal relation. Moreover, there lie in the repeated +perceptions not only uniformities of sequence, but also uniformities of +the qualitative content of the successive events themselves, and these +uniformities also must be apprehended through abstraction. Thus these +uniform contents of perception make up series of the following form:</p> + +<p class="center"><i>a<sub>1</sub></i> → <i>b<sub>1</sub></i><br /> +<i>a<sub>2</sub></i> → <i>b<sub>2</sub></i><br /> +" "<br /> +" "<br /> +" "<br /> +<i>a<sub>n</sub></i> → <i>b<sub>n</sub></i></p> + +<p>The presupposition of the possibility of the causal relations +includes, therefore, more than mere perceptive elements. It involves the +relation of different, if you will, of peculiar contents of perception, +by virtue of which we recognize <i>a<sub>2</sub></i> → +<i>b<sub>2</sub></i> ... <i>a<sub>n</sub></i> → +<i>b<sub>n</sub></i> as events that resemble one another and the event +<i>a<sub>1</sub></i> → <i>b<sub>1</sub></i> qualitatively as well +as in their sequence. There are accordingly involved in our +presupposition <i>reproductive</i> elements which indicate the action of +memory. In order that I may in the act of perceiving +<i>a<sub>3</sub></i> → <i>b<sub>3</sub></i> apprehend the +uniformity of this present content with that of <i>a<sub>2</sub></i> +→ <i>b<sub>2</sub></i> and <i>a<sub>1</sub></i> → +<i>b<sub>1</sub></i>, these earlier perceptions must in some way, +perhaps through memory,<a name="fnanchor_9" id="fnanchor_9"></a><a +href="#footnote_9" class="fnanchor"><sup>[9]</sup></a> be revived with +the present perception.</p> + +<p>In this reproduction there is still a further element, which can be +separated, to be sure only <i>in abstracto</i>, from the one just +pointed out. The present revived content, even if it is given in memory +as an independent mental state, is essentially different from the +original perception. It differs in all the modifications in which the +memory of lightning and thunder could differ from the perception of +their successive occurrence, or, again, the memory of a pain and the +resulting disturbance of attention could differ from the corresponding +original experience. However, as memory, the revived experience presents +itself as a picture of that which has been previously perceived. +Especially is this the case in memory properly so called, where the +peculiar space and time relations individualize the revived experience. +If we give to this identifying element in the associative process a +logical expression, we shall have to say that there is involved in +revival, and especially in memory, an awareness that the present ideas +recall the same content that was previously given us in perception. To +be sure, the revival of the content of previous perceptions does not +have to produce ideas, let alone memories. Rapid, transitory, or +habitual revivals, stimulated by associative processes, can remain +unconscious, that is, they need not appear as ideas or states of +consciousness. Stimulation takes place, but consciousness does not +arise, provided we mean by the term "consciousness" the genus of our +thoughts, feelings, and volitions. None the less it must not be +forgotten that this awareness of the essential identity of the present +revived content with that of the previous perception can be brought +about in every such case of reproduction. How all this takes place is +not our present problem.</p> + +<p>We can apply to this second element in the reproductive process, +which we have found to be essential to the causal relation, a Kantian +term, "Recognition." This term, however, is to be taken only in the +sense called for by the foregoing statements; for the rationalistic +presuppositions and consequences which mark Kant's "Synthesis of +Recognition" are far removed from the present line of thought.</p> + +<p>We may, then, sum up our results as follows: In the presupposition of +a uniform sequence of events, which we have accepted from tradition as +the necessary condition of the possibility of the causal relation, there +lies the thought that the contents of perception given us through +repeated sense stimulation are related to one another through a +reproductive recognition.</p> + +<p>The assumption of such reproductive recognition is not justified +merely in the cases so far considered. It is already necessary in the +course of the individual perceptions <i>a</i> and <i>b</i>, and hence in +the apprehension of an occurrence. It makes the sequence itself in which +<i>a</i> and <i>b</i> are joined possible; for in order to apprehend +<i>b</i> as following upon <i>a</i>, in case the perception of <i>a</i> +has not persisted in its original form, <i>a</i> must be as far revived +and recognized upon <i>b</i>'s entrance into the field of perception as +it has itself passed out of that field. Otherwise, instead of <i>b</i> +following upon <i>a</i> and being related to <i>a</i>, there would be +only the relationless change from <i>a</i> to <i>b</i>. This holds +generally and not merely in the cases where the perception of <i>a</i> +has disappeared before that of <i>b</i> begins, for example, in the case +of lightning and thunder, or where it has in part disappeared, for +example, in the throwing of a stone.</p> + +<p>We have represented <i>a</i> as an event or change, in order that +uniform sequences of events may alone come into consideration as the +presupposition of the causal relation. But every event has its course in +time, and is accordingly divisible into many, ultimately into infinitely +many, shorter events. Now if <i>b</i> comes only an infinitely short +interval later than <i>a</i>, and by hypothesis it must come later than +<i>a</i>, then a corresponding part of <i>a</i> must have disappeared by +the time <i>b</i> appears. But the infinitesimal part of a perception is +just as much out of all consideration as would be an infinitely long +perception; all which only goes to show that we have to substitute +intervals of finite length in place of this purely conceptual analysis +of a continuous time interval. This leaves the foregoing discussion as +it stands. If <i>b</i> follows <i>a</i> after a perceptible finite +interval, then the flow or development of <i>a</i> by the time of +<i>b</i>'s appearance must have covered a course corresponding to that +interval; and all this is true even though the earlier stages of +<i>a</i> remain unchanged throughout the interval preceding <i>b</i>'s +appearance. The present instant of flow is distinct from the one that +has passed, even though it takes place in precisely the same way. The +former, not the latter, gives the basis of relation which is here +required, and therefore the former must be reproduced and recognized. +This thought also is included in the foregoing summary of what critical +analysis shows to be involved in the presupposition of a uniform +sequence.</p> + +<p>In all this we have already abandoned the field of mere perception +which gave us the point of departure for our analysis of uniform +sequence. We may call the changing course of perception only in the +narrower meaning the sensory presupposition of the causal relation. In +order that these changing contents of perception may be known as like +one another, as following one another, and as following one another +uniformly, they must be related to one another through a recognitive +reproduction.</p> + +<p>Our critical analysis of uniform sequence is, however, not yet +complete. To relate to one another the contents of two ideas always +requires a process at once of identifying and of differentiating, which +makes these contents members of the relation, and which accordingly +presupposes that our attention has been directed to each of the two +members as well as to the relation itself—in the present case, to +the sequence. Here we come to another essential point. We should apply +the name "thought" to every ideational process in which attention is +directed to the elements of the mental content and which leads us to +identify with one another, or to differentiate from one another, the +members of this content.<a name="fnanchor_10" id="fnanchor_10"></a><a +href="#footnote_10" class="fnanchor"><sup>[10]</sup></a> The act of +relating, which knows two events as similar, as following one another, +indeed, as following one another uniformly, is therefore so far from +being a sensation that it must be claimed to be an act of thinking. The +uniformity of sequence of <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> is therefore an act of +relating on the part of our thought, so far as this becomes possible +solely through the fact that we at one and the same time identify with +one another and differentiate from one another <i>a</i> as cause and +<i>b</i> as effect. We say "at one and the same time," because the terms +identifying and differentiating are correlatives which denote two +different and opposing sides of one and the same ideational process +viewed logically. Accordingly, there is here on need of emphasizing that +the act of relating, which enables us to think <i>a</i> as cause and +<i>b</i> as effect, is an act of thought also, because it presupposes on +our part an act of naming which raises it to being a component of our +formulated and discursive thought. We therefore <i>think a</i> as cause +and <i>b</i> as effect in that we apprehend the former as uniform +<i>antecedens</i> and the latter as uniform <i>consequens</i>.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>Have we not the right, after the foregoing analysis, to interpret the +uniform sequence of events solely as the <i>necessary</i> presupposition +of the causal relation? Is it not at the same time the <i>adequate</i> +presupposition? Yes, is it not the causal relation itself? As we know, +empiricism since Hume has answered the last question in the affirmative, +and rationalism since Kant has answered it in the negative.</p> + +<p>We, too, have seemingly followed in our discussion the course of +empiricism. At least, I find nothing in that discussion which a +consistent empiricist might not be willing to concede; that is, if he is +ready to set aside the psychological investigation of the actual +processes which we here presuppose and make room for a critical analysis +of the content of the relation of cause and effect.<a name="fnanchor_11" +id="fnanchor_11"></a><a href="#footnote_11" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[11]</sup></a> However, the decision of the +question, whether or not empiricism can determine exhaustively the +content that we think in the causal relation, depends upon other +considerations than those which we have until now been called upon to +undertake. We have so far only made clear what every critical analysis +of the causal relation has to concede to empiricism. In reality the +empiristic hypothesis is inadequate. To be sure, the proof of this +inadequacy is not to be taken from the obvious argument which Reid +raised against the empiricism of Hume, and which compelled Stuart Mill +in his criticism of that attack<a name="fnanchor_12" +id="fnanchor_12"></a><a href="#footnote_12" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[12]</sup></a> to abandon his empiristic position +at this point. No doubt the conclusion to which we also have come for +the time being, goes much too far, the conclusion that the cause is +nothing but the uniform <i>antecedens</i> and the effect merely the +uniform <i>consequens</i>. Were it true, as we have hitherto assumed, +that every uniformly preceding event is to be regarded as cause and +every uniformly following event as effect, then day must be looked upon +as cause of night and night as cause of day.</p> + +<p>Empiricism can, however, meet this objection without giving up its +position; in fact, it can employ the objection as an argument in its +favor; for this objection affects only the manifestly imperfect +formulation of the doctrine, not the essential arguments.</p> + +<p>It should have been pointed out again and again in the foregoing +exposition that only in the first indiscriminating view of things may we +regard the events given us in perception as the basis of our concepts of +cause and effect. All these events are intricately mixed, those that are +given in self perception as well as those given in sense perception. The +events of both groups flow along continuously. Consequently, as regards +time, they permit a division into parts, which division proceeds, not +indeed for our perception, but for our scientific thought, in short, +conceptually, into infinity. The events of sense perception permit also +conceptually of infinite division in their spatial relations.</p> + +<p>It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we turn our attention to +the question of divisibility in time. This fact of divisibility shows +that the events of our perception, which alone we have until now brought +under consideration, must be regarded as systems of events. We are +therefore called upon to apportion the causal relations among the +members of these systems. Only for the indiscriminating view of our +practical <i>Weltanschauung</i> is the perceived event <i>a</i> the +cause of the perceived event <i>b</i>. The more exact analysis of our +theoretical apprehension of the world compels us to dissect the events +<i>a</i> and <i>b</i> into the parts <i>a<sub>α</sub></i>, +<i>a<sub>β</sub></i>, <i>a<sub>γ</sub></i>—<i>b<sub>α</sub></i>, +<i>b<sub>β</sub></i>, <i>b<sub>γ</sub></i>, and, where occasion calls +for it, to continue the same process in turn for these and further +components. We have accordingly to relate those parts to one another as +causes and effects which, from the present standpoint of analysis, +follow one another uniformly and <i>immediately</i>, viz., follow one +another so that from this standpoint no other intervening event must be +presupposed. In this way we come to have a <i>well-ordered +experience</i>. The dispositions to such experience which reveal +themselves within the field of practical thought taught man long before +the beginning of scientific methods not to connect causally day and +night with one another, but the rising and setting of the sun with day +and night. The theoretical analysis, indeed, goes farther. It teaches +that in what is here summed up as rising of the sun and yonder as day, +there lie again intricate elements requiring special attention, in our +own day extending perhaps to the lines of thought contained in the +electro-dynamic theory of light and of electrons. Still the ways of +thought remain the same, on all the levels of penetrating analysis. We +have throughout to relate to one another as cause and effect those +events which, in a well-ordered experience, must be regarded as +following one another immediately. The cause is then the +<i>immediate</i> uniform <i>antecedens</i>, the effect the +<i>immediate</i> uniform <i>consequens</i>. Otherwise stated, the +perceived events that we are accustomed, from the standpoint of the +practical <i>Weltanschauung</i>, to regard as causes and effects, <i>e. +g.</i>, lightning and thunder, from the theoretical apprehension of the +world prove to be infinitely involved collections of events, whose +elements must be related to one another as causes and effects in as far +as they can be regarded as following one another immediately. No +exception is formed by expressions of our rough way of viewing and +describing which lead us without hesitation to regard as cause one out +of the very many causes of an event, and this, too, not necessarily the +immediate uniformly preceding event. All this lies rather in the nature +of such a hasty view.</p> + +<p>The present limitation of uniform sequence to cases of immediate +sequence sets aside, then, the objection from which we started, in that +it adopts as its own the essential point in question.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the way that leads us to this necessary limitation goes +farther: it leads to a strengthening of the empiristic position. It +brings us to a point where we see that the most advanced analysis of +intricate systems of events immediately given to us in perception as +real nowhere reveals more than the simple fact of uniform sequence. +Again where we come to regard the intervals between the events that +follow one another immediately as very short, there the uniformity of +the time relation makes, it would seem, the events for us merely causes +and effects; and as often as we have occasion to proceed to the smaller +time differences of a higher order, the same process repeats itself; for +we dissect the events that make up our point of departure into ever more +complex systems of component events, and the coarser relations of +uniform sequence into ever finer immediate ones. Nowhere, seemingly, do +we get beyond the field of events in uniform sequence, which finally +have their foundation in the facts of perception from which they are +drawn. Thus there follows from this conceptual refinement of the point +of departure only the truth that nothing connects the events as causes +and effects except the immediate uniformity of sequence.</p> + +<p>None the less, we have to think the empiristic doctrine to the +bottom, if we desire to determine whether or not the hypothesis which it +offers is really sufficient to enable us to deduce the causal relation. +For this purpose let us remind ourselves that the question at issue is, +whether or not this relation is merely a temporal connection of events +that are given to us in perception or that can be derived from the data +of perception.</p> + +<p>Besides, let us grant that this relation is as thoroughly valid for +the content of our experience as empiricism has always, and rationalism +nearly always, maintained. We presuppose, therefore, as granted, that +every event is to be regarded as cause, and hence, in the opposite time +relation, as effect, mental events that are given to us in self +perception no less than the physical whose source is our sense +perception. In other words, we assume that the totality of events in our +possible experience presents a closed system of causal series, that is, +that every member within each of the contemporary series is connected +with the subsequent ones, as well as with the subsequent members of all +the other series, backward and forward as cause and effect; and +therefore, finally, that every member of every series stands in causal +relationship with every member of every other series. We do not then, +for the present purpose, burden ourselves with the hypothesis which was +touched upon above, that this connection is to be thought of as a +continuous one, namely, that other members can be inserted <i>ad +infinitum</i> between any two members of the series.</p> + +<p>We maintain at the same time that there is no justification for +separating from one another the concepts, causality and interaction. +This separation is only to be justified through the metaphysical +hypothesis that reality consists in a multitude of independently +existing substances inherently subject to change, and that their mutual +interconnection is conditioned by a common dependence upon a first +infinite cause.<a name="fnanchor_13" id="fnanchor_13"></a><a +href="#footnote_13" class="fnanchor"><sup>[13]</sup></a> Every +connection between cause and effect is mutual, if we assume with Newton +that to every action there is an equal opposing reaction.</p> + +<p>In that we bring the totality of knowable reality, as far as it is +analyzable into events, under the causal relation, we may regard the +statement that every event requires us to seek among uniformly preceding +events for the sufficient causes of its own reality, namely, <i>the +general causal law</i>, as the principle of all material sciences. For +all individual instances of conformity to law which we can discover in +the course of experience are from this point of view only special cases +of the general universal conformity to law which we have just +formulated.</p> + +<p>For the empiristic interpretation, the (general) causal law is only +the highest genus of the individual cases of empirically synthetic +relations of uniform sequence. Starting from these presuppositions, it +cannot be other than a generalization from experience, that is, a +carrying over of observed relations of uniform, or, as we may now also +say, constant sequence to those which have not been or cannot be objects +of observation, as well as to those which we expect to appear in the +future. Psychologically regarded, it is merely the most general +expression of an expectation, conditioned through associative +reproduction, of uniform sequence. It is, therefore,—to bring +Hume's doctrine to a conclusion that the father of modern empiricism +himself did not draw,—a species of temporal contiguity.</p> + +<p>The general validity which we ascribe to the causal law is +accordingly a merely empirical one. It can never attain apodeictic or +even assertorical validity, but purely that type of problematic validity +which we may call "real" in contradistinction to the other type of +problematic validity attained in judgments of objective as well as of +subjective and hypothetical possibility.<a name="fnanchor_14" +id="fnanchor_14"></a><a href="#footnote_14" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[14]</sup></a> No possible progress of experience +can win for the empiristically interpreted causal law any other than +this real problematic validity; for experience can never become complete +<i>a parte post</i>, nor has it ever been complete <i>a parte ante</i>. +The causal law is valid assertorically only in so far as it sums up, +purely in the way of an inventory, the preceding experiences. We call +such assumptions, drawn from well-ordered experience and of inductive +origin, "hypotheses," whether they rest upon generalizing inductive +inferences in the narrower sense, or upon specializing inferences from +analogy. They, and at the same time the empiristically interpreted +causal law, are not hypotheses in the sense in which Newton rightly +rejected all formation of hypotheses,<a name="fnanchor_15" +id="fnanchor_15"></a><a href="#footnote_15" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[15]</sup></a> but are such as are necessarily +part of all methods in the sciences of facts in so far as the paths of +research lead out beyond the content given immediately in perception to +objects of only possible experience.</p> + +<p>The assertion of Stuart Mill, in opposition to this conclusion, that +the cause must be thought of as the "invariable antecedent" and, +correspondingly, the effect is the "invariable consequent,"<a +name="fnanchor_16" id="fnanchor_16"></a><a href="#footnote_16" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[16]</sup></a> does all honor to the genius of the +thinker; but it agrees by no means with the empiristic presuppositions +which serve as the basis for his conclusions. For, starting from these +presuppositions, the "invariable sequence" can only mean one that is +uniform and constant according to past experience, and that we +henceforth carry over to not yet observed events as far as these prove +in conformity with it, and in this way verify the anticipation contained +in our general assertion. The same holds of the assertion through which +Mill endeavors to meet the above-mentioned objection of Reid, namely, +that the unchanging sequence must at the same time be demonstrably an +"unconditional" one. The language in which experience speaks to us knows +the term "the unconditioned" as little as the term "the unchangeable," +even though this have, as Mill explains, the meaning that the effect +"will be, whatever supposition we may make in regard to all other +things," or that the sequence will "be subject to no other than negative +conditions." For in these determinations there does not lie exclusively, +according to Mill, a probable prediction of the future. "It is +<i>necessary</i> to our using the word cause, that we should believe not +only that the antecedent always <i>has</i> been followed by the +consequent, but that as long as the present constitution of things +endures, it always <i>will</i> be so." Likewise, Mill, the man of +research, not the empiristic logician, asserts that there belongs to the +causal law, besides this generality referring to all possible events of +uniform sequence, also an "undoubted assurance;" although he could have +here referred to a casual remark of Hume.<a name="fnanchor_17" +id="fnanchor_17"></a><a href="#footnote_17" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[17]</sup></a> Such an undoubted assurance, "that +for every event ... there is a law to be found, if we only know where to +find it," evidently does not know of a knowledge referred exclusively to +experience.</p> + +<p>Hence, if the causal law is, as empiricism to be consistent must +maintain, only a general hypothesis which is necessarily subject to +verification as experience progresses, then it is not impossible that in +the course of experience events will appear that are not preceded or +followed uniformly by others, and that accordingly cannot be regarded as +causes or effects. According to this interpretation of the causal law, +such exceptional events, whether in individual or in repeated cases of +perception, must be just as possible as those which in the course of +preceding experience have proved themselves to be members of series of +constant sequence. On the basis of previous experience, we should only +have the right to say that such exceptional cases are less probable; and +we might from the same ground expect that, if they could be surely +determined, they would only have to be regarded as exceptions to the +rule and not, possibly, as signs of a misunderstood universal +non-uniformity of occurrence. No one wants to maintain an empirical +necessity, that is, a statement that so comprehends a present experience +or an hypothesis developed on the basis of present experience that its +contradictory is rationally impossible. An event preceded by no other +immediately and uniformly as cause would, according to traditional +usage, arise out of nothing. An event that was followed immediately and +constantly by no other would accordingly be an event that remained +without effect, and, did it pass away, it must disappear into nothing. +The old thought, well known in its scholastic formulation, <i>ex nihilo +nihil fit, in nihilum nihil potest reverti</i>, is only another +expression for the causal law as we have interpreted it above. The +contradictories to each of the clauses of the thought just formulated, +that something can arise out of nothing and pass into nothing, remain +therefore, as a consequence of empiricism, an improbable thought, to be +sure, but none the less a thought to which a real possibility must be +ascribed.</p> + +<p>It was in all probability this that Stuart Mill wished to convey in +the much-debated passage: "I am convinced that anyone accustomed to +abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the +purpose, will, when his imagination has once learnt to entertain the +notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, +of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the +universe, events may succeed one another at random without any fixed +law; nor can anything in our experience, or in our mental nature, +constitute a sufficient, or indeed any, reason for believing that this +is nowhere the case." For Mill immediately calls our attention to the +following: "Were we to suppose (what it is perfectly possible to +imagine) that the present order of the universe were brought to an end, +and that a chaos succeeded in which there was no fixed succession of +events, and the past gave no assurance of the future; if a human being +were miraculously kept alive to witness this change, he surely would +soon cease to believe in any uniformity, the uniformity itself no longer +existing."<a name="fnanchor_18" id="fnanchor_18"></a><a +href="#footnote_18" class="fnanchor"><sup>[18]</sup></a></p> + +<p>We can throw light from another side upon the thought that lies in +this outcome of the empiristic interpretation of the causal law. If we +still desire to give the name "effect" to an event that is preceded +uniformly by no other, and that we therefore have to regard as arising +out of nothing, then we must say that it is the effect of itself, that +is, its cause lies in its own reality, in short, that it is <i>causa +sui</i>. Therefore the assumption that a <i>causa sui</i> has just as +much real possibility as have the causes of our experience which are +followed uniformly by another event, is a necessary consequence of the +empiristic view of causation. This much only remains sure, there is +nothing contained in our previous experience that in any way assures us +of the validity of this possible theory.</p> + +<p>The empiristic doctrine of causation requires, however, still further +conclusions. Our scientific, no less than our practical thought has +always been accustomed to regard the relation between cause and effect +not as a matter of mere sequence, not therefore as a mere formal +temporal one. Rather it has always, in both forms of our thought, stood +for a <i>real</i> relation, that is, for a relation of <i>dynamic +dependence</i> of effect upon cause. Accordingly, the effect <i>arises +out</i> of the cause, is <i>engendered through</i> it, or <i>brought +forth by</i> it.</p> + +<p>The historical development of this dynamic conception of cause is +well known. The old anthropopathic interpretation, which interpolates +anthropomorphic and yet superhuman intervention between the events that +follow one another uniformly, has maintained itself on into the modern +metaphysical hypotheses. It remains standing wherever God is assumed as +the first cause for the interaction between parts of reality. It is made +obscure, but not eliminated, when, in other conceptions of the world, +impersonal nature, fate, necessity, the absolute identity, or an +abstraction related to these, appears in the place of God. On the other +hand, it comes out clearly wherever these two tendencies of thought +unite themselves in an anthropopathic pantheism. That is, it rests only +upon a difference in strength between the governing religious and +scientific interests, whether or not the All-One which unfolds itself in +the interconnection and content of reality is thought of more as the +immanent God, or more as substance. Finally, we do not change our +position, if the absolute, self-active being (in all these theories a +first cause is presupposed as <i>causa sui</i>) is degraded to a +non-intellectual will.</p> + +<p>However, the dynamic interpretation of cause has not remained +confined to the field of these general speculations, just because it +commanded that field so early. There is a second branch, likewise early +evolved from the stem of the anthropopathic interpretation, the doctrine +that the causal relations of dependence are effected through "forces." +These forces adhere to, or dwell in, the ultimate physical elements +which are thought of as masses. Again, as spiritual forces they belong +to the "soul," which in turn is thought of as a substance. In the modern +contrast between attractive and repulsive forces, there lies a remnant +of the Empedoklean opposition between Love and Hate. In the various old +and new hylozoistic tendencies, the concepts of force and its correlate, +mass, are eclectically united. In consistent materialism as well as +spiritualism, and in the abstract dynamism of energetics, the one member +is robbed of its independence or even rejected in favor of the other.<a +name="fnanchor_19" id="fnanchor_19"></a><a href="#footnote_19" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[19]</sup></a></p> + +<p>It is evident in what light all these dynamic conceptions appear, +when looked at from the standpoint of consistent extreme empiricism. +These "forces," to consider here only this one of the dynamic +hypotheses, help to explain nothing. The physical forces, or those which +give rise to movement, are evidently not given to us as contents of +sense perception, and at the most they can be deduced as non-sensuous +foundations, not as contents of possible sense perception. The often and +variously expressed belief that self perception reveals to us here what +our senses leave hidden has proved itself to be in all its forms a +delusion. The forces whose existence we assume have then an intuitable +content only in so far as they get it through the uniformities present +in repeated perceptions, which uniformities are to be "explained" +through them. But right here their assumption proves itself to be not +only superfluous but even misleading; for it makes us believe that we +have offered an explanation, whereas in reality we have simply +duplicated the given by means of a fiction, quite after the fashion of +the Platonic doctrine of ideas. This endeavor to give the formal +temporal relations between events, which we interpret as causes and +effects, a dynamic real substructure, shows itself thus to be worthless +in its contributions to our thought. The same holds true of every other +dynamic hypothesis. The critique called forth by these contributions +establishes therefore only the validity of the empiristic +interpretation.</p> + +<p>If, however, we have once come so far, we may not hold ourselves back +from the final step. Empiricism has long ago taken this step, and the +most consistent among its modern German representatives has aroused anew +the impulses that make it necessary. Indeed, if we start from the +empiristic presuppositions, we must recognize that there lies not only +in the assumption of forces, but even in the habit of speaking of causes +and effects, "a clear trace of fetishism." We are not then surprised +when the statement is made: The natural science of the future, and +accordingly science in general, will, it is to be hoped, set aside these +concepts also on account of their formal obscurity. For, so it is +explained, repetitions of like cases in which <i>a</i> is always +connected with <i>b</i>, namely, in which like results are found under +like circumstances, in short, the essence of the connection of cause and +effect, exists only in the abstraction that is necessary to enable us to +repicture the facts. In nature itself there are no causes and effects. +<i>Die Natur ist nur einmal da.</i></p> + +<p>It is, again, Stuart Mill, the man of research, not the empiricist, +that opposes this conclusion, and indeed opposes it in the form that +Auguste Comte had given it in connection with thoughts that can be read +into Hume's doctrine. Comte's "objection to the <i>word</i> cause is a +mere matter of nomenclature, in which, as a matter of nomenclature, I +consider him to be entirely wrong.... By rejecting this form of +expression, M. Comte leaves himself without any term for marking a +distinction which, however incorrectly expressed, is not only real, but +is one of the fundamental distinctions in science."<a name="fnanchor_20" +id="fnanchor_20"></a><a href="#footnote_20" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[20]</sup></a></p> + +<p>For my own part, the right seems to be on the side of Comte and his +recent followers in showing the old nomenclature to be worn out, if +viewed from the standpoint of empiricism. If the relation between cause +and effect consists alone in the uniformity of sequence which is +hypothetically warranted by experience, then it can be only misleading +to employ words for the members of this purely formal relation that +necessarily have a strong tang of real dynamic dependence. In fact, they +give the connection in question a peculiarity that, according to +consistent empiricism, it does not possess. The question at issue in the +empiristically interpreted causal relation is a formal functional one, +which is not essentially different, as Ernst Mach incidentally +acknowledges, from the interdependence of the sides and angles of a +triangle.</p> + +<p>Here two extremes meet. Spinoza, the most consistent of the dogmatic +rationalists, finds himself compelled in his formulation of the analytic +interpretation of the causal relation handed down to him to transform it +into a mathematical one. Mach, the most consistent of recent German +empiricists, finds himself compelled to recognize that the empirically +synthetic relation between cause and effect includes no other form of +dependence than that which is present in the functional mathematical +relations. (In Germany empiricism steeped in natural science has +supplanted the naïve materialism saturated with natural science.) That +the mathematical relations must likewise be subjected to a purely +empirical interpretation, which even Hume denied them, is a matter of +course.</p> + +<p>However, this agreement of two opposing views is no proof that +empiricism is on the right road. The empiristic conclusions to which we +have given our attention do not succeed in defining adequately the +specific nature of the causal relation; on the contrary, they compel us +to deny such a relation. Thus they cast aside the concept that we have +endeavored to define, that is, the judgment in which we have to +comprehend whatever is peculiar to the causal connection. But one does +not untie a knot by denying that it exists.</p> + +<p>It follows from this self-destruction of the empiristic causal +hypothesis that an additional element of thought must be contained in +the relation of cause and effect besides the elements of reproductive +recognition and those of identification and discrimination, all of which +are involved in the abstract comprehension of uniform sequence. The +characteristics of the causal connection revealed by our previous +analysis constitute the necessary and perhaps adequate conditions for +combining the several factual perceptions into the abstract registering +idea of uniform sequence. We may, therefore, expect to find that the +element sought for lies in the tendency to extend the demand for causal +connections over the entire field of possible experience; and perhaps we +may at the same time arrive at the condition which led Hume and Mill to +recognize the complete universality of the causal law in spite of the +exclusively empirical content that they had ascribed to it. In this +further analysis also we have to draw from the nature of our thought +itself the means of guiding our investigation.</p> + +<p>In the first place, all thought has a formal necessity which reveals +itself in the general causal law no less than in every individual +thought process, that is, in every valid judgment. The meaning of this +formal necessity of thought is easily determined. If we presuppose, for +example, that I recognize a surface which lies before me as green, then +the perception judgment, "This surface is green," that is, the +apprehension of the present perceptive content in the fundamental form +of discursive thought, repeats with predicative necessity that which is +presented to me in the content of perception. The necessity of thought +contained in this perception judgment, as <i>mutatis mutandis</i> in +every affirmative judgment meeting the logical conditions, is +recognizable through the fact that the contradictory judgment, "This +surface is not green," is impossible for our thought under the +presupposition of the given content of perception and of our +nomenclature. It contradicts itself. I can express the contradictory +proposition, for instance, in order to deceive; but I cannot really pass +the judgment that is contained in it. It lies in the very nature of our +thought that the predicate of an assertive judgment call contain only +whatever belongs as an element of some sort (characteristic, attribute, +state, relation) to the subject content in the wider sense. The same +formal necessity of thought, to give a further instance, is present in +the thought process of mediate syllogistic predication. The conclusion +follows necessarily from the premises, for example, the judgment, "All +bodies are divisible," from the propositions, "All bodies are extended," +and, "Whatever is extended is divisible."</p> + +<p>These elementary remarks are not superfluous; for they make clear +that the casually expressed assertion of modern natural scientific +empiricism, declaring in effect that there is no such thing as necessity +of thought, goes altogether too far. Such necessity can have an +admissible meaning only in so far as it denotes that in predicting or +recounting <i>the content</i> of possible experience every hypothesis is +possible for thought. Of course it is, but that is not the subject under +discussion.</p> + +<p>The recognition of the formal necessity of thought that must be +presupposed helps us to define our present question; for it needs no +proof that this formal necessity of thought, being valid for every +affirmative judgment, is valid also for each particular induction, and +again for the general causal law. If in the course of our perceptions we +meet uniform sequences, then the judgment, "These sequences are +uniform," comprehends the common content of many judgments with formal +necessity of thought. Empiricism, too, does not seriously doubt that the +hypothesis of a general functional, even though only temporal, relation +between cause and effect is deduced as an expectation of possible +experience with necessity from our real experience. It questions only +the doctrine that the relation between the events regarded as cause and +effect has any other than a purely empirical import. The reality of an +event that is preceded and followed uniformly by no other remains for +this view, as we have seen, a possibility of thought.</p> + +<p>In opposition to empiricism, we now formulate the thesis to be +established: Wherever two events <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> are known to +follow one another uniformly and immediately, there we must require with +formal necessity that some element in the preceding <i>a</i> be thought +of as fundamental, which will determine sufficiently <i>b</i>'s +appearance or make that appearance necessary. The necessity of the +relation between the events regarded as cause and effect is, therefore, +the question at issue.</p> + +<p>We must keep in mind from the very start that less is asserted in +this formulation than we are apt to read into it. It states merely that +something in <i>a</i> must be thought of as fundamental, which makes +<i>b</i> necessary. On the other hand, it says nothing as to what this +fundamental something is, or how it is constituted. It leaves entirely +undecided whether or not this something that our thought must +necessarily postulate is a possible content of perception or can become +such, accordingly whether or not it can become an object of our +knowledge, or whether or not it lies beyond the bounds of all our +possible experience and hence all our possible knowledge. It contains +nothing whatsoever that tells us how the determination of <i>b</i> takes +place through <i>a</i>. The word "fundamental" is intended to express +all this absence of determination.</p> + +<p>Thus we hope to show a necessity of thought peculiar to the relation +between cause and effect. This is the same as saying that our proof will +establish the logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion; for +the logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion is the only +criterion of logical necessity. Thus the proof that we seek can be given +only indirectly. In the course of this proof, we can disregard the +immediacy of the constant sequence and confine our attention to the +uniformity of the sequence, not only for the sake of brevity, but also +because, as we have seen, we have the right to speak of near and remote +causes. We may then proceed as follows.</p> + +<p>If there is not something fundamental in a constant antecedent event +<i>a</i>, which determines necessarily the constant subsequent +appearance of one and the same <i>b</i>,—that is, if there is +nothing fundamental which makes this appearance necessary,—then we +must assume that also <i>c</i> or <i>d</i> ..., in short, any event you +will, we dare not say "follows upon," but appears after <i>a</i> in +irregular alternation with <i>b</i>. This assumption, however, is +impossible for our thought, because it is in contradiction with our +experience, on the basis of which our causal thought has been developed. +Therefore the assumption of a something that is fundamental in <i>a</i>, +and that determines sufficiently and necessarily the appearance of +<i>b</i>, is a necessity for our thought.</p> + +<p>The assertion of this logical impossibility +(<i>Denkunmöglichkeit</i>) will at once appear thoroughly paradoxical. +The reader, merely recalling the results of the empiristic +interpretation given above, will immediately say: "The assumption that a +<i>b</i> does not follow constantly upon an <i>a</i>, but that sometimes +<i>b</i>, sometimes <i>c</i>, sometimes <i>d</i> ... irregularly +appears, is in contradiction only with all our previous experience, but +it is not on this account a <i>logical</i> impossibility. It is merely +improbable." The reader will appeal especially to the discussion of +Stuart Mill, already quoted, in which Mill pictures <i>in concreto</i> +such an improbable logical impossibility, and therefore at the same time +establishes it in fact. Again, the reader may bring forward the words in +which Helmholtz introduces intellectual beings of only two dimensions. +"By the much misused expression, 'to be able to imagine to one's self,' +or, 'to think how something happens,' I understand (and I do not see how +anybody can understand anything else thereby without robbing the +expression of all meaning) that one can picture to one's self the series +of sense impressions which one would have if such a thing actually took +place in an individual case."<a name="fnanchor_21" +id="fnanchor_21"></a><a href="#footnote_21" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[21]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Nevertheless, pertinent as are these and similar objections, they are +not able to stand the test. We ask: "Is in fact a world, or even a +portion of our world, possible for thought that displays through an +absolutely irregular alternation of events a chaos in the full sense; or +is the attempt to picture such a chaos only a mere play of words to +which not even our imagination, not to mention our thought, can give a +possible meaning?"</p> + +<p>Perhaps we shall reach a conclusion by the easiest way, if we subject +Mill's description to a test. If we reduce it to the several +propositions it contains, we get the following: (1) Every one is able to +picture to himself in his imagination a reality in which events follow +one another without rule, that is, so that after an event <i>a</i> now +<i>b</i> appears, now <i>c</i>, etc., in complete irregularity. (2) The +idea of such a chaos accordingly contradicts neither the nature of our +mind nor our experience. (3) Neither the former nor the latter gives us +sufficient reason to believe that such an irregular alternation does not +actually exist somewhere in the observable world. (4) If such a chaos +should be presented to us as fact, that is, if we were in a position to +outlive such an alternation, then the belief in the uniformity of time +relations would soon cease.</p> + +<p>Every one would subscribe to the last of these four theses, +immediately upon such a chaos being admitted to be a possibility of +thought; that is, he would unless he shared the rationalistic conviction +that our thought constitutes an activity absolutely independent of all +experience. We must simply accept this conclusion on the ground of the +previous discussion and of a point still to be brought forward.</p> + +<p>If we grant this conclusion, however, then it follows, on the ground +of our previous demonstration of the reproductive and recognitive, as +well as thought elements involved in the uniform sequence, that the +irregularity in the appearance of the events, assumed in such a chaos, +can bring about an absolutely relationless alternation of impressions +for the subject that we should presuppose to be doing the perceiving. If +we still wish to call it perception, it would remain only a perception +in which no component of its content could be related to the others, a +perception, therefore, in which not even the synthesis of the several +perception contents could be apprehended as such. That is, every +combination of the different perception contents, by which they become +components of one and the same perception, presupposes, as we have seen, +those reproductive and recognitive acts in revival which are possible +only where uniformities of succession (and of coexistence) exist. Again, +every act of attention involved in identifying and discriminating, which +likewise we have seen to be possible only if we presuppose uniformities +in the given contents of perception, must necessarily disappear when we +presuppose the chaotic content; and yet they remain essential to the +very idea of such a chaos. A relationless chaos is after all nothing +else than a system of relations thought of without relations! That the +same contradiction obtains also in the mere mental picturing of a +manifold of chaotic impressions needs no discussion; for the productive +imagination as well as the reproductive is no less dependent than is our +perceptive knowledge upon the reproductive recognition and upon the +processes of identifying and discriminating.</p> + +<p>Thus the mental image of a chaos could be formed only through an +extended process of ideation, which itself presupposes as active in it +all that must be denied through the very nature of the image. A +relationless knowledge, a relationless abstraction, a relationless +reproduction or recognition, a relationless identification or +discrimination, in short, a relationless thought, are, as phrases, one +and all mere contradictions. We cannot picture "through our relating +thought," to use Helmholtz's expression, nor even in our imagination, +the sense impressions that we should have if our thought were +relationless, that is, were nullified in its very components and +presuppositions. In the case of Helmholtz's two dimensional beings, the +question at issue was not regarding the setting aside of the conditions +of our thought and the substituting conditions contradictory to them, +but regarding the setting aside of a part of the content of our sense +intuition, meanwhile retaining the conditions and forms peculiar to our +thought. In this case, therefore, we have a permissible fiction, whereas +in Mill's chaos we have an unthinkable thought.</p> + +<p>Again, the sense impressions that must be presupposed in an +inherently relationless chaos have no possible relation to the world of +our perception, whose components are universally related to each other +through the uniformities of their coexistences and sequences. +Accordingly, the remark with which Helmholtz concludes the passage above +quoted holds, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, here also. "If there is no sense +impression known that stands in relation to an event which has never +been observed (by us), as would be the case for us were there a motion +toward a fourth dimension, and for those two dimensional beings were +there a motion toward our third dimension; then it follows that such an +'idea' is impossible, as much so as that a man completely blind from +childhood should be able to 'imagine' the colors, if we could give him +too a conceptual description of them."</p> + +<p>Hence the first of the theses in which we summed up Stuart Mill's +assumptions must be rejected. With it go also the second and third. In +this case we need not answer the question: In how far do these theses +correspond to Mill's own statements regarding the absolute surety and +universality of the causal law?</p> + +<p>We have now found what we sought, in order to establish as a valid +assertion the seeming paradox in the proof of the necessity that we +ascribe to the relation between cause and effect. We have proved that +the assumption of a completely irregular and therefore relationless +alternation of impressions contradicts not only our experience, but even +the conditions of our thought; for these presuppose the uniformities of +the impressions, and consequently our ability to relate them, all which +was eliminated from our hypothetical chaos. Hence we have also +established that a necessary relation is implied in the thought of a +constant sequence of events, which makes the uniformly following +<i>b</i> really dependent upon the uniformly preceding <i>a</i>.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>From still another side, we can make clear the necessity asserted in +the relation of cause and effect. We found that the connection between +each definite cause and its effect is an empirically synthetic one and +has as its warrant merely experience. We saw further that the necessity +inherent in the causal connection contains merely the demand that there +shall be something fundamental in the constantly preceding <i>a</i> +which makes the appearance of <i>b</i> necessary; not, however, that it +informs us what this efficacy really is, and hence also not that it +informs us how this efficacy brings about its effect. Finally, we had to +urge that every induction, the most general no less than the most +particular, depends upon the presupposition that the same causes will be +given in the reality not yet observed as in that already observed. This +expectation is warranted by no necessity of thought, not even by that +involved in the relation of cause and effect; for this relation begins +for future experience only when the presupposition that the same causes +will be found in it is assumed as fulfilled.<a name="fnanchor_22" +id="fnanchor_22"></a><a href="#footnote_22" +class="fnanchor"><sup>[22]</sup></a> This expectation is then dependent +solely upon previous experience, whose servants we are, whose lords we +can never be. Therefore, every induction is an hypothesis requiring the +verification of a broader experience, since, in its work of widening and +completing our knowledge, it leads us beyond the given experience to a +possible one. In this respect we can call all inductive thought +empirical, that is, thought that begins with experience, is directed to +experience, and in its results is referred to experience. The office of +this progressing empirical thought is accordingly to form hypotheses +from which the data of perception can be regressively deduced, and by +means of which they can be exhibited as cases of known relations of our +well-ordered experience, and thus can be explained.</p> + +<p>The way of forming hypotheses can be divided logically into different +sections which can readily be made clear by an example. The police +magistrate finds a human corpse under circumstances that eliminate the +possibility of accident, natural death, or suicide; in short, that +indicate an act of violence on the part of another man. The general +hypothesis that he has here to do with a crime against life forms the +guide of his investigation. The result of the circumstantial evidence, +which we presuppose as necessary, furnishes then a special hypothesis as +following from the general hypothesis.</p> + +<p>It is clear that this division holds for all cases of forming +hypotheses. A general hypothesis serves every special hypothesis as a +heuristic principle. In the former we comprehend the causal explanation +indicated immediately by the facts revealed to our perception in the +special case. It contains, as we might also express it, the genus to the +specific limitations of the more exact investigation. But each of these +general hypotheses is a modification of the most general form of +building hypotheses, which we have already come to know as the condition +of the validity of all inductive inferences, that is, as the condition +for the necessity of their deduction, and, consequently, as the +condition for the thought that like causes will be given in the reality +not yet observed as in that already observed. We have further noticed +that in this most general form of building hypotheses there lie two +distinct and different valid assumptions: beside the empirical statement +that like causes will be given, which gives the inductive conclusion the +hypothetical form, there stands the judgment that like causes bring +forth like effects, a corollary of the causal law. The real dependence +of the effect upon the cause, presupposed by this second proposition and +the underlying causal law, is not, as was the other assumption, an +hypothesis, but a necessary requirement or <i>postulate</i> of our +thought. Its necessity arises out of our thought, because our experience +reveals uniformity in the sequence of events. From this point of view, +therefore, the causal law appears as a postulate of our thought, +grounded upon the uniformity in the sequence of events. It underlies +every special case of constructing hypotheses as well as the expectation +that like causes will be given in the reality not yet observed.</p> + +<p>Mill's logic of induction contains the same fault as that already +present in Hume's psychological theory of cause. Hume makes merely the +causal law itself responsible for our inductive inferences, and +accordingly (as Mill likewise wrongly assumes) for our inferences in +general. But we recognize how rightly Mill came to assert, in +contradiction to his empiristic presuppositions, that the causal law +offers "an undoubted assurance of an invariable, universal, and +unconditional," that is, necessary, sequence of events, from which no +seeming irregularity of occurrence and no gap in our experience can lead +us astray, as long as experience offers uniformities of sequence.</p> + +<p>Rationalism is thus in the right, when it regards the necessary +connection as an essential characteristic of the relation between cause +and effect, that is, recognizes in it a relation of real dependence. At +this point Kant and Schopenhauer have had a profounder insight than Hume +and Stuart Mill. Especially am I glad to be in agreement with Lotze on a +point which he reached by a different route and from essentially +different presuppositions. Lotze distinguishes in pure logic between +postulates, hypotheses, and fictions. He does not refer the term +"postulate" exclusively to the causal law which governs our entire +empirical thought in its formation of hypotheses, but gives the term a +wider meaning. "Postulates" are only corollaries from the inductive +fundamental form of all hypothesis construction, and correspond +essentially to what we have called general or heuristic hypotheses. His +determination of the validity of these postulates, however, implies the +position to be assigned to the causal law and therefore not to those +heuristic hypotheses. "The postulate is not an assumption that we can +make or refrain from making, or, again, in whose place we can substitute +another. It is rather an (absolutely) necessary assumption without which +the content of the view at issue would contradict the laws of our +thought."<a name="fnanchor_23" id="fnanchor_23"></a><a +href="#footnote_23" class="fnanchor"><sup>[23]</sup></a></p> + +<p>Still the decision that we have reached is not on this account in +favor of rationalism, as this is represented for instance by Kant and +his successors down to our own time, and professed by Lotze in the +passage quoted, when he speaks of an absolute necessity for thought. We +found that the causal law requires a necessary connection between events +given us in constant sequence. It is not, however, on that account a law +of our thought or of a "pure understanding" which would be absolutely +independent of all experience. When we take into consideration the +evolution of the organic world of which we are members, then we must say +that our intellect, that is, our ideation and with it our sense +perception, has evolved in us in accordance with the influences to which +we have been subjected. The common elements in the different contents of +perception which have arisen out of other psychical elements, seemingly +first in the brute world, are not only an occasion, but also an +efficient cause, for the evolution of our processes of reproduction, in +which our memory and imagination as well as our knowledge and thought, +psychologically considered, come to pass. The causal law, which the +critical analysis of the material<ins title="hyphenated in the +original"> </ins>scientific methods shows to be a fundamental condition +of empirical thought, in its requirement that the events stand as causes +and effects in necessary connection, or real dependence, comprehends +these uniform contents of perception only in the way peculiar to our +thought.</p> + +<p>Doubtless our thought gives a connection to experience through this +its requirement which experience of itself could not offer. The +necessary connection of effect with cause, or the real dependence of the +former upon the latter, is not a component of possible perception. This +requirement of our thought does not, however, become thereby independent +of the perceptive elements in the presuppositions involved in the +uniformity of sequence. The <i>a priori</i> in the sense of "innate +ideas," denoting either these themselves or an absolutely <i>a +priori</i> conformity to law that underlies them, for instance, our +"spontaneity," presupposes in principle that our "soul" is an +independently existing substance in the traditional metaphysical sense +down to the time of Locke. Kant's rationalistic successors, for the most +part, lost sight of the fact that Kant had retained these old +metaphysical assumptions in his interpretation of the transcendental +conditions of empirical interaction and in his cosmological doctrine of +freedom. The common root of the sensibility and of the understanding as +the higher faculty of knowledge remains for Kant the substantial force +of the soul, which expresses itself (just as in Leibnitz) as <i>vis +passiva</i> and <i>vis activa</i>. The modern doctrine of evolution has +entirely removed the foundation from this rationalism which had been +undermined ever since Locke's criticism of the traditional concept of +substance.</p> + +<p>To refer again briefly to a second point in which the foregoing +results differ from the Kantian rationalism as well as from empiricism +since Hume: The postulate of a necessary connection between cause and +effect, as we have seen, in no way implies the consequence that the +several inductions lose the character of hypotheses. This does not +follow merely from the fact that all inductions besides the causal law +include the hypothetical thought that the same causes will be given in +the reality not yet observed as appear in that already observed. The +hypothetical character of all inductive inferences is rather revealed +through the circumstance that in the causal postulate absolutely nothing +is contained regarding <i>what</i> the efficacy in the causes is, and +<i>how</i> this efficacy arises.</p> + +<p class="center">* * * * *</p> + +<p>Only such consequences of the foregoing interpretation of the causal +law and of its position as one of the bases of all scientific +construction of hypotheses may be pointed out, in conclusion, as will +help to make easier the understanding of the interpretation itself.</p> + +<p>The requirement of a necessary connection, or dependence, is added by +our thought to the reproductive and recognitive presuppositions that are +contained in the uniformity of the sequence of events. If this necessary +connection be taken objectively, then it reveals as its correlate the +requirement of a real dependence of effect upon cause. We come not only +upon often and variously used rationalistic thoughts, but also upon old +and unchangeable components of all empirical scientific thought, when we +give the name "force" to the efficacy that underlies causes. The old +postulate of a dynamic intermediary between the events that follow one +another constantly retains for us, therefore, its proper meaning. We +admit without hesitation that the word "force" suggests fetishism more +than do the words "cause" and "effect;" but we do not see how this can +to any degree be used as a counter-argument. All words that were coined +in the olden time to express thoughts of the practical +<i>Weltanschauung</i> have an archaic tang. Likewise all of our science +and the greater part of our nomenclature have arisen out of the sphere +of thought contained in the practical <i>Weltanschauung</i>, which +centred early in fetishism and related thoughts. If, then, we try to +free our scientific terminology from such words, we must seek refuge in +the Utopia of a <i>lingua universalis</i>, in short, we must endeavor to +speak a language which would make science a secret of the few. Or will +any one seriously maintain that a thought which belongs to an ancient +sphere of mental life must be false for the very reason that it is +ancient?</p> + +<p>In any case, it is fitting that we define more closely the sense in +which we are to regard forces as the dynamic intermediaries of uniform +occurrence. Force cannot be given as a content of perception either +through our senses or through our consciousness of self; in the case of +the former, not in our kinesthetic sensations, in the case of the +latter, not in our consciousness of volition. Volition would not include +a consciousness of force, even though we were justified in regarding it +as a simple primitive psychosis, and were not compelled rather to regard +it as an intricate collection of feelings and sensations as far as these +elementary forms of consciousness are connected in thought with the +phenomena of reaction. Again, forces cannot be taken as objects that are +derived as <i>possible</i> perceptions or after the analogy of possible +perceptions. The postulate of our thought through which these forces are +derived from the facts of the uniform sequence of events, reveals them +as limiting notions (<i>Grenzbegriffe</i>), as specializations of the +necessary connection between cause and effect, or of the real dependence +of the former upon the latter; for the manner of their causal +intermediation is in no way given, rather they can be thought of only as +underlying our perceptions. They are then in fact <i>qualitates +occultae</i>; but they are such only because the concept of quality is +taken from the contents of our sense and self perception, which of +course do not contain the necessary connection required by our thought. +Whoever, therefore, requires from the introduction of forces new +contents of perception, for instance, new and fuller mechanical +pictures, expects the impossible.</p> + +<p>The contempt with which the assumption of forces meets, on the part +of those who make this demand, is accordingly easily understood, and +still more easily is it understood, if one takes into consideration what +confusion of concepts has arisen through the use of the term "force" and +what obstacles the assumption of forces has put in the way of the +material sciences. It must be frankly admitted that this concept delayed +for centuries both in the natural and moral sciences the necessary +analysis of the complicated phenomena forming our data. Under the +influence of the "concept philosophy" it caused, over and over again, +the setting aside of the problems of this analytical empirical thought +as soon as their solution had been begun. This misuse cannot but make +suspicious from the very start every new form of maintaining that forces +underlie causation.</p> + +<p>However, misuse proves as little here against a proper use as it does +in other cases. Moreover, the scruples that we found arising from the +standpoint of empiricism against the assumption of forces are not to the +point. In assuming a dynamic intermediary between cause and effect, we +are not doubling the problems whose solution is incumbent upon the +sciences of facts, and still less is it true that our assumption must +lead to a logical circle. That is, a comparison with the ideas of the +old concept philosophy, which even in the Aristotelian doctrine contain +such a duplication, is not to the point. Those ideas are hypostasized +abstractions which are taken from the uniformly coexisting +characteristics of objects. Forces, on the other hand, are the +imperceivable relations of dependence which we must presuppose between +events that follow one another uniformly, if the uniformity of this +sequence is to become for us either thinkable or conceivable. The +problems of material scientific research are not doubled by this +presupposition of a real dynamic dependence, because it introduces an +element not contained in the data of perception which give these +problems their point of departure. This presupposition does not renew +the thought of an analytic rational connection between cause and effect +which the concept philosophy involves; on the contrary, it remains true +to the principle made practical by Hume and Kant, that the real +connection between causes and their effects is determinable only through +experience, that is, empirically and synthetically through the actual +indication of the events of uniform sequence. How these forces are +constituted and work, we cannot know, since our knowledge is confined to +the material of perception from which as a basis presentation has +developed into thought. The insight that we have won from the limiting +notion of force helps us rather to avoid the misuse which has been made +of the concept of force. A fatal circle first arises, when we use the +unknowable forces and not the knowable events for the purpose of +explanation, that is, when we cut off short the empirical analysis which +leads <i>ad infinitum</i>. To explain does not mean to deduce the known +from the unknown, but the particular from the general. It was therefore +no arbitrary judgment, but an impulse conditioned by the very nature of +our experience and of our thought, that made man early regard the causal +connection as a dynamic one, even though his conception was of course +indistinct and mixed with confusing additions.</p> + +<p>The concept of force remains indispensable also for natural +scientific thought. It is involved with the causal law in every attempt +to form an hypothesis, and accordingly it is already present in every +description of facts which goes by means of memory or abstraction beyond +the immediately given content of present perception. In introducing it +we have in mind, moreover, that the foundations of every possible +interpretation of nature possess a dynamic character, just because all +empirical thought, in this field as well, is subordinate to the causal +law. This must be admitted by any one who assumes as indispensable aids +of natural science the mechanical figures through which we reduce the +events of sense perception to the motion of mass particles, that is, +through which we associate these events with the elements of our visual +and tactual perception. All formulations of the concept of mass, even +when they are made so formal as in the definition given by Heinrich +Hertz, indicate dynamic interpretations. Whether the impelling forces +are to be thought of in particular as forces acting at a distance or as +forces acting through collision depends upon the answer to the question +whether we have to assume the dynamic mass particles as filling space +discontinuously or continuously. The dynamic basis of our interpretation +of nature will be seen at once by any one who is of the opinion that we +can make the connection of events intelligible without the aid of +mechanical figures, for instance, in terms of energy.</p> + +<p>Thus it results that we interpret the events following one another +immediately and uniformly as causes and effects, by presupposing as +fundamental to them forces that are the necessary means of their +uniformity of connection. What we call "laws" are the judgments in which +we formulate these causal connections.</p> + +<p>A second and a third consequence need only be mentioned here. The +hypothesis that interprets the mutual connection of psychical and +physical vital phenomena as causal one is as old as it is natural. It is +natural, because even simple observations assure us that the mental +content of perception <i>follows</i> uniformly the instigating physical +stimulus and the muscular movement the instigating mental content which +we apprehend as will. We know, however, that the physical events which, +in raising the biological problem, we have to set beside the psychical, +do not take place in the periphery of our nervous system and in our +muscles, but in the central nervous system. But we must assume, in +accordance with all the psycho-physiological data which at the present +time are at our disposal, that these events in our central nervous +system do not follow the corresponding psychical events, but that both +series have their course simultaneously. We have here, therefore, +instead of the real relation of dependence involved in constant +sequence, a real dependence of the simultaneity or correlative series of +events. This would not, of course, as should be at once remarked, tell +as such against a causal connection between the two separate causal +series. But the contested parallelistic interpretation of this +dependence is made far more probable through other grounds. These are in +part corollaries of the law of the conservation of energy, rightly +interpreted, and in part epistemological considerations. Still it is not +advisable to burden methodological study, for instance, the theory of +induction, with these remote problems; and on that account it is better +for our present investigation to subordinate the psychological +interdependences, to the causal ones in the narrower sense.</p> + +<p>The final consequence, too, that forces itself upon our attention is +close at hand in the preceding discussion. The tradition prevailing +since Hume, together with its inherent opposition to the interpretation +of causal connection given by the concept philosophy, permitted us to +make the uniform sequences of events the basis of our discussion. In so +doing, however, our attention had to be called repeatedly to one +reservation. In fact, only a moment ago, in alluding to the +psychological interdependences, we had to emphasize the uniform +<i>sequence</i>. Elsewhere the arguments depended upon the +<i>uniformity</i> that characterizes this sequence; and rightly, for the +reduction of the causal relation to the fundamental relation of the +sequence of events is merely a convenient one and not the only possible +one. As soon as we regard the causal connection, along with the opposed +and equal reaction, as an interconnection, then cause and effect become, +is a matter of principle, simultaneous. The separation of interaction +from causation is not justifiable.</p> + +<p>In other ways also we can so transform every causal relation that +cause and effect must be regarded as simultaneous. Every stage, for +instance, of the warming of a stone by the heat of the sun, or of the +treaty conferences of two states, presents an effect that is +simultaneous with the totality of the acting causes. The analysis of a +cause that was at first grasped as a whole into the multiplicity of its +constituent causes and the comprehension of the constituent causes into +a whole, which then presents itself as the effect, is a necessary +condition of such a type of investigation. This conception, which is +present already in Hobbes, but especially in Herbart's "method of +relations," deserves preference always where the purpose in view is not +the shortest possible argumentation but the most exact analysis.</p> + +<p>If we turn our attention to this way of viewing the +problem,—not, however, in the form of Herbart's speculative +method,—we shall find that the results which we have gained will +in no respect be altered. We do, however, get a view beyond. From it we +can find the way to subordinate not only the uniform sequence of events, +but also the persistent characteristics and states with their mutual +relations, under the extended causal law. In so doing, we do not fall +back again into the intellectual world of the concept philosophy. We +come only to regard the <i>persisting coexistences</i>—in the +physical field, the bodies, in the psychical, the subjects of +consciousness—as systems or modes of activity. The thoughts to +which such a doctrine leads are accordingly not new or unheard of. The +substances have always been regarded as sources of modes of activity. We +have here merely new modifications of thoughts that have been variously +developed, not only from the side of empiricism, but also from that of +rationalism. They carry with them methodologically the implication that +it is possible to grasp the totality of reality, as far as it reveals +uniformities, as a causally connected whole, as a cosmos. They give the +research of the special sciences the conceptual bases for the wider +prospects that the sciences of facts have through hard labor won for +themselves. The subject of consciousness is unitary as far as the +processes of memory extend, but it is not simple. On the contrary, it is +most intricately put together out of psychical complexes, themselves +intricate and out of their relations; all of which impress upon us, +psychologically and, in their mechanical correlates, physiologically, an +ever-recurring need for further empirical analysis. Among the mechanical +images of physical reality that form the foundation of our +interpretation of nature, there can finally be but one that meets all +the requirements of a general hypothesis of the continuity of kinetic +connections. With this must be universally coördinated the persistent +properties or sensible modes of action belonging to bodies. The +mechanical constitution of the compound bodies, no matter at what stage +of combination and formation, must be derivable from the mechanical +constitution of the elements of this combination. Thus our causal +thought compels us to trace back the persistent coexistences of the +so-called elements to combinations whose analysis, as yet hardly begun, +leads us on likewise to indefinitely manifold problems. +Epistemologically we come finally to a universal phenomenological +dynamism as the fundamental basis of all theoretical interpretation of +the world, at least fundamental for our scientific thought, and we are +here concerned with no other.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_4" id="footnote_4"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_4">[4]</a> Cf. the author's "Theorie der +Typeneinteilungen," <i>Philosophische Monatshefte</i>, vol. xxx, Berlin, +1894.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_5" id="footnote_5"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_5">[5]</a> Kant, <i>Kr. d. r. V.</i>, 2d ed., p. 862.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_6" id="footnote_6"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_6">[6]</a> According to Plato, it is true, the ideas +are separated from the sensible things; they must be thought in a +conceptual place, for the space of sense<ins title="hyphenated in the +original"> </ins>perception is to be understood as non-being, matter. +The things revealed to sense, however, occupy a middle position between +being and non-being, so that they partake of the ideas. In this sense, +the statement made above holds also of the older view of the concept +philosophy.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_7" id="footnote_7"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_7">[7]</a> Cf. the articles on Francis Bacon by Chr. +Sigwart in the <i>Preussische Jahrbücher</i>, xii, 1863, and xiii, +1864.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_8" id="footnote_8"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_8">[8]</a> Kant, <i>Kr. d. r. V.</i>, 1st ed., pp. +100 f.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_9" id="footnote_9"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_9">[9]</a> It is not our present concern to ascertain +how this actually happens. The psychological presuppositions of the +present paper are contained in the theory of reproduction that I have +worked out in connection with the psychology of speech in the articles +on "Die psychologischen Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen Sprechen und +Denken," <i>Archiv für systematische Philosophie</i>, II, III, und VII; +cf. note 1, page 151.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_10" id="footnote_10"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_10">[10]</a> Cf. the author's "Umrisse zur +Psychologie des Denkens," in <i>Philosophische Abhandlungen Chr. Sigwart +... gewidmet</i>, Tübingen, 1900.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_11" id="footnote_11"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_11">[11]</a> The difference between the two points of +view can be made clearer by an illustration. The case that we shall +analyze is the dread of coming into contact with fire. The psychological +analysis of this case has to make clear the mental content of the dread +and its causes. Such dread becomes possible only when we are aware of +the burning that results from contact with fire. We could have learned +to be aware of this either immediately through our own experience, or +mediately through the communication of others' experience. In both cases +it is a matter of one or repeated experiences. In all cases the effects +of earlier experiences equal association and recall, which, in turn, +result in recognition. The recognition explaining the case under +discussion arises thus. The present stimuli of visual perception arouse +the retained impressions of previous visual perceptions of fire and give +rise to the present perception (apperception) by fusing with them. By a +process of interweaving, associations are joined to this perception. The +apperceptively revived elements which lie at the basis of the content of +the perception are interwoven by association with memory elements that +retain the additional contents of previous perceptions of fire, viz., +the burning, or, again, are interwoven with the memory elements of the +communications regarding such burning. By means of this interweaving, +the stimulation of the apperceptive element transmits itself to the +remaining elements of the association complex. The character of the +association is different under different conditions. If it be founded +only upon one experience, then there can arise a memory or a recall, in +the wider sense, of the foregoing content of the perception and feeling +at the time of the burning, or, again, there can arise a revival wherein +the stimulated elements of retention remain unconscious. Again, the +words of the mother tongue that denote the previous mental content, and +which likewise belong to the association complex (the apperceiving mass, +in the wider sense), can be excited in one of these three forms and in +addition as abstract verbal ideas. Each one of these forms of verbal +discharge can lead to the innervations of the muscles involved in +speech, which bring about some sort of oral expression of judgment. Each +of these verbal reproductions can be connected with each of the +foregoing sensory (<i>sachlichen</i>) revivals. Secondly, if the +association be founded upon repeated perceptions on the part of the +person himself, then all the afore-mentioned possibilities of +reproduction become more complicated, and, in addition, the mental +revivals contain, more or less, only the common elements of the previous +perceptions, <i>i. e.</i>, reappear in the form of abstract ideas or +their corresponding unconscious modifications. In the third case the +association is founded upon a communication of others' experience. For +the sake of simplicity, let this case be confined to the following +instance. The communication consisted in the assertion: "All fire will +burn upon contact." Moreover, this judgment was expressed upon occasion +of imminent danger of burning. There can then arise, as is perhaps +evident, all the possibilities mentioned in the second case, only that +here there will be a stronger tendency toward verbal reproduction and +the sensory reproduction will be less fixed.</p> + +<p class="footnote">In the first two cases there was connected with the +perception of the burning an intense feeling of pain. In the third the +idea of such pain added itself to the visual perception of the moment. +The associated elements of the earlier mental contents belong likewise +to the apperceiving mass excited at the moment, in fact to that part of +it excited by means of association processes, or, as we can again say, +depending upon the point from which we take our view, the associative or +apperceptive completion of the content of present perception. If these +pain elements are revived as memories, <i>i. e.</i>, as elements in +consciousness, they give rise to a new disagreeable feeling, which is +referred to the possible coming sensation of burning. If the mental +modifications corresponding to these pain elements remain unconscious, +as is often possible, there arises none the less the same result as +regards our feeling, only with less intensity. This feeling tone we call +the dread.</p> + +<p class="footnote">As a result of the sum total of the revivals actual +and possible, there is finally produced, according to the particular +circumstances, either a motor reaction or an inhibitant of such +reaction. Both innervations can take place involuntarily or +voluntarily.</p> + +<p class="footnote">The critical analysis of the fact that we dread +contact with fire, even has another purpose and accordingly proceeds on +other lines. It must make clear under what presuppositions the foresight +that lies at the basis of such dread is valid for future experience. It +must then formulate the actual process of revival that constitutes the +foundation of this feeling as a series of judgments, from which the +meaning and interconnection of the several judgments will become clear. +Thus the critical analysis must give a logical presentation of the +apperceptive and associative processes of revival.</p> + +<p class="footnote">For this purpose the three cases of the +psychological analysis reduce themselves to two: viz., first, to the +case in which an immediate experience forms the basis, and secondly, to +that in which a variety of similar mediately or immediately communicated +experiences form such basis.</p> + +<p class="footnote">In the first of these logically differentiated +cases, the transformation into the speech of formulated thought leads to +the following inference from analogy:</p> + +<p class="footnote poem"> + <span class="i4">Fire A burned.</span><br /> + <span class="i4 u">Fire B is similar to fire A.</span><br /> + <span class="i4">Fire B will burn.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p class="footnote">In the second case there arises a syllogism of some +such form as:</p> + +<p class="footnote poem"> + <span class="i2">All fire causes burning upon contact.</span><br /> + <span class="i2">This present phenomenon is fire.</span><br /> + <span class="i2 o">This present phenomenon will cause burning upon + contact.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p class="footnote">Both premises of this syllogism are inductive +inferences, whose implicit meaning becomes clear when we formulate as +follows:</p> + +<p class="footnote poem"> + <span class="i0">All heretofore investigated instances of fire have + burned, therefore all fire burns.</span><br /> + <span class="i0">The present phenomenon manifests some properties of + fire, will consequently have all the properties thereof.</span><br /> + <span class="i0 o">The present phenomenon will, in case of contact, + cause burning.</span><br /></p> + +<p class="footnote">The first syllogism goes from the particular to the +particular. The second proves itself to be (contrary to the analysis of +Stuart Mill) an inference that leads from the general to the particular. +For the conclusion is the particular of the second parts of the major +and minor premises; and these second parts of the premises are inferred +from their first parts in the two possible ways of inductive inference. +The latter do not contain the case referred to in the conclusion, but +set forth the conditions of carrying a result of previous experience +over to a new case with inductive probability, in other words, the +conditions of making past experience a means of foreseeing future +experience. It would be superfluous to give here the symbols of the two +forms of inductive inference.</p> + +<p class="footnote">We remain within the bounds of logical analysis, if +we state under what conditions conclusions follow necessarily from their +premises, viz., the conclusions of arguments from analogy and of +syllogisms in the narrower sense, as well as those of the foregoing +inductive arguments. For the inference from analogy and the two forms of +inductive inference, these conditions are the presuppositions already +set forth in the text of the present paper, that in the as yet +unobserved portion of reality the like causes will be found and they +will give rise to like effects. For the syllogism they are the thought +that the predicate of a predicate is the (mediate) predicate of the +subject. Only the further analysis of these presuppositions, which is +undertaken in the text, leads to critical considerations in the narrower +sense.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_12" id="footnote_12"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_12">[12]</a> <i>A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and +Inductive</i>, bk. III, ch. v, § 6.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_13" id="footnote_13"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_13">[13]</a> This doctrine began in the theological +evolution of the Christian concept of God. It was first fundamentally +formulated by Leibnitz. It is retained in Kant's doctrine of the +<i>harmonia generaliter stabilita</i> and the latter's consequences for +the critical doctrine of the <i>mundus intelligibilis</i>. Hence it +permeates the metaphysical doctrines of the systems of the nineteenth +century in various ways.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_14" id="footnote_14"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_14">[14]</a> Cf. the author's <i>Logik</i>, bd. <span +class="smcap">i</span>, § 61.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_15" id="footnote_15"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_15">[15]</a> "<i>Rationem</i> vero harum gravitatis +proprietatum ex phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non +fingo. <i>Quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur, hypothesis vocanda +est</i>; et hypotheses seu metaphysicae, seu physicae, seu qualitatum +occultarum, seu mechanicae, in philosophia experimentali locum non +habent. In hac philosophia propositiones deducuntur ex phaenomenis, et +redduntur generales per <i>inductionem</i>." Newton, at the end of his +chief work.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_16" id="footnote_16"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_16">[16]</a> <i>Logik</i>, bk. <span +class="smcap">iii</span>, ch. v, § 2.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_17" id="footnote_17"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_17">[17]</a> <i>Logic</i>, bk. <span +class="smcap">iii</span>, ch. v, § 6, and end of § 2. Hume says in a +note to section <span class="smcap">vi</span> of his <i>Enquiry +Concerning Human Understanding</i>: "We ought to divide arguments into +<i>demonstrations</i>, <i>proofs</i>, <i>and probabilities</i>. By +proofs Meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt +or opposition." The note stands in evident contrast to the well-known +remarks at the beginning of section <span class="smcap">iv</span>, pt. +<span class="smcap">i</span>.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_18" id="footnote_18"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_18">[18]</a> <i>Logic</i>, bk. <span +class="smcap">iii</span>, ch. xxi, § 1.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_19" id="footnote_19"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_19">[19]</a> Alongside of these dynamic theories, +there are to be found mechanical ones that arose just as early and from +the same source, viz., the practical <i>Weltanschauung</i>. It is not +part of our purpose to discuss them. Their first scientific expression +is to be found in the doctrine of effluences and pores in Empedokles and +in Atomism.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_20" id="footnote_20"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_20">[20]</a> <i>Logic</i>, bk. <span +class="smcap">iii</span>, ch. v, § 6.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_21" id="footnote_21"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_21">[21]</a> <i>Vorträge und Reden</i>, bd. <span +class="smcap">ii</span>, "Über den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der +geometrischen Axiome."</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_22" id="footnote_22"></a> +<a href="#fnanchor_22">[22]</a> The only empiricism which can maintain +that the same causes would, in conformity with the causal law, be given +in the unobserved reality, is one which puts all events that can be +regarded as causes in the immediately given content of perception as its +members. Such a view is not to be found in Mill; and it stands so +completely in the way of all further analysis required of us by every +perception of events that no attention has been paid in the text to this +extreme of extremes.</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="footnote_23" id="footnote_23"></a> <a +href="#fnanchor_23">[23]</a> <i>Logic</i>, 1874, buch <span +class="smcap">i</span>, kap. viii.</p> + +<h4 class="p4 ">ADDENDA PAGES</h4> + +<hr class="c10" /> + +<h4 class="add4">FOR LECTURE NOTES AND MEMORANDA<br /> OF +COLLATERAL READING</h4> + +<div class='tnote'> <h3>Transcriber's Notes:</h3> + +<p>In the original book, ten blank pages follow the last text entry.</p> + +<p>In the chronological order of proceedings for September 24, there is +no listing for Hall 9 at 3 p.m.</p> + +<p>Footnotes were numbered sequentially and moved to the end of the +paper in which they occur.</p> + +<p>Punctuation has been standardized.</p> + +<p>The remaining changes are indicated by dotted lines under the text. +Scroll the mouse over the word and the original text will <ins +title="Original reads 'apprear'"> appear</ins>.</p> + +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of International Congress of Arts and +Science, Volume I, by Various + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INT'L CONGRESS--ARTS, SCIENCE, VOL I *** + +***** This file should be named 38267-h.htm or 38267-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/6/38267/ + +Produced by Robin Monks, Carol Brown, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. 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