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diff --git a/38141-8.txt b/38141-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0154659 --- /dev/null +++ b/38141-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5787 @@ +Project Gutenberg's John Dewey's logical theory, by Delton Thomas Howard + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: John Dewey's logical theory + +Author: Delton Thomas Howard + +Release Date: November 26, 2011 [EBook #38141] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY *** + + + + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + + + + + +CORNELL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY + +No. 11 + + +JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY + + +BY + +DELTON THOMAS HOWARD, A.M. + +FORMERLY FELLOW IN THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY + + +A THESIS +PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF +CORNELL UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE +REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY + + +NEW YORK +LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. +1919 + + +PRESS OF +THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY +LANCASTER, PA. + + + + +PREFACE + + +It seems unnecessary to offer an apology for an historical treatment of +Professor Dewey's logical theories, since functionalism glories in the +genetic method. To be sure, certain more extreme radicals are opposed to +a genetic interpretation of the history of human thought, but this is +inconsistent. At any rate, the historical method employed in the +following study may escape censure by reason of its simple character, +for it is little more than a critical review of Professor Dewey's +writings in their historical order, with no discussion of influences and +connections, and with little insistence upon rigid lines of development. +It is proposed to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" as far as +possible; to discover what topics interested Professor Dewey, how he +dealt with them, and what conclusions he arrived at. This plan has an +especial advantage when applied to a body of doctrine which, like +Professor Dewey's, does not possess a systematic form of its own, since +it avoids the distortion which a more rigid method would be apt to +produce. + +It has not been possible, within the limits of the present study, to +take note of all of Professor Dewey's writings, and no reference has +been made to some which are of undoubted interest and importance. Among +these may be mentioned especially his books and papers on educational +topics and a number of his ethical writings. Attention has been devoted +almost exclusively to those writings which have some important bearing +upon his logical theory. The division into chapters is partly arbitrary, +although the periods indicated are quite clearly marked by the different +directions which Professor Dewey's interests took from time to time. It +will be seen that there is considerable chance for error in +distinguishing between the important and the unimportant, and in +selecting the essays which lie in the natural line of the author's +development. But, _valeat quantum_, as William James would say. + +The criticisms and comments which have been made from time to time, as +seemed appropriate, may be considered pertinent or irrelevant according +to the views of the reader. It is hoped that they are not entirely +aside from the mark, and that they do not interfere with a fair +presentation of the author's views. The last chapter is devoted to a +direct criticism of Professor Dewey's functionalism, with some comments +on the general nature of philosophical method. + +Since this thesis was written, Professor Dewey has published two or +three books and numerous articles, which are perhaps more important than +any of his previous writings. The volume of _Essays in Experimental +Logic_ (1916) is a distinct advance upon _The Influence of Darwin on +Philosophy and Other Essays_, published six years earlier. Most of these +essays, however, are considered here in their original form, and the new +material, while interesting, presents no vital change of standpoint. It +might be well to call attention to the excellent introductory essay +which Professor Dewey has provided for this new volume. Some mention +might also be made of the volume of essays by eight representative +pragmatists, which appeared last year (1917) under the title, _Creative +Intelligence_. My comments on Professor Dewey's contribution to the +volume have been printed elsewhere.[1] It has not seemed necessary, in +the absence of significant developments, to extend the thesis beyond its +original limits, and it goes to press, therefore, substantially as +written two years ago. + +I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the faculty of the Sage +School of Philosophy for many valuable suggestions and kindly +encouragement in the course of my work. I am most deeply indebted to +Professor Ernest Albee for his patient guidance and helpful criticism. +Many of his suggestions, both as to plan and detail, have been adopted +and embodied in the thesis, and these have contributed materially to +such logical coherence and technical accuracy as it may possess. The +particular views expressed are, of course, my own. I wish also to thank +Professor J. E. Creighton especially for his friendly interest and for +many suggestions which assisted the progress of my work, as well as for +his kindness in looking over the proofs. + +D. T. HOWARD. + +EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, +June, 1918. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] "The Pragmatic Method," _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and +Scientific Methods_, 1918, Vol. XV, pp. 149-156. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER PAGE + + I. "Psychology as Philosophic Method" 1 + + II. The Development of the Psychological Standpoint 15 + + III. "Moral Theory and Practice" 33 + + IV. Functional Psychology 47 + + V. The Evolutionary Standpoint 59 + + VI. "Studies in Logical Theory" 72 + + VII. The Polemical Period 88 + +VIII. Later Developments 105 + + IX. Conclusions 119 + + + + +CHAPTER I + +"PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD" + + +Dewey's earliest standpoint in philosophy is presented in two articles +published in _Mind_ in 1886: "The Psychological Standpoint," and +"Psychology as Philosophic Method."[2] These articles appear to have +been written in connection with his _Psychology_, which was published in +the same year, and which represents the same general point of view as +applied to the study of mental phenomena. For the purposes of the +present study attention may be confined to the two articles in _Mind_. + +Dewey begins his argument, in "The Psychological Standpoint," with a +reference to Professor Green's remark that the psychological standpoint +is what marks the difference between transcendentalism and British +empiricism. Dewey takes exception to this view, and asserts that the two +schools hold this standpoint in common, and, furthermore, that the +psychological standpoint has been the strength of British empiricism and +desertion of that standpoint its weakness. Shadworth Hodgson's comment +on this proposal testifies to its audacity. In a review of Dewey's +article, he says: "If for instance we are told by a competent writer, +that Absolute Idealism is not only a truth of experience but one +attained directly by the method of experiential psychology, we should +not allow our astonishment to prevent our examining the arguments, by +virtue of which English psychology attains the results of German +transcendentalism without quitting the ground of experience."[3] + +Dewey defines his psychological standpoint as follows: "We are not to +determine the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical +inquiry by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element +in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related to our mind, +or is an 'idea'.... Or, in the ordinary way of putting it, the nature +of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out +what experience says about them."[4] The implications of this definition +do not appear at first sight, but they become clearer as the discussion +proceeds. + +Locke, Dewey continues, deserted the psychological standpoint because he +did not, as he proposed, explain the nature of such things as matter and +mind by reference to experience. On the contrary, he explained +experience through the assumption of the two unknowable substances, +matter and mind. Berkeley also deserted the psychological standpoint, in +effect, by having recourse to a purely transcendent Spirit. Even Hume +deserted it by assuming as the only reals certain unrelated sensations, +and by trying to explain the origin of experience and knowledge by their +combination. These reals were supposed to exist in independence of an +organized experience, and to constitute it by their association. It +might be argued that Hume's sensations are found in experience by +analysis, and this would probably be true. But the sensations are +nothing apart from the consciousness in which they are found. "Such a +sensation," Dewey says, "a sensation which exists only within and for +experience, is not one which can be used to account for experience. It +is but one element in an organic whole, and can no more account for the +whole, than a given digestive act can account for the existence of a +living body."[5] + +So far Dewey is merely restating the criticism of English empiricism +that had been made by Green and his followers. Reality, as experienced, +is a whole of organically related parts, not a mechanical compound of +elements. Whatever is to be explained must be taken as a fact of +experience, and its meaning will be revealed in terms of its position +and function within the whole. But while Dewey employs the language of +idealism, it is doubtful whether he has grasped the full significance of +the "concrete universal" of the Hegelian school. The following passage +illustrates the difficulty: "The psychological standpoint as it has +developed itself is this: all that is, is for consciousness or +knowledge. The business of the psychologist is to give a genetic +account of the various elements within this consciousness, and thereby +fix their place, determine their validity, and at the same time show +definitely what the real and eternal nature of this consciousness +is."[6] + +Consciousness (used here as identical with 'experience') is apparently +interpreted as a structure made up of elements related in a determinable +order, and having, consequently, a 'real and eternal nature.' The result +is a 'structural' view of reality, and the type of idealism for which +Dewey stands may fittingly be called 'structural' idealism. This type of +idealism does, in fact, hold a position intermediate between English +empiricism and German transcendentalism. But it would not commonly be +considered a synthesis of the best characteristics of the two schools. +'Structural' idealism is, historically considered, a reversion to Kant +which retains the mechanical elements of the _Critique_, but fails to +reckon with the truly organic mode of interpretation in which it +culminates. As experience, from Kant's undeveloped position, is a +structure of sensations and forms, so Dewey's 'consciousness' is a +compound of separate elements or existences related in a 'real and +eternal' order. + +Dewey illustrates his method, in the discussion which follows, by +employing it, or showing how it should be employed, in the definition of +certain typical objects of philosophical inquiry. The first to be +considered are subject and object. In dealing with the relation of +subject to object, the psychological method will attempt to show how +consciousness differentiates itself, or 'specifies' itself, into subject +and object. These terms will be viewed as related terms within the whole +of 'consciousness,' rather than as elements existing prior to or in +independence of the whole in which they are found. + +There is a type of realism which illustrates the opposite or ontological +method. It is led, through a study of the dependence of the mind upon +the organism, to a position in which subject and object fall apart, out +of relation to each other. The separation of the two leads to the +positing of a third term, an unknown _x_, which is supposed to unite +them. The psychological method would hold that the two objects have +their union, not in an unknown 'real,' but in the 'consciousness' in +which they appear. The individual consciousness as subject, and the +objects over against it, are elements at once distinguished and related +within the whole. All the terms are facts of experience, and none are to +be assumed as ontological reals. + +Subjective idealism, Dewey continues, makes a similar error in failing +to discriminate between the ego, or individual consciousness, and the +Absolute Consciousness within which ego and object are differentiated +elements. It fails to see that subject and object are complements, and +inexplicable except as related elements in a larger whole. The +individual consciousness, again, and the universal 'Consciousness,' are +to be defined by reference to experience. It is not to be assumed at the +start, as the subjective idealists assume, that the nature of the +individual consciousness is known. The ego is to be defined, not +assumed, and this is the essence of the psychological method. + +So far, two factors in Dewey's standpoint are clearly discernible. In +the first place, all noumena and transcendent reals are to be rejected +as means of explanation, and definition is to be wholly in terms of +experienced elements, as experienced. In the second place, experience is +to be regarded as a rational system of related elements, while +explanation is to consist in tracing out the relations which any element +bears to the whole. The universal 'Consciousness' is the whole, and the +individual mind, again, is an element within the whole, to be explained +by tracing out the relations which it bears to other elements and to the +whole system. It is not easy to avoid the conclusion that Dewey +conceives of 'consciousness' as a construct of existentially distinct +terms. + +Dewey does not actually treat subject and object, individual and +universal consciousness, in the empirical manner for which he contends. +He merely outlines a method; and, while this has a negative bearing as +against transcendent modes of explanation, it has little content of its +own. But in spite of Dewey's lack of explicitness, it is evident that he +tends to view his 'objects of philosophical inquiry' as so many concrete +particular existences or things. The idea that they can be empirically +marked out and investigated seems to imply this. But subject, object, +individual, and universal are certainly not reducible to particular +sensations, even though it must be admitted that they have a reference +to particulars. These abstract concepts had been a source of difficulty +to the empiricists, because they had not been able to reduce them to +particular impressions, and Dewey's proposed method appears to involve +the same difficulty. + +In his second article, on "Psychology as Philosophic Method," Dewey +proposes to show that his standpoint is practically identical with that +of transcendental idealism. This is made possible, he believes, through +the fact that, since experience or consciousness is the only reality, +psychology, as the scientific account of this reality, becomes identical +with philosophy. + +In maintaining his position, Dewey finds it necessary to criticise the +tendency, found in certain idealists, to treat psychology merely as a +special science. This view of psychology is attained, Dewey observes, by +regarding man under two arbitrarily determined aspects. Taken as a +finite being acting amid finite things, a knowing, willing, feeling +phenomenon, man is said to be the object of a special science, +psychology. But in another aspect man is infinite, the universal +self-consciousness, and as such is the object of philosophy. This +distinction between the two aspects of man's nature, Dewey believes, +cannot be maintained. As a distinction, it must arise within +consciousness, and it must therefore be a psychological distinction. +Psychology cannot limit itself to anything less than the whole of +experience, and cannot, therefore, be a special science dependent, like +others, upon philosophy for its working concepts. On the contrary, the +method of psychology must be the method of philosophy. + +Dewey reaches this result quite easily, because he makes psychology the +science of reality to begin with. "The universe," he says, "except as +realized in an individual, has no existence.... Self-consciousness means +simply an individualized universe; and if this universe has _not_ been +realized in man, if man be not self-conscious, then no philosophy +whatever is possible. If it _has_ been realized, it is in and through +psychological experience that this realization has occurred. Psychology +is the scientific account of this realization, of this individualized +universe, of this self-consciousness."[7] + +It is difficult to understand exactly what these expressions meant for +Dewey. Granting that the human mind is both individual and universal, +what objection could be raised against the study of its individual or +finite aspects as the special subject-matter of a particular science? +All the sciences, as Dewey was aware, are abstract in method. Dewey's +position appears to be that the universal and individual aspects of +consciousness are nothing apart from each other, and must be studied +together. But 'consciousness' in Dewey's view is, in fact, two +consciousnesses. Reality as a whole is a Consciousness, and the +individual mind is another consciousness. A problem arises, therefore, +as to their connection. Dewey affirms that, unless they are united, +unless the universal is given in the individual consciousness, there can +be no science of the whole, and therefore no philosophy. The +epistemological problem of the relation of the mind to reality becomes, +accordingly, the _raison d'être_ of his method. The problem was an +inheritance from subjective idealism. It may be pointed out that there +is some similarity between Dewey's standpoint and Berkeley's. Both +conceive of consciousness as a construct of elements, and Dewey's +'Consciousness in general' holds much the same relation to the finite +consciousness that the Divine Mind holds to the individual consciousness +in Berkeley's system. The similarity between the two standpoints must +not be overemphasized, but it is none the less suggestive and +interesting. + +In attempting to determine the proper status of psychology as a science, +Dewey is led into a more detailed exposition of his standpoint. His +position in general is well indicated in the following passage: "In +short, the real _esse_ of things is neither their _percipi_, nor their +_intelligi_ alone; it is their _experiri_."[8] The science of the +_intelligi_ is logic, and of the _percipi_, philosophy of nature. But +these are abstractions from the _experiri_, the science of which is +psychology. If it be denied that the _experiri_, self-consciousness in +its wholeness, can be the subject-matter of psychology, then the +possibility of philosophy is also denied. "If man, as matter of fact, +does not realise the nature of the eternal and the universal _within_ +himself, as the essence of his own being; if he does not at one stage of +his experience consciously, and in all stages implicitly, lay hold of +this universal and eternal, then it is mere matter of words to say that +he can give no account of things as they universally and eternally are. +To deny, therefore, that self-consciousness is a matter of psychological +experience is to deny the possibility of any philosophy."[9] Dewey +assures us again that his method alone will solve the epistemological +problem. + +Self-consciousness, as that within which things exist _sub specie +æternitatis_ and _in ordine ad universum_, must be the object of +psychology. The refusal to take self-consciousness as an experienced +fact, Dewey says, results in such failures as are seen in Kant, Hegel, +and even Green and Caird, to give any adequate account of the nature of +the Absolute. Kant, for purely logical reasons, denied that +self-consciousness could be an object of experience, although he +admitted conceptions and perceptions as matters of experience. As a +result of his attitude, conception and perception were never brought +into organic connection; the self-conscious, eternal order of the world +was referred to something back of experience. Dewey attributes Kant's +failure to his logical method, which led him away from the psychological +standpoint in which he would have found self-consciousness as a directly +presented fact. + +This criticism of Kant's 'logical method' fails to take account of the +transitional nature of Kant's standpoint. Looking backward, it is easy +enough to ask why Kant did not begin with the organic view of experience +at which he finally arrived. But the answer must be that the organic +standpoint did not exist until Kant, by his 'logical method,' had +brought it to light. The Kantian interpretation of experience, in which, +as Dewey asserts, conception and perception were never brought into +organic relation, is a half-way stage between mechanism and organism. +But how does Dewey propose to improve upon Kant's position? He will +first of all put Kant's noumenal self back into experience, as a fact in +consciousness. But how will this help to bring perception and conception +into closer union? There seems to be no answer. Dewey's view appears to +be that organic relations are achieved whenever an object is made a part +of experience and so brought into connection with other experienced +facts. 'Organic relation' is interpreted as equivalent to 'mental +relation.' But mental relations are not organic because they are mental. +It would be as easy to assert that they are mechanical. The test lies in +the nature of the relations which are actually found in the mental +sphere and the fitness of the organic categories to express them. +Dewey's 'consciousness,' as has been said before, appears to be a +structure, not an organism. Its parts are external to each other, +however closely they may be related. An organic view of experience would +begin with a denial of the actuality of bare facts or sensations, and +would not waver in maintaining that standpoint to the end. + +Hegel's advance upon Kant, Dewey continues, "consisted essentially in +showing that Kant's _logical_ standard was erroneous, and that, as a +matter of logic, the only true criterion or standard was the organic +notion, or _Begriff_, which is a systematic totality, and accordingly +able to explain both itself and also the simpler processes and +principles."[10] The logical reformation which Hegel accomplished was +most important, but the work of Kant still needed to be completed by +"showing self-consciousness as a fact of experience, as well as +perception through organic forms and thinking through organic +principles."[11] This element is latent in Hegel, Dewey believes, but +needs to be brought out. + +T. H. Green comes under the same criticism. He followed Kant's logical +method, and as a consequence arrived at the same negative results. The +nature of self-consciousness remains unknown to Green; he can affirm its +existence, but cannot describe its nature. Dewey quotes that passage +from the _Prolegomena to Ethics_ in which Green says:[12] "As to what +that consciousness in itself or in its completeness is, we can only +make negative statements. _That_ there is such a consciousness is +implied in the existence of the world; but _what_ it is we only know +through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and +interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent +experience." If, Dewey observes, Green had begun with the latter point +of view, and had taken self-consciousness as at least partially realized +in finite minds, he would have been able to make some positive +statements about it. Dewey, however, has not given the most adequate +interpretation of Green's 'Spiritual Principle in Nature.' This was +evidently, for Green, a symbol of the intelligibility of the world as +organically conceived, an order which could not be comprehended by the +mechanical categories, but which was nevertheless real. As Green tended +to hypostatize the organic conception, so Dewey would make it a concrete +reality, with the further specification that it must be something given +to psychological observation. + +The chief point of Dewey's criticism of the idealists is that they fail +to establish self-consciousness as an experienced fact; and, Dewey +maintains, it must be so established if it is to be anything real and +genuine. If it is anything that can be discussed at all, it must be an +element in experience; and if it is in experience, it must be the +subject-matter of psychology. It is inevitable, from Dewey's standpoint, +that transcendentalism should adopt his psychological method. + +In the further development of his standpoint, Dewey considers (1) the +relations of psychology to the special sciences, and (2) the relation of +psychology to logic. Dewey's conception of the relation of psychology to +the special sciences is well illustrated in the following passage: +"Mathematics, physics, biology exist, because conscious experience +reveals itself to be of such a nature, that one may make virtual +abstraction from the whole, and consider a part by itself, without +damage, so long as the treatment is purely scientific, that is, so long +as the implicit connection with the whole is left undisturbed, and the +attempt is not made to present this partial science as metaphysic, or as +an explanation of the whole, as is the usual fashion of our uncritical +so-called 'scientific philosophies.' Nay more, this abstraction of some +one sphere is itself a living function of the psychologic experience. It +is not merely something which it allows: it is something which it +_does_. It is the analytic aspect of its own activity, whereby it +deepens and renders explicit, realizes its own nature.... The analytic +movement constitutes the special sciences; the synthetic constitutes the +philosophy of nature; the self-developing activity itself, as +psychology, constitutes philosophy."[13] + +The special sciences are regarded as abstractions from the central or +psychological point of view, but they are legitimate abstractions, +constituted by a proper analytic movement of the total +self-consciousness, which specifies itself into the special branches of +knowledge. If we begin with any special science, and drive it back to +its fundamentals, it reveals its abstractness, and thought is led +forward into other sciences, and finally into philosophy, as the science +of the whole. But philosophy, first appearing as a special science, +turns out to be science; it is presupposed in all the special sciences, +and is their basis. But where does psychology stand in this +classification? + +At first sight psychology appears to be a special science, abstract like +the others. "As to systematic observation, experiment, conclusion and +verification, it can differ in no essential way from any one of +them."[14] But psychology, like philosophy, turns out to be a science of +the whole. Each special science investigates a special sphere of +conscious experience. "From one science to another we go, asking for +some explanation of conscious experience, until we come to +psychology.... But the very process that has made necessary this new +science reveals also that each of the former sciences existed only in +abstraction from it. Each dealt with some one phase of conscious +experience, and for that very reason could not deal with the totality +which gave it its being, consciousness."[15] Philosophy and psychology +therefore mainly coincide, and the method of psychology, properly +developed, becomes the method of philosophy. + +If psychology is to be identified with philosophy in this fashion, the +mere change of name would seem to be superfluous. There would be no +reason for maintaining psychology as a separate discipline. Perhaps +Dewey did not intend that it should be maintained separately. In that +case, the total effect of his argument would be to prescribe certain +methods for philosophy. It seems necessary to suppose that Dewey +proposed to merge philosophy in psychology, and make it an exact science +while retaining its universality. "Science," he argued, "is the +systematic account, or _reason_ of _fact_; Psychology is the completed +systematic account of the ultimate fact, which, as fact, reveals itself +as reason...."[16] Self-consciousness in its ultimate nature is +conceived of as a special fact, over and above what it includes in the +way of particulars. Psychology, as the science of this ultimate fact, +must at the same time be philosophy. The identification of the two +disciplines depends upon taking the 'wholeness' of reality as a 'fact,' +which can be brought under observation. This is a natural conclusion +from Dewey's structural view of reality. + +In taking up the subject of the relation of psychology to logic, Dewey +remarks that in philosophy matter and form cannot be separated. +"Self-consciousness is the final truth, and in self-consciousness the +form as organic system and the content as organized system are exactly +equal to each other."[17] Logic abstracts from the whole, gives us only +the form, or _intelligi_ of reality, and is therefore only one moment in +philosophy. Since logic is an abstraction from Nature, we cannot get +from logic back to Nature, by means of logic. We do, as a matter of +fact, make the transition in philosophy, because the facts force us back +to Nature. Just as in Hegel's logic, the category of quality, when +pressed, reveals itself as inadequate to express the facts, and is +compelled to pass into the category of quantity, so does logic as a +whole, when pressed, reveal its inadequacy to express the whole of +reality. The transition from category to category in the Hegelian logic +is not an unfolding of the forms as forms, but results from a compulsion +exerted by the facts, when the categories are used to explain them. +Logic is, and must remain, abstract in all its processes, and its +outcome (with Hegel, _Geist_) may assert the abstract necessity of one +self-conscious whole, but cannot give the reality. "Logic cannot reach, +however much it may point to, an actual individual. The gathering up of +the universe into one self-conscious individuality it may assert as +_necessary_, it cannot give it as _reality_."[18] Taken as an abstract +method, logic is apt to result in a pantheism, "where the only real is +the _Idee_, and where all its factors and moments, including spirit and +nature, are real only at different stages or phases of the _Idee_, but +vanish as imperfect ways of looking at things ... when we reach the +_Idee_."[19] + +Dewey has in mind logic as a science of the forms of reality taken in +abstraction from their content. In reality, however, there can be no +logic of concepts apart from their concrete application. Hegel certainly +never believed that it was possible to abstract the logical forms from +reality and study them in their isolation. As against a purely formal +logic, if such a thing were possible, Dewey's criticism would be valid, +but the transcendental logic of his time was not formal in this sense. +The psychological method which Dewey offers as a substitute for the +logical method escapes, he believes, the difficulties of the latter +method. At the same time it preserves, in his opinion, the essential +spirit of the Hegelian method. Dewey's comments show that he conceives +his method to be a restatement, in improved form, of the doctrine of the +'concrete universal.' But the 'psychological method' and the method of +idealism are, if anything, antithetical. An excellent summary of Dewey's +theory is afforded by the following passage: "Only a living actual Fact +can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in +virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being. It is with this +fact, conscious experience in its entirety, that psychology as method +begins. It thus brings to clear light of day the presupposition implicit +in every philosophy, and thereby affords logic, as well as the +philosophy of nature, its basis, ideal and surety. If we have determined +the nature of reality, by a process whose content equals its form, we +can show the meaning, worth and limits of any one moment of this +reality."[20] + +It would be useless to speculate upon the various possible +interpretations that might be given of Dewey's psychological method. The +most critical examination of the text will not dispel its vagueness, nor +afford an answer to the many questions that arise. It does, however, +throw an interesting light on certain tendencies in Dewey's own +thinking. + +Dewey's attempt to show that English empiricism and transcendentalism +have a common psychological basis must be regarded as a failure. That +the nature of the attempt reveals a misunderstanding, or fatal lack of +appreciation, on the part of Dewey, of the critical philosophy and the +later development of idealism by Hegel, has already been suggested. He +does not appear to have grasped the significance of the movement from +Kant to Hegel. Kant, of course, believed that the _a priori_ forms of +experience could be determined by a process of critical analysis, which +would reveal them in their purity. The constitutive relations of +experience were supposed by him to be limited to the pure forms of +sensibility, space and time, and the twelve categories of the +understanding, which, being imposed upon the manifold of sensations, as +organized by the productive imagination, determined once and for all the +order of the phenomenal world. His logic, therefore, as an account of +the forms of experience, would represent logic of the type which Dewey +criticized. But with the rejection of Kant's noumenal world, the +critical method assumed a different import. It was no longer to be +supposed that reality, as knowable, was organized under the forms of a +determinate number of categories, which could be separated out and +classified. Kant's idea that experience was an intelligible system was +retained, but its intelligibility was not supposed to be wholly +comprised in man's methods of knowing it. The instrumental character of +the categories was recognized. Criticism was directed upon the +categories, with the object of determining their validity, spheres of +relevance, and proper place in the system of knowledge. Such a +criticism, in the nature of things, could not deal with the forms of +thought in abstraction from their application. Direct reference to +experience, therefore, became a necessary element in idealism. At the +same time, philosophy became a 'criticism of categories.' The method is +empirical, but never psychological. + +Dewey recognized the need of an empirical method in philosophy, but +failed to show specifically how psychology could deal with philosophical +problems. He appears to have conceived that sensation and meaning, facts +and forms, were present in experience or 'Consciousness,' as if this +were some total understanding which retained the elements in a fixed +union and order. While, according to his method, the forms of this +universal consciousness could not be considered apart from the +particulars in which they inhered, they might be studied by a survey of +experience, a direct appeal to consciousness, in which 'form and content +are equal.' He seems to have held that truth is given in immediate +experience. A study of reality as immediately given, therefore, to +psychological observation, would provide an account of the eternal +nature of things, as they stand in the universal mind. Dewey did not +attempt a criticism of the categories and methods which psychology must +employ in such a task. Had he done so, the advantages of a critical +method might have occurred to him. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] Vol. XI, pp. 1-19; pp. 153-173. + +[3] "Illusory Psychology," _Mind_, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 478. + +[4] "The Psychological Standpoint," _Mind_, 1886, Vol. XI, p. 2. + +[5] _Ibid._, p. 7. + +[6] _Op. cit._, p. 8 f. + +[7] "Psychology as Philosophic Method," _Mind_, 1886, Vol. XI, p. 157. + +[8] _Ibid._, p. 160. (Observe that this is a direct reference to +Berkeley.) + +[9] _Op. cit._ + +[10] _Op. cit._, p. 161. + +[11] _Ibid._ + +[12] Third Edition, p. 54. + +[13] _Mind_, Vol. XI, p. 166 f. + +[14] _Ibid._, p. 166. + +[15] _Ibid._ + +[16] _Op. cit._, p. 170. + +[17] _Ibid._ + +[18] _Op. cit._, p. 172. + +[19] _Ibid._ + +[20] _Op. cit._ + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT + + +The "psychological method," as so far presented, is an outline which +must be developed in detail before its philosophical import is revealed. +For several years following the publication of his first articles in +_Mind_ Dewey was occupied with the task of working out his method in +greater detail, and giving it more concrete form. His thought during +this period follows a fairly regular order of development, which is to +be sketched in the present chapter. + +In 1887 Dewey published in _Mind_ an article entitled "Knowledge as +Idealisation."[21] This article is, in effect, a consideration of one of +the special problems of the "psychological method." If reality is an +eternal and all-inclusive consciousness, in which sensations and +meanings are ordered according to a rational system, what must be the +nature of the finite thought-process which apprehends this reality? In +his previous articles Dewey had proposed the "psychological method" as +an actual mode of investigation, and questions concerning the nature of +the human thought-process naturally forced themselves upon his +attention. + +The thought-process is, to begin with, a relating activity which gives +meaning to experience. Says Dewey: "When Psychology recognizes that the +relating activity of mind is one not exercised _upon_ sensations, but +one which supplies relations and thereby makes meaning (makes +experience, as Kant said), Psychology will be in a position to explain, +and thus to become Philosophy."[22] This statement raises the more +specific question, what is meaning? + +Every idea, Dewey remarks, has two aspects: existence and meaning. +"Recognizing that every psychical fact does have these two aspects, we +shall, for the present, confine ourselves to asking the nature, +function and origin of the aspect of meaning or significance--the +content of the idea as opposed to its existence."[23] The meaning aspect +of the idea cannot be reduced to the centrally excited image existences +which form a part of the existence-aspect of the idea. "I repeat, as +existence, we have only a clustering of sensuous feelings, stronger and +weaker."[24] But the thing is not perceived as a clustering of feelings; +the sensations are immediately interpreted as a significant object. +"Perceiving, to restate a psychological commonplace, is interpreting. +The content of the perception is what is signified."[25] Dewey's +treatment of sensations, at this point, is somewhat uncertain. If it be +a manifold that is given to the act of interpretation, Kant's difficulty +is again presented. The bare sensations taken by themselves mean +nothing, and yet everything does mean something in being apprehended. +The conclusion should be that there is no such thing as mere existence. +Dewey's judgment is undecided on this issue. "It is true enough," he +says, "that without the idea _as existence_ there would be no +experience; the sensuous clustering is a condition _sine qua non_ of +all, even the highest spiritual, consciousness. But it is none the less +true that if we could strip any psychical existence of all its qualities +except bare existence, there would be nothing left, not even existence, +for our intelligence.... If we take out of an experience all that it +_means_, as distinguished from what it _is_--a particular occurrence at +a certain time, there is no psychical experience. The barest fragment of +consciousness that can be hit upon has meaning as well as being."[26] An +interpretation of reality as truly organic would treat mechanical +sensation as a pure fiction. But Dewey clings to 'existence' as a +necessary 'aspect' of the psychical fact. The terms and relations never +entirely fuse, although they are indispensable to each other. There is +danger that the resulting view of experience will be somewhat angular +and structural. + +At one point, indeed, Dewey asserts that there is no such thing as a +merely immediate psychical fact, at least for our experience. "So far is +it from being true that we know only what is _immediately_ present in +consciousness, that it should rather be said that what is _immediately_ +present is never known."[27] But in the next paragraph Dewey remarks: +"That which is immediately present is the sensuous existence; that which +is known is the content conveyed by this existence."[28] The sensation +is not known, and therefore probably not experienced. In this case Dewey +is departing from his own principles, by introducing non-experienced +factors into his interpretation of experience. The language is +ambiguous. If nothing is immediately given, then the sensuous content is +not so given. + +The 'sensuous existences' assumed by Dewey are the ghosts of Kant's +'manifold of sensation.' The difficulty comes out clearly in the +following passage: "It is indifferent to the sensation whether it is +interpreted as a cloud or as a mountain; a danger signal, or a signal of +open passage. The auditory sensation remains unchanged whether it is +interpreted as an evil spirit urging one to murder, or as intra-organic, +due to disordered blood-pressure.... It is not the sensation in and of +itself that means this or that object; it is the sensation as +associated, composed, identified, or discriminated with other +experiences; the sensation, in short, as mediated. The whole worth of +the sensation for intelligence is the meaning it has by virtue of its +relation to the rest of experience."[29] + +There is an obvious parallel between this view of experience and Kant's. +Kant, indeed, transcended the notion that experience is a structure of +sensations set in a frame-work of thought forms; but the first +_Critique_ undoubtedly leaves the average reader with such a conception +of experience. It is unjust to Kant, however, to take the mechanical +aspect of his thought as its most important phase. He stands, in the +opinion of modern critics, at a half-way stage between the mechanism of +the eighteenth century and the organic logic of the nineteenth, and his +works point the way from the lower to the higher point of view. This +was recognized by Hegel and by his followers in England. How does it +happen, then, that Dewey, who was well-read in the philosophical +literature of the day, should have persisted in a view of experience +which appears to assume the externally organized manifold of the +_Critique of Pure Reason_? Or, to put the question more explicitly, why +did he retain as a fundamental assumption Kant's 'manifold of +sensations'? + +So far, Dewey has been concerned with the nature of meaning. He now +turns to knowledge, and the knowing process as that which gives meaning +to experience. Knowledge, or science, he says, is a process of following +out the ideal element in experience. "The idealisation of science is +simply a further development of this ideal element. It is, in short, +only rendering explicit and definite the meaning, the idea, already +contained in perception."[30] But if perception is already organized by +thought, the sensations must have been related in a 'productive +imagination.' Dewey, however, does not recognize such a necessity. The +factor of meaning is ideal, he continues, because it is not present as +so much immediate content, but is present as symbolized or mediated. But +the question may be asked, "Whence come the ideal elements which give to +experience its meaning?" No answer can be given except by psychology, as +an inquiry into the facts, as contrasted with the logical necessity of +experience. + +Sensations acquire meaning through being identified with and +discriminated from other sensations to which they are related. But it is +not as mere existences that they are compared and related, but as +already ideas or meanings. "The identification is of the meaning of the +present sensation with some meaning previously experienced, but which, +although previously experienced, still exists because it _is_ meaning, +and not occurrence."[31] The existences to which meanings attach come +and go, and are new for every new appearance of the idea in +consciousness; but the meanings remain. "The experience, as an existence +at a given time, has forever vanished. Its meaning, as an ideal quality, +remains as long as the mind does. Indeed, its remaining is the +remaining of the mind; the conservation of the ideal quality of +experience is what makes the mind a permanence."[32] + +It is not possible, Dewey says, to imagine a primitive state in which +unmeaning sensations existed alone. Meaning cannot arise out of that +which has no meaning. "Sensations cannot revive each other except as +members of one whole of meaning; and even if they could, we should have +no beginning of significant experience. Significance, meaning, must be +already there. Intelligence, in short, is the one indispensable +condition of intelligent experience."[33] + +Thinking is an act which idealizes experience by transforming sensations +into an intelligible whole. It works by seizing upon the ideal element +which is already there, conserving it, and developing it. It produces +knowledge by supplying relations to experience. Dewey realizes that his +act of intelligence is similar to Kant's 'apperceptive unity.' He says: +"The mention of Kant's name suggests that both his strength and his +weakness lie in the line just mentioned. It is his strength that he +recognizes that an apperceptive unity interpreting sensations through +categories which constitute the synthetic content of self-consciousness +is indispensable to experience. It is his weakness that he conceives +this content as purely logical, and hence as formal."[34] Kant's error +was to treat the self as formal and held apart from its material. "The +self does not work with _a priori_ forms upon an _a posteriori_ +material, but intelligence as ideal (or _a priori_) constitutes +experience (or the _a posteriori_) as having meaning."[35] Dewey's +standpoint here seems to be similar to that of Green. But as Kant's +unity of apperception became for Green merely a symbol of the world's +inherent intelligibility, the latter did not regard it as an actual +process of synthesis. Dewey fails to make a distinction, which might +have been useful to him, between Kant's unity of apperception and his +productive imagination. It is the latter which Dewey retains, and he +tends to identify it with the empirical process of the understanding. +Knowing, psychologically considered, is a synthetic process. "And this +is to say that experience grows as intelligence adds out of its own +ideal content ideal quality.... The growth of the power of comparison +implies not a formal growth, but a synthetic internal growth."[36] +Dewey, of course, views understanding as an integral part of reality's +processes rather than as a process apart, but it is for him a very +special activity, which builds up the meaning of experience. "Knowledge +might be indifferently described, therefore, as a process of +idealisation of experience, or of realisation of intelligence. It is +each through the other. Ultimately the growth of experience must consist +in the development out of itself by intelligence of its own implicit +ideal content upon occasion of the solicitation of sensation."[37] + +The difficulties of Dewey's original position are numerous. The relation +of the self, as a synthetic activity, to the "Eternal Consciousness," in +which meaning already exists in a completed form, is especially +perplexing. Does the self merely trace out the meaning already present +in reality, or is it a factor in the creation of meaning? It is clear +that if the thinking process is a genuinely synthetic activity, imposing +meaning on sensations, it literally 'makes the world' of our experience. +But, on the other hand, if meaning is given to thought, as a part of its +data, the self merely reproduces in a subjective experience the thought +which exists objectively in the eternal mind. The dilemma arises as a +result of Dewey's initial conception of reality as a structure of +sensations and meanings. This conception of reality must be given up, if +the notion of thought as a process of idealization is to be retained. + +In 1888, Dewey's _Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human +Understanding_ appeared, and during the two years following he appears +to have become interested in ethical theory, the results of his study +beginning to appear in 1890. Dewey's ethical theories have so important +a bearing upon his logical theory as to demand special attention. They +will be reserved, therefore, for a separate chapter, and attention will +be given here to the more strictly logical studies of the period. + +The three years which intervened between the publication of the essay on +"Knowledge as Idealisation" and the appearance of an article "On Some +Current Conceptions of the term 'Self,'" in _Mind_ (1890),[38] did not +serve to divert Dewey's attention from the inquiries in which he had +previously been interested. On the contrary, the later article shows how +persistently his mind must have dwelt upon the problems connected with +the notion of the self as a synthetic activity in experience. + +The immediate occasion for the article on the Self was the appearance of +Professor Andrew Seth's work, _Hegelianism and Personality_ (1889). +Dewey appears to have been influenced by Seth at an even earlier +period,[39] and he now found the lectures on Hegel stimulating in +connection with his own problems about thought and reality. + +It will not be necessary to go into the details of Dewey's criticism of +the three ideas of the self presented by Seth. Since it is Dewey's own +position that is in question, it is better to begin with his account of +the historical origin of these definitions, "chiefly as found in Kant, +incidentally in Hegel as related to Kant."[40] Dewey turns to the +'Transcendental Deduction,' and follows Kant's description of the +synthetic unity of apperception. "Its gist," he says, "in the second +edition of the _K.d.r.V._, is the proof that the identity of +self-consciousness involves the synthesis of the manifold of feelings +through rules or principles which render this manifold objective, and +that, therefore, the analytic identity of self-consciousness involves an +objective synthetic unity of consciousness."[41] To say that +self-consciousness is identical is a merely analytical proposition, and, +as it stands, unfruitful. "But if we ask how we know this sameness or +identity of consciousness, the barren principle becomes wonderfully +fruitful."[42] In order to know reality as mine, not only must the +consciousness that it is mine accompany each particular impression, but +each must be known as an element in _one_ consciousness. "The sole way +of accounting for this analytic identity of consciousness is through the +activity of consciousness in connecting or 'putting together' the +manifold of sense."[43] + +In the 'Deduction' of the first _Critique_, Dewey continues, Kant begins +with the consciousness of objects, rather than with the identity of +self-consciousness. Here also consciousness implies a unity, which is +not merely formal, but one which actually connects the manifold of sense +by an act. "Whether, then, we inquire what is involved in mere sameness +of consciousness, or what is involved in an objective world, we get the +same answer: a consciousness which is not formal or analytic, but which +is synthetic of sense, and which acts universally (according to +principles) in this synthesis."[44] + +The term 'Self,' as thus employed by Kant, Dewey says, is the +correlative of the intelligible world. "It is the transcendental self +looked at as 'there,' as a product, instead of as an activity or +process."[45] This, however, by no means exhausts what Kant means by the +self, for while he proceeds in the 'Deduction' as if the manifold of +sense and the synthetic unity of the self were strictly correlative, he +assumes a different attitude elsewhere. The manifold of sense is +something in relation to the thing-in-itself, and the forms of thought +have a reference beyond their mere application to the manifold. In the +other connections the self appears as something purely formal; something +apart from its manifestation in experience. In view of the wider meaning +of the self, Dewey asks, "Can the result of the transcendental deduction +stand without further interpretation?" It would appear that the content +of the self is not the same as the content of the known world. The self +is too great to exhaust itself in relation to sensation. "Sense is, as +it were, inadequate to the relations which constitute +self-consciousness, and thus there must also remain a surplusage in the +self, not entering into the make-up of the known world."[46] This +follows from the fact that, while the self is unconditioned, the +manifold of sensation is conditioned, as given, by the forms of space +and time. "Experience can never be complete enough to have a content +equal to that of self-consciousness, for experience can never escape its +limitation through space and time. Self-consciousness is real, and not +merely logical; it is the ground of the reality of experience; it is +wider than experience, and yet is unknown except so far as it is +reflected through its own determinations in experience,--this is the +result of our analysis of Kant, the _Ding-an-Sich_ being eliminated but +the Kantian method and all presuppositions not involved in the notion of +the _Ding-an-Sich_ being retained."[47] + +Dewey's interpretation of Kant's doctrine as presented in the +'Deductions' is no doubt essentially correct. But granting that Kant +found it necessary to introduce a synthesis in imagination to account +for the unity of experience and justify our knowledge of its relations, +it must not be forgotten that this necessity followed from the nature of +his presuppositions. If the primal reality is a 'manifold of +sensations,' proceeding from a noumenal source, and lacking meaning and +relations, it follows that the manifold must be gathered up into a unity +before the experience which we actually apprehend can be accounted for. +But if reality is experience, possessing order and coherence in its own +nature, the productive imagination is rendered superfluous. Dewey, +however, clings to the notion that thought is a "synthetic activity" +which makes experience, and draws support from Kant for his doctrine. + +Dewey now inquires what relation this revised Kantian conception of the +self bears to the view advanced by Seth, viz., that the idea of +self-consciousness is the highest category of thought and explanation. +Kant had tried to discover the different forms of synthesis, by a method +somewhat artificial to be sure, and had found twelve of them. While +Hegel's independent derivation and independent placing of the categories +must be accepted, it does not follow that the idea of self-consciousness +can be included in the list, even if it be considered the highest +category. "For it is impossible as long as we retain Kant's fundamental +presupposition--the idea of the partial determination of sensation by +relation to perception, apart from its relation to conception--to employ +self-consciousness as a principle of explaining any fact of +experience."[48] It cannot be said of the self of Kant that it is simply +an hypostatized category. "It is more, because the self of Kant ... is +more than any category: it is a real activity or being."[49] + +Hegel, Dewey continues, develops only one aspect of Kant's _Critique_, +that is, the logical aspect, and consequently does not fulfil Kant's +entire purpose. "This is, I repeat, not an immanent 'criticism of +categories' but an analysis of experience into its aspects and really +constituent elements."[50] Dewey, as usual, shows his opposition to a +'merely logical' method in philosophy. He plainly indicates his +dissatisfaction with the Hegelian development of Kant's standpoint. He +is unfair to Hegel, however, in attributing to him a 'merely logical' +method. Kant's self was, as Dewey asserts, something more than a +category of thought, but it is scarcely illuminating to say of Kant that +his purpose was the analysis of experience into its 'constituent +elements.' Kant did, indeed, analyze experience, but this analysis must +be regarded as incidental to a larger purpose. No criticism need be made +of Dewey's preference for the psychological, as opposed to the logical +aspects of Kant's work. The only comment to be made is that this +attitude is not in line with the modern development of idealism. + +The question which finally emerges, as the result of Dewey's inquiry, is +this: What is the nature of this self-activity which is more than the +mere category of self-consciousness? "As long as sensation was regarded +as given by a thing-in-itself, it was possible to form a conception of +the self which did not identify it with the world. But when sense is +regarded as having meaning only because it is 'there' as determined by +thought, just as thought is 'there' only as determining sense, it would +seem either that the self is just their synthetic unity (thus equalling +the world) or that it must be thrust back of experience, and become a +thing-in-itself. The activity of the self can hardly be a third +something distinct from thought and from sense, and it cannot be their +synthetic union. What, then, is it?"[51] Green, Dewey says, attempted to +solve the difficulty by his "idea of a completely realized self making +an animal organism the vehicle of its own reproduction in time."[52] +This attempt was at least in the right direction, acknowledging as it +did the fact that the self is something more than the highest category +of thought. + +Dewey admits his difficulties in a way that makes extended comment +unnecessary. He does not challenge the validity of the Hegelian +development of the Kantian categories, but proposes to make more of the +self than the Hegelians ordinarily do. This synthetic self-activity must +reveal itself as a concrete process; that is one of the demands of his +psychological standpoint. It is impossible to foresee what this process +would be as an actual fact of experience. + +Although the next article which is to be considered does not offer a +direct answer to the problems which have so far been raised, it +nevertheless indicates the general direction which Dewey's thought is to +take. This article, on "The Present Position of Logical Theory," was +published in the _Monist_ in 1891.[53] Dewey appears at this time as the +champion of the transcendental, or Hegelian logic, in opposition to +formal and inductive logic. His attitude toward Hegel undergoes a marked +change at this period. Dewey's general objection to formal logic is well +expressed in the following passage: "It is assumed, in fine, that +thought has a nature of its own independent of facts or subject-matter; +that this thought, _per se_, has certain forms, and that these forms are +not forms which the facts themselves take, varying with the facts, but +are rigid frames, into which the facts are to be set. Now all of this +conception--the notion that the mind has a faculty of thought apart from +things, the notion that this faculty is constructed, in and of itself, +with a fixed framework, the notion that thinking is the imposing of this +fixed framework on some unyielding matter called particular objects, or +facts--all of this conception appears to me as highly scholastic."[54] +The inductive logic, Dewey says, still clings to the notion of thought +as a faculty apart from its material, operating with bare forms upon +sensations. Kant had been guilty of this separation and never overcame +it successfully. Because formal logic views thought as a process apart +from the matter with which it has to deal, it can never be the logic of +science. "For if science means anything, it is that our ideas, our +judgments may in some degree reflect and report the fact itself. Science +means, on one hand, that thought is free to attack and get hold of its +subject-matter, and, on the other, that fact is free to break through +into thought; free to impress itself--or rather to express itself--in +intelligence without vitiation or deflection. Scientific men are true to +the instinct of the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct _a +priori_ factor supplied to fact from the mind. Apriorism of this sort +must seem like an effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of +fact, to bring them under the yoke of fixed, external forms."[55] + +In opposition to this formal, and, as he calls it, subjective standpoint +in logic, Dewey stands for the transcendental logic, which supposes that +there is some kind of vital connection between thought and fact; "that +thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process of +translation from brute impression to lucent meaning."[56] Hegel holds +this view of logic. "This, then, is why I conceive Hegel--entirely apart +from the value of any special results--to represent the quintessence of +the scientific spirit. He denies not only the possibility of getting +truth out of a formal, apart thought, but he denies the existence of any +faculty of thought which is other than the expression of fact +itself."[57] At another place Dewey expresses his view of Hegel as +follows: "Relations of thought are, to Hegel, the typical forms of +meaning which the subject-matter takes in its various progressive stages +of being understood."[58] + +Dewey's defence of the transcendental logic is vigorous. He maintains +that the disrespect into which the transcendental logic had fallen, was +due to the fact that the popular comprehension of the transcendental +movement had been arrested at Kant, and had never gone on to Hegel. + +The objection made to Kant's standpoint is that it treated thought as a +process over against experience, imposing its forms upon it from +without. "Kant never dreams, for a moment, of questioning the existence +of a special faculty of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms. +He states and restates that thought in itself exists apart from fact and +occupies itself with fact given to it from without."[59] While Kant gave +the death blow to a merely formal conception of thought, indirectly, and +opened up the way for an organic interpretation, he did not achieve the +higher standpoint himself. Remaining at the standpoint of Kant, +therefore, the critic of the transcendental logic has much to complain +of. Scientific men deal with facts, look to them for guidance, and must +suppose that thought and fact pass into each other directly, and without +vitiation or deflection. They are correct in opposing a conception which +would interpose conditions between thought on the one hand and the facts +on the other. + +But Hegel is true to the scientific spirit. "When Hegel calls thought +objective he means just what he says: that there is no special, apart +faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind existing separate +from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective thought is the +meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by methods of thought +he understands simply the processes in which this meaning of fact is +evolved."[60] + +If Hegel is true to the scientific spirit; if his logic presupposes that +there is an intrinsic connection of thought and fact, and views science +simply as the progressive realization of the world's ideality, then the +only questions to be asked about his logic are questions of fact +concerning his treatment of the categories. Is the world such a +connected system as he holds it to be? "And, if a system, does it, in +particular, present such phases (such relations, categories) as Hegel +shows forth?"[61] These questions are wholly objective. Such a logic as +Hegel's could scarcely make headway when it was first produced, because +the significance of the world, its ideal character, had not been brought +to light through the sciences. We are now reaching a stage, however, +where science has brought the ideality of the world into the foreground, +where it may become as real and objective a material of study as +molecules and vibrations. + +This appreciation of Hegel would seem to indicate that Dewey has finally +grasped the significance of Hegel's development of the Kantian +standpoint. A close reading of the article, however, dispels this +impression. Dewey believes that he has found in Hegel a support for his +own psychological method in philosophy. It is scarcely necessary to say +that Hegel's standpoint was anything but psychological. Dewey has +already given up Kant; he will presently desert Hegel. A psychological +interpretation of the thought-process in its relations to reality is not +compatible with the critical method in philosophy. + +In the next article to be examined, "The Superstition of Necessity," in +the _Monist_ (1893),[62] Dewey begins to attain the psychological +description of thought at which he had been aiming. This article was +suggested, as Dewey indicates in a foot-note, by Mr. C. S. Pierce's +article, "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," in the _Monist_ +(1892).[63] Although Dewey acknowledges his indebtedness to Pierce for +certain suggestions, the two articles have little in common. + +Dewey had consistently maintained that thought is a synthetic activity +through which reality is idealized or takes on meaning. It is from this +standpoint that he approaches the subject of necessity. The following +passage reveals the connection between his former position and the one +that he is now approaching: "The whole, although first in the order of +reality, is last in the order of knowledge. The complete statement of +the whole is the goal, not the beginning of wisdom. We begin, therefore, +with fragments, which are taken for wholes; and it is only by piecing +together these fragments, and by the transformation of them involved in +this combination, that we arrive at the real fact. There comes a stage +at which the recognition of the unity begins to dawn upon us, and yet, +the tradition of the many distinct wholes survives; judgment has to +combine these two contradictory conceptions; it does so by the theory +that the dawning unity is an effect necessarily produced by the +interaction of the former wholes. Only as the consciousness of the unity +grows still more is it seen that instead of a group of independent +facts, held together by 'necessary' ties, there is one reality, of which +we have been apprehending various fragments in succession and +attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence. We learn (but +only at the end) that instead of discovering and then connecting +together a number of separate realities, we have been engaged in the +progressive definition of one fact."[64] + +Dewey adds to his idea that our knowledge of reality is a progressive +development of its implicit ideality through a synthetic +thought-process, the specification that the process of idealization +occurs in connection with particular crises and situations. There comes +a stage, he says, when unity begins to dawn and meaning emerges. +Necessity is a term used in connection with these transitions from +partial to greater realization of the world's total meaning. Necessity +is a middle term, or go-between. It marks a critical stage in the +development of knowledge. No necessity attaches to a whole, as such. +"_Qua_ whole, the fact simply is what it is; while the parts, instead of +being necessitated either by one another or by the whole, are the +analyzed factors constituting, in their complete circuit, the +whole."[65] But when the original whole breaks up, through its inability +to comprehend new facts under its unity, a process of judgment occurs +which aims at the establishment of a new unity. "The judgment of +necessity, in other words, is exactly and solely the transition in our +knowledge from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis. +Its value is just the value of this transition; as negating the old +partial and isolated judgments--in its backward look--necessity has +meaning; in its forward look--with reference to the resulting completely +organized subject-matter--it is itself as false as the isolated +judgments which it replaces."[66] We say that things must be so, when we +do not know that they are so; that is, while we are in course of +determining what they are. Necessity has its value exclusively in this +transition. + +Dewey attempts to show, in a discussion which need not be followed in +detail, that there is nothing radical in his view, and that it finds +support among the idealists and empiricists alike. Thinkers of both +schools (he quotes Caird and Venn) admit that the process of judgment +involves a change in objects, at least as they are for us. There is a +transformation of their value and meaning. "This point being held in +common, both schools must agree that _the progress of judgment is +equivalent to a change in the value of objects_--that objects as they +are for us, as known, change with the development of our judgments."[67] +Dewey proposes to give a more specific description of this process of +transformation, and especially, to show how the idea of necessity is +involved in it. + +The process of transformation is occasioned by practical necessity. Men +have a tendency to take objects as just so much and no more; to attach +to a given subject-matter these predicates, and no others. There is a +principle of inertia, or economy, in the mind, which leads it to +maintain objects in their _status quo_ as long as possible. "There is no +doubt that the reluctance of the mind to give up an object once made +lies deep in its economies.... I wish here to call attention to the fact +that the forming of a number of distinct objects has its origin in +practical needs of our nature. The analysis and synthesis which is first +made is that of most practical importance...."[68] We tend to retain +such objects as we have, and it is not until "the original +subject-matter has been overloaded with various and opposing predicates +that we think of doubting the correctness of our first judgments, of +putting our first objects under suspicion."[69] Once the Ptolemaic +system is well established, cycles and epicycles are added without +number, rather than reconstruct the original object. When, finally, we +are compelled to make some change, we tend to invent some new object to +which the predicates can attach. "When qualities arise so incompatible +with the object already formed that they cannot be referred to that +object, it is easier to form a new object on their basis than it is to +doubt the correctness of the old...."[70] Let us suppose, then, that +under stress of practical need, we refer the new predicates to some new +object, and have, as a consequence, two objects. (Dewey illustrates this +situation by specific examples.) This separation of the two objects +cannot continue long, before we begin to discover that the two objects +are related elements in a larger whole. "The wall of partition between +the two separate 'objects' cannot be broken at one attack; they have to +be worn away by the attrition arising from their slow movement into one +another. It is the 'necessary' influence which one exerts upon the other +that finally rubs away the separateness and leaves them revealed as +elements of one unified whole."[71] + +The concept of necessity has its validity in such a movement of judgment +as has been described. "Necessity, as the middle term, is the mid-wife +which, from the dying isolation of judgments, delivers the unified +judgment just coming into life--it being understood that the +separateness of the original judgments is not as yet quite negated, nor +the unity of the coming judgment quite attained."[72] The judgment of +necessity connects itself with certain facts in the situation which are +immediately concerned with our practical activities. These are facts +which, before the crisis arises, have been neglected; they are elements +in the situation which have been regarded as unessential, as not yet +making up a part of the original object. "Although after our desire has +been met they have been eliminated as accidental, as irrelevant, yet +when the experience is again desired their integral membership in the +real fact has to be recognized. This is done under the guise of +considering them as means which are necessary to bring about the +end."[73] We have the if so, then so situation. "_If_ we are to reach an +end we _must_ take certain means; while so far as we want an undefined +end, an end in general, conditions which accompany it are mere +accidents."[74] The end of this process of judgment in which necessity +appears as a half-way stage, is the unity of reality; a whole into which +the formerly discordant factors can be gathered together. + +Only a detailed study of the original text, with its careful +illustrations, can furnish a thorough understanding of Dewey's position. +Enough has been said, however, to show that this psychological account +of the judgment process is a natural outgrowth of his former views, and +that, as it stands, it is still in conformity with his original +idealism. The article as a whole marks a half-way stage in Dewey's +philosophical development. Looking backward, it is a partial fulfilment +of the demands of "The Psychological Standpoint." It is a psychological +description of the processes whereby self-consciousness specifies itself +into parts which are still related to the whole. Looking forward, it +forecasts the functional theory of knowledge. We have, to begin with, +objects given as familiar or known experiences. So long as these are not +put under suspicion or examined, they simply are themselves, or are +non-cognitionally experienced. But on the occasion of a conflict in +experience between opposed facts and their meanings, a process of +judgment arises, whose function is to restore unity. It is in this +process of judgment as an operation in the interests of the unity of +experience, that the concepts, necessity and contingency, have their +valid application and use. They are instruments for effecting a +transformation of experience. This is the root idea of functional +instrumentalism. It is apparent, therefore, that Dewey's later +functionalism resulted from the natural growth and development of the +psychological standpoint which he adopted at the beginning of his +philosophical career. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[21] Vol. XII, pp. 382-396. + +[22] _Ibid._, p. 394. + +[23] _Op. cit._, p. 383. + +[24] _Ibid._ + +[25] _Ibid._, p. 384. + +[26] _Ibid._ + +[27] _Op. cit._, p. 385. + +[28] _Ibid._ + +[29] _Ibid._, p. 388. + +[30] _Op. cit._, p. 390. + +[31] _Ibid._, p. 392. + +[32] _Op. cit._ + +[33] _Ibid._, p. 393. + +[34] _Ibid._, p. 394. + +[35] _Ibid._, p. 395. + +[36] _Op. cit._ + +[37] _Ibid._, p. 396. (The last sentence forecasts Dewey's later +contention that knowing is a specific act operating upon the occasion of +need.) + +[38] Vol. XV, pp. 58-74. + +[39] See _Mind_, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 170. + +[40] _Ibid._, p. 63. + +[41] _Ibid._ + +[42] _Ibid._, p. 64. + +[43] _Op. cit._ + +[44] _Ibid._, p. 65. + +[45] _Ibid._ + +[46] _Op. cit._, p. 67. + +[47] _Ibid._, p. 68. + +[48] _Op. cit._, p. 70. + +[49] _Ibid._, p. 71. + +[50] _Ibid._ + +[51] _Op. cit._, p. 73. + +[52] _Ibid._ + +[53] Vol. II, pp. 1-17. + +[54] _Op. cit._, p. 4. + +[55] _Ibid._, p. 12. + +[56] _Ibid._, p. 3. + +[57] _Ibid._, p. 14. + +[58] _Ibid._, p. 13. + +[59] _Op. cit._, p. 11. + +[60] _Ibid._, p. 12 f. + +[61] _Op. cit._, p. 14. + +[62] Vol. III, pp. 362-379. + +[63] Vol. II, pp. 321-337. + +[64] _The Monist_, Vol. III, 1893, p. 364. + +[65] _Ibid._, p. 363. + +[66] _Op. cit._ + +[67] _Ibid._, p. 364 f. + +[68] _Ibid._, p. 367. + +[69] _Ibid._, p. 366. + +[70] _Op. cit._, p. 367. + +[71] _Ibid._, p. 368. + +[72] _Ibid._, p. 363. + +[73] _Op. cit._, p. 372. + +[74] _Ibid._ + + + + +CHAPTER III + +"MORAL THEORY AND PRACTICE" + + +Dewey's ethical theory, as has already been indicated, stands in close +relation to his general theory of knowledge. Since it has been found +expedient to treat the ethical theory separately, it will be necessary +to go back some two years and trace it from its beginnings. The order of +arrangement that has been chosen is fortunate in this respect, since it +brings into close connection two articles which are really companion +pieces, in spite of the two-year interval which separates them. These +are "The Superstition of Necessity," which was considered at the close +of the last chapter, and "Moral Theory and Practice," an article +published in _The International Journal of Ethics_, in January, +1891.[75] This latter article, now to be examined, is one of Dewey's +first serious undertakings in the field of ethical theory, and probably +represents some of the results of his study in connection with his +text-book, _Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics_, published in the +same year (1891). + +The immediate occasion for the article is explained by Dewey in his +introductory remarks: "In the first number of this journal four writers +touch upon the same question,--the relation of moral theory to moral +practice."[76] The four writers mentioned were Sidgwick, Adler, +Bosanquet, and Salter. None of them, according to Dewey, had directly +discussed the relation of moral theory to practice. "But," he says, +"finding the subject touched upon ... in so many ways, I was led to +attempt to clear up my own ideas."[77] + +There seems to exist, Dewey continues, "the idea that moral theory is +something other than, or something beyond, an analysis of conduct,--the +idea that it is not simply and wholly 'the theory of practice.'"[78] It +is often defined, for instance, as an inquiry into the metaphysics of +morals, which has nothing to do with practice. But, Dewey believes, +there must be some intrinsic connection between the theory of morals and +moral practice. Such intrinsic connection may be denied on the ground +that practice existed long before theory made its appearance. Codes of +morality were in existence before Plato, Kant, or Spencer rose to +speculate upon them. This raises the question, What is theory? + +Moral theory is nothing more than a proposed act in idea. It is insight, +or perception of the relations and bearings of the contemplated act. "It +is all one with moral _insight_, and moral insight is the recognition of +the relationships in hand. This is a very tame and prosaic conception. +It makes moral insight, and therefore moral theory, consist simply in +the everyday workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures +drygoods, drives nails, sells wheat, and invents the telephone."[79] The +nature of theory as idea is more definitely described. "It is the +construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. _It +is, therefore, the doing,--the act itself, in its emerging._"[80] + +Theory is practice in idea, or as foreseen; it is the perception of what +ought to be done. This, at least, is what moral theory is. Dewey's +demand that fact and theory must have some intrinsic connection, +unsatisfied in the articles reviewed in the previous chapter, is met +here by discovering a connecting link in _action_. Theory is "_the +doing,--the act itself in its emerging_." The reduction of thought to +terms of action, here implied, is a serious step. It marks a new +tendency in Dewey's speculation. Dewey does not claim, in the present +article, that his remarks hold good for all theory. "Physical science," +he remarks, "does deal with abstractions, with hypothesis. It says, 'If +this, then that.' It deals with the relations of conditions and not with +facts, or individuals, at all. It says, 'I have nothing to do with your +concrete falling stone, but I can tell you this, that it is a law of +falling bodies that, etc.'"[81] But moral theory is compelled to deal +with concrete situations. It must be a theory which can be applied +directly to the particular case. Moral theory cannot exist simply in a +book. Since, moreover, there is no such thing as theory in the abstract, +there can be no abstract theory of morals. + +There can be no difficulty, Dewey believes, in understanding moral +theory as action in idea. All action that is intelligent, all conduct, +that is, involves theory. "For any _act_ (as distinct from mere impulse) +there must be 'theory,' and the wider the act, the greater its import, +the more exigent the demand for theory."[82] This does not, however, +answer the question how any particular moral theory, the Kantian, the +Hedonistic, or the Hegelian, is related to action. These systems +present, not 'moral ideas' as explained above, but 'ideas about +morality.' What relation have ideas about morality to specific moral +conduct? + +The answer to this question is to be obtained through an understanding +of the nature of the moral situation. If an act is moral, it must be +intelligent; as moral conduct, it implies insight into the situation at +hand. This insight is obtained by an examination and analysis of the +concrete situation. "This is evidently a work of analysis. Like every +analysis, it requires that the one making it be in possession of certain +working tools. I cannot resolve this practical situation which faces me +by merely looking at it. I must attack it with such instruments of +analysis as I have at hand. _What we call moral rules are precisely such +tools of analysis._"[83] The Golden Rule is such an instrument of +analysis. Taken by itself, it offers no direct information as to what is +to be done. "The rule is a counsel of perfection; it is a warning that +in my analysis of the moral situation (that is, of the conditions of +practice) I be impartial as to the effects on me and thee.'"[84] Every +rule which is of any use at all is employed in a similar fashion. + +But this is not, so far, a statement of the nature of moral theory, +since only particular rules have been considered. Ethical theory, in its +wider significance, is a reflective process in which, as one might say, +the 'tools of analysis' are shaped and adapted to their work. These +rules are not fixed things, made once and for all, but of such a nature +that they preserve their effectiveness only as they are constantly +renewed and reshaped. Ethical theory brings the Golden Rule together +with other general ideas, conforms them to each other, and in this way +gives the moral rule a great scope in practice. All moral theory, +therefore, is finally linked up with practice. "It bears much the same +relation to the particular rule as this to the special case. It is a +tool for the analysis of its meaning, and thereby a tool for giving it +greater effect."[85] In ethical theory we find moral rules in the +making. Ideas about morals are simply moral ideas in the course of being +formed. + +Dewey presents here an instrumental theory of knowledge and concepts. +But it differs widely from the instrumentalism of the Neo-Hegelian +school both in its form and derivation. Dewey reaches his +instrumentalism through a psychological analysis of the judgment +process. He finds that theory is related to fact through action, and +since he had been unable to give a concrete account of this relationship +at a previous time, the conclusion may be regarded as a discovery of +considerable moment for his philosophical method. Dewey's +instrumentalism rests upon a very special psychological interpretation, +which puts action first and thought second. Unable to discover an overt +connection between fact and thought, he delves underground for it, and +finds it in the activities of the nervous organism. This discovery, he +believes, solves once and for all the ancient riddle of the relation of +thought to reality. + +In the concluding part of the article Dewey takes up the consideration +of moral obligation. "What is the relation of knowledge, of theory, to +that Ought which seems to be the very essence of moral conduct?"[86] The +answer anticipates in some measure the position which was taken later, +as has been seen, in regard to necessity. The concept of obligation, +like that of necessity, Dewey believes, has relevance only for the +judgment situation. "But," Dewey says, "limiting the question as best I +can, I should say (first) that the 'ought' always rises from and falls +back into the 'is,' and (secondly) that the 'ought' is itself an +'is,'--the 'is' of action."[87] Obligation is not something added to the +conclusion of a judgment, something which gives a moral aspect to what +had been a coldly intellectual matter. The 'ought' finds an integral +place in the judgment process. "The difference between saying, 'this act +is the one to be done, ...' and saying, 'The act _ought_ to be done,' is +merely verbal. The analysis of action is from the first an analysis of +what is to be done; how, then, should it come out excepting with a 'this +should be done'?"[88] The peculiarity of the 'ought' is that it applies +to conduct or action, whereas the 'is' applies to the facts. It has +reference to doing, or acting, as the situation demands. "This, then, is +the relation of moral theory and practice. Theory is the cross-section +of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should +be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: in is theory in +action."[89] + +The parallel between this article and "The Superstition of Necessity" is +too obvious to require formulation, and the same criticism that applies +to the one is applicable to the other. "The Superstition of Necessity" +is more detailed and concrete in its treatment of the judgment process +than this earlier article, as might be expected, but the fundamental +position is essentially the same. The synthetic activity of the self, +the thought-process, finally appears as the servant of action, or, more +exactly, as itself a special mode of organic activity in general. + +From the basis of the standpoint which he had now attained Dewey +attempted a criticism of Green's moral theory, in two articles in the +_Philosophical Review_, in 1892 and 1893. The first of these, entitled +"Green's Theory of the Moral Motive,"[90] appeared almost two years +after the article on "Moral Theory and Practice." The continuity of +Dewey's thought during the intervening period, however, is indicated by +the fact that the first four pages of the article to be considered are +given over to an introductory discussion which repeats in almost +identical terms the position taken in "Moral Theory and Practice." Dewey +himself calls attention to this fact in a foot-note. + +There must be, Dewey again asserts, some vital connection of theory with +practice. "Ethical theory must be a general statement of the reality +involved in every moral situation. It must be action stated in its more +generic terms, terms so generic that every individual action will fall +within the outlines it sets forth. If the theory agrees with these +requirements, then we have for use in any special case a tool for +analyzing that case; a method for attacking and reducing it, for laying +it open so that the action called for in order to meet, to satisfy it, +may readily appear."[91] Dewey argues that moral theory cannot possibly +give directions for every concrete case, but that it by no means follows +that theory can stand aside from the specific case and say: "What have I +to do with thee? Thou art empirical, and I am the metaphysics of +conduct." + +Dewey's preliminary remarks are introductory to a consideration of +Green's ethical theory. "His theory would, I think," Dewey says, "be +commonly regarded as the best of the modern attempts to form a +metaphysic of ethic. I wish, using this as type, to point out the +inadequacy of such metaphysical theories, on the ground that they fail +to meet the demand just made of truly ethical theory, that it lend +itself to translation into concrete terms, and thereby to the guidance, +the direction of actual conduct."[92] Dewey recognizes that Green is +better than his theory, but says that the theory, taken in logical +strictness, cannot meet individual needs. + +Dewey makes a special demand of Green's theory. He demands, that is, +that it supply a body of rules, or guides to action which can be +employed by the moral agent as tools of analysis in cases requiring +moral judgment. It is evident in advance that Green's theory was built +upon a different plan, and can not meet the conditions which Dewey +prescribes. The general nature of Green's inquiry is well stated in the +following summary by Professor Thilly: "The truth in Green's thought is +this: the purpose of all social devotion and reform is, after all, the +perfection of man on the spiritual side, the development of men of +character and ideals.... The final purpose of all moral endeavor must be +the realization of an attitude of the human soul, of some form of noble +consciousness in human personalities.... It is well enough to feed and +house human bodies, but the paramount question will always be: What +kinds of souls are to dwell in these bodies?"[93] To put the matter in +more technical terms, Green is concerned with ends and values. His +question is not, What is the best means of accomplishing a given +purpose, but, What end is worth attaining? Such an inquiry has no +immediate relation to action. It may lead to conclusions which become +determining factors in action, but the process of inquiry has no direct +reference to conduct. Dewey, having reduced thought to a function of +activity, must proceed, by logical necessity, to carry the same +reduction into the field of theory in general. This he does in thorough +style. His demand that moral theory shall concern itself with concrete +and 'specific' situations is a result of the same tendency. Since action +can only be described as response to a 'situation,' thought, as a +function of activity, must likewise be directed upon a 'situation.' +Conduct in general and values in general become impossible under his +system, because there is no such thing as an activity-in-general of the +organism. Ends, in other words, exist only for thought, when thought is +interpreted as transcending action, and being, in some sense, +self-contained. When thought is interpreted as a kind of 'indirect +activity,' its capacity for metaphysical inquiry vanishes along with its +independence. + +It would have been more in keeping with sound criticism had Dewey +himself taken note of the important divergence in aim and intent between +his work and Green's. As a consequence of his failure to do so, he +fails, necessarily, to do justice to Green's standpoint. The criticism +which he directs against Green's moral theory may be briefly summed up +as follows. + +Green tends to repeat the Kantian separation of the self as reason from +the self as want or desire. "The dualism between reason and sense is +given up, indeed, but only to be replaced by a dualism between the end +which would satisfy the self as a unity or whole, and that which +satisfies it in the particular circumstances of actual conduct."[94] As +a consequence of the separation of the ideal from the actual, no action +can satisfy the whole self, and thus no action can be truly moral. "No +thorough-going theory of total depravity ever made righteousness more +impossible to the natural man than Green makes it to a human being by +the very constitution of his being...."[95] Dewey traces this separation +of the self as reason from the self as desire through those passages in +which Green describes the moral agent as one who distinguishes himself +from his desires (Book II, _Prolegomena to Ethics_). "The process of +moral experience involves, therefore, a process in which the self, in +becoming conscious of its want, objectifies that want by setting it over +against itself; distinguishing the want from self and self from want.... +Now this theory so far might be developed in either of two +directions."[96] + +In the first place, the self-distinguishing process may be an activity +by means of which the self specifies its own activity and satisfaction. +"The particular desires and ends would be the modes in which the self +relieved itself of its abstractness, its undeveloped character, and +assumed concrete existence.... The unity of the self would stand in no +opposition to the particularity of the special desire; on the contrary, +the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires would be the +synthetic and analytic aspects of one and the same reality, neither +having any advantage metaphysical or ethical over the other!"[97] But +Green, unfortunately, does not develop his theory in this concrete +direction. The self does not specify itself in the particulars, but +remains apart from them. "The objectification is not of the self in the +special end; but the self remains behind setting the special object over +against itself as not adequate to itself.... The unity of the self sets +up an ideal of satisfaction for itself as it withdraws from the special +want, and this ideal set up through negation of the particular desire +and its satisfaction constitutes the moral ideal. It is forever +unrealizable, because it forever negates the special activities through +which alone it might, after all, realize itself."[98] In completing this +argument Dewey refers to certain well-known passages in the _Prolegomena +to Ethics_, in which Green states that the moral ideal is never +completely attainable. Green's abstract conception of the self as that +which forever sets itself over against its desires is, Dewey argues, not +only useless as an ideal for action, but positively opposed to moral +striving. "It supervenes, not as a power active in its own satisfaction, +but to make us realize the unsatisfactoriness of such seeming +satisfactions as we may happen to get, and to keep us striving for +something which we can never get!"[99] The most that can be made of +Green's moral ideal is to conceive it as the bare form of unity in +conduct. Employed as a tool of analysis, as a moral rule, it might tell +us, "Whatever the situation, seek for its unity." But it can scarcely go +even as far as this in the direction of concreteness, for it says: "_No_ +unity can be found in the situation because the situation is particular, +and therefore set over against the unity."[100] + +Most students of Green would undoubtedly say that this account of his +moral theory is entirely one-sided, and fails to reckon with certain +elements which should properly be taken into account. In the first +place, Green is defining the moral agent as he finds him, and is +reporting what seems to him a fact when he says that the moral ideal is +too high to be realized in this life. Having a spiritual nature, man +fails to find satisfaction in the goods of natural life. Dewey should +address himself to the facts in refuting Green's analysis of human +nature. In the second place, with respect to Green's separation of the +self as unity from the self as a manifold of desires, Dewey's criticism +may be flatly rejected. Green raises the question himself: "'Do you +mean,' it may be asked, 'to assert the existence of a mysterious +abstract entity which you call the self of a man, apart from all his +particular feelings, desires, and thoughts--all the experience of his +inner life?'"[101] Green takes time to state his position as clearly as +possible. He repudiates the idea of an abstract self apart from desire. +The following passage is typical of his remarks: "Just as we hold that +our desires, feelings, and thoughts would not be what they are--would +not be those of a man--if not related to a subject which distinguishes +itself from each and all of them; so we hold that this subject would not +be what it is, if it were not related to the particular feelings, +desires, and thoughts, which it thus distinguishes from and presents to +itself."[102] It will be remembered also, that in moral action the agent +identifies himself with his desires, or adopts them as his own, and the +ability to do this is the chief mark of human intelligence. But man +could not identify himself with his desires, or 'specify himself in +them,' as Dewey says, did he not at the same time have the capacity to +differentiate himself from them. + +Dewey's further remarks on Green's ideal need not be followed in detail, +since they rest upon a misapprehension of Green's purpose, and add +little to what he has already said. Taking the moral ideal as something +that can never be realized in this life, Dewey inquires what use can be +made of it. He considers three modes in which Green might have given +content to the ideal, as a working principle, and finds that it cannot +be made, in any of these ways, to serve as a tool of analysis. Green was +not prepared to meet these 'pragmatic' requirements. He did not propose +his ideal as a principle of conduct, in Dewey's sense; he stated that, +as a matter of fact, man is more than natural, and that, as such a +being, his ideals can never be completely met by natural objects. How +man is to act, in view of his spiritual nature, is a further question: +but the realization which the individual has of his own spiritual nature +must of necessity be a large factor in the determination of his conduct. +The 'Spiritual Nature,' in Green's terminology, meant a 'not-natural' +nature, and 'not-natural' in turn meant a nature that is not definable +in mechanical or biological terms. Dewey's criticism, therefore, went +wide of the mark. + +In November, 1893, Dewey followed his criticism of Green's moral motive +by a second article in the _Philosophical Review_ on "Self-realization +as the Moral Ideal."[103] It continues the criticism which has already +been made of Green, but from a different point of departure. + +The idea of self-realization in ethics, Dewey begins, may be helpful or +harmful according to the way in which the ideas of the self and its +realization are worked out in the concrete. The mere idea of a self to +be realized is, of course, abstract; it is merely the statement of a +problem, which needs to be worked out and given content. By way of +introducing his own idea of self-realization, Dewey proposes to +criticize a certain conception of the self which he finds in current +discussion. "The notion which I wish to criticize," he says, "is that of +the self as a presupposed fixed _schema_ or outline, while realization +consists in the filling up of this _schema_. The notion which I would +suggest as substitute is that of the self as always a concrete +_specific_ activity; and, therefore, (to anticipate) of the identity of +self and realization."[104] Such a presupposed fixed self is to be found +in Green's "Eternally complete Consciousness." + +The idea of self-realization implies capacities or possibilities. To +translate capacity into actuality, as the conception of the fixed self +seems to do, is to vitiate the whole idea of possibility. There must, +then, be some conception of unrealized powers which will meet this +difficulty. The way to a valid conception is through the realization +that capacities are always specific. "The capacities of a child, for +example, are not simply of _a_ child, not of a man, but of _this_ child, +not of any other."[105] Whatever else capacity may be, whether infinite +or not, it must be an element in an actual situation. As specific +things, moreover, capacities reside in activities, which are now going +on. The capacity of a child to become a musician consists in this fact: +"Even _now_ he has a certain quickness, vividness, and plasticity of +vision, a certain deftness of hand, and a certain motor coördination by +which his hand is stimulated to work in harmony with his eye."[106] + +How do these specific, actual activities come to be called capacities? +There is a peculiar psychological reason for this which James has +pointed out, in his statement that essence "is that _which is so +important for my interests_ that, comparatively, other properties may be +omitted."[107] When we pay attention to any activity, there is a natural +tendency to select only that portion of it that is of immediate +interest, and to exclude the rest as irrelevant. "In the act of vision, +for example," Dewey tells us, "the thing that seems nearest us, that +which claims continuously our attention, is the eye itself. We thus come +to abstract the eye from all special acts of seeing; we make the eye the +_essential_ thing in sight, and conceive of the circumstances of vision +as indeed _circumstances_; as more or less accidental concomitants of +the permanent eye."[108] There is no eye in general; the eye is always +given along with other circumstances which in their totality make up a +concrete seeing situation. Nevertheless, we abstract the eye from other +circumstances and set it up as the essence of seeing. But we cannot +retain the eye in absolute abstraction, because the concrete +circumstances of vision force themselves upon the attention. So we lump +these together on the other side as a new object, and take as their +essence the vibrations of ether. "_The eye now becomes the capacity of +seeing; the vibrations of ether, conditions required for the exercise of +the capacity._"[109] We keep the two abstractions, but try to restore +the unity of the situation through taking one as capacity and the other +as the condition of the exercise of capacity. + +But we cannot stop even with this double abstraction. "The eye in +general and the vibrations in general do not, even in their unity, +constitute the act of vision. A multitude of other factors are +included."[110] Preserving the original 'core' as capacity, we tend to +treat all the attendant circumstances which occur frequently enough to +require taking account of, as conditions which help realize the +abstracted reality called capacity. + +The discussion here is very much like that in "The Superstition of +Necessity" (published in the same year), which was reviewed in the last +chapter. Dewey calls attention to this connection in a foot-note, +remarking that he has already developed at greater length "the idea that +necessity and possibility are simply the two correlative abstractions +into which the one reality falls apart during the process of our +conscious apprehension of it."[111] The danger, Dewey says, is that the +merely relative character of a given capacity may be overlooked, and +that it may be ontologized into a fixed entity. This is the error, he +thinks, into which Green fell. The ideal self, as that which capacity +may realize, is ontologized into an already existent fact. Then we get a +separation between the present self, as capacity, and the ideal self +which is to be realized. The self already realized is opposed to the +self as yet ideal. "This 'realized self' is no reality by itself; it is +simply our partial conception of the self erected into an entity. +Recognizing its incomplete character, we bring in what we have left out +and call it the 'ideal self.' Then by way of dealing with the fact that +we have not two selves here at all, but simply a less and a more +adequate insight into the same self, we insert the idea of one of these +selves realizing the other."[112] It is in this manner that error +arises. + +But what is the correct attitude toward the self? First of all, the self +must be conceived as "a working, practical self, carrying within the +rhythm of its own process both 'realized' and 'ideal' self. The current +ethics of the self ... are too apt to stop with a metaphysical +definition, which seems to solve problems in general, but at the expense +of the practical problems which alone really demand or admit +solution."[113] The first point of the argument is that the self +activity is individual, concrete, and specific, here and now, and the +second point is that if the self is to be talked of in an intelligent +way it must be taken as something empirically given. "The whole point is +expressed when we say that no possible future activities or conditions +have anything to do with the present action except as they enable us to +take deeper account of the present activity, to get beyond the mere +superficies of the act, to see it in its totality."[114] The phrase, +'realize yourself,' is a direction for knowledge; it means, see the +wider consequences of your act, realize its wider bearings. + +Dewey says: "The fixed ideal is as distinctly the bane of ethical +science today as the fixed universe of mediævalism was the bane of the +natural science of the Renascence."[115] This is a strong statement, +which indicates how wide was the gulf which now separated Dewey from +Green, whom he formerly acknowledged as his master. + +Dewey's interpretation of Green's ideal self is far from satisfactory, +largely because of its lack of insight and appreciation. The reduction +of thought to a 'form of activity' renders a purely theoretical inquiry +impossible. The 'present activity,' the biological situation, becomes +the measure of all things, even of thought. Ideals, in his own words, +have nothing to do with present action, "except as they enable us to +take deeper account of the present activity." Dewey's self and Green's +are incommensurable. The former is the biological organism, with a +capacity for indirect activity called thinking; the latter is a +not-natural being, whose reality escapes the logic of descriptive +science, because of the fulness of its content. Dewey's failure to +understand this difference is significant. His acquaintance with Green +seems to have been formal from the beginning, never intimate, and the +articles just reviewed mark the end of Dewey's idealistic discipleship. +His psychological idealism, in fact, was fundamentally antithetical to +the Neo-Hegelianism which he had sought to espouse, and the development +of his own standpoint brought out the vital differences which had been +hidden from his earlier understanding. The idealism which seeks to view +reality together and as a whole is forever incompatible with a method +which seeks to interpret the whole in terms of one of its parts. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[75] Vol. I, pp. 186-203. + +[76] _Ibid._, p. 186. + +[77] _Ibid._ + +[78] _Op. cit._, p. 187. + +[79] _Ibid._, p. 188. + +[80] _Ibid._ + +[81] _Ibid._, p. 191 f. + +[82] _Op. cit._, p. 189. + +[83] _Ibid._, p. 194. Author's Italics. + +[84] _Ibid._ + +[85] _Op. cit._, p. 195. + +[86] _Ibid._, p. 198. + +[87] _Op. cit._ + +[88] _Ibid._, p. 202. + +[89] _Ibid._, p. 203. + +[90] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. I, 1892, pp. 593-612. + +[91] _Op. cit._, p. 596. + +[92] _Ibid._, p. 597. + +[93] _History of Philosophy_, p. 555. + +[94] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. I, 1892, p. 598. + +[95] _Ibid._ + +[96] _Ibid._, p. 599. + +[97] _Ibid._ Compare with the passage in "Psychology as Philosophic +Method," _Mind_, Vol. XI, p. 9. + +[98] _Op. cit._, p. 600. + +[99] _Ibid._, p. 601. + +[100] _Ibid._, p. 602. + +[101] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, third ed., p. 103. + +[102] _Ibid._, p. 104. + +[103] Vol. II, pp. 652-664. + +[104] _Ibid._, p. 653. + +[105] _Ibid._, p. 655. + +[106] _Op. cit._, p. 656. + +[107] _Ibid._, p. 657. + +[108] _Ibid._ + +[109] _Ibid._, p. 658. Author's italics. + +[110] _Ibid._ + +[111] _Op. cit._, note. + +[112] _Ibid._, p. 663. + +[113] _Ibid._ + +[114] _Op. cit._, p. 659. + +[115] _Ibid._, p. 664. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY + + +It now becomes necessary to review that period of Dewey's philosophical +career which is marked by the definite abandonment of the idealistic +standpoint, and the adoption of the method of instrumental pragmatism. +It has already been seen that there is a close connection between the +"functionalism" which now begins to appear, and the "Psychological +Standpoint" set forth in the preceding pages of this review. It is not +possible, however, to account for all the elements which contribute to +this development. Dewey was active in many fields and received +suggestions from many sources. It seems best, in dealing with this +period, to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" and avoid _a priori_ +speculation on the factors which determined the precise form of Dewey's +mature standpoint in philosophy. + +Dewey had always kept in mind the idea that the synthetic activity +whereby self-consciousness evolves the ideality of the world must +operate through the human organism. He had frequently referred to +Green's saying that the Eternal Self-Consciousness reproduces itself in +man, and to similar notions in Caird and Kant; but he had never +considered, in a detailed way, how the organism might serve as the +vehicle for such a process. His ethical theory, with its analysis of +individuality into capacity and environment, tended to bring the +body-world relationship into the foreground, and the idea that theory is +relative to action tended to emphasize still more the relation of +thought to the bodily processes. Dewey finally discovers the basis upon +which the synthetic activity of the self, the thought process, may be +described empirically and concretely. +Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the key-stone of his theory +of knowledge. Thought is interpreted as a function of the organism, +biologically considered, and the biological psychology which results +from this mode of interpretation is commonly known as 'functional +psychology.' + +The functional psychology is presented in a series of articles in the +_Philosophical Review_ and the _Psychological Review_, published between +1894 and 1898. The most important of these is "The Reflex Arc Concept in +Psychology," published in the _Psychological Review_ in 1896.[116] Since +it is the only article in the series which gives a complete view of the +theory, it will be made the basis for the discussion of the functional +theory of psychology. + +The reflex arc concept in psychology, Dewey says, recognizes that the +sensory-motor arc is to be taken as the unit of nerve structure, and the +type of nerve function. But psychologists do not avail themselves of the +full value of this conception, because they still retain in connection +with it certain distinctions which were used in the older psychology. +"The older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current +dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions; the older +dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of +stimulus and response."[117] These rigid distinctions must be set aside, +and the separated elements must be viewed as elements in one +sensory-motor coördination. Each is to be defined, not as something +existing by itself, but as an element functioning in a concrete whole of +activity. Thus, if we are to study vision, we must first take vision as +a sensory-motor coördination, the act of seeing, and within the whole we +may then be able to distinguish certain elements, sensations, or +movements, and define them according to their function in the total act +of seeing. The reflex arc idea, as commonly employed, takes sensation as +stimulus, and movement as response, as if they were actually separate +existences, apart from a coördination. Response is said to follow +sensation, but it is forgotten that the sensation which preceded was +correlated with a response, and that the response which follows is also +correlated with sensation. Sound, for instance, is not a mere sensation +in itself, apart from sensory-motor coördination. Hearing is an act, and +while sound may, for purposes of study, be abstracted from the total, it +is not, in itself, independent of the total act of hearing. + +"But, in spite of all this, it will be urged, there is a distinction +between stimulus and response, between sensation and motion. Precisely; +but we ought now to be in a condition to ask of what nature is the +distinction, instead of taking it for granted as a distinction somehow +lying in the existence of the facts themselves."[118] The distinction +which is to be made between them must be made on a teleological basis. +"The fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of +existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of +function, or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an +end."[119] There are two kinds of teleological distinction that can be +made between stimulus and response, or rather, the teleological +interpretation has two phases. + +In the first place, it may be assumed that all of man's activity +furthers some general end, as, for instance, the maintenance of life. +Then man's activity may be viewed as a sequence of acts, which tend to +further this end, and on this basis we may separate out stimulus and +response. "It is only when we regard the sequence of acts _as if_ they +were adapted to reach some end that it occurs to us to speak of one as +stimulus and the other as response. Otherwise, we look at them as a +_mere_ series."[120] In these cases the stimulus is as truly an act as +the response, and what we have is a series of sensory-motor +coördinations. Looking, for instance, is a sensory-motor coördination +which is the stimulus or antecedent of another coördinated act, running +away. The first coördination passes into the second, and the second may +be viewed as a modification or reconstitution of the first. + +But this external teleological distinction between sensation and +response is not so important as the distinction now to be made. So far +only fixed coördinations, habitual modes of action, have been +considered. But there are situations in which habitual responses and +fixed modes of action fail: situations in which new habits are formed. +In these situations there arises a special distinction between stimulus +and response, for in these formative situations the stimuli and +responses are consciously present in experience as such. "The circle is +a coördination, some of whose members have come into conflict with each +other. It is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution +which occasions, which affords the genesis of, the conscious distinction +into sensory stimulus on one side and motor response on the other."[121] +The distinction which arises between stimulus and response is a +distinction of function within the problematical situation. Suppose that +a sound is heard, the character of which is uncertain, and which, as a +coördination, does not readily pass into its following coördination, or +habitual response. The sound is puzzling, and moves into the center of +attention. It is fixed upon, abstracted, studied on its own account. In +that event, the sound may be spoken of as a sensation. As a sensation, +it is the datum of a reflective process of thought, or conscious +inference, whose aim is to constitute the sound a stimulus, or, in other +words, to find what response belongs to it. When this response is +determined the problem is done with and sensory-motor unity is achieved. + +The stimulus, in these cases, is simply "that phase of activity +requiring to be defined in order that a coördination may be +completed."[122] It is not any particular existence, and is not to be +taken as an element apart from others, having an independent existence. +But the conscious process of attending to the sensation and finding a +response to it arises only when coördination is disturbed by conflicting +factors, and the separation of stimulus from response arises only as a +means for bringing unity into the coördination. The sensation, then, is +that element which is to be attended to; upon which further response +depends. This phase of the teleological interpretation defines each +element by the part which it plays in the reflective process. + +If this brief summary of the article is difficult to comprehend, a +reading of the original text will do little towards making it more +intelligible. The doctrine presented there, however, is simple and +coherent enough when its bearings and purpose are once understood, and, +at the risk of being over-elaborate, it seems advisable to attempt some +remarks on the general bearing and applications of the theory. + +It must be remembered that Dewey is seeking an interpretation of the +thought process which shall reveal it as an actual fact of experience. A +thought which is apart from experience and not _in_ it, which is shut up +to the contemplation of its own mental states is, by its definition, +non-experienced. It is, like Kant's 'productive imagination,' formative +of experience, but not a part of it. Dewey holds to the belief that +experience must be explained in terms of itself; he would do away with +all transcendental factors in the explanation of reality. But modern +psychological theory, Dewey believes, tends to shut thought in to the +contemplation of its own subjective states, and thus gives it an +extra-experiential status. A stimulus is said to strike upon an end +organ, which sends an impulse to the cortex and there gives rise to a +sensation which, as the effect of a stimulus, is representative of the +real, but not real in itself. Thought, again, interprets the sensation, +and sends out a motor impulse appropriate to the situation. These mental +states and the thought which interprets them are, in Dewey's mind, +wholly fictitious. The problem, then, is to give an account of the +perceptual processes which shall eliminate the artificial states of mind +and present mental operations as natural processes. + +The difficulty with customary psychological explanation is that it +breaks the reflex arc of the nervous system into three parts whose +relations are successive and causal rather than simultaneous and +organic. There is not first a stimulus, then perception, then response; +these processes are supplementary, not separate. Or, from another point +of view, psychological explanation must begin with a whole process +which, when analyzed, is seen to contain the three moments or phases: +stimulus, sensation, and response. The whole process is primary and +actual, the abstracted phases are secondary and derivative. + +With the disappearance of the mechanical interpretation of the +perceptual process, mental states vanish. Representative perceptionism +is thus done away with, together with all the problems which it +generates. + +The position of conscious, or reflective thought, in Dewey's scheme, is +especially interesting. This mode of thought is not constantly +operative, but arises only in situations of stress and strain, when +habitual modes of response break down. A dualism is established between +reflective thought and the habitual life processes. Dewey does not take +the ground that these processes are supplementary, as he had done in the +case of stimulus, sensation, and response. It will be remembered that +Dewey had defined judgment, in his logical and ethical writings of an +earlier period, as a special activity operating in critical situations. +This conception of judgment is now carried over into his psychology, and +given a biological basis. It is worth noting that this view of judgment +was worked out in logical terms before it was reinforced by biological +data. Nevertheless, it is through biology that Dewey is able to give his +interpretation of the thought process that empirical concreteness which +he demanded from the beginning, but achieved very slowly. + +The value of the functional psychology, considered merely as psychology, +is undeniable. It is, in fact, a natural and almost inevitable step in +the development of psychological theory. Dewey's achievement consists in +the establishment of an organic mode of interpretation in psychology, +intended to displace the mechanical interpretation. The mechanical +causal series is displaced by an organic system of internally related +parts. Dewey, however, does not display any interest in the logical +aspects of his doctrine. He takes the biological situation literally, as +a fact empirically given, and to be accepted without criticism. + +A discussion of the period now under consideration would not be complete +without reference to certain articles which supplement the essay +discussed above. The first of these is an article on "The Psychology of +Effort," published in the _Philosophical Review_ in 1897.[123] + +It is not proposed to follow the argument of this article in detail, but +to center attention upon those parts of it, especially the concluding +pages, which have a special interest in connection with the subject +under discussion. Dewey returns, in this article, to the situation of +effort at adjustment; to the situation in which an effort is made to +determine the proper response to a stimulus. The opening pages are +devoted, in the first place, to a discussion of the distinction between +conscious effort and the mere expenditure of energy or effort as it +appears to an outsider, and, in the second place, to maintaining, by +means of examples, the proposition that the sense of effort is +sensationally mediated. "How then does, say, a case of perception with +effort differ from a case of 'easy' or effortless perception? The +difference, I repeat, shall be wholly in sensory quale; but in _what_ +sensory quale?"[124] + +The conscious sense of effort arises, Dewey answers, when there is a +rivalry or conflict between two sensational elements in experience. "In +the case of felt effort, certain sensory quales, usually fused, fall +apart in consciousness, and there is an alternation, an oscillation, +between them, accompanied by a disagreeable tone when they are apart, +and an agreeable tone when they become fused again."[125] These two sets +of sensory elements have each a significance in terms of adjustment; one +of them is a correlate of a habit, or fixed mode of response, and the +other is an intruder which resists absorption into, or fusion with, the +dominant images of the current habit or purpose. The same idea of a +natural tendency to persist in a habitual mode of regarding things was +met with in the last two chapters, and is qualified here by the addition +of the idea that each sensory element represents a typical mode of +response on the part of the organism. Dewey illustrates his notion by +the case of learning to ride a bicycle. "Before one mounts one has +perhaps a pretty definite visual image of himself in balance and in +motion. This image persists as a desirability. On the other hand, there +comes into play at once the consciousness of the familiar motor +adjustments,--for the most part, related to walking. The two sets of +sensations refuse to coincide, and the result is an amount of stress and +strain relevant to the most serious problems of the universe."[126] In +another passage, which brings out even more clearly the rivalry of the +two sets of sensations, he says: "It means that the activity already +going on (and, therefore, reporting itself sensationally) resists +displacement, or transformation, by or into another activity which is +beginning, and thus making its sensational report."[127] + +The sense of effort, then, reduces itself to an awareness of conflict +between two sensational elements and their motor correlates. +"Practically stated, this means that effort is nothing more, and also +nothing less, than tension between means and ends in action, and that +the sense of effort is the awareness of this conflict."[128] + +The important aspect of Dewey's argument, for the present discussion, is +that awareness reduces to these sensational elements and their +attributes. Throughout the article Dewey is opposing his sensational +view of the sense of effort to what he calls the 'spiritual' or +non-sensational view, which supposes that the sense of effort is +something purely psychical, which accompanies the expenditure of +physical energy. The consciousness of effort, Dewey says, is not +something added to the effort, but is itself a certain condition +existing in the sensory quales. + +This provision would make it necessary to identify consciousness, and, +therefore, conscious inference, with the tensional situation which has +been described. This being granted, all that pertains to conscious +inference, all the methods and categories of science, would be +applicable only in such situations of stress and strain; they would +appear simply as instruments for effecting a readjustment; they would be +employed exclusively in the interests of action. This is the direction +in which Dewey is tending. No criticism of this treatment of judgment +need be made at this time, beyond pointing out that it presents itself, +at first sight, as an awkward and indirect mode of describing the +relations between organic activity and intelligence, and between +psychology and logic. + +Nothing has so far been said of the historical sources of Dewey's +theory, and these may be briefly considered. There are at least two +sources which must be taken into account: the James-Lange theory of the +emotions, and the Neo-Hegelian ethical theory. The latter has already +been considered to some extent, as it manifests itself in Dewey's own +ethical theory, but its relation to his psychology has not been +indicated. In his text-book, the _Outlines of a Critical Theory of +Ethics_ (1891), Dewey advanced certain ideas for which he claimed +originality, at least in treatment. Among these was the analysis of +individuality into function including capacity and environment.[129] + +Bradley appears to have been the first among English philosophers to +introduce that synthesis of the internal and external, of the +intuitional and utilitarian modes of judging conduct, which became +characteristic of Neo-Hegelian ethics. The synthesis, of course, is +Hegelian in temper, and the _Ethical Studies_ are much more suggestive, +in general method, of the _Philosophie des Rechts_ than of any previous +English work. Utilitarianism tended to judge the moral act by its +external, _de facto_ results; intuitionism, on the contrary, attributed +morality to the will of the agent. The former found morality to consist +in a certain state of affairs, the latter in a certain internal +attitude. According to the synthetic point of view, these opposed +ethical systems are one-sided representations of the moral situation, +each being true in its own way. To state the matter in another form, the +moral act has a content as well as a purpose. "Let us explain," says +Bradley. "The moral world, as we said, is a whole, and has two sides. +There is an outer side, systems and institutions, from the family to the +nation; this we may call the body of the moral world. And there must +also be a soul, or else the body goes to pieces; every one knows that +institutions without the spirit of them are dead.... We must never let +this out of our sight, that, where the moral world exists, you have and +you must have these two sides."[130] Dewey expresses the same idea in a +more detailed fashion. "What do we mean by individuality? We may +distinguish two factors--or better two aspects, two sides--in +individuality. On one side it means special disposition, temperament, +gifts, bent, or inclination; on the other side it means special station, +situation, limitations, surroundings, opportunities, etc. Or, let us +say, it means _specific capacity_ and _specific environment_. Each of +these elements apart from the other, is a bare abstraction, and without +reality. Nor is it strictly correct to say that individuality is +contributed by these two factors _together_. It is, rather, as intimated +above, that each is individuality looked at from a certain point of +view, from within and from without."[131] It is a fact, empirically +demonstrable, according to Dewey, that body and object, intention and +foreseen consequence, interest and environment, attitude and +objectivity, are parts of one another and of the whole moral situation. +Each is relative to the other. "It is not, then, the environment as +physical of which we are speaking, but as it appears to consciousness, +as it is affected by the make-up of the agent. This is the _practical_ +or _moral_ environment."[132] When this relation of the inner to the +outer is taken literally and universally, we have the essence of the +functional psychology. Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the +catch-word of instrumental pragmatism. + +The other source of Dewey's psychology, which is now to be considered, +is the James-Lange theory of the emotions. The connection here is more +obvious, but perhaps not so vital, as in the case of the ethical theory. +From the numerous references which Dewey made to James's _Principles of +Psychology_ (1890), it is evident that he was much impressed with this +work. The theory of emotion there presented seems to have had a special +interest for him; so much so that he made it the subject of two articles +in the _Psychological Review_, in 1894 and 1895, under the general +title, "The Theory of Emotion."[133] These studies bear a very close +relation to the article on "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" +(1896), the standpoint being essentially the same, although developed in +reference to a technical problem. Some indications may be given here of +the relationships which they bear to the James-Lange theory on the one +side, and functional psychology on the other. The James-Lange theory is +itself concerned with order and connection between emotional states, +perceptions, and responses. James says: "Our natural way of thinking +about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact +excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter +state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the +contrary, is that _the bodily changes follow directly the perception of +the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they +occur IS the emotion_."[134] It is all a question, James says, of the +order and sequence of these elements, and his contention is that the +bodily changes should be interposed between the two mental states. This +is the question with which Dewey's functional psychology is also +concerned, the relation of response to stimulus, and the manner in which +a stimulus is determined by a reaction 'into it.' Dewey's theory rises +so naturally out of James's theory of the emotions as to seem but little +more than its universal application. + +This connection is revealed in several passages in Dewey's study of the +emotions. It is said, for instance, that the emotional situation must be +taken as a whole, as a state, for instance, of 'being angry.' The +several constituents of the state of anger, idea or object, affect or +emotion, and mode of expression or behavior, are not to be taken +separately, but all together as elements in one whole.[135] Another +characteristic doctrine appears in the affirmation that the emotional +attitude is to be distinguished from other attitudes by certain special +features which it possesses. Particularly, it involves a special +relation of stimulus to response.[136] Again, there is a tendency to +translate meaning in terms of projected activity. "The consciousness of +our mode of behavior as affording data for other possible actions +constitutes an objective or ideal content."[137] + +It is enough, perhaps, to reveal these two sources as probable factors +in the development of Dewey's psychological method. No speculation upon +them is necessary. At most, they were merely contributory to Dewey's +thought, and by fitting in with his previous ideas enabled him to give a +more concrete presentation of his psychological theory than would +otherwise have been possible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[116] Vol. III, pp. 357-370. + +[117] _Ibid._, p. 357. + +[118] _Op. cit._, p. 365. + +[119] _Ibid._ + +[120] _Ibid._, p. 366, note. + +[121] _Op. cit._, p. 370. + +[122] _Ibid._, p. 368. + +[123] Vol. VI, pp. 43-56. + +[124] _Op. cit._, p. 46. + +[125] _Ibid._, p. 48. + +[126] _Op. cit._, p. 50. + +[127] _Ibid._, p. 52. + +[128] _Ibid._, p. 51. + +[129] _Op. cit._, p. viii. + +[130] _Ethical Studies_, p. 160 f. + +[131] _Outlines of Ethics_, p. 97. + +[132] _Ibid._, p. 99. + +[133] Vol. I, pp. 553-569; Vol. II, pp. 13-32. + +[134] _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, p. 449. + +[135] _Psy. Rev._, Vol. II, p. 15 f. + +[136] _Ibid._, p. 24 f. + +[137] _Ibid._, p. 24. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE EVOLUTIONARY STANDPOINT + + +Dewey's psychology is linked up with his logical theory, as has already +been suggested, through the interpretation of the thought-process as a +mode of adjustment involving inference. This conception of thought +implies, of course, that thought is an instrument of adaptation, and +this in turn suggests that the organ of reflection is a product of +evolutionary forces operating on the individual and on the race. In the +period now to be reviewed Dewey, for the first time in his career, +displays an active and intense interest in evolutionary theory, +especially as applied in the fields of ethics and psychology. + +An article published in the _Monist_, in 1898, on "Evolution and +Ethics,"[138] deserves special attention. The central thought of the +article is to be found in the following passage: "The belief that +natural selection has ceased to operate [in the human sphere] rests upon +the assumption that there is only one form of such selection: that where +improvement is indirectly effected by the failure of species of a +certain type to continue to reproduce; carrying with it as its +correlative that certain variations continue to multiply, and finally +come to possess the land. This ordeal by death is an extremely important +phase of natural selection, so called.... However, to identify this +procedure absolutely with selection, seems to me to indicate a somewhat +gross and narrow vision. Not only is one form of life as a whole +selected at the expense of other forms, _but one mode of action in the +same individual is constantly selected at the expense of others_. There +is not only the trial by death, but there is the trial by the success or +failure of special acts--the counterpart, I suppose, of physiological +selection so called."[139] We have here a refinement upon the doctrine +of natural selection. The keynote of Dewey's new psychology is a +process of selection constantly occurring within the individual +organism. He points out that, in dealing with man, we have a highly +adaptable, not merely a highly adapted animal. "It is certainly implied +in the idea of natural selection that the most effective modes of +variation should themselves be finally selected."[140] The capacity to +vary, or adapt, is highly developed in man. Through these variations, +the organism is able to react against the environment, changing its +character quite completely. The environment of the modern human is +tremendously complicated by his reaction upon it. "The growth of +science, its application in invention to industrial life, the +multiplication and acceleration of means of transportation and +intercommunication, have created a peculiarly unstable +environment."[141] Under these conditions, the ability of the individual +to adapt himself to changing circumstances is largely determined by his +degree of flexibility in the selection of right acts and responses. "In +the present environment, flexibility of function, the enlargement of the +range of uses to which one and the same organ, grossly considered, may +be put, is a great, almost the supreme, condition of success."[142] The +human mind is to be interpreted as a highly developed organ whose +special function is to make adaptation more flexible and response more +varied and discriminating. "That which was 'tendency to vary' in the +animal is conscious foresight in man. That which was unconscious +adaptation and survival in the animal, taking place by the 'cut and try' +method until it worked itself out, is with man conscious deliberation +and experimentation."[143] + +This view of consciousness is worked out on the basis of an evolutionary +metaphysics. Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the changing +whirl of things, stimulated into action by his needs and wants, adapting +himself to conditions, making the situation over, or meeting it +habitually where he can and suffering the consequences where he cannot +make the necessary adjustment. If this be taken, as would seem, for the +ultimate truth about reality and man's place in it, it must be called a +metaphysics. Against this background Dewey's logical theory is +developed. The most important result, from the standpoint of the student +of mind and spirit, is the reduction of self-conscious reflection to the +position of a nervous function of the organism. The purely theoretical +evidence by which this position is sustained should be subjected to +closer scrutiny than can be undertaken in this limited space. + +The purpose of reflection, then, is to enable man to adapt himself to +his environment, understanding by the environment the whole of the +reality which surrounds him. The test of the mind and its newly +projected modes of response [ideas] lies in its ability to meet the +demands of the situation. The capacities and limits of mind are +determined by the purpose for which it was evolved; it can enable a man +to deal more effectively with his environment; it can do nothing else. +It cannot speculate on the nature of reality as such, nor voyage on long +journeys in search of truth! Its business is practical, here and now. +Its problems are always set for it by circumstances, and these +circumstances are concrete and specific. There is no such thing as +adaptation at large or in general. + +The business of mind is to have, and to continually reconstruct, useful +habits. So Dewey assures the American Psychological Association in 1899, +in an address on "Psychology and Social Practice."[144] We must +recognize, he says, "that the existing order is determined neither by +fate nor by chance, but is based on law and order, on a system of +existing stimuli and modes of reaction, through knowledge of which we +can modify the practical outcome."[145] Psychology uninterpreted, he +says, will never provide ready-made materials and prescriptions for the +ethical life. "But science, both physical and psychological, makes known +the conditions upon which certain results depend, and therefore puts at +the disposal of life a certain method of controlling them."[146] These +statements show the extent to which Dewey's view of knowledge has come +to be controlled by biological conceptions. + +The evolutionary method is investigated in considerable detail in the +next article to be considered, which was published in two parts in the +_Philosophical Review_, 1902, under the title, "The Evolutionary Method +as Applied to Morality."[147] + +The fact that some philosophers deny the importance of the evolutionary +method for ethics, holding that morality is purely a matter of value, +and that the evolutionary method tends only to obscure differences of +value, makes it necessary to inquire into the import and nature of this +method. "Anyway," Dewey says, "before we either abuse or recommend +genetic method we ought to have some answers to these questions: Just +what is it? Just what is to come of it and how?"[148] + +The experimental method in science has at least some of the traits of a +genetic method. The nature of water, for instance, cannot be determined +by simply observing it. But experiment brings to light the exact +conditions under which it came into being and therefore explains it. +"Through generating water we single out the precise and sole conditions +which have to be fulfilled that water may present itself as an +experienced fact. If this case be typical, then the experimental method +is entitled to rank as genetic method; it is concerned with the manner +or process by which anything comes into experienced existence."[149] + +Some would deny this, on the ground that a genuinely historical event +occupies a particular place in a historical series, from which it is +inseparable, while in experimental science the sets or pairs of terms +are not limited to any particular place in a historical series, but +occur and recur. "Water is made over and over again, and, so to speak, +at any date in the cosmic series. This deprives any account of it of +genuinely historic quality."[150] Again, it might be said in opposition +to treating the experimental method as a genetic method, that it is +interested in individual cases not as such, but as samples or instances. +The particular case is only an illustration of the general relation +which is being sought. + +It will turn out in the course of the discussion, Dewey says, that, +although science deals with origins, it is not, in strictness, a +historical discipline. The distinction between the historical and other +sciences is based on an abstraction, which has been introduced for the +sake of more adequate control. It is only by abstraction that we get the +pairs of facts that may show up at any time, and by abstraction we +attribute to them a generalized character. The facts, in themselves, are +historic. + +There is no such thing as water in general, but water is just this +water, at this time, in this place, and it never shows itself twice, +never recurs. The scientist must deal, therefore, with particular +historic cases of water, and with their specific origins. "Experiment +has to do with the conditions of production of a specific amount of +water, at a specific time and place, under specific circumstances: in a +word, it must deal with just _this_ water. The conditions which define +its origin must be stated with equal definiteness and +circumstantiality."[151] The instance has as definite a place in an +historical series as has Julius Caesar. But the difference in treatment +of the water and Caesar is due to the difference in interest. "Julius +Caesar served a purpose which no other individual, at any other time, +could have served. There is a peculiar flavor of human meaning and +accomplishment about him which has no substitute or equivalent. Not so +with water. While each portion is absolutely unique in its occurrence, +yet one lot will serve our intellectual or practical needs just as well +as any other."[152] For this reason the specific case of water is not +dealt with on its own account, but only as giving insight into the +processes of its generation in general. In this way the difference +arises between the generalized statements of physical science and the +individualized form demanded in historical science. The abstract +character of the physical result is recognized by the hypothetical form +of judgment in modern logic; if certain conditions, then certain +consequences. But the counterpart of this must not be forgotten, that +every categorical proposition applies to an individual. Experimental +propositions, therefore, have an historical value. "They take their +rise in, and they find their application to, a world of unique and +changing things: an evolutionary universe."[153] The recognition of the +historical character of experimental science does not in any way +derogate from its value, but, properly understood, gives a deeper +insight into its significance. It should be observed that here also +Dewey treats thought, hypothesis, as coming 'after something, and for +the sake of something.' + +This attempt to justify the historical method by showing that it is +implied in physical experiment is of dubious value. Its net result would +seem to be the conclusion that every fact may be dealt with either as a +historical fact or as a datum for physical science. Even here, however, +Dewey slurs over certain difficulties which demand close scrutiny. The +treatment of individuality is most unsatisfactory. While each portion or +instance of water is itself, and has its own unquestionable uniqueness, +no case is a mere particular, but each is a true individual, which means +that it is, as it occurs, an instance of a general phenomenon. While the +scientist must deal with specific cases of water, he has no regard for +their particularity, but chooses them as instances, and is from first to +last occupied with their typical characteristics. The historian, also, +selects relevant and representative instances, in so far as his history +is interpretative and not mere narrative. + +A merely factual account of a series of events is not science, and never +could be. + +Dewey now turns to the ethical field, with the purpose of showing that +the historical method in ethics does for this science precisely what the +experimental method does for other sciences. "History offers to us the +only available substitute for the isolation and for the cumulative +recombination of experiment. The early periods present us in their +relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial +operation of an experiment: following the phenomenon into the more +complicated and refined form which it assumes later, is a substitute for +the synthesis of the experiment."[154] Hydrogen and oxygen are the +historical antecedents of water, whose synthesis the scientist +observes, and so the more primitive forms of conduct are the elements +which the moralist traces in their process of becoming fused into the +present social fabric. Primitive social practices cannot be artificially +isolated, like the physical elements, but they can be traced to their +historical origins, and their interweaving towards present complex +conditions can be observed. + +The historical method is subject to two misunderstandings, Dewey says, +one by the empiricists and materialists, the other by the idealists. The +former, having isolated the primitive facts, suppose them to have a +superior logical and existential value. "The earlier is regarded as +somehow more 'real' than the later, or as furnishing the quality in +terms of which the reality of all the later must be stated."[155] The +later is looked upon as simply a recombination of the earlier +existences. "Writers who ought to know better tell us that if we only +had an adequate knowledge of the 'primitive' state of the world, if we +only had some general formula by which to circumscribe it, we could +deduce down to its last detail the entire existing constitution of the +world, life, and society."[156] The primitive elements, however, take on +new qualities on entering into new combinations. Water is more than +hydrogen and oxygen. There is a similar process intervening between the +earlier and the later in the moral field, of which the primitive state +and the present are merely end terms. Actual study must take account of +the whole process. + +The idealistic fallacy is of the opposite nature. It takes the final +term of the process to be exclusively real. "The later reality is, +therefore, to him the persistent reality in contrast with which the +first forms are, if not illusions, at least poor excuses for being.... +It is enough for present purposes to note that we have here simply a +particular case of the general fallacy just discussed--the emphasis of a +particular term of the series at the expense of the process operative in +reference to all terms."[157] The true reality is the whole process, +which is represented in empiricism only by the primitive terms, and in +idealism only by the end terms. Only a historical method can deal with +it in its entirety. + +In summing up the advantages of the historical method, Dewey says that +it gives a complete account of the origin and development of ethical +ideas, opinions, beliefs, and practices. "It is concerned with the +origin and development of these customs and ideas; and with the question +of their mode of operation after they have arisen. The described +facts--yes; but among the facts described is precisely certain +conditions under which various norms, ideals, and rules of action have +originated and functioned."[158] Dewey finds it irritating that the +facts thus singled out should be treated as mere facts, apart from their +significance. The historical method employs description, to be sure, but +it also aims at interpretation. "The historic method is a method, first, +for determining how specific moral values (whether in the way of +customs, expectations, conceived ends, or rules) came to be; and second, +for determining their significance as indicated in their career."[159] + +It is true, as Dewey holds, that the historical method may furnish a +basis for interpretation, as well as description. But the mere scrutiny +of what has happened will not reveal the elements, nor determine their +significance. The historian must approach his material with something +more than his eyes. But there are many historical methods. Which shall +be used in dealing with the development of morals?[160] Chemistry, for +instance, in interpreting the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen into water, +employs a system of atoms related to each other in a mathematical order, +and something similarly definite must underlie the study of morals. The +historical method, in general, needs no defence, but since it takes many +forms, great care must be exercised in its application. Dewey seems to +ignore these difficulties. + +Dewey's argument now leads him to a comparison of the evolutionary +methods with the intuitional and empirical methods in ethics. In making +the comparison, he does not propose to raise the question of fact +concerning the existence of intuitions. The question to be confronted is +rather a logical one, concerning the validity of beliefs. "Under what +conditions alone, and in what measure or degree, are we justified in +arguing from the existence of moral intuitions as mental states and acts +to facts taken to correspond to them?"[161] + +The answer is that the existence of a belief argues nothing as to its +validity. The intuitionist takes his belief as a brute fact, unrelated +to objective conditions. The 'inexpugnable' character of the belief +cannot establish its validity, because the life of a single individual +occupies but a brief span in the continuity of the social life in which +the belief is embedded. Beliefs last for generations, and then very +often disappear. "What guarantee have we that our present 'intuitions' +have more validity than hundreds of past ideas that have shown +themselves by passing away to be empty opinion or indurated +prejudice?"[162] Intuitionism has no way of guaranteeing its beliefs. + +The evolutionary method, on the other hand, is able to determine the +validity of beliefs. "The worth of the intuition depends upon genetic +considerations. In so far as we can state the intuition in terms of the +conditions of its origin, development, and later career, in so far we +have some criterion for passing judgment upon its pretensions to +validity.... But if we cannot find such historic origin and functioning, +the intuition remains a mere state of consciousness, a hallucination, an +illusion, which is not made more worthy by simply multiplying the number +of people who have participated in it."[163] Certain savage races, for +instance, possessed moral intuitions which made the practice of +infanticide an obligation. But the fact that it was universally held +does not establish its validity. It must be condemned or justified by +the results to which it led. + +Dewey's criticism of intuitionism scarcely does justice to that method, +whatever may be its inherent weakness. There doubtless have been +thinkers who held that truth is revealed to the reason of man in its +naked purity, in the shape of apodictic intellectual principles. But +even in the case of so extreme a position as that of Kant, there are +important qualifying considerations to be taken into account. There is +no reason to suppose that moral judgment, as Kant conceived it, was +excluded from the consideration of relevant data, such as the knowledge +of actual effects produced by given courses of conduct. His position +seems to have been, not that moral judgment lacked specific content, but +that reason took something with it to the moral situation. The +intuitionists may have over-estimated the original endowment of the +mind, but it must be admitted with them that the mind which approaches +the moral situation empty of concepts cannot make moral decisions. If +man is to hold no beliefs except those proved valid by experience, how +can there be any to validate? Intelligence must have the capacity to +frame beliefs in the light of its past knowledge, and its acts of +judgment, consequently, presuppose a test of the validity of ideas which +belongs to intelligence as such, and not to history taken abstractly. +Beliefs are adapted to their objects in the making, and on this account +are usually found to have had some justification, even where set aside. +'A principle that is suitable for universal legislation already +presupposes a content.' + +Dewey next considers the relation of the evolutionary methods to +empiricism. "Empiricism," he says, "is no more historic in character +than is intuitionalism. Empiricism is concerned with the moral idea or +belief as a grouping or association of various elementary feelings. It +regards the idea simply as a complex state which is to be explained by +resolving it into its elementary constituents. By its logic, both the +complex and the elements are isolated from an historic context.... The +empirical and the genetic methods thus imply a very different +relationship between the moral state, idea, or belief, and objective +reality.... The empirical theory holds that the idea arises as a reflex +of some existing object or fact. Hence the test of its objectivity is +the faithfulness with which it reproduces that object as copy. The +genetic theory holds that the idea arises as a response, and that the +test of its validity is found in its later career as manifested with +reference to the needs of the situation that evoked it."[164] + +Only a method that takes the world as a changing, historical thing, can +deal with the adaptation of morality to new conditions. "Both empiricism +and intuitionalism, though in very different ways, deny the continuity +of the moralizing process. They set up timeless, and hence absolute and +disconnected, ultimates; thereby they sever the problems and movements +of the present from the past, rob the past, the sole object of calm, +impartial, and genuinely objective study, of all instructing power, and +leave our experience to form undirected, at the mercy of circumstance +and arbitrariness, whether that of dogmatism or scepticism."[165] + +In evaluating the article as a whole, it must be said that Dewey's study +is not productive of definite results. The history of the past can +undoubtedly offer to the student a mass of data that is interesting and +instructive. The importance of this or that belief, or its value, can be +gauged by the results which it is known to have produced. But when, in +this day and age, the moralist sets out to find the principles which +shall guide his own conduct, the history of morals is of no more +importance than the observations of every day life, which reveal the +consequences of conduct in the lives of men about him. But more +particularly, it should be added, an estimate of present moral action +depends, not upon truth uttered by the past, but upon truth discovered +and interpreted by an intelligence which surveys the past and makes it +meaningful. The past in itself is nothing; thought alone can create real +history. + +Another article, published by Dewey in the _Philosophical Review_ in +1900, "Some Stages of Logical Thought," illustrates the employment of +the genetic method in a more specific way.[166] In his introductory +remarks, Dewey says: "I wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking, +easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual, +may be identified and arranged as successive species of the relationship +which doubting bears to assurance; as various ratios, so to speak, which +the vigor of doubting bears to mere acquiescence. The presumption is +that the function of questioning is one which has continually grown in +intensity and range, that doubt is continually chased back, and, being +cornered, fights more desperately, and thus clears the ground more +thoroughly."[167] Dewey finds four stages of relationship between +questioning and dogmatism: dogmatism, discussion, proof, and empirical +science; and he seeks to show how each stage involves a higher degree of +free inquiry. "Modern scientific procedure, as just set forth, seems to +define the ideal or limit of this process. It is inquiry emancipated, +universalized, whose sole aim and criterion is discovery, and hence it +makes the terminus of our description. It is idle to conceal from +ourselves, however, that this scientific procedure, as a practical +undertaking, has not as yet reflected itself into any coherent and +generally accepted theory of thinking...."[168] + +It is not necessary to comment on Dewey's stages of thought. The +similarity of this division to Comte's theological, metaphysical and +scientific stages of explanation will be apparent. Dewey's remarks on +the logic of the scientific stage, however, are interesting. "The simple +fact of the case is," he says, "that there are at least three rival +theories on the ground, each claiming to furnish the sole proper +interpretation of the actual procedure of thought."[169] There is the +Aristotelian logic, with its fixed forms; the empirical logic, which +holds "that only particular facts are self-supporting, and that the +authority allowed to general principles is derivative and second +hand;"[170] and finally there is the transcendental logic, which claims, +"by analysis of science and experience, to justify the conclusion that +the universe itself is a construction of thought, giving evidence +throughout of the pervasive and constitutive action of reason; and +holds, consequently, that our logical processes are simply the reading +off or coming to consciousness of the inherently rational structure +already possessed by the universe in virtue of the presence within it of +this pervasive and constitutive action of thought."[171] + +None of these logics, Dewey finds, is capable of dealing with the +actual procedure of science, because none of them treats thought as a +doubt-inquiry process, but rather as something fixed and limited by +conditions which determine its operations in advance. Dewey asks: "Does +not an account or theory of thinking, basing itself on modern scientific +procedure, demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of +thought--judgment, concept, inference, subject, predicate and copula of +judgment, etc. _ad indefinitum_--shall be interpreted simply and +entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the +doubt-inquiry process?"[172] + +Seven years before, Dewey had been an ardent champion of the +transcendental logic, on the ground that it was progressive, and he +contrasted it most favorably with the formal logics which treat thought +as a self-contained process. Now, however, he has a new insight. Logic +must be reinterpreted in the light of the evolutionary or biological +method. We shall see how this is accomplished in the next chapter. + +To the student of the history of philosophy, Dewey's treatment of the +genetic and historical methods must seem seriously inadequate. The +idealist, moreover, will feel that Dewey should have taken note, in his +criticism of the idealistic standpoint, of the fact that Hegelianism was +from first to last a historical method; that the German idealists gave +the impulse to modern historical research, and provoked a study of the +historical method whose results are still felt. But in turning away from +idealism, Dewey has no word of appreciation for this aspect of the +Hegelian philosophy. + +When the truth is boiled down, it appears that Dewey's historical +method, in so far as he had one, was based on biological evolutionism. +He had no interest in any other form of historical interpretation. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[138] Vol. VIII, pp. 321-341. The article is a criticism of Huxley's +essay with the same title. + +[139] _Ibid._, p. 337. Italics mine. + +[140] _Op. cit._, p. 338. + +[141] _Ibid._, p. 340. + +[142] _Ibid._ + +[143] _Ibid._ It should be observed that this conclusion is reached on a +purely theoretical basis. + +[144] Printed in the _Psychological Review_, Vol. VII, 1900, pp. +105-124. + +[145] _Ibid._, p. 123. + +[146] _Ibid._, p. 124. + +[147] Vol. XI, pp. 107-124; 353-371. + +[148] _Ibid._, p. 108. + +[149] _Ibid._, p. 109. + +[150] _Ibid._ + +[151] _Op. cit._, p. 110. + +[152] _Ibid._, p. 111. + +[153] _Op. cit._, p. 112. + +[154] _Ibid._, p. 113. + +[155] _Op. cit._, p. 114. + +[156] _Ibid._, p. 116. + +[157] _Ibid._, p. 118. + +[158] _Op. cit._, p. 355. + +[159] _Ibid._, p. 356. + +[160] See Bosanquet's _Logic_, second edition, Chapter VII, and +especially page 240. + +[161] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, p. 357. + +[162] _Ibid._, p. 360. + +[163] _Ibid._, p. 358. + +[164] _Op. cit._, p. 364 f. + +[165] _Op. cit._, p. 370. + +[166] Vol. IX, pp. 465-489. + +[167] _Op. cit._, p. 465. + +[168] _Ibid._, p. 486 f. + +[169] _Ibid._, p. 487. + +[170] _Ibid._ + +[171] _Ibid._ + +[172] _Op. cit._, p. 489. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +"STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY" + + +In 1903 a volume entitled _Studies in Logical Theory_, consisting of +essays on logical topics by Dewey and his colleagues and pupils, was +published under the auspices of the University of Chicago. In a review +of this volume, Professor Pringle-Pattison remarks: "It is, indeed, most +unusual to find a series of philosophical papers by different writers in +which (without repetition or duplication) there is so much unity in the +point of view and harmony in results. That this is so is a striking +evidence of the moulding influence of Professor Dewey upon his pupils +and coadjutors in the Chicago School of Philosophy."[173] It would be a +needless task to review the whole volume, and attention will be confined +to the essays which constitute Dewey's special contribution to the +undertaking. These constitute the first four chapters of the volume, and +are devoted to a critical examination of Lotze's logic.[174] Here, for +the first time, Dewey presents in complete form the logical theory which +stands as the goal of his previous endeavors, and marks the beginning of +his career as a pragmatist.[175] + +The first chapter of the "Studies" is devoted to a general consideration +of the nature of logical theory. Dewey begins his discussion with an +account of the naïve view of thought, the view of the man of affairs or +of the scientist, who employs ideas and reflection but has never become +critical of his mental processes; who has never reflected upon +reflection. "If we were to ask," he says, "the thinking of naïve life to +present, with a minimum of theoretical elaboration, its conception of +its own practice, we should get an answer running not unlike this: +Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just +as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity."[176] While the +standpoint of the naïve man is usually hard to determine, there appears +to be considerable justification for Dewey's statement. The common man +does tend to view thinking as a special kind of activity, performed by +an organ which can be 'trained,' and he is inclined to speak of +education as a process of 'training the mind.'[177] + +Dewey finds a large measure of truth in this naïve view of thought. +Thought appears to be derivative and secondary. "It comes after +something and out of something, and for the sake of something."[178] It +is employed at need, and ceases to operate when not needed. "Taking some +part of the universe of action, of affection, of social construction, +under its special charge, and having busied itself therewith +sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented, thought releases +that topic and enters upon further more direct experience."[179] There +is a rhythm of practice and thought; man acts, thinks, and acts again. +The business of thought is to solve practical difficulties, such as +arise in connection with the conduct of life. The purpose for which +thought intervenes is to enable action to get ahead by discovering a way +out of the given difficulty. Ordinarily, the transition from thought to +action and the reverse is accomplished without break or difficulty. + +Occasions arise, however, when thought is balked by a situation with +which it is unable to deal, after repeated attempts. Critical reflection +is then directed upon thought itself, and logical theory is the result. +"The general theory of reflection, as over against its concrete +exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so overwhelming and +so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is +blocked."[180] The purpose of logical theory is therefore a practical +one, and logical theory, like ordinary reflection, is directed toward +the removal of difficulties which stand in the way of the achievement of +practical ends. + +This description of thought and of the nature of logical theory invites +suspicion by its very simplicity. Nobody would deny that thought is +linked up with practice, that the processes of life link up into one +whole organic process, and that it would be a mistake to treat the +cognitive processes as if they were separate from the whole. But Dewey's +account of thought seems to fall into the very abstractness which he is +so anxious to avoid. Experience is represented as a series of acts, +attitudes, or functions, which follow one another in succession. +"Thinking follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows thinking. +Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its +successor."[181] The functions are distinct, but are united to each +other, end to end, like links in a chain. They pass into and out of one +another, but are not simultaneous. This description gives rise, as +Bosanquet observes,[182] to a kind of dualism between thinking and the +other processes of life, which is made deeper because thinking is +regarded as a very special activity, which "passes judgment upon both +the processes and contents of other functions," and whose aim and work +is "distinctively reconstructive or transformatory."[183] + +Dewey's description of the processes of experience is undoubtedly +plausible, but should not be accepted without close scrutiny of the +facts. It has been held, in opposition to such a view, that the +cognitive processes are so bound up with perception, feeling, willing, +and doing, that they cannot be separated from the complex.[184] Or it +might be held that thinking and doing are simultaneous and +complementary processes, rather than successive and supplementary. Dewey +does not concern himself with these possibilities, seeming to take it +for granted that his interpretation is the 'natural' one. It must be +said, however, that Dewey's description of thought as a process is by no +means obvious and simple; thought is not easy to describe. + +When we turn to logical theory, Dewey says, there are two directions +which may be taken. The general features of logical theory are indicated +by its origin. When ordinary thinking is impeded, an examination of the +thinking function is undertaken, with the purpose of discovering its +business and its mode of operation. The object of the examination is +practical; to enable thinking to be carried on more effectively. If +these conditions are kept in mind, logical theory will be guided into +its proper channels: it will be assumed that every process of reflection +arises with reference to some specific situation, and has to subserve a +specific purpose dependent upon the occasion which calls it forth. +Logical theory will determine the conditions which arouse thought, the +mode of its operation, and the testing of its results. Such a logic, +being true to the problems set for it by practical needs, is in no +danger of being lost in generalities. + +But there is another direction which logical theory sometimes takes, +unmindful of the conditions imposed by its origin. This is the +epistemological direction. Epistemological logic concerns itself with +the relation of thought at large to reality at large. It assumes that +thought is a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with +the world which is to be known. Such a logic can never be fruitful, for +it has lost sight of its purpose in the formulation of its problem. + +Dewey is quite right in opposing a conception of thought which makes it +a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with other life +processes. Few recent thinkers have been guilty of that error. Lotze, to +be sure, made the mistake of separating thought from the reality to be +known, and therefore serves as a ready foil for Dewey's criticism. But +Lotze's age is past and gone. + +When the abstract conception of thought is set aside, and it is agreed +that thought must be treated as a process among the processes of +experience, there is still room for divergence of opinion as to the +exact manner in which thought is related to other functions. Dewey's +logical theory, as outlined above, depends upon a very special +interpretation of the place which thought occupies in experience. For +this reason he considers logic to be inseparable from psychology. +"Psychology ... is indispensable to logical evaluation, the moment we +treat logical theory as an account of thinking as a mode of adaptation +to its own generating conditions, and judge its validity by reference to +its efficiency in meeting its problems."[185] Psychology, in other +words, must substantiate Dewey's account of thought, else his 'logic' +has no foundation. But if it were held that the cognitive processes +cannot be separated (except by abstraction for psychological purposes) +from other processes, there could manifestly be no such logical problem +as Dewey has posited. Logic would be freed from reliance upon +psychology. In this case, logical inquiry would be directed to the study +of concepts, forms of judgment, and methods of knowledge, with the +purpose of determining their relations, proper applications, and spheres +of relevance. Logic would be a 'criticism of categories' rather than a +criticism of the function of thinking. Dewey recognizes that such a +study of method might be useful, but holds that it would be subsidiary +to the larger problems of logic. "The distinctions and classifications +that have been accumulated in 'formal' logic are relevant data; but they +demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment +to material antecedents and stimuli."[186] It will be seen that the +treatment of the forms of thought as "organs of adjustment" makes logic +subsidiary to psychology, necessarily and completely. All follows, +however, from the original assumption that thought is a special +activity, clearly distinguishable from other experienced processes, and +possessing a special function of its own. + +In his further analysis of logical theory, Dewey states that it has two +phases, one general and one specific. The general problem concerns the +relations of the various functions of experience to one another; how +they give rise to each other, and what is their order of succession. +This wider logic is identified with philosophy in general.[187] The +specific phase of logic, logic proper, concerns itself with the function +of knowing as such, inquiring into its typical behavior, occasion of +operation, divisions of labor, content, and successful employment. Dewey +indicates the danger of identifying logic with either of these to the +exclusion of the other, or of supposing that they can be finally +isolated from one another. "It is necessary to work back and forth +between the larger and the narrower fields."[188] + +Why is it necessary to make such a distinction at all? And why necessary +to move back and forth between the two provisional standpoints? Dewey +might answer by the following analogy: The thought function may be +studied, first of all, as a special organ, as an anatomist might study +the structure of any special organ of the body; but in order to +understand the part played by this member in the organism as a whole, it +would be necessary to adopt a wider view, so that its place in the +system could be determined. This is probably what Dewey means by his two +standpoints. He says: "We keep our paths straight because we do not +confuse the sequential, efficient, and functional relationship of types +of experience with the contemporaneous, correlative, and structural +distinctions of elements within a given function."[189] The first +objection to be made to this treatment of thought is that it makes +knowing the activity of a special organ, like liver or lungs. If this +objection is surmounted, there remains another from the side of general +method. The biologist not only studies the particular organs as to their +structure and their relationships within the body, but he has a view of +the body as a whole, of its general end and purpose. His study of the +particular organ is in part determined by his knowledge of the relations +between body and environment. But experience as a whole cannot be +treated like a body, because it has no environment. The analogy between +body and its processes and experience and its processes breaks down, +therefore, at a vital point. Dewey's genetic interpretation gains in +plausibility when the human body, and not the whole of experience, is +taken as the ground upon which the 'functions' are to be explained, for +the body has an environment and purposes in relation to that +environment. Experience as a whole possesses no such external reference. + +It will be seen that Dewey's interpretation of the function of knowing +is not as empirical as it proposes to be. Its underlying conceptions are +biological in character, and these conceptions are brought ready-made to +the study of thought. Logical theory does not arise naturally and +spontaneously from a study of the facts of mind, but the facts are +aligned and interpreted in terms of categories selected in advance. +Empiricism develops its theories in connection with facts, but +rationalism (in the bad sense of the word) fits the facts into prepared +theories. Dewey's treatment of thought is, after all, more rationalistic +than empirical. + +To sum up Dewey's conclusions so far: Logic is the study of the function +of knowing in relation to the other functions of experience. The wider +logic distinguishes the function of knowing from other activities, and +discovers its general purpose; the narrower logic examines the function +of knowing in itself, with the object of determining its structure and +operation. The aim of logic as a whole is to understand the operations +of the concrete activity called knowing, with the purpose of rendering +it more efficient. This concrete treatment of thought contrasts sharply +with the 'epistemological' method, which sets thought over against the +concrete processes of experience, and thus generates the false problem +of the relation of thought in general to reality in general. + +Having stated his position, we might expect Dewey, in the course of the +next three chapters, to enter upon a consideration of one phase or other +of his logic. On the contrary, he proposes to take up "some of the +considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the +narrower conceptions of logical theory."[190] First, he will consider +the antecedent conditions and cues of the thought-process; the +conditions which lead up to and into the function of knowing. These +conditions lie between the thought-process and the preceding function +(in order of time), and are therefore on the borderland between the +wider and narrower spheres of logic. + +In defining the conditions which precede and evoke thought, Dewey says: +"There is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some +subject-matter of the physical or social world, or organized +intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each other--so +much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience, which +accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate re-definition +and re-relation of its tensional parts."[191] Thought is always called +into action by the whole concrete situation in which it occurs, not by +any particular sensation, idea, or feeling. + +The opposite interpretation of the nature of the antecedents of thought +is furnished by Lotze, who makes them consist in bare impressions, +'moods of ourselves,' mere states of consciousness. Dewey is quite right +in calling these bare impressions purely fictitious, though the +observation is by no means original. From the manner in which he +approaches the study of the "antecedents of thought" it appears, +however, that Dewey has something in common with Lotze. The functional +theory, that is, allows a certain initial detachment of thought from +reality, which must be bridged over by an empirical demonstration of its +natural connection with preceding processes. + +Dewey is wholly justified, again, in maintaining that thought is not a +faculty set apart from reality, and that what is 'given' to thought is a +coherent world, not a mass of unmeaning sensations. He recognizes his +substantial agreement with the modern idealists in these matters.[192] +But the idealists, he believes, hold a constitutive conception of +thought which is in conflict with the empirical description of thinking +as a concrete activity in time. Reality, according to this conception, +is a vast system of sensations brought into a rational order by logical +forms, and finite thought, in its operations, simply apprehends or +discovers the infinite order of the cosmos. "How does it happen," Dewey +asks, "that the absolute constitutive and intuitive Thought does such a +poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to +patch up its products?"[193] + +Against Lotze, such an indictment has considerable force, but its +applicability to modern idealism is not so obvious. Modern idealism has +insisted upon an empirical treatment of thought, and has definitely +surrendered the abstract sensations of the older psychologies. Nor does +idealism tend to treat finite thought as a process which merely 'copies' +an eternally present nature. The issue between Dewey and the idealists +is this: Does functionalism render an accurate empirical account of the +nature of thought as a concrete process? + +In his third chapter Dewey discusses "Thought and its Subject-matter: +The Datum of Thinking." The tensional situation passes into a thought +situation, and reflection enters upon its work of restoring the +equilibrium of experience. Certain characteristic processes attend the +operation of thought. "The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or +dichotomizes itself. There is somewhat which is untouched in the +contention of incompatibles. There is something which remains secure, +unquestioned. On the other hand, there are elements which are rendered +doubtful and precarious."[194] The unquestioned element is the _datum_; +the uncertain element, the _ideatum_. Ideas are "impressions, +suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc., the facts are crude, +raw, unorganized, brute."[195] There is an approximation to bare meaning +on the one hand, and bare existence on the other. + +The first dichotomy passes into a second. "Once more, and briefly, both +datum and ideatum may ... break up, each for itself, into physical and +psychical."[196] The datum, or sense material, is all, somehow, matter +and real, but one part of it turns out to have a psychical, another a +physical form. Similarly, the ideatum divides into what is mere fancy, +the psychical, and what is objectively valid, the physical. + +These distinctions are divisions of labor within the thought-process. +"All the distinctions of the thought-function, of conception as over +against sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of +inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions +come within the thought situation as growing out of a characteristic +antecedent typical formation of experience...."[197] Great confusion +results in logical theory, Dewey believes, when it is forgotten that +these distinctions are valid only within the thought process. Their +order of occurrence within the thought process must also be observed, if +confusion is to be prevented. Datum and ideatum come first, psychical +and physical next in order. "Thus the distinction between subjectivity +and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It +is a specification that emerges, correspondently, in _both_ datum and +ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is +left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as +real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is +regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense."[198] + +Dewey does well to call attention to the limitations of these +categories, which cannot, indeed, be treated as absolute without serious +error. It may be questioned, however, whether their limitations are of +the precise nature which he describes. All depends upon the initial +conception of the nature of thought. From Dewey's standpoint, these +categories are 'tools of analysis' which function only within the +thinking process; but his description of the function of knowing may be +questioned, in which case his instrumental view of the concepts is +rendered meaningless. A logical, as distinct from a psychological, +treatment of the concepts mentioned, would show that their validity is +limited to a certain 'sphere of relevance;' that they are applicable +within a certain context and to a particular subject-matter. The danger +of indiscriminate use of the categories would be avoided by the logical +criticism even better, perhaps, than by Dewey's method. + +The discussion in Dewey's fourth and last chapter, concerning "The +Content and Object of Thought," hinges upon a detailed criticism of +Lotze's position, which cannot be presented here. The general bearing of +the discussion, however, may be indicated. "To regard," says Dewey, "the +thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as qualifications +of 'pure thought, apart from any difference in objects,' instead of as +successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material +(or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism."[199] + +Pure thought, of course, cannot be defended. At the same time, Dewey, +like Lotze, tends to regard thought as a special function with a +'content' of its own. If thought is regarded as a special kind of +process, having its own content in the way of instrumental concepts, the +question inevitably arises: How shall these forms be employed to reach +truth? How apply them correctly to the matter in hand? + +Dewey answers that the forms and hypotheses of thought, like the tools +and scaffoldings for its operations, are especially designed for the +labor which they have to perform. "There is no miracle in the fact that +tool and material are adapted to each other in the process of reaching a +valid conclusion.... Each has been slowly evolved with reference to its +fit employ in the entire function; and this evolution has been checked +at every point by reference to its own correspondent."[200] + +It is no doubt true that established conceptions, no less than temporary +hypotheses, have been evolved in connection with, as a feature or part +of, the subject-matter to which they pertain. But it is quite another +thing to say that these evolved forms belong to thought, if by thought +be meant the functional activity of Dewey's description. Dewey stresses +the relevance of these forms to the thought-process, rather than their +relevance to a particular sphere of discourse. His purpose is to show +that distinctions which are valid within the process of knowing are not +valid elsewhere, and the net result is to limit the faculty of thought +as a whole, as well as the forms of thought. + +This result reveals itself most clearly in his discussion of the test of +truth. "In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought, as thought, +just as at the other limit thought originates out of a situation which +is not reflectional in character. Interpret this before and beyond in a +historic sense, as an affair of the place occupied and role played by +thinking as a function in experience in relation to other functions, and +the intermediate and instrumental character of thought, its dependence +upon unreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon a consequent +experience for its test of final validity, becomes significant and +necessary."[201] This notion that the test of thought must be external +to thought depends directly upon the doctrine that thought is a special +activity of the kind heretofore described. It results from the +occasionalism attributed by Dewey to the thinking process. + +If the truth or falsity of an idea is not discovered by thought, then by +what faculty might it be discovered? Perhaps by experience as a whole or +in general. Dewey, on occasion, speaks as follows: "Experience is +continually integrating itself into a wholeness of coherent meaning +deepened in significance by passing through an inner distraction in +which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered partial and +hence objectively conscious."[202] Perhaps Dewey means to say that truth +is determined by this cosmic automatism. It is confusing, however, to be +told in one moment that thought transforms experience, and in another +that experience transforms itself. + +Experience, not reflection, is, then, the test of truth and thought. +Such a statement would not be possible, except in connection with a +psychology which deliberately sets experience over against reflection, +making the latter a peculiar, although dependent, process. Lotze, +indeed, makes the separation of thought from experience quite complete. +Dewey attempts to bring them together by his psychological method, but +does not completely succeed. In the meantime modern idealism has +suggested that thought and experience are merely parts of one general +process, constantly operating in conjunction. To one who believes that +the various processes or 'functions' of experience constitute a single +organ of life, the proposition that experience, rather than reflection, +is the judge of truth, becomes meaningless. + +In an essay on "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of +Morality" in another volume of the Chicago Publications of 1903,[203] +Dewey presents a positive statement of his logical theory which is an +excellent supplement to the critical study of Lotze. + +Science, Dewey remarks in introducing this essay, is a systematized body +of knowledge. Knowledge may be taken either as a body of facts or as a +process of arranging a body of facts; as results or the acquiring of +results. The latter phase of science is the more important. "As used in +this article, 'scientific' means regular methods of controlling the +formation of judgments regarding some subject-matter."[204] In the +scientific attitude, beliefs are looked upon as _conclusions_, and as +conclusions they look in two directions. They look backward towards the +ground from which they are empirically derived, and which renders them +valid, and they look forward, as meaning, to being the ground from which +further conclusions can be deduced. "So far as we engage in this +procedure, we look at our respective acts of judging not as independent +and detached, but as an interrelated system, within which every +assertion entitles us to other assertions (which must be carefully +deduced since they constitute its meaning) and to which we are entitled +only through other assertions (so that they must be carefully searched +for). 'Scientific' as used in this article thus means the possibility of +establishing an order of judgments such that each one when made is of +use in determining other judgments, thereby securing control of their +formation."[205] + +This view of science as an order of judgments requires a special +treatment of the generic ideas, the 'conclusions,' or universals of +science. The individual judgment, 'This, _A_, is _B_,' expresses an +identity. But it is much better expressed in hypothetical form. +"Identification, in other words, is secure only when it can be made +through (1) breaking up the analyzed. This of naïve judgment into +determinate traits, (2) breaking up the predicate into a similar +combination of elements, and (3) establishing uniform connection between +some of the elements in the subject and some in the predicate."[206] +Identity exists amid relevant differences, and the more intimately the +system of differents is understood, the more positive is the +determination of identity. This will be recognized as the 'concrete +universal' of the Hegelian logicians. + +But, Dewey says, modern logicians tend to disregard judgment as act, and +pay attention to it only as content. The generic ideas are studied in +independence of their applications, as if this were a matter of no +concern in logic. "In truth, there is no such thing as control of one +content by mere reference to another content as such. To recognize this +impossibility is to recognize that the control of the formation of the +judgment is always through the medium of an act by which the respective +contents of both the individual judgment and of the universal +proposition are selected and brought into relationship to each +other."[207] The individual act of judgment is necessary to logical +theory, because the act of the individual forms the connecting link +between the generic idea and the specific details of the situation. +There must be some means whereby the instrumental concept is brought to +bear upon its appropriate material. "The logical process includes, as an +organic part of itself, the selection and reference of that particular +one of the system which is relevant to the particular case. This +individualized selection and adaptation is an integral portion of the +logic of the situation. And such selection and adjustment is clearly in +the nature of an act."[208] + +This problem of the relation of the categories to their subject-matter +is an acute one for Dewey, because of limitations placed upon thought. +He decides that the idea must be, in some fashion, self-selective, must +signify its own fitness to a given subject-matter. But it can only be +self-selective by being itself in the nature of an act. It turns out +that the generic idea has been evolved in connection with acts of +judgment, and its own applicability is born in it. "The activity which +selects and employs is logical, not extra-logical, just because the tool +selected and employed has been invented and developed precisely for the +sake of just such future selection and use."[209] + +The logic and system of science must be embodied in the individual. He +must be a good logical medium, his acts must be orderly and consecutive, +and generic ideas must have a good motor basis in his organism, if he is +to think successfully. This is the essence of Dewey's argument in the +essay under discussion. The inference seems to be that logic cannot be +separated from biology and psychology, since the act of knowing and the +ideas which it employs have a physiological basis. + +It is difficult to see, however, how such a standpoint could prove +useful in the practical study of logic. Certainly little headway could +be made toward a study of the proper use and limitations of the +categories by an investigation of the human nervous system. And to what +extent would physiology illuminate the problem of the relation of the +generic ideas to their appropriate objects? Although Dewey decides that +the relationship must have its ground in the motor activities of the +organism, his conclusion has little empirical evidence to support it. + +A practical, workable conception of the relations between generic ideas +and their objects must be based on considerations less obscure. Why not +be content to verify, by criticism, the truth that experience and +thoughts about experience develop together, with the result that each +theory, hypothesis, or method is applicable within the sphere where it +was born? Why wait upon psychology for confirmation of a truth so +obvious and important? + +Bosanquet remarks: "Either one may speak as if reality were relative to +the individual mind, a ridiculous idea ..., or one may become interested +in tracing the germination and growth of ideas in the individual mind as +typical facts indeed, but only as one animal's habits are typical of +those of others, and we may slur over the primary basis of logic, which +is its relation to reality. For mental facts unrelated to reality are no +knowledge, and therefore have no place in logic."[210] Bosanquet +emphasizes an important truth neglected by Dewey. Logic is not concerned +with ideas as things existing in individuals, nor with conceptions as +individual modes of response. Truth has little to do with the individual +as such, though the individual might well concern himself about truth. +Truth is objective, super-individual, and logic is the study of the +objective verity of thought. The proposition, 'All life is from the +living,' finds no premises in the nerve tissues of the scientist who +accepts it. How does the proposition square up with reality or +experience? That is the question, and it can only be answered by turning +away from psychology to empirical verification, involving a critical +test of the applicability of the thought to reality. + +In the strictly ethical part of the essay, Dewey tries to show that +moral judgments, at least, involve the character of the agent and his +specific acts as data. Intellectual judgments, on the other hand, may +disregard the acts of the individual; they are left out of account, +"when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference +with respect to the _particular_ object or content judged."[211] It will +be seen that the distinction between moral and intellectual judgments is +made on the basis of their content. But Dewey is committed to the +doctrine that judgments are to be differentiated as acts, on a +psychological basis. In any case, if the character and acts of a man are +to be judged, they must be treated objectively, and the relevance of the +judge's ideas to the man's actual character cannot be decided by a +psychological analysis of the judge's mind. Right and wrong, whether +moral or intellectual, are not attributes of the individual nervous +system. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[173] _The Philosophical Radicals_, "Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory," +p. 179. The essay was originally printed as a critical notice in the +_Philosophical Review_, November, 1904. + +[174] Since this was written (1915-16), Dewey's chapters have been +reprinted in a volume entitled _Essays in Experimental Logic_, published +by the University of Chicago Press (June, 1916). They are preceded, in +this new setting, by a special introductory chapter, and numerous +alterations have been made which do not, however, affect the fundamental +standpoint. + +[175] See James's review, "The Chicago School," _Psychological +Bulletin_, Vol. I, 1904, pp. 1-5. + +[176] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 2. + +[177] Compare Dewey, _How We Think_ (1910), Chapter II, "The Need for +Training Thought." + +[178] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 1. + +[179] _Ibid._, p. 2. + +[180] _Op. cit._, p. 3 f. + +[181] _Ibid._, p. 16. + +[182] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. II, p. 270. + +[183] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. x. + +[184] "Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract +cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course of its +development carries these along with it. There is, of course, such a +thing as what we have called abstract cognition; but the different +moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the +life of thought." Creighton, "Experience and Thought," _Philosophical +Review_, Vol. XV, 1906, p. 487 f. + +[185] _Op. cit._, p. 15. + +[186] _Ibid._, p. 8. + +[187] _Op. cit._, pp. 18-19. + +[188] _Ibid._, p. 23. + +[189] _Ibid._, p. 17. + +[190] _Op. cit._, p. 23. + +[191] _Op. cit._, p. 39 f. Bradley suggests a similar idea of the +'tensional situation.' See, for instance, _Ethical Studies_, p. 65, +where he remarks: "We have conflicting desires, say A and B; we feel two +tensions, two drawings (so to speak) but we can not actually affirm +ourselves in both." A more complete statement of the 'tensional +situation' will be found on page 239 of the same work and in various +other passages. + +[192] _Ibid._, pp. 43-44. + +[193] _Op. cit._, p. 45. + +[194] _Ibid._, p. 50. + +[195] _Ibid._, p. 52. + +[196] _Op. cit._ + +[197] _Ibid._, p. 47. + +[198] _Ibid._, p. 53. + +[199] _Op. cit._, p. 61 f. + +[200] _Ibid._, p. 80. + +[201] _Op. cit._, p. 85. + +[202] _Ibid._ + +[203] _Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_, First +Series, Vol. III, pp. 115-139. + +[204] _Ibid._, p. 115. + +[205] _Ibid._, p. 116. + +[206] _Op. cit._, p. 120. + +[207] _Ibid._, p. 121. + +[208] _Ibid._, p. 122. + +[209] _Op. cit._ + +[210] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. I, p. 232. + +[211] _Decennial Publication of the University of Chicago_, First +Series, Vol. III, p. 127. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE POLEMICAL PERIOD + + +After the publication of the _Studies in Logical Theory_, Dewey entered +upon what may be called the polemical period of his career. He joined +forces with James and Schiller in the promotion of the new movement +called 'Pragmatism.' The _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and +Scientific Methods_, instituted at Columbia University in 1904, the same +year in which Dewey accepted a professorship in that institution, became +a convenient medium for the expression of his views, and every volume of +this periodical will be found to contain notes, discussions, and +articles by Dewey and his followers, bearing on current controversy. He +also published many articles in other journals, technical and popular. +In 1910, the most important of these essays were collected into a +volume, published under the title, _The Influence of Darwin on +Philosophy, and Other Essays_. For purposes of discussion, these essays +may be divided into two classes: those of a more constructive character, +setting forth Dewey's own standpoint, and those which are mainly +polemical, directed against opposing standpoints, chiefly the +idealistic. The constructive writings will be given first consideration. + +The essay on "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," first published in +the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in +July, 1905, and later reprinted in the volume of collected essays, +offers a convenient point of departure. Dewey observes that many of the +difficulties in current controversy can be traced to presuppositions +tacitly held by thinkers as to what experience means. Dewey attempts to +make his own presuppositions explicit, with the object of clearing up +this confusion. + +"Immediate empiricism," he says, "postulates that things--anything, +everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term +'thing'--are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to +describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as +being."[212] The idealists, on the contrary, hold "that things (or, +ultimately, Reality, Being) _are_ only and just what they are _known_ to +be or that things are, or Reality _is_, what it is for a conscious +knower--whether the knower be conceived primarily as a perceiver or as a +thinker being a further, and secondary, question. This is the +root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective, +psychological or epistemological."[213] Knowing is merely one mode of +experiencing, and things may be experienced in other ways, as, for +instance, aesthetically, morally, technologically, or economically. This +follows Dewey's familiar division of the processes of experience into +separate 'functions' or activities. It becomes the duty of the +philosopher, following this scheme, to find out "_what_ sort of an +experience knowing is--or, concretely how things are experienced when +they are experienced _as_ known things."[214] + +Dewey fails, in this essay, to draw a distinction which is highly +important, between knowledge as awareness and knowledge as reflection. +This results in some confusion. For the present, he is concerned with +knowledge as awareness. He employs an illustration to make his meaning +clear; the experience of fright at a noise, which turns out, when +examined and known, to be the tapping of a window shade. What is +originally experienced is a frightful noise. If, after examination, the +'frightfulness' is classified as 'psychical,' while the 'real' fact is +said to be harmless, there is no warrant for reading this distinction +back into the original experience. The argument is directed against that +mode of explaining the difference between the psychical and the physical +which employs a subjective mind or 'knower' as the container of the +merely subjective aspects of reality. Dewey would hold that mind, used +in this sense, is a fiction, having a small explanatory value, and +creating more problems than it solves. The difference between psychical +and physical is relative, not absolute. The frightful noise first heard +was neither psychical nor physical; it was what it was experienced as, +and the experience contained no such distinction, nor did it contain a +'knower.' The noise _as known_, after the intervention of an act of +judgment, contained these elements (except the 'knower'), but the thing +is not merely what it is known as. There is no warrant for reading the +distinctions made by judgment back into a situation where judgment was +not operative. The original fact was precisely what it was experienced +as. + +Dewey's purpose, though not well stated, seems to be the complete +rejection of the notion of knowledge as awareness, or of the subjective +knower. He discovers at the same time an opportunity to substantiate his +own descriptive account of knowing (or reflection) as an occasional +function. The two enterprises, however, should be kept distinct. +Granting that the subjective knower of the older epistemology should be +dismissed from philosophy, it does not follow that Dewey's special +interpretation of the function of reflection is the only substitute. + +The principle of immediate empiricism, Dewey says, furnishes no positive +truth. It is simply a method. Not a single philosophical proposition can +be deduced from it. The application of the method is indicated in the +following proposition: "If you wish to find out what subjective, +objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose, +activity, evil, being, quality--any philosophic term, in short--means, +go to experience and see what the thing is experienced _as_."[215] This +recipe cannot be taken literally. Dewey probably means that each concept +has, or should have, a positive empirical reference, and is significant +only in that reference. He is a firm believer, however, in the +descriptive method. In a note, he remarks that he would employ in +philosophy "the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in +all the natural sciences, with such modifications, of course, as the +subject itself entails."[216] This remark calls for closer examination +than can be made here. It may be said in passing, however, that +'scientific description' is by no means so simple a method of procedure +as Dewey would seem to indicate. 'Scientific description,' as actually +employed, is a highly elaborated and specialized method of dealing with +experience. The whole subject, indeed, is involved, and requires +cautious treatment. Dewey's somewhat ingenuous hope, that the +identification of his method with the methods of science will add to its +impressiveness, is in danger, unfortunately, of being vitiated through +the suspicion that he is, after all, not in close touch with the methods +of science. + +Dewey employs the descriptive method chiefly as a means for +substantiating his special interpretation of the judgment process. His +use of the method in this connection is well illustrated by an article +called "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge"[217] (1906), in which he +attempts "to find out _what_ sort of an experience knowing is" through +an appeal to immediate experience. "It should be possible," he says, "to +discern and describe a knowing as one identifies any object, concern, or +event.... What we want is just something which takes itself as +knowledge, rightly or wrongly."[218] The difficulty lies not in finding +a case of knowing, but in describing it when found. Dewey selects a case +to be described, and, as usual, chooses a simple one. + +"This means," he says, "a specific case, a sample.... Our recourse is to +an example so simple, so much on its face as to be as innocent as may be +of assumptions.... Let us suppose a smell, just a floating odor."[219] +The level at which this illustration is taken is significant. Is it +possible to suppose that anything so complex, varied, myriad-sided as +that something we call knowledge, can be discovered and described within +the limits of so simple an instance? + +Dewey employs the smell in three situations, the first representing the +'non-cognitional,' the second the 'cognitive,' and the third the +genuinely 'cognitional' situation. The first, or 'non-cognitional' +situation is described as follows: "But, let us say, the smell is not +the smell _of_ the rose; the resulting change of the organism is not a +sense of walking and reaching; the delicious finale is not the +fulfilment of the movement, and, through that, of the original smell; +'is not,' in each case meaning is 'not experienced as' such. We may +take, in short, these experiences in a brutely serial fashion. The +smell, _S_, is replaced (and displaced) by a felt movement, _K_, this is +replaced by the gratification, _G_. Viewed from without, as we are now +regarding it, there is _S-K-G_. But from within, for itself, it is now +_S_, now _K_, now _G_, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is +there looking before and after; memory and anticipation are not born. +Such an experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor +does it exercise a cognitive function."[220] + +It will be seen at once that this is not a description of an actual +human experience, but a schematic story designed to illustrate a +comparatively simple point. In this situation the person concerned does +not deliberately and consciously recognize the smell as the smell of a +rose; he is not aware of any symbolic character in the smell, it does +not enter as a middle term into a process of inference. In such a +situation, Dewey believes, it would be wrong to read into the smell a +cognitive property which it does not, as experienced, possess. + +In the second, or 'cognitive' situation, the smell as originally +experienced does not involve the function of knowing, but turns out +after the event, as reflected upon, to have had a significance. "In +saying that the smell is finally experienced as _meaning_ gratification +... we retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the +smell--and this is what is signified by 'cognitive.' Yet the smell is +not cognitional, because it did not knowingly intend to mean this; but +is found, after the event, to have meant it."[221] The moral is, as +usual, that the findings of reflection must not be read back into the +former unreflective experience. + +In the truly 'cognitional' experience the smell is then and there +experienced as meaning or symbolizing the rose. "An experience is a +knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and +connection of two elements of the following sort: _one means or intends +the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already +present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same +fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its +companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it +sets up_."[222] In the 'cognitional' situation, the smell is then and +there experienced as signifying the presence of a rose in the vicinity, +and the rose must be experienced as a present fact, before the meaning +of the smell is completely fulfilled and verified. + +It will be seen at once that this description of knowing follows the +lines laid down by James in his chapter on "Reasoning" in the +_Principles of Psychology_. In the process of reasoning the situation is +analyzed; some particular feature of it is abstracted and made the +middle term in an inference. The smell, as thus abstracted, is said to +have the function of knowing, or meaning, the rose whose reality it +evidences. + +Dewey's treatment of knowledge, however, is far too simple. The function +of meaning, symbolizing, or 'pointing' does not reside in the abstracted +element as such; for the context in which the judgment occurs determines +the choosing of the 'middle term,' as well as the direction in which it +shall point. The situation as a whole has a rationality which resides in +the distinctions, identities, phases of emphasis, and discriminations of +the total experience. Rationality expresses itself in the organized +system of experience, not in particular elements and their 'pointings.' +Taken in this sense, rationality is present in all experience. The +smell, in Dewey's first situation, is not 'cognitional' because the +situation as a whole does not permit it to be, if such an expression may +be used. The intellectual drift of the moment drives the smell away from +the centre of attention at one time, just as at another it selects it to +serve as an element in judgment. It is only with reference to a system +of some kind that things can be regarded as symbols at all. Things do +not represent one another at haphazard, but definitely and concretely; +they imply an organization of elements having mutual implications. One +thing implies another because both are elements in a whole which +determines their mutual reference. This organization is present in all +experience, not in the form of 'established habits,' but in the form of +will and purpose. + +In the course of his further discussion, which need not be followed in +detail, Dewey passes on to a consideration of truth. Truth is concerned +with the worth or validity of ideas. But, before their validity can be +determined, there must be a 'cognitional' experience of the type +described above. "Before the category of confirmation or refutation can +be introduced, there must be something which _means_ to mean something +and which therefore can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue."[223] +Ideas, or meanings, as directly experienced, are neither true nor false, +but are made so by the results in which they issue. Even then, the +outcome must be reflected upon, before they can be designated true or +false. "_Truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only +in situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced +fulfilments and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and +contrasted with reference to the question of the worth, as to +reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of +meanings._"[224] This makes the whole problem of truth a relatively +simple affair. The symbol and its 'pointing' are taken as a single, +objective fact, to be tested, and, if verified, labelled 'true.' +Meanings, after all, are not so simple as this scheme would imply. + +As the intellectual life of man is more subtle and universal than Dewey +represents it to be, so is truth, as that which thought seeks to +establish, something deeper-lying and more comprehensive. Ideas are not +simple and isolated facts; their truth is not strictly their own, but is +reflected into them from the objective order to which they pertain. The +possibility of making observations and experiments, and of having ideas, +rests upon the presence in and through experience of that directing +influence which we call valid knowledge, or truth. An idea, to be true, +must fit in with this general body of truth. Not correspondence with its +single object, but correspondence with the whole organized body of +knowledge, is the test of the truth of an idea. The attempt to describe +knowledge as a particular occurrence, fact, or function, is foredoomed +to failure. It should be noted also that Dewey's 'description,' +throughout this essay, is anything but a direct, empirical examination +of thought. He presents a schematized picture of reality which, like an +engineer's diagram, leaves out the cloying details of the object it is +supposed to represent. + +The sceptical and positivistic results of Dewey's treatment of knowledge +are set forth in an article entitled "Some Implications of +Anti-Intellectualism," published in the _Journal of Philosophy, +Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in 1910.[225] This was not included +in the volume of collected essays published in the same year, but may be +regarded as of some importance. + +After some comments on current anti-intellectualistic tendencies, Dewey +proceeds to distinguish his own anti-intellectualism from that of +others. This type "starts from acts, functions, as primary data, +functions both biological and social in character; from organic +responses, readjustments. It treats the knowledge standpoint, in all its +patterns, structures, and purposes, as evolving out of, and operating in +the interests of, the guidance and enrichment of these primary +functions. The vice of intellectualism from this standpoint is not in +making of logical relations and functions in and for knowledge, but in a +false abstraction of knowledge (and the logical) from its working +context."[226] + +The manner in which this exaltation of the "primary" functions at the +expense of knowledge affects philosophy is indicated in the following +passage: "Philosophy is itself a mode of knowing, and of knowing wherein +reflective thinking is much in play.... As a mode of knowledge, it +arises, like any intellectual undertaking, out of certain typical +perplexities and conflicts of behavior, and its purpose is to help +straighten these out. Philosophy may indeed render things more +intelligible or give greater insight into existence; but these +considerations are subject to the final criterion of what it means to +acquire insight and to make things intelligible, _i. e._, namely, +service of _special_ purposes in behavior, and limit by the _special_ +problems in which the need of insight arises. This is not to say that +instrumentalism is merely a methodology or an epistemology preliminary +to more ultimate philosophic or metaphysical inquiries, for it involves +the doctrine that the origin, structure, and purpose of knowing are such +as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of +Being."[227] + +In the last analysis, this appears to be a confession, rather than an +argument. It is the inevitable outcome of the functional analysis of +intelligence. Thought is this organ, with these functions, and is +capable of so much and no more. The limit to its capacity is set by the +description of its nature. The nature of the functionalistic limitation +of thought is well expressed in the words 'special' and 'specific.' +Since thought is the servant of the 'primary' modes of experience, it +can only deal with the problems set for it by preceding non-reflective +processes. These problems are 'specific' because they are concrete +problems of action, and are concerned with particular aspects of the +environment. Dewey's formidable positivism would vanish at once, +however, if his special psychology of the thought-process should be +found untenable. Thought is limited, according to Dewey, because it is a +very special form of activity, operating occasionally in the interest of +the direct modes of experiencing. + +Probably every philosopher recognizes that speculation cannot be allowed +to run wild. Some problems are worth while, others are artificial and +trivial, and some means must be found for separating the sound and +substantial from the tawdry and sentimental. The question is, however, +whether Dewey's psychology furnishes a ground for such distinctions. +Again, it should be noted that, in spite of the limitations placed upon +thought by its very nature, as described by Dewey, certain philosophers, +by his own confession, are guilty of "wholesale inquiries into the +nature of Being." If thought can deal only with specific problems, then +there can be no question as to whether philosophy _ought_ to be +metaphysical. It is a repetition of the case of psychological _versus_ +ethical hedonism. + +Modern idealists would resent the imputation that there is any +inclination on their part to deny the need for a critical attitude +toward the problems and methods of philosophy. Kant's criticism of the +'dogmatists' for their undiscriminating employment of the categories in +the interpretation of reality, established an attitude which has been +steadily maintained by his philosophical descendants. The idealist, in +fact, has accused Dewey of laxity in the criticism of his own methods +and presuppositions. The categories of description and natural selection +by means of which his functionalism is established, it is argued, are of +little service in the sphere of mind. And while Dewey accepts an +evolutionary view of reality in general, the idealist has found +evolutionism, at least in its biological form, too limited in scope to +serve the extensive interests of philosophy. Dewey is right in opposing +false problems and fanciful solutions in philosophy; but these evils are +to be corrected, not by functional psychology, but by an empirical +criticism of each method and each problem as it arises. + +It has been seen that, even in these more constructive essays, Dewey's +position is largely defined in negatives. What might be expected, then, +of the essays which are primarily critical? Perhaps the best answer will +be afforded by a close analysis of one or more of them. Idealism, as has +been said, receives most of Dewey's attention. There are three essays in +_The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, which bear directly against +idealism. One, "The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth," is directed +against Bradley; another, "Experience and Objective Idealism," is a +historical discussion of idealistic views. The third, which is broadest +in scope, is entitled "Beliefs and Existences." This was originally +delivered as the presidential address at the meeting of the American +Philosophical Association in December, 1905, and was printed in the +_Philosophical Review_ in March, 1906, under the title, "Beliefs and +Realities." + +Dewey begins with a discussion of the personal and human character of +beliefs. "Beliefs," he says, "look both ways, towards persons and +towards things.... They form or judge--justify or condemn--the agents +who entertain them and who insist upon them.... To believe is to ascribe +value, impute meaning, assign import."[228] Beliefs are entertained by +persons; by men as individuals and not as professional beings. Because +they are essentially human, beliefs issue in action, and have their +import in conduct. "That believed better is held to, asserted, affirmed, +acted upon.... That believed worse is fled, resisted, transformed into +an instrument for the better."[229] Beliefs, then, have a human side; +they belong to people, and have a character which is expressed in the +conduct to which they lead. + +On the other hand, beliefs look towards things. "'Reality' naturally +instigates belief. It appraises itself and through this self-appraisal +manages its affairs.... It is interpretation; not merely existence aware +of itself as fact, but existence discerning, judging itself, approving +and disapproving."[230] The vital connection between belief as personal, +and as directed upon things, cannot be disregarded. "We cannot keep +connection on one side and throw it away on the other. We cannot +preserve significance and decline the personal attitude in which it is +inscribed and operative...."[231] To take the world as something +existing by itself, is to overlook the fact that it is always somebody's +world, "and you shall not have completed your metaphysics till you have +told whose world is meant and how and what for--in what bias and to what +effect."[232] + +But philosophers have been guilty of error here. They have thrown aside +all consideration of belief as a personal fact in reality, and have +taken "an oath of allegiance to Reality, objective, universal, complete; +made perhaps of atoms, perhaps of sensations, perhaps of logical +meanings."[233] This Reality leaves no place for belief; for belief, as +having to do with human adventures, can have no place in a cut and dried +cosmos. The search for a world which is eternally fixed in eternal +meanings has developed the present wondrous and formidable technique of +philosophy. + +The attempt to exclude the human element from belief has resulted in +philosophical errors. Philosophers have divided reality into two parts, +"one of which shall alone be good and true 'Reality,' ... while the +other part, that which is excluded, shall be referred exclusively to +belief and treated as mere appearance...."[234] To cap the climax, this +division of the world into two parts must be made by some philosopher +who, being human, employs his own beliefs, and classifies things on the +basis of his own experience. Can it be done? We are today in the +presence of a revolt against such tendencies, Dewey says; and he +proposes to give some sketch, "(1) of the historical tendencies which +have shaped the situation in which a Stoic theory of knowledge claims +metaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies that have furnished the +despised principle of belief opportunity and means of reassertion."[235] + +Throughout this introduction Dewey speaks with considerable feeling, as +if the question were a moral one, rather than a disquisition concerning +the best method of dealing with the personal aspects of thought. His +meaning, however, is far from being apparent. What does it mean to say +that a Stoic theory of knowledge holds a monopoly in modern philosophy? +In what sense has the philosophy of the past been misanthropic? _Is_ +Humanism a product of the twentieth century? Dewey's assertions are +broad and sweeping; too broad even for a popular discourse, let alone a +philosophical address. Perhaps his attitude will be more fully expressed +in the historical inquiry which follows. + +Dewey begins this inquiry with the period of the rise of Christianity, +which, because it emphasized faith and the personal attitude, seemed in +a fair way to do justice to human belief. "That the ultimate principle +of conduct is affectional and volitional; that God is love; that access +to the principle is by faith, a personal attitude; that belief, +surpassing logical basis and warrant, works out through its own +operation its own fulfilling evidence: such was the implied moral +metaphysic of Christianity."[236] But these implications had to be +worked out into a theory, and the only logical or metaphysical systems +which offered themselves as a basis for organization were those Stoic +systems which "identified true existence with the proper object of +logical reason." Aristotle alone among the ancients gave practical +thought its due attention, but he, unfortunately, failed to assimilate +"his idea of theoretical to his notion of practical knowledge."[237] In +the Greek systems generally, "desiring reason culminating in beliefs +relating to imperfect existence, stands forever in contrast with +passionless reason functioning in pure knowledge, logically complete, of +perfect being."[238] + +Dewey's discussion moves too rapidly here to be convincing. He does not +take time, for instance, to make a very important distinction between +the Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. He does not do justice to the +purpose which animated the Greeks in their attempt to put thought on a +'theoretical' basis. His confusion of Platonism with Neo-Platonism is +especially annoying. And, most assuredly, his estimate of primitive +Christianity needs corroboration. Probably Christianity, in its +primitive form, did lay great stress upon individual beliefs and +persuasions, but it was expected, nevertheless, that the Holy Spirit +working in men would produce uniform results in the way of belief. When +the uniformity failed to materialize, Christianity was forced, in the +interests of union, to fall back upon some objective standard by which +belief could be tested. After this was established, an end was made of +individual inspiration. From the earliest times, therefore, it may be +said, Christianity sought means for the suppression of free inquiry and +belief, a proceeding utterly opposed to the spirit of ancient Greece. + +"I need not remind you," Dewey continues, "how through Neo-Platonism, +St. Augustine, and the Scholastic renaissance, these conceptions became +imbedded in Christian philosophy; and what a reversal occurred of the +original practical principle of Christianity. Belief is henceforth +important because it is the mere antecedent in a finite and fallen +world, a temporal and phenomenal world infected with non-being, of true +knowledge to be achieved only in a world of completed Being."[239] +Through the hundreds of years that intervened before the world's +awakening, the 'Stoic dogma,' enforced by authority, held the world in +thrall. And still Dewey finds the mediaeval Absolutism in many respects +more merciful than the Absolutism of modern philosophy. "For my part, I +can but think that mediaeval absolutism, with its provision for +authoritative supernatural assistance in this world and assertion of +supernatural realization in the next, was more logical, as well as more +humane, then the modern absolutism, that, with the same logical +premises, bids man find adequate consolation and support in the fact +that, after all, his strivings are already eternally fulfilled, his +errors already eternally transcended, his partial beliefs already +eternally comprehended."[240] Dewey takes no note of the fact that +philosophy, as involving really free inquiry, was dead during the whole +period of mediaeval predominance. + +The modern age, Dewey continues, brought intelligence back to earth +again, but only partially. Fixed being was still supposed to be the +object of thought. "The principle of the inherent relation of thought to +being was preserved intact, but its practical locus was moved down from +the next world to this."[241] Aristotle's mode of dealing with the +Platonic ideas was followed, and Spinoza was the great exponent of "the +strict correlation of the attribute of matter with the attribute of +thought." + +But, again, the modern conception of knowledge failed to do justice to +belief, in spite of the compromise that gave the natural world to +intelligence, and the spiritual world to faith. This compromise could +not endure, for Science encroached upon the field of religious belief, +and invaded the sphere of the personal and emotional. "Knowledge, in its +general theory, as philosophy, went the same way. It was pre-committed +to the old notion: the absolutely real is the object of _knowledge_, and +hence is something universal and impersonal. So, whether by the road of +sensationalism or rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism or objective +idealism, it came about that concrete selves, specific feeling and +willing beings, were relegated with the beliefs in which they declare +themselves to the 'phenomenal.'"[242] Feeling, volition, desiring +thought have never received the justice due them in the whole course of +philosophy. This is Dewey's conclusion. Little can be said in praise of +his historical survey. There is scarcely a statement to which exception +could not be taken, for the history of philosophy is not amenable to +generalized treatment of this character. + +The reader turns more hopefully toward the third part of the essay, in +which he is promised a positive statement of the new theory which does +full justice to belief. "First, then, the very use of the knowledge +standpoint, the very expression of the knowledge preoccupation, has +produced methods and tests that, when formulated, intimate a radically +different conception of knowledge, and of its relation to existence and +belief, than the orthodox one."[243] + +But after this not unpromising introduction, Dewey falls into the +polemical strain again. The argument need not be followed in detail, +since it consists largely in a reassertion of the validity of belief as +an element in knowledge. The general conclusion is that modern +scientific investigation reveals itself, when examined, as nothing more +that the "rendering into a systematic technique, into an art +deliberately and delightfully pursued, the rougher and cruder means by +which practical human beings have in all ages worked out the +implications of their beliefs, tested them, and endeavored in the +interests of economy, efficiency, and freedom, to render them coherent +with one another."[244] This is presumably true. If no more is implied +than is definitely asserted in this passage, the reader is apt to wonder +who would deny it. + +Dewey again claims for his theory the support of modern science. +"Biology, psychology, and the social sciences proffer an imposing body +of concrete facts that also point to the rehabilitation of +belief...."[245] Psychology has revised its notions in terms of +beliefs. 'Motor' is writ large on the face of sensation, perception, +conception, cognition in general. Biology shows that the organic +instruments of the intellectual life were evolved for specifically +practical purposes. The historical sciences show that knowledge is a +social instrument for the purpose of meeting social needs. This +testimony is not philosophy, Dewey says, but it has a bearing on +philosophy. The new sciences have at least as much importance as +mathematics and physics. "Such being the case, the reasons for ruling +psychology and sociology and allied sciences out of competency to give +philosophic testimony have more significance than the bare denial of +jurisdiction."[246] The idealists, apparently, have been the worst +offenders in this connection. "One would be almost justified in +construing idealism as a Pickwickian scheme, so willing is it to +idealize the principle of intelligence at the expense of its specific +undertakings, were it not that this reluctance is the necessary outcome +of the Stoic basis and tenor of idealism--its preoccupation with logical +contents and relations in abstraction from their _situs_ and function in +conscious living beings."[247] + +In conclusion, Dewey warns against certain possible misunderstandings. +The pragmatic philosopher, he says, is not opposed to objective +realities, and logical and universal thinking. Again, it is not to be +supposed that science is any the less exact by reason of being +instrumental to human beliefs. "Because reason is a scheme of working +out the meanings of convictions in terms of one another and of the +consequences they import in further experience, convictions are the +more, not the less, amenable and responsible to the full exercise of +reason."[248] And finally, Dewey assures the reader that the outcome of +his discussion is not a solution, but a problem. Nobody is apt to +dispute that statement. + +This very unsatisfactory essay is, nevertheless, a fair specimen of the +polemical literature which was produced by Dewey and others during these +years. Pragmatism was trying to make converts, and the _argumentum ad +hominem_ was freely employed. If the opposition was painted a good deal +blacker than was necessary, the end was supposed to justify the evident +exaggeration. And so, in this essay, after accusing his contemporaries +of adherence to tenets that they would have indignantly repudiated, +after a wholesale and indiscriminate condemnation of idealism, Dewey +concludes with--a problem. This period of propaganda is now quite +definitely a thing of the past. Philosophical discussion, especially +since the beginning of the great war, has entered upon a new epoch of +sanity, and, perhaps, of constructive effort. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[212] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 227. + +[213] _Ibid._, p. 228. In connection with the discussion which follows +see Bradley "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," in _Essays on +Truth and Reality_, Chapter VI. + +[214] _Ibid._, p. 229. + +[215] _Op. cit._, p. 239. + +[216] _Ibid._, p. 240. + +[217] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, pp. 77-111. + +[218] _Ibid._, p. 77. + +[219] _Ibid._, p. 78. + +[220] _Op. cit._ + +[221] _Ibid._, p. 84. + +[222] _Op. cit._, p. 90. Author's italics. + +[223] _Op. cit._, p. 87. + +[224] _Ibid._, p. 95. Author's italics. + +[225] Vol. VII. pp. 477-481. + +[226] _Ibid._, p. 478. + +[227] _Op. cit._, p. 479. + +[228] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 169. + +[229] _Ibid._, p. 170. + +[230] _Ibid._, p. 171. + +[231] _Ibid._ + +[232] _Ibid._ + +[233] _Ibid._, p. 172. + +[234] _Op. cit._, p. 175. + +[235] _Ibid._, p. 177. + +[236] _Ibid._, p. 17?. + +[237] _Op. cit._, p. 179. + +[238] _Ibid._ + +[239] _Op. cit._ + +[240] _Ibid._, p. 180. + +[241] _Ibid._, p. 181. + +[242] _Op. cit._, p. 183. + +[243] _Ibid._, p. 184. + +[244] _Ibid._, p. 187. + +[245] _Ibid._, p. 189. + +[246] _Op. cit._, p. 190. + +[247] _Ibid._, p. 191 f. + +[248] _Ibid._, p. 194. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +LATER DEVELOPMENTS + + +Neo-realism began to flourish in this country after 1900, its rise being +nearly contemporary with the spread of pragmatism. Many neo-realists, +indeed, consider themselves followers of James. Dewey views the new +realism, along with pragmatism and 'naturalistic idealism,' as "part and +parcel of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction."[249] The +neo-realists, like the pragmatists, have been active in the field of +controversy, and the pages of the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, +and Scientific Methods_ are filled with exchanges between the +representatives of the two schools, in the form of notes, articles, +discussions, agreements, and disclaimers. Dewey has more sympathy for +realism than for idealism. He finds among the writers of this school, +however, a tendency toward the epistemological interpretation of thought +which he so strongly opposes. An excellent statement of his estimate of +realism is furnished by his "Brief Studies in Realism," published in the +_Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in +1911.[250] + +In beginning these studies Dewey observes that certain idealistic +writers (not named) have been employing in support of their idealism +certain facts which have an obvious physical nature and explanation. +Such illusions as that of the bent stick in the water, the converging +railway tracks, and the double image that occurs when the eye-ball is +pressed, have, as the realists have well proved, a physical explanation +which is entirely adequate. Why is it that the idealists remain +unimpressed by this demonstration? There is a certain element in the +realistic explanation which undoubtedly explains the reluctance of the +idealists to be convinced. "Many realists, in offering the type of +explanation adduced above, have treated the cases of seen light, +doubled imagery, as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an +inherent cognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as _cases +of knowledge_, instead of as simply natural events...."[251] + +Dewey draws a distinction, at this point, between naïve and presentative +realism, employing, by way of illustration, the 'star' illusion, which +turns upon the peculiar fact that a star may be seen upon the earth long +after it has ceased to exist. The naïve realist remains in the sphere of +natural explanation. He accounts for the star illusion in physical +terms. The astronomical star and the perceived star are two physical +events within a continuous physical order or process. But the +presentative realist maintains that, since the two stars are numerically +separate, the astronomical star must be the 'real' star, while the +perceived star is merely mental; the real star exists in independence of +a knowing subject, while the perceived star is related to a mind. The +naïve realist has no need of the hypothesis of a knower, since he can +furnish an adequate physical account of the numerical duplicity of the +star. Dewey favors the naïve standpoint, and affirms that presentative +realism is tainted by an epistemological subjectivism. "Once depart," he +says, "from this thorough naïveté, and substitute for it the +psychological theory that perception is a cognitive presentation of an +object to a mind, and the first step is taken on the road which ends in +an idealistic system."[252] + +The presentative realist, Dewey continues, finds himself possessed of +two kinds of knowledge, when he comes to take account of inference; for +inference is "in the field as an obvious and undisputed case of +knowledge." There is the knowledge of perception by a knower, and the +inferential knowledge which passes beyond perception. All reality, +consequently, is related, directly or indirectly, to the knowing +subject, and idealism is triumphant. But the real difficulty of the +realist's position is that, if perception is a mode of knowing, it +stands in unfavorable contrast with knowledge by inference. How can the +inferred reality of the star be established, considering the +subjectivity of all perception? + +Dewey is alert to the dangers which result from subjectivism, but does +not distinguish, as carefully as he might, between knowledge as +inference, and knowledge as perceptual awareness. Thus, while it might +be granted that the subjective mind is a vicious abstraction, it does +not follow that Dewey's particular interpretation of the function of +inference is correct. And, although the "unwinking, unremitting eye" of +the subjective knower might make experience merely a mental affair, +there is no reason to believe that the operation of inference in +perception would lead to the same result, for inference and awareness +are quite distinct, in historical meaning and function. It is, in fact, +a mere accident that inference and awareness (in the subjective sense) +should both be called knowledge. + +In opposition to presentative realism, Dewey offers his 'naturalistic' +interpretation of knowledge.[253] He finds that the function of +inference, "although embodying the logical relation, is itself a natural +and specifically detectable process among natural things--it is not a +non-natural or epistemological relation, that is, a relation to a mind +or knower not in the natural series...."[254] As has been observed, +Dewey is safe in maintaining that inference is _not_ an operation +performed by a subjective knower, but it does not follow from this that +his interpretation of inference is correct. In fact, a discussion of +inference is irrelevant to the matters which Dewey is here considering. + +In the second part of the essay, the discussion passes into a keen and +rather clever recital of the difficulties that result from taking the +knowledge relation to be 'ubiquitous.'[255] Since this relation is a +constant factor in experience, it would seem as if it might be +eliminated from philosophical calculations. The realist would be glad to +eliminate it, but the idealist is not so willing; for, "since the point +at issue is precisely the statement of the most universally defining +trait of existence as existence, the invitation deliberately to +disregard the most universal trait is nothing more or less than an +invitation to philosophic suicide."[256] It is, Dewey says, as if two +philosophers should set out to ascertain the relation which holds +between an organism as 'eater' and the environment as 'food,' and one +should find the essential thing to be the food, the other the eating. +The 'foodists' would represent the realists, the 'eaterists' the +idealists. No advance, he believes, can be made on this basis. + +In opposition to the epistemologists, Dewey would consider the knowledge +relation not ubiquitous, but specific and occasional. As man bears other +relations to his environment than that of eater, so is he also something +more than a knower. "If the one who is knower is, in relation to +objects, something else and more than their knower, and if objects are, +_in relation to the one who knows them_, something else and other than +things in a knowledge relation, there is somewhat to define and +discuss...."[2] Dewey proposes to advance certain facts to support his +contention that knowing is "a relation to things which depends upon +other and more primary connections between a self and things; a relation +which grows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates +in their interests at specifiable crises."[257] + +This brings the discussion back to familiar ground again, and nothing is +added to his previous statements of the functional conception of +knowledge. While the realist (explicitly or implicitly) conceives the +knowledge relation as obtaining between a subject knower and the +external world, Dewey interprets the knowledge relation in terms of +organism and environment. The 'ubiquity' of the knowledge relation is +disposed of, as has been seen, by conceiving knowledge from an entirely +different standpoint; by reducing all knowledge to inference, and +abolishing the knowing subject. Dewey is plainly under the impression +that the only alternative to the ubiquitous knower is his naturalistic, +biological interpretation of the processes of inference. + +In support of his naturalistic logic, Dewey argues as follows: (1) All +perception involves reference to an organism. "We might about as well +talk of the production of a specimen case of water as a presentation of +water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too accustomed to talk +about perceptions and the organism."[258] (2) Awareness is only a single +phase of experience. We 'know' only a small part of the causes which +affect us as agents. "This means, of course, that things, the things +that come to be _known_, are primarily not objects of awareness, but +causes of weal and woe, things to get and things to avoid, means and +obstacles, tools and results."[259] (3) Knowing is only a special phase +of the behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation, but very important as having +to do with means for the practical and scientific control of the +environment. + +In the final analysis, it will be seen that Dewey refutes the realist by +substituting inference for what the realist calls 'consciousness,' and +settling the issue by this triumph in the field of dialectics, rather +than by an appeal to the facts. Nowhere does Dewey do justice to those +concrete situations which, to the realist, seem to necessitate a +definition of consciousness as awareness. His attitude toward the +realists may be summed up in the statement that he finds in most +realistic systems the fault to which his logical theory is especially +opposed: the tendency to define the problem of logic as that of the +relation of thought at large to reality at large, and to distinguish the +content of mind from the content of the world on an existential rather +than on a functional basis. + +One of Dewey's more recent studies, "The Logic of Judgments of +Practise,"[260] seems to add something positive to his interpretation of +knowledge. A practical judgment, Dewey explains at the outset of this +study, is differentiated from others, not by having a separate organ and +source, but by having a specific sort of subject-matter. It is concerned +with things to be done or situations demanding action. "He had better +consult a physician," and "It would be well for you to invest in these +bonds," are examples of the practical judgment. + +These propositions, as will be seen, are not cast in what the logician +calls logical form, with regular terms and copula. When put in that +form, they seem to lose the direct reference to action which, Dewey +says, differentiates them from the 'descriptive' judgment of the form +_S_ is _P_.[261] This apparently trivial matter is really important. +Although every statement embodies judgment, some statements do not +reflect the ground upon which they are asserted. In this condition they +may be viewed as opinions, suggestions, or guesses, looking towards +judgment rather than reflecting its results. True judgment is occupied +with reasons, proofs, and grounds, and does not concern itself with +action as action. Only when taken as the expression of an individual's +attitude, do Dewey's practical judgments (or assertions) possess the +direct reference to action which he selects as their chief +characteristic. The statement, "You ought to invest in these bonds," +does, indeed, suggest a specific action, but in so doing it loses its +character as a judgment. Put in more logical form, "You are one of those +who should invest in these bonds," the proposition is more clearly the +expression of a judgment, and leads back to its premises. Attention +turns from specific action as such to action as a typical or universal +fact. In short, Dewey's practical judgment is not a true judgment; it +will be seen that it is studied, not as a logical, but as a +psychological phenomenon. + +In pursuance of his psychological method, Dewey discovers several +interesting facts about judgments of practice.(1) These judgments imply +an incomplete situation,--concretely and specifically incomplete; they +express a need. (2) The judgment is itself a factor in assisting toward +the completion of the situation, since it directs an action necessary to +the fulfilment of the need. (3) The subject-matter of the judgment +expresses the fact that one outcome is to be preferred to another. The +element of preference is peculiar to the practical judgment, for it is +not found in merely descriptive judgments, or those 'confined to the +given.' (4) A practical judgment implies both means and end, the act +that completes, and the completeness. It is in this respect 'binary.' +(5) The judgment of what is to be done demands an accurate statement of +the course of action to be pursued and the means to be employed, and +these are to be determined relatively to the end in view. (6) It finally +appears that what is true of the practical judgment may be true of all +judgments of fact; it may be held that "all judgments of fact have +reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and the +discovery of means for their attempted realization."[262] + +This ingenious reading of functionalism out of the practical judgment +is, after all, merely a drawing forth of the psychological implications +previously placed in it. That judgment is an instrument for completing a +situation; that it is linked up with action through desire and +preference; that it seeks to determine the means for effecting a +practical outcome,--these typically instrumental notions are of one +piece with the system of belief that led Dewey to hit upon the practical +judgment as the embodiment of a direction to action. It is important to +distinguish between the logical and the psychological aspects of these +propositions. Action as psychological is one thing; as the +subject-matter of judgment, it is another. In coming to a decision as to +how to act, the agent sets his proposed action over against himself, and +considers it in its universal and typical character. His motor +tendencies, his feelings, his desires factor in the situation +psychologically considered; but they do not enter judgment as +psychological facts, but rather, if at all, as data which have a +significance beyond their mere particularity. Dewey remains at the +psychological standpoint, giving no attention to the genuinely logical +aspects of his 'judgments of practice.' + +From the study of the practical judgment, Dewey passes on to a +consideration of judgments of value, proposing to maintain that "value +judgments are a species of practical judgments."[263] There will be a +distinct gain for moral and economic theory, he believes, in treating +value as concerned with acts necessary to complete a given +need-situation. There is no obvious reason why Dewey should pass to the +pragmatic theory of value through the medium of the practical judgment, +since it could be directly considered on its own account. At any rate, +the discussion of value judgments which follows must stand on its own +merits; it has no vital relation to what precedes. + +It is, as usual, the psychological characteristics of the value judgment +that attract Dewey's attention. Any process of judgment, according to +his analysis, deals with a specific subject-matter, not from the +standpoint of any objective quality it may possess, but with reference +to its functional capacity. "Relative, or comparative, durability, +cheapness, suitability, style, esthetic attractiveness [_e. g._, in a +suit of clothes] constitute value traits. They are traits of objects not +_per se_, but _as entering into a possible and foreseen completing of +the situation_. Their value is their force in precisely this +function."[264] + +Attention should not be distracted from this interpretation of value, +Dewey warns, through confusing the value sought with the price or market +value of the goods. Price values, like the qualities and patterns of the +goods, are data which must be considered in making the judgment, but +they are not the values which the judgment seeks. The value to be +determined is here, is specific, and must be established by reference to +the specific or psychological situation as it presents itself. + +It is true, as Dewey says, that in judgment a value is being established +which has not been determined previously. But it must be insisted that +this value is not estimated by reference to the specific situation in +its limited aspects. The weight of the past bears against the moment; +the act of judgment bases itself upon knowledge objective and +substantial; the test of the value of the thing is its place and +function, not in the here and now, but in the whole system of +experience. Dewey has excluded the reference of the thing to objective, +organized reality, by specifying that its value shall be decided upon +with reference to a specific situation. This limitation of the judgment +situation is imposed upon it from without, and from a special point of +view,--that of functional psychology. Every object and every situation +has its quality of uniqueness and particularity; but the judgment, as +judgment, is not concerned with this aspect of things. Judgment seizes +upon the generic aspect of objects; this kind of a suit of clothes is +the kind that is appropriate to this type of situation. The movement of +judgment is objective and universal, not subjective and psychological. + +Dewey finds one alternative especially opposed to his 'specific' +judgment of value; that is, the proposition that evaluation involves a +comparison of the present object with some fixed standard. When the +fixed standard is investigated, it is found to depend on something else, +and this on something else again in an infinite regress. Finally, the +_Summum Bonum_, as the absolute end term of such a _regressus_, turns +out to be a fiction. Dewey is quite right in maintaining that value is +not something eternally fixed. This does not, however, remove the +possibility of 'real' value, as opposed to mere expediency. + +Value as established, Dewey continues, must be taken into consideration +in making a value judgment. At the same time, it will not do to accept +the established value from mere force of habit. Ultimately, he finds, +all genuine valuation implies a degree of revaluation. "To many," he +observes, "it will appear to be a survival of an idealistic +epistemology,"[265] presumably because it implies a real change in +reality, as opposed to a fixed and rigid order of external reality. But +practical judgments, Dewey says, as having reference to proposed acts, +necessarily look toward some proposed change which the act is to effect. +It is not in an epistemological, but in a practical sense, that judgment +involves a change in values. + +The outcome of the discussion so far, Dewey believes, is to show, first +of all, that "the passage of a proposition into action is not a miracle, +but the realization of its own character--its own meaning as +logical,"[266] and, in the second place, to suggest that all judgments, +not merely practical ones, may have their import in reference to some +difference to be brought about through action. + +In the third part of the essay, Dewey's discussion leads him back to +sense perceptions as forms of practical judgment. There is no doubt, in +his mind, that many perceptions do have an import for action. Not merely +sign-posts, and familiar symbols of the kind, but many perceptions +lacking this obvious reference, have a significance for conduct. It must +not, of course, be supposed that all perception, at any one time, has +cognitive properties; for some of the perceptions have esthetic, and +other non-cognitive properties. Only certain elements of a situation +have the function of cognition. + +Dewey goes on to say that care must be taken in the use made of these +sign-functions in connection with inference. "There is a great +difference between saying that the perception of a shape affords an +indication of how to act and saying that the perception of shape is +itself an inference."[267] No judgment, Dewey seems to imply, is +involved in responding to the motor cue furnished by a familiar object. +Again, the common idea that present perception consists of sensations as +immediate, plus inferred images, implies that every perception involves +inference. But the merging of sensations and images in perception can be +explained naturally, by the fusion of nervous processes, and no +supplementary (transcendental) act of mind is needed to explain the +integrity of experience. + +The tendency to take perception as the object of knowledge, Dewey +continues, instead of as simply cognitive, a term in knowledge, is due +to two chief causes. The first is that in practical judgments the +pointing of the thing towards action is so universal a trait as to be +overlooked, and the second is that signs, because of their importance, +become objects of study on their own account, and in this condition +cease to function directly as cognitive. Dewey means, apparently, that +because the cognitive aspect of things is never attended to except when +they are 'known,' or treated as objects of judgment, there is a tendency +to suppose that they always have the character that pertains to them as +'known' things. + +Again, Dewey says, perception may be translated as the effect of a cause +that produced it. But the cause does not ordinarily appear in +experience, and the perceptions, as effects, remain isolated from the +system of things. Truth and error then become matters of the relation of +the perception to its cause. The difficulties attendant upon this view +can be avoided by taking sense perceptions as terms in practical +judgments. Here the 'other term' which is sought is the action proposed +by the perception. "To borrow an illustration of Professor Woodbridge's: +A certain sound indicates to the mother that her baby needs attention. +If there is error it is not because the sound ought to mean so many +vibrations of the air, while as matter of fact it doesn't even suggest +air vibrations, but because there is wrong inference as to the act to be +performed."[268] The idea is tested, not by its correspondence with some +formal reality, but by its ability to lead up to the experience to which +it points. + +From the consideration of error as cognitive, Dewey passes on to +consider its status as primitive sense data. He draws a distinction +between sensation as psychological and as logical. Ordinary sensation, +just as it comes, is often too confused to serve as a basis for +inference. "It has often been pointed out that sense qualities being +just what they are, it is illegitimate to introduce such notions as +obscurity or confusion into them: a slightly illuminated color is just +as irretrievably what it is, as clearly itself, as an object in the +broad glare of noon-day."[269] But when a confused object is made a +datum for inference, its confusion is just the thing to be got rid of. +It is broken up by analysis into simple elements, and the psychologist's +sensations are logical products, not psychological facts. "Locke writes +a mythology of the history of knowledge, starting from clear and +distinct meanings, each simple, well-defined, sharply and unambiguously +just what it is on its face, without concealments and complications, and +proceeds by 'natural' compoundings up to the store of complex ideas, and +the perception of simple relations of agreement among ideas: a +perception always certain if the ideas are simple, and always +controllable in the case of the complex ideas if we consider the simple +ideas and connections by which they are reached. Thus he established the +habit of taking logical discriminations as historical or psychological +primitives--as 'sources' of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks +upon inference."[270] This way of treating perception found its way into +psychology and into empirical logic. The acceptance of the doctrine that +all sense involves knowledge, Dewey believes, leads to an +epistemological logic; but all perception must involve thought if the +'given' is the simple sensation. + +There is nothing especially new in this critique of sensationalism. +Historically, sensationalism had been displaced by idealism, and the +idea that reality is a construct of ideas held together by logical +relations was given up long before functionalism arrived on the scene. +But if inference, or rationality, is not present in all experience as +the combiner of simple into complex ideas, it may be present in some +other form, even more vital. Dewey, however, does not consider such +possibilities. + +Finally, in an article of slightly earlier date than the studies which +have just been considered, Dewey returns to a consideration of +metaphysics, and the possibility of a metaphysical standpoint in +philosophy. This article, entitled "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical +Inquiry,"[271] deserves careful notice. + +The comments of a number of mechanistic biologists on vitalism furnish +the point of departure for Dewey's discussion. These scientists hold +that, if the organism is considered simply as a part of external nature, +as an existing system, it can be satisfactorily analyzed by the methods +of physico-chemical science. But if the question of ultimate origins is +raised, if it be asked _why_ nature exhibits certain innate +potentialities for producing life, science can give no answer. These +questions belong to metaphysics, and vitalistic or biocentric +conceptions may be valid in the metaphysical sphere. + +This raises the question of the nature of metaphysical inquiry. Dewey +says that the ultimate traits or tendencies which give rise to life need +not necessarily be considered ultimate in a temporal sense. On the +contrary, they may be viewed as permanent, 'irreducible traits,' which +are ultimate in the sense of being always present in reality. The +inquiry and search for these ultimate traits is what constitutes valid +metaphysics. "They are found equally and indifferently whether a +subject-matter in question be dated 1915 or ten million years B. C. +Accordingly, they would seem to deserve the name of ultimate, or +irreducible, traits. As such they may be made the object of a kind of +inquiry differing from that which deals with the genesis of a particular +group of existences, a kind of inquiry to which the name metaphysical +may be given."[272] + +The irreducible traits which Dewey finds are, in the physical sciences, +plurality, interaction, and change. "These traits have to be begged or +taken in any case," for wherever and whenever we take the world, we must +explain it as "a plurality of diverse interacting and changing +existences."[273] The evolutionary sciences add another trait; that is, +evolution, or development in a direction. "For evolution appears to be +just one of the irreducible traits. In other words, it is a fact to be +reckoned with in considering the traits of diversity, interaction, and +change which have been enumerated as among the traits taken for granted +in all scientific subject-matter."[274] + +The doctrine that plurality, interaction, change, and evolution are +permanent traits of reality gains in clearness when contrasted with the +opposed theories which involve creation, absolute origins, or temporal +ultimates. The term 'ultimate origins' may be taken in a merely relative +sense which is valid. The French language has an origin in the Latin +tongues, which is an ultimate origin for French, but this is not an +absolutely ultimate origin, since the Latin tongues, in their turn, +have origins. It is, for instance, meaningless to inquire into the +ultimate origin of the world as a whole; and it is equally futile to +trace any part of the world back to an absolute origin. "That scientific +inquiry does not itself deal with any question of ultimate origins, +except in the purely relative sense already indicated, is, of course, +recognized. But it also seems to follow from what has been said that +scientific inquiry does not generate, or leave over, such a question for +some other discipline, such as metaphysics, to deal with."[275] + +Theories like that of Laplace, for instance, trace the world back to an +origin in some undifferentiated universe; or, in Spencer's terms, some +state of homogeneity. From this original state the world is said to +evolve. But the undifferentiated mass lacks the plurality, interaction, +and change which are presupposed in all scientific explanation. These +traits must be present before development can occur. "To get change we +have to assume other structures which interact with it, existences not +covered by the formula."[276] In short, although Dewey only implies +this, all scientific explanation presupposes a system of interacting +parts; nothing can be explained by reference to an undifferentiated +world which lacks such traits. + +Dewey is particularly interested in the origin of mind or intelligence. +In dealing with mind, he says, we must begin with the present, and in +the present we find that the world has an organization, "in spots," of +the kind we call intelligence. This existing intelligence cannot be +explained by any theory which reduces it to something inferior. The +"attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and +irreducible existence of the thing dealt with."[277] Mind cannot be +explained by being explained away, nor can it be explained as a +development out of an original source in which the potentiality, or +direction of change towards mind, was lacking. + +The evolution of things, Dewey says, is a real fact, and is to be +reckoned with. Moreover, if everything that exists changes, then the +evolution of life and mind surely have a bearing on the nature of +physico-chemical things. They must have in them the trait of direction +of change towards life and mind. "To say, accordingly, that the +existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes +impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics is to say something which +the situation calls for."[278] In other words, the world, metaphysically +considered, must have evolution, as well as the physico-chemical traits. +"Without a doctrine of evolution we might be able to say, not that +matter _caused_ life, but that matter under certain conditions of highly +complicated and intensified interaction is living. With the doctrine of +evolution, we can add to this statement that the interactions and +changes of matter are themselves of a kind to bring about that complex +and intensified interaction which is life."[279] Dewey holds that +evolution rests upon the reality of time: "time itself, or genuine +change in a specific direction, is itself one of the ultimate traits of +the world irrespective of date."[280] + +This article presents on the whole a distinct advance over the position +taken in the earlier essay, "Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism," +which was reviewed in the last chapter. Dewey is not now, to be sure, +instituting a wholesale inquiry into the nature of being, but he betrays +an interest in the general, as opposed to the specific traits of +reality. He inquires into the real nature of the world, and believes +that he discovers its ultimate traits. This essay, of course, is +incomplete, and consequently indefinite in certain important respects. +It may be said, nevertheless, to give an accurate view of the +metaphysical back-ground against which all of Dewey's theories are +projected. His metaphysics, as would be expected, are evolutionary +throughout, and evolution is conceived, where he is at all definite, in +biological terms. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[249] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, Introduction, p. iv. + +[250] Vol. VIII: "I. Naïve Realism _vs._ Presentative Realism," pp. +393-400. "II. Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the +Knowledge Relation," pp. 546-554. + +[251] _Op. cit._, p. 395. + +[252] _Ibid._, p. 397. + +[253] In this connection Dewey's disagreements with Professor McGilvary +are of especial interest. See especially McGilvary's article, "Pure +Experience and Reality" (_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XVI, 1907, pp. +266-284) and Dewey's reply, together with McGilvary's rejoinder +(_Ibid._, pp. 419-424). McGilvary failed to understand that Dewey's +argument was conducted on a purely 'naturalistic' basis, an almost +inevitable error, in view of Dewey's practical identification of +psychology, biology, and logic. + +[254] _Ibid._, p. 399. + +[255] Dewey is here dealing with the 'epistemological' realists, among +whom he includes such writers as Bertrand Russell. In an article +entitled "The Existence of the World as a Problem" (_Philosophical +Review_, Vol. XXIV, 1915, pp. 357-370), Dewey argues that Russell, in +making a problem of the existence of the external world, implies its +existence in his formulation of the problem. Dewey argues that, since +the existence of the world is presupposed in every such formulation, it +cannot be called in question. This is like disposing of Zeno's paradox +on the ground that arrows fly anyway. + +[256] _Op. cit._, p. 548. + +[257] _Ibid._ + +[258] _Op. cit._ + +[259] _Ibid._, p. 553. + +[260] _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. +XII, 1915. Parts I and II, pp. 505-523; Part III, pp. 533-543. + +[261] _Ibid._, p. 506. + +[262] _Op. cit._, p. 511. + +[263] _Op. cit._, p. 514. + +[264] _Ibid._, p. 515. + +[265] _Op. cit._, p. 521. + +[266] _Op. cit._, p. 522 f. + +[267] _Ibid._, p. 536. + +[268] _Op. cit._, p. 538. + +[269] _Ibid._, p. 540. + +[270] _Op. cit._, p. 541. + +[271] _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol. +XII, 1915, pp. 337-345. + +[272] _Op. cit._, p. 340. + +[273] _Ibid._ + +[274] _Ibid._, p. 345. + +[275] _Op. cit._, p. 339. + +[276] _Ibid._, p. 343. + +[277] _Ibid._, p. 344. + +[278] _Op. cit._, p. 345. + +[279] _Ibid._ + +[280] _Ibid._ + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +CONCLUSIONS + + +Dewey's interest as a philosopher centres, from first to last, upon +knowledge and the knowing process. All that is vital in his ethical, +social, and educational theories depends ultimately upon the special +interpretation of the function of knowledge which constitutes his chief +claim to philosophical distinction. Dewey's logical theory, as has been +seen, was the natural and inevitable outcome of his demand for an +empirical and 'psychological' description of thought as a +'transformatory' process working actual changes in reality. If in the +beginning of his career he found the problem of the nature of knowledge +all-important for his own interests, he came in the end to regard it as +the problem of problems for all philosophers. There is no mistaking +Dewey's conviction that the special interpretation of knowledge which he +advocates opens the door to important advances in philosophical +speculation, while it ends all discussion of those pseudo-problems which +result from a false, epistemological formulation of the function of +knowledge. + +The history of the development of Dewey's thought, set forth in the +preceding chapters, does not pretend to furnish an adequate estimate of +his philosophical system. The two questions, of origin and worth, are, +after all, distinct. The genetic account of Dewey's theory of knowledge +may serve to make its bearings and implications better understood, may +reveal its deeper meaning and import, but the final estimate of its +value as a philosophical hypothesis depends on other considerations. In +this final chapter, it is proposed to deal with the question of the +positive value of functionalism as a working hypothesis. This criticism +may also serve to gather together the threads of criticism and comment +which run through the previous chapters, and reveal the general ground +upon which the writer's opposition to Dewey's theory is based. + +There can be no question that Dewey's theory of knowledge rests, +finally, upon the doctrine of 'immediate empiricism;' upon his belief in +"the necessity of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method +that has now made its way in all the natural sciences...."[281] This +doctrine is clearly stated in the first essay reviewed in this study, +"The Psychological Standpoint" (1886). To quote again from that essay: +"The psychological standpoint as it has developed itself is this: all +that is, is for consciousness or knowledge. The business of the +psychologist is to give a genetic account of the various elements within +this consciousness, and thereby fix their place, determine their +validity, and at the same time show definitely what the real and eternal +nature of this consciousness is."[282] The descriptive method here +advocated does not differ, as an actual mode of procedure, from that of +Dewey's later empiricism. It lies at the basis of all his speculation, +earlier as well as later, and is undoubtedly the most important single +element in his philosophical system. + +In "The Psychological Standpoint" Dewey ascribes the failure of the +earlier empiricists to their desertion of the direct descriptive method +(a criticism repeated frequently in later essays). Locke, for instance, +instead of describing experience as it actually occurs, interprets it in +terms of certain assumed simple sensations, the products of reflection. +These non-experienced elements, Dewey believes, have no place in a +purely empirical philosophy. + +But the empiricist must deal in some manner with the products of +reflection. The atoms of chemistry and the elements of the psychologist +are not experienced facts, but still they play a valuable, indispensable +role in the technique of the sciences. What is to be done with them? It +must be made to appear that they are valid within knowledge, but invalid +elsewhere. This leads to a separation of knowing from other modes of +experiencing, and the descriptive method is depended upon to maintain +the empirical validity of the separation. It has been seen how Dewey's +attempt to interpret knowledge led gradually to a distinction between +the 'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' processes of experience. + +The completed theory of knowledge depends for its validity upon the +distinction thus established between knowing (as reflective thought) and +the practical attitudes of life. The concepts, elements, and other +apparatus of reflection are employed, it is said, only when there is +thinking,--and this is only occasionally. Theory is an instrument to be +used in connection with that special activity, reflective thought, the +general aim of which is the furtherance of the practical ends of life. + +One fairly obvious difficulty with this separation of reflection from +the other life activities is that the 'direct descriptive method,' as +here employed, is itself reflective. How does it come, then, that this +particular method achieves such an effective hegemony over the other +modes of reflection? The 'descriptive method,' as the method of pure +experience, is made to determine or supplant all other methods. It +defines the limits and aims of conceptual systems; it marks out the +limits, aims, and tests of reflective thought in general. How, it may be +asked, does the 'direct descriptive method' escape the limitations which +it imposes upon the other forms of reflective thought? + +It has been seen that in Dewey's view logic is subsidiary to psychology. +But psychology (his psychology) results from the application of the +'descriptive method' to experience. The 'descriptive method,' it may be +inferred from this, is not subject to logical criticism. On the +contrary, it is the basis of all logic. Logic, as the criticism of +categories, is confined to the study of the instrumental concepts as +functioning within the knowledge experience, and its limits are set by +descriptive psychology. There is, apparently, no means by which the +'direct descriptive method' can itself be brought under criticism. + +Dewey says: "By our postulate, things are what they are experienced to +be; and, unless knowing is the sole and only genuine mode of +experiencing, it is fallacious to say that Reality is just and +exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower; or +even that it _is_, relatively and piece-meal, what it is to a finite and +partial knower."[283] Reality is not simply what it is known as, for it +is experienced in other ways than by being known. "But I venture to +repeat that ... the inferential factor must _exist_, or must occur, and +that all existence is direct and vital, so that philosophy can pass upon +its nature--as upon the nature of all of the rest of its +subject-matter--only by first ascertaining what it exists or occurs +_as_."[284] + +Reflection, then, is not designed to furnish an insight into the nature +of things. Acquaintance with reality must be obtained, not by reflecting +upon it, but by describing it as it occurs. Whatever else this may mean, +it certainly aims at demonstrating the superiority of description to the +supposedly less effective modes of thought. It cannot be conceded, +however, that 'description,' as employed by Dewey, is non-reflective, or +super-reflective. If things are not what they are known as, then they +are not what they are known as to a describer. The point of this +objection will be obvious if it is remembered that it is the method of +'direct description' which enables Dewey to distinguish between the +'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' activities of life, and make +thought the servant of action. If Dewey's descriptive method is not +reflective, then there is no such thing as reflection. + +Passing for the moment from this criticism, which is not apt to be +convincing in such abstract form, it may be well to consider for a time +the psychology upon which Dewey's logical theory is grounded: the +psychology which is established by the 'direct descriptive method.' + +From the standpoint of the nervous correlates of experience, Dewey's +theory involves two postulates: first, that customary conduct is carried +on by an habitual set of nervous adjustments, and, second, that +reflection is a process whereby new reactions are established when +habitual modes of response fail to meet a critical situation. + +It must be clearly recognized that, so far as the nervous system is +concerned, the scheme is highly speculative. The advance made by +physiology towards an analysis and understanding of the minute and +specialized parts of the nervous organism has necessarily been slow and +uncertain. Whatever plausibility Dewey's theory possesses must depend, +not upon the technical results of neurology, but upon the external +evidence which seems to justify some such scheme of nervous +organization. + +An examination of this evidence shows that it falls under two main +heads: (1) facts drawn from the observation of the outward behavior of +the organism, and (2) facts derived from an introspective analysis of +the thought-process. + +The study of behavior shows that man thinks only now and then. Most of +his conduct is, literally, thoughtless. It is said that thought is +outwardly manifested by a characteristic attitude, marked by hesitation +and an obvious effort at adjustment. The introspective analysis of the +thought-process shows that it alone, among experiences, is accompanied +by analysis, abstraction, and mediation. Again, both the internal and +external evidence show that a puzzling situation (whose nervous +correlate is a conflict of impulses) is the stimulus which awakens +thought. These are important items in the list of evidence which +supports the functional theory. + +It would be a tedious and unnecessary task to subject each of these bits +of evidence to empirical criticism. It will be better to deal with them +by showing that they do not necessarily imply functionalism, since they +are compatible with a psychology directly opposed to the fundamental +assumptions of Dewey's theory. + +It is doubtless true that men think only occasionally and with some +reluctance. This is a common observation. What is to be made of this +intermittance of thought? The evidence merely shows that man is more +wide awake, energetic, and alert at some times than at others. On these +occasions every faculty of the organism is in operation, higher as well +as lower centres are pitched to a high degree of responsiveness, not at +hap-hazard, to be sure, but _apropos_--tuned to the situation. In saying +that men think only now and then nothing more is necessarily implied +than that men are for the most part sluggish and indifferent, and the +periods of high intensification of the normal processes contrast sharply +with the habitual lethargy of conduct. + +Against Dewey, it will be maintained here that thought cannot be +defined as a special kind of activity considered from the side of the +organism. The life processes are constantly welded into a single unified +activity, which may, as a whole, be directed upon different objects. +Thus, from the side of its objects, this life activity may be called +eating, running, reading, and whatever else one chooses. Thinking, from +this standpoint, may be defined as the direction of effort upon symbols +and abstract terms. But thinking in this case would be identified on the +basis of its content, not in terms of special nervous activities in the +organism. Whether, therefore, thinking signifies that intense periodical +activity which has been noted, or preoccupation with a certain kind of +subject-matter, it in no case implies the operation of a special organic +faculty of the type described by Dewey. + +But, again, it is said that true reflection is marked by a certain +characteristic bodily attitude, which bespeaks inner conflict and a +search for adjustment. This contention seems to have little ground in +fact. The puzzled, hesitating, undecided expression that is usually +supposed to betray deep cogitation may in fact mean simply hesitation +and bewilderment,--the need for thought, rather than its presence. The +expression reveals a certain degree of incompetence and sluggishness in +the individual concerned, and signifies a lack of wide-awakeness and +responsiveness. A student puzzling over his algebra, a speaker +extemporizing an argument, a ball-player using all his resources to +defeat the enemy, have attitudes so unlike that no analysis could +discover in them a common form of expression. And yet it would be +madness to deny that thinking attends their various performances. There +is, in short, no evidence from the side of bodily expression to indicate +the presence in man of a special nervous faculty called reflection. + +Consider next the contention that the cue to thought is a puzzling +situation, involving a problem. No problem, no thought; no thought, no +problem. This may mean either that a man finding himself in a difficult +situation uses all his energy and resource to escape from it, or, that +he never concerns himself with abstract symbols except under the spur of +necessity. The former meaning contains some truth, but the latter is +what Dewey would call a 'dark saying.' If by 'thought' be meant that +period of high activity of all the faculties which is only occasional, +it is doubtless true enough that a problem is frequently needed to +awaken it. Man is content to let life glide along with a minimum of +effort; he cannot, if he would, long maintain the state of high activity +here called 'thinking.' As a consequence of not thinking when he should, +man frequently finds himself involved in situations requiring the +exercise of all the energy and resource he possesses. But the really +efficient 'thinker' is the man who keeps his eyes open, who sees ahead. +He is not efficient merely because of the excellence of his established +modes of response, but, more particularly, because he is alive and +alert. His thinking is effective in preventing difficult situations, as +well as in getting out of them. + +Defining 'thought,' however, as the direction of activity upon symbols +and conceptions, there seems to be little warrant for asserting that it +functions only on the occasion of a concrete, specific problem. One +would say, on the contrary, that this would be an unfavorable occasion +for the study of fundamental principles, whether scientific or +practical. Summing up the external evidence, then, one would say that it +accords as well with the hypothesis that the life processes constitute a +single activity directed upon various objects, as with the hypothesis +that thought is a very special organic activity, having a special +biological function. At least, the evidence for the existence of such a +special faculty is dubious and uncertain. + +What does the internal evidence prove? The analysis of thought contained +in James's chapter on "Reasoning" in the _Principles of Psychology_ has +been the guide for Dewey and other pragmatists in this connection.[285] +James undertakes to show that reasoning is marked off from other +processes by the employment of analysis, abstraction, and the use of +mediating terms. It must be urged here, not only against James, but +against a considerable modern tradition, that this account of thinking +is misleading and inaccurate. The question to be faced, of course, is +whether the processes of thought differ radically from the +non-reflective processes _in kind_, or whether they are simply the +intensification of processes which attend all conscious life. It should +be noted that no concession is made to the notion that thinking is a +special kind of process; only its subject-matter is special, or else +thought is simply a period of wide-awakeness and alertness. In the +latter sense, thought involves an intensification of the powers of +observation, an awakening of memory, a general stimulation of all the +faculties. It calls for the fullest possible apprehension, demands the +most complete insight into the nature of the situation that the +capacities can provide. The contrast between the adequate view of +reality achieved in this manner and the common and inadequate +apprehension of ordinary life is very great, and might easily lead to +the supposition that thinking (so understood) contains elements which +are added through the activities of a special nerve process. + +But is it only in such moments that we deliberately resolve a situation +into its elements, and abstract an 'essence' to serve as a middle term +in inference? It is certain that at such moments these processes are +more distinct than at other times; but the whole situation, for that +matter, stands out more clearly and distinctly. Perception is keener, +memory more definite, feeling more intense. In less degree, however, all +attention involves analysis and abstraction. Experience has always a +focus and a margin; there is a constant selecting and analyzing out of +important elements, which in turn lead to further conclusions and acts, +through associations by contiguity and similarity. This process appears +in an intensified form in the high moments of life. In short, thought +and passive perception are differentiated, not by the elements which +compose them, but by the degree of energy that goes into perception, +memory, feeling, and discrimination. There is nothing in the evidence to +show that thinking is a special kind of activity, which operates now and +then. On the contrary, there is every reason to hold to the position +that the life processes are one and inseparable, operating continually +in conjunction. + +What shall be said, then, with reference to the assertion that thought +operates in the interests of the non-cognitive life processes? That it +comes 'after something and for the sake of something,' namely, 'direct' +experience? Since the separation of the activities into various +'functions' cannot be allowed, by occasional thought must then be meant +those moments of energetic aliveness described above. Translating, +Dewey's theory would read something like this: Man employs his faculties +to the fullest extent only when he is compelled to do so. He gets along +habitually, that is, with a minimum of effort, as long as he can, but +rouses himself and makes an earnest effort to comprehend the world only +when his environment presents him with difficulties which demand +solution. The test of man's thinking consists in its efficiency in +getting him out of trouble, and enabling him to return to his habitual +modes of sub-conscious conduct with a minimum of annoyance. In short, +thinking is an instrument which subserves man's natural laziness, and +its test is the efficiency with which it promotes an easy, or, at any +rate, a satisfactory mode of existence. + +No doubt some men, perhaps many men, do follow such a programme; but it +would not be kind to Nature to assert that she planned it so. + +This separation of the activities of life into several distinct +processes having each a special function looks like a survival of the +old faculty psychology, against which modern thought has protested as +much as against anything whatever. The conception of the organic +processes as separate in action has all the faults of a merely +mechanical representation of consciousness. Doubtless some advantage is +to be obtained, for purposes of investigation, by treating thought, +appreciation, and affection separately; but it is a serious error to +take this provisional distinction as real. It is a curious fact that +Dewey, with all his opposition to such modes of procedure, himself falls +into this abstract way of treating the 'functions' of experience, seeing +not the beam that is in his own eye. + +It is this very form of treatment, strangely enough, which enables Dewey +to call biology to the support of his interpretation of the function of +knowledge. According to the Darwinian theory, survival of the species is +dependent upon the development of special structures and capacities +which enable the organism to adjust itself to its environment. Dewey +finds, following a familiar argument, that the lower animals are adapted +to their environment by special habits of reaction which are relatively +fixed and inelastic. Man, on the contrary, has an exceedingly plastic +nervous system, which enables him to meet changing conditions. Man is +not only highly adapted, but highly adaptable. This trait of plasticity, +or adaptability, Dewey believes, is a product of natural selection, and, +of course, in the final analysis, this high degree of plasticity is the +thought function. + +It is scarcely necessary to say that this treatment of thought is highly +speculative. Dewey offers little concrete evidence to support his +position; indeed, it would require the labor of a Darwin to supply the +needed evidence. Instead of grounding his theories upon the results of +science, Dewey adapts the ever elastic 'evolutionary method' (not really +that of biological evolution, however indeterminate) to his own scheme +of things. It would be hard to discover in philosophical literature a +method more purely theoretical and even dialectical than that whereby +Dewey gives his logical theory the support of evolutionary theory. + +The ultimately mechanical tendencies of his argument are conspicuous, in +spite of all disclaimers. The effect of his analysis is to set +plasticity or adaptability off by itself, as a special trait or feature +of the nervous system. The lower forms of life are governed, we are +told, by fixed reflexes, and the trait of adaptability appears at some +higher stage in the process as a superadded capacity of the nervous +system, correlated, no doubt, with special nervous structures. +Evolutionism would not serve Dewey so well, had he not previously made +this separation between the organic functions and their correlated +structures; but, given this abstract treatment of the life processes, he +is able to make the doctrine of selection contribute to its support. In +opposition to Dewey's argument, it would be reasonable to contend that +plasticity is inherent in all nervous substance. The higher organisms +are more adaptable, because there is more to be modified in them,--more +nerves and synapses, more pliability. There is no sound empirical reason +for accepting Dewey's biological conclusions. + +Taking Dewey's theory at its face value,--and it would be presumptuous +to search for hidden meanings,--its net result is to place the function +of knowing in an embarrassing situation with respect to its capacity for +giving a correct report of reality. Dewey expressly denies, indeed, that +the purpose of knowing is to give an account of the nature of things. +Reality, he asserts, is whatever it is 'experienced as being,' and it is +normally experienced in other ways than by being known. The nature of +reality is not hidden behind a veil, to be searched out; but is here and +now, as it comes and goes in the form of passing experience. Knowing is +designed to transform experience, not to bring it within the survey of +consciousness. + +How does it stand, then, with Dewey's own account of the knowledge +process? He has reflected upon experience, and claims to have given a +correct account of its nature. Dewey's conception of the processes of +experience is genuinely conceptual, a thought product, designed to +furnish a solid basis for belief and calculation. But reflection, by his +own account, is shut in to its own moment, cannot apprehend the true +nature of 'non-cognitional' experiences, and cannot, therefore, deal +adequately with any problems except such as are furnished it by other +'functions.' No wonder that 'anti-intellectualism' should result from +such a conception of knowledge. + +Philosophers have always held that the purpose of reflection (whatever +reflection may be, psychologically) is the attainment of a reliable +insight into the nature of the world. Practical considerations compel +this view. Ordinary, casual observation is superficial and unsystematic; +it never penetrates beneath the surface. Doubtless reality is, in some +degree, what it is in unreflective moments; but it is frequently +something more, as man learns to his sorrow. Reflection displaces the +casual, haphazard attitude, in the attempt to get at the real nature of +the world. + +The results of reflection, moreover, are cumulative. It tends to build +up, by gradual accretions, a conceptual view of reality which may serve +as a relatively stable basis for conduct and calculation. Thought does, +indeed, possess a transforming function. The reasoned knowledge of +things is gradually extended beyond the occasional moments of inquiring +thought, supplanting the casual view with a more penetrating insight; +reality becomes more and better _known_, and less merely _experienced_. + +Dewey reverses this view in a curious manner. It is 'experience' that is +built up by the action of thought, not knowledge itself. This play on +terms might be innocuous, if it were not accompanied by his separation +of the knowing function from others. Dewey makes 'knowing' the servant +of 'direct experience' by giving it the function of reconstructing the +habits of the organism, in order that unreflective experience may be +maintained with a minimum of effort. The non-reflective experience +becomes the valuable experience, and knowledge is made to minister unto +it. This is truly a 'transvaluation of values.' + +Dewey asks: "What is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete +world of experience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction, and +in a world of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and +ideal?"[286] This sharp separation of thought from action is vigorously +maintained. Following are some of the terms by means of which the +difference between direct and reflective experience is expressed: +'direct practice,' 'derived theory;' 'primary construction,' 'secondary +criticism;' 'living appreciation,' 'abstract description;' 'active +endeavor,' 'pale reflection.'[287] This casual, easy distinction escapes +criticism because it seems harmless and unimportant. The distinction, +however, is _not_ real. It does not correspond to the simple facts of +life. Thinking, far from being 'pale reflection,' is often a strenuous +and energetic 'activity.' Reflection, not 'direct experience,' is often, +at least, at the high moment of life. Experience becomes unmeaning on +any other basis. 'Living appreciation' and 'primary construction' +involve thought in a high degree; 'pale reflection' is lazy +contemplation, lacking the spark of life that characterizes true +thought. + +There is no escape from Dewey's needlessly alarming conclusions, except +by maintaining that thought accompanies all conscious life, in greater +or less degree, and that the moment of _real_, earnest thinking is at +the high tide of life, when all the powers are awake and operating. +Thought must be made integral with all other activities, a feature of +the total life organization, rather than an isolated phenomenon. Man is +a thinking organism, not an organism with a thinker. + +It is not to be supposed for a moment that by 'thought' is here meant +the activity of a merely subjective knower. Dewey does, indeed, deal +effectively with the subjective ego, and with representative +perceptionism. But by 'thought' is here meant reflection, judgment, +inference; and in this sense thought is said to be present in all +experience. There can be no question of the relation of thought, so +understood, to reality; for the reason that it has been so integrated +with experience as to be inseparable from it. Setting aside knowing as +the awareness of a conscious subject, there remains an issue with Dewey +concerning the actual place of thought, as an empirical process, in +experience, and the issue must be settled on definite and really +empirical grounds. So much, then, for 'functionalism' and its +psychology. + +Something should be said, before closing this discussion, concerning +philosophical methods in general, since Dewey's psychological approach +to the problems of philosophy must be held responsible for his +anti-intellectualistic results, with their sceptical implications. In +the beginning of his career, as has been seen, Dewey adopted the +'psychological method,' and he has adhered to it consistently ever +since. This initial attitude, although he was not aware of it for many +years, cut him off from the community of understanding that exists among +modern idealists concerning the proper aims and purposes of +philosophical inquiry. Although at first a professed follower of Green +and Caird, Dewey's method was not reconcilable with idealistic +procedure, and in a very real sense he never was an idealist. The +virulence of his later attacks on 'intellectualism' may be explained in +terms of his reaction against a philosophical method which interfered +with the development of his own 'naturalistic' tendencies. + +The method of idealism, or speculative philosophy, is logical; but it +may perfectly well be empirical at the same time. To the +anti-intellectualist empirical logic is an anomaly, a red blue-bird, so +to speak. The philosophical logician is represented as one who evolves +reality out of his own consciousness; who labors with the concepts which +have their abode in the mental sphere, and, by means of the principle of +contradiction, forces them into harmony until they provide a perfectly +consistent representation of the external world which, because of its +perfect rationality, must somehow correspond with the cosmic reality. In +spite of the fact that no man possesses, at least in a sane condition, +the mental equipment requisite for such a performance, certain critics +have not hesitated to impute this kind of logical procedure to the +idealists. To quote from Dewey himself: "For modern philosophy is, as +every college senior recites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps +our books and lectures sometimes forget to tell the senior, has absorbed +Stoic dogma. Passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete +subjection to a ready-made and finished reality ... is its professed +ideal.... Philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge which is other +than the propitious outgrowth of beliefs that shall develop aforetime +their ulterior implications in order to recast them ..., the dream of a +knowledge that has to do with objects having no nature save to be +known."[288] + +This charge against modern idealism has little foundation. Speculative +philosophy repudiated, long ago, the 'epistemological standpoint' as +defined by Dewey. Idealists have not fostered the conception of a +knowing subject shut in to its own states, seeking information about an +impersonal reality over against itself. Note, for example, this comment +of Pringle-Pattison on Kant, made over thirty-five years ago: "The +distinction between mind and the world, which is valid only from a +certain point of view, he took as an absolute separation. He took it, to +use a current phrase, abstractly--that is to say, as a mere fact, a fact +standing by itself and true in any reference. And of course when two +things are completely separate, they can only be brought together by a +bond which is mechanical, external, and accidental to the real nature +of both."[289] Dewey himself never condemned 'epistemology' more +effectively. But it is useless to cite instances, for any serious +student familiar with the literature of modern philosophy ought to know +that 'idealism' has never really been 'epistemological' in the sense +meant by Dewey and his disciples. Subjectivism is not idealism,--the +stolid dogmatism of neo-realism to the contrary notwithstanding. + +Idealism holds, speaking more positively, that philosophers must submit +the conceptions and methods which they employ to a preliminary immanent +criticism, in order to determine the limits within which they may be +validly applied. Every genuine category or method is valid within a +certain sphere of relevance, and the business of criticism is to +determine by empirical investigation or by 'ideal experiment' (which +means much the same thing) what concrete significance the conception is +capable of bearing. Dewey, from the standpoint of idealism, is guilty of +a somewhat uncritical use of the categories of 'description' and +'evolution.' Are the categories of biology fitted to explain mind and +spirit? Instead of instituting an inquiry designed to answer that +question, Dewey accepts 'evolutionism' as final, and attempts to force +all phenomena into conformity with his resulting logical scheme. He +misses the valuable checks upon thought which are furnished by the +'critical method,' and is none too sensitive to the technical results of +the special sciences. + +The logical approach to philosophy strictly involves certain +implications which have been overlooked by many of its critics. It may +well be admitted that our real categories are not fixed and final, but +are perpetually in process of reconstruction. The process of criticism +inevitably makes manifest the human and empirical character of the +particular forms of reflective thought. It recognizes the fact of +development, both in knowledge and in reality, and by this very +recognition the value of knowledge is enhanced. It is forced, by the +very nature of its method, to recognize the concrete and practical +bearings of thought. Indeed, there is a sense in which idealism would +declare that there is no thought--when thought, that is, is taken to +mean an isolated fact out of relation to the world. It is not possible +to make this retort upon the critics of idealism without recognizing +that there has been a vast misjudgment, amounting almost to +misrepresentation, of the intellectual ideals of modern speculative +philosophy. + +To conclude, it is neither by abstract logical processes, nor yet by the +dogmatic employment of scientific categories, that philosophy makes +progress, but by an empirical process which unites criticism and +experiment. In speaking of the development of modern idealism, Bosanquet +says: "All difficulties about the general possibility--the possibility +in principle--of apprehending reality in knowledge and preception were +flung aside as antiquated lumber. What was undertaken was the direct +adventure of knowing; of shaping a view of the universe which should +include and express reality in its completeness. The test and criterion +were not any speculative assumption of any kind whatever. They were the +direct work of the function of knowledge in exhibiting what could and +what could not maintain itself when all the facts were confronted and +set in the order they themselves demanded. The method of inquiry was +ideal experiment."[290] + +When all has been said, this method remains the natural and normal one. +Dewey's 'psychological method,' by contrast, seems strained and +far-fetched, an artificial and externally motived attempt to guide the +intellect, which only by depending upon its own resources and its own +increasing insight can hope to attain the distant and difficult, but +never really foreign goal. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[281] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 240. + +[282] _Op. cit._, Mind, Vol. XI, p. 8 f. + +[283] "The Experimental Method," _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. +228. + +[284] "The Experimental Method," _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. +240. + +[285] See the review of Dewey's essay, "The Experimental Method," in +Chapter VII of this study, p. 91 ff. + +[286] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 4. + +[287] _Ibid._, p. 2. + +[288] "Beliefs and Existences," _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, +p. 172 f. + +[289] _The Philosophical Radicals_, p. 297. The essay in which it +occurs, "Philosophy as a Criticism of Categories," was first published +in 1883, in the volume _Essays on Philosophical Criticism_. + +[290] "Realism and Metaphysics," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XXVI, +1917, p. 8. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of John Dewey's logical theory, by +Delton Thomas Howard + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY *** + +***** This file should be named 38141-8.txt or 38141-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/1/4/38141/ + +Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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