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diff --git a/38267-0.txt b/38267-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..738975e --- /dev/null +++ b/38267-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,18924 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of International Congress of Arts and Science, +Volume I, by Various + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume I + Philosophy and Metaphysics + +Author: Various + +Editor: Howard J. Rogers + +Release Date: December 10, 2011 [EBook #38267] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INT'L CONGRESS--ARTS, SCIENCE, VOL I *** + + + + +Produced by Robin Monks, Carol Brown, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive. + + + + + + [Illustration: Cover Title Page] + + _OF THE_ + + Cambridge Edition + + _There have been printed seven hundred and fifty sets + of which this is copy_ + + _No._ 337 + + INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS + OF ARTS AND SCIENCE + + + + + [Illustration: ALMA MATER + + _Photogravure of the Statue by Daniel C. French_ + + The colossal figure of French's Alma Mater adorns the fine suite of + stone steps leading up to the picturesque library building of + Columbia University. It is a bronze statue, gilded with pure gold. + The female figure typifying "Alma Mater" is represented as sitting + in a chair of classic shape, her elbows resting on the arms of the + chair. Both hands are raised. The right hand holds and is supported + by a sceptre. On her head is a classic wreath, and on her lap lies + an open book, from which her eyes seem to have just been raised in + meditation. Drapery falls in semi-classic folds from her neck to her + sandalled feet, only the arms and neck being left bare. + + Every University man cherishes a kindly feeling for his Alma Mater, + and the famous American sculptor, Daniel C. French, has been most + successful in his artistic creation of the "Fostering Mother" + spiritualized--the familiar ideal of the mother of minds trained to + thought and consecrated to intellectual service.] + + + + + INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS + + OF + + ARTS AND SCIENCE + + _EDITED BY_ + + HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D. + + DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSES + + + VOLUME I + + PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS + + COMPRISING + + Lectures on Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, + Philosophy of Religion, Sciences of the + Ideal, Problems of Metaphysics, + The Theory of Science, + and Logic + + [Illustration: University Alliance logo] + + UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE + LONDON NEW YORK + + + + + COPYRIGHT 1906 BY HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO. + + ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + + COPYRIGHT 1908 BY UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE + + + + + _ILLUSTRATIONS_ + + + VOLUME I + + FACING + PAGE + + ALMA MATER _Frontispiece_ + Photogravure from the statue by Daniel C. French + + DR. HOWARD J. ROGERS 1 + Photogravure from a photograph + + DR. SIMON NEWCOMB 135 + Photogravure from a photograph + + THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 168 + Photogravure from the painting by OTTO KNILLE + + + + + _TABLE OF CONTENTS_ + + + VOLUME I + + THE HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS 1 + HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D. + + PROGRAMME 47 + + PURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE CONGRESS 50 + + ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS 52 + + OFFICERS OF THE CONGRESS 53 + + SPEAKERS AND CHAIRMEN 54 + + CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS 77 + + PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL EVENTS 81 + + LIST OF TEN-MINUTE SPEAKERS 82 + + THE SCIENTIFIC PLAN OF THE CONGRESS 85 + HUGO MUENSTERBERG, PH.D., LL.D. + + INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS. + _The Evolution of the Scientific Investigator_ 135 + SIMON NEWCOMB, PH.D., LL.D. + + NORMATIVE SCIENCE + + _The Sciences of the Ideal_ 151 + BY PROF. JOSIAH ROYCE, PH.D., LL.D. + + PHILOSOPHY. + + _Philosophy: Its Fundamental Conceptions and its Methods_ 173 + BY PROF. GEORGE HOLMES HOWISON, LL.D. + + _The Development of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century_ 194 + BY PROF. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, D.D., LL.D. + + METAPHYSICS. + + _The Relations Between Metaphysics and the Other Sciences_ 227 + BY PROF. ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR, M.A. + + _The Present Problems of Metaphysics_ 246 + BY PROF. ALEXANDER THOMAS ORMOND, PH.D., LL.D. + + PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. + + _The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Other Sciences_ 263 + BY PROF. OTTO PFLEIDERER, D.D. + + _Main Problems of the Philosophy of Religion: Psychology and + Theory Of Knowledge in the Science of Religion_ 275 + BY PROF. ERNST TROELTSCH, D.D. + + _Some Roots and Factors of Religion_ 289 + BY PROF. ALEXANDER T. ORMOND. + + LOGIC. + + _The Relations of Logic to Other Disciplines_ 296 + BY PROF. WILLIAM ALEXANDER HAMMOND, PH.D. + + _The Field of Logic_ 313 + BY PROF. FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE, LL.D. + + METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE. + + _On the Theory of Science_ 333 + BY PROF. WILHELM OSTWALD, LL.D. + + _The Content and Validity of the Causal Law_ 353 + BY PROF. BENNO ERDMANN, PH.D. + + + + + [Illustration: _HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D._ + + Howard Jason Rogers, born Stephentown, Rensselaer Co., N. Y., + November 16, 1861; graduated from Williams College, 1884; admitted + to bar, 1877; Superintendent New York State Exhibit World's + Columbian Exposition, 1893; Deputy State Superintendent Public + Institution, 1895-1899; Republican Director Department of Education + and Social Economy of U. S. Commission to Paris Exposition 1900; + Chief Department of Education, St. Louis Exposition, 1904; First. + Asst. Commissioner State Department of Education, N. Y., since 1904, + when he received degree of A.M. from Columbia and degree of LL.D. + from Northwestern University. He is an officer of the Legion of + Honor of France; Chevalier of San Maurice and Lazare, Italy; + Chevalier de l'Etoile Polaire, Sweden; Chevalier Nat. order of + Leopold, Belgium; and officer of the Red Eagle, Germany.] + + + + +THE HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS + +BY HOWARD J. ROGERS A.M., LL.D. + + +The forces which bring to a common point the thousandfold energies of a +universal exposition can best promote an international congress of +ideas. Under national patronage and under the spur of international +competition the best products and the latest inventions of man in +science, in literature, and in art are grouped together in orderly +classification. Whether the motive underlying the exhibits be the +promotion of commerce and trade, or whether it be individual ambition, +or whether it be national pride and loyalty, the resultant is the same. +The space within the boundaries of the exposition is a forum of the +nations where equal rights are guaranteed to every representative from +any quarter of the globe, and where the sovereignty of each nation is +recognized whenever its flag floats over a national pavilion or an +exhibit area. The productive genius of every governed people contends in +peaceful rivalry for world recognition, and the exposition becomes an +international clearing-house for practical ideas. + +For the demonstration of the value of these products men thoroughly +skilled in their development and use are sent by the various exhibitors. +The exposition by the logic of its creation thus gathers to itself the +expert representatives of every art and industry. For at least two +months in the exposition period there are present the members of the +international jury of awards, selected specially by the different +governments for their thorough knowledge, theoretical and practical, of +the departments to which they are assigned, and selected further for +their ability to impress upon others the correctness of their views. The +renown of a universal exposition brings, as visitors, students and +investigators bent upon the solution of problems and anxious to know the +latest contributions to the facts and the theories which underlie every +phase of the world's development. + +The material therefore is ready at hand with which to construct the +framework of a conference of parts, or a congress of the whole of any +subject. It was a natural and logical step to accompany the study of the +exhibits with a debate on their excellence, an analysis of their growth, +and an argument for their future. Hence the congress. The exposition and +the congress are correlative terms. The former concentres the visible +products of the brain and hand of man; the congress is the literary +embodiment of its activities. + +Yet it was not till the Paris Exposition of 1889 that the idea of a +series of congresses, international in membership and universal in +scope, was fully developed. The three preceding expositions, Paris, +1878, Philadelphia, 1876, and Vienna, 1873, had held under their +auspices many conferences and congresses, and indeed the germ of the +congress idea may be said to have been the establishment of the +International Scientific Commission in connection with the Paris +Exposition of 1867; but all of these meetings were unrelated and +sometimes almost accidental in their organization, although many were of +great scientific interest and value. + +The success of the series of seventy congresses in Paris in 1889 led the +authorities of the World's Columbian Exposition in 1893 to establish the +World's Congress Auxiliary designed "to supplement the exhibit of +material progress by the Exposition, by a portrayal of the wonderful +achievements of the new age in science, literature, education, +government, jurisprudence, morals, charity, religion, and other +departments of human activity, as the most effective means of increasing +the fraternity, progress, prosperity, and peace of mankind." The +widespread interest in this series of meetings is a matter easily within +recollection, but they were in no wise interrelated to each other, nor +more than ordinarily comprehensive in their scope. + +It remained for the Paris Exposition of 1900 to bring to a perfect +organization this type of congress development. By ministerial decree +issued two years prior to the exposition the conduct of the department +was set forth to the minutest detail. One hundred twenty-five +congresses, each with its separate secretary and organizing committee, +were authorized and grouped under twelve sections corresponding closely +to the exhibit classification. The principal delegate, M. Gariel, +reported to a special commission, which was directly responsible to the +government. The department was admirably conducted and reached as high a +degree of success as a highly diversified, ably administered, but +unrelated system of international conferences could. And yet the +attendance on a majority of these congresses was disappointing, and in +many there was scarcely any one present outside the immediate circle of +those concerned in its development. If this condition could prevail in +Paris, the home of arts and letters, in the immediate centre of the +great constituency of the University and of many scientific circles and +learned societies, and within easy traveling distance of other European +university and literary centres, it was fair to presume that the +usefulness of this class of congress was decreasing. It certainly was +safe to assume, on the part of the authorities of the St. Louis +Exposition of 1904, that such a series could not be a success in that +city, owing to its geographical position and the limited number of +university and scientific circles within a reasonable traveling +distance. Something more than a repetition of the stereotyped form of +conference was admitted to be necessary in order to arouse interest +among scholars and to bring credit to the Exposition. + +This was the serious problem which confronted the Exposition of St. +Louis. No exposition was ever better fitted to serve as the groundwork +of a congress of ideas than that of St. Louis. The ideal of the +Exposition, which was created in time and fixed in place to commemorate +a great historic event, was its educational influence. Its appeal to the +citizens of the United States for support, to the Federal Congress for +appropriations, and to foreign governments for coöperation, was made +purely on this basis. For the first time in the history of expositions +the educational influence was made the dominant factor and the +classification and installation of exhibits made contributory to that +principle. The main purpose of the Exposition was to place within reach +of the investigator the objective thought of the world, so classified as +to show its relations to all similar phases of human endeavor, and so +arranged as to be practically available for reference and study. As a +part of the organic scheme a congress plan was contemplated which should +be correlative with the exhibit features of the Exposition, and whose +published proceedings should stand as a monument to the breadth and +enterprise of the Exposition long after its buildings had disappeared +and its commercial achievements grown dim in the minds of men. + + +DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONGRESS + +The Department of Congresses, to which was to be intrusted this +difficult task, was not formed until the latter part of 1902, although +the question was for a year previous the subject of many discussions and +conferences between the President of the Exposition, Mr. Francis; the +Director of Exhibits, Mr. Skiff; the Chief of the Department of +Education, Mr. Rogers; President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia +University, and President William R. Harper of Chicago University. To +the disinterested and valuable advice of the two last-named gentlemen +during the entire history of the Congress the Exposition is under heavy +obligations. During this period proposals had been made to two men of +international reputation to give all their time for two years to the +organization of a plan of congresses which should accomplish the +ultimate purpose of the Exposition authorities. Neither one, however, +could arrange to be relieved of the pressure of his regular duties, and +the entire scheme of supervision was consequently changed. The plan +adopted was based upon the idea of an advisory board composed of men of +high literary and scientific standing who should consider and recommend +the kind of congress most worthy of promotion, and the details of its +development. + +In November, 1902, Howard J. Rogers, LL.D., was appointed Director of +Congresses, and the members of the Advisory (afterwards termed +Administrative) Board selected as follows:-- + +CHAIRMAN: NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, PH.D., LL.D., President Columbia +University. + +WILLIAM R. HARPER, PH.D., LL.D., President University of Chicago. + +HONORABLE FREDERICK W. HOLLS, A.M., LL.B., New York. + +R. H. JESSE, PH.D., LL.D., President University of Missouri. + +HENRY S. PRITCHETT, PH.D., LL.D., President Massachusetts Institute of +Technology. + +HERBERT PUTNAM, LITT.D., LL.D., Librarian of Congress. + +FREDERICK J. V. SKIFF, A.M., Director of Field Columbian Museum. + + * * * * * + +The action of the Executive Committee of the Exposition, approved by the +President, was as follows:-- + + There shall be appointed by the President of the Exposition + Company a Director of Congresses who shall report to the + President of the Exposition Company. + + There shall be appointed by the President of the Exposition + Company an Advisory Board of seven persons, the chairman to + be named by the President, who shall meet at the call of the + Director of Congresses, or the Chairman of the Advisory + Board. + + The expenses of the members of the Advisory Board while on + business of the Exposition shall be a charge against the + funds of the Exposition Company. + + The duties of the said Advisory Board shall be: to consider + and make recommendations to the Director of Congresses on + all matters submitted to them; to determine the number and + the extent of the congresses; the emphasis to be placed upon + special features; the prominent men to be invited to + participate; the character of the programmes; and the + methods for successfully carrying out the enterprise. + + There shall be set aside from the Exposition funds for the + maintenance of the congresses the sum of two hundred + thousand dollars ($200,000). + +The standing Committee on Congresses from the Exposition board of +directors was shortly afterwards appointed and was composed of five of +the most prominent men in St. Louis:-- + +CHAIRMAN: HON. FREDERICK W. LEHMANN, Attorney at Law. + +BRECKENRIDGE JONES, Banker. + +CHARLES W. KNAPP, Editor of _The St. Louis Republic_. + +JOHN SCHROERS, Manager of the _Westliche Post_. + +A. F. SHAPLEIGH, Merchant. + +To this committee were referred for consideration by the President all +matters of policy submitted by the Director of Congresses. This +committee had jurisdiction over all congress matters, including not only +the Congress of Arts and Science, but also the many miscellaneous +congresses and conventions, and a great part of the success of the +congresses is due to their broad-minded and liberal determination of the +questions laid before them. + + +IDEA OF THE CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE + +It is impossible to ascribe the original idea of the Congress of Arts +and Science to any one person. It was a matter of slow growth from the +many conferences which had been held for a year by men of many +occupations, and as finally worked out bore little resemblance to the +original plans under discussion. The germ of the idea may fairly be said +to have been contained in Director Skiff's insistence to the Executive +Committee of the Exposition that the congress work stand for something +more than an unrelated series of independent gatherings, and that some +project be authorized which would at once be distinctive and of real +scientific worth. To support this view Director Skiff brought the +Executive Committee to the view of expending $200,000, if need be, to +insure the project. Starting from this suggestion many plans were +brought forward, but one which seems to belong of right to the late +Honorable Frederick W. Holls, of New York City, contained perhaps the +next recognizable step in advance. This thought was, briefly, that a +series of lectures on scientific and literary topics by men prominent in +their respective fields be delivered at the Exposition and that the +Exposition pay the speakers for their services. This point was +thoroughly discussed by Mr. Holls and President Butler, and the next +step in the evolution of the Congress was the idea of bringing these +lecturers together at the Exposition at about the same time or all +during one month. At this stage Professor Hugo Münsterberg, who was the +guest of Mr. Holls and an invited participant in the conference, made +the important suggestion that such a series of unrelated lectures, even +though given by most eminent men, would have little or no scientific +value, but that if some relation, or underlying thought, could be +introduced into the addresses, then the best work could be done, which +would be of real value to the scientific world. He further stated that +only in this case would scientific leaders be likely to favor the plan +of a St. Louis congress, as they would feel attracted not so much +through the honorariums to be given for their services as through the +valuable opportunity of developing such a contribution to scientific +thought. Subsequently Professor Münsterberg was asked by Mr. Holls to +formulate his ideas in a manner to be submitted to the Exposition +authorities. This was done in a communication under date of October 20, +1902, which contained logically presented the foundation of the plan +afterwards worked out in detail. At this juncture the Department of +Congresses was organized, as has been stated, the Director named, and +the Administrative Board appointed, and on December 27, 1902, the first +meeting of the Director with the Administrative Board took place in New +York City. + +A thorough canvass of the subject was made at this meeting and as a +result the following recommendations were made to the Exposition +authorities:-- + +(1) That the sessions of this Congress be held within a period of four +weeks, beginning September 15, 1904. + +(2) That the various groups of learned men who may come together be +asked to discuss their several sciences or professions with reference to +some theme of universal human interest, in order that thereby a certain +unity of interest and of action may be had. Under such a plan the groups +of men who come together would thus form sections of a single Congress +rather than separate congresses. + +(3) As a subject which has universal significance, and one likely to +serve as a connecting thread for all of the discussions of the Congress, +the theme "The Progress of Man since the Louisiana Purchase" was +considered by the Administrative Board fit and suggestive. It is +believed that discussions by leaders of thought in the various branches +of pure and applied science, in philosophy, in politics, and in +religion, from the standpoint of man's progress in the century which has +elapsed, would be fruitful, not only in clearing the thoughts of men not +trained in science and in government, but also in preparing the way for +new advances. + +(4) The Administrative Board further recommends that the Congress be +made up from men of thought and of action, whose work would probably +fall under the following general heads:-- + +_a._ The Natural Sciences (such as Astronomy, Biology, Mathematics, +etc.). + +_b._ The Historical, Sociological, and Economic group of studies +(History, Political Economy, etc.). + +_c._ Philosophy and Religion. + +_d._ Medicine and Surgery. + +_e._ Law, Politics, and Government (including development and history of +the colonies, their government, revenue and prosperity, arbitration, +etc.). + +_f._ Applied Science (including the various branches of engineering). + +(5) The Administrative Board recommends further referring to a special +committee of seven the problem of indicating in detail the method in +which this plan can best be carried out. To this committee is assigned +the duty of choosing the general divisions of the Congress, the various +branches of science and of study in these divisions, and of recommending +to the Administrative Board a detailed plan of the sections in which, in +their judgment, those who come to the Congress may be most effectively +grouped, with a view not only to bring out the central theme, but also +to represent in a helpful way and in a suggestive manner the present +boundary of knowledge in the various lines of study and investigation +which the committee may think wise to accept. + +These recommendations were transmitted by the Director of Congresses to +the Committee on Congresses, approved by them, and afterwards approved +by the Executive Committee and the President. The first four +recommendations were of a preliminary character, but the fifth contained +a distinct advance in the formation of a Committee on Plan and Scope +which should be composed of eminent scientists capable of developing the +fundamental idea into a plan which should harmonize with the scientific +work in every field. The committee selected were as follows:-- + +DR. SIMON NEWCOMB, PH.D., LL.D., Retired Professor of Mathematics, U. S. +Navy. + +PROF. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, PH.D., LL.D., Professor of Psychology, Harvard +University. + +PROF. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, LL.D., ex-assistant Secretary of State, and +Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University. + +PROF. ALBION W. SMALL, PH.D., Professor of Sociology, University of +Chicago. + +DR. WILLIAM H. WELCH, M.D., LL.D., Professor of Pathology, Johns Hopkins +University. + +HON. ELIHU THOMSON, Consulting Engineer General Electric Company. + +PROF. GEORGE F. MOORE, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Comparative Religion, +Harvard University. + + * * * * * + +In response to a letter from President Butler, Chairman of the +Administrative Board, giving a complete résumé of the growth of the idea +of the Congress to that time, all of the members of the committee, with +the exception of Mr. Thomson, met at the Hotel Manhattan on January 10, +1903, for a preliminary discussion. The entire field was canvassed, +using the recommendations of the Administrative Board and the +aforementioned letter of Professor Münsterberg's to Mr. Holls as a +basis, and an adjournment taken until January 17 for the preparation of +detailed recommendations. + +The Committee on Plan and Scope again met, all members being present, at +the Hotel Manhattan on January 17, and arrived at definite conclusions, +which were embodied in the report to the Administrative Board, a meeting +of which had been called at the Hotel Manhattan for January 19, 1903. +The report of the Committee on Plan and Scope is of such historic +importance in the development of the Congress that it is given as +follows, although many points were afterwards materially modified:-- + + NEW YORK, January 19, 1903. + + President Nicholas Murray Butler, + Chairman Administrative Board of World's Congress at + The Louisiana Purchase Exposition: + + Dear Sir,--The undersigned, appointed by your Board a + committee on the scope and plan of the proposed World's + Congress, at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, have the + honor to submit the following report:-- + + The authority under which the Committee acted is found in a + communication addressed to its members by the Chairman of + the Administrative Board. A subsequent communication to the + Chairman of the Committee indicated that the widest scope + was allowed to it in preparing its plan. Under this + authority the Committee met on January 10, 1903, and again + on January 17. The Committee was, from the beginning, + unanimous in accepting the general plan of the + Administrative Board, that there should be but a single + congress, which, however, might be divided and subdivided, + in accord with the general plan, into divisions, + departments, and sections, as its deliberations proceed. + + + PLANS OF THE CONGRESS + + As a basis of discussion two plans were drawn up by members + of the Committee and submitted to it. The one, by Professor + Münsterberg, started from a comprehensive classification and + review of human achievement in advancing knowledge, the + other, by Professor Small, from an equally comprehensive + review of the great public questions involved in human + progress. + + Professor Münsterberg proposed a congress having the + definite task of bringing out the unity of knowledge with a + view of correlating the scattered theoretical and practical + scientific work of our day. This plan proposed that the + congress should continue through one week. The first day was + to be devoted to the discussion of the most general problem + of knowledge in one comprehensive discussion and four + general divisions. On the second day the congress was to + divide into several groups and on the remaining days into + yet more specialized groups, as set forth in detail in the + plan. + + The plan by Professor Small proposed a congress which would + exhibit not merely the scholar's interpretation of progress + in scholarship, but rather the scholar's interpretation of + progress in civilization in general. The proposal was based + on a division of human interests into six great groups:-- + + I. The Promotion of Health. + II. The Production of Wealth. + III. The Harmonizing of Human Relations. + IV. Discovery and Spread of Knowledge. + V. Progress in the Fine Arts. + VI. Progress in Religion. + + The plan agreed with the other in beginning with a general + discussion and then subdividing the congress into divisions + and groups. + + As a third plan the Chairman of the Committee suggested the + idea of a congress of publicists and representative men of + all nations and of all civilized peoples, which should + discuss relations of each to all the others and throw light + on the question of promoting the unity and progress of the + race. + + After due consideration of these plans the Committee reached + the conclusion that the ends aimed at in the second and + third plans could be attained by taking the first plan as a + basis, and including in its subdivisions, so far as was + deemed advisable, the subjects proposed in the second and + third plans. They accordingly adopted a resolution that "Mr. + Münsterberg's plan be adopted as setting forth the general + object of the Congress and defining the scope of its work, + and that Mr. Small's plan be communicated to the General + Committee as containing suggestions as to details, but + without recommending its adoption as a whole." + + + DATE OF THE CONGRESS + + Your Committee is of opinion that, in view of the climatic + conditions at St. Louis during the summer and early autumn, + it is desirable that the meeting of this general Congress be + held during the six days beginning on Monday, September 19, + 1904, and continuing until the Saturday following. Special + associations choosing St. Louis as their meeting-place may + then convene at such other dates as may be deemed fit; but + it is suggested that learned societies whose field is + connected with that of the Congress should meet during the + week beginning September 26. + + The sectional discussions of the Congress will then be + continued by these societies, the whole forming a continuous + discussion of human progress during the last century. + + + PLAN OF ADDRESSES + + The Committee believe that in order to carry out the + proposed plan in the most effective way it is necessary that + the addresses be prepared by the highest living authorities + in each and every branch. In the last subdivisions, each + section embraces two papers; one on the history of the + subject during the last one hundred years and the other on + the problems of to-day. + + The programme of papers suggested by the Committee as + embraced in Professor Münsterberg's plan may be summarized + as follows:-- + + On the first day four papers will be read on the general + subject, and four on each of the four large divisions, + twenty in all. On the second day those four divisions will + be divided into twenty groups, or departments, each of which + will have four papers referring to the divisions and + relations of the sciences, eighty in all. On the last four + days, two papers in each of the 120 sections, 240 in all, + thus making a total of 340 papers. + + In view of the fact that the men who will make the addresses + should not be expected to bear all the expense of their + attendance at the Congress, it seems advisable that the + authorities of the Fair should provide for the expenses + necessarily incurred in the journey, as well as pay a small + honorarium for the addresses. The Committee suggest, + therefore, that each American invited be offered $100 for + his traveling expenses and each European $400. In addition + to this that each receive $150 as an honorarium. Assuming + that one half of those invited to deliver addresses will be + Americans and one half Europeans, this arrangement will + involve the expenditure of $136,000. This estimate will be + reduced if the same person prepares more than one address. + It will also be reduced if more than half of the speakers + are Americans, and increased in the opposite case. + + As the Committee is not advised of the amount which the + management of the Exposition may appropriate for the purpose + of the Congress, it cannot, at present, enter further into + details of adjustment, but it records its opinion that the + sum suggested is the least by which the ends sought to be + attained by the Congress can be accomplished. To this must + be added the expenses of administration and publication. + + All addresses paid for by the Congress should be regarded as + its property, and be printed and published together, thus + constituting a comprehensive work exhibiting the unity, + progress, and present state of knowledge. + + This plan does not preclude the delivery of more than one + address by a single scholar. The directors of the Exposition + may sometimes find it advisable to ask the same scholar to + deliver two addresses, possibly even three. + + The Committee recommends that full liberty be allowed to + each section of the Congress in arranging the general + character and programme of its discussions within the field + proposed. + + As an example of how the plan will work in the case of any + one section, the Committee take the case of a neurologist + desiring to profit by those discussions which relate to his + branch of medicine. This falls under C of the four main + divisions as related to the physical sciences. His interest + on the first day will therefore be centred in Division C, + where he may hear the general discussion of the physical + sciences and the relations to the other sciences. On the + second day he will hear four papers in Group 18 on the + Subjects embraced in the general science of anthropology; + one on its fundamental conceptions; one on its methods and + two on the relation of anthropology to the sciences most + closely connected with it. During the remaining four days he + will meet with the representatives of medicine and its + related subjects, who will divide into sections, and listen + to four papers in each section. One paper will consider the + progress of that section in the last one hundred years, one + paper will be devoted to the problems of to-day, leaving + room for such contributions and discussions as may seem + appropriate during the remainder of the day. + + + COÖPERATION OF LEARNED SOCIETIES INVOKED + + In presenting this general plan, your Committee wishes to + point out the difficulty of deciding in advance what + subjects should be included in every section. Therefore, the + Committee deems it of the utmost importance to secure the + advice and assistance of learned societies in this country + in perfecting the details of the proposed plan, especially + the selection of speakers and the programme of work in each + section. It will facilitate the latter purpose if such + societies be invited and encouraged to hold meetings at St. + Louis during the week immediately preceding, or, preferably, + the week following the General Congress. The selection of + speakers should be made as soon as possible, and, in any + case, before the end of the present academic year, in order + that formal invitations may be issued and final arrangements + made with the speakers a year in advance of the Congress. + + + CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS + + With the view of securing the coöperation of the governments + and leading scholars of the principal countries of Western + and Central Europe in the proposed Congress, it seems + advisable to send two commissioners to these countries for + this purpose. It seems unnecessary to extend the operations + of this commission outside the European continent or to + other than the leading countries. In other cases + arrangements can be made by correspondence. + + It is the opinion of the Committee that an American of + world-wide reputation as a scholar should be selected to + preside over the Congress. + + All which is respectfully submitted. + (Signed) SIMON NEWCOMB, + Chairman; + GEORGE F. MOORE, + JOHN B. MOORE, + HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, + ALBION W. SMALL, + WILLIAM H. WELCH, + ELIHU THOMSON, + Committee. + +The Administrative Board met on January 19 to receive the report of the +Committee on Plan and Scope which was presented by Dr. Newcomb. +Professor Münsterberg and Professor John Bassett Moore were also present +by invitation to discuss the details of the scheme. In the afternoon the +Board went into executive session, and the following recommendations +were adopted and transmitted by the Director of Congresses to the +Committee on Congresses of the Exposition and to the President and +Executive Committee, who duly approved them. + + To the Director of Congresses:-- + + The Administrative Board have the honor to make the + following recommendations in reference to the Department of + Congresses:-- + + (1) That there be held in connection with the Universal + Exposition of St. Louis in 1904, an International Congress + of Arts and Science. + + (2) That the plan recommended by the Committee on Plan and + Scope for a general congress of Arts and Science, to be held + during the six days beginning on Monday, September 19, 1904, + be approved and adopted, subject to such revision in point + of detail as may be advisable, preserving its fundamental + principles. + + (3) That Simon Newcomb, LL.D., of Washington, D. C., be + named for President of the International Congress of Arts + and Science, provided for in the foregoing resolution. + + (4) That Professor Münsterberg, of Harvard University, and + Professor Albion W. Small, of the University of Chicago, be + invited to act as Vice-Presidents of the Congress. + + (5) That the Directors of the World's Fair be requested to + change the name of this Board from the "Advisory Board" to + the "Administrative Board of the International Congress of + Arts and Science." + + (6) That the detailed arrangements for the Congress be + intrusted to a committee consisting of the President and two + Vice-Presidents already named, subject to the general + oversight and control of the Administrative Board, and that + the Directors of the Exposition be requested to make + appropriate provision for their compensation and necessary + expenses. + + (7) That it be recommended to the Directors of the World's + Fair that appropriate provision should be made in the office + of the Department of Congresses for an executive secretary + and such clerical assistance as may be needed. + + (8) That the following payment be recommended to those + scholars who accept invitations to participate and do a + specified piece of work, or submit a specified contribution + in the International Congress of Arts and Science: For + traveling expenses for a European scholar, $500. For + traveling expenses for an American scholar, $150. + + (9) That provision be made for the publication of the + proceedings of the Congress in suitable form to constitute a + permanent memorial of the work of the World's Fair for the + promotion of science and art, under competent editorial + supervision. + + (10) That an appropriation of $200,000 be made to cover + expenses of the Department of Congresses, of which sum + $130,000 be specifically appropriated for an International + Congress of Arts and Science, and the remainder to cover all + expenses connected with the publication of the proceedings + of said International Congress of Arts and Science, and the + expenses for promotion of all other congresses. + +In addition to the foregoing recommendations, Professor Münsterberg was +requested at his earliest convenience to furnish each member with a +revised plan of his classification, which would reduce as far as +possible the number of sections into which the Congress was finally to +be divided. + +With the adjournment of the Board on January 19 the Congress may be +fairly said to have been launched upon its definite course, and such +changes as were thereafter made in the programme did not in any wise +affect the principle upon which the Congress was based, but were due to +the demands of time, of expediency, and in some cases to the accidents +attending the participation. The organization of the Congress and the +personnel of its officers from this time on remained unchanged, and the +history of the meeting is one of steady and progressive development. The +Committee on Plan and Scope were discharged of their duties, with a vote +of thanks for the laborious and painstaking work which they had +accomplished and the thoroughly scientific and novel plan for an +international congress which they had recommended. + +It was determined by the Administrative Board to keep the services of +three of the members of the Committee on Plan and Scope, who should act +as a scientific organizing committee and who should also be the +presiding officers of the Congress. The choice for President of the +Congress fell without debate to the dean of American scientific circles, +whose eminent services to the Government of the United States and whose +recognized position in foreign and domestic scientific circles made him +particularly fitted to preside over such an international gathering of +the leading scientists of the world, Dr. Simon Newcomb, retired +Professor of Mathematics, United States Navy. Professor Hugo +Münsterberg, of Harvard University, and Professor Albion W. Small, of +the University of Chicago, were designated as the first and second +Vice-Presidents respectively. + +The work of the succeeding spring, with both the Organizing Committee +and the Administrative Board, was devoted to the perfecting of the +programme and the selection of foreign scientists to be invited to +participate in the Congress. The theory of the development of the +programme and its logical bases are fully and forcibly treated by +Professor Münsterberg in the succeeding chapter, and therefore will not +be touched upon in this record of facts. As an illustration of the +growth of the programme, however, it is interesting to compare its form, +which was adopted at the next meeting of the Organizing Committee on +February 23, 1903, in New York City, with its final form as given in the +completed programme presented at St. Louis in September, 1904 (pp. +47-49). No better illustration can be given of the immense amount of +labor and painstaking adjustment, both to scientific and to physical +conditions, and of the admirable adaptability of the original plan to +the exigencies of actual practice. At the meeting of February 23, 1903, +which was attended by all of the members of the Organizing Committee and +by President Butler of the Administrative Board, it was determined that +the number of Departments should be sixteen, with the following +designations:-- + + A. NORMATIVE SCIENCES + + 1. Philosophical Sciences. + 2. Mathematical Sciences. + + B. HISTORICAL SCIENCES + + 3. Political Sciences. + 4. Legal Sciences. + 5. Economic Sciences. + 6. Philological Sciences. + 7. Pedagogical Sciences. + 8. Æsthetic Sciences. + 9. Theological Sciences. + + C. PHYSICAL SCIENCES + + 10. General Physical Sciences. + 11. Astronomical Sciences. + 12. Geological Sciences. + 13. Biological Sciences. + 14. Anthropological Sciences. + + D. MENTAL SCIENCES + + 15. Psychological Sciences. + 16. Sociological Sciences. + + SECTIONS + + 1. _a_ Metaphysics. + _b_ Logic. + _c_ Ethics. + _d_ Æsthetics. + + 2. _a_ Algebra. + _b_ Geometry. + _c_ Statistical Methods. + + 3. _a_ Classical Political History of Asia. + _b_ Classical Political History of Europe. + _c_ Medieval Political History of Europe. + _d_ Modern Political History of Europe. + _e_ Political History of America. + + 4. _a_ History of Roman Law. + _b_ History of Common Law. + _aa_ Constitutional Law. + _bb_ Criminal Law. + _cc_ Civil Law. + _dd_ History of International Law. + + 5. _a_ History of Economic Institutions. + _b_ History of Economic Theories. + _c_ Economic Law. + _aa_ Finance. + _bb_ Commerce and Transportation. + _cc_ Labor. + + 6. _a_ Indo-Iranian Languages. + _b_ Semitic Languages. + _c_ Classical Languages. + _d_ Modern Languages. + + 7. _a_ History of Education. + _aa_ Educational Institutions. + + 8. _a_ History of Architecture. + _b_ History of Fine Arts. + _c_ History of Music. + _d_ Oriental Literature. + _e_ Classical Literature. + _f_ Modern Literature. + _aa_ Architecture. + _bb_ Fine Arts. + _cc_ Music. + + 9. _a_ Primitive Religions. + _b_ Asiatic Religions. + _c_ Semitic Religions. + _d_ Christianity. + _aa_ Religious Institutions. + + 10. _a_ Mechanics and Sound. + _b_ Light and Heat. + _c_ Electricity. + _d_ Inorganic Chemistry. + _e_ Organic Chemistry. + _f_ Physical Chemistry. + _aa_ Mechanical Technology. + _bb_ Optical Technology. + _cc_ Electrical Technology + _dd_ Chemical Technology. + + 11. a_ Theoretical Astronomy. + b_ Astrophysics. + + 12. _a_ Geodesy. + _b_ Geology. + _c_ Mineralogy. + _d_ Physiography. + _e_ Meteorology. + _aa_ Surveying. + _bb_ Metallurgy. + + 13. _a_ Botany. + _b_ Plant Physiology. + _c_ Ecology. + _d_ Bacteriology. + _e_ Zoölogy. + _f_ Embryology. + _g_ Comparative Anatomy. + _h_ Physiology. + _aa_ Agronomy. + _bb_ Veterinary Medicine. + + 14. Anthropological Sciences: + _a_ Human Anatomy. + _b_ Human Physiology. + _c_ Neurology. + _d_ Physical Chemistry. + _e_ Pathology. + _f_ Raceomatology. + _aa_ Hygiene. + _bb_ Contagious Diseases. + _cc_ Internal Medicine. + _dd_ Surgery. + _ee_ Gynecology. + _ff_ Ophthalmology. + _gg_ Therapeutics. + _hh_ Dentistry. + + 15. Psychological Sciences: + _a_ General Psychology. + _b_ Experimental Psychology. + _c_ Comparative Psychology. + _d_ Child Psychology. + _e_ Abnormal Psychology. + + 16. Sociological Sciences: + _a_ Social Morphology. + _b_ Social Psychology. + _c_ Laws of Civilization. + _d_ Laws of Language and Myths. + _e_ Ethnology. + _aa_ Social Technology. + +It was also resolved, that the discussion of subjects falling under the +first four divisions should be held in the forenoon of each of the four +days, from Wednesday until Saturday, and those relating to the three +divisions of Practical Science in the afternoon of the same days. The +programme was thus rearranged by the addition of the following:-- + + E. UTILITARIAN SCIENCES + + 17. Medical Sciences: + _a_ Hygiene. + _b_ Sanitation. + _c_ Contagious Diseases. + _d_ Internal Medicine. + _e_ Psychiatry. + _f_ Surgery. + _g_ Gynecology. + _h_ Ophthalmology. + _i_ Otology. + _j_ Therapeutics. + _k_ Dentistry. + + 18. Practical Economic Sciences: + _a_ Extractive Productions of Wealth. + _b_ Transportation. + _c_ Commerce. + _d_ Postal Service. + _e_ Money and Banking. + + 19. Technological Sciences: + _a_ Mechanical Technology. + _b_ Electrical Technology. + _c_ Chemical Technology. + _d_ Optical Technology. + _e_ Surveying. + _f_ Metallurgy. + _g_ Agronomy. + _h_ Veterinary Medicine. + + F. REGULATIVE SCIENCES + + 20. Practical Political Sciences: + _a_ Internal Practical Politics. + _b_ National Practical Politics. + _c_ Tariff. + _d_ Taxation. + _e_ Municipal Practical Politics. + _f_ Colonial Practical Politics. + + 21. Practical Legal Sciences: + _a_ International Law. + _b_ Constitutional Law. + _c_ Criminal Law. + _d_ Civil Law. + + 22. Practical Social Sciences: + _a_ Treatment of the Poor. + _b_ Treatment of the Defective. + _c_ Treatment of the Dependent. + _d_ Treatment of Vice and Crime. + _e_ Problems of Labor. + _f_ Problems of the Family. + + G. CULTURAL SCIENCES + + 23. Practical Educational Sciences: + _a_ Kindergarten and Home. + _b_ Primary Education. + _c_ Universities and Research--Secondary. + _d_ Moral Education. + _e_ Æsthetic Education. + _f_ Manual Training. + _g_ University. + _h_ Libraries. + _i_ Museums. + _j_ Publications. + + 24. Practical Æsthetic Sciences: + _a_ Architecture. + _b_ Fine Arts. + _c_ Music. + _d_ Landscape Architecture. + + 25. Practical Religious Sciences: + _a_ Religious Education. + _b_ Training for Religious Service. + _c_ Missions. + _d_ Religious Influence. + +The programme was again thoroughly revised at the meeting of the +Organizing Committee on April 9, 1903, at Hotel Manhattan, and as thus +amended was submitted to the Administrative Board at a meeting held in +New York on April 11. A careful consideration of the programme at this +meeting, and a final revision made at the meeting of the Administrative +Board at the St. Louis Club April 30, 1903, brought it practically into +its final shape, with such minor changes as were found necessary in the +latter days of the Congress due to the unexpected declinations of +foreign speakers at the last moment. The continuous and exacting work +done in perfecting the programme by each member of the Organizing +Committee and by the Chairman of the Administrative Board deserves +special mention, and was productive of the best results by its logical +appeal to the scientific world. The programme as finally worked out in +orderly detail, shortened in many departments by various exigencies, may +be found on pages 47 to 49 of this volume. + + +PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT + +The general plan of the Congress having been determined and the +programme practically perfected by May 1, 1903, two most important +questions demanded the attention of the Administrative Board: first, the +participation in the Congress, both foreign and domestic; second, the +support of the scientific public. At a meeting of the Board held in New +York City April 11, 1903, these points were given full consideration. It +was determined that the list of speakers both foreign and domestic +should be made up on the advice of men of letters and of scientific +thought in this country, and accordingly there was sent to the officers +of the various scientific societies in the United States, to heads of +university departments and to every prominent exponent of science and +art in this country, a printed announcement and tentative programme of +the Congress, and a letter asking advice as to the scientists best +fitted in view of the object of the Congress to prepare an address. From +the hundreds of replies received in response to this appeal were made up +the original lists of invited speakers, and only those were placed +thereon who were the choice of a fair majority of the representatives of +the particular science under selection. The Administrative Board +reserved to itself the full right to reject any of these names or to +change them so as to promote the best interests of the Congress, but in +nearly every instance it would be safe to say that the person selected +was highly satisfactory to the great majority of his fellow scientists +in this country. Many changes were unavoidably made at the last moment +to meet the situation caused by withdrawals and declinations, but the +list of second choices was so complete, and in many cases there was such +a delicate balance between the first and second choice, that there was +no difficulty in keeping the standard of the programme to its original +high plane. + +It was early determined that the seven Division speakers and the +forty-eight Department speakers, which occupied the first two days of +the programme, should be Americans, and that these Division and +Department addresses should be a contribution of American scholarship to +the general scientific thought of the world. This decision commended +itself to the scientific public both at home and abroad, and it was so +carried out. It was further determined that the Division and Department +speakers and the foreign speakers should be selected during the summer +of 1903, and that the American participation in the Section addresses +should be determined after it was definitely known what the foreign +participation would be. In view of the importance of the Congress, it +was deemed inadvisable to attempt to interest foreign scientific circles +by correspondence, and it was further decided to pay a special +compliment to each invited speaker by sending an invitation at the hands +of special delegates. Arrangements were therefore made for Dr. Newcomb +and Professors Münsterberg and Small to proceed to Europe during the +summer of 1903, and to present in person to the scientific circles of +Europe and to the scientists specially desired to deliver addresses the +complete plan and scope of the Congress and an invitation to +participate. + + +INVITATIONS TO FOREIGN SPEAKERS + +The members of the Organizing Committee, armed with very strong +credentials from the State Department to the diplomatic service abroad, +sailed in the early summer of 1903 to present the invitation of the +Exposition to the selected scientists. Dr. Newcomb sailed May 6, +Professor Münsterberg May 30, and Professor Small June 6. A general +interest in the project had at this time become aroused, and there was +assured a respectful hearing. Both the President of the United States +and the Emperor of Germany expressed their warm interest in the plan, +and the State Department at Washington gave to the Congress both on this +occasion and on succeeding occasions its effective aid. The Director of +Congresses wishes to express his obligations both to the late Secretary +Hay and to Assistant-Secretary Loomis for their valuable suggestions and +courteous coöperation in all matters relating to the foreign +participation. Strong support was also given the Committee and the plan +of the Congress by Commissioner-General Lewald of Germany, and +Commissioner-General Lagrave of France. Throughout the entire Congress +period, both of these energetic Commissioners-General placed themselves +actively at the disposition of the Department in promoting the +attendance of scientists from their respective countries. + +Geographically the division between the three members of the Organizing +Committee gave to Dr. Newcomb, France; to Professor Münsterberg, +Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; and to Professor Small, England, +Russia, Italy, and a part of Austria. It was also agreed that Dr. +Newcomb should have special oversight of the departments of Mathematics, +Physics, Astronomy, Biology, and Technology; Professor Münsterberg, +special charge of Philosophy, Philology, Art, Education, Psychology, and +Medicine; and that Professor Small should look after Politics, Law, +Economics, Theology, Sociology, and Religion. The Committee worked +independently of each other, but met once during the summer at Munich to +compare results and to determine their closing movements. + +The public and even the Exposition authorities have probably never +realized the delicacy and the extremely careful adjustment exercised by +the Organizing Committee in their summer's campaign. Scientists are as a +class sensitive, jealous of their reputations, and loath to undertake +long journeys to a distant country for congress purposes. The amount of +labor devolving upon the Committee to find the scientists scattered over +all Europe; the careful and painstaking presentation to each of the plan +of the Congress; the appeal to their scientific pride; the hearing of a +thousand objections, and the answering of each; the disappointments +incurred; the substitutions made necessary at the last moment;--all sum +up a task of the greatest difficulty and of enormous labor. The +remarkable success with which the mission was crowned stands out the +more prominently in view of these conditions. When the Committee +returned in the latter part of September, they had visited every +important country of Europe, delivered more than one hundred fifty +personal invitations, and for the one hundred twenty-eight sections had +secured one hundred seventeen acceptances. + +At a meeting of the Administrative Board, which met with the Organizing +Committee on October 13, 1903, a full report of the European trip was +received and ways and means considered for insuring the attendance from +abroad. A list of the foreign acceptances was ordered printed at once +for general distribution, and the Chairman of the Administrative Board +was requested to address a letter to each of the foreign scientists +confirming the action of the special delegates and giving additional +information as to the length of addresses, and rules and details +governing the administration of the Congress. + + +DEATH OF FREDERICK W. HOLLS + +The number of the Administrative Board was decreased during the summer +by the sudden death of the Hon. Frederick W. Holls, on July 23, 1903. +Mr. Holls had been intensely interested in the development of the +Congress from its earliest days, and was very instrumental in +determining the form in which it was finally promoted. His great +influence abroad as a member of the Hague Conference, and his high +standing in legal and literary circles in this country, rendered him one +of the most prominent members of the Board. A resolution of regret at +his untimely death was spread upon the minutes of the Administrative +Board at the meeting in October, and it was decided that his place upon +the Board should remain unfilled. + + +DOMESTIC PARTICIPATION + +At this same meeting of October 13, active measures were taken to +forward the American participation in the Congress. The necessity was +now very evident that our strongest men of science must be induced to +take part, in order to compare favorably with the leading minds which +Europe was sending. The Organizing Committee were instructed to consult +the American scientific societies and associations regarding the +selection of American speakers, and also in reference to presiding +officials for each section. Six weeks was considered sufficient for this +task, and the Committee were asked to submit to the Administrative Board +at a meeting in New York, on December 3 and 4, their recommendations for +American speakers. + +An immense amount of detailed labor, in the way of correspondence, now +devolved upon the Organizing Committee as well as upon the Director of +Congresses, and a branch office was established in Washington equipped +with clerks and stenographers under the charge of Dr. Newcomb, who +devoted the greater portion of his time for the next six months to the +many details connected with the selection of foreign and American +speakers and chairmen. The meeting of the Administrative Board in New +York in December, and a similar meeting with the Organizing Committee +held at the St. Louis Club on December 28, were given over entirely to +perfecting the personnel of the programme. Great care was exerted in +selecting the chairmen of the departments and sections, inasmuch as they +must be men of international reputation and conceded strength. For the +secretaryships younger men of promise and ability were selected, chiefly +from university circles. Both the chairmen and secretaries served +without compensation. + +The work of the late winter was a continuance of the perfecting of +details, and at a meeting of the Administrative Board held in New York +in February, 1904, a final approval was given to the programme and the +speakers. The imminent approach of the Exposition and the work of the +college commencement season made it impossible for further general +meetings, and on June 1 the Organizing Committee was constituted a +committee with power to fill vacancies in the programme or to amend the +programme as circumstances might demand. All suggestions with reference +to details were to be made directly to the Director of Congresses, upon +whom devolved from this time forward the entire executive control of the +Congress. + + +ASSEMBLY HALLS + +The highly diversified nature of the Congress and the holding of one +hundred twenty-eight section meetings in four days' time rendered +necessary a large number of meeting-places centrally located. The +Exposition was fortunate in having the use of the new plant of the +Washington University, nine large buildings of which had been erected. +Many of these buildings contained lecture halls and assembly rooms, +seating from one hundred fifty to fifteen hundred people. Sixteen halls +were necessary to accommodate the full number of sections running at any +one time, and of this number twelve were available in the group of +University Buildings; the other four were found in the lecture halls of +the Education Building, Mines and Metallurgy Building, Agriculture +Building, and the Transportation Building. The opening exercises, at +which the entire Congress was assembled, was held in Festival Hall, +capable of seating three thousand people. In the assignment of halls +care was taken so far as possible to assign the larger halls to the more +popular subjects, but it often happened that a great speaker was of +necessity assigned to a smaller hall. Two of the halls also proved bad +for speaking owing to the traffic of the Intramural Railway, and there +was lacking in nearly all of the halls that academic peace and quiet +which usually surrounds gatherings of a scientific nature. This, +however, was to be expected in an exposition atmosphere, and was readily +acquiesced in by the speakers themselves, and very little objection was +heard to the halls as assigned. Every one seemed to recognize the fact +that the immediate value of the meeting lay in the commingling and +fellowship, and that the addresses, of which one could hear at most only +one in sixteen, could not be judged in the proper light until their +publication. + + +SUPPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC PUBLIC + +A strong effort was made by the Organizing Committee to secure the +attendance of an audience which should not only in its proportions be +complimentary to the eminence of the speakers, but also be thoroughly +appreciative of the addresses and conversant with the topic under +discussion. Letters were therefore sent to all of the prominent +scientific societies in the United States, asking that wherever possible +the meetings of the society be set for the Congress week in St. Louis, +and wherever this was not possible that the societies send special +delegates to attend the Congress, and urge their membership to make an +effort to be present. Personal letters were also sent to the leading +members of the different professions and sciences, to the faculties of +universities and colleges, urging them to attend, and pointing out the +necessity of the support of the American scientific public. + +Special invitations were also sent in the name of the Organizing +Committee to the leading authorities of the various subjects under +discussion in the Congress, asking them to contribute a ten-minute paper +to any section in which they were particularly interested. The result of +this careful campaign, in addition to the general exploitation which the +Congress received, was such a flattering attendance of American +scientists, as to be both a compliment to the European speakers and a +benefit to scientific thought. Many societies, such as the American +Neurological Association, American Philological Association, American +Mathematical Society, Physical and Chemical Societies of America, +American Astronomical Society, Germanic Congress, American +Electro-Therapeutic Association, held their annual meetings during the +week of the Congress, although the date rendered it impossible for the +majority of the associations to meet at that time. The eighth +International Geographic Congress adjourned from Washington to St. Louis +to meet with the Congress of Arts and Science. In response to the +special invitations, two hundred forty-seven ten-minute addresses were +promised and one hundred two actually read. + + +RECEPTION OF FOREIGN GUESTS + +Every effort was made by the Department of Congresses to assist the +foreign speakers in their traveling arrangements and to make matters as +easy and comfortable as possible. A letter of advice was mailed to each +speaker prior to his departure, carefully setting forth the conditions +of American travel, routes to be followed, reception committees to be +met, and other essential details. The official badge of the Congress was +also mailed, so that those wearing them might be easily identified by +the reception committees both in New York and St. Louis. Nine tenths of +the speakers came by the way of New York, and in order to facilitate the +clearance of their baggage and to provide for their fitting +entertainment in New York, a special reception committee was formed +composed of the following members:-- + + F. P. Keppel, Columbia University, New York City, Chairman. + Prof. Herbert V. Abbott, New York. + R. Arrowsmith, New York. + C. William Beebe, New York. + George Bendelari, New York. + Edward W. Berry, Passaic. + J. Fuller Berry, Old Forge. + Rev. H. C. Birckhead, New York. + Dr. James H. Canfield, New York. + Rev. G. A. Carstenson, New York. + Prof. H. S. Crampton, New York. + Sanford L. Cutler, New York. + Dr. Israel Davidson, New York. + William H. Davis, New York. + Prof. James C. Egbert, New York. + Dr. Haven Emerson, New York. + Prof. T. S. Fiske, New York. + J. D. Fitz-Gerald, II, Newark. + W. D. Forbes, Hoboken. + Clyde Furst, Yonkers. + William K. Gregory, New York. + George C. O. Haas, New York. + Prof. W. A. Hervey, New York. + Carl Herzog, New York. + Robert Hoguet, New York. + Dr. Percy Hughes, Brooklyn. + Prof. A. V. W. Jackson, New York. + Albert J. W. Kern, New York. + Prof. Charles F. Kroh, Orange. + Dr. George F. Kunz, New York. + Prof. L. A. Lousseaux, New York. + Frederic L. Luqueer, Brooklyn. + R. A. V. Minckwitz, New York. + Charles A. Nelson, New York. + Dr. Harry B. Penhollow, New York. + Prof. E. D. Perry, New York. + John Pohlman, New York. + Dr. Ernest Richard, New York. + Dr. K. E. Richter, New York. + Edward Russ, Hoboken. + Prof. C. L. Speranza, Oak Ridge. + Prof. Francis H. Stoddard, New York. + Dr. Anthony Spitzka, Goodground. + Harvey W. Thayer, Brooklyn. + Prof. H. A. Todd, New York. + Dr. E. M. Wahl, New York. + Prof. F. H. Wilkens, New York. + +To each foreign speaker was extended the courtesies of the Century and +the University clubs while remaining in New York City. Mention should +also be made of the assistance of the Treasury Department and of the +courtesy of Collector of the Port, Hon. N. N. Stranahan, through whom +special privileges of the Port were extended to the members of the +Congress. The work of the reception committee was most satisfactorily +and efficiently performed, and was highly appreciated by the foreign +guests. Special acknowledgment is due Mr. F. P. Keppel, of Columbia +University, for his painstaking and efficient management of the affairs +of the committee in New York. Many of the speakers proceeded singly to +St. Louis, stopping at various places, but the great majority went +directly to the University of Chicago, where they were entertained +during the week preceding the Congress by President Harper and Professor +Small, of the University of Chicago. The arrivals at St. Louis were made +on Saturday the 17th and Sunday the 18th of September. Many of the +participants had arrived at earlier dates, and fully twenty of the +speakers were members of the International Jury of Awards for their +respective countries, and had been in St. Louis since September 1, the +beginning of the Jury work. + +A reception committee similar to that in New York was also formed at St. +Louis from the members of the University Club, and their duties were to +meet all incoming trains and conduct the members of the Congress +personally to their stopping-places, and assist them in all matters of +detail. This committee was comprised of the following members, nearly +all of the University Club, who performed their work efficiently and +enthusiastically to the great satisfaction of the Exposition and to the +thorough appreciation of the foreign guests:-- + + V. M. Porter, Chairman, St. Louis. + E. H. Angert, St. Louis. + Gouverneur Calhoun, St. Louis. + W. M. Chauvenet, St. Louis. + H. G. Cleveland, St. Louis. + Mr. M. B. Clopton, St. Louis. + Walter Fischel, St. Louis. + W. L. R. Gifford, St. Louis. + E. M. Grossman, St. Louis. + L. W. Hagerman, St. Louis. + Louis La Beaume, St. Louis. + Carl H. Lagenburg, St. Louis. + Sears Lehmann, St. Louis. + G. F. Paddock, St. Louis. + T. G. Rutledge, St. Louis. + Luther Ely Smith, St. Louis. + J. Clarence Taussig, St. Louis. + C. E. L. Thomas, St. Louis. + W. M. Tompkins, St. Louis. + G. T. Weitzel, St. Louis. + Tyrrell Williams, St. Louis. + +The itinerary of the foreign speakers after leaving St. Louis at the end +of the Congress took them on appointed trains to Washington, where they +were given an official reception by President Roosevelt and a reception +by Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress. From here they +proceeded to Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., where they were given +a reception by Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, and were entertained as guests of +Harvard University. Thence the great majority of the speakers returned +to New York, where they were the guests of Columbia University, and were +given a farewell dinner by the Association of Old German Students. Many +of the speakers, however, visited other portions of the country before +returning to Europe. + +The foreign speakers while in St. Louis were considered the guests of +the Exposition Company, and were relieved from all care and expense for +rooms and entertainment. Those who were accompanied by their wives and +daughters were entertained by prominent St. Louis families, and those +who came singly were quartered in the dormitory of the Washington +University, which was set aside for this purpose during the week of the +Congress. The dormitory arrangement proved a very happy circumstance, as +nearly one hundred foreign and American scientists of the highest rank +were thrown in contact, much after the fashion of their student days, +and thoroughly enjoyed the novelty and fellowship of the plan. The +dormitory contained ninety-six rooms newly fitted up with much care and +with all modern conveniences. Light breakfasts were served in the rooms, +and special service provided at the call of the occupants. The situation +of the dormitory also in the Exposition grounds in close proximity to +the assembly halls was highly appreciated, and although at times there +were minor matters which did not run so smoothly, the almost unanimous +expression of the guests of the Exposition was one of delight and +appreciation of the arrangements. Special mention ought in justice to be +made to those residents of St. Louis who sustained the time-honored name +of the city for hospitality and courtesy by entertaining those foreign +members of the Congress who were accompanied by the immediate members of +their family. They were as follows:-- + + Dr. C. Barek + Dr. William Bartlett + Judge W. F. Boyle + Mr. Robert Brookings + Mrs. J. T. Davis + Dr. Samuel Dodd + Mr. L. D. Dozier + Dr. W. E. Fischel + Mr. Louis Fusz + Mr. August Gehner + Dr. M. A. Goldstein + Mr. Charles H. Huttig + Dr. Ernest Jonas + Mr. R. McKittrick Jones + Mr. F. W. Lehmann + Dr. Robert Luedeking + Mr. Edward Mallinckrodt + Mr. George D. Markham + Mr. Thomas McKittrick + Mr. Theodore Meier + Dr. S. J. Niccolls + Dr. W. F. Nolker + Dr. S. J. Schwab + Dr. Henry Schwartz + Mr. Corwin H. Spencer + Dr. William Taussig + Mr. G. H. Tenbroek + Dr. Herman Tuholske + Hon. Rolla Wells + Mr. Edwards Whitaker + Mr. Charles Wuelfing + Mr. Max Wuelfing. + + +DETAIL OF THE CONGRESS + +The immense amount of detail work which devolved upon the Department in +the matter of preparing halls for the meetings, receiving guests, +providing for their comfort, issuing the programmes, managing the detail +of the receptions, banquets, invitations, etc., providing for +registration, payment of honorariums, and furnishing information on +every conceivable topic, rendered necessary the formation of a special +bureau which was placed in charge of Dr. L. O. Howard of Washington, D. +C., as Executive Secretary. Dr. Howard's long experience as Secretary of +the American Association for the Advancement of Science rendered him +particularly well qualified to assume this laborious and thankless task. +By mutual arrangement the Director of Congresses and the Executive +Secretary divided the field of labor. The Director had, in addition to +the general oversight of the Congress, special supervision of the local +reception committee, the entertainment of the guests, official banquets +and entertainments, and all financial details. The Executive Secretary +took entire charge of the programme, assignment of rooms in the +dormitory, care and supervision of the dormitory, assignment of halls +for speakers, registration books and bureau of information. Dr. Howard +arrived on September 1 to begin his duties, and remained until September +30. + + +WEEK OF THE CONGRESS + +The opening session of the Congress was set for Monday afternoon. +September 19, at 2.30 o'clock in Festival Hall. The main programme of +the Congress began Tuesday morning. The sessions were held in the +mornings and afternoons, the evenings being left free for social +affairs. The list of functions authorized in honor of the Congress of +Arts and Science were as follows:-- + +Monday evening, September 19, grand fête night in honor of the guests of +the Congress, with special musical programme about the Grand Basin and +lagoons, boat rides and lagoon fête; this function was unfortunately +somewhat marred by inclement weather. It was the only evening free in +the entire week, however, for members of the Congress to witness the +illuminations and decorative evening effects. + +Banquet given by the St. Louis Chemical Society at the Southern Hotel to +members of the chemical sections of the Congress. + +Tuesday evening, September 20, general reception by the Board of Lady +Managers to the officers and speakers of the Congress and Officials of +the Exposition. + +Wednesday afternoon, September 21, garden fête given to the members of +the Congress at the French National Pavilion by the Commissioner-General +from France. The gardens of the miniature Grand Trianon were never more +beautiful than on this brilliant afternoon, and the presence of the +Garde Républicaine band and the entire official representation of the +Exposition, lent a color and spirit to the affair unsurpassed during the +Exposition period. + +Wednesday evening, reception by the Imperial German Commissioner-General +to the officers and speakers of the Congress and the officials of the +Exposition, at the German State House. The magnificent hospitality which +characterized this building during the entire Exposition period was +fairly outdone on this occasion, and the function stands prominent as +one of the brilliant successes of the Exposition period. + +Thursday evening, September 22, Shaw banquet at the Buckingham Club to +the foreign delegates and officers of the Congress. Through the courtesy +of the trustees of Shaw's Garden and of the officers of Washington +University, the annual banquet provided for men of science, letters, and +affairs, by the will of Henry B. Shaw, founder of the Missouri Botanical +Gardens, was given during this week as a compliment to the noted foreign +scientists who were the guests of the city of St. Louis. + +Friday evening, September 23, official banquet given by the Exposition +to the speakers and officials of the Congress and the officials of the +Exposition, in the banquet hall of the Tyrolean Alps. + +Saturday evening, September 24, banquet at the St. Louis Club given by +the Round Table of St. Louis, to the foreign members of the Congress. +The Round Table is a literary club which meets at banquet six times +annually for discussion of topics of interest to the literary and +scientific world. + +Banquet given by the Imperial Commissioner-General from Japan to the +Japanese delegation to the Congress and to the Exposition officials and +Chiefs of Departments. + +Dinner given by Commissioner-General from Great Britain to the English +members of the Congress. + + +OPENING OF THE CONGRESS + +The assembling of the Congress on the afternoon of September 19, in the +magnificent auditorium of Festival Hall which crowned Cascade Hill and +the Terrace of States, was marked with simple ceremonies and impressive +dignity. The great organ pealed the national hymns of the countries +participating and closed with the national anthem of the United States. +In the audience were the members of the Congress representing the +selected talent of the world in their field of scientific endeavor, and +about them were grouped an audience drawn from every part of the United +States to promote by their presence the success of the Congress and to +do honor to the noted personages who were the guests of the Exposition +and of the Nation. On the stage were seated the officials of the +Congress, the honorary vice-presidents from foreign nations, and the +officials of the Exposition. + +At the appointed hour the Director of Congresses, Dr. Howard J. Rogers, +called the meeting to order, and outlined in a few words the object of +the Congress, welcomed the foreign delegates, and presented the members, +both foreign and American, to the President of the Exposition, Hon. +David R. Francis. + +The President spoke as follows:-- + + What an ambitious undertaking is a universal exposition! But + how worthy it is of the highest effort! And, if successful, + how far-reaching are its results, how lasting its benefits! + Who shall pass judgment on that success? On what evidence, + by what standards shall their verdicts be formed? The + development of society, the advancement of civilization, + involve many problems, encounter many and serious + difficulties, and have met with deplorable reactions which + decades and centuries were required to repair. The proper + study of mankind is man, and any progress in science that + ignores or loses sight of his welfare and happiness, however + admirable and wonderful such progress may be, disturbs the + equilibrium of society. + + The tendency of the times toward centralization or + unification is, from an economic standpoint, a drifting in + the right direction, but the piloting must be done by + skillful hands, under the supervision and control of + far-seeing minds, who will remember that the masses are + human beings whose education and expanding intelligence are + constantly broadening and emphasizing their individuality. A + universal exposition affords to its visitors, and these who + systematically study its exhibits and its phases, an + unequaled opportunity to view the general progress and + development of all countries and all races. Every line of + human endeavor is here represented. + + The conventions heretofore held on these grounds and many + planned to be held--aggregating over three hundred--have + been confined in their deliberations to special lines of + thought or activity. This international congress of arts and + sciences is the most comprehensive in its plan and scope of + any ever held, and is the first of its kind. The lines of + its organization, I shall leave the Director of Exhibits, + who is also a member of the administrative board of this + congress, to explain. You who are members are already + advised as to its scope, and your almost universal and + prompt acceptance of the invitations extended to you to + participate, implies an approval which we appreciate, and + indicates a willingness and a desire to coöperate in an + effort to bring into intelligent and beneficial correlation + all branches of science, all lines of thought. You need no + argument to convince you of the eminent fitness of making + such a congress a prominent feature of a universal + exposition in which education is the dominant feature. + + The administrative board and the organizing committee have + discharged their onerous and responsible tasks with signal + fidelity and ability, and the success that has rewarded + their efforts is a lasting monument to their wisdom. The + management of the Exposition tenders to them, collectively + and individually, its grateful acknowledgments. The + membership in this congress represents the world's elect in + research and in thought. The participants were selected + after a careful survey of the entire field; no limitations + of national boundaries or racial affiliations have been + observed. The Universal Exposition of 1904, the city of St. + Louis, the Louisiana territory whose acquisition we are + celebrating, the entire country, and all participating in or + visiting this Exposition are grateful for your coming, and + feel honored by your presence. + + We are proud to welcome you to a scene where are presented + the best and highest material products of all countries and + of every civilization, participated in by all peoples, from + the most primitive to the most highly cultured--a marker in + the progress of the world, and of which the International + Congress of Arts and Science is the crowning feature. + + May the atmosphere of this universal exposition, charged as + it is with the restless energies of every phase of human + activity and permeated by that ineffable sentiment of + universal brotherhood engendered by the intelligent sons of + God, congregating for the friendly rivalries of peace, + inspire you with even higher thoughts--imbue you with still + broader sympathies, to the end that by your future labors + you may be still more helpful to the human race and place + your fellow men under yet deeper obligations. + +Director Frederick J. V. Skiff was then introduced by the President as +representing the Division of Exhibits, whose untiring labors had filled +the magnificent Exposition palaces surrounding the Festival Hall with +the visible products of those sciences and arts, the theory, progress, +and problems of which the Congress was assembled to consider. + +Mr. Skiff spoke as follows:-- + + The division of exhibits of the Universal Exposition of 1904 + has looked forward to this time, when the work it has + performed is to be reviewed and discussed by this + distinguished body. I do not, of course, intend to convey + the idea that the international congress is to inspect or + criticise the exhibitions, but I do mean to say that the + deliberations of this organization are contemporaneous with + and share the responsibility for the accomplishments of + which the exhibitions made are the visible evidences. + + The great educational yield of a universal exposition comes + from the intellectual more than from the mechanical + processes. It is the material condition of the times. It is + as well the duty of the responsible authorities to go yet + further and record the thoughts and theories, the + investigations, experiments, and observations of which these + material things are the tangible results. + + A congress of arts and science, whose membership is drawn + from all educational as well as geographical zones, not only + accounts for and analyzes the philosophy of conditions, but + points the way for further advance along the lines + consistent with demonstration. Its contribution to the hour + is at once a history and a prophecy. + + The extent to which the deliberations and utterances of this + congress may regulate the development of society or give + impulse to succeeding generations, it is impossible to + estimate, but not unreasonable to anticipate. The plans of + the congress matured in the minds of the best scholars; the + classification of its purpose, the scope, the selection of + its distinguished participants, gave to the hopes and + ambitions of the management of the Exposition inspiration of + a most exalted degree. At first these ambitions were--not + without reason--regarded as too high. The plane upon which + the congress had been inaugurated, the aim, the broad + intent, seemed beyond the merits, if not beyond the + capacity, of this hitherto not widely recognized + intellectual centre. But the courage of the inception, the + loftiness of the purpose, appealed so profoundly to the + toilers for truth and the apostles of fact, that we find + gathered here to-day in the heart of the new Western + continent the great minds whose impress on society has + rendered possible the intellectual heights to which this age + has ascended and now beckon forward the students of the + world to limitless possibilities. + + While international congresses of literature, science, art, + and industry have been accomplished by previous expositions, + yet to classify and select the topics in sympathy with the + classification and installation of the exhibits material is + a step considerably in advance of the custom. The men who + build an exposition must by temperament, if not by + characteristic, be educators. They must be in sympathy with + the welfare of humanity and its higher destiny. The + exhibitions at this Exposition are not the haphazard + gatherings of convenient material, but the outline of a plan + to illustrate the productiveness of mankind at this + particular time, carefully digested, thoroughly thought out, + and conscientiously executed. The exhibit, therefore, in + each of the departments of the classification, as well as in + the groups of the different departments, are of such + character, and so arranged as to reflect the best that the + world can do along departmental lines, and the best that + different peoples can do along group lines. The congresses + accord with the exhibits, and the exhibits give expression + to the congresses. + + Education has been the keynote of this Exposition. Were it + not for the educational idea, the acts of government + providing vast sums of money for the up-building of this + Exposition would have been impossible. This congress + reflects one idea vastly outstripping others, and that is, + in the unity of thought in the universal concert of purpose. + It is the first time, I believe, that there has been an + international gathering of the authorities of all the + sciences, and in that respect the congress initiates and + establishes the universal brotherhood of scholars. + + A thought uncommunicated is of little value. An unrecorded + achievement is not an asset of society. The real lasting + value of this congress will consist of the printed record of + its proceedings. The delivery of the addresses, reaching and + appealing to, as must necessarily be the case, a very + limited number of people, can be considered as only a method + of reaching the lasting and perpetual good of civilization. + + In just the degree that this Exposition in its various + divisions shall make a record of accomplishments, and lead + the way to further advance, this enterprise has reached the + expectations of its contributors and the hopes of its + promoters. This congress is the peak of the mountain that + this Exposition has builded on the highway of progress. From + its heights we contemplate the past, record the present, and + gaze into the future. + + This universal exposition is a world's university. The + International Congress of Arts and Science constitutes the + faculty; the material on exhibition are the laboratories and + the museums; the students are mankind. + + That in response to invitation of the splendid committee of + patriotic men, to whom all praise is due for their efforts + in this crowning glory of the Exposition, so eminent a + gathering of the scholars and savants of the world has + resulted, speaks unmistakably for the fraternity of the + world, for the sympathy of its citizenship, and for the + patriotism of its people. + +In reply to these addresses of the officials of the Exposition, the +honorary Vice-Presidents for Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, +Austria, Italy, and Japan made brief responses in behalf of their +respective countries. + +Sir William Ramsay of London spoke in the place of Hon. James Bryce, +extending England's thanks for the courtesy which had been shown her +representatives and declaring that England, particularly in the +scientific field, looked upon America as a relative and not as a foreign +country. + +France was represented by Professor Jean Gaston Darboux, Perpetual +Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of Paris, who spoke as follows:-- + + MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,--My first word will be + to thank you for the honor which you have been so courteous + as to pay my country in reserving for her one of the + vice-presidencies of the Congress. Since the time of + Franklin, who received at the hands of France the welcome + which justice and his own personal genius and worth + demanded, most affectionate relations have not ceased to + unite the scientists of France and the scientists of + America. The distinction which you have here accorded to us + will contribute still further to render these relations more + intimate and more fraternal. In choosing me among so many of + the better fitted delegates sent by my country, you have + without doubt wished to pay special honor to the Académie + des Sciences and to the Institut de France, which I have the + honor of representing in the position of Perpetual + Secretary. Permit me therefore to thank you in the name of + these great societies, which are happy to count in the + number of their foreign associates and of their + correspondents so many of the scholars of America. In like + manner as the Institut de France, so the Congress which + opens to-day seeks to unite at the same time letters, + science, and arts. We shall be happy and proud to take part + in this work and contribute to its success. + +Germany was represented by Professor Wilhelm Waldeyer, of the University +of Berlin, who replied as follows:-- + + MR. PRESIDENT, HONORED ASSEMBLAGE,--The esteemed invitation + which has been offered to me in this significant hour of the + opening of the Congress of Arts and Science to greet the + members of this congress, and particularly my esteemed + compatriots, I have had no desire to decline. I have been + for a fortnight under the free sky of this mighty city--so I + must express myself, since enclosing walls are unknown in + the United States--and this fact, together with the + hospitality offered me in such delightful manner by the + Chairman of the Committee on Congresses, Mr. Frederick W. + Lehmann, has almost made me a St. Louis man. Therefore I may + perhaps take it upon myself to greet you here. + + I confess that I arrived here with some misgiving--some + doubts as to whether the great task which was here + undertaken under most difficult circumstances could be + accomplished with even creditable success. These doubts + entirely disappeared the first time I entered the grounds of + the World's Fair and obtained a general view of the method, + beautiful as well as practical, by which the treasures + gathered from the whole world were arranged and displayed. I + trust you, too, will have a like experience; and will soon + recognize that a most earnest and good work is here + accomplished. + + And I must remark at this time that we Germans may indeed be + well satisfied here; the unanimous and complete recognition + which our coöperation in this great work has received is + almost disconcerting. + + What can be said of the whole Exposition with reference to + its extent and the order in which everything is arranged, I + may well say concerning the departments of science, + especially interesting to us. In this hour in which the + Congress of Arts and Science is being opened, we shall not + express any thanks to those who took this part of the work + upon their shoulders--a more difficult task indeed than all + the others, for here the problem is not to manage materials, + but heads and minds. And as I see here assembled a large + number of German professors--I, too, belong to the + profession--of whom it is said, I know not with how much + justice, that they are hard to lead, the labors of the + Directors and Presidents of the Congress could not have + been, and are not now, small. Neither shall we to-day + prophesy into what the Congress may develop. The greater + number of speakers cannot expect to have large audiences, + but even to-day we can safely say this: the imposing row of + volumes in which shall be given to posterity the reviews + here to be presented concerning the present condition, and + future problems of the sciences and arts as they appear to + the scientific world at the beginning of the twentieth + century, will provide a monumental work of lasting value. + This we may confidently expect. The thanks which we to-day + do not wish to anticipate in words, let us show by our + actions to our kind American hosts, and especially to the + directors of the World's Fair and of this Congress. With + exalted mind, forgetting all little annoyances which may and + will come, let us go forward courageously to the work, and + let us do our best. Let us grasp heartily the open hand + honestly extended to us. + + May this Congress of Arts and Science worthily take part in + the great and undisputed success which even to-day we must + acknowledge the World's Fair at St. Louis. + +For Austria Dr. Theodore Escherich, of the University of Vienna, +responded as follows:-- + + In the name of the many Austrians present at the Congress I + express the thanks of my compatriots to the Committee which + summoned us, for their invitation and the hospitality so + cordially extended.... + + I congratulate the authorities upon the idea of opening this + Congress. How many world-expositions have already been held + without an attempt having been made to exhibit the spirit + that has created this world of beautiful and useful things? + It was reserved for these to find the form in which the + highest results of human thought--Science--presented in the + persons of her representatives, could be incorporated in the + compass of the World's Fair. The conception of this + International Congress of all Sciences in its originality + and audacity, in its universality and comprehensive + organization, is truly a child of the "young-American + spirit."... + + After this Congress has come to a close and the collection + of the lectures delivered, an unparalleled encyclopedia of + human knowledge, both in extent and content, will have + appeared. We may say that this Fair has become of epochal + importance, not alone for trade and manufactures, but also + for science. These proud palaces will long have disappeared + and been forgotten when this work, a _monumentum aere + perennius_, shall still testify to future generations the + standard of scientific attainment at the beginning of the + twentieth century. + +Short acknowledgments were then made for Russia by Dr. Oscar Backlund, +of the Astronomical Observatory at Pulkowa, Russia, and for Japan by +Prof. Nobushige Hozumi, of the Imperial University at Tokio, Japan. + +The last of the Vice-Presidents to respond to the addresses of welcome +was Signor Attilio Brunialti, Councilor of State for Italy, who after a +few formal words in English broke into impassioned eloquence in his +native tongue, and in brilliant diction and graceful periods expressed +the deep feeling and profound joy which Italy, the mother of arts, felt +in participating in an occasion so historic and so magnificent. Signor +Brunialti said in part: + + I thank you, gentlemen, for the honor you have paid both to + my country and myself by electing me a Vice-President of + this great scientific assembly. Would that I could thank you + in words in which vibrate the heart of Rome, the scientific + spirit of my land, and all that it has given to the world + for the progress of science, literature, and art. You know + Italy, gentlemen, you admire her, and therefore it is for + this also that my thanks are due to you. What ancient Rome + has contributed to the common patrimony of civilization is + also reflected here in a thousand ways, and a classical + education, held in such honor, by a young and practical + people such as yours, excites our admiration and also our + astonishment. By giant strides you are reviving the activity + of Italy at the epoch of the Communes, when all were + animated by unwearying activity and our manufactures and + arts held the first place in Europe. I have already praised + here the courageous spirit which has suggested the meeting + of this Congress--a Congress that will remain famous in the + annals of science. Many things in your country have aroused + in me growing surprise, but nothing has struck me more, I + assure you, than this homage to science which is pushing all + the wealthy classes to a noble rivalry for the increase of + education and mental cultivation. + + You have already large libraries and richly endowed + universities, and every kind of school, where the works of + Greece and Rome are perhaps even more appreciated and + adapted to modern improvements than with us old classical + nations. Full of energy, activity, and wealth, you have + before you perpetual progress, and what, up to this, your + youth has not allowed you to give to the world, you will + surely be able to give in the future. Use freely all the + treasures of civilization, art, and science that centuries + have accumulated in the old world, and especially in my + beloved Italy; fructify them with your youthful initiation + and with your powerful energy. By so doing you will + contribute to peace, and then we may say with truth that we + have prepared your route by the work of centuries; and like + unto those who from old age are prevented from following the + bold young man of Longfellow in his course, we will + accompany you with our greetings and our alterable + affection. + + By my voice, the native country of Columbus, of Galileo, of + Michelangelo and Raphael, of Macchiavelli and Volta, salutes + and with open arms hails as her hopeful daughter young + America,--thanking and blessing her for the road she has + opened to the sons of Italy, workmen and artists, to + civilization, to science, and to modern research and + thought. + +The Chairman of the Administrative Board, President Nicholas Murray +Butler, of Columbia University, was prevented by illness in his family +from being present at the Congress, and in place of the address to have +been delivered by him on the idea and development of the Congress and +the work of the Administrative Board, President William R. Harper, of +the University of Chicago, spoke on the same subject as follows: + + I have been asked within a few hours by those in authority + to present to you on behalf of the Administrative Board of + this International Congress a statement concerning the + origin and purpose of the congress. It is surely a source of + great disappointment to all concerned that the chairman of + the board, President Butler, is prevented from being + present. + + Many of us recall the fact that at the Paris Exposition of + 1889 the first attempt was made to do something systematic + in the way of congresses. This attempt was the natural + outcome of the opinion which had come to exist that so + splendid an opportunity as was afforded by the coming + together of leaders in every department of activity should + not be suffered to pass by unimproved. What could be more + natural in the stimulating and thought-provoking atmosphere + of an exposition than the proposal to make provision for a + consideration and discussion of some of the problems so + closely related to the interests represented by the + exposition? + + The results achieved at the Paris Exposition of 1889 were so + striking as to lead those in charge of the World's Columbian + Exposition in Chicago, 1893, to organize what was called the + World's Congress Auxiliary, including a series of + congresses, in which, to use the language of the original + decree, "the best workers in general science, philosophy, + literature, art, agriculture, trade, and labor were to meet + to present their experiences and results obtained in all + those various lines of thought up to the present time." + Seven years later, in connection with the Paris Exposition + of 1900, there was held another similar series of + international congresses. The general idea had in this way + slowly but surely gained recognition. + + The authorities of the Universal Exposition at St. Louis, + from the first, recognized the desirability of providing for + a congress which should exceed in its scope those that had + before been attempted. In the earliest days of the + preparation for this Exposition Mr. Frederick J. V. Skiff, + the Director of the Field Columbian Museum, my nearest + neighbor in the city of Chicago, took occasion to present + this idea, and particularly to emphasize the specific point + that something should be undertaken which not only might add + dignity and glory to the great name of the Exposition, but + also constitute a permanent and valuable contribution to the + sum of human knowledge. After a consideration of the whole + question, which extended over many months, the committee on + international congresses resolved to establish an + administrative board of seven members, to which should be + committed the responsibility of suggesting a plan in detail + for the attainment of the ends desired. This Board was + appointed in November, 1902, and consisted of President + Nicholas Murray Butler, of Columbia University, New York; + President R. H. Jesse, of the University of Missouri; + President Henry S. Pritchett, of the Massachusetts Institute + of Technology; Dr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress; + Mr. Frederick J. V. Skiff, of the Field Columbian Museum, + Chicago; Frederick G. Holls, of New York City, and the + present speaker. + + This Board held several meetings for the study of the + questions and problems involved in the great undertaking. + Much valuable counsel was received and considered. The Board + was especially indebted, however, to Prof. Hugo Münsterberg + of Harvard University for specific material which he placed + at their disposal--material which, with modification, served + as the basis of the plans adopted by the Board, and + recommended to the members of the Exposition. + + At the same time the Administrative Board recommended the + appointment of Dr. Howard J. Rogers as the Director of + Congresses, and nominated Prof. Simon Newcomb of the United + States Navy to be President of the Congress, and Professors + Hugo Münsterberg of Harvard University and Albion W. Small + of the University of Chicago to be Vice-Presidents of the + Congress; the three to constitute the Organizing Committee + of the Congress. This Organizing Committee was later + empowered to visit foreign countries and to extend personal + invitations to men distinguished in the arts and sciences to + participate in the Congress. The reception accorded to + these, our representatives, was most cordial. Of the 150 + invitations thus extended, 117 were accepted; and of the 117 + learned savants who accepted the invitation, 96 are here in + person this afternoon to testify by their presence the + interest they have felt in this great concourse of the + world's leaders. I am compelled by necessity this afternoon + to omit many points of interest in relation to the origin + and history of the undertaking, all of which will be + published in due time. + + After many months of expectancy we have at last come + together from all the nations of the world. But for what + purpose? I do not know that to the statement already + published in the programme of the Congress anything can be + added which will really improve that statement. The purpose, + as it has seemed to some of us, is threefold: + + In the first place, to secure such a general survey of the + various fields of learning, with all their "subdivisions and + multiplication of specialties," as will at the same time set + forth their mutual relations and connections, and likewise + constitute an effort toward the unification of knowledge. + This idea of unity has perhaps been uppermost in the minds + of all concerned with the work of organizing the Congress. + + In the second place, to provide a platform from which might + be presented the various problems, a solution of which will + be expected of the scholarship of the future. This includes + a recognition of the fundamental principles and conception + that underlie these mutual relations, and therefore serve + necessarily as the basis of all such future work. Here again + the controlling idea is that of unity and law, in other + words, universal law. + + In the third place, to bring together in person and spirit + distinguished investigators and scholars from all the + countries of the world, in order that by contact of one with + another a mutual sympathy may be promoted, and a practical + coöperation may be effected among those whose lifework leads + them far apart. Here, still again, unity of result is sought + for. + + As we now take up the work of this convention, which already + gives sure promise of being notable among the conventions + that have called together men of different nations, let us + confidently assure ourselves that the great purpose which + has throughout controlled in the different stages of its + organization will be realized; that because the Congress has + been held, the nations of the earth will find themselves + drawn more closely together; that human thought will possess + a more unified organization and human life a more unified + expression. + +Following these addresses of welcome and of response came the first +paper of the specific programme, designed to be introductory to the +division, department, and section addresses of the week. This address, +which will be found in full in its proper place, on pages 135 to 147 of +this volume, was given by Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress +and Chairman of the Organizing Committee, whose labors for fifteen +months were thus brought to a brilliant conclusion. + +At the close of Dr. Newcomb's address the assembly was dismissed by a +few words of President Francis, in which he placed at the disposition of +the members of the Congress the courtesies and privileges of the +Exposition, and expressed the hope and belief that their presence and +the purpose for which they were assembled, would be the crowning glory +of the Universal Exposition of 1904. + +On Tuesday, September 20, the seven division addresses and the +twenty-four department addresses were given, all the speakers being +Americans: Royce, in Normative Science; Wilson, in Historical Science; +Woodward, in Physical Science; Hall, in Mental Science; Jordan, in +Utilitarian Science; Lowell, in Social Regulation; and Harris, in Social +Culture, treating the main divisions of science and their applications, +each dwelling particularly on the scope of the great field included in +his address and the unification of the work therein. The forty-eight +department speakers divided the field of knowledge, one address in each +department giving the fundamental conceptions and methods, the other the +history and development of the work of the department during the last +century. + +With Wednesday the international participation began, and in the one +hundred twenty-eight sections into which the departments were divided +one half of the speakers were drawn, so far as circumstances permitted, +from foreign scientific circles. With the exception of the last two +sections, Religious Influence Personal, and Religious Influence Social, +the work of the Congress closed on Saturday afternoon. These two +sections having four speakers each were placed, one on Sunday morning +and one on Sunday afternoon, in Festival Hall, and passes to the grounds +given upon application to any one desiring to attend. Large numbers +availed themselves of the privilege, and the closing hours of the +Congress were eminently suitable and worthy of its high success. At the +end of the afternoon session in Festival Hall, Vice-President of the +Congress, Dr. Albion W. Small, reviewed in a few words the work of the +week, its meaning to science, its possible effect upon American thought, +and then formally announced the Congress closed. + + +OFFICIAL BANQUET + +The official banquet given by the Exposition to all participants, +members, and officials of the Congress, on Friday evening, at the +Tyrolean Alps banquet hall, proved a charming conclusion to the labors +of the week. No better place could be imagined for holding it, within +the grounds of an exposition, than the magnificently proportioned music +and dining hall of the "Alps." A room 160 feet by 105 feet, capable of +seating fifteen hundred banqueters; the spacious, oval, orchestral stage +at the south end; the galleries and boxes along the sides of the hall +done in solid German oak; the beautiful and impressive mural +decorations, the work of the best painters of Germany; the excellence of +the cuisine, and the thoroughly drilled corps of waiters, rendered the +physical accessories of a banquet as nearly perfect as possible in a +function so extensive. + +The banquet was the largest held during the Exposition period, eight +hundred invitations being issued and nearly seven hundred persons +present. The music was furnished by the famous Garde Républicaine Band +of France, as the Exposition orchestra was obliged to fill its regular +weekly assignment at Festival Hall. The decorations of the hall, the +lights and flowers, the musical programme, the galleries and boxes +filled with ladies representing the official and social life of the +Exposition, and the distinguished body of the Congress, formed a picture +which appealed to the admiration and enthusiasm of every one alike. No +attempt was made to assign seats to the banqueters outside the speakers' +table, and little coteries and clusters of scientists, many of whom were +making acquaintances and intellectual alliances during this week which +would endure for a lifetime, were scattered about the hall, giving an +interest and an animation to the scene quite beyond the powers of +description. In one corner were Harnack, Budde, Jean Réville, and +Cuthbert Hall, chatting as animatedly as though their religious theories +were not as far apart as the poles; in another, Waldeyer, Escherich, +Jacobi, Allbutt, and Kitasato formed a medical group, the counterpart of +which would be hard to find unless in another part of this same hall; +still again were Erdmann, Sorley, Ladd, Royce, and Creighton as the +centre of a group of philosophers of world renown. So in every part of +the picture which met the eye were focused the leaders of thought and +action in their respective fields. The _tout ensemble_ of the Congress +was here brought out in its strongest effect, as, with the exception of +the opening exercises at Festival Hall at which time many had not +arrived, it was the only time when the entire membership was together. +The banquet coming at the close of the week was also fortunate, as by +this time the acquaintances made, and the common incidents and anecdotes +experienced, heightened the enjoyment of all. + +The toastmaster of the banquet and presiding officer, Hon. David R. +Francis, was never in a happier vein than when he assumed the gavel and +proposed the health of the President of the United States and the rulers +of all nations represented at the board. + +President Francis said:-- + + MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE: + + On the façade at the base of the Louisiana Monument, which + is the central feature of this Exposition picture, is a + group of Livingston, Monroe, and Marbois. It represents the + signing of the treaty, which by peaceful negotiation + transferred an empire from France to the United States. Upon + the inscription are the words of Livingston, "We have lived + long and accomplished much, but this is the crowning act of + our lives." + + It is that transfer of an empire which this Exposition is + held to commemorate. And paraphrasing the words of + Livingston, permit me to say that I have presided over many + dinners, but this is the crowning act of my career. + + In opening the deliberations of the International Congress + of Arts and Science, I made the statement that a Universal + Exposition is an ambitious undertaking. I stated also that + the International Congress of Arts and Science is the + crowning feature of this Exposition. I did not venture the + assertion then which I have the presumption to make now, + that the most difficult task in connection with this + Universal Exposition was the assembling of an International + Congress of Arts and Science. I venture to make the + statement now, because I feel that I am justified in doing + so by the success which up to the present has attended your + deliberations. Any congregation of the leaders of thought in + the world is a memorable occasion. This is the first + systematic one that has ever been attempted. Whether it + proves successful or not, it will be long remembered in the + history of the civilized countries that have participated in + it. If it be but the precursor of other like assemblages it + will still be long remembered, and in that event it will be + entitled to unspeakable credit if it accomplishes anything + toward the realization of the very laudable objects which + prompted its assembling. + + The effort to unify all human knowledge and to establish the + inter-relations thereof is a bold conception, and requires + the courage that characterizes the people who live in the + western section of the United States. If it be the last + effort of the kind it will still be remembered, and this + Universal Exposition, if it had done nothing else to endear + it to cultured people of this and other countries, will not + be forgotten. The savants assembled by the call of this + Exposition have pursued their respective lines of thought + and research, prompted by no desire other than one to find a + solution of the problem which confronts humanity. By + bringing you together and making an effort to determine and + establish the relations between all lines of human + knowledge, we have certainly made an advance in the right + direction. If your researches, if the results of your + studies, can be utilized by the human race, then we who have + been the instruments of that great blessing will be entitled + to credit secondary only to the men who are the discoverers + of the scientific knowledge whose relations we are + endeavoring to establish. The Management of the Universal + Exposition of 1904 salutes the International Congress of + Arts and Science. We drink to the perpetuation of that + organization, and I shall call upon its distinguished + President, Professor Newcomb, to respond to the Sentiment. + +Dr. Newcomb in a few words thanked the members of the Congress for their +participation, which had made possible the brilliant success of the +enterprise, portrayed its effect and the influence of its perpetuation, +and then extended to all the invitation from the President of the United +States to attend the reception at the White House on the following +Tuesday. + +In responding to these toasts the senior Honorary Vice-President, Hon. +James Bryce, of Great Britain, spoke in matchless form and held the +attention of the vast hall closely while he portrayed in a few words the +chief glories of England in the field of science, and the pride the +English nation felt in the glorious record made by her eldest daughter, +the United States. Mr. Bryce spoke extemporaneously, and his remarks +cannot be given in full. + +For Germany, Commissioner-General Lewald responded in an eloquent +address, in which, after thanking the Exposition and the American +Government for the high honor done the German nation in selecting so +large a percentage of the speakers from German scientific circles, he +enlarged upon the close relations which had existed between German +university thought and methods and American thought and practice, due to +the vast number of American students who had pursued their post-graduate +courses in the universities of Germany. He dwelt upon the pride that +Germany felt in this sincerest form of tribute to German supremacy in +scientific thought, and of the satisfaction which the influence in this +country of German-trained students afforded. He described at length the +great exhibit made by German universities in the education department of +the Exposition, and pointed to it as demonstrating the supremacy of +German scientific thought and accurate methods. Dr. Lewald closed with a +brilliant peroration, in which he referred to the immense service done +for the cause of science in the last fifty years of German history and +to the patronage and support of the Emperor, not only to science in +general, but to this great international gathering of scientific +experts, and drank to the continued cordial relations of Germany and +America through its university circles and scientific endeavors. + +For the response from France, Prof. Gaston Darboux was delegated by +Commissioner-General Gerald, who was unable to be present on account of +sickness. In one of the most beautiful and polished addresses of the +evening, Professor Darboux spoke in French, of which the following is a +translation:-- + + GENTLEMEN,--Graciously invited to respond in the name of the + delegates of France who have accept the invitation of the + American Government, I consider it my duty in the first + place to thank this great nation for the honor which it has + paid to us, and for the welcome, which it has extended to + us. Those of you who are doing me the honor to listen, know + of that disagreeable feeling of isolation which at times the + traveler in the midst of a strange people experiences;--that + feeling I know only from hearsay. We have not had a moment + of time to experience it. They are accustomed in Europe to + portray the Americans as exclusively occupied with business + affairs. They throw in our faces the famous proverb, + 'Business is Business,' and give it to us as the rule of + conduct for Americans. We are able to testify entirely to + the contrary, since the inhabitants of this beautiful + country are always seeking to extend to strangers a thousand + courtesies. Above all, we have encountered no one who has + not been anxious to go out of his way to give to us, even + before we had asked it, such information as it was necessary + for us to have. And what shall I say of the welcome which we + have received here at the hands of our American + confrères,--Monsieur the President of the Exposition, + Monsieur the Director of Congresses and other worthy + co-laborers? The authorities of the Exposition and the + inhabitants of St. Louis have rivaled each other in making + our stay agreeable and our ways pleasant in the heart of + this magnificent Exposition, of which we shall ever preserve + the most enchanting memory. + + We should have wished to see in a more leisurely manner, and + to make acquaintance with the attractions without number + with which the Exposition literally swarms (men of letters + and men of science love at times to disport themselves) and + to study the exhibits classified in a method so exact in the + palaces of an architecture so original and so impressive. + But Monsieur Newcomb has not permitted this. The Congress of + which he is the illustrious President offers so much in the + way of attractions,--of a kind a little rigorous it is + true,--and so much of work to be accomplished, that to our + very great regret we have had to refuse many invitations + which it would have been most agreeable to accept. The + Americans will pardon us for this, I am sure; they know + better than any one else the value of time, but they know + also that human strength has some limits, especially among + us poor Europeans, for I doubt whether an American ever + knows the meaning of fatigue. + + Messieurs, the Congress which is about to terminate + to-morrow has been truly a very great event. It is the first + time, I believe, that there has been seen assembled in one + grand international reunion that which our great minister, + Colbert, had in mind, and that which we have realized for + the first time in our Institut de France,--the union of + letters, science, and arts. That this union shall maintain + itself in the future is the dearest wish of my heart. + + Science is a unit, even as the Universe. The aspects which + it presents know neither boundaries of states nor the + political divisions established between peoples. In all + civilized countries they calculate with the same figures, + they measure with the same instruments, they employ the same + classifications, they study the same historic facts, + economics, and morals. If there exists among the different + nations some differences in methods, these difference are + slight. They are a benefit at the same time as well as a + necessity. For the doing of the immense amount of work of + research imposed on that part of humanity which thinks, it + is necessary that the subjects of study should not be + identically the same, or better, if they are identical, that + the difference between the points of view from which they + are considered in the different countries contribute to our + better knowledge of their nature, their results, and their + applications. It is necessary then that each people preserve + their distinctive genius, their particular methods which + they use to develop the qualities they have inherited. In + exactly the same way that it is important in an orchestra + that each instrument play in the most perfect manner, and + with the timbre which accords with its nature, the part + which is given to it, so in science as in music, the harmony + between the players is a necessary condition, which each one + ought to exert himself to realize. Let us endeavor then in + scientific research to execute in the most perfect manner + that part of the task which fate has devolved upon us, but + let us endeavor also to maintain that accord which is a + necessary condition to the harmony which will alone be able + in the future to assure the progress of humanity. + + Gentlemen, in this international reunion it would not be + fitting that I dwell upon the services which my country has + been able to render to science; and on the other hand it + would be difficult for me to say to you exactly what part + America is called upon to take in this concert of civilized + nations; but I am certain that the part will be worthy of + the great nation which has given to itself a constitution so + liberal and which in so short a space of time has known how + to conquer, and measure in value, a territory so immense + that it extends from ocean to ocean. I lift my glass to the + honor of American science; I drink to the future of that + great nation, for which we, as well as all other Frenchmen, + hold so much of common remembrance, so much of close and + living sympathy, and so much of profound admiration. I am + the more happy to do this in this most beautiful territory + of Louisiana, which France in a former age ceded freely to + America. + +Perhaps the treat of the evening was the response made in behalf of the +Empire of Japan by Professor Hozumi, of the Faculty of Law of the +University of Tokio. + +Unfortunately this response was not preserved in full, but Professor +Hozumi dwelt with much feeling on the world-wide significance of the +Congress and the common plane upon which all nations might meet in the +pursuit of science and the manifold applications of scientific +principles. He paid a beautiful tribute to the educational system of the +United States and to the great debt which Japan owed to American +scholars and to American teachers for their aid in establishing modern +educational principles and methods in the Empire of Japan. The impetus +given to scientific study in Japan by the Japanese students trained in +American universities was also earnestly dwelt upon, and the close +relations which had always existed between Japanese and American +students and instructors feelingly described. In the field of science +Japan was yet young, but she had shown herself a close and apt pupil, +and her period of initiative and original research was at hand. In +bacteriology, in medicine, in seismology, oceanography, and other +fields, Japan has made valuable contributions to science and established +the right to recognition in an international gathering of this nature. +It was with peculiar and grateful pride and pleasure that the Japanese +Government had sent its delegation to this Congress of selected experts +in response to the invitation of the American Government. Near the close +of his address Professor Hozumi made a gracious and happy allusion, +based upon the conflict with Russia, in which he said that of all places +where men meet, and of all places sunned by the light of heaven, this +great Congress, built on the high plane of the brotherhood of science +and the fellowship of scholars, was the only place where a Japanese and +a Russian could meet in mutual accord, with a common purpose, and clasp +hands in unity of thought. This chivalrous and beautiful idea, given +here so imperfectly from memory, brought the great assembly to its feet +in rounds of cheers. In closing, Professor Hozumi expressed the earnest +belief that the benefits of science from a gathering of this nature +would quickly be felt, by a closer coöperation in the application of +theory and practical principles and a simultaneous advance in all parts +of the world. + +The closing response of the evening for the foreign members was made for +Italy by Signor Attilio Brunialti, whose brilliant eloquence at many +times during the week had won the admiration of the members of the +Congress. Under the inspiration of this assemblage he fairly surpassed +himself, and the following translation of his remarks but poorly +indicates the grace and brilliant diction of the original:-- + + I have had the good fortune to be present in this wonderful + country at three international Congresses, that of science, + the peace parliament, and the geographic. I wish to record + the impression they have excited in my mind, already so + favorably inclined by your never-to-be-forgotten and + gracious reception. You must, please, allow me to address + you in my own language, because the Latin tongue inspires + me, because I wish to affirm more solemnly my nationality, + and also, because I cannot express my feelings well in a + language not familiar to me. My country, the land of + Columbus, of Galileo, the nation that more than all others + in Europe is an element of peace, is already in itself the + synthesis of the three Congresses. And I can call to mind + that this land is indebted to geography for the fact of its + being made known to the world, because the immortal Genoese + pointed it out to people fighting in the old world for a + small territory, and opened to mortals new and extensive + countries destined to receive the valiant and the audacious + of the entire world and to rise like yours to immortal + glory. + + Thus the poet can sing,-- + + L'avanza, l'avanza + Divino straniero, + Conosci la stanza + Che i fati ti diero; + Se lutti, se lagrime + Ancora rinterra + L'giovin la terra. + + Thus Columbus of old could point out to men--who run down + each other, disputing even love for fear that man may become + a wolf for man--the vast and endless wastes awaiting + laborers, and give to man the treasures of the fruitful + land. 'Tis in the name of peace that I greet modern science + in all its forms, and I say to you chemists: "Invent new + means of destruction;" and to you mechanics and + shipbuilders: "Give us invulnerable men-of-war and such + perfect cannons, that your own progress may contribute to + make war rarer in the world." Then will men, amazed at their + own destructive progress, be drawn together by brotherly + love, by the development of common knowledge and sympathy, + and by the study of geography be led to know that there is + plenty of room for every one in the world to contribute to + progress and civilization. + + Americans! these sentiments are graven in your country; in + point of fact, it is a proof of the harmony that reigns in + this Congress between guests come from all parts of the + world, that I, an Italian, am allowed to address you in my + own language on American ground, near the Tyrolean Alps, + greeted by the music of the Républicaine French Garde, + united in eternal bonds of friendship by the two great + goddesses of the modern world,--Science and Peace. + +The last speaker of the evening was Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann, Chairman +of the Exposition Committee on Congresses, who in eloquent periods set +forth the ambition of the city of St. Louis and the Exposition of 1904 +in creating a Congress of intellect on the same high plane that had +characterized the educational ideals of the Exposition, and the intense +satisfaction which the officials of the Congress felt in its brilliant +outcome, and the possibilities which it promised for an unequaled +contribution to scientific literature. + +At the close of these addresses the members of the Congress and the +spectators in the gallery sang, in full chorus and under the lead of the +Garde Républicaine Band, the various national anthems, closing with "The +Star Spangled Banner." + + +PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT + +In accordance with the recommendation of the Administrative Board to the +Committee on Congresses, the Executive Committee appointed Dr. Howard J. +Rogers, Director of Congresses, editor of the proceedings of the +Congress of Arts and Science. The Congress records were removed from St. +Louis to Albany, New York, the home of the Director, from which place +the publication has been prepared. Upon collecting the papers it was +found that they could be divided logically, and with a fair degree of +similarity in size, into eight volumes, each of which should cover a +definite and distinct portion of the programme. These are as follows:-- + + Volume 1. History of the Congress, Scientific Plan of the Congress, + Philosophy, Mathematics. + Volume 2. Political and Economic History, History of Law, History + of Religion. + Volume 3. History of Language, History of Literature, History of + Art. + Volume 4. Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Sciences of the Earth. + Volume 5. Biology, Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology. + Volume 6. Medicine, Technology. + Volume 7. Economics, Politics, Jurisprudence, Social Science. + Volume 8. Education, Religion. + +The details and specifications of the volumes were prepared for +competitive bids and submitted to twelve of the prominent publishers of +the country. The most advantageous bid was received from Houghton, +Mifflin & Company of Boston, Mass., and was accepted by the Exposition +Company. The Administrative Board and the authorities Of the Exposition +feel deeply pleased at the result, inasmuch as the imprint of this firm +guarantees a work in full accord with the high plane upon which the +Congress has been conducted. + +It was determined to print the entire proceedings in the English +language, inasmuch as the Congress was held in an English-speaking +country and the vast majority of the papers were read in that language. +The consent of every foreign speaker was obtained for this procedure. It +was found, after collecting, that the number of addresses to be +translated was forty-four. The translators were selected by the editor +upon the advice of the members of the Administrative Board and +Organizing Committee, and great care was taken to find persons not only +thoroughly trained in the two languages and possessing a good English +style, but also persons who were thoroughly conversant with the subject +on which the paper treated. Many of the translators were suggested by +the foreign speakers themselves. As a result of this careful selection, +the editor feels confident that the original value of the papers has +been in no wise detracted from, and that both in form and content the +translations are thoroughly satisfactory. + +It will be found that some addresses are not closely related to the +scheme of the Congress. Either through some misunderstanding of the +exact purpose of the Congress, or through too close devotion to their +own particular phase of investigation, some half-dozen speakers +submitted papers dealing with special lines of work. These, while +valuable and scholarly from their standpoint, do not accord with a +series of papers prepared with a view to general relations and +historical perspective. The exceptions are so few, however, as not +seriously to interfere with the unity of the plan. + +In the arrangement of the papers the order of the official programme is +followed exactly, with the exception that, under Historical Science, +Departments 3, 4, and 8, covering History of Politics, Law, and +Religion, are combined in one volume; and Departments 5, 6, and 7, +covering History of Language, Literature, and Art, are combined in the +succeeding volume. In volume one, the first chapter is devoted to the +history of the Congress, written by the editor, in which is set forth +the plain narrative of the growth and development of the Congress, as +much for the benefit of similar undertakings in the future as for the +interest of those participating in this Congress. The second chapter +contains the scientific introduction, written by Prof. Hugo Münsterberg +of Harvard University, First Vice-President of the Congress and Member +of the Organizing Committee. This is written for the purpose of giving +in detail the principles upon which the classification was based, and +the relations which the different sections and departments held to each +other. + +Each paper is prefaced by a very short biographical note in categorical +form, for the purpose of insuring the identity of the speaker as long in +the future as the volumes may exist. Appended to the addresses of each +department is a short bibliography, which is essential for a general +study of the subject in question. These are in no wise exhaustive or +complete, but are rather designed to be a small, valuable, working +reference library for students. The bibliographies have been prepared by +eminent experts in the departments of the Congress, but are necessarily +somewhat uneven, as some of the writers have gone into the subject more +thoroughly than others. The general arrangement of the bibliographies +is: 1. Historical books and standard works dealing with the subject. 2. +General books for the whole department. 3. Books for sections of +departments. + +Appended also to the addresses of each department and sections are +résumés of the ten-minute addresses delivered by invitation at the +meeting of the department or section. Many of these papers are of high +value; but inasmuch as very few of them were written in accord with the +plan of the Congress, and with the main thought to be developed by the +Congress, but deal rather with some interesting and detached phase of +the subject, it has been deemed best not to print them in full, but to +indicate in brief the subject and the treatment given it by the writer. +Those which do accord with the plan of the Congress are given more +extensive treatment. + + +CONCLUSION + +What the results of the Congress will be; what influence it may have; +was it worth the work and cost, are questions often fairly asked. + +The lasting results and influences are of course problematical. They +depend upon the character and soundness of the addresses, and whether +the uniform strength of the publication will make the work as a whole, +what it undoubtedly is in parts, a source-book for the future on the +bases of scientific theory at the beginning of the twentieth century, +and a reliable sketch of the growth of science during the nineteenth +century. Critical study of the addresses will alone determine this, but +from the favorable reception of those already published in reviews, and +from editorial acquaintance with the others, it seems assured. That +portion of the section addresses which deals with the inter-relations of +science and demonstrates both its unity and variety of processes is new +and authoritative thought, and will be the basis of much discussion and +remodeling of theories in the future. The immediate results of the +Congress are highly satisfactory, and fully repay the work and the cost +both from a scientific and an exposition standpoint. As an +acknowledgment of the prominence of scientific methods, as a public +recognition of the work of scientists, as the means of bringing to one +place the most noted assemblage of thinkers the world has ever seen, as +an opportunity for scholars to meet and know each other better, the +Congress was an unqualified success and of enduring reputation. From the +Exposition point of view, it was equally a success; not financially, nor +was there ever a thought that it would be. Probably not more than seven +thousand persons outside of St. Louis came primarily to attend the +Congress, and their admission fees were a bagatelle; the revenue derived +from the sale of the _Proceedings_ will not meet the cost of printing. +There has been no money value sought for in the Congress,--none +received. Its value to the Exposition lies solely in the fact that it is +the final argument to the world of the initial claims of the officials +of the Exposition that its purpose was purely educational. Coördinate +with the material exhibits, sought, classified, and installed on a +rigidly scientific classification, the Congress, which relates, +illumines, and defends the principles upon which the material portion +was founded, has triumphantly vindicated the good faith, the wisdom, and +the foresight of the Universal Exposition of 1904. This printed record +of its proceedings will be a monument not only to the spirit of Science, +but to the spirit of the Exposition, which will endure as long as the +records of man are preserved. + + * * * * * + +In conclusion, the editor wishes to express his obligations to the many +speakers and officers of the Congress, who have evinced great interest +in the publication and assisted by valuable suggestions and advice. In +particular, he acknowledges the help of President Butler of Columbia +University, Professor Münsterberg of Harvard University, and Professor +Small of the University of Chicago. Acknowledgments are with justice and +pleasure made to the Committee on Congresses of the Exposition, and the +able chairman, Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann, for their unwavering and +prompt support on all matters of policy and detail, without which the +full measure of success could not have been achieved. To the efficient +secretary of the Department of Congresses, Mr. James Green Cotchett, an +expression of obligation is due for his indefatigable labors during the +Congress period, and for his able and painstaking work in compiling the +detailed records of this publication. + +At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Exposition on January 3, +1905, there was unanimously voted the following resolution, recommended +by the Administrative Board and approved by the Committee on +Congresses:-- + +MOVED: that a vote of thanks and an expression of deepest obligation be +tendered to Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress, Prof. Hugo +Münsterberg, vice-president of the Congress, and Prof. Albion W. Small, +vice-president of the Congress, for their efficient, thorough, and +comprehensive work in connection with the programme of the Congress, the +selection and invitation of speakers, and the attention to detail in its +execution. That, in view of the enormous amount of labor devolving upon +these three gentlemen for the past eighteen months, to the exclusion of +all opportunities for literary and other work outside their college +departments, an honorarium of twenty-five hundred dollars be tendered to +each of them. + +At a subsequent meeting the following resolution was also passed:-- + +MOVED: that the Directors of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition Company +place upon the record an expression of their appreciation of the +invaluable aid so freely given by the Administrative Board of the +Congress of Arts and Science. In organization, guidance, and results the +Congress was the most notable of its kind in history. For the important +part performed wisely and zealously by the Administrative Board the +Exposition Management extends this acknowledgment. + + + SUMMARY OF EXPENSES OF THE CONGRESS + + Office expenses $7,025 82 + Travel 3,847 24 + Exploitation, Organizing Committee abroad 8,663 16 + Traveling expenses, American Speakers 31,350 + Traveling expenses, Foreign Speakers 49,000 + Honorariums 7,500 + Banquet 3,500 + Expenses for editing proceedings 5,875 + Estimated cost of printing proceedings 22,000 $138,761 22 + + + + + INTERNATIONAL + + CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE + + UNIVERSAL EXPOSITION ST. LOUIS + + SEPTEMBER 19-25 1904 + + * * * * * + + PROGRAMME AND LIST OF SPEAKERS + + + + + PROGRAMME + + + Purpose and Plan of the Congress + Organization of the Congress + Speakers and Chairmen + Chronological Order of Proceedings + Programme of Social Events + List of Ten-minute Speakers + List of Chairmen and Principal Speakers + + + INDEX SUBJECTS + + + Division A. Normative Science + + Department 1. Philosophy + + Sec. A. Metaphysics + B. Philosophy of Religion + C. Logic + D. Methodology of Science + E. Ethics + F. Æsthetics + + Department 2. Mathematics + + Sec. A. Algebra and Analysis + B. Geometry + C. Applied Mathematics + + + Division B. Historical Science + + Department 3. Political and Economic History + + Sec. A. History of Asia + B. History of Greece and Rome + C. Mediæval History + D. Modern History of Europe + E. History of America + F. History of Economic Institutions + + Department 4. History of Law + + Sec. A. History of Roman Law + B. History of Common Law + C. Comparative Law + + Department 5. History of Language + + Sec. A. Comparative Language + B. Semitic Language + C. Indo-Iranian Languages + D. Greek Language + E. Latin Language + F. English Language + G. Romance Languages + H. Germanic Languages + + Department 6. History of Literature + + Sec. A. Indo-Iranian Literature + B. Classical Literature + C. English Literature + D. Romance Literature + E. Germanic Literature + F. Slavic Literature + G. Belles-Lettres + + Department 7. History of Art + + Sec. A. Classical Art + B. Modern Architecture + C. Modern Painting + + Department 8. History of Religion + + Sec. A. Brahminism and Buddhism + B. Mohammedism + C. Old Testament + D. New Testament + E. History of the Christian Church + + + Division C. Physical Science + + Department 9. Physics + + Sec. A. Physics of Matter + B. Physics of Ether + C. Physics of the Electron + + Department 10. Chemistry + + Sec. A. Inorganic Chemistry + B. Organic Chemistry + C. Physical Chemistry + D. Physiological Chemistry + + Department 11. Astronomy + + Sec. A. Astrometry + B. Astrophysics + + Department 12. Sciences of the Earth + + Sec. A. Geophysics + B. Geology + C. Palæontology + D. Petrology and Mineralogy + E. Physiography + F. Geography + G. Oceanography + H. Cosmical Physics + + Department 13. Biology + + Sec. A. Phylogeny + B. Plant Morphology + C. Plant Physiology + D. Plant Pathology + E. Ecology + F. Bacteriology + G. Animal Morphology + H. Embryology + I. Comparative Anatomy + J. Human Anatomy + K. Physiology + + Department 14. Anthropology + + Sec. A. Somatology + B. Archæology + C. Ethnology + + + Division D. Mental Science + + Department 15. Psychology + + Sec. A. General Psychology + B. Experimental Psychology + C. Comparative and Genetic Psychology + D. Abnormal Psychology + + Department 16. Sociology + + Sec. A. Social Structure + B. Social Psychology + + + Division E. Utilitarian Sciences + + Department 17. Medicine + + Sec. A. Public Health + B. Preventive Medicine + C. Pathology + D. Therapeutics and Pharmacology + E. Internal Medicine + F. Neurology + G. Psychiatry + H. Surgery + I. Gynecology + J. Ophthalmology + K. Otology and Laryngology + L. Pediatrics + + Department 18. Technology + + Sec. A. Civil Engineering + B. Mechanical Engineering + C. Electrical Engineering + D. Mining Engineering + E. Technical Chemistry + F. Agriculture + + Department 19. Economic + + Sec. A. Economic Theory + B. Transportation + C. Commerce and Exchange + D. Money and Credit + E. Public Finance + F. Insurance + + + Division F. Social Regulation + + Department 20. Politics + + Sec. A. Political Theory + B. Diplomacy + C. National Administration + D. Colonial Administration + E. Municipal Administration + + Department 21. Jurisprudence + + Sec. A. International Law + B. Constitutional Law + C. Private Law + + Department 22. Social Science + + Sec. A. The Family + B. The Rural Community + C. The Urban Community + D. The Industrial Group + E. The Dependent Group + F. The Criminal Group + + + Division G. Social Culture + + Department 23. Education + + Sec. A. Educational Theory + B. The School + C. The College + D. The University + E. The Library + + Department 24. Religion + + Sec. A. General Religious Education + B. Professional Religious Education + C. Religious Agencies + D. Religious Work + E. Religious Influence: Personal + F. Religious Influence: Social + + + + +PURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE CONGRESS + + +The idea of the Congress grows out of the thought that the subdivision +and multiplication of specialties in science has reached a stage at +which investigators and scholars may derive both inspiration and profit +from a general survey of the various fields of learning, planned with a +view of bringing the scattered sciences into closer mutual relations. +The central purpose is the unification of knowledge, an effort toward +which seems appropriate on an occasion when the nations bring together +an exhibit of their arts and industries. An assemblage is therefore to +be convened at which leading representatives of theoretical and applied +sciences shall set forth those general principles and fundamental +conceptions which connect groups of sciences, review the historical +development of special sciences, show their mutual relations and discuss +their present problems. + +The speakers to treat the various themes are selected in advance from +the European and American continents. The discussions will be arranged +on the following general plan:-- + +After the opening of the Congress on Monday afternoon, September 19, +will follow, on Tuesday forenoon, addresses on main divisions of science +and its applications, the general theme being the unification of each of +the fields treated. These will be followed by two addresses on each of +the twenty-four great departments of knowledge. The theme of one address +in each case will be the Fundamental Conceptions and Methods, while the +other will set forth the progress during the last century. The preceding +addresses will be delivered by Americans, making the work of the first +two days the contribution of American scholars. + +On the third day, with the opening of the sections, the international +work will begin. One hundred twenty-eight sectional meetings will be +held on the four remaining days of the Congress, at each of which two +papers will be read, the theme of one being suggested by the relations +of the special branch treated to other branches; the other by its +present problems. Three hours will be devoted to each sectional meeting, +thus enabling each hearer to attend eight such meetings, if he so +desires. The programme is so arranged that related subjects will be +treated, as far as possible, at different times. The length of the +principal addresses being limited to forty-five minutes each, there will +remain at least one hour for five or six brief communications in each +section. The addresses in each department will be collected and +published in a special volume. + +It is hoped that the living influence of this meeting will be yet more +important than the formal addresses, and that the scholars whose names +are announced in the following programme of speakers and chairmen will +form only a nucleus for the gathering of thousands who feel in sympathy +with the efforts to bring unity into the world of knowledge. + + + + + ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS + + * * * * * + + PRESIDENT OF THE EXPOSITION: + HON. DAVID R. FRANCIS, A.M., LL.D. + + DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSES, + HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D. + _Universal Exposition, 1904._ + + * * * * * + + + ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD + + NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, PH.D., LL.D. + _President of Columbia University, Chairman._ + + WILLIAM R. HARPER, PH.D., LL.D. + _President of the University of Chicago._ + + R. H. JESSE, PH.D., LL.D. + _President of the University of Missouri._ + + HENRY S. PRITCHETT, PH.D., LL.D. + _President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology._ + + HERBERT PUTNAM, LITT.D., LL.D. + _Librarian of Congress._ + + FREDERICK J. V. SKIFF, A.M. + _Director of the Field Columbian Museum._ + + * * * * * + + + OFFICERS OF THE CONGRESS + + PRESIDENT: + SIMON NEWCOMB, PH.D., LL.D. + _Retired Professor U. S. N._ + + VICE-PRESIDENTS: + HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, PH.D., LL.D. + _Professor of Psychology in Harvard University._ + + ALBION W. SMALL, PH.D., LL.D. + _Professor of Sociology in The University of Chicago._ + + HONORARY VICE-PRESIDENTS: + RIGHT HONORABLE JAMES BRYCE, M.P. + GREAT BRITAIN. + + M. GASTON DARBOUX, + FRANCE. + + PROFESSOR WILHELM WALDEYER, + GERMANY. + + DR. OSKAR BACKLUND, + RUSSIA. + + PROFESSOR THEODORE ESCHERICH, + AUSTRIA. + + SIGNOR ATTILIO BRUNIALTI, + ITALY. + + PROFESSOR N. HOZUMI, + JAPAN. + + EXECUTIVE SECRETARY: + DR. L. O. HOWARD, + _Permanent Secretary American Association + for the Advancement of Science_. + + + + + SPEAKERS AND CHAIRMEN + + * * * * * + + + DIVISION A--NORMATIVE SCIENCE + + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE, Harvard University. + + (_Hall 6, September 20, 10 a. m._) + + * * * * * + + + DEPARTMENT 1--PHILOSOPHY + (_Hall 6, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR BORDEN P. BOWNE, Boston University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE H. HOWISON, University of California. + PROFESSOR GEORGE T. LADD, Yale University. + + + SECTION A. METAPHYSICS. (_Hall 6, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. C. ARMSTRONG, Wesleyan University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR, McGill University, Montreal. + PROFESSOR ALEXANDER T. ORMOND, Princeton University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR A. O. LOVEJOY, Washington University, + + + SECTION B. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. (_Hall 1, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS C. HALL, Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, University of Heidelberg. + SECRETARY: DR. W. P. MONTAGUE, Columbia University. + + + SECTION C. LOGIC. (_Hall 6, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE M. DUNCAN, Yale University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, Cornell University. + PROFESSOR FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: DR. W. H. SHELDON, Columbia University. + + + SECTION D. METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE. (_Hall 6, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES E. CREIGHTON, Cornell University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM OSTWALD, University of Leipzig. + PROFESSOR BENNO ERDMANN, University of Bonn. + SECRETARY: DR. R. B. PERRY, Harvard University. + + + SECTION E. ETHICS. (_Hall 6, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE H. PALMER, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM R. SORLEY, University of Cambridge. + PROFESSOR PAUL HENSEL, University of Erlangen. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. C. SHARP, University of Wisconsin. + + + SECTION F. AESTHETICS. (_Hall 4, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: DR. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL, New York City. + PROFESSOR MAX DESSOIR, University of Berlin. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR MAX MEYER, University of Missouri. + + + DEPARTMENT 2--MATHEMATICS + (_Hall 7, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY S. WHITE, Northwestern University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR MAXIME BOCHER, Harvard University. + PROFESSOR JAMES P. PIERPONT, Yale University. + + + SECTION A. ALGEBRA AND ANALYSIS. (_Hall 9, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR E. H. MOORE, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EMILE PICARD, the Sorbonne; Member of the Institute + of France. + PROFESSOR HEINRICH MASCHKE, University of Chicago. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR G. A. BLISS, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION B. GEOMETRY. (_Hall 9, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR M. W. HASKELL, University of California. + SPEAKERS: M. GASTON DARBOUX, Perpetual Secretary of The Academy of + Sciences, Paris. + DR. EDWARD KASNER, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR THOMAS J. HOLGATE, Northwestern University. + + + SECTION C. APPLIED MATHEMATICS. (_Hall 7, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ARTHUR G. WEBSTER, Clark University, Worcester, + Mass. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LUDWIG BOLTZMANN, University of Vienna. + PROFESSOR HENRI POINCARÉ, the Sorbonne; Member of the + Institute of France. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR HENRY T. EDDY, University of Minnesota. + + + + + DIVISION B--HISTORICAL SCIENCE + + (_Hall 3, September 20, 10 a. m._) + + SPEAKER: PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON, Princeton University. + + + DEPARTMENT 3--POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY + (_Hall 4, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM M. SLOANE, Columbia University. + PROFESSOR JAMES H. ROBINSON, Columbia University. + + + SECTIONS A AND B. HISTORY OF GREECE, ROME, AND ASIA. (_Hall 3, + September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS D. SEYMOUR, Yale University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN P. MAHAFFY, University of Dublin. + PROFESSOR ETTORE PAIS, University of Naples. Director + of the National Museum of Antiquities, Naples. + PROFESSOR HENRI CORDIER, Ecole Des Langues Vivantes + Orientales, Paris. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR EDWARD CAPPS, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION C. MEDIAEVAL HISTORY. (_Hall 6, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES H. HASKINS, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR KARL LAMPRECHT, University of Leipzig. + PROFESSOR GEORGE B. ADAMS, Yale University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR EARLE W. DOW, University of Michigan. + + + SECTION D. MODERN HISTORY OF EUROPE. (_Hall 3, September 22, + 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: HONORABLE JAMES B. PERKINS, Rochester, N. Y. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR J. B. BURY, University of Cambridge. + PROFESSOR CHARLES W. COLBY, Mcgill University, Montreal. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR FERDINAND SCHWILL, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION E. HISTORY OF AMERICA. (_Hall 1, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. JAMES SCHOULER, Boston. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FREDERIC J. TURNER, University of Wisconsin. + PROFESSOR EDWARD G. BOURNE, Yale University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR EVARTS B. GREENE, University of Illinois. + + + SECTION F. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. (_Hall 2, September 23, + 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANK A. FETTER, Cornell University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR J. E. CONRAD, University of Halle. + PROFESSOR SIMON N. PATTEN, University of Pennsylvania. + SECRETARY: DR. J. PEASE NORTON, Yale University. + + + DEPARTMENT 4--HISTORY OF LAW + (_Hall 5, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: HONORABLE DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice of the Supreme + Court of the United States. + SPEAKERS: HONORABLE EMLIN MCCLAIN, Judge of the Supreme Court of Iowa, + Iowa City. + PROFESSOR NATHAN ABBOTT, Leland Stanford Jr. University. + + + SECTION A. HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW. (_Hall 11, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: MR. W. H. BUCKLER, Baltimore, Md. + PROFESSOR MUNROE SMITH, Columbia University. + + + SECTION B. HISTORY OF COMMON LAW. (_Hall 11, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JOHN D. LAWSON, University of Missouri. + SPEAKERS: HONORABLE SIMEON E. BALDWIN, Judge of the Supreme Court of + Errors, New Haven, Conn. + PROFESSOR JOHN H. WIGMORE, Northwestern University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR C. H. HUBERICH, University of Texas. + + + SECTION C. COMPARATIVE LAW. (_Hall 14, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: HONORABLE JACOB M. DICKINSON, Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR NOBUSHIGE HOZUMI, University of Tokio. + PROFESSOR ALFRED NERINCX, University of Louvain. + SECRETARY: + + + DEPARTMENT 5--HISTORY OF LANGUAGE + (_Hall 4, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE HEMPL, University of Michigan. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. R. LOUNSBURY, Yale University. + PRESIDENT BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER, University of California. + + + SECTION A. COMPARATIVE LANGUAGE. (_Hall 4, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANCIS A. MARCH, Lafayette College. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CARL D. BUCK, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR HANS OERTEL, Yale University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. W. FAY, University of Texas, Austin, Texas. + + + SECTION B. SEMITIC LANGUAGES. (_Hall 4, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR G. F. MOORE, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. CRAIG, University of Michigan. + PROFESSOR CRAWFORD H. TOY, Harvard University. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION C. INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES. (_Hall 8, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR SYLVAIN LÉVI, Collège de France, Paris. + PROFESSOR ARTHUR A. MACDONELL, University of Oxford. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION D. GREEK LANGUAGE. (_Hall 3, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MARTIN L. D'OOGE, University of Michigan. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERBERT W. SMYTH, Harvard University. + PROFESSOR MILTON W. HUMPHREYS, University of Virginia. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR J. E. HARRY, University of Cincinnati. + + + SECTION E. LATIN LANGUAGE. (_Hall 9, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE HUTTON, University of Toronto. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR E. A. SONNENSCHEIN, University of Birmingham. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM G. HALE, University of Chicago. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. W. SHIPLEY, Washington University. + + + SECTION F. ENGLISH LANGUAGE. (_Hall 3, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GAYLEY, University of California. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO JESPERSEN, University of Copenhagen. + PROFESSOR GEORGE L. KITTREDGE, Harvard University. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION G. ROMANCE LANGUAGES. (_Hall 5, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PAUL MEYER, Collège de France, Paris. + PROFESSOR HENRY A. TODD, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. E. BRANDON, Miami University. + + + SECTION H. GERMANIC LANGUAGES. (_Hall 3, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GUSTAF E. KARSTEN, Cornell University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDUARD SIEVERS, University of Leipzig. + PROFESSOR HERMAN COLLITZ, Bryn Mawr College. + SECRETARY: + + + DEPARTMENT 6--HISTORY OF LITERATURE + (_Hall 6, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. HARRISON, University of Virginia. + PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GAYLEY, University of California. + + + SECTION A. INDO-IRANIAN LITERATURE. (_Hall 8, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Johns Hopkins University. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR A. V. W. JACKSON, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION B. CLASSICAL LITERATURE. (_Hall 3, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ANDREW F. WEST, Princeton University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PAUL SHOREY, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR JOHN H. WRIGHT, Harvard University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. G. MOORE, Dartmouth College. + + + SECTION C. ENGLISH LITERATURE. (_Hall 1, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FRANCIS B. GUMMERE, Haverford College. + PROFESSOR JOHN HOOPS, University of Heidelberg. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION D. ROMANCE LITERATURE. (_Hall 8, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ADOLPHE COHN, Columbia University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PIO RAJNA, Institute of Higher Studies, Florence, + Italy. + PROFESSOR ALCÉE FORTIER, Tulane University, New Orleans. + SECRETARY: DR. COMFORT, Haverford College. + + + SECTION E. GERMANIC LITERATURE. (_Hall 3, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR KUNO FRANCKE, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR AUGUST SAUER, University of Prague. + PROFESSOR J. MINOR, University of Vienna. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR D. K. JESSEN, Bryn Mawr College. + + + SECTION F. SLAVIC LITERATURE. (_Hall 8, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. CHARLES R. CRANE, Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LEO WIENER, Harvard University. + PROFESSOR PAUL BOYER, Ecole Des Langues Vivantes + Orientales, Paris. + SECRETARY: MR. S. N. HARPER, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION G. BELLES-LETTRES. (_Hall 3, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ROBERT HERRICK, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HENRY SCHOFIELD, Harvard University. + PROFESSOR BRANDER MATTHEWS, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: + + + DEPARTMENT 7--HISTORY OF ART + (_Hall 8, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HALSEY C. IVES, Washington University, St. Louis. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, New York, N. Y. + PROFESSOR JOHN C. VAN DYKE, Rutgers College. + + + SECTION A. CLASSICAL ART. (_Hall 12, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, New York City. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ADOLPH FURTWANGLER, University Of Munich. + PROFESSOR FRANK B. TARBELL, University of Chicago. + SECRETARY: DR. P. BAUR, Yale University. + + + SECTION B. MODERN ARCHITECTURE. (_Hall 7, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. CHARLES F. MCKIM, New York City. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR C. ENLART, University of Paris. + PROFESSOR ALFRED D. F. HAMLIN, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: MR. GUY LOWELL, Boston, Mass. + + + SECTION C. MODERN PAINTING. (_Hall 4, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR RICHARD MUTHER, University of Breslau. + MR. OKAKURA KAKUZO, Japan. + SECRETARY: + + + DEPARTMENT 8--HISTORY OF RELIGION + (_Hall 5, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: REV. WM. ELIOT GRIFFIS, Ithaca, N. Y. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE F. MOORE, Harvard University. + PROFESSOR NATHANIEL SCHMIDT, Cornell University. + + + SECTION A. BRAHMANISM AND BUDDHISM. (_Hall 8, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERMANN OLDENBERG, University of Kiel. + PROFESSOR MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Johns Hopkins University. + SECRETARY: DR. REGINALD C. ROBBINS, Harvard University. + + + SECTION B. MOHAMMEDISM. (_Hall 8, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES R. JEWETT, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, University of Budapest. + PROFESSOR DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, Hartford Theological Seminary. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION C. OLD TESTAMENT. (_Hall 4, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. S. CARRIER, McCormick Theological Seminary. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES F. MCCURDY, University College of Toronto. + PROFESSOR KARL BUDDE, University of Marburg. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JAMES A. KELSO, Western Theological Seminary, + Allegheny, Pa. + + + SECTION D. NEW TESTAMENT. (_Hall 1, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ANDREW C. ZENOS, McCormick Theological Seminary. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR BENJAMIN W. BACON, Yale University. + PROFESSOR ERNEST D. BURTON, University of Chicago. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR CLYDE W. VOTAW, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION E. HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. (_Hall 2, September 24, + 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. ERI BAKER HULBERT, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ADOLF HARNACK, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR JEAN RÉVILLE, Faculty of Protestant Theology, + Paris. + SECRETARY: + + + + + DIVISION C--PHYSICAL SCIENCE + + (_Hall 4, September 20, 10 a. m._) + + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR ROBERT S. WOODWARD, Columbia University. + + + DEPARTMENT 9--PHYSICS + (_Hall 6, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY CREW, Northwestern University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDWARD L. NICHOLS, Cornell University. + PROFESSOR CARL BARUS, Brown University. + + + SECTION A. PHYSICS OF MATTER. (_Hall 11, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SAMUEL W. STRATTON, Director of The National + Bureau of Standards, Washington. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ARTHUR L. KIMBALL, Amherst College. + PROFESSOR FRANCIS E. NIPHER, Washington University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR R. A. MILLIKEN, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION B. PHYSICS OF ETHER. (_Hall 11, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY CREW, Northwestern University. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR DEWITT B. BRACE, University of Nebraska. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR AUGUSTUS TROWBRIDGE, University of Wisconsin. + + + SECTION C. PHYSICS OF THE ELECTRON. (_Hall 5, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. G. WEBSTERr, Clark University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR P. LANGEVIN, Collège de France. + PROFESSOR ERNEST RUTHERFURD, McGill University, Montreal. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR W. J. HUMPHREYS, University of Virginia. + + + DEPARTMENT 10--CHEMISTRY + (_Hall 5, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES M. CRAFTS, Massachusetts Institute of + Technology. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN U. NEF, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR FRANK W. CLARKE, Chief Chemist, U. S. Geological + Survey. + + + SECTION A. INORGANIC CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JOHN W. MALLET, University of Virginia. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HENRI MOISSAN, the Sorbonne; Member of the + Institute of France. + SIR WILLIAM RAMSAY, K.C.B., Royal Institution, London. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM L. DUDLEY, Vanderbilt University. + + + SECTION B. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ALBERT B. PRESCOTT, University of Michigan. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JULIUS STIEGLITZ, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. NOYES, National Bureau of Standards. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION C. PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILDER D. BANCROFT, Cornell University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR J. H. VAN T'HOFF, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR ARTHUR A. NOYES, Massachusetts Institute of + Technology. + SECRETARY: MR. W. R. WHITNEY, Schenectady, N. Y. + + + SECTION D. PHYSIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILDER O. ATWATER, Wesleyan University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR O. COHNHEIM, University of Heidelberg. + PROFESSOR RUSSELL H. CHITTENDEN, Yale University. + SECRETARY: DR. C. L. ALSBERG, Harvard University. + + + DEPARTMENT 11--ASTRONOMY + (_Hall 8, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE C. COMSTOCK, Director of the Observatory, + Madison, Wisconsin. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LEWIS BOSS, Director of Dudley Observatory. + PROFESSOR EDWARD C. PICKERING, Director of Harvard + Observatory. + + + SECTION A. ASTROMETRY. (_Hall 9, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ORMOND STONE, University of Virginia. + SPEAKERS: DR. OSKAR BACKLUND, Director of the Observatory, Pulkowa, + Russia. + PROFESSOR JOHN C. KAPTEYN, University of Groningen, Holland. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR W. S. EICHELBERGER, U. S. Naval Observatory. + + + SECTION B. ASTROPHYSICS. (_Hall 9, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE E. HALE, Director of the Yerkes Observatory. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERBERT H. TURNER, F.R.S., University of Oxford. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM W. CAMPBELL, Director of The Lick + Observatory, Mt. Hamilton, California. + SECRETARY: MR. W. S. ADAMS, Yerkes Observatory. + + + DEPARTMENT 12--SCIENCES OF THE EARTH + (_Hall 3, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. G. K. GILBERT, U. S. Geological Survey. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR THOMAS C. CHAMBERLIN, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM M. DAVIS, Harvard University. + + + SECTION A. GEOPHYSICS. (_Hall 14, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER W. HALL, University of Minnesota. + SPEAKER: DR. GEORGE F. BECKER, Geologist, U. S. Geological Survey. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. M. LEHNERTS, Minnesota State Normal School. + + + SECTION B. GEOLOGY. (_Hall 14, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR T. C. CHAMBERLIN, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT CHARLES R. VAN HISE, University of Wisconsin. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR R. D. SALISBURY, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION C. PALAEONTOLOGY. (_Hall 11, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM B. SCOTT, Princeton University. + SPEAKERS: DR. A. S. WOODWARD, F.R.S., British Museum Of Natural + History, London. + PROFESSOR HENRY F. OSBORN, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: DR. JOHN M. CLARKE, Albany, N. Y. + + + SECTION D. PETROLOGY AND MINERALOGY. (_Hall 9, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. OLIVER C. FARRINGTON, Field Columbian Museum, Chicago. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR F. ZIRKEL, University of Leipzig. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION E. PHYSIOGRAPHY. (_Hall 12, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. HENRY GANNETT, United States Geological Survey. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ALBRECHT PENCK, University of Vienna. + PROFESSOR ISRAEL C. RUSSELL, University of Michigan. + SECRETARY: DR. JOHN M. CLARKE, Albany, N. Y. + + + SECTION F. GEOGRAPHY. (_Hall 11, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ISRAEL C. RUSSELL, University of Michigan. + SPEAKERS: DR. HUGH R. MILL, Director British Rainfall Organization, + London. + PROFESSOR H. YULE OLDHAM, Cambridge, England. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR R. D. SALISBURY, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION G. OCEANOGRAPHY. (_Hall 8, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN R. BARTLETT, United States Navy. + SPEAKERS: SIR JOHN MURRAY, K.C.B., F.R.S., Edinburgh. + PROFESSOR K. MITSUKURI, University of Tokio. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION H. COSMICAL PHYSICS. (_Hall 10, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANCIS E. NIPHER, Washington University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR SVANTE ARRHENIUS, University of Stockholm, + Stockholm. + DR. ABBOTT L. ROTCH, Blue Hill Observatory. + DR. L. A. BAUER, Washington, D. C. + SECRETARY: + + + DEPARTMENT 13--BIOLOGY + (_Hall 2, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM G. FARLOW, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN M. COULTER, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR JACQUES LOEB, University of California. + + + SECTION A. PHYLOGENY. (_Hall 2, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR T. H. MORGAN, Columbia University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HUGO DE VRIES, University of Amsterdam. + PROFESSOR CHARLES O. WHITMAN, University of Chicago. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION B. PLANT MORPHOLOGY. (_Hall 2, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM TRELEASE, Washington University, St. Louis. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FREDERICK O. BOWER, University of Glasgow. + PROFESSOR KARL F. GOEBEL, University of Munich. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. E. LLOYD, Columbia University. + + + SECTION C. PLANT PHYSIOLOGY. (_Hall 4, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES R. BARNES, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JULIUS WIESNER, University of Vienna. + PROFESSOR BENJAMIN M. DUGGAR, University of Missouri. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. C. NEWCOMB, University of Michigan. + + + SECTION D. PLANT PATHOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHAS. E. BESSEY, University of Nebraska. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOSEPH C. ARTHUR, Purdue University. + MERTON B. WAITE, U. S. Department of Agriculture. + SECRETARY: DR. C. S. SHEAR, U. S. Department of Agriculture. + + + SECTION E. ECOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OSKAR DRUDE, Kön. Technische Hochschule, Dresden. + PROFESSOR BENJAMIN ROBINSON, Harvard University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. E. CLEMENTS, University of Nebraska. + + + SECTION F. BACTERIOLOGY. (_Hall 15, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HAROLD C. ERNST, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDWIN O. JORDAN, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR THEOBALD SMITH, Harvard University. + SECRETARY: DR. P. H. HISS, JR., Columbia University. + + + SECTION G. ANIMAL MORPHOLOGY. (_Hall 2, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. LELAND O. HOWARD, Department of Agriculture, + Washington, D. C. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR ALFRED GIARD, the Sorbonne; Member of the + Institute of France. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR C. H. HERRICK, Dennison University. + + + SECTION H. EMBRYOLOGY. (_Hall 9, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SIMON H. GAGE, Cornell University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OSKAR HERTWIG, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM K. BROOKS, Johns Hopkins University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR T. G. LEE, University of Minnesota. + + + SECTION I. COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. (_Hall 2, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES P. MCMURRICH, University of Michigan. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM E. RITTER, University of California. + PROFESSOR YVES DELAGE, the Sorbonne; Member of the Institute + of France. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR HENRY B. WARD, University of Nebraska. + + + SECTION J. HUMAN ANATOMY. (_Hall 2, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE A. PIERSOL, University of Pennsylvania. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM WALDEYER, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR H. H. DONALDSON, University of Chicago. + SECRETARY: DR. R. J. TERRY, Washington University. + + + SECTION K. PHYSIOLOGY. (_Hall 4, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. S. J. MELTZER, New York. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR MAX VERWORN, University of Göttingen. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM H. HOWELL, Johns Hopkins University. + SECRETARY: DR. REID HUNT, Washington. + + + DEPARTMENT 14--ANTHROPOLOGY + (_Hall 8, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FREDERIC W. PUTNAM, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: DR. W. J. MCGEE, President American Anthropological + Association, Washington, D. C. + PROFESSOR FRANZ BOAS, Columbia University. + + + SECTION A. SOMATOLOGY. (_Hall 16, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. EDWARD C. SPITZKA, New York City. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR L. MANOUVRIER, School of Anthropology, Paris. + DR. GEORGE A. DORSEY, Field Columbian Museum, Chicago. + SECRETARY: DR. E. A. SPITZKA, New York City. + + + SECTION B. ARCHAEOLOGY. (_Hall 16, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. M. H. SAVILLE, American Museum of Natural History, + New York. + SPEAKERS: SEÑOR ALFREDO CHAVERO, Inspector of the National Museum, + Mexico. + PROFESSOR EDOUARD SELER, University of Berlin. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM C. MILLS, Ohio State University. + + + SECTION C. ETHNOLOGY. (_Hall 16, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MISS ALICE C. FLETCHER, President of the Washington + Anthropological Society. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FREDERICK STARR, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR A. C. HADDON, University of Cambridge. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. W. SHIPLEY, Washington University. + + + + + DIVISION D--MENTAL SCIENCE + + (_Hall 7, September 20, 10 a. m._) + + SPEAKER: PRESIDENT G. STANLEY HALL, Clark University, Worcester, Mass. + + + DEPARTMENT 15--PSYCHOLOGY + (_Hall 7, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES MCK. CATTELL, Columbia University. + PROFESSOR J. MARK BALDWIN, Johns Hopkins University. + + + SECTION A. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 6, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JOS. ROYCE, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HARALD HOEFFDING, University of Copenhagen. + PROFESSOR JAMES WARD, University of Cambridge, England. + SECRETARY: DR. W. H. DAVIS, Lehigh University. + + + SECTION B. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 2, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EDWARD A. PACE, Catholic University of America. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ROBERT MACDOUGAL, New York University. + PROFESSOR EDWARD B. TITCHENER, Cornell University. + SECRETARY: DR. R. S. WOODWORTH, Columbia University. + + + SECTION C. COMPARATIVE AND GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 6, September 24, + 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EDMUND C. SANFORD, Clark University, Worcester, + Mass. + SPEAKERS: PRINCIPAL C. LLOYD MORGAN, University College, Bristol. + PROFESSOR MARY W. CALKINS, Wellesley College. + SECRETARY: DR. R. M. YERKES, Harvard University. + + + SECTION D. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 6, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. EDWARD COWLES, Waverley, Mass. + SPEAKERS: DR. PIERRE JANET, Collège de France, Paris. + DR. MORTON PRINCE, Boston. + SECRETARY: DR. ADOLPH MEYER, New York City. + + + DEPARTMENT 16--SOCIOLOGY + (_Hall 7, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANK W. BLACKMAR, University of Kansas. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University. + PROFESSOR GEORGE E. VINCENT, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION A. SOCIAL STRUCTURE. (_Hall 15, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FREDERICK W. MOORE, Vanderbilt University. + SPEAKERS: FIELD MARSHAL GUSTAV RATZENHOFER, Vienna. + PROFESSOR F. TOENNIES, University of Kiel. + PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, U. S. National Museum. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JEROME DOWD, University of Wisconsin. + + + SECTION B. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 15, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WM. I. THOMAS, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Nebraska. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES, Miami University. + + + + + DIVISION E--UTILITARIAN SCIENCES + + (_Hall 1, September 20, 10 a. m._) + + SPEAKER: PRESIDENT DAVID STARR JORDAN, Leland Stanford Jr. University. + + + DEPARTMENT 17--MEDICINE + (_Hall 1, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. WILLIAM OSLER, Johns Hopkins University. + SPEAKERS: DR. WILLIAM T. COUNCILMAN, Harvard University. + DR. FRANK BILLINGS, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION A. PUBLIC HEALTH. (_Hall 13, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. WALTER WYMAN, Surgeon-General of the U. S. Marine + Hospital Service. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM T. SEDGWICK, Massachusetts Institute of + Technology. + DR. ERNST J. LEDERLE, Former Commissioner of Health, New + York City. + SECRETARY: DR. H. M. BRACKEN, St. Paul, Minn. + + + SECTION B. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE. (_Hall 13, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. JOSEPH M. MATHEWS, President of the State Board of + Health, Louisville, Ky. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR RONALD ROSS, F.R.S., School of Tropical Medicine, + University College, Liverpool. + SECRETARY: DR. J. N. HURTY, Indianapolis, Ind. + + + SECTION C. PATHOLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SIMON FLEXNER, Director of the Rockefeller + Institute. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LUDWIG HEKTOEN, University of Chicago. + PROFESSOR JOHANNES ORTH, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR SHIBASABURO KITASATO, University of Tokio. + SECRETARY: DR. W. MCN. MILLER, University of Missouri. + + + SECTION D. THERAPEUTICS AND PHARMACOLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 24, + 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. HOBART A. HARE, Jefferson Medical College. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OSCAR LIEBREICH, University of Berlin. + SIR LAUDER BRUNTON, F.R.S., London. + SECRETARY: DR. H. B. FAVILL, Chicago, Ill. + + + SECTION E. INTERNAL MEDICINE. (_Hall 13, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FREDERICK C. SHATTUCK, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. CLIFFORD ALLBUTT, F.R.S., University of + Cambridge. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM S. THAYER, Johns Hopkins University. + SECRETARY: DR. R. C. CABOT, Boston, Mass. + + + SECTION F. NEUROLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR LEWELLYN F. BARKER, University of Chicago. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR JAMES J. PUTNAM, Harvard University. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION G. PSYCHIATRY. (_Hall 7, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: DR. CHARLES L. DANA, Cornell University, New York. + DR. EDWARD COWLES, Boston. + SECRETARY: DR. C. G. CHADDDOCK, St. Louis, Mo. + + + SECTION H. SURGERY. (_Hall 13, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CARL BECK, Post-Graduate Medical School, New York. + SPEAKERS: DR. FREDERIC S. DENNIS, F.R.C.S., Cornell Medical College, + New York City. + PROFESSOR JOHANNES ORTH, University of Berlin. + SECRETARY: DR. J. F. BINNIE, Kansas City, Mo. + + + SECTION I. GYNECOLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HOWARD A. KELLY, Johns Hopkins University. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR J. CLARENCE WEBSTER, Rush Medical College, Chicago. + SECRETARY: DR. G. H. NOBLE, Atlanta, Ga. + + + SECTION J. OPHTHALMOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. GEORGE C. HARLAN, Philadelphia, Pa. + SPEAKERS: DR. EDWARD JACKSON, Denver, Col. + DR. GEORGE M. GOULD, Philadelphia, Pa. + SECRETARY: DR. WM. M. SWEET, Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, + Pa. + + + SECTION K. OTOLOGY AND LARYNGOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM C. GLASGOW, Washington University, + St. Louis. + SPEAKER: SIR FELIX SEMON, C.V.O., Physician Extraordinary to His + Majesty, the King, London. + SECRETARY: DR. S. SPENCER, Allenhurst, N. J. + + + SECTION L. PEDIATRICS. (_Hall 7, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS M. ROTCH, Harvard University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR THEODORE ESCHERICH, University of Vienna. + PROFESSOR ABRAHAM JACOBI, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: DR. SAMUEL S. ADAMS, Washington, D. C. + + + DEPARTMENT 18--TECHNOLOGY. + (_Hall 3, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: CHANCELLOR WINFIELD S. CHAPLIN, Washington University, + St. Louis. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR HENRY T. BOVEY, F.R.S., McGill University, + Montreal. + + + SECTION A. CIVIL ENGINEERING. (_Hall 10, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM H. BURR, Columbia University. + SPEAKERS: DR. J. A. L. WADDELL, Consulting Engineer, Kansas City. + MR. LEWIS M. HAUPT, Consulting Engineer, Philadelphia. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION B. MECHANICAL ENGINEERING. (_Hall 10, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES E. DENTON, Stevens Institute of Technology. + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR ALBERT W. SMITH, Leland Stanford Jr. University. + SECRETARY: MR. GEORGE DINKEL, JR., Jersey City. + + + SECTION C. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING. (_Hall 10, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ARTHUR E. KENNELLY, Harvard University. + PROFESSOR MICHAEL I. PUPIN, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: MR. CARL HERING, Philadelphia, Pa. + + + SECTION D. MINING ENGINEERING. (_Hall 11, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. JOHN HAYS HAMMOND, New York City. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ROBERT H. RICHARDS, Massachusetts Institute of + Technology. + PROFESSOR SAMUEL B. CHRISTY, University of California. + SECRETARY: DR. JOSEPH STRUTHERS, New York City. + + + SECTION E. TECHNICAL CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. H. W. WILEY, Department of Agriculture. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES E. MUNROE, George Washington University. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM H. WALKER, Massachusetts Institute of + Technology. + SECRETARY: DR. MARCUS BENJAMIN, U. S. National Museum. + + + SECTION F. AGRICULTURE. (_Hall 10, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR H. J. WHEELER, Kingston, R. I. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES W. DABNEY, JR., University of Cincinnati. + PROFESSOR LIBERTY H. BAILEY, Cornell University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM HILL, University of Chicago. + + + DEPARTMENT 19--ECONOMICS + (_Hall 1, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EMORY R. JOHNSON, University of Pennsylvania. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FRANK A. FETTER, Cornell University. + PROFESSOR ADOLPH C. MILLER, University of California. + + + SECTION A. ECONOMIC THEORY. (_Hall 15, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN B. CLARK, Columbia University. + PROFESSOR JACOB H. HOLLANDER, Johns Hopkins University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JESSE E. POPE, University of Missouri. + + + SECTION B. TRANSPORTATION. (_Hall 10, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR J. LAWRENCE LAUGHLIN, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EUGENE VON PHILIPPOVICH, University of Vienna. + PROFESSOR WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, Harvard University. + SECRETARY: MR. GEORGE G. TUNELL, Chicago. + + + SECTION C. COMMERCE AND EXCHANGE. (_Hall 10, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR E. D. JONES, University of Michigan. + PROFESSOR CARL PLEHN, University of California. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION D. MONEY AND CREDIT. (_Hall 5, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. B. E. WALKER, Canadian Bank of Commerce, Toronto. + SPEAKERS: MR. HORACE WHITE, New York City. + PROFESSOR J. LAWRENCE LAUGHLIN, University of Chicago. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JOHN CUMMINGS, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION E. PUBLIC FINANCE. (_Hall 1, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HENRY C. ADAMS, University of Michigan. + PROFESSOR EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION F. INSURANCE. (_Hall 10, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. EMORY MCCLINTOCK, Actuary, Mutual Life Insurance + Company, New York. + SPEAKERS: MR. FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, Statistician, Prudential + Insurance Company, Newark. + PROFESSOR BALTHASAR H. MEYER, University of Wisconsin. + SECRETARY: + + + + + DIVISION F--SOCIAL REGULATION + + (_Hall 2, September 20, 10 a. m._) + + SPEAKER: PROFESSOR ABBOTT L. LOWELL, Harvard University. + + + DEPARTMENT 20--POLITICS + (_Hall 2, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. DUNNING, Columbia University. + CHANCELLOR E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS, University of Nebraska. + + + SECTIONS A AND C. POLITICAL THEORY AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. + (_Hall 15, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR W. W. WILLOUGHBY, Johns Hopkins University. + PROFESSOR GEORGE G. WILSON, Brown University. + RIGHT HON. JAMES BRYCE, London, England. + SECRETARY: DR. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION B. DIPLOMACY. (_Hall 1, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: HONORABLE JOHN W. FOSTER, Ex-Secretary of State. + HONORABLE DAVID JAYNE HILL, Minister of the United States + to Switzerland. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION D. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION. (_Hall 4, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HARRY P. JUDSON, University of Chicago. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR BERNARD J. MOSES, University of California. + PROFESSOR PAUL S. REINSCH, University of Wisconsin. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION E. MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION. (_Hall 15, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: MR. ALBERT SHAW, Editor American Monthly Review of Reviews. + MISS JANE ADDAMS, Hull House, Chicago. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JOHN A. FAIRLIE, University of Michigan. + + + DEPARTMENT 21--JURISPRUDENCE + (_Hall 3, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, Columbia University. + SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT CHARLES W. NEEDHAM, Columbian University, + Washington. + PROFESSOR JOSEPH H. BEALE, Harvard University. + + + SECTION A. INTERNATIONAL LAW. (_Hall 14, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES B. SCOTT, Columbia University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR H. LAFONTAINE, Member of the Senate, Brussels, + Belgium. + PROFESSOR CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, University of Iowa. + COUNT ALBERT APPONYI, Hungary. + SECRETARY: DR. W. C. DENNIS, Leland Stanford Jr. University. + + + SECTION B. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (_Hall 14, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, George Washington + University, Washington. + SPEAKERS: SIGNOR ATTILIO BRUNIALTI, Councilor of State, Rome. + PROFESSOR JOHN W. BURGESS, Columbia University. + PROFESSOR FERDINAND LARNAUDE, University of Paris. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION C. PRIVATE LAW. (_Hall 14, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES B. AMES, Dean, Harvard Law School. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ERNST FREUND, University of Chicago. + HONORABLE EDWARD B. WHITNEY, New York. + SECRETARY: DEAN WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, University of Pennsylvania. + + + DEPARTMENT 22--SOCIAL SCIENCE + (_Hall 1, September 20, 2 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. WALTER L. SHELDON, Ethical Society, St. Louis. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FELIX ADLER, Columbia University. + PROFESSOR GRAHAM TAYLOR, Chicago Theological Seminary. + + + SECTION A. THE FAMILY. (_Hall 5, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SAMUEL G. SMITH, University of Minnesota. + SPEAKERS: DR. SAMUEL W. DIKE, Auburndale, Mass. + PROFESSOR GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, University of Nebraska. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION B. THE RURAL COMMUNITY. (_Hall 5, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: HON. AARON JONES, Master of National Grange, South Bend, Ind. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR MAX WEBER, University of Heidelberg. + PRESIDENT KENYON L. BUTTERFIELD, Rhode Island State + Agricultural College. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM HILL, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION C. THE URBAN COMMUNITY. (_Hall 5, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. JASTROW, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR LOUIS WUARIN, University of Geneva. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION D. THE INDUSTRIAL GROUP. (_Hall 14, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WERNER SOMBART, University of Breslau. + PROFESSOR RICHARD T. ELY, University of Wisconsin. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR THOMAS S. ADAMS, Madison, Wis. + + + SECTION E. THE DEPENDENT GROUP. (_Hall 5, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. ROBERT W. DEFOREST, New York City. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES R. HENDERSON, University of Chicago. + DR. EMIL MÜNSTERBERG, President City Charities, Berlin. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION F. THE CRIMINAL GROUP. (_Hall 5, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKER: MR. FREDERICK H. WINES, Secretary State Charities Aid + Association, Upper Montclair, N. J. + SECRETARY: + + + + + DIVISION G--SOCIAL CULTURE + + (_Hall 5, September 20, 10 a. m._) + + SPEAKER: HONORABLE WILLIAM T. HARRIS, United States Commissioner of + Education. + + + DEPARTMENT 23--EDUCATION + (_Hall 2, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT ARTHUR T. HADLEY, Yale University. + THE RIGHT REV. JOHN L. SPALDING, Bishop of Peoria. + + + SECTION A. EDUCATIONAL THEORY. (_Hall 12, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES DEGARMO, Cornell University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM REIN, University of Jena. + PROFESSOR ELMER E. BROWN, University of California. + SECRETARY: DR. G. M. WHITTLE, Cornell University. + + + SECTION B. THE SCHOOL. (_Hall 12, September 23, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. F. LOUIS SOLDAN, Superintendent Public Schools, + St. Louis. + SPEAKERS: DR. MICHAEL E. SADLER, University of Manchester. + DR. WILLIAM H. MAXWELL, Superintendent Public Schools, + New York City. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR A. S. LANGSDORF, Washington University. + + + SECTION C. THE COLLEGE. (_Hall 12, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PRESIDENT W. S. CHAPLIN, Washington University. + SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT WILLIAM DEWITT HYDE, Bowdoin College. + PRESIDENT M. CAREY THOMAS, Bryn Mawr College. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR H. H. HORNE, Dartmouth College. + + + SECTION D. THE UNIVERSITY. (_Hall 12, September 24, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR C. CHABOT, University of Lyons. + PROFESSOR EDWARD DELAVAN PERRY, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION E. THE LIBRARY. (_Hall 12, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: MR. FREDERICK M. CRUNDEN, Librarian St. Louis Public Library. + SPEAKERS: MR. WILLIAM A. E. AXON, Manchester, England. + PROFESSOR GUIDO BIAGI, Royal Librarian, Florence. + SECRETARY: MR. C. P. PETTUS, Washington University. + + + DEPARTMENT 24--RELIGION + (_Hall 4, September 20, 4.15 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: BISHOP JOHN H. VINCENT, Chautauqua, N. Y. + SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT HENRY C. KING, Oberlin College. + PROFESSOR FRANCIS G. PEABODY, Harvard University. + + + SECTION A. GENERAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. (_Hall 11, September 24, + 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EDWIN D. STARBUCK, Earlham College, Richmond, Ind. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE A. COE, Northwestern University. + DR. WALTER L. HERVEY, Examiner Board of Education, + New York City. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION B. PROFESSIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. (_Hall 1, September 22, + 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: + SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT CHARLES CUTHBERT HALL, Union Theological Seminary. + PROFESSOR FRANK K. SANDERS, Yale University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR HERBERT L. WILLETT, Disciples Divinity House, + Chicago, Ill. + + + SECTION C. RELIGIOUS AGENCIES. (_Hall 15, September 23, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PRESIDENT EDGAR C. MULLINS, Southern Baptist Theological + Seminary, Louisville, Ky. + SPEAKERS: REV. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, Columbus, Ohio. + REV. JAMES M. BUCKLEY, Editor The Christian Advocate, + New York. + SECRETARY: DR. IRA LANDRITH, General Secretary Religious Education + Association, Chicago, Ill. + + + SECTION D. RELIGIOUS WORK. (_Hall 1, September 24, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: RT. REV. THOMAS F. GAILOR, Memphis. + SPEAKERS: REV. FLOYD W. TOMKINS, Church of the Holy Trinity, + Philadelphia. + REV. HENRY C. MABIE, Corresponding Secretary, American + Baptist Missionary Union. + SECRETARY: + + + SECTION E. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: PERSONAL. (_Festival Hall, + September 25, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: CHANCELLOR J. H. KIRKLAND, Vanderbilt University. + SPEAKERS: REV. HUGH BLACK, Edinburgh, Scotland. + PROFESSOR JOHN E. MCFADYEN, Knox College. + REV. SAMUEL ELIOT, Boston, Mass. + REV. EDWARD B. POLLARD, Georgetown, Ky. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR CLYDE W. VOTAW, University of Chicago. + + + SECTION F. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: SOCIAL. (_Festival Hall, September 25, + 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: DR. J. H. GARRISON, St. Louis. + SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT JOSEPH SWAIN, Swarthmore College. + DR. EMIL G. HIRSCH, Chicago, Ill. + PROFESSOR EDWARD C. MOORE, Harvard University. + DR. JOSIAH STRONG, League for Social Service, New York. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR CLYDE W. VOTAW, University of Chicago. + + + + +CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS + + * * * * * + +MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19. + +3 P. M. Opening exercises of the Congress. Festival Hall (Hall 17). + +The Congress will be called to order by the Director of Congresses, who +will introduce the President of the Exposition. + +Welcoming addresses will be delivered by the President of the Exposition +and other officials. + +A reply to these addresses of welcome will be made on behalf of the +Congress by the Honorary Vice-President for Great Britain. + +The Chairman of the Administrative Board will give an account of the +origin and purpose of the Congress. + +The President of the Congress will then be introduced and will deliver +an introductory address, after which adjournment will follow. + + * * * * * + +TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20. + +10.00 A. M. Meetings of the seven Divisions. The Divisional addresses +will be given as follows:-- + + Hall 1, Utilitarian Sciences. + Hall 2, Social Regulation. + Hall 3, Historical Science. + Hall 4, Physical Science. + Hall 5, Social Culture. + Hall 6, Normative Science. + Hall 7, Mental Science. + +11.15 to 6.00 P. M. Meetings of the Departments, with addresses:-- + +Meeting at 11.15 A. M. + +DEPARTMENTS. + + Hall 1, Economics. + Hall 2, Biology. + Hall 3, Sciences of the Earth. + Hall 4, Political History. + Hall 5, History of Law. + Hall 6, Philosophy. + Hall 7, Mathematics. + Hall 8, History of Art. + + Adjournment at 1 P. M. + +Meeting at 2 P. M. + +DEPARTMENTS. + + Hall 1, Social Science. + Hall 2, Politics. + Hall 3, Technology. + Hall 4, History of Language. + Hall 5, History of Religion. + Hall 6, Physics. + Hall 7, Psychology. + Hall 8, Anthropology. + + Adjournment at 3.45 P. M. + +Meeting at 4.15 P. M. + +DEPARTMENTS. + + Hall 1, Medicine. + Hall 2, Education. + Hall 3, Jurisprudence. + Hall 4, Religion. + Hall 5, Chemistry. + Hall 6, History of Literature. + Hall 7, Sociology. + Hall 8, Astronomy. + + Adjournment at 6. P. M. + +On the four days following, the Sectional meetings will be held. The +duration of each session will be three hours. The morning sessions will +extend from 10 A. M. until 1 P. M.; the afternoon sessions from 3 P. M. +to 6 P. M. + +The meetings of some of the religious sections will be held on Sunday, +September 25, in Festival Hall. Further announcements concerning these +Sunday Meetings will be made in Registration Hall, in the daily press of +St. Louis, and in the World's Fair Official Programme. + + * * * * * + +WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21. + +Meeting at 10 A. M. + + Hall 1, Public Finance. + Hall 2, Animal Morphology. + Hall 3, History of Greece, Rome, and Asia. + Hall 4, Comparative Language. + Hall 5, The Family. + Hall 6, Metaphysics. + Hall 7, Otology and Laryngology. + Hall 8, Slavic Literature. + Hall 9, Astrometry. + Hall 10, Civil Engineering. + Hall 11, History of Common Law. + Hall 12, Physiography. + Hall 13, Public Health. + Hall 14, Geophysics. + Hall 15, Social Structure. + Hall 16, Inorganic Chemistry. + + Adjournment at 1 P. M. + +Meeting at 3 P. M. + + Hall 1, Philosophy of Religion. + Hall 2, Phylogeny. + Hall 3, Classical Literature. + Hall 4, Semitic Languages. + Hall 5, The Rural Community. + Hall 6, Medieval History. + Hall 7, Pediatrics. + Hall 8, Oceanography. + Hall 9, Astrophysics. + Hall 10, Insurance. + Hall 11, History of Roman Law. + Hall 13, Preventive Medicine. + Hall 14, Geology. + Hall 16, Organic Chemistry. + + Adjournment at 6 P. M. + + * * * * * + +Immediately following the Section of Geophysics in the morning, and the +Section of Geology in the afternoon, in Room 14, the Eighth +International Geographic Congress will hold sessions in the same room, +Hall 14, Mines and Metallurgy Building. + +THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22. + +Meeting at 10 A. M. + + Hall 1, English Literature. + Hall 2, Plant Morphology. + Hall 3, Modern History of Europe. + Hall 4, Old Testament. + Hall 5, The Urban Community. + Hall 6, Logic. + Hall 7, Psychiatry. + Hall 8, Indo-Iranian Languages. + Hall 9, Algebra and Analysis. + Hall 10, Cosmical Physics. + Hall 11, Palæontology. + Hall 12, Classical Art. + Hall 13, Pathology. + Hall 14, International Law. + Hall 15, Economic Theory. + Hall 16, Physical Chemistry. + + Adjournment at 1 P. M. + +Meeting at 3 P. M. + + Hall 1, Professional Religious Education. + Hall 2, Human Anatomy. + Hall 3, Greek Language. + Hall 4, Plant Physiology. + Hall 5, Physics of the Electron. + Hall 6, Methodology of Science. + Hall 7, Modern Architecture. + Hall 8, Romance Literature. + Hall 9, Petrology and Mineralogy. + Hall 10, Electrical Engineering. + Hall 11, Geography. + Hall 12, The Library. + Hall 13, Neurology. + Hall 14, The Industrial Group. + Hall 15, Political Theory and + National Administration. + Hall 16, Physiological Chemistry. + + Adjournment at 6 P. M. + + * * * * * + +FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23. + +Meeting at 10 A. M. + + Hall 1, New Testament. + Hall 2, Experimental Psychology. + Hall 3, Germanic Literature. + Hall 4, Physiology. + Hall 5, The Dependent Group. + Hall 6, Ethics. + Hall 7, Plant Pathology. + Hall 8, Brahmanism and Buddhism. + Hall 9, Latin Language. + Hall 10, Transportation. + Hall 11, Physics of Matter. + Hall 12, The School. + Hall 13, Surgery. + Hall 15, Social Psychology. + Hall 16, Technical Chemistry. + + Adjournment at 1 P. M. + +Meeting at 3 P. M. + + Hall 1, Diplomacy. + Hall 2, History of Economic Institutions. + Hall 3, English Language. + Hall 4, Æsthetics. + Hall 5, The Criminal Group. + Hall 6, General Psychology. + Hall 7, Ecology. + Hall 8, Mohammedism. + Hall 9, Embryology. + Hall 10, Mechanical Engineering. + Hall 11, Physics of Ether. + Hall 12, The College. + Hall 13, Internal Medicine. + Hall 14, Private Law. + Hall 15, Religious Agencies. + Hall 16, Somatology. + + Adjournment at 6 P. M. + + * * * * * + +SATURDAY. SEPTEMBER 24. + +Meeting at 10 A. M. + + Hall 1, History of America. + Hall 2, History of the Christian Church. + Hall 3, Belles-Lettres. + Hall 4, Colonial Administration. + Hall 5, Romance Languages. + Hall 6, Comparative and Genetic Psychology. + Hall 7, Ophthalmology. + Hall 8, History of Asia. + Hall 9, Geometry. + Hall 10, Commerce and Exchange. + Hall 11, Mining Engineering. + Hall 12, The University. + Hall 13, Gynecology. + Hall 14, Constitutional Law. + Hall 15, Bacteriology. + Hall 16, Archæology. + + Adjournment at 1 P. M. + +Meeting at 3 P. M. + + Hall 1, Religious Work. + Hall 2, Comparative Anatomy. + Hall 3, Germanic Languages. + Hall 4, Modern Painting. + Hall 5, Money and Credit. + Hall 6, Abnormal Psychology. + Hall 7, Applied Mathematics. + Hall 8, Indo-Iranian Literature. + Hall 10, Agriculture. + Hall 11, . . . . . . . . . + Hall 12, Educational Theory. + Hall 13, Therapeutics and Pharmacology. + Hall 14, Comparative Law. + Hall 15, Municipal Administration. + Hall 16, Ethnology. + + Adjournment at 6 P. M. + + * * * * * + +SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 25. + +_Festival Hall._ + +Meeting at 10 A. M. + + Religious Influence: Personal. + +Meeting at 3 P. M. + + Religious Influence: Social. + + + + +PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL EVENTS + + * * * * * + + +MONDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 19.--Grand Fête night in honor of the Congress +of Arts and Science. Special illuminations about the Grand Basin. Lagoon +fête. + +Banquet by the St. Louis Chemical Society, at the Southern Hotel, to the +members of the Chemical Sections. + +TUESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 20.--General Reception by Board of Lady +Managers to the officers and speakers of the Congress and officials of +the Exposition. + +WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, SEPTEMBER 21.--Garden fête to be given to the +members of the Congress of Arts and Science, at the French Pavilion, by +the Commissioner-General from France. + +WEDNESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 21.--General reception by the German +Imperial Commissioner-General to the members of the Congress of Arts and +Science, at the German State House. + +THURSDAY EVENING.--Shaw banquet at the Buckingham Club to the foreign +delegates. + +FRIDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 23.--General banquet to the speakers and +officials of the Congress of Arts and Science in the banquet hall of the +Tyrolean Alps. 8 P. M. + +SATURDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 24.--Banquet at St. Louis Club by Round +Table of St. Louis, to the foreign members of the Congress. + +Banquet given by Imperial Commissioner-General from Japan to the +Japanese delegation to the Congress and Exposition officials. + +Dinner given by Commissioner-General from Great Britain to the English +members of the Congress. + + + + +ALPHABETICAL LIST OF MEMBERS WHO MADE 10-MINUTE ADDRESSES + + * * * * * + +The following list differs from the original programme, in that it +contains the names only of those who actually read addresses. It was +planned that each Section should meet for three hours. When authors of +ten-minute papers were not present, and where not enough of these +shorter papers were offered to fill out the time, the Chairmen invited +discussions from the floor until the time was filled. + + + Professor R. G. Aitken Lick Observatory Astronomy + James W. Alexander, Esq. New York City Insurance + Frederick Almy Buffalo, N. Y. Social Science + Professor S. G. Ashmore Union College Latin Language + Professor L. A. Bauer Carnegie Institute Cosmical Physics + Dr. Marcus Benjamin National Museum Technical Chemistry + Professor H. T. Blickfeldt Leland Stanford Univ. Geometry + Professor Ernest W. Brown Haverford College Lunar Theory + Dr. Henry Dickson Bruns New Orleans Municipal + Administration + Dr. F. K. Cameron Dep't of Agriculture Physical Chemistry + Rear-Admiral C. M. Chester, United States Naval Astronomy + U. S. N. Observatory + H. H. Clayton, Esq. Blue Hill Observatory Cosmical Physics + Professor Charles A. Coffin New York City Modern Painting + Dr. George Coronilas Athens, Greece Tuberculosis + Professor J. E. Denton Stevens Institute Mechanical + Engineering + Professor L. W. Dowling Univ. of Wisconsin Geometry + Professor H. C. Elmer Cornell Univ. Latin Language + Professor A. Emch Univ. of Colorado Geometry + Professor H. R. Fanclough Leland Stanford Univ. Classical Literature + Professor W. S. Ferguson Univ. of California History of Greece, + Rome, and Asia + Dr. Carlos Finley Havana Pathology + Dr. C. E. Fisk Centralia, Ill. History of America + Homer Folks, Esq. New York City Social Science + Professor F. C. French Univ. of Nebraska Philosophy of + Religion + H. L. Gannt, Esq. Schenectady, N. Y. Mechanical + Engineering + Dr. F. P. Gorham Brown Univ. Bacteriology + Professor Evarts B. Greene Univ. of Illinois History of America + Stansbury Hagar, Esq. Brooklyn, N.Y. Ethnology + J. D. Hague, Esq. New York City Mining Engineering + Professor G. B. Halstead Kenyon College Geometry + Professor A. D. F. Hamlin Columbia Univ. Æsthetics + Professor H. Hancock Univ. of Cincinnati Geometry + Professor J. A. Harris St. Louis, Mo. Plant Morphology + Professor M. W. Haskell Univ. of California Algebra and Analysis + Professor J. T. Hatfield Northwestern Univ. Germanic Language + Professor E. C. Hayes Miami Univ. Social Psychology + Professor W. E. Heidel Iowa College Greek Language + Dr. C. L. Herrick Granville, Ohio Neurology + Dr. C. Judson Herrick Granville, Ohio Animal Morphology + Professor W. H. Hobbs Univ. of Wisconsin Petrology and + Mineralogy + Professor A. R. Hohlfeld Univ. of Wisconsin Germanic Literature + Professor H. H. Horne Dartmouth College Educational Theory + Dr. E. V. Huntington Harvard Univ. Algebra and Analysis + Dr. Reid Hunt U. S. Marine Hospital Alcohol, etc. + Dr. J. N. Hurty Indianapolis, Ind. Public Health + Professor J. J. Hutchinson Cornell Univ. Algebra and Analysis + Rev. Thomas E. Judge Catholic Review of General Religious + Reviews Education + Professor L. Kahlenburg Univ. of Wisconsin Physical Chemistry + Professor Albert G. Keller Yale University Municipal + Administration + Professor George Lefevre Univ. of Missouri Comparative Anatomy + President Henry C. King Oberlin College Education, The + College + Dr. Ira Landrith Belmont College Religious Agencies + Professor M. D. Learned Univ. of Pennsylvania Germanic Literature + Professor A. O. Leuschner Univ. of California Astronomy + Dr. E. P. Lyon St. Louis Univ. Physiology + Dr. Duncan B. Macdonald Hartford Theological Semitic Languages + Seminary + Professor A. MacFarlane Chatham, Ontario Applied Mathematics + Professor James McMahon Cornell Univ. Applied Mathematics + Mr. Edward Mallinckrodt St. Louis, Mo. Chemistry + Professor H. P. Manning Brown Univ. Geometry + Professor G. A. Miller Leland Stanford Univ. Algebra and + Analysis. + Dr. W. C. Mills Ohio State Univ. Archæology + Professor W. S. Milner Univ. of Toronto Classical Literature + Professor F. G. Moore Dartmouth College Classical Literature + Dr. W. P. Montague Columbia Univ. Metaphysics + Clarence B. Moore, Esq. Philadelphia Archæology. + Professor F. R. Moulton Univ. of Chicago Astronomy. + Dr. J. G. Needham Lake Forest Univ. Animal Morphology + Professor Alex. T. Ormond Princeton Univ. Philosophy of + Religion + Professor Frederic L. Paxton Univ. of Colorado History of America + Dr. Carl Pfister St. Mark's Hospital, Surgery + New York City + Professor M. B. Porter Univ. of Texas Algebra and Analysis + Dr. A. J. Reynolds Chicago Public Health + Professor S. P. Sadtler Philadelphia College Technical Chemistry + of Pharmacy + Dr. John A. Sampson Albany, N. Y. Gynæcology + Oswald Schreiner, Esq. U. S. Dep't of Chemistry + Agriculture + Rev. Frank Sewall Washington, D. C. Social Science, The + Family + Professor H. C. Sheldon Boston Univ. History of the + Christian Church + Professor Frank C. Sharp Univ. of Wisconsin Ethics + Professor J. B. Shaw Milliken Univ. Algebra and Analysis + Professor W. B. Smith Tulane Univ. New Testament + Professor Marshall S. Snow Washington Univ History of America + Professor Henry Snyder Univ. of Minnesota Social Science + Professor Edwain D. Starbuck Earlham College General Religious + Professor George B. Stewart Auburn Theological Professional + Seminary Religious Education + John M. Stahl Quincy, Ill. The Rural Community + Professor J. Stieglitz Univ. of Chicago Chemistry + Professor Robert Stein U. S. Geological + Survey Comparative Language + Mr. Teitaro Suzuki La Salle, Ill. Brahmanism and + Buddhism + Col. T. W. Symonds, U. S. A. Washington, D. C. Civil Engineering + Professor Teissier Lyons, France Pathology + Judge W. H. Thomas Montgomery, Ala. Private Law + Professor O. H. Tittmann U. S. C. and G. Survey Astronomy + Professor Alfred M. Tozzer Peabody Museum Anthropology + Dr. Benjamin F. Trueblood Univ. of Missouri Medieval History + Professor Clyde W. Votaw Univ. of Chicago New Testament + Professor John B. Watson Univ. of Chicago Psychology + Professor H. L. Willett Disciples Divinity Professional + House, Chicago Religious Education + President Mary E. Woolley Mt. Holyoke College Education, The + College + H. Zwaarddemaker Utrecht Otology and + Laryngology + + + + +THE SCIENTIFIC PLAN OF THE CONGRESS + +BY PROF. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG + + + + +I + +THE PURPOSE OF THE CONGRESS + + +1. _The Centralization of the Congress_ + +The history of the Congress has been told. It remains to set forth the +principles which controlled the work of the Congress week, and thus +scientifically to introduce the scholarly undertaking, the results of +which are to speak for themselves in the eight volumes of this +publication. Yet in a certain way this scientific introduction has once +more to use the language of history. It does not deal with the external +development of the Congress, and the story which it has to tell is thus +not one of dates and names and events. But the principles which shaped +the whole undertaking have themselves a claim to historical treatment; +they do not lie before us simply as the subject for a logical +disputation or as a plea for a future work. That was the situation of +three years ago. At that time various ideas and opposing principles +entered into the arena of discussion; but now, since the work is +completed, the question can be only of what principles, right or wrong, +have really determined the programme. We have thus to interpret that +state of mind out of which the purposes and the scientific arrangement +of the Congress resulted; and no after-thought of to-day would be a +desirable addition. Whatever possible improvements of the plan may +suggest themselves in the retrospect can be given only a closing word. +It was certainly easy to learn from experience, but first the experience +had to be passed through. We have here to interpret the view from that +standpoint from which the experience of the Congress was still a matter +of the future, and of an uncertain future indeed, full of doubts and +fears, and yet full of hopes and possibilities. + +The St. Louis World's Fair promised, through the vast extent of its +grounds, through the beautiful plans of the buildings, through the +eagerness of the United States, through the participation of all +countries on earth, and through the gigantic outlines of the internal +plans, to become the most monumental expression of the energies with +which the twentieth century entered on its course. Commerce and +industry, art and social work, politics and education, war and peace, +country and city. Orient and Occident, were all to be focussed for a few +summer months in the ivory city of the Mississippi Valley. It seemed +most natural that science and productive scholarship should also find +its characteristic place among the factors of our modern civilization. +Of course the scientist had his word to say on almost every square foot +of the Exposition. Whether the building was devoted to electricity or to +chemistry, to anthropology or to metallurgy, to civic administration or +to medicine, to transportation or to industrial arts, it was everywhere +the work of the scientist which was to win the triumph; and the Palace +of Education, the first in any universal exposition, was to combine +under its roof not only the school work of all countries, but the +visible record of the world's universities and technical schools as +well. And yet it seemed not enough to gather the products and records of +science and to make science serve with its tools and inventions. Modern +art, too, was to reign over every hall and to beautify every palace, and +yet demanded its own unfolding in the gallery of paintings and +sculptures. In the same way it was not enough for science to penetrate a +hundred exhibitions and turn the wheels in every hall, but it must also +seek to concentrate all its energies in one spot and show the +cross-section of human knowledge in our time, and, above all, its own +methods. + +An exhibition of scholarship cannot be arranged for the eyes. The great +work which grows day by day in quiet libraries and laboratories, and on +a thousand university platforms, can express itself only through words. +Yet heaped up printed volumes would be dead to a World's Fair spectator; +how to make such words living was the problem. Above all, scholarship +does not really exhibit its methods, if it does not show itself in +production. It is no longer scholarship which speaks of a truth-seeking +that has been performed instead of going on with the search for further +truth. If the world's science was to be exhibited, a form had to be +sought in which the scholarly work on the spot would serve the ideals of +knowledge, would add to the storehouse of truth, and would thus work in +the service of human progress at the same moment in which it contributed +to the completeness of the exhibition. + +The effort was not without precedent. Scholarly production had been +connected with earlier expositions, and the large gatherings of scholars +at the Paris Exposition were still in vivid memory. A large number of +scientific congresses of specialists had been held there, and many +hundred scholarly papers had been read. Yet the results hardly suggested +the repetition of such an experiment. Every one felt too strongly that +the outcome of such disconnected congresses of specialists is hardly +comparable with the glorious showing which the arts and industries have +made and were to make again. In every other department of the World's +Fair the most careful preparation secured an harmonious effect. The +scholarly meetings alone failed even to aim at harmony and unity. Not +only did the congresses themselves stand apart without any inner +relation, grouped together by calendar dates or by their alphabetical +order from Anthropology to Zoölogy; but in every congress, again, the +papers read and the manuscripts presented were disconnected pieces +without any programme or correlation. Worse than that, they could not +even be expected in their isolatedness to add anything which would not +have been worked out and communicated to the world just as well without +any congress. The speaker at such a meeting is asked to contribute +anything he has at hand, and he accepts the invitation because he has by +chance a completed paper or a research ready for publication. In the +best case it would have appeared in the next number of the specialistic +magazine, in not infrequent cases it has appeared already in the last +number. Such a congress is then only an accident and does not itself +serve the progress of knowledge. + +Even that would be acceptable if at least the best scholars would come +out with their latest investigations, or, still more delightful, if they +would enter into an important discussion. But experience has too often +shown that the conditions are most favorable for the opposite outcome. +The leading scholars stay away partly to give beginners the chance to be +heard, partly not to be grouped with those who habitually have the floor +at such gatherings. These are either the men whose day has gone by or +those whose day has not yet come; and both groups tyrannize alike an +unwilling audience. Yet it may be said that in scientific meetings of +specialists the reading of papers is non-essential and no harm is done +even if they do not contribute anything to the status of scholarship; +their great value lies in the personal contact of fellow workers and in +the discussions and informal exchange of opinions. All that is true, and +completely justifies the yearly meetings of scholarly associations. But +these advantages are much diminished whenever such gatherings take on an +international character, and thus introduce the confusion of tongues. +And hardly any one can doubt that the turmoil of a world's fair is about +the worst possible background for such exchange of thought, which +demands repose and quietude. Yet even with the certainty of all these +disadvantages the city of Paris, with its large body of scholars, with +its venerable scholarly traditions, and with its incomparable +attractions, could overcome every resistance, and its convenient +location made it natural that in vacation time, in an exposition summer, +the scholars should gather there, not on account of, but in spite of, +the hundred congresses. With this the city of St. Louis could make no +claim to rivalry. Its recent growth, its minimum of scholarly tradition, +its great distance from the old centres of knowledge even in the New +World, the apathy of the East and the climatic fears of Europe, all +together made it clear that a mere repetition of unrelated congresses +would be not only useless, but a disastrous failure. These very fears, +however, themselves suggested the remedy. + +If the scholarly work of our time was to be represented at St. Louis, +something had to be attempted which should be not simply an imitation of +the branch-congresses which every scientific specialty in every country +is calling every year. Scholarship was to be asked to show itself really +in process, and to produce for the World's Fair meeting something which +without it would remain undone. To invite the scholars of the world for +their leisurely enjoyment and reposeful discussion of work done +elsewhere is one thing; to call them together for work which they would +not do otherwise, and which ought to be done, is a very different thing. +The first had in St. Louis all odds against it; it seemed worth while to +try the second. And it seemed not only worth while in the interest of +scholarship, it seemed, above all, the only way to give to the +scholarship of our time a chance for the complete demonstration of its +productive energies. + +The plan of unrelated congresses, with chance combinations of papers +prepared at random, was therefore definitively replaced by the plan of +only one representative gathering, bound together by one underlying +thought, given thus the unity of one scholarly aim, whose fulfillment is +demanded by the scientific needs of our time, and is hardly to be +reached by other methods. Every arbitrary and individual choice was then +to be eliminated and every effort was to be controlled by the one +central purpose; the work thus to be organized and prepared with the +same carefulness of adjustment and elaboration which was doubtless to be +applied in the admirable exhibitions of the United States Government or +in the art exhibition. The open question was, of course, what topic +could fulfill these various demands most completely; wherein lay the +greatest scholarly need of our time; what task could be least realized +by the casual efforts of scholarship at random; where was the unity of a +world organization most needed? + +One thought was very naturally suggested by the external circumstances. +St. Louis had asked the nations of the world to a celebration of the +Louisiana Purchase. Historical thoughts thus gave meaning and importance +to the whole undertaking. The pride of one century's development had +stimulated the gigantic work from its inception. An immense territory +had been transformed from a half wilderness into a land with a rich +civilization, and with a central city in which eight thousand factories +are at work. No thought lay nearer than to ask how far this century was +of similar importance for the changes in the world of thought. How have +the sciences developed themselves since the days of the Louisiana +Purchase? That is a topic which with complete uniformity might be asked +from every special science, and which might thus offer a certain unity +of aim to scholars of all scientific denominations. There was indeed no +doubt that such an historical question would have to be raised if we +were to live up to the commemorative idea of the whole Fair. And yet it +seemed still more certain that the retrospective problem did not justify +itself as a central topic for a World's Congress. There were sciences +for which the story of the last hundred years was merely the last +chapter of a history of three thousand years and other sciences whose +life history did not begin until one or two decades ago. It would thus +be a very external uniformity; the question would have a very different +meaning for the various branches of knowledge, and the treatment would +be of very unequal interest and importance. More than that, it would not +abolish the unrelated character of the endeavors; while the same topic +might be given everywhere, yet every science would remain isolated; +there would be no internal unity, and thus no inner reason for bringing +together the best workers of all spheres. And finally the mere +retrospective attitude brings with it the depressing mood of perfunctory +activity. Certainly to look back on the advance of a century can be most +suggestive for a better understanding of the way which lies before us; +and we felt indeed that the occasion for such a backward glance ought +not to be missed. Yet there would be something lifeless if the whole +meeting were devoted to the consideration of work that had been +completed; a kind of necrological sentiment would pervade the whole +ceremony, while our chief aim was to serve the progress of knowledge and +thus to stimulate living interests. + +This language of life spoke indeed in the programme of another plan +which seemed also to be suggested by the character of the Exposition. +The St. Louis Fair desired not merely to look backward and to revive the +historical interest in the Louisiana purchase, but its first aim seemed +to be to bring into sharp relief the factors which serve to-day the +practical welfare and the achievements of human society. If all the +scholars of all sciences were to convene under one flag, would it not +thus seem most harmonious with the occasion, if, as the one controlling +topic, the question were proposed, "What does your science contribute to +the practical progress of mankind?" No one can deny that such a +formulation would fit in well with the lingering thoughts of every +World's Fair visitor. Whoever wanders through the aisles of exhibition +palaces and sees amassed the marvelous achievements of industry and +commerce, and the thousand practical arts of modern society, may indeed +turn most naturally to a gathering of scholars with the question, "What +have you to offer of similar import?" All your thinking and speaking and +writing, are they merely words on words, or do you also turn the wheels +of this gigantic civilization? + +Such a question would give a noble opening indeed to almost every +science. Who would say that the opportunity is confined to the man of +technical science? Does not the biologist also prepare the achievements +of modern medicine, does not the mathematician play his most important +rôle in our mastery over stubborn nature, do we not need language for +our social intercourse, and law and religion for our practical social +improvement? Yes, is there any science which has not directly or +indirectly something to contribute to the practical development of the +modern man and his civilization? All this is true, and yet the +perspective of this truth, too, appears at once utterly distorted if we +take the standpoint of science itself. The one end of knowledge is to +reach the truth. The belief in the absolute value of truth gives to it +meaning and significance. This value remains the controlling influence +even where the problem to be solved is itself a practical one, and the +spirit of science remains thus essentially theoretical even in the +so-called applied sciences. But incomparably more intense in that +respect is the spirit of all theoretical disciplines. Philosophy and +mathematics, history and philology, chemistry and biology, astronomy and +geology, may be and ought to be helpful to practical civilization +everywhere; and every step forward which they take will be an advance +for man's practical life too. And yet their real meaning never lies in +their technical by-product. It is not the scholar who peers in the +direction of practical use who is most loyal to the deepest demand of +scholarship, and every relation to practical achievement is more or less +accidental or even artificial for the real life interests of productive +scholarship. + +But if the contrast between his real intention and his social technical +successes may not appear striking to the physicist or chemist, it would +appear at least embarrassing to the scholars in many other departments +and directly bewildering to not a few. Perhaps two thirds of the +sciences to which the best thinkers of our time are faithfully devoted +would then be grouped together and relegated to a distant corner, their +only practical technical function would be to contribute material to the +education of the cultured man. For what else do we study Sanscrit or +medieval history or epistemology? And finally even the uniform topic of +practical use would not have brought the different sciences nearer to +each other; the Congress would still have remained a budget of +disconnected records of scholarship. If the practical side of the +Exposition was to suggest anything, it should then not be more than an +appeal not to overlook the importance of the applied sciences which too +often play the rôle of a mere appendix to the system of knowledge. The +logical one-sidedness which considers practical needs as below the +dignity of pure science was indeed to be excluded, but to choose +practical service as the one controlling topic would be far more +anti-scientific. + + +2. _The Unity of Knowledge_ + +There was another side of the Exposition plan which suggested a stronger +topic. The World's Fair was not only an historical memorial work, and +was not only a show of the practical tools of technical civilization; +its deepest aim was after all the effort to bring the energies of our +time into inner relation. The peoples of the whole globe, separated by +oceans and mountains, by language and custom, by politics and prejudice, +were here to come in contact and to be brought into correlation by +better mutual understanding of the best features of their respective +cultures. The various industries and arts, the most antagonistic efforts +of commerce and production, separated by the rivalry of the market and +by the diversity of economic interests were here to be brought together +in harmony, were to be correlated for the eye of the spectator. It was a +near-lying thought to choose correlation as the controlling thought of a +scientific World's Congress too. That was the topic which was finally +agreed upon: the inner relation of the sciences of our day. + +The fitness and the external advantages of such a scheme are evident. +First of all, the danger of disconnectedness now disappears completely. +If the sciences are to examine what binds them together, their usual +isolation must be given up for the time being and a concerted effort +must control the day. The bringing together of scholars of all +scientific specialties is then no longer a doubtful accidental feature, +but becomes a condition of the whole undertaking. More than that, such a +topic, with all that it involves, makes it a matter of course that the +call goes out to the really leading scholars of the time. To aim at a +correlation of sciences means to seek for the fundamental principles in +each territory of knowledge and to look with far-seeing eye beyond the +limits of its field; but just this excludes from the outset those who +like to be the self-appointed speakers in routine gatherings. It +excludes from the first the narrow specialist who does not care for +anything but for his latest research, and ought to exclude not less the +vague spirits who generalize about facts of which they have no concrete +substantial knowledge, as their suggestions towards correlation would +lack inner productiveness and outer authority. Such a plan has room only +for those men who stand high enough to see the whole field and who have +yet the full authority of the specialistic investigator; they must +combine the concentration on specialized productive work with the +inspiration that comes from looking over vast regions. With such a topic +the usual question does not come up whether one or another strong man +would feel attracted to take part in the gathering, but it would be +justified and necessary to confine the active participation from the +outset to those who are leaders, and thus to guarantee from the +beginning a representation of science equal in dignity to the best +efforts of the exhibiting countries in all other departments. In this +way such a plan had the advantage of justifying through its topic the +administrative desire to bring all sciences to the same spot, and at the +same time of excluding all participants but the best scholars: with +isolated gatherings or with second-rate men, this subject would have +been simply impossible. + +Yet all these halfway external advantages count little compared with the +significance and importance of the topic for the inner life of +scientific thought of our time. We all felt it was the one topic which +the beginning of the twentieth century demanded and which could not be +dealt with otherwise than by the combined labors of all nations and of +all sciences. The World's Fair was the one great opportunity to make a +first effort in this direction; we had no right to miss this +opportunity. Thus it was decided to have a congress with the definite +purpose of working towards the unity of human knowledge, and with the +one mission, in this time of scattered specializing work, of bringing to +the consciousness of the world the too much neglected idea of the unity +of truth. To quote from our first tentative programme: "Let the rush of +the world's work stop for one moment for us to consider what are the +underlying principles, what are their relations to one another and to +the whole, what are their values and purposes; in short, let us for once +give to the world's sciences a holiday. The workaday functions are much +better fulfilled in separation, when each scholar works in his own +laboratory or in his library; but this holiday task of bringing out the +underlying unity, this synthetic work, this demands really the +coöperation of all, this demands that once at least all sciences come +together in one place at one time." + +Yet if our work stands for the unity of knowledge, aims to consider the +fundamental conceptions which bind together all the specialistic +results, and seeks to inquire into the methods which are common to +various fields, all this is after all merely a symptom of the whole +spirit of our times. A reaction against the narrowness of mere +fact-diggers has set in. A mere heaping up of disconnected, unshaped +facts begins to disappoint the world; it is felt too vividly that a mere +dictionary of phenomena, of events and laws, makes our knowledge larger +but not deeper, makes our life more complex but not more valuable, makes +our science more difficult but not more harmonious. Our time longs for a +new synthesis and looks towards science no longer merely with a desire +for technical prescriptions and new inventions in the interest of +comfort and exchange. It waits for knowledge to fulfill its higher +mission, it waits for science to satisfy our higher needs for a view of +the world which shall give unity to our scattered experience. The +indications of this change are visible to every one who observes the +gradual turning to philosophical discussion in the most different fields +of scientific life. + +When after the first third of the nineteenth century the great +philosophic movement which found its climax in Hegelianism came to +disaster in consequence of its absurd neglect of hard solid facts, the +era of naturalism began its triumph with contempt for all philosophy and +for all deeper unity. Idealism and philosophy were stigmatized as the +enemies of true science and natural science had its great day. The rapid +progress of physics and chemistry fascinated the world and produced +modern technique; the sciences of life, physiology, biology, medicine, +followed; and the scientific method was carried over from body to mind, +and gave us at the end of the nineteenth century modern psychology and +sociology. The lifeless and the living, the physical and the mental, the +individual and the social, all had been conquered by analytical methods. +But just when the climax was reached and all had been analyzed and +explained, the time was ripe for disillusion, and the lack of deeper +unity began to be felt with alarm in every quarter. For seventy years +there had been nowhere so much philosophizing going on as suddenly +sprung up among the scientists of the last decade. The physicists and +the mathematicians, the chemists and the biologists, the geologists and +the astronomers, and, on the other side, the historians and the +economists, the psychologists and the sociologists, the jurists and the +theologians--all suddenly found themselves again in the midst of +discussions on fundamental principles and methods, on general categories +and conditions of knowledge, in short, in the midst of the despised +philosophy. And with those discussions has come the demand for +correlation. Everywhere have arisen leaders who have brought unconnected +sciences together and emphasized the unity of large divisions. The time +seems to have come again when the wave of naturalism and realism is +ebbing, and a new idealistic philosophical tide is swelling, just as +they have always alternated in the civilization of two thousand years. + +No one dreams, of course, that the great synthetic apperception, for +which our modern time seems ripe, will come through the delivery of some +hundred addresses, or the discussions of some hundred audiences. An +ultimate unity demands the gigantic thought of a single genius, and the +work of the many can, after all, be merely the preparation for the final +work of the one. And yet history shows that the one will never come if +the many have not done their share. What is needed is to fill the +sciences of our time with the growing consciousness of belonging +together, with the longing for fundamental principles, with the +conviction that the desire for correlation is not the fancy of dreamers, +but the immediate need of the leaders of thought. And in this +preparatory work the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science seemed +indeed called for an important part when it was committed to this topic +of correlation. + +To call the scholars of the world together for concerted action towards +the correlation of knowledge meant, of course, first of all, to work out +a detailed programme, and to select the best authorities for every +special part of the whole scheme. Nothing could be left to chance +methods and to casual contributions. The preparation needed the same +administrative strictness which would be demanded for an encyclopedia, +and the same scholarly thoroughness which would be demanded for the most +scientific research. A plan was to be devised in which every possible +striving for truth would find its place, and in which every section +would have its definite position in the system. And such a ground-plan +given, topics were to be assigned to every department and +sub-department, the treatment of which would bring out the fundamental +principles and the inner relations in such a way that the papers would +finally form a close-woven intellectual fabric. There would be plenty of +room for a retrospective glance at the historical development of the +sciences and plenty of room for emphasis on their practical +achievements; but the central place would always belong to the effort +towards unity and internal harmonization. + +We thus divided human knowledge into large parts, and the parts into +divisions, and the divisions into departments, and the departments into +sections. As the topic of the general divisions--we proposed seven of +them--it was decided to discuss the Unity of the whole field. As topic +for the departments--we had twenty-four of them--the addresses were to +discuss the fundamental Conceptions and Methods and the Progress during +the last century; and in the sections, finally--our plan provided for +one hundred and twenty-eight of them--the topics were in every one the +Relation of the special branch to other branches, and those most +important Present Problems which are essential for the deeper principles +of the special field. In this way the ground-plan itself suggested the +unity of the practically separated sciences; and, moreover, our plan +provided from the first that this logical relation should express itself +externally in the time order of the work. We were to begin with the +meetings of the large divisions, the meetings of the departments were to +follow, and the meetings of the sections and their ramifications would +follow the departmental gatherings. + + +3. _The Objections to the Plan_ + +It was evident that even the most modest success of that gigantic +undertaking depended upon the right choice of speakers, upon the value +of the ground-plan, and upon many external conditions; thus no one was +in doubt as to the difficulty in realizing such a scheme. Yet there were +from the scholarly side itself objections to the principles involved, +objections which might hold even if those other conditions were +successfully met. The most immediate reason for reluctance lies in the +specializing tendencies of our time. Those who devote all their working +energy as loyal sons of our analyzing period of science to the minute +detail of research come easily into the habit of a nervous fear with +regard to any wider general outlook. The man of research sees too often +how ignorance hides itself behind generalities. He knows too well how +much easier it is to formulate vague generalities than to contribute a +new fact to human knowledge, and how often untrained youngsters succeed +with popular text-books which are rightly forgotten the next day. +Methodical science must thus almost encourage this aversion to any +deviation from the path of painstaking specialistic labor. Then, of +course, it seems almost a scientific duty to declare war against an +undertaking which explicitly asks everywhere for the wide perspectives +and the last principles, and does not aim at adding at this moment to +the mere treasury of information. + +But such a view is utterly one-sided, and to fight against such +one-sidedness and to overcome the specializing narrowness of the +scattered sciences was the one central idea of the plan. If there +existed no scholars who despise the philosophizing connection, there +would have hardly been any need for this whole undertaking; but to yield +to such philosophy-phobia means to declare the analytic movement of +science permanent, and to postpone a synthetic movement indefinitely. +Our time has just to emphasize, and the leaders of thought daily +emphasize it more, that a mere heaping up of information can be merely a +preparation for knowledge, and that the final aim is a _Weltanschauung_, +a unified view of the whole of reality. All that our Congress had to +secure was thus merely that the generalizing discussion of principles +should not be left to men who generalized because they lacked the +substantial knowledge which is necessary to specialize. The thinkers we +needed were those who through specialistic work were themselves led to a +point where the discussion of general principles becomes unavoidable. +Our plan was by no means antagonistic to the patient labors of analysis; +the aim was merely to overcome its one-sidedness and to stimulate the +synthesis as a necessary supplement. + +But the objections against a generalizing plan were not confined to the +mistaken fear that we sought to antagonize the productive work of the +specialist. They not seldom took the form of a general aversion to the +logical side of the ground-plan. It was often said that such a scheme +has after all interest only for the logician, for whom science as such +is an object of study, and who must thus indeed classify the sciences +and determine their logical relation. The real scientist, it was said, +does not care for such methodological operations, and should be +suspicious from the first of such philosophical high-handedness. The +scientist cannot forget how often in the history of civilization science +was the loser when it trusted its problems to the metaphysical thinker +who substituted his lofty speculations for the hard work of the +investigator. The true scholar will thus not only object to generalizing +"commonplaces" as against solid information, but he will object as well +to logical demarcation lines and systematization as against the +practical scientific work which does not want to be hampered by such +philosophical subtleties. Yet all these fears and suspicions were still +more mistaken. + +Nothing was further from our intentions than a substitution of +metaphysics for concrete science. It was not by chance that we took such +pains to find the best specialists for every section. No one was invited +to enter into logical discussions and to consider the relations of +science merely from a dialectic point of view. The topic was everywhere +the whole living manifoldness of actual relations, and the logician had +nothing else to do than to prepare the programme. The outlines of the +programme demanded, of course, a certain logical scheme. If hundreds of +sciences are to take part, they have to be grouped somehow, if a merely +alphabetical order is not adopted; and even if we were to proceed +alphabetically, we should have to decide beforehand what part of +knowledge is to be recognized as a special science. But the logical +order of the ground-plan refers, of course, merely to the simple +relation of coördination, subordination, and superordination, and the +logician is satisfied with such a classification. But the endless +variety of internal relations is no longer to be dealt with from the +point of view of mere logic. We may work out the ground-plan in such a +way that we understand that logically zoölogy is coördinated to botany +and subordinated to mechanics and superordinated to ichthyology; but +this minimum of determination gives, of course, not even a hint of that +world of relations which exists from the standpoint of the biologist +between the science of zoölogy and the science of botany, or between the +biological and the mechanical studies. To discuss these relations of +real scientific life is the work of the biologist and not at all of the +logician. + +The foregoing answers also at once an objection which might seem more +justified at the first glance. It has been said that we were undertaking +the work of bringing about a synthesis of scientific endeavors, and that +we yet had that synthesis already completed in the programme on which +the work was to be based. The scholars to be invited would be bound by +the programme, and would therefore have no other possibility than to say +with more words what the programme had settled beforehand. The whole +effort would then seem determined from the start by the arbitrariness of +the proposed ground-plan. Now it cannot be denied indeed that a certain +factor of arbitrariness has to enter into a programme. We have already +referred to the fact that some one must decide beforehand what fraction +of science is to be acknowledged as a self-dependent discipline. If a +biologist were to work out the scheme, he might decide that the whole of +philosophy was just one science; while the philosopher might claim a +large number of sections for logic and ethics and philosophy of +religion, and so on. And the philosopher, on the other hand, might treat +the whole of medicine as one part in itself, while the physician might +hold that even otology has to be separated from rhinology. A certain +subjectivity of standpoint is unavoidable, and we know very well that +instead of the one hundred and twenty-eight sections of our programme we +might have been satisfied with half that number or might have indulged +in double that number. And yet there was no possible plan which would +have allowed us to invite the speakers without defining beforehand the +sectional field which each was to represent. A certain courage of +opinion was then necessary, and sometimes also a certain adjustment to +external conditions. + +Quite similar was the question of classification. Just as we had to take +the responsibility for the staking-out of every section, we had also to +decide in favor of a certain grouping, if we desired to organize the +Congress and not simply to bring out haphazard results. The principles +which are sufficient for a mere directory would never allow the shaping +of a programme which can be the basis for synthetic work. Even a +university catalogue begins with a certain classification, and yet no +one fancies that such catalogue grouping inhibits the freedom of the +university lecturer. It is easy to say, as has been said, that the +essential trait of the scientific life of to-day is its +live-and-let-live character. Certainly it is. In the regular work in our +libraries and laboratories the year round, everything depends upon this +democratic freedom in which every one goes his own way, hardly asking +what his neighbor is doing. It is that which has made the specialistic +sciences of our day as strong as they are. But it has brought about at +the same time this extreme tendency to unrelated specialization with its +discouraging lack of unity; this heaping up of information without an +outer harmonious view of the world; and if we were really at least once +to satisfy the desire for unity, then we had not the right to yield +fully to this live-and-let-live tendency. Therefore some principle of +grouping had to be accepted, and whatever principle had been chosen, it +would certainly have been open to the criticism that it was a product of +arbitrary decision, inasmuch as other principles might have been +possible. + +A classification which in itself expresses all the practical relations +in which sciences stand to each other is, of course, absolutely +impossible. A programme which should try to arrange the place of a +special discipline in such a way that it would become the neighbor of +all those other sciences with which it has internal relation is +unthinkable. On the other hand, only if we had tried to construct a +scheme of such exaggerated ambitions should we have been really guilty +of anticipating a part of that which the specialistic scholars were to +tell us. The Congress had to leave it to the invited participants to +discuss the totality of relations which practically exist between their +fields and others, and the organizers confined themselves to that +minimum of classification which just indicates the pure logical +relations, a minimum which every editor of encyclopedic work would be +asked to initiate without awakening suspicions of interference with the +ideas of his contributors. + +The only justified demand which could be met was that a system of +division and classification should be proposed which should give fair +play to every existing scientific tendency. The minimum of +classification was to be combined with the maximum of freedom, and to +secure that a careful consideration of principles was indeed necessary. +To bring logical order into the sciences which stand out clearly with +traditional rights is not difficult; but the chances are too great that +certain tendencies of thought might fail to find recognition or might be +suppressed by scientific prejudice. Any serious omission would indeed +have necessarily inhibited the freedom of expression. To secure thus the +greatest inner fullness of the programme, seemed indeed the most +important task in the elaboration of the ground-plan. The fears that we +might offer empty generalization instead of scholarly facts, or that we +might simply heap up encyclopedic information instead of gaining wide +perspectives, or that we might interfere with the living connections of +sciences by the logical demarcation lines, or that we might disturb the +scholar in his freedom by determining beforehand his place in the +classification,--all these fears and objections, which were repeatedly +raised when the plan was first proposed, seemed indeed unimportant +compared with the fear that the programme might be unable to include all +scientific tendencies of the time. + +That would have been, indeed, the one fundamental mistake, as the whole +Congress work was planned in the service of the great synthetic movement +which pervades the intellectual life of to-day. The undertaking would be +useless and even hindering if it were not just the newer and deeper +tendencies that came to most complete expression in it. Everything +depended, therefore, upon the fullest possible representation of +scientific endeavors in the plan. But no one can become aware of this +manifoldness and of the logical relations who does not go back to the +ultimate principles of the human search for truth. We have, therefore, +to enter now into a full discussion of the principles which have +controlled the classification and subdivision of the whole work. The +discussion is necessarily in its essence a philosophical one, as it was +earlier made plain that philosophy must lay out the plan, while in the +realization of the plan through concrete work the scientist alone, and +not the logician, has to speak. Yet here again it may be said that while +our discussion of principles in its essence is logical, in another +respect it is a merely historical account. The question is not what +principles of classification are to be acknowledged as valuable now that +the work of the Congress lies behind us, but what principles were +accepted and really led to the organization of the work in that form in +which it presents itself in the records of the following volumes. + + + + +II + +THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES + + +1. _The Development of Classification_ + +The problem of dividing and subdividing the whole of human knowledge and +of thus bringing order into the manifoldness of scientific efforts has +fascinated the leading thinkers of all ages. It may often be difficult +to say how far the new principles of classification themselves open the +way for new scientific progress and how far the great forward movements +of thought in the special sciences have in turn influenced the +principles of classification. In any case every productive age has +demanded the expression of its deepest energy in a new ordering of human +science. The history of these efforts leads from Plato and Aristotle to +Bacon and Locke, to Bentham and Ampère, to Kant and Hegel, to Comte and +Spencer, to Wundt and Windelband. And yet we can hardly speak of a real +historical continuity. In a certain way every period took up the problem +anew, and the new aspects resulted not only from the development of the +sciences themselves which were to be classified, but still more from the +differences of logical interest. Sometimes the classification referred +to the material, sometimes to the method of treatment, sometimes to the +mental energies involved, and sometimes to the ends to be reached. The +reference to the mental faculties was certainly the earliest method of +bringing order into human knowledge, for the distinction of the Platonic +philosophy between dialectics, physics, and ethics pointed to the +threefold character of the mind, to reason, perception, and desire; and +it was on the threshold of the modern time, again, when Bacon divided +the intellectual globe into three large parts according to three +fundamental psychical faculties: memory, imagination, and reason. The +memory gives us history; the imagination, poetry; the reason, +philosophy, or the sciences. History was further divided into natural +and civil history; natural history into normal, abnormal, and artificial +phenomena; civil history into political, literary, and ecclesiastical +history. The field of reason was subdivided into man, nature, and God; +the domain of man gives, first, civil philosophy, parted off into +intercourse, business, and government, and secondly, the philosophy of +humanity, divided into that of body and of soul, wherein medicine and +athletics belong to the body, logic and ethics to the soul. Nature, on +the other hand, was divided into speculative and applied science,--the +speculative containing both physics and metaphysics; the applied, +mechanics and magic. All this was full of artificial constructions, and +yet still more marked by deep insight into the needs of Bacon's time, +and not every modification of later classifiers was logically a step +forward. + +Yet modern efforts had to seek quite different methods, and the energies +which have been most effective for the ordering of knowledge in the last +decades spring unquestionably from the system of Comte and his +successors. He did not aim at a system of ramifications; his problem was +to show how the fundamental sciences depend on each other. A series was +to be constructed in which each member should presuppose the foregoing. +The result was a simplicity which is certainly tempting, but this +simplicity was reached only by an artificial emphasis which corresponded +completely to the one-sidedness of naturalistic thought. It was a +philosophy of positivism, the background for the gigantic work of +natural science and technique in the last two thirds of the nineteenth +century. Comte's fundamental thought is that the science of Morals, in +which we study human nature for the government of human life, is +dependent on sociology. Sociology, however, depends on biology; this on +chemistry; this on physics; this on astronomy; and this finally on +mathematics. In this way, all mental and moral sciences, history and +philology, jurisprudence and theology, economics and politics, are +considered as sociological phenomena, as dealing with functions of the +human being. But as man is a living organism, and thus certainly falls +under biology, all the branches of knowledge from history to ethics, +from jurisprudence to æsthetics, can be nothing but subdivisions of +biology. The living organism, on the other hand, is merely one type of +the physical bodies on earth, and biology is thus itself merely a +department of physics. But as the earthly bodies are merely a part of +the cosmic totality, physics is thus a part of astronomy; and as the +whole universe is controlled by mathematical laws, mathematics must be +superordinated to all sciences. + +But there followed a time which overcame this thinly disguised example +of materialism. It was a time when the categories of the physiologist +lost slightly in credit and the categories of the psychologist won +repute. This newer movement held that it is artificial to consider +ethical and logical life, historic and legal action, literary and +religious emotions, merely as physiological functions of the living +organism. The mental life, however necessarily connected with brain +processes, has a positive reality of its own. The psychical facts +represent a world of phenomena which in its nature is absolutely +different from that of material phenomena, and, while it is true that +every ethical action and every logical thought can, from the standpoint +of the biologist, be considered as a property of matter, it is not less +true that the sciences of mental phenomena, considered impartially, form +a sphere of knowledge closed in itself, and must thus be coördinated, +not subordinated, to the knowledge of the physical world. We should say +thus: all knowledge falls into two classes, the physical sciences and +the mental sciences. In the circle of physical sciences we have the +general sciences, like physics and chemistry, the particular sciences of +special objects, like astronomy, geology, mineralogy, biology, and the +formal sciences, like mathematics. In the circle of mental sciences we +have correspondingly, as a general science, psychology, and as the +particular sciences all those special mental and moral sciences which +deal with man's inner life, like history or jurisprudence, logic or +ethics, and all the rest. Such a classification, which had its +philosophical defenders about twenty years ago, penetrated the popular +thought as fully as the positivism of the foregoing generation, and was +certainly superior to its materialistic forerunner. + +Of course it was not the first time in the history of civilization that +materialism was replaced by dualism, that biologism was replaced by +psychologism; and it was also not the first time that the development of +civilization led again beyond this point: that is, led beyond the +psychologizing period. There is no doubt that our time presses on, with +all its powerful internal energies, away from this _Weltanschauung_ of +yesterday. The materialism was anti-philosophic, the psychological +dualism was unphilosophic. To-day the philosophical movement has set in. +The one-sidedness of the nineteenth century creed is felt in the deeper +thought all over the world: popular movements and scholarly efforts +alike show the signs of a coming idealism, which has something better +and deeper to say than merely that our life is a series of causal +phenomena. Our time longs for a new interpretation of reality; from the +depths of every science wherein for decades philosophizing was despised, +the best scholars turn again to a discussion of fundamental conceptions +and general principles. Historical thinking begins again to take the +leadership which for half a century belonged to naturalistic thinking; +specialistic research demands increasingly from day to day the +readjustment toward higher unities, and the technical progress which +charmed the world becomes more and more simply a factor in an ideal +progress. The appearance of this unifying congress itself is merely one +of a thousand symptoms of this change appearing in our public life, and +if the scientific philosophy is producing to-day book upon book to prove +that the world of phenomena must be supplemented by the world of values, +that description must yield to interpretation, and that explanation must +be harmonized with appreciation: it is but echoing in technical terms +the one great emotion of our time. + +This certainly does not mean that any step of the gigantic +materialistic, technical, and psychological development will be +reversed, or that progress in any one of these directions ought to +cease. On the contrary, no time was ever more ready to put its immense +energies into the service of naturalistic work; but it does mean that +our time recognizes the one-sidedness of these movements, recognizes +that they belong only to one aspect of reality, and that another aspect +is possible; yes, that the other aspect is that of our immediate life, +with its purposes and its ideals, its historical relations and its +logical aims. The claim of materialism, that all psychical facts are +merely functions of the organism, was no argument against psychology, +because, though the biological view was possible, yet the other aspect +is certainly a necessary supplement. In the same way it is no argument +against the newer view that all purposes and ideals, all historical +actions and logical thoughts, can be considered as psychological +phenomena. Of course we can consider them as such, and we must go on +doing so in the service of the psychological and sociological sciences; +but we ought not to imagine that we have expressed and understood the +real character of our historical or moral, our logical or religious life +when we have described and explained it as a series of phenomena. Its +immediate reality expresses itself above all in the fact that it has a +meaning, that it is a purpose which we want to understand, not by +considering its causes and effects, but by interpreting its aims and +appreciating its ideals. + +We should say, therefore, to-day that it is most interesting and +important for the scientist to consider human life with all its +strivings and creations from a biological, psychological, sociological +point of view; that is, to consider it as a system of causal phenomena; +and many problems worthy of the highest energies have still to be solved +in these sciences. But that which the jurist or the theologian, the +student of art or of history, of literature or of politics, of education +or of morality, is dealing with, refers to the other aspect in which +inner life is not a phenomenon but a system of purposes, not to be +explained but to be interpreted, to be approached not by causal but by +teleological methods. In this case the historical sciences are no longer +sub-sections of psychological or of sociological sciences; the +conception of science is no longer identical with the conception of the +science of phenomena. There exist sciences which do not deal with the +description or explanation of phenomena at all, but with the internal +relation and connection, the interpretation and appreciation of purpose. +In this way modern thought demands that sciences of purpose be +coördinated with sciences of phenomena. Only if all these tendencies of +our time are fully acknowledged can the outer framework of our +classification offer a fair field to every scientific thought, while a +positivistic system would cripple the most promising tendencies of the +twentieth century. + + +2. _The Four Theoretical Divisions_ + +We have first to determine the underlying structure of the +classification, that is, we have to seek the chief Divisions, of which +our plan shows seven; four theoretical and three practical ones. It will +be a secondary task to subdivide them later into the 24 Departments and +128 Sections. We desire to divide the whole of knowledge in a +fundamental way, and we must therefore start with the question of +principle:--what is knowledge? This question belongs to epistemology, +and thus falls, indeed, into the domain of philosophy. The positivist is +easily inclined to substitute for the philosophical problem the +empirical question: how did that which we call knowledge grow and +develop itself in our individual mind, or in the mind of the nations? +The question becomes, then, of course, one which must be answered by +psychology, by sociology, and perhaps by biology. Such genetic inquiries +are certainly very important, and the problem of how the processes of +judging and conceiving and thinking are produced in the individual or +social consciousness, and how they are to be explained through physical +and psychical causes, deserves fullest attention. But its solution +cannot even help us as regards the fundamental problem, what we mean by +knowledge, and what the ultimate value of knowledge may be, and why we +seek it. This deeper logical inquiry must be answered somehow before +those genetic studies of the psychological and the sociological +positivists can claim any truth at all, and thus any value, for their +outcome. To explain our present knowledge genetically from its foregoing +causes means merely to connect the present experience, which we know, +with a past experience, which we remember, or with earlier phenomena +which we construct on the basis of theories and hypotheses; but in any +case with facts which we value as parts of our knowledge and which thus +presuppose the acknowledgment of the value of knowledge. We cannot +determine by linking one part of knowledge with another part of +knowledge whether we have a right to speak of knowledge at all and to +rely on it. + +We can thus not start from the childhood of man, or from the beginning +of humanity, or from any other object of knowledge, but we must begin +with the state which logically precedes all knowledge; that is, with our +immediate experience of real life. Here, in the naïve experience in +which we do not know ourselves as objects which we perceive, but where +we feel ourselves in our subjective attitudes as agents of will, as +personalities, here we find the original reality not yet shaped and +remoulded by scientific conceptions and by the demands of knowledge. And +from this basis of primary, naïve reality we must ask ourselves what we +mean by seeking knowledge, and how this demand of ours is different from +the other activities in which we work out the meaning and the ideals of +our life. + +One thing is certain, we cannot go back to the old dogmatic standpoint, +whether rationalistic or sensualistic. In both cases dogmatism took for +granted that there is a real world of things which exist in themselves +independent of our subjective attitudes, and that our knowledge has to +give us a mirror picture of that self-dependent world. Sensualism +averred that we get this knowledge through our perceptions; rationalism, +that we get it by reasoning. The one asserted that experience gives us +the data which mere abstract reasoning can never supply; the other +asserted that our knowledge speaks of necessity which no mere perception +can find out. Our modern time has gone through the school of +philosophical criticism, and the dogmatic ideas have lost for us their +meaning. We know that the world which we think as independent cannot be +independent of the forms of our thinking, and that no science has +reference to any other world than the world which is determined by the +categories of our apperception. There cannot be anything more real than +the immediate pure experience, and if we seek the truth of knowledge, we +do not set out to discover something which is hidden behind our +experience, but we set out simply to make something out of our +experience which satisfies certain demands. Our immediate experience +does not contain an objective thing and a subjective picture of it, but +they are completely one and the same piece of experience. We have the +object of our immediate knowledge not in the double form of an outer +object independent of ourselves and an idea in us, but we have it as our +object there in the practical world before science for its special +purposes has broken up that bit of reality into the physical material +thing and the psychical content of consciousness. And if this doubleness +does not hold for the immediate reality of pure experience, it cannot +enter through that reshaping and reconstructing and connecting and +interpreting of pure experience which we call our knowledge. All that +science gives to us is just such an endlessly enlarged experience, of +which every particle remains objective and independent, inasmuch as it +is not in us as psychical individuals, while yet completely dependent +upon the forms of our subjective experience. The ideal of truth is thus +not to gain by reason or by observation ideas in ourselves which +correspond as well as possible to absolute things, but to reconstruct +the given experience in the service of certain purposes. Everything +which completely fulfills the purposes of this intentional +reconstruction is true. + +What are these purposes? One thing is clear from the first: There cannot +be a purpose where there is not a will. If we come from pure experience +to knowledge by a purposive transformation, we must acknowledge the +reality of will in ourselves, or rather, we must find ourselves as will +in the midst of pure experience before we reach any knowledge. And so it +is indeed. We can abstract from all those reconstructions which the +sciences suggest to us and go back to the most immediate naïve +experience; but we can never reach an experience which does not contain +the doubleness of subject and object, of will and world. That doubleness +has nothing whatever to do with the difference of physical and +psychical; both the physical thing and the psychical idea are objects. +The antithesis is not that between two kinds of objects, since we have +seen that in the immediate experience the objects are not at all split +up into the two groups of material and mental things; it is rather the +antithesis between the object in its undifferentiated state on the one +side and the subject in its will-attitude on the other side. Yes, even +if we speak of the subject which stands as a unity behind the +will-attitudes, we are already reconstructing the real experience in the +interest of the purposes of knowledge. In the immediate experience, we +have the will-attitudes themselves, and not a subject which wills them. + +If we ask ourselves finally what is then the ultimate difference between +those two elements of our pure experience, between the object and the +will-attitude, we stand before the ultimate data: we call that element +which exists merely through a reference to its opposite, the object, and +we call that element of our experience which is complete in itself, the +attitude of the will. If we experienced liking or disliking, affirming +or denying, approving or disapproving in the same way in which we +experience the red and the green, the sweet and the sour, the rock and +the tree and the moon, we should know objects only. But we do experience +them in quite a different way. The rock and the tree do not point to +anything else, but the approval has no reality if it does not point to +its opposition in disapproval, and the denial has no meaning if it is +not meant in relation to the affirmative. This doubleness of our primary +experience, this having of objects and of antagonistic attitudes must be +acknowledged wherever we speak of experience at all. We know no object +without attitude, and no attitude without object. The two are one state; +object and attitude form a unity which we resolve by the different way +in which we experience these two features of the one state: we find the +object and we live through the attitude. It is a different kind of +awareness, the having of the object and the taking of the attitude. In +real life our will is never an object which we simply perceive. The +psychologist may treat the will as such, but in the immediate experience +of real life, we are certain of our action by doing it and not by +perceiving our doing; and this our performing and rejecting is really +our self which we posit as absolute reality, not by knowing it, but by +willing it. This corner-stone of the Fichtean philosophy was forgotten +throughout the uncritical and unphilosophical decades of a mere +naturalistic age. But our time has finally come to give attention to it +again. + +Our pure experience thus contains will-attitudes and objects of will, +and the different attitudes of the will give the fundamental classes of +human activity. We can easily recognize four different types of +will-relation towards the world. Our will submits itself to the world; +our will approves the world as it is; our will approves the changes in +the world; our will transcends the world. Yet we must make at once one +more most important discrimination. We have up to this point simplified +our pure experience too much. It is not true that we experience only +objects and our own will-attitudes. Our will reaches out not only to +objects, but also to other subjects. In our most immediate experience, +not reshaped at all by theoretical science, our will is in agreement or +disagreement with other wills; tries to influence them, and receives +influences and suggestions from them. The pseudo-philosophy of +naturalism must say of course that the will does not stand in any direct +relation to another will, but that the other persons are for us simply +material objects which we perceive, like other objects, and into which +we project mental phenomena like those which we find in ourselves by the +mere conclusion of analogy. But the complex reconstructions of +physiological psychology are therein substituted for the primary +experience. If we have to express the agreement or disagreement of wills +in the terms of causal science, we may indeed be obliged to transform +the real experience into such artificial constructions; but in our +immediate consciousness, and thus at the starting-point of our theory of +knowledge, we have certainly to acknowledge that we understand the other +person, accept or do not accept his suggestion, agree or disagree with +him, before we know anything of a difference between physical and mental +objects. + +We cannot agree with an object. We agree directly with a will, which +does not come to us as a foreign phenomenon, but as a proposition which +we accept or decline. In our immediate experience will thus reaches +will, and we are aware of the difference between our will-attitude as +merely individual and our will-attitude as act of agreement with the +will-attitude of other individuals. We can go still further. The circle +of other individuals whose will we express in our own will-act may be +narrow or wide, may be our friends or the nation, and this relation +clearly constitutes the historical significance of our attitude. In the +one case our act is a merely personal choice for personal purposes +without any general meaning; in the other case it is the expression of +general tendencies and historical movements. Yet our will-decisions can +have connections still wider than those with our social community or our +nation, or even with all living men of to-day. It can seek a relation to +the totality of those whom we aim to acknowledge as real subjects. It +thus becomes independent of the chance experience of this or that man, +or this or that movement, which appeals to us, but involves in an +independent way the reference to every one who is to be acknowledged as +a subject at all. Such reference, which is no longer bound to any +special group of historical individuals, thus becomes strictly +over-individual. We can then discriminate three stages: our merely +individual will; secondly, our will as bound by other historical +individuals; and thirdly, our over-individual will, which is not +influenced by any special individual, but by the general demands for the +idea of a personality. + +Each of those four great types of will-attitude which we insisted +on--that is, of submitting, of approving the given, of approving change, +and of transcending--can be carried out on these three stages, that is, +as individual act, as historical act, and as over-individual act. And we +may say at once that only if we submit and approve and change and +transcend in an over-individual act, do we have Truth and Beauty and +Morality and Conviction. If we approve, for instance, a given experience +in an individual will-act, we have simply personal enjoyment and its +object is simply agreeable; if we approve it in harmony with other +individuals, we reach a higher attitude, yet one which cannot claim +absolute value, as it is dependent on historical considerations and on +the tastes and desires of a special group or a school or a nation or an +age. But if we approve the given object just as it is in an +over-individual will-act, then we have before us a thing of beauty, +whose value is not dependent upon our personal enjoyment as individuals, +but is demanded as a joy forever, by every one whom we acknowledge at +all as a complete subject. In exactly the same way, we may approve a +change in the world from any individual point of view: we have then to +do with technical, practical achievements; or we may approve it in +agreement with others: we then enter into the historical interests of +our time. Or we may approve it, finally, in an over-individual way, +without any reference to any special personality: then only is it +valuable for all time, then only is it morally good. And if our will is +transcending experience in an individual way, it can again claim no more +than a subjective satisfaction furnished by any superstition or hope. +But if the transcending will is over-individual, it reaches the absolute +values of religion and metaphysics. + +Exactly the same differences, finally, must occur when our will submits +itself to experience. This submission may be, again, an individual +decision for individual purposes; no absolute value belongs to it. Or it +may be again a yielding to the suggestions of other individuals; or it +may, finally, again be an over-individual submission, which seeks no +longer a personal interest. This submission is not to the authority of +others, and is without reference to any individual; we assume that every +one who is to share with us our world of experience has to share this +submission too. That alone is a submission to truth, and experience, +considered in so far as we submit ourselves to it over-individually, +constitutes our knowledge. + +The system of knowledge is thus the system of experience with all that +is involved in it in so far as it demands submission from our +over-individual will, and the classification which we are seeking must +be thus a division and subdivision of our over-individual submissions. +But the submission itself can be of very different characters and these +various types must give the deepest logical principles of scientific +classification. To point at once to the fundamental differences: our +will acknowledges the demands of other wills and of objects. We cannot +live our life--and this is not meant in a biological sense, but, first +of all, in a teleological sense--our life becomes meaningless, if our +will does not respect the reality of will-demands and of objects of +will. Now we have seen that the will which demands our decision may be +either the individual will of other subjects or the over-individual +will, which belongs to every subject as such and is independent of any +individuality. We can say at once that in the same way we are led to +acknowledge that the object has partly an over-individual character, +that is, necessarily belongs to the world of objects of every possible +subject, and partly an individual character, as our personal object. We +have thus four large groups of experiences to which we submit ourselves: +over-individual will-acts, individual will-acts, over-individual +objects, individual objects. They constitute the first four large +divisions of our system. + +The over-individual will-acts, which are as such teleologically binding +for every subject and therefore norms for his will, give us the +Normative Sciences. The individual will-acts in the world of historical +manifoldness give us the Historical Sciences. The objects, in so far as +they belong to every individual, make up the physical world, and thus +give us the Physical Sciences; and finally the objects, in so far as +they belong to the individual, are the contents of consciousness, and +thus give us the Mental Sciences. We have then the demarcation lines of +our first four large divisions: the Normative, the Historical, the +Physical, and the Mental Sciences. Yet their meaning and method and +difference must be characterized more fully. We must understand why we +have here to deal with four absolutely different types of scientific +systems, why the over-individual objects lead us to general laws and to +the determination of the future, while the study of the individual +will-acts, for instance, gives us the system of history, which turns +merely to the past and does not seek natural laws; and why the study of +the norms gives us another kind of system in which neither a causal nor +an historical, but a purely logical connection prevails. Yet all these +methodological differences result necessarily from the material with +which these four different groups of sciences are working. + +Let us start again from the consideration of our original logical +purpose. We feel ourselves bound and limited in our will by physical +things, by psychical contents, by the demands of other subjects, and by +norms. The purpose of all our knowledge is to develop completely all +that is involved in this bondage. We want to develop in an +over-individual way all the obligations for our submission which are +necessarily included in the given objects and the given demands of +subjects. We start of course everywhere and in every direction from the +actual experience, but we expand the experience by seeking those objects +and those demands to which, as necessarily following from the +immediately given experience, we must also submit. And in thus +developing the whole system of submissions, the interpretation of the +experience itself becomes transformed: the physicist may perhaps +substitute imperceptible atoms for the physical object and the +psychologist may substitute sensations for the real idea, and the +historian may substitute combinations of influences for the real +personality, and the student of norms may substitute combinations of +conflicting demands for the one complete duty; yet in every case the +substitution is logically necessary and furnishes us what we call truth +inasmuch as it is needed to develop the concrete system of our +submissions and thus to express our confidence in the order-lines of +reality. And each of these substitutions and supplementations becomes, +as material of knowledge, itself a part of the world of experience. + + +3. _The Physical and the Mental Sciences_ + +The physicist, we said, speaks of the world of objects in so far as they +belong to every possible subject, and are material for a merely passive +spectator. Of course the pure experience does not offer us anything of +that kind. We insisted that the objects of our real life are objects of +our will and of our attitudes, and are at the same time undifferentiated +into the physical things outside of us and the psychical ideas in us. To +reach the abstraction of the physicist, we have thus to cut loose the +objects from our will and to separate the over-individual elements from +the individual elements. Both transformations are clearly demanded by +our logical aims. As to the cutting loose from our will, it means +considering the object as if it existed for itself, as if it were a mere +passively given material and not a material of our personal interests. +But just that is needed. We want to find out how far we have to submit +ourselves to the object. If we want to live our life, we must adjust our +attitudes to things, and, as we know our will, we must seek to +understand the other factor in the complex experience, the object of our +will, and we must find out what it involves in itself. But we do not +understand the object and the submission which it demands if we do not +completely understand its relation to our desires. Our total submission +to the thing thus involves our acknowledgment of all that we have to +expect from it. And although the real experience is a unity of will and +thing, we have thus the most immediate interest in considering what we +have to expect from the thing in itself, without reference to our will. +That means finding out the effects of the given object with a subject as +the passive spectator. We eliminate artificially, therefore, the +activity of the subject and construct as presupposition for this circle +of knowledge a nowhere existing subject without activity, for which the +thing exists merely as a cause of the effects which it produces. + +The first step towards natural science is, therefore, to dissolve the +real experience into thing and personality; that is, into object and +active subject, and to eliminate in an artificial abstraction the +activity of the subject, making the object material of merely passive +awareness, and related no longer to the will but merely to other +objects. It may be more difficult to understand the second step which +naturalism has to take before a natural science is possible. It must +dissolve the object of will into an over-individual and an individual +part and must eliminate the individual. That part of my objects which +belongs to me alone is their psychical side; that which belongs to all +of us and is the object of ever new experience is the physical object. +As a physicist, in the widest sense of the word, I have to ignore the +objects in so far as they are my ideas and have to consider the stones +and the stars, the inorganic and the organic objects, as they are +outside of me, material for every one. The logical purpose of this +second abstraction may be perhaps formulated in the following way. + +We have seen that the purpose of the study of the objects is to find out +what we have to expect from them; that is, to what effects of the given +thing we have to submit ourselves in anticipation. The ideal aim is thus +to understand completely how present objects and future objects--that +is, how causes and effects--are connected. The first stage in such +knowledge of causal connections is, of course, the observation of +empirical consequences. Our feeling of expectation grows with the +regularity of observed succession; yet the ideal aim can never be +fulfilled in that way. The mere observation of regularities can help us +to reduce a particular case to a frequently observed type, but what we +seek to understand is the necessity of the process. Of course we have to +formulate laws, and as soon as we acknowledge a special law to be +expressive of a necessity, the subsumption of the particular case under +the law will satisfy us even if the necessity of the connection is not +recognized in the particular case. We are satisfied because the +acknowledgment of the law involved all possible cases. But we do not at +all feel that we have furnished a real explanation if the law means to +us merely a generalization of routine experiences, and if thus no +absolute validity is attached to the law. This necessity between cause +and effect must thus have its ultimate reason in our own understanding. +We must be logically obliged to connect the objects in such a way, and +wherever observation seems to contradict that which is logically +necessary, we must reshape our idea of the object till the demands of +reason are fulfilled. That is, we must substitute for the given object +an abstraction which serves the purpose of a logically necessary +connection. That demand is clearly not satisfied if we simply group the +totality of such causal judgments under the single name, Causality, and +designate thus all these judgments as results of a special disposition +of the understanding. We never understand why just this cause demands +just this effect so long as we rely on such vague and mystical power of +our reason to link the world by causality. + +But the situation changes at once if we go still further back in the +categories of our understanding. While a mere demand for causality never +explains what cause is to be linked with what effect, the vagueness +disappears when we understand this demand for causality itself as the +product of a more fundamental demand for identity. That an object +remains identical with itself does not need for us any further +interpretation. That is the ultimate presupposition of our thought, and +where a complete identity is found nothing demands further explanation. +All scientific effort aims at so rethinking different experiences that +they can be regarded as partially identical, and every discovery of +necessary connection is ultimately a demonstration of identity. If we +seek connections with the final aim to understand them as necessary, we +must conceive the world of our objects in such a way that it is possible +to consider the successive experiences as parts of a self-identical +world; that is, as parts of a world in which no substance and no energy +can disappear or appear anew. To reach this end it is obviously needed +that we eliminate from the world of objects all that cannot be conceived +as identically returning in a new experience; that is, all that belongs +to the present experience only. We do eliminate this by taking it up +conceptually into the subject and calling it psychical, and thus leaving +to the object merely that which is conceived as belonging to the world +of everybody's experience, that is, of over-individual experience. The +whole history of natural science is first of all the gigantic +development of this transformation, resolution, and reconstruction. The +objects of experience are re-thought till everything is eliminated which +cannot be conceived as identical with itself in the experiences of all +individuals and thus as belonging to the over-individual world. All the +substitutions of atoms for the real thing, and of energies for the real +changes, are merely conceptional schemes to satisfy this demand. + +The logically primary step is thus not the separation of the physical +and the psychical things plus the secondary demand to connect the +physical things causally; the order is exactly opposite. The primary +desire is to connect the real objects and to understand them as causes +and effects. This understanding demands not only empirical observation, +but insight into the necessary connection. Necessary connection, on the +other hand, exists merely for identical objects and identical qualities. +But in the various experiences only that is identical which is +independent of the momentary individual experiences, and therefore we +need as the ultimate aim a reconstruction of the object into the two +parts, the one perceptional, which refers to our individual experience; +and the other conceptional, which expresses that which can be conceived +as identical in every new experience. The ideal of this constructed +world is the mechanical universe in which every atom moves by causal +necessity because there is nothing in that universe, no element of +substance and no element of energy, which will not remain identical in +all changes of the universe which are possibly to be expected. It +becomes completely determinable by anticipation and the system of our +submissions to the object can be completely constructed. The totality of +intellectual efforts to reconstruct such a causally connected +over-individual world of objects clearly represents a unity of its own. +It is the system of physical sciences. + +The physical universe is thus not the totality of our objects. It is a +substitution for our real objects, constructed by eliminating the +individual parts of our objects of experience. These individual parts +are the psychical aspects of our objective experience, and they clearly +awake our scientific interest too. The physical sciences need thus as +counterpart a division of mental sciences. Their aim must be the same. +We want to foresee the psychical results and to understand causally the +psychical experience. Yet it is clear that the plan of the mental +sciences must be quite different in principle from that of the sciences +of nature. The causal connection of the physical universe was ultimately +anchored in the identity of the object through various experiences; +while the object of experience was psychical for us just in so far as it +could never be conceived as identical in different phases of reality. +The psychical object is an ever new creation; my idea can never be your +idea. Their meaning may be identical, but the psychical stuff, the +content of my consciousness, can never be object for any one else, and +even in myself the idea of to-day is never the idea of yesterday or +to-morrow. But if there cannot be identity in different psychical +experiences, it is logically impossible to connect them directly by +necessity. If we yet want to master their successive appearance, we must +substitute an indirect connection for the direct one, and must describe +and explain the psychical phenomena through reference to the physical +world. It is in this way that modern psychology has substituted +elementary sensations for the real contents of consciousness and has +constructed relations between these elementary mental states on the +basis of processes in the organism, especially brain processes. Here, +again, reality is left behind and a mere conceptional construction is +put in its place. But this construction fulfills its purpose and thus +gives us truth; and if the basis is once given, the psychological +sciences can build up a causal system of the conscious processes in the +individual man and in society. + + +4. _The Historical and the Normative Sciences_ + +The two divisions of the physical and mental sciences represent our +systematized submission to objects. But we saw from the first that it is +an artificial abstraction to consider in our real experience the object +alone. We saw clearly that we, as acting personalities, in our will and +in our attitudes, do not feel ourselves in relation to objects, merely, +but to will-acts; and that these will-acts were the individual ones of +other subjects or the over-individual ones which come to us in our +consciousness of norms. The sciences which deal with our submissions to +the individual will-acts of others are the Historical Sciences. Their +starting-point is the same as that of the object sciences, the immediate +experience. But the other subjects reach our individuality from the +start in a different way from the objects. The wills of other subjects +come to us as propositions with which we have to agree or disagree; as +suggestions, which we are to imitate or to resist; and they carry in +themselves that reference to an opposite which, as we saw, characterizes +all will-activity. The rock or the tree in our surroundings may +stimulate our reactions, but does not claim to be in itself a decision +with an alternative. But the political or legal or artistic or social or +religious will of my neighbors not only demands my agreement or +disagreement, but presents itself to me in its own meaning as a free +decision which rejects the opposite, and its whole meaning is destroyed +if I consider it like the tree or the rock as a mere phenomenon, as an +object in the world of objects. Whoever has clearly understood that +politics and religion and knowledge and art and law come to me from the +first quite differently from objects, can never doubt that their +systematic connection must be most sharply separated from all the +sciences which connect impressions of objects, and is falsified if the +historical disciplines are treated simply as parts of the sciences of +phenomena--for instance, as parts of sociology, the science of society +as a psycho-physical object. + +Just as natural science transcends the immediately experienced object +and works out the whole system of our necessary submissions to the world +of objects, so the historical sciences transcend the social will-acts +which approach us in our immediate experience, and again seek to find +what we are really submitting to if we accept the suggestions of our +social surroundings. And yet this similar demand has most dissimilar +consequences. We submit to an object and want to find out what we are +really submitting to. That cannot mean anything else, as we have seen, +than to seek the effects of the object and thus to look forward to what +we have to expect from the object. On the other hand, if we want to find +out what we are really submitting to if we agree with the decision of +our neighbor, the only meaning of the question can be to ask what our +neighbor really is deciding on, what is contained in his decision; and +as his decision must mean an agreement or disagreement with the will-act +of another subject, we cannot understand the suggestion which comes to +us without understanding in respect to what propositions of others it +takes a stand. Our interest is in this case thus led from those subjects +of will which enter into our immediate experience to other subjects +whose purposes stand in the relation of suggestion and demand to the +present ones. And if we try to develop the system of these relations, we +come to an endless chain of will-relations, in which one individual will +always points back in its decisions to another individual will with +which it agrees or disagrees, which it imitates or overcomes by a new +attitude of will; and the whole network of these will-relations is the +political or religious or artistic or social history of mankind. This +system of history as a system of teleologically connected will-attitudes +is elaborated from the will-propositions which reach us in immediate +experience, with the same necessity with which the mechanical universe +of natural science is worked out from the objects of our immediate +experience. + +The historical system of will-connections is similar to the system of +object-connections, not only in its starting in the immediate +experience, but further in its also seeking identities. Without this +feature history would not offer to our understanding real connections. +We must link the will-attitudes of men by showing the identity of the +alternatives. Just as the physical thing is substituted by a large +number of atoms which remain identical in the causal changes, in the +same way the personality is substituted by an endless manifoldness of +decisions and becomes linked with the historical community by the +thought that each of these partial decisions refers to an alternative +which is identical with that of other persons. And yet there remains a +most essential difference between the historical and the causal +connection. In a world of things the mere identical continuity is +sufficient to determine the phenomena of any given moment. In a world of +will the identity of alternatives cannot determine beforehand the actual +decision; that belongs to the free activity of the subject. If this +factor of freedom were left out, man would be made an object and history +a mere appendix of natural science. The connection of the historian can +therefore never be a necessary one, however much we may observe +empirical regularities. If there were no identities, our reason could +not find connection in history; but if the historical connections were +necessary, like the causal ones, it would not be history. The historian +is, therefore, unable and without the ambition to look into the future +like the naturalist; his domain is the past. + +Yet will-attitudes and will-acts can also be brought into necessary +connection; that is, we can conceive will-acts as teleologically +identical with each other and exempt from the freedom of the individual. +That is clearly possible only if they are conceived as beyond the +freedom of individual decision and related to the over-individual +subject. The question is then no longer how this special man wills and +decides, but how far a certain will-decision binds every possible +individual who performs this act if he is to share our common world of +will and meaning. Such an over-individual connection of will-acts is +what we call the logical connection. It shares with all other +connections the dependence upon the category of identity. The logical +connection shows how far one act or combination of acts involves, and +thus is partially identical with, a new combination. This logical +connection has, in common with the causal connection, necessity; and in +common with the historical connection, teleological character. Any +individual will-act of historical life may be treated for certain +purposes as such a starting-point of over-individual relations; it would +then lead to that scientific treatment which gives us an interpretation, +for instance, of law. Such interpretative sciences belong to the system +of history in the widest sense of the word. + +The chief interest, however, must belong to the logical connections of +those will-acts which themselves have over-individual character. A +merely individual proposition can lead to necessary logical connection, +but cannot claim that scientific importance which belongs to the logical +connection of those propositions which are necessary for the +constitution of every real experience: the science of chess cannot stand +on the same level with the science of geometry, the science of local +legal statutes not on the same level with the system of ethics. The +logical connections of the over-individual attitudes thus constitute the +fourth large division besides the physical, the mental, and the +historical sciences. It must thus comprise the systems of all those +propositions which are presuppositions of our common reality, +independent of the free individual decision. Here belong the acts of +approval--the ethical approval of changes and achievements, as well as +the æsthetic approval of the given world; the acts of conviction--the +religious convictions of a superstructure of the world as well as the +metaphysical convictions of a substructure; and above all, the acts of +affirmation and submission, the logical as well as the mathematical. But +to be consistent we must really demand that merely the over-individual +logical connections are treated in this division. If we deal, for +instance, with the æsthetical or ethical acts as psychological +experiences, or as historical propositions, they belong to the psychical +or historical division. Only the philosophical system of ethics or +æsthetics finds its place in this division. It is difficult to find a +suitable name for this whole system of logical connections of +over-individual attitudes. Perhaps it would be most correct to call it +the Sciences of Values, inasmuch as every one of these over-individual +decisions constitutes a value in our world which our individual will +finds as an absolute datum like the objects of experience. Seen from +another point of view, these values appear as norms which bind our +practical will inasmuch as these absolute values demand of our will to +realize them, and it may thus be permitted to designate this whole group +of sciences as a Division of Normative Sciences. + +Our logical explanation of the meaning of these four divisions naturally +began with the interpretation of that science which usually takes +precedence in popular thought--with the science of nature, that is, and +passed then to those groups whose methodological situation is seen +rather vaguely by our positivistic age. But as soon as we have once +defined and worked out the boundary lines of each of these four +divisions, it would appear more logical to change their order and to +begin with that division whose material is those over-individual +will-acts on which all possible knowledge must depend, and then to turn +to those individual will-acts which determine the formulation of our +present-day knowledge, and then only to go to the objects of knowledge, +the over-individual and the individual ones. In short, we must begin +with the normative sciences, consider in the second place the historical +sciences, in the third place the physical sciences, and in the fourth +place the psychical sciences. There cannot be a scientific judgment +which must not find its place somewhere in one of these four groups. And +yet can we really say that these four great divisions complete the +totality of scientific efforts? The plan of our Congress contains three +important divisions besides these. + + +5. _The Three Divisions of Practical Sciences_ + +The three divisions which still lie before us represent Practical +Knowledge. Have we a logical right to put them on an equal level with +the four large divisions which we have considered so far? Might it not +rather be said that all that is knowledge in those practical sciences +must find its place somewhere in the theoretical field, and that +everything outside of it is not knowledge, but art? It cannot be denied +indeed that the logical position of the practical sciences presents +serious problems. That the function of the engineer or of the physician, +of the lawyer or of the minister, of the diplomat or of the teacher, +contains elements of an art cannot be doubted. They all need not only +knowledge, but a certain instinct and power and skill, and their +schooling thus demands a training and discipline through imitation which +cannot be substituted by mere learning. Yet when it comes to the +classification of sciences, it seems very doubtful whether practical +sciences have to be acknowledged as special divisions, inasmuch as the +factor of art must have been eliminated at the moment they are presented +as sciences. The auscultation of the physician certainly demands skill +and training, yet this practical activity itself does not enter into the +science of medicine as presented in medical writings. As soon as the +physician begins to deal with it scientifically, he needs, as does any +scholar, not the stethoscope, but the pen. He must formulate judgments; +and as soon as he simply describes and analyzes and explains and +interprets his stethoscopic experiences, his statements become a system +of theoretical ideas. + +We can say in general that the science of medicine or of engineering, of +jurisprudence or of education, contains, as science, no element of art, +but merely theoretical judgments which, as such, can find their place +somewhere in the complete systems of the theoretical sciences. If the +physician describes a disease, its symptoms, the means of examining +them, the remedies, their therapeutical effects, and the prophylaxis, in +short, everything which the physician needs for his art, he does not +record anything which would not belong to an ideally complete +description and explanation of the processes in the human body. In the +same way it can be said that if the engineer characterizes the +conditions under which an iron bridge will be safe, it is evident that +he cannot introduce any facts which would not find their logical place +in an ideally complete description of the properties of inorganic +nature; and finally, the same is true for the statements of the +politician, the jurist, the pedagogue, or the minister. Whatever is said +about their art is a theoretical judgment which connects facts of the +ideally complete system of theoretical science; in their case the facts +of course belong in first line to the realm of the psychological, +historical, and normative sciences. There never has been or can be +practical advice in the form of words, which is not in principle a +statement of facts which belong to the absolute totality of theoretical +knowledge. Seen from this point of view, it is evident that all our +knowledge is fundamentally theoretical, and that the conception of +practical knowledge is logically unprecise. + +But the opposite point of view might also be taken. It might be said +that after all every kind of knowledge is practical, and our own +deduction of the meaning of science might be said to suggest such +interpretation. We acknowledged at the outset that the so-called +theoretical knowledge is by no means a passive mirror picture of an +independent outside world; but that in every judgment real experience is +remoulded and reshaped in the service of certain purposes of will. Here +lies the true core of that growing popular philosophy of to-day which, +under the name of pragmatism, or under other titles, mingles the +purposive character of our knowledge and the evolutionary theories of +modern biology in the vague notion that men created knowledge because +the biological struggle for existence led to such views of the world; +and that we call true that correlation of our experiences which has +approved itself through its harmony with the phylogenetic development. +Certainly we must reject such circle philosophies. We must see clearly +that the whole conception of a biological development and of a struggle +of organisms is itself only a part of our construction of causal +knowledge. We must have knowledge to conceive ourselves as products of a +phylogenetic history, and thus cannot deduce from it the fact, and, +still less, the justification of knowledge. Yet one element of this +theory remains valuable: knowledge is indeed a purposive activity, a +reconstruction of the world in the service of ideals of the will. We +have thus from one side the suggestion that all knowledge is merely +theoretical, from the other side the claim that all knowledge is +practical activity. It seems as if both sides might agree that it is +superfluous and unjustified to make a demarcation line through the field +of knowledge and to separate two sorts of knowledge, theoretical and +practical. For both theories demand that all knowledge be of one kind, +and they disagree only as to whether we ought to call it all theoretical +or all practical. + +Yet the true situation is not characterized by such an antithesis. If we +say that all knowledge is ultimately practical, we are speaking from an +epistemological point of view, inasmuch as we take it then as a +reconstruction of the world through the purposive activity of the +over-individual subject. On the other hand it is an empirical point of +view from which ultimately all knowledge, that of the physician and +engineer and lawyer, as well as that of the astronomer, appears +theoretical. But this antithesis can, therefore, not decide the further +empirical question, whether or not in the midst of theoretical knowledge +two kinds of sciences may be discriminated, of which the one refers to +empirical practical purposes and the other not. Such an inquiry would +have nothing to do with the epistemological problem of pragmatism; it +would be strictly non-philosophical, just as the separation of chemistry +into organic and inorganic chemistry. This empirical question is indeed +to be answered in the affirmative. If we ask what causes bring about a +certain effect, for the sake of a practical purpose of ours,--for +instance, the curing a patient of disease,--no one can state facts which +are not in principle to be included in the complete system of physical +causes and effects and thus in the system of physical sciences. And yet +it may well be that the physical sciences, as such, have not the +slightest reason to mention the effect of that special drug on that +special pathological alteration of the tissues of the organism. The +descriptions and explanations of science are not a mere heaping up of +material, but a steady selection in the interest of the special aim of +the science. No physical science describes every special pebble on the +beach; no historical science deals with the chance happenings in the +daily life of any member of the crowd. And we already well know the +point of view from which the selection is to be performed. We want to +know in the physical and psychical sciences whatever is involved in the +object of our experience, and in the historical and normative sciences +whatever is involved in the demands which reach our will. But whether we +have to do with the objects or with the demands, in both cases we have +systems before us which are determined only by the objects or demands +themselves, without any relation to our individual will and our own +practical activity. Theoretically, of course, our will, our activity, +our organism, our personality is included in the complete system; and if +we knew absolutely everything of the empirical effects of the object or +of the consequences of these demands, we should find among them their +relation to our individual interests; but that relation would be but one +chance case among innumerable others, and the sciences would not have +the slightest interest in giving any attention to that particular case. +Thus if our knowledge of chemical substances were complete, we should +certainly have to know theoretically that a few grains of antipyrine +introduced into the organism have an influence on those brain centres +which regulate the temperature of the human body. Yet if the chemist +does not share the interest of the physician who wants to fight a fever, +he would have hardly any reason for examining this particular relation, +as it hardly throws light on the chemical constitution as such. In this +way we might say in general that the relation of the world to us as +acting individuals is in principle contained in the total system of the +relations of our world of experience, but has a strictly accidental +place there and can never be in itself a centre around which the +scientific data are clustered, and science will hardly have an interest +in giving any attention to its details. + +This relation of the world, the physical, the psychical, the historical, +and the normative world, to our individual, practical purposes can, +however, indeed become the centre of scientific interest, and it is +evident that the whole inquiry receives thereupon a perfectly new +direction which demands not only a completely new grouping of facts and +relations, but also a very different shading in elaboration. As long as +the purpose was to understand the world without relation to our +individual aims, science had to gather endless details which are for us +now quite indifferent, as they do not touch our aims; and in other +respects science was satisfied with broad generalizations and +abstractions where we have now to examine the most minute details. In +short, the shifting of the centre of gravity creates perfectly new +sciences which must be distinguished; and if we call them again +theoretical and practical sciences, it is clear that this difference has +then no longer anything to do with the philosophical problems from which +we started. + +The term practical may be preferable to the other term which is +sometimes used: Applied Science. If we construct the antithesis of +theoretical and applied science, the underlying idea is clearly that we +have to do on the practical side with a discipline which teaches how to +apply a science which logically exists as such beforehand. Engineering, +for instance, is an applied science because it applies the science of +physics; but this is not really our deepest meaning here. Our practical +sciences are not meant as mere applications of theoretical sciences. +They are logically somewhat degraded if they are treated in such a way. +Their real logical meaning comes out only if they are acknowledged as +self-dependent sciences whose material is differentiated from that of +the theoretical sciences by the different point of view and purpose. +They are methodologically perfectly independent, and the fact that a +large part or theoretically even everything of their teaching overlaps +the teaching of certain theoretical sciences ought not to have any +influence on their logical standing. The practical sciences could be +conceived as completely self-dependent, without the existence of any +so-called theoretical sciences; that is, the relations of the world of +experience to our individual aims might be brought into complete systems +without working out in principle the system of independent experience. +We might have a science of engineering without acknowledging an +independent science of theoretical physics besides it. To be sure, such +a science of engineering would finally develop itself into a system +which would contain very much that might just as well be called +theoretical physics; yet all would be held together by the point of view +of the engineer, and that part of theoretical physics which the engineer +applies might just as well be considered as depracticalized engineering. +If this logical self-dependence of the practical science holds true even +for such technological disciplines, it is still more evident that it +would cripple the meaning and independent character of jurisprudence and +social science, or of pedagogy and theology, to treat them simply as +applied sciences, that is, as applications of theoretical science. + +This point of view determines, also, of course, the classification of +the Practical Sciences. If they were really merely applied sciences it +would be most natural to group them according to the classification of +the theoretical sciences which are to be applied. We should then have +applied physical sciences, applied psychological sciences, applied +historical sciences, and applied normative sciences. Yet even from the +standpoint of practice, we should come at once into difficulties, and +indeed much of the superficiality of practical sciences to-day results +from the hasty tendency to consider them as applied sciences only, and +thus to be determined by the points of view of the theoretical +discipline which is to be applied. Then, for instance, pedagogy becomes +simply applied psychology, and the psychological point of view is +substituted for the educational one. Pedagogy then becomes simply a +selection of those chapters in psychology which deal with the mental +functions of the child. Yet as soon as we really take the teachers' +point of view, we understand at once that it is utterly artificial to +substitute the categories of the psychologist for those of immediate +practical will-relations and to consider the child in the class-room as +a causal system of psycho-physical elements instead of a personality +which is teleologically to be interpreted, and whose aims are not to be +connected with causal effects but with over-individual attitudes. In +this way the historical relation and the normative relation have to play +at least as important a rôle in the pedagogical system as the +psycho-physical relation, and we might quite as well call education +applied history and applied ethics. + +Almost every practical science can be shown in this way to apply a +number of theoretical sciences; it synthesizes them to a new unity. But +better, we ought to say, that it is a unity in itself from the start, +and that it only overlaps with a number of theoretical sciences. If we +want to classify the practical sciences, we have thus only the one +logical principle at our disposal: we must classify them in accordance +with the group of human individual aims which control those different +disciplines. If all practical sciences deal with the relation of the +world of experience to our individual practical ends, the classes of +those ends are the classes of our practical sciences, whatever +combinations of applied theoretical sciences may enter into the group. +Of course a special classification of these aims must remain somewhat +arbitrary; yet it may seem most natural to separate three large +divisions. We called them the Utilitarian Sciences, the Sciences of +Social Regulation, and the Sciences of Social Culture. Utilitarian we +may call those sciences in which our practical aim refers to the world +of things; it may be the technical mastery of nature or the treatment of +the body, or the production, distribution, and consumption of the means +of support. The second division contains everything in which our aim +does not refer to the thing, but to the other subjects; here naturally +belong the sciences which deal with the political, legal, and social +purposes. And finally the sciences of culture refer to those aims in +which not the individual relations to things or to other subjects are in +the foreground, but the purposes of the teleological development of the +subject himself; education, art, and religion here find their place. It +is, of course, evident that the material of these sciences frequently +allows the emphasis of different aspects. For instance, education, which +aims primarily at self-development, might quite well be considered also +from the point of view of social regulation; and still more naturally +could the utilitarian sciences of the economic distribution of the means +of support be considered from this point of view. Yet a classification +of sciences nowhere suggests by its boundary lines that there are no +relations and connections between the different parts; on the contrary, +it is just the manifoldness of these given connections which makes it so +desirable to become conscious of the principles involved, and thus to +emphasize logical demarcation lines, which of course must be obliterated +as soon as any material is to be treated from every possible point of +view. It may thus well be that, for instance, a certain industrial +problem could be treated in the Normative Sciences from the point of +view of ethics; in the Historical Sciences, from the point of view of +the history of economic institutions; in the Physical Sciences, from the +point of view of physics or chemistry; in the Mental Sciences, from the +point of view of sociology; in the Utilitarian Sciences, from the point +of view of medicine or of engineering, or of commerce and +transportation; and finally in the Regulative Sciences, from the point +of view of political administration, or in the Social Sciences, from the +standpoint of the urban community, and so on. The more complex the +relations are, the more necessary is it to make clean distinctions +between the different logical purposes with which the scientific +inquiries start. Practical life may demand a combination of historical, +sociological, psychological, economical, social, and ethical +considerations; but not one of these sciences can contribute its best if +the consciousness of these differences is lost and the deliberate +combination is replaced by a vague mixture of the problems. + + +6. _The Subdivisions_ + +We have now before us the ground-plan of the scheme, the four +theoretical divisions, and the three practical divisions; every +additional comment on the classification must be of secondary +importance, as it has to refer to the smaller subdivisions, which cannot +change the principles of the plan, and which have not seldom, indeed, +been a result of practical considerations. If, for instance, our +Division of Cultural Sciences shows in the final plan merely the +departments of Education and of Religion, while the originally planned +Department of Art is left out, there was no logical reason for it, but +merely the practical ground that it seemed difficult to bring such a +practical art section to a desirable scientific level; we confine art, +therefore, to the normative æsthetic and historical points of view. Or, +to choose another illustration, if it happened that the normative +sciences were finally organized without a section for the philosophy of +law, this resulted from the fact that the American jurists, in contrast +with their Continental European colleagues, showed a general lack of +appreciation for such a section. A few sections had to be left out even +for the chance reason that the leading speakers were obliged to withdraw +at a time when it was too late to ask substitutes to work up addresses. +And almost everywhere there had to be something arbitrary in the +limitation of the special sections. Though Otology and Laryngology were +brought together into one section, they might just as well have been +placed in two; and Rhinology, which was left out, might have been added +as a third in that company. As to this subtler ramification, the plan +has been changed several times during the period of the practical +preparation of the plan, and much is the result of adjustment to +questions of personalities. No one claims, thus, any special logical +value for the final formulation of the sectional details, for which our +chief aim was not to go beyond eight times sixteen, that is 128, +sections, inasmuch as it was planned to have the meetings at eight +different time-periods in sixteen different halls. If we had fulfilled +all the wishes which were expressed by specialists, the number would +have been quickly doubled. + +Yet a few remarks may be devoted to the branching off within the seven +divisions, as a short discussion of some of these details may throw +additional light on the general principles of the whole plan. If we thus +begin with the Normative Sciences, we stand at once before one feature +of the plan which has been in an especially high degree a matter of both +approval and criticism: the fact that Mathematics is grouped with +Philosophy. The Division was to contain, as we have seen, the systems of +logically connected will-acts of the over-individual subject. That +Ethics or Logic or Æsthetics or Philosophy of Religion deals with such +over-individual attitudes cannot be doubted; but have we a right to +coördinate the mathematical sciences with these philosophical sciences? +Has Mathematics not a more natural place among the physical sciences +coördinated with and introductory to Mechanics, Physics, and Astronomy? +The mathematicians themselves would often be inclined to accept without +hesitation this neighborhood of the physical sciences. They would say +that the mathematical objects are independent realities whose properties +we study like those of nature, whose relations we "observe," whose +existence we "discover," and in which we are interested because they +belong to the real world. All this is true, and yet the objects of the +mathematician are objects made by the logical will only, and thus +different from all phenomena into which sensation enters. The +mathematician, of course, does not reflect on the purely logical origin +of the objects which he studies, but the system of knowledge must give +to the study of the mathematical objects its place in the group where +the functions and products of the over-individual attitudes are +classified. The mathematical object is a free creation, and a creation +not only as to the combination of elements--that would be the case with +many laboratory substances of the chemist too--but a creation as to the +elements themselves, and the value of that creation, its "mathematical +interest," is to be judged by ideals of thought; that is, by logical +purposes. No doubt this logical purpose is its application in the world +of objects and the mathematical concepts must thus fit the objective +world so absolutely that mathematics can be conceived as a description +of the world after abstracting not only from the will-relations, as +physics does, but also from the content. Mathematics would, then, be the +phenomenalistic science of the form and order of the world. In this way, +mathematics has indeed a claim to places in both divisions: among the +physical sciences if we emphasize its applicability to the world, and +among the teleological sciences if we emphasize the free creation of the +objects by the logical will. But if we really go back to epistemological +principles, our system has to prefer the latter emphasis; that is, we +must coördinate mathematics with logic and not with physics. + +As to the subdivision of philosophy, it is most essential for us to +point to the negative fact that of course psychology cannot have a place +in the philosophical department, as part of the Normative Division. +There is perhaps no science whose position in the system of knowledge +offers so many methodological difficulties as psychology. Historical +tradition of course links it with philosophy; throughout a great part of +its present endeavors it is, on the other hand, linked with physiology. +Thus we find it sometimes coördinated with logic and ethics, and +sometimes, especially in the classical positivistic systems, coördinated +with the sciences of the organic functions. We have seen why a really +logical treatment has to disregard those historical and practical +relations and has to separate the psychological sciences from the +philosophical and the biological sciences. Yet even this does not +complete the list of problems which must be settled, inasmuch as modern +thinkers have frequently insisted that psychology itself allows a +twofold aspect. We can have a psychology which describes and explains +the mental life by analyzing it into its elements and by connecting +these elements through causality. But there may be another psychology +which treats inner life in that immediate unity in which we experience +it and seeks to interpret it as the free function of personality. This +latter kind of psychology has been called voluntaristic psychology as +against the phenomenalistic psychology which seeks description and +explanation. Such voluntaristic psychology would clearly belong again to +a different division. It would be a theory of individual life as a +function of will, and would thus be introductory to the historical +sciences and to the normative sciences too. Yet we left out this +teleological psychology from our programme, as such a science is as yet +a programme only. Wherever an effort is made to realize it, it becomes +an odd mixture of an inconsistent phenomenalistic psychology on the one +side, and philosophy of history, logic, ethics, and æsthetics on the +other side. The only science which really has a right to call itself +psychology is the one which seeks to describe and to explain inner life +and treats it therefore as a system of psychical objects, that is, as +contents of consciousness, that is, as phenomena. Psychology belongs, +then, in the general division of psychical sciences as over against +physical sciences, and both deal with objects as over against philosophy +and history, which deal with subjects of will. + +The subdivision of the Historical Sciences offers no methodological +difficulty as soon as those epistemological arguments are acknowledged +by which we sharply distinguish history from the Physical and Mental +Sciences. If history is a system of will-relations which is in +teleological connection with the will-demands that surround us, then +political history loses its predominant rôle, and the history of law and +of literature, of language and of economy, of art and religion, become +coördinated with political development, while the mere anthropological +aspect of man is relegated to the physical sciences. The more complete +original scheme was here again finally condensed for practical reasons; +for instance, the planned departments on the History of Education, on +the History of Science, and on the History of Philosophy were +sacrificed, and the department of Economic History was joined to that of +Political History. In the same way we felt obliged to omit in the end +many important sections in the departments; we had, for instance, in the +History of Language at first a section on Slavic Languages; yet the +number of scholars interested was too small to justify its existence +beside a section on Slavic Literature. Also the History of Music was +omitted from the History of Art; and the History of Law was planned at +first with a fuller ramification. + +The division of Physical Sciences naturally suggested that kind of +subdivision which the positivistic classification presents as a complete +system of sciences. Considering physics and chemistry as the two +fundamental sciences of general laws, we turn first to astronomy, then +from the science of the whole universe to the one planet, to the +sciences of the earth; thence to the living organisms on the earth; and +from biology to the still narrower circle of anthropology. The special +classification of physics offers a certain difficulty. To divide it in +text-book fashion into sound, light, electricity, etc., seems hardly in +harmony with the effort to seek logical principles in the other parts of +the classification. The three groups which we finally formed, Physics of +Matter, Physics of Ether, and Physics of Electron, may appear somewhat +too much influenced by the latest theories of to-day, yet it seemed +preferable to other principles. In the biological department, criticism +seems justified in view of the fact that we constructed a special +section, Human Anatomy. A strictly logical scheme might have +acknowledged that human anatomy is to-day not a separate science, and +that it has resolved itself into comparative anatomy. Sections of +Invertebrate and Vertebrate Anatomy might have been more satisfactory. +The final arrangement was a concession to the practical interests of the +physicians, who have naturally to emphasize the anatomy of the human +organism. + +In the division of Mental Sciences, we have the Department of Sociology. +We were, of course, aware that the sociological interest includes not +only the psychological, but also the physiological life of society, and +that it thus has relations to the physical sciences too. Yet these +relations are logically not more fundamental than those of the +individual mental life to the functions of the individual organism. Much +of the physiological side was further to be handed over to the +Department of Anthropology, and thus we felt justified in grouping +sociology with psychology under the Mental Sciences, as the psychology +of the social organism. Here, too, a larger number of sections was +intended and only the two most essential ones, Social Structure and +Social Psychology, were finally admitted. + +The ramifications of the practical sciences had to follow the general +principle that their character is determined by purpose and not by +material. The difficulty was here merely in the extreme specialization +of the practical disciplines, which suggests on the whole the forming of +very small units, while our plan was to provide for fifty practical +sections only. It seemed, therefore, incongruous to have the whole of +Internal Medicine or the whole of Private Law condensed into one +section. Yet as the purpose of the scheme was a theoretical and not a +practical one, even where the theory of practical sciences was in +question, we felt justified in constructing coördinated sections, even +where the practical importance was very unequal. On the other hand, some +glaring defects just here are due merely to chance circumstances. That +there were, for instance, no sections on Criminal Law or Ecclesiastical +Law in the Department of Jurisprudence, nor on Legal Procedure, resulted +from the unfortunate accident that in these cases the speakers who were +to come from Europe were withheld by illness or public duties. The +absence of the Department of Art in the Division of Social Culture, and +thus of the Sections on the theory and practice of the different arts, +has been explained before. It is evident that also in the Economical +Department the practical development has interfered with the original +symmetrical arrangement of the sections. This is not true of the +Religious Department, whose six sections express the tendencies of the +original plan. The frequently expressed criticism that the different +religions and their denominations ought to have found place there shows +a misconception of our purpose; a Parliament of Religion did not belong +to this plan. + + + + +III + +THE RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS + + +The programme of the Congress, as outlined in the previous pages, was in +this case somewhat more than a mere programme. It not only invited to do +a piece of work, but it sought to contribute to the work itself. Yet the +chief work had to be done by others, and their part needed careful +preparation. Yet very little of the preparation showed itself to the +eyes of the larger public, and few were fully aware what a complex +organization was growing up and how many persons of mark were +coöperating. + +It was essential to find for every address the best man. Specialists +only could suggest to the committees where to find him. It has been told +before how our invitations were brought to the foreigners first till the +desired number of foreign participants was secured, and how the +Americans followed. As could not be otherwise expected, interferences of +all kinds disturbed the ideal configuration of the first list of +acceptances; substitutes had sometimes to be relied on; and yet, when on +the nineteenth of September President Francis welcomed the Congress of +Arts and Science in the gigantic Festival Hall of the St. Louis +Exposition, the Committee knew that almost four hundred speakers had +completed their manuscripts, and that it was a galaxy which far +surpassed in importance that of any previous international congress. And +the list of those who stood for the success of the work was not confined +to the official speakers. Each Department and each Section had its own +honorary President, who was also chosen by the consent of leading +specialists and whose introductory remarks were to give additional +importance to the gathering. At their side stood the hundred and thirty +Secretaries, carefully chosen from among the productive scholars of the +younger generation. And a large number of informal, yet officially +invited contributors, had announced valuable discussions and addresses +for almost every Section. Invitations to membership finally had been +sent to the universities and scholarly societies of all countries. + +That the turmoil of a world's fair is out of harmony with the scholar's +longing for repose and quietude is a natural presupposition, which has +not been disproved by the experience of St. Louis. When Professor +Newcomb, our President, spoke to the opening assembly on the dignity of +scholarship, the scholar's peaceful address was accentuated by the +thunder of the cannons with which Boer and British forces were playing +at war near by. The roaring of the Pike overpowered many a quiet +session, and the patient speaker had not seldom to fight heroically with +a brass band on the next lawn. The trains were delayed, trunks were +mixed up, and the sultry St. Louis weather stirred much secret longing +for the seashore and the mountains, which most had to leave too early +for that pilgrimage to the Mississippi Valley. Yet all this could have +been easily foreseen, and every one knew that all this would soon be +forgotten. These slight discomforts were many times made up for by the +overwhelming beauty of that ivory city in which the civilization of the +world was focused by the united energy of the nations, and it seemed +well worth while to cross the ocean for the delight of that enchantment +which came with every evening's myriad illumination. And every day +brought interesting festivities. No one will forget the receptions of +the foreign commissioners, or the charming hospitality of the leading +citizens of St. Louis, or the enthusiastic banquet which brought one +thousand speakers and presidents and official members of the Congress +together as guests of the master mind of the Exposition, President +Francis. + +While the discomfort of external shortcomings was thus easily balanced, +it is more doubtful whether the internal shortcomings of the work can be +considered as fully compensated for. It would be impossible to overlook +these defects in the realization of our plans, even if it may be +acknowledged that they were unavoidable under the given conditions. The +principal difficulty has been that many speakers have not really treated +the topic for the discussion of which they were invited. This deviation +from the plan took various forms. There was in some cases a fundamental +attitude taken which did not harmonize with those logical principles +which had led to the classification; for instance, we had sharply +separated, for reasons fully stated above, the Division of History from +the Division of Mental Sciences, including sociology; yet some papers +for the Division of History clearly indicated sympathy with the +traditional positivistic view, according to which history becomes simply +a part of sociology. And similar variations of the general plan occur in +almost every division. But there cannot be any objection to this +secondary variety as long as the whole framework gives the primary +uniformity. Certainly no one of the contributors is to be blamed for it; +no one was pledged to the philosophy of the general plan, and probably +few would have agreed if any one had had the idea of demanding from +every contributor an identical background of general convictions. Such +monotony would have been even harmful, as the work would have become +inexpressive of the richness of tendencies in the scholarly life of our +time. This was not an occasion where educated clerks were to work up in +a secondhand way a report whose general trend was determined beforehand; +the work demanded original thinkers, with whom every word grows out of a +rich individual view of the totality. If every paper had been meant +merely as a detailed amplification of the logical principles on which +the whole plan was based, it would have been wiser to set young Doctor +candidates to work, who might have elaborated the hint of the general +scheme. To invite the leaders of knowledge meant to give them complete +freedom and to confine the demands of the plan to a most general +direction. + +The same freedom, which every one was to have as to the general +standpoint, was intended also for all with regard to the arrangement and +limitation of the topic. All the sectional addresses were supposed to +deal either with relations or with fundamental problems of to-day. It +would have been absurd to demand that in every case the totality of +relations or of problems should be covered or even touched. The result +would have become perfunctory and insignificant. No one intended to +produce a cyclopedia. It was essential everywhere to select that which +was most characteristic of the tendencies of the age and most promising +for the science of the twentieth century. Those problems were to be +emphasized whose solution is most demanded for the immediate progress of +knowledge, and those relations had to be selected through which new +connections, new synthetic thoughts prepare themselves to-day. That this +selection had to be left to the speaker was a matter of course. + +Yet it may be said that in all these directions, with reference to the +general standpoint and with reference to problems and relations, the +Organizing Committee had somewhat prepared the choice through the +selection of the speakers themselves. As the standpoints of the leading +speakers were well known, it was not difficult to invite as far as +possible for every place a scholar whose general views would be least +out of harmony with the principles of the plan. For instance, when we +had the task before us of selecting the divisional speakers for the +Normative and for the Mental Sciences, it was only natural to invite for +the first a philosopher of idealistic type and for the latter a +philosopher of positivistic stamp, inasmuch as the whole scheme gave to +the mental sciences the same place which they would have had in a +positivistic scheme, while the normative sciences would have lost the +meaning which they had in our plan if a positivist had simply +psychologized them. In the same way we gave preference as far as +possible, for the addresses on relations, to those scholars whose +previous work was concerned with new synthetic movements, and as +speakers on problems those were invited who were in any case engaged in +the solution of those problems which seemed central in the present state +of science. Thus it was that on the whole the expectation was justified +that the most characteristic relations and the most characteristic +problems would be selected if every invited speaker spoke essentially on +those relations and on those problems with which his own special work +was engaged. + +Yet there is no doubt that this expectation was sometimes fulfilled +beyond our anticipation, in an amount of specialization which was no +longer entirely in harmony with the general character of the +undertaking. The general problem has become sometimes only the +starting-point or almost the pretext for speaking on some relation or +problem so detailed that it can hardly stand as a representative symbol +of the whole movement in that sectional field. Especially in the +practical sciences more room was sometimes taken for particular hobbies +and chance aspects than in the eyes of the originators the occasion may +have called for. Yet on the whole this was the exception. The +overwhelming majority of the addresses fulfilled nobly the high hopes of +the Boards, and even in those exceptional cases where the speaker went +his own way, it was usually such an original and stimulating expression +of a strong personality that no one would care to miss this tone in the +symphony of science. + +Even now of course, though the Congress days have passed, and only +typewritten manuscripts are left from all those September meetings, it +would be easy to provide, by editorial efforts, for a greater uniformity +and a smoother harmonization. Most of the authors would have been quite +willing to retouch their addresses in the interest of greater objective +uniformity and to accept the hint of an editorial committee in +elaborating more fully some points and in condensing or eliminating +others. Much was written in the desire to bring a certain thought for +discussion before such an eminent audience, while the speaker would be +ready to substitute other features of the subject for the permanent form +of the printed volume. Yet such editorial supervision and transformation +would be not only immodest but dangerous. We might risk gaining some +external uniformity, but only to lose much of the freshness and +immediacy and brilliancy of the first presentation. And who would dare +to play the critical judge when the international contributors are the +leaders of thought? There was therefore not the slightest effort made to +suggest revision of the manuscripts, for which the whole responsibility +must thus fall to the particular author. The reduction to a uniform +language seemed, on the other hand, most natural, and those who had +delivered their addresses in French, German, or Italian themselves +welcomed the idea that their papers should be translated into English by +competent specialists. The short bibliographies, selected mostly through +the chairman of the departments, and the very full index with references +may add to the general usefulness of the eight volumes in which the work +is to be presented. + +But the significance of the Congress of Arts and Science ought not to be +measured and valued only by reference to this printed result. Its less +visible side-effects seem in no way less important for scholarship, and +they are fourfold. There was, first, the personal contact between the +scholarly public and the leaders of thought; there was, secondly, the +first academic alliance between the United States and Europe; there was, +thirdly, the first demonstration of a world congress crystallized about +one problem; there was, fourthly, the unique accentuation of the thought +of unity in all human science; and each of these four movements will be +continued and reinforced by the publication of these proceedings. + +The first of these four features, the contact of the scholarly public +with the best thinkers of our time, had, to be sure, its limitations. It +was not sought to create a really popular congress. Neither the level of +the addresses, nor the size of the halls, nor the number of invitations +sent out, nor the general conditions of a world's fair at which the +expense of living is high and the distractions thousandfold, favored the +attendance of crowds. It was planned from the first that on the whole +scholars and specialists should attend and that the army should be made +up essentially of officers. If in an astronomical section perhaps thirty +men were present, among whom practically every one was among the best +known directors of observatories or professors of mathematics, +astronomy, or physics, from all countries of the globe, much more was +gained than if three thousand had been in the audience, brought together +by an interest of curiosity in moon and stars. For the most part there +must have been between a hundred and two hundred in each of the 128 +sectional meetings, and that was more than the organizers expected. This +direct influence on the interested public is now to be expanded a +thousandfold by the mission work of these volumes. The concentration of +these hundreds of addresses into a few days made it in any case +impossible to listen to more than to a small fraction; these volumes +will bring at last all speakers to coördinated effectiveness; and while +one hall suffered from bad acoustics, another from bad ventilation, and +a third from the passing of the intermural trains, here at least is an +audience in which nothing will disturb the sensitive nerves of the +willing follower. + +But much more emphasis is due to the second feature. The Congress was an +epoch-making event for the international world of scholarship from the +fact that it was the first great undertaking in which the Old and the +New Worlds stood on equal levels and in which Europe really became +acquainted with the scientific life of these United States. The contact +of scholarship between America and Europe has, indeed, grown in +importance through many decades. Many American students had studied in +European and especially in German universities and had come back to fill +the professorial chairs of the leading academic institutions. The spirit +of the Graduate School and the work towards the Doctor's degree, yes, +the whole productive scholarship of recent decades had been influenced +by European ideals, and the results were no longer ignored at the seats +of learning throughout the whole world. European scholars had here and +there come as visiting lecturers or as assimilated instructors, and a +few American scholars belonged to the leading European Academies. Yet, +whoever knew the real development of American post-graduate university +life, the rapid advance of genuine American scholarship, the +incomparable progress of the scientific institutions of the New World, +of their libraries and laboratories, museums and associations, was well +aware that Europe had hardly noticed and certainly not fully understood +the gigantic strides of the country which seemed a rival only on +commercial and industrial ground. Europe was satisfied with the +traditional ideas of America's scientific standing which reflected the +situation of thirty years ago, and did not understand that the changes +of a few lustres mean in the New World more than under the firmer +traditions of Europe. American scientific literature was still +neglected; American universities treated in a condescending and +patronizing spirit and with hardly any awareness of the fundamental +differences in the institutions of the two sides. Those European +scholars who crossed the ocean did it with missionary, or perhaps with +less unselfish, intentions, and the Americans who attended European +congresses were mostly treated with the friendliness which the +self-satisfied teacher shows to a promising pupil. The time had really +come when the contrast between the real situation and the traditional +construction became a danger for the scientific life of the time. Both +sides had to suffer from it. The Americans felt that their serious and +important achievements did not come to their fullest effectiveness +through the insistent neglect of those who by the tradition of centuries +had become the habitual guardians of scientific thought. A kind of +feeling of dependency as it usually develops in weak colonies too often +depressed the conscientious scholarship on American soil as the result +of this undue condescension. Yet the greater harm was to the other side. +Once before Europe had had the experience of surprise when American +successes presented themselves where nothing of that kind was +anticipated in the Old World. It was in the field of economic life that +Europe looked down patronizingly on America's industrial efforts, and +yet before she was fully aware how the change resulted, suddenly the +warning signal of the "American danger" was heard everywhere. The +surprise in the intellectual field will not be less. The unpreparedness +was certainly the same. Of course, there cannot be any danger of rivalry +in the scientific field, inasmuch as science knows no competition but +only coöperation. And yet it cannot be without danger for European +science if it willfully neglects and recklessly ignores this eager +working of the modern America. For both sides a change in the situation +was thus not only desirable, but necessary; and to prepare this change, +to substitute knowledge for ignorance, nothing could have been more +effective than this Congress of Arts and Science. + +Even if we abstract from the not inconsiderable number of those European +scholars who followed naturally in the path of the invited guests, and +if we consider merely the function of these invited participants, the +importance of the procedure is evident. More than a hundred leading +scholars from all European countries came under conditions where +academic fellowship on an equal footing was a necessary part of the +work. There was not the slightest premium held out which might have +attracted them had not real inter-academic interest brought them over +the ocean, and no missionary spirit was appealed to, as everything was +equally divided between American and foreign contributors. It was a real +feast of international scholarship, in which the importance and the +number of foreigners stamped it as the first significant alliance of the +spirit of learning in the New and the Old Worlds. And it was essentially +for this purpose that the week of personal intermingling in St. Louis +itself was preceded and followed by happy weeks of visits to leading +universities. Almost every one of those one hundred European scholars +visited Harvard and Yale, Chicago and Johns Hopkins, Columbia and +Pennsylvania, saw the treasures of Washington and examined the +exhibitions of American scholarship in the World's Fair itself. The +change of opinion, the disappearance of prejudice, the growth of +confidence, the personal intercollegiate ties which resulted from all +that, have been evident since those days all over Europe. And it is not +surprising that it is just the most famous and most important of the +visitors, famous and important through their width and depth of view, +whose expression of appreciation and admiration for the new achievements +has been loudest. + +We insisted that the effectiveness of the Congress showed itself in two +other directions still: on the one side, there was at last a congress +with a unified programme, a congress which stood for a definite thought, +and which brought all its efforts to bear on the solution of one +problem. There seemed a far-reaching agreement of opinion that this new +principle of congress administration had successfully withstood the test +of practical realization. Mere conglomerations of unconnected meetings +with casual programmes and unrelated papers cannot claim any longer to +represent the only possible form of international gatherings of +scholars. More than that, their superfluous and disheartening character +will be felt in future more strongly than before. No congress will +appear fully justified whose printed proceedings do not show a real plan +in its programme. And the consciousness of this mission of the Congress +will certainly be again reinforced by the publication of these volumes, +inasmuch as it is evident that they represent a substantial contribution +to the knowledge of our time which would not have been made without the +special stimulating occasion of the Congress. + +And, finally, whether such a congress is held again or not, the impulse +of this one cannot be lost on account of the special end to which all +its efforts have been directed: the unity of scientific knowledge. We +had emphasized from the first that here was the centre of our purposes +in a time whose scientific specialization necessarily involves a +scattering of scholarly work and which yet in its deepest meaning +strives for a new synthesis, for a new unity, which is to give to all +this scattered labor a real dignity and significance; truly nothing was +more needed than an intense accentuation of the internal harmony of all +human knowledge. But for that it is not enough that the masses feel +instinctively the deep need of such unifying movements, nor is it enough +that the philosophers point with logical arguments towards the new +synthesis. The philosopher can only stand by and point the way; the +specialists themselves must go the way. And here at last they have done +so. Leaders of thought have interrupted their specialistic work and have +left their detailed inquiries to seek the fundamental conceptions and +methods and principles which bind all knowledge together, and thus to +work towards that unity from which all special work derives its meaning. +Whether or not their coöperation has produced anything which is final is +a question almost insignificant compared with the fundamental fact that +they coöperated at all for this ideal synthetic purpose. This fact can +never lose its influence on the scholarly effort of our age, and will +certainly find its strongest reinforcement in this unified publication. +It has fulfilled its noblest purpose if it adds strength to the deepest +movement of our time, the movement towards unity of meaning in the +scattered manifoldness of scientific endeavor with which the twentieth +century has opened. + + + + +[Illustration: _Simon Newcomb, Ph.D., LL.D._ + +Dr. Newcomb, the famous Astronomer, is conceded to be the Dean of +American scientists. His eminent services to the Government of the +United States, and his recognized position in foreign and domestic +scientific circles, made him peculiarly fitted to deliver the +introductory address, and to officiate as President of an International +Congress of the leading scientists of the world. + +He has been the recipient of honorary degrees from six American and ten +European Universities, and he is a member of almost every important +Academy of Science in Europe and America. He is an officer of the Legion +of Honour, and is the only native American besides Benjamin Franklin who +has been elected an Associate of the Institute de France. From 1861 to +1897 he was Professor of Mathematics in the United States Navy. He also +lectured on Mathematics and Astronomy at Johns Hopkins, and is now a +Professor Emeritus in the Faculty of Arts of that university. Dr. +Newcomb is the author of numerous works on Astronomy and other +scientific subjects.] + + + + +PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS + + +INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS + + +DELIVERED AT THE OPENING EXERCISES AT FESTIVAL HALL BY PROFESSOR SIMON +NEWCOMB, PRESIDENT OF THE CONGRESS + + +THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATOR + + +As we look at the assemblage gathered in this hall, comprising so many +names of widest renown in every branch of learning,--we might almost say +in every field of human endeavor,--the first inquiry suggested must be +after the object of our meeting. The answer is, that our purpose +corresponds to the eminence of the assemblage. We aim at nothing less +than a survey of the realm of knowledge, as comprehensive as is +permitted by the limitations of time and space. The organizers of our +Congress have honored me with the charge of presenting such preliminary +view of its field as may make clear the spirit of our undertaking. + +Certain tendencies characteristic of the science of our day clearly +suggest the direction of our thoughts most appropriate to the occasion. +Among the strongest of these is one toward laying greater stress on +questions of the beginning of things, and regarding a knowledge of the +laws of development of any object of study as necessary to the +understanding of its present form. It may be conceded that the principle +here involved is as applicable in the broad field before us as in a +special research into the properties of the minutest organism. It +therefore seems meet that we should begin by inquiring what agency has +brought about the remarkable development of science to which the world +of to-day bears witness. This view is recognized in the plan of our +proceedings, by providing for each great department of knowledge a +review of its progress during the century that has elapsed since the +great event commemorated by the scenes outside this hall. But such +reviews do not make up that general survey of science at large which is +necessary to the development of our theme, and which must include the +action of causes that had their origin long before our time. The +movement which culminated in making the nineteenth century ever +memorable in history is the outcome of a long series of causes, acting +through many centuries, which are worthy of especial attention on such +an occasion as this. In setting them forth we should avoid laying stress +on those visible manifestations which, striking the eye of every +beholder, are in no danger of being overlooked, and search rather for +those agencies whose activities underlie the whole visible scene, but +which are liable to be blotted out of sight by the very brilliancy of +the results to which they have given rise. It is easy to draw attention +to the wonderful qualities of the oak; but from that very fact, it may +be needful to point out that the real wonder lies concealed in the acorn +from which it grew. + +Our inquiry into the logical order of the causes which have made our +civilization what it is to-day will be facilitated by bringing to mind +certain elementary considerations--ideas so familiar that setting them +forth may seem like citing a body of truisms--and yet so frequently +overlooked, not only individually, but in their relation to each other, +that the conclusion to which they lead may be lost to sight. One of +these propositions is that psychical rather than material causes are +those which we should regard as fundamental in directing the development +of the social organism. The human intellect is the really active agent +in every branch of endeavor,--the _primum mobile_ of civilization,--and +all those material manifestations to which our attention is so often +directed are to be regarded as secondary to this first agency. If it be +true that "in the world is nothing great but man; in man is nothing +great but mind," then should the keynote of our discourse be the +recognition of this first and greatest of powers. + +Another well-known fact is that those applications of the forces of +nature to the promotion of human welfare which have made our age what it +is, are of such comparatively recent origin that we need go back only a +single century to antedate their most important features, and scarcely +more than four centuries to find their beginning. It follows that the +subject of our inquiry should be the commencement, not many centuries +ago, of a certain new form of intellectual activity. + +Having gained this point of view, our next inquiry will be into the +nature of that activity, and its relation to the stages of progress +which preceded and followed its beginning. The superficial observer, who +sees the oak but forgets the acorn, might tell us that the special +qualities which have brought out such great results are expert +scientific knowledge and rare ingenuity, directed to the application of +the powers of steam and electricity. From this point of view the great +inventors and the great captains of industry were the first agents in +bringing about the modern era. But the more careful inquirer will see +that the work of these men was possible only through a knowledge of the +laws of nature, which had been gained by men whose work took precedence +of theirs in logical order, and that success in invention has been +measured by completeness in such knowledge. While giving all due honor +to the great inventors, let us remember that the first place is that of +the great investigators, whose forceful intellects opened the way to +secrets previously hidden from men. Let it be an honor and not a +reproach to these men, that they were not actuated by the love of gain, +and did not keep utilitarian ends in view in the pursuit of their +researches. If it seems that in neglecting such ends they were leaving +undone the most important part of their work, let us remember that +nature turns a forbidding face to those who pay her court with the hope +of gain, and is responsive only to those suitors whose love for her is +pure and undefiled. Not only is the special genius required in the +investigator not that generally best adapted to applying the discoveries +which he makes, but the result of his having sordid ends in view would +be to narrow the field of his efforts, and exercise a depressing effect +upon his activities. The true man of science has no such expression in +his vocabulary as "useful knowledge." His domain is as wide as nature +itself, and he best fulfills his mission when he leaves to others the +task of applying the knowledge he gives to the world. + +We have here the explanation of the well-known fact that the functions +of the investigator of the laws of nature, and of the inventor who +applies these laws to utilitarian purposes, are rarely united in the +same person. If the one conspicuous exception which the past century +presents to this rule is not unique, we should probably have to go back +to Watt to find another. + +From this viewpoint it is clear that the primary agent in the movement +which has elevated man to the masterful position he now occupies, is the +scientific investigator. He it is whose work has deprived plague and +pestilence of their terrors, alleviated human suffering, girdled the +earth with the electric wire, bound the continent with the iron way, and +made neighbors of the most distant nations. As the first agent which has +made possible this meeting of his representatives, let his evolution be +this day our worthy theme. As we follow the evolution of an organism by +studying the stages of its growth, so we have to show how the work of +the scientific investigator is related to the ineffectual efforts of his +predecessors. + +In our time we think of the process of development in nature as one +going continuously forward through the combination of the opposite +processes of evolution and dissolution. The tendency of our thought has +been in the direction of banishing cataclysms to the theological limbo, +and viewing nature as a sleepless plodder, endowed with infinite +patience, waiting through long ages for results. I do not contest the +truth of the principle of continuity on which this view is based. But it +fails to make known to us the whole truth. The building of a ship from +the time that her keel is laid until she is making her way across the +ocean is a slow and gradual process; yet there is a cataclysmic epoch +opening up a new era in her history. It is the moment when, after lying +for months or years a dead, inert, immovable mass, she is suddenly +endowed with the power of motion, and, as if imbued with life, glides +into the stream, eager to begin the career for which she was designed. + +I think it is thus in the development of humanity. Long ages may pass +during which a race, to all external observation, appears to be making +no real progress. Additions may be made to learning, and the records of +history may constantly grow, but there is nothing in its sphere of +thought, or in the features of its life, that can be called essentially +new. Yet, nature may have been all along slowly working in a way which +evades our scrutiny until the result of her operations suddenly appears +in a new and revolutionary movement, carrying the race to a higher plane +of civilization. + +It is not difficult to point out such epochs in human progress. The +greatest of all, because it was the first, is one of which we find no +record either in written or geological history. It was the epoch when +our progenitors first took conscious thought of the morrow, first used +the crude weapons which nature had placed within their reach to kill +their prey, first built a fire to warm their bodies and cook their food. +I love to fancy that there was some one first man, the Adam of +evolution, who did all this, and who used the power thus acquired to +show his fellows how they might profit by his example. When the members +of the tribe or community which he gathered around him began to conceive +of life as a whole,--to include yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow in the +same mental grasp--to think how they might apply the gifts of nature to +their own uses,--a movement was begun which should ultimately lead to +civilization. + +Long indeed must have been the ages required for the development of this +rudest primitive community into the civilization revealed to us by the +most ancient tablets of Egypt and Assyria. After spoken language was +developed, and after the rude representation of ideas by visible marks +drawn to resemble them had long been practiced, some Cadmus must have +invented an alphabet. When the use of written language was thus +introduced, the word of command ceased to be confined to the range of +the human voice, and it became possible for master minds to extend their +influence as far as a written message could be carried. Then were +communities gathered into provinces; provinces into kingdoms; kingdoms +into the great empires of antiquity. Then arose a stage of civilization +which we find pictured in the most ancient records,--a stage in which +men were governed by laws that were perhaps as wisely adapted to their +conditions as our laws are to ours,--in which the phenomena of nature +were rudely observed, and striking occurrences in the earth or in the +heavens recorded in the annals of the nation. + +Vast was the progress of knowledge during the interval between these +empires and the century in which modern science began. Yet, if I am +right in making a distinction between the slow and regular steps of +progress, each growing naturally out of that which preceded it, and the +entrance of the mind at some fairly definite epoch into an entirely new +sphere of activity, it would appear that there was only one such epoch +during the entire interval. This was when abstract geometrical reasoning +commenced, and astronomical observations aiming at precision were +recorded, compared, and discussed. Closely associated with it must have +been the construction of the forms of logic. The radical difference +between the demonstration of a theorem of geometry and the reasoning of +every-day life which the masses of men must have practiced from the +beginning, and which few even to-day ever get beyond, is so evident at a +glance that I need not dwell upon it. The principal feature of this +advance is that, by one of those antinomies of the human intellect of +which examples are not wanting even in our own time, the development of +abstract ideas preceded the concrete knowledge of natural phenomena. +When we reflect that in the geometry of Euclid the science of space was +brought to such logical perfection that even to-day its teachers are not +agreed as to the practicability of any great improvement upon it, we +cannot avoid the feeling that a very slight change in the direction of +the intellectual activity of the Greeks would have led to the beginning +of natural science. But it would seem that the very purity and +perfection which was aimed at in their system of geometry stood in the +way of any extension or application of its methods and spirit to the +field of nature. One example of this is worthy of attention. In modern +teaching the idea of magnitude as generated by motion is freely +introduced. A line is described by a moving point; a plane by a moving +line; a solid by a moving plane. It may, at first sight, seem singular +that this conception finds no place in the Euclidian system. But we may +regard the omission as a mark of logical purity and rigor. Had the real +or supposed advantages of introducing motion into geometrical +conceptions been suggested to Euclid, we may suppose him to have replied +that the theorems of space are independent of time; that the idea of +motion necessarily implies time, and that, in consequence, to avail +ourselves of it would be to introduce an extraneous element into +geometry. + +It is quite possible that the contempt of the ancient philosophers for +the practical application of their science, which has continued in some +form to our own time, and which is not altogether unwholesome, was a +powerful factor in the same direction. The result was that, in keeping +geometry pure from ideas which did not belong to it, it failed to form +what might otherwise have been the basis of physical science. Its +founders missed the discovery that methods similar to those of geometric +demonstration could be extended into other and wider fields than that of +space. Thus not only the development of applied geometry, but the +reduction of other conceptions to a rigorous mathematical form was +indefinitely postponed. + +Astronomy is necessarily a science of observation pure and simple, in +which experiment can have no place except as an auxiliary. The vague +accounts of striking celestial phenomena handed down by the priests and +astrologers of antiquity were followed in the time of the Greeks by +observations having, in form at least, a rude approach to precision, +though nothing like the degree of precision that the astronomer of +to-day would reach with the naked eye, aided by such instruments as he +could fashion from the tools at the command of the ancients. + +The rude observations commenced by the Babylonians were continued with +gradually improving instruments,--first by the Greeks and afterward by +the Arabs,--but the results failed to afford any insight into the true +relation of the earth to the heavens. What was most remarkable in this +failure is that, to take a first step forward which would have led on to +success, no more was necessary than a course of abstract thinking vastly +easier than that required for working out the problems of geometry. That +space is infinite is an unexpressed axiom, tacitly assumed by Euclid and +his successors. Combining this with the most elementary consideration of +the properties of the triangle, it would be seen that a body of any +given size could be placed at such a distance in space as to appear to +us like a point. Hence a body as large as our earth, which was known to +be a globe from the time that the ancient Phœnicians navigated the +Mediterranean, if placed in the heavens at a sufficient distance, would +look like a star. The obvious conclusion that the stars might be bodies +like our globe, shining either by their own light or by that of the sun, +would have been a first step to the understanding of the true system of +the world. + +There is historic evidence that this deduction did not wholly escape the +Greek thinkers. It is true that the critical student will assign little +weight to the current belief that the vague theory of Pythagoras--that +fire was at the centre of all things--implies a conception of the +heliocentric theory of the solar system. But the testimony of +Archimedes, confused though it is in form, leaves no serious doubt that +Aristarchus of Samos not only propounded the view that the earth +revolves both on its own axis and around the sun, but that he correctly +removed the great stumbling-block in the way of this theory by adding +that the distance of the fixed stars was infinitely greater than the +dimensions of the earth's orbit. Even the world of philosophy was not +yet ready for this conception, and, so far from seeing the +reasonableness of the explanation, we find Ptolemy arguing against the +rotation of the earth on grounds which careful observations of the +phenomena around him would have shown to be ill-founded. + +Physical science, if we can apply that term to an uncoördinated body of +facts, was successfully cultivated from the earliest times. Something +must have been known of the properties of metals, and the art of +extracting them from their ores must have been practiced, from the time +that coins and medals were first stamped. The properties of the most +common compounds were discovered by alchemists in their vain search for +the philosopher's stone, but no actual progress worthy of the name +rewarded the practitioners of the black art. + +Perhaps the first approach to a correct method was that of Archimedes, +who by much thinking worked out the law of the lever, reached the +conception of the centre of gravity, and demonstrated the first +principles of hydrostatics. It is remarkable that he did not extend his +researches into the phenomena of motion, whether spontaneous or produced +by force. The stationary condition of the human intellect is most +strikingly illustrated by the fact that not until the time of Leonardo +was any substantial advance made on his discovery. To sum up in one +sentence the most characteristic feature of ancient and medieval +science, we see a notable contrast between the precision of thought +implied in the construction and demonstration of geometrical theorems +and the vague indefinite character of the ideas of natural phenomena +generally, a contrast which did not disappear until the foundations of +modern science began to be laid. + +We should miss the most essential point of the difference between +medieval and modern learning if we looked upon it as mainly a difference +either in the precision or the amount of knowledge. The development of +both of these qualities would, under any circumstances, have been slow +and gradual, but sure. We can hardly suppose that any one generation, or +even any one century, would have seen the complete substitution of exact +for inexact ideas. Slowness of growth is as inevitable in the case of +knowledge as in that of a growing organism. The most essential point of +difference is one of those seemingly slight ones, the importance of +which we are too apt to overlook. It was like the drop of blood in the +wrong place, which some one has told us makes all the difference between +a philosopher and a maniac. It was all the difference between a living +tree and a dead one, between an inert mass and a growing organism. The +transition of knowledge from the dead to the living form must, in any +complete review of the subject, be looked upon as the really great event +of modern times. Before this event the intellect was bound down by a +scholasticism which regarded knowledge as a rounded whole, the parts of +which were written in books and carried in the minds of learned men. The +student was taught from the beginning of his work to look upon authority +as the foundation of his beliefs. The older the authority the greater +the weight it carried. So effective was this teaching that it seems +never to have occurred to individual men that they had all the +opportunities ever enjoyed by Aristotle of discovering truth, with the +added advantage of all his knowledge to begin with. Advanced as was the +development of formal logic, that practical logic was wanting which +could see that the last of a series of authorities, every one of which +rested on those which preceded it, could never form a surer foundation +for any doctrine than that supplied by its original propounder. + +The result of this view of knowledge was that, although during the +fifteen centuries following the death of the geometer of Syracuse great +universities were founded at which generations of professors expounded +all the learning of their time, neither professor nor student ever +suspected what latent possibilities of good were concealed in the most +familiar operations of nature. Every one felt the wind blow, saw water +boil, and heard the thunder crash, but never thought of investigating +the forces here at play. Up to the middle of the fifteenth century the +most acute observer could scarcely have seen the dawn of a new era. + +In view of this state of things, it must be regarded as one of the most +remarkable facts in evolutionary history that four or five men, whose +mental constitution was either typical of the new order of things or who +were powerful agents in bringing it about, were all born during the +fifteenth century, four of them at least at so nearly the same time as +to be contemporaries. + +Leonardo da Vinci, whose artistic genius has charmed succeeding +generations, was also the first practical engineer of his time, and the +first man after Archimedes to make a substantial advance in developing +the laws of motion. That the world was not prepared to make use of his +scientific discoveries does not detract from the significance which must +attach to the period of his birth. + +Shortly after him was born the great navigator whose bold spirit was to +make known a new world, thus giving to commercial enterprise that +impetus which was so powerful an agent in bringing about a revolution in +the thoughts of men. + +The birth of Columbus was soon followed by that of Copernicus, the first +after Aristarchus to demonstrate the true system of the world. In him +more than in any of his contemporaries do we see the struggle between +the old forms of thought and the new. It seems almost pathetic and is +certainly most suggestive of the general view of knowledge taken at that +time that, instead of claiming credit for bringing to light great truths +before unknown, he made a labored attempt to show that, after all, there +was nothing really new in his system, which he claimed to date from +Pythagoras and Philolaus. In this connection it is curious that he makes +no mention of Aristarchus, who I think will be regarded by conservative +historians as his only demonstrated predecessor. To the hold of the +older ideas upon his mind we must attribute the fact that in +constructing his system he took great pains to make as little change as +possible in ancient conceptions. + +Luther, the greatest thought-stirrer of them all, practically of the +same generation with Copernicus, Leonardo, and Columbus, does not come +in as a scientific investigator, but as the great loosener of chains +which had so fettered the intellect of men that they dared not think +otherwise than as the authorities thought. + +Almost coeval with the advent of these intellects was the invention of +printing with movable type. Gutenberg was born during the first decade +of the century, and his associates and others credited with the +invention not many years afterward. If we accept the principle on which +I am basing my argument, that we should assign the first place to the +birth of those psychic agencies which started men on new lines of +thought, then surely was the fifteenth the wonderful century. + +Let us not forget that, in assigning the actors then born to their +places, we are not narrating history, but studying a special phase of +evolution. It matters not for us that no university invited Leonardo to +its halls, and that his science was valued by his contemporaries only as +an adjunct to the art of engineering. The great fact still is that he +was the first of mankind to propound laws of motion. It is not for +anything in Luther's doctrines that he finds a place in our scheme. No +matter for us whether they were sound or not. What he did toward the +evolution of the scientific investigator was to show by his example that +a man might question the best-established and most venerable authority +and still live--still preserve his intellectual integrity--still command +a hearing from nations and their rulers. It matters not for us whether +Columbus ever knew that he had discovered a new continent. His work was +to teach that neither hydra, chimera, nor abyss--neither divine +injunction nor infernal machination--was in the way of men visiting +every part of the globe, and that the problem of conquering the world +reduced itself to one of sails and rigging, hull and compass. The better +part of Copernicus was to direct man to a viewpoint whence he should see +that the heavens were of like matter with the earth. All this done, the +acorn was planted from which the oak of our civilization should spring. +The mad quest for gold which followed the discovery of Columbus, the +questionings which absorbed the attention of the learned, the +indignation excited by the seeming vagaries of a Paracelsus, the fear +and trembling lest the strange doctrine of Copernicus should undermine +the faith of centuries, were all helps to the germination of the +seed--stimuli to thought which urged it on to explore the new fields +opened up to its occupation. This given, all that has since followed +came out in regular order of development, and need be here considered +only in those phases having a special relation to the purpose of our +present meeting. + +So slow was the growth at first that the sixteenth century may scarcely +have recognized the inauguration of a new era. Torricelli and Benedetti +were of the third generation after Leonardo, and Galileo, the first to +make a substantial advance upon his theory, was born more than a century +after him. Only two or three men appeared in a generation who, working +alone, could make real progress in discovery, and even these could do +little in leavening the minds of their fellow men with the new ideas. + +Up to the middle of the seventeenth century an agent which all +experience since that time shows to be necessary to the most productive +intellectual activity was wanting. This was the attraction of like +minds, making suggestions to each other, criticising, comparing, and +reasoning. This element was introduced by the organization of the Royal +Society of London and the Academy of Sciences of Paris. + +The members of these two bodies seem like ingenious youth suddenly +thrown into a new world of interesting objects, the purposes and +relations of which they had to discover. The novelty of the situation is +strikingly shown in the questions which occupied the minds of the +incipient investigators. One natural result of British maritime +enterprise was that the aspirations of the Fellows of the Royal Society +were not confined to any continent or hemisphere. Inquiries were sent +all the way to Batavia to know "whether there be a hill in Sumatra which +burneth continually, and a fountain which runneth pure balsam." The +astronomical precision with which it seemed possible that physiological +operations might go on was evinced by the inquiry whether the Indians +can so prepare that stupefying herb Datura that "they make it lie +several days, months, years, according as they will, in a man's body +without doing him any harm, and at the end kill him without missing an +hour's time." Of this continent one of the inquiries was whether there +be a tree in Mexico that yields water, wine, vinegar, milk, honey, wax, +thread, and needles. + +Among the problems before the Paris Academy of Sciences those of +physiology and biology took a prominent place. The distillation of +compounds had long been practiced, and the fact that the more spirituous +elements of certain substances were thus separated naturally led to the +question whether the essential essences of life might not be +discoverable in the same way. In order that all might participate in the +experiments, they were conducted in open session of the Academy, thus +guarding against the danger of any one member obtaining for his +exclusive personal use a possible elixir of life. A wide range of the +animal and vegetable kingdom, including cats, dogs, and birds of various +species, were thus analyzed. The practice of dissection was introduced +on a large scale. That of the cadaver of an elephant occupied several +sessions, and was of such interest that the monarch himself was a +spectator. + +To the same epoch with the formation and first work of these two bodies +belongs the invention of a mathematical method which in its importance +to the advance of exact science may be classed with the invention of the +alphabet in its relation to the progress of society at large. The use of +algebraic symbols to represent quantities had its origin before the +commencement of the new era, and gradually grew into a highly developed +form during the first two centuries of that era. But this method could +represent quantities only as fixed. It is true that the elasticity +inherent in the use of such symbols permitted of their being applied to +any and every quantity; yet, in any one application, the quantity was +considered as fixed and definite. But most of the magnitudes of nature +are in a state of continual variation; indeed, since all motion is +variation, the latter is a universal characteristic of all phenomena. No +serious advance could be made in the application of algebraic language +to the expression of physical phenomena until it could be so extended as +to express variation in quantities, as well as the quantities +themselves. This extension, worked out independently by Newton and +Leibnitz, may be classed as the most fruitful of conceptions in exact +science. With it the way was opened for the unimpeded and continually +accelerated progress of the last two centuries. + +The feature of this period which has the closest relation to the purpose +of our coming together is the seemingly unending subdivision of +knowledge into specialties, many of which are becoming so minute and so +isolated that they seem to have no interest for any but their few +pursuers. Happily science itself has afforded a corrective for its own +tendency in this direction. The careful thinker will see that in these +seemingly diverging branches common elements and common principles are +coming more and more to light. There is an increasing recognition of +methods of research, and of deduction, which are common to large +branches, or to the whole of science. We are more and more recognizing +the principle that progress in knowledge implies its reduction to more +exact forms, and the expression of its ideas in language more or less +mathematical. The problem before the organizers of this Congress was, +therefore, to bring the sciences together, and seek for the unity which +we believe underlies their infinite diversity. + +The assembling of such a body as now fills this hall was scarcely +possible in any preceding generation, and is made possible now only +through the agency of science itself. It differs from all preceding +international meetings by the universality of its scope, which aims to +include the whole of knowledge. It is also unique in that none but +leaders have been sought out as members. It is unique in that so many +lands have delegated their choicest intellects to carry on its work. +They come from the country to which our republic is indebted for a third +of its territory, including the ground on which we stand; from the land +which has taught us that the most scholarly devotion to the languages +and learning of the cloistered past is compatible with leadership in the +practical application of modern science to the arts of life; from the +island whose language and literature have found a new field and a +vigorous growth in this region; from the last seat of the holy Roman +Empire; from the country which, remembering a monarch who made an +astronomical observation at the Greenwich Observatory, has enthroned +science in one of the highest places in its government; from the +peninsula so learned that we have invited one of its scholars to come +and tell us of our own language; from the land which gave birth to +Leonardo, Galileo, Torricelli, Columbus, Volta--what an array of +immortal names!--from the little republic of glorious history which, +breeding men rugged as its eternal snow-peaks, has yet been the seat of +scientific investigation since the day of the Bernoullis; from the land +whose heroic dwellers did not hesitate to use the ocean itself to +protect it against invaders, and which now makes us marvel at the amount +of erudition compressed within its little area; from the nation across +the Pacific, which, by half a century of unequaled progress in the arts +of life, has made an important contribution to evolutionary science +through demonstrating the falsity of the theory that the most ancient +races are doomed to be left in the rear of the advancing age--in a word, +from every great centre of intellectual activity on the globe I see +before me eminent representatives of that world-advance in knowledge +which we have met to celebrate. May we not confidently hope that the +discussions of such an assemblage will prove pregnant of a future for +science which shall outshine even its brilliant past? + +Gentlemen and scholars all! You do not visit our shores to find great +collections in which centuries of humanity have given expression on +canvas and in marble to their hopes, fears, and aspirations. Nor do you +expect institutions and buildings hoary with age. But as you feel the +vigor latent in the fresh air of these expansive prairies, which has +collected the products of human genius by which we are here surrounded, +and, I may add, brought us together; as you study the institutions which +we have founded for the benefit, not only of our own people, but of +humanity at large; as you meet the men who, in the short space of one +century, have transformed this valley from a savage wilderness into what +it is to-day--then may you find compensation for the want of a past like +yours by seeing with prophetic eye a future world-power of which this +region shall be the seat. If such is to be the outcome of the +institutions which we are now building up, then may your present visit +be a blessing both to your posterity and ours by making that power one +for good to all mankind. Your deliberations will help to demonstrate to +us and to the world at large that the reign of law must supplant that of +brute force in the relations of the nations, just as it has supplanted +it in the relations of individuals. You will help to show that the war +which science is now waging against the sources of diseases, pain, and +misery offers an even nobler field for the exercise of heroic qualities +than can that of battle. We hope that when, after your all too fleeting +sojourn in our midst, you return to your own shores, you will long feel +the influence of the new air you have breathed in an infusion of +increased vigor in pursuing your varied labors. And if a new impetus is +thus given to the great intellectual movement of the past century, +resulting not only in promoting the unification of knowledge, but in +widening its field through new combinations of effort on the part of its +votaries, the projectors, organizers, and supporters of this Congress of +Arts and Science will be justified of their labors. + + + + +DIVISION A--NORMATIVE SCIENCE + + + + +DIVISION A--NORMATIVE SCIENCE + +SPEAKER: PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE, Harvard University + +(_Hall 6, September 20, 10 a. m._) + +THE SCIENCES OF THE IDEAL + +BY JOSIAH ROYCE + + [Josiah Royce, Professor of History of Philosophy, Harvard + University, since 1892. b. Grass Valley, Nevada County, + California, November 20, 1855. A.B. University of + California, 1875; Ph.D. Johns Hopkins 1878; LL.D. University + of Aberdeen, Scotland; LL.D. Johns Hopkins. Instructor in + English Literature and Logic, University of California, + 1878-82. Instructor and Assistant Professor, Harvard + University, 1882-92. Author of _Religious Aspect of + Philosophy_; _History of California_; _The Feud of Oakfield + Creek_; _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_; _Studies of Good + and Evil_; _The World and the Individual_; _Gifford + Lectures_; and numerous other works and memoirs.] + + +I shall not attempt, in this address, either to justify or to criticise +the name, normative science, under which the doctrines which constitute +this division are grouped. It is enough for my purpose to recognize at +the outset that I am required, by the plans of this Congress, to explain +what scientific interests seem to me to be common to the work of the +philosophers and of the mathematicians. The task is one which makes +severe demands upon the indulgence of the listener, and upon the +expository powers of the speaker, but it is a task for which the present +age has well prepared the way. The spirit which Descartes and Leibnitz +illustrated seems likely soon to become, in a new and higher sense, +prominent in science. The mathematicians are becoming more and more +philosophical. The philosophers, in the near future, will become, I +believe, more and more mathematical. It is my office to indicate, as +well as the brief time and my poor powers may permit, why this ought to +be so. + +To this end I shall first point out what is that most general community +of interest which unites all the sciences that belong to our division. +Then I shall indicate what type of recent and special scientific work +most obviously bears upon the tasks of all of us alike. Thirdly, I shall +state some results and problems to which this type of scientific work +has given rise, and shall try to show what promise we have of an early +increase of insight regarding our common interests. + + +I + +The most general community of interest which unites the various +scientific activities that belong to our division is this: We are all +concerned with what may be called ideal truth, as distinct from physical +truth. Some of us also have a strong interest in physical truth; but +none of us lack a notable and scientific concern for the realm of ideas, +viewed as ideas. + +Let me explain what I mean by these terms. Whoever studies physical +truth (taking that term in its most general sense) seeks to observe, to +collate, and, in the end, to control, facts which he regards as external +to his own thought. But instead of thus looking mainly without, it is +possible for a man chiefly to take account, let us say, of the +consequences of his own hypothetical assumptions--assumptions which may +possess but a very remote relation to the physical world. Or again, it +is possible for such a student to be mainly devoted to reflecting upon +the formal validity of his own inferences, or upon the meaning of his +own presuppositions, or upon the value and the interrelation of human +ideals. Any such scientific work, reflective, considerate principally of +the thinker's own constructions and purposes, or of the constructions +and purposes of humanity in general, is a pursuit of ideal truth. The +searcher who is mainly devoted to the inquiry into what he regards as +external facts, is indeed active; but his activity is moulded by an +order of existence which he conceives as complete apart from his +activity. He is thoughtful; but a power not himself assigns to him the +problems about which he thinks. He is guided by ideals; but his +principal ideal takes the form of an acceptance of the world as it is, +independently of his ideals. His dealings are with nature. His aim is +the conquest of a foreign realm. But the student of what may be called, +in general terms, ideal truth, while he is devoted as his fellow, the +observer of outer nature, to the general purpose of being faithful to +the verity as he finds it, is still aware that his own way of finding, +or his own creative activity as an inventor of hypotheses, or his own +powers of inference, or his conscious ideals, constitute in the main the +object into which he is inquiring, and so form an essential aspect of +the sort of verity which he is endeavoring to discover. The guide, then, +of such a student is, in a peculiar sense, his own reason. His goal is +the comprehension of his own meaning, the conscious and thoughtful +conquest of himself. His great enemy is not the mystery of outer nature, +but the imperfection of his reflective powers. He is, indeed, as +unwilling as is any scientific worker to trust private caprices. He +feels as little as does the observer of outer facts, that he is merely +noting down, as they pass, the chance products of his arbitrary fantasy. +For him, as for any scientific student, truth is indeed objective; and +the standards to which he conforms are eternal. But his method is that +of an inner considerateness rather than of a curiosity about external +phenomena. His objective world is at the same time an essentially ideal +world, and the eternal verity in whose light he seeks to live has, +throughout his undertakings, a peculiarly intimate relation to the +purposes of his own constructive will. + +One may then sum up the difference of attitude which is here in question +by saying that, while the student of outer nature is explicitly +conforming his plans of action, his ideas, his ideals, to an order of +truth which he takes to be foreign to himself--the student of the other +sort of truth, here especially in question, is attempting to understand +his own plans of action, that is, to develop his ideas, or to define his +ideals, or else to do both these things. + +Now it is not hard to see that this search for some sort of ideal truth +is indeed characteristic of every one of the investigations which have +been grouped together in our division of the normative sciences. Pure +mathematics shares in common with philosophy this type of scientific +interest in ideal, as distinct from physical or phenomenal truth. There +is, to be sure, a marked contrast between the ways in which the +mathematician and the philosopher approach, select, and elaborate their +respective sorts of problems. But there is also a close relation between +the two types of investigation in question. Let us next consider both +the contrast and the analogy in some of their other most general +features. + +Pure mathematics is concerned with the investigation of the logical +consequences of certain exactly stateable postulates or +hypotheses--such, for instance, as the postulates upon which arithmetic +and analysis are founded, or such as the postulates that lie at the +basis of any type of geometry. For the pure mathematician, the truth of +these hypotheses or postulates depends, not upon the fact that physical +nature contains phenomena answering to the postulates, but solely upon +the fact that the mathematician is able, with rational consistency, to +state these assumed first principles, and to develop their consequences. +Dedekind, in his famous essay, "Was Sind und Was Sollen die Zahlen," +called the whole numbers "freie Schöpfungen des Menschlichen Geistes;" +and, in fact, we need not enter into any discussion of the psychology of +our number concept in order to be able to assert that, however we men +first came by our conception of the whole numbers, for the mathematician +the theory of numerical truth must appear simply as the logical +development of the consequences of a few fundamental first principles, +such as those which Dedekind himself, or Peano, or other recent writers +upon this topic, have, in various forms, stated. A similar formal +freedom marks the development of any other theory in the realm of pure +mathematics. Pure geometry, from the modern point of view, is neither a +doctrine forced upon the human mind by the constitution of any primal +form of intuition, nor yet a branch of physical science, limited to +describing the spatial arrangement of phenomena in the external world. +Pure geometry is the theory of the consequences of certain postulates +which the geometer is at liberty consistently to make; so that there are +as many types of geometry as there are consistent systems of postulates +of that generic type of which the geometer takes account. As is also now +well known, it has long been impossible to define pure mathematics as +the science of quantity, or to limit the range of the exactly stateable +hypotheses or postulates with which the mathematician deals to the world +of those objects which, ideally speaking, can be viewed as measurable. +For the ideally defined measurable objects are by no means the only ones +whose properties can be stated in the form of exact postulates or +hypotheses; and the possible range of pure mathematics, if taken in the +abstract, and viewed apart from any question as to the value of given +lines of research, appears to be identical with the whole realm of the +consequences of exactly stateable ideal hypotheses of every type. + +One limitation must, however, be mentioned, to which the assertion just +made is, in practice, obviously subject. And this is, indeed, a +momentous limitation. The exactly stated ideal hypotheses whose +consequences the mathematician develops must possess, as is sometimes +said, sufficient intrinsic importance to be worthy of scientific +treatment. They must not be trivial hypotheses. The mathematician is +not, like the solver of chess problems, merely displaying his skill in +dealing with the arbitrary fictions of an ideal game. His truth is, +indeed, ideal; his world is, indeed, treated by his science as if this +world were the creation of his postulates a "freie Schöpfung." But he +does not thus create for mere sport. On the contrary, he reports a +significant order of truth. As a fact, the ideal systems of the pure +mathematician are customarily defined with an obvious, even though often +highly abstract and remote, relation to the structure of our ordinary +empirical world. Thus the various algebras which have been actually +developed have, in the main, definite relations to the structure of the +space world of our physical experience. The different systems of ideal +geometry, even in all their ideality, still cluster, so to speak, about +the suggestions which our daily experience of space and of matter give +us. Yet I suppose that no mathematician would be disposed, at the +present time, to accept any brief definition of the degree of closeness +or remoteness of relation to ordinary experience which shall serve to +distinguish a trivial from a genuinely significant branch of +mathematical theory. In general, a mathematician who is devoted to the +theory of functions, or to group theory, appears to spend little time in +attempting to show why the development of the consequences of his +postulates is a significant enterprise. The concrete mathematical +interest of his inquiry sustains him in his labors, and wins for him the +sympathy of his fellows. To the questions, "Why consider the ideal +structure of just this system of object at all?" "Why study various +sorts of numbers, or the properties of functions, or of groups, or the +system of points in projective geometry?"--the pure mathematician in +general, cares to reply only, that the topic of his special +investigation appears to him to possess sufficient mathematical +interest. The freedom of his science thus justifies his enterprise. Yet, +as I just pointed out, this freedom is never mere caprice. This ideal +interest is not without a general relation to the concerns even of +common sense. In brief, as it seems at once fair to say, the pure +mathematician is working under the influence of more or less clearly +conscious philosophical motives. He does not usually attempt to define +what distinguishes a significant from a trivial system of postulates, or +what constitutes a problem worth attacking from the point of view of +pure mathematics. But he practically recognizes such a distinction +between the trivial and the significant regions of the world of ideal +truth, and since philosophy is concerned with the significance of ideas, +this recognition brings the mathematician near in spirit to the +philosopher. + +Such, then, is the position of the pure mathematician. What, by way of +contrast, is that of the philosopher? We may reply that to state the +formal consequences of exact assumptions is one thing; to reflect upon +the mutual relations, and the whole significance of such assumptions, +does indeed involve other interests; and these other interests are the +ones which directly carry us over to the realm of philosophy. If the +theory of numbers belongs to pure mathematics, the study of the place of +the number concept in the system of human ideas belongs to philosophy. +Like the mathematician, the philosopher deals directly with a realm of +ideal truth. But to unify our knowledge, to comprehend its sources, its +meaning, and its relations to the whole of human life, these aims +constitute the proper goal of the philosopher. In order, however, to +accomplish his aims, the philosopher must, indeed, take account of the +results of the special physical science; but he must also turn from the +world of outer phenomena to an ideal world. For the unity of things is +never, for us mortals, anything that we find given in our experience. +You cannot see the unity of knowledge; you cannot describe it as a +phenomenon. It is for us now, an ideal. And precisely so, the meaning of +things, the relation of knowledge to life, the significance of our +ideals, their bearing upon one another--these are never, for us men, +phenomenally present data. Hence the philosopher, however much he ought, +as indeed he ought, to take account of phenomena, and of the results of +the special physical sciences, is quite as deeply interested in his own +way, as the mathematician is interested in his way, in the consideration +of an ideal realm. Only, unlike the mathematician, the philosopher does +not first abstract from the empirical suggestions upon which his exact +ideas are actually based, and then content himself merely with +developing the logical consequences of these ideas. On the contrary, his +main interest is not in any idea or fact in so far as it is viewed by +itself, but rather in the interrelations, in the common significance, in +the unity, of all fundamental ideas, and in their relations both to the +phenomenal facts and to life! On the whole, he, therefore, neither +consents, like the student of a special science of experience, to seek +his freedom solely through conformity to the phenomena which are to be +described; nor is he content, like the pure mathematician, to win his +truth solely through the exact definition of the formal consequences of +his freely defined hypotheses. He is making an effort to discover the +sense and the unity of the business of his own life. + +It is no part of my purpose to attempt to show here how this general +philosophical interest differentiates into the various interests of +metaphysics, of the philosophy of religion, of ethics, of æsthetics, of +logic. Enough--I have tried to illustrate how, while both the +philosopher and the mathematician have an interest in the meaning of +ideas rather than in the description of external facts, still there is a +contrast which does, indeed, keep their work in large measure asunder, +namely, the contrast due to the fact that the mathematician is directly +concerned with developing the consequences of certain freely assumed +systems of postulates or hypotheses; while the philosopher is interested +in the significance, in the unity, and in the relation to life, of all +the fundamental ideals and postulates of the human mind. + +Yet not even thus do we sufficiently state how closely related the two +tasks are. For this very contrast, as we have also suggested, is, even +within its own limits, no final or perfectly sharp contrast. There is a +deep analogy between the two tasks. For the mathematician, as we have +just seen, is not evenly interested in developing the consequences of +any and every system of freely assumed postulates. He is no mere solver +of arbitrary ideal puzzles in general. His systems of postulates are so +chosen as to be not trivial, but significant. They are, therefore, in +fact, but abstractly defined aspects of the very system of eternal truth +whose expression is the universe. In this sense the mathematician is as +genuinely interested as is the philosopher in the significant use of his +scientific freedom. On the other hand, the philosopher, in reflecting +upon the significance and the unity of fundamental ideas, can only do so +with success in case he makes due inquiry into the logical consequences +of given ideas. And this he can accomplish only if, upon occasion, he +employs the exact methods of the mathematician, and develops his systems +of ideal truth with the precision of which only mathematical research is +capable. As a fact, then, the mathematician and the philosopher deal +with ideal truth in ways which are not only contrasted, but profoundly +interconnected. The mathematician, in so far as he consciously +distinguishes significant from trivial problems, and ideal systems, is a +philosopher. The philosopher, in so far as he seeks exactness of logical +method, in his reflection, must meanwhile aim to be, within his own +limits, a mathematician. He, indeed, will not in future, like Spinoza, +seek to reduce philosophy to the mere development, in mathematical form, +of the consequences of certain arbitrary hypotheses. He will distinguish +between a reflection upon the unity of the system of truth and an +abstract development of this or that selected aspect of the system. But +he will see more and more that, in so far as he undertakes to be exact, +he must aim to become, in his own way, and with due regard to his own +purposes, mathematical; and thus the union of mathematical and +philosophical inquiries, in the future, will tend to become closer and +closer. + + +II + +So far, then, I have dwelt upon extremely general considerations +relating to the unity and the contrast of mathematical and philosophical +inquiries. I can well conceive, however, that the individual worker in +any one of the numerous branches of investigation which are represented +by the body of students whom I am privileged to address, may at this +point mentally interpose the objection that all these considerations +are, indeed, far too general to be of practical interest to any of us. +Of course, all we who study these so-called normative sciences are, +indeed, interested in ideas, for their own sakes--in ideas so distinct +from, although of course also somehow related to, phenomena. Of course, +some of us are rather devoted to the development of the consequences of +exactly stated ideal hypotheses, and others to reflecting as we can upon +what certain ideas and ideals are good for, and upon what the unity is +of all ideas and ideals. Of course, if we are wise enough to do so, we +have much to learn from one another. But, you will say, the assertion of +all these things is a commonplace. The expression of the desire for +further mutual coöperation is a pious wish. You will insist upon asking +further: "Is there just now any concrete instance in a modern type of +research which furnishes results such as are of interest to all of us? +Are we actually doing any productive work in common? Are the +philosophers contributing anything to human knowledge which has a +genuine bearing upon the interests of mathematical science? Are the +mathematicians contributing anything to philosophy?" + +These questions are perfectly fair. Moreover, as it happens, they can be +distinctly answered in the affirmative. The present age is one of a +rapid advance in the actual unification of the fields of investigation +which are included within the scope of this present division. What +little time remains to me must be devoted to indicating, as well as I +can, in what sense this is true. I shall have still to deal in very +broad generalities. I shall try to make these generalities definite +enough to be not wholly unfruitful. + +We have already emphasized one question which may be said to interest, +in a very direct way, both the mathematician and the philosopher. The +ideal postulates, whose consequences mathematical science undertakes to +develop, must be, we have said, significant postulates, involving ideas +whose exact definition and exposition repay the labor of scientific +scrutiny. Number, space, continuity, functional correspondence or +dependence, group-structure--these are examples of such significant +ideas; the postulates or ideal assumptions upon which the theory of such +ideas depends are significant postulates, and are not the mere +conventions of an arbitrary game. But now what constitutes the +significance of an idea, or of an abstract mathematical theory? What +gives an idea a worthy place in the whole scheme of human ideas? Is it +the possibility of finding a physical application for a mathematical +theory which for us decides what is the value of the theory? No, the +theory of functions, the theory of numbers, group theory, have a +significance which no mathematician would consent to measure in terms of +the present applicability or non-applicability of these theories in +physical science? In vain, then, does one attempt to use the test of +applied mathematics as the main criticism of the value of a theory of +pure mathematics. The value of an idea, for the sciences which +constitute our division, is dependent upon the place which this idea +occupies in the whole organized scheme or system of human ideas. The +idea of number, for instance, familiar as its applications are, does not +derive its main value from the fact that eggs and dollars and +star-clusters can be counted, but rather from the fact that the idea of +numbers has those relations to other fundamental ideas which recent +logical theory has made prominent--relations, for instance, to the +concept of order, to the theory of classes or collections of objects +viewed in general, and to the metaphysical concept of the self. +Relations of this sort, which the discussions of the number concept by +Dedekind, Cantor, Peano, and Russell have recently brought to +light--such relations, I say, constitute what truly justified Gauss in +calling the theory of numbers a "divine science." As against such deeper +relations, the countless applications of the number concept in ordinary +life, and in science, are, from the truly philosophical point of view, +of comparatively small moment. What we want, in the work of our division +of the sciences, is to bring to light the unity of truth, either, as in +mathematics, by developing systems of truth which are significant by +virtue of their actual relations to this unity, or, as in philosophy, by +explicitly seeking the central idea about which all the many ideas +cluster. + +Now, an ancient and fundamental problem for the philosophers is that +which has been called the problem of the categories. This problem of the +categories is simply the more formal aspect of the whole philosophical +problem just defined. The philosopher aims to comprehend the unity of +the system of human ideas and ideals. Well, then, what are the primal +ideas? Upon what group of concepts do the other concepts of human +science logically depend? About what central interests is the system of +human ideals clustered? In ancient thought Aristotle already approached +this problem in one way. Kant, in the eighteenth century, dealt with it +in another. We students of philosophy are accustomed to regret what we +call the excessive formalism of Kant, to lament that Kant was so much +the slave of his own relatively superficial and accidental table of +categories, and that he made the treatment of every sort of +philosophical problem turn upon his own schematism. Yet we cannot doubt +that Kant was right in maintaining that philosophy needs, for the +successful development of every one of its departments, a well-devised +and substantially complete system of categories. Our objection to Kant's +over-confidence in the virtues of his own schematism is due to the fact +that we do not now accept his table of categories as an adequate view of +the fundamental concepts. The efforts of philosophers since Kant have +been repeatedly devoted to the task of replacing his scheme of +categories by a more adequate one. I am far from regarding these purely +philosophical efforts made since Kant as fruitless, but they have +remained, so far, very incomplete, and they have been held back from +their due fullness of success by the lack of a sufficiently careful +survey and analysis of the processes of thought as these have come to be +embodied in the living sciences. Such concepts as number, quantity, +space, time, cause, continuity, have been dealt with by the pure +philosophers far too summarily and superficially. A more thoroughgoing +analysis has been needed. But now, in comparatively recent times, there +has developed a region of inquiry which one may call by the general name +of modern logic. To the constitution of this new region of inquiry men +have principally contributed who began as mathematicians, but who, in +the course of their work, have been led to become more and more +philosophers. Of late, however, various philosophers, who were +originally in no sense mathematicians, becoming aware of the importance +of the new type of research, are in their turn attempting both to +assimilate and to supplement the undertakings which were begun from the +mathematical side. As a result, the logical problem of the categories +has to-day become almost equally a problem for the logicians of +mathematics and for those students of philosophy who take any serious +interest in exactness of method in their own branch of work. The result +of this actual coöperation of men from both sides is that, as I think, +we are to-day, for the first time, in sight of what is still, as I +freely admit, a somewhat distant goal, namely, the relatively complete +rational analysis and tabulation of the fundamental categories of human +thought. That the student of ethics is as much interested in such an +investigation as is the metaphysician, that the philosopher of religion +needs a well-completed table of categories quite as much as does the +pure logician, every competent student of such topics ought to admit. +And that the enterprise in question keenly interests the mathematicians +is shown by the prominent part which some of them have taken in the +researches in question. Here, then, is the type of recent scientific +work whose results most obviously bear upon the tasks of all of us +alike. + +A catalogue of the names of the workers in this wide field of modern +logic would be out of place here. Yet one must, indeed, indicate what +lines of research are especially in question. From the purely +mathematical side, the investigations of the type to which I now refer +may be viewed (somewhat arbitrarily) as beginning with that famous +examination into one of the postulates of Euclid's geometry which gave +rise to the so-called non-Euclidean geometry. The question here +originally at issue was one of a comparatively limited scope, namely, +the question whether Euclid's parallel-line postulate was a logical +consequence of the other geometrical principles. But the investigation +rapidly develops into a general study of the foundations of geometry--a +study to which contributions are still almost constantly appearing. +Somewhat independently of this line of inquiry there grew up, during the +latter half of the nineteenth century, that reëxamination of the bases +of arithmetic and analysis which is associated with the names of +Dedekind, Weierstrass, and George Cantor. At the present time, the +labors of a number of other inquirers (amongst whom we may mention the +school of Peano and Pieri in Italy, and men such as Poincaré and +Couturat in France, Hilbert in Germany, Bertrand Russell and Whitehead +in England, and an energetic group of our American mathematicians--men +such as Professor Moore, Professor Halsted, Dr. Huntington, Dr. Veblen, +and a considerable number of others) have been added to the earlier +researches. The result is that we have recently come for the first time +to be able to see, with some completeness, what the assumed first +principles of pure mathematics actually are. As was to be expected, +these principles are capable of more than one formulation, according as +they are approached from one side or from another. As was also to be +expected, the entire edifice of pure mathematics, so far as it has yet +been erected, actually rests upon a very few fundamental concepts and +postulates, however you may formulate them. What was not observed, +however, by the earlier, and especially by the philosophical, students +of the categories, is the form which these postulates tend to assume +when they are rigidly analyzed. + +This form depends upon the precise definition and classification of +certain types of relations. The whole of geometry, for instance, +including metrical geometry, can be developed from a set of postulates +which demand the existence of points that stand in certain ordinal +relationships. The ordinal relationships can be reduced, according as +the series of points considered is open or closed, either to the +well-known relationship in which three points stand when one is between +the other two upon a right line, or else to the ordinal relationship in +which four points stand when they are separated by pairs; and these two +ordinal relationships, by means of various logical devices, can be +regarded as variations of a single fundamental form. Cayley and Klein +founded the logical theory of geometry here in question. Russell, and in +another way Dr. Veblen, have given it its most recent expressions. In +the same way, the theory of whole numbers can be reduced to sets of +principles which demand the existence of certain ideal objects in +certain simple ordinal relations. Dedekind and Peano have worked out +such ordinal theories of the number concept. In another development of +the theory of the cardinal whole numbers, which Russell and Whitehead +have worked out, ordinal concepts are introduced only secondarily, and +the theory depends upon the fundamental relation of the equivalence or +nonequivalence of collections of objects. But here also a certain simple +type of relation determines the definitions and the development of the +whole theory. + +Two results follow from such a fashion of logically analyzing the first +principles of mathematical science. In the first place, as just pointed +out, we learn _how few and simple are the conceptions and postulates_ +upon which the actual edifice of exact science rests. Pure mathematics, +we have said, is free to assume what it chooses. Yet the assumptions +whose presence as the foundation principles of the actually existent +pure mathematics an exhaustive examination thus reveals, show by their +fewness that the ideal freedom of the mathematician to assume and to +construct what he pleases, is indeed, in practice, a very decidedly +limited freedom. The limitation is, as we have already seen, a +limitation which has to do with the essential significance of the +fundamental concepts in question. And so the result of this analysis of +the bases of the actually developed and significant branches of +mathematics, constitutes a sort of empirical revelation of what +categories the exact sciences have practically found to be of such +significance as to be worthy of exhaustive treatment. Thus the +instinctive sense for significant truth, which has all along been +guiding the development of mathematics, comes at least to a clear and +philosophical consciousness. And meanwhile the essential categories of +thought are seen in a new light. + +The second result still more directly concerns a philosophical logic. It +is this: Since the few types of relations which this sort of analysis +reveals as the fundamental ones in exact science are of such importance, +the logic of the present day is especially required to face the +questions: _What is the nature of our concept of relations?_ What are +the various possible types of relations? Upon what does the variety of +these types depend? What unity lies beneath the variety? + +As a fact, logic, in its modern forms, namely, first that symbolic logic +which Boole first formulated, which Mr. Charles S. Peirce and his pupils +have in this country already so highly developed, and which Schroeder in +Germany, Peano's school in Italy, and a number of recent English writers +have so effectively furthered--and secondly, the logic of scientific +method, which is now so actively pursued, in France, in Germany, and in +the English-speaking countries--this whole movement in modern logic, as +I hold, is rapidly approaching _new solutions of the problem of the +fundamental nature and the logic of relations_. The problem is one in +which we are all equally interested. To De Morgan in England, in an +earlier generation, and, in our time, to Charles Peirce in this country, +very important stages in the growth of these problems are due. Russell, +in his work on the _Principles of Mathematics_ has very lately +undertaken to sum up the results of the logic of relations, as thus far +developed, and to add his own interpretations. Yet I think that Russell +has failed to get as near to the foundations of the theory of relations +as the present state of the discussion permits. For Russell has failed +to take account of what I hold to be the most fundamentally important +generalization yet reached in the general theory of relations. This is +the generalization set forth as early as 1890, by Mr. A. B. Kempe, of +London, in a pair of wonderful but too much neglected, papers, entitled, +respectively, _The Theory of Mathematical Form_, and _The Analogy +between the Logical Theory of Classes and the Geometrical Theory of +Points_. A mere hint first as to the more precise formulation of the +problem at issue, and then later as to Kempe's special contribution to +that problem, may be in order here, despite the impossibility of any +adequate statement. + + +III + +The two most obviously and universally important kinds of relations +known to the exact sciences, as these sciences at present exist, are: +(1) The relations of the type of equality or equivalence; and (2) the +relations of the type of before and after, or greater and less. The +first of these two classes of relations, namely, the class represented, +although by no means exhausted, by the various relations actually +called, in different branches of science by the one name equality, this +class I say, might well be named, as I myself have proposed, the +leveling relations. A collection of objects between any two of which +some one relation of this type holds, may be said to be a collection +whose members, in some defined sense or other, are on the same level. +The second of these two classes of relations, namely, those of the type +of before and after, or greater and less--this class of relations, I +say, consists of what are nowadays often called the serial relations. +And a collection of objects such that, if any pair of these objects be +chosen, a determinate one of this pair stands to the other one of the +same pair in some determinate relation of this second type, and in a +relation which remains constant for all the pairs that can be thus +formed out of the members of this collection--any such collection, I +say, constitutes a one-dimensional open series. Thus, in case of a file +of men, if you choose any pair of men belonging to the file, a +determinate one of them is, in the file, before the other. In the number +series, of any two numbers, a determinate one is greater than the other. +Wherever such a state of affairs exists, one has a series. + +Now these two classes of relations, the leveling relations and the +serial relations, agree with one another, and differ from one another in +very momentous ways. They _agree_ with one another in that both the +leveling and the serial relations are what is technically called +_transitive_; that is, both classes conform to what Professor James has +called the law of "skipped intermediaries." Thus, if _A_ is equal to +_B_, and _B_ is equal to _C_, it follows that _A_ is equal to _C_. If +_A_ is before _B_, and _B_ is before _C_, then _A_ is before _C_. And +this property, which enables you in your reasonings about these +relations to skip middle terms, and so to perform some operation of +elimination, is the property which is meant when one calls relations of +this type transitive. But, on the other hand, these two classes of +relations _differ_ from each other in that the leveling relations are, +while the serial relations are not, _symmetrical_ or reciprocal. Thus, +if _A_ is equal to _B_, _B_ is equal to _A_. But if _X_ is greater than +_Y_, then _Y_ is not greater than _X_, but less than _X_. So the +leveling relations are symmetrical transitive relations. But the serial +relations are transitive relations which are not symmetrical. + +All this is now well known. It is notable, however, that nearly all the +processes of our exact sciences, as at present developed, can be said to +be essentially such as lead either to the placing of sets or classes of +objects on the same level, by means of the use of symmetrical transitive +relations, or else to the arranging of objects in orderly rows or +series, by means of the use of transitive relations which are not +symmetrical. This holds also of all the applications of the exact +sciences. Whatever else you do in science (or, for that matter, in art), +you always lead, in the end, either to the arranging of objects, or of +ideas, or of acts, or of movements, in rows or series, or else to the +placing of objects or ideas of some sort on the same level, by virtue of +some equivalence, or of some invariant character. Thus numbers, +functions, lines in geometry, give you examples of serial relations. +Equations in mathematics are classic instances of leveling relations. +So, of course, are invariants. Thus, again, the whole modern theory of +energy consists of two parts, one of which has to do with levels of +energy, in so far as the quantity of energy of a closed system remains +invariant through all the transformations of the system, while the other +part has to do with the irreversible serial order of the transformations +of energy themselves, which follow a set of unsymmetrical relations, in +so far as energy tends to fall from higher to lower levels of intensity +within the same system. + +The entire conceivable universe then, and all of our present exact +science, can be viewed, if you choose, as a collection of objects or of +ideas that, whatever other types of relations may exist, are at least +largely characterized either by the leveling relations, or by the serial +relations, or by complexes of both sorts of relations. Here, then, we +are plainly dealing with very fundamental categories. The "between" +relations of geometry can of course be defined, if you choose, in terms +of transitive relations that are not symmetrical. There are, to be sure, +some other relations present in exact science, but the two types, the +serial and leveling relations, are especially notable. + +So far the modern logicians have for some time been in substantial +agreement. Russell's brilliant book is a development of the logic of +mathematics very largely in terms of the two types of relations which, +in my own way, I have just characterized; although Russell gives due +regard, of course, to certain other types of relations. + +But hereupon the question arises, "Are these two types of relations what +Russell holds them to be, namely, ultimate and irreducible logical +facts, unanalyzable categories--mere data for the thinker?" Or can we +reduce them still further, and thus simplify yet again our view of the +categories? + +Here is where Kempe's generalization begins to come into sight. These +two categories, in at least one very fundamental realm of exact thought, +can be reduced to one. There is, namely, a world of ideal objects which +especially interest the logician. It is the world of a _totality of +possible logical classes_, or again, it is the ideal world, equivalent +in formal structure to the foregoing, but composed of a _totality of +possible statements_, or thirdly, it is the world, equivalent once more, +in formal structure, to the foregoing, but consisting of a _totality of +possible acts of will_, of possible decisions. When we proceed to +consider the relational structure of such a world, taken merely in the +abstract as such a structure, a relation comes into sight which at once +appears to be peculiarly general in its nature. It is the so-called +illative relation, the relation which obtains between two classes when +one is subsumed under the other, or between two statements, or two +decisions, when one implies or entails the other. This relation is +transitive, but may be either symmetrical or not symmetrical; so that, +according as it is symmetrical or not, it may be used either to +establish levels or to generate series. In the order system of the +logician's world, the relational structure is thus, in any case, a +highly general and fundamental one. + +But this is not all. In this the logician's world of classes, or of +statements, or of decisions, there is also another relation observable. +This is the relation of exclusion or mutual opposition. This is a purely +symmetrical or reciprocal relation. It has two forms--obverse or +contradictory opposition, that is, negation proper, and contrary +opposition. But both these forms are purely symmetrical. And by proper +devices each of them can be stated in terms of the other, or reduced to +the other. And further, as Kempe incidentally shows, and as Mrs. Ladd +Franklin has also substantially shown in her important theory of the +syllogism, _it is possible to state every proposition, or complex of +propositions involving the illative relation, in terms of this purely +symmetrical relation of opposition_. Hence, so far as mere relational +form is concerned, the illative relation itself may be wholly reduced to +the symmetrical relation of opposition. This is our first result as to +the relational structure of the realm of pure logic, that is, the realm +of classes, of statements, or of decisions. + +It follows that, in describing the logician's world of possible classes +or of possible decisions, _all unsymmetrical, and so all serial, +relations can be stated solely in terms of symmetrical relations, and +can be entirely reduced to such relations_. Moreover, as Kempe has also +very prettily shown, the relation of opposition, in its two forms, just +mentioned, need not be interpreted as obtaining merely between pairs of +objects. It may and does obtain between triads, tetrads, _n_-ads of +logical entities; and so all that is true of the relations of logical +classes may consequently be stated merely by ascribing certain perfectly +symmetrical and homogeneous predicates to pairs, triads, tetrads, n-ads +of logical objects. The essential contrast between symmetrical and +unsymmetrical relations thus, in this ideal realm of the logician, +simply vanishes. The categories of the logician's world of classes, of +statements, or of decisions, are marvelously simple. All the relations +present may be viewed as variations of the mere conception of opposition +as distinct from non-opposition. + +All this holds, of course, so far, merely for the logician's world of +classes or of decisions. There, at least, all serial order can actually +be derived from wholly symmetrical relations. But Kempe now very +beautifully shows (and here lies his great and original contribution to +our topic)--he shows, I say, that the ordinal relations of geometry, as +well as of the number system, can all be regarded as indistinguishable +from _mere variations of those relations which, in pure logic, one finds +to be the symmetrical relations obtaining within pairs or triads of +classes or of statements_. The formal identity of the geometrical +relation called "between" with a purely logical relation which one can +define as existing or as not existing amongst the members of a given +triad of logical classes, or of logical statements, is shown by Kempe in +a fashion that I cannot here attempt to expound. But Kempe's result thus +enables one, as I believe, to simplify the theory of relations far +beyond the point which Russell in his brilliant book has reached. For +Kempe's triadic relation in question can be stated, in what he calls its +obverse form, in perfectly symmetrical terms. And he proves very exactly +that the resulting logical relation is precisely identical, in all its +properties, with the fundamental ordinal relation of geometry. + +Thus the order-systems of geometry and analysis appear simply as special +cases of the more general order-system of pure logic. The whole, both of +analysis and of geometry, can be regarded as a description of certain +selected groups of entities, which are chosen, according to special +rules, from a single ideal world. This general and inclusive ideal world +consists simply of _all the objects which can stand to one another in +those symmetrical relations wherein the pure logician finds various +statements, or various decisions inevitably standing_. "Let me," says in +substance Kempe, "choose from the logician's ideal world of classes or +decisions, what entities I will; and I will show you a collection of +objects that are in their relational structure, precisely identical with +the points of a geometer's space of _n_ dimensions." In other words, all +of the geometer's figures and relations can be precisely pictured by the +relational structure of a selected system of classes or of statements, +whose relations are wholly and explicitly logical relations, such as +opposition, and whose relations may all be regarded, accordingly, as +reducible to a single type of purely symmetrical relation. + +Thus, for _all_ exact science, and not merely for the logician's special +realm, the contrast between symmetrical and unsymmetrical relations +proves to be, after all, superficial and derived. The purely logical +categories, such as opposition, and such as hold within the calculus of +statements, are, apparently, the basal categories of all the exact +science that has yet been developed. Series and levels are relational +structures that, sharply as they are contrasted, can be derived from a +single root. + +I have restated Kempe's generalization in my own way. I think it the +most promising step towards new light as to the categories that we have +made for some generations. + +In the field of modern logic, I say, then, work is doing which is +rapidly tending towards the unification of the tasks of our entire +division. For this problem of the categories, in all its abstractness, +is still a common problem for all of us. Do you ask, however, what such +researches can do to furnish more special aid to the workers in +metaphysics, in the philosophy of religion, in ethics, or in æsthetics, +beyond merely helping towards the formulation of a table of +categories--then I reply that we are already not without evidence that +such general researches, abstract though they may seem, are bearing +fruits which have much more than a merely special interest. Apart from +its most general problems, that analysis of mathematical concepts to +which I have referred has in any case revealed numerous unexpected +connections between departments of thought which had seemed to be very +widely sundered. One instance of such a connection I myself have +elsewhere discussed at length, in its general metaphysical bearings. I +refer to the logical identity which Dedekind first pointed out between +the mathematical concept of the ordinal number of series and the +philosophical concept of the formal structure of an ideally completed +self. I have maintained that this formal identity throws light upon +problems which have as genuine an interest for the student of the +philosophy of religion as for the logician of arithmetic. In the same +connection it may be remarked that, as Couturat and Russell, amongst +other writers, have very clearly and beautifully shown, the argument of +the Kantian mathematical antinomies needs to be explicitly and totally +revised in the light of Cantor's modern theory of infinite collections. +To pass at once to another, and a very different instance: The modern +mathematical conceptions of what is called group theory have already +received very wide and significant applications, and promise to bring +into unity regions of research which, until recently, appeared to have +little or nothing to do with one another. Quite lately, however, there +are signs that group theory will soon prove to be of importance for the +definition of some of the fundamental concepts of that most refractory +branch of philosophical inquiry, æsthetics. Dr. Emch, in an important +paper in the _Monist_, called attention, some time since, to the +symmetry groups to which certain æsthetically pleasing forms belong, and +endeavored to point out the empirical relations between these groups and +the æsthetic effects in question. The grounds for such a connection +between the groups in question and the observed æsthetic effects, +seemed, in the paper of Dr. Emch to be left largely in the dark. But +certain papers recently published in the country by Miss Ethel Puffer, +bearing upon the psychology of the beautiful (although the author has +approached the subject without being in the least consciously +influenced, as I understand, by the conceptions of the mathematical +group theory), still actually lead, if I correctly grasp the writer's +meaning, to the doctrine that the æsthetic object, viewed as a +psychological whole, must possess a structure closely, if not precisely, +equivalent to the ideal structure of what the mathematician calls a +group. I myself have no authority regarding æsthetic concepts, and speak +subject to correction. But the unexpected, and in case of Miss Puffer's +research, quite unintended, appearance of group theory in recent +æsthetic analysis is to me an impressive instance of the use of +relatively new mathematical conceptions in philosophical regions which +_seem_, at first sight, very remote from mathematics. + +That both the group concept and the concept of the self just suggested +are sure to have also a wide application in the ethics of the future, I +am myself well convinced. In fact, no branch of philosophy is without +close relations to all such studies of fundamental categories. + +These are but hints and examples. They suffice, I hope, to show that the +workers in this division have deep common interests, and will do well, +in future, to study the arts of coöperation, and to regard one another's +progress with a watchful and cordial sympathy. In a word: Our common +problem is the theory of the categories. That problem can be solved only +by the coöperation of the mathematicians and of the philosophers. + + + + +[Illustration: THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY + +_Hand-painted Photogravure from a Painting by Otto Knille. Reproduced +from a Photograph of the Painting by permission of the Berlin Photograph +Co._ + +This famous painting is now in the University of Berlin. Thomas Aquinas, +one of the greatest of the scholastic philosophers, surnamed the +"Angelic Doctor," is delivering a learned discourse before King Louis +IX. To the right of the King stands Joinville, the French chronicler. +The Dominican monk with his hand to his face is Guillaume de Saint +Amour, and Vincent de Beauvais, and another Dominican are seated with +their backs to the platform desk from which Thomas Aquinas is making his +animated address. The picture is thoroughly characteristic of a +University disputation at the close of the Middle Ages.] + + + + +DEPARTMENT I--PHILOSOPHY + + + + +DEPARTMENT I--PHILOSOPHY + +(_Hall 6, September 20, 11.15 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR BORDEN P. BOWNE, Boston University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE H. HOWISON, University of California. + PROFESSOR GEORGE T. LADD, Yale University. + + +In opening the Department of Philosophy, the Chairman, Professor Borden +P. Bowne, LL.D., of Boston University, made an interesting address on +the Philosophical Outlook. Professor Bowne said in part:-- + + I congratulate the members of the Philosophical Section on + the improved outlook in philosophy. In the generation just + passed, philosophy was somewhat at a discount. The great and + rapid development of physical science and invention, + together with the profound changes in biological thought, + produced for a time a kind of chaos. New facts were showered + upon us in great abundance, and we had no adequate + philosophical preparation for dealing with them. Such a + condition is always disturbing. The old mental equilibrium + is overthrown and readjustment is a slow process. Besides, + the shallow sense philosophy of that time readily lent + itself to mechanical and materialistic interpretations, and + for a while it seemed as if all the higher faiths of + humanity were permanently discredited. All this has passed + away. Philosophical criticism began its work and the naïve + dogmatism of materialistic naturalism was soon disposed of. + It quickly appeared that our trouble was not due to the new + facts, but to the superficial philosophy by which they had + been interpreted. Now that we have a better philosophy, we + have come to live in perfect peace with the facts once + thought disturbing, and even to welcome them as valuable + additions to knowledge.... + + The brief naturalistic episode was not without instruction + for us. It showed conclusively the great practical + importance of philosophy. Had we had thirty years ago the + current philosophical insight, the great development of the + physical and biological sciences would have made no + disturbance whatever. But being interpreted by a crude + scheme of thought, it produced somewhat of a storm. + Philosophy may not contribute much of positive value, but it + certainly has an important negative function in the way of + suppressing pretentious dogmatism and fictitious knowledge, + which often lead men astray. It is these things which + produce conflicts of science and religion or which find in + evolution the solvent of all mysteries and the source of all + knowledge. + + Concerning the partition of territory between science and + philosophy, there are two distinct questions respecting the + facts of experience. First, we need to know the facts in + their temporal and spatial order, and the way they hang + together in a system of law. To get this knowledge is the + function of science, and in this work science has + inalienable rights and a most important practical function. + This work cannot be done by speculation nor interfered with + by authority of any kind. It is not surprising, then, that + scientists in their sense of contact with reality should be + indignant with, or feel contempt for, any who seek to limit + or proscribe their research. But supposing this work all + done, there remains another question respecting the + causality and interpretation of the facts. This question + belongs to philosophy. Science describes and registers the + facts with their temporal and spatial laws; philosophy + studies their causality and significance. And while the + scientist justly ignores the philosopher who interferes with + his inquiries, so the philosopher may justly reproach the + scientist who fails to see that the scientific question does + not touch the philosophic one.... + + In the field of metaphysics proper I note a strong tendency + toward personal idealism, or as it might be called, + Personalism; that is, the doctrine that substantial reality + can be conceived only under the personal form and that all + else is phenomenal. This is quite distinct from the + traditional idealisms of mere conceptionism. It holds the + essential fact to be a community of persons with a Supreme + Person at their head while the phenomenal world is only + expression and means of communication. And to this view we + are led by the failure of philosophizing on the impersonal + plane, which is sure to lose itself in contradiction and + impossibility. Under the form of mechanical naturalism, with + its tendencies to materialism and atheism, impersonalism has + once more been judged and found wanting. We are not likely + to have a recurrence of this view unless there be a return + to philosophical barbarism. But impersonalism at the + opposite pole in the form of abstract categories of being, + causality, unity, identity, continuity, sufficient reason, + etc., is equally untenable. Criticism shows that these + categories when abstractly and impersonally taken cancel + themselves. On the impersonal plane we can never reach unity + from plurality, or plurality from unity; and we can never + find change in identity, or identity in change. Continuity + in time becomes mere succession without the notion of + potentiality, and this in turn is empty. Existence itself is + dispersed into nothingness through the infinite divisibility + of space and time, while the law of the sufficient reason + loses itself in barren tautology and the infinite regress. + The necessary logical equivalence of cause and effect in any + impersonal scheme makes all real explanation and progress + impossible, and shuts us up to an unintelligible oscillation + between potentiality and actuality, to which there is no + corresponding thought.... + + Philosophy is still militant and has much work before it, + but the omens are auspicious, the problems are better + understood, and we are coming to a synthesis of the results + of past generations of thinking which will be a very + distinct progress. Philosophy has already done good service, + and never better than in recent times, by destroying + pretended knowledge and making room for the higher faiths of + humanity. It has also done good service in helping these + faiths to better rational form, and thus securing them + against the defilements of superstition and the cavilings of + hostile critics. With all its aberrations and shortcomings, + philosophy deserves well of humanity. + + + + +PHILOSOPHY: ITS FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS AND ITS METHODS + +BY GEORGE HOLMES HOWISON + + [George Holmes Howison, Mills Professor of Intellectual and + Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity, University of California. + b. Montgomery County, Maryland, 1834. A.B. Marietta College, + 1852; M.A. 1855; LL.D. _ibid._ 1883. Post-graduate, Lane + Theological Seminary, University of Berlin, and Oxford. + Headmaster High School, Salem, Mass., 1862-64; Assistant + Professor of Mathematics, Washington University, St. Louis, + 1864-66; Tileston Professor of Political Economy, _ibid._ + 1866-69; Professor of Logic and the Philosophy of Science, + Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1871-79; Lecturer on + Ethics, Harvard University, 1879-80; Lecturer on Logic and + Speculative Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1883-84. + Member and vice-president St. Louis Philosophical Society; + member California Historical Society; American Historical + Association; American Association for the Advancement of + Science; National Geographic Society, etc. Author of + _Treatise on Analytic Geometry_, 1869; _The Limits of + Evolution_, 1901, 2d edition, 1904; joint author and editor + of _The Conception of God_, 1897, etc. Editor Philosophical + Publications of University of California; American Editorial + Representative _Hibbert Journal_, London.] + + +The duty has been assigned me, honored colleagues, of addressing you on +the Fundamental Conceptions and the Methods of our common +pursuit--philosophy. In endeavoring to deal with the subject in a way +not unworthy of its depth and its extent, I have found it impossible to +bring the essential material within less compass than would occupy, in +reading, at least four times the period granted by our programme. I have +therefore complied with the rule of the Congress which directs that, if +a more extended writing be left with the authorities for publication, +the reading must be restricted to such a portion of it as will not +exceed the allotted time. I will accordingly read to you, first, a brief +summary of my entire discussion, by way of introduction, and then an +excerpt from the larger document, which may serve for a _specimen_, as +our scholastic predecessors used to say, of the whole inquiry I have +carried out. The impression will, of course, be fragmentary, and I must +ask beforehand for your most benevolent allowances, to prevent a +judgment too unfavorable. + +The discussion naturally falls into two main parts: the first dealing +with the Fundamental Conceptions; and the second, with the Methods. + +In the former, after presenting the conception of philosophy itself, as +_the consideration of things in the light of the whole_, I take up the +involved Fundamental Concepts in the following order:-- + + I. Whole and Part; + + II. Subject and Object (Knowing and Being, Mind and Matter; Dualism, + Materialism, Idealism); + + III. Reality and Appearance (Noumenon and Phenomenon); + + IV. Cause and Effect (Ground and Consequence; Causal System); + + V. One and Many (Number System; Monism and Pluralism); + + VI. Time and Space (their relation to Number; their Origin and + Real Meaning); + + VII. Unconditioned and Conditioned (Soul, World, God; their + Reinterpretation in terms of Pluralism); + + VIII. The True, the Beautiful, the Good (their relation to the + question between Monism and Pluralism). + +These are successively dealt with as they rise one out of the other in +the process of interpreting them and applying them in the actual +creation of philosophy, as this goes on in the historic schools. The +theoretic progress of philosophy is in this way explained by them, in +its movement from natural dualism, or realism, through the successive +forms of monism, materialistic, agnostic, and idealistic, until it +reaches the issue, now coming so strongly forward within the school of +idealism, between the adherents of monism and those of pluralism. + +The importance of the Fundamental Concepts is shown to increase as we +pass along the list, till on reaching Cause and Effect, and entering +upon its full interpretation into the complete System of Causes, we +arrive at the very significant conception of the RECIPROCITY OF FIRST +CAUSES, and through it come to the PRIMACY OF FINAL CAUSE, and the +derivative position of the other forms of cause, Material, Formal, +Efficient. The philosophic strength of idealism, but especially of +idealistic pluralism, comes into clear light as the result of this stage +of the inquiry. But it appears yet more decidedly when One and Many, +Time and Space, and their interrelations, are subjected to analysis. So +the discussion next passes to the higher conceptions, Soul, World, God, +by the pathway of the correlation Unconditioned and Conditioned, and its +kindred contrasts Absolute and Relative, Necessary and Contingent, +Infinite and Finite, corroborating and reinforcing the import of +idealism, and, still more decidedly, that of its plural form. Finally, +the strong and favorable bearing of this last on the dissolution of +agnosticism and the habilitation of the ideals, the True, the Beautiful, +and the Good, in a heightened meaning, is brought out. + +This carries the inquiry to the second part of it, that of the +Philosophical Methods. Here I recount these in a series of six: the +Dogmatic, the Skeptical, the Critical, the Pragmatic, the Genetic, the +Dialectic. These, I show, in spite of the tendency of the earlier +members in the series to over-emphasis, all have their place and +function in the development of a complete philosophy, and in fact form +an ascending series in methodic effectiveness, all that precede the last +being taken up into the comprehensive Critical Rationalism of the last. +Methodology thus passes upward, over the ascending and widening roadways +of (1) Intuition and Deduction; (2) Experience and Induction; (3) +Intuition and Experience adjusted by Critical Limits; (4) Skepticism +reinforced and made _quasi_-affirmative by Desire and Will; (5) +Empiricism enlarged by substitution of cosmic and psychic history for +subjective consciousness; (6) Enlightened return to a Rationalism +critically established by the inclusion of the preceding elements, and +by the sifting and the grading of the Fundamental Concepts through their +behavior when tested by the effort to make them universal. In this way, +the methods fall into a System, the organic principle of which is this +principle of Dialectic, which proves itself alone able to establish +_necessary_ truths; that is, _truths indeed_,--judgments that are seen +to exclude their opposites, because, in the attempt to substitute the +opposite, the place of it is still filled by the judgment which it aims +to dislodge. + +And now, with your favoring leave, I will read the excerpt from my +larger text. + +The task to which, in an especial sense, the cultivators of philosophy +are summoned by the plans of the present Congress of Arts and Science, +is certainly such as to stir an ambition to achieve it. At the same +time, it tempers eagerness by its vast difficulty, and the apprehension +lest this may prove insuperable. The task, the officers of the Congress +tell us, is no less than to promote the unification of all human +knowledge. It requires, then, the reduction of the enormous detail in +our present miscellany of sciences and arts, which to a general glance, +or even to a more intimate view, presents a confusion of differences +that seems overwhelming, to a system nevertheless clearly +harmonious,--founded, that is to say, upon universal principles which +control all differences by explaining them, and which therefore, in the +last resort, themselves flow lucidly from a single supreme principle. +Simply to state this meaning of the task set us, is enough to awaken the +doubt of its practicability. + +This doubt, we are bound to confess, has more and more impressed itself +upon the general mind, the farther this has advanced in the experience +of scientific discovery. The very increase in the multiplicity and +complexity of facts and their causal groupings increases the feeling +that at the root of things there is "a final inexplicability"--total +reality seems, more and more, too vast, too profound, for us to grasp or +to fathom. And yet, strangely enough, this increasing sense of +mysterious vastness has not in the least prevented the modern mind from +more and more asserting, with a steadily increasing insistence, the +essential and unchangeable unity of that whole of things which to our +ordinary experience, and even to all our sciences, appears such an +endless and impenetrable complex of differences,--yes, of +contradictions. In fact, this assertion of the unity of all things, +under the favorite name of the Unity of Nature, is the pet dogma of +modern science; or, rather, to speak with right accuracy, it is the +stock-in-trade of a _philosophy_ of science, current among many of the +leaders of modern science; for every such assertion, covering, as it +tacitly and unavoidably does, a view about the absolute whole, is an +assertion belonging to the province of philosophy, before whose tribunal +it must come for the assessment of its value. The presuppositions of all +the special sciences, and, above all, this presupposition of the Unity +and Uniformity of Nature, common to all of them, must thus come back for +justification and requisite definition to philosophy--that uppermost and +all-inclusive form of cognition which addresses itself to the whole as +whole. In their common assertion of the Unity of Nature, the exponents +of modern science come unawares out of their own province into quite +another and a higher; and in doing so they show how unawares they come, +by presenting in most instances the curious spectacle of proclaiming at +once their increasing belief in the unity of things, and their +increasing disbelief in its penetrability by our intelligence:-- + + _In's Innere der Natur, + Dringt kein erschaffner Geist,_ + +is their chosen poet's expression of their philosophic mood. Curious we +have the right to call this state of the scientific mind, because it is +to critical reflection so certainly self-contradictory. How can there be +a real unity belonging to what is inscrutable?--what evidence of unity +can there be, except in intelligible and explanatory continuity? + +But, at all events, this very mood of agnostic self-contradiction, into +which the development of the sciences casts such a multitude of minds, +brings them,--brings all of us,--as already indicated, into that court +of philosophy where alone such issues lawfully belong, and where alone +they can be adjudicated. If the unification of the sciences can be made +out to be real by making out its sole sufficient condition, namely, that +there is a genuine, and not a merely nominal, unity in the whole of +reality itself,--a unity that explains because it is itself, not simply +intelligible, but the only completely intelligible of things,--this +desirable result must be the work of philosophy. However difficult the +task may be, it is rightly put upon us who belong to the Department +listed first among the twenty-four in the programme of this +representative Congress. + +I cannot but express my own satisfaction, as a member of this +Department, nor fail to extend my congratulations to you who are my +colleagues in it, that the Congress, in its programme, takes openly the +affirmative on this question of the possible unification of knowledge. +The Congress has thus declared beforehand for the practicability of the +task it sets. It has even declared for its not distant accomplishment; +indeed, not impossibly, its accomplishment through the transactions of +the Congress itself; and it indicates, by no uncertain signs, the +leading, the determining part that philosophy must have in the +achievement. In fact, the authorities of the Congress themselves suggest +a solution of their own for their problem. In their programme we see a +renewed Hierarchy of the Sciences, and at the summit of this appears now +again, after so long a period of humiliating obscuration, the figure of +Philosophy, raised anew to that supremacy, as Queen of the Sciences, +which had been hers from the days of Plato to those of Copernicus, but +which she began to lose when modern physical and historical research +entered upon its course of sudden development, and which, until +recently, she has continued more and more to lose as the sciences have +advanced in their career of discoveries,--ever more unexpected, more +astonishing, yet more convincing and more helpful to the welfare of +mankind. May this sign of her recovered empire not fail! If we rejoice +at the token, the Congress has made it our part to see that the title is +vindicated. It is ours to show this normative function of philosophy, +this power to reign as the unifying discipline in the entire realm of +our possible knowledge; to show it by showing that the very nature of +philosophy--its elemental concepts and its directing ideals, its methods +taken in their systematic succession--is such as must result in a view +of universal reality that will supply the principle at once giving rise +to all the sciences and connecting them all into one harmonious whole. + +Such, and so grave, my honored colleagues, is the duty assigned to this +hour. Sincerely can I say, Would it had fallen to stronger hands than +mine! But since to mine it has been committed, I will undertake it in no +disheartened spirit; rather, in that temper of animated hope in which +the whole Congress has been conceived and planned. And I draw +encouragement from the place, and its associations, where we are +assembled--from its historic connections not only with the external +expansion of our country, but with its growth in culture, and especially +with its growth in the cultivation of philosophy. For your speaker, at +least, can never forget that here in St. Louis, the metropolis of the +region by which our national domain was in the Louisiana Purchase so +enlarged,--here was the centre of a movement in philosophic study that +has proved to be of national import. It is fitting that we all, here +to-day, near to the scene itself, commemorate the public service done by +our present National Commissioner of Education and his group of +enthusiastic associates, in beginning here, in the middle years of the +preceding century, those studies of Kant and his great idealistic +successors that unexpectedly became the nucleus of a wider and more +penetrating study of philosophy in all parts of our country. It is with +quickened memories belonging to the spot where, more than +five-and-thirty years ago, it was my happy fortune to take some part +with Dr. Harris and his companions, that I begin the task assigned me. +The undertaking seems less hopeless when I can here recall the names and +the congenial labors of Harris, of Davidson, of Brockmeyer, of Snider, +of Watters, of Jones,--half of them now gone from life. They "builded +better than they knew;" and, humbly as they may themselves have +estimated their ingenuous efforts to gain acquaintance with the greatest +thoughts, history will not fail to take note of what they did, as +marking one of the turning-points in the culture of our nation. The +publication of the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, granting all the +subtractions claimed by its critics on the score of defects (of which +its conductors were perhaps only too sensible), was an influence that +told in all our circles of philosophical study, and thence in the whole +of our social as well as our academic life. + + * * * * * + +[Here I enter upon the discussion of the subject proper, beginning, as +above indicated, with the Fundamental Conceptions. Having followed these +through the contrasts Whole and Part, Subject and Object, Reality and +Appearance (or Noumenon and Phenomenon), and developed the bearing of +these on the procedure of thought from the dualism of natural realism to +materialism and thence to idealism, with the issue now coming on, in +this last, between monism and pluralism, I strike into the contrast +Cause and Effect, and, noting its unfolding into the more comprehensive +form of Ground and Consequence, go on thence as follows:] + + * * * * * + +It is plain that the contrast Ground and Consequence will enable us to +state the new issue with closer precision and pertinence than Reality +and Appearance, Noumenon and Phenomenon, can supply; while, at the same +time, Ground and Consequence exhibits Cause and Effect as presenting a +contrast that only fulfills what Noumenon and Phenomenon foretold and +strove towards; in fact, what was more remotely, but not less surely, +also indicated by Whole and Part, Knowing and Being, Subject and Object. +For in penetrating to the coherent meaning of these conceptions, the +philosophic movement, as we saw, advanced steadily to the fuller and +fuller translating of each of them into the reality that unifies _by +explanation_, instead of pretending to explain by merely unifying; and +this, of course, will now be put forward explicitly, in the clarified +category of Cause and Effect, transfigured from a physical into a purely +logical relation. What idealism now says, in terms of this, is that the +Cause (or, as we now read it, the Ground) of all that exists is the +Subject; is Mind, the intelligently Self-conscious; and that all things +else, the mere objects, material things, are its Consequence, its +Outcome,--in that sense its Effect. And what the new pluralistic +idealism says, is that the _assemblage of individual minds_--intelligence +being essentially personal and individual, and never merely universal +and collective--is the true total Cause of all, and that every mind thus +belongs to the order of First Causes; nevertheless, that part, and the +most significant part, of the nature of every mind, essential to its +personality and its reason, is _its recognition of other minds in the +very act of its own self-definition_. That is to say, a mind by its +spontaneous nature as intelligence, by its intrinsic rational or logical +genius, puts itself as member of a _system_ of minds; all minds are put +by each other as Ends--completely standard and sacred Objects, as much +parts of the system of true Causes as each is, in its capacity of +Subject; and we have a noumenal Reality that is properly to be described +as the eternal Federal Republic of Spirits. + +Consequently, the relation of Cause and Effect now expands and heightens +into a system of the RECIPROCITY OF FIRST CAUSES; causes, that is, +which, while all coefficients in the existence and explanation of that +natural world of experience which forms their passive effect, their +objects of mere perception, are themselves related only in the higher +way of Final Causes--that is, Defining-Bases and Ends--of each other, +making them the logical Complements, and the Objects of conduct, all for +each, and each for all. Hence, the system of causation undergoes a +signal transformation, and proves to be organized by Final Cause as its +basis and root, instead of by Efficient Cause, or Originating Ground, as +the earlier stages of thinking had always assumed. + +The causal relation between the absolute or primary realities being +purely Final, or Defining and Purposive; that is to say, the uncoercive +influence of recognition and ideality; all the other forms of cause, as +grouped by Aristotle,--Material, Formal, and Efficient,--are seen to be +the derivatives of Final Cause, as being supplied by the action of the +minds that, as absolute or underived realities, exist only in the +relation of mutual Complements and Ends. Accordingly, Efficient Cause +operates only from minds, as noumena, to matter, as their phenomenon, +their presented contents of experience; or, in a secondary and +derivative sense, from one phenomenon to another, or from one group of +phenomena to another group, these playing the part of transmitters, or +(as some logicians would say) Instrumental Causes, or Means. Cause, as +Material, is hence defined as the elementary phenomenon, and the +combinations of this; and therefore, strictly taken, is merely Effect +(or Outcome) of the self-active consciousness, whose spontaneous forms +of conception and perception become the Formal Cause that organizes the +sum of phenomena into cosmic harmony or unity. + +Here, accordingly, comes into view the further and in some respects +deeper conceptual pair, Many and One. The history of philosophic thought +proves that this antithesis is darkly obscure and deeply ambiguous; for +about it have centred a large part of the conflicts of doctrine. This +pair has already been used, implicitly, in exhibiting the development of +the preceding group, Cause and Effect; and in so using it we have +supplied ourselves with a partial clarification of it, and with one +possible solution of its ambiguity. We have seen, namely, how our strong +natural persuasion that philosophy guided by the fundamental concept +Cause must become the search for the One amid the wilderness of the +Many, and that this search cannot be satisfied and ended except in an +all-inclusive Unit, in which the Many is embraced as the integral and +originated parts, completely determined, subjected, and controlled, may +give way to another and less oppressive conception of unity; a +conception of it as the harmony among many free and independent primary +realities, a harmony founded on their intelligent and reasonable mutual +recognition. This conception casts at least _some_ clearing light upon +the long and dreary disputes over the Many and the One; for it exposes, +plainly, the main source of them. They have arisen out of two chief +ambiguities,--the ambiguity of the concept One, and the ambiguity of the +concept Cause in its supreme meaning. The normal contrast between the +One and the Many is a clear and simple contrast: the One is the single +unit, and the Many is the repetition of the unit, or is the collection +of the several units. But if we go on to suppose that there is a +collection or sum of all possible units, and call this the Whole, then, +since there can be no second such, we call it also "one" (or the One, by +way of preëminence), overlooking the fact that it differs from the +simple one, or unit, _in genere_; that it is in fact not a unit at all, +not an elementary member of a series, but the annulment of all series; +that our name "one" has profoundly changed its meaning, and now stands +for the Sole, the Only. Thus, by our forgetfulness of differences, we +fall into deep water, and, with the confused illusions of the drowning, +dream of the One and All as the single _punctum originationis_ of all +things, the Source and Begetter of the very units of which it is in +reality only the resultant and the derivative. Or, from another point of +view, and in another mood, we rightly enough take the One to mean the +coherent, the intelligible, the consistent, the harmonious; and putting +the Many, on the misleading hint of its contrast to the unit, in +antithesis to this One of harmony, we fall into the belief that the Many +cannot be harmonious, is intrinsically a cluster of repulsions or of +collisions, incapable of giving rise to accord; indeed, essentially +hostile to it. So, as accord is the aim and the essence of our reason, +we are caught in the snare of monism, pluralism having apparently become +the equivalent of chaos, and thus the _bête noir_ of rational +metaphysics. Nay, in the opposed camp itself, some of the most ardent +adherents of pluralism, the liveliest of wit, the most exuberant in +literary resources, are the abjectest believers in the hopeless +disjunction and capriciousness of the plural, and hold there is a rift +in the texture of reality that no intelligence, "even though you dub it +'the Absolute,'" can mend or reach across. Yet surely there is nothing +in the Many, as a sum of units, the least at war with the One as a +system of harmony. On the contrary, even in the pure form of the Number +Series, the Many is impossible except on the principle of harmony,--the +units can be collected and summed (that is, constitute the Many), only +if they cohere in a community of intrinsic kindred. Consequently the +whole question of the chaotic or the harmonic nature of a plural world +turns on the nature of the genus which we find characteristic of the +absolutely (_i. e._, the unreservedly) real, and which is to be taken as +the common denomination enabling us to count them and to sum them. When +minds are seen to be necessarily the primary realities, but _also +necessarily federal_ as well as individual, the illusion about the +essential disjunction and non-coherence of the plurally real dissolves +away, and a primordial world of manifold persons is seen to involve no +fundamental or hopeless anarchy of individualism, irreducible in +caprice, but an indwelling principle of harmony, rather, that from the +springs of individual being intends the control and composure of all the +disorders that mark the world of experiential appearance, and so must +tend perpetually to effect this. + +The other main source of our confusions over the Many and the One is the +variety of meaning hidden in the concept Cause, and our propensity to +take its most obvious but least significant sense for its supreme +intent. Closest at hand, in experience, is our productive causation of +changes in our sense-world, and hence most obvious is that reading of +Cause which takes it as the producer of changes and, with a deeper +comprehension of it, of the inalterable linkage between changes, whereby +one follows regularly and surely upon another. Thus what we have in +philosophy agreed to call Efficient Cause comes to be mistaken for the +profoundest and the supreme form of cause, and all the other modes of +cause, the Material (or Stuff), the Form (or Conception), and the End +(or Purpose), its consequent and derivative auxiliaries. Under the +influence of this strong impression, we either assume total reality to +be One Whole, all-embracing and all-producing of its manifold modes, or +else view it as a duality, consisting of One Creator and his manifold +creatures. So it has come about that metaphysics has hitherto been +chiefly a contention between pantheism and monotheism, or, as the latter +should for greater accuracy be called, monarchotheism; and, it must be +acknowledged, this struggle has been attended by a continued (though not +continual) decline of this later dualistic theory before the steadfast +front and unyielding advance of the older monism. Thus persistent has +been the assumption that harmony can only be assured by the unity given +in some single productive causation: the only serious uncertainty has +been about the most rational way of conceiving the operation of this +Sole Cause; and this doubt has thus far, on the whole, declined in favor +of the Elder Oriental or monistic conception, as against the Hebraic +conception of extraneous creation by fiat. The frankly confessed mystery +of the latter, its open appeal to miracle, places it at a fatal +disadvantage with the Elder Orientalism, when the appeal is to reason +and intelligibility. It is therefore no occasion for wonder that, +especially since the rise of the scientific doctrine of Evolution, with +its postulate of a universal unity, self-varying yet self-fulfilling, +even the leaders of theology are more and more falling into the monistic +line and swelling the ever-growing ranks of pantheism. If it be asked +here, _And why not?_--_where is the harm of it?_--_is not the whole +question simply of what is true_? the answer is, _The mortal harm of the +destruction of personality, which lives or dies with the preservation or +destruction of individual responsibility; while the completer truth is, +that there are other and profounder (or, if you please, higher) truths +than this of explanation by Efficient Cause_. In fact, there is a higher +conception of Cause itself than this of production, or efficiency; for, +of course, as we well might say, that alone can be the supreme +conception of Cause which can subsist between absolute or unreserved +realities, and such must exclude their production or their necessitating +control by others. So that we ought long since to have realized that +Final Cause, the recognized presence to each other as unconditioned +realities, or Defining Auxiliaries and Ends, is the sole causal relation +that can hold among primary realities; though among such it _can_ hold, +and in fact must. + +For the absolute reality of personal intelligences, at once individual +and universally recognizant of others, is called for by other +conceptions fundamental to philosophy. These other fundamental concepts +can no more be counted out or ignored than those we have hitherto +considered; and when we take them up, we shall see how vastly more +significant they are. They alone will prove supreme, truly organizing, +normative; they alone can introduce gradation in truths, for they alone +introduce the judgment of worth, of valuation; they alone can give us +counsels of perfection, for they alone rise from those elements in our +being which deal with ideals and with veritable Ideas. So let us proceed +to them. + + * * * * * + +Our path into their presence, however, is through another pair, not so +plainly antithetic as those we have thus far considered. This pair that +I now mean is Time and Space, which, though not obviously antinomic, yet +owes its existence, as can now be shown, to that profoundest of +concept-contrasts which we earlier considered under the head of Subject +and Object, when the Object takes on its only adequate form of Other +Subject. But in passing from the contrast One and Many towards its +rational transformation into the moral society of Mind and Companion +Minds, we break into this pair of Time and Space, and must make our way +through it by taking in its full meaning. + +Time and Space play an enormous part in all our empirical thinking, our +actual use of thought in our sense-perceptive life. And no wonder; for, +in coöperation, they form the postulate and condition of all our +possible sensuous consciousness. Only on them as backgrounds can thought +take on the peculiar clearness of an image or a picture; only on the +screens which they supply can we literally _depict_ an object. And this +clarity of outline and boundary is so dear to our ordinary +consciousness, that we are prone to say there is no sufficient, no real +clearness, unless we can clarify by the bounds either of place or of +date, or of both. In this mood, we are led to deny the reality and +validity of thought altogether, when it cannot be defined in the metes +and bounds afforded by Time or by Space: that which has no date nor +place, we say,--no extent and no duration,--cannot be real; it is but a +pseudo-thought, a pretense and a delusion. Here is the extremely +plausible foundation of the philosophy known as sensationism, the +refined or second-thought form of materialism, in which it begins its +euthanasia into idealism. + +Without delaying here to criticise this, let us notice the part that +Time and Space play in reference to the conceptual pair we last +considered, the One and the Many; for not otherwise shall we find our +way beyond them to the still more fundamental conceptions which we are +now aiming to reach. Indeed, it is through our surface-apprehension of +the pair One and Many, as this illumines experience, that we most +naturally come at the pair Time and Space; so that these are at first +taken for mere generalizations and abstractions, the purely nominal +representatives of the actual distinctions between the members of the +Many by our sense perception of this from that, of here from there, of +now from then. It is not till our reflective attention is fixed on the +fact that _there_ and _here_, _now_ and _then_, are _peculiar_ +distinctions, wholly different from other contrasts of this with +that,--which may be made in all sorts of ways, by difference of quality, +or of quantity, or of relations quite other than place and date,--it is +not till we realize this _peculiar_ character of the Time-contrast and +the Space-contrast, that we see these singular differential _qualia_ +cannot be derived from others, not even from the contrast One and Many, +but are independent, are themselves underived and spontaneous utterances +of our intelligent, our percipient nature. But when Kant first helped +mankind to the realization of this spontaneous (or _a priori_) character +of this pair of perceptive conditions, or Sense-Forms, he fell into the +persuasion, and led the philosophic world into it, that though Time and +Space are not derivatives of the One and the Many read as the numerical +aspect of our perceptive experiences, yet there _is_ between the two +pairs a connection of dependence as intimate as that first supposed, but +in exactly the opposite sense; namely, that the One and the Many are +conditioned by Time and Space, or, when it comes to the last resort, are +at any rate completely dependent upon Time. By a series of units, this +view means, we really understand a set of items discriminated and +related either as points or as instants: in the last analysis, as +instants: that is, it is impossible to apprehend a unit, or to count and +sum units, unless the unit is taken as an instant, and the units as so +many instants. Numbers, Kant holds, are no doubt pure (or quite +unsensuous) percepts,--discerned particulars,--therefore spontaneous +products of the mind _a priori_, but made possible only by the primary +pure percept Time, or, again, through the mediation of this, by the +conjoined pure percept Space; so that the numbers, in their own pure +character, are simply the instants in their series. As the instants, and +therefore the numbers, are pure percepts,--particulars discerned without +the help of sense,--so pure percepts, in a primal and comprehensive +sense, argues Kant, must their conditioning postulates Time and Space +be, to supply the "element," or "medium," that will render such pure +percepts possible. + +This doctrine of Kant's is certainly plausible; indeed, it is +impressively so; and it has taken a vast hold in the world of science, +and has reinforced the popular belief in the unreality of thought apart +from Time and Space; an unreality which it is an essential part of +Kant's system to establish critically. But as a graver result, it has +certainly tended to discredit the belief in personal identity as an +abiding and immutable reality, enthroned over the mutations of things in +Time and Space; since all that is in these is numbered and is mutable, +and is rather many than one, yet nothing is believed real except as it +falls under them, at any rate under Time. And with this decline of the +belief in a changeless self, has declined, almost as rapidly and +extensively, the belief in immortality. Or, rather, the permanence and +the identity of the person has faded into a question regarded as +unanswerable; though none the less does this agnostic state of belief +tend to take personality, in any responsible sense of the word, out of +the region of practical concern. With what is unknowable, even if +existing, we can have no active traffic; 't is for our conduct as if it +were not. + +So it behooves us to search if this prevalent view about the relation of +One and Many to Time and Space is trustworthy and exact. What place and +function in philosophy must Space and Time be given?--for they certainly +have a place and function; they certainly are among the inexpugnable +conceptions with which thought has to concern itself when it undertakes +to gain a view of the whole. But it may be easy to give them a larger +place and function than belong to them by right. Is it true, then, that +the One and the Many--that the system of Numbers, in short--are +unthinkable except as in Space and Time, or, at any rate, in Time? Or, +to put the question more exactly, as well as more gravely and more +pertinently, Are Space and Time the true _principia individui_, and is +Time preëminently the ultimate _principium individuationis_? Is there +accordingly no individuality, and no society, no associative assemblage, +except in the fleeting world of phenomena, dated and placed? Simply to +ask the question, and thus bring out the full drift of this Kantian +doctrine, is almost to expose the absurdity of it. Such a doctrine, +though it may be wisely refusing to confound personality, true +individuality, with the mere logical singular; nay, worse, with a +limited and special illustration of the singular, the one _here_ or the +one _there_, the one _now_ or the one _then_; nevertheless, by confining +numerability to things material and sensible, makes personal identity +something unmeaning or impossible, and destroys part of the foundation +for the relations of moral responsibility. Though the vital trait of the +person, his genuine individuality, doubtless lies, not in his being +exactly numerable, but in his being aboriginal and originative; in a +word, in his self-activity, in his being a centre of autonomous social +recognition; yet exactly numerable he indeed is, and must be, not +confusable with any other, else his professed autonomy, his claim of +rights and his sense of duty, can have no significance, must vanish in +the universal confusion belonging to the indefinite. Nor, on the other +hand, is it at all true that a number has to be a point or an instant, +nor that things when numbered and counted are implicitly pinned upon +points or, at all events, upon instants. It may well enough be the fact +that in our empirical use of number we have to employ Time, or even +Space, but it is a gaping _non sequitur_ to conclude that we therefore +can count nothing but the placed and the dated. Certainly we count +whenever we _distinguish_,--by whatever means, on whatever ground. To +think is, in general, at least to "distinguish the things that differ;" +but this will not avail except we keep account of the differences; hence +the One and the Many lie in the very bosom of intelligence, and this +fundamental and spontaneous contrast can not only rive Time and Space +into expressions of it, in instants and in points, but travels with +thought from its start to its goal, and as organic factor in +mathematical science does indeed, as Plato in the _Republic_ said, deal +with absolute being, if yet dreamwise; so that One and Many, and Many as +the sum of the ones, makes part of the measure of that primally real +world which the world of minds alone can be. If the contrast One and +Many can pass the bounds of the merely phenomenal, by passing the +temporal and the spatial; if it applies to universal being, to the +noumenal as well as to the phenomenal; then the absolutely real world, +so far as concerns this essential condition, can be a world of genuine +individuals, identifiable, free, abiding, responsible, and there can be +a real moral order; if not, then there can be no such moral world, and +the deeper thought-conceptions to which we now approach must be +regarded, at the best, as fair illusions, bare ideals, which the serious +devotee of truth must shun, except in such moments of vacancy and +leisure as he may venture to surrender, at intervals, to purely hedonic +uses. But if the One and the Many are not dependent on Time and Space, +their universal validity is possible; and it has already been shown that +they are not so dependent, are not thus restricted. + +And now it remains to show their actual universality, by exhibiting +their place in the structure of the absolutely real; since nobody calls +in question their pertinence to the world of phenomena. But their +noumenal applicability follows from their essential implication with all +and every difference: no difference, no distinction, that does not carry +counting; and this is quite as true as that there can be no counting +without difference. The One and the Many thus root in Identity and +Difference, pass up into fuller expression in Universal and Particular, +hold forward into Cause and Effect, attain their commanding presentation +in the Reciprocity of First Causes, and so keep record of the contrast +between Necessity and Contingency. In short, they are founded in, and in +their turn help (indispensably) to express, _all_ the categories,--Quality, +Quantity, Relation, Modality. Nor do they suffer arrest there; they hold +in the ideals, the True, the Beautiful, the Good, and in the primary +Ideas, the Self, the World, and God. For all of these differ, however +close their logical linkage may be; and in so far as they differ, each +of them is a counted unit, and so they are many. And, most profoundly of +all, One and Many take footing in absolute reality so soon as we realize +that nothing short of intelligent being can be primordially real, +underived, and truly causal, and that intelligence is, by its idea, at +once an _I_-thinking and a universal recognizant outlook upon others +that think _I_. + +Hence Number, so far from being the derivative of Time and Space, +founds, at the bottom, in the self-definition and social recognition of +intelligent beings, and so finds _a priori_ a valid expression in Time +and in Space, as well as in every other primitive and spontaneous form +in which intelligence utters itself. The Pythagorean doctrine of the +rank of Number in the scale of realities is only one remove from the +truth: though the numbers are indeed not the Prime Beings, they do enter +into the essential nature of the Prime Beings; are, so to speak, the +organ of their definite reality and identity, and for that reason go +forward into the entire defining procedure by which these intelligences +organize their world of experiences. And the popular impression that +Time and Space are derivatives from Number, is in one aspect the truth, +rather than the doctrine of Kant is; for though they are not mere +generalizations and abstractions from numbered dates and durations, +places and extents, they do exist as relating-principles which minds +simply _put_, as the conditions _of perceptive experiences_; which by +the nature of intelligence they must number in order to have and to +master; while Number itself, the contrast of One and Many, enters into +the very being of minds, and therefore still holds in Time and in Space, +which are the organs, or _media_, not of the whole being of the mind, +but only of that region of it constituted by sensation,--the material, +the disjunct, the empirical. Besides, the logical priority of Number is +implied in the fact that minds in putting Time and Space _a priori_ must +count them as two, since they discriminate them with complete clearness, +so that it is impossible to work up Space out of Time (as Berkeley and +Stuart Mill so adroitly, but so vainly, attempted to do), or Time out of +Space (as Hegel, with so little adroitness and such patent failure, +attempted to do). No; there Time and Space stand, fixed and +inconfusable, incapable of mutual transmutation, and thus the ground of +an abiding difference between the inner or psychic sense-world and the +outer or physical, between the subjective and the (sensibly) objective. +By means of them, the world of minds discerns and bounds securely +between the privacy of each and the publicity, the life "out of doors," +which is common to all; between the cohering isolation of the individual +and the communicating action of the society. Indeed, as from this +attained point of view we can now clearly see, the real ground of the +difference between Time and Space, and hence between subjective +perception and the objective existence of physical things, is in the +fact that a mind, in _being_ such,--in its very act of +self-definition,--correlates itself with a _society_ of minds, and so, +to fulfill its nature, in so far as this includes a world of +experiences, must form its experience socially as well as privately, and +hence will put forth a condition of sensuous communication, as well as a +condition of inner sensation. Thus the dualization of the sense-world +into inner and outer, psychic and physical, subjective and objective, +rests at last on the intrinsically social nature of conscious being; +rests on the twofold structure, logically dichotomous, of the +self-defining act; and we get the explanation, from the nature of +intelligence as such, why the Sense-Forms are necessarily two, and only +two. It is no accident that we experience all things sensible in Time or +in Space, or in both together; it is the natural expression of our +primally intelligent being, concerned as that is, directly and only, +with our self and its logically necessary complement, the other selves; +and so the natural order, in its two discriminated but complemental +portions, the inner and the outer, is founded in that moral order which +is given in the fundamental act of our intelligence. It is this resting +of Space upon our veritable Objects, the Other Subjects, that imparts to +it its externalizing quality, so that things in it are referred to the +testing of all minds, not to ours only, and are reckoned external +because measured by that which is alone indeed other than we. + +In this way we may burst the restricting limit which so much of +philosophy, and so much more of ordinary opinion, has drawn about our +mental powers in view of this contrast Time and Space, especially with +reference to the One and the Many, and to the persuasion that plural +distinctions, at any rate, cannot belong in the region of absolute +reality. Ordinary opinion either inclines to support a philosophy that +is skeptical of either Unity or Plurality being pertinent beyond Time +and Space, and thus to hold by agnosticism, or, if it affects +affirmative metaphysics, tends to prefer monism to pluralism, when the +number-category is carried up into immutable regions: to represent the +absolutely real as One, somehow seems less contradictory of the "fitness +of things" than to represent it as Many; moreover, carrying the Many +into that supreme region, by implying the belonging there of mortals +such as we, seems shocking to customary piety, and full of extravagant +presumption. Still, nothing short of this can really satisfy our deep +demand for a moral order, a personal responsibility, nay, an adequate +logical fulfillment of our conception of a self as an _intelligence_; +while the clarification which a rational pluralism supplies for such +ingrained puzzles in the theory of knowledge as that of the source and +finality of the contrast Time and Space, to mention no others, should +afford a strong corroborative evidence in its behalf. And, as already +said, this view enables us to pass the limit which Time and Space are so +often supposed to put, hopelessly, upon our concepts of the ideal grade, +the springs of all our aspiration. To these, then, we may now pass. + + * * * * * + +We reach them through the doorways of the Necessary _vs._ the +Contingent, the Unconditioned _vs._ the Conditioned, the Infinite _vs._ +the Finite, the Absolute _vs._ the Relative; and we recognize them as +our profoundest foundation-concepts, alone deserving, as Kant so +pertinently said, the name of IDEAS,--the Soul, the World, and God. +Associated with them are what we may call our three Forms of the +Ideal,--the True, the Beautiful, the Good. These Ideas and their +affiliated ideals have the highest directive and settling function in +the organization of philosophy; they determine its schools and its +history, by forming the centre of all its controlling problems; they +prescribe its great subdivisions, breaking it up into Metaphysics, +Æsthetics, and Ethics, and Metaphysics, again, into Psychology +Cosmology, and Ontology,--or Theology in the classic sense, which, in +the modern sense, becomes the Philosophy of Religion; they call into +existence, as essential preparatory and auxiliary disciplines, Logic and +the Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology. They thus provide the true +distinctions between philosophy and the sciences of experience, and +present these sciences as the carrying out, upon experiential details, +of the methodological principles which philosophy alone can supply; +hence they lead us to view all the sciences as in fact the applied +branches, the completing organs of philosophy, instead of its hostile +competitors. + +As for the controlling questions which they start, these are such as +follow: Are the ideals but bare ideals, serving only to cast "a light +that never was, on land or sea?"--are the Ideas only bare ideas, without +any objective being of their own, without any footing in the real, +serving only to enhance the dull facts of experience with auroral +illusions? The philosophic thinker answers affirmatively, or with +complete skeptical dubiety, or with a convinced and uplifting negative, +according to his less or greater penetration into the real meaning of +these deepest concepts, and depending on his view into the nature and +thought-effect of the Necessary and the Contingent, the Unconditioned +and the Conditioned, the Infinite and the Finite, the Absolute and the +Relative. + +And what, now, are the accurate, the adequate meanings of the three +Ideas?--what _does_ our profoundest thought intend by the Soul, by the +World, by God? We know how Kant construed them, in consequence of the +course by which he came critically (as he supposed) upon them,--as +respectively the paramount Subject of experiences; the paramount Object +of experiences, or the Causal Unity of the possible series of sensible +objects; and the complete Totality of Conditions for experience and its +objects, itself therefore the Unconditioned. It is worth our notice, +that especially by his construing the idea of God in this way, thus +rehabilitating the classical and scholastic conception of God as the Sum +of all Realities, he laid the foundation for that very transfiguration +of mysticism, that idealistic monism, which he himself repudiated, but +which his three noted successors in their several ways so ardently +accepted, and which has since so pervaded the philosophic world. But +suppose Kant's alleged critical analysis of the three Ideas and their +logical basis is in fact far from critical, far from "exactly +discriminative,"--and I believe there is the clearest warrant for +declaring that it is,--then the assumed "undeniable critical basis" for +idealistic monism will be dislodged, and it will be open to us to +interpret the Ideas with accuracy and consistency--an interpretation +which may prove to establish, not at all any monism, but a rational +pluralism. And this will also reveal to us, I think, that our prevalent +construing of the Unconditioned and the Conditioned, the Necessary and +the Contingent, the Infinite and the Finite, the Absolute and the +Relative, suffers from an equal inaccuracy of analysis, and precisely +for this reason gives a plausible but in fact untrustworthy support to +the monistic interpretation of God, and Soul, and World; or, as Hegel +and his chief adherents prefer to name them, God, Mind, and Nature. If +the Kantian analysis stands, then it seems to follow, clearly enough, +that God is the Inclusive Unit which at once embraces Mind and Nature, +Soul and World, expresses itself in them, and imparts to them their +meaning; and the plain dictate then is, that Kant's personal prejudice, +and the personal prejudices of others like him, in favor of a +transcendent God, must give way to that conception of the Divine, as +immanent and inclusive, which is alone consistent with its being indeed +the Totality of Conditions,--the Necessary Postulate, and the Sufficient +Reason, for both Subject and Object. + +But will Kant's analysis stand? Have we not here another of his few but +fatal slips,--like his doctrine of the dependence of Number upon Time +and Space, and its consequent subjection to them? It surely seems so. If +the veritable postulate of categorical syllogizing be, as Kant thinks it +is, merely the Subject, the self as experiencer of presented phenomena, +in contrast to the Object, the causally united sum of possible +phenomena; and if the true postulate of conditional syllogizing is this +cosmic Object, as contrasted with the correlate Subject, then it would +seem we cannot avoid certain pertinent questions. Is such a postulate +Subject any fit and adequate account of the whole Self, of the Soul?--is +there not a vital difference between this subject-self and the Self as +Person?--does not Kant himself imply so, in his doctrine of the primacy +of the Practical Reason? Again: Is not the World, as explained in Kant's +analysis, and as afterwards made by him the solution of the Cosmological +Antinomies, simply the supplemental factor necessarily correlate to the +subjective aspect of the conscious life, and reduced from its uncritical +rôle of thing-in-itself to the intelligible subordination required by +Kant's theory of Transcendental Idealism?--and can this be any adequate +account of the Idea that is to stand in sufficing contrast to the whole +Self, the Person?--what less than the Society of Persons can meet the +World-Idea for that? Further: If with Kant we take the World to mean no +more than this object-factor in self-consciousness, must not the Soul, +the total Self, from which, according to Kant's Transcendental Idealism, +both Space and Time issue, supplying the basis for the immutable +contrast between the experiencing subject and the really experienced +objects,--must not this _whole_ Self be the real meaning of the +"Totality of Conditions, itself unconditioned," which comes into view as +simply the postulate of disjunctive syllogizing? How in the world can +disjunctive syllogizing, the confessed act of the _I_-thinking +intelligence, really postulate anything as Totality of Conditions, in +any other sense than the total of conditions for such syllogizing?--namely, +the conditioning _I_ that organizes and does the reasoning? There is +surely no warrant for calling this total, which simply transcends and +conditions the subject and the object of sensible experiences, by any +loftier name than that which Kant had already given it in the Deduction +of the Categories, when he designated it the "originally synthetic unity +of apperception (self-consciousness)," or "the _I_-thinking (_das +ich-denke_) that must accompany all my mental presentations,"--that is +to say, the whole Self, or thinking Person, idealistically interpreted. +The use of the name God in this connection, where Kant is in fact only +seeking the roots of the three orders of the syllogism _when reasoning +has by supposition been restricted to the subject-matter of experience_, +is assuredly without warrant; yes, without excuse. In fact, it is +because Kant sees that the third Idea, as reached through his analysis, +is intrinsically immanent,--resident in the self that syllogizes +disjunctively, and, because so resident, incapable of passing the bounds +of possible experience,--while he also sees that the idea of God should +mean a Being transcendent of every other thinker, himself a distinct +individual consciousness, though not an empirically limited one,--it is, +I say, precisely because he sees all this, that he pronounces the Idea, +though named with the name of God, utterly without pertinence to +indicate God's existence, and so enters upon that part of his +Transcendental Dialectic which is, in chief, directed to exposing the +transcendental illusion involved in the celebrated Ontological Proof. +Consistently, Kant in this famous analytic of the syllogism should be +talking, not of the Soul, the World, and God, but of the Subject (as +uniting-principle of its sense-_perceptions_), the Object (as +uniting-principle of all possible sense-_percepts_), and the Self (the +whole _I_ presiding over experience in both its aspects, as these are +discriminated in Time and Space). By what rational title--even granting +for the sake of argument that they are the genuine postulates of +categorical and of conditional syllogizing--can this Subject and this +Object, these correlate factors in the Self, rank as Ideas with the Idea +of their conditioning Whole--the Self, that in its still unaltered +identity fulfills, in Practical Reason, the high rôle of Person? If +_this_ no more than meets the standard of Idea, how can _they_ meet it? +How can two somethings, neither of which is the Totality of Conditions, +and both of which are therefore in fact conditioned, deserve the same +title with that which is intrinsically the Totality of Conditions, and, +as such, unconditioned? To call the conditioned and the unconditioned +alike Ideas is a confounding of dignities that Pure Reason should not +tolerate, whether the procedure be read as a leveling down or a leveling +up. Distributing the titles conferred by Pure Reason in this democratic +fashion reminds us too much, unhappily for Kant, of the Cartesian +performances with Substance; whereby God, mind, and matter became alike +"substances," though only God could in truth be said to "require nothing +for his existence save himself," while mind and matter, though +absolutely dependent on God, and derivative from him, were still to be +called substances in the "modified" and Pickwickian sense of being +underived from each other. + +But if Kant's naming his third syllogistic postulate the Idea of God is +inconsequent upon his analysis; or if, when the analysis is made +consequent by taking the third Idea to mean the whole Self, the first +and second postulates sink in conceptual rank, so that they cannot with +any pertinence be called Ideas, unless we are willing to keep the same +name when its meaning must be changed _in genere_,--a procedure that can +only encumber philosophy instead of clearing its way,--these +difficulties do not close the account; we shall find other curious +things in this noted passage, upon which part of the characteristic +outcome of Kant's philosophizing so much depends. Besides the misnaming +of the third Idea, we have already had to question, in view of the path +by which he reaches it, the fitness of his calling the first by the +title of the Soul; and likewise, though for other and higher reasons, of +his calling the second by the name of the World. In fact, it comes home +to us that all of the Ideas are, in one way or another, misnomers; +Kant's whole procedure with them, in fine, has already appeared inexact, +inconsistent, and therefore uncritical. But now we shall become aware of +certain other inconsistencies. In coming to the Subject, as the +postulate of categorical syllogizing, Kant, you remember, does so by the +path of the relation Subject and Predicate, arguing that the chain of +categorical prosyllogisms has for its limiting concept and logical motor +the notion of an absolute subject that cannot be a predicate; and as no +subject of a judgment can of itself give assurance of fulfilling this +condition, he concludes this motor-limit of judgment-subjects to be +identical with the Subject as thinker, upon whom, at the last, all +judgments depend, and who, therefore, and who alone, can never be a +predicate merely. In similar fashion, he finds as the motor-limit of the +series of conditional prosyllogisms, which is governed by the relation +Cause and Effect, the notion of an absolute cause--a cause, that is, +incapable of being an effect; and this, as undiscoverable in the chain +of phenomenal causes, which are all in turn effects, he concludes is a +pure Idea, the reason's native conception of a necessary linkage among +all changes in Space, or of a Cosmic Unity among physical phenomena. In +both conceptions, then, whether of the unity of the Subject or of the +World, we seem to have a case of the unconditioned, as each, surely, is +a totality of conditions: the one, for all possible syllogisms by +Subject and Predicate; the other, for all possible syllogisms from Cause +and Effect. Until it can be shown that the syllogisms of the first sort +and the syllogisms of the second are both conditioned by the system of +disjunctive syllogisms, so that the Idea alleged to be the totality of +conditions for this system becomes the conditioning principle for both +the others, there appears to be no ground for contrasting the totality +of conditions presented in it with those presented in the others, as if +it were the absolute Totality of all Conditions, while the two others +are only "relative totalities,"--which would be as much as to say they +were only pseudo-totalities, both being conditioned instead of being +unconditioned. But there seems to be no evidence, not even an +indication, that disjunctive reasoning conditions categorical or +conditional--that it constitutes the whole kingdom, in which the other +two orders of reasoning form dependent provinces, or that for final +validation these must appeal to the disjunctive series and the Idea that +controls it. On the contrary, any such relation seems disproved by the +fact that the three types of syllogism apply alike in all +subject-matter, psychic or physical, subjective or objective, concerning +the Self or concerning the World,--yes, concerning other Selves or even +concerning God; whereas, if the relation were a fact, it would require +that only disjunctive reasoning can deal with the Unconditioned, and +that conditional must confine itself to cosmic material, while +categorical pertains only to the things of inner sense. + +Such considerations cannot but shake our confidence in the inquisition +to which Kant has submitted the Ideas of Reason, both as regards what +they really mean and how they are to be correlated. At all events, the +analysis of logical procedure and connection on which his account of +them is based is full of the confusions and oversights that have now +been pointed out, and justifies us in saying that his case is not +established. Hence we are not bound to follow when his three successors, +or their later adherents, proceed in acceptance of his results, and +advance into various forms of idealism, all of the monistic type, as if +the general relation between the three Ideas had been demonstrably +settled by Kant in the monist sense, despite his not knowing this, and +that all we have to do is to disregard his recorded protests, and render +his results consistent, and our idealism "absolute," by casting out from +his doctrine the distinction between the Theoretical and the Practical +Reason, with the "primacy" of the latter, through making an end of his +assumed world of _Dinge an sich_, or "things in themselves." This +movement, I repeat, we are not bound to follow: a rectification of view +as to the meaning of the three Ideas becomes possible as soon as we are +freed from Kant's entangled method of discovering and defining them; and +when this rectification is effected, we shall find that the question +between monism and rational or harmonic pluralism is at least open, to +say no more. Nay, we are not to forget that by the results of our +analysis of the concepts One and Many, Time and Space, and the real +relation between them, plural metaphysics has already won a precedence +in this contest. + + + + +THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY + +BY GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD + + [George Trumbull Ladd, Professor of Philosophy, Yale + University. b. January 19, 1842, Painesville, Ohio. B.A. + Western Reserve College, 1864; B.D. Andover Theological + Seminary, 1869; D.D. Western Reserve, 1879; M.A. Yale, 1881; + LL.D. Western Reserve, 1895; LL.D. Princeton, 1896. + Decorated with the 3d Degree of the Order of the Rising Sun + of Japan, 1899; Pastor, Edinburg, Ohio, 1869-71; _ibid._, + Milwaukee, Wis., 1871-79; Professor of Philosophy, Bowdoin + College, 1879-81; _ibid._, Yale University, 1881--; + Lecturer, Harvard, Tokio, Bombay, etc., 1885--, Member + American Psychological Association, American Society of + Naturalists, American Philosophical Association, American + Oriental Society, Imperial Educational Society of Japan, + Connecticut Academy. Author of _Elements of Physiological + Psychology_; _Philosophy of Knowledge_; _Philosophy of + Mind_; _A Theory of Reality_; and many other noted + scientific works and papers.] + + +The history of man's critical and reflective thought upon the more +ultimate problems of nature and of his own life has, indeed, its period +of quickened progress, relative stagnation, and apparent decline. Great +thinkers are born and die, "schools of philosophy," so-called, arise, +flourish, and become discredited; and tendencies of various +characteristics mark the national or more general Zeitgeist of the +particular centuries. And always, a certain deep undercurrent, or +powerful stream of the rational evolution of humanity, flows silently +onward. But these periods of philosophical development do not correspond +to those which have been marked off for man by the rhythmic motion of +the heavenly bodies, or by himself for purposes of greater convenience +in practical affairs. The proposal, therefore, to treat any century of +philosophical development as though it could be taken out of, and +considered apart from, this constant unfolding of man's rational life +is, of necessity, doomed to failure. And, indeed, the nineteenth century +is no exception to the general truth. + +There is, however, one important and historical fact which makes more +definite, and more feasible, the attempt to present in outline the +history of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century. This +fact is the death of Immanuel Kant, February 12, 1804. In a very unusual +way this event marks the close of the development of philosophy in the +eighteenth century. In a yet more unusual way the same event defines the +beginning of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century. +The proposal is, therefore, not artificial, but in accordance with the +truth of history, if we consider the problems, movements, results, and +present condition of this development, so far as the fulfillment of our +general purpose is concerned, in the light of the critical philosophy of +Kant. This purpose may then be further defined in the following way: to +trace the history of the evolution of critical and reflective thought +over the more ultimate problems of Nature and of human life, in the +Western World during the last hundred years, and from the standpoint of +the conclusions, both negative and positive, which are best embodied in +the works of the philosopher of Königsberg. This purpose we shall try to +fulfill in these four divisions of our theme: (1) A statement of the +problems of philosophy as they were given over to the nineteenth century +by the Kantian Critique; (2) a brief description of the lines of +movement along which the attempts at the improved solution of these +problems have proceeded, and of the principal influences contributing to +these attempts; (3) a summary of the principal results of these +movements--the items, so to say, of progress in philosophy which may be +credited to the last century; and finally, (4) a survey of the present +state of these problems as they are now to be handed down by the +nineteenth to the twentieth century. Truly an immensely difficult, if +not an impossible task, is involved in this purpose! + +I. The problems which the critical philosophy undertook definitively to +solve may be divided into three classes. The first is the +epistemological problem, or the problem offered by human knowledge--its +essential nature, its fixed limitations, if such there be, and its +ontological validity. It was this problem which Kant brought to the +front in such a manner that certain subsequent writers on philosophy +have claimed it to be, not only the primary and most important branch of +philosophical discipline, but to comprise the sum-total of what human +reflection and critical thought can successfully compass. "We call +philosophy self-knowledge," says one of these writers. "The theory of +knowledge is the true _prima philosophia_," says another. Kant himself +regarded it as the most imperative demand of reason to establish a +science that shall "determine _a priori_ the possibility, the +principles, and the extent of all cognitions." The burden of the +epistemological problem has pressed heavily upon the thought of the +nineteenth century; the different attitudes toward this problem, and its +different alleged solutions, have been most influential factors in +determining the philosophical discussions, divisions, schools, and +permanent or transitory achievements of the century. + +In the epistemological problem as offered by the Kantian philosophy of +cognition there is involved the subordinate but highly important +question as to the proper method of philosophy. Is the method of +criticism, as that method was employed in the three Critiques of Kant, +the exclusive, the sole appropriate and productive way of advancing +human philosophical thought? I do not think that the experience of the +nineteenth century warrants an affirmative answer to this question of +method. This experience has certainly, however, resulted in +demonstrating the need of a more thorough, consistent, and fundamental +use of the critical method than that in which it was employed by Kant. +And this improved use of the critical method has induced a more profound +study of the psychology of cognition, and of the historical development +of philosophy in the branch of epistemology. More especially, however, +it has led to the reinstatement of the value-judgments, as means of +cognition, in their right relations of harmony with the judgments of +fact and of law. + +The second of the greater problems which the critical philosophy of the +eighteenth handed on to the nineteenth century is the ontological +problem. This problem, even far more than the epistemological, has +excited the intensest interest, and called for the profoundest thought, +of reflective minds during the last hundred years. This problem engages +in the inquiry as to what Reality is; for to define philosophy from the +ontological point of view renders it "the rational science of reality;" +or, at least, "the science of the supreme and most important realities." +In spite of the fact that the period immediately following the +conclusion of the Kantian criticism was the age when the people were +singing + + "_Da die Metaphysik vor Kurzem unbeerbt abging,_ + _Werden die Dinge an sich jetzo sub hasta verkauft,_" + +the cultivation of the ontological problem, and the growth of systematic +metaphysics in the nineteenth century, had never previously been +surpassed. In spite of, or rather because of, the fact that Kant left +the ancient body of metaphysics so dismembered and discredited, and his +own ontological structure, in such hopeless confusion, all the several +buildings both of Idealism and of Realism either rose quickly or were +erected upon the foundations made bare by the critical philosophy. + +But especially unsatisfactory to the thought of the first quarter of the +nineteenth century was the Kantian position with reference to the +problem in which, after all, both the few who cultivate philosophy and +the multitude who share in its fruits are always most truly interested; +and this is the ethico-religious problem. In the judgment of the +generation which followed him, Kant had achieved for those who accepted +his points of view, his method of philosophizing, and his results, much +greater success in "removing knowledge" than in "finding room for +faith." For he seemed to have left the positive truths of Ethics so +involved in the negative positions of his critique of knowledge as +greatly to endanger them; and to have entangled the conceptions of +religion with those of morality in a manner to throw doubt upon them +both. + +The breach between the human cognitive faculties and the ontological +doctrines and conceptions on which morality and religion had been +supposed to rest firmly, the elaborately argued distrust and skepticism +which had been aimed against the ability of human reason to reach +reality, and the consequent danger which threatened the most precious +judgments of worth and the ontological value of ethical and æsthetical +sentiments, could not remain unnoticed, or fail to promote ceaseless and +earnest efforts to heal it. The hitherto accepted solutions of the +problems of cognition, of being, and of man's ethico-religious +experience, could not survive the critical philosophy. But the solutions +which the critical philosophy itself offered could not fail to excite +opposition and to stimulate further criticism. Moreover, certain factors +in human nature, certain interests in human social life, and certain +needs of humanity, not fully recognized and indeed scarcely noticed by +criticism, could not fail to revive and to enforce their ancient, +perennial, and valid claims. + +In a word, Kant left the main problems of philosophy involved in +numerous contradictions. The result of his penetrating but excessive +analysis was unwarrantably to contrast sense with understanding; to +divide reason as constitutive from reason as regulative; to divorce the +moral law from our concrete experience of the results of good and bad +conduct, true morality from many of the noblest desires and sentiments, +and to set in opposition phenomena and noumena, order and freedom, +knowledge and faith, science and religion. Now the highest aim of +philosophy is reconciliation. What wonder, then, that the beginning of +the last century felt the stimulus of the unreconciled condition of the +problems of philosophy at the end of the preceding century! The +greatest, most stimulating inheritance of the philosophy of the +nineteenth century from the philosophy of the eighteenth century was the +"post-Kantian problems." + +II. The lines of the movement of philosophical thought and the principal +contributory influences which belong to the nineteenth century may be +roughly divided into two classes; namely, (1) those which tended in the +direction of carrying to the utmost extreme the negative and destructive +criticism of Kant, and (2) those which, either mainly favoring or mainly +antagonizing the conclusions of the Kantian criticism, endeavored to +place the positive answer to all three of these great problems of +philosophy upon more comprehensive, scientifically defensible, and +permanently sure foundations. The one class so far completed the attempt +to remove the knowledge at which philosophy aims as, by the end of the +first half of the century, to have left no rational ground for any kind +of faith. The other class had not, even by the end of the second half of +the century, as yet agreed upon any one scheme for harmonizing the +various theories of knowledge, of reality, and of the ground of morality +and religion. There appeared, however,--especially during the last two +decades of the century,--certain signs of convergence upon positions, to +occupy which is favorable for agreement upon such a scheme, and which +now promise a new constructive era for philosophy. The terminus of the +destructive movement has been reached in our present-day positivism and +philosophical skepticism. For this movement there would appear to be no +more beyond in the same direction. The terminus of the other movement +can only be somewhat dimly descried. It may perhaps be predicted with a +reasonable degree of confidence as some form of ontological Idealism (if +we may use such a phrase) that shall be at once more thoroughly grounded +in man's total experience, as interpreted by modern science, and also +more satisfactory to human ethical, æsthetical, and religious ideals, +than any form of systematic philosophy has hitherto been. But to say +even this much is perhaps unduly to anticipate. + +If we attempt to fathom and estimate the force of the various streams of +influence which have shaped the history of the philosophical development +of the nineteenth century, I think there can be no doubt that the +profoundest and the most powerful is the one influence which must be +recognized and reckoned with in all the centuries. This influence is +humanity's undying interest in its moral, civil, and religious ideals, +and in the civil and religious institutions which give a faithful but +temporary expression to these ideals. In the long run, every fragmentary +or systematic attempt at the solution of the problem of philosophy must +sustain the test of an ability to contribute something of value to the +realization of these ideals. The test which the past century has +proposed for its own thinkers, and for its various schools of +philosophy, is by far the severest which has ever been proposed. For the +most part unostentatiously and in large measure silently, the thoughtful +few and the comparatively thoughtless multitude have been contributing, +either destructively or constructively, to the effort at satisfaction +for the rising spiritual life of man. And if in some vague but +impressive manner we speak of this thirst for spiritual satisfaction as +characteristic of any period of human history, we may say, I believe, +that it has been peculiarly characteristic and especially powerful as an +influence during the last hundred years. The opinions, sentiments, and +ideals which shape the development of the institutions of the church and +state, and the freer activities of the same opinions, sentiments, and +ideals, have been in this century, as they have been in every century, +the principal factors in determining the character of its philosophical +development. + +But a more definite and visible kind of influence has constantly +proceeded from the centres of the higher education. The +universities--especially of Germany, next, perhaps of Scotland, but also +of England and the United States, and even in less degree of France and +Italy--have both fostered and shaped the evolution of critical and +reflective thought, and of its product as philosophy. In Germany during +the eighteenth century the greater universities had been emancipating +themselves from the stricter forms of political and court favoritism and +of ecclesiastical protection and control. This emancipation had already +operated at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it continued +more and more to operate throughout this century, for participation in +that free thought whose spirit is absolutely essential to the +flourishing of true philosophy. All the other colleges and universities +can scarcely repay the debt which modern philosophy owes to the +universities of Germany. The institutions of the higher education which +are moulded after this spirit, and which have a generous share of this +spirit, have everywhere been _schools of thought_ as well as schools of +learning and research. Without the increasing numbers and growing +encouragement of such centres for the cultivation of the discipline of +critical and reflective thinking, it is difficult to conjecture how much +the philosophical development of the nineteenth century would have lost. +_Libertas docendi_ and _Academische Freiheit_--without these philosophy +has one of its wings fatally wounded or severely clipped. + +Not all the philosophy of the last century, however, was born and +developed in academical centres and under academical influences. In +Germany, Great Britain, and France, the various so-called "Academies" or +other unacademical associations of men of scientific interests and +attainments--notably, the Berlin Academy, which has been called "the +seat of an anti-scholastic popular philosophy"--were during the first +half of the nineteenth century contributing by their conspicuous +failures as well as by their less conspicuous successes, important +factors to the constructive new thought of the latter half of the +nineteenth century. In general, although these men decried system and +were themselves inadequately prepared to treat the problems of +philosophy, whether from the historical or the speculative and critical +point of view, they cannot be wholly neglected in estimating its +development. Clever reasoning, and witty and epigrammatic writing on +scientific or other allied subjects, cannot indeed be called +_philosophy_ in the stricter meaning of the word. But this so-called +"popular philosophy" has greatly helped in a way to free thought from +its too close bondage to scholastic tradition. And even the despite of +philosophy, and sneering references to its "barrenness," which formerly +characterized the meetings and the writings of this class of its +critics, but which now are happily much less frequent, have been on the +whole both a valuable check and a stimulus to her devotees. He would be +too narrow and sour a disciple of scholastic metaphysics and systematic +philosophy, who, because of the levity or scorning of "outsiders," +should refuse them all credit. Indeed, the lesson of the close of the +nineteenth century may well enough be the motto for the beginning of the +twentieth century: _In philosophy--since to philosophize is natural and +inevitable for all rational beings--there really are no outsiders._ + +In this connection it is most interesting to notice how men of the type +just referred to, were at the end of the eighteenth century found +grouped around such thinkers as Mendelssohn, Lessing, F. +Nicolai,--representing a somewhat decided reaction from the French +realism to the German idealism. The work of the Academicians in the +criticism of Kant was carried forward by Jacobi, who, at the time of his +death, was the pensioned president of the Academy at Munich. Some of +these same critics of the Kantian philosophy showed a rather decided +preference for the "commonsense" philosophy of the Scottish School. + +But both inside and outside of the Universities and Academies the +scientific spirit and acquisitions of the nineteenth century have most +profoundly, and on the whole favorably, affected the development of its +philosophy. In the wider meaning of the word, "science,"--the meaning, +namely, in which science = _Wissenschaft_,--philosophy aims to be +scientific; and science can never be indifferent to philosophy. In their +common aim at a rational and unitary system of principles, which shall +explain and give its due significance to the totality of human +experience, science and philosophy can never remain long in antagonism; +they ought never even temporarily to be divided in interests, or in the +spirit which leads each generously to recognize the importance of the +other. The early part of the last century was, indeed, too much under +the influence of that almost exclusively speculative _Natur-philosophie_, +of which Schelling and Hegel were the most prominent exponents. On the +other hand, the conception of nature as a vast interconnected and +unitary system of a rational order, unfolding itself in accordance with +teleological principles,--however manifold and obscure,--is a noble +conception and not destined to pass away. + +On the continent--at least in France, where it had attained its highest +development--the scientific spirit was, at the close of the eighteenth +century, on the whole opposed to systematization. The impulse to both +science and philosophy during both the eighteenth and the nineteenth +centuries, over the entire continent of Europe, was chiefly due to the +epoch-making work of that greatest of all titles in the modern +scientific development of the Western World, the _Principia_ of Newton. +In mathematics and the physical sciences, during the early third or half +of the last century, Great Britain also has a roll of distinguished +names which compares most favorably with that of either France or +Germany. But in England, France, and the United States, during the whole +century, science has lacked the breadth and philosophic spirit which it +had in Germany during the first three quarters of this period. During +all that time the German man of science was, as a rule, a scholar, an +investigator, a teacher, _and a philosopher_. Science and philosophy +thrived better, however, in Scotland than elsewhere outside of Germany, +so far as their relations in interdependence were concerned. Into the +Scottish universities Playfair introduced some of the continental +suggestions toward the end of the eighteenth century, so that there was +less of exclusiveness and unfriendly rivalry between science and +philosophy; and both profited thereby. In the United States, during the +first half or more of the century, so dominant were the theological and +practical interests and influences that there was little free +development of either science or philosophy,--if we interpret the one as +the equivalent of _Wissenschaft_ and understand the other in the +stricter meaning of the word. + +The history of the development of the scientific spirit and of the +achievements of the particular sciences is not the theme of this paper. +To trace in detail, or even in its large outlines, the reciprocal +influence of science and philosophy during the past hundred years, would +itself require far more than the space allotted to me. It must suffice +to say that the various advances in the efforts of the particular +sciences to enlarge and to define the conceptions and principles +employed to portray the Being of the World in its totality, have +somewhat steadily grown more and more completely metaphysical, and more +and more of positive importance for the reconstruction of systematic +philosophy. The latter has not simply been disciplined by science, +compelled to improve its method, and to examine all its previous claims. +But philosophy has also been greatly enriched by science with respect to +its material awaiting synthesis, and it has been not a little profited +by the unsuccessful attempts of the current scientific theories to give +themselves a truly satisfactory account of that Ultimate Reality which, +to understand the better, is no unworthy aim of their combined efforts. + +During the nineteenth century science has seen many important additions +to that Ideal of Nature and her processes, to form which in a unitary +and harmonizing but comprehensive way is the philosophical goal of +science. The gross mechanical conception of nature which prevailed in +the earlier part of the eighteenth century has long since been +abandoned, as quite inadequate to our experience with her facts, forces, +and laws. The kinetic view, which began with Huygens, Euler, and Ampère, +and which was so amplified by Lord Kelvin and Clerk-Maxwell in England, +and by Helmholtz and others in Germany, on account of its success in +explaining the phenomena of light, of gases, etc., very naturally led to +the attempt to develop a kinetic theory, a doctrine of energetics, which +should explain all phenomena. But the conception of "that which moves," +the experience of important and persistent qualitative _differentiae_, +and the need of assuming ends and purposes served by the movement, are +troublesome obstacles in the way of giving such a completeness to this +theory of the Being of the World. Yet again the amazing success which +the theory of evolution has shown in explaining the phenomena with which +the various biological sciences concern themselves, has lent favor +during the latter half of the century to the vitalistic and genetic view +of nature. For all our most elaborate and advanced kinetic theories seem +utterly to fail us as explanatory when we, through the higher powers of +the microscope, stand wondering and face to face with the evolution of a +single living cell. But from such a view of the essential Being of the +World as evolution suggests to the psycho-physical theory of nature is +not an impassable gulf. And thus, under its growing wealth of knowledge, +science may be leading up to an Ideal of the Ultimate Reality, in which +philosophy will gratefully and gladly coincide. At any rate, the modern +conception of nature and the modern conception of God are not so far +apart from each other, as either of these conceptions is now removed +from the conceptions covered by the same terms, some centuries gone by. + +There is one of the positive sciences, however, with which the +development of philosophy during the last century has been particularly +allied. This science is psychology. To speak of its history is not the +theme of this paper. But it should be noted in passing how the +development of psychology has brought into connection with the physical +and biological sciences the development of philosophy. This union, +whether it be for better or for worse,--and, on the whole, I believe it +to be for better rather than for worse,--has been in a very special way +the result of the last century. In tracing its details we should have to +speak of the dependence of certain branches of psychology on physiology, +and upon Sir Charles Bell's discovery of the difference between the +sensory and the motor nerves. This discovery was the contribution of the +beginning of the century to an entire line of discoveries, which have +ended at the close of the century with putting the localization of +cerebral function upon a firm experimental basis. Of scarcely less +importance has been the cellular theory as applied (1838) by Matthias +Schleiden, a pupil of Fries in philosophy, to plants, and by Theodor +Schwann about the same time to animal organisms. To these must be added +the researches of Johannes Müller (1801-1858), the great biologist, a +listener to Hegel's lectures, whose law of _specific energies_ brings +him into connection with psychology and, through psychology, to +philosophy. Even more true is this of Helmholtz, whose _Lehre von den +Tonempfindungen_ (1862) and _Physiologische Optik_ (1867) placed him in +even closer, though still mediate, relations to philosophy. But perhaps +especially Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887), whose researches in +psycho-physics laid the foundations of whatever, either as psychology or +as philosophy, goes under this name; and whether the doctrine have +reference to the relation of man's mind and body, or to the wider +relations of spirit and matter. + +In my judgment it cannot be affirmed that the attempts of the latter +half of the nineteenth century to develop an experimental science of +psychology in independence of philosophical criticism and metaphysical +assumption, or the claims of this science to have thrown any wholly new +light upon the statement, or upon the solution of philosophical +problems, have been largely successful. But certain more definitely +psychological questions have been to a commendable degree better +analyzed and elucidated; the new experimental methods, where confined +within their legitimate sphere, have been amply justified; and certain +_quasi_-metaphysical views respecting the nature of the human mind, and +even, if you will, the nature of the Spirit in general--have been placed +in a more favorable and scientifically engaging attitude toward +speculative philosophy. This seems to me to be especially true with +respect to two problems in which both empirical psychology and +philosophy have a common and profound interest. These are (1) the +complex synthesis of mental functions involved in every act of true +cognition, together with the bearing which the psychology of cognition +has upon epistemological problems; and (2) the yet more complex and +profound analysis, from the psychological point of view, of what it is +to be a self-conscious and self-determining Will, a true Self, together +with the bearing which the psychology of selfhood has upon all the +problems of ethics, æsthetics, and religion. + +The more obvious and easily traceable influences which have operated to +incite and direct the philosophical development of the nineteenth +century are, of course, dependent upon the teachings and writings of +philosophers, and the schools of philosophy which they have founded. To +speak of these influences even in outline would be to write a manual of +the history of philosophy during that hundred of years, which has been +of all others by far the most fruitful in material results, whatever +estimate may be put upon the separate or combined values of the +individual thinkers and their so-called schools. No fewer than seven or +eight relatively independent or partially antagonistic movements, which +may be traced back either directly or more indirectly to the critical +philosophy, and to the form in which the problems of philosophy were +left by Kant, sprung up during the century. In Germany chiefly, there +arose the Faith-philosophy, the Romantic School, and Rational Idealism; +in France, Eclecticism and Positivism (if, indeed, the latter can be +called _a_ philosophy); in Scotland, a naïve and crude form of Realism, +which served well for the time as an antagonist of a skeptical idealism, +but which itself contributed to an improved form of Idealism; and in the +United States, or rather in New England, a peculiar kind of +Transcendentalism of the sentimental type. But all these movements of +thought, and others lying somewhere midway between, in a pair composed +of any two, together with a steadfast remainder of almost every sort of +Dogmatism, and all degrees and kinds of Skepticism, have been intermixed +and contending with one another, in all these countries. Such has been +the varied, undefinable, and yet intensely stimulating and interesting +character of the development of systematic and scholastic philosophy, +during the nineteenth century. + +The early opposition to Kant in Germany was, in the main, twofold:--both +to his peculiar extreme analysis with its philosophical conclusions, and +also to all systematic as distinguished from a more popular and literary +form of philosophizing. Toward the close of the eighteenth century a +group of men had been writing upon philosophical questions in a spirit +and method quite foreign to that held in respect by the critical +philosophy. It is not wholly without significance that Lessing, whose +aim had been to use common sense and literary skill in clearing up +obscure ideas and improving and illumining the life of man, died in the +very year of the appearance of Kant's _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_. Of +this class of men an historian dealing with this period has said, "There +is hardly one who does not quote somewhere or other Pope's saying, 'The +proper study of mankind is man.'" To this class belong Hamann +(1730-1788), the inspirer of Herder and Jacobi. The former, who was +essentially a poet and a friend of Goethe, controverted Kant with regard +to his doctrine of reason, his antithesis between the individual and the +race, and his schism between things as empirically known and the known +unity in the Ground of their being and becoming. Herder's path to truth +was highly colored with flowers of rhetoric; but the promise was that he +would lead men back to the heavenly city. Jacobi, too, with due +allowance made for the injury wrought by his divorce of the two +philosophies,--that of faith and that of science,--and his excessive +estimate of the value-judgments which repose in the mist of a +feeling-faith, added something of worth by way of exposing the +barrenness of the Kantian doctrine of an unknowable "Thing-in-itself." + +From men like Fr. Schlegel (1772-1829), whose valid protest against the +sharp separation of speculative philosophy from the æsthetical, social, +and ethical life, assumed the "standpoint of irony," little real result +in the discovery of truth could be expected. But Schleiermacher +(1768-1834), in spite of that mixture of unfused elements which has made +his philosophy "a rendezvous for the most diverse systems," contributed +valuable factors to the century's philosophical development, both of a +negative and of a positive character. This thinker was peculiarly +fortunate in the enrichment of the conception of experience as +warranting a justifiable confidence in the ontological value of ethical, +æsthetical, and religious sentiment and ideas; but he was most +unfortunate in reviving and perpetuating the unjustifiable Kantian +distinction between cognition and faith in the field of experience. On +the whole, therefore, the Faith-philosophy and the Romantic School can +easily be said to have contributed more than a negative and modifying +influence to the development of the philosophy of the nineteenth +century. Its more modern revival toward the close of the same century, +and its continued hold upon certain minds of the present day, are +evidences of the positive but partial truth which its tenets, however +vaguely and unsystematically, continue to maintain in an æsthetically +and practically attractive way. + +The admirers of Kant strove earnestly and with varied success to remedy +the defects of his system. Among the earlier, less celebrated and yet +important members of this group, were K. G. Reinhold (1758-1823), and +Maimon (died, 1800). The former, like Descartes, in that he was educated +by the Jesuits, began the attempt, after rejecting some of the arbitrary +distinctions of Kant and his barren and self-contradictory +"Thing-in-itself," to unify the critical philosophy by reducing it to +some one principle. The latter really transcended Kant in his +philosophical skepticism, and anticipated the Hamiltonian form of the +so-called principle of relativity. Fries (1773-1843), and Hermes +(1775-1831)--the latter of whom saw in empirical psychology the only +true propædeutic to philosophy--should be mentioned in this connection. +In the same group was another, both mathematician and philosopher, who +strove more successfully than others of this group to accept the +critical standpoint of Kant and yet to transcend his negative +conclusions with regard to a theory of knowledge. I refer to Bolzano +(Prague, 1781-1848), who stands in the same line of succession with +Fries and Hermes, and whose works on the _Science of Religion_ (4 vols. +1834) and his _Science of Knowledge_ (4 vols. 1837) are noteworthy +contributions to epistemological doctrine. In the latter we have +developed at great length the important thought that the illative +character of propositional judgments implies an objective relation; and +that in all truths the subject-idea must be objective. In the work on +religion there is found as thoroughly dispassionate and rational a +defense of Catholic doctrine as exists anywhere in philosophical +literature. The limited influence of these works, due in part to their +bulk and their technical character, is on the whole, I think, sincerely +to be regretted. + +It was, however, chiefly that remarkable series of philosophers which +may be grouped under the rubric of a "rational Idealism," who filled so +full and made so rich the philosophical life of Germany during the first +half of the last century; whose philosophical thoughts and systems have +spread over the entire Western World, and who are most potent influences +in shaping the development of philosophy down to the present hour. Of +these we need do little more than that we can do--mention their names. +At their head, in time, stands Fichte, who--although Kant is reported to +have complained of this disciple because he lied about him so +much--really divined a truth which seems to be hovering in the clouds +above the master's head, but which, if the critical philosophy truly +meant to teach it, needed helpful deliverance in order to appear in +perfectly clear light. Fichte, although he divined this truth, did not, +however, free it from internal confusion and self-contradiction. It _is_ +his truth, nevertheless, that in the Self, as a self-positing and +self-determining activity, must somehow be found the Ground of all +experience and of all Reality. + +The important note which Schelling sounded was the demand that +philosophy should recognize "Nature" as belonging to the sphere of +Reality, and as requiring a measure of reflective thought which should +in some sort put it on equal terms with the Ego, for the construction of +our conception of the Being of the World. To Schelling it seemed +impossible to deduce, as Fichte had done, all the rich concrete +development of the world of things from the subjective needs and +constitutional forms of functioning which belong to the finite Self. +And, indeed, the doctrine which limits the origin, existence, and value +of all that is known about this sphere of experience to these needs, and +which finds the sufficient account of all experience with nature in +these forms of functioning, must always seem inadequate and even +grotesque in the sight of the natural sciences. Both Nature and Spirit, +thought Schelling, must be allowed to claim actual existence and equally +real value; while at the same time philosophy must reconcile the seeming +opposition of their claims and unite them in an harmonious and +self-explanatory way. In some common substratum, in which, to adopt +Hegel's sarcastic criticism, as in the darkness of the night "all cows +are black,"--that is in the Absolute, as an Identical Basis of +Differences,--the reconciliation was to be accomplished. + +But the constructive idealistic movement, in which Fichte and Schelling +bore so important a part, could not be satisfied with the positions +reached by either of these two philosophers. Neither the physical and +psychological sciences, nor the speculative interests of religion, +ethics, art, and social life, permitted this movement to stop at this +point. In all the subsequent developments of philosophy during the first +half or three quarters of the nineteenth century, undoubtedly the +influence of Hegel was greatest of all individual thinkers. His _motif_ +and plan are revealed in his letter of November 2, 1800, to Schelling, +namely, to transform what had hitherto been an ideal into a thoroughly +elaborate system. And in spite of his obvious obscurities of thought and +style, there is real ground for his claim to be the champion of the +common consciousness. It is undoubtedly in Hegel's _Phänomenologie des +Geistes_ (1807), that the distinctive features of the philosophy of the +first half of the last century most clearly define themselves. The +forces of reflection now abandon the abstract analytic method and +positions of the Kantian Critique, and concentrate themselves upon the +study of man's spiritual life as an historical evolution, in a more +concrete, face-to-face manner. Two important and, in the main, valid +assumptions underlie and guide this reflective study: (1) The Ultimate +Reality, or principle of all realities, is Mind or Spirit, which is to +be recognized and known in its essence, not by analysis into its formal +elements (the categories), but as a living development; (2) those formal +elements, or categories to which Kant gave validity merely as +constitutional forms of the functioning of the human understanding, +represent, the rather, the essential structure of Reality. + +In spite of these true thoughts, fault was justly found by the +particular sciences with both the speculative method of Hegel, which +consists in the smooth, harmonious, and systematic arrangement of +conceptions in logical or ideal relations to one another; and also with +the result, which reduces the Being of the World to terms of thought and +dialectical processes merely, and neglects or overlooks the other +aspects of racial experience. Therefore, the idealistic movement could +not remain satisfied with the Hegelian dialectic. Especially did both +the religious and the philosophical party revolt against the important +thought underlying Hegel's philosophy of religion; namely, that "the +more philosophy approximates to a complete development, the more it +exhibits the same need, the same interest, and the same content, as +religion itself." This, as they interpreted it, meant the absorption of +religion in philosophy. + +Next after Hegel, among the great names of this period, stand the names +of Herbart and Schopenhauer. The former contributes in an important way +to the proper conception of the task and the method of philosophy, and +influences greatly the development of psychology, both as a science that +is pedagogic to philosophy, and as laying the basis for pedagogical +principles and practice. But Herbart commits again the ancient fallacy, +under the spell of which so much of the Kantian criticism was bound; and +which identifies contradictions that belong to the imperfect or illusory +conceptions of individual thinkers with insoluble antinomies inherent in +reason itself. In spite of the little worth and misleading character of +his view of perception, and the quite complete inadequacy of the method +by which, at a single leap, he reaches the one all-explanatory principle +of his philosophy, Schopenhauer made a most important contribution to +the reflective thought of the century. It is true, as Kuno Fischer has +said, that it seems to have occurred to Schopenhauer only twenty-five +years after he had propounded his theory, that will, as it appears in +consciousness, is as truly phenomenal as is intellect. It is also true +that his theory of knowledge and his conception of Reality, as measured +by their power to satisfy and explain our total experience, are +inflicted with irreconcilable contradictions. Neither can we accord firm +confidence or high praise to the "Way of Salvation" which somehow Will +can attain to follow by æsthetic contemplation and ascetic self-denial. +Yet the philosophy of Schopenhauer rightly insists upon our Idealistic +construction of Reality having regard to aspects of experience which his +predecessors had quite too much neglected; and even its spiteful and +exaggerated reminders of the facts which contradict the tendency of all +Idealism to construct a smooth, regular, and altogether pleasing +conception of the Being of the World, have been of great benefit to the +development of the latter half of the nineteenth century. + +In estimating the thoughts and the products of modern Idealism we ought +not to forget the larger multitude of thoughtful men, both in Germany +and elsewhere, who have contributed toward shaping the course of +reflection in the attempt to answer the problems which the critical +philosophy left to the nineteenth century. It is a singular comment upon +the caprices of fame that, in philosophy as in science, politics, and +art, some of those who have really reasoned most soundly and acutely, if +not also effectively upon these problems, are little known even by name +in the history of the philosophical development of the century. Among +the earlier members of this group, did space permit, we should wish to +mention Berger, Solger, Steffens, and others, who strove to reconcile +the positions of a subjective idealism with a realistic but pantheistic +conception of the Being of the World. There are others, who like Weisse, +I. H. Fichte, C. P. Fischer, and Braniss, more or less bitterly or +moderately and reasonably, opposed the method and the conclusions of the +Hegelian dialectic. Still another group earned for themselves the +supposedly opprobrious but decidedly vague title of "Dualists," by +rejecting what they conceived to be the pantheism of Hegel. Still +others, like Fries and Beneke and their successors, strove to parallel +philosophy with the particular sciences by grounding it in an empirical +but scientific psychology; and thus they instituted a line of closely +connected development, to which reference has already been made. + +Hegel himself believed that he had permanently effected that +reconciliation of the orthodox creed with the cognition of Ultimate +Reality at which his dialectic aimed. In all such attempts at +reconciliation three great questions are chiefly concerned: (1) the +Being of God; (2) the nature of man; (3) the actual and the ideally +satisfactory relations between the two. But, as might have been +expected, a period of wild, irregular, and confused contention met the +attempt to establish this claim. In this conflict of more or less noisy +and popular as well as of thoughtful and scholastic philosophy, +Hegelians of various degrees of fidelity, anti-Hegelians of various +degrees of hostility, and ultra-Hegelians of various degrees of +eccentricity, all took a valiant and conspicuous part. We cannot follow +its history; but we can learn its lesson. Polemical philosophy, as +distinguished from quiet, reflective, and critical but constructive +philosophy involves a most uneconomical use of mental force. Yet out of +this period of conflict, and in a measure as its result, there came a +period of improved relations between science and philosophy and between +philosophy and theology, which was the dawn, toward the close of the +nineteenth century, of that better illumined day into the middle of +which we hope that we are proceeding. + +Before leaving this idealistic movement in Germany, and elsewhere as +influenced largely by German philosophy, one other name deserves +mention. This name is that of Lotze, who combined elements from many +previous thinkers with those derived from his own studies and +thoughts,--the conceptions of mechanism as applied to physical +existences and to psychical life, with the search for some monistic +Principle that shall satisfy the æsthetical and ethical, as well as the +scientific demands of the human mind. This variety of interests and of +culture led to the result of his making important contributions to +psychology, logic, metaphysics, and æsthetics. If we find his system of +thinking--as I think we must--lacking in certain important elements of +consistency and obscured in places by doubts as to his real meaning, +this does not prevent us from assigning to Lotze a position which, for +versatility of interests, genial quality of reflection and criticism, +suggestiveness of thought and charm of style, is second to no other in +the history of nineteenth century philosophical development. + +In France and in England the first quarter of the last century was far +from being productive of great thinkers or great thoughts in the sphere +of philosophy. De Biran (1766-1824), in several important respects the +forerunner of modern psychology, after revolting from his earlier +complacent acceptance of the vagaries of Condillac and Cabanis, made the +discovery that the "immediate consciousness of self-activity is the +primitive and fundamental principle of human cognition." Meantime it was +only a little group of Academicians who were being introduced, in a +somewhat superficial way, to the thoughts of the Scottish and the German +idealistic Schools by Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, Cousin, and others. A +more independent and characteristic movement was that inaugurated by +Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who, having felt the marked influence of +Saint-Simon when he was only a boy of twenty, in a letter to his friend +Valat, in the year 1824, declares: "I shall devote my whole life and all +my powers to the founding of positive philosophy." In spite of the +impossibility of harmonizing with this point of view the vague and +mystical elements which characterize the later thought of Comte, or with +its carrying into effect the not altogether intelligent recognition of +the synthetic activity of the mind (_tout se réduit toujours à lier_) +and certain hints as to "first principles;" and in spite of the small +positive contribution to philosophy which Comtism could claim to have +made; it has in a way represented the value of two ideas. These are (1) +the necessity for philosophy of studying the actual historical forces +which have been at work and which are displayed in the facts of history; +and (2) the determination not to go by mere unsupported speculation +beyond experience in order to discover knowable Reality. There is, +however, a kind of subtle irony in the fact that the word "Positivism" +should have come to stand so largely for _negative_ conclusions, in the +very spheres of philosophy, morals, and religion where _affirmative_ +conclusions are so much desired and sought. + +That philosophy in Great Britain was in a nearly complete condition of +decadence during the first half or three quarters of the nineteenth +century was the combined testimony of writers from such different points +of view as Carlyle, Sir William Hamilton, and John Stuart Mill. And yet +these very names are also witnesses to the fact that this decadence was +not quite complete. In the first quarter of the century Coleridge, +although he had failed, on account of weakness both of mind and of +character, in his attempt to reconcile religion to the thought of his +own age, on the basis of the Kantian distinction between reason and the +intellect, had sowed certain seed-thoughts which became fertile in the +soil of minds more vigorous, logical, and practical than his own. This +was, perhaps, especially true in America, where inquirers after truth +were seeking for something more satisfactory than the French skepticism +of the revolutionary and following period. Carlyle's mocking sarcasm was +also not without wholesome effect. + +But it was Sir William Hamilton and John Stuart Mill whose thoughts +exercised a more powerful formative influence over the minds of the +younger men. The one was the flower of the Scottish Realism, the other +of the movement started by Bentham and the elder Mill. + +That the Scottish Realism should end by such a combination with the +skepticism of the critical philosophy as is implied in Hamilton's law of +the relativity of all knowledge, is one of the most curious and +interesting turns in the history of modern philosophy. And when this law +was so interpreted by Dean Mansel in its application to the fundamental +cognitions of religion as to lay the foundations upon which the most +imposing structure of agnosticism was built by Herbert Spencer, surely +the entire swing around the circle, from Kant to Kant again, has been +made complete. The attempt of Hamilton failed, as every similar attempt +must always fail. Neither speculative philosophy nor religious faith is +satisfied with an abstract conception, about the correlate of which in +Reality nothing is known or ever can be known. But every important +attempt of this sort serves the double purpose of stimulating other +efforts to reconstruct the answer to the problem of philosophy, on a +basis of positive experience of an enlarged type; and also of acting as +a real, if only temporary practical support to certain value-judgments +which the faiths of morality, art, and religion both implicate and, in a +measure, validate. + +The influence of John Stuart Mill, as it was exerted not only in his +conduct of life while a servant of the East India Company, but also in +his writings on Logic, Politics, and Philosophy, was, on the whole, a +valuable contribution to his generation. In the additions which he made +to the Utilitarianism of Bentham we have done, I believe, all that ever +can be done in defense of this principle of ethics. And his posthumous +confessions of faith in the ontological value of certain great +conceptions of religion are the more valuable because of the nature of +the man, and of the experience which is their source. Perhaps the most +permanent contribution which Mill made to the development of philosophy +proper, outside of the sphere of logic, ethics, and politics, was his +vigorous polemical criticism of Hamilton's claim for the necessity of +faith in an "Unconditioned" whose conception is "only a fasciculus of +negations of the Conditioned in its opposite extremes, and bound +together merely by the aid of language and their common character of +incomprehensibility." + +The history of the development of philosophy in America during the +nineteenth century, as during the preceding century, has been +characterized in the main by three principal tendencies. These may be +called the theological, the social, and the eclectic. From the beginning +down to the present time the religious influence and the interest in +political and social problems have been dominant. And yet withal, the +student of these problems in the atmosphere of this country likes, in a +way, to do his own thinking and to make his own choices of the thoughts +that seem to him true and best fitted for the best form of life. In +spite of the fact that the different streams of European thought have +flowed in upon us somewhat freely, there has been comparatively little +either of the adherence to schools of European philosophy or of the +attempt to develop a national school. Doubtless the influence of English +and Scottish thinking upon the academical circles of America was +greatest for more than one hundred and fifty years after the gift in +1714 by Governor Yale of a copy of Locke's Essay to the college which +bore his name,--and especially upon the reflections and published works +of Jonathan Edwards touching the fundamental problems of epistemology, +ethics, and religion. During the early part of this century these views +awakened antagonism from such writers as Dana, Whedon, Hazard, Nathaniel +Taylor, Jeremiah Day, Henry P. Tappan, and other opponents of the +Edwardean theology, and also from such advocates of so-called +"free-thinking," as had derived their _motifs_ and their views from +English deistical writers like Shaftesbury, or from the skepticism of +Hume. + +A more definite philosophical movement, however, which had established +itself somewhat firmly in scholastic centres by the year 1825, and which +maintained itself for more than half a century, went back to the arrival +in this country of John Witherspoon, in 1768, to be the president of +Princeton, bringing with him a library of three hundred books. It was +the appeal of the Scottish School to the "plain man's consciousness" and +to so-called "common sense," which was relied upon to controvert all +forms of philosophy which seemed to threaten the foundations of religion +and of the ethics of politics and sociology. But even during this +period, which was characterized by relatively little independent +thinking in scholastic circles, a more pronounced productivity was shown +by such writers as Francis Wayland, and others; but, perhaps, especially +by Laurens P. Hickok, whose works on psychology and cosmology deserve +especial recognition: while in psychology, as related to philosophical +problems, the principal names of this period are undoubtedly the +presidents of Yale and Princeton,--Noah Porter and James McCosh,--both +of whom (but especially the former) had their views modified by the more +scientific psychology of Europe and the profounder thinking of Germany. + +It was Germany's influence, however, both directly and indirectly +through Coleridge and a few other English writers, that caused a ferment +of impressions and ideas which, in their effort to work themselves +clear, resulted in what is known as New England "Transcendentalism." In +America this movement can scarcely be called definitely philosophical; +much less can it be said to have resulted in a system, or even in a +school, of philosophy. It must also be said to have been "inspired but +not borrowed" from abroad. Its principal, if not sole, literary survival +is to be found in the works of Emerson. As expounded by him, it is not +precisely Pantheism--certainly not a consistent and critical development +of the pantheistic theory of the Being of the World; it is, rather, a +vague, poetical, and pantheistical Idealism of a decidedly mystical +type. + +The introduction of German philosophy proper, in its nature form, and +essential being, to the few interested seriously in critical and +reflective thinking upon the ultimate problems of nature and of human +life, began with the founding of the _Journal of Speculative +Philosophy_, in 1867, under the direction of William T. Harris, then +Superintendent of Schools in this city. + +With the work of Darwin, and his predecessors and successors, there +began a mighty movement of thought which, although it is primarily +scientific and more definitely available in biological science, has +already exercised, and is doubtless destined to exercise in the future, +an enormous influence upon philosophy. Indeed, we are already in the +midst of the preliminary confusions and contentions, but most fruitful +considerations and discoveries belonging to a so-called philosophy of +evolution. + +This development has, in the sphere of systematic philosophy, reached +its highest expression in the voluminous works produced through the +latter half of the nineteenth century by Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose +recent death seems to mark the close of the period we have under +consideration. The metaphysical assumptions and ontological value of the +system of Spencer, as he wished it to be understood and interpreted, +have perhaps, though not unnaturally, been quite too much submerged in +the more obvious expressions of its agnostic positivism. In its +psychology, however, the assumption of "some underlying substance in +contrast to all changing forms," distinguishes it from a pure positivism +in a very radical way. But more especially in philosophy, the +metaphysical postulate of a mysterious Unity of Force that somehow +manages to reveal itself, and the law of its operations, to the +developed cognition of the nineteenth century philosopher, however much +it seems to involve the system in internal contradictions, certainly +forbids that we should identify it with the positivism of Auguste Comte. +In our judgment, however, it is in his ethical good sense and integrity +of judgment,--a good sense and integrity which commits to ethics rather +than to sociology the task of determining the highest type of human +life,--and in basing the conditions for the prevalence and the +development of the highest type of life upon ethical principles and upon +the adherence to ethical ideas, that Herbert Spencer will be found most +clearly entitled to a lasting honor. + +III. The third number of our difficult tasks is to summarize the +principal results, to inventory the net profits, as it were, of the +development of philosophy during the nineteenth century. This task is +made the more difficult by the heterogeneous nature and as yet +unclassified condition of the development. With the quickening and +diversifying of all kinds and means of intercourse, there has come the +breaking down of national schools and idiosyncrasies of method and of +thought. In philosophy, Germany, France, Great Britain, and indeed, +Italy, have come to intermingle their streams of influence; and from all +these countries these streams have been flowing in upon America. In +psychology, especially, as well as in all the other sciences, but also +to some degree in philosophy, returning streams of influence from +America have, during the last decade or two, been felt in Europe itself. + +It must also be admitted that the attempts at a reconstruction of +systematic philosophy which have followed the rapid disintegration of +the Hegelian system, and the enormous accumulations of new material due +to the extension of historical studies and of the particular +sciences,--including especially the so-called "new psychology,"--have +not as yet been fruitful of large results. In philosophy, as in art, +politics, and even scientific theory, the spirit and the opportunity of +the time are more favorable to the gathering of material and to the +projecting of a bewildering variety of new opinions, or old opinions put +forth under new names, than to that candid, patient, and prolonged +reflection and balancing of judgment which a worthy system-building +inexorably requires. The age of breaking up the old, without +assimilating the new, has not yet passed away. And whatever is new, +startling, large, even monstrous, has in many quarters the seeming +preference, in philosophy's building as in other architecture. To the +confusion which reigns even in scholastic circles, contributions have +been arriving from the outside, from philosophers like Nietzsche, and +from men great in literature like Tolstoi. Nor has the matter been +helped by the more recent extreme developments of positivism and +skepticism, which often enough, without any consciousness of their +origin and without the respect for morality and religion which Kant +always evinced, really go back to the critical philosophy. + +In spite of all this, however, the last two decades or more have shown +certain hopeful tendencies and notable achievements, looking toward the +reconstruction of systematic philosophy. In this attempt to bring order +out of confusion, to enable calm, prolonged, and reflective thinking to +build into its structure the riches of the new material which the +evolution of the race has secured, a place of honor ought to be given to +France, where so much has been done of late to blend with clearness of +style and independence of thought that calm reflective and critical +judgment which looks all sides of human experience sympathetically but +bravely in the face. In psychology Ribot, and in philosophy, Fouillée, +Renouvier, Secrétan, and others, deserve grateful recognition. No friend +of philosophy can, I think, fail to recognize the probable benefits to +be derived from that movement with which such names as Mach and Ostwald +in Germany are connected, and which is sounding the call to the men of +science to clear up the really distressing obscurity and confusion which +has so long clung to their fundamental conceptions; and to examine anew +the significance of their assumptions, with a view to the construction +of a new and improved doctrine of the Being of the World. And if to +these names we add those of the numerous distinguished investigators of +psychology as pedagogic to philosophy, and, in philosophy, of Deussen, +Eucken, von Hartmann, Riehl, Wundt, and others, we may well affirm that +new light will continue to break forth from that country which so +powerfully aroused the whole Western World at the end of the eighteenth +and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In Great Britain the name and +works of Thomas Hill Green have influenced the attempts at a +reconstruction of systematic philosophy in a manner to satisfy at one +and the same time both the facts and laws of science and the æsthetical, +ethical, and religious ideals of the age, in a very considerable degree. +And in this attempt, both as it expresses itself in theoretical +psychology and in the various branches of philosophical discipline, +writers like Bradley, Fraser, Flint, Hodgson, Seth, Stout, Ward, and +others, have taken a conspicuous part. Nor are there wanting in Holland, +Italy, and even in Sweden and Russia, thinkers equally worthy of +recognition, and recognized, in however limited and unworthy fashion, in +their own land. The names of those in America who have labored most +faithfully, and succeeded best, in this enormous task of reconstructing +philosophy in a systematic way, and upon a basis of history and of +modern science, I do not need to mention; they are known, or they surely +ought to be known, to us all. + +In attempting to summarize the gains of philosophy during the last +hundred years, we should remind ourselves that progress in philosophy +does not consist in the final settlement, and so in the "solving" of any +of its great problems. Indeed, the relations of philosophy to its +grounds in experience, and the nature of its method and of its ideal, +are such that its progress can never be expected to put an end to +itself. But the content of the total experience of humanity has been +greatly enriched during the last century; and the critical and +reflective thought of trained minds has been led toward a more profound +and comprehensive theory of Reality, and toward a doctrine of values +that shall be more available for the improvement of man's political, +social, and religious life. + +In view of this truth respecting the limitations of systematic +philosophy, I think we may hold that certain negative results, which are +customarily adduced as unfavorable to the claims of philosophical +progress, are really signs of improvement during the latter half of the +nineteenth century. One is an increased spirit of reserve and caution, +and an increased modesty of claims. This result is perhaps significant +of riper wisdom and more trustworthy maturity. Kant believed himself to +have established for philosophy a system of apodeictic conclusions, +which were as completely forever to have displaced the old dogmatism as +Copernicus had displaced the Ptolemaic astronomy. But the steady +pressure of historical and scientific studies has made it increasingly +difficult for any sane thinker to claim for any system of thinking such +demonstrable validity. May we not hope that the students of the +particular sciences, to whom philosophy owes so much of its enforced +sanity and sane modesty, will themselves soon share freely of the +philosophic spirit with regard to their own metaphysics and ethical and +religious standpoints, touching the Ultimate Reality? Even when the +recoil from the overweening self-satisfaction and crass complacency of +the earlier part of the last century takes the form of melancholy, or of +acute sadness, or even of a mild despair of philosophy, I am not sure +that the last state of that man is not better than the first. + +In connection with this improvement in spirit, we may also note an +improvement in the method of philosophy. The purely speculative method, +with its intensely interesting but indefensible disregard of concrete +facts, and of the conclusions of the particular sciences, is no longer +in favor even among the most ardent devotees and advocates of the +superiority of philosophy to those sciences. At the same time, +philosophy may quite properly continue to maintain its position of +independent critic, as well as of docile pupil, toward the particular +sciences. + +In the same connection must be mentioned the hopeful fact that the last +two or three decades have shown a decided improvement in the relations +of philosophy toward the positive sciences. There are plain signs of +late that the attitude of antagonism, or of neglect, which prevailed so +largely during the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century, +is to be replaced by one of friendship and mutual helpfulness. And, +indeed, science and philosophy cannot long or greatly flourish without +reciprocal aid, if by science we mean a true _Wissenschaft_ and if we +also mean to base philosophy upon our total experience. For science and +philosophy are really engaged upon the same task,--to _understand and to +appreciate the totality of man's_ _experience_. They, therefore, have +essential and permanent relations of dependence for material, for +inspiration and correction, and for other forms of helpfulness. While, +then, their respective spheres have been more clearly delimited during +the last century, their interdependence has been more forcefully +exhibited. Both of them have been developing a systematic exposition of +the universe. Both of them desire to enlarge and deepen the conception +of the Being of the World, as made known to the totality of human +experience, in its Unity of nature and significance. We cannot believe +that the end of the nineteenth century would sustain the charge which +Fontenelle made in the closing years of the seventeenth century: +"_L'Académie des Sciences ne prend la nature que par petites +parcelles_." Science itself now bids us regard the Universe as a +dynamical Unity, teleologically conceived, because in a process of +evolution under the control of immanent ideas. Philosophy assumes the +same point of view, rather at the beginning than at the end of defining +its purpose; and so feels a certain glad leap at its heart-strings, and +an impulse to hold out the hand to science, when it hears such an +utterance as that of Poincaré: _Ce n'est pas le méchanisme le vrai, le +seul but; c'est l'unité_. + +Shall we not say, then, that this double-faced but wholly true lesson +has been learned: namely, that the so-called philosophy of nature has no +sound foundation and no safeguard against vagaries of every sort, unless +it follows the lead of the positive sciences of nature; but that the +sciences themselves can never afford a full satisfaction to the +legitimate aspirations of human reason unless they, too, contribute to +the philosophy of nature--writ large and conceived of as a real-ideal +Unity. + +That nature, as known and knowable by man, is a great artist, and that +man's æsthetical consciousness may be trusted as having a certain +ontological value, is the postulate properly derived from the +considerations advanced in the latest, and in some respects the most +satisfactory, of the three Critiques of Kant. The ideal way of looking +at natural phenomena which so delighted the mind of Goethe has now been +placed on broad and sound foundations by the fruitful industries of many +workmen,--such as Karl Ernst von Baer and Charles Darwin,--whose +morphological and evolutionary conceptions of the universe have +transformed the current conceptions of cosmic processes. But the world +of physical and natural phenomena has thereby been rendered not less, +but more, of a Cosmos, an orderly totality. + +In addition to these more general but somewhat vague evaluations of the +progress of philosophy during the nineteenth century, we are certainly +called upon to face the question whether, after all, any advance has +been made toward the more satisfactory solution of the definite problems +which the Kantian criticism left unsolved. To this question I believe an +affirmative answer may be given in accordance with the facts of history. +It will be remembered that the first of these problems was the +epistemological. Certainly no little improvement has been made in the +psychology of cognition. We can no longer repeat the mistakes of Kant, +either with respect to the uncritical assumptions he makes regarding the +origin of knowledge in the so-called "faculties" of the human mind or +regarding the analysis of those faculties and their interdependent +relations. It is not the Scottish philosophy alone which has led to the +conclusion that, in the word of the late Professor Adamson, "What are +called acts or states of consciousness are _not_ rightly conceived of as +having for their objects their own modes of existence as ways in which a +subject is modified." And in the larger manner both science and +philosophy, in their negations and their affirmations, and even in their +points of view, have better grounds for the faith of human reason in its +power progressively to master the knowledge of Reality than was the case +a hundred years ago. Nor has the skepticism of the same era, whether by +shallow scoffing at repeated failures, or by pious sighs over the +limitations of human reason, or by critical analysis of the cognitive +faculties "according to well-established principles," succeeded in +limiting our speculative pretensions to the sphere of possible +experience,--in the Kantian meaning both of "principles" and of +"experience." But what both science and philosophy are compelled to +agree upon as a common underlying principle is this: The proof of the +most fundamental presuppositions, as well as of the latest more +scientifically established conclusions, of both science and philosophy, +is the assistance they afford in the satisfactory explanation of the +totality of racial experience. + +In the evolution of the ontological problem, as compared with the form +in which it was left by the critical philosophy, the past century has +also made some notable advances. To deny this would be to discredit the +development of human knowledge so far as to say that we know no more +about what nature is, and man is, than was known a hundred years ago. To +say this, however, would not be to speak truth of fact. And here we may +not unnaturally grow somewhat impatient with that metaphysical fallacy +which places an impassable gulf between Reality and Experience. No +reality is, of course, cognizable or believable by man which does not +somehow show its presence in his total experience. But no growth of +experience is possible without involving increase of knowledge +representing Reality. For Reality is no absent and dead, or statical, +Ding-an-Sich. Cognition itself is a commerce of realities. And are there +not plain signs that the more thoughtful men of science are becoming +less averse to the recognition of the truth of ontological philosophy; +namely, that the deeper meaning of their own studies is grasped only +when they recognize that they are ever face to face with what they call +Energy and we call Will, and with what they call laws and we call Mind +as significant of the progressive realization of immanent ideas. This +Ultimate Reality is so profound that neither science nor philosophy will +ever sound all its depths, and so comprehensive as more than to justify +all the categories of both. + +Probably, on the whole, there has been less progress made toward a +satisfactory solution of the problems offered by the value-judgments of +ethics and religion, in the form in which these problems were left by +the critical philosophy. The century has illustrated the truth of +Falckenberg's statement: "In periods which have given birth to a +skeptical philosophy, one never looks in vain for the complementary +phenomenon of mysticism." Twice during the century the so-called +"faith-philosophy," or philosophy of feeling, has been borne to the +front, to raise a bulwark against the advancing hosts of +agnostics--occasioned in the first period by the negations of the +Kantian criticism, and in the second by the positive conclusions of the +physical and biological sciences. This form of protesting against the +neglect or disparagement of important factors which belong to man's +æsthetical, ethical, and religious experience, is reasonable and must be +heard. But the extravagances with which these neglected factors have +been posited and appraised, to the neglect of the more definitively +scientific and strictly logical, is to be deplored. The great work +before the philosophy of the present age is the reconciliation of the +historical and scientific conceptions of the Universe with the +legitimate sentiments and ideals of art, morality, and religion. But +surely neither rationalism nor "faith-philosophy" is justified in +pouring out the living child with the muddy water of the bath. + +IV. The attempt to survey the present situation of philosophy, and to +predict its immediate future, is embarrassed by the fact that we are all +immersed in it, are a part of its spirit and present form. But if +nearness has its embarrassments, it has also its benefits. Those who are +amidst the tides of life may know better, in a way, how these tides are +tending and what is their present strength, than do those who survey +them from distant, cool, and exalted heights. "_Für jeden einzelnen +bildet der Vater und der Sohn eine greifbare Kette von Lebensereignungen +und Erfahrungen._" The very intensely vital and formative but unformed +condition of systematic philosophy--its protoplasmic character--contains +promises of a new life. If we may believe the view of Hegel that the +systematizing of the thought of any age marks the time when the peculiar +living thought of that age is passing into a period of decay, we may +certainly claim for our present age the prospect of a prolonged +vitality. + +The nineteenth century has left us with a vast widening of the +horizon,--outward into space, backward in time, inward toward the +secrets of life, and downward into the depths of Reality. With this +there has been an increase in the profundity of the conviction of the +spiritual unity of the race. In the consideration of all of its problems +in the immediate future and in the coming century--so far as we can see +forward into this century--philosophy will have to reckon with certain +marked characteristics of the human spirit which form at the same time +inspiring stimuli and limiting conditions of its endeavors and +achievements. Chief among these are the greater and more firmly +established principles of the positive sciences, and the prevalence of +the historical spirit and method in the investigation of all manner of +problems. These influences have given shape to the conception which, +although it is as yet by no means in its final or even in thoroughly +self-consistent form, is destined powerfully to affect our philosophical +as well as our scientific theories. This conception is that of +Development. But philosophy, considered as the product of critical and +reflective thinking over the more ultimate problems of nature and of +human life, is itself a development. And it is now, more than ever +before, a development interdependently connected with all the other +great developments. + +Philosophy, in order to adapt itself to the spirit of the age, must +welcome and cultivate the freest critical inquiry into its own methods +and results, and must cheerfully submit itself to the demand for +evidences which has its roots in the common and essential experience of +the race. Moreover, the growth of the spirit of democracy, which, on the +one hand, is distinctly unfavorable to any system of philosophy whose +tenets and formulas seem to have only an academic validity or a merely +esoteric value, and which, on the other hand, requires for its +satisfaction a more tenable, helpful, and universally applicable theory +of life and reality, cannot fail, in my judgment, to influence favorably +the development of philosophy. In the union of the speculative and the +practical; in the harmonizing of the interests of the positive sciences, +with their judgments of fact and law, and the interests of art, +morality, and religion, with their value-judgments and ideals; in the +synthesis of the truths of Realism and Idealism, as they have existed +hitherto and now exist in separateness or antagonism; in a union that is +not accomplished by a shallow eclecticism, but by a sincere attempt to +base philosophy upon the totality of human experience;--in such a union +as this must we look for the real progress of philosophy in the coming +century. + +Just now there seem to be two somewhat heterogeneous and not altogether +well-defined tendencies toward the reconstruction of systematic +philosophy, both of which are powerful and represent real truths +conquered by ages of intellectual industry and conflict. These two, +however, need to be internally harmonized, in order to obtain a +satisfactory statement of the development of the last century. They may +be called the evolutionary and the idealistic. The one tendency lays +emphasis on mechanism, the other on spirit. Yet it is most interesting +to notice how many of the early workmen in the investigation of the +principle of the conservation and correlation of energy took their point +of departure from distinctly teleological and spiritual conceptions. "I +was led," said Colding,--to take an extreme case,--at the Natural +Science Congress at Innsbruck, 1869, "to the idea of the constancy of +national forces by the religious conception of life." And even +Moleschott, in his _Autobiography_, posthumously published, declares: "I +myself was well aware that the whole conception might be converted; for +since all matter is a bearer of force, endowed with force or penetrated +with spirit, it would be just as correct to call it a spiritualistic +conception." On the other hand, the modern, better instructed Idealism +is much inclined, both from the psychological and from the more purely +philosophical points of view, to regard with duly profound respect all +the facts and laws of that mechanism of Reality, which certainly is not +merely the dependent construction of the human mind functioning +according to a constitution that excludes it from Reality, but is rather +the ever increasingly more trustworthy revealer of Reality. This +tendency to a union of the claims of both Realism and Idealism is +profoundly influencing the solution of each one of these problems which +the Kantian criticism left to the philosophy of the nineteenth century. +In respect of the epistemological problem, philosophy--as I have already +said--is not likely again to repeat the mistakes either of Kant or of +the dogmatism which his criticism so effectually overthrew. It was a +wise remark of the physician Johann Benjamin Erhard, in a letter dated +May 19, 1794, _à propos_ of Fichte: "The philosophy which _proceeds_ +from a _single_ fundamental principle, and pretends to deduce everything +from it, is and always will remain a piece of artificial sophistry: only +that philosophy which _ascends_ to the highest principle and exhibits +everything else in perfect harmony with it, is the true one." This at +least ought--one would say--to have been made clear by the century of +discussion over the epistemological problem, since Kant. You cannot +_deduce_ the Idea from the Reality, or the Reality from the Idea. The +problem of knowledge is not, as Fichte held in the form of a fundamental +assumption, an alternative of this sort. The Idea _and_ Reality are, the +rather already there, and to be recognized as in a living unity, in +every cognitive experience. Psychology is constantly adding something +toward the problem of cognition as a problem in synthesis; and is then +in a way contributing to the better scientific understanding of the +philosophical postulate which is the confidence of human reason in its +ability, by the harmonious use of all its powers, progressively to reach +a better and fuller knowledge of Reality. + +The ontological problem will necessarily always remain the unsolved, in +the sense of the very incompletely solved problem of philosophy. But as +long as human experience develops, and as long as philosophy bestows +upon experience the earnest and candid efforts of reflecting minds, the +solution of the ontological problem will be approached, but never fully +reached. That Being of the World which Kant, in the negative and +critical part of his work, left as an X, unknown and unknowable, the +last century has filled with a new and far richer content than it ever +had before. Especially has this century changed the conception of the +Unity of the Universe in such manner that it can never return again to +its ancient form. On the one hand, this Unity cannot be made +comprehensible in terms of any one scientific or philosophical principle +or law. Science and philosophy are both moving farther and farther away +from the hope of comprehending the variety and infinite manifoldness of +the Absolute in terms of any one side or aspect of man's complex +experience. But, on the other hand, the confidence in this essential +Unity is not diminished, but is the rather confirmed. As humanity itself +develops, as the Selfhood of man grows in the experience of the world +which is its own environment, and of the world within which it is its +own true Self, humanity may reasonably hope to win an increased, and +increasingly valid, cognition of the Being of the World as the Absolute +Self. + +Closely connected, and in a way essentially identical with the +ontological problem, is that of the origin, validity, and rational value +of the ideas of humanity. May it not be said that the nineteenth century +transfers to the twentieth an increased interest in and a heightened +appreciation of the so-called practical problems of philosophy. Science +and philosophy certainly ought to combine--and are they not ready to +combine?--in the effort to secure a more nearly satisfactory +understanding and solution of the problems afforded by the æsthetical, +ethical, and religious sentiments and ideals of the race. To philosophy +this combination means that it shall be more fruitful than ever before +in promoting the uplift and betterment of mankind. The fulfillment of +the practical mission of philosophy involves the application of its +conceptions and principles to education, politics, morals, as a matter +of law and of custom, and to religion as matter both of rational faith +and of the conduct of life. + +How, then, can this brief and imperfect sketch of the outline of the +development of philosophy in the nineteenth century better come to a +close than by words of encouragement and of exhortation as well. There +are, in my judgment, the plainest signs that the somewhat too +destructive and even nihilistic tendencies of the second and third +quarters of the nineteenth century have reached their limit; that the +strife of science and philosophy, and of both with religion, is +lessening, and is being rapidly displaced by the spirit of mutual +fairness and reciprocal helpfulness; and that reasonable hopes of a new +and a splendid era of reconstruction in philosophy may be entertained. +For I cannot agree with the _dictum_ of a recent writer on the subject, +that "the sciences are coming less and less to admit of a synthesis, and +not at all of a synthetic philosopher." + +On the contrary, I hold that, with an increased confidence in the +capacity of human reason to discover and validate the most secret and +profound, as well as the most comprehensive, of truths, philosophy may +well put aside some of its shyness and hesitancy, and may resume more of +that audacity of imagination, sustained by ontological convictions, +which characterized its work during the first half of the nineteenth +century. And if the latter half of the twentieth century does for the +constructions of the first half of the same century, what the latter +half of the nineteenth century did for the first half of that century, +this new criticism will only be to illustrate the way in which the human +spirit makes every form of its progress. + +Therefore, a summons of all helpers, in critical but fraternal spirit, +to this work of reconstruction, for which two generations of enormous +advance in the positive sciences has gathered new material, and for the +better accomplishment of which both the successes and the failures of +the philosophy of the nineteenth century have prepared the men of the +twentieth century, is the winsome and imperative voice of the hour. + + + + +SECTION A--METAPHYSICS + + + + +SECTION A--METAPHYSICS + +(_Hall 6, September 21, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. C. ARMSTRONG, Wesleyan University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR, McGill University, Montreal. + PROFESSOR ALEXANDER T. ORMOND, Princeton University. + SECRETARY: PROFESSOR A. O. LOVEJOY, Washington University. + + +The Chairman of the Section, Professor A. C. Armstrong, of Wesleyan +University, in opening the meeting referred to the continued vitality of +metaphysics as shown by its repeated revivals after the many destructive +attacks upon it in the later modern times: he congratulated the Section +on the fact that the principal speakers were scholars who had made +notable contributions to metaphysical theory. + + + + +THE RELATIONS BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THE OTHER SCIENCES + +BY PROFESSOR ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR + + [Alfred Edward Taylor, Frothingham Professor of Philosophy, + McGill University, Montreal, Canada. b. Oundle, England, + December 22, 1869. M.A. Oxford. Fellow, Merton College, + Oxford, 1891-98, 1902-; Lecturer in Greek and Philosophy, + Owens College, Manchester, 1896-1903; Assistant Examiner to + University of Wales, 1899-1903; Green Moral Philosophy + Prizeman, Oxford, 1899; Frothingham Professor of Philosophy, + McGill University, 1903-; Member Philosophical Society, + Owens College, American Philosophical Association. Author of + _The Problem of Conduct_; _Elements of Metaphysics_.] + + +When we seek to determine the place of metaphysics in the general scheme +of human knowledge, we are at once confronted by an initial difficulty +of some magnitude. There seems, in fact, to be no one universally +accepted definition of our study, and even no very general consensus +among its votaries as to the problems with which the metaphysician ought +to concern himself. This difficulty, serious as it is, does not, +however, justify the suspicion that our science is, like alchemy or +astrology, an illusion, and its high-sounding title a mere "idol of the +market-place," one of those _nomina rerum quae non sunt_ against which +the Chancellor Bacon has so eloquently warned mankind. If it is hard to +determine precisely the scope of metaphysics, it is no less difficult to +do the same thing for the undoubtedly legitimate sciences of logic and +mathematics. And in all three cases the absence of definition merely +shows that we are dealing with branches of knowledge which are, so to +say, still in the making. It is not until the first principles of +science are already firmly laid beyond the possibility of cavil that we +must look for general agreement as to its boundary lines, though +excellent work may be done, long before this point has been reached, in +the establishment of individual principles and deduction of consequences +from them. To revert to the parallel cases I have just cited, many +mathematical principles of the highest importance are formulated in the +_Elements_ of Euclid, and many logical principles in the _Organon_ of +Aristotle; yet it is only in our own time that it has become possible to +offer a general definition either of logic or of mathematics, and even +now it would probably be true to say that the majority of logicians and +mathematicians trouble themselves very little about the precise +definition of their respective studies. + +The state of our science then compels me to begin this address with a +more or less arbitrary, because provisional, definition of the term +metaphysics, for which I claim no more than that it may serve to +indicate with approximate accuracy the class of problems which I shall +have in view in my subsequent use of the word. By metaphysics, then, I +propose to understand the inquiry which used formerly to be known as +ontology, that is, the investigation into the general character which +belongs to real Being as such, the science, in Aristotelian phraseology, +of ὄντα ᾗ ὄντα (onta hê onta). Or, if the term "real" be objected against as +ambiguous, I would suggest as an alternative account the statement that +metaphysics is the inquiry into the general character by which the +content of _true_ assertions is distinguished from that of _false_ +assertions. The two definitions here offered will, I think, be found +equivalent when it is borne in mind that what the second of them speaks +of is exclusively the _content_ which is asserted as true in a true +proposition, not the process of true assertion, which, like all other +processes in the highest cerebral centres, falls under the consideration +of the vastly different sciences of psychology and cerebral physiology. +Of the two equivalent forms of statement, the former has perhaps the +advantage of making it most clear that it is ultimately upon the +objective distinction between the reality and the unreality of that +which is asserted for truth, and not upon any psychological peculiarity +in the process of assertion itself that the distinction between true and +untrue rests, while the second may be useful in guarding against +misconceptions that might be suggested by too narrow an interpretation +of the term "reality," such as, _e. g._, the identification of the +"real" with what is revealed by sensuous perception. + +From the acceptance of such a definition two important consequences +would follow. (1) The first is that metaphysics is at once sharply +discriminated from any study of the psychical _process_ of knowledge, if +indeed, there can be any such study distinct from the psychology of +conception and belief, which is clearly not itself the science we have +in view. For the psychological laws of the formation of concepts and +beliefs are exemplified equally in the discovery and propagation of +truth and of error. And thus it is in vain to look to them for any +explanation of the difference between the two. Nor does the otherwise +promising extension of Darwinian conceptions of the "struggle for +existence" and the "survival of the fittest" to the field of opinions +and convictions appear to affect this conclusion. Such considerations +may indeed assist us to understand how true convictions in virtue of +their "usefulness" gradually come to be established and extended, but +they require to presume the truth of these convictions as an antecedent +condition of their "usefulness" and consequent establishment. I should +infer, then, that it is a mistake in principle to seek to replace +ontology by a "theory of knowledge," and should even be inclined to +question the very possibility of such a theory as distinct from +metaphysics on the one hand and empirical psychology on the other. (2) +The second consequence is of even greater importance. The inquiry into +the general character by which the contents of true assertions are +discriminated from the contents of false assertions must be carefully +distinguished from any investigation into the truth or falsehood of +special assertions. To ask how in the end truth differs from falsehood +is to raise an entirely different problem from that created by asking +whether a given statement is to be regarded as true or false. The +distinction becomes particularly important when we have to deal with +what Locke would call assertions of "real existence," _i. e._, +assertions as to the occurrence of particular events in the temporal +order. All such assertions depend, in part at least, upon the admission +of what we may style "empirical" evidence, the immediate unanalyzed +witness of simple apprehension to the occurrence of an alleged matter of +fact. Thus it would follow from our proposed conception of metaphysics +that metaphysics is in principle incapable either of establishing or +refuting any assertion as to the details of our immediate experience of +empirical fact, though it may have important bearings upon any theory of +the general nature of true Being which we may seek to found upon our +alleged experiences. In a word, if our conception be the correct one, +the functions of a science of metaphysics in respect of our knowledge of +the temporal sequence of events psychical and physical must be purely +critical, never constructive,--a point to which I shall presently have +to recur. + +One more general reflection, and we may pass to the consideration of the +relation of metaphysics to the various alreadyorganized branches of +human knowledge more in detail. The admission that there is, or may be, +such a study as we have described, seems of itself to involve the +recognition that definite knowledge about the character of what really +"is," is attainable, and thus to commit us to a position of sharp +opposition both to consistent and thorough-going agnosticism and also to +the latent agnosticism of Kantian and neo-Kantian "critical philosophy." +In recognizing ontology as a legitimate investigation, we revert in +principle to the "dogmatist" position common, _e. g._, to Plato, to +Spinoza and to Leibniz, that there is genuine truth which can be known, +and that this genuine truth is not confined to statements about the +process of knowing itself. In fact, the "critical" view that the only +certain truth is truth about the process of knowing seems to be +inherently self-contradictory. For the knowledge that such a proposition +as, _e. g._, "I know only the laws of my own apprehending activity," is +true, would itself be knowledge not about the process of knowing but +about the content known. Thus metaphysics, conceived as the science of +the general character which distinguishes truth from falsehood, +presupposes throughout all knowledge the presence of what we may call a +"transcendent object," that is, a content which is never identical with +the process by which it is apprehended, though it may no doubt be +maintained that the two, the process and its content, if distinct, are +yet not ultimately separable. That they are in point of fact not +ultimately separable would seem to be the doctrine which, under various +forms of statement, is common to and characteristic of all the +"idealistic" systems of metaphysics. So much then in defense of a +metaphysical point of view which seems to be closely akin to that of Mr. +Bradley and of Professor Royce, to mention only two names of +contemporary philosophers, and which might, I think, for the purpose of +putting it in sharp opposition to the "neo-Kantian" view, not unfairly +be called, if it is held to need a name, "neo-Leibnizian." + +In passing on to discuss in brief the nature of the boundary lines which +divide metaphysics from other branches of study, it seems necessary to +start with a clear distinction between the "pure" or "formal" and the +"applied" or "empirical" sciences, the more so as in the loose current +employment of language the name "science" is frequently given +exclusively to the latter. In every-day life, when we are told that a +certain person is a "man of science," or as the detestable jargon of our +time likes to say, a "scientist," we expect to find that he is, _e. g._, +a geologist, a chemist, a biologist, or an electrician. We should be a +little surprised to find on inquiry that our "man of science" was a pure +mathematician, and probably more than a little to learn that he was a +formal logician. The distinction between the pure and the empirical +sciences may be roughly indicated by saying that the latter class +comprises all those sciences which yield information about the +particular details of the temporal order of events physical and +psychical, whereas the pure sciences deal solely with the general +characteristics either of all truths, or of all truths of some +well-defined class. More exactly we may say that the marks by which an +empirical is distinguished from a pure science are two. (1) The +empirical sciences one and all imply the presence among their premises +of empirical propositions, that is, propositions which assert the actual +occurrence of some temporal fact, and depend upon the witness of +immediate apprehension, either in the form of sense perception or in +that of what is commonly called self-consciousness. In the vague +language made current by Kant, they involve an appeal to some form of +unanalyzed "intuition." The pure sciences, on the other hand, contain no +empirical propositions either among their premises or their conclusions. +The principles which form their premises are self-evidently true +propositions, containing no reference to the actual occurrence of any +event in the temporal order, and thus involving no appeal to any form of +"intuition." And the conclusions established in a pure science are all +rigidly logical deductions from such self-evident premises. That the +universality of this distinction is still often overlooked even by +professed writers on scientific method seems explicable by two simple +considerations. On the one hand, it is easy to overlook the important +distinction between a principle which is self-evident, that is, which +cannot be denied without explicit falsehood, and a proposition affirmed +on the warrant of the senses, because, though its denial cannot be seen +to be obviously false, the senses appear on each fresh appeal to +substantiate the assertion. Thus the Euclidean postulate about parallels +was long falsely supposed to possess exactly the same kind of +self-evidence as the _dictum de omni_ and the principle of identity +which are part of the foundations of all logic. And further Kant, +writing under the influence of this very confusion, has given wide +popularity to the view that the best known of the pure sciences, that of +mathematics, depends upon the admission of empirical premises in the +form of an appeal to intuition of the kind just described. Fortunately +the recent developments of arithmetic at the hands of such men as +Weierstrass, Cantor, and Dedekind seem to have definitely refuted the +Kantian view as far as general arithmetic, the pure science of number, +is concerned, by proving that one and all of its propositions are +_analytic_ in the strict sense of the word, that is, that they are +capable of rigid deduction from self-evident premises, so that, in what +regards arithmetic, we may say with Schröder that the famous Kantian +question "how are synthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?" is now known +to be meaningless. As regards geometry, the case appears to a +non-mathematician like myself more doubtful. Those who hold with +Schröder that geometry essentially involves, as Kant thought it did, an +appeal to principles not self-evident and dependent upon an appeal to +sensuous "intuition," are logically bound to conclude with him that +geometry is an "empirical," or as W. K. Clifford called it, a "physical" +science, different in no way from mechanics except in the relative +paucity of the empirical premises presupposed, and to class it with the +applied sciences. On the other hand, if Mr. Bertrand Russell should be +successful in his promised demonstration that all the principles of +geometry are deducible from a few premises which include nothing of the +nature of an appeal to sensuous diagrams, geometry too would take its +place among the pure sciences, but only on condition of our recognizing +that its truths, like those of arithmetic, are one and all, as Leibniz +held, strictly analytical. Thus we obtain as a first distinction between +the pure and the empirical sciences the principle that the propositions +of the former class are all analytical, those of the latter all +synthetic. It is not the least of the services which France is now +rendering to the study of philosophy that we are at last being placed by +the labors of M. Couturat in a position to appreciate at their full +worth the views of the first and greatest of German philosophers on this +distinction, and to understand how marvelously they have been confirmed +by the subsequent history of mathematics and of logic. + +(2) A consequence of this distinction is that only the pure or formal +sciences can be matter of rigid logical demonstration. Since the +empirical or applied sciences one and all contain empirical premises, +_i. e._, premises which we admit as true only because they have always +appeared to be confirmed by the appeal to "intuition," and not because +the denial of them can be shown to lead to falsehood, the conclusions to +which they conduct us must one and all depend, in part at least, upon +induction from actual observation of particular temporal sequences. This +is as much as to say that all propositions in the applied sciences +involve somewhere in the course of the reasoning by which they are +established the appeal to the calculus of Probabilities, which is our +one method of eliciting general results from the statistics supplied by +observation or experiment. That this is the case with the more concrete +among such applied sciences has long been universally acknowledged. That +it is no less true of sciences of such wide range as mechanics may be +said, I think, to have been definitely established in our own day by the +work of such eminent physicists as Kirchhoff and Mach. In fact, the +recent developments of the science of pure number, to which reference +has been made in a preceding paragraph, combined with the creation of +the "descriptive" theory of mechanics, may fairly be said to have +finally vindicated the distinction drawn by Leibniz long ago between the +truths of reason and the truths of empirical fact, a distinction which +the Kantian trend of philosophical speculation tended during the greater +part of the nineteenth century to obscure, while it was absolutely +ignored by the empiricist opponents of metaphysics both in England and +in Germany. The philosophical consequences of a revival of the +distinction are, I conceive, of far-reaching importance. On the one +side, recognition of the empirical and contingent character of all +general propositions established by induction appears absolutely fatal +to the current mechanistic conception of the universe as a realm of +purposeless sequences unequivocally determined by unalterable "laws of +nature," a result which has in recent years been admirably illustrated +for the English-speaking world by Professor Ward's well-known Gifford +lectures on "Naturalism and Agnosticism." Laws of physical nature, on +the empiristic view of applied science, can mean no more than observed +regularities, obtained by the application of the doctrine of +chances,--regularities which we are indeed justified in accepting with +confidence as the basis for calculation of the future course of temporal +sequence, but which we have no logical warrant for treating as ultimate +truths about the final constitution of things. Thus, for example, take +the common assumption that our physical environment is composed of a +multitude of particles each in every respect the exact counterpart of +every other. Reflection upon the nature of the evidence by which this +conclusion, if supported at all, has to be supported, should convince us +that at most all that the statement ought to mean is that individual +differences between the elementary constituents of the physical world +need not be allowed for in devising practical formulae for the +intelligent anticipation of events. When the proposition is put forward +as an absolute truth and treated as a reason for denying the ultimate +spirituality of the world, we are well within our rights in declining +the consequence on the logical ground that conclusions from an empirical +premise must in their own nature be themselves empirical and contingent. + +On the other hand, the extreme empiricism which treats all knowledge +whatsoever as merely relative to the total psychical state of the +knower, and therefore in the end problematic, must, I apprehend, go down +before any serious investigation into the nature of the analytic truths +of arithmetic, a consequence which seems to be of some relevance in +connection with the philosophic view popularly known as Pragmatism. Thus +I should look to the coming regeneration of metaphysics, of which there +are so many signs at the moment, on the one hand, for emphatic +insistence on the right, _e. g._, of physics and biology and psychology +to be treated as purely empirical sciences, and as such freed from the +last vestiges of any domination by metaphysical presuppositions and +foregone conclusions, and on the other, for an equally salutary +purgation of formal studies like logic and arithmetic from the taint of +corruption by the irrelevant intrusion of considerations of empirical +psychology. + +We cannot too persistently bear in mind that there is, corresponding to +the logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic +proposition, a deep and broad general difference between the wants of +our nature ministered to by the formal and the applied sciences +respectively. The formal sciences, incapable of adding anything to our +detailed knowledge of the course of events, as we have seen, enlighten +us solely as to the general laws of interconnection by which all +conceivable systems of true assertions are permeated and bound together. +In a different connection it would be interesting to develop further the +reflection that the necessity of appealing to such formal principles in +all reasoning about empirical matters of fact contains the explanation +of the famous Platonic assertion that the "Idea of Good" or supreme +principle of organization and order in the universe, is itself not an +existent, but something ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (eti epekeina tês +ousias), "transcending even existence," and the very similar declaration +of Hegel that the question whether "God"--in the sense of such a supreme +principle--exists is frivolous, inasmuch as existence (_Dasein_) is a +category entirely inadequate to express the Divine nature. For my +present purpose it is enough to remark that the need to which the formal +sciences minister is the demand for that purely speculative satisfaction +which arises from insight into the order of interconnection between the +various truths which compose the totality of true knowledge. Hence it +seems a mistake to say, as some theorists have done, that were we born +with a complete knowledge of the course of temporal sequences throughout +the universe, and a faultless memory, we should have no need of logic or +metaphysics, or in fact of inference. For even a mind already in +possession of all true propositions concerning the course of events, +would still lack one of the requisites for complete intellectual +satisfaction unless it were also aware, not only of the individual +truths, but of the order of their interdependence. What Aristotle said +long ago with reference to a particular instance may be equally said +universally of all our empirical knowledge; "even if we stood on the +moon and saw the earth intercepting the light of the sun, we should +still have to ask for the reason _why_." The purposes ministered to by +the empirical sciences, on the other hand, always include some reference +to the actual manipulation in advance by human agency of the stream of +events. We study mechanics, for instance, not merely that we may +perceive the interdependence of truths, but that we may learn how to +maintain a system of bodies in equilibrium, or how to move masses in a +given direction with a given momentum. Hence it is true of applied +science, though untrue of science as a whole, that it would become +useless if the whole past and future course of events were from the +first familiar to us. And, incidentally it may be observed, it is for +the same reason untrue of inference, though true of inductive inference, +that it is essentially a passage from the known to the unknown. + +In dealing with the relation of metaphysics to the formal sciences +generally, the great difficulty which confronts us is that of +determining exactly the boundaries which separate one from another. +Among such pure sciences we have by universal admission to include at +least two, pure formal logic and pure mathematics, as distinguished from +the special applications of logic and mathematics to an empirical +material. Whether we ought also to recognize ethics and æsthetics, in +the sense of the general determination of the nature of the good and the +beautiful, as non-empirical sciences, seems to be a more difficult +question. It seems clear, for instance, that ethical discussions, such +as bulk so largely in our contemporary literature, as to what is the +right course of conduct under various conditions, are concerned +throughout with an empirical material, namely, the existing +peculiarities of human nature as we find it, and must therefore be +regarded as capable only of an empirical and therefore problematic +solution. Accordingly I was at one time myself tempted to regard ethics +as a purely empirical science, and even published a lengthy treatise in +defense of that point of view and in opposition to the whole Kantian +conception of the possibility of a constructive _Metaphysik der Sitten_. +It seems, however, possible to hold that in the question "What do we +mean by good?" as distinguished from the question "What in particular is +it right to do?" there is no more of a reference to the empirical facts +of human psychology than in the question "What do we mean by truth?" and +that there must therefore be a non-empirical answer to the problem. The +same would of course hold equally true of the question "What _is_ +beauty?" If there are, however, such a pure science of ethics and again +of æsthetics, it must at least be allowed that for the most part these +sciences are still undiscovered, and that the ethical and æsthetical +results hitherto established are in the main of an empirical nature, and +this must be my excuse for confining the remarks of the next two +paragraphs to the two great pure sciences of which the general +principles may be taken to be now in large measure known. + +That metaphysics and logic should sometimes have been absolutely +identified, as for instance by Hegel, will not surprise us when we +consider how hard it becomes on the view here defended to draw any hard +and fast boundary line between them. For metaphysics, according to this +conception of its scope, deals with the formulation of the self-evident +principles implied, in there being such a thing as truth and the +deductions which these principles warrant us in drawing. Thus it might +be fairly said to be the supreme science of _order_, and it would not be +hard to show that all the special questions commonly included in its +range, as to the nature of space, time, causation, continuity, and so +forth, are all branches of the general question, how many types of order +among concepts are there, and what is their nature. A completed +metaphysics would thus appear as the realization of Plato's splendid +conception of dialectic as the ultimate reduction of the contents of +knowledge to order by their continuous deduction from a supreme +principle (or, we may add, principles). Now such a view seems to make it +almost impossible to draw any ultimate distinction between logic and +metaphysics. For logic is strictly the science of the mutual implication +of propositions, as we see as soon as we carefully exclude from it all +psychological accretions. In the question what are the conditions under +which one proposition or group of propositions imply another, we exhaust +the whole scope of logic pure and proper, as distinguished from its +various empirical applications. This is the important point which is so +commonly forgotten when logic is defined as being in some way a study of +"psychical processes," or when the reference to the presence of "minds" +in which propositions exist, is intended into logical science. We cannot +too strongly insist that for logic the question so constantly raised in +a multitude of text-books, what processes actually take place when we +pass from the assertion of the premises to the assertion of the +conclusion, is an irrelevant one, and that the only logical problem +raised by inference is whether the assertion of the premises as true +_warrants_ the further assertion of the conclusion, supposing it to be +made. (At the risk of a little digression I cannot help pointing out +that the confusion between a logical and a psychological problem is +committed whenever we attempt, as is so often done, to make the +self-evidence of a principle identical with our psychological inability +to believe the contradictory. From the strictly logical point of view, +all that is to be said about the two sides of such an ultimate +contradiction is that the one is true and the other is false. Whether it +is or is not possible, as a matter of psychical fact for me to affirm +with equal conviction, both sides of a contradiction, knowing that I am +doing so, is a question of empirical psychology which is possibly +insoluble, and at any rate seems not to have received from the +psychologists the attention it deserves. But the logician, so far as I +can see, has no interest as a logician in its solution. For him it would +still be the case even though all mankind should actually and +consciously affirm both sides of a given contradiction, that one of the +affirmations would be true, and the other untrue.) Logic thus seems to +become either the whole or an integral part of the science of order, and +there remain only two possible ways of distinguishing it from +metaphysics. It might be suggested that logical order, the order of +implication between truths, is only one species of a wider genus, order +in general by the side, for example, of spatial, temporal, and numerical +order, and thus that logic is one subordinate branch of the wider +science of metaphysics. Such a view, of course, implies that there are a +plurality of ultimately independent forms of order irreducible to a +single type. Whether this is the case, I must confess myself at present +incompetent to decide, though the signal success with which the +principles of number have already been deduced from the fundamental +definitions and axioms of symbolic logic, and number itself defined, as +by Mr. Russell, in terms of the purely logical concept of +class-relation, seems to afford some presumption to the contrary. Or it +may be held that the difference is purely one of the degree of +completeness with which the inquiry into order is pursued. Thus the +ordinary symbolic logic of what Schröder has called the "identical +calculus," or "calculus of domains," consists of a series of deductions +from the fundamental concepts of class and number, identical equality, +totality or the "logical 1," zero or the null-class, and the three +principles of identity, subsumption, and negation. The moment you cease +to accept these data in their totality as the given material for your +science, and to inquire into their mutual coherence, by asking for +instance whether any one of them could be denied, and yet a body of +consistent results deduced from the rest, your inquiry, it might be +said, becomes metaphysics. So, again, the discussion of the well-known +contradictions which arise when we try to apply these principles in +their entirety and without modification to classes of classes instead of +classes of individuals, or of the problem raised by Peano and Russell, +whether the assertions "Socrates is a man" and "the Greeks are men" +affirm the same or a different relation between their subject and +predicate (which seems indeed to be the same question differently +stated), would generally be allowed to be metaphysical. And the same +thing seems to be equally true of the introduction of time relations +into the interpretation of our symbols for predication employed by Boole +in his treatment of hypotheticals, and subsequently adopted by his +successors as the foundation of the "calculus of equivalent statements." + +However we may decide such questions, we seem at least driven by their +existence to the recognition of two important conclusions. (1) The +relation between logical and metaphysical problems is so close that you +cannot in consistency deny the possibility of a science of metaphysics +unless you are prepared with the absolute skeptic to go the length of +denying the possibility of logic also, and reducing the first principles +of inference to the level of formulae which have happened hitherto to +prove useful but are, for all we know, just as likely to fail us in +future application as not. (Any appeal to the doctrine of chances would +be out of place here, as that doctrine is itself based on the very +principles at stake.) (2) The existence of fundamental problems of this +kind which remained almost or wholly unsuspected until revealed in our +own time by the creation of a science of symbolic logic should console +us if ever we are tempted to suspect that metaphysics is at any rate a +science in which all the main constructive work has already been +accomplished by the great thinkers of the past. To me it appears, on the +contrary, that the recent enormous developments in the purely formal +sciences of logic and mathematics, with the host of fundamental problems +they open up, give promise of an approaching era of fresh speculative +construction which bids fair to be no less rich in results than any of +the great "golden" periods in the past history of our science. Indeed, +but that I would avoid the slightest suspicion of a desire to advertise +personal friends, I fancy I might even venture to name some of those to +whom we may reasonably look for the work to be done. + +Of the relation of metaphysics to pure mathematics it would be +impertinent for any but a trained mathematician to say very much. I must +therefore be content to point out that the same difficulty in drawing +boundary lines meets us here as in the case of logic. Not so long ago +this difficulty might have been ignored, as it still is by too many +writers on the philosophy of science. Until recently mathematics would +have been thought to be adequately defined as the science of numerical +and quantitative relations, and adequately distinguished from +metaphysics by the non-quantitative and non-numerical character of the +latter, though it would probably have been admitted that the problem of +the definition of quantity and number themselves is a metaphysical one. +But in the present state of our knowledge such an account seems doubly +unsatisfactory. On the one hand, we have to recognize the existence of +branches of mathematics, such as the so-called descriptive geometry, +which are neither quantitative nor numerical, and, on the other, +quantity as distinct from number appears to play no part in mathematical +science, while number itself, thanks to the labors of such men as Cantor +and Dedekind, seems, as I have said before, to be known now to be only a +special type of order in a series. Thus there appears to be ground for +regarding serial order as the fundamental category of mathematics, and +we are thrown back once more upon the difficult task of deciding how +many ultimately irreducible types of order there may be before we can +undertake any precise discrimination between mathematical and +metaphysical science. However we may regard the problem, it is at least +certain that the recent researches of mathematicians into the meaning of +such concepts as continuity and infinity have, besides opening up new +metaphysical problems, done much to transfigure the familiar ones, as +all readers of Professor Royce must be aware. For instance I imagine all +of us here present, even the youngest, were brought up on the +Aristotelian doctrine that there is and can be no such thing as an +actually existing infinite collection, but which of us would care to +defend that time-honored position to-day? Similarly with continuity all +of us were probably once on a time instructed that whereas "quantity" is +continuous, number is essentially "discrete," and is indeed the typical +instance of what we mean by the non-continuous. To-day we know that it +is in the number series that we have our one certain and familiar +instance of a perfect continuum. Still a third illustration of the +transforming light which is thrown upon old standing metaphysical +puzzles by the increasing formal development of mathematics may be found +in the difficulties attendant upon the conception of the "infinitely +little," once regarded as the logical foundation of the so-called +Differential Calculus. With the demonstration, which maybe found in Mr. +Russell's important work, that "infinitesimal," unlike "infinite," is a +purely relative term, and that there are no infinitesimal real numbers, +the supposed logical significance of the concept seems simply to +disappear. Instances of this kind could easily be multiplied almost +indefinitely, but those already cited should be sufficient to show how +important are the metaphysical results which may be anticipated from +contemporary mathematical research, and how grave a mistake it would be +to regard existing metaphysical construction, _e. g._, that of the +Hegelian system, as adequate in principle to the present state of our +organized knowledge. In fact, all the materials for a new +_Kategorienlehre_, which may be to the knowledge of our day what Hegel's +_Logic_ was to that of eighty years ago, appear to lie ready to hand +when it may please Providence to send us the metaphysician who knows how +to avail himself of them. The proof, given since this address was +delivered, by E. Zermelo, that every assemblage can be well ordered, is +an even more startling illustration of the remarks in the text. + +It remains to say something of the relation of metaphysical speculation +to the various sciences which make use of empirical premises. On this +topic I maybe allowed to be all the more brief, as I have quite recently +expressed my views at fair length in an extended treatise (_Elements of +Metaphysics_, Bks. 3 and 4), and have nothing of consequence to add to +what has been there said. The empirical sciences, as previously defined, +appear to fall into two main classes, distinguished by a difference +which corresponds to that often taken in the past as the criterion by +which science is to be separated from philosophy. We may study the facts +of temporal sequence either with a view to the actual control of future +sequences or with a view to detecting under the sequence some coherent +purpose. It is in the former way that we deal with facts in mechanics, +for instance, or in chemistry, in the latter that we treat them when we +study history for the purpose of gaining insight into national aims and +character. We may, if we please, with Professor Royce, distinguish the +two attitudes toward fact as the attitude respectively of description +and of appreciation or evaluation. Now as regards the descriptive +sciences, the position to which, as I believe, metaphysicians are more +and more tending is that here metaphysics has, strictly speaking, no +right at all to interfere. Just because of the absence from metaphysics +itself of all empirical premises, it can be no business of the +metaphysician to determine what the course of events will be or to +prescribe to the sciences what methods and hypotheses they shall employ +in the work of such determination. Within these sciences any and every +hypothesis is sufficiently justified, whatever its nature, so long as it +enables us more efficiently than any other to perform the actual task of +calculation and prediction. And it was owing to neglect of this caution +that the _Naturphilosophie_ of the early nineteenth century speedily +fell into a disrepute fully merited by its ignorant presumption. As +regards the physical sciences, the metaphysician has indeed by this time +probably learned his lesson. We are not likely to-day to repeat the +mistake of supposing that it is for us as metaphysicians to dictate what +shall be the physicist's or chemist's definition of matter or mass or +elementary substance or energy, or how he shall formulate the laws of +motion or of chemical composition. Here, at any rate, we can see that +the metaphysician's work is done when his analysis has made it clear +that we are dealing with no self-evident truths such as the laws of +number, but with inductive, and therefore problematic and provisional +results of empirical assumptions as to the course of facts, assumptions +made not because of their inherent necessity, but because of their +practical utility for the special task of calculation. It is only when +such empirical assumptions are treated as self-evident axioms, in fact +when mechanical science gives itself out as a mechanistic philosophy, +that the metaphysician obtains a right to speak, and then only for the +purpose of showing by analysis that the presence of the empirical +postulates which is characteristic of the natural sciences of itself +excludes their erection into a philosophy of first principles. + +What is important in this connection is that we should recognize quite +clearly that psychology stands in this respect on precisely the same +logical footing as physics or chemistry. It is tempting to suppose that +in psychology, at any rate, we are dealing throughout with absolute +certainties, realities which "consciousness" apprehends just as they are +without any of that artificial selection and construction which, as we +are beginning to see, is imposed upon the study of physical nature by +the limitations of our purpose of submitting the course of events to +calculation and manipulation. And it is a natural consequence of this +point of view to infer that since psychology deals directly with +realities, it must be taken as the foundation of the metaphysical +constructions which aim at understanding the general character of the +real as such. The consequence, indeed, disappears at once if the views +maintained in this address as to the intimate relation of metaphysics +and logic, and the radical expulsion from logic of all discussion of +mental processes as such, be admitted. But it is still important to note +that the premises from which the conclusion in question was drawn are +themselves false. We must never allow ourselves to forget that, as the +ever-increasing domination of psychology by the highly artificial +methods of observation and experiment introduced by Fechner and Wundt is +daily making more apparent, psychology itself, like physics, deals not +directly with the concrete realities of individual experience, but with +an abstract selected from that experience, or rather a set of artificial +symbols only partially corresponding with the realities symbolized, and +devised for the special object of submitting the realm of mental +sequences to mathematical calculation. We might, in fact, have based +this inference upon the single reflection that every psychological "law" +is obtained, like physical laws, by the statistical method of +elimination of individual peculiarities, and the taking of an average +from an extended series of measurements. For this very reason, no +psychological law can possibly describe the unique realities of +individual experience. We have in psychology, as in the physical +sciences, the duty of suspecting _exact_ correspondence between the +single case and the general "law" to be of itself proof of error +somewhere in the course of our computation. These views, which I suppose +I learned in the first instance from Mr. F. H. Bradley's paper called _A +Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology_, may now, I think, be taken as +finally established beyond doubt by the exhaustive analysis of Professor +Münsterberg's _Grundzüge der Psychologie_. They possess the double +advantage of freeing the psychologist once for all from any interference +by the metaphysician in the prosecution of his proper study, and +delivering metaphysics from the danger of having assumptions whose sole +justification lies in their utility for the purpose of statistical +computation thrust upon it as self-evident principles. For their full +discussion I may perhaps be allowed to refer to the first three chapters +of the concluding book of my _Elements of Metaphysics_. + +When we turn to the sciences which aim at the appreciation or evaluation +of empirical fact, the case seems rather different. It may fairly be +regarded as incumbent on the metaphysician to consider how far the +general conception he has formed of the character of reality can be +substantiated and filled in by our empirical knowledge of the actual +course of temporal sequence. And thus the way seems to lie open to the +construction of what may fairly be called a Philosophy of Nature and +History. For instance, a metaphysician who has rightly or wrongly +convinced himself that the universe can only be coherently conceived as +a society of souls or wills may reasonably go on to ask what views seem +best in accord with our knowledge of human character and animal +intelligence as to the varying degrees of organized intelligence +manifested by the members of such a hierarchy of souls, and the nature +and amount of mutual intercourse between them. And again, he may fairly +ask what general way of conceiving what we loosely call the inanimate +world would at once be true to fundamental metaphysical principles and +free from disagreement with the actual state of our physical hypotheses. +Only he will need to bear in mind that since conclusions on these points +involve appeal to the present results of the inductive sciences, and +thus to purely empirical postulates, any views he may adopt must of +necessity share in the problematic and provisional character of the +empirical sciences themselves, and can have no claim to be regarded as +definitely demonstrated in respect of their details. I will here only +indicate very briefly two lines of inquiry to which these reflections +appear applicable. The growth of evolutionary science, with the new +light it has thrown upon the processes by which useful variations may be +established without the need for presupposing conscious preëxisting +design, naturally gives rise to the question whether such unconscious +factors are of themselves sufficient to account for the actual course of +development so far as it can be traced, or whether the actual history of +the world offers instances of results which, so far as we can see, can +only have issued from deliberate design. And thus we seem justified in +regarding the problem of the presence of ends in Nature as an +intelligible and legitimate one for the philosophy of the future. I +would only suggest that such an inquiry must be prosecuted throughout by +the same empirical methods, and with the same consciousness of the +provisional character of any conclusions we may reach which would be +recognized as in place if we were called on to decide whether some +peculiar characteristic of an animal group or some singular social +practice in a recently discovered tribe does or does not indicate +definite purpose on the part of breeders or legislators. + +The same remarks, in my opinion, apply to the familiar problems of +Natural Theology relative to the existence and activity of such +non-human intelligences as are commonly understood by the names "God" or +"gods." Hume and Kant, as it seems to me, have definitely shown between +them that the old-fashioned attempts to demonstrate from self-evident +principles the existence of a supreme personal intelligence as a +condition of the very being of truth all involve unavoidable logical +paralogisms. I should myself, indeed, be prepared to go further, and to +say that the conception of a single personality as the ground of truth +and reality can be demonstrated to involve contradiction, but this I +know is a question upon which some philosophers for whom I entertain the +profoundest respect hold a contrary opinion. The more modest question, +however, whether the actual course of human history affords probable +ground for believing in the activity of one or more non-human +personalities as agents in the development of our species I cannot but +think a perfectly proper subject for empirical investigation, if only it +be borne in mind that any conclusion upon such a point is inevitably +affected by the provisional character of our information as to empirical +facts themselves, and can claim in consequence nothing more than a +certain grade of probability. With this proviso, I cannot but regard the +question as to the existence of a God or of gods as one upon which we +may reasonably hope for greater certainty as our knowledge of the +empirical facts of the world's history increases. And I should be +inclined only to object to any attempt to foreclose examination by +forcing a conclusion either in the theistic or in the atheistic sense on +alleged grounds of _a priori_ metaphysics. In a word, I would maintain +not only with Kant that the "physico-theological" argument is specially +deserving of our regard, but with Boole that it is with it that Natural +Theology must stand or fall. + + +NOTE ON EXTENSION AND INTENSION OF TERMS + +Among the numerous difficulties which beset the teaching of the elements +of formal logic to beginners, one of the earliest is that of deciding +whether all names shall be considered to have meaning both in extension +and intension. As we all know, the problem arises in connection with two +classes of names, (1) proper names of individuals, (2) abstract terms. I +should like to indicate what seems to me the true solution of the +difficulty, though I do not remember to have seen it advocated anywhere +in just the form I should prefer. + +(1) As to proper names. It seems clear that those who regard the true +proper name as a meaningless label are nearer the truth than those who +assert with Jevons that a proper name has for its intension all the +predicates which can be truly ascribed to the object named. As has often +been observed, it is a sufficient proof that, for example, John does not +_mean_ "a human being of the male sex," to note that he who names his +daughter, his dog, or his canoe John, makes no false assertion, though +he may commit a solecism. So far the followers of Mill seem to have a +satisfactory answer to Jevons, when they say, for example, that he +confuses the intension of a term with its accidental or acquired +associations. (So, again, we can see that Socrates cannot _mean_ "the +wisest of the Greek philosophers," by considering that I may perfectly +well understand the statement "there goes Socrates" without being aware +that Socrates is wise or a Greek or a philosopher.) And if we objected +that no proper name actually in use is ever without some associations +which in part determine its meaning by restricting its applicability, it +would be a valid rejoinder that in pure logic we have to consider not +the actual usages of language, but those that would prevail in an ideal +language purged of all elements of irrelevancy. In such an ideal +scientific language, it might be said, the proper name would be reduced +to the level of a mere mark serviceable for identification, but +conveying no implication whatever as to the special nature of the thing +identified. Thus it would be indifferent _what_ mark we attach to any +particular individual, just as in mathematics it is indifferent what +alphabetical symbol we appropriate to stand for a given class or number. +I think, however, that even in such an ideal scientific language the +proper name would have a certain intension. In the first place, the use +of proper name seems to inform us that the thing named is not unique, is +not the only member of a class. To a monotheist, for instance, the name +"God" is no true proper name, nor can he consistently give a proper name +to his Deity. It is only where one member of a class has to be +distinguished from others that the bestowal of a proper name has a +meaning. And, further, to give a thing a proper name seems to imply that +the thing is itself not a class. In logic we have, of course, occasion +to form the concept of classes which have other classes for their +individual members. But the classes which compose such classes of +classes could not themselves be identified by means of proper names. +Thus the employment of a proper name seems to indicate that the thing +named is not the only member of its class, and further that it is not +itself a class of individuals. Beyond this it seems to be a mere +question of linguistic convention what information the use of a proper +name shall convey. Hence it ought to be said, not that the proper name +has no intension, but that it represents a limiting case in which +intension is at a minimum. + +(2) As to abstract terms. Ought we to say, with so many English formal +logicians, that an abstract term is always singular and non-intensional? +The case for asserting that such terms are all singular, I own, seems +unanswerable. For it is clear that if the name of an attribute or +relation is equally the name of another attribute or relation, it is +ambiguous and thus not properly one term at all. To say, for example, +that whiteness means two or more distinct qualities seems to amount to +saying that it has no one definite meaning. Of course, it is true that +milk is white, paper is white, and snow is white, and yet the +color-tones of the three are distinct. But what we assert here is, not +that there are different whitenesses, but only that there are different +degrees of approximation to a single ideal standard or type of +whiteness. It is just because the whiteness we have in view is one and +not many that we can intelligibly assert, for example, that newly fallen +snow is _whiter_ than any paper. All the instances produced by Mill to +show that abstract terms may be general seem to me either to involve +confusion between difference of kind and difference in degree of +approximation to type, or else to depend upon treating as abstract a +term which is really concrete. Thus when we say red, blue, green, are +different kinds of color, surely what we mean is different kinds of +colored surface. Quà colored, they are not different; I mean just as +much and no more when I say "a red thing is colored," or "has color," as +when I say "a green thing is colored." If Mill were right, the +proposition "red is a color" ought to mean exactly the same as "red is +red." Or, to put it in another way, it would become impossible to form +in thought any concept of a single class of colored things. + +But need we infer because abstract terms are singular that therefore +they have no intension and are mere meaningless marks? Commonly as this +inference is made, it seems to me clearly mistaken. It seems, in fact, +to rest upon the vague and ill-defined principle that an attribute can +have no attributes of its own. That it is false is shown, I think, by +the simple reflection that scientific definitions are one and all +statements as to the meaning of abstract names of attributes and +relations. For example, the definition of a circle is a statement as to +the meaning of circularity, the legal definition of responsible persons +a statement as to the meaning of the abstraction "responsibility," and +so on. (We only evade the point if we argue that abstract terms when +used as the subjects of propositions are really being employed +concretely. For "cruelty is odious," for instance, does not merely mean +that cruel acts are odious acts, but that they are odious _because_ they +are cruel.) In fact, the doctrine that abstract terms have no intension +would seem, if thought out, to lead to the view that there are only +classes of individuals, but no classes of classes. Thus to say "cruel +acts are odious because cruel" implies, not only that I can form the +concept of a class of cruel acts, but also that of classes of odious +acts of which the class of cruel acts in its turn is a member. And to +admit as much as this is to admit that the class of cruel acts, +considered as a member of the class of odious acts, shares the common +predicate of odiousness with the other classes of acts composing the +higher class. Hence the true account of abstract terms seems to me to be +that we have in them another limiting case, a case in which the +extension and the intension are coincident. Incidentally, by +illustrating the ambiguity of the principle that attributes have no +attributes of their own, our discussion seems to indicate the advantage +of taking the purely extensional view is opposed to the predicative view +of the import of propositions as the basis of an elementary treatment of +logical doctrine. + + + + +THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS + +BY ALEXANDER T. ORMOND + + [Alexander Thomas Ormond, McCosh Professor of Philosophy, + Princeton University, since 1897. b. 1847, Punxsutawney, + Pennsylvania. Mental Science Fellow, Princeton, 1877-78; + Post-grad. Bonn and Berlin, 1884-85; Ph.D. Princeton, 1880; + A.B. _ibid._ 1877; LL.D. Miami, 1899. Professor of + Philosophy and History, University of Minnesota, 1880-83; + Professor of Mental Science and Logic, Princeton University, + 1883-97. Member American Philosophical Association, American + Psychological Association.] + + +I + +THE PRELIMINARY QUESTION + + +The living problems of any science arise out of two sources: (1) out of +what men may think of it, in view of its nature and claims, and (2) the +problems that at any period are vital to it, and in the solution of +which it realizes the purpose of its existence. Now if we distinguish +the body of the sciences which deal with aspects of the world's +phenomena--and here I would include both the psychic and the +physical--from metaphysics, which professes to go behind the phenomenon +and determine the world in terms of its inner, and, therefore, +_ultimate_ reality, it may be truly said of the body of the sciences +that they are in a position to disregard in a great measure questions +that arise out of the first source, inasmuch as the data from which they +make their departure are obvious to common observation. Our world is all +around us, and its phenomena either press upon us or are patent to our +observation. Lying thus within the field of observation, it does not +occur to the average mind to question either the legitimacy or the +possibility of that effort of reflection which is devoted to their +investigation and interpretation. Metaphysics, however, enjoys no such +immunity as this, but its claims are liable to be met with skepticism or +denial at the outset, and this is due partly to the nature of its +initial claims, and partly to the fact that its real data are less open +to observation than are those of the sciences. I say partly to the +nature of the initial claims of metaphysics, for it is characteristic of +metaphysics that it refuses to regard the distinction between phenomena +and ground or inner nature, on which the sciences rest, as final, and is +committed from the outset to the claim that the real is in its inner +nature one and to be interpreted in the light of, or in terms of, its +inner unity; whereas, science has so indoctrinated the modern mind with +the supposition that only the outer movements of things are open to +knowledge, while their inner and real nature must forever remain +inaccessible to our powers; I say that the modern mind has been so +imbued with this pretension as to have almost completely forgotten the +fact that the distinction of phenomenon and ground is one of science's +own making. Neither the plain man nor the cultured man, if he happens +not to be tinctured with science, finds his world a duality. The things +he deals with are the realities, and it is only when his naïve realism +begins to break down before the complex demands of his growing life, +that the thought occurs to him that his world may be more complex than +he has dreamed. It is clear, then, that the distinction of our world +into phenomena and ground, on which science so largely rests, is a first +product of reflection, and not a fact of observation at all. + +If this be the case, it may be possible and even necessary for +reflection at some stage to transcend this distinction. At least, there +can be no reason except an arbitrary one for taking this first step of +reflection to be a finality. And there would be the same justification +for a second step that would transcend this dualism, as for the initial +step out of which the distinction arose; provided, it should be found +that the initial distinction does not supply an adequate basis for a +rational interpretation of the world that can be taken as final. Now, it +is precisely because the dualistic distinction of the sciences does fail +in this regard, that a further demand for a reflective transformation of +the data arises. Let us bear in mind that the data of the sciences are +not the simple facts of observation, but rather those facts transformed +by an act of reflection by virtue of which they become phenomena +distinguished from a more fundamental nature on which they depend and +which itself is not open to observation. The real data of science are +found only when the world of observation has been thus transformed by an +act of reflection. If then at some stage in our effort to interpret our +world it should become clear that the sciences of phenomena, whatever +value their results may possess, are not giving us an interpretation in +terms that can be taken as final, and that in order to ground such an +interpretation a further transformation of our data becomes necessary, I +do not see why any of the sciences should feel that they have cause to +demur. In truth, it is out of just such a situation as this that the +metaphysical interpretation arises (as I propose very briefly here to +show), a situation that supplies a genuine demand in the light of which +the effort of metaphysics to understand its world seems to possess as +high a claim to legitimacy as that of the sciences of phenomena. Let us +take our stand with the plain man or the child, within the world of +unmodified observation. The things of observation, in this world, are +the realities, and at first we may suppose have undergone little +reflective transformation. The first reflective effort to change this +world in any way will, no doubt, be an effort to _number_ or _count_ the +things that present themselves to observation, and out of this effort +will arise the transformation of the world that results from considering +it under the concepts and categories of number. In short, to +mathematical reflection of this simple sort, the things of observation +will resolve themselves into a plurality of countable things, which the +numbering reflection becoming explicit in its ordinal and cardinal +moments will translate into a system that will be regarded as a whole +made up of the sum of its parts. The very first step, then, in the +reflective transformation of things resolves them into a dual system, +the world conceived as a cardinal whole that is made up of its ordinal +parts, and exactly equal to them. This mathematical conception is +moreover purely quantitative; involving the exact and stable equivalence +of its parts or units and that of the sum of the parts with the whole. +Now it is with this purely quantitative transformation that mathematics +and the mathematical sciences begin. We may ask, then, why should there +be any other than mathematical science,[1] and what ground can +non-mathematical science point to as substantiating its claims? I +confess I can see no other final reason than this, that mathematical +science does not meet the whole demand we feel obliged to make on our +world. If mathematics were asked to vindicate itself, it no doubt would +do so by claiming that things present quantitative aspects on which it +founds its procedure. In like manner non-mathematical, or, as we may +call it, physical or natural science, will seek to substantiate its +claims by pointing to certain ultra-quantitative or qualitative aspects +of things. It is true that, so far as things are merely _numerable_, +they are purely quantitative; but mathematics abstracts from the content +and character of its units and aggregates, which may and do change, so +that a relation of stable equivalence is not maintained among them. In +fact, the basis of these sciences is found in the tendency of things to +be always changing and becoming different from what they were before. +The problem of these sciences is how to ground a rational scheme of +knowledge in connection with a fickle world like that of qualitative +change. It is here that reflection finds its problem, and noticing that +the tendency of this world of change is for _a_ to pass into _b_ and +thus to lose its own identity, the act of reflection that rationalizes +the situation is one that connects _a_ and _b_ by relating them to a +common ground _x_ of which they stand as successive manifestations or +symbols. _X_ thus supplies the thread of identity that binds the two +changes _a_ and _b_ into a relation to which the name causation may be +applied. And just as quantitative equivalence is the principle of +relationship among the parts of the simple mathematical world, so here +in the world of the dynamic or natural sciences, the principle of +relation is natural causation.[2] We find, then, that the +non-mathematical sciences rest on a basis that is constituted by a +_second act of reflection_; one that translates our world into a system +of phenomena causally inter-related and connected with their underlying +grounds. + + [Footnote 1: I do not raise the question of qualitative + mathematics at all. It is clear that the first mathematical + reflection will be quantitative.] + + [Footnote 2: By natural causation I mean such a relationship + between _a_ and _b_ in a phenomenal system as enables _a_ + through its connection with its ground to determine _b_.] + +We have now reached a point where it will be possible in a few sentences +to indicate the rise of the metaphysical reflection and the ground on +which it rests. If we consider both the mathematical and the physical +ways of looking at things, we will find that they possess this feature +in common,--they are purely external, having nothing to say respecting +the _inner_ and, therefore, _real_ nature of the things with which they +deal. Or, if we concede the latest claims of some of the physical +speculators and agree that the aim of physics is an ultimate physical +explanation of reality, it will still be true that the whole standpoint +of this explanation will be external. Let me explain briefly what I mean +substantially by the term _external_ as I use it here. Every +interpretation of a world is a function of some knowing consciousness, +and consequently of some knowing self. This is too obvious to need +proof. A system will be _external_ to such a knower just to the extent +that the knower finds it dominated and determined by categories that are +different from those of its own determination. A world physically +interpreted is one that is brought completely under the rubrics of +physics and mathematics; whose movements yield themselves completely, +therefore, to a mechanical calculus that gives rise to purely +descriptive formulæ; _or_ to the control of a dynamic principle; that of +natural causation, by virtue of which everything is determined without +thought of its own, by the impulse of another, which impulse itself is +not directly traceable to any thought or purpose. Now, the occasion for +the metaphysical reflection arises when this situation that brings us +face to face, with, nay, makes us part and parcel of, an alien system of +things, becomes intolerable, and the knower begins to demand a closer +kinship with his world. The knower finds the categories of his own +central and characteristic activity in experience. Here he is conscious +of being an agent going out in forms of activity for the realization of +his world. The determining categories of the activity he is most fully +conscious of, are interest, idea, prevision, purpose, and that selective +activity which goes to its termination in some achieved end. The +metaphysical interpretation arises out of the demand that the world +shall be brought into bonds of kinship with the knower. And this is +effected by generalizing the categories of consciousness and applying +them as principles of interpretation to the world. The act of reflection +on which the metaphysical interpretation proceeds is one, then, in which +the world of science is further transformed by bringing the inner nature +of things out of its isolation and translating the world-movements into +process the terms of which are no longer _phenomena and hidden ground_, +but rather inception and realization, or, more specifically, _Idea_ and +_Reality_. And the point to be noted here is the fact that these +metaphysical categories are led up to positivity by an act of reflection +that has for its guiding aim an interpretation of the world that will be +more ultimately satisfactory to the knower than that of the physical or +natural sciences; while negatively, it is led up to by the refusal of +the knowing consciousness to rest in a world alien to its own nature and +in which it is subordinated to the physical and made a mere +epiphenomenon. + + +II + +QUESTIONS OF POINT OF VIEW, PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF METAPHYSICS + + +It is clear from what has been said that the metaphysical interpretation +proceeds on a presupposition radically different from that of +mathematical and physical science. The presumption of these sciences is +that the world is physical, that the physical categories supply the +norms of reality, and that consciousness and the psychic, in general, +are subordinate and phenomenal to the physical. On the contrary, +metaphysics arises out of a revolt from these presumptions toward the +opposite presumption, namely, that _consciousness itself is the great +reality_, and that the norms of an ultimate interpretation of things are +to be sought in its categories. This is the great transformation that +conditions the possibility and value of all metaphysics. It is the +Copernican revolution which the mind must pass through, a revolution in +which matter and the physical world yields the primacy to mind; a +revolution in which consciousness becomes central, its categories and +analogies supplying the principles of final world-interpretation. Let us +consider then, in the light of this great Copernican revolution, the +questions of the _point of view_, _principle_, and _method_ of +metaphysics. And here the utmost brevity must be observed. If +consciousness be the great reality, then its own central activity, that +effort by which it realizes its world, will determine for us the _point +of view_ or departure of which we are in quest. This will be _inner_ +rather than _outer_; it will be motived by _interest_, will shape itself +into interest-directed effort. This effort will be cognitive; dominated +by an _idea_ which will be an anticipation of the _goal_ of the effort. +It will, therefore, become _directive_, _selective_, and will stand as +the _end_ or _aim_ of the completed effort. The whole movement will thus +take the form, genetically, of a developing _purpose informed by an +idea_, or _teleologically_, of a _purpose going on to its fulfillment_ +in some _aim_ which is also its _motive_. Now, metaphysics determines +its point of view in the following reasoning: if in consciousness we +find the type of the inner nature of things, then the point of view for +the interpretation of this inner nature will be to seek by generalizing +the standpoint of consciously determined effort and asserting that this +is the true point of view from which the _meaning_ of the world is to be +sought. + +Having determined the metaphysical point of view, the next question of +vital importance is that of its _principle_. And we may cut matters +short here by saying at once that the principle we are seeking is that +of _sufficient reason_, and we may say that a reason will be sufficient +when it adequately expresses the world-view or concept under which an +investigation is being prosecuted. Let us suppose that this world-view +is that of simple mathematics, the principle of sufficient reason here +will be that of _quantitative equivalence_ of parts; or, from the +standpoint of the whole, that of _infinite divisibility_. Whereas, if we +take the world of the ultra-mathematical science, which is determined by +the notion of _phenomena depending on underlying ground_, we will find +that the sufficient reason in this sphere takes the form of _adequate +cause or condition_. The determining condition or causes of any physical +phenomenon supply, from that point of view, the _ratio sufficiens_ of +its existence. We have seen that the sufficiency of a reason in the +above cases has been determined in view of that notion which defines the +kind of world the investigation is dealing with. Let us apply this +insight to the problem of the principle of metaphysics, and we will soon +conclude that no reason can be metaphysically sufficient that does not +satisfy the requirements of a world conceived under the notion of +_inception_ and _realization_; or, more specifically, _idea_ and +_reality_. In short, the _reason_ of metaphysics will refuse to regard +its world as a mechanism that is devoid of thought and intention; that +lacks, in short, the motives of internal determination and movement, and +will in all cases insist that an explanation or interpretation can be +metaphysically adequate only when its ultimate reference is to an idea +that is in the process of _purposive_ fulfillment. Such an explanation +we call _teleological_ or _rational_, rather than merely mechanical, and +such a principle is alone adequate to embody the _ratio sufficiens_ of +metaphysics. + +Having determined the point of view and principle of metaphysics, the +question of metaphysical _method_ will be divested of some of its +greatest difficulties. It will be clear to any one who reflects that the +very first problem in regard to the method of metaphysics will be that +of its starting-point and the kind of results it is to look for. And +little can be accomplished here until it has been settled that +consciousness is to have the primacy, and that its prerogative is to +supply both standpoint and principle of the investigation. We have gone +a long way toward mastering our method when we have settled these +points: (1) that the metaphysical world is a world of consciousness; (2) +that the conscious form of effort rather than the mechanical is the +species of activity or movement with which we have to deal; and, (3) +that the world it is seeking to interpret is ultimately one of _idea_ +and _reality_ in which the processes take the _purposive_ form. In view +of this, the important steps of method (and we use the term method here +in the most fundamental sense) will be (1) the question of the _form_ of +metaphysical activity or agency as contrasted with that of the physical +sciences. This may be brought out in the contrast of the two terms +_finality_ and _mere efficiency_, in which by mere efficiency is meant +an agency that is presumed to be thoughtless and purposeless, and +consequently without _foresight_. All this is embodied in the term +_force_ or physical energy, and less explicitly in that of _natural +causation_. Contrasted with this, _finality_ is a term that involves the +forward impulse of _idea_, _prevision_, and _purpose_. Anything that is +capable of any sort of _foretaste_ has in it a principle of prevision, +selection, choice, and purpose. The impulse that motives and runs it, +that also stands out as the _end_ of its fulfillment, is a foretaste, an +_Ahnung_, an anticipation, and the whole process or movement, as well as +every part of it, will take on this character. (2) The second question +of method will be that of the nature of this category of which +_finality_ is the form. What is its content, pure idea or pure will, or +a synthesis that includes both? We have here the three alternatives of +_pure rationalism_, _voluntarism_, and a doctrine hard to characterize +in a single word; that rests on a _synthesis_ of the norms of both +rationalism and voluntarism. Without debating these alternatives, I +propose here briefly to characterize the _synthetic_ concept as +supplying what I conceive to be the most satisfactory doctrine. The +principle of _pure rationalism_ is one of insight but is lacking in +practical energy, whereas, that of _voluntarism_ supplies practical +energy, but is lacking in insight. Pure voluntarism is _blind_, while +pure rationalism is _powerless_. But the synthesis of _idea_ and _will_, +provided we go a step further (as I think we must) and presuppose also a +germ of _feeling_ as _interest_, supplies both _insight_ and _energy_. +So that the spring out of which our world is to arise may be described +as either the _idea informed with purposive energy_, or _purpose or will +informed and guided by the idea_. It makes no difference which form of +conception we use. In either case if we include feeling as interest we +are able to conceive movements originating in some species of +apprehension, taking the dynamic form of purpose, and motived and +selected, so to speak, by interest; and in describing such activity we +are simply describing these normal movements of consciousness with which +our experience makes us most familiar. (3) The third question of method +involves the relation or correlation of the metaphysical interpretation +with that of the natural or physical science. Two points are fundamental +here. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is the same +world with which the plain man, the man of science, and the +metaphysician are concerned. We cannot partition off the external world +to the plain man, the atoms and ethers to the man of science, leaving +the metaphysician in exclusive and solitary possession of the world of +consciousness. It is the same world for all. The metaphysician cannot +shift the physical world, with its oceans and icebergs, its vast +planetary systems and milky ways, on to the shoulders of the physicist. +This is the metaphysician's own recalcitrant world, which will doubtless +task all his resources to explain. In the _second_ place, though it is +the same world that is clamoring for interpretation, it is a world that +passes through successive transformations, in order to adapt itself to +progressive modes of interpretation. The plain man is called to pass +through a species of Copernican revolution that subordinates the +phenomenon to its ground, before he can become a man of science. In +turn, the man of science must go through the Copernican process, and +learn to subordinate his atoms and ethers to consciousness before he can +become a metaphysician. And it is this transformation that marks one of +the most fundamental steps in the method of metaphysics. The world must +experience this transformation, and it must become habitual to the +thinker to subordinate the physical to the mental before the +metaphysical point of view can be other than foreign to him. If, then, +it be the same content with which the sciences and metaphysics are +called on to deal, it is clear that we have on our hands another problem +on the answer to which the fate of metaphysics vitally depends; the +question of the _correlation_ of its method with that of the sciences so +that it may stand vindicated as the final interpretation of things. + + +III + +QUESTION OF THE CORRELATION OF METAPHYSICS WITH THE SCIENCES + + +We have reached two conclusions that are vital here: (1) that the +metaphysical way of looking at the world involves a transformation of +the world of physical science; (2) that it is the same world that lies +open to both science and metaphysics. Out of this arises the problem of +the _correlation_ of the two views; the two interpretations of the +world. If science be right in conceiving the world under such categories +as quantity and natural causation; if science be right in seeking a +mechanical explanation of phenomena (that is, one that excludes +prevision, purpose, and aim); and if metaphysics be right in refusing to +accept this explanation as final and in insisting that the principle of +ultimate interpretation is teleological, that it falls under the +categories of prevision, purpose, and aim; then it is clear that the +problem of correlation is on our hands. In dealing with this problem, it +will be convenient to separate it into two questions: (1) that of the +fact; (2) that of its rationale. The fact of the correlation is a thing +of common experience. We have but to consider the way in which this +Congress of Science has been brought about in order to have an +exhibition of the method of correlation. Originating first in the sphere +of thought and purpose, the design has been actualized through the +operation of mechanical agencies which it has somehow contributed to +liberate. On the scale of individual experience we have the classic +instance of the arm moving through space in obedience to a hidden will. +There can be no question as to the fact and the great difficulty of +metaphysics does not arise in the task of generalizing the fact and +conceiving the world as a system of thought-purposes working out into +forms of the actual through mechanical agencies. This generalization +somehow lies at the foundation of all metaphysical faith, and, this +being the case, the real task here, aside from the profounder question +of the _rationale_, is that of exhibiting the actual points of +correlation; those points in the various stages of the sciences from +physics to ethics and religion, at which the last category or result of +science is found to hold as its immediate implication some first term of +the more ultimate construction of metaphysics. The working out of this +task is of the utmost importance, inasmuch as it makes clear to both the +man of science and the metaphysician the intrinsic necessity of the +correlation. It is a task analogous to the Kantian deduction of the +categories. + + +IV + +QUESTIONS OF THE ULTIMATE NATURE OF REALITY + + +We come, then, to the question of the rationale of this correlation, and +it is clear here that we are dealing with a phase of the problem of the +ultimate nature of reality. For the question of the correlation now is +how it is possible that our thoughts should affect things so that they +move in response; how mind influences body or the reverse, how, when we +will, the arm moves through space. And without going into details of +discussion here, let us say at once, that whatever the situation may be +for any science,--and it may be that some form of _dualism_ is a +necessary presupposition of science,--for metaphysics it is clear that +no dualism of substances or orders can be regarded as final. The life of +metaphysics depends on finding the one for the many; the one that when +found will also ground the many. If, then, the phenomenon of _mind and +body_ presents the appearance of a correspondence of two different and, +so far as can be determined, mutually exclusive agencies, the problem of +metaphysics is the reduction of these agencies to one species. Here we +come upon the issue between materialism and immaterialism. But inasmuch +as the notion of metaphysics itself seems to exclude materialism, the +vital alternative is that of immaterialism. Again, if psycho-physics +presents as its basal category a _parallelism_ between two orders of +phenomena, psychic and physical, it is the business of metaphysics to +seek the explanation of this dualism in some more ultimate and unitary +conception. Now, since the very notion of metaphysics again excludes the +physical alternative from the category of finality, we are left with the +psychic term as the one that, by virtue of the fact that it embodies a +form of _conscious_ activity, promises to be most fruitful for +metaphysics. From one point of view, then, we have reduced our world to +immaterialism; from another, to some form or analogue of the psychic. +Now it is not necessary here to carry the inquiry further in this +direction. For what metaphysics is interested in, specially, is the fact +that the world must be reduced to one kind of being and one type of +agency. If this be done, it is clear that the dualism of _body and mind_ +and the _parallel orders_ of psycho-physics cannot be regarded as final, +but must take their places as phenomena that are relative and reducible +to a more fundamental unity. The metaphysician will say that the arm +moves through space in response to the will, and that everywhere the +correlation between mechanical and teleological agency takes place +because in the last analysis _there is only one type of agency_; an +agency that finds its initiative in interest, thought, purpose, design, +and thus works out its results in the fields of space and mechanical +activities. + +Furthermore, on the question to which these considerations lead up; that +of the ultimate interpretation we are to put on the reality of the +world, the issue is not so indeterminate as it might seem from some +points of view. Taking it that the very notion of metaphysics excludes +the material and the physical as ultimate types of the real, we are left +with the notions of the immaterial and the psychic; and while the former +is indefinite, it is a fact that in the psychic and especially in the +form of it which man realizes in his own experience, he finds an +intelligible type and the only one that is available to him for the +definition of the immaterial. He has his choice, then, either to regard +the world as _absolutely opaque_, showing nothing but its phenomenal +dress which ceases to have any meaning; or to apply to the world's inner +nature the intelligible types and analogies of his own form of being. +That this is the alternative that is embodied in the existence of +metaphysics is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the metaphysical +interpretation embodies itself in the categories of _reason_, _design_, +_purpose_, and _aim_. Whatever difficulties we may encounter, then, in +the _use_ and application of the _psychic analogy_ in determining the +nature of the real, it is clear that its employment is inevitable and +indispensable. Let us, then, employ the term _rational_ to that +characterization of the nature of things which to metaphysics is thus +inevitable and indispensable. The world must in the last analysis be +_rational_ in its constitution, and its agencies and forms of being must +be construed as _rational_ in their type. + +And here we come upon the last question in this field, that of the +_ultimate being of the world_. We have already concluded that the _real_ +is in the last analysis rational. But we have not answered the question +whether there shall be one rational or many. Now it has become clear +that with metaphysics _unity_ is a cardinal interest; that, therefore, +the world must be _one_ in _thought_, _purpose_, _aim_. And it is on +this insight that the metaphysical doctrine of the _absolute_ rests. +There must be _one_ being whose thought and purpose are all-inclusive, +in order that the world may be one and that it may have meaning as a +whole. But the world presents itself as a plurality of finite +_existents_ which our metaphysics requires us to reduce in the last +analysis to the psychic type. What of this plurality of psychic +existents? It is on this basis that metaphysics constructs its doctrine +of _individuality_. Allowing for latitude of opinion here, the trend of +metaphysical reflection sets strongly toward a doctrine of reality that +grounds the world in an Absolute whose all-comprehending thought and +purpose utters or realizes itself in the plurality of finite individuals +that constitutes the world; the degree of reality that shall be ascribed +to the plurality of individuals being a point in debate, giving rise to +the contemporary form of the issue between idealism and realism. +Allowing for minor differences, however, there is among metaphysicians a +fair degree of assent to the doctrine that in order to be completely +rational the world of individual plurality must be regarded as implying +an _Absolute_, which, whether it is to be conceived as an individual or +not, is the author and bearer of the thought and design of the world as +a whole. + + +V + +QUESTIONS OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE AND ULTIMATE CRITERIA OF TRUTH + + +We have only time to speak very briefly, in conclusion, of two vital +problems in metaphysics: (1) that of the nature and limits of +metaphysical knowledge; (2) that of the ultimate criteria of truth. In +regard to the question of knowledge, we may either _identify thought +with reality_, or we may regard thought as _wholly inadequate to +represent the real_; in one case we will be _gnostic_, in the other +_agnostic_. Now whatever may be urged in favor of the gnostic +alternative, it remains true that _our_ thought, in order to follow +along intelligible lines, must be guided by the categories and analogies +of our own experience. This fixes a limit, so that the thought of man is +never in a position to grasp the real completely. Again, whatever may be +urged in behalf of the agnostic alternative, it is to be borne in mind +that our experience does supply us with intelligible types and +categories; and that under the impulse of the _infinite_ and _absolute_, +or the transcendent, to which our thought responds (to put it no +stronger), a dialectical activity arises; on the one hand, the +application of the experience-analogies to determine the real; on the +other, the incessant removal of limits by the impulse of transcendence +(as we may call it). Thus arises a _movement of approximation_ which +while it never completely compasses its goal, yet proceeds along +intelligent lines; constitutes the mind's effort to know; and results in +an _approximating series of intelligible and relatively adequate +conceptions_. Metaphysically, we are ever approximating to ultimate +knowledge; though it can never be said that we have attained it. The +type of metaphysical knowledge cannot be characterized, therefore, as +either gnostic or agnostic. + +As to the question of ultimate _criteria_, it is clear that we are here +touching one of the living issues of our present-day thought. Shall the +judgment of truth, on which certitude must found, exclude practical +considerations of value, or shall the consideration of value have weight +in the balance of certitude? On this issue we have at the opposite +extremes (1) the _pure rationalist_ who insists on the rigid exclusion +from the epistemological scale of every consideration except that of +pure logic. The truth of a thing, he urges, is always a purely logical +consideration. On the other hand, we have (2) the _pure pragmatist_, who +insists on the "_will to believe_" as a legitimate datum or factor in +the determination of certitude. The pragmatic platform has two planks: +(1) the _ontological_--we select our world that we call real at the +behest of our interests; (2) the _ethical_--in such a world practical +interest has the right of way in determining what we are to accept as +true as well as what we are to choose as good. It is my purpose in thus +outlining the extremes of doctrine to close with a suggestion or two +toward less ultra-conclusions. It is a sufficient criticism on the _pure +rationalist's_ position to point out the fact that his separation of +practical and theoretic interests is a pure fiction that is never +realized anywhere. The motives of science and the motives of practice +are so blended that interest in the conclusion always enters as a factor +in the process. A conclusion reached by the pure rationalist's method +would be one that would only interest the pure rationalist in so far as +he could divest himself of all motives except the bare love of fact for +its own sake. The _pure pragmatist_ is, I think, still more vulnerable. +He must, to start with, be a pure subjective idealist, otherwise he +would find his world at many points recalcitrant to his ontology. +Furthermore, the mere _will to believe_ is arbitrary and involves the +suppression of reason. In order that the will to believe may work _real_ +conviction, the point believed must at least amount to a postulate of +the practical reason; it must become somehow evident that the refusal to +believe would create a situation that would be theoretically unsound or +irrational; as, for instance, if we assume that the immortality of the +soul is a _real postulate_ of practical reason, it must be so because +the negative of it would involve the irrationality of our world; and +therefore a degree of theoretic imperfection or confusion. Personally I +believe the lines here converge in such a way that the ideal of truth +will always be found to have practical value; and _conversely_, as to +practical ideals, that a sound practical postulate will have weight in +the theoretic scales. And it is doubtless true, as Professor Royce urges +in his presidential address on _The Eternal and The Practical_, that all +judgments must find their final warrant at the Court of the Eternal +where, so far as we can see, the theoretical and practical coalesce into +one. + + * * * * * + +At the close of the work of this Section and upon the invitation of Dr. +Armstrong, a number of distinguished members in attendance joined freely +in the discussion, to the great pleasure of the many specialists who +were present. Among those participating were Professor Boltzmann of +Vienna, Professor Hoeffding of Copenhagen, Professor Calkins of +Wellesley, and Professor French of the University of Nebraska, to whom +replies were made by the principal speakers, Messrs. Taylor and Ormond. + + + + +SHORT PAPERS + + +A short paper was contributed to the work of the Section by Professor W. +P. Montague of Columbia University, on the "Physical Reality of +Secondary Qualities." The speaker said that from the beginning of modern +philosophy there has existed a strong tendency among all schools of +thought--monists of the idealistic or materialistic types, as well as +outspoken dualists--to treat the distinction between primary and +secondary qualities as coincident, so far as it goes, with the +distinction between physical and psychical. Colors, sounds, odors, etc., +are regarded as purely subjective or mental in their nature, and as +having no true membership in the physical order; while correlatively all +special forms and relations have been in their turn extruded from the +field of the psychical. Let it be noted that introspection offers little +or nothing in support of this view. There is nothing, for example, about +the color red that would make it appear more distinctively psychical or +subjective than a figure or a motion. The perception of a square or a +triangle is not a square or triangular perception; but neither is the +perception of red or blue a red or blue perception. Now with the +affective or emotional contents of experience the case is quite +different. + +A feeling of pain is a painful feeling, a consciousness of anger is an +angry consciousness. Pains are more and less painful, according as we +are more and less aware of them. With feelings and volitions _esse_ is +indeed _percipi_. Colors and other secondary qualities, however, do not +seem thus to increase or diminish in their reality concomitantly with +our perceptions of them. Red is red, neither more nor less, regardless +of the amount to which we attend to it. And yet it remains true that, +notwithstanding this seeming objectivity, the secondary qualities have +long been contrasted with the primary, and classed along with the +affective and volitional states as purely subjective facts. It has +always seemed curious that a view so important as this in its +consequences, and so radically at variance, not only with Pre-Cartesian +philosophy, but also with our instinctive beliefs, should have won its +way to the position of an accepted dogma; and the purpose of this paper +was first to examine the grounds upon which this belief rests, and +second to show that the problem of the independent reality of the +physical world and the problem of the relation of physical and psychical +appear in a clearer and more hopeful light when disentangled from the +quite different problem of the relation of primary and secondary +qualities. + +There were two reasons why the older or Pre-Cartesian view of this +question should give place to the modern doctrine. First, because of the +rediscovery of the idea of mechanism, without which predictive science +had been virtually impossible. The second reason for reducing the +secondary qualities to a merely subjective status lay in the fact that +they are much more dependent than the primary qualities upon the bodily +organism of the one who perceives them. In closing Professor Montague +said:-- + +"I wish in closing to point out two consequences of the view which I +have been opposing. First, the present paradoxical status of the eternal +world; second, the equally paradoxical status of the relation of that +world to the world of mind. Berkeley was the first thinker clearly to +perceive the unsubstantial nature of a world made up solely of primary +qualities. Indeed, in the last analysis, a world of primary qualities, +and nothing else, is a world of relations without terms, a geometrical +fiction, the objective (or, for that matter, the subjective) existence +of which the idealist would be right in denying. In Biology we have +abandoned obscurantist methods, and no longer attribute the distinctive +vital functions of growth and reproduction to a vital force or vital +substance, but solely to the peculiar configuration of the material +elements of a cell. Why may we not in psychology with equal propriety +attribute the distinctively psychical functions of subjectivity or +consciousness, not to the action of a hyper-psychical soul-substance, +nor to the presence of a transcendental ego, but simply to that peculiar +configuration of sensory elements which constitutes a what we call +psychosis?" + + + + +SECTION B--PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION + + + + +SECTION B + +PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION + +(_Hall 1, September 21, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS C. HALL, Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER, University of Berlin. + PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, University of Heidelberg. + SECRETARY: DR. W. P. MONTAGUE, Columbia University. + + + + +THE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION TO THE OTHER SCIENCES + +BY PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER + + [D. Otto Pfleiderer, Professor of Theology, University of + Berlin since 1875. b. September 1, 1839, Stetten, + Würtemberg. Grad. Tübingen, 1857-61. Post-grad. _ibid._ + 1864-68. City Professor, Heilbronn, 1868-69; Superintendent, + Jena, 1869-70; Professor of Theology, Jena, 1870-75. Author + of _Religion and its Essential Characteristics_; _Religious + Philosophy upon Historical Foundation_; and many other works + and papers on Theology.] + + +In order to answer this question, we need to consider a preliminary +question, namely, whether religion can be regarded as the object of +scientific knowledge in the same manner as other processes of the +intellectual life of the race, such as law, history, and art. It is well +known that this question has not always received an affirmative answer, +and indeed it can never be answered in the affirmative so long as the +position is maintained that the only religion is that of the Christian +Church, whose doctrines and teachings rest upon an immediate divine +revelation, and that these must be accepted by men in blind belief. +Under the position of an authoritative ecclesiastical faith there can +indeed exist a theoretical consideration of the doctrines of faith, as +it was the case with the scholastic theology of the Middle Ages, which +with great earnestness sought to harmonize faith and knowledge; +nevertheless, no one of the present day would give to the scholastic +theology the name of science with the modern meaning of the term +science. The scholastic theology used great formal acuteness and skill +in the work of defining and defending ecclesiastical traditions, still +there was lacking that which for us is the essential condition of +scientific knowledge, the free examination of tradition according to the +laws of human thought and the analogy of the general experience of +humanity. The great hindrance to the progress of the knowledge of +religion was the accepted position that the truth of the ecclesiastical +doctrines was beyond human reason and outside of human examination, +since their truth rested upon an immediate divine revelation. Whether +this supernatural authority was ascribed to the Church or the Bible +makes very little difference, for in either case the assumption of such +an authority is a hindrance to the free examination of that which claims +to be the divine revealed truth. + +But is this assumption really justifiable in the nature of the case? Do +the doctrines of the Church rest upon a supernatural divine revelation? +So soon as this question was really earnestly considered, and the +thinking mind could not always avoid the consideration, then there was +revealed the inadequacy of the assumption. Two ways of examination led +to a common critical result, the philosophical analysis of the religious +consciousness and the historical comparison of various religions. The +first to enter upon these ways and at the same time to become the +founder of the modern science of religion was the keen Scotch thinker +David Hume. Truly the thought of Hume was still a one-sided, +disorganizing skepticism; even as his theory of knowledge disturbed the +truth of all our previous commonsense opinions and conceptions, so also +his philosophy of religion sought to demonstrate that all religion +cannot be proved and is full of doubt, and that the origin of religion +was neither to be found in divine revelation nor in the reason of man, +but in the passions of the heart and in the illusions of imagination. As +unsatisfactory as this result was, nevertheless it gave an important +advance to the rational study of religion in two directions, in that of +religion being an experience of the inner life of the soul and in that +of religion being a fact of human history. + +Kant added the positive criticism of reason to the negative skepticism +of Hume; that is, Kant showed that the human intellect moved +independently in the formation of theoretical and practical judgments, +and that the various materials of thought, desire, and feelings were +regulated by the intellect according to innate original ideas of the +true and good and beautiful. Thus as a natural result there came the +conception that the doctrines of belief arose not as complete truths, +given by divine revelation, but, like every other form of conscious +knowledge, these came to us through the activity of our own mind, and +that therefore these doctrines cannot be regarded as of absolute +authority for all time, but that we are to seek to understand their +origin in historical and psychical motives. So far as one looked at the +ceremonial forms of positive religion, these motives indeed were found +according to Kant in irrational conceptions, but as far as the essence +of religion was concerned they were rather found to be rooted in the +moral nature of man. This is the consciousness of obligation of the +practical reason or of the conscience, which raises man to a faith in +the moral government of the world, in immortality and God. With the +reduction of religion from all external forms, doctrines, and ceremonies +and the finding of the real essence of religion in the human mind and +spirit, the way was opened to a knowledge of religion free from all +external authority. Those philosophers who came after Kant followed +essentially this course, though here and there they may separate in +their opinions according to their thought of the psychological function +of religion. When Kant had emphasized the close connection between +religion and the moral obligation, then came Schleiermacher, who +emphasized the feeling of our dependence upon the Eternal, and who +sought to find the explanation of all religious thoughts and conceptions +in the many relations of the feeling to religious experience. Hegel on +the other hand sought the truth of religion in the thought of the +absolute spirit as found in the finite spirit. Thus Hegel made religion +a sort of popular philosophy. + +At present all agree that all sides of the soul-life have part in +religion; now one side may be the more prominent, now another, according +to the peculiarity of certain religions or the individual temperaments. +The philosophy of religion has, in common with scientific psychology, +the question of the relation of feeling to the intellect and the will, +and as yet there may be many views of this question. Altogether the +philosophy of religion is looking for important solutions to many of its +problems from the realm of the present scientific psychology. +Experiences, such as religious conversions, appear under this point of +view as ethical changes in which the aim of a personal life is changed +from a carnal and selfish end to that of a spiritual and altruistic +purpose. These are extraordinary and seemingly supernatural processes; +nevertheless in them there can still be found a certain development of +the soul-life according to law. Modern psychology especially has thrown +light upon the abnormal conditions of consciousness which have so often +been made manifest in the religious experience of all times. That which +religious history records concerning inspiration, visions, ecstasy, and +revelation, we now classify with the well-known appearances of +hypnotism, the induction of conceptions and motives of the will through +foreign suggestion or through self-suggestion, of the division of +consciousness in different egos, and in the union of several +consciousnesses into one common mediumistic fusion of thought and will. +The explanation of these experiences may not yet be satisfactory, but +nevertheless we do not doubt the possibility of a future explanation +from the general laws controlling the life of the soul. The fact that we +can through psychological experiments produce such abnormal conditions +of consciousness justifies us in taking the position, that certain +psychical laws are at the foundation of these conditions which in their +kind are as natural and regular in their functions as the physical laws +which we observe in physical experiments. These solutions which modern +psychology so far has given, and hopes still further to give, are of +great importance to the philosophy of religion. They are an indorsement +of the general principle which one hundred years ago had been advanced +by critical speculation, namely, that in all experiences of the +religious life the same principles which control the human mind in all +other intellectual and emotional fields shall hold sway. Nothing +therefore should hinder us in scientific research from following the +well-defined maxims of thought, and unreservedly applying the same +methods of scientific analysis in theology as is done generally in the +other sciences. + +The claim of the Church to infallibility and divine inspiration of its +dogmas is weakened under this view of the work of the philosophy of +religion. Prophetical inspiration and ecstasy, which usually were +thought to be supernatural revelations, are now declared by the present +psychology to come under the category of other analogous experiences, +such as the action of mental powers which, under definite conditions of +individual gifts and on historical occasions, have manifested themselves +in extraordinary forms of consciousness. However, these enthusiastic +forms of prophetical consciousness cannot be accepted for a higher form +of knowledge or even as of divine origin and as an infallible +proclamation of the truth; on the contrary, these forms are to be judged +as pathological appearances, which may be more harmful than beneficent +for the ethical value of the prophetical intuition. At least, it has +come to pass that all forms of revelation must come under the +examination of a psychological analysis and of an analogical judgment. +Hence their traditional nimbus of unique, supernatural, and absolute +authority is for all time destroyed. + +We are carried to the same result by the comparative study of the +history of religions. The study shows us that the Christian Church, with +its dogma of the divine inspiration of the Bible, does not stand alone; +that before and after Christianity other religions made exactly the same +claims for their sacred scriptures. By the pious Brahman the Veda is +regarded as infallible and eternal; he believes the hymns of the old +seers were not composed by the seers themselves, but were taken from an +original copy in heaven. The Buddhist sees in the sayings of his sacred +book "Dhammapadam" the exact inheritance of the infallible words of his +omniscient teacher Buddha. For the confessor of Ahuramazda the +Zendavesta contains the scriptural revelation of the good spirit unto +the prophet Zarathustra; according to the rabbis the laws revealed unto +Moses on Mount Sinai were even before the creation of the world the +object of the observation of God; for the faithful Mohammedan the Koran +is the copy of an ever-present original in heaven, the contents of which +were dictated word for word to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel. Whoever +ponders the similar claims of all these religions for the infallibility +of their sacred books, to him it becomes difficult to hold the dogma of +the Christian Church concerning the inspiration and infallibility of the +Bible as alone true and the similar dogmas of other religions as being +false. Rather he will accept the view that in all these examples there +are found the same motives of the religious mind, that here is given an +expression to the same need common to all seeking for an absolute and +abiding basis for their faith. + +The study of the comparison of religions has discovered in religions +other than that of Christianity many very striking parallels to many +narratives and teachings of the Bible. It may be well to recall very +briefly some of the important points. Owing to the fact that the +Assyrian cuneiform writings have now been deciphered, there has been +found a story of the creation which has many characteristics in common +with those of the Bible. There is found a story of a flood, which in its +very details can be regarded as the forerunner of the story of the flood +in the Bible. There have been found Assyrian penitential psalms, which, +in consciousness of guilt and in earnestness of prayer for forgiveness, +can well be compared with many psalms of the Bible. Recently the Code of +the Assyrian King Hammurabi, who reigned two thousand three hundred +years before Christ, has been discovered. The similarity of this Code +with many of the early Mosaic Laws has called general attention to this +fact. In the Persian religion there are found teachings of the Kingdom +of God, of the good spirits who surround the throne of God, of the +Spirit hostile to God and of an army of his demons, of the judgment of +each soul after death, of a heaven with eternal light and of the dark +abyss of hell, of the future struggle of the multitudes of good and bad +spirits and the victory over the bad through a divine hero and saviour, +of the general resurrection of the dead, of the awful destruction of the +world and the creation of a new and better world,--teachings which are +also found in the later Jewish theology and apocalypse, so that the +acceptance of a dependence of Jewish upon corresponding Persian teaching +can hardly be avoided. Also Grecian influence is observed in later +Jewish literature, in proverbs, in the wisdom of Solomon and the Son of +Sirach; especially in the Alexandrian Jewish theology are found Platonic +thoughts of an eternal, ideal world, of the heavenly home of the soul, +and the Stoic conception of a world-ruling divine Logos. + +It is from this source that the Logos to which Philo had already +ascribed the meaning of the Son of God and the Bringer of a divine +revelation crossed over into Christian theology and became the +foundation of the dogma of the Church concerning the person of Christ. +Of still greater importance than even all this was the opening of the +Indian and especially the Buddhistic religious writings. In these we +have, five hundred years before Christianity, the revelation of +redemptive religion, resting upon the ethical foundation of the +abnegation of self and the withdrawal from the world. In the centre of +this religion is Gautama Buddha, the ideal teacher of redeeming truth, +whose human life was adorned by the faith of his followers with a crown +of wonderful legends; from an abode in heaven, out of mercy to the +world, he descended into the world, conceived and born of a virgin +mother, greeted and entertained by heavenly spirits, recognized +beforehand by a pious seer as the future redeemer of the world; as a +youth he manifested a wisdom beyond that of his teachers. Then after the +reception of an illuminating revelation, he victoriously overcomes the +temptation of the devil, who would cause him to become faithless to his +call to redemption. Then he begins to preach of the coming of the +Kingdom of Justice, and sends forth his disciples, two by two, as +messengers of his gospel to all people. Although he declares that it is +not his calling to perform miracles, nevertheless the legends indeed +tell how many sick were healed, how with the contents of a small basket +hundreds were fed, how possessed of all knowledge he reveals hidden +things; how overcoming the limitations of space and time, swaying in the +air, being transfigured in a heavenly light, he reveals himself to his +disciples just before his death. And at last, in the faith of his +followers, having passed from the position of a human teacher to that of +an eternal heavenly spirit and lord of the world, he is exalted as the +object of prayer and reverence, to many millions of the human race in +Southern and Eastern Asia. + +It is hardly possible that the knowledge of this parallel from India to +the New Testament, and of the Babylonian and Persian parallel to the Old +Testament, can be without influence upon the religious thought of +Christian people. Although we may be ever so much convinced concerning +the essential superiority of our religion over all other religions, +nevertheless the dogmatic contrast between absolute truth on the one +side and complete falsity on the other can no more be maintained. In +place of this view there must enter the view of a relative grade of +differences between the higher and lower stages of development. No +longer can we see in other religions only mistakes and fiction, but +under the husk of their legends many precious kernels of truth must be +seen, expressions of inner religious feelings and of noble ethical +sentiments. One should therefore accept the position not to object to +the same discrimination between husk and kernel in the matter of one's +own religion, and to recognize in its inherited traditions and dogmas +legendary elements, the explanation of which is to be found in psychical +motives and in historical surroundings, even as they are found in the +corresponding parts of religions other than the Christian religion. +Therefore the historical comparison of religions takes us away from an +absolute dogmatic positivism to a relative evolutionary manner of study, +placing all religions without exception under the laws of time +progression and under the causal connection of the law of cause and +effect. The isolation of religion therefore is no more. It is regarded +as being a part of other human historical affairs, and must yield to the +test of a thorough unhindered research. The value of the Christian +religion can never suffer in the view of a reasonable man, when it is +not accepted in blind faith, but as the result of discriminating +comparison. + +As the evolutionary philosophy of religion uses the method of science +without exception in the case of all historical religions, so also it +does not shrink from taking up the question of the beginning of +religion, but believes that here also is found the key in the +analytical, critical, and comparative method. And here is found the +assistance of the comparative study of languages, ethnology, and +paleontology. + +The celebrated Sanscrit scholar, Max Müller, sought in the comparative +study of mythology to prove the etymological relation of many of the +Grecian gods and heroes with those of the mythology of India and to +trace the common origin of all these mythical beings and legends in the +personification of the movements of the heavenly bodies, the thunder and +lightning, the tempest and the rain. All mythical belief in gods of the +Indo-Germanic peoples seems to have arisen out of a poetical view and +dramatic personification of the powers of nature. Suggestive as this +hypothesis is, it is not by any means sufficient to give us a complete +explanation of the subject. In fact, others have shown that primitive +religion does not altogether consist in mythical conceptions, but mainly +in reverential actions, sacrifices, sacraments, vows, and other similar +cults, which have very little to do with the atmospherical powers of +nature, but rather with the social life of primitive people. And when +once the sight was clearly directed to the social meaning of the +religious rites, it was then observed that even the earliest legends +concerning the gods were connected far more closely with the habits and +customs of early society than with the facts of nature. Tyler's +celebrated book concerning "Primitive Civilization" is written from this +standpoint, an epoch-making book, showing the original close connection +of religion with the entire civilization of humanity, with the views of +life and death, the social customs, the forms of law, their strivings in +art and science; a book with a large amount of information, brought +together from observation on all sides. In this channel are found all +the researches which to-day are classified under the name of Folklore; +seeking to gather the still existing characteristic customs and forms, +legends, stories, and sayings, in order to compose these and to discover +the survivals of earliest religion, poetry, and civilization of +humanity. The gain of this study pursued with so great diligence is not +to be underrated. These studies show that all that, which at one time +existed as faith in the spirit of humanity, possessed within its very +nature the strongest power of continuance, so that in new and strange +conditions and in other forms it continued to remain. Under all changes +and progress of history there is still found an unbroken connection of +constant development. + +As important, however, as the possession of a general knowledge of +historical forms of development is to the philosophy of religion, +nevertheless the possession of this knowledge is not wholly a +fulfillment of the purpose of the philosophy of religion. To understand +a development means not merely to know how one thing follows as the +result of the other, but also to understand the law which lies at the +foundation of all empirical changes and at the same time controls the +end of the development. If this principle holds good in the +understanding of the development in the processes of nature, much more +does the principle hold good in understanding the processes of +intellectual development of humanity, which have for us not only a +theoretical, but at the same time an eminently practical interest. The +philosopher of religion sees in religious history not merely the coming +together of similar forms, but an advance from the lowest stage of +childlike ignorance to an ever purer and richer realization of the idea +of religion, a divinely ordained progress for the education of humanity +from the slavery of nature to the freedom of the spirit. The question +now arises: where do we find the principle and law of this ever-rising +development? Where do we find the measure of judgment for the relative +value of religious appearances? It is clear that the general principle +of the complete development cannot be found in a single fact which is +only one of the many manifestations of the general principle, and it is +just as clear that the absolute norm of judgment is not found in a +single fact always relative, presenting to us the object of judgment and +therefore being impossible to stand as the norm of judgment. Therefore +the principle of religious development and the norm of its judgment can +only be found in the inner being of the spirit of humanity, namely, in +the necessary striving of the mind into an harmonious arrangement of all +our conceptions, or the idea of the truth, and into the complete order +of all our purposes, or the idea of the good. These ideas unite in the +highest unity, in the Idea of God. Therefore the consciousness of God is +the revelation of the original innate longing of reason after complete +unity as a principle of universal harmony and consistence in all our +thinking and willing. Hence, in the first place, arises the result that +the development of the consciousness of God in the history of religion +is always dependent upon the existing conditions of the two united +sides, the theoretical perception of the truth and the moral standard of +life. In the second place the result arises that the judgment of the +value of all appearances in the history of religion depends as to +whether and how far these appearances agree with the idea of the true +and the good, and correspond with the demands of reason and conscience. +That science which is engaged with the idea of the good we name Ethics; +that which is engaged with the last principles of the perception of +truth, using the expression of Aristotle, we may name Metaphysics, or +following Plato--Dialectic. Recognizing then in the idea of God the +synthesis of the idea of the true and the good, the philosophy of +religion is closely related with both, Ethics and Metaphysics. + +At present the relation of religion to morality is an object of much +controversy. There are many who hold that morality without religion is +not only possible but also very desirable; since they are of the opinion +that moral strength is weakened, the will is without freedom, and its +motives corrupted on account of religious conceptions. On the other +hand, the Church, considering the experience of history, finds that +religion has ever proved itself to be the strongest and most necessary +aid to morality. In this contest the philosophy of religion occupies the +position of a judge who is called upon to adjust the relative rights of +the parties. The philosophy of religion brings to light the historical +fact that from the very beginnings of human civilization, social life +and morality were closely connected with religious conceptions and +usages, and indeed always so interchangeable in their influence that the +position of social civilization on the one side corresponded with the +position of religious civilization on the other, just as the water-level +in two communicating pipes. Therefore it follows that it is unjust and +not historical to blame religion on account of the defects of a national +and temporal morality; for these defects of morality, with the +corresponding errors of religion, find a common ground in a low stage of +development of the entire civilization of the people of the time and +age. Further, it becomes the task of the philosophy of religion to +examine whether this correspondence of religion and morality, recognized +in history, is also found in the very nature of morality and religion. +This question in the main is answered without doubt in the affirmative, +for it is clear that the religious feeling of dependence upon one +all-ruling power is well adapted not only to make keen the moral +consciousness of obligation and to deepen the feeling of responsibility, +but also to endow moral courage with power and to strengthen the hope of +the solution of moral purposes. The clearer religious faith comprehends +the relation of man to God, so much the more will that faith prove +itself as a strong motive and a great incentive of the moral life. Such +a conception will not make the moral will unfree but truly free, not in +the sense of a selfish choice, but in the sense of a love that serves, +knowing itself as an instrument of the divine will, who binds us all +into a social organism, the kingdom of God. And, on the other hand, the +more ideal the moral view of life, the higher and greater its aims, the +more it recognizes its great task to care for the welfare not only of +the individual but of all, to coöperate in the welfare and development +of all forms of society, the more earnestly the moral mind will need a +sincere faith that this is God's world, that above all the changes of +time an eternal will is on the throne, whose all-wise guidance causes +everything to be for the best unto those who love him. + +A like middle position of arbitration falls to the philosophy of +religion in the matter of the relation of religion to science. The first +demand of science is freedom of thought, according to its own logical +laws, and its fundamental assumption is the possibility of the knowledge +of the world on the basis of the unchangeable laws of all existence and +events. With this fundamental demand science places itself in opposition +to the formal character of ecclesiastical doctrine so far as the +doctrine claims infallible authority resting upon a divine revelation. +And the fundamental assumption of the regular law of the course of the +world is in opposition to the contents of ecclesiastical doctrine +concerning the miraculous interposition in the course of nature and of +history. To the superficial observer there appears therefore to exist an +irreconcilable conflict between science and religion. Here is the work +of the philosophy of religion, to take away the appearance of an +irreconcilable opposition between science and religion, in that the +philosophy of religion teaches first of all to distinguish between the +essence of religion and the ecclesiastical doctrines of a certain +religion, and to comprehend the historical origin of these doctrines in +the forms of thought of past times. To this purpose the method of +psychological analysis and of historical comparison mentioned above is +of service. When, then, by this critical process religion is traced to +its real essence in the emotional consciousness of God, to which the +dogmatic doctrines stand as secondary products and varied symbols, then +it remains to show that between the essence of religion and that which +science demands and presupposes, there exists not conflict but harmony. +When the idea of God is recognized as the synthesis of the ideas of the +true and the good, so then must all truth as sought by science, even as +the highest good, which the system of ethics places as the purpose of +all action--these must be recognized as the revelation of God in his +eternal reason and goodness. The laws of our rational thinking then +cannot be in conflict with divine revelation in history, and the laws of +the natural order of the world can no more stand in conflict with the +world-governing Omnipotence; but both, the laws of our thinking and +those of the real world, reveal themselves as the harmonious revelations +of the creative reason of God, which, according to Plato's fitting word, +is the efficient ground of being as well as of knowing. It is therefore +not merely a demand of religious belief that there is real truth in our +God-consciousness, that there should be an activity and revelation of +God himself in the human mind; it is also in the same manner a demand of +science considering its last principles, that the world, in order to be +known by us as a rational, regulated order, must have for its principle +an eternal creative reason. Long ago the old master of thinking, +Aristotle, recognized this fact clearly, when he said that order in the +world without a principle of order could be as little thinkable as the +order of an army without a commanding general. + +But while it is true that science, as the ground of the possibility of +its knowledge of the truth, must presuppose the same general principle +of intellectual knowledge which religion has as the object of its +practical belief, then by principle the apprehension is excluded that +any possible progress on the part of science in its knowledge of the +world can ever destroy religion. We are rather the more justified in the +hope that all true knowledge of science will be a help to religion, and +will serve as the means of purifying religion from the dross of +superstition. + +Truly it can easily be shown that a divine government of the world +breaking through, and now and then suspending the regular order of +nature through miraculous intervention, would not be more majestic, but +far more limited and human, than such a government which reveals itself +as everywhere and always the same in and through its own ordained laws +in the world. And again, that a revelation prescribing secret and +incomprehensible doctrines and rites, demanding from humanity a blind +faith, would far less be in harmony with the guiding wisdom and love of +God, and far less could work for the intellectual liberty and perfection +of humanity, than such a revelation which is working in and through the +reason and conscience of humanity, and is realizing its purpose in the +progressive development of our intellectual and moral capacities and +powers. When therefore science raises critical misgivings against the +supernatural and irrational doctrines of positive religion, then the +real and rightly understood interests of religion are not harmed but +rather advanced; for this criticism serves religion in helping it to +become free from the unintellectual inheritance of its early days, in +helping religion to consider its true intellectual and moral essence, +and to bring to a full display all the blessed powers which are +concealed within its nature, to press through the narrow walls of an +ecclesiasticism out into the full life of humanity, and to work as +leaven for the ennoblement of humanity. Not in conflict with science and +moral culture, but only in harmony with these, can religion come nearer +to the attainment of its ideal, which consists in the worship of God in +spirit and in truth. Even though they may not be conscious of their +purpose, but nevertheless in fact all honest work of science and all the +endeavors of social and ethical humanity have part in the attainment of +this ideal. + +It is the work of the philosophy of religion to make clear that all work +of the thinking and striving spirit of humanity, in its deepest meaning, +is a work in the kingdom of God, as service to God, who is truth and +goodness. It is the work of the philosophy of religion to explain +various misunderstandings, to bring together opposing sides, and so to +prepare the way for a more harmonious coöperation of all, and for an +always hopeful progress of all on the road to the high aims of a +humanity fraternally united in the divine spirit. + + + + +MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF +KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION + +BY PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH + +(_Translated from the German by Dr. J. H. Woods, Harvard University._) + + [Ernst Troeltsch, Professor of Systematic Theology, + University of Heidelberg, since 1894. b. February 17 1865, + Augsburg, Bavaria. Doctor of Theology. Professor University + of Bonn, 1892-94. Author of _John Gerhard and Melanchthon_; + _Richard Rubbe_; _The Scientific Attitude and its Demands on + Theology_; _The Absoluteness of Christianity, and of the + History of Religion_; _Political Ethics and Christianity_; + _The Historic Element in Kant's Religious Philosophy_.] + + +The philosophy of religion of to-day is philosophy of religion so far +only, and in such a sense, as this word means science of religion or +philosophy with reference to religion. The science of religion of former +days was first dogmatic theology, deriving its dogmas from the Bible and +from Church tradition, expounding them apologetically with the +metaphysical speculation of the later period of antiquity, and regarding +the non-Christian religions as sinful derangements and obscure fragments +of the primitive revelation. This lasted sixteen centuries, and is +confined to-day to strictly ecclesiastical circles. Next, science of +religion became natural theology, which proved the existence of God by +the nature of thought and by the constitution of reality, and also the +immortality of the soul by the concept of the soul and by moral demands, +thus constructing natural or rational dogmas and putting these dogmas +into more or less friendly relations with traditional Christianity. This +lasted about two centuries, and is to-day of the not strictly +ecclesiastical or pietistic circles, which still wish to hold fast to +religion. Both kinds of science of religion exist no longer for the +strict science. The first was, in reality, supernaturalistic dogmatics, +the second was, in reality, a substitution of philosophy for religion. +The first was demolished by the criticism of miracles in the eighteenth +century, the second by the criticism of knowledge in the nineteenth +century, which, in its turn, rests upon Hume and Kant. + +The science of religion of to-day keeps in touch with that which without +doubt factually exists and is an object of actual experience, _the +subjective religious consciousness_. The distrust of ecclesiastical and +rationalistic dogmas has made, in the thought of the present, every +other treatment impossible. So the spirit of empiricism has here as at +other points completely prevailed. But empiricism in this field means +psychological analysis. This analysis is pursued by the present to the +widest extent: on the one side by anthropologists and archæologists, who +investigate the life of the soul in primitive peoples and thus indicate +the particular function and condition of religion in these states; on +the other side, by the modern experimental psychologists and +psychological empiricists, who, by self-observation, and especially by +the collection of observations by others and of personal testimony, +study religion, and then, from the point of view of the concepts of +experimental psychology, examine the main phenomena thus found. + +Now, such an empirical psychology of religion has been constructed with +considerable success. In this German literature, it is true, has +coöperated to a slight degree only. The German theologians have held to +the older statements of the psychology of Kant, of Schleiermacher, of +Hegel, and of Fries, alone, which, in principle, were on the right path, +but which combined the purely psychological with metaphysical and +epistemological problems to such a degree that it was impossible to +reach a really unprejudiced attitude. German psychologists remain, +furthermore, under the spell of psycho-physiology and of quantitative +statements of measure, and have, consequently, not liked to advance into +this field, which is inaccessible to such statements. More productive +than the German psychology for this subject is the French, which has +attacked the complex facts far more courageously. Here, however, under +the predominance of positivism, there prevails, on the whole, the +tendency to regard religion, in its essence, anthropologically or +medically and pathologically in connection with bodily conditions. This +is the confusion of conditions and origins with the essence of the thing +itself, which can be determined only by the thing, and is, by no means, +bound exclusively to these conditions. Notwithstanding, the works of +Marillier, Murisier, and Flournoy have considerably aided the problem. +More impartially than all of these, the English and American psychology +has investigated our subject. Here we have a masterpiece in the Gifford +Lectures of William James, which collects into a single reservoir +similar investigations such as have been carried on by Coe and Starbuck. +There is here no tendency to a mechanism of consciousness, or to the +dogma of the causal and necessary structure of consciousness. And to +just this is due the freshness and impartiality of the analyses which +James gives out of his enviable knowledge of characteristic cases. James +rightly emphasizes the endlessly different intensity of religious +experiences, and the great number of points of view and of judgments +which thereby results. He also rightly emphasizes the connection of this +different intensity with irreducible typical constitutions of the soul's +life, with the optimistic and the melancholy disposition; hence there +arise constantly, even within the same religion, essentially different +types of religiousness. Limiting himself, then, to the most intense +experiences, he decides that the characteristic of religious states is +the sense of presence of the divine, which one might perhaps describe in +other terms, but which still continues the specifically divine, with the +opposed emotional effects of a solemn sense of contrast and of +enthusiastic exaltation. He pictures these senses of presence, and +illustrates them by visionary and hallucinatory representations of the +abstract. With this are connected impulsive and inhibitive conditions +for the appearance of these senses of presence and of reality, +descriptions of the effects upon the emotional life and action, and, +above all, the analysis of the event usually called conversion, in which +the religious experience out of subconscious antecedents becomes, in +various ways, the centre of the soul's life. All this is description, +but it is based upon a mass of examples and explained by general +psychological categories which, by the occurrence of the religious event +only, receive a thoroughly specific coloring. It is a description after +the manner of Kirchhoff's mechanics; permanent and similar types, and, +likewise, similar conditions for their relations to the rest of the +soul's life are sought out everywhere, without maintaining to have +proven at the same time, in this way, an intellectual necessity for the +connection. But the characteristic peculiarity of religious phenomena is +thus conceived as in no other previous analysis. + +All this is still, however, nothing more than psychologic. For the +science of religion it accomplishes nothing more than the psychological +determination of the peculiarity of the phenomenon, of its environment, +its relations and consequences. It is evident that the phenomenon occurs +in an indefinite number of varieties; and the chosen point of departure, +in unusual and excessive cases, frequently diffuses over religion itself +the character of the bizarre and abnormal. Consequently nothing whatever +is said about the amount of truth or of reality in these cases. This, by +the very principles of such a psychology, is impossible. It analyzes, +produces types and categories, points out comparatively constant +connections and interactions. But this cannot be the last word for the +science of religion. It demands, above all, empirical knowledge of the +phenomenon; but it demands this only in order, on the basis of this +knowledge, to be able to answer the question of the amount of truth. But +this leads to an entirely different problem, that of the _theory of +knowledge_, which has its own conditions of solution. It is impossible +to stop at a merely empirical psychology. The question is not merely of +given facts, but of the amount of knowledge in these facts. But pure +empiricism will not succeed in answering this question. The question +with regard to the amount of truth is always a question of validity. The +question with regard to validity can, however, be decided only by +logical and by general, conceptual investigations. Thus we pass over +from the ground of empiricism to that of rationalism, and the question +is, what the theory of knowledge or rationalism signifies for the +science of religion. + +Such a synthesis of the rational and irrational, of the psychological +and the theory of knowledge, is the main problem raised by the teaching +of Kant, and the significance of Kant is that he clearly and once for +all raised the problem in this way. He had the same strong mind for the +empirical and actual as for the rational and conceptual elements of +human knowledge, and constructed science as a balance between the two. +(He destroyed forever the _a priori_ speculative rationalism of the +necessary ideas of thought, and the analytical deductions from them, +which undertakes to call reality out of the necessity of thought as +such. He restricted regressive rationalism to metaphysical hypotheses +and probabilities, the evidence for which rests upon the inevitability +of the logical operations which leads to them, which, however, apply +general concepts without reference to experience, and therefore become +empty, and thus afford no real knowledge.) On the other hand, he +proclaimed the formal, immanent rationalism of experience, in attempting +to unite Hume's truth with the truth of Leibnitz and of Plato. In this +way he succeeded in grasping the great problem of thought by the root, +and in putting attempts at solutions on the right basis. So it is not a +mere national custom of German philosophizing, if we take our bearings, +for the most part, from this greatest of German thinkers, but it is, +absolutely, the most fruitful and keenest way of putting the problem. It +is true, the solutions which Kant made, and which are closely connected +with the classical mechanics of that time, with the undeveloped +condition of the psychology of that time, and with the incompleteness of +historical thinking then just beginning, have been, meantime, more than +once given up again. A simple return to him is therefore impossible. But +the problem was put by him in a fundamental way, and his solutions need +nothing more than modification and completion. + +Now all this is especially true in the case of the science of religion. +Here also Kant took the same course, which seemed to me right for the +theoretical knowledge of the natural sciences and for anthropology. In +practical philosophy also, to which he rightly counts philosophy of +religion, he seeks laws of the practical reason analogous to the laws of +theoretical reason, axioms of the ethical, æsthetic, and religious +consciousness which are already contained _a priori_ in the elementary +appearances in these fields, and, in application to concrete reality, +produce just these activities of the reason. Here also one should grasp +reason only as contained in life itself, the _a priori_ law itself +already effective in the diversity of the appearances should make one's +self clear-sighted and so competent for a criticism of the stream of the +soul's appearances. Seizing upon itself in the practical reality, the +practical reason criticises the psychological complex, rejects as +illusion and error that which cannot be comprehended in an _a priori_ +law, selects that part of the same which needs basis and centre and +requires only clearness with regard to itself, clears the way for +revelations of a life consciousness of its own legality and becomes +capable of the development of critically purified experience. + +If this is, in principle, valid, the Kantian thought, in the further +detail, is maintained in principle only and as a whole. The elaboration +itself will have to be quite different from that of his own. Even by +Kant himself, on this very point, the synthesis of empiricism and +rationalism is far from being elaborated with the necessary rigor and +consistency. And to-day we have a quite differently developed psychology +of religion, in contrast with which that presupposed by Kant is bare and +thin. Finally, there remain in the whole method of the critical system +unsolved problems; by failure to solve these, or by too hasty solution, +science of religion, especially, is affected. + +To make clear the present condition of the problem, one ought, above +all, to indicate the modifications to which the Kantian theory of +religion must submit,--must submit, especially, by reason of a more +delicate psychology, such as we have, with remarkable richness, in James +and the American psychologists connected with him. There are _four_ +points with regard to this question. + +The first is the question of the relation of psychology and theory of +knowledge in the very establishment of the laws of the theory of +knowledge. Are not the search for and discovery of the laws of the +theory of knowledge themselves possible only by way of psychological +ascertainment of facts, itself then a psychological undertaking and +consequently dependent upon all its conditions? It is the much discussed +question of the circle which itself lies at the outset of the critical +system. The answer to this is that this circle lies in the very being of +all knowledge, and must therefore be resolutely committed. It signifies +nothing more than the presupposition of all thought, the trust in a +reason which establishes itself only by making use of itself. The +unmistakable elements of the logical assert themselves as logical in +distinction from the psychological, and from this point on reason must +be trusted in all its confusions and entanglements to recognize itself +within the psychological. It is the courage of thought, as Hegel says, +which may presuppose that the self-knowledge of reason may trust itself, +presuppose that reason is contained within the psychological; or it is +the ethical and teleological presupposition of all thought, as Lotze +says, which believes in knowledge and the validity of its laws for the +sake of a connected meaning for reality, and which, therefore, trusts to +recognize itself out of the psychological mass. The establishment, +therefore, of the laws of the theory of knowledge is not itself a +psychological analysis, but a knowledge of self by the logical by virtue +of which it extricates itself out of the psychological mass. Theory of +knowledge, like every rationalism, includes, it is true, very real +presuppositions with regard to the significant, rational, and +teleologically connective character of reality, and without this +presupposition it is untenable; in it lies its root. It is insight of +former days, the importance of which, however, must constantly be +emphasized anew, that discusses the validity of the rational as opposed +to the merely empirical. But still more important than this thesis are +several _inferences_ which are given with it. + +The establishment of the laws of consciousness, in which we produce +experience, is a selection of the laws out of experience itself, a +knowledge of itself by the reason contained in the very experience by +way of the analysis which extracts it. It is then an endless task, +completed by constantly renewed attacks, and always only approximately +solvable. The complete separation of the merely psychological and actual +and of the logical and necessary will never be completely accomplished, +but will always be open to doubt; one can only attempt always to limit +more vigorously the field of what is doubtful. And with this something +further is connected. + +The inexhaustible production of life becomes constantly, in the latent +amount of reason, richer than the analysis discerns, or, in other words, +the laws which are brought into the light of logic will always be less +the amount of reason not brought into consciousness, and conscious logic +will always be obliged to correct itself and enrich itself out of the +unartificial logical operations arising in contact with the object. So a +finished system of _a priori_ principles, but this system will always be +in growth, will be obliged unceasingly to correct itself, and to contain +open spaces. + +Finally, and above all, in case of this separation, there remains within +the psychologically conditioned appearance, a residuum, which is either +not conceived, but is later reduced to law and thereby a conceived +phenomenon, or which never can be so, and is therefore illusion and +error. If the psychological and the theoretical for knowledge are to be +separated, then that can occur, not merely to show that both must always +be together, and form real experience only when together, but there must +also be a rejection of that which is merely psychological and not +rational since it is illusion and error. The distinction between the +apparent and the real was the point of departure which made the whole +theory necessary, and, accordingly, the merely psychological must remain +appearance and error side by side with that which is psychological and, +at the same time, theoretical for knowledge. There always remains in +consciousness a residuum of the inconceivable, that is, inconceivable +since it is illusion and error. This amounts to saying that reality is +never fully rational, but is engaged in a struggle between the rational +and anti-rational. The anti-rational or irrational, in the sense of +psychological illusion and error, belongs also to the real, and strives +against the rational. The true and rational reality to be attained by +thought is always in conjunction with the untrue reality, the +psychological, that containing illusion and error. + +All this signifies that the rationalism of the theory of knowledge must +be conditional, partly owing to the corrective and enriching fecundation +by primitive and naïve thought, partly owing to never quite separable +admixture of illusion and error. So, long ago, the system of categorical +forms, as Kant constructed it for theoretical and practical reason, +began to change, and can never again acquire the rigidity which Kant's +rationalism intended to give it forevermore. And thus the critical +system's rational reality of law produced by reason always contains +below itself and beside itself the merely psychological reality of the +factual, to which also illusion and error belong,--a reality which can +never be rationalized, but only set aside. This, too, is also true for +the philosophy of religion: the rational reduction of the psychological +facts of religion to the general laws of consciousness which prevail +among them is a task constantly to be resumed anew by the study of +reality, and follows the movements of primitive religion in order to +find there first the rational basis; the reduction is, however, always +approximate, can comprehend the main points only, and must leave much +open, the rational ground for which is not or not yet evident; finally +it has unceasingly to reckon with the irrational as illusion and error, +which attaches to the rational, and yet is not explainable by it. The +two realities, which the critical system must recognize at its very +foundation, continue in strife with each other, and this strife as the +strife of divine truth with human illusion is for the science of +religion of still more importance. + +The second correction of the Kantian teaching is only a further +consequence from this state of things. If the attitude of psychology and +theory of knowledge requires a strict separation, it requires it only +for the purpose of more correct relation. The laws of the theory of +knowledge are separated from the merely psychological actuality, but +still can be produced only out of it. Thus, as a matter of fact, +psychological analysis is always the presupposition for the correct +conception of all these laws. Psychology is the entrance gate to theory +of knowledge. This is true for theoretical logic as well as for the +practical logic of the moral, the æsthetical, and the religious. But +just at this point the present, on the basis of its psychological +investigation, presses far beyond the original form of the Kantian +teaching. This is not the place to describe this, more closely, with +reference to the first of the subjects just mentioned. But it is +important to insist that this is especially true with respect to the +Kantian doctrine of religion. The Kantian doctrine of religion is +founded on the moral and religious psychology of Deism, which had made +the connection, frequent in experience, of moral feelings with religious +emotion the sole basis of the philosophy of religion, and had, in the +manner of the psychology of the eighteenth century, immediately changed +this connection into intellectual reflections, in accord with which the +moral law demands its originator and guarantee. Kant accepted this +psychology of religion without proof and built upon it his main law of +the religious consciousness, in accordance with which a synthetic +judgment _a priori_ is operative in religion (arising in the moral +experience of freedom), which requires that the world be regarded as +subject to the purposes of freedom. It is, however, extremely one-sided, +to give religion its place just between the elements, and a rather +violent translation of the religious constitution into reflection. The +error of this psychology of religion had been discovered and corrected +already by Schleiermacher. But Schleiermacher, for his part too, also +failed to deny himself an altogether too sudden metaphysical +interpretation of the religious _a priori_ which he had demonstrated, +since he not only described the _a priori_ judgment of things, from the +point of view of absolute dependence upon God, as a vague feeling, but +raised this feeling, by reason of the supposed lack of difference, in +it, between thought and will, reason and being, to a world-principle, +and interpreted the idea of God contained in this feeling in the terms +of his Spinozism, the lack of difference between God and Nature within +the Absolute. A real theory of knowledge of religion must keep itself +much more independent of all metaphysical presuppositions and +inferences, and must admit that the essence of the religious _a priori_ +is extorted from a thoroughly impartial psychological analysis. And this +is always the place where works, such as those of James, come into play. +Religion as a special category or form of psychical constitution, the +result of a more or less vague presence of the divine in the soul, the +feeling of presence and reality with reference to the superhuman or +infinite, that is without any doubt a much more correct point of +departure for the analysis of the rational _a priori_ of religion, and +it remains to make this new psychology fruitful for the theory of +knowledge of religion. That will be one of the chief tasks of the +future. + +The third change relates to the distinction of the empirical and +intelligible Ego, which Kant connected closely, almost indissolubly with +his main epistemological thought of the formal rationalisms immanent in +experience. Kant rationalized the whole outer and inner experience, by +means of _a priori_ laws, into a totality, conforming to law, appearing +in intuitive forms of space and time, causally and necessarily rigidly +connected. The freedom autonomously determining itself out of the +logical idea, and contrasting itself with the psychological stream, +produces out of the confused psycholican reality this scientific +formation of the true reality. The product of thought, however, swallows +its own maker. For the same acts of freedom, which autonomously produced +the formation of the reality of law, remain themselves in the temporal +sequence of psychical events, and, therefore, themselves, with that +formation, lapse into the sequence which is under mechanical law. The +intelligible Ego creates the world of law, and finds itself therein, +with its activity, as empirical Ego, that is, as product of the great +world-mechanism and of its causal sequence. It is an intolerable, +violent contradiction, and it is no solution of this contradiction to +refer the empirical Ego to appearance, and the intelligible Ego to +actuality existing in itself, if the operations of the intelligible Ego, +also a constituent part of what takes place in the soul, occur in time +and so relapse irrecoverably into phenomenality and its mechanism. All +the ingenuity of modern interpretation of Kant has not succeeded in +making this circle more tolerable, all shifting of one and the same +thing to different points of view has only enriched scientific +terminology with masterpieces of parenthetical caution, but not removed +the objection that two different points of view do not, as a matter of +fact, exist side by side, but conflict within the same object. + +This circle is especially intolerable for the psychology of religion and +its application to the theory of knowledge. The psychology of religion +certainly shows us that the deeper feeling of all religion is not a +product of the mechanical sequence, but an effect of the supersensuous +itself as it is felt there; it believes that it arises in the +intelligible Ego by way of some kind of connection with the +supersensuous world. This, however, becomes completely impossible for +the Kantian theory of the empirical Ego, and all distinctions of a +double point of view in no wise change the fact that these points of +view are mutually absolutely exclusive. Here we have the results of +psychology which the expression of religious emotion confirms, in that +religion can be causally reduced to nothing else, totally opposed to the +consequences of such a theory of knowledge. Kant had himself often +enough practically felt this, and spoke then of freedom as an experience +of communion with the supersensuous as a possible but unprovable affair, +while all that, in case of a strict adherence to the phenomenality of +time and of the theory of the empirical Ego, which is a consequence of +it, is completely impossible. Nothing can be of any assistance here +except a decisive renunciation of those epistemological positions which +contradict the results of psychology, and which are themselves only +doctrinaire consequences from other positions. Nothing else is possible +but the modification of the phenomenality of time, in such a way that by +no means everything which belongs to time belongs also as a matter of +course to phenomenality, but that the autonomous rational acts which +occur in the time series of consciousness possess their own intelligible +time-form. At the same time the concept of causality closely connected +with the concept of time is to be modified so that there should be not +only an immanent and phenomenal causal connection, but also a regular +interaction between phenomenal and intelligible, psychological and +rational, conscious reality. At the same time the conclusion is also +given up, that the Ego submits unconditionally and directly to +phenomenality and to causal necessity, while the same Ego, once more, in +the same way, as a whole, from another point of view, is subordinate to +freedom and autonomy, that is, self-constitutive through ideas. The two +Egos must lie not side by side, but in and over one another. It must be +possible that, within the phenomenal Ego by a creative act of the +intelligible Ego in it, the personality should be formed and developed +as a realization of the autonomous reason, so that the intelligible +issues from the phenomenal, the rational from the psychological, the +former elaborates and shapes the latter, and between both a relation of +regular interaction, but not of causal constraint, takes place. This +rather deep, incisive modification is, in its turn, an approach of the +Kantian teaching to empiricism, but still at the same time, in the +destruction and subordination of the phenomenal and intelligible world, +in the emphasis upon the single personality issuing from the act of +reason, an adherence to rationalism. But since the distinction and the +interrelation between the rational and the empirical forms the point of +departure for the critical system, and this point of departure requires +at the same time the moulding and shaping of the empirical by the +rational and the rejection of the psychological appearance; a mere +parallelism is altogether impossible, but an interrelation is included, +and a task set for the effort and labor which constantly makes the +rational penetrate the empirical. At the very outset we have the +exclusion of the parallelism and the assertion of the interrelation. The +interrelation, by its very nature, asserts the interruption of the +causal necessity and the penetration of autonomous reason in this +sequence, without being itself produced by this sequence, although it +can be stimulated and helped or inhibited and weakened by it. Thus, in +such a case as this, the irrational is recognized by the side of and in +the rational. In this case the irrational of the event without causal +compulsion by some antecedent, or of the self-determination by the +autonomous idea alone, is the irrational of freedom. It is the +irrational of the creative procedure which constitutes the idea out of +itself and produces the consequences of the reason out of the +constituted idea. But this irrational plays everywhere in the whole life +of the soul an essential part, and is not less than decisive in the case +of religion, which must be quite different from what it is if it did not +have the right to maintain that which it declares to be true of itself, +namely, that it is an act of freedom and a gift of grace, an effect of +the supersensuous permeating the natural phenomenal life of the soul and +an act of free devotion the natural motivation. + +The fourth problem arises, when we examine the rational law of the +religious nature or of the having of religion which lies in the being +and organization of the reason. The having of religion may be +demonstrated as a law of the normal consciousness from the immanent +feeling of necessity and obligation which properly belongs to religion, +and from its organic place in the economy of consciousness, which +receives its concentration and its relation to an objective world-reason +only from religion. But precisely because religion is reduced to this, +it is clear that this is only a reduction which abstracts from the +empirical actuality just as the categories of pure reason do. This +abstraction, then, should under no circumstances itself be regarded as +the real religion. It is only the rational _a priori_ of the psychical +appearances, but not the replacement of appearances by the truth free +from confusion. The psychical reality in which alone the truth is +effective should never be forgotten out of regard for the truth. This +is, however, the fact in the Kantian theory of religion in _two_ +directions. + +It is always noticeable that the _a priori_ of the practical reason is +treated by Kant quite differently from the theoretical. In case of the +latter the main idea of the synthesis, immanent in experience, of +rationalism and empiricism, is retained, and the _a priori_ of the pure +forms of intuition and of the pure categories is nothing without the +contents of concrete reality which become shaped in it. It may be very +difficult actually to grasp the coöperation of the _a priori_ and the +empirical in the single case, and Kant's theory of the categories may +have to be entirely reshaped and approximated to _a priori_ hypotheses +requiring verification, but the principle itself is always the +disposition of the real and genuine problem of all knowledge. In case of +the practical _a priori_ Kant did, it is true, firmly emphasize the +formal character of the ethical, æsthetical, and religious law, but, in +doing this, does not lose quite out of sight the psychical reality. They +appear not as empty forms which attain to their reality only when filled +with the concrete ethical tasks, the artistic creations, and the +religious states, but as abstract truths of reason, which have to take +the place of the intricacies of usual consciousness. At this point one +has always been right in feeling a relapse on the part of Kant into the +abstract, analytical, conceptual, rationalism, and for this very reason +Kant's statements about these things are of great sublimity and rigor of +principle, but scanty in content. It is more important in case also of +this _a priori_ of the practical reason to keep in mind that it is a +purely formal _a priori_ and in reality must constantly be in relation +with the psychical content, in order to give this content the firm core +of the real and the principle of the critical regulation of self. So the +_a priori_ of morals is not to be represented abstractly merely by +itself, but it is to be conceived in its relation to all the tasks which +we feel as obligatory, and it extends itself from that point outwards +over the total expanse of the activity of reason. Likewise the _a +priori_ of art is not to be denoted in the abstract idea of the unity of +freedom and necessity, but to be shown in the whole expanse which is +present to the soul as artistic form or conception. Thus, in especial +degree, religion is not to be reduced to the belief of reason in a moral +world-order, and simply contrasted with all supposed religion of any +other kind, but the religious _a priori_ should only serve in order to +establish the essential in the empirical appearance, but without +stripping off this appearance altogether, and from this point of the +essential to correct the intricacies and narrowness, the errors and +false combinations of the psychical situation. Kant, by his original +thought of the _a priori_, was urged in different ways to such a view, +and construed epistemologically the empirical psychological religion as +imaginary illustrations of the _a priori_. But that is occasional only +and does not dominate Kant's real view of religion. This is and still +remains only a translation of the usual moral and theological +rationalism from the formula of Locke and Wolff into the formula of the +critical philosophy. + +The same revision occurs in quite a different direction. If religion is +an _a priori_ of reason, it is, once for all, established together with +reason, and all religion is everywhere and always religious in the same +proposition as it is in any way realized. Schleiermacher expressly +stated this in his development of the Kantian theory, and, in so far as +the practical reason is always penetrated with freedom, and consequently +religion itself is established with the act of moral freedom, this was +also asserted by Kant himself. Such an assertion, however, contradicts +every psychological observation whatsoever. It is true such observation +can prove that religious emotions adjust themselves easily to all +activities of reason, but it must sharply distinguish what is nothing +more than the religiousness of vague feeling of supersensual +regulations, which usually are joined with art and morals, from real and +characteristic religiousness, in which, each single time, a purely +personal relation of presence to the supersensuous takes place. But this +whole problem signifies nothing else than the actualizing of the +religious _a priori_, which actualizing always occurs in quite specific +and, in spite of all difference, essentially similar psychical +experiences and states. This problem of the actualizing of the religious +_a priori_ and of its connection with concrete individual psychical +phenomena, Kant completely overlooked in his abstract concept of +religion, or rather, deliberately ignored, because, as he wrote to +Jacobi, he saw all the dangers of mysticism lurking in it. This fear was +justified; for, as a matter of fact, all the specific occurrences of +mysticism, from conversion, prayer, and contemplation to enthusiasm, +vision, and ecstasy, do lurk in it. But without this mysticism there is +no real religion, and the psychology of religion shows most clearly how +the real pulse of religion beats in the mystical experiences. A religion +without it is only a preliminary step, or a reverberation of real and +actual religion. Moreover, the states are easily conceived in a theory +of knowledge, if one sees in them the actualizing of the religious _a +priori_, the production of actual religion in the fusion of the rational +law with the concrete individual psychical fact. The mysticism +recognized as essential by the psychology of religion must find its +place in the theory of knowledge, and it finds it as the psychological +actualizing of the religious _a priori_, in which alone that interlacing +of the necessary, the rational, the conformable to law, and the factual +occurs, which characterizes real religion. The dangers of such a +mysticism, which are recognized a thousandfold in experience, cannot be +dispelled altogether by the displacement of mysticism, for that would +mean to displace religion itself. It would be the same, if one should +try to avoid the dangers of illusion and error, by keeping to the pure +categories alone, and ceasing to employ them in the actual thinking of +experience. Rather, they can be dispelled only in that the actualizing +of the rational _a priori_ is recognized in the mystical occurrences, +and thus the intricacies and one-sidedness of the mere psychological +stream of religiousness be avoided. The psychological reality of +religion must always remember the rational substance of religion, and +always bring religion as central in the system of consciousness into +fruitful and adjusted contact with the total life of the reason. Thus +the psychological reality corrects and purifies itself out of its own _a +priori_, without, however, destroying itself; or rather, the actual +religion in the psychical category of the mystical occurrences will +subside to a more or less degree. Thus we have the irrational prevailing +here in its third form, which like the two others was contained in the +very outset of the critical system, in the form of the once-occurring, +factual, and individual, which, of course, has a rational basis or a +rational element in itself, but is besides a pure fact and reality. Just +this is the excellence of the rationalism immanent in experience (the +critical system), that it makes room for this feature beside the general +and conceptual rationality. It did not make room for it to the extent +really required, and it especially left no space for it in its abstract +philosophy of religion. This space must again be opened by the theory of +the actualizing of the religious _a priori_, and there again lies +another improvement of the critical system under the influence of modern +psychology. + +If we summarize all this, we have a quantity of concessions by the +formal epistemological rationalism to the irrationality of the +psychological facts and a repeated breaking down of the over-rigorous +Kantian rationalism. Contrariwise, however, the pure psychological +investigation is also compelled to withdraw from the unlimited quantity +and the absolute irrationality of the multifarious (and of the confusion +of appearance and truth) to a rational criterium, which can be found in +the rational _a priori_ of the reason only, and in the organic position +of this _a priori_ in the system of consciousness in general. By this +rationalism alone may the true validity of religion be founded, and by +this alone the uncultivated psychical life may be critically regulated. +Religion will be conceived in its concrete vitality and not mutilated; +it will constantly be brought out of the jumble of its distortions, +blendings, one-sidedness, narrowness, and exuberance back again to its +original content, and to its organic relations to the totality of the +life of reason, to the scientific moral and artistic accomplishments. +That is everything that science can do for it, but is not this service +great enough and indispensable enough to justify the work of such a +science? We do not stop with nothing more than "varieties of religious +experience" which is the result of James's method; but neither do we +stop with nothing more than a rational idea of religion, which +overpowers experience, as was still so in the case of Kant. But we must +learn how intimately to combine the empirical and psychological with the +critical and normative. The ideas of Hume and of Leibnitz must once more +be brought into relation with the continuations of Kant's work, and the +combination of the Anglo-Saxon sense for reality with the German spirit +of speculation is still the task for the new century as well as for the +century past. + + + + +SHORT PAPERS + + +A short paper was contributed to this Section by Professor Alexander T. +Ormond, of Princeton University, on "Some Roots and Factors of +Religion." The speaker said that religion, like everything else human, +has its rise in man's experience. It has also doubtless had a history +that will present the outlines of a development, if but the course of +that development can be traced. "But in the case of religion our theory +of development will be largely qualified by our judgment as to its +origin; while, regarding origin itself, we have to depend on hypotheses +constructed from our more or less imperfect acquaintance with the races, +and especially the savage races, of the present. The primitive +pre-religious man is a construction from present data, and will always +remain more or less hypothetical. This will partially explain, and at +the same time partially excuse, what we will agree is the unsatisfactory +character of the anthropological theories as accounts of the origin of +religion. But there are other reasons for this partial failure that are +less excusable. One of these is the rather singular failure of the +leading anthropologists, in dealing with the origin of religion, to +distinguish between _fundamental_ and merely tributary causes. For +instance, if we suppose that man has in some way come into possession of +a germ of religiousness, many things will become genuine tributaries to +its development that when urged as explanations of the germ itself would +be obviously futile. There must be a cause for the pretty general +failure to note this distinction which is vital to religious theory, and +I am convinced that the principal cause is a certain lack of +psychological insight and of philosophical grasp in dealing with the +problem of the first data and primary roots of religion in man's nature. + +"In the first place, it is needful in dealing with the religion of the +hypothetical man that we should have some idea of what constitutes +religion in the actual man. Now, back of all the outward manifestations +of religion, will stand the religious consciousness of the man and the +community, and it will be this that will determine the idea of religion +in its most essential form. The developed idea of religion, therefore, +arising out of this germinal impression, would take the form of a sense +(we may now call it concept) of relatedness to some being _akin_ to man +himself, and yet transcending him in some real though undetermined +respects. Anything short of this would, I think, leave religion in some +respects unaccounted for; while anything more would perhaps exclude some +genuine manifestations of religion. + +"If the idea of religion arises out of an _impression_, then it will not +be possible to deny to it an intellectual root. I make this statement +with some diffidence, because if I do not misinterpret them, some recent +psychologists have practically denied the intellectual root in their +doctrine that religion can have no original intellectual content. If I +am not further misled, however, these writers would admit that a content +is achieved by the symbolic use of experience. This is perhaps all I +need argue for here; since our epistemology is teaching us that the +distinction between symbolism and perception is only that between the +direct and the indirect; while here it is clear that its use in +developing the significance of the religious impression would have all +the directness and, therefore, all the cogency of an immediate +inference. + +"Let us now restore the intellectual and emotional elements of religion +to their place in a synthesis; we will then have a concrete religious +experience out of which may be analyzed at least two fundamental +factors. The first of these is what we may call the _personal_ factor in +religion. We are treading in the footsteps of the anthropologists when +we find among the most undeveloped savages a tendency to personify the +objects of their worship. When it comes to the question of determining +the rôle that this personalizing tendency has actually played in the +development of religion, the anthropologists divide into two camps, one +of these, led by Max Müller, regarding it as a symbolic interpretation +put upon the impression of some great natural or cosmic object or +phenomenon; while others, including Herbert Spencer and Mr. Tylor, +prefer to seek the originals of religion in ancestral dream-images and +ghostly apparitions. These writers thus start with completely +anthropomorphic terms, and their problem is to de-anthropomorphize the +elements to the extent necessary to constitute them data of religion. +The second factor standing over against the personal, as its opposite, +is that of transcendence. By transcendence I mean that deifying, +infinitating process that is ever working contra to the anthropomorphic +influence in the sphere of religious conceptions. The School of Spencer +regard this as the only legitimate tendency in religion. We do not argue +this point here, but agree that it is as legitimate and real a factor as +that of personality. The root of this factor, if our diagnosis of the +idea of religion be correct, is to be sought in the original impression +of religion, and it no doubt has its origin in man's feeling-reaction +from that impression. We have pointed to submission as one of the +religious emotions. Now submission rests on some deeper +feeling-attitude, which some have translated into the feeling or sense +of dependence. This, however, is not adequate, since men have the sense +of social dependence on finite beings, and we have it with reference to +the floor we are standing on. Rather, it seems to me, we must translate +it into the stronger and more unconditional feeling of helplessness. One +real ground of our religious consciousness is the sense or feeling of +helplessness toward God; the sense that we have no standing in being as +against the Deity. This radical feeling utters itself in every note of +the religious scale, from the lowest superstitious terror to the highest +mystical self-annihilation. + +"These two factors, the forces of personalization and transcendence, are +inseparable. They constitute the terms of a dialectic within the +religious consciousness, by virtue of which in one phase our religious +conceptions are becoming ever more adequate and satisfying, while from +another point of view their insufficiency grows more and more apparent. +And, on the broader field of religious history, they embody themselves +in a law of tendency, which Spencer has only half-expressed, by virtue +of which the objects of religion are on one hand becoming ever more +intelligible; on the other, ever more transcendent of our conceptions." + + * * * * * + +A short paper was read by Professor F. C. French, Professor of +Philosophy in the University of Nebraska, on "The Bearing of Certain +Aspects of the Newer Psychology on the Philosophy of Religion." The +speaker said in part: + +"The relation of science to religion has received, to be sure, much +study, but to most minds hitherto this has meant the relation of only +the physical sciences to religion. The older psychology was largely +speculative and metaphysical in character. There were, of course, some +who employed the empirical method in psychology, but they were so far +from comprehending the full scope of mental phenomena that, at best, +their work gave the promise of a science rather than a science itself. + +"It is not the fact that the newer psychology takes account of the +physiological conditions of mental life; it is not the fact that the +subject is now pursued in laboratories with instruments of precision, +that gives it its full standing as a science: it is much more the fact +that the psychology of to-day has found a place in the natural system of +mental things for those strange and relatively unusual phenomena of +consciousness which to the scientifically minded seemed totally unreal +and to the superstitious manifestations of the supernatural.... + +"In showing that the abnormal can be explained in terms of the normal, +psychology does now for the phenomena of mind what the physical sciences +have long done for the phenomena of nature.... + +"Psychology as a science postulates the reign of natural law in the +subjective sphere just as rigorously as physics postulates the reign of +law in the objective sphere.... + +"It is not in the unusual and the abnormal that the reflective mind is +to see God. It is not through gaps in nature that we are to get glimpses +of the supernatural. Rather is it in the very nature of nature, +rational, harmonious, law-conforming, subject to scientific +interpretation, that we have the best evidence that the world is made +mind-wise, that it is the work of an intelligent mind, that there is a +rational spirit at the care of the universe. + +"For science the transcendent does not enter into the perceptual realm +external or internal. It is, indeed, hard for the religious mind to +admit this fact in all its fullness. Until it does, however, religion +must always stand more or less in fear of science. Once give up the +perceptual, in all its bearings, to science, and religion will find that +it has lost a weak support only to gain a stronger one. Ultimately, I +believe, we shall find that the full acceptance of science in the mental +domain as well as in the physical will strengthen the rational grounds +of theistic belief." + + + + + +SECTION C--LOGIC + + + + +SECTION C--LOGIC + +(_Hall 6, September 22, 10 a. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE M. DUNCAN, Yale University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, Cornell University. + PROFESSOR FREDRICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE, Columbia University. + SECRETARY: DR. W. H. SHELDON, Columbia University. + + +The Chairman of this Section, Professor George M. Duncan, Professor of +Logic and Mathematics at Yale University, in introducing the speakers +spoke briefly of the scope and importance of the subject assigned to the +Section; expressed, on behalf of those in attendance, regret at the +inability of Professor Wilhelm Windelband to be present and take part in +the work of the Section, as had been expected; congratulated the Section +on the papers to be presented and the speakers who were to present them; +and announced the final programme of the Section. + + + + +THE RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES + +BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND + + [William Alexander Hammond, Assistant Professor of Ancient + and Medieval Philosophy and Æsthetics, Cornell University. + b. May 20, 1861, New Athens, Ohio. A.B. Harvard, 1885; Ph.D. + Leipzig, 1891. Lecturer on Classics, King's College, + Windsor, N. S., 1885-88; Secretary of the University + Faculty, Cornell; Member American Psychological Association, + American Philosophical Association. Author of _The + Characters of Theophrastus_, translated with Introduction; + _Aristotle's Psychology_, translated with Introduction.] + + +In 1787, in the preface to the second edition of the _Kr. d. r. V._, +Kant wrote the following words: "That logic, from the earliest times, +has followed that secure method" (namely, the secure method of a science +witnessed by the unanimity of its workers and the stability of its +results) "may be seen from the fact that since Aristotle it has not had +to retrace a single step, unless we choose to consider as improvements +the removal of some unnecessary subtleties, or the clearer definition of +its matter, both of which refer to the elegance rather than to the +solidity of the science. It is remarkable, also, that to the present +day, it has not been able to make one step in advance, so that to all +appearances it may be considered as completed and perfect. If some +modern philosophers thought to enlarge it, by introducing +_psychological_ chapters on the different faculties of knowledge +(faculty of imagination, wit, etc.), or _metaphysical_ chapters on the +origin of knowledge or different degrees of certainty according to the +difference of objects (idealism, skepticism, etc.), or, lastly, +_anthropological_ chapters on prejudices, their causes and remedies, +this could only arise from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of +logical science. We do not enlarge, but we only disfigure the sciences, +if we allow their respective limits to be confounded; and the limits of +logic are definitely fixed by the fact that it is a science which has +nothing to do but fully to exhibit and strictly to prove the formal +rules of all thought (whether it be _a priori_ or empirical, whatever be +its origin or its object, and whatever be the impediments, accidental or +natural, which it has to encounter in the human mind)."--[Translated by +Max Müller.] Scarcely more than half a century after the publication of +this statement of Kant's, John Stuart Mill (Introduction to _System of +Logic_) wrote: "There is as great diversity among authors in the modes +which they have adopted of defining logic, as in their treatment of the +details of it. This is what might naturally be expected on any subject +on which writers have availed themselves of the same language as a means +of delivering different ideas.... This diversity is not so much an evil +to be complained of, as an inevitable, and in some degree a proper +result of the imperfect state of those sciences" (that is, of logic, +jurisprudence, and ethics). "It is not to be expected that there should +be agreement about the definition of anything, until there is agreement +about the thing itself." This remarkable disparity of opinion is due +partly to the changes in the treatment of logic from Kant to Mill, and +partly to the fact that both statements are extreme. That the science of +logic was "completed and perfect" in the time of Kant could only with +any degree of accuracy be said of the treatment of syllogistic proof or +the deductive logic of Aristotle. That the diversity was so great as +pictured by Mill is not historically exact, but could be said only of +the new epistemological and psychological treatment of logic and not of +the traditional formal logic. The confusion in logic is no doubt largely +due to disagreement in the delimitation of its proper territory and to +the consequent variety of opinions as to its relations to other +disciplines. The rise of inductive logic, coincident with the rise and +growth of physical science and empiricism, forced the consideration of +the question as to the relation of formal thought to reality, and the +consequent entanglement of logic in a triple alliance of logic, +psychology, and metaphysics. How logic can maintain friendly relations +with both of these and yet avoid endangering its territorial integrity +has not been made clear by logicians or psychologists or metaphysicians, +and that, too, in spite of persistent attempts justly to settle the +issue as to their respective spheres of influence. Until modern logic +definitely settles the question of its aims and legitimate problems, it +is difficult to see how any agreement can be reached as to its relation +to the other disciplines. The situation as it confronts one in the +discussion of the relations of logic to allied subjects may be analyzed +as follows: + + 1. The relation of logic as science to logic as art. + 2. The relation of logic to psychology. + 3. The relation of logic to metaphysics. + +The development of nineteenth century logic has made an answer to the +last two of the foregoing problems exceedingly difficult. Indeed, one +may say that the evolution of modern epistemology has had a centrifugal +influence on logic, and instead of growth towards unity of conception we +have a chaos of diverse and discordant theories. The apple of discord +has been the theory of knowledge. A score of years ago when Adamson +wrote his admirable article in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_ (article +"Logic," 1882), he found the conditions much the same as I now find +them. "Looking to the chaotic state of logical text-books at the present +time, one would be inclined to say that there does not exist anywhere a +recognized currently received body of speculations to which the title +logic can be unambiguously assigned, and that we must therefore resign +the hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of the received +doctrine a precise determination of the nature and limits of logical +theory." I do not, however, take quite so despondent a view of the +logical chaos as the late Professor Adamson; rather, I believe with +Professor Stratton (_Psy. Rev._ vol. III) that something is to be gained +for unity and consistency by more exact delimitation of the +subject-matter of the philosophical disciplines and their +interrelations, which precision, if secured, would assist in bringing +into clear relief the real problems of the several departments of +inquiry, and facilitate the proper classification of the disciplines +themselves. + +The attempt to delimit the spheres of the disciplines, to state their +interrelations and classify them, was made early in the history of +philosophy, at the very beginning of the development of logic as a +science by Aristotle. In Plato's philosophy, logic is not separated from +epistemology and metaphysics. The key to his metaphysics is given +essentially in his theory of the reality of the concept, which offers an +interesting analogy to the position of logic in modern idealism. Before +Plato there was no formulation of logical theory, and in his dialogues +it is only contained in solution. The nearest approach to any +formulation is to be found in an applied logic set forth in the precepts +and rules of the rhetoricians and sophists. Properly speaking, Aristotle +made the first attempt to define the subject of logic and to determine +its relations to the other sciences. In a certain sense logic for +Aristotle is not a science at all. For science is concerned with some +_ens_, some branch of reality, while logic is concerned with the +methodology of knowing, with the formal processes of thought whereby an +_ens_ or a reality is ascertained and appropriated to knowledge. In the +sense of a method whereby all scientific knowledge is secured, logic is +a propædeutic to the sciences. In the idealism of the Eleatics and +Plato, thought and being are ultimately identical, and the laws of +thought are the laws of being. In Aristotle's conception, while the +processes of thought furnish a knowledge of reality or being, their +formal operation constitutes the technique of investigation, and their +systematic explanation and description constitute logic. Logic and +metaphysics are distinguished as the science of being and the doctrine +of the thought processes whereby being is known. Logic is the doctrine +of the organon of science, and when applied is the organon of science. +The logic of Aristotle is not a purely formal logic. He is not +interested in the merely schematic character of the thought processes, +but in their function as mediators of apodictic truth. He begins with +the assumption that in the conjunction and disjunction of correctly +formed judgments the conjunction or disjunction of reality is mirrored. +Aristotle does not here examine into the powers of the mind as a whole; +that is done, though fragmentarily, in the _De Anima_ and _Parva +Naturalia_, where the mental powers are regarded as phases of the +processes of nature without reference to normation; but in his logic he +inquires only into those forms and laws of thinking which mediate proof. +Scientific proof, in his conception, is furnished in the form of the +syllogism, whose component elements are terms and propositions. In the +little tract _On Interpretation_ (_i. e._ on the judgment as +_interpreter_ of thought), if it is genuine, the proposition is +considered in its logical bearing. The treatise on the _Categories_, +which discusses the nature of the most general terms, forms a connecting +link between logic and metaphysics. The categories are the most general +concepts or universal modes under which we have knowledge of the world. +They are not simply logical relations; they are existential forms, being +not only the modes under which thought regards being, but the modes +under which being exists. Aristotle's theory of the methodology of +science is intimately connected with his view of knowledge. Scientific +knowledge in his opinion refers to the essence of things; for example, +to those universal aspects of reality which are given in particulars, +but which remain self-identical amidst the variation and passing of +particulars. The universal, however, is known only through and after +particulars. There is no such thing as innate knowledge or Platonic +reminiscence. Knowledge, if not entirely empirical, has its basis in +empirical reality. Causes are known only through effects. The universals +have no existence apart from things, although they exist _realiter_ in +things. Empirical knowledge of particulars must, therefore, precede in +time the conceptual or scientific knowledge of universals. In the +evolution of scientific knowledge in the individual mind, the body of +particulars or of sense-experience is to its conceptual transformation +as potentiality is to actuality, matter to form, the completed end of +the former being realized in the latter. Only in the sense of this power +to transform and conceptualize, does the mind have knowledge within +itself. The genetic content is experiential; the developed concept, +judgment, or inference is _in form_ noëtic. Knowledge is, therefore, not +a mere "precipitate of experience," nor is Aristotle a complete +empiricist. The conceptual form of knowledge is not immediately given in +things experienced, but is a product of noëtic discrimination and +combination. Of a sensible object as such there is no concept; the +object of a concept is the generic essence of a thing; and the concept +itself is the thought of this generic essence. The individual is +generalized; every concept does or can embrace several individuals. It +is an "aggregate of distinguishing marks," and is expressed in a +definition. The concept as such is neither true nor false. Truth first +arises in the form of a judgment or proposition, wherein a subject is +coupled with a predicate, and something is said about something. A +judgment is true when the thought (whose inward process is the judgment +and the expression in vocal symbols is the proposition) regards as +conjoined or divided that which is conjoined or divided in actuality; in +other words, when the thought is congruous with the real. While +Aristotle does not ignore induction as a scientific method, (how could +he when he regards the self-subsistent individual as the only real?) yet +he says that, as a method, it labors under the defect of being only +proximate; a complete induction from _all_ particulars is not possible, +and therefore cannot furnish demonstration. Only the deductive process +proceeding syllogistically from the universal (or essential truth) to +the particular is scientifically cogent or apodictic. Consequently +Aristotle developed the science of logic mainly as a syllogistic +technique or instrument of demonstration. From this brief sketch of +Aristotle's logical views it will be seen that the epistemological and +metaphysical relations of logic which involve its greatest difficulty +and cause the greatest diversity in its modern exponents, were present +in undeveloped form to the mind of the first logician. It would require +a mighty optimism to suppose that this difficulty and diversity, which +has increased rather than diminished in the progress of historical +philosophy, should suddenly be made to vanish by some magic of +restatement of subject-matter, or theoretical delimitation of the +discipline. As Fichte said of philosophy, "The sort of a philosophy that +a man has, depends on the kind of man he is;" so one might almost say of +logic, "The sort of logic that a man has, depends on the kind of +philosopher he is." If the blight of discord is ever removed from +epistemology, we may expect agreement as to the relations of logic to +metaphysics. Meanwhile logic has the great body of scientific results +deposited in the physical sciences on which to build and test, with some +assurance, its doctrine of methodology; and as philosophy moves forward +persistently to the final solution of its problems, logic may justly +expect to be a beneficiary in its established theories. + +After Aristotle's death logic lapsed into a formalism more and more +removed from any vital connection with reality and oblivious to the +profound epistemological and methodological questions that Aristotle had +at least raised. In the Middle Ages it became a highly developed +exercise in inference applied to the traditional dogmas of theology and +science as premises, with mainly apologetic or polemical functions. Its +chief importance is found in its application to the problem of realism +and nominalism, the question as to the nature of universals. At the +height of scholasticism realism gained its victory by syllogistically +showing the congruity of its premises with certain fundamental dogmas of +the Church, especially with the dogma of the unity and reality of the +Godhead. The heretical conclusion involved in nominalism is equivalent +(the accepted dogma of the Church being axiomatic) to _reductio ad +absurdum_. A use of logic such as this, tending to conserve rather than +to increase the body of knowledge, was bound to meet with attack on the +awakening of post-renaissance interest in the physical world, and the +acquirement of a body of truth to which the scholastic formal logic had +no relation. The anti-scholastic movement in logic was inaugurated by +Francis Bacon, who sought in his _Novum Organum_ to give science a real +content through the application of induction to experience and the +discovery of universal truths from particular instances. The syllogism +is rejected as a scientific instrument, because it does not lead _to_ +principles, but proceeds only _from_ principles, and is therefore not +useful for discovery. It permits at most only refinements on knowledge +already possessed, but cannot be regarded as creative or productive. The +Baconian theory of induction regarded the accumulation of facts and the +derivation of general principles and laws from them as the true and +fruitful method of science. In England this empirical view of logic has +been altogether dominant, and the most illustrious English exponents of +logical theory, Herschel, Whewell, and Mill, have stood on that ground. +Since the introduction of German idealism in the last half century a new +logic has grown up whose chief business is with the theory of knowledge. + +Kant's departure in logic is based on an epistemological examination of +the nature of judgment, and on the answer to his own question, "How are +synthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?" The _a priori_ elements in +knowledge make knowledge of the real nature of things impossible. Human +knowledge extends to the phenomenal world, which is seen under the _a +priori_ forms of the understanding. Logic for Kant is the science of the +formal and necessary laws of thought, apart from any reference to +objects. Pure or universal logic aims to understand the forms of thought +without regard to metaphysical or psychological relations, and this +position of Kant is the historical beginning of the subjective formal +logic. + +In the metaphysical logic of Hegel, which rests on a panlogistic basis, +being and thought, form and content, are identical. Logical necessity is +the measure and criterion of objective reality. The body of reality is +developed through the dialectic self-movement of the idea. In such an +idealistic monism, formal and real logic are by the metaphysical +postulate coincident. + +Schleiermacher in his dialectic regards logic from the standpoint of +epistemological realism, in which the real deliverances of the senses +are conceptually transformed by the spontaneous activity of reason. This +spirit of realism is similar to that of Aristotle, in which the +one-sided _a priori_ view of knowledge is controverted. Space and time +are forms of the existence of things, and not merely _a priori_ forms of +knowing. Logic he divides into dialectic and technical logic. The former +regards the idea of knowledge as such; the formal or technical regards +knowledge in the process of becoming or the idea of knowledge in motion. +The forms of this process are induction and deduction. The Hegelian +theory of the generation of knowledge out of the processes of pure +thought is emphatically rejected. + +Lotze, who is undoubtedly one of the most influential and fruitful +writers on logic in the last century, attempts to bring logic into +closer relations with contemporary science, and is an antagonist of +one-sided formal logics. For him logic falls into the three parts of (1) +pure logic or the logic of thought; (2) applied logic or the logic of +investigation; (3) the logic of knowledge or methodology; and this +classification of the matter and problems of logic has had an important +influence on subsequent treatises on the discipline. His logic is +formal, as he describes it himself, in the sense of setting forth the +modes of the operation of thought and its logical structure; it is real +in the sense that these forms are dependent on the nature of things and +not something independently given in the mind. While he aims to maintain +the distinct separation of logic and metaphysics, he says (in the +discussion of the relations between formal and real logical meaning) the +question of meaning naturally raises a metaphysical problem: "Ich thue +besser der Metaphysik die weitere Erörterung dieses wichtigen Punktes zu +überlassen." (_Log._ 2d ed. p. 571.) How could it be otherwise when his +whole view of the relations and validity of knowledge is inseparable +from his realism or teleological idealism, as he himself characterizes +his own standpoint? + +Drobisch, a follower of Herbart, is one of the most thoroughgoing +formalists in modern logical theory. He attempts to maintain strictly +the distinction between thought and knowledge. Logic is the science of +thought. He holds that there may be formal truth, for example, logically +valid truth, which is materially false. Logic, in other words, is purely +formal; material truth is matter for metaphysics or science. Drobisch +holds, therefore, that the falsity of the judgment expressed in the +premise from which a formally correct syllogism may be deduced, is not +subject-matter for logic. The sphere of logic is limited to the region +of inference and forms of procedure, his view of the nature and function +of logic being determined largely by the bias of his mathematical +standpoint. The congruity of thought with itself, judgments, +conclusions, analyses, etc., is the sole logical truth, as against +Trendelenburg, who took the Aristotelian position that logical truth is +the "agreement of thought with the object of thought." + +Sigwart looks at logic mainly from the standpoint of the technology of +science, in which, however, he discovers the implications of a +teleological metaphysic. Between the processes of consciousness and +external changes he finds a causal relation and not parallelism. +Inasmuch as thought sometimes misses its aim, as is shown by the fact +that error and dispute exist, there is need of a discipline whose +purpose is to show us how to attain and establish truth and avoid error. +This is the practical aim of logic, as distinguished from the +psychological treatment of thought, where the distinction between true +and false has no more place than the distinction between good and bad. +Logic presupposes the impulse to discover truth, and it therefore sets +forth the criteria of true thinking, and endeavors to describe those +normative operations whose aim is validity of judgment. Consequently +logic falls into the two parts of (1) critical, (2) technical, the +former having meaning only in reference to the latter; the main value of +logic is to be sought in its function as art. "Methodology, therefore, +which is generally made to take a subordinate place, should be regarded +as the special, final, and chief aim of our science." (_Logic_, vol. i, +p. 21, Eng. Tr.) As an art, logic undertakes to determine under what +conditions and prescriptions judgments are valid, but does not undertake +to pass upon the validity of the content of given judgments. Its +prescriptions have regard only to formal correctness and not to the +material truth of results. Logic is, therefore, a formal discipline. Its +business is with the due procedure of thought, and it attempts to show +no more than how we may advance in the reasoning process in such way +that each step is valid and necessary. If logic were to tell us _what_ +to think or give us the content of thought, it would be commensurate +with the whole of science. Sigwart, however, does not mean by formal +thought independence of content, for it is not possible to disregard the +particular manner in which the materials and content of thought are +delivered through sensation and formed into ideas. Further, logic having +for its chief business the methodology of science, the development of +knowledge from empirical data, it ought to include a theory of +knowledge, but it should not so far depart from its subjective limits as +to include within its province the discussion of metaphysical +implications or a theory of being. For this reason, Sigwart relegates to +a postscript his discussion of teleology, but he gives an elaborate +treatment of epistemology extending through vol. I and develops his +account of methodology in vol. II. The question regarding the relation +between necessity, the element in which logical thought moves, and +freedom, the postulate of the will, carries one beyond the confines of +logic and is, in his opinion, the profoundest problem of metaphysics, +whose function is to deal with the ultimate relation between "subject +and object, the world and the individual, and this is not only basal for +logic and all science, but is the crown and end of them all." + +Wundt's psychological and methodological treatment of logic stands +midway between the purely formal treatises on the one hand, and the +metaphysical treatises on the other hand. The general standpoint of +Wundt is similar to that of Sigwart, in that he discovers the function +of logic in the exposition of the formation and methods of scientific +knowledge; for example, in epistemology and methodology. Logic must +conform to the conditions under which scientific inquiry is actually +carried on; the forms of thought, therefore, cannot be separate from or +indifferent to the content of knowledge; for it is a fundamental +principle of science that its particular methods are determined by the +nature of its particular subject-matter. Scientific logic must reject +the theory that identifies thought and being (Hegel) and the theory of +parallelism between thought and reality (Schleiermacher, Trendelenburg, +and Ueberweg), in which the ultimate identity of the two is only +concealed. Both of these theories base logic on a metaphysics, which +makes it necessary to construe the real in terms of thought, and logic, +so divorced from empirical reality, is powerless to explain the methods +of scientific procedure. One cannot, however, avoid the acceptance of +thought as a competent organ for the interpretation of reality, unless +one abandons all question of validity and accepts agnosticism or +skepticism. This interpretative power of thought or congruity with +reality is translated by metaphysical logic into identity. Metaphysical +logic concerns itself fundamentally with the content of knowledge, not +with its evidential or formal logical aspects, but with being and the +laws of being. It is the business of metaphysics to construct its +notions and theories of reality out of the deliverances of the special +sciences and inferences derived therefrom. The aim of metaphysics is the +development of a world-view free from internal contradictions, a view +that shall unite all particular and plural knowledges into a whole. +Logic stands in more intimate relation to the special sciences, for here +the relations are reciprocal and immediate; for example, from actual +scientific procedure logic abstracts its general laws and results, and +these in turn it delivers to the sciences as their formulated +methodology. In the history of science the winning of knowledge precedes +the formulation of the rules employed, that is, precedes any scientific +methodology. Logic, as methodology, is not an _a priori_ construction, +but has its genesis in the growth of science itself and in the discovery +of those tests and criteria of truth which are found to possess an +actual heuristic or evidential value. It is not practicable to separate +epistemology and logic, for such concepts as causality, analogy, +validity, etc., are fundamental in logical method, and yet they belong +to the territory of epistemology, are epistemological in nature, as one +may indeed say of all the general laws of thought. A formal logic that +is merely propædeutic, a logic that aims to free itself from the +quarrels of epistemology, is scientifically useless. Its norms are +valueless, in so far as they can only teach the arrangement of knowledge +already possessed, and teach nothing as to how to secure it or test its +real validity. While formal logic aims to put itself outside of +philosophy, metaphysical logic would usurp the place of philosophy. +Formal logic is inadequate, because it neither shows how the laws of +thought originate, why they are valid, nor in what sense they are +applicable to concrete investigation. Wundt, therefore, develops a logic +which one may call epistemological methodological, and which stands +between the extremes of formal logic and metaphysical logic. The laws of +logic must be derived from the processes of psychic experience and the +procedure of the sciences. "Logic therefore needs," as he says, +"epistemology for its foundation and the doctrine of methods for its +completion." + +Lipps takes the view outright that logic is a branch of psychology; +Husserl in his latest book goes to the other extreme of a purely formal +and technical logic, and devotes almost his entire first volume to the +complete sundering of psychology and logic. + +Bradley bases his logic on the theory of the judgment. The logical +judgment is entirely different from the psychological. The logical +judgment is a qualification of reality by means of an idea. The +predicate is an adjective or attribute which in the judgment is ascribed +to reality. The aim of truth is to qualify reality by general notions. +But inasmuch as reality is individual and self-existent, whereas truth +is universal, truth and reality are not coincident. Bradley's +metaphysical solution of the disparity between thought and reality is +put forward in his theory of the unitary Absolute, whose concrete +content is the totality of experience. But as thought is not the whole +of experience, judgments cannot compass the whole of reality. Bosanquet +objects to this, and maintains that reality must not be regarded as an +ideal construction. The real world is the world to which our concepts +and judgments refer. In the former we have a world of isolated +individuals of definite content; in the latter, we have a world of +definitely systematized and organized content. Under the title of the +Morphology of Knowledge Bosanquet considers the evolution of judgment +and inference in their varied forms. "Logic starts from the individual +mind, as that within which we have the actual facts of intelligence, +which we are attempting to interpret into a system" (_Logic_, vol. i, p. +247). The real world for every individual is _his_ world. "The work of +intellectually constituting that totality which we call the real world +is the work of knowledge. The work of analyzing the process of this +constitution or determination is the work of logic, which might be +described ... as the reflection of knowledge upon itself" (_Logic_, vol. +i, p. 3). "The relation of logic to truth consists in examining the +characteristics by which the various phases of the one intellectual +function are fitted for their place in the intellectual totality which +constitutes knowledge" (_ibid._). The real world is the intelligible +world; reality is something to which we attain by a constructive +process. We have here a type of logic which is essentially a metaphysic. +Indeed, Bosanquet says in the course of his first volume: "I entertain +no doubt that in content logic is one with metaphysics, and differs, if +at all, simply in mode of treatment--in tracing the evolution of +knowledge in the light of its value and import, instead of attempting to +summarize its value and import apart from the details of its evolution" +(_Logic_, vol. i, 247). + +Dewey (_Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 5) describes the essential +function of logic as the inquiry into the relations of thought as such +to reality as such. Although such an inquiry may involve the +investigation of psychological processes and of the concrete methods of +science and verification, a description and analysis of the forms of +thought, conception, judgment, and inference, yet its concern with these +is subordinate to its main concern, namely, the relation of "thought at +large to reality at large." Logic is not reflection on thought, either +on its nature as such or on its forms, but on its relations to the real. +In Dewey's philosophy, logical theory is a description of thought as a +mode of adaptation to its own conditions, and validity is judged in +terms of the efficiency of thought in the solution of its own problems +and difficulties. The problem of logic is more than epistemological. +Wherever there is striving there are obstacles; and wherever there is +thinking there is a "material-in-question." Dewey's logic is a theory of +reflective experience regarded functionally, or a pragmatic view of the +discipline. This logic of experience aims to evaluate the significance +of social research, psychology, fine and industrial art, and religious +aspiration in the form of scientific statement, and to accomplish for +social values in general what the physical sciences have done for the +physical world. In Dewey's teleological pragmatic logic the judgment is +essentially instrumental, the whole of thinking is functional, and the +meaning of things is identical with valid meaning (_Studies in Logical +Theory_, cf. pp. 48, 82, 128). The real world is not a self-existent +world outside of knowledge, but simply the totality of experience; and +experience is a complex of strains, tensions, checks, and attitudes. The +function of logic is the redintegration of this experience. "Thinking is +adaptation _to_ an end _through_ the adjustment of particular objective +contents" (_ibid._ p. 81). Logic here becomes a large part, if not the +whole, of a metaphysics of experience; its nature and function are +entirely determined by the theory of reality. + +In this brief and fragmentary _résumé_ are exhibited certain +characteristic movements in the development of logical theory, the +construction put upon its subject-matter and its relation to other +disciplines. The _résumé_ has had in view only the making of the +diversity of opinion on these questions historically salient. There are +three distinct types of logic noticed here: (1) formal, whose concern is +merely with the structural aspect of inferential thought, and its +validity in terms of internal congruity; (2) metaphysical logic whose +concern is with the functional aspect of thought, its validity in terms +of objective reference, and its relation to reality; (3) epistemological +and methodological logic, whose concern is with the genesis, nature, and +laws of logical thinking as forms of scientific knowledge, and with +their technological application to the sciences as methodology. I am not +at present concerned with a criticism of these various viewpoints, +excepting in so far as they affect the problem of the interrelationship +of logic and the allied disciplines. + +For my present purpose I reject the extreme metaphysical and formal +positions, and assume that logic is a discipline whose business is to +describe and systematize the formal processes of inferential thought and +to apply them as practical principles to the body of real knowledge. + +I wish now to take up _seriatim_ the several questions touching the +various relations of logic enumerated above, and first of all the +question of the relation of logic as science to logic as art. + + +I. _Logic as science and logic as art._ + +It seems true that the founder of logic, Aristotle, regarded logic not +as a science, but rather as propædeutic to science, and not as an end in +itself, but rather technically and heuristically as an instrument. In +other words, logic was conceived by him rather in its application or as +an art, than as a science, and so it continued to be regarded until the +close of the Middle Ages, being characterized indeed as the _ars +artium_; for even the _logica docens_ of the Scholastics was merely the +formulation of that body of precepts which are of practical service in +the syllogistic arrangement of premises, and the Port Royal Logic aims +to furnish _l'art de penser_. This technical aspect of the science has +clung to it down to the present day, and is no doubt a legitimate +description of a part of its function. But no one would now say that +logic _is_ an art; rather it is a body of theory which may be +technically applied. Mill, in his examination of Sir William Hamilton's +Philosophy (p. 391), says of logic that it "is the art of thinking, +which means of correct thinking, and the science of the conditions of +correct thinking," and indeed, he goes so far as to say (_System of +Logic_, Introd. § 7): "The extension of logic as a science is determined +by its necessities as an art." Strictly speaking, logic as a science is +purely theoretical, for the function of science as such is merely to +know. It is an organized system of knowledge, namely, an organized +system of the principles and conditions of correct thinking. But because +correct thinking is an art, it does not follow that a knowledge of the +methods and conditions of correct thinking is art, which would be a +glaring case of μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος (metabasis eis allo genos). The +art-bearings of the science are given in the normative character of its +subject-matter. As a science logic is descriptive and explanatory, that +is, it describes and formulates the norms of valid thought, although as +science it is not normative, save in the sense that the principles +formulated in it may be normatively or regulatively applied, in which +case they become precepts. What is principle in science becomes precept +in application, and it is only when technically applied that principles +assume a mandatory character. Validity is not created by logic. Logic +merely investigates and states the conditions and criteria of validity, +being in this reference a science of evidence. In the very fact, +however, that logic is normative in the sense of describing and +explaining the norms of correct thinking, its practical or applied +character is given. Its principles as known are science; its principles +as applied are art. There is, therefore, no reason to sunder these two +things or to call logic an art merely or a science merely; for it is +both when regarded from different viewpoints, although one must insist +on the fact that the rules for practical guidance are, so far as the +science is concerned, quite _ab extra_. Logic, ethics, and æsthetics are +all commonly (and rightly) called normative disciplines: they are all +concerned with values and standards; logic with validity and evidence, +or values for cognition; ethics with motives and moral quality in +conduct, or values for volition; æsthetics with the standards of beauty, +or values for appreciation and feeling. Yet none of them is or can be +merely normative, or indeed as science normative at all; if that were +so, they would not be bodies of organized knowledge, but bodies of +rules. They might be well-arranged codes of legislation on conduct, fine +art, and evidence, but not sciences. Strictly regarded, it is the +descriptive and explanatory aspect of logic that constitutes its +scientific character, while it is the specific normative aspect that +constitutes its logical character. Values, whether ethical or logical, +without an examination and formulation of their ground, relations, +origin, and interconnection, would be merely rules of thumb, popular +phrases, or pastoral precepts. The actual methodology of the sciences or +applied logic is logic as art. + + +II. _Relation of logic to psychology._ + +The differentiation of logic and psychology in such way as to be of +practical value in the discussion of the disciplines has always been a +difficult matter. John Stuart Mill was disposed to merge logic in +psychology, and Hobhouse, his latest notable apologete, draws no fixed +distinction between psychology and logic, merely saying that they have +different centres of interest, and that their provinces overlap. Lipps, +in his _Grundzüge der Logik_ (p. 2), goes the length of saying that +"Logic is a psychological discipline, as certainly as knowledge occurs +only in the Psyche, and thought, which is developed in knowledge, is a +psychical event." Now, if we were to take such extreme ground as this, +their ethics, æsthetics, and pure mathematics would become at once +branches of psychology and not coördinate disciplines with it, for +volitions, the feelings of appreciation, and the reasoning of pure +mathematics are psychical events. Such a theory plainly carries us too +far and would involve us in confusion. That the demarcation between the +two disciplines is not a chasmic cleavage, but a line, and that, too, an +historically shifting line, is apparent from the foregoing historical +_résumé_. + +The four main phases of logical theory include: (1) the concept +(although some logicians begin with the judgment as temporally prior in +the evolution of language), (2) judgment, (3) inference, (4) the +methodology of the sciences. The entire concern of logic is, indeed, +with psychical processes, but with psychical processes regarded from a +specific standpoint, a standpoint different from that of psychology. In +the first place psychology in a certain sense is much wider than logic, +being concerned with the whole of psychosis as such, including the +feelings and will and the entire structure of cognition, whereas logic +is concerned with the particular cognitive processes enumerated above +(concept, judgment, inference), and that, too, merely from the point of +view of validity and the grounds of validity. In another sense +psychology is narrower than logic, being concerned purely with the +description and explanation of a particular field of phenomena, whereas +logic is concerned with the procedure of all the sciences and is +practically related to them as their formulated method. The compass and +aims of the two disciplines are different; for while psychology is in +different references both wider and narrower than logic, it is also +different in the problems it sets itself, its aim being to describe and +explain the phenomena of mind in the spirit of empirical science, +whereas the aim of logic is only to explain and establish the laws of +evidence and standards of validity. Logic is, therefore, selective and +particular in the treatment of mental phenomena, whereas psychology is +universal, that is, it covers the entire range of mental processes as a +phenomenalistic science; logic dealing with definite elements as a +normative science. By this it is not meant that the territory of +judgment and inference should be delivered from the psychologist into +the care of the logician; through such a division of labor both +disciplines would suffer. The two disciplines handle to some extent the +same subjects, so far as names are concerned; but the essence of the +logical problem is not touched by psychology, and should not be mixed up +with it, to the confusion and detriment of both disciplines. The field +of psychology, as we have said, is the whole of psychical phenomena; the +aim of individual psychology in the investigation of its field is: (1) +to give a genetic account of cognition, feeling, and will, or whatever +be the elements into which consciousness is analyzed; (2) to explain +their interconnections causally; (3) as a chemistry of mental life to +analyze its complexes into their simplest elements; (4) to explain the +totality structurally (or functionally) out of the elements; (5) to +carry on its investigation and set forth its results as a purely +empirical science; (6) psychology makes no attempt to evaluate the +processes of mind either in terms of false and true, or good and bad. +From this description of the field and function of psychology, based on +the expressions of its modern exponents, it will be found impossible to +shelter logic under it as a subordinate discipline. If one were to +enlarge the scope of psychology to mean rational psychology, in the +sense which Professor Howison advocates (_Psychological Review_, vol. +iii, p. 652), such a subordination might be possible, but it would +entail the loss of all that the new psychology has gained by the sharper +delimitation of its sphere and problems, and would carry us back to the +position of Mill, who appears to identify psychology with philosophy at +large and with metaphysics. + +In contradistinction to the aims of psychology as described in the +foregoing, the sphere and problems of logic may be summarily +characterized as follows: (1) All concepts and judgments are +psychological complexes and processes and may be genetically and +structurally described; that is the business of psychology. They also +have a meaning value, or objective reference, that is, they may be +correct or incorrect, congruous or incongruous with reality. The +meaning, aspect of thought, or its content as truth is the business of +logic. This subject-matter is got by regarding a single aspect in the +total psychological complex. (2) Its aim is not to describe factual +thought or the whole of thought, or the natural processes of thought, +but only certain ideals of thinking, namely, the norms of correct +thinking. Its object is not a datum, but an ideal. (3) While psychology +is concerned with the natural history of reasoning, logic is concerned +with the warrants of inferential reasoning. In the terminology of +Hamilton it is the nomology of discursive thought. To use an often +employed analogy, psychology is the physics of thought, logic an ethics +of thought. (4) Logic implies an epistemology or theory of cognition in +so far as epistemology discusses the concept and judgment and their +relations to the real world, and here is to be found its closest +connection with psychology. A purely formal logic, which is concerned +merely with the internal order of knowledge and does not undertake to +show how the laws of thought originate, why they hold good as the +measures of evidence, or in what way they are applicable to concrete +reality, would be as barren as scholasticism. (5) While logic thus goes +back to epistemology for its bases and for the theoretical determination +of the interrelation of knowledge and truth, it goes forward in its +application to the practical service of the sciences as their +methodology. Apart of its subject-matter is therefore the actual +procedure of the sciences, which it attempts to organize into systematic +statements as principles and formulæ. This body of rules given +implicitly or explicitly in the workings and structure of the special +sciences, consisting in classification, analysis, experiment, induction, +deduction, nomenclature, etc., logic regards as a concrete deposit of +inferential experience. It abstracts these principles from the content +and method of the sciences, describes and explains them, erects them +into a systematic methodology, and so creates the practical branch of +real logic. Formal logic, therefore, according to the foregoing account, +would embrace the questions of the internal congruity and +self-consistency of thought and the schematic arrangement of judgments +to insure formally valid conclusions; real logic would embrace the +epistemological questions of how knowledge is related to reality, and +how it is built up out of experience, on the one hand, and the +methodological procedure of science, on the other. The importance of +mathematical logic seems to be mainly in the facilitation of logical +expression through symbols. It is rather with the machinery of the +science than with its content and real problem that the logical +algorithm or calculus is concerned. In these condensed paragraphs +sufficient has been said, I think, to show that logic and psychology +should be regarded as coördinate disciplines; for their aims and +subject-matter differ too widely to subordinate the former under the +latter without confusion to both. + +I wish now to add a brief note on the relation of logic to another +discipline. + + +III. _Relation of logic to metaphysics._ + +As currently expounded, logic either abuts immediately on the territory +of metaphysics at certain points or is entirely absorbed in it as an +integral part of the metaphysical subject-matter. I regard the former +view as not only the more tenable theoretically, but as practically +advantageous for working purposes, and necessary for an intelligible +classification of the philosophical disciplines. The business of +metaphysics, as I understand it, is with the nature of reality; logic is +concerned with the nature of validity, or with the relations of the +elements of thought within themselves (self-consistency) and with the +relations of thought to its object (real truth), but not with the nature +of the objective world or reality as such. Further, metaphysics is +concerned with the unification of the totality of knowledge in the form +of a scientific cosmology; logic is concerned merely with the +inferential and methodological processes whereby this result is reached. +The former is a science of content; the latter is a science of procedure +and relations. Now, inasmuch as procedure and relations apply to some +reality and differ with different forms of reality, logic necessitates +in its implications a theory of being, but such implications are in no +wise to be identified with its subject-matter or with its own proper +problems. Their consideration falls within the sphere of metaphysics or +a broadly conceived epistemology, whose business it is to solve the +ultimate questions of subject and object, thought and thing, mind and +matter, that are implied and pointed to rather than formulated by logic. +Inasmuch as the logical judgment says something about something, the +scientific impulse drives us to investigate what the latter something +ultimately is; but this is not necessary for logic, nor is it one of +logic's legitimate problems, any more than it is the proper business of +the physicist to investigate the mental implications of his scientific +judgments and hypotheses or the ultimate nature of the theorizing and +perceiving mind, or of causality to his world of matter and motion, +although a general scientific interest may drive him to seek a solution +of these ultimate metaphysical problems. Scientifically the end of logic +and of every discipline is in itself; it is a territorial unity, and its +government is administered with a unitary aim. Logic is purely a science +of evidential values, not a science of content (in the meaning of +particular reality, as in the special sciences, or of ultimate reality, +as in metaphysics); its sole aim and purpose, as I conceive it, is to +formulate the laws and grounds of evidence, the principles of method, +and the conditions and forms of inferential thinking. When it has done +this, it has, as a single science, done its whole work. When one looks +at the present tendencies of logical theory, one is inclined to believe +that the discipline is in danger of becoming an "_Allerleiwissenschaft_," +whose vast undefined territory is the land of "_Weissnichtwo_." The +strict delimitation of the field and problems of science is demanded in +the interest of a serviceable division of scientific labor and in the +interest of an intelligible classification of the accumulated products +of research. + + + + +THE FIELD OF LOGIC + +BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE + + [Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Johnsonian Professor of + Philosophy in Columbia University, New York, N. Y., since + 1902. b. Windsor, Ontario, Canada, March 26, 1867. A.B. + Amherst College, 1889; Union Theological Seminary, 1892; + A.M. 1898, LL.D. 1903, Amherst College. Post-grad. Berlin + University. Instructor in Philosophy, University of + Minnesota, 1894-95; Professor of Philosophy and head of + department, 1895-1902. Member of American Association for + the Advancement of Science, American Philosophical + Association, American Psychological Association. Editor of + the _Journal of Philosophy_, _Psychology and Scientific + Methods_.] + + +Current tendencies in logical theory make a determination of the field +of logic fundamental to any statement of the general problems of the +science. In view of this fact, I propose in this paper to attempt such a +determination by a general discussion of the relation of logic to +mathematics, psychology, and biology, especially noting in connection +with biology the tendency known as pragmatism. In conclusion, I shall +indicate what the resulting general problems appear to be. + + +I + +There may appear, at first, little to distinguish mathematics in its +most abstract, formal, and symbolic type from logic. Indeed, mathematics +as the universal method of all knowledge has been the ideal of many +philosophers, and its right to be such has been claimed of late with +renewed force. The recent notable advances in the science have done much +to make this claim plausible. A logician, a non-mathematical one, might +be tempted to say that, in so far as mathematics is the method of +thought in general, it has ceased to be mathematics; but, I suppose, one +ought not to quarrel too much with a definition, but should let +mathematics mean knowledge simply, if the mathematicians wish it. I +shall not, therefore, enter the controversy regarding the proper limits +of mathematical inquiry. I wish to note, however, a tendency in the +identification of logic and mathematics which seems to me to be +inconsistent with the real significance of knowledge. I refer to the +exaltation of the freedom of thought in the construction of conceptions, +definitions, and hypotheses. + +The assertion that mathematics is a "pure" science is often taken to +mean that it is in no way dependent on experience in the construction of +its basal concepts. The space with which geometry deals may be Euclidean +or not, as we please; it may be the real space of experience or not; the +properties of it and the conclusions reached about it may hold in the +real world or they may not; for the mind is free to construct its +conception and definition of space in accordance with its own aims. +Whether geometry is to be ultimately a science of this type must be +left, I suppose, for the mathematicians to decide. A logician may +suggest, however, that the propriety of calling all these conceptions +"space" is not as clear as it ought to be. Still further, there seems to +underlie all arbitrary spaces, as their foundation, a good deal of the +solid material of empirical knowledge, gained by human beings through +contact with an environing world, the environing character of which +seems to be quite independent of the freedom of their thought. However +that may be, it is evident, I think, that the generalization of the +principle involved in this idea of the freedom of thought in framing its +conception of space, would, if extended to logic, give us a science of +knowledge which would have no necessary relation to the real things of +experience, although these are the things with which all concrete +knowledge is most evidently concerned. It would inform us about the +conclusions which necessarily follow from accepted conceptions, but it +could not inform us in any way about the real truth of these +conclusions. It would, thus, always leave a gap between our knowledge +and its objects which logic itself would be quite impotent to close. +Truth would thus become an entirely extra-logical matter. So far as the +science of knowledge is concerned, it would be an accident if knowledge +fitted the world to which it refers. Such a conception of the science of +knowledge is not the property of a few mathematicians exclusively, +although they have, perhaps, done more than others to give it its +present revived vitality. It is the classic doctrine that logic is the +science of thought as thought, meaning thereby thought in independence +of any specific object whatever. + +In regard to this doctrine, I would not even admit that such a science +of knowledge is possible. You cannot, by a process of generalization or +free construction, rid thought of connection with objects; and there is +no such thing as a general content or as content-in-general. +Generalization simply reduces the richness of content and, consequently, +of implication. It deals with concrete subject-matter as much and as +directly as if the content were individual and specialized. "Things +equal to the same thing are equal to each other," is a truth, not about +thought, but about things. The conclusions about a fourth dimension +follow, not from the fact that we have thought of one, but from the +conception about it which we have framed. Neither generalization nor +free construction can reveal the operations of thought in transcendental +independence. + +It may be urged, however, that nothing of this sort was ever claimed. +The bondage of thought to content must be admitted, but generalization +and free construction, just because they give us the power to vary +conditions as we please, give us thinking in a relative independence of +content, and thus show us how thought operates irrespective of, although +not independent of, its content. The binomial theorem operates +irrespective of the values substituted for its symbols. But I can find +no gain in this restatement of the position. It is true, in a sense, +that we may determine the way thought operates irrespective of any +specific content by the processes of generalization and free +construction; but it is important to know in what sense. Can we claim +that such irrespective operation means that we have discovered certain +logical constants, which now stand out as the distinctive tools of +thought? Or does it rather mean that this process of varying the content +of thought as we please reveals certain real constants, certain ultimate +characters of reality, which no amount of generalization or free +construction can possibly alter? The second alternative seems to me to +be the correct one. Whether it is or not may be left here undecided. +What I wish to emphasize is the fact that the decision is one of the +things of vital interest for logic, and properly belongs in that +science. Clearly, we can never know the significance of ultimate +constants for our thinking until we know what their real character is. +To determine that character we must most certainly pass out of the realm +of generalization and free construction; logic must become other than +simply mathematical or symbolic. + +There is another sense in which the determination of the operations of +thought irrespective of its specific content is interpreted in +connection with the exaltation of generalization and free construction. +Knowledge, it is said, is solely a matter of implication, and logic, +therefore, is the science of implication simply. If this is so, it would +appear possible to develop the whole doctrine of implication by the use +of symbols, and thus free the doctrine from dependence on the question +as to how far these symbols are themselves related to the real things of +the world. If, for instance, _a_ implies _b_, then, if _a_ is true, _b_ +is true, and this quite irrespective of the real truth of _a_ or _b_. It +is to be urged, however, in opposition to this view, that knowledge is +concerned ultimately only with the real truth of _a_ and _b_, and that +the implication is of no significance whatever apart from this truth. +There is no virtue in the mere implication. Still further, the +supposition that there can be a doctrine of implication, simply, seems +to be based on a misconception. For even so-called formal implication +gets its significance only on the supposed truth of the terms with which +it deals. We suppose that _a_ _does_ imply _b_, and that _a_ _is_ true. +In other words, we can state this law of implication only as we first +have valid instances of it given in specific, concrete cases. The law is +a generalization and nothing more. The formal statement gives only an +apparent freedom from experience. Moreover, there is no reason for +saying that _a_ implies _b_ unless it does so either really or by +supposition. If _a_ really implies _b_, then the implication is clearly +not a matter of thinking it; and to suppose the implication is to feign +a reality, the implications of which are equally free from the processes +by which they are thought. Ultimately, therefore, logic must take +account of real implications. We cannot avoid this through the use of a +symbolism which virtually implies them. Implication can have a logical +character only because it has first a metaphysical one. + +The supposition underlying the conception of logic I have been examining +is, itself, open to doubt and seriously questioned. That supposition was +the so-called freedom of thought. The argument has already shown that +there is certainly a very definite limit to this freedom, even when +logic is conceived in a very abstract and formal way. The processes of +knowledge are bound up with their contents, and have their character +largely determined thereby. When, moreover, we view knowledge in its +genesis, when we take into consideration the contributions which +psychology and biology have made to our general view of what knowledge +is, we seem forced to conclude that the conceptions which we frame are +very far from being our own free creations. They have, on the contrary, +been laboriously worked out through the same processes of successful +adaptation which have resulted in other products. Knowledge has grown up +in connection with the unfolding processes of reality, and has, by no +means, freely played over its surface. That is why even the most +abstract of all mathematics is yet grounded in the evolution of human +experience. + +In the remaining parts of this paper, I shall discuss further the claims +of psychology and biology. The conclusion I would draw here is that the +field of logic cannot be restricted to a realm where the operations of +thought are supposed to move freely, independent or irrespective of +their contents and the objects of a real world; and that mathematics, +instead of giving us any support for the supposition that it can, +carries us, by the processes of symbolization and formal implication, to +recognize that logic must ultimately find its field where implications +are real, independent of the processes by which they are thought, and +irrespective of the conceptions we choose to frame. + + +II + +The processes involved in the acquisition and systematization of +knowledge may, undoubtedly, be regarded as mental processes and fall +thus within the province of psychology. It may be claimed, therefore, +that every logical process is also a psychological one. The important +question is, however, is it nothing more? Do its logical and +psychological characters simply coincide? Or, to put the question in +still another form, as a psychological process simply, does it also +serve as a logical one? The answers to these questions can be determined +only by first noting what psychology can say about it as a mental +process. + +In the first place, psychology can analyze it, and so determine its +elements and their connections. It can thus distinguish it from all +other mental processes by pointing out its unique elements or their +unique and characteristic connection. No one will deny that a judgment +is different from an emotion, or that an act of reasoning is different +from a volition; and no one will claim that these differences are +entirely beyond the psychologist's power to ascertain accurately and +precisely. Still further, it appears possible for him to determine with +the same accuracy and precision the distinction in content and +connection between processes which are true and those which are false. +For, as mental processes, it is natural to suppose that they contain +distinct differences of character which are ascertainable. The states of +mind called belief, certainty, conviction, correctness, truth, are thus, +doubtless, all distinguishable as mental states. It may be admitted, +therefore, that there can be a thoroughgoing psychology of logical +processes. + +Yet it is quite evident to me that the characterization of a mental +process as logical is not a psychological characterization. In fact, I +think it may be claimed that the characterization of any mental process +in a specific way, say as an emotion, is extra-psychological. Judgments +and inferences are, in short, not judgments and inferences because they +admit of psychological analysis and explanation, any more than space is +space because the perception of it can be worked out by genetic +psychology. In other words, knowledge is first _knowledge_, and only +later a set of processes for psychological analysis. That is why, as it +seems to me, all psychological logicians, from Locke to our own day, +have signally failed in dealing with the problem of knowledge. The +attempt to construct knowledge out of mental states, the relations +between ideas, and the relation of ideas to things, has been, as I read +the history, decidedly without profit. Confusion and divergent opinion +have resulted instead of agreement and confidence. On precisely the same +psychological foundation, we have such divergent views of knowledge as +idealism, phenomenalism, and agnosticism, with many other strange +mixtures of logic, psychology, and metaphysics. The lesson of these +perplexing theories seems to be that logic, as logic, must be divorced +from psychology. + +It is also of importance to note, in this connection, that the +determination of a process as mental and as thus falling within the +domain of psychology strictly, has by no means been worked out to the +general satisfaction of psychologists themselves. Recent literature +abounds in elaborate discussion of the distinction between what is a +mental fact and what not, with a prevailing tendency to draw the +remarkable conclusion that all facts are somehow mental or experienced +facts. The situation would be worse for psychology than it is, if that +vigorous science had not learned from other sciences the valuable knack +of isolating concrete problems and attacking them directly, without the +burden of previous logical or metaphysical speculation. Thus knowledge, +which is the peculiar province of logic, is increased, while we wait for +the acceptable definition of a mental fact. But definitions, be it +remembered, are themselves logical matters. Indeed, some psychologists +have gone so far as to claim that the distinction of a fact as mental is +a purely logical distinction. This is significant as indicating that the +time has not yet come for the identification of logic and psychology. + +In refreshingly sharp contrast to the vagueness and uncertainty which +beset the definition of a mental fact are the palpable concreteness and +definiteness of knowledge itself. Every science, even history and +philosophy, are instances of it. What constitutes a knowledge ought to +be as definite and precise a question as could be asked. That logic has +made no more progress than it has in the answer to it appears to be due +to the fact that it has not sufficiently grasped the significance of its +own simplicity. Knowledge has been the important business of thinking +man, and he ought to be able to tell what he does in order to know, as +readily as he tells what he does in order to build a house. And that is +why the Aristotelian logic has held its own so long. In that logic, "the +master of them that know" simply rehearsed the way he had systematized +his own stores of knowledge. Naturally we, so far as we have followed +his methods, have had practically nothing to add. In our efforts to +improve on him, we have too often left the right way and followed the +impossible method inaugurated by Locke. Had we examined with greater +persistence our own methods of making science, we should have profited +more. The introduction of psychology, instead of helping the situation, +only confuses it. + +Let it be granted, however, in spite of the vagueness of what is meant +by a mental fact, that logical processes are also mental processes. This +fact has, as I have already suggested, an important bearing on their +genesis, and sets very definite limits to the freedom of thought in +creating. It is not, however, as mental processes that they have the +value of knowledge. A mental process which is knowledge purports to be +connected with something other than itself, something which may not be a +mental process at all. This connection should be investigated, but the +investigation of it belongs, not to psychology, but to logic. + +I am well aware that this conclusion runs counter to some metaphysical +doctrines, and especially to idealism in all its forms, with the +epistemologies based thereon. It is, of course, impossible here to +defend my position by an elaborate analysis of these metaphysical +systems. But I will say this. I am in entire agreement with idealism in +its claim that questions of knowledge and of the nature of reality +cannot ultimately be separated, because we can know reality only as we +know it. But the general question as to how we know reality can still be +raised. By this I do not mean the question, how is it possible for us to +have knowledge at all, or how it is possible for reality to be known at +all, but how, as a matter of fact, we actually do know it? That we +really do know it, I would most emphatically claim. Still further, I +would claim that what we know about it is determined, not by the fact +that we can know in general, but by the way reality, as distinct from +our knowledge, has determined. These ways appear to me to be +ascertainable, and form, thus, undoubtedly, a section of metaphysics. +But the metaphysics will naturally be realistic rather than idealistic. + + +III + +Just as logical processes may be regarded as, at the same time, +psychological processes, so they may be regarded, with equal right, as +vital processes, coming thus under the categories of evolution. The +tendency so to regard them is very marked at the present day, especially +in France and in this country. In France, the movement has perhaps +received the clearer definition. In America the union of logic and +biology is complicated--and at times even lost sight of--by emphasis on +the idea of evolution generally. It is not my intention to trace the +history of this movement, but I should like to call attention to its +historic motive in order to get it in a clear light. + +That the theory of evolution, even Darwinism itself, has radically +transformed our historical, scientific, and philosophical methods, is +quite evident. Add to this the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, +with its own doctrine of development, and one finds the causes of the +rather striking unanimity which is discoverable in many ways between +Hegelian idealists, on the one hand, and philosophers of evolution of +Spencer's type, on the other. Although two men would, perhaps, not +appear more radically different at first sight than Hegel and Spencer, I +am inclined to believe that we shall come to recognize more and more in +them an identity of philosophical conception. The pragmatism of the day +is a striking confirmation of this opinion, for it is often the +expression of Hegelian ideas in Darwinian and Spencerian terminology. +The claims of idealism and of evolutionary science and philosophy have +thus sought reconciliation. Logic has been, naturally, the last of the +sciences to yield to evolutionary and genetic treatment. It could not +escape long, especially when the idea of evolution had been so +successful in its handling of ethics. If morality can be brought under +the categories of evolution, why not thinking also? In answer to that +question we have the theory that thinking is an adaptation, judgment is +instrumental. But I would not leave the impression that this is true of +pragmatism alone, or that it has been developed only through pragmatic +tendencies. It is naturally the result also of the extension of +biological philosophy. In the biological conception of logic, we have, +then, an interesting coincidence in the results of tendencies differing +widely in their genesis. + +It would be hazardous to deny, without any qualifications, the +importance of genetic considerations. Indeed, the fact that evolution in +the hands of a thinker like Huxley, for instance, should make +consciousness and thinking apparently useless epiphenomena, in a +developing world, has seemed like a most contradictory evolutionary +philosophy. It was difficult to make consciousness a real function in +development so long as it was regarded as only cognitive in character. +Evolutionary philosophy, coupled with physics, had built up a sort of +closed system with which consciousness could not interfere, but which it +could know, and know with all the assurance of a traditional logic. If, +however, we were to be consistent evolutionists, we could not abide by +such a remarkable result. The whole process of thinking must be brought +within evolution, so that knowledge, even the knowledge of the +evolutionary hypothesis itself, must appear as an instance of +adaptation. In order to do this, however, consciousness must not be +conceived as only cognitive. Judgment, the core of logical processes, +must be regarded as an instrument and as a mode of adaptation. + +The desire for completeness and consistency in an evolutionary +philosophy is not the only thing which makes the denial of genetic +considerations hazardous. Strictly biological considerations furnish +reasons of equal weight for caution. For instance, one will hardly deny +that the whole sensory apparatus is a striking instance of adaptation. +Our perceptions of the world would thus appear to be determined by this +adaptation, to be instances of adjustment. They might conceivably have +been different, and in the case of many other creatures, the perceptions +of the world are undoubtedly different. All our logical processes, +referring ultimately as they do to our perceptions, would thus appear +finally to depend on the adaptation exhibited in the development of our +sensory apparatus. So-called laws of thought would seem to be but +abstract statements or formulations of the results of this adjustment. +It would be absurd to suppose that a man thinks in a sense radically +different from that in which he digests, or a flower blossoms, or that +two and two are four in a sense radically different from that in which a +flower has a given number of petals. Thinking, like digesting and +blossoming, is an effect, a product, possibly a structure. + +I am not at all interested in denying the force of these considerations. +They have, to my mind, the greatest importance, and due weight has, as +yet, not been given to them. To one at all committed to a unitary and +evolutionary view of the world, it must indeed seem strange if thinking +itself should not be the result of evolution, or that, in thinking, +parts of the world had not become adjusted in a new way. But while I am +ready to admit this, I am by no means ready to admit some of the +conclusions for logic and metaphysics which are often drawn from the +admission. Just because thought, as a product of evolution, is +functional and judgment instrumental, it by no means follows that logic +is but a branch of biology, or that knowledge of the world is but a +temporary adjustment, which, as knowledge, might have been radically +different. In these conclusions, often drawn with Protagorean assurance, +two considerations of crucial importance seem to be overlooked, first, +that adaptation is itself metaphysical in character, and secondly, that +while knowledge may be functional and judgment instrumental, the +character of the functioning has the character of knowledge, which sets +it off sharply from all other functions. + +It seems strange to me that the admission that knowledge is a matter of +adaptation, and thus a relative matter, should, in these days, be +regarded as in any way destroying the claims of knowledge to +metaphysical certainty. Yet, somehow, the opinion widely prevails that +the doctrine of relativity necessarily involves the surrender of +anything like absolute truth. "All our knowledge is relative, and, +therefore, only partial, incomplete, and but practically trustworthy," +is a statement repeatedly made. The fact that, if our development had +been different, our knowledge would have been different, is taken to +involve the conclusion that our knowledge cannot possibly disclose the +real constitution of things, that it is essentially conditional, that it +is only a mental device for getting results, that any other system of +knowledge which would get results equally well would be equally true; in +short, that there can be no such thing as metaphysical or +epistemological truth. These conclusions do indeed seem strange, and +especially strange on the basis of evolution. For while the evolutionary +process might, conceivably, have been different, its results are, in any +case, the results of the process. They are not arbitrary. We might have +digested without stomachs, but the fact that we use stomachs in this +important process ought not to free us from metaphysical respect for the +organ. As M. Rey suggests, in the _Revue Philosophique_ for June, 1904, +a creature without the sense of smell would have no geometry, but that +does not make geometry essentially hypothetical, a mere mental +construction; for we have geometry because of the working out of +nature's laws. Indeed, instead of issuing in a relativistic metaphysics +of knowledge, the doctrine of relativity should issue in the recognition +of the finality of knowledge in every case of ascertainably complete +adaptation. In other words, adaptation is itself metaphysical in +character. Adjustment is always adjustment between things, and yields +only what it does yield. The things or elements get into the state which +is their adjustment, and this adjustment purports to be their actual and +unequivocal ordering in relation to one another. Different conditions +might have produced a different ordering, but, again, this ordering +would be equally actual and unequivocal, equally the _one_ ordering to +issue from them. To suppose or admit that the course of events might +have been and might be different is not at all to suppose or admit that +it was or is different; it is, rather, to suppose and admit that we have +real knowledge of what that course really was and is. This seems to be +very obvious. + +Yet the evolutionist often thinks that he is not a metaphysician, even +when he brings all his conceptions systematically under the conception +of evolution. This must be due to some temporary lack of clearness. If +evolution is not a metaphysical doctrine when extended to apply to all +science, all morality, all logic, in short, all things, then it is quite +meaningless for evolutionists to pronounce a metaphysical sentence on +logical processes. But if evolution is a metaphysics, then its sentence +is metaphysical, and in every case of adjustment or adaptation we have a +revelation of the nature of reality in a definite and unequivocal form. +This conclusion applies to logical processes as well as to others. The +recognition that they are vital processes can, therefore, have little +significance for these processes in their distinctive character as +logical. They are like all other vital processes in that they are vital +and subject to evolution. They are unlike all others in that thought is +unlike digestion or breathing. To regard logical processes as vital +processes does not in any way, therefore, invalidate them as logical +processes or make it superfluous to consider their claim to give us real +knowledge of a real world. Indeed, it makes such a consideration more +necessary and important. + +A second consideration overlooked by the Protagorean tendencies of the +day is that judgment, even if it is instrumental, purports to give us +knowledge, that is, it claims to reveal what is independent of the +judging process. Perhaps I ought not to say that this consideration is +overlooked, but rather that it is denied significance. It is even denied +to be essential to judgment. It is claimed that, instead of revealing +anything independent of the judging process, judgment is just the +adjustment and no more. It is a reorganization of experience, an attempt +at control. All this looks to me like a misstatement of the facts. +Judgment _claims_ to be no such thing. It does not function as such a +thing. When I make any judgment, even the simplest, I may make it as the +result of tension, because of a demand for reorganization, in order to +secure control of experience; but the judgment _means_ for me something +quite different. It means decidedly and unequivocally that in reality, +apart from the judging process, things exist and operate just as the +judgment declares. If it is claimed that this meaning is illusory, I +eagerly desire to know on what solid ground its illusoriness can be +established. When the conclusion was reached that gravitation varies +directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance, it was +doubtless reached in an evolutionary and pragmatic way; but it claimed +to disclose a fact which prevailed before the conclusion was reached, +and in spite of the conclusion. Knowledge has been born of the travail +of living, but it has been born as knowledge. + +When the knowledge character of judgment is insisted on, it seems almost +incredible that any one would think of denying or overlooking it. +Indeed, current discussions are far from clear on the subject. +Pragmatists are constantly denying that they hold the conclusions that +their critics almost unanimously draw. There is, therefore, a good deal +of confusion of thought yet to be dispelled. Yet there seems to be +current a pronounced determination to banish the epistemological problem +from logic. This is, to my mind, suspicious, even when epistemology is +defined in a way which most epistemologists would not approve. It is +suspicious just because we must always ask eventually that most +epistemological and metaphysical question: "Is knowledge true?" To +answer, it is true when it functions in a way to satisfy the needs which +generated its activity, is, no doubt, correct, but it is by no means +adequate. The same answer can be made to the inquiry after the +efficiency of any vital process whatever, and is, therefore, not +distinctive. We have still to inquire into the specific character of the +needs which originate judgments and of the consequent satisfaction. Just +here is where the uniqueness of the logical problem is disclosed. With +conscious beings, the success of the things they do has become +increasingly dependent on their ability to discover what takes place in +independence of the knowing process. That is the need which generates +judgment. The satisfaction is, of course, the attainment of the +discovery. Now to make the judgment itself and not the consequent action +the instrumental factor seems to me to misstate the facts of the case. +Nothing is clearer than that there is no necessity for knowledge to +issue in adjustment. And it is clear to me that increased control of +experience, while resulting from knowledge, does not give to it its +character. Omniscience could idly view the transformations of reality +and yet remain omniscient. Knowledge works, but it is not, therefore, +knowledge. + +These considerations have peculiar force when applied to that branch of +knowledge which is knowledge itself. Is the biological account of +knowledge correct? That question we must evidently ask, especially when +we are urged to accept the account. Can we, to put the question in its +most general form, accept as an adequate account of the logical process +a theory which is bound up with some other specific department of human +knowledge? It seems to me that we cannot. Here we must be +epistemologists and metaphysicians, or give up the problem entirely. +This by no means involves the attempt to conceive pure thought set over +against pure reality--the kind of epistemology and metaphysics justly +ridiculed by the pragmatist--for knowledge, as already stated, is given +to us in concrete instances. How knowledge in general is possible is, +therefore, as useless and meaningless a question as how reality in +general is possible. The knowledge is given as a fact of life, and what +we have to determine is not its non-logical antecedents or its practical +consequences, but its constitution as knowledge and its validity. It may +be admitted that the question of validity is settled pragmatically. No +knowledge is true unless it yields results which can be verified, unless +it _can_ issue in increased control of experience. But I insist again +that that fact is not sufficient for an account of what knowledge claims +to be. It claims to issue in control because it is true in independence +of the control. And it is just this assurance that is needed to +distinguish knowledge from what is not knowledge. It is the necessity of +exhibiting this assurance which makes it impossible to subordinate +logical problems, and forces us at last to questions of epistemology and +metaphysics. + +As I am interested here primarily in determining the field of logic, it +is somewhat outside my province to consider the details of logical +theory. Yet the point just raised is of so much importance in connection +with the main question that I venture the following general +considerations. This is, perhaps, the more necessary because the +pragmatic doctrine finds in the concession made regarding the test of +validity one of its strongest defenses. + +Of course a judgment is not true simply because it is a judgment. It may +be false. The only way to settle its validity is to discover whether +experience actually provides what the judgment promises, that is, +whether the conclusions drawn from it really enable us to control +experience. No mere speculation will yield the desired result, no matter +with how much formal validity the conclusions may be drawn. That merely +formal validity is not the essential thing, I have pointed out in +discussing the relation of logic to mathematics. The test of truth is +pragmatic. It is apparent, therefore, that the formal validity does not +determine the actual validity. What is this but the statement that the +process of judgment is not itself the determining factor in its real +validity? It is, in short, only valid judgments that can really give us +control of experience. The implications taken up in the judgment must, +therefore, be real implications which, as such, have nothing to do with +the judging process, and which, most certainly, are not brought about by +it. And what is this but the claim that judgment as such is never +instrumental? In other words, a judgment which effected its own content +would only by the merest accident function as valid knowledge. We have +valid knowledge, then, only when the implications of the judgment are +found to be independent of the judging process. We have knowledge only +at the risk of error. The pragmatic test of validity, instead of proving +the instrumental character of judgment, would thus appear to prove just +the reverse. + +Valid knowledge has, therefore, for its content a system of real, not +judged or hypothetical implications. The central problem of logic which +results from this fact is not how a knowledge of real implications is +then possible, but what are the ascertainable types of real +implications. But, it may be urged, we need some criterion to determine +what a real implication is. I venture to reply that we need none, if by +such is meant anything else than the facts with which we are dealing. I +need no other criterion than the circle to determine whether its +diameters are really equal. And, in general, I need no other criterion +than the facts dealt with to determine whether they really imply what I +judge them to imply. Logic appears to me to be really as simple as this. +Yet there can be profound problems involved in the working out of this +simple procedure. There is the problem already stated of the most +general types of real implication, or, in other words, the time-honored +doctrine of categories. Whether there are categories or basal types of +existence seems to me to be ascertainable. When ascertained, it is also +possible to discover the types of inference or implication which they +afford. This is by no means the whole of logic, but it appears to me to +be its central problem. + +These considerations will, I hope, throw light on the statement that +while knowledge works, it is not therefore knowledge. It works because +its content existed before its discovery by the knowledge process, and +because its content was not effected or brought about by that process. +Judgment was the instrument of its discovery, not the instrument which +fashioned it. While, therefore, willing to admit that logical processes +are vital processes, I am not willing to admit that the problem of logic +is radically changed thereby in its formulation or solution, for the +vital processes in question have the unique character of knowledge, the +content of which is what it claims to be, a system of real implications +which existed prior to its discovery. + +In the psychological and biological tendencies in logic, there is, +however, I think, a distinct gain for logical theory. The insistence +that logical processes are both mental and vital has done much to take +them out of the transcendental aloofness from reality in which they have +often been placed, especially since Kant. So long as thought and object +were so separated that they could never be brought together, and so long +as logical processes were conceived wholly in terms of ideas set over +against objects, there was no hope of escape from the realm of pure +hypothesis and conjecture. Locke's axiom that "the mind, in all its +thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own +ideas," an axiom which Kant did so much to sanctify, and which has been +the basal principle of the greater part of modern logic and metaphysics, +is most certainly subversive of logical theory. The transition from +ideas to anything else is rendered impossible by it. Now it is just this +axiom which the biological tendencies in logic have done so much to +destroy. They have insisted, with the greatest right, that logical +processes are not set over against their content as idea against object, +as appearance against reality, but are processes of reality itself. Just +as reality can and does function in a physical or a physiological way, +so also it functions in a logical way. The state we call knowledge +becomes, thus, as much a part of the system of things as the state we +call chemical combination. The problem how thought can know anything +becomes, therefore, as irrelevant as the problem how elements can +combine at all. The recognition of this is a great gain, and the promise +of it most fruitful for both logic and metaphysics. + +But, as I have tried to point out, all this surrendering of pure thought +as opposed to pure reality, does not at all necessitate our regarding +judgment as a process which makes reality different from what it was +before. Of course there is one difference, namely, the logical one; for +reality prior to logical processes is unknown. As a result of these +processes it becomes known. These processes are, therefore, responsible +for a known as distinct from an unknown reality. But what is the +transformation which reality undergoes in becoming known? When it +becomes known that water seeks its own level, what change has taken +place in the water? It would appear that we must answer, none. The water +which seeks its own level has not been transformed into ideas or even +into a human experience. It appears to remain, as water, precisely what +it was before. The transformation which takes place, takes place in the +one who knows, a transformation from ignorance to knowledge. Psychology +and biology can afford us the natural history of this transformation, +but they cannot inform us in the least as to why it should have its +specific character. That is given and not deduced. The attempts to +deduce it have, without exception, been futile. That is why we are +forced to take it as ultimate in the same way we take as ultimate the +specific character of any definite transformation. To my mind, there is +needed a fuller and more cordial recognition of this fact. The +conditions under which we, as individuals, know are certainly +discoverable, just as much as the conditions under which we breathe or +digest. And what happens to things when we know them is also as +discoverable as what happens to them when we breathe them or digest +them. + +But here the idealist may interpose that we can never know what happens +to things when we know them, because we can never know them before they +become known. I suppose I ought to wrestle with this objection. It is an +obvious one, but, to my mind, it is without force. The objection, if +pursued, can carry us only in a circle. The problem of knowledge is +still on our hands, and every logician of whatever school, the offerer +of this objection also, has, nevertheless, attempted to show what the +transformation is that thought works, for all admit that it works some. +Are we, therefore, engaged in a hopeless task? Or have we failed to +grasp the significance of our problem? I think the latter. We fail to +recognize that, in one way or other, we do solve the problem, and that +our attempts to solve it show quite clearly that the objection under +consideration is without force. Take, for instance, any concrete case of +knowledge, the water seeking its own level, again. Follow the process of +knowledge to the fullest extent, we never find a single problem which is +not solvable by reference to the concrete things with which we are +dealing, nor a single solution which is not forced upon us by these +things rather than by the fact that we deal with them. The +transformation wrought is thus discovered, in the progress of knowledge +itself, to be wrought solely in the inquiring individual, and wrought by +repeated contact with the things with which he deals. In other words, +all knowledge discloses the fact that its content is not created by +itself, but by the things with which it is concerned. + +It is quite possible, therefore, that knowledge should be what we call +transcendent and yet not involve us in a transcendental logic. That we +should be able to know without altering the things we know is no more +and no less remarkable and mysterious than that we should be able to +digest by altering the things we digest. In other words, the fact that +digestion alters the things is no reason that knowledge should alter +them, even if we admit that logical processes are vital and subject to +evolution. Indeed, if evolution teaches us anything on this point, it is +that knowledge processes are real just as they exist, as real as growth +and digestion, and must have their character described in accordance +with what they are. The recognition that knowledge can be transcendent +and yet its processes vital seems to throw light on the difficulty +evolution has encountered in accounting for consciousness and knowledge. +All the reactions of the individual seem to be expressible in terms of +chemistry and physics without calling in consciousness as an operating +factor. What is this but the recognition of its transcendence, +especially when the conditions of conscious activity are quite likely +expressible in chemical and physical terms? While, therefore, biological +considerations result in the great gain of giving concrete reality to +the processes of knowledge, the gain is lost, if knowledge itself is +denied the transcendence which it so evidently discloses. + + +IV + +The argument advanced in this discussion has had the aim of emphasizing +the fact that in knowledge we have actually given, as content, reality +as it is in independence of the act of knowing, that the real world is +self-existent, independent of the judgments we make about it. This fact +has been emphasized in order to confine the field of logic to the field +of knowledge as thus understood. In the course of the argument, I have +occasionally indicated what some of the resulting problems of logic are. +These I wish now to state in a somewhat more systematic way. + +The basal problem of logic becomes, undoubtedly, the metaphysics of +knowledge, the determination of the nature of knowledge and its relation +to reality. It is quite evident that this is just the problem which the +current tendencies criticised have sought, not to solve, but to avoid or +set aside. Their motives for so doing have been mainly the difficulties +which have arisen from the Kantian philosophy in its development into +transcendentalism, and the desire to extend the category of evolution to +embrace the whole of reality, knowledge included. I confess to feeling +the force of these motives as strongly as any advocate of the criticised +opinions. But I do not see my way clear to satisfying them by denying or +explaining away the evident character of knowledge itself. It appears +far better to admit that a metaphysics of knowledge is as yet hopeless, +rather than so to transform knowledge as to get rid of the problem; for +we must ultimately ask after the truth of the transformation. But I am +far from believing that a metaphysics of knowledge is hopeless. The +biological tendencies themselves seem to furnish us with much material +for at least the beginnings of one. Reality known is to be set over +against reality unknown or independent of knowledge, not as image to +original, idea to thing, phenomena to noumena, appearance to reality; +but reality as known is a new stage in the development of reality +itself. It is not an external mind which knows reality by means of its +own ideas, but reality itself becomes known through its own expanding +and readjusting processes. So far I am in entire agreement with the +tendencies I have criticised. But what change is effected by this +expansion and readjustment? I can find no other answer than this simple +one: the change to knowledge. And by this I mean to assert unequivocally +that the addition of knowledge to a reality hitherto without it is +simply an addition to it and not a transformation of it. Such a view may +appear to make knowledge a wholly useless addition, but I see no +inherent necessity in such a conclusion. Nor do I see any inherent +necessity of supposing that knowledge must be a useful addition. Yet I +would not be so foolish as to deny the usefulness of knowledge. We have, +of course, the most palpable evidences of its use. As we examine them, I +think we find, without exception, that knowledge is useful just in +proportion as we find that reality is not transformed by being known. If +it really were transformed in that process, could anything else than +confusion result from the multitude of knowing individuals? + +To me, therefore, the metaphysics of the situation resolves itself into +the realistic position that a developing reality develops, under +ascertainable conditions, into a known reality without undergoing any +other transformation, and that this new stage marks an advance in the +efficiency of reality in its adaptations. My confidence steadily grows +that this whole process can be scientifically worked out. It is +impossible here to justify my confidence in detail, and I must leave the +matter with the following suggestion. The point from which knowledge +starts and to which it ultimately returns is always some portion of +reality where there is consciousness, the things, namely, which, we are +wont to say, are in consciousness. These things are not ideas +representing other things outside of consciousness, but real things, +which, by being in consciousness, have the capacity of representing +_each other_, of standing for or implying each other. Knowledge is not +the creation of these implications, but their successful +systematization. It will be found, I think, that this general statement +is true of every concrete case of knowledge which we possess. Its +detailed working out would be a metaphysics of knowledge, an +epistemology. + +Since knowledge is the successful systematization of the implications +which are disclosed in things by virtue of consciousness, a second +logical problem of fundamental importance is the determination of the +most general types of implication with the categories which underlie +them. The execution of this problem would naturally involve, as +subsidiary, the greater part of formal and symbolic logic. Indeed, vital +doctrines of the syllogism, of definition, of formal inference, of the +calculus of classes and propositions, of the logic of relations, appear +to be bound up ultimately with a doctrine of categories; for it is only +a recognition of basal types of existence with their implications that +can save these doctrines from mere formalism. These types of existence +or categories are not to be regarded as free creations or as the +contributions of the mind to experience. There is no deduction of them +possible. They must be discovered in the actual progress of knowledge +itself, and I see no reason to suppose that their number is necessarily +fixed, or that we should necessarily be in possession of all of them. It +is requisite, however, that in every case categories should be incapable +of reduction to each other. + +A doctrine of categories seems to me to be of the greatest importance in +the systematization of knowledge, for no problem of relation is even +stateable correctly before the type of existence to which its terms +belong has been first determined. I submit one illustration to reinforce +this general statement, namely, the relation of mind to body. If mind +and body belong to the same type of existence, we have one set of +problems on our hands; but if they do not, we have an entirely different +set. Yet volumes of discussion written on this subject have abounded in +confusion, simply because they have regarded mind and body as belonging +to radically different types of existence and yet related in terms of +the type to which one of them belongs. The doctrine of parallelism is, +perhaps, the epitome of this confusion. + +The doctrine of categories will involve not only the greater part of +formal and symbolic logic, but will undoubtedly carry the logician into +the doctrine of method. Here it is to be hoped that recent tendencies +will result in effectively breaking down the artificial distinctions +which have prevailed between deduction and induction. Differences in +method do not result from differences in points of departure, or between +the universal and the particular, but from the categories, again, which +give the method direction and aim, and result in different types of +synthesis. In this direction, the logician may hope for an approximately +correct classification of the various departments of knowledge. Such a +classification is, perhaps, the ideal of logical theory. + + + + +SECTION D--METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE + + + + +SECTION D--METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE + +(_Hall 6, September 22, 3 p. m._) + + CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES E. CREIGHTON, Cornell University. + SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM OSTWALD, University of Leipzig. + PROFESSOR BENNO ERDMANN, University of Bonn. + SECRETARY: DR. R. B. PERRY, Harvard University. + + + + +ON THE THEORY OF SCIENCE + +BY WILHELM OSTWALD + +(_Translated from the German by Dr. R. M. Yerkes, Harvard University_) + + [Wilhelm Ostwald, Professor of Physical Chemistry, + University of Leipzig, since 1887. b. September 2, 1853, + Riga, Russia. Grad. Candidate Chemistry, 1877; Master + Chemistry, 1878; Doctor Chemistry, Dorpat. Dr. Hon. Halle + and Cambridge; Privy Councilor; Assistant, Dorpat, 1875-81; + Regular Professor, Riga 1881-87. Member various learned and + scientific societies. Author of _Manual of General + Chemistry_; _Electro Chemistry_; _Foundation of Inorganic + Chemistry_; _Lectures on Philosophy of Nature_; _Artist's + Letters_; _Essays and Lectures_; and many other noted works + and papers on Chemistry and Philosophy.] + + +One of the few points on which the philosophy of to-day is united is the +knowledge that the only thing completely certain and undoubted for each +one is the content of his own consciousness; and here the certainty is +to be ascribed not to the content of consciousness in general, but only +to the momentary content. + +This momentary content we divide into two large groups, which we refer +to the inner and outer world. If we call any kind of content of +consciousness an experience, then we ascribe to the outer world such +experiences as arise without the activity of our will and cannot be +called forth by its activity alone. Such experiences never arise without +the activity of certain parts of our body, which we call sense organs. +In other words, the outer world is that which reaches our consciousness +through the senses. + +On the other hand, we ascribe to our inner world all experiences which +arise without the immediate assistance of a sense organ. Here, first of +all, belong all experiences which we call remembering and thinking. An +exact and complete differentiation of the two territories is not +intended here, for our purpose does not demand that this task be +undertaken. For this purpose the general orientation in which every one +recognizes familiar facts of his consciousness is sufficient. + +Each experience has the characteristic of uniqueness. None of us doubts +that the expression of the poet "Everything is only repeated in life" is +really just the opposite of the truth, and that in fact nothing is +repeated in life. But to express such a judgment we must be in position +to compare different experiences with each other, and this possibility +rests upon a fundamental phenomenon of our consciousness, memory. Memory +alone enables us to put various experiences in relation to each other, +so that the question as to their likeness or difference can be asked. + +We find the simpler relations here in the inner experiences. A certain +thought, such as twice two is four, I can bring up in my consciousness +as often as I wish, and in addition to the content of the thought I +experience the further consciousness that I have already had this +thought before, that it is familiar to me. + +A similar but somewhat more complex phenomenon appears in the +experiences in which the outer world takes part. After I have eaten an +apple, I can repeat the experience in two ways. First, as an inner +experience, I can remember that I have eaten the apple and by an effort +of my will I can re-create in myself, although with diminished strength +and intensity, a part of the former experience--the part which belonged +to my inner world. Another part, the sense impression which belonged to +that experience, I cannot re-create by an effort of my will, but I must +again eat an apple in order to have a similar experience of this sort. +This is a complete repetition of the experience to which the external +world also contributes. Such a repetition does not depend altogether on +my own powers, for it is necessary that I have an apple, that is, that +certain conditions which are independent of me and belong to the outer +world be fulfilled. + +Whether the outer world takes part in the repetition of an experience or +not has no influence upon the possibility of the content of +consciousness which we call memory. From this it follows that this +content depends upon the inner experience alone, and that we remember an +external event only by means of its inner constituents. The mere +repetition of corresponding sense impressions is not sufficient for +this, for we can see the same person repeatedly without recognizing him, +if the inner accompanying phenomena were so insignificant, as a result +of lack of interest, that their repetition does not produce the content +of consciousness known as memory. If we see him quite frequently, the +frequent repetition of the external impression finally causes the memory +of the corresponding inner experience. + +From this it results that for the "memory"-reaction a certain intensity +of the inner experience is necessary. This threshold can be attained +either at once or by continued repetition. The repetitions are the more +effective the more rapidly they follow each other. From this we may +conclude that the memory-value of an experience, or its capacity for +calling forth the "memory"-reaction by repetition, decreases with the +lapse of time. Further, we must consider the fact mentioned above, that +an experience is never exactly repeated, and that therefore the +"memory"-reaction occurs even where there is only resemblance or partial +agreement in place of complete agreement. Here, too, there are different +degrees; memory takes place more easily the more perfectly the two +experiences agree, and _vice versa_. + +If we look at these phenomena from the physiological side, we may say we +have two kinds of apparatus or organs, one of which does not depend upon +our will, whereas the other does. The former are the sense organs. The +latter constitutes the organ of thought. Only the activities of the +latter constitute our experiences or the content of our consciousness. + +The activities of the former may call forth the corresponding processes +of the latter, but this is not always necessary. Our sense organs can be +influenced without our "noticing" it, that is, without the thinking +apparatus being involved. An especially important reaction of the +thinking apparatus is memory, that is, the consciousness that an +experience which we have just had possesses more or less agreement with +former experiences. With reference to the organ of thought, it is the +expression of the general physiological fact that every process +influences the organ in such a way that it has a different relation to +the repetition of this process, from the first time, and moreover that +the repetition is rendered easier. This influence decreases with time. + +It is chiefly upon these phenomena that experience rests. Experience +results from the fact that all events consist of a complete series of +simultaneous and successive components. When a connection between some +of those parts has become familiar to us by the repetition of similar +occurrences (for instance, the succession of day and night), we do not +feel such an occurrence as something completely new, but as something +partially familiar, and the single parts or phases of it do not surprise +us, but rather we anticipate their coming or expect them. From +expectation to prediction is only a short step, and so experience +enables us to prophesy the future from the past and present. + +Now this is also the road to science: for science is nothing but +systematized experience, that is, experience reduced to its simplest and +clearest forms. Its purposes to predict from a part of a phenomenon +which is known another part which is not yet known. Here it may be a +question of spatial as well as of temporal phenomena. Thus the +scientific zoölogist knows how to "determine," that is, to tell, from +the skull of an animal, the nature of the other parts of the animal to +which the skull belongs; likewise the astronomer is able to indicate the +future, situation of a planet from a few observations of its present +situation; and the more exact the first observations were, the more +distant the future for which he can predict. All such scientific +predictions are limited, therefore, with reference to their number and +their accuracy. If the skull shown to the zoölogist is that of a +chicken, then he will probably be able to indicate the general +characteristics of chickens, and also perhaps whether the chicken had a +top-knot or not; but not its color, and only uncertainly its age and its +size. Both facts, the possibility of prediction and its limitation in +content and amount, are an expression for the two fundamental facts, +that among our experiences there is similarity, but not complete +agreement. + +The foregoing considerations deserve to be discussed and extended in +several directions. First, the objection will be made that a chicken or +a planet is not an experience; we call them rather by the most general +name of thing. But our knowledge of the chicken begins with the +experiencing of certain visual impressions, to which are added, perhaps, +certain impressions of hearing and touch. The sight impressions (to +discuss these first) by no means completely agree. We see the chicken +large or small, according to the distance; and according to its position +and movement its outline is very different. As we have seen, however, +these differences are continually grading into one other and do not +reach beyond certain limits; we neglect to observe them and rest +contented with the fact that certain other peculiarities (legs, wings, +eyes, bill, comb, etc.) remain and do not change. The constant +properties we group together as a thing, and the changing ones we call +the states of this thing. Among the changing properties, we distinguish +further those which depend upon us (for example, the distance) and those +upon which we have no immediate influence (for instance, the position or +motion): the first is called the subjective changeable part of our +experience, while the second is called the objective mutability of the +thing. + +This omission of both the subjectively and objectively changeable +portion of the experience in connection with the retention of the +constant portion and the gathering together of the latter into a unity +is one of the most important operations which we perform with our +experiences. We call it the process of abstraction, and its product, the +permanent unity, we call a concept. Plainly this procedure contains +arbitrary as well as necessary factors. Arbitrary or accidental is the +circumstance that quite different phases of a given experience come to +consciousness according to our attention, the amount of practice we have +had, indeed according to our whole intellectual nature. We may overlook +constant factors and attend to changeable ones. The objective factors, +however, become necessary as soon as we have noticed them; after we have +seen that the chicken is black, it is not in our power to see it red. +Accordingly, in general, our knowledge of that which agrees must be less +than it actually could be, since we have not been able to observe every +agreement, and our concept is always poorer in constituents at any given +time than it might be. To seek out such elements of concepts as have +been overlooked, and to prove that they are necessary factors of the +corresponding experiences, is one of the never-ending tasks of science. +The other case, namely, that elements have been received in the concept +which do not prove to be constant, also happens, and leads to another +task. One can then leave that element out of the concept, if further +experiences show that the other elements are found in them, or one can +form a new concept which contains the former elements, leaving out those +that have been recognized as unessential. For a long time the white +color belonged to the concept swan. When the Dutch black swans became +known, it was possible either to drop the element white from the concept +swan (as actually happened), or to make a new concept for the bird which +is similar to the swan but black. Which choice is made in a given case +is largely arbitrary, and is determined by considerations of expediency. + +Into the formation of concepts, therefore, two factors are operative, an +objective empirical factor, and a subjective or purposive factor. The +fitness of a concept is seen in relation to its purpose, which we shall +now consider. + +The purpose of a concept is its use for prediction. The old logic set up +the syllogism as the type of thought-activity, and its simplest example +is the well-known + + All men are mortal, + Caius is a man, + Therefore Caius is mortal. + +In general, the scheme runs + + To the concept M belongs the element B, + C belongs under the concept M, + Therefore the element B is found in C. + +One can say that this method of reasoning is in regular use even to this +day. It must be added, however, that this use is of a quite different +nature from that of the ancients. Whereas formerly the setting up of the +first proposition or the major premise was considered the most important +thing, and the establishment of the second proposition or minor premise +was thought to be a rather trifling matter, now the relation is +reversed. The major premise contains the description of a concept, the +minor makes the assertion that a certain thing belongs under this +concept. What right exists for such an assertion? The most palpable +reply would be, since all the elements of the concept M (including B) +are found in C, C belongs under the concept M. Such a conclusion would +indeed be binding, but at the same time quite worthless, for it only +repeats the minor premise. Actually the method of reasoning is +essentially different, for the minor premise is not obtained by showing +that all the elements of the concept M are found in C, but only some of +them. The conclusion is not necessary, but only probable, and the whole +process of reasoning runs: Certain elements are frequently found +together, therefore they are united in the concept M. Certain of these +elements are recognized in the thing C, therefore probably the other +elements of the concept M will be found in C. + +The old logic, also, was familiar with this kind of conclusion. It was +branded, however, as the worst of all, by the name of incomplete +induction, since the absolute certainty demanded of the syllogism did +not belong to its results. One must admit, however, that the whole of +modern science makes use of no other form of reasoning than incomplete +induction, for it alone admits of a prediction, that is, an indication +of relations which have not been immediately observed. + +How does science get along with the defective certainty of this process +of reasoning? The answer is, that the probability of the conclusion can +run through all degrees from mere conjecture to the maximum probability, +which is practically indistinguishable from certainty. The probability +is the greater the more frequently an incomplete induction of this kind +has proven correct in later experience. Accordingly we have at our +command a number of expressions which in their simplest and most general +form have the appearance: If an element A is met within a thing, then +the element B is also found in it (in spatial or temporal relationship). + +If the relation is temporal, this general statement is known by some +such name as the law of causality. If it is spatial, one talks of the +idea (in the Platonic sense), or the type of the thing, of substance, +etc. + +From the considerations here presented we get an easy answer to many +questions which are frequently discussed in very different senses. +First, the question concerning the general validity of the law of +causality. All attempts to prove such a validity have failed, and there +has remained only the indication that without this law we should feel an +unbearable uncertainty in reference to the world. From this, however, we +see very plainly that here it is merely a question of expediency. From +the continuous flux of our experiences we hunt out those groups which +can always be found again, in order to be able to conclude that if the +element A is given, the element B will be present. We do not find this +relationship as "given," but we put it into our experiences, in that we +consider the parts which correspond to the relationship as belonging +together. + +The very same thing may be said of spatial complexes. Such factors as +are always, or at any rate often, found together are taken by us as +"belonging together," and out of them a concept is formed which embraces +these factors. A question as to the why has here, as with the temporal +complexes, no definite meaning. There are countless things that happen +together once to which we pay no attention because they happen only once +or but seldom. The knowledge of the fact that such a single concurrence +exists amounts to nothing, since from the presence of one factor it does +not lead to a conclusion as to the presence of another, and therefore +does not make possible prediction. Of all the possible, and even actual +combinations, only those interest us which are repeated, and this +arbitrary but expedient selection produces the impression that the world +consists only of combinations that can be repeated; that, in other +words, the law of causality or of the type is a general one. However +general or limited application those laws have, is more a question of +our skill in finding the constant combinations among those that are +present than a question of objective natural fact. + +Thus we see the development and pursuit of all sciences going on in such +a way that on the one hand more and more constant combinations are +discovered, and on the other hand more inclusive relations of this kind +are found out, by means of which elements are united with each other +which before no one had even tried to bring together. So sciences are +increasing both in the sense of an increasing complication and in an +increasing unification. + +If we consider from this standpoint the development and procedure of the +various sciences, we find a rational division of the sum total of +science in the question as to the scope and multiplicity of the +combinations or groups treated of in them. These two properties are in a +certain sense antithetical. The simpler a complex is, that is, the fewer +elements brought together in it, the more frequently it is met with, and +_vice versa_. One can therefore arrange all the sciences in such a way +that one begins with the least multiplicity and the greatest scope, and +ends with the greatest multiplicity and the least scope. The first +science will be the most general, and will therefore contain the most +general and therefore the most barren concepts; the last will contain +the most specific and therefore the richest. + +What are these limiting concepts? The most general is the concept of +_thing_, that is, any piece of experience, seized arbitrarily from the +flux of our experiences, which can be repeated. The most specific and +richest is the concept of _human intercourse_. Between the science of +things and the science of human intercourse, all the other sciences are +found arranged in regular gradation. If one follows out the scheme the +following outline results: + + 1. Theory of order. } + 2. Theory of numbers, or arithmetic. } Mathematics. + 3. Theory of time. } + 4. Theory of space, or geometry. } + 5. Mechanics. } + 6. Physics. } Energetics. + 7. Chemistry. } + 8. Physiology. } + 9. Psychology. } Biology. + 10. Sociology. } + +This table is arbitrary in so far as the grades assumed can be increased +or diminished according to need. For example, mechanics and physics +could be taken together; or between physics and chemistry, physical +chemistry could be inserted. Likewise between physiology and psychology, +anthropology might find a place; or the first five sciences might be +united under mathematics. How one makes these divisions is entirely a +practical question, which will be answered at any time in accordance +with the purposes of division; and dispute concerning the matter is +almost useless. + +I should like, however, to call attention to the three great groups of +mathematics, energetics, and biology (in the wider sense). They +represent the decisive regulative thought which humanity has evolved, +contributed up to this time, toward the scientific mastery of its +experiences. Arrangement is the fundamental thought of mathematics. From +mechanics to chemistry the concept of energy is the most important; and +for the last three sciences it is the concept of life. Mathematics, +energetics, and biology, therefore, embrace the totality of the +sciences. + +Before we enter upon the closer consideration of these sciences, it will +be well to anticipate another objection which can be raised on the basis +of the following fact. Besides the sciences named (and those which lie +between them) there are many others, as geology, history, medicine, +philology, which we find difficulty in arranging in the above scheme, +which must, however, be taken into consideration in some way or other. +They are often characterized by the fact that they stand in relation +with several of the sciences named, but even more by the following +circumstance. Their task is not, as is true of the pure sciences above +named, the discovery of general relationships, but they relate rather to +existing complex objects whose origin, scope, extent, etc., in short, +whose temporal and spatial relationships they have to discover or to +"explain." For this purpose they make use of relations which are placed +at their disposal by the first-named pure sciences. These sciences, +therefore, had better be called applied sciences. However, in this +connection we should not think only or even chiefly of technical +applications; rather the expression is used to indicate that the +reciprocal relations of the parts of an object are to be called to mind +by the application of the general rules found in pure science. + +While in such a task the abstraction process of pure science is not +applicable (for the omission of certain parts and the concentration upon +others which is characteristic of these is excluded by the nature of the +task), yet in a given case usually the necessity of bringing in various +pure sciences for the purpose of explanation is evident. + +Astronomy is one of these applied sciences. Primarily it rests upon +mechanics, and in its instrumental portion, upon optics; in its present +development on the spectroscopic side, however, it borrows considerably +of chemistry. In like manner history is applied sociology and +psychology. Medicine makes use of all the sciences before mentioned, up +to psychology, etc. + +It is important to get clearly in mind the nature of these sciences, +since, on account of their compound nature, they resist arrangement +amongst the pure sciences, while, on account of their practical +significance, they still demand consideration. The latter fact gives +them also a sort of arbitrary or accidental character, since their +development is largely conditioned by the special needs of the time. +Their number, speaking in general, is very large, since each pure +science may be turned into an applied science in various ways; and since +in addition we have combinations of two, three, or more sciences. +Moreover, the method of procedure in the applied sciences is +fundamentally different from that in the pure sciences. In the first it +is a question of the greatest possible analysis of a single given +complex into its scientifically comprehensible parts; while pure +science, on the other hand, considers many complexes together in order +to separate out from them their common element, but expressly disclaims +the complete analysis of a single complex. + +In scientific work, as it appears in practice, pure and applied science +are by no means sharply separated. On the one hand the auxiliaries of +investigations, such as apparatus, books, etc., demand of the pure +investigator knowledge and application in applied science; and, on the +other hand, the applied scientist is frequently unable to accomplish his +task unless he himself becomes for the time being a pure investigator +and ascertains or discovers the missing general relationships which he +needs for his task. A separation and differentiation of the two forms of +science was necessary, however, since the method and the aim of each +present essential differences. + +In order to consider the method of procedure of pure science more +carefully, let us turn back to the table on pages 339, 340, and attend +to the single sciences separately. The theory of arrangement was +mentioned first, although this place is usually assigned to mathematics. +However, mathematics has to do with the concepts of number and magnitude +as fundamentals, while the theory of arrangement does not make use of +these. Here the fundamental concept is rather the thing or object of +which nothing more is demanded or considered than that it is a fragment +of our experience which can be isolated and will remain so. It must not +be an arbitrary combination; such a thing would have only momentary +duration, and the task of science, to learn the unknown from the given, +could not find application. Rather must this element have such a nature +that it can be characterized and recognized again, that is, it must +already have a conceptual nature. Therefore only parts of our experience +which can be repeated (which alone can be objects of science) can be +characterized as things or objects. But in saying this we have said all +that was demanded of them. In other respects they may be just as +different as is conceivable. + +If the question is asked, What can be said scientifically about +indefinite things of this sort? it is especially the relations of +arrangement and association which yield an answer. If we call any +definite combination of such things a group, we can arrange such a group +in different ways, that is, we can determine for each thing the relation +in which it is to stand to the neighboring thing. From every such +arrangement result not only the relationships indicated, but a great +number of new ones, and it appears that when the first relationships are +given the others always follow in like manner. This, however, is the +type of the scientific proposition or natural law (page 335). From the +presence of certain relations of arrangement we can deduce the presence +of others which we have not yet demonstrated. + +To illustrate this fact by an example, let us think of the things +arranged in a simple row, while we choose one thing as a first member +and associate another with it as following it; with the latter another +is associated, etc. Thereby the position of each thing in the row is +determined only in relation to the immediately preceding thing. +Nevertheless, the position of every member in the whole row, and +therefore its relation to every other member, is determined by this. +This is seen in a number of special laws. If we differentiate former and +latter members we can formulate the proposition, among others, if B is a +later member with reference to A, and C with reference to B, then C is +also a later member with reference to A. + +The correctness and validity of this proposition seems to us beyond all +doubt. But this is only a result of the fact that we are able to +demonstrate it very easily in countless single cases, and have so +demonstrated it. We know only cases which correspond to the proposition, +and have never experienced a contradictory case. To call such a +proposition, however, a necessity of thinking, does not appear to me +correct. For the expression necessity of thinking can only rest upon the +fact that every time the proposition is thought, that is, every time one +remembers its demonstration, its confirmation always arises. But every +sort of false proposition is also thinkable. An undeniable proof of this +is the fact that so much which is false is actually thought. But to base +the proof for the correctness of a proposition upon the impossibility of +thinking its opposite is an impossible undertaking, because every sort +of nonsense can be thought: where the proof was thought to have been +given, there has always been a confusion of thought and intuition, proof +or inspection. + +With this one proposition of course the theory of order is not +exhausted, for here it is not a question of the development of this +theory, but of an example of the nature of the problems of science. Of +the further questions we shall briefly discuss the problem of +association. + +If we have two groups A and B given, one can associate with every member +of A one of B; that is, we determine that certain operations which can +be carried on with the members of A are also to be carried on with those +of B. Now we can begin by simply carrying out the association, member +for member. Then we shall have one of three results: A will be exhausted +while there are still members of B left, or B will be exhausted first, +or finally A and B will be exhausted at the same time. In the first case +we call A poorer than B; in the second B poorer than A; in the third +both quantities are alike. + +Here for the first time we come upon the scientific concept of equality, +which calls for discussion. There can be no question of a complete +identity of the two groups which have been denominated equal, for we +have made the assumption that the members of both groups can be of any +nature whatever. They can then be as different as possible, considered +singly, but they are alike as groups. However I may arrange the members +of A, I can make a similar arrangement of the members of B, since every +member of A has one of B associated with it; and with reference to the +property of arrangement there is no difference to be observed between A +and B. If, however, A is poorer or richer than B, this possibility +ceases, for then one of the groups has members to which none of the +members in the other group corresponds; so that the operations carried +out with these members cannot be carried out with those of the other +group. + +Equality in the scientific sense, therefore, means equivalence, or the +possibility of substitution in quite definite operations or for quite +definite relations. Beyond this the things which are called like may +show any differences whatever. The general scientific process of +abstraction is again easily seen in this special case. + +On the basis of the definitions just given, we can establish further +propositions. If group A equals B, and B equals C, then A also equals C. +The proof of this is that we can relate every member of A to a +corresponding member of B and by hypothesis no member will be left. Then +C is arranged with reference to B, and here also no member is left. By +this process every member of A, through the connecting link of a member +of B, is associated with a member of C, and this association is +preserved even if we cut out the group B. Therefore A and C are equal. +The same process of reasoning can be carried out for any number of +groups. + +Likewise it can be demonstrated that if A is poorer than B and B poorer +than C, then A is also poorer than C. For in the association of B with A +some members of B are left over by hypothesis, and likewise some members +of C are left over if one associates C with B. Therefore in the +association of C with A, not only those members are left over which +could not be associated with B, but also those members of C which extend +beyond B. This proposition can be extended to any number of groups, and +permits the arrangement of a number of different groups in a simple +series by beginning with the poorest and choosing each following so that +it is richer than the preceding but poorer than the following. From the +proposition just established, it follows that every group is so arranged +with reference to all other groups that it is richer than all the +preceding and poorer than all the following.[3] + + [Footnote 3: Equal groups cannot be distinguished here, and + therefore represent only a group.] + +In this derivation of scientific proposition or laws of the simplest +kinds, the process of derivation and the nature of the result becomes +particularly clear. We arrive at such a proposition by performing an +operation and expressing the result of it. This expression enables us to +avoid the repetition of the operation in the future, since in accordance +with the law we can indicate the result immediately. Thus an +abbreviation and therefore, a facilitation of the problem is attained +which is the more considerable the larger the number of operations +saved. + +If we have a number of equal groups, we know by the process of +association that all of the operations with reference to arrangement +which we can perform with one of them can be performed with all the +others. It is sufficient, therefore, to determine the properties of +arrangement of one of these groups in order to know forthwith the +properties of all the others. This is an extremely important +proposition, which is continually employed for the most various +purposes. All speaking, writing, and reading rests upon the association +of thoughts with sounds and symbols, and by arranging the signs in +accordance with our thoughts we bring it to pass that our hearers or +readers think like thoughts in like order. In a similar fashion we make +use of various systems of formulæ in the different sciences, especially +in the simpler sciences; and these formulæ we correlate with phenomena +and use in place of the phenomena themselves, and can therefore derive +from them certain characteristics of phenomena without being compelled +to use the latter. The force of this process appears very strikingly in +astronomy where, by the use of definite formulæ associated with the +different heavenly bodies, we can foretell the future positions of these +bodies with a high degree of approximation. + +From the theory of order we come to the theory of number or arithmetic +by the systematic arrangement or development of an operation just +indicated (page 343). We can arrange any number of groups in such a way +that a richer always follows a poorer. But the complex obtained in this +manner is always accidental with reference to the number and the +richness of its members. A regular and complete structure of all +possible groups is evidently obtained only if we start from a group of +one member or from a simple thing, and by the addition of one member at +a time make further groups out of those that we have. Thus we obtain +different groups arranged according to an increasing richness, and since +we have advanced one member at a time, that is, made the smallest step +which is possible, we are certain that we have left out no possible +group which is poorer than the richest to which the operation has been +carried. + +This whole process is familiar; it gives the series of the positive +whole numbers, that is, the cardinal numbers. It is to be noted that the +concept of quantity has not yet been considered; what we have gained is +the concept of number. The single things or members in this number are +quite arbitrary, and especially they do not need to be alike in any +manner. Every number forms a group-type, and arithmetic or the science +of numbers has the task of investigating the properties of these +different types with reference to their division and combination. If +this is done in general form, without attention to the special amount of +the number, the corresponding science is called algebra. On the other +hand, by the application of formal rules of formation, the number system +has had one extension after another beyond the territory of its original +validity. Thus counting backward led to zero and to the negative +numbers; the inversion of involution to the imaginary numbers. For the +group-type of the positive whole numbers is the simplest but by no means +the only possible one, and for the purpose of representing other +manifolds than those which are met with in experience, these new types +have proved themselves very useful. + +At the same time the number series gives us an extremely useful type of +arrangement. In the process of arising it is already ordered, and we +make use of it for the purpose of arranging other groups. Thus, we are +accustomed to furnish the pages in a book, the seats in a theatre, and +countless other groups which we wish to make use of in any kind of order +with the signs of the number series, and thereby we make the tacit +assumption that the use of that corresponding group shall take place in +the same order as the natural numbers follow each other. The ordinal +numbers arising therefrom do not represent quantities, nor do they +represent the only possible type of arrangement, but they are again the +simplest of all. We come to the concept of magnitude only in the theory +of time and space. The theory of time has not been developed as a +special science; on the contrary, what we have to say about time first +appears in mechanics. Meantime we can present the fundamental concepts, +which arise in this connection, with reference to such well-known +characteristics of time that the lack of a special science of time is no +disadvantage. + +The first and most important characteristic of time (and of space, too) +is that it is a continuous manifold; that is, every portion of time +chosen can be divided at any place whatever. In the number series this +is not the case; it can be divided only between the single numbers. The +series one to ten has only nine places of division and no more. A +minute, or a second, on the other hand, has an unlimited number of +places of division. In other words, there is nothing in the lapse of any +time which hinders us from separating or distinguishing in thought at +any given instant the time which has elapsed till then from the +following time. It is just the same with space, except that time is a +simple manifold and space a threefold, continuous manifold. + +Nevertheless, when we measure them, we are accustomed to indicate times +and spaces with numbers. If we first examine, for example, the process +of measuring a length, it consists in our applying to the distance to be +measured a length conceived as unchangeable, the unit of measure, until +we have passed over the distance. The number of these applications gives +us the measure or magnitude of the distance. The result is that by the +indication of arbitrarily chosen points upon the continuous distance, we +place upon it an artificial discontinuity which enables us to associate +it with the discontinuous number series. + +A still further assumption, however, belongs to the concept of +measuring, namely, that the parts of the distance cut off by the unit +used as a measure be equal, and it is taken for granted that this +requirement will be fulfilled to whatever place the unit of measure is +shifted. As may be seen, this is a definition of equality carried +further than the former, for one cannot actually replace a part of the +distance by another in order to convince one's self that it has not +changed. Just as little can one assert or prove that the unit of measure +in changing its place in space remains of the same length; we can only +say that such distances as are determined by the unit of measure in +different places are declared or defined as equal. Actually, for our +eye, the unit of measure becomes smaller in perspective the farther away +from it we find ourselves. + +From this example we see again the great contribution which +arbitrariness or free choice has made to all our structure of science. +We could develop a geometry in which distances which seem subjectively +equal to our eye are called equal, and upon this assumption we would be +able to develop a self-consistent system or science. Such a geometry, +however, would have an extremely complex and impractical structure for +objective purposes (as, for example, land measurement), and so we strive +to develop a science as free as possible from subjective factors. +Historically, we have before us a process of this sort in the astronomy +of Ptolemy and that of Copernicus. The former corresponded to the +subjective appearances in the assumption that all heavenly bodies +revolved around the earth, but proved to be very complicated when +confronted with the task of mastering these movements with figures. The +latter gave up the subjective standpoint of the observer, who looked +upon himself as the centre, and attained a tremendous simplification by +placing the centre of revolution in the sun. + +A few words are to be said here about the application of arithmetic and +algebra to geometry. It is well known that under definite assumptions +(coördinates), geometrical figures can be represented by means of +algebraic formulæ, so that the geometrical properties of the figure can +be deduced from the arithmetical properties of the formulæ, and _vice +versa_. The question must be asked how such a close and univocal +relationship is possible between things of such different nature. The +answer is, that here is an especially clear case of association. The +manifold of numbers is much greater than that of surface or space, for +while the latter are determined by two or three independent +measurements, one can have any number of independent number series +working together. Therefore the manifold of numbers is arbitrarily +limited to two or three independent series, and in so far determines +their mutual relations (by means of the laws of cosine) that there +results a manifold, corresponding to the spatial, which can be +completely associated with the spatial manifold. Then we have two +manifolds of the same manifold character, and all characteristics of +arrangement and size of the one find their likeness in the other. + +This again characterizes an extremely important scientific procedure +which consists, namely, in constructing a formal manifold for the +content of experience of a certain field, to which one attributes the +same manifold character which the former possesses. Every science +reaches by this means a sort of formal language of corresponding +completeness, which depends upon how accurately the manifold character +of the object is recognized and how judiciously the formulæ have been +chosen. While in arithmetic and algebra this task has been performed +fairly well (though by no means absolutely perfectly), the chemical +formulæ, for instance, express only a relatively small part of the +manifold to be represented; and in biology as far as sociology, scarcely +the first attempts have been made in the accomplishment of this task. + +Language especially serves as such a universal manifold to represent the +manifolds of experience. As a result of its development from a time of +less culture, it has by no means sufficient regularity and completeness +to accomplish its purpose adequately and conveniently. Rather, it is +just as unsystematic as the events in the lives of single peoples have +been, and the necessity of expressing the endlessly different +particulars of daily life has only allowed it to develop so that the +correspondence between word and concept is kept rather indefinite and +changeable, according to need within somewhat wide limits. Thus all work +in those sciences which must make vital use of these means, as +especially psychology and sociology, or philosophy in general, is made +extremely difficult by the ceaseless struggle with the indefiniteness +and ambiguity of language. An improvement of this condition can be +effected only by introducing signs in place of words for the +representation of concepts, as the progress of science allows it, and +equipping these signs with the manifold which from experience belongs to +the concept. + +An intermediate position in this respect is taken by the sciences which +were indicated above as parts of energetics. In this realm there is +added to the concepts order, number, size, space, and time, a new +concept, that of energy, which finds application to every single +phenomenon in this whole field, just as do those more general concepts. +This is due to the fact that a certain quantity, which is known to us +most familiarly as mechanical work, on account of its qualitative +transformability and quantitative constancy, can be shown to be a +constituent of every physical phenomenon, that is, every phenomenon +which belongs to the field of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. In +other words, one can perfectly characterize every physical event by +indicating what amounts and kinds of energy have been present in it and +into what energies they have been transformed. Accordingly, it is +logical to designate the so-called physical phenomena as energetical. + +That such a conception is possible is now generally admitted. On the +other hand, its expediency is frequently questioned, and there is at +present so much the more reason for this because a thorough presentation +of the physical sciences in the energetical sense has not yet been made. +If one applies to this question the criterion of the scientific system +given above, the completeness of the correspondence between the +representing manifold and that to be represented, there is no doubt that +all previous systematizations in the form of hypotheses which have been +tried in these sciences are defective in this respect. Formerly, for the +purpose of representing experiences, manifolds whose character +corresponded to the character of the manifold to be represented only in +certain salient points without consideration of any rigid agreement, +indeed, even without definite question as to such an agreement, have +been employed. + +The energetical conception admits of that definiteness of representation +which the condition of science demands and renders possible. For each +special manifold character of the field a special kind of energy +presents itself: science has long distinguished mechanical, electric, +thermal, chemical, etc., energies. All of these different kinds hold +together by the law of transformation with the maintenance of the +quantitative amount, and in so far are united. On the other hand, it has +been possible to fix upon the corresponding energetical expression for +every empirically discovered manifold. As a future system of united +energetics, we have then a table of possible manifolds of which energy +is capable. In this we must keep in mind the fact that, in accordance +with the law of the conservation, energy is a necessarily positive +quantity which also is furnished with the property of unlimited +possibility of addition; therefore, every particular kind of energy must +have this character. + +The very small manifold which seems to lack this condition is much +widened by the fact that every kind of energy can be separated into two +factors, which are only subject to the limitation that their product, +the energy, fulfills the conditions mentioned while they themselves are +much freer. For example, one factor of a kind of enemy can become +negative as well as positive; it is only necessary that at the same time +the other factor should become negative, viz., positive. + +Thus it seems possible to make a table of all possible forms of energy, +by attributing all thinkable manifold characteristics to the factors of +the energy and then combining them by pairs and cutting out those +products which do not fulfill the above-mentioned conditions. For a +number of years I have tried from time to time to carry out this +programme, but I have not yet got far enough to justify publication of +the results obtained. + +If we turn to the biological sciences, in them the phenomenon of life +appears to us as new. If we stick to the observed facts, keeping +ourselves free from all hypotheses, we observe as the general +characteristics of the phenomena of life the continuous stream of energy +which courses through a relatively constant structure. Change of +substance is only a part, although a very important part, of this +stream. Especially in plants we can observe at first hand the great +importance of energy in its most incorporeal form, the sun's rays. Along +with this, self-preservation and development and reproduction, the +begetting of offspring of like nature, are characteristic. All of these +properties must be present in order that an organism may come into +existence; they must also be present if the reflecting man is to be able +by repeated experience to form a concept of any definite organism, +whether of a lion or of a mushroom. Other organisms are met with which +do not fulfill these conditions; on account of their rarity, however, +they do not lead to a species concept, but are excluded from scientific +consideration (except for special purposes) as deformities or monsters. + +While organisms usually work with kinds of energy which we know well +from the inorganic world, organs are found in the higher forms which +without doubt cause or assist transfers of energy, but we cannot yet say +definitely what particular kind of energy is active in them. These +organs are called nerves, and their function is regularly that, after +certain forms of energy have acted upon one end of them, they should act +at the other end and release the energies stored up there which then act +in their special manner. That energetical transformations also take +place in the nerve during the process of nervous transmission can be +looked upon as demonstrated. We shall thus be justified in speaking of a +nerve energy, while leaving it undecided whether there is here an energy +of a particular kind, or perhaps chemical energy, or finally a +combination of several energies. + +While these processes can be shown objectively by the stimulation of the +nerve and its corresponding releasing reaction in the end apparatus (for +instance, a muscle), we find in ourselves, connected with certain +nervous processes, a phenomenon of a new sort which we call +self-consciousness. From the agreement of our reactions with those of +other people we conclude with scientific probability that they also have +self-consciousness; and we are justified in making the same conclusion +with regard to some higher animals. How far down something similar to +this is present cannot be determined by the means at hand, since the +analogy of organization and of behavior diminishes very quickly; but the +line is probably not very long, in view of the great leap from man to +animal. Moreover, there are many reasons for the view that the gray +cortical substance in the brain, with its characteristic pyramidal cell, +is the anatomical substratum of this kind of nervous activity. + +The study of the processes of self-consciousness constitutes the chief +task of psychology. To this science belong those fields which are +generally allotted to philosophy, especially logic and epistemology, +while æsthetics, and still more ethics, are to be reckoned with the +social sciences. + +The latter have to do with living beings in so far as they can be united +in groups with common functions. Here in place of the individual mind +appears a collective mind, which owing to the adjustment of the +differences of the members of society shows simpler conditions than +that. From this comes especially the task of the historical sciences. +The happenings in the world accessible to us are conditioned partly by +physical, partly by psychological factors, and both show a temporal +mutability in one direction. Thus arises on the one hand a history of +heaven and earth, on the other hand a history of organisms up to man. + +All history has primarily the task of fixing past events through the +effects which have remained from them. Where such are not accessible, +only analogy is left, a very doubtful means for gaining a conception of +those events. But it must be kept in mind that an event which has left +no evident traces has no sort of interest for us, for our interest is +directly proportional to the amount of change which that event has +caused in what we have before us. The task of historical science is just +as little exhausted, however, with the fixing of former events as, for +instance, the task of physics with the establishment of a single fact, +as the temperature of a given place at a given time. Rather the +individual facts must serve to bring out the general characteristics of +the collective mind, and the much discussed historical laws are laws of +collective psychology. Just as physical and chemical laws are deduced in +order with their help to predict the course of future physical events +(to be called forth either experimentally or technically), so should the +historical laws contribute to the formation and control of social and +political development. We see that the great statesmen of all time have +eagerly studied history for this purpose, and from that we derive the +assurance that there are historical laws in spite of the objections of +numerous scholars. + +After this brief survey, if we look back over the road we have come, we +observe the following general facts. In every case the development of a +science consists in the formation of concepts by certain abstractions +from experience, and setting of these concepts in relation with each +other so that a systematical control of certain sides of our experience +is made possible. These relations, according to their generality and +reliability, are called rules or laws. A law is the more important the +more it definitely expresses concerning the greatest possible number of +things, and the more accurately, therefore, it enables us to predict the +future. Every law rests upon an incomplete induction, and is therefore +subject to modification by experience. From this there results a double +process in the development of science. + +First, the actual conditions are investigated to find out whether, +besides those already known, new rules or laws, that is, constant +relations between individual peculiarities, cannot be discovered between +them. This is the inductive process, and the induction is always an +incomplete one on account of the limitlessness of all possible +experience. + +Immediately the relationship found inductively is applied to cases which +have not yet been investigated. Especially such cases are investigated +as result from a combination of several inductive laws. If these are +perfectly certain, and the combination is also properly made, the result +has claim to unconditional validity. This is the limit which all +sciences are striving to reach. It has almost been reached in the +simpler sciences: in mathematics and in certain parts of mechanics. This +is called the deductive process. + +In the actual working of every science the two methods of investigation +are continually changing. The best means of finding new successful +inductions is in the making of a deduction on a very insufficient basis, +perhaps, and subsequently testing it in experience. Sometimes the +elements of his deductions do not come into the investigator's +consciousness; in such cases we speak of scientific instinct. On the +other hand we have much evidence from great mathematicians that they +were accustomed to find their general laws by the method of induction, +by trying and considering single cases; and that the deductive +derivation from other known laws is an independent operation which +sometimes does not succeed until much later. Indeed there is to-day a +number of mathematical propositions which have not yet reached the +second stage and therefore have at present a purely inductive empirical +character. The proportion of such laws in science increases very quickly +with the rise in the scale (page 339). + +Another peculiarity which may be mentioned here is that in the scale all +previous sciences have the character of applied sciences (page 341) with +reference to those which follow, since they are everywhere necessary in +the technique of the latter, yet do not serve to increase their own +field but are merely auxiliaries to the latter. + +If we ask finally what influence upon the shaping of the future such +investigations as those which have been sketched in outline above can +have, the following can be said. Up till now it has been considered a +completely uncontrollable event whether and where a great and +influential man of science has developed. It is obvious that such a man +is among the most costly treasures which a people (and, indeed, +humanity) can possess. The conscious and regular breeding of such +rarities has not been considered possible. While this is still the case +for the very exceptional genius, we see in the countries of the older +civilization, especially in Germany at present, a system of education in +vogue in the universities by which a regular harvest of young scientific +men is gained who not only have a mastery of knowledge handed down, but +also of the technique of discovery. Thereby the growth of science is +made certain and regular, and its pursuit is raised to a higher plane. +These results were formerly attained chiefly by empirically and +oftentimes by accidental processes. It is a task of scientific theory to +make this activity also regular and systematic, so that success is no +more dependent solely upon a special capacity for the founding of a +"school" but can also be attained by less original minds. By the mastery +of methods the way to considerably higher performances than he could +otherwise attain will be open for the exceptionally gifted. + + + + +THE CONTENT AND VALIDITY OF THE CAUSAL LAW + +BY BENNO ERDMANN + +(_Translated from the German by Professor Walter T. Marvin, Western +Reserve University_) + + [Benno Erdmann, Professor of Philosophy, University of Bonn, + since 1898. b. October 5, 1851, Glogau in Schlesien, + Germany. Ph.D.; Privy Councilor. Academical Lecturer, + Berlin, 1876- ; Special Professor, Kiel, 1878-79; Regular + Professor, _ibid._ 1879-84; _ibid._ Breslau, 1884-90; + _ibid._ Halle, 1890-98. Member various scientific and + learned societies. Author of _The Axioms of Geometry_; + _Kant's Criticism_; _Logic_; _Psychological Researches on + Reading_ (together with Prof. Ramon Dodge); _The Psychology + of the Child and the School_; _Historical Researches an + Kant's Prolegomena_, and many other works and papers in + Philosophy.] + + +We have learned to regard the real, which we endeavor to apprehend +scientifically in universally valid judgments, as a whole that is +connected continuously in time and in space and by causation, and that +is accordingly continuously self-evolving. This continuity of connection +has the following result, namely, every attempt to classify the sum +total of the sciences on the basis of the difference of their objects +leads merely to representative types, that is, to species which glide +into one another. We find no gaps by means of which we can separate +sharply physics and chemistry, botany and zoölogy, political and +economic history and the histories of art and religion, or, again, +history, philology, and the study of the prehistoric. + +As are the objects, so also are the methods of science. They are +separable one from another only through a division into representative +types; for the variety of these methods is dependent upon the variety of +the objects of our knowledge, and is, at the same time, determined by +the difference between the manifold forms of our thought, itself a part +of the real, with its elements also gliding into One another.[4] + + [Footnote 4: Cf. the author's "Theorie der + Typeneinteilungen," _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xxx, + Berlin, 1894.] + +The threads which join the general methodology of scientific thought +with neighboring fields of knowledge run in two main directions. In the +one direction they make up a closely packed cable, whereas in the other +their course diverges into all the dimensions of scientific thought. +That is to say, first, methodology has its roots in logic, in the +narrower sense, namely, in the science of the elementary forms of our +thought which enter into the make-up of all scientific methods. +Secondly, methodology has its source in the methods themselves which +actually, and therefore technically, develop in the various fields of +our knowledge out of the problems peculiar to those fields. + +It is the office of scientific thought to interpret validly the objects +that are presented to us in outer and inner perception, and that can be +derived from both these sources. We accomplish this interpretation +entirely through judgments and combinations of judgments of manifold +sorts. The concepts, which the older logic regarded as the true +elementary forms of our thinking, are only certain selected types of +judgment, such stereotyped judgments as those which make up definitions +and classifications, and which appear independent and fundamental +because their subject-matter, that is, their intension or extension, is +connected through the act of naming with certain words. Scientific +methods, then, are the ways and means by which our thought can +accomplish and set forth, in accordance with its ideal, this universally +valid interpretation. + +There belongs, accordingly, to methodology a list of problems which we +can divide, to be sure only _in abstracto_, into three separate groups. +First, methodology has to analyze the methods which have been +technically developed in the different fields of knowledge into the +elementary forms of our thinking from which they have been built up. +Next to this work of _analyzing_, there comes a second task which may be +called a _normative_ one; for it follows that we must set forth and +deduce systematically from their sources the nature of these manifold +elements, their resulting connection, and their validity. To these two +offices must be added a third that we may call _a potiori_ a _synthetic_ +one; for finally we must reconstruct out of the elements of our +thinking, as revealed by analysis, the methods belonging to the +different fields of knowledge and also determine their different scope +and validity. + +The beginning of another conception of the office of methodology can be +found in those thoughts which have become significant, especially in +Leibnitz's fragments and drafts of a _calculus ratiocinator_ or a +_spécieuse générale_. The foregoing discussion has set aside all hope +that these beginnings and their recent development may give, of the +possibility of constructing the manifold possible methods _a priori_, +that is, before or independent of experience. However, it remains +entirely undecided, as it should in this our preliminary account of the +office of general methodology, whether or not all methods of our +scientific thought will prove to be ultimately but branches of one and +the same universal method, a thought contained in the undertakings just +referred to. Although modern empiricism, affiliated as it is with +natural science, tends to answer this question in the affirmative even +more definitely and dogmatically than any type of the older rationalism, +still the question is one that can be decided only in the course of +methodological research. + +The conception of a methodology of scientific thought can be said to be +almost as old as scientific thought itself; for it is already contained +essentially, though undifferentiated, in the Socratic challenge of +knowledge. None the less, the history of methodology, as the history of +every other science, went through the course of which Kant has given a +classical description. "No one attempts to construct a science unless he +can base it on some idea; but in the elaboration of it the schema, nay, +even the definition which he gives in the beginning of his science, +corresponds very seldom to his idea, which, like a germ, lies hidden in +the reason, and all the parts of which are still enveloped and hardly +distinguishable even under microscopical observation."[5] + + [Footnote 5: Kant, _Kr. d. r. V._, 2d ed., p. 862.] + +We are indebted to the Greek, and especially to the +Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy for important contributions to the +understanding of the deductive method of mathematical thought. It was +precisely this trend of philosophic endeavor which, though furnishing +for the most part the foundation of methodological doctrine well on into +the seventeenth century, offered no means of differentiating the methods +that are authoritative for our knowledge of facts. What Socrates was +perhaps the first to call "induction," is essentially different, as +regards its source and aim, from the inductive methods that direct our +research in natural and mental science. For it is into these two fields +that we have to divide the totality of the sciences of facts, the +material sciences, let us call them, in opposition to the formal or +mathematical sciences,--that is, if we are to do justice to the +difference between sense and self perception, or "outer" and "inner" +perception. + +Two closely connected forces especially led astray the methodological +opinions regarding the material sciences till the end of the eighteenth +century, and in part until the beginning of the nineteenth century. We +refer, in the first place, to that direction of thought which gives us +the right to characterize the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy as a +"concept philosophy;" namely, the circumstance that Aristotelian logic +caused the "concept" to be set before the "judgment." In short, we refer +to that tendency in thought which directs the attention not to the +permanent in the world's occurrences, the uniform connections of events, +but rather to the seemingly permanent in the things, their essential +attributes or essences. Thus the concept philosophy, as a result of its +tendency to hypostasize, finds in the abstract general concepts of +things, the ideas, the eternal absolute reality that constitutes the +foundation of things and is contained in them beside the accidental and +changing properties.[6] Here we have at once the second force which +inspired the ancient methodology. These ideas, like the fundamentally +real, constitute that which ultimately alone acts in all the coming into +existence and the going out of existence of the manifold things. In the +Aristotelian theory of causation, this thought is made a principle; and +we formulate only what is contained in it, when we say that, according +to it, the efficient and at the same time final causes can be deduced +through mere analysis from the essential content of the effects; that, +in fact, the possible effects of every cause can be deduced from the +content of its definition. The conceptual determination of the causal +relation, and with it in principle the sum total of the methods in the +material sciences, becomes a logical, analytical, and deductive one. +These sciences remain entirely independent of the particular content of +experience as this broadens, and so do also the methods under +discussion. + + [Footnote 6: According to Plato, it is true, the ideas are + separated from the sensible things; they must be thought in + a conceptual place, for the space of sense perception is to + be understood as non-being, matter. The things revealed to + sense, however, occupy a middle position between being and + non-being, so that they partake of the ideas. In this sense, + the statement made above holds also of the older view of the + concept philosophy.] + +As a consequence, every essential difference between mathematical +thought and the science of causes is done away with in favor of a +rationalistic construction of the methods of material science. +Accordingly, throughout the seventeenth century, the ideal of all +scientific method becomes, not the inductive method that founded the new +epoch of the science of to-day, but the deductive mathematical method +applied to natural scientific research. The flourish of trumpets with +which Francis Bacon hailed the onslaught of the inductive methods in the +natural science of the time, helped in no way; for he failed to remodel +the traditional, Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of cause, and, +accordingly, failed to understand both the problem of induction and the +meaning of the inductive methods of the day.[7] Descartes, Hobbes, +Spinoza, and related thinkers develop their _mathesis universalis_ after +the pattern of geometrical thinking. Leibnitz tries to adapt his +_spécieuse générale_ to the thought of mathematical analysis. The old +methodological conviction gains its clear-cut expression in Spinoza's +doctrine: "_Aliquid efficitur ab aliqua re_" means "_aliquid sequitur ex +ejus definitione_." + + [Footnote 7: Cf. the articles on Francis Bacon by Chr. + Sigwart in the _Preussische Jahrbücher_, xii, 1863, and + xiii, 1864.] + +The logically straight path is seldom the one taken in the course of the +history of thought. The new formulation and solution of problems +influence us first through their evident significance and consequences, +not through the traditional presuppositions upon which they are founded. +Thus, in the middle of the seventeenth century, when insight into the +precise difference between mental and physical events gave rise to +pressing need for its definite formulation, no question arose concerning +the dogmatic presupposition of a purely logical (_analytisch_) +relationship between cause and effect; but, on the contrary, this +presupposition was then for the first time brought clearly before +consciousness. It was necessary to take the roundabout way through +occasionalism and the preëstablished harmony, including the latter's +retreat to the omnipotence of God, before it was possible to miss the +question of the validity of the presupposition that the connection +between cause and effect is analytic and rational. + +Among the leading thinkers of the period this problem was recognized as +the cardinal problem of contemporaneous philosophy. It is further +evidence how thoroughly established this problem must have been among +the more deeply conceived problems of the time in the middle of the +eighteenth century, that Hume and Kant were forced to face it, led on, +seemingly independently of each other, and surely from quite different +presuppositions and along entirely different ways. The historical +evolution of that which from the beginning has seemed to philosophy the +solving of her true problem has come to pass in a way not essentially +different from that of the historical evolution in all other departments +of human knowledge. Thus, in the last third of the seventeenth century, +Newton and Leibnitz succeeded in setting forth the elements of the +infinitesimal calculus; and, in the fifth decade of the nineteenth +century, Robert Mayer, Helmholtz, and perhaps Joule, formulated the law +of the conservation of energy. In one essential respect Hume and Kant +are agreed in the solution of the new, and hence contemporaneously +misunderstood, problem. Both realized that the connection between the +various causes and effects is not a rational analytic, but an empirical +synthetic one. However, the difference in their presuppositions as well +as method caused this common result to make its appearance in very +different light and surroundings. In Hume's empiricism the connection +between cause and effect appears as the mere empirical result of +association; whereas in Kant's rationalism this general relation between +cause and effect becomes the fundamental condition of all possible +experience, and is, as a consequence, independent of all experience. It +rests, as a means of connecting our ideas, upon an inborn uniformity of +our thought. + +Thus the way was opened for a fundamental separation of the inductive +material scientific from the deductive mathematical method. For Hume +mathematics becomes the science of the relations of ideas, as opposed to +the sciences of facts. For Kant philosophical knowledge is the knowledge +of the reason arising from concepts, whereas the mathematical is that +arising from the construction of concepts. The former, therefore, +studies the particular only in the universal; the latter, the universal +in the particular, nay, rather in the individual. + +Both solutions of the new problem which in the eighteenth century +supplant the old and seemingly self-evident presupposition, appear +accordingly embedded in the opposition between the rationalistic and +empiristic interpretation of the origin and validity of our knowledge, +the same opposition that from antiquity runs through the historical +development of philosophy in ever new digressions. + +Even to-day the question regarding the meaning and the validity of the +causal connection stands between these contrary directions of +epistemological research; and the ways leading to its answer separate +more sharply than ever before. It is therefore more pressing in our day +than it was in earlier times to find a basis upon which we may build +further epistemologically and therefore methodologically. The purpose of +the present paper is to seek such a basis for the different methods +employed in the sciences of facts. + + * * * * * + +As has already been said, the contents of our consciousness, which are +given us immediately in outer and inner perception, constitute the raw +material of the sciences of facts. From these various facts of +perception we derive the judgments through which we predict, guide, and +shape our future perception in the course of possible experience. These +judgments exist in the form of reproductive ideational processes, which, +if logically explicit, become _inductive inferences_ in the broader +sense. These inferences may be said to be of two sorts, though +fundamentally only two sides of one and the same process of thought; +they are in part analogical inferences and in part _inductive inferences +in the narrower sense_. The former infers from the particular in a +present perception, _which in previous perceptions was uniformly +connected with other particular contents of perception_, to a particular +that resembles _those other contents of perception_. In short, they are +inferences from a particular to a particular. After the manner of such +inferences we logically formulate, for example, the reproductive +processes, whose conclusions run: "This man whom I see before me, is +attentive, feels pain, will die;" "this meteor will prove to have a +chemical composition similar to known meteors, and also to have +corresponding changes on its surface as the result of its rapid passage +through our atmosphere." The inductive inferences in the narrower sense +argue, on the contrary, from the perceptions of a series of uniform +phenomena to a universal, which includes the given and likewise all +possible cases, in which a member of the particular content of the +earlier perceptions is presupposed as given. In short, they are +conclusions from a particular to a universal that is more extensive than +the sum of the given particulars. For example: "All men have minds, will +die;" "all meteoric stones will prove to have this chemical composition +and those changes of surface." + +There is no controversy regarding the inner similarity of both these +types of inference or regarding their outward structure; or, again, +regarding their outward difference from the deductive inferences, which +proceed not from a particular to a particular or general, but from a +general to a particular. + +There is, however, difference of opinion regarding their inner structure +and their inner relation to the deductive inferences. Both questions +depend upon the decision regarding the meaning and validity of the +causal relation. The contending parties are recruited essentially from +the positions of traditional empiricism and rationalism and from their +modern offshoots. + +We maintain first of all: + +1. The _presupposition_ of all inductive inferences, from now on to be +taken in their more general sense, is, that the contents of perception +are given to us _uniformly_ in repeated perceptions, that is, in uniform +components and uniform relations. + +2. The _condition_ of the validity of the inductive inferences lies in +the thoughts that _the same causes will be present_ in the unobserved +realities as in the observed ones, and that _these same causes will +bring forth the same effects_. + +3. The _conclusions_ of all inductive inferences have, logically +speaking, purely _problematic_ validity, that is, their contradictory +opposite remains equally thinkable. They are, accurately expressed, +merely _hypotheses_, whose validity needs verification through future +experience. + +The first-mentioned _presupposition_ of inductive inference must not be +misunderstood. The paradox that nothing really repeats itself, that each +stage in nature's process comes but once, is just as much and just as +little justified as the assertion, everything has already existed. It +does not deny the fact that we can discriminate in the contents of our +perceptions the uniformities of their components and relations, in +short, that similar elements are present in these ever new complexes. +This fact makes it possible that our manifold perceptions combine to +make up one continuous experience. Even our paradox presupposes that the +different contents of our perceptions are comparable with one another, +and reveal accordingly some sort of common nature. All this is not only +a matter of course for empiricism, which founds the whole constitution +of our knowledge upon habits, but must also be granted by every +rationalistic interpretation of the structure of knowledge. Every one +that is well informed knows that what we ordinarily refer to as facts +already includes a theory regarding them. Kant judges in this matter +precisely as Hume did before him and Stuart Mill after him. "If cinnabar +were sometimes red and sometimes black, sometimes light and sometimes +heavy, if a man could be changed now into this, now into another animal +shape, if on the longest day the fields were sometimes covered with +fruit, sometimes with ice and snow, the faculty of my empirical +imagination would never be in a position, when representing red color, +to think of heavy cinnabar."[8] + + [Footnote 8: Kant, _Kr. d. r. V._, 1st ed., pp. 100 f.] + +The assumption that in recurring perceptions similar elements of +content, as well as of relation, are given, is a necessary condition of +the possibility of experience itself, and accordingly of all those +processes of thought which lead us, under the guidance of previous +perceptions, from the contents of one given perception to the contents +of possible perceptions. + +A tradition from Hume down has accustomed us to associate the relation +of cause and effect not so much with the uniformity of coexistence as +with the uniformity of sequence. Let us for the present keep to this +tradition. Its first corollary is that the relation of cause and effect +is to be sought in the uninterrupted flow and connection of events and +changes. The cause becomes the uniformly preceding event, the constant +_antecedens_, the effect the uniformly following, the constant +_consequens_, in the course of the changes that are presented to +consciousness as a result of foregoing changes in our sensorium. + +According to this tradition that we have taken as our point of +departure, the uniformity of the sequence of events is a necessary +presupposition of the relation between cause and effect. This uniformity +is given us as an element of our experience; for we actually find +uniform successions in the course of the changing contents of +perception. Further, as all our perceptions are in the first instance +sense perceptions, we may call them the sensory presupposition of the +possibility of the causal relation. + +In this presupposition, however, there is much more involved than the +name just chosen would indicate. The uniformity of sequence lies, as we +saw, not in the contents of perception as such, which are immediately +given to us. It arises rather through the fact that, in the course of +repeated perceptions, we apprehend through abstraction the uniformities +of their temporal relation. Moreover, there lie in the repeated +perceptions not only uniformities of sequence, but also uniformities of +the qualitative content of the successive events themselves, and these +uniformities also must be apprehended through abstraction. Thus these +uniform contents of perception make up series of the following form: + + _a_1 --> _b_1 + _a_2 --> _b_2 + " " + " " + " " + _a_n --> _b_n + +The presupposition of the possibility of the causal relations includes, +therefore, more than mere perceptive elements. It involves the relation +of different, if you will, of peculiar contents of perception, by virtue +of which we recognize _a_2 --> _b_2 ... _a_n --> _b_n as events that +resemble one another and the event _a_1 --> _b_1 qualitatively as well +as in their sequence. There are accordingly involved in our +presupposition _reproductive_ elements which indicate the action of +memory. In order that I may in the act of perceiving _a_3 --> _b_3 +apprehend the uniformity of this present content with that of _a_2 --> +_b_2 and _a_1 --> _b_1, these earlier perceptions must in some way, +perhaps through memory,[9] be revived with the present perception. + + [Footnote 9: It is not our present concern to ascertain how + this actually happens. The psychological presuppositions of + the present paper are contained in the theory of + reproduction that I have worked out in connection with the + psychology of speech in the articles on "Die psychologischen + Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen Sprechen und Denken," + _Archiv für systematische Philosophie_, II, III, und VII; + cf. note 1, page 151.] + +In this reproduction there is still a further element, which can be +separated, to be sure only _in abstracto_, from the one just pointed +out. The present revived content, even if it is given in memory as an +independent mental state, is essentially different from the original +perception. It differs in all the modifications in which the memory of +lightning and thunder could differ from the perception of their +successive occurrence, or, again, the memory of a pain and the resulting +disturbance of attention could differ from the corresponding original +experience. However, as memory, the revived experience presents itself +as a picture of that which has been previously perceived. Especially is +this the case in memory properly so called, where the peculiar space and +time relations individualize the revived experience. If we give to this +identifying element in the associative process a logical expression, we +shall have to say that there is involved in revival, and especially in +memory, an awareness that the present ideas recall the same content that +was previously given us in perception. To be sure, the revival of the +content of previous perceptions does not have to produce ideas, let +alone memories. Rapid, transitory, or habitual revivals, stimulated by +associative processes, can remain unconscious, that is, they need not +appear as ideas or states of consciousness. Stimulation takes place, but +consciousness does not arise, provided we mean by the term +"consciousness" the genus of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions. None +the less it must not be forgotten that this awareness of the essential +identity of the present revived content with that of the previous +perception can be brought about in every such case of reproduction. How +all this takes place is not our present problem. + +We can apply to this second element in the reproductive process, which +we have found to be essential to the causal relation, a Kantian term, +"Recognition." This term, however, is to be taken only in the sense +called for by the foregoing statements; for the rationalistic +presuppositions and consequences which mark Kant's "Synthesis of +Recognition" are far removed from the present line of thought. + +We may, then, sum up our results as follows: In the presupposition of a +uniform sequence of events, which we have accepted from tradition as the +necessary condition of the possibility of the causal relation, there +lies the thought that the contents of perception given us through +repeated sense stimulation are related to one another through a +reproductive recognition. + +The assumption of such reproductive recognition is not justified merely +in the cases so far considered. It is already necessary in the course of +the individual perceptions _a_ and _b_, and hence in the apprehension of +an occurrence. It makes the sequence itself in which _a_ and _b_ are +joined possible; for in order to apprehend _b_ as following upon _a_, in +case the perception of _a_ has not persisted in its original form, _a_ +must be as far revived and recognized upon _b_'s entrance into the field +of perception as it has itself passed out of that field. Otherwise, +instead of _b_ following upon _a_ and being related to _a_, there would +be only the relationless change from _a_ to _b_. This holds generally +and not merely in the cases where the perception of _a_ has disappeared +before that of _b_ begins, for example, in the case of lightning and +thunder, or where it has in part disappeared, for example, in the +throwing of a stone. + +We have represented _a_ as an event or change, in order that uniform +sequences of events may alone come into consideration as the +presupposition of the causal relation. But every event has its course in +time, and is accordingly divisible into many, ultimately into infinitely +many, shorter events. Now if _b_ comes only an infinitely short interval +later than _a_, and by hypothesis it must come later than _a_, then a +corresponding part of _a_ must have disappeared by the time _b_ appears. +But the infinitesimal part of a perception is just as much out of all +consideration as would be an infinitely long perception; all which only +goes to show that we have to substitute intervals of finite length in +place of this purely conceptual analysis of a continuous time interval. +This leaves the foregoing discussion as it stands. If _b_ follows _a_ +after a perceptible finite interval, then the flow or development of _a_ +by the time of _b_'s appearance must have covered a course corresponding +to that interval; and all this is true even though the earlier stages of +_a_ remain unchanged throughout the interval preceding _b_'s appearance. +The present instant of flow is distinct from the one that has passed, +even though it takes place in precisely the same way. The former, not +the latter, gives the basis of relation which is here required, and +therefore the former must be reproduced and recognized. This thought +also is included in the foregoing summary of what critical analysis +shows to be involved in the presupposition of a uniform sequence. + +In all this we have already abandoned the field of mere perception which +gave us the point of departure for our analysis of uniform sequence. We +may call the changing course of perception only in the narrower meaning +the sensory presupposition of the causal relation. In order that these +changing contents of perception may be known as like one another, as +following one another, and as following one another uniformly, they must +be related to one another through a recognitive reproduction. + +Our critical analysis of uniform sequence is, however, not yet complete. +To relate to one another the contents of two ideas always requires a +process at once of identifying and of differentiating, which makes these +contents members of the relation, and which accordingly presupposes that +our attention has been directed to each of the two members as well as to +the relation itself--in the present case, to the sequence. Here we come +to another essential point. We should apply the name "thought" to every +ideational process in which attention is directed to the elements of the +mental content and which leads us to identify with one another, or to +differentiate from one another, the members of this content.[10] The act +of relating, which knows two events as similar, as following one +another, indeed, as following one another uniformly, is therefore so far +from being a sensation that it must be claimed to be an act of thinking. +The uniformity of sequence of _a_ and _b_ is therefore an act of +relating on the part of our thought, so far as this becomes possible +solely through the fact that we at one and the same time identify with +one another and differentiate from one another _a_ as cause and _b_ as +effect. We say "at one and the same time," because the terms identifying +and differentiating are correlatives which denote two different and +opposing sides of one and the same ideational process viewed logically. +Accordingly, there is here on need of emphasizing that the act of +relating, which enables us to think _a_ as cause and _b_ as effect, is +an act of thought also, because it presupposes on our part an act of +naming which raises it to being a component of our formulated and +discursive thought. We therefore _think a_ as cause and _b_ as effect in +that we apprehend the former as uniform _antecedens_ and the latter as +uniform _consequens_. + + [Footnote 10: Cf. the author's "Umrisse zur Psychologie des + Denkens," in _Philosophische Abhandlungen Chr. Sigwart ... + gewidmet_, Tübingen, 1900.] + + * * * * * + +Have we not the right, after the foregoing analysis, to interpret the +uniform sequence of events solely as the _necessary_ presupposition of +the causal relation? Is it not at the same time the _adequate_ +presupposition? Yes, is it not the causal relation itself? As we know, +empiricism since Hume has answered the last question in the affirmative, +and rationalism since Kant has answered it in the negative. + +We, too, have seemingly followed in our discussion the course of +empiricism. At least, I find nothing in that discussion which a +consistent empiricist might not be willing to concede; that is, if he is +ready to set aside the psychological investigation of the actual +processes which we here presuppose and make room for a critical analysis +of the content of the relation of cause and effect.[11] However, the +decision of the question, whether or not empiricism can determine +exhaustively the content that we think in the causal relation, depends +upon other considerations than those which we have until now been called +upon to undertake. We have so far only made clear what every critical +analysis of the causal relation has to concede to empiricism. In reality +the empiristic hypothesis is inadequate. To be sure, the proof of this +inadequacy is not to be taken from the obvious argument which Reid +raised against the empiricism of Hume, and which compelled Stuart Mill +in his criticism of that attack[12] to abandon his empiristic position +at this point. No doubt the conclusion to which we also have come for +the time being, goes much too far, the conclusion that the cause is +nothing but the uniform _antecedens_ and the effect merely the uniform +_consequens_. Were it true, as we have hitherto assumed, that every +uniformly preceding event is to be regarded as cause and every uniformly +following event as effect, then day must be looked upon as cause of +night and night as cause of day. + + [Footnote 11: The difference between the two points of view + can be made clearer by an illustration. The case that we + shall analyze is the dread of coming into contact with fire. + The psychological analysis of this case has to make clear + the mental content of the dread and its causes. Such dread + becomes possible only when we are aware of the burning that + results from contact with fire. We could have learned to be + aware of this either immediately through our own experience, + or mediately through the communication of others' + experience. In both cases it is a matter of one or repeated + experiences. In all cases the effects of earlier experiences + equal association and recall, which, in turn, result in + recognition. The recognition explaining the case under + discussion arises thus. The present stimuli of visual + perception arouse the retained impressions of previous + visual perceptions of fire and give rise to the present + perception (apperception) by fusing with them. By a process + of interweaving, associations are joined to this perception. + The apperceptively revived elements which lie at the basis + of the content of the perception are interwoven by + association with memory elements that retain the additional + contents of previous perceptions of fire, viz., the burning, + or, again, are interwoven with the memory elements of the + communications regarding such burning. By means of this + interweaving, the stimulation of the apperceptive element + transmits itself to the remaining elements of the + association complex. The character of the association is + different under different conditions. If it be founded only + upon one experience, then there can arise a memory or a + recall, in the wider sense, of the foregoing content of the + perception and feeling at the time of the burning, or, + again, there can arise a revival wherein the stimulated + elements of retention remain unconscious. Again, the words + of the mother tongue that denote the previous mental + content, and which likewise belong to the association + complex (the apperceiving mass, in the wider sense), can be + excited in one of these three forms and in addition as + abstract verbal ideas. Each one of these forms of verbal + discharge can lead to the innervations of the muscles + involved in speech, which bring about some sort of oral + expression of judgment. Each of these verbal reproductions + can be connected with each of the foregoing sensory + (_sachlichen_) revivals. Secondly, if the association be + founded upon repeated perceptions on the part of the person + himself, then all the afore-mentioned possibilities of + reproduction become more complicated, and, in addition, the + mental revivals contain, more or less, only the common + elements of the previous perceptions, _i. e._, reappear in + the form of abstract ideas or their corresponding + unconscious modifications. In the third case the association + is founded upon a communication of others' experience. For + the sake of simplicity, let this case be confined to the + following instance. The communication consisted in the + assertion: "All fire will burn upon contact." Moreover, this + judgment was expressed upon occasion of imminent danger of + burning. There can then arise, as is perhaps evident, all + the possibilities mentioned in the second case, only that + here there will be a stronger tendency toward verbal + reproduction and the sensory reproduction will be less + fixed. + + In the first two cases there was connected with the + perception of the burning an intense feeling of pain. In the + third the idea of such pain added itself to the visual + perception of the moment. The associated elements of the + earlier mental contents belong likewise to the apperceiving + mass excited at the moment, in fact to that part of it + excited by means of association processes, or, as we can + again say, depending upon the point from which we take our + view, the associative or apperceptive completion of the + content of present perception. If these pain elements are + revived as memories, _i. e._, as elements in consciousness, + they give rise to a new disagreeable feeling, which is + referred to the possible coming sensation of burning. If the + mental modifications corresponding to these pain elements + remain unconscious, as is often possible, there arises none + the less the same result as regards our feeling, only with + less intensity. This feeling tone we call the dread. + + As a result of the sum total of the revivals actual and + possible, there is finally produced, according to the + particular circumstances, either a motor reaction or an + inhibitant of such reaction. Both innervations can take + place involuntarily or voluntarily. + + The critical analysis of the fact that we dread contact with + fire, even has another purpose and accordingly proceeds on + other lines. It must make clear under what presuppositions + the foresight that lies at the basis of such dread is valid + for future experience. It must then formulate the actual + process of revival that constitutes the foundation of this + feeling as a series of judgments, from which the meaning and + interconnection of the several judgments will become clear. + Thus the critical analysis must give a logical presentation + of the apperceptive and associative processes of revival. + + For this purpose the three cases of the psychological + analysis reduce themselves to two: viz., first, to the case + in which an immediate experience forms the basis, and + secondly, to that in which a variety of similar mediately or + immediately communicated experiences form such basis. + + In the first of these logically differentiated cases, the + transformation into the speech of formulated thought leads + to the following inference from analogy: + + Fire A burned. + Fire B is similar to fire A. + ---------------------------- + Fire B will burn. + + In the second case there arises a syllogism of some such + form as: + + All fire causes burning upon contact. + This present phenomenon is fire. + -------------------------------------------------------- + This present phenomenon will cause burning upon contact. + + Both premises of this syllogism are inductive inferences, + whose implicit meaning becomes clear when we formulate as + follows: + + All heretofore investigated instances of fire have burned, + therefore all fire burns. + The present phenomenon manifests some properties of fire, + will consequently have all the properties thereof. + --------------------------------------------------------- + The present phenomenon will, in case of contact, cause burning. + + The first syllogism goes from the particular to the + particular. The second proves itself to be (contrary to the + analysis of Stuart Mill) an inference that leads from the + general to the particular. For the conclusion is the + particular of the second parts of the major and minor + premises; and these second parts of the premises are + inferred from their first parts in the two possible ways of + inductive inference. The latter do not contain the case + referred to in the conclusion, but set forth the conditions + of carrying a result of previous experience over to a new + case with inductive probability, in other words, the + conditions of making past experience a means of foreseeing + future experience. It would be superfluous to give here the + symbols of the two forms of inductive inference. + + We remain within the bounds of logical analysis, if we state + under what conditions conclusions follow necessarily from + their premises, viz., the conclusions of arguments from + analogy and of syllogisms in the narrower sense, as well as + those of the foregoing inductive arguments. For the + inference from analogy and the two forms of inductive + inference, these conditions are the presuppositions already + set forth in the text of the present paper, that in the as + yet unobserved portion of reality the like causes will be + found and they will give rise to like effects. For the + syllogism they are the thought that the predicate of a + predicate is the (mediate) predicate of the subject. Only + the further analysis of these presuppositions, which is + undertaken in the text, leads to critical considerations in + the narrower sense.] + + [Footnote 12: _A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and + Inductive_, bk. III, ch. v, § 6.] + +Empiricism can, however, meet this objection without giving up its +position; in fact, it can employ the objection as an argument in its +favor; for this objection affects only the manifestly imperfect +formulation of the doctrine, not the essential arguments. + +It should have been pointed out again and again in the foregoing +exposition that only in the first indiscriminating view of things may we +regard the events given us in perception as the basis of our concepts of +cause and effect. All these events are intricately mixed, those that are +given in self perception as well as those given in sense perception. The +events of both groups flow along continuously. Consequently, as regards +time, they permit a division into parts, which division proceeds, not +indeed for our perception, but for our scientific thought, in short, +conceptually, into infinity. The events of sense perception permit also +conceptually of infinite division in their spatial relations. + +It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we turn our attention to +the question of divisibility in time. This fact of divisibility shows +that the events of our perception, which alone we have until now brought +under consideration, must be regarded as systems of events. We are +therefore called upon to apportion the causal relations among the +members of these systems. Only for the indiscriminating view of our +practical _Weltanschauung_ is the perceived event _a_ the cause of the +perceived event _b_. The more exact analysis of our theoretical +apprehension of the world compels us to dissect the events _a_ and _b_ +into the parts _a_α , _a_β, _a_γ--_b_α, _b_β, _b_γ, and, where occasion +calls for it, to continue the same process in turn for these and further +components. We have accordingly to relate those parts to one another as +causes and effects which, from the present standpoint of analysis, +follow one another uniformly and _immediately_, viz., follow one another +so that from this standpoint no other intervening event must be +presupposed. In this way we come to have a _well-ordered experience_. +The dispositions to such experience which reveal themselves within the +field of practical thought taught man long before the beginning of +scientific methods not to connect causally day and night with one +another, but the rising and setting of the sun with day and night. The +theoretical analysis, indeed, goes farther. It teaches that in what is +here summed up as rising of the sun and yonder as day, there lie again +intricate elements requiring special attention, in our own day extending +perhaps to the lines of thought contained in the electro-dynamic theory +of light and of electrons. Still the ways of thought remain the same, on +all the levels of penetrating analysis. We have throughout to relate to +one another as cause and effect those events which, in a well-ordered +experience, must be regarded as following one another immediately. The +cause is then the _immediate_ uniform _antecedens_, the effect the +_immediate_ uniform _consequens_. Otherwise stated, the perceived events +that we are accustomed, from the standpoint of the practical +_Weltanschauung_, to regard as causes and effects, _e. g._, lightning +and thunder, from the theoretical apprehension of the world prove to be +infinitely involved collections of events, whose elements must be +related to one another as causes and effects in as far as they can be +regarded as following one another immediately. No exception is formed by +expressions of our rough way of viewing and describing which lead us +without hesitation to regard as cause one out of the very many causes of +an event, and this, too, not necessarily the immediate uniformly +preceding event. All this lies rather in the nature of such a hasty +view. + +The present limitation of uniform sequence to cases of immediate +sequence sets aside, then, the objection from which we started, in that +it adopts as its own the essential point in question. + +Moreover, the way that leads us to this necessary limitation goes +farther: it leads to a strengthening of the empiristic position. It +brings us to a point where we see that the most advanced analysis of +intricate systems of events immediately given to us in perception as +real nowhere reveals more than the simple fact of uniform sequence. +Again where we come to regard the intervals between the events that +follow one another immediately as very short, there the uniformity of +the time relation makes, it would seem, the events for us merely causes +and effects; and as often as we have occasion to proceed to the smaller +time differences of a higher order, the same process repeats itself; for +we dissect the events that make up our point of departure into ever more +complex systems of component events, and the coarser relations of +uniform sequence into ever finer immediate ones. Nowhere, seemingly, do +we get beyond the field of events in uniform sequence, which finally +have their foundation in the facts of perception from which they are +drawn. Thus there follows from this conceptual refinement of the point +of departure only the truth that nothing connects the events as causes +and effects except the immediate uniformity of sequence. + +None the less, we have to think the empiristic doctrine to the bottom, +if we desire to determine whether or not the hypothesis which it offers +is really sufficient to enable us to deduce the causal relation. For +this purpose let us remind ourselves that the question at issue is, +whether or not this relation is merely a temporal connection of events +that are given to us in perception or that can be derived from the data +of perception. + +Besides, let us grant that this relation is as thoroughly valid for the +content of our experience as empiricism has always, and rationalism +nearly always, maintained. We presuppose, therefore, as granted, that +every event is to be regarded as cause, and hence, in the opposite time +relation, as effect, mental events that are given to us in self +perception no less than the physical whose source is our sense +perception. In other words, we assume that the totality of events in our +possible experience presents a closed system of causal series, that is, +that every member within each of the contemporary series is connected +with the subsequent ones, as well as with the subsequent members of all +the other series, backward and forward as cause and effect; and +therefore, finally, that every member of every series stands in causal +relationship with every member of every other series. We do not then, +for the present purpose, burden ourselves with the hypothesis which was +touched upon above, that this connection is to be thought of as a +continuous one, namely, that other members can be inserted _ad +infinitum_ between any two members of the series. + +We maintain at the same time that there is no justification for +separating from one another the concepts, causality and interaction. +This separation is only to be justified through the metaphysical +hypothesis that reality consists in a multitude of independently +existing substances inherently subject to change, and that their mutual +interconnection is conditioned by a common dependence upon a first +infinite cause.[13] Every connection between cause and effect is mutual, +if we assume with Newton that to every action there is an equal opposing +reaction. + + [Footnote 13: This doctrine began in the theological + evolution of the Christian concept of God. It was first + fundamentally formulated by Leibnitz. It is retained in + Kant's doctrine of the _harmonia generaliter stabilita_ and + the latter's consequences for the critical doctrine of the + _mundus intelligibilis_. Hence it permeates the metaphysical + doctrines of the systems of the nineteenth century in + various ways.] + +In that we bring the totality of knowable reality, as far as it is +analyzable into events, under the causal relation, we may regard the +statement that every event requires us to seek among uniformly preceding +events for the sufficient causes of its own reality, namely, _the +general causal law_, as the principle of all material sciences. For all +individual instances of conformity to law which we can discover in the +course of experience are from this point of view only special cases of +the general universal conformity to law which we have just formulated. + +For the empiristic interpretation, the (general) causal law is only the +highest genus of the individual cases of empirically synthetic relations +of uniform sequence. Starting from these presuppositions, it cannot be +other than a generalization from experience, that is, a carrying over of +observed relations of uniform, or, as we may now also say, constant +sequence to those which have not been or cannot be objects of +observation, as well as to those which we expect to appear in the +future. Psychologically regarded, it is merely the most general +expression of an expectation, conditioned through associative +reproduction, of uniform sequence. It is, therefore,--to bring Hume's +doctrine to a conclusion that the father of modern empiricism himself +did not draw,--a species of temporal contiguity. + +The general validity which we ascribe to the causal law is accordingly a +merely empirical one. It can never attain apodeictic or even +assertorical validity, but purely that type of problematic validity +which we may call "real" in contradistinction to the other type of +problematic validity attained in judgments of objective as well as of +subjective and hypothetical possibility.[14] No possible progress of +experience can win for the empiristically interpreted causal law any +other than this real problematic validity; for experience can never +become complete _a parte post_, nor has it ever been complete _a parte +ante_. The causal law is valid assertorically only in so far as it sums +up, purely in the way of an inventory, the preceding experiences. We +call such assumptions, drawn from well-ordered experience and of +inductive origin, "hypotheses," whether they rest upon generalizing +inductive inferences in the narrower sense, or upon specializing +inferences from analogy. They, and at the same time the empiristically +interpreted causal law, are not hypotheses in the sense in which Newton +rightly rejected all formation of hypotheses,[15] but are such as are +necessarily part of all methods in the sciences of facts in so far as +the paths of research lead out beyond the content given immediately in +perception to objects of only possible experience. + + [Footnote 14: Cf. the author's _Logik_, bd. I, § 61.] + + [Footnote 15: "_Rationem_ vero harum gravitatis proprietatum + ex phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non + fingo. _Quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur, + hypothesis vocanda est_; et hypotheses seu metaphysicae, seu + physicae, seu qualitatum occultarum, seu mechanicae, in + philosophia experimentali locum non habent. In hac + philosophia propositiones deducuntur ex phaenomenis, et + redduntur generales per _inductionem_." Newton, at the end + of his chief work.] + +The assertion of Stuart Mill, in opposition to this conclusion, that the +cause must be thought of as the "invariable antecedent" and, +correspondingly, the effect is the "invariable consequent,"[16] does all +honor to the genius of the thinker; but it agrees by no means with the +empiristic presuppositions which serve as the basis for his conclusions. +For, starting from these presuppositions, the "invariable sequence" can +only mean one that is uniform and constant according to past experience, +and that we henceforth carry over to not yet observed events as far as +these prove in conformity with it, and in this way verify the +anticipation contained in our general assertion. The same holds of the +assertion through which Mill endeavors to meet the above-mentioned +objection of Reid, namely, that the unchanging sequence must at the same +time be demonstrably an "unconditional" one. The language in which +experience speaks to us knows the term "the unconditioned" as little as +the term "the unchangeable," even though this have, as Mill explains, +the meaning that the effect "will be, whatever supposition we may make +in regard to all other things," or that the sequence will "be subject to +no other than negative conditions." For in these determinations there +does not lie exclusively, according to Mill, a probable prediction of +the future. "It is _necessary_ to our using the word cause, that we +should believe not only that the antecedent always _has_ been followed +by the consequent, but that as long as the present constitution of +things endures, it always _will_ be so." Likewise, Mill, the man of +research, not the empiristic logician, asserts that there belongs to the +causal law, besides this generality referring to all possible events of +uniform sequence, also an "undoubted assurance;" although he could have +here referred to a casual remark of Hume.[17] Such an undoubted +assurance, "that for every event ... there is a law to be found, if we +only know where to find it," evidently does not know of a knowledge +referred exclusively to experience. + + [Footnote 16: _Logik_, bk. III, ch. v, § 2.] + + [Footnote 17: _Logic_, bk. III, ch. v, § 6, and end of § 2. + Hume says in a note to section VI of his _Enquiry Concerning + Human Understanding_: "We ought to divide arguments into + _demonstrations_, _proofs_, _and probabilities_. By proofs + Meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for + doubt or opposition." The note stands in evident contrast to + the well-known remarks at the beginning of section IV, pt. I.] + +Hence, if the causal law is, as empiricism to be consistent must +maintain, only a general hypothesis which is necessarily subject to +verification as experience progresses, then it is not impossible that in +the course of experience events will appear that are not preceded or +followed uniformly by others, and that accordingly cannot be regarded as +causes or effects. According to this interpretation of the causal law, +such exceptional events, whether in individual or in repeated cases of +perception, must be just as possible as those which in the course of +preceding experience have proved themselves to be members of series of +constant sequence. On the basis of previous experience, we should only +have the right to say that such exceptional cases are less probable; and +we might from the same ground expect that, if they could be surely +determined, they would only have to be regarded as exceptions to the +rule and not, possibly, as signs of a misunderstood universal +non-uniformity of occurrence. No one wants to maintain an empirical +necessity, that is, a statement that so comprehends a present experience +or an hypothesis developed on the basis of present experience that its +contradictory is rationally impossible. An event preceded by no other +immediately and uniformly as cause would, according to traditional +usage, arise out of nothing. An event that was followed immediately and +constantly by no other would accordingly be an event that remained +without effect, and, did it pass away, it must disappear into nothing. +The old thought, well known in its scholastic formulation, _ex nihilo +nihil fit, in nihilum nihil potest reverti_, is only another expression +for the causal law as we have interpreted it above. The contradictories +to each of the clauses of the thought just formulated, that something +can arise out of nothing and pass into nothing, remain therefore, as a +consequence of empiricism, an improbable thought, to be sure, but none +the less a thought to which a real possibility must be ascribed. + +It was in all probability this that Stuart Mill wished to convey in the +much-debated passage: "I am convinced that anyone accustomed to +abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the +purpose, will, when his imagination has once learnt to entertain the +notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, +of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the +universe, events may succeed one another at random without any fixed +law; nor can anything in our experience, or in our mental nature, +constitute a sufficient, or indeed any, reason for believing that this +is nowhere the case." For Mill immediately calls our attention to the +following: "Were we to suppose (what it is perfectly possible to +imagine) that the present order of the universe were brought to an end, +and that a chaos succeeded in which there was no fixed succession of +events, and the past gave no assurance of the future; if a human being +were miraculously kept alive to witness this change, he surely would +soon cease to believe in any uniformity, the uniformity itself no longer +existing."[18] + + [Footnote 18: _Logic_, bk. III, ch. xxi, § 1.] + +We can throw light from another side upon the thought that lies in this +outcome of the empiristic interpretation of the causal law. If we still +desire to give the name "effect" to an event that is preceded uniformly +by no other, and that we therefore have to regard as arising out of +nothing, then we must say that it is the effect of itself, that is, its +cause lies in its own reality, in short, that it is _causa sui_. +Therefore the assumption that a _causa sui_ has just as much real +possibility as have the causes of our experience which are followed +uniformly by another event, is a necessary consequence of the empiristic +view of causation. This much only remains sure, there is nothing +contained in our previous experience that in any way assures us of the +validity of this possible theory. + +The empiristic doctrine of causation requires, however, still further +conclusions. Our scientific, no less than our practical thought has +always been accustomed to regard the relation between cause and effect +not as a matter of mere sequence, not therefore as a mere formal +temporal one. Rather it has always, in both forms of our thought, stood +for a _real_ relation, that is, for a relation of _dynamic dependence_ +of effect upon cause. Accordingly, the effect _arises out_ of the cause, +is _engendered through_ it, or _brought forth by_ it. + +The historical development of this dynamic conception of cause is well +known. The old anthropopathic interpretation, which interpolates +anthropomorphic and yet superhuman intervention between the events that +follow one another uniformly, has maintained itself on into the modern +metaphysical hypotheses. It remains standing wherever God is assumed as +the first cause for the interaction between parts of reality. It is made +obscure, but not eliminated, when, in other conceptions of the world, +impersonal nature, fate, necessity, the absolute identity, or an +abstraction related to these, appears in the place of God. On the other +hand, it comes out clearly wherever these two tendencies of thought +unite themselves in an anthropopathic pantheism. That is, it rests only +upon a difference in strength between the governing religious and +scientific interests, whether or not the All-One which unfolds itself in +the interconnection and content of reality is thought of more as the +immanent God, or more as substance. Finally, we do not change our +position, if the absolute, self-active being (in all these theories a +first cause is presupposed as _causa sui_) is degraded to a +non-intellectual will. + +However, the dynamic interpretation of cause has not remained confined +to the field of these general speculations, just because it commanded +that field so early. There is a second branch, likewise early evolved +from the stem of the anthropopathic interpretation, the doctrine that +the causal relations of dependence are effected through "forces." These +forces adhere to, or dwell in, the ultimate physical elements which are +thought of as masses. Again, as spiritual forces they belong to the +"soul," which in turn is thought of as a substance. In the modern +contrast between attractive and repulsive forces, there lies a remnant +of the Empedoklean opposition between Love and Hate. In the various old +and new hylozoistic tendencies, the concepts of force and its correlate, +mass, are eclectically united. In consistent materialism as well as +spiritualism, and in the abstract dynamism of energetics, the one member +is robbed of its independence or even rejected in favor of the +other.[19] + + [Footnote 19: Alongside of these dynamic theories, there are + to be found mechanical ones that arose just as early and + from the same source, viz., the practical _Weltanschauung_. + It is not part of our purpose to discuss them. Their first + scientific expression is to be found in the doctrine of + effluences and pores in Empedokles and in Atomism.] + +It is evident in what light all these dynamic conceptions appear, when +looked at from the standpoint of consistent extreme empiricism. These +"forces," to consider here only this one of the dynamic hypotheses, help +to explain nothing. The physical forces, or those which give rise to +movement, are evidently not given to us as contents of sense perception, +and at the most they can be deduced as non-sensuous foundations, not as +contents of possible sense perception. The often and variously expressed +belief that self perception reveals to us here what our senses leave +hidden has proved itself to be in all its forms a delusion. The forces +whose existence we assume have then an intuitable content only in so far +as they get it through the uniformities present in repeated perceptions, +which uniformities are to be "explained" through them. But right here +their assumption proves itself to be not only superfluous but even +misleading; for it makes us believe that we have offered an explanation, +whereas in reality we have simply duplicated the given by means of a +fiction, quite after the fashion of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. This +endeavor to give the formal temporal relations between events, which we +interpret as causes and effects, a dynamic real substructure, shows +itself thus to be worthless in its contributions to our thought. The +same holds true of every other dynamic hypothesis. The critique called +forth by these contributions establishes therefore only the validity of +the empiristic interpretation. + +If, however, we have once come so far, we may not hold ourselves back +from the final step. Empiricism has long ago taken this step, and the +most consistent among its modern German representatives has aroused anew +the impulses that make it necessary. Indeed, if we start from the +empiristic presuppositions, we must recognize that there lies not only +in the assumption of forces, but even in the habit of speaking of causes +and effects, "a clear trace of fetishism." We are not then surprised +when the statement is made: The natural science of the future, and +accordingly science in general, will, it is to be hoped, set aside these +concepts also on account of their formal obscurity. For, so it is +explained, repetitions of like cases in which _a_ is always connected +with _b_, namely, in which like results are found under like +circumstances, in short, the essence of the connection of cause and +effect, exists only in the abstraction that is necessary to enable us to +repicture the facts. In nature itself there are no causes and effects. +_Die Natur ist nur einmal da._ + +It is, again, Stuart Mill, the man of research, not the empiricist, that +opposes this conclusion, and indeed opposes it in the form that Auguste +Comte had given it in connection with thoughts that can be read into +Hume's doctrine. Comte's "objection to the _word_ cause is a mere matter +of nomenclature, in which, as a matter of nomenclature, I consider him +to be entirely wrong.... By rejecting this form of expression, M. Comte +leaves himself without any term for marking a distinction which, however +incorrectly expressed, is not only real, but is one of the fundamental +distinctions in science."[20] + + [Footnote 20: _Logic_, bk. III, ch. v, § 6.] + +For my own part, the right seems to be on the side of Comte and his +recent followers in showing the old nomenclature to be worn out, if +viewed from the standpoint of empiricism. If the relation between cause +and effect consists alone in the uniformity of sequence which is +hypothetically warranted by experience, then it can be only misleading +to employ words for the members of this purely formal relation that +necessarily have a strong tang of real dynamic dependence. In fact, they +give the connection in question a peculiarity that, according to +consistent empiricism, it does not possess. The question at issue in the +empiristically interpreted causal relation is a formal functional one, +which is not essentially different, as Ernst Mach incidentally +acknowledges, from the interdependence of the sides and angles of a +triangle. + +Here two extremes meet. Spinoza, the most consistent of the dogmatic +rationalists, finds himself compelled in his formulation of the analytic +interpretation of the causal relation handed down to him to transform it +into a mathematical one. Mach, the most consistent of recent German +empiricists, finds himself compelled to recognize that the empirically +synthetic relation between cause and effect includes no other form of +dependence than that which is present in the functional mathematical +relations. (In Germany empiricism steeped in natural science has +supplanted the naïve materialism saturated with natural science.) That +the mathematical relations must likewise be subjected to a purely +empirical interpretation, which even Hume denied them, is a matter of +course. + +However, this agreement of two opposing views is no proof that +empiricism is on the right road. The empiristic conclusions to which we +have given our attention do not succeed in defining adequately the +specific nature of the causal relation; on the contrary, they compel us +to deny such a relation. Thus they cast aside the concept that we have +endeavored to define, that is, the judgment in which we have to +comprehend whatever is peculiar to the causal connection. But one does +not untie a knot by denying that it exists. + +It follows from this self-destruction of the empiristic causal +hypothesis that an additional element of thought must be contained in +the relation of cause and effect besides the elements of reproductive +recognition and those of identification and discrimination, all of which +are involved in the abstract comprehension of uniform sequence. The +characteristics of the causal connection revealed by our previous +analysis constitute the necessary and perhaps adequate conditions for +combining the several factual perceptions into the abstract registering +idea of uniform sequence. We may, therefore, expect to find that the +element sought for lies in the tendency to extend the demand for causal +connections over the entire field of possible experience; and perhaps we +may at the same time arrive at the condition which led Hume and Mill to +recognize the complete universality of the causal law in spite of the +exclusively empirical content that they had ascribed to it. In this +further analysis also we have to draw from the nature of our thought +itself the means of guiding our investigation. + +In the first place, all thought has a formal necessity which reveals +itself in the general causal law no less than in every individual +thought process, that is, in every valid judgment. The meaning of this +formal necessity of thought is easily determined. If we presuppose, for +example, that I recognize a surface which lies before me as green, then +the perception judgment, "This surface is green," that is, the +apprehension of the present perceptive content in the fundamental form +of discursive thought, repeats with predicative necessity that which is +presented to me in the content of perception. The necessity of thought +contained in this perception judgment, as _mutatis mutandis_ in every +affirmative judgment meeting the logical conditions, is recognizable +through the fact that the contradictory judgment, "This surface is not +green," is impossible for our thought under the presupposition of the +given content of perception and of our nomenclature. It contradicts +itself. I can express the contradictory proposition, for instance, in +order to deceive; but I cannot really pass the judgment that is +contained in it. It lies in the very nature of our thought that the +predicate of an assertive judgment call contain only whatever belongs as +an element of some sort (characteristic, attribute, state, relation) to +the subject content in the wider sense. The same formal necessity of +thought, to give a further instance, is present in the thought process +of mediate syllogistic predication. The conclusion follows necessarily +from the premises, for example, the judgment, "All bodies are +divisible," from the propositions, "All bodies are extended," and, +"Whatever is extended is divisible." + +These elementary remarks are not superfluous; for they make clear that +the casually expressed assertion of modern natural scientific +empiricism, declaring in effect that there is no such thing as necessity +of thought, goes altogether too far. Such necessity can have an +admissible meaning only in so far as it denotes that in predicting or +recounting _the content_ of possible experience every hypothesis is +possible for thought. Of course it is, but that is not the subject under +discussion. + +The recognition of the formal necessity of thought that must be +presupposed helps us to define our present question; for it needs no +proof that this formal necessity of thought, being valid for every +affirmative judgment, is valid also for each particular induction, and +again for the general causal law. If in the course of our perceptions we +meet uniform sequences, then the judgment, "These sequences are +uniform," comprehends the common content of many judgments with formal +necessity of thought. Empiricism, too, does not seriously doubt that the +hypothesis of a general functional, even though only temporal, relation +between cause and effect is deduced as an expectation of possible +experience with necessity from our real experience. It questions only +the doctrine that the relation between the events regarded as cause and +effect has any other than a purely empirical import. The reality of an +event that is preceded and followed uniformly by no other remains for +this view, as we have seen, a possibility of thought. + +In opposition to empiricism, we now formulate the thesis to be +established: Wherever two events _a_ and _b_ are known to follow one +another uniformly and immediately, there we must require with formal +necessity that some element in the preceding _a_ be thought of as +fundamental, which will determine sufficiently _b_'s appearance or make +that appearance necessary. The necessity of the relation between the +events regarded as cause and effect is, therefore, the question at +issue. + +We must keep in mind from the very start that less is asserted in this +formulation than we are apt to read into it. It states merely that +something in _a_ must be thought of as fundamental, which makes _b_ +necessary. On the other hand, it says nothing as to what this +fundamental something is, or how it is constituted. It leaves entirely +undecided whether or not this something that our thought must +necessarily postulate is a possible content of perception or can become +such, accordingly whether or not it can become an object of our +knowledge, or whether or not it lies beyond the bounds of all our +possible experience and hence all our possible knowledge. It contains +nothing whatsoever that tells us how the determination of _b_ takes +place through _a_. The word "fundamental" is intended to express all +this absence of determination. + +Thus we hope to show a necessity of thought peculiar to the relation +between cause and effect. This is the same as saying that our proof will +establish the logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion; for +the logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion is the only +criterion of logical necessity. Thus the proof that we seek can be given +only indirectly. In the course of this proof, we can disregard the +immediacy of the constant sequence and confine our attention to the +uniformity of the sequence, not only for the sake of brevity, but also +because, as we have seen, we have the right to speak of near and remote +causes. We may then proceed as follows. + +If there is not something fundamental in a constant antecedent event +_a_, which determines necessarily the constant subsequent appearance of +one and the same _b_,--that is, if there is nothing fundamental which +makes this appearance necessary,--then we must assume that also _c_ or +_d_ ..., in short, any event you will, we dare not say "follows upon," +but appears after _a_ in irregular alternation with _b_. This +assumption, however, is impossible for our thought, because it is in +contradiction with our experience, on the basis of which our causal +thought has been developed. Therefore the assumption of a something that +is fundamental in _a_, and that determines sufficiently and necessarily +the appearance of _b_, is a necessity for our thought. + +The assertion of this logical impossibility (_Denkunmöglichkeit_) will +at once appear thoroughly paradoxical. The reader, merely recalling the +results of the empiristic interpretation given above, will immediately +say: "The assumption that a _b_ does not follow constantly upon an _a_, +but that sometimes _b_, sometimes _c_, sometimes _d_ ... irregularly +appears, is in contradiction only with all our previous experience, but +it is not on this account a _logical_ impossibility. It is merely +improbable." The reader will appeal especially to the discussion of +Stuart Mill, already quoted, in which Mill pictures _in concreto_ such +an improbable logical impossibility, and therefore at the same time +establishes it in fact. Again, the reader may bring forward the words in +which Helmholtz introduces intellectual beings of only two dimensions. +"By the much misused expression, 'to be able to imagine to one's self,' +or, 'to think how something happens,' I understand (and I do not see how +anybody can understand anything else thereby without robbing the +expression of all meaning) that one can picture to one's self the series +of sense impressions which one would have if such a thing actually took +place in an individual case."[21] + + [Footnote 21: _Vorträge und Reden_, bd. II, "Über den + Ursprung und die Bedeutung der geometrischen Axiome."] + +Nevertheless, pertinent as are these and similar objections, they are +not able to stand the test. We ask: "Is in fact a world, or even a +portion of our world, possible for thought that displays through an +absolutely irregular alternation of events a chaos in the full sense; or +is the attempt to picture such a chaos only a mere play of words to +which not even our imagination, not to mention our thought, can give a +possible meaning?" + +Perhaps we shall reach a conclusion by the easiest way, if we subject +Mill's description to a test. If we reduce it to the several +propositions it contains, we get the following: (1) Every one is able to +picture to himself in his imagination a reality in which events follow +one another without rule, that is, so that after an event _a_ now _b_ +appears, now _c_, etc., in complete irregularity. (2) The idea of such a +chaos accordingly contradicts neither the nature of our mind nor our +experience. (3) Neither the former nor the latter gives us sufficient +reason to believe that such an irregular alternation does not actually +exist somewhere in the observable world. (4) If such a chaos should be +presented to us as fact, that is, if we were in a position to outlive +such an alternation, then the belief in the uniformity of time relations +would soon cease. + +Every one would subscribe to the last of these four theses, immediately +upon such a chaos being admitted to be a possibility of thought; that +is, he would unless he shared the rationalistic conviction that our +thought constitutes an activity absolutely independent of all +experience. We must simply accept this conclusion on the ground of the +previous discussion and of a point still to be brought forward. + +If we grant this conclusion, however, then it follows, on the ground of +our previous demonstration of the reproductive and recognitive, as well +as thought elements involved in the uniform sequence, that the +irregularity in the appearance of the events, assumed in such a chaos, +can bring about an absolutely relationless alternation of impressions +for the subject that we should presuppose to be doing the perceiving. If +we still wish to call it perception, it would remain only a perception +in which no component of its content could be related to the others, a +perception, therefore, in which not even the synthesis of the several +perception contents could be apprehended as such. That is, every +combination of the different perception contents, by which they become +components of one and the same perception, presupposes, as we have seen, +those reproductive and recognitive acts in revival which are possible +only where uniformities of succession (and of coexistence) exist. Again, +every act of attention involved in identifying and discriminating, which +likewise we have seen to be possible only if we presuppose uniformities +in the given contents of perception, must necessarily disappear when we +presuppose the chaotic content; and yet they remain essential to the +very idea of such a chaos. A relationless chaos is after all nothing +else than a system of relations thought of without relations! That the +same contradiction obtains also in the mere mental picturing of a +manifold of chaotic impressions needs no discussion; for the productive +imagination as well as the reproductive is no less dependent than is our +perceptive knowledge upon the reproductive recognition and upon the +processes of identifying and discriminating. + +Thus the mental image of a chaos could be formed only through an +extended process of ideation, which itself presupposes as active in it +all that must be denied through the very nature of the image. A +relationless knowledge, a relationless abstraction, a relationless +reproduction or recognition, a relationless identification or +discrimination, in short, a relationless thought, are, as phrases, one +and all mere contradictions. We cannot picture "through our relating +thought," to use Helmholtz's expression, nor even in our imagination, +the sense impressions that we should have if our thought were +relationless, that is, were nullified in its very components and +presuppositions. In the case of Helmholtz's two dimensional beings, the +question at issue was not regarding the setting aside of the conditions +of our thought and the substituting conditions contradictory to them, +but regarding the setting aside of a part of the content of our sense +intuition, meanwhile retaining the conditions and forms peculiar to our +thought. In this case, therefore, we have a permissible fiction, whereas +in Mill's chaos we have an unthinkable thought. + +Again, the sense impressions that must be presupposed in an inherently +relationless chaos have no possible relation to the world of our +perception, whose components are universally related to each other +through the uniformities of their coexistences and sequences. +Accordingly, the remark with which Helmholtz concludes the passage above +quoted holds, _mutatis mutandis_, here also. "If there is no sense +impression known that stands in relation to an event which has never +been observed (by us), as would be the case for us were there a motion +toward a fourth dimension, and for those two dimensional beings were +there a motion toward our third dimension; then it follows that such an +'idea' is impossible, as much so as that a man completely blind from +childhood should be able to 'imagine' the colors, if we could give him +too a conceptual description of them." + +Hence the first of the theses in which we summed up Stuart Mill's +assumptions must be rejected. With it go also the second and third. In +this case we need not answer the question: In how far do these theses +correspond to Mill's own statements regarding the absolute surety and +universality of the causal law? + +We have now found what we sought, in order to establish as a valid +assertion the seeming paradox in the proof of the necessity that we +ascribe to the relation between cause and effect. We have proved that +the assumption of a completely irregular and therefore relationless +alternation of impressions contradicts not only our experience, but even +the conditions of our thought; for these presuppose the uniformities of +the impressions, and consequently our ability to relate them, all which +was eliminated from our hypothetical chaos. Hence we have also +established that a necessary relation is implied in the thought of a +constant sequence of events, which makes the uniformly following _b_ +really dependent upon the uniformly preceding _a_. + + * * * * * + +From still another side, we can make clear the necessity asserted in the +relation of cause and effect. We found that the connection between each +definite cause and its effect is an empirically synthetic one and has as +its warrant merely experience. We saw further that the necessity +inherent in the causal connection contains merely the demand that there +shall be something fundamental in the constantly preceding _a_ which +makes the appearance of _b_ necessary; not, however, that it informs us +what this efficacy really is, and hence also not that it informs us how +this efficacy brings about its effect. Finally, we had to urge that +every induction, the most general no less than the most particular, +depends upon the presupposition that the same causes will be given in +the reality not yet observed as in that already observed. This +expectation is warranted by no necessity of thought, not even by that +involved in the relation of cause and effect; for this relation begins +for future experience only when the presupposition that the same causes +will be found in it is assumed as fulfilled.[22] This expectation is +then dependent solely upon previous experience, whose servants we are, +whose lords we can never be. Therefore, every induction is an hypothesis +requiring the verification of a broader experience, since, in its work +of widening and completing our knowledge, it leads us beyond the given +experience to a possible one. In this respect we can call all inductive +thought empirical, that is, thought that begins with experience, is +directed to experience, and in its results is referred to experience. +The office of this progressing empirical thought is accordingly to form +hypotheses from which the data of perception can be regressively +deduced, and by means of which they can be exhibited as cases of known +relations of our well-ordered experience, and thus can be explained. + + [Footnote 22: The only empiricism which can maintain that + the same causes would, in conformity with the causal law, be + given in the unobserved reality, is one which puts all + events that can be regarded as causes in the immediately + given content of perception as its members. Such a view is + not to be found in Mill; and it stands so completely in the + way of all further analysis required of us by every + perception of events that no attention has been paid in the + text to this extreme of extremes.] + +The way of forming hypotheses can be divided logically into different +sections which can readily be made clear by an example. The police +magistrate finds a human corpse under circumstances that eliminate the +possibility of accident, natural death, or suicide; in short, that +indicate an act of violence on the part of another man. The general +hypothesis that he has here to do with a crime against life forms the +guide of his investigation. The result of the circumstantial evidence, +which we presuppose as necessary, furnishes then a special hypothesis as +following from the general hypothesis. + +It is clear that this division holds for all cases of forming +hypotheses. A general hypothesis serves every special hypothesis as a +heuristic principle. In the former we comprehend the causal explanation +indicated immediately by the facts revealed to our perception in the +special case. It contains, as we might also express it, the genus to the +specific limitations of the more exact investigation. But each of these +general hypotheses is a modification of the most general form of +building hypotheses, which we have already come to know as the condition +of the validity of all inductive inferences, that is, as the condition +for the necessity of their deduction, and, consequently, as the +condition for the thought that like causes will be given in the reality +not yet observed as in that already observed. We have further noticed +that in this most general form of building hypotheses there lie two +distinct and different valid assumptions: beside the empirical statement +that like causes will be given, which gives the inductive conclusion the +hypothetical form, there stands the judgment that like causes bring +forth like effects, a corollary of the causal law. The real dependence +of the effect upon the cause, presupposed by this second proposition and +the underlying causal law, is not, as was the other assumption, an +hypothesis, but a necessary requirement or _postulate_ of our thought. +Its necessity arises out of our thought, because our experience reveals +uniformity in the sequence of events. From this point of view, +therefore, the causal law appears as a postulate of our thought, +grounded upon the uniformity in the sequence of events. It underlies +every special case of constructing hypotheses as well as the expectation +that like causes will be given in the reality not yet observed. + +Mill's logic of induction contains the same fault as that already +present in Hume's psychological theory of cause. Hume makes merely the +causal law itself responsible for our inductive inferences, and +accordingly (as Mill likewise wrongly assumes) for our inferences in +general. But we recognize how rightly Mill came to assert, in +contradiction to his empiristic presuppositions, that the causal law +offers "an undoubted assurance of an invariable, universal, and +unconditional," that is, necessary, sequence of events, from which no +seeming irregularity of occurrence and no gap in our experience can lead +us astray, as long as experience offers uniformities of sequence. + +Rationalism is thus in the right, when it regards the necessary +connection as an essential characteristic of the relation between cause +and effect, that is, recognizes in it a relation of real dependence. At +this point Kant and Schopenhauer have had a profounder insight than Hume +and Stuart Mill. Especially am I glad to be in agreement with Lotze on a +point which he reached by a different route and from essentially +different presuppositions. Lotze distinguishes in pure logic between +postulates, hypotheses, and fictions. He does not refer the term +"postulate" exclusively to the causal law which governs our entire +empirical thought in its formation of hypotheses, but gives the term a +wider meaning. "Postulates" are only corollaries from the inductive +fundamental form of all hypothesis construction, and correspond +essentially to what we have called general or heuristic hypotheses. His +determination of the validity of these postulates, however, implies the +position to be assigned to the causal law and therefore not to those +heuristic hypotheses. "The postulate is not an assumption that we can +make or refrain from making, or, again, in whose place we can substitute +another. It is rather an (absolutely) necessary assumption without which +the content of the view at issue would contradict the laws of our +thought."[23] + + [Footnote 23: _Logic_, 1874, buch II, kap. viii.] + +Still the decision that we have reached is not on this account in favor +of rationalism, as this is represented for instance by Kant and his +successors down to our own time, and professed by Lotze in the passage +quoted, when he speaks of an absolute necessity for thought. We found +that the causal law requires a necessary connection between events given +us in constant sequence. It is not, however, on that account a law of +our thought or of a "pure understanding" which would be absolutely +independent of all experience. When we take into consideration the +evolution of the organic world of which we are members, then we must say +that our intellect, that is, our ideation and with it our sense +perception, has evolved in us in accordance with the influences to which +we have been subjected. The common elements in the different contents of +perception which have arisen out of other psychical elements, seemingly +first in the brute world, are not only an occasion, but also an +efficient cause, for the evolution of our processes of reproduction, in +which our memory and imagination as well as our knowledge and thought, +psychologically considered, come to pass. The causal law, which the +critical analysis of the material scientific methods shows to be a +fundamental condition of empirical thought, in its requirement that the +events stand as causes and effects in necessary connection, or real +dependence, comprehends these uniform contents of perception only in the +way peculiar to our thought. + +Doubtless our thought gives a connection to experience through this its +requirement which experience of itself could not offer. The necessary +connection of effect with cause, or the real dependence of the former +upon the latter, is not a component of possible perception. This +requirement of our thought does not, however, become thereby independent +of the perceptive elements in the presuppositions involved in the +uniformity of sequence. The _a priori_ in the sense of "innate ideas," +denoting either these themselves or an absolutely _a priori_ conformity +to law that underlies them, for instance, our "spontaneity," presupposes +in principle that our "soul" is an independently existing substance in +the traditional metaphysical sense down to the time of Locke. Kant's +rationalistic successors, for the most part, lost sight of the fact that +Kant had retained these old metaphysical assumptions in his +interpretation of the transcendental conditions of empirical interaction +and in his cosmological doctrine of freedom. The common root of the +sensibility and of the understanding as the higher faculty of knowledge +remains for Kant the substantial force of the soul, which expresses +itself (just as in Leibnitz) as _vis passiva_ and _vis activa_. The +modern doctrine of evolution has entirely removed the foundation from +this rationalism which had been undermined ever since Locke's criticism +of the traditional concept of substance. + +To refer again briefly to a second point in which the foregoing results +differ from the Kantian rationalism as well as from empiricism since +Hume: The postulate of a necessary connection between cause and effect, +as we have seen, in no way implies the consequence that the several +inductions lose the character of hypotheses. This does not follow merely +from the fact that all inductions besides the causal law include the +hypothetical thought that the same causes will be given in the reality +not yet observed as appear in that already observed. The hypothetical +character of all inductive inferences is rather revealed through the +circumstance that in the causal postulate absolutely nothing is +contained regarding _what_ the efficacy in the causes is, and _how_ this +efficacy arises. + + * * * * * + +Only such consequences of the foregoing interpretation of the causal law +and of its position as one of the bases of all scientific construction +of hypotheses may be pointed out, in conclusion, as will help to make +easier the understanding of the interpretation itself. + +The requirement of a necessary connection, or dependence, is added by +our thought to the reproductive and recognitive presuppositions that are +contained in the uniformity of the sequence of events. If this necessary +connection be taken objectively, then it reveals as its correlate the +requirement of a real dependence of effect upon cause. We come not only +upon often and variously used rationalistic thoughts, but also upon old +and unchangeable components of all empirical scientific thought, when we +give the name "force" to the efficacy that underlies causes. The old +postulate of a dynamic intermediary between the events that follow one +another constantly retains for us, therefore, its proper meaning. We +admit without hesitation that the word "force" suggests fetishism more +than do the words "cause" and "effect;" but we do not see how this can +to any degree be used as a counter-argument. All words that were coined +in the olden time to express thoughts of the practical _Weltanschauung_ +have an archaic tang. Likewise all of our science and the greater part +of our nomenclature have arisen out of the sphere of thought contained +in the practical _Weltanschauung_, which centred early in fetishism and +related thoughts. If, then, we try to free our scientific terminology +from such words, we must seek refuge in the Utopia of a _lingua +universalis_, in short, we must endeavor to speak a language which would +make science a secret of the few. Or will any one seriously maintain +that a thought which belongs to an ancient sphere of mental life must be +false for the very reason that it is ancient? + +In any case, it is fitting that we define more closely the sense in +which we are to regard forces as the dynamic intermediaries of uniform +occurrence. Force cannot be given as a content of perception either +through our senses or through our consciousness of self; in the case of +the former, not in our kinesthetic sensations, in the case of the +latter, not in our consciousness of volition. Volition would not include +a consciousness of force, even though we were justified in regarding it +as a simple primitive psychosis, and were not compelled rather to regard +it as an intricate collection of feelings and sensations as far as these +elementary forms of consciousness are connected in thought with the +phenomena of reaction. Again, forces cannot be taken as objects that are +derived as _possible_ perceptions or after the analogy of possible +perceptions. The postulate of our thought through which these forces are +derived from the facts of the uniform sequence of events, reveals them +as limiting notions (_Grenzbegriffe_), as specializations of the +necessary connection between cause and effect, or of the real dependence +of the former upon the latter; for the manner of their causal +intermediation is in no way given, rather they can be thought of only as +underlying our perceptions. They are then in fact _qualitates occultae_; +but they are such only because the concept of quality is taken from the +contents of our sense and self perception, which of course do not +contain the necessary connection required by our thought. Whoever, +therefore, requires from the introduction of forces new contents of +perception, for instance, new and fuller mechanical pictures, expects +the impossible. + +The contempt with which the assumption of forces meets, on the part of +those who make this demand, is accordingly easily understood, and still +more easily is it understood, if one takes into consideration what +confusion of concepts has arisen through the use of the term "force" and +what obstacles the assumption of forces has put in the way of the +material sciences. It must be frankly admitted that this concept delayed +for centuries both in the natural and moral sciences the necessary +analysis of the complicated phenomena forming our data. Under the +influence of the "concept philosophy" it caused, over and over again, +the setting aside of the problems of this analytical empirical thought +as soon as their solution had been begun. This misuse cannot but make +suspicious from the very start every new form of maintaining that forces +underlie causation. + +However, misuse proves as little here against a proper use as it does in +other cases. Moreover, the scruples that we found arising from the +standpoint of empiricism against the assumption of forces are not to the +point. In assuming a dynamic intermediary between cause and effect, we +are not doubling the problems whose solution is incumbent upon the +sciences of facts, and still less is it true that our assumption must +lead to a logical circle. That is, a comparison with the ideas of the +old concept philosophy, which even in the Aristotelian doctrine contain +such a duplication, is not to the point. Those ideas are hypostasized +abstractions which are taken from the uniformly coexisting +characteristics of objects. Forces, on the other hand, are the +imperceivable relations of dependence which we must presuppose between +events that follow one another uniformly, if the uniformity of this +sequence is to become for us either thinkable or conceivable. The +problems of material scientific research are not doubled by this +presupposition of a real dynamic dependence, because it introduces an +element not contained in the data of perception which give these +problems their point of departure. This presupposition does not renew +the thought of an analytic rational connection between cause and effect +which the concept philosophy involves; on the contrary, it remains true +to the principle made practical by Hume and Kant, that the real +connection between causes and their effects is determinable only through +experience, that is, empirically and synthetically through the actual +indication of the events of uniform sequence. How these forces are +constituted and work, we cannot know, since our knowledge is confined to +the material of perception from which as a basis presentation has +developed into thought. The insight that we have won from the limiting +notion of force helps us rather to avoid the misuse which has been made +of the concept of force. A fatal circle first arises, when we use the +unknowable forces and not the knowable events for the purpose of +explanation, that is, when we cut off short the empirical analysis which +leads _ad infinitum_. To explain does not mean to deduce the known from +the unknown, but the particular from the general. It was therefore no +arbitrary judgment, but an impulse conditioned by the very nature of our +experience and of our thought, that made man early regard the causal +connection as a dynamic one, even though his conception was of course +indistinct and mixed with confusing additions. + +The concept of force remains indispensable also for natural scientific +thought. It is involved with the causal law in every attempt to form an +hypothesis, and accordingly it is already present in every description +of facts which goes by means of memory or abstraction beyond the +immediately given content of present perception. In introducing it we +have in mind, moreover, that the foundations of every possible +interpretation of nature possess a dynamic character, just because all +empirical thought, in this field as well, is subordinate to the causal +law. This must be admitted by any one who assumes as indispensable aids +of natural science the mechanical figures through which we reduce the +events of sense perception to the motion of mass particles, that is, +through which we associate these events with the elements of our visual +and tactual perception. All formulations of the concept of mass, even +when they are made so formal as in the definition given by Heinrich +Hertz, indicate dynamic interpretations. Whether the impelling forces +are to be thought of in particular as forces acting at a distance or as +forces acting through collision depends upon the answer to the question +whether we have to assume the dynamic mass particles as filling space +discontinuously or continuously. The dynamic basis of our interpretation +of nature will be seen at once by any one who is of the opinion that we +can make the connection of events intelligible without the aid of +mechanical figures, for instance, in terms of energy. + +Thus it results that we interpret the events following one another +immediately and uniformly as causes and effects, by presupposing as +fundamental to them forces that are the necessary means of their +uniformity of connection. What we call "laws" are the judgments in which +we formulate these causal connections. + +A second and a third consequence need only be mentioned here. The +hypothesis that interprets the mutual connection of psychical and +physical vital phenomena as causal one is as old as it is natural. It is +natural, because even simple observations assure us that the mental +content of perception _follows_ uniformly the instigating physical +stimulus and the muscular movement the instigating mental content which +we apprehend as will. We know, however, that the physical events which, +in raising the biological problem, we have to set beside the psychical, +do not take place in the periphery of our nervous system and in our +muscles, but in the central nervous system. But we must assume, in +accordance with all the psycho-physiological data which at the present +time are at our disposal, that these events in our central nervous +system do not follow the corresponding psychical events, but that both +series have their course simultaneously. We have here, therefore, +instead of the real relation of dependence involved in constant +sequence, a real dependence of the simultaneity or correlative series of +events. This would not, of course, as should be at once remarked, tell +as such against a causal connection between the two separate causal +series. But the contested parallelistic interpretation of this +dependence is made far more probable through other grounds. These are in +part corollaries of the law of the conservation of energy, rightly +interpreted, and in part epistemological considerations. Still it is not +advisable to burden methodological study, for instance, the theory of +induction, with these remote problems; and on that account it is better +for our present investigation to subordinate the psychological +interdependences, to the causal ones in the narrower sense. + +The final consequence, too, that forces itself upon our attention is +close at hand in the preceding discussion. The tradition prevailing +since Hume, together with its inherent opposition to the interpretation +of causal connection given by the concept philosophy, permitted us to +make the uniform sequences of events the basis of our discussion. In so +doing, however, our attention had to be called repeatedly to one +reservation. In fact, only a moment ago, in alluding to the +psychological interdependences, we had to emphasize the uniform +_sequence_. Elsewhere the arguments depended upon the _uniformity_ that +characterizes this sequence; and rightly, for the reduction of the +causal relation to the fundamental relation of the sequence of events is +merely a convenient one and not the only possible one. As soon as we +regard the causal connection, along with the opposed and equal reaction, +as an interconnection, then cause and effect become, is a matter of +principle, simultaneous. The separation of interaction from causation is +not justifiable. + +In other ways also we can so transform every causal relation that cause +and effect must be regarded as simultaneous. Every stage, for instance, +of the warming of a stone by the heat of the sun, or of the treaty +conferences of two states, presents an effect that is simultaneous with +the totality of the acting causes. The analysis of a cause that was at +first grasped as a whole into the multiplicity of its constituent causes +and the comprehension of the constituent causes into a whole, which then +presents itself as the effect, is a necessary condition of such a type +of investigation. This conception, which is present already in Hobbes, +but especially in Herbart's "method of relations," deserves preference +always where the purpose in view is not the shortest possible +argumentation but the most exact analysis. + +If we turn our attention to this way of viewing the problem,--not, +however, in the form of Herbart's speculative method,--we shall find +that the results which we have gained will in no respect be altered. We +do, however, get a view beyond. From it we can find the way to +subordinate not only the uniform sequence of events, but also the +persistent characteristics and states with their mutual relations, under +the extended causal law. In so doing, we do not fall back again into the +intellectual world of the concept philosophy. We come only to regard the +_persisting coexistences_--in the physical field, the bodies, in the +psychical, the subjects of consciousness--as systems or modes of +activity. The thoughts to which such a doctrine leads are accordingly +not new or unheard of. The substances have always been regarded as +sources of modes of activity. We have here merely new modifications of +thoughts that have been variously developed, not only from the side of +empiricism, but also from that of rationalism. They carry with them +methodologically the implication that it is possible to grasp the +totality of reality, as far as it reveals uniformities, as a causally +connected whole, as a cosmos. They give the research of the special +sciences the conceptual bases for the wider prospects that the sciences +of facts have through hard labor won for themselves. The subject of +consciousness is unitary as far as the processes of memory extend, but +it is not simple. On the contrary, it is most intricately put together +out of psychical complexes, themselves intricate and out of their +relations; all of which impress upon us, psychologically and, in their +mechanical correlates, physiologically, an ever-recurring need for +further empirical analysis. Among the mechanical images of physical +reality that form the foundation of our interpretation of nature, there +can finally be but one that meets all the requirements of a general +hypothesis of the continuity of kinetic connections. With this must be +universally coördinated the persistent properties or sensible modes of +action belonging to bodies. The mechanical constitution of the compound +bodies, no matter at what stage of combination and formation, must be +derivable from the mechanical constitution of the elements of this +combination. Thus our causal thought compels us to trace back the +persistent coexistences of the so-called elements to combinations whose +analysis, as yet hardly begun, leads us on likewise to indefinitely +manifold problems. Epistemologically we come finally to a universal +phenomenological dynamism as the fundamental basis of all theoretical +interpretation of the world, at least fundamental for our scientific +thought, and we are here concerned with no other. + + + + +ADDENDA PAGES + +FOR LECTURE NOTES AND MEMORANDA OF COLLATERAL READING + + + + + Transcriber's Notes: + + In the original book, ten blank pages follow the last text entry. + On the title page, the copy number (337) is written in by hand. + In the chronological order of proceedings for September 24, there + is no listing for Hall 9 at 3 p.m. + + Alterations: + + Punctuation was standardized. + Footnotes were moved directly after the paragraph to which they pertain + and are indented. + Greek phrases were transliterated and added following in parentheses. + Hyphens removed for consistency with remaining text: + ... banquet hall of the Tyrolean Alps ... + ... breaking down of national Schools ... + ... analysis of the material scientific methods ... + ... is by no means a passive mirror picture of an ... + ... and the much discussed historical laws are ... + ... it is in the number series that we have ... + ... as well as of the number system, can all be ... + ... by our sense perception of this ... + ... in the form of sense perception ... + ... for the space of sense perception is to ... + ... are in the first instance sense perceptions,... + ... doctrine of the thought processes,... + ... character of the thought processes,... + ... introduction of time relations into the ... + ... the too much neglected idea of the ... + ... in the main, twofold: ... + ... sense and self perception,... + Hyphen added for consistency with remaining text: + ... of those will-acts which themselves have ... + Changed: + 'colaborers' to 'co-laborers' ... and other worthy co-laborers?... + 'pyscho' to 'psycho' ... psycho-physical elements ... + 'interacademic' to 'inter-academic' ... inter-academic interest ... + 'organzied' to 'organized' ... already organized branches ... + 'Pyschological' to 'Psychological' ... Psychological Association.... + 'B' to 'A' and 'C' to 'B' in the Programme, Department 16. Sociology + Capitalized 'Admiral' ... Rear-Admiral John R. Bartlett ... + Added period to 'LL.D.' ... Putnam, Litt.D., LL.D., ... + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of International Congress of Arts and +Science, Volume I, by Various + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INT'L CONGRESS--ARTS, SCIENCE, VOL I *** + +***** This file should be named 38267-0.txt or 38267-0.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/6/38267/ + +Produced by Robin Monks, Carol Brown, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. 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