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+Project Gutenberg's John Dewey's logical theory, by Delton Thomas Howard
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: John Dewey's logical theory
+
+Author: Delton Thomas Howard
+
+Release Date: November 26, 2011 [EBook #38141]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Martin Pettit and the
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
+(This file was produced from images generously made
+available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CORNELL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
+
+No. 11
+
+
+JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY
+
+
+BY
+
+DELTON THOMAS HOWARD, A.M.
+
+FORMERLY FELLOW IN THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+A THESIS
+PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
+CORNELL UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
+REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+NEW YORK
+LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.
+1919
+
+
+PRESS OF
+THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY
+LANCASTER, PA.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+It seems unnecessary to offer an apology for an historical treatment of
+Professor Dewey's logical theories, since functionalism glories in the
+genetic method. To be sure, certain more extreme radicals are opposed to
+a genetic interpretation of the history of human thought, but this is
+inconsistent. At any rate, the historical method employed in the
+following study may escape censure by reason of its simple character,
+for it is little more than a critical review of Professor Dewey's
+writings in their historical order, with no discussion of influences and
+connections, and with little insistence upon rigid lines of development.
+It is proposed to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" as far as
+possible; to discover what topics interested Professor Dewey, how he
+dealt with them, and what conclusions he arrived at. This plan has an
+especial advantage when applied to a body of doctrine which, like
+Professor Dewey's, does not possess a systematic form of its own, since
+it avoids the distortion which a more rigid method would be apt to
+produce.
+
+It has not been possible, within the limits of the present study, to
+take note of all of Professor Dewey's writings, and no reference has
+been made to some which are of undoubted interest and importance. Among
+these may be mentioned especially his books and papers on educational
+topics and a number of his ethical writings. Attention has been devoted
+almost exclusively to those writings which have some important bearing
+upon his logical theory. The division into chapters is partly arbitrary,
+although the periods indicated are quite clearly marked by the different
+directions which Professor Dewey's interests took from time to time. It
+will be seen that there is considerable chance for error in
+distinguishing between the important and the unimportant, and in
+selecting the essays which lie in the natural line of the author's
+development. But, _valeat quantum_, as William James would say.
+
+The criticisms and comments which have been made from time to time, as
+seemed appropriate, may be considered pertinent or irrelevant according
+to the views of the reader. It is hoped that they are not entirely
+aside from the mark, and that they do not interfere with a fair
+presentation of the author's views. The last chapter is devoted to a
+direct criticism of Professor Dewey's functionalism, with some comments
+on the general nature of philosophical method.
+
+Since this thesis was written, Professor Dewey has published two or
+three books and numerous articles, which are perhaps more important than
+any of his previous writings. The volume of _Essays in Experimental
+Logic_ (1916) is a distinct advance upon _The Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy and Other Essays_, published six years earlier. Most of these
+essays, however, are considered here in their original form, and the new
+material, while interesting, presents no vital change of standpoint. It
+might be well to call attention to the excellent introductory essay
+which Professor Dewey has provided for this new volume. Some mention
+might also be made of the volume of essays by eight representative
+pragmatists, which appeared last year (1917) under the title, _Creative
+Intelligence_. My comments on Professor Dewey's contribution to the
+volume have been printed elsewhere.[1] It has not seemed necessary, in
+the absence of significant developments, to extend the thesis beyond its
+original limits, and it goes to press, therefore, substantially as
+written two years ago.
+
+I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the faculty of the Sage
+School of Philosophy for many valuable suggestions and kindly
+encouragement in the course of my work. I am most deeply indebted to
+Professor Ernest Albee for his patient guidance and helpful criticism.
+Many of his suggestions, both as to plan and detail, have been adopted
+and embodied in the thesis, and these have contributed materially to
+such logical coherence and technical accuracy as it may possess. The
+particular views expressed are, of course, my own. I wish also to thank
+Professor J. E. Creighton especially for his friendly interest and for
+many suggestions which assisted the progress of my work, as well as for
+his kindness in looking over the proofs.
+
+D. T. HOWARD.
+
+EVANSTON, ILLINOIS,
+June, 1918.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[1] "The Pragmatic Method," _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods_, 1918, Vol. XV, pp. 149-156.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+CHAPTER                                                        PAGE
+
+   I. "Psychology as Philosophic Method"                          1
+
+  II. The Development of the Psychological Standpoint            15
+
+ III. "Moral Theory and Practice"                                33
+
+  IV. Functional Psychology                                      47
+
+   V. The Evolutionary Standpoint                                59
+
+  VI. "Studies in Logical Theory"                                72
+
+ VII. The Polemical Period                                       88
+
+VIII. Later Developments                                        105
+
+  IX. Conclusions                                               119
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+"PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD"
+
+
+Dewey's earliest standpoint in philosophy is presented in two articles
+published in _Mind_ in 1886: "The Psychological Standpoint," and
+"Psychology as Philosophic Method."[2] These articles appear to have
+been written in connection with his _Psychology_, which was published in
+the same year, and which represents the same general point of view as
+applied to the study of mental phenomena. For the purposes of the
+present study attention may be confined to the two articles in _Mind_.
+
+Dewey begins his argument, in "The Psychological Standpoint," with a
+reference to Professor Green's remark that the psychological standpoint
+is what marks the difference between transcendentalism and British
+empiricism. Dewey takes exception to this view, and asserts that the two
+schools hold this standpoint in common, and, furthermore, that the
+psychological standpoint has been the strength of British empiricism and
+desertion of that standpoint its weakness. Shadworth Hodgson's comment
+on this proposal testifies to its audacity. In a review of Dewey's
+article, he says: "If for instance we are told by a competent writer,
+that Absolute Idealism is not only a truth of experience but one
+attained directly by the method of experiential psychology, we should
+not allow our astonishment to prevent our examining the arguments, by
+virtue of which English psychology attains the results of German
+transcendentalism without quitting the ground of experience."[3]
+
+Dewey defines his psychological standpoint as follows: "We are not to
+determine the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical
+inquiry by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element
+in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related to our mind,
+or is an 'idea'.... Or, in the ordinary way of putting it, the nature
+of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out
+what experience says about them."[4] The implications of this definition
+do not appear at first sight, but they become clearer as the discussion
+proceeds.
+
+Locke, Dewey continues, deserted the psychological standpoint because he
+did not, as he proposed, explain the nature of such things as matter and
+mind by reference to experience. On the contrary, he explained
+experience through the assumption of the two unknowable substances,
+matter and mind. Berkeley also deserted the psychological standpoint, in
+effect, by having recourse to a purely transcendent Spirit. Even Hume
+deserted it by assuming as the only reals certain unrelated sensations,
+and by trying to explain the origin of experience and knowledge by their
+combination. These reals were supposed to exist in independence of an
+organized experience, and to constitute it by their association. It
+might be argued that Hume's sensations are found in experience by
+analysis, and this would probably be true. But the sensations are
+nothing apart from the consciousness in which they are found. "Such a
+sensation," Dewey says, "a sensation which exists only within and for
+experience, is not one which can be used to account for experience. It
+is but one element in an organic whole, and can no more account for the
+whole, than a given digestive act can account for the existence of a
+living body."[5]
+
+So far Dewey is merely restating the criticism of English empiricism
+that had been made by Green and his followers. Reality, as experienced,
+is a whole of organically related parts, not a mechanical compound of
+elements. Whatever is to be explained must be taken as a fact of
+experience, and its meaning will be revealed in terms of its position
+and function within the whole. But while Dewey employs the language of
+idealism, it is doubtful whether he has grasped the full significance of
+the "concrete universal" of the Hegelian school. The following passage
+illustrates the difficulty: "The psychological standpoint as it has
+developed itself is this: all that is, is for consciousness or
+knowledge. The business of the psychologist is to give a genetic
+account of the various elements within this consciousness, and thereby
+fix their place, determine their validity, and at the same time show
+definitely what the real and eternal nature of this consciousness
+is."[6]
+
+Consciousness (used here as identical with 'experience') is apparently
+interpreted as a structure made up of elements related in a determinable
+order, and having, consequently, a 'real and eternal nature.' The result
+is a 'structural' view of reality, and the type of idealism for which
+Dewey stands may fittingly be called 'structural' idealism. This type of
+idealism does, in fact, hold a position intermediate between English
+empiricism and German transcendentalism. But it would not commonly be
+considered a synthesis of the best characteristics of the two schools.
+'Structural' idealism is, historically considered, a reversion to Kant
+which retains the mechanical elements of the _Critique_, but fails to
+reckon with the truly organic mode of interpretation in which it
+culminates. As experience, from Kant's undeveloped position, is a
+structure of sensations and forms, so Dewey's 'consciousness' is a
+compound of separate elements or existences related in a 'real and
+eternal' order.
+
+Dewey illustrates his method, in the discussion which follows, by
+employing it, or showing how it should be employed, in the definition of
+certain typical objects of philosophical inquiry. The first to be
+considered are subject and object. In dealing with the relation of
+subject to object, the psychological method will attempt to show how
+consciousness differentiates itself, or 'specifies' itself, into subject
+and object. These terms will be viewed as related terms within the whole
+of 'consciousness,' rather than as elements existing prior to or in
+independence of the whole in which they are found.
+
+There is a type of realism which illustrates the opposite or ontological
+method. It is led, through a study of the dependence of the mind upon
+the organism, to a position in which subject and object fall apart, out
+of relation to each other. The separation of the two leads to the
+positing of a third term, an unknown _x_, which is supposed to unite
+them. The psychological method would hold that the two objects have
+their union, not in an unknown 'real,' but in the 'consciousness' in
+which they appear. The individual consciousness as subject, and the
+objects over against it, are elements at once distinguished and related
+within the whole. All the terms are facts of experience, and none are to
+be assumed as ontological reals.
+
+Subjective idealism, Dewey continues, makes a similar error in failing
+to discriminate between the ego, or individual consciousness, and the
+Absolute Consciousness within which ego and object are differentiated
+elements. It fails to see that subject and object are complements, and
+inexplicable except as related elements in a larger whole. The
+individual consciousness, again, and the universal 'Consciousness,' are
+to be defined by reference to experience. It is not to be assumed at the
+start, as the subjective idealists assume, that the nature of the
+individual consciousness is known. The ego is to be defined, not
+assumed, and this is the essence of the psychological method.
+
+So far, two factors in Dewey's standpoint are clearly discernible. In
+the first place, all noumena and transcendent reals are to be rejected
+as means of explanation, and definition is to be wholly in terms of
+experienced elements, as experienced. In the second place, experience is
+to be regarded as a rational system of related elements, while
+explanation is to consist in tracing out the relations which any element
+bears to the whole. The universal 'Consciousness' is the whole, and the
+individual mind, again, is an element within the whole, to be explained
+by tracing out the relations which it bears to other elements and to the
+whole system. It is not easy to avoid the conclusion that Dewey
+conceives of 'consciousness' as a construct of existentially distinct
+terms.
+
+Dewey does not actually treat subject and object, individual and
+universal consciousness, in the empirical manner for which he contends.
+He merely outlines a method; and, while this has a negative bearing as
+against transcendent modes of explanation, it has little content of its
+own. But in spite of Dewey's lack of explicitness, it is evident that he
+tends to view his 'objects of philosophical inquiry' as so many concrete
+particular existences or things. The idea that they can be empirically
+marked out and investigated seems to imply this. But subject, object,
+individual, and universal are certainly not reducible to particular
+sensations, even though it must be admitted that they have a reference
+to particulars. These abstract concepts had been a source of difficulty
+to the empiricists, because they had not been able to reduce them to
+particular impressions, and Dewey's proposed method appears to involve
+the same difficulty.
+
+In his second article, on "Psychology as Philosophic Method," Dewey
+proposes to show that his standpoint is practically identical with that
+of transcendental idealism. This is made possible, he believes, through
+the fact that, since experience or consciousness is the only reality,
+psychology, as the scientific account of this reality, becomes identical
+with philosophy.
+
+In maintaining his position, Dewey finds it necessary to criticise the
+tendency, found in certain idealists, to treat psychology merely as a
+special science. This view of psychology is attained, Dewey observes, by
+regarding man under two arbitrarily determined aspects. Taken as a
+finite being acting amid finite things, a knowing, willing, feeling
+phenomenon, man is said to be the object of a special science,
+psychology. But in another aspect man is infinite, the universal
+self-consciousness, and as such is the object of philosophy. This
+distinction between the two aspects of man's nature, Dewey believes,
+cannot be maintained. As a distinction, it must arise within
+consciousness, and it must therefore be a psychological distinction.
+Psychology cannot limit itself to anything less than the whole of
+experience, and cannot, therefore, be a special science dependent, like
+others, upon philosophy for its working concepts. On the contrary, the
+method of psychology must be the method of philosophy.
+
+Dewey reaches this result quite easily, because he makes psychology the
+science of reality to begin with. "The universe," he says, "except as
+realized in an individual, has no existence.... Self-consciousness means
+simply an individualized universe; and if this universe has _not_ been
+realized in man, if man be not self-conscious, then no philosophy
+whatever is possible. If it _has_ been realized, it is in and through
+psychological experience that this realization has occurred. Psychology
+is the scientific account of this realization, of this individualized
+universe, of this self-consciousness."[7]
+
+It is difficult to understand exactly what these expressions meant for
+Dewey. Granting that the human mind is both individual and universal,
+what objection could be raised against the study of its individual or
+finite aspects as the special subject-matter of a particular science?
+All the sciences, as Dewey was aware, are abstract in method. Dewey's
+position appears to be that the universal and individual aspects of
+consciousness are nothing apart from each other, and must be studied
+together. But 'consciousness' in Dewey's view is, in fact, two
+consciousnesses. Reality as a whole is a Consciousness, and the
+individual mind is another consciousness. A problem arises, therefore,
+as to their connection. Dewey affirms that, unless they are united,
+unless the universal is given in the individual consciousness, there can
+be no science of the whole, and therefore no philosophy. The
+epistemological problem of the relation of the mind to reality becomes,
+accordingly, the _raison d'être_ of his method. The problem was an
+inheritance from subjective idealism. It may be pointed out that there
+is some similarity between Dewey's standpoint and Berkeley's. Both
+conceive of consciousness as a construct of elements, and Dewey's
+'Consciousness in general' holds much the same relation to the finite
+consciousness that the Divine Mind holds to the individual consciousness
+in Berkeley's system. The similarity between the two standpoints must
+not be overemphasized, but it is none the less suggestive and
+interesting.
+
+In attempting to determine the proper status of psychology as a science,
+Dewey is led into a more detailed exposition of his standpoint. His
+position in general is well indicated in the following passage: "In
+short, the real _esse_ of things is neither their _percipi_, nor their
+_intelligi_ alone; it is their _experiri_."[8] The science of the
+_intelligi_ is logic, and of the _percipi_, philosophy of nature. But
+these are abstractions from the _experiri_, the science of which is
+psychology. If it be denied that the _experiri_, self-consciousness in
+its wholeness, can be the subject-matter of psychology, then the
+possibility of philosophy is also denied. "If man, as matter of fact,
+does not realise the nature of the eternal and the universal _within_
+himself, as the essence of his own being; if he does not at one stage of
+his experience consciously, and in all stages implicitly, lay hold of
+this universal and eternal, then it is mere matter of words to say that
+he can give no account of things as they universally and eternally are.
+To deny, therefore, that self-consciousness is a matter of psychological
+experience is to deny the possibility of any philosophy."[9] Dewey
+assures us again that his method alone will solve the epistemological
+problem.
+
+Self-consciousness, as that within which things exist _sub specie
+æternitatis_ and _in ordine ad universum_, must be the object of
+psychology. The refusal to take self-consciousness as an experienced
+fact, Dewey says, results in such failures as are seen in Kant, Hegel,
+and even Green and Caird, to give any adequate account of the nature of
+the Absolute. Kant, for purely logical reasons, denied that
+self-consciousness could be an object of experience, although he
+admitted conceptions and perceptions as matters of experience. As a
+result of his attitude, conception and perception were never brought
+into organic connection; the self-conscious, eternal order of the world
+was referred to something back of experience. Dewey attributes Kant's
+failure to his logical method, which led him away from the psychological
+standpoint in which he would have found self-consciousness as a directly
+presented fact.
+
+This criticism of Kant's 'logical method' fails to take account of the
+transitional nature of Kant's standpoint. Looking backward, it is easy
+enough to ask why Kant did not begin with the organic view of experience
+at which he finally arrived. But the answer must be that the organic
+standpoint did not exist until Kant, by his 'logical method,' had
+brought it to light. The Kantian interpretation of experience, in which,
+as Dewey asserts, conception and perception were never brought into
+organic relation, is a half-way stage between mechanism and organism.
+But how does Dewey propose to improve upon Kant's position? He will
+first of all put Kant's noumenal self back into experience, as a fact in
+consciousness. But how will this help to bring perception and conception
+into closer union? There seems to be no answer. Dewey's view appears to
+be that organic relations are achieved whenever an object is made a part
+of experience and so brought into connection with other experienced
+facts. 'Organic relation' is interpreted as equivalent to 'mental
+relation.' But mental relations are not organic because they are mental.
+It would be as easy to assert that they are mechanical. The test lies in
+the nature of the relations which are actually found in the mental
+sphere and the fitness of the organic categories to express them.
+Dewey's 'consciousness,' as has been said before, appears to be a
+structure, not an organism. Its parts are external to each other,
+however closely they may be related. An organic view of experience would
+begin with a denial of the actuality of bare facts or sensations, and
+would not waver in maintaining that standpoint to the end.
+
+Hegel's advance upon Kant, Dewey continues, "consisted essentially in
+showing that Kant's _logical_ standard was erroneous, and that, as a
+matter of logic, the only true criterion or standard was the organic
+notion, or _Begriff_, which is a systematic totality, and accordingly
+able to explain both itself and also the simpler processes and
+principles."[10] The logical reformation which Hegel accomplished was
+most important, but the work of Kant still needed to be completed by
+"showing self-consciousness as a fact of experience, as well as
+perception through organic forms and thinking through organic
+principles."[11] This element is latent in Hegel, Dewey believes, but
+needs to be brought out.
+
+T. H. Green comes under the same criticism. He followed Kant's logical
+method, and as a consequence arrived at the same negative results. The
+nature of self-consciousness remains unknown to Green; he can affirm its
+existence, but cannot describe its nature. Dewey quotes that passage
+from the _Prolegomena to Ethics_ in which Green says:[12] "As to what
+that consciousness in itself or in its completeness is, we can only
+make negative statements. _That_ there is such a consciousness is
+implied in the existence of the world; but _what_ it is we only know
+through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and
+interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent
+experience." If, Dewey observes, Green had begun with the latter point
+of view, and had taken self-consciousness as at least partially realized
+in finite minds, he would have been able to make some positive
+statements about it. Dewey, however, has not given the most adequate
+interpretation of Green's 'Spiritual Principle in Nature.' This was
+evidently, for Green, a symbol of the intelligibility of the world as
+organically conceived, an order which could not be comprehended by the
+mechanical categories, but which was nevertheless real. As Green tended
+to hypostatize the organic conception, so Dewey would make it a concrete
+reality, with the further specification that it must be something given
+to psychological observation.
+
+The chief point of Dewey's criticism of the idealists is that they fail
+to establish self-consciousness as an experienced fact; and, Dewey
+maintains, it must be so established if it is to be anything real and
+genuine. If it is anything that can be discussed at all, it must be an
+element in experience; and if it is in experience, it must be the
+subject-matter of psychology. It is inevitable, from Dewey's standpoint,
+that transcendentalism should adopt his psychological method.
+
+In the further development of his standpoint, Dewey considers (1) the
+relations of psychology to the special sciences, and (2) the relation of
+psychology to logic. Dewey's conception of the relation of psychology to
+the special sciences is well illustrated in the following passage:
+"Mathematics, physics, biology exist, because conscious experience
+reveals itself to be of such a nature, that one may make virtual
+abstraction from the whole, and consider a part by itself, without
+damage, so long as the treatment is purely scientific, that is, so long
+as the implicit connection with the whole is left undisturbed, and the
+attempt is not made to present this partial science as metaphysic, or as
+an explanation of the whole, as is the usual fashion of our uncritical
+so-called 'scientific philosophies.' Nay more, this abstraction of some
+one sphere is itself a living function of the psychologic experience. It
+is not merely something which it allows: it is something which it
+_does_. It is the analytic aspect of its own activity, whereby it
+deepens and renders explicit, realizes its own nature.... The analytic
+movement constitutes the special sciences; the synthetic constitutes the
+philosophy of nature; the self-developing activity itself, as
+psychology, constitutes philosophy."[13]
+
+The special sciences are regarded as abstractions from the central or
+psychological point of view, but they are legitimate abstractions,
+constituted by a proper analytic movement of the total
+self-consciousness, which specifies itself into the special branches of
+knowledge. If we begin with any special science, and drive it back to
+its fundamentals, it reveals its abstractness, and thought is led
+forward into other sciences, and finally into philosophy, as the science
+of the whole. But philosophy, first appearing as a special science,
+turns out to be science; it is presupposed in all the special sciences,
+and is their basis. But where does psychology stand in this
+classification?
+
+At first sight psychology appears to be a special science, abstract like
+the others. "As to systematic observation, experiment, conclusion and
+verification, it can differ in no essential way from any one of
+them."[14] But psychology, like philosophy, turns out to be a science of
+the whole. Each special science investigates a special sphere of
+conscious experience. "From one science to another we go, asking for
+some explanation of conscious experience, until we come to
+psychology.... But the very process that has made necessary this new
+science reveals also that each of the former sciences existed only in
+abstraction from it. Each dealt with some one phase of conscious
+experience, and for that very reason could not deal with the totality
+which gave it its being, consciousness."[15] Philosophy and psychology
+therefore mainly coincide, and the method of psychology, properly
+developed, becomes the method of philosophy.
+
+If psychology is to be identified with philosophy in this fashion, the
+mere change of name would seem to be superfluous. There would be no
+reason for maintaining psychology as a separate discipline. Perhaps
+Dewey did not intend that it should be maintained separately. In that
+case, the total effect of his argument would be to prescribe certain
+methods for philosophy. It seems necessary to suppose that Dewey
+proposed to merge philosophy in psychology, and make it an exact science
+while retaining its universality. "Science," he argued, "is the
+systematic account, or _reason_ of _fact_; Psychology is the completed
+systematic account of the ultimate fact, which, as fact, reveals itself
+as reason...."[16] Self-consciousness in its ultimate nature is
+conceived of as a special fact, over and above what it includes in the
+way of particulars. Psychology, as the science of this ultimate fact,
+must at the same time be philosophy. The identification of the two
+disciplines depends upon taking the 'wholeness' of reality as a 'fact,'
+which can be brought under observation. This is a natural conclusion
+from Dewey's structural view of reality.
+
+In taking up the subject of the relation of psychology to logic, Dewey
+remarks that in philosophy matter and form cannot be separated.
+"Self-consciousness is the final truth, and in self-consciousness the
+form as organic system and the content as organized system are exactly
+equal to each other."[17] Logic abstracts from the whole, gives us only
+the form, or _intelligi_ of reality, and is therefore only one moment in
+philosophy. Since logic is an abstraction from Nature, we cannot get
+from logic back to Nature, by means of logic. We do, as a matter of
+fact, make the transition in philosophy, because the facts force us back
+to Nature. Just as in Hegel's logic, the category of quality, when
+pressed, reveals itself as inadequate to express the facts, and is
+compelled to pass into the category of quantity, so does logic as a
+whole, when pressed, reveal its inadequacy to express the whole of
+reality. The transition from category to category in the Hegelian logic
+is not an unfolding of the forms as forms, but results from a compulsion
+exerted by the facts, when the categories are used to explain them.
+Logic is, and must remain, abstract in all its processes, and its
+outcome (with Hegel, _Geist_) may assert the abstract necessity of one
+self-conscious whole, but cannot give the reality. "Logic cannot reach,
+however much it may point to, an actual individual. The gathering up of
+the universe into one self-conscious individuality it may assert as
+_necessary_, it cannot give it as _reality_."[18] Taken as an abstract
+method, logic is apt to result in a pantheism, "where the only real is
+the _Idee_, and where all its factors and moments, including spirit and
+nature, are real only at different stages or phases of the _Idee_, but
+vanish as imperfect ways of looking at things ... when we reach the
+_Idee_."[19]
+
+Dewey has in mind logic as a science of the forms of reality taken in
+abstraction from their content. In reality, however, there can be no
+logic of concepts apart from their concrete application. Hegel certainly
+never believed that it was possible to abstract the logical forms from
+reality and study them in their isolation. As against a purely formal
+logic, if such a thing were possible, Dewey's criticism would be valid,
+but the transcendental logic of his time was not formal in this sense.
+The psychological method which Dewey offers as a substitute for the
+logical method escapes, he believes, the difficulties of the latter
+method. At the same time it preserves, in his opinion, the essential
+spirit of the Hegelian method. Dewey's comments show that he conceives
+his method to be a restatement, in improved form, of the doctrine of the
+'concrete universal.' But the 'psychological method' and the method of
+idealism are, if anything, antithetical. An excellent summary of Dewey's
+theory is afforded by the following passage: "Only a living actual Fact
+can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in
+virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being. It is with this
+fact, conscious experience in its entirety, that psychology as method
+begins. It thus brings to clear light of day the presupposition implicit
+in every philosophy, and thereby affords logic, as well as the
+philosophy of nature, its basis, ideal and surety. If we have determined
+the nature of reality, by a process whose content equals its form, we
+can show the meaning, worth and limits of any one moment of this
+reality."[20]
+
+It would be useless to speculate upon the various possible
+interpretations that might be given of Dewey's psychological method. The
+most critical examination of the text will not dispel its vagueness, nor
+afford an answer to the many questions that arise. It does, however,
+throw an interesting light on certain tendencies in Dewey's own
+thinking.
+
+Dewey's attempt to show that English empiricism and transcendentalism
+have a common psychological basis must be regarded as a failure. That
+the nature of the attempt reveals a misunderstanding, or fatal lack of
+appreciation, on the part of Dewey, of the critical philosophy and the
+later development of idealism by Hegel, has already been suggested. He
+does not appear to have grasped the significance of the movement from
+Kant to Hegel. Kant, of course, believed that the _a priori_ forms of
+experience could be determined by a process of critical analysis, which
+would reveal them in their purity. The constitutive relations of
+experience were supposed by him to be limited to the pure forms of
+sensibility, space and time, and the twelve categories of the
+understanding, which, being imposed upon the manifold of sensations, as
+organized by the productive imagination, determined once and for all the
+order of the phenomenal world. His logic, therefore, as an account of
+the forms of experience, would represent logic of the type which Dewey
+criticized. But with the rejection of Kant's noumenal world, the
+critical method assumed a different import. It was no longer to be
+supposed that reality, as knowable, was organized under the forms of a
+determinate number of categories, which could be separated out and
+classified. Kant's idea that experience was an intelligible system was
+retained, but its intelligibility was not supposed to be wholly
+comprised in man's methods of knowing it. The instrumental character of
+the categories was recognized. Criticism was directed upon the
+categories, with the object of determining their validity, spheres of
+relevance, and proper place in the system of knowledge. Such a
+criticism, in the nature of things, could not deal with the forms of
+thought in abstraction from their application. Direct reference to
+experience, therefore, became a necessary element in idealism. At the
+same time, philosophy became a 'criticism of categories.' The method is
+empirical, but never psychological.
+
+Dewey recognized the need of an empirical method in philosophy, but
+failed to show specifically how psychology could deal with philosophical
+problems. He appears to have conceived that sensation and meaning, facts
+and forms, were present in experience or 'Consciousness,' as if this
+were some total understanding which retained the elements in a fixed
+union and order. While, according to his method, the forms of this
+universal consciousness could not be considered apart from the
+particulars in which they inhered, they might be studied by a survey of
+experience, a direct appeal to consciousness, in which 'form and content
+are equal.' He seems to have held that truth is given in immediate
+experience. A study of reality as immediately given, therefore, to
+psychological observation, would provide an account of the eternal
+nature of things, as they stand in the universal mind. Dewey did not
+attempt a criticism of the categories and methods which psychology must
+employ in such a task. Had he done so, the advantages of a critical
+method might have occurred to him.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[2] Vol. XI, pp. 1-19; pp. 153-173.
+
+[3] "Illusory Psychology," _Mind_, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 478.
+
+[4] "The Psychological Standpoint," _Mind_, 1886, Vol. XI, p. 2.
+
+[5] _Ibid._, p. 7.
+
+[6] _Op. cit._, p. 8 f.
+
+[7] "Psychology as Philosophic Method," _Mind_, 1886, Vol. XI, p. 157.
+
+[8] _Ibid._, p. 160. (Observe that this is a direct reference to
+Berkeley.)
+
+[9] _Op. cit._
+
+[10] _Op. cit._, p. 161.
+
+[11] _Ibid._
+
+[12] Third Edition, p. 54.
+
+[13] _Mind_, Vol. XI, p. 166 f.
+
+[14] _Ibid._, p. 166.
+
+[15] _Ibid._
+
+[16] _Op. cit._, p. 170.
+
+[17] _Ibid._
+
+[18] _Op. cit._, p. 172.
+
+[19] _Ibid._
+
+[20] _Op. cit._
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT
+
+
+The "psychological method," as so far presented, is an outline which
+must be developed in detail before its philosophical import is revealed.
+For several years following the publication of his first articles in
+_Mind_ Dewey was occupied with the task of working out his method in
+greater detail, and giving it more concrete form. His thought during
+this period follows a fairly regular order of development, which is to
+be sketched in the present chapter.
+
+In 1887 Dewey published in _Mind_ an article entitled "Knowledge as
+Idealisation."[21] This article is, in effect, a consideration of one of
+the special problems of the "psychological method." If reality is an
+eternal and all-inclusive consciousness, in which sensations and
+meanings are ordered according to a rational system, what must be the
+nature of the finite thought-process which apprehends this reality? In
+his previous articles Dewey had proposed the "psychological method" as
+an actual mode of investigation, and questions concerning the nature of
+the human thought-process naturally forced themselves upon his
+attention.
+
+The thought-process is, to begin with, a relating activity which gives
+meaning to experience. Says Dewey: "When Psychology recognizes that the
+relating activity of mind is one not exercised _upon_ sensations, but
+one which supplies relations and thereby makes meaning (makes
+experience, as Kant said), Psychology will be in a position to explain,
+and thus to become Philosophy."[22] This statement raises the more
+specific question, what is meaning?
+
+Every idea, Dewey remarks, has two aspects: existence and meaning.
+"Recognizing that every psychical fact does have these two aspects, we
+shall, for the present, confine ourselves to asking the nature,
+function and origin of the aspect of meaning or significance--the
+content of the idea as opposed to its existence."[23] The meaning aspect
+of the idea cannot be reduced to the centrally excited image existences
+which form a part of the existence-aspect of the idea. "I repeat, as
+existence, we have only a clustering of sensuous feelings, stronger and
+weaker."[24] But the thing is not perceived as a clustering of feelings;
+the sensations are immediately interpreted as a significant object.
+"Perceiving, to restate a psychological commonplace, is interpreting.
+The content of the perception is what is signified."[25] Dewey's
+treatment of sensations, at this point, is somewhat uncertain. If it be
+a manifold that is given to the act of interpretation, Kant's difficulty
+is again presented. The bare sensations taken by themselves mean
+nothing, and yet everything does mean something in being apprehended.
+The conclusion should be that there is no such thing as mere existence.
+Dewey's judgment is undecided on this issue. "It is true enough," he
+says, "that without the idea _as existence_ there would be no
+experience; the sensuous clustering is a condition _sine qua non_ of
+all, even the highest spiritual, consciousness. But it is none the less
+true that if we could strip any psychical existence of all its qualities
+except bare existence, there would be nothing left, not even existence,
+for our intelligence.... If we take out of an experience all that it
+_means_, as distinguished from what it _is_--a particular occurrence at
+a certain time, there is no psychical experience. The barest fragment of
+consciousness that can be hit upon has meaning as well as being."[26] An
+interpretation of reality as truly organic would treat mechanical
+sensation as a pure fiction. But Dewey clings to 'existence' as a
+necessary 'aspect' of the psychical fact. The terms and relations never
+entirely fuse, although they are indispensable to each other. There is
+danger that the resulting view of experience will be somewhat angular
+and structural.
+
+At one point, indeed, Dewey asserts that there is no such thing as a
+merely immediate psychical fact, at least for our experience. "So far is
+it from being true that we know only what is _immediately_ present in
+consciousness, that it should rather be said that what is _immediately_
+present is never known."[27] But in the next paragraph Dewey remarks:
+"That which is immediately present is the sensuous existence; that which
+is known is the content conveyed by this existence."[28] The sensation
+is not known, and therefore probably not experienced. In this case Dewey
+is departing from his own principles, by introducing non-experienced
+factors into his interpretation of experience. The language is
+ambiguous. If nothing is immediately given, then the sensuous content is
+not so given.
+
+The 'sensuous existences' assumed by Dewey are the ghosts of Kant's
+'manifold of sensation.' The difficulty comes out clearly in the
+following passage: "It is indifferent to the sensation whether it is
+interpreted as a cloud or as a mountain; a danger signal, or a signal of
+open passage. The auditory sensation remains unchanged whether it is
+interpreted as an evil spirit urging one to murder, or as intra-organic,
+due to disordered blood-pressure.... It is not the sensation in and of
+itself that means this or that object; it is the sensation as
+associated, composed, identified, or discriminated with other
+experiences; the sensation, in short, as mediated. The whole worth of
+the sensation for intelligence is the meaning it has by virtue of its
+relation to the rest of experience."[29]
+
+There is an obvious parallel between this view of experience and Kant's.
+Kant, indeed, transcended the notion that experience is a structure of
+sensations set in a frame-work of thought forms; but the first
+_Critique_ undoubtedly leaves the average reader with such a conception
+of experience. It is unjust to Kant, however, to take the mechanical
+aspect of his thought as its most important phase. He stands, in the
+opinion of modern critics, at a half-way stage between the mechanism of
+the eighteenth century and the organic logic of the nineteenth, and his
+works point the way from the lower to the higher point of view. This
+was recognized by Hegel and by his followers in England. How does it
+happen, then, that Dewey, who was well-read in the philosophical
+literature of the day, should have persisted in a view of experience
+which appears to assume the externally organized manifold of the
+_Critique of Pure Reason_? Or, to put the question more explicitly, why
+did he retain as a fundamental assumption Kant's 'manifold of
+sensations'?
+
+So far, Dewey has been concerned with the nature of meaning. He now
+turns to knowledge, and the knowing process as that which gives meaning
+to experience. Knowledge, or science, he says, is a process of following
+out the ideal element in experience. "The idealisation of science is
+simply a further development of this ideal element. It is, in short,
+only rendering explicit and definite the meaning, the idea, already
+contained in perception."[30] But if perception is already organized by
+thought, the sensations must have been related in a 'productive
+imagination.' Dewey, however, does not recognize such a necessity. The
+factor of meaning is ideal, he continues, because it is not present as
+so much immediate content, but is present as symbolized or mediated. But
+the question may be asked, "Whence come the ideal elements which give to
+experience its meaning?" No answer can be given except by psychology, as
+an inquiry into the facts, as contrasted with the logical necessity of
+experience.
+
+Sensations acquire meaning through being identified with and
+discriminated from other sensations to which they are related. But it is
+not as mere existences that they are compared and related, but as
+already ideas or meanings. "The identification is of the meaning of the
+present sensation with some meaning previously experienced, but which,
+although previously experienced, still exists because it _is_ meaning,
+and not occurrence."[31] The existences to which meanings attach come
+and go, and are new for every new appearance of the idea in
+consciousness; but the meanings remain. "The experience, as an existence
+at a given time, has forever vanished. Its meaning, as an ideal quality,
+remains as long as the mind does. Indeed, its remaining is the
+remaining of the mind; the conservation of the ideal quality of
+experience is what makes the mind a permanence."[32]
+
+It is not possible, Dewey says, to imagine a primitive state in which
+unmeaning sensations existed alone. Meaning cannot arise out of that
+which has no meaning. "Sensations cannot revive each other except as
+members of one whole of meaning; and even if they could, we should have
+no beginning of significant experience. Significance, meaning, must be
+already there. Intelligence, in short, is the one indispensable
+condition of intelligent experience."[33]
+
+Thinking is an act which idealizes experience by transforming sensations
+into an intelligible whole. It works by seizing upon the ideal element
+which is already there, conserving it, and developing it. It produces
+knowledge by supplying relations to experience. Dewey realizes that his
+act of intelligence is similar to Kant's 'apperceptive unity.' He says:
+"The mention of Kant's name suggests that both his strength and his
+weakness lie in the line just mentioned. It is his strength that he
+recognizes that an apperceptive unity interpreting sensations through
+categories which constitute the synthetic content of self-consciousness
+is indispensable to experience. It is his weakness that he conceives
+this content as purely logical, and hence as formal."[34] Kant's error
+was to treat the self as formal and held apart from its material. "The
+self does not work with _a priori_ forms upon an _a posteriori_
+material, but intelligence as ideal (or _a priori_) constitutes
+experience (or the _a posteriori_) as having meaning."[35] Dewey's
+standpoint here seems to be similar to that of Green. But as Kant's
+unity of apperception became for Green merely a symbol of the world's
+inherent intelligibility, the latter did not regard it as an actual
+process of synthesis. Dewey fails to make a distinction, which might
+have been useful to him, between Kant's unity of apperception and his
+productive imagination. It is the latter which Dewey retains, and he
+tends to identify it with the empirical process of the understanding.
+Knowing, psychologically considered, is a synthetic process. "And this
+is to say that experience grows as intelligence adds out of its own
+ideal content ideal quality.... The growth of the power of comparison
+implies not a formal growth, but a synthetic internal growth."[36]
+Dewey, of course, views understanding as an integral part of reality's
+processes rather than as a process apart, but it is for him a very
+special activity, which builds up the meaning of experience. "Knowledge
+might be indifferently described, therefore, as a process of
+idealisation of experience, or of realisation of intelligence. It is
+each through the other. Ultimately the growth of experience must consist
+in the development out of itself by intelligence of its own implicit
+ideal content upon occasion of the solicitation of sensation."[37]
+
+The difficulties of Dewey's original position are numerous. The relation
+of the self, as a synthetic activity, to the "Eternal Consciousness," in
+which meaning already exists in a completed form, is especially
+perplexing. Does the self merely trace out the meaning already present
+in reality, or is it a factor in the creation of meaning? It is clear
+that if the thinking process is a genuinely synthetic activity, imposing
+meaning on sensations, it literally 'makes the world' of our experience.
+But, on the other hand, if meaning is given to thought, as a part of its
+data, the self merely reproduces in a subjective experience the thought
+which exists objectively in the eternal mind. The dilemma arises as a
+result of Dewey's initial conception of reality as a structure of
+sensations and meanings. This conception of reality must be given up, if
+the notion of thought as a process of idealization is to be retained.
+
+In 1888, Dewey's _Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human
+Understanding_ appeared, and during the two years following he appears
+to have become interested in ethical theory, the results of his study
+beginning to appear in 1890. Dewey's ethical theories have so important
+a bearing upon his logical theory as to demand special attention. They
+will be reserved, therefore, for a separate chapter, and attention will
+be given here to the more strictly logical studies of the period.
+
+The three years which intervened between the publication of the essay on
+"Knowledge as Idealisation" and the appearance of an article "On Some
+Current Conceptions of the term 'Self,'" in _Mind_ (1890),[38] did not
+serve to divert Dewey's attention from the inquiries in which he had
+previously been interested. On the contrary, the later article shows how
+persistently his mind must have dwelt upon the problems connected with
+the notion of the self as a synthetic activity in experience.
+
+The immediate occasion for the article on the Self was the appearance of
+Professor Andrew Seth's work, _Hegelianism and Personality_ (1889).
+Dewey appears to have been influenced by Seth at an even earlier
+period,[39] and he now found the lectures on Hegel stimulating in
+connection with his own problems about thought and reality.
+
+It will not be necessary to go into the details of Dewey's criticism of
+the three ideas of the self presented by Seth. Since it is Dewey's own
+position that is in question, it is better to begin with his account of
+the historical origin of these definitions, "chiefly as found in Kant,
+incidentally in Hegel as related to Kant."[40] Dewey turns to the
+'Transcendental Deduction,' and follows Kant's description of the
+synthetic unity of apperception. "Its gist," he says, "in the second
+edition of the _K.d.r.V._, is the proof that the identity of
+self-consciousness involves the synthesis of the manifold of feelings
+through rules or principles which render this manifold objective, and
+that, therefore, the analytic identity of self-consciousness involves an
+objective synthetic unity of consciousness."[41] To say that
+self-consciousness is identical is a merely analytical proposition, and,
+as it stands, unfruitful. "But if we ask how we know this sameness or
+identity of consciousness, the barren principle becomes wonderfully
+fruitful."[42] In order to know reality as mine, not only must the
+consciousness that it is mine accompany each particular impression, but
+each must be known as an element in _one_ consciousness. "The sole way
+of accounting for this analytic identity of consciousness is through the
+activity of consciousness in connecting or 'putting together' the
+manifold of sense."[43]
+
+In the 'Deduction' of the first _Critique_, Dewey continues, Kant begins
+with the consciousness of objects, rather than with the identity of
+self-consciousness. Here also consciousness implies a unity, which is
+not merely formal, but one which actually connects the manifold of sense
+by an act. "Whether, then, we inquire what is involved in mere sameness
+of consciousness, or what is involved in an objective world, we get the
+same answer: a consciousness which is not formal or analytic, but which
+is synthetic of sense, and which acts universally (according to
+principles) in this synthesis."[44]
+
+The term 'Self,' as thus employed by Kant, Dewey says, is the
+correlative of the intelligible world. "It is the transcendental self
+looked at as 'there,' as a product, instead of as an activity or
+process."[45] This, however, by no means exhausts what Kant means by the
+self, for while he proceeds in the 'Deduction' as if the manifold of
+sense and the synthetic unity of the self were strictly correlative, he
+assumes a different attitude elsewhere. The manifold of sense is
+something in relation to the thing-in-itself, and the forms of thought
+have a reference beyond their mere application to the manifold. In the
+other connections the self appears as something purely formal; something
+apart from its manifestation in experience. In view of the wider meaning
+of the self, Dewey asks, "Can the result of the transcendental deduction
+stand without further interpretation?" It would appear that the content
+of the self is not the same as the content of the known world. The self
+is too great to exhaust itself in relation to sensation. "Sense is, as
+it were, inadequate to the relations which constitute
+self-consciousness, and thus there must also remain a surplusage in the
+self, not entering into the make-up of the known world."[46] This
+follows from the fact that, while the self is unconditioned, the
+manifold of sensation is conditioned, as given, by the forms of space
+and time. "Experience can never be complete enough to have a content
+equal to that of self-consciousness, for experience can never escape its
+limitation through space and time. Self-consciousness is real, and not
+merely logical; it is the ground of the reality of experience; it is
+wider than experience, and yet is unknown except so far as it is
+reflected through its own determinations in experience,--this is the
+result of our analysis of Kant, the _Ding-an-Sich_ being eliminated but
+the Kantian method and all presuppositions not involved in the notion of
+the _Ding-an-Sich_ being retained."[47]
+
+Dewey's interpretation of Kant's doctrine as presented in the
+'Deductions' is no doubt essentially correct. But granting that Kant
+found it necessary to introduce a synthesis in imagination to account
+for the unity of experience and justify our knowledge of its relations,
+it must not be forgotten that this necessity followed from the nature of
+his presuppositions. If the primal reality is a 'manifold of
+sensations,' proceeding from a noumenal source, and lacking meaning and
+relations, it follows that the manifold must be gathered up into a unity
+before the experience which we actually apprehend can be accounted for.
+But if reality is experience, possessing order and coherence in its own
+nature, the productive imagination is rendered superfluous. Dewey,
+however, clings to the notion that thought is a "synthetic activity"
+which makes experience, and draws support from Kant for his doctrine.
+
+Dewey now inquires what relation this revised Kantian conception of the
+self bears to the view advanced by Seth, viz., that the idea of
+self-consciousness is the highest category of thought and explanation.
+Kant had tried to discover the different forms of synthesis, by a method
+somewhat artificial to be sure, and had found twelve of them. While
+Hegel's independent derivation and independent placing of the categories
+must be accepted, it does not follow that the idea of self-consciousness
+can be included in the list, even if it be considered the highest
+category. "For it is impossible as long as we retain Kant's fundamental
+presupposition--the idea of the partial determination of sensation by
+relation to perception, apart from its relation to conception--to employ
+self-consciousness as a principle of explaining any fact of
+experience."[48] It cannot be said of the self of Kant that it is simply
+an hypostatized category. "It is more, because the self of Kant ... is
+more than any category: it is a real activity or being."[49]
+
+Hegel, Dewey continues, develops only one aspect of Kant's _Critique_,
+that is, the logical aspect, and consequently does not fulfil Kant's
+entire purpose. "This is, I repeat, not an immanent 'criticism of
+categories' but an analysis of experience into its aspects and really
+constituent elements."[50] Dewey, as usual, shows his opposition to a
+'merely logical' method in philosophy. He plainly indicates his
+dissatisfaction with the Hegelian development of Kant's standpoint. He
+is unfair to Hegel, however, in attributing to him a 'merely logical'
+method. Kant's self was, as Dewey asserts, something more than a
+category of thought, but it is scarcely illuminating to say of Kant that
+his purpose was the analysis of experience into its 'constituent
+elements.' Kant did, indeed, analyze experience, but this analysis must
+be regarded as incidental to a larger purpose. No criticism need be made
+of Dewey's preference for the psychological, as opposed to the logical
+aspects of Kant's work. The only comment to be made is that this
+attitude is not in line with the modern development of idealism.
+
+The question which finally emerges, as the result of Dewey's inquiry, is
+this: What is the nature of this self-activity which is more than the
+mere category of self-consciousness? "As long as sensation was regarded
+as given by a thing-in-itself, it was possible to form a conception of
+the self which did not identify it with the world. But when sense is
+regarded as having meaning only because it is 'there' as determined by
+thought, just as thought is 'there' only as determining sense, it would
+seem either that the self is just their synthetic unity (thus equalling
+the world) or that it must be thrust back of experience, and become a
+thing-in-itself. The activity of the self can hardly be a third
+something distinct from thought and from sense, and it cannot be their
+synthetic union. What, then, is it?"[51] Green, Dewey says, attempted to
+solve the difficulty by his "idea of a completely realized self making
+an animal organism the vehicle of its own reproduction in time."[52]
+This attempt was at least in the right direction, acknowledging as it
+did the fact that the self is something more than the highest category
+of thought.
+
+Dewey admits his difficulties in a way that makes extended comment
+unnecessary. He does not challenge the validity of the Hegelian
+development of the Kantian categories, but proposes to make more of the
+self than the Hegelians ordinarily do. This synthetic self-activity must
+reveal itself as a concrete process; that is one of the demands of his
+psychological standpoint. It is impossible to foresee what this process
+would be as an actual fact of experience.
+
+Although the next article which is to be considered does not offer a
+direct answer to the problems which have so far been raised, it
+nevertheless indicates the general direction which Dewey's thought is to
+take. This article, on "The Present Position of Logical Theory," was
+published in the _Monist_ in 1891.[53] Dewey appears at this time as the
+champion of the transcendental, or Hegelian logic, in opposition to
+formal and inductive logic. His attitude toward Hegel undergoes a marked
+change at this period. Dewey's general objection to formal logic is well
+expressed in the following passage: "It is assumed, in fine, that
+thought has a nature of its own independent of facts or subject-matter;
+that this thought, _per se_, has certain forms, and that these forms are
+not forms which the facts themselves take, varying with the facts, but
+are rigid frames, into which the facts are to be set. Now all of this
+conception--the notion that the mind has a faculty of thought apart from
+things, the notion that this faculty is constructed, in and of itself,
+with a fixed framework, the notion that thinking is the imposing of this
+fixed framework on some unyielding matter called particular objects, or
+facts--all of this conception appears to me as highly scholastic."[54]
+The inductive logic, Dewey says, still clings to the notion of thought
+as a faculty apart from its material, operating with bare forms upon
+sensations. Kant had been guilty of this separation and never overcame
+it successfully. Because formal logic views thought as a process apart
+from the matter with which it has to deal, it can never be the logic of
+science. "For if science means anything, it is that our ideas, our
+judgments may in some degree reflect and report the fact itself. Science
+means, on one hand, that thought is free to attack and get hold of its
+subject-matter, and, on the other, that fact is free to break through
+into thought; free to impress itself--or rather to express itself--in
+intelligence without vitiation or deflection. Scientific men are true to
+the instinct of the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct _a
+priori_ factor supplied to fact from the mind. Apriorism of this sort
+must seem like an effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of
+fact, to bring them under the yoke of fixed, external forms."[55]
+
+In opposition to this formal, and, as he calls it, subjective standpoint
+in logic, Dewey stands for the transcendental logic, which supposes that
+there is some kind of vital connection between thought and fact; "that
+thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process of
+translation from brute impression to lucent meaning."[56] Hegel holds
+this view of logic. "This, then, is why I conceive Hegel--entirely apart
+from the value of any special results--to represent the quintessence of
+the scientific spirit. He denies not only the possibility of getting
+truth out of a formal, apart thought, but he denies the existence of any
+faculty of thought which is other than the expression of fact
+itself."[57] At another place Dewey expresses his view of Hegel as
+follows: "Relations of thought are, to Hegel, the typical forms of
+meaning which the subject-matter takes in its various progressive stages
+of being understood."[58]
+
+Dewey's defence of the transcendental logic is vigorous. He maintains
+that the disrespect into which the transcendental logic had fallen, was
+due to the fact that the popular comprehension of the transcendental
+movement had been arrested at Kant, and had never gone on to Hegel.
+
+The objection made to Kant's standpoint is that it treated thought as a
+process over against experience, imposing its forms upon it from
+without. "Kant never dreams, for a moment, of questioning the existence
+of a special faculty of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms.
+He states and restates that thought in itself exists apart from fact and
+occupies itself with fact given to it from without."[59] While Kant gave
+the death blow to a merely formal conception of thought, indirectly, and
+opened up the way for an organic interpretation, he did not achieve the
+higher standpoint himself. Remaining at the standpoint of Kant,
+therefore, the critic of the transcendental logic has much to complain
+of. Scientific men deal with facts, look to them for guidance, and must
+suppose that thought and fact pass into each other directly, and without
+vitiation or deflection. They are correct in opposing a conception which
+would interpose conditions between thought on the one hand and the facts
+on the other.
+
+But Hegel is true to the scientific spirit. "When Hegel calls thought
+objective he means just what he says: that there is no special, apart
+faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind existing separate
+from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective thought is the
+meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by methods of thought
+he understands simply the processes in which this meaning of fact is
+evolved."[60]
+
+If Hegel is true to the scientific spirit; if his logic presupposes that
+there is an intrinsic connection of thought and fact, and views science
+simply as the progressive realization of the world's ideality, then the
+only questions to be asked about his logic are questions of fact
+concerning his treatment of the categories. Is the world such a
+connected system as he holds it to be? "And, if a system, does it, in
+particular, present such phases (such relations, categories) as Hegel
+shows forth?"[61] These questions are wholly objective. Such a logic as
+Hegel's could scarcely make headway when it was first produced, because
+the significance of the world, its ideal character, had not been brought
+to light through the sciences. We are now reaching a stage, however,
+where science has brought the ideality of the world into the foreground,
+where it may become as real and objective a material of study as
+molecules and vibrations.
+
+This appreciation of Hegel would seem to indicate that Dewey has finally
+grasped the significance of Hegel's development of the Kantian
+standpoint. A close reading of the article, however, dispels this
+impression. Dewey believes that he has found in Hegel a support for his
+own psychological method in philosophy. It is scarcely necessary to say
+that Hegel's standpoint was anything but psychological. Dewey has
+already given up Kant; he will presently desert Hegel. A psychological
+interpretation of the thought-process in its relations to reality is not
+compatible with the critical method in philosophy.
+
+In the next article to be examined, "The Superstition of Necessity," in
+the _Monist_ (1893),[62] Dewey begins to attain the psychological
+description of thought at which he had been aiming. This article was
+suggested, as Dewey indicates in a foot-note, by Mr. C. S. Pierce's
+article, "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," in the _Monist_
+(1892).[63] Although Dewey acknowledges his indebtedness to Pierce for
+certain suggestions, the two articles have little in common.
+
+Dewey had consistently maintained that thought is a synthetic activity
+through which reality is idealized or takes on meaning. It is from this
+standpoint that he approaches the subject of necessity. The following
+passage reveals the connection between his former position and the one
+that he is now approaching: "The whole, although first in the order of
+reality, is last in the order of knowledge. The complete statement of
+the whole is the goal, not the beginning of wisdom. We begin, therefore,
+with fragments, which are taken for wholes; and it is only by piecing
+together these fragments, and by the transformation of them involved in
+this combination, that we arrive at the real fact. There comes a stage
+at which the recognition of the unity begins to dawn upon us, and yet,
+the tradition of the many distinct wholes survives; judgment has to
+combine these two contradictory conceptions; it does so by the theory
+that the dawning unity is an effect necessarily produced by the
+interaction of the former wholes. Only as the consciousness of the unity
+grows still more is it seen that instead of a group of independent
+facts, held together by 'necessary' ties, there is one reality, of which
+we have been apprehending various fragments in succession and
+attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence. We learn (but
+only at the end) that instead of discovering and then connecting
+together a number of separate realities, we have been engaged in the
+progressive definition of one fact."[64]
+
+Dewey adds to his idea that our knowledge of reality is a progressive
+development of its implicit ideality through a synthetic
+thought-process, the specification that the process of idealization
+occurs in connection with particular crises and situations. There comes
+a stage, he says, when unity begins to dawn and meaning emerges.
+Necessity is a term used in connection with these transitions from
+partial to greater realization of the world's total meaning. Necessity
+is a middle term, or go-between. It marks a critical stage in the
+development of knowledge. No necessity attaches to a whole, as such.
+"_Qua_ whole, the fact simply is what it is; while the parts, instead of
+being necessitated either by one another or by the whole, are the
+analyzed factors constituting, in their complete circuit, the
+whole."[65] But when the original whole breaks up, through its inability
+to comprehend new facts under its unity, a process of judgment occurs
+which aims at the establishment of a new unity. "The judgment of
+necessity, in other words, is exactly and solely the transition in our
+knowledge from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis.
+Its value is just the value of this transition; as negating the old
+partial and isolated judgments--in its backward look--necessity has
+meaning; in its forward look--with reference to the resulting completely
+organized subject-matter--it is itself as false as the isolated
+judgments which it replaces."[66] We say that things must be so, when we
+do not know that they are so; that is, while we are in course of
+determining what they are. Necessity has its value exclusively in this
+transition.
+
+Dewey attempts to show, in a discussion which need not be followed in
+detail, that there is nothing radical in his view, and that it finds
+support among the idealists and empiricists alike. Thinkers of both
+schools (he quotes Caird and Venn) admit that the process of judgment
+involves a change in objects, at least as they are for us. There is a
+transformation of their value and meaning. "This point being held in
+common, both schools must agree that _the progress of judgment is
+equivalent to a change in the value of objects_--that objects as they
+are for us, as known, change with the development of our judgments."[67]
+Dewey proposes to give a more specific description of this process of
+transformation, and especially, to show how the idea of necessity is
+involved in it.
+
+The process of transformation is occasioned by practical necessity. Men
+have a tendency to take objects as just so much and no more; to attach
+to a given subject-matter these predicates, and no others. There is a
+principle of inertia, or economy, in the mind, which leads it to
+maintain objects in their _status quo_ as long as possible. "There is no
+doubt that the reluctance of the mind to give up an object once made
+lies deep in its economies.... I wish here to call attention to the fact
+that the forming of a number of distinct objects has its origin in
+practical needs of our nature. The analysis and synthesis which is first
+made is that of most practical importance...."[68] We tend to retain
+such objects as we have, and it is not until "the original
+subject-matter has been overloaded with various and opposing predicates
+that we think of doubting the correctness of our first judgments, of
+putting our first objects under suspicion."[69] Once the Ptolemaic
+system is well established, cycles and epicycles are added without
+number, rather than reconstruct the original object. When, finally, we
+are compelled to make some change, we tend to invent some new object to
+which the predicates can attach. "When qualities arise so incompatible
+with the object already formed that they cannot be referred to that
+object, it is easier to form a new object on their basis than it is to
+doubt the correctness of the old...."[70] Let us suppose, then, that
+under stress of practical need, we refer the new predicates to some new
+object, and have, as a consequence, two objects. (Dewey illustrates this
+situation by specific examples.) This separation of the two objects
+cannot continue long, before we begin to discover that the two objects
+are related elements in a larger whole. "The wall of partition between
+the two separate 'objects' cannot be broken at one attack; they have to
+be worn away by the attrition arising from their slow movement into one
+another. It is the 'necessary' influence which one exerts upon the other
+that finally rubs away the separateness and leaves them revealed as
+elements of one unified whole."[71]
+
+The concept of necessity has its validity in such a movement of judgment
+as has been described. "Necessity, as the middle term, is the mid-wife
+which, from the dying isolation of judgments, delivers the unified
+judgment just coming into life--it being understood that the
+separateness of the original judgments is not as yet quite negated, nor
+the unity of the coming judgment quite attained."[72] The judgment of
+necessity connects itself with certain facts in the situation which are
+immediately concerned with our practical activities. These are facts
+which, before the crisis arises, have been neglected; they are elements
+in the situation which have been regarded as unessential, as not yet
+making up a part of the original object. "Although after our desire has
+been met they have been eliminated as accidental, as irrelevant, yet
+when the experience is again desired their integral membership in the
+real fact has to be recognized. This is done under the guise of
+considering them as means which are necessary to bring about the
+end."[73] We have the if so, then so situation. "_If_ we are to reach an
+end we _must_ take certain means; while so far as we want an undefined
+end, an end in general, conditions which accompany it are mere
+accidents."[74] The end of this process of judgment in which necessity
+appears as a half-way stage, is the unity of reality; a whole into which
+the formerly discordant factors can be gathered together.
+
+Only a detailed study of the original text, with its careful
+illustrations, can furnish a thorough understanding of Dewey's position.
+Enough has been said, however, to show that this psychological account
+of the judgment process is a natural outgrowth of his former views, and
+that, as it stands, it is still in conformity with his original
+idealism. The article as a whole marks a half-way stage in Dewey's
+philosophical development. Looking backward, it is a partial fulfilment
+of the demands of "The Psychological Standpoint." It is a psychological
+description of the processes whereby self-consciousness specifies itself
+into parts which are still related to the whole. Looking forward, it
+forecasts the functional theory of knowledge. We have, to begin with,
+objects given as familiar or known experiences. So long as these are not
+put under suspicion or examined, they simply are themselves, or are
+non-cognitionally experienced. But on the occasion of a conflict in
+experience between opposed facts and their meanings, a process of
+judgment arises, whose function is to restore unity. It is in this
+process of judgment as an operation in the interests of the unity of
+experience, that the concepts, necessity and contingency, have their
+valid application and use. They are instruments for effecting a
+transformation of experience. This is the root idea of functional
+instrumentalism. It is apparent, therefore, that Dewey's later
+functionalism resulted from the natural growth and development of the
+psychological standpoint which he adopted at the beginning of his
+philosophical career.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[21] Vol. XII, pp. 382-396.
+
+[22] _Ibid._, p. 394.
+
+[23] _Op. cit._, p. 383.
+
+[24] _Ibid._
+
+[25] _Ibid._, p. 384.
+
+[26] _Ibid._
+
+[27] _Op. cit._, p. 385.
+
+[28] _Ibid._
+
+[29] _Ibid._, p. 388.
+
+[30] _Op. cit._, p. 390.
+
+[31] _Ibid._, p. 392.
+
+[32] _Op. cit._
+
+[33] _Ibid._, p. 393.
+
+[34] _Ibid._, p. 394.
+
+[35] _Ibid._, p. 395.
+
+[36] _Op. cit._
+
+[37] _Ibid._, p. 396. (The last sentence forecasts Dewey's later
+contention that knowing is a specific act operating upon the occasion of
+need.)
+
+[38] Vol. XV, pp. 58-74.
+
+[39] See _Mind_, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 170.
+
+[40] _Ibid._, p. 63.
+
+[41] _Ibid._
+
+[42] _Ibid._, p. 64.
+
+[43] _Op. cit._
+
+[44] _Ibid._, p. 65.
+
+[45] _Ibid._
+
+[46] _Op. cit._, p. 67.
+
+[47] _Ibid._, p. 68.
+
+[48] _Op. cit._, p. 70.
+
+[49] _Ibid._, p. 71.
+
+[50] _Ibid._
+
+[51] _Op. cit._, p. 73.
+
+[52] _Ibid._
+
+[53] Vol. II, pp. 1-17.
+
+[54] _Op. cit._, p. 4.
+
+[55] _Ibid._, p. 12.
+
+[56] _Ibid._, p. 3.
+
+[57] _Ibid._, p. 14.
+
+[58] _Ibid._, p. 13.
+
+[59] _Op. cit._, p. 11.
+
+[60] _Ibid._, p. 12 f.
+
+[61] _Op. cit._, p. 14.
+
+[62] Vol. III, pp. 362-379.
+
+[63] Vol. II, pp. 321-337.
+
+[64] _The Monist_, Vol. III, 1893, p. 364.
+
+[65] _Ibid._, p. 363.
+
+[66] _Op. cit._
+
+[67] _Ibid._, p. 364 f.
+
+[68] _Ibid._, p. 367.
+
+[69] _Ibid._, p. 366.
+
+[70] _Op. cit._, p. 367.
+
+[71] _Ibid._, p. 368.
+
+[72] _Ibid._, p. 363.
+
+[73] _Op. cit._, p. 372.
+
+[74] _Ibid._
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+"MORAL THEORY AND PRACTICE"
+
+
+Dewey's ethical theory, as has already been indicated, stands in close
+relation to his general theory of knowledge. Since it has been found
+expedient to treat the ethical theory separately, it will be necessary
+to go back some two years and trace it from its beginnings. The order of
+arrangement that has been chosen is fortunate in this respect, since it
+brings into close connection two articles which are really companion
+pieces, in spite of the two-year interval which separates them. These
+are "The Superstition of Necessity," which was considered at the close
+of the last chapter, and "Moral Theory and Practice," an article
+published in _The International Journal of Ethics_, in January,
+1891.[75] This latter article, now to be examined, is one of Dewey's
+first serious undertakings in the field of ethical theory, and probably
+represents some of the results of his study in connection with his
+text-book, _Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics_, published in the
+same year (1891).
+
+The immediate occasion for the article is explained by Dewey in his
+introductory remarks: "In the first number of this journal four writers
+touch upon the same question,--the relation of moral theory to moral
+practice."[76] The four writers mentioned were Sidgwick, Adler,
+Bosanquet, and Salter. None of them, according to Dewey, had directly
+discussed the relation of moral theory to practice. "But," he says,
+"finding the subject touched upon ... in so many ways, I was led to
+attempt to clear up my own ideas."[77]
+
+There seems to exist, Dewey continues, "the idea that moral theory is
+something other than, or something beyond, an analysis of conduct,--the
+idea that it is not simply and wholly 'the theory of practice.'"[78] It
+is often defined, for instance, as an inquiry into the metaphysics of
+morals, which has nothing to do with practice. But, Dewey believes,
+there must be some intrinsic connection between the theory of morals and
+moral practice. Such intrinsic connection may be denied on the ground
+that practice existed long before theory made its appearance. Codes of
+morality were in existence before Plato, Kant, or Spencer rose to
+speculate upon them. This raises the question, What is theory?
+
+Moral theory is nothing more than a proposed act in idea. It is insight,
+or perception of the relations and bearings of the contemplated act. "It
+is all one with moral _insight_, and moral insight is the recognition of
+the relationships in hand. This is a very tame and prosaic conception.
+It makes moral insight, and therefore moral theory, consist simply in
+the everyday workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures
+drygoods, drives nails, sells wheat, and invents the telephone."[79] The
+nature of theory as idea is more definitely described. "It is the
+construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. _It
+is, therefore, the doing,--the act itself, in its emerging._"[80]
+
+Theory is practice in idea, or as foreseen; it is the perception of what
+ought to be done. This, at least, is what moral theory is. Dewey's
+demand that fact and theory must have some intrinsic connection,
+unsatisfied in the articles reviewed in the previous chapter, is met
+here by discovering a connecting link in _action_. Theory is "_the
+doing,--the act itself in its emerging_." The reduction of thought to
+terms of action, here implied, is a serious step. It marks a new
+tendency in Dewey's speculation. Dewey does not claim, in the present
+article, that his remarks hold good for all theory. "Physical science,"
+he remarks, "does deal with abstractions, with hypothesis. It says, 'If
+this, then that.' It deals with the relations of conditions and not with
+facts, or individuals, at all. It says, 'I have nothing to do with your
+concrete falling stone, but I can tell you this, that it is a law of
+falling bodies that, etc.'"[81] But moral theory is compelled to deal
+with concrete situations. It must be a theory which can be applied
+directly to the particular case. Moral theory cannot exist simply in a
+book. Since, moreover, there is no such thing as theory in the abstract,
+there can be no abstract theory of morals.
+
+There can be no difficulty, Dewey believes, in understanding moral
+theory as action in idea. All action that is intelligent, all conduct,
+that is, involves theory. "For any _act_ (as distinct from mere impulse)
+there must be 'theory,' and the wider the act, the greater its import,
+the more exigent the demand for theory."[82] This does not, however,
+answer the question how any particular moral theory, the Kantian, the
+Hedonistic, or the Hegelian, is related to action. These systems
+present, not 'moral ideas' as explained above, but 'ideas about
+morality.' What relation have ideas about morality to specific moral
+conduct?
+
+The answer to this question is to be obtained through an understanding
+of the nature of the moral situation. If an act is moral, it must be
+intelligent; as moral conduct, it implies insight into the situation at
+hand. This insight is obtained by an examination and analysis of the
+concrete situation. "This is evidently a work of analysis. Like every
+analysis, it requires that the one making it be in possession of certain
+working tools. I cannot resolve this practical situation which faces me
+by merely looking at it. I must attack it with such instruments of
+analysis as I have at hand. _What we call moral rules are precisely such
+tools of analysis._"[83] The Golden Rule is such an instrument of
+analysis. Taken by itself, it offers no direct information as to what is
+to be done. "The rule is a counsel of perfection; it is a warning that
+in my analysis of the moral situation (that is, of the conditions of
+practice) I be impartial as to the effects on me and thee.'"[84] Every
+rule which is of any use at all is employed in a similar fashion.
+
+But this is not, so far, a statement of the nature of moral theory,
+since only particular rules have been considered. Ethical theory, in its
+wider significance, is a reflective process in which, as one might say,
+the 'tools of analysis' are shaped and adapted to their work. These
+rules are not fixed things, made once and for all, but of such a nature
+that they preserve their effectiveness only as they are constantly
+renewed and reshaped. Ethical theory brings the Golden Rule together
+with other general ideas, conforms them to each other, and in this way
+gives the moral rule a great scope in practice. All moral theory,
+therefore, is finally linked up with practice. "It bears much the same
+relation to the particular rule as this to the special case. It is a
+tool for the analysis of its meaning, and thereby a tool for giving it
+greater effect."[85] In ethical theory we find moral rules in the
+making. Ideas about morals are simply moral ideas in the course of being
+formed.
+
+Dewey presents here an instrumental theory of knowledge and concepts.
+But it differs widely from the instrumentalism of the Neo-Hegelian
+school both in its form and derivation. Dewey reaches his
+instrumentalism through a psychological analysis of the judgment
+process. He finds that theory is related to fact through action, and
+since he had been unable to give a concrete account of this relationship
+at a previous time, the conclusion may be regarded as a discovery of
+considerable moment for his philosophical method. Dewey's
+instrumentalism rests upon a very special psychological interpretation,
+which puts action first and thought second. Unable to discover an overt
+connection between fact and thought, he delves underground for it, and
+finds it in the activities of the nervous organism. This discovery, he
+believes, solves once and for all the ancient riddle of the relation of
+thought to reality.
+
+In the concluding part of the article Dewey takes up the consideration
+of moral obligation. "What is the relation of knowledge, of theory, to
+that Ought which seems to be the very essence of moral conduct?"[86] The
+answer anticipates in some measure the position which was taken later,
+as has been seen, in regard to necessity. The concept of obligation,
+like that of necessity, Dewey believes, has relevance only for the
+judgment situation. "But," Dewey says, "limiting the question as best I
+can, I should say (first) that the 'ought' always rises from and falls
+back into the 'is,' and (secondly) that the 'ought' is itself an
+'is,'--the 'is' of action."[87] Obligation is not something added to the
+conclusion of a judgment, something which gives a moral aspect to what
+had been a coldly intellectual matter. The 'ought' finds an integral
+place in the judgment process. "The difference between saying, 'this act
+is the one to be done, ...' and saying, 'The act _ought_ to be done,' is
+merely verbal. The analysis of action is from the first an analysis of
+what is to be done; how, then, should it come out excepting with a 'this
+should be done'?"[88] The peculiarity of the 'ought' is that it applies
+to conduct or action, whereas the 'is' applies to the facts. It has
+reference to doing, or acting, as the situation demands. "This, then, is
+the relation of moral theory and practice. Theory is the cross-section
+of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should
+be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: in is theory in
+action."[89]
+
+The parallel between this article and "The Superstition of Necessity" is
+too obvious to require formulation, and the same criticism that applies
+to the one is applicable to the other. "The Superstition of Necessity"
+is more detailed and concrete in its treatment of the judgment process
+than this earlier article, as might be expected, but the fundamental
+position is essentially the same. The synthetic activity of the self,
+the thought-process, finally appears as the servant of action, or, more
+exactly, as itself a special mode of organic activity in general.
+
+From the basis of the standpoint which he had now attained Dewey
+attempted a criticism of Green's moral theory, in two articles in the
+_Philosophical Review_, in 1892 and 1893. The first of these, entitled
+"Green's Theory of the Moral Motive,"[90] appeared almost two years
+after the article on "Moral Theory and Practice." The continuity of
+Dewey's thought during the intervening period, however, is indicated by
+the fact that the first four pages of the article to be considered are
+given over to an introductory discussion which repeats in almost
+identical terms the position taken in "Moral Theory and Practice." Dewey
+himself calls attention to this fact in a foot-note.
+
+There must be, Dewey again asserts, some vital connection of theory with
+practice. "Ethical theory must be a general statement of the reality
+involved in every moral situation. It must be action stated in its more
+generic terms, terms so generic that every individual action will fall
+within the outlines it sets forth. If the theory agrees with these
+requirements, then we have for use in any special case a tool for
+analyzing that case; a method for attacking and reducing it, for laying
+it open so that the action called for in order to meet, to satisfy it,
+may readily appear."[91] Dewey argues that moral theory cannot possibly
+give directions for every concrete case, but that it by no means follows
+that theory can stand aside from the specific case and say: "What have I
+to do with thee? Thou art empirical, and I am the metaphysics of
+conduct."
+
+Dewey's preliminary remarks are introductory to a consideration of
+Green's ethical theory. "His theory would, I think," Dewey says, "be
+commonly regarded as the best of the modern attempts to form a
+metaphysic of ethic. I wish, using this as type, to point out the
+inadequacy of such metaphysical theories, on the ground that they fail
+to meet the demand just made of truly ethical theory, that it lend
+itself to translation into concrete terms, and thereby to the guidance,
+the direction of actual conduct."[92] Dewey recognizes that Green is
+better than his theory, but says that the theory, taken in logical
+strictness, cannot meet individual needs.
+
+Dewey makes a special demand of Green's theory. He demands, that is,
+that it supply a body of rules, or guides to action which can be
+employed by the moral agent as tools of analysis in cases requiring
+moral judgment. It is evident in advance that Green's theory was built
+upon a different plan, and can not meet the conditions which Dewey
+prescribes. The general nature of Green's inquiry is well stated in the
+following summary by Professor Thilly: "The truth in Green's thought is
+this: the purpose of all social devotion and reform is, after all, the
+perfection of man on the spiritual side, the development of men of
+character and ideals.... The final purpose of all moral endeavor must be
+the realization of an attitude of the human soul, of some form of noble
+consciousness in human personalities.... It is well enough to feed and
+house human bodies, but the paramount question will always be: What
+kinds of souls are to dwell in these bodies?"[93] To put the matter in
+more technical terms, Green is concerned with ends and values. His
+question is not, What is the best means of accomplishing a given
+purpose, but, What end is worth attaining? Such an inquiry has no
+immediate relation to action. It may lead to conclusions which become
+determining factors in action, but the process of inquiry has no direct
+reference to conduct. Dewey, having reduced thought to a function of
+activity, must proceed, by logical necessity, to carry the same
+reduction into the field of theory in general. This he does in thorough
+style. His demand that moral theory shall concern itself with concrete
+and 'specific' situations is a result of the same tendency. Since action
+can only be described as response to a 'situation,' thought, as a
+function of activity, must likewise be directed upon a 'situation.'
+Conduct in general and values in general become impossible under his
+system, because there is no such thing as an activity-in-general of the
+organism. Ends, in other words, exist only for thought, when thought is
+interpreted as transcending action, and being, in some sense,
+self-contained. When thought is interpreted as a kind of 'indirect
+activity,' its capacity for metaphysical inquiry vanishes along with its
+independence.
+
+It would have been more in keeping with sound criticism had Dewey
+himself taken note of the important divergence in aim and intent between
+his work and Green's. As a consequence of his failure to do so, he
+fails, necessarily, to do justice to Green's standpoint. The criticism
+which he directs against Green's moral theory may be briefly summed up
+as follows.
+
+Green tends to repeat the Kantian separation of the self as reason from
+the self as want or desire. "The dualism between reason and sense is
+given up, indeed, but only to be replaced by a dualism between the end
+which would satisfy the self as a unity or whole, and that which
+satisfies it in the particular circumstances of actual conduct."[94] As
+a consequence of the separation of the ideal from the actual, no action
+can satisfy the whole self, and thus no action can be truly moral. "No
+thorough-going theory of total depravity ever made righteousness more
+impossible to the natural man than Green makes it to a human being by
+the very constitution of his being...."[95] Dewey traces this separation
+of the self as reason from the self as desire through those passages in
+which Green describes the moral agent as one who distinguishes himself
+from his desires (Book II, _Prolegomena to Ethics_). "The process of
+moral experience involves, therefore, a process in which the self, in
+becoming conscious of its want, objectifies that want by setting it over
+against itself; distinguishing the want from self and self from want....
+Now this theory so far might be developed in either of two
+directions."[96]
+
+In the first place, the self-distinguishing process may be an activity
+by means of which the self specifies its own activity and satisfaction.
+"The particular desires and ends would be the modes in which the self
+relieved itself of its abstractness, its undeveloped character, and
+assumed concrete existence.... The unity of the self would stand in no
+opposition to the particularity of the special desire; on the contrary,
+the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires would be the
+synthetic and analytic aspects of one and the same reality, neither
+having any advantage metaphysical or ethical over the other!"[97] But
+Green, unfortunately, does not develop his theory in this concrete
+direction. The self does not specify itself in the particulars, but
+remains apart from them. "The objectification is not of the self in the
+special end; but the self remains behind setting the special object over
+against itself as not adequate to itself.... The unity of the self sets
+up an ideal of satisfaction for itself as it withdraws from the special
+want, and this ideal set up through negation of the particular desire
+and its satisfaction constitutes the moral ideal. It is forever
+unrealizable, because it forever negates the special activities through
+which alone it might, after all, realize itself."[98] In completing this
+argument Dewey refers to certain well-known passages in the _Prolegomena
+to Ethics_, in which Green states that the moral ideal is never
+completely attainable. Green's abstract conception of the self as that
+which forever sets itself over against its desires is, Dewey argues, not
+only useless as an ideal for action, but positively opposed to moral
+striving. "It supervenes, not as a power active in its own satisfaction,
+but to make us realize the unsatisfactoriness of such seeming
+satisfactions as we may happen to get, and to keep us striving for
+something which we can never get!"[99] The most that can be made of
+Green's moral ideal is to conceive it as the bare form of unity in
+conduct. Employed as a tool of analysis, as a moral rule, it might tell
+us, "Whatever the situation, seek for its unity." But it can scarcely go
+even as far as this in the direction of concreteness, for it says: "_No_
+unity can be found in the situation because the situation is particular,
+and therefore set over against the unity."[100]
+
+Most students of Green would undoubtedly say that this account of his
+moral theory is entirely one-sided, and fails to reckon with certain
+elements which should properly be taken into account. In the first
+place, Green is defining the moral agent as he finds him, and is
+reporting what seems to him a fact when he says that the moral ideal is
+too high to be realized in this life. Having a spiritual nature, man
+fails to find satisfaction in the goods of natural life. Dewey should
+address himself to the facts in refuting Green's analysis of human
+nature. In the second place, with respect to Green's separation of the
+self as unity from the self as a manifold of desires, Dewey's criticism
+may be flatly rejected. Green raises the question himself: "'Do you
+mean,' it may be asked, 'to assert the existence of a mysterious
+abstract entity which you call the self of a man, apart from all his
+particular feelings, desires, and thoughts--all the experience of his
+inner life?'"[101] Green takes time to state his position as clearly as
+possible. He repudiates the idea of an abstract self apart from desire.
+The following passage is typical of his remarks: "Just as we hold that
+our desires, feelings, and thoughts would not be what they are--would
+not be those of a man--if not related to a subject which distinguishes
+itself from each and all of them; so we hold that this subject would not
+be what it is, if it were not related to the particular feelings,
+desires, and thoughts, which it thus distinguishes from and presents to
+itself."[102] It will be remembered also, that in moral action the agent
+identifies himself with his desires, or adopts them as his own, and the
+ability to do this is the chief mark of human intelligence. But man
+could not identify himself with his desires, or 'specify himself in
+them,' as Dewey says, did he not at the same time have the capacity to
+differentiate himself from them.
+
+Dewey's further remarks on Green's ideal need not be followed in detail,
+since they rest upon a misapprehension of Green's purpose, and add
+little to what he has already said. Taking the moral ideal as something
+that can never be realized in this life, Dewey inquires what use can be
+made of it. He considers three modes in which Green might have given
+content to the ideal, as a working principle, and finds that it cannot
+be made, in any of these ways, to serve as a tool of analysis. Green was
+not prepared to meet these 'pragmatic' requirements. He did not propose
+his ideal as a principle of conduct, in Dewey's sense; he stated that,
+as a matter of fact, man is more than natural, and that, as such a
+being, his ideals can never be completely met by natural objects. How
+man is to act, in view of his spiritual nature, is a further question:
+but the realization which the individual has of his own spiritual nature
+must of necessity be a large factor in the determination of his conduct.
+The 'Spiritual Nature,' in Green's terminology, meant a 'not-natural'
+nature, and 'not-natural' in turn meant a nature that is not definable
+in mechanical or biological terms. Dewey's criticism, therefore, went
+wide of the mark.
+
+In November, 1893, Dewey followed his criticism of Green's moral motive
+by a second article in the _Philosophical Review_ on "Self-realization
+as the Moral Ideal."[103] It continues the criticism which has already
+been made of Green, but from a different point of departure.
+
+The idea of self-realization in ethics, Dewey begins, may be helpful or
+harmful according to the way in which the ideas of the self and its
+realization are worked out in the concrete. The mere idea of a self to
+be realized is, of course, abstract; it is merely the statement of a
+problem, which needs to be worked out and given content. By way of
+introducing his own idea of self-realization, Dewey proposes to
+criticize a certain conception of the self which he finds in current
+discussion. "The notion which I wish to criticize," he says, "is that of
+the self as a presupposed fixed _schema_ or outline, while realization
+consists in the filling up of this _schema_. The notion which I would
+suggest as substitute is that of the self as always a concrete
+_specific_ activity; and, therefore, (to anticipate) of the identity of
+self and realization."[104] Such a presupposed fixed self is to be found
+in Green's "Eternally complete Consciousness."
+
+The idea of self-realization implies capacities or possibilities. To
+translate capacity into actuality, as the conception of the fixed self
+seems to do, is to vitiate the whole idea of possibility. There must,
+then, be some conception of unrealized powers which will meet this
+difficulty. The way to a valid conception is through the realization
+that capacities are always specific. "The capacities of a child, for
+example, are not simply of _a_ child, not of a man, but of _this_ child,
+not of any other."[105] Whatever else capacity may be, whether infinite
+or not, it must be an element in an actual situation. As specific
+things, moreover, capacities reside in activities, which are now going
+on. The capacity of a child to become a musician consists in this fact:
+"Even _now_ he has a certain quickness, vividness, and plasticity of
+vision, a certain deftness of hand, and a certain motor coördination by
+which his hand is stimulated to work in harmony with his eye."[106]
+
+How do these specific, actual activities come to be called capacities?
+There is a peculiar psychological reason for this which James has
+pointed out, in his statement that essence "is that _which is so
+important for my interests_ that, comparatively, other properties may be
+omitted."[107] When we pay attention to any activity, there is a natural
+tendency to select only that portion of it that is of immediate
+interest, and to exclude the rest as irrelevant. "In the act of vision,
+for example," Dewey tells us, "the thing that seems nearest us, that
+which claims continuously our attention, is the eye itself. We thus come
+to abstract the eye from all special acts of seeing; we make the eye the
+_essential_ thing in sight, and conceive of the circumstances of vision
+as indeed _circumstances_; as more or less accidental concomitants of
+the permanent eye."[108] There is no eye in general; the eye is always
+given along with other circumstances which in their totality make up a
+concrete seeing situation. Nevertheless, we abstract the eye from other
+circumstances and set it up as the essence of seeing. But we cannot
+retain the eye in absolute abstraction, because the concrete
+circumstances of vision force themselves upon the attention. So we lump
+these together on the other side as a new object, and take as their
+essence the vibrations of ether. "_The eye now becomes the capacity of
+seeing; the vibrations of ether, conditions required for the exercise of
+the capacity._"[109] We keep the two abstractions, but try to restore
+the unity of the situation through taking one as capacity and the other
+as the condition of the exercise of capacity.
+
+But we cannot stop even with this double abstraction. "The eye in
+general and the vibrations in general do not, even in their unity,
+constitute the act of vision. A multitude of other factors are
+included."[110] Preserving the original 'core' as capacity, we tend to
+treat all the attendant circumstances which occur frequently enough to
+require taking account of, as conditions which help realize the
+abstracted reality called capacity.
+
+The discussion here is very much like that in "The Superstition of
+Necessity" (published in the same year), which was reviewed in the last
+chapter. Dewey calls attention to this connection in a foot-note,
+remarking that he has already developed at greater length "the idea that
+necessity and possibility are simply the two correlative abstractions
+into which the one reality falls apart during the process of our
+conscious apprehension of it."[111] The danger, Dewey says, is that the
+merely relative character of a given capacity may be overlooked, and
+that it may be ontologized into a fixed entity. This is the error, he
+thinks, into which Green fell. The ideal self, as that which capacity
+may realize, is ontologized into an already existent fact. Then we get a
+separation between the present self, as capacity, and the ideal self
+which is to be realized. The self already realized is opposed to the
+self as yet ideal. "This 'realized self' is no reality by itself; it is
+simply our partial conception of the self erected into an entity.
+Recognizing its incomplete character, we bring in what we have left out
+and call it the 'ideal self.' Then by way of dealing with the fact that
+we have not two selves here at all, but simply a less and a more
+adequate insight into the same self, we insert the idea of one of these
+selves realizing the other."[112] It is in this manner that error
+arises.
+
+But what is the correct attitude toward the self? First of all, the self
+must be conceived as "a working, practical self, carrying within the
+rhythm of its own process both 'realized' and 'ideal' self. The current
+ethics of the self ... are too apt to stop with a metaphysical
+definition, which seems to solve problems in general, but at the expense
+of the practical problems which alone really demand or admit
+solution."[113] The first point of the argument is that the self
+activity is individual, concrete, and specific, here and now, and the
+second point is that if the self is to be talked of in an intelligent
+way it must be taken as something empirically given. "The whole point is
+expressed when we say that no possible future activities or conditions
+have anything to do with the present action except as they enable us to
+take deeper account of the present activity, to get beyond the mere
+superficies of the act, to see it in its totality."[114] The phrase,
+'realize yourself,' is a direction for knowledge; it means, see the
+wider consequences of your act, realize its wider bearings.
+
+Dewey says: "The fixed ideal is as distinctly the bane of ethical
+science today as the fixed universe of mediævalism was the bane of the
+natural science of the Renascence."[115] This is a strong statement,
+which indicates how wide was the gulf which now separated Dewey from
+Green, whom he formerly acknowledged as his master.
+
+Dewey's interpretation of Green's ideal self is far from satisfactory,
+largely because of its lack of insight and appreciation. The reduction
+of thought to a 'form of activity' renders a purely theoretical inquiry
+impossible. The 'present activity,' the biological situation, becomes
+the measure of all things, even of thought. Ideals, in his own words,
+have nothing to do with present action, "except as they enable us to
+take deeper account of the present activity." Dewey's self and Green's
+are incommensurable. The former is the biological organism, with a
+capacity for indirect activity called thinking; the latter is a
+not-natural being, whose reality escapes the logic of descriptive
+science, because of the fulness of its content. Dewey's failure to
+understand this difference is significant. His acquaintance with Green
+seems to have been formal from the beginning, never intimate, and the
+articles just reviewed mark the end of Dewey's idealistic discipleship.
+His psychological idealism, in fact, was fundamentally antithetical to
+the Neo-Hegelianism which he had sought to espouse, and the development
+of his own standpoint brought out the vital differences which had been
+hidden from his earlier understanding. The idealism which seeks to view
+reality together and as a whole is forever incompatible with a method
+which seeks to interpret the whole in terms of one of its parts.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[75] Vol. I, pp. 186-203.
+
+[76] _Ibid._, p. 186.
+
+[77] _Ibid._
+
+[78] _Op. cit._, p. 187.
+
+[79] _Ibid._, p. 188.
+
+[80] _Ibid._
+
+[81] _Ibid._, p. 191 f.
+
+[82] _Op. cit._, p. 189.
+
+[83] _Ibid._, p. 194. Author's Italics.
+
+[84] _Ibid._
+
+[85] _Op. cit._, p. 195.
+
+[86] _Ibid._, p. 198.
+
+[87] _Op. cit._
+
+[88] _Ibid._, p. 202.
+
+[89] _Ibid._, p. 203.
+
+[90] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. I, 1892, pp. 593-612.
+
+[91] _Op. cit._, p. 596.
+
+[92] _Ibid._, p. 597.
+
+[93] _History of Philosophy_, p. 555.
+
+[94] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. I, 1892, p. 598.
+
+[95] _Ibid._
+
+[96] _Ibid._, p. 599.
+
+[97] _Ibid._ Compare with the passage in "Psychology as Philosophic
+Method," _Mind_, Vol. XI, p. 9.
+
+[98] _Op. cit._, p. 600.
+
+[99] _Ibid._, p. 601.
+
+[100] _Ibid._, p. 602.
+
+[101] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, third ed., p. 103.
+
+[102] _Ibid._, p. 104.
+
+[103] Vol. II, pp. 652-664.
+
+[104] _Ibid._, p. 653.
+
+[105] _Ibid._, p. 655.
+
+[106] _Op. cit._, p. 656.
+
+[107] _Ibid._, p. 657.
+
+[108] _Ibid._
+
+[109] _Ibid._, p. 658. Author's italics.
+
+[110] _Ibid._
+
+[111] _Op. cit._, note.
+
+[112] _Ibid._, p. 663.
+
+[113] _Ibid._
+
+[114] _Op. cit._, p. 659.
+
+[115] _Ibid._, p. 664.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
+
+
+It now becomes necessary to review that period of Dewey's philosophical
+career which is marked by the definite abandonment of the idealistic
+standpoint, and the adoption of the method of instrumental pragmatism.
+It has already been seen that there is a close connection between the
+"functionalism" which now begins to appear, and the "Psychological
+Standpoint" set forth in the preceding pages of this review. It is not
+possible, however, to account for all the elements which contribute to
+this development. Dewey was active in many fields and received
+suggestions from many sources. It seems best, in dealing with this
+period, to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" and avoid _a priori_
+speculation on the factors which determined the precise form of Dewey's
+mature standpoint in philosophy.
+
+Dewey had always kept in mind the idea that the synthetic activity
+whereby self-consciousness evolves the ideality of the world must
+operate through the human organism. He had frequently referred to
+Green's saying that the Eternal Self-Consciousness reproduces itself in
+man, and to similar notions in Caird and Kant; but he had never
+considered, in a detailed way, how the organism might serve as the
+vehicle for such a process. His ethical theory, with its analysis of
+individuality into capacity and environment, tended to bring the
+body-world relationship into the foreground, and the idea that theory is
+relative to action tended to emphasize still more the relation of
+thought to the bodily processes. Dewey finally discovers the basis upon
+which the synthetic activity of the self, the thought process, may be
+described empirically and concretely.
+Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the key-stone of his theory
+of knowledge. Thought is interpreted as a function of the organism,
+biologically considered, and the biological psychology which results
+from this mode of interpretation is commonly known as 'functional
+psychology.'
+
+The functional psychology is presented in a series of articles in the
+_Philosophical Review_ and the _Psychological Review_, published between
+1894 and 1898. The most important of these is "The Reflex Arc Concept in
+Psychology," published in the _Psychological Review_ in 1896.[116] Since
+it is the only article in the series which gives a complete view of the
+theory, it will be made the basis for the discussion of the functional
+theory of psychology.
+
+The reflex arc concept in psychology, Dewey says, recognizes that the
+sensory-motor arc is to be taken as the unit of nerve structure, and the
+type of nerve function. But psychologists do not avail themselves of the
+full value of this conception, because they still retain in connection
+with it certain distinctions which were used in the older psychology.
+"The older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current
+dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions; the older
+dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of
+stimulus and response."[117] These rigid distinctions must be set aside,
+and the separated elements must be viewed as elements in one
+sensory-motor coördination. Each is to be defined, not as something
+existing by itself, but as an element functioning in a concrete whole of
+activity. Thus, if we are to study vision, we must first take vision as
+a sensory-motor coördination, the act of seeing, and within the whole we
+may then be able to distinguish certain elements, sensations, or
+movements, and define them according to their function in the total act
+of seeing. The reflex arc idea, as commonly employed, takes sensation as
+stimulus, and movement as response, as if they were actually separate
+existences, apart from a coördination. Response is said to follow
+sensation, but it is forgotten that the sensation which preceded was
+correlated with a response, and that the response which follows is also
+correlated with sensation. Sound, for instance, is not a mere sensation
+in itself, apart from sensory-motor coördination. Hearing is an act, and
+while sound may, for purposes of study, be abstracted from the total, it
+is not, in itself, independent of the total act of hearing.
+
+"But, in spite of all this, it will be urged, there is a distinction
+between stimulus and response, between sensation and motion. Precisely;
+but we ought now to be in a condition to ask of what nature is the
+distinction, instead of taking it for granted as a distinction somehow
+lying in the existence of the facts themselves."[118] The distinction
+which is to be made between them must be made on a teleological basis.
+"The fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of
+existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of
+function, or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an
+end."[119] There are two kinds of teleological distinction that can be
+made between stimulus and response, or rather, the teleological
+interpretation has two phases.
+
+In the first place, it may be assumed that all of man's activity
+furthers some general end, as, for instance, the maintenance of life.
+Then man's activity may be viewed as a sequence of acts, which tend to
+further this end, and on this basis we may separate out stimulus and
+response. "It is only when we regard the sequence of acts _as if_ they
+were adapted to reach some end that it occurs to us to speak of one as
+stimulus and the other as response. Otherwise, we look at them as a
+_mere_ series."[120] In these cases the stimulus is as truly an act as
+the response, and what we have is a series of sensory-motor
+coördinations. Looking, for instance, is a sensory-motor coördination
+which is the stimulus or antecedent of another coördinated act, running
+away. The first coördination passes into the second, and the second may
+be viewed as a modification or reconstitution of the first.
+
+But this external teleological distinction between sensation and
+response is not so important as the distinction now to be made. So far
+only fixed coördinations, habitual modes of action, have been
+considered. But there are situations in which habitual responses and
+fixed modes of action fail: situations in which new habits are formed.
+In these situations there arises a special distinction between stimulus
+and response, for in these formative situations the stimuli and
+responses are consciously present in experience as such. "The circle is
+a coördination, some of whose members have come into conflict with each
+other. It is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution
+which occasions, which affords the genesis of, the conscious distinction
+into sensory stimulus on one side and motor response on the other."[121]
+The distinction which arises between stimulus and response is a
+distinction of function within the problematical situation. Suppose that
+a sound is heard, the character of which is uncertain, and which, as a
+coördination, does not readily pass into its following coördination, or
+habitual response. The sound is puzzling, and moves into the center of
+attention. It is fixed upon, abstracted, studied on its own account. In
+that event, the sound may be spoken of as a sensation. As a sensation,
+it is the datum of a reflective process of thought, or conscious
+inference, whose aim is to constitute the sound a stimulus, or, in other
+words, to find what response belongs to it. When this response is
+determined the problem is done with and sensory-motor unity is achieved.
+
+The stimulus, in these cases, is simply "that phase of activity
+requiring to be defined in order that a coördination may be
+completed."[122] It is not any particular existence, and is not to be
+taken as an element apart from others, having an independent existence.
+But the conscious process of attending to the sensation and finding a
+response to it arises only when coördination is disturbed by conflicting
+factors, and the separation of stimulus from response arises only as a
+means for bringing unity into the coördination. The sensation, then, is
+that element which is to be attended to; upon which further response
+depends. This phase of the teleological interpretation defines each
+element by the part which it plays in the reflective process.
+
+If this brief summary of the article is difficult to comprehend, a
+reading of the original text will do little towards making it more
+intelligible. The doctrine presented there, however, is simple and
+coherent enough when its bearings and purpose are once understood, and,
+at the risk of being over-elaborate, it seems advisable to attempt some
+remarks on the general bearing and applications of the theory.
+
+It must be remembered that Dewey is seeking an interpretation of the
+thought process which shall reveal it as an actual fact of experience. A
+thought which is apart from experience and not _in_ it, which is shut up
+to the contemplation of its own mental states is, by its definition,
+non-experienced. It is, like Kant's 'productive imagination,' formative
+of experience, but not a part of it. Dewey holds to the belief that
+experience must be explained in terms of itself; he would do away with
+all transcendental factors in the explanation of reality. But modern
+psychological theory, Dewey believes, tends to shut thought in to the
+contemplation of its own subjective states, and thus gives it an
+extra-experiential status. A stimulus is said to strike upon an end
+organ, which sends an impulse to the cortex and there gives rise to a
+sensation which, as the effect of a stimulus, is representative of the
+real, but not real in itself. Thought, again, interprets the sensation,
+and sends out a motor impulse appropriate to the situation. These mental
+states and the thought which interprets them are, in Dewey's mind,
+wholly fictitious. The problem, then, is to give an account of the
+perceptual processes which shall eliminate the artificial states of mind
+and present mental operations as natural processes.
+
+The difficulty with customary psychological explanation is that it
+breaks the reflex arc of the nervous system into three parts whose
+relations are successive and causal rather than simultaneous and
+organic. There is not first a stimulus, then perception, then response;
+these processes are supplementary, not separate. Or, from another point
+of view, psychological explanation must begin with a whole process
+which, when analyzed, is seen to contain the three moments or phases:
+stimulus, sensation, and response. The whole process is primary and
+actual, the abstracted phases are secondary and derivative.
+
+With the disappearance of the mechanical interpretation of the
+perceptual process, mental states vanish. Representative perceptionism
+is thus done away with, together with all the problems which it
+generates.
+
+The position of conscious, or reflective thought, in Dewey's scheme, is
+especially interesting. This mode of thought is not constantly
+operative, but arises only in situations of stress and strain, when
+habitual modes of response break down. A dualism is established between
+reflective thought and the habitual life processes. Dewey does not take
+the ground that these processes are supplementary, as he had done in the
+case of stimulus, sensation, and response. It will be remembered that
+Dewey had defined judgment, in his logical and ethical writings of an
+earlier period, as a special activity operating in critical situations.
+This conception of judgment is now carried over into his psychology, and
+given a biological basis. It is worth noting that this view of judgment
+was worked out in logical terms before it was reinforced by biological
+data. Nevertheless, it is through biology that Dewey is able to give his
+interpretation of the thought process that empirical concreteness which
+he demanded from the beginning, but achieved very slowly.
+
+The value of the functional psychology, considered merely as psychology,
+is undeniable. It is, in fact, a natural and almost inevitable step in
+the development of psychological theory. Dewey's achievement consists in
+the establishment of an organic mode of interpretation in psychology,
+intended to displace the mechanical interpretation. The mechanical
+causal series is displaced by an organic system of internally related
+parts. Dewey, however, does not display any interest in the logical
+aspects of his doctrine. He takes the biological situation literally, as
+a fact empirically given, and to be accepted without criticism.
+
+A discussion of the period now under consideration would not be complete
+without reference to certain articles which supplement the essay
+discussed above. The first of these is an article on "The Psychology of
+Effort," published in the _Philosophical Review_ in 1897.[123]
+
+It is not proposed to follow the argument of this article in detail, but
+to center attention upon those parts of it, especially the concluding
+pages, which have a special interest in connection with the subject
+under discussion. Dewey returns, in this article, to the situation of
+effort at adjustment; to the situation in which an effort is made to
+determine the proper response to a stimulus. The opening pages are
+devoted, in the first place, to a discussion of the distinction between
+conscious effort and the mere expenditure of energy or effort as it
+appears to an outsider, and, in the second place, to maintaining, by
+means of examples, the proposition that the sense of effort is
+sensationally mediated. "How then does, say, a case of perception with
+effort differ from a case of 'easy' or effortless perception? The
+difference, I repeat, shall be wholly in sensory quale; but in _what_
+sensory quale?"[124]
+
+The conscious sense of effort arises, Dewey answers, when there is a
+rivalry or conflict between two sensational elements in experience. "In
+the case of felt effort, certain sensory quales, usually fused, fall
+apart in consciousness, and there is an alternation, an oscillation,
+between them, accompanied by a disagreeable tone when they are apart,
+and an agreeable tone when they become fused again."[125] These two sets
+of sensory elements have each a significance in terms of adjustment; one
+of them is a correlate of a habit, or fixed mode of response, and the
+other is an intruder which resists absorption into, or fusion with, the
+dominant images of the current habit or purpose. The same idea of a
+natural tendency to persist in a habitual mode of regarding things was
+met with in the last two chapters, and is qualified here by the addition
+of the idea that each sensory element represents a typical mode of
+response on the part of the organism. Dewey illustrates his notion by
+the case of learning to ride a bicycle. "Before one mounts one has
+perhaps a pretty definite visual image of himself in balance and in
+motion. This image persists as a desirability. On the other hand, there
+comes into play at once the consciousness of the familiar motor
+adjustments,--for the most part, related to walking. The two sets of
+sensations refuse to coincide, and the result is an amount of stress and
+strain relevant to the most serious problems of the universe."[126] In
+another passage, which brings out even more clearly the rivalry of the
+two sets of sensations, he says: "It means that the activity already
+going on (and, therefore, reporting itself sensationally) resists
+displacement, or transformation, by or into another activity which is
+beginning, and thus making its sensational report."[127]
+
+The sense of effort, then, reduces itself to an awareness of conflict
+between two sensational elements and their motor correlates.
+"Practically stated, this means that effort is nothing more, and also
+nothing less, than tension between means and ends in action, and that
+the sense of effort is the awareness of this conflict."[128]
+
+The important aspect of Dewey's argument, for the present discussion, is
+that awareness reduces to these sensational elements and their
+attributes. Throughout the article Dewey is opposing his sensational
+view of the sense of effort to what he calls the 'spiritual' or
+non-sensational view, which supposes that the sense of effort is
+something purely psychical, which accompanies the expenditure of
+physical energy. The consciousness of effort, Dewey says, is not
+something added to the effort, but is itself a certain condition
+existing in the sensory quales.
+
+This provision would make it necessary to identify consciousness, and,
+therefore, conscious inference, with the tensional situation which has
+been described. This being granted, all that pertains to conscious
+inference, all the methods and categories of science, would be
+applicable only in such situations of stress and strain; they would
+appear simply as instruments for effecting a readjustment; they would be
+employed exclusively in the interests of action. This is the direction
+in which Dewey is tending. No criticism of this treatment of judgment
+need be made at this time, beyond pointing out that it presents itself,
+at first sight, as an awkward and indirect mode of describing the
+relations between organic activity and intelligence, and between
+psychology and logic.
+
+Nothing has so far been said of the historical sources of Dewey's
+theory, and these may be briefly considered. There are at least two
+sources which must be taken into account: the James-Lange theory of the
+emotions, and the Neo-Hegelian ethical theory. The latter has already
+been considered to some extent, as it manifests itself in Dewey's own
+ethical theory, but its relation to his psychology has not been
+indicated. In his text-book, the _Outlines of a Critical Theory of
+Ethics_ (1891), Dewey advanced certain ideas for which he claimed
+originality, at least in treatment. Among these was the analysis of
+individuality into function including capacity and environment.[129]
+
+Bradley appears to have been the first among English philosophers to
+introduce that synthesis of the internal and external, of the
+intuitional and utilitarian modes of judging conduct, which became
+characteristic of Neo-Hegelian ethics. The synthesis, of course, is
+Hegelian in temper, and the _Ethical Studies_ are much more suggestive,
+in general method, of the _Philosophie des Rechts_ than of any previous
+English work. Utilitarianism tended to judge the moral act by its
+external, _de facto_ results; intuitionism, on the contrary, attributed
+morality to the will of the agent. The former found morality to consist
+in a certain state of affairs, the latter in a certain internal
+attitude. According to the synthetic point of view, these opposed
+ethical systems are one-sided representations of the moral situation,
+each being true in its own way. To state the matter in another form, the
+moral act has a content as well as a purpose. "Let us explain," says
+Bradley. "The moral world, as we said, is a whole, and has two sides.
+There is an outer side, systems and institutions, from the family to the
+nation; this we may call the body of the moral world. And there must
+also be a soul, or else the body goes to pieces; every one knows that
+institutions without the spirit of them are dead.... We must never let
+this out of our sight, that, where the moral world exists, you have and
+you must have these two sides."[130] Dewey expresses the same idea in a
+more detailed fashion. "What do we mean by individuality? We may
+distinguish two factors--or better two aspects, two sides--in
+individuality. On one side it means special disposition, temperament,
+gifts, bent, or inclination; on the other side it means special station,
+situation, limitations, surroundings, opportunities, etc. Or, let us
+say, it means _specific capacity_ and _specific environment_. Each of
+these elements apart from the other, is a bare abstraction, and without
+reality. Nor is it strictly correct to say that individuality is
+contributed by these two factors _together_. It is, rather, as intimated
+above, that each is individuality looked at from a certain point of
+view, from within and from without."[131] It is a fact, empirically
+demonstrable, according to Dewey, that body and object, intention and
+foreseen consequence, interest and environment, attitude and
+objectivity, are parts of one another and of the whole moral situation.
+Each is relative to the other. "It is not, then, the environment as
+physical of which we are speaking, but as it appears to consciousness,
+as it is affected by the make-up of the agent. This is the _practical_
+or _moral_ environment."[132] When this relation of the inner to the
+outer is taken literally and universally, we have the essence of the
+functional psychology. Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the
+catch-word of instrumental pragmatism.
+
+The other source of Dewey's psychology, which is now to be considered,
+is the James-Lange theory of the emotions. The connection here is more
+obvious, but perhaps not so vital, as in the case of the ethical theory.
+From the numerous references which Dewey made to James's _Principles of
+Psychology_ (1890), it is evident that he was much impressed with this
+work. The theory of emotion there presented seems to have had a special
+interest for him; so much so that he made it the subject of two articles
+in the _Psychological Review_, in 1894 and 1895, under the general
+title, "The Theory of Emotion."[133] These studies bear a very close
+relation to the article on "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology"
+(1896), the standpoint being essentially the same, although developed in
+reference to a technical problem. Some indications may be given here of
+the relationships which they bear to the James-Lange theory on the one
+side, and functional psychology on the other. The James-Lange theory is
+itself concerned with order and connection between emotional states,
+perceptions, and responses. James says: "Our natural way of thinking
+about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact
+excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter
+state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the
+contrary, is that _the bodily changes follow directly the perception of
+the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they
+occur IS the emotion_."[134] It is all a question, James says, of the
+order and sequence of these elements, and his contention is that the
+bodily changes should be interposed between the two mental states. This
+is the question with which Dewey's functional psychology is also
+concerned, the relation of response to stimulus, and the manner in which
+a stimulus is determined by a reaction 'into it.' Dewey's theory rises
+so naturally out of James's theory of the emotions as to seem but little
+more than its universal application.
+
+This connection is revealed in several passages in Dewey's study of the
+emotions. It is said, for instance, that the emotional situation must be
+taken as a whole, as a state, for instance, of 'being angry.' The
+several constituents of the state of anger, idea or object, affect or
+emotion, and mode of expression or behavior, are not to be taken
+separately, but all together as elements in one whole.[135] Another
+characteristic doctrine appears in the affirmation that the emotional
+attitude is to be distinguished from other attitudes by certain special
+features which it possesses. Particularly, it involves a special
+relation of stimulus to response.[136] Again, there is a tendency to
+translate meaning in terms of projected activity. "The consciousness of
+our mode of behavior as affording data for other possible actions
+constitutes an objective or ideal content."[137]
+
+It is enough, perhaps, to reveal these two sources as probable factors
+in the development of Dewey's psychological method. No speculation upon
+them is necessary. At most, they were merely contributory to Dewey's
+thought, and by fitting in with his previous ideas enabled him to give a
+more concrete presentation of his psychological theory than would
+otherwise have been possible.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[116] Vol. III, pp. 357-370.
+
+[117] _Ibid._, p. 357.
+
+[118] _Op. cit._, p. 365.
+
+[119] _Ibid._
+
+[120] _Ibid._, p. 366, note.
+
+[121] _Op. cit._, p. 370.
+
+[122] _Ibid._, p. 368.
+
+[123] Vol. VI, pp. 43-56.
+
+[124] _Op. cit._, p. 46.
+
+[125] _Ibid._, p. 48.
+
+[126] _Op. cit._, p. 50.
+
+[127] _Ibid._, p. 52.
+
+[128] _Ibid._, p. 51.
+
+[129] _Op. cit._, p. viii.
+
+[130] _Ethical Studies_, p. 160 f.
+
+[131] _Outlines of Ethics_, p. 97.
+
+[132] _Ibid._, p. 99.
+
+[133] Vol. I, pp. 553-569; Vol. II, pp. 13-32.
+
+[134] _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, p. 449.
+
+[135] _Psy. Rev._, Vol. II, p. 15 f.
+
+[136] _Ibid._, p. 24 f.
+
+[137] _Ibid._, p. 24.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE EVOLUTIONARY STANDPOINT
+
+
+Dewey's psychology is linked up with his logical theory, as has already
+been suggested, through the interpretation of the thought-process as a
+mode of adjustment involving inference. This conception of thought
+implies, of course, that thought is an instrument of adaptation, and
+this in turn suggests that the organ of reflection is a product of
+evolutionary forces operating on the individual and on the race. In the
+period now to be reviewed Dewey, for the first time in his career,
+displays an active and intense interest in evolutionary theory,
+especially as applied in the fields of ethics and psychology.
+
+An article published in the _Monist_, in 1898, on "Evolution and
+Ethics,"[138] deserves special attention. The central thought of the
+article is to be found in the following passage: "The belief that
+natural selection has ceased to operate [in the human sphere] rests upon
+the assumption that there is only one form of such selection: that where
+improvement is indirectly effected by the failure of species of a
+certain type to continue to reproduce; carrying with it as its
+correlative that certain variations continue to multiply, and finally
+come to possess the land. This ordeal by death is an extremely important
+phase of natural selection, so called.... However, to identify this
+procedure absolutely with selection, seems to me to indicate a somewhat
+gross and narrow vision. Not only is one form of life as a whole
+selected at the expense of other forms, _but one mode of action in the
+same individual is constantly selected at the expense of others_. There
+is not only the trial by death, but there is the trial by the success or
+failure of special acts--the counterpart, I suppose, of physiological
+selection so called."[139] We have here a refinement upon the doctrine
+of natural selection. The keynote of Dewey's new psychology is a
+process of selection constantly occurring within the individual
+organism. He points out that, in dealing with man, we have a highly
+adaptable, not merely a highly adapted animal. "It is certainly implied
+in the idea of natural selection that the most effective modes of
+variation should themselves be finally selected."[140] The capacity to
+vary, or adapt, is highly developed in man. Through these variations,
+the organism is able to react against the environment, changing its
+character quite completely. The environment of the modern human is
+tremendously complicated by his reaction upon it. "The growth of
+science, its application in invention to industrial life, the
+multiplication and acceleration of means of transportation and
+intercommunication, have created a peculiarly unstable
+environment."[141] Under these conditions, the ability of the individual
+to adapt himself to changing circumstances is largely determined by his
+degree of flexibility in the selection of right acts and responses. "In
+the present environment, flexibility of function, the enlargement of the
+range of uses to which one and the same organ, grossly considered, may
+be put, is a great, almost the supreme, condition of success."[142] The
+human mind is to be interpreted as a highly developed organ whose
+special function is to make adaptation more flexible and response more
+varied and discriminating. "That which was 'tendency to vary' in the
+animal is conscious foresight in man. That which was unconscious
+adaptation and survival in the animal, taking place by the 'cut and try'
+method until it worked itself out, is with man conscious deliberation
+and experimentation."[143]
+
+This view of consciousness is worked out on the basis of an evolutionary
+metaphysics. Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the changing
+whirl of things, stimulated into action by his needs and wants, adapting
+himself to conditions, making the situation over, or meeting it
+habitually where he can and suffering the consequences where he cannot
+make the necessary adjustment. If this be taken, as would seem, for the
+ultimate truth about reality and man's place in it, it must be called a
+metaphysics. Against this background Dewey's logical theory is
+developed. The most important result, from the standpoint of the student
+of mind and spirit, is the reduction of self-conscious reflection to the
+position of a nervous function of the organism. The purely theoretical
+evidence by which this position is sustained should be subjected to
+closer scrutiny than can be undertaken in this limited space.
+
+The purpose of reflection, then, is to enable man to adapt himself to
+his environment, understanding by the environment the whole of the
+reality which surrounds him. The test of the mind and its newly
+projected modes of response [ideas] lies in its ability to meet the
+demands of the situation. The capacities and limits of mind are
+determined by the purpose for which it was evolved; it can enable a man
+to deal more effectively with his environment; it can do nothing else.
+It cannot speculate on the nature of reality as such, nor voyage on long
+journeys in search of truth! Its business is practical, here and now.
+Its problems are always set for it by circumstances, and these
+circumstances are concrete and specific. There is no such thing as
+adaptation at large or in general.
+
+The business of mind is to have, and to continually reconstruct, useful
+habits. So Dewey assures the American Psychological Association in 1899,
+in an address on "Psychology and Social Practice."[144] We must
+recognize, he says, "that the existing order is determined neither by
+fate nor by chance, but is based on law and order, on a system of
+existing stimuli and modes of reaction, through knowledge of which we
+can modify the practical outcome."[145] Psychology uninterpreted, he
+says, will never provide ready-made materials and prescriptions for the
+ethical life. "But science, both physical and psychological, makes known
+the conditions upon which certain results depend, and therefore puts at
+the disposal of life a certain method of controlling them."[146] These
+statements show the extent to which Dewey's view of knowledge has come
+to be controlled by biological conceptions.
+
+The evolutionary method is investigated in considerable detail in the
+next article to be considered, which was published in two parts in the
+_Philosophical Review_, 1902, under the title, "The Evolutionary Method
+as Applied to Morality."[147]
+
+The fact that some philosophers deny the importance of the evolutionary
+method for ethics, holding that morality is purely a matter of value,
+and that the evolutionary method tends only to obscure differences of
+value, makes it necessary to inquire into the import and nature of this
+method. "Anyway," Dewey says, "before we either abuse or recommend
+genetic method we ought to have some answers to these questions: Just
+what is it? Just what is to come of it and how?"[148]
+
+The experimental method in science has at least some of the traits of a
+genetic method. The nature of water, for instance, cannot be determined
+by simply observing it. But experiment brings to light the exact
+conditions under which it came into being and therefore explains it.
+"Through generating water we single out the precise and sole conditions
+which have to be fulfilled that water may present itself as an
+experienced fact. If this case be typical, then the experimental method
+is entitled to rank as genetic method; it is concerned with the manner
+or process by which anything comes into experienced existence."[149]
+
+Some would deny this, on the ground that a genuinely historical event
+occupies a particular place in a historical series, from which it is
+inseparable, while in experimental science the sets or pairs of terms
+are not limited to any particular place in a historical series, but
+occur and recur. "Water is made over and over again, and, so to speak,
+at any date in the cosmic series. This deprives any account of it of
+genuinely historic quality."[150] Again, it might be said in opposition
+to treating the experimental method as a genetic method, that it is
+interested in individual cases not as such, but as samples or instances.
+The particular case is only an illustration of the general relation
+which is being sought.
+
+It will turn out in the course of the discussion, Dewey says, that,
+although science deals with origins, it is not, in strictness, a
+historical discipline. The distinction between the historical and other
+sciences is based on an abstraction, which has been introduced for the
+sake of more adequate control. It is only by abstraction that we get the
+pairs of facts that may show up at any time, and by abstraction we
+attribute to them a generalized character. The facts, in themselves, are
+historic.
+
+There is no such thing as water in general, but water is just this
+water, at this time, in this place, and it never shows itself twice,
+never recurs. The scientist must deal, therefore, with particular
+historic cases of water, and with their specific origins. "Experiment
+has to do with the conditions of production of a specific amount of
+water, at a specific time and place, under specific circumstances: in a
+word, it must deal with just _this_ water. The conditions which define
+its origin must be stated with equal definiteness and
+circumstantiality."[151] The instance has as definite a place in an
+historical series as has Julius Caesar. But the difference in treatment
+of the water and Caesar is due to the difference in interest. "Julius
+Caesar served a purpose which no other individual, at any other time,
+could have served. There is a peculiar flavor of human meaning and
+accomplishment about him which has no substitute or equivalent. Not so
+with water. While each portion is absolutely unique in its occurrence,
+yet one lot will serve our intellectual or practical needs just as well
+as any other."[152] For this reason the specific case of water is not
+dealt with on its own account, but only as giving insight into the
+processes of its generation in general. In this way the difference
+arises between the generalized statements of physical science and the
+individualized form demanded in historical science. The abstract
+character of the physical result is recognized by the hypothetical form
+of judgment in modern logic; if certain conditions, then certain
+consequences. But the counterpart of this must not be forgotten, that
+every categorical proposition applies to an individual. Experimental
+propositions, therefore, have an historical value. "They take their
+rise in, and they find their application to, a world of unique and
+changing things: an evolutionary universe."[153] The recognition of the
+historical character of experimental science does not in any way
+derogate from its value, but, properly understood, gives a deeper
+insight into its significance. It should be observed that here also
+Dewey treats thought, hypothesis, as coming 'after something, and for
+the sake of something.'
+
+This attempt to justify the historical method by showing that it is
+implied in physical experiment is of dubious value. Its net result would
+seem to be the conclusion that every fact may be dealt with either as a
+historical fact or as a datum for physical science. Even here, however,
+Dewey slurs over certain difficulties which demand close scrutiny. The
+treatment of individuality is most unsatisfactory. While each portion or
+instance of water is itself, and has its own unquestionable uniqueness,
+no case is a mere particular, but each is a true individual, which means
+that it is, as it occurs, an instance of a general phenomenon. While the
+scientist must deal with specific cases of water, he has no regard for
+their particularity, but chooses them as instances, and is from first to
+last occupied with their typical characteristics. The historian, also,
+selects relevant and representative instances, in so far as his history
+is interpretative and not mere narrative.
+
+A merely factual account of a series of events is not science, and never
+could be.
+
+Dewey now turns to the ethical field, with the purpose of showing that
+the historical method in ethics does for this science precisely what the
+experimental method does for other sciences. "History offers to us the
+only available substitute for the isolation and for the cumulative
+recombination of experiment. The early periods present us in their
+relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial
+operation of an experiment: following the phenomenon into the more
+complicated and refined form which it assumes later, is a substitute for
+the synthesis of the experiment."[154] Hydrogen and oxygen are the
+historical antecedents of water, whose synthesis the scientist
+observes, and so the more primitive forms of conduct are the elements
+which the moralist traces in their process of becoming fused into the
+present social fabric. Primitive social practices cannot be artificially
+isolated, like the physical elements, but they can be traced to their
+historical origins, and their interweaving towards present complex
+conditions can be observed.
+
+The historical method is subject to two misunderstandings, Dewey says,
+one by the empiricists and materialists, the other by the idealists. The
+former, having isolated the primitive facts, suppose them to have a
+superior logical and existential value. "The earlier is regarded as
+somehow more 'real' than the later, or as furnishing the quality in
+terms of which the reality of all the later must be stated."[155] The
+later is looked upon as simply a recombination of the earlier
+existences. "Writers who ought to know better tell us that if we only
+had an adequate knowledge of the 'primitive' state of the world, if we
+only had some general formula by which to circumscribe it, we could
+deduce down to its last detail the entire existing constitution of the
+world, life, and society."[156] The primitive elements, however, take on
+new qualities on entering into new combinations. Water is more than
+hydrogen and oxygen. There is a similar process intervening between the
+earlier and the later in the moral field, of which the primitive state
+and the present are merely end terms. Actual study must take account of
+the whole process.
+
+The idealistic fallacy is of the opposite nature. It takes the final
+term of the process to be exclusively real. "The later reality is,
+therefore, to him the persistent reality in contrast with which the
+first forms are, if not illusions, at least poor excuses for being....
+It is enough for present purposes to note that we have here simply a
+particular case of the general fallacy just discussed--the emphasis of a
+particular term of the series at the expense of the process operative in
+reference to all terms."[157] The true reality is the whole process,
+which is represented in empiricism only by the primitive terms, and in
+idealism only by the end terms. Only a historical method can deal with
+it in its entirety.
+
+In summing up the advantages of the historical method, Dewey says that
+it gives a complete account of the origin and development of ethical
+ideas, opinions, beliefs, and practices. "It is concerned with the
+origin and development of these customs and ideas; and with the question
+of their mode of operation after they have arisen. The described
+facts--yes; but among the facts described is precisely certain
+conditions under which various norms, ideals, and rules of action have
+originated and functioned."[158] Dewey finds it irritating that the
+facts thus singled out should be treated as mere facts, apart from their
+significance. The historical method employs description, to be sure, but
+it also aims at interpretation. "The historic method is a method, first,
+for determining how specific moral values (whether in the way of
+customs, expectations, conceived ends, or rules) came to be; and second,
+for determining their significance as indicated in their career."[159]
+
+It is true, as Dewey holds, that the historical method may furnish a
+basis for interpretation, as well as description. But the mere scrutiny
+of what has happened will not reveal the elements, nor determine their
+significance. The historian must approach his material with something
+more than his eyes. But there are many historical methods. Which shall
+be used in dealing with the development of morals?[160] Chemistry, for
+instance, in interpreting the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen into water,
+employs a system of atoms related to each other in a mathematical order,
+and something similarly definite must underlie the study of morals. The
+historical method, in general, needs no defence, but since it takes many
+forms, great care must be exercised in its application. Dewey seems to
+ignore these difficulties.
+
+Dewey's argument now leads him to a comparison of the evolutionary
+methods with the intuitional and empirical methods in ethics. In making
+the comparison, he does not propose to raise the question of fact
+concerning the existence of intuitions. The question to be confronted is
+rather a logical one, concerning the validity of beliefs. "Under what
+conditions alone, and in what measure or degree, are we justified in
+arguing from the existence of moral intuitions as mental states and acts
+to facts taken to correspond to them?"[161]
+
+The answer is that the existence of a belief argues nothing as to its
+validity. The intuitionist takes his belief as a brute fact, unrelated
+to objective conditions. The 'inexpugnable' character of the belief
+cannot establish its validity, because the life of a single individual
+occupies but a brief span in the continuity of the social life in which
+the belief is embedded. Beliefs last for generations, and then very
+often disappear. "What guarantee have we that our present 'intuitions'
+have more validity than hundreds of past ideas that have shown
+themselves by passing away to be empty opinion or indurated
+prejudice?"[162] Intuitionism has no way of guaranteeing its beliefs.
+
+The evolutionary method, on the other hand, is able to determine the
+validity of beliefs. "The worth of the intuition depends upon genetic
+considerations. In so far as we can state the intuition in terms of the
+conditions of its origin, development, and later career, in so far we
+have some criterion for passing judgment upon its pretensions to
+validity.... But if we cannot find such historic origin and functioning,
+the intuition remains a mere state of consciousness, a hallucination, an
+illusion, which is not made more worthy by simply multiplying the number
+of people who have participated in it."[163] Certain savage races, for
+instance, possessed moral intuitions which made the practice of
+infanticide an obligation. But the fact that it was universally held
+does not establish its validity. It must be condemned or justified by
+the results to which it led.
+
+Dewey's criticism of intuitionism scarcely does justice to that method,
+whatever may be its inherent weakness. There doubtless have been
+thinkers who held that truth is revealed to the reason of man in its
+naked purity, in the shape of apodictic intellectual principles. But
+even in the case of so extreme a position as that of Kant, there are
+important qualifying considerations to be taken into account. There is
+no reason to suppose that moral judgment, as Kant conceived it, was
+excluded from the consideration of relevant data, such as the knowledge
+of actual effects produced by given courses of conduct. His position
+seems to have been, not that moral judgment lacked specific content, but
+that reason took something with it to the moral situation. The
+intuitionists may have over-estimated the original endowment of the
+mind, but it must be admitted with them that the mind which approaches
+the moral situation empty of concepts cannot make moral decisions. If
+man is to hold no beliefs except those proved valid by experience, how
+can there be any to validate? Intelligence must have the capacity to
+frame beliefs in the light of its past knowledge, and its acts of
+judgment, consequently, presuppose a test of the validity of ideas which
+belongs to intelligence as such, and not to history taken abstractly.
+Beliefs are adapted to their objects in the making, and on this account
+are usually found to have had some justification, even where set aside.
+'A principle that is suitable for universal legislation already
+presupposes a content.'
+
+Dewey next considers the relation of the evolutionary methods to
+empiricism. "Empiricism," he says, "is no more historic in character
+than is intuitionalism. Empiricism is concerned with the moral idea or
+belief as a grouping or association of various elementary feelings. It
+regards the idea simply as a complex state which is to be explained by
+resolving it into its elementary constituents. By its logic, both the
+complex and the elements are isolated from an historic context.... The
+empirical and the genetic methods thus imply a very different
+relationship between the moral state, idea, or belief, and objective
+reality.... The empirical theory holds that the idea arises as a reflex
+of some existing object or fact. Hence the test of its objectivity is
+the faithfulness with which it reproduces that object as copy. The
+genetic theory holds that the idea arises as a response, and that the
+test of its validity is found in its later career as manifested with
+reference to the needs of the situation that evoked it."[164]
+
+Only a method that takes the world as a changing, historical thing, can
+deal with the adaptation of morality to new conditions. "Both empiricism
+and intuitionalism, though in very different ways, deny the continuity
+of the moralizing process. They set up timeless, and hence absolute and
+disconnected, ultimates; thereby they sever the problems and movements
+of the present from the past, rob the past, the sole object of calm,
+impartial, and genuinely objective study, of all instructing power, and
+leave our experience to form undirected, at the mercy of circumstance
+and arbitrariness, whether that of dogmatism or scepticism."[165]
+
+In evaluating the article as a whole, it must be said that Dewey's study
+is not productive of definite results. The history of the past can
+undoubtedly offer to the student a mass of data that is interesting and
+instructive. The importance of this or that belief, or its value, can be
+gauged by the results which it is known to have produced. But when, in
+this day and age, the moralist sets out to find the principles which
+shall guide his own conduct, the history of morals is of no more
+importance than the observations of every day life, which reveal the
+consequences of conduct in the lives of men about him. But more
+particularly, it should be added, an estimate of present moral action
+depends, not upon truth uttered by the past, but upon truth discovered
+and interpreted by an intelligence which surveys the past and makes it
+meaningful. The past in itself is nothing; thought alone can create real
+history.
+
+Another article, published by Dewey in the _Philosophical Review_ in
+1900, "Some Stages of Logical Thought," illustrates the employment of
+the genetic method in a more specific way.[166] In his introductory
+remarks, Dewey says: "I wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking,
+easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual,
+may be identified and arranged as successive species of the relationship
+which doubting bears to assurance; as various ratios, so to speak, which
+the vigor of doubting bears to mere acquiescence. The presumption is
+that the function of questioning is one which has continually grown in
+intensity and range, that doubt is continually chased back, and, being
+cornered, fights more desperately, and thus clears the ground more
+thoroughly."[167] Dewey finds four stages of relationship between
+questioning and dogmatism: dogmatism, discussion, proof, and empirical
+science; and he seeks to show how each stage involves a higher degree of
+free inquiry. "Modern scientific procedure, as just set forth, seems to
+define the ideal or limit of this process. It is inquiry emancipated,
+universalized, whose sole aim and criterion is discovery, and hence it
+makes the terminus of our description. It is idle to conceal from
+ourselves, however, that this scientific procedure, as a practical
+undertaking, has not as yet reflected itself into any coherent and
+generally accepted theory of thinking...."[168]
+
+It is not necessary to comment on Dewey's stages of thought. The
+similarity of this division to Comte's theological, metaphysical and
+scientific stages of explanation will be apparent. Dewey's remarks on
+the logic of the scientific stage, however, are interesting. "The simple
+fact of the case is," he says, "that there are at least three rival
+theories on the ground, each claiming to furnish the sole proper
+interpretation of the actual procedure of thought."[169] There is the
+Aristotelian logic, with its fixed forms; the empirical logic, which
+holds "that only particular facts are self-supporting, and that the
+authority allowed to general principles is derivative and second
+hand;"[170] and finally there is the transcendental logic, which claims,
+"by analysis of science and experience, to justify the conclusion that
+the universe itself is a construction of thought, giving evidence
+throughout of the pervasive and constitutive action of reason; and
+holds, consequently, that our logical processes are simply the reading
+off or coming to consciousness of the inherently rational structure
+already possessed by the universe in virtue of the presence within it of
+this pervasive and constitutive action of thought."[171]
+
+None of these logics, Dewey finds, is capable of dealing with the
+actual procedure of science, because none of them treats thought as a
+doubt-inquiry process, but rather as something fixed and limited by
+conditions which determine its operations in advance. Dewey asks: "Does
+not an account or theory of thinking, basing itself on modern scientific
+procedure, demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of
+thought--judgment, concept, inference, subject, predicate and copula of
+judgment, etc. _ad indefinitum_--shall be interpreted simply and
+entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the
+doubt-inquiry process?"[172]
+
+Seven years before, Dewey had been an ardent champion of the
+transcendental logic, on the ground that it was progressive, and he
+contrasted it most favorably with the formal logics which treat thought
+as a self-contained process. Now, however, he has a new insight. Logic
+must be reinterpreted in the light of the evolutionary or biological
+method. We shall see how this is accomplished in the next chapter.
+
+To the student of the history of philosophy, Dewey's treatment of the
+genetic and historical methods must seem seriously inadequate. The
+idealist, moreover, will feel that Dewey should have taken note, in his
+criticism of the idealistic standpoint, of the fact that Hegelianism was
+from first to last a historical method; that the German idealists gave
+the impulse to modern historical research, and provoked a study of the
+historical method whose results are still felt. But in turning away from
+idealism, Dewey has no word of appreciation for this aspect of the
+Hegelian philosophy.
+
+When the truth is boiled down, it appears that Dewey's historical
+method, in so far as he had one, was based on biological evolutionism.
+He had no interest in any other form of historical interpretation.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[138] Vol. VIII, pp. 321-341. The article is a criticism of Huxley's
+essay with the same title.
+
+[139] _Ibid._, p. 337. Italics mine.
+
+[140] _Op. cit._, p. 338.
+
+[141] _Ibid._, p. 340.
+
+[142] _Ibid._
+
+[143] _Ibid._ It should be observed that this conclusion is reached on a
+purely theoretical basis.
+
+[144] Printed in the _Psychological Review_, Vol. VII, 1900, pp.
+105-124.
+
+[145] _Ibid._, p. 123.
+
+[146] _Ibid._, p. 124.
+
+[147] Vol. XI, pp. 107-124; 353-371.
+
+[148] _Ibid._, p. 108.
+
+[149] _Ibid._, p. 109.
+
+[150] _Ibid._
+
+[151] _Op. cit._, p. 110.
+
+[152] _Ibid._, p. 111.
+
+[153] _Op. cit._, p. 112.
+
+[154] _Ibid._, p. 113.
+
+[155] _Op. cit._, p. 114.
+
+[156] _Ibid._, p. 116.
+
+[157] _Ibid._, p. 118.
+
+[158] _Op. cit._, p. 355.
+
+[159] _Ibid._, p. 356.
+
+[160] See Bosanquet's _Logic_, second edition, Chapter VII, and
+especially page 240.
+
+[161] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, p. 357.
+
+[162] _Ibid._, p. 360.
+
+[163] _Ibid._, p. 358.
+
+[164] _Op. cit._, p. 364 f.
+
+[165] _Op. cit._, p. 370.
+
+[166] Vol. IX, pp. 465-489.
+
+[167] _Op. cit._, p. 465.
+
+[168] _Ibid._, p. 486 f.
+
+[169] _Ibid._, p. 487.
+
+[170] _Ibid._
+
+[171] _Ibid._
+
+[172] _Op. cit._, p. 489.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+"STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY"
+
+
+In 1903 a volume entitled _Studies in Logical Theory_, consisting of
+essays on logical topics by Dewey and his colleagues and pupils, was
+published under the auspices of the University of Chicago. In a review
+of this volume, Professor Pringle-Pattison remarks: "It is, indeed, most
+unusual to find a series of philosophical papers by different writers in
+which (without repetition or duplication) there is so much unity in the
+point of view and harmony in results. That this is so is a striking
+evidence of the moulding influence of Professor Dewey upon his pupils
+and coadjutors in the Chicago School of Philosophy."[173] It would be a
+needless task to review the whole volume, and attention will be confined
+to the essays which constitute Dewey's special contribution to the
+undertaking. These constitute the first four chapters of the volume, and
+are devoted to a critical examination of Lotze's logic.[174] Here, for
+the first time, Dewey presents in complete form the logical theory which
+stands as the goal of his previous endeavors, and marks the beginning of
+his career as a pragmatist.[175]
+
+The first chapter of the "Studies" is devoted to a general consideration
+of the nature of logical theory. Dewey begins his discussion with an
+account of the naïve view of thought, the view of the man of affairs or
+of the scientist, who employs ideas and reflection but has never become
+critical of his mental processes; who has never reflected upon
+reflection. "If we were to ask," he says, "the thinking of naïve life to
+present, with a minimum of theoretical elaboration, its conception of
+its own practice, we should get an answer running not unlike this:
+Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just
+as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity."[176] While the
+standpoint of the naïve man is usually hard to determine, there appears
+to be considerable justification for Dewey's statement. The common man
+does tend to view thinking as a special kind of activity, performed by
+an organ which can be 'trained,' and he is inclined to speak of
+education as a process of 'training the mind.'[177]
+
+Dewey finds a large measure of truth in this naïve view of thought.
+Thought appears to be derivative and secondary. "It comes after
+something and out of something, and for the sake of something."[178] It
+is employed at need, and ceases to operate when not needed. "Taking some
+part of the universe of action, of affection, of social construction,
+under its special charge, and having busied itself therewith
+sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented, thought releases
+that topic and enters upon further more direct experience."[179] There
+is a rhythm of practice and thought; man acts, thinks, and acts again.
+The business of thought is to solve practical difficulties, such as
+arise in connection with the conduct of life. The purpose for which
+thought intervenes is to enable action to get ahead by discovering a way
+out of the given difficulty. Ordinarily, the transition from thought to
+action and the reverse is accomplished without break or difficulty.
+
+Occasions arise, however, when thought is balked by a situation with
+which it is unable to deal, after repeated attempts. Critical reflection
+is then directed upon thought itself, and logical theory is the result.
+"The general theory of reflection, as over against its concrete
+exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so overwhelming and
+so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is
+blocked."[180] The purpose of logical theory is therefore a practical
+one, and logical theory, like ordinary reflection, is directed toward
+the removal of difficulties which stand in the way of the achievement of
+practical ends.
+
+This description of thought and of the nature of logical theory invites
+suspicion by its very simplicity. Nobody would deny that thought is
+linked up with practice, that the processes of life link up into one
+whole organic process, and that it would be a mistake to treat the
+cognitive processes as if they were separate from the whole. But Dewey's
+account of thought seems to fall into the very abstractness which he is
+so anxious to avoid. Experience is represented as a series of acts,
+attitudes, or functions, which follow one another in succession.
+"Thinking follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows thinking.
+Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its
+successor."[181] The functions are distinct, but are united to each
+other, end to end, like links in a chain. They pass into and out of one
+another, but are not simultaneous. This description gives rise, as
+Bosanquet observes,[182] to a kind of dualism between thinking and the
+other processes of life, which is made deeper because thinking is
+regarded as a very special activity, which "passes judgment upon both
+the processes and contents of other functions," and whose aim and work
+is "distinctively reconstructive or transformatory."[183]
+
+Dewey's description of the processes of experience is undoubtedly
+plausible, but should not be accepted without close scrutiny of the
+facts. It has been held, in opposition to such a view, that the
+cognitive processes are so bound up with perception, feeling, willing,
+and doing, that they cannot be separated from the complex.[184] Or it
+might be held that thinking and doing are simultaneous and
+complementary processes, rather than successive and supplementary. Dewey
+does not concern himself with these possibilities, seeming to take it
+for granted that his interpretation is the 'natural' one. It must be
+said, however, that Dewey's description of thought as a process is by no
+means obvious and simple; thought is not easy to describe.
+
+When we turn to logical theory, Dewey says, there are two directions
+which may be taken. The general features of logical theory are indicated
+by its origin. When ordinary thinking is impeded, an examination of the
+thinking function is undertaken, with the purpose of discovering its
+business and its mode of operation. The object of the examination is
+practical; to enable thinking to be carried on more effectively. If
+these conditions are kept in mind, logical theory will be guided into
+its proper channels: it will be assumed that every process of reflection
+arises with reference to some specific situation, and has to subserve a
+specific purpose dependent upon the occasion which calls it forth.
+Logical theory will determine the conditions which arouse thought, the
+mode of its operation, and the testing of its results. Such a logic,
+being true to the problems set for it by practical needs, is in no
+danger of being lost in generalities.
+
+But there is another direction which logical theory sometimes takes,
+unmindful of the conditions imposed by its origin. This is the
+epistemological direction. Epistemological logic concerns itself with
+the relation of thought at large to reality at large. It assumes that
+thought is a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with
+the world which is to be known. Such a logic can never be fruitful, for
+it has lost sight of its purpose in the formulation of its problem.
+
+Dewey is quite right in opposing a conception of thought which makes it
+a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with other life
+processes. Few recent thinkers have been guilty of that error. Lotze, to
+be sure, made the mistake of separating thought from the reality to be
+known, and therefore serves as a ready foil for Dewey's criticism. But
+Lotze's age is past and gone.
+
+When the abstract conception of thought is set aside, and it is agreed
+that thought must be treated as a process among the processes of
+experience, there is still room for divergence of opinion as to the
+exact manner in which thought is related to other functions. Dewey's
+logical theory, as outlined above, depends upon a very special
+interpretation of the place which thought occupies in experience. For
+this reason he considers logic to be inseparable from psychology.
+"Psychology ... is indispensable to logical evaluation, the moment we
+treat logical theory as an account of thinking as a mode of adaptation
+to its own generating conditions, and judge its validity by reference to
+its efficiency in meeting its problems."[185] Psychology, in other
+words, must substantiate Dewey's account of thought, else his 'logic'
+has no foundation. But if it were held that the cognitive processes
+cannot be separated (except by abstraction for psychological purposes)
+from other processes, there could manifestly be no such logical problem
+as Dewey has posited. Logic would be freed from reliance upon
+psychology. In this case, logical inquiry would be directed to the study
+of concepts, forms of judgment, and methods of knowledge, with the
+purpose of determining their relations, proper applications, and spheres
+of relevance. Logic would be a 'criticism of categories' rather than a
+criticism of the function of thinking. Dewey recognizes that such a
+study of method might be useful, but holds that it would be subsidiary
+to the larger problems of logic. "The distinctions and classifications
+that have been accumulated in 'formal' logic are relevant data; but they
+demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment
+to material antecedents and stimuli."[186] It will be seen that the
+treatment of the forms of thought as "organs of adjustment" makes logic
+subsidiary to psychology, necessarily and completely. All follows,
+however, from the original assumption that thought is a special
+activity, clearly distinguishable from other experienced processes, and
+possessing a special function of its own.
+
+In his further analysis of logical theory, Dewey states that it has two
+phases, one general and one specific. The general problem concerns the
+relations of the various functions of experience to one another; how
+they give rise to each other, and what is their order of succession.
+This wider logic is identified with philosophy in general.[187] The
+specific phase of logic, logic proper, concerns itself with the function
+of knowing as such, inquiring into its typical behavior, occasion of
+operation, divisions of labor, content, and successful employment. Dewey
+indicates the danger of identifying logic with either of these to the
+exclusion of the other, or of supposing that they can be finally
+isolated from one another. "It is necessary to work back and forth
+between the larger and the narrower fields."[188]
+
+Why is it necessary to make such a distinction at all? And why necessary
+to move back and forth between the two provisional standpoints? Dewey
+might answer by the following analogy: The thought function may be
+studied, first of all, as a special organ, as an anatomist might study
+the structure of any special organ of the body; but in order to
+understand the part played by this member in the organism as a whole, it
+would be necessary to adopt a wider view, so that its place in the
+system could be determined. This is probably what Dewey means by his two
+standpoints. He says: "We keep our paths straight because we do not
+confuse the sequential, efficient, and functional relationship of types
+of experience with the contemporaneous, correlative, and structural
+distinctions of elements within a given function."[189] The first
+objection to be made to this treatment of thought is that it makes
+knowing the activity of a special organ, like liver or lungs. If this
+objection is surmounted, there remains another from the side of general
+method. The biologist not only studies the particular organs as to their
+structure and their relationships within the body, but he has a view of
+the body as a whole, of its general end and purpose. His study of the
+particular organ is in part determined by his knowledge of the relations
+between body and environment. But experience as a whole cannot be
+treated like a body, because it has no environment. The analogy between
+body and its processes and experience and its processes breaks down,
+therefore, at a vital point. Dewey's genetic interpretation gains in
+plausibility when the human body, and not the whole of experience, is
+taken as the ground upon which the 'functions' are to be explained, for
+the body has an environment and purposes in relation to that
+environment. Experience as a whole possesses no such external reference.
+
+It will be seen that Dewey's interpretation of the function of knowing
+is not as empirical as it proposes to be. Its underlying conceptions are
+biological in character, and these conceptions are brought ready-made to
+the study of thought. Logical theory does not arise naturally and
+spontaneously from a study of the facts of mind, but the facts are
+aligned and interpreted in terms of categories selected in advance.
+Empiricism develops its theories in connection with facts, but
+rationalism (in the bad sense of the word) fits the facts into prepared
+theories. Dewey's treatment of thought is, after all, more rationalistic
+than empirical.
+
+To sum up Dewey's conclusions so far: Logic is the study of the function
+of knowing in relation to the other functions of experience. The wider
+logic distinguishes the function of knowing from other activities, and
+discovers its general purpose; the narrower logic examines the function
+of knowing in itself, with the object of determining its structure and
+operation. The aim of logic as a whole is to understand the operations
+of the concrete activity called knowing, with the purpose of rendering
+it more efficient. This concrete treatment of thought contrasts sharply
+with the 'epistemological' method, which sets thought over against the
+concrete processes of experience, and thus generates the false problem
+of the relation of thought in general to reality in general.
+
+Having stated his position, we might expect Dewey, in the course of the
+next three chapters, to enter upon a consideration of one phase or other
+of his logic. On the contrary, he proposes to take up "some of the
+considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the
+narrower conceptions of logical theory."[190] First, he will consider
+the antecedent conditions and cues of the thought-process; the
+conditions which lead up to and into the function of knowing. These
+conditions lie between the thought-process and the preceding function
+(in order of time), and are therefore on the borderland between the
+wider and narrower spheres of logic.
+
+In defining the conditions which precede and evoke thought, Dewey says:
+"There is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some
+subject-matter of the physical or social world, or organized
+intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each other--so
+much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience, which
+accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate re-definition
+and re-relation of its tensional parts."[191] Thought is always called
+into action by the whole concrete situation in which it occurs, not by
+any particular sensation, idea, or feeling.
+
+The opposite interpretation of the nature of the antecedents of thought
+is furnished by Lotze, who makes them consist in bare impressions,
+'moods of ourselves,' mere states of consciousness. Dewey is quite right
+in calling these bare impressions purely fictitious, though the
+observation is by no means original. From the manner in which he
+approaches the study of the "antecedents of thought" it appears,
+however, that Dewey has something in common with Lotze. The functional
+theory, that is, allows a certain initial detachment of thought from
+reality, which must be bridged over by an empirical demonstration of its
+natural connection with preceding processes.
+
+Dewey is wholly justified, again, in maintaining that thought is not a
+faculty set apart from reality, and that what is 'given' to thought is a
+coherent world, not a mass of unmeaning sensations. He recognizes his
+substantial agreement with the modern idealists in these matters.[192]
+But the idealists, he believes, hold a constitutive conception of
+thought which is in conflict with the empirical description of thinking
+as a concrete activity in time. Reality, according to this conception,
+is a vast system of sensations brought into a rational order by logical
+forms, and finite thought, in its operations, simply apprehends or
+discovers the infinite order of the cosmos. "How does it happen," Dewey
+asks, "that the absolute constitutive and intuitive Thought does such a
+poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to
+patch up its products?"[193]
+
+Against Lotze, such an indictment has considerable force, but its
+applicability to modern idealism is not so obvious. Modern idealism has
+insisted upon an empirical treatment of thought, and has definitely
+surrendered the abstract sensations of the older psychologies. Nor does
+idealism tend to treat finite thought as a process which merely 'copies'
+an eternally present nature. The issue between Dewey and the idealists
+is this: Does functionalism render an accurate empirical account of the
+nature of thought as a concrete process?
+
+In his third chapter Dewey discusses "Thought and its Subject-matter:
+The Datum of Thinking." The tensional situation passes into a thought
+situation, and reflection enters upon its work of restoring the
+equilibrium of experience. Certain characteristic processes attend the
+operation of thought. "The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or
+dichotomizes itself. There is somewhat which is untouched in the
+contention of incompatibles. There is something which remains secure,
+unquestioned. On the other hand, there are elements which are rendered
+doubtful and precarious."[194] The unquestioned element is the _datum_;
+the uncertain element, the _ideatum_. Ideas are "impressions,
+suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc., the facts are crude,
+raw, unorganized, brute."[195] There is an approximation to bare meaning
+on the one hand, and bare existence on the other.
+
+The first dichotomy passes into a second. "Once more, and briefly, both
+datum and ideatum may ... break up, each for itself, into physical and
+psychical."[196] The datum, or sense material, is all, somehow, matter
+and real, but one part of it turns out to have a psychical, another a
+physical form. Similarly, the ideatum divides into what is mere fancy,
+the psychical, and what is objectively valid, the physical.
+
+These distinctions are divisions of labor within the thought-process.
+"All the distinctions of the thought-function, of conception as over
+against sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of
+inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions
+come within the thought situation as growing out of a characteristic
+antecedent typical formation of experience...."[197] Great confusion
+results in logical theory, Dewey believes, when it is forgotten that
+these distinctions are valid only within the thought process. Their
+order of occurrence within the thought process must also be observed, if
+confusion is to be prevented. Datum and ideatum come first, psychical
+and physical next in order. "Thus the distinction between subjectivity
+and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It
+is a specification that emerges, correspondently, in _both_ datum and
+ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is
+left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as
+real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is
+regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense."[198]
+
+Dewey does well to call attention to the limitations of these
+categories, which cannot, indeed, be treated as absolute without serious
+error. It may be questioned, however, whether their limitations are of
+the precise nature which he describes. All depends upon the initial
+conception of the nature of thought. From Dewey's standpoint, these
+categories are 'tools of analysis' which function only within the
+thinking process; but his description of the function of knowing may be
+questioned, in which case his instrumental view of the concepts is
+rendered meaningless. A logical, as distinct from a psychological,
+treatment of the concepts mentioned, would show that their validity is
+limited to a certain 'sphere of relevance;' that they are applicable
+within a certain context and to a particular subject-matter. The danger
+of indiscriminate use of the categories would be avoided by the logical
+criticism even better, perhaps, than by Dewey's method.
+
+The discussion in Dewey's fourth and last chapter, concerning "The
+Content and Object of Thought," hinges upon a detailed criticism of
+Lotze's position, which cannot be presented here. The general bearing of
+the discussion, however, may be indicated. "To regard," says Dewey, "the
+thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as qualifications
+of 'pure thought, apart from any difference in objects,' instead of as
+successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material
+(or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism."[199]
+
+Pure thought, of course, cannot be defended. At the same time, Dewey,
+like Lotze, tends to regard thought as a special function with a
+'content' of its own. If thought is regarded as a special kind of
+process, having its own content in the way of instrumental concepts, the
+question inevitably arises: How shall these forms be employed to reach
+truth? How apply them correctly to the matter in hand?
+
+Dewey answers that the forms and hypotheses of thought, like the tools
+and scaffoldings for its operations, are especially designed for the
+labor which they have to perform. "There is no miracle in the fact that
+tool and material are adapted to each other in the process of reaching a
+valid conclusion.... Each has been slowly evolved with reference to its
+fit employ in the entire function; and this evolution has been checked
+at every point by reference to its own correspondent."[200]
+
+It is no doubt true that established conceptions, no less than temporary
+hypotheses, have been evolved in connection with, as a feature or part
+of, the subject-matter to which they pertain. But it is quite another
+thing to say that these evolved forms belong to thought, if by thought
+be meant the functional activity of Dewey's description. Dewey stresses
+the relevance of these forms to the thought-process, rather than their
+relevance to a particular sphere of discourse. His purpose is to show
+that distinctions which are valid within the process of knowing are not
+valid elsewhere, and the net result is to limit the faculty of thought
+as a whole, as well as the forms of thought.
+
+This result reveals itself most clearly in his discussion of the test of
+truth. "In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought, as thought,
+just as at the other limit thought originates out of a situation which
+is not reflectional in character. Interpret this before and beyond in a
+historic sense, as an affair of the place occupied and role played by
+thinking as a function in experience in relation to other functions, and
+the intermediate and instrumental character of thought, its dependence
+upon unreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon a consequent
+experience for its test of final validity, becomes significant and
+necessary."[201] This notion that the test of thought must be external
+to thought depends directly upon the doctrine that thought is a special
+activity of the kind heretofore described. It results from the
+occasionalism attributed by Dewey to the thinking process.
+
+If the truth or falsity of an idea is not discovered by thought, then by
+what faculty might it be discovered? Perhaps by experience as a whole or
+in general. Dewey, on occasion, speaks as follows: "Experience is
+continually integrating itself into a wholeness of coherent meaning
+deepened in significance by passing through an inner distraction in
+which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered partial and
+hence objectively conscious."[202] Perhaps Dewey means to say that truth
+is determined by this cosmic automatism. It is confusing, however, to be
+told in one moment that thought transforms experience, and in another
+that experience transforms itself.
+
+Experience, not reflection, is, then, the test of truth and thought.
+Such a statement would not be possible, except in connection with a
+psychology which deliberately sets experience over against reflection,
+making the latter a peculiar, although dependent, process. Lotze,
+indeed, makes the separation of thought from experience quite complete.
+Dewey attempts to bring them together by his psychological method, but
+does not completely succeed. In the meantime modern idealism has
+suggested that thought and experience are merely parts of one general
+process, constantly operating in conjunction. To one who believes that
+the various processes or 'functions' of experience constitute a single
+organ of life, the proposition that experience, rather than reflection,
+is the judge of truth, becomes meaningless.
+
+In an essay on "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of
+Morality" in another volume of the Chicago Publications of 1903,[203]
+Dewey presents a positive statement of his logical theory which is an
+excellent supplement to the critical study of Lotze.
+
+Science, Dewey remarks in introducing this essay, is a systematized body
+of knowledge. Knowledge may be taken either as a body of facts or as a
+process of arranging a body of facts; as results or the acquiring of
+results. The latter phase of science is the more important. "As used in
+this article, 'scientific' means regular methods of controlling the
+formation of judgments regarding some subject-matter."[204] In the
+scientific attitude, beliefs are looked upon as _conclusions_, and as
+conclusions they look in two directions. They look backward towards the
+ground from which they are empirically derived, and which renders them
+valid, and they look forward, as meaning, to being the ground from which
+further conclusions can be deduced. "So far as we engage in this
+procedure, we look at our respective acts of judging not as independent
+and detached, but as an interrelated system, within which every
+assertion entitles us to other assertions (which must be carefully
+deduced since they constitute its meaning) and to which we are entitled
+only through other assertions (so that they must be carefully searched
+for). 'Scientific' as used in this article thus means the possibility of
+establishing an order of judgments such that each one when made is of
+use in determining other judgments, thereby securing control of their
+formation."[205]
+
+This view of science as an order of judgments requires a special
+treatment of the generic ideas, the 'conclusions,' or universals of
+science. The individual judgment, 'This, _A_, is _B_,' expresses an
+identity. But it is much better expressed in hypothetical form.
+"Identification, in other words, is secure only when it can be made
+through (1) breaking up the analyzed. This of naïve judgment into
+determinate traits, (2) breaking up the predicate into a similar
+combination of elements, and (3) establishing uniform connection between
+some of the elements in the subject and some in the predicate."[206]
+Identity exists amid relevant differences, and the more intimately the
+system of differents is understood, the more positive is the
+determination of identity. This will be recognized as the 'concrete
+universal' of the Hegelian logicians.
+
+But, Dewey says, modern logicians tend to disregard judgment as act, and
+pay attention to it only as content. The generic ideas are studied in
+independence of their applications, as if this were a matter of no
+concern in logic. "In truth, there is no such thing as control of one
+content by mere reference to another content as such. To recognize this
+impossibility is to recognize that the control of the formation of the
+judgment is always through the medium of an act by which the respective
+contents of both the individual judgment and of the universal
+proposition are selected and brought into relationship to each
+other."[207] The individual act of judgment is necessary to logical
+theory, because the act of the individual forms the connecting link
+between the generic idea and the specific details of the situation.
+There must be some means whereby the instrumental concept is brought to
+bear upon its appropriate material. "The logical process includes, as an
+organic part of itself, the selection and reference of that particular
+one of the system which is relevant to the particular case. This
+individualized selection and adaptation is an integral portion of the
+logic of the situation. And such selection and adjustment is clearly in
+the nature of an act."[208]
+
+This problem of the relation of the categories to their subject-matter
+is an acute one for Dewey, because of limitations placed upon thought.
+He decides that the idea must be, in some fashion, self-selective, must
+signify its own fitness to a given subject-matter. But it can only be
+self-selective by being itself in the nature of an act. It turns out
+that the generic idea has been evolved in connection with acts of
+judgment, and its own applicability is born in it. "The activity which
+selects and employs is logical, not extra-logical, just because the tool
+selected and employed has been invented and developed precisely for the
+sake of just such future selection and use."[209]
+
+The logic and system of science must be embodied in the individual. He
+must be a good logical medium, his acts must be orderly and consecutive,
+and generic ideas must have a good motor basis in his organism, if he is
+to think successfully. This is the essence of Dewey's argument in the
+essay under discussion. The inference seems to be that logic cannot be
+separated from biology and psychology, since the act of knowing and the
+ideas which it employs have a physiological basis.
+
+It is difficult to see, however, how such a standpoint could prove
+useful in the practical study of logic. Certainly little headway could
+be made toward a study of the proper use and limitations of the
+categories by an investigation of the human nervous system. And to what
+extent would physiology illuminate the problem of the relation of the
+generic ideas to their appropriate objects? Although Dewey decides that
+the relationship must have its ground in the motor activities of the
+organism, his conclusion has little empirical evidence to support it.
+
+A practical, workable conception of the relations between generic ideas
+and their objects must be based on considerations less obscure. Why not
+be content to verify, by criticism, the truth that experience and
+thoughts about experience develop together, with the result that each
+theory, hypothesis, or method is applicable within the sphere where it
+was born? Why wait upon psychology for confirmation of a truth so
+obvious and important?
+
+Bosanquet remarks: "Either one may speak as if reality were relative to
+the individual mind, a ridiculous idea ..., or one may become interested
+in tracing the germination and growth of ideas in the individual mind as
+typical facts indeed, but only as one animal's habits are typical of
+those of others, and we may slur over the primary basis of logic, which
+is its relation to reality. For mental facts unrelated to reality are no
+knowledge, and therefore have no place in logic."[210] Bosanquet
+emphasizes an important truth neglected by Dewey. Logic is not concerned
+with ideas as things existing in individuals, nor with conceptions as
+individual modes of response. Truth has little to do with the individual
+as such, though the individual might well concern himself about truth.
+Truth is objective, super-individual, and logic is the study of the
+objective verity of thought. The proposition, 'All life is from the
+living,' finds no premises in the nerve tissues of the scientist who
+accepts it. How does the proposition square up with reality or
+experience? That is the question, and it can only be answered by turning
+away from psychology to empirical verification, involving a critical
+test of the applicability of the thought to reality.
+
+In the strictly ethical part of the essay, Dewey tries to show that
+moral judgments, at least, involve the character of the agent and his
+specific acts as data. Intellectual judgments, on the other hand, may
+disregard the acts of the individual; they are left out of account,
+"when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference
+with respect to the _particular_ object or content judged."[211] It will
+be seen that the distinction between moral and intellectual judgments is
+made on the basis of their content. But Dewey is committed to the
+doctrine that judgments are to be differentiated as acts, on a
+psychological basis. In any case, if the character and acts of a man are
+to be judged, they must be treated objectively, and the relevance of the
+judge's ideas to the man's actual character cannot be decided by a
+psychological analysis of the judge's mind. Right and wrong, whether
+moral or intellectual, are not attributes of the individual nervous
+system.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[173] _The Philosophical Radicals_, "Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory,"
+p. 179. The essay was originally printed as a critical notice in the
+_Philosophical Review_, November, 1904.
+
+[174] Since this was written (1915-16), Dewey's chapters have been
+reprinted in a volume entitled _Essays in Experimental Logic_, published
+by the University of Chicago Press (June, 1916). They are preceded, in
+this new setting, by a special introductory chapter, and numerous
+alterations have been made which do not, however, affect the fundamental
+standpoint.
+
+[175] See James's review, "The Chicago School," _Psychological
+Bulletin_, Vol. I, 1904, pp. 1-5.
+
+[176] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 2.
+
+[177] Compare Dewey, _How We Think_ (1910), Chapter II, "The Need for
+Training Thought."
+
+[178] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 1.
+
+[179] _Ibid._, p. 2.
+
+[180] _Op. cit._, p. 3 f.
+
+[181] _Ibid._, p. 16.
+
+[182] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. II, p. 270.
+
+[183] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. x.
+
+[184] "Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract
+cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course of its
+development carries these along with it. There is, of course, such a
+thing as what we have called abstract cognition; but the different
+moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the
+life of thought." Creighton, "Experience and Thought," _Philosophical
+Review_, Vol. XV, 1906, p. 487 f.
+
+[185] _Op. cit._, p. 15.
+
+[186] _Ibid._, p. 8.
+
+[187] _Op. cit._, pp. 18-19.
+
+[188] _Ibid._, p. 23.
+
+[189] _Ibid._, p. 17.
+
+[190] _Op. cit._, p. 23.
+
+[191] _Op. cit._, p. 39 f. Bradley suggests a similar idea of the
+'tensional situation.' See, for instance, _Ethical Studies_, p. 65,
+where he remarks: "We have conflicting desires, say A and B; we feel two
+tensions, two drawings (so to speak) but we can not actually affirm
+ourselves in both." A more complete statement of the 'tensional
+situation' will be found on page 239 of the same work and in various
+other passages.
+
+[192] _Ibid._, pp. 43-44.
+
+[193] _Op. cit._, p. 45.
+
+[194] _Ibid._, p. 50.
+
+[195] _Ibid._, p. 52.
+
+[196] _Op. cit._
+
+[197] _Ibid._, p. 47.
+
+[198] _Ibid._, p. 53.
+
+[199] _Op. cit._, p. 61 f.
+
+[200] _Ibid._, p. 80.
+
+[201] _Op. cit._, p. 85.
+
+[202] _Ibid._
+
+[203] _Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_, First
+Series, Vol. III, pp. 115-139.
+
+[204] _Ibid._, p. 115.
+
+[205] _Ibid._, p. 116.
+
+[206] _Op. cit._, p. 120.
+
+[207] _Ibid._, p. 121.
+
+[208] _Ibid._, p. 122.
+
+[209] _Op. cit._
+
+[210] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. I, p. 232.
+
+[211] _Decennial Publication of the University of Chicago_, First
+Series, Vol. III, p. 127.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE POLEMICAL PERIOD
+
+
+After the publication of the _Studies in Logical Theory_, Dewey entered
+upon what may be called the polemical period of his career. He joined
+forces with James and Schiller in the promotion of the new movement
+called 'Pragmatism.' The _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods_, instituted at Columbia University in 1904, the same
+year in which Dewey accepted a professorship in that institution, became
+a convenient medium for the expression of his views, and every volume of
+this periodical will be found to contain notes, discussions, and
+articles by Dewey and his followers, bearing on current controversy. He
+also published many articles in other journals, technical and popular.
+In 1910, the most important of these essays were collected into a
+volume, published under the title, _The Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy, and Other Essays_. For purposes of discussion, these essays
+may be divided into two classes: those of a more constructive character,
+setting forth Dewey's own standpoint, and those which are mainly
+polemical, directed against opposing standpoints, chiefly the
+idealistic. The constructive writings will be given first consideration.
+
+The essay on "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," first published in
+the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in
+July, 1905, and later reprinted in the volume of collected essays,
+offers a convenient point of departure. Dewey observes that many of the
+difficulties in current controversy can be traced to presuppositions
+tacitly held by thinkers as to what experience means. Dewey attempts to
+make his own presuppositions explicit, with the object of clearing up
+this confusion.
+
+"Immediate empiricism," he says, "postulates that things--anything,
+everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term
+'thing'--are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to
+describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as
+being."[212] The idealists, on the contrary, hold "that things (or,
+ultimately, Reality, Being) _are_ only and just what they are _known_ to
+be or that things are, or Reality _is_, what it is for a conscious
+knower--whether the knower be conceived primarily as a perceiver or as a
+thinker being a further, and secondary, question. This is the
+root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective,
+psychological or epistemological."[213] Knowing is merely one mode of
+experiencing, and things may be experienced in other ways, as, for
+instance, aesthetically, morally, technologically, or economically. This
+follows Dewey's familiar division of the processes of experience into
+separate 'functions' or activities. It becomes the duty of the
+philosopher, following this scheme, to find out "_what_ sort of an
+experience knowing is--or, concretely how things are experienced when
+they are experienced _as_ known things."[214]
+
+Dewey fails, in this essay, to draw a distinction which is highly
+important, between knowledge as awareness and knowledge as reflection.
+This results in some confusion. For the present, he is concerned with
+knowledge as awareness. He employs an illustration to make his meaning
+clear; the experience of fright at a noise, which turns out, when
+examined and known, to be the tapping of a window shade. What is
+originally experienced is a frightful noise. If, after examination, the
+'frightfulness' is classified as 'psychical,' while the 'real' fact is
+said to be harmless, there is no warrant for reading this distinction
+back into the original experience. The argument is directed against that
+mode of explaining the difference between the psychical and the physical
+which employs a subjective mind or 'knower' as the container of the
+merely subjective aspects of reality. Dewey would hold that mind, used
+in this sense, is a fiction, having a small explanatory value, and
+creating more problems than it solves. The difference between psychical
+and physical is relative, not absolute. The frightful noise first heard
+was neither psychical nor physical; it was what it was experienced as,
+and the experience contained no such distinction, nor did it contain a
+'knower.' The noise _as known_, after the intervention of an act of
+judgment, contained these elements (except the 'knower'), but the thing
+is not merely what it is known as. There is no warrant for reading the
+distinctions made by judgment back into a situation where judgment was
+not operative. The original fact was precisely what it was experienced
+as.
+
+Dewey's purpose, though not well stated, seems to be the complete
+rejection of the notion of knowledge as awareness, or of the subjective
+knower. He discovers at the same time an opportunity to substantiate his
+own descriptive account of knowing (or reflection) as an occasional
+function. The two enterprises, however, should be kept distinct.
+Granting that the subjective knower of the older epistemology should be
+dismissed from philosophy, it does not follow that Dewey's special
+interpretation of the function of reflection is the only substitute.
+
+The principle of immediate empiricism, Dewey says, furnishes no positive
+truth. It is simply a method. Not a single philosophical proposition can
+be deduced from it. The application of the method is indicated in the
+following proposition: "If you wish to find out what subjective,
+objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose,
+activity, evil, being, quality--any philosophic term, in short--means,
+go to experience and see what the thing is experienced _as_."[215] This
+recipe cannot be taken literally. Dewey probably means that each concept
+has, or should have, a positive empirical reference, and is significant
+only in that reference. He is a firm believer, however, in the
+descriptive method. In a note, he remarks that he would employ in
+philosophy "the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in
+all the natural sciences, with such modifications, of course, as the
+subject itself entails."[216] This remark calls for closer examination
+than can be made here. It may be said in passing, however, that
+'scientific description' is by no means so simple a method of procedure
+as Dewey would seem to indicate. 'Scientific description,' as actually
+employed, is a highly elaborated and specialized method of dealing with
+experience. The whole subject, indeed, is involved, and requires
+cautious treatment. Dewey's somewhat ingenuous hope, that the
+identification of his method with the methods of science will add to its
+impressiveness, is in danger, unfortunately, of being vitiated through
+the suspicion that he is, after all, not in close touch with the methods
+of science.
+
+Dewey employs the descriptive method chiefly as a means for
+substantiating his special interpretation of the judgment process. His
+use of the method in this connection is well illustrated by an article
+called "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge"[217] (1906), in which he
+attempts "to find out _what_ sort of an experience knowing is" through
+an appeal to immediate experience. "It should be possible," he says, "to
+discern and describe a knowing as one identifies any object, concern, or
+event.... What we want is just something which takes itself as
+knowledge, rightly or wrongly."[218] The difficulty lies not in finding
+a case of knowing, but in describing it when found. Dewey selects a case
+to be described, and, as usual, chooses a simple one.
+
+"This means," he says, "a specific case, a sample.... Our recourse is to
+an example so simple, so much on its face as to be as innocent as may be
+of assumptions.... Let us suppose a smell, just a floating odor."[219]
+The level at which this illustration is taken is significant. Is it
+possible to suppose that anything so complex, varied, myriad-sided as
+that something we call knowledge, can be discovered and described within
+the limits of so simple an instance?
+
+Dewey employs the smell in three situations, the first representing the
+'non-cognitional,' the second the 'cognitive,' and the third the
+genuinely 'cognitional' situation. The first, or 'non-cognitional'
+situation is described as follows: "But, let us say, the smell is not
+the smell _of_ the rose; the resulting change of the organism is not a
+sense of walking and reaching; the delicious finale is not the
+fulfilment of the movement, and, through that, of the original smell;
+'is not,' in each case meaning is 'not experienced as' such. We may
+take, in short, these experiences in a brutely serial fashion. The
+smell, _S_, is replaced (and displaced) by a felt movement, _K_, this is
+replaced by the gratification, _G_. Viewed from without, as we are now
+regarding it, there is _S-K-G_. But from within, for itself, it is now
+_S_, now _K_, now _G_, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is
+there looking before and after; memory and anticipation are not born.
+Such an experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor
+does it exercise a cognitive function."[220]
+
+It will be seen at once that this is not a description of an actual
+human experience, but a schematic story designed to illustrate a
+comparatively simple point. In this situation the person concerned does
+not deliberately and consciously recognize the smell as the smell of a
+rose; he is not aware of any symbolic character in the smell, it does
+not enter as a middle term into a process of inference. In such a
+situation, Dewey believes, it would be wrong to read into the smell a
+cognitive property which it does not, as experienced, possess.
+
+In the second, or 'cognitive' situation, the smell as originally
+experienced does not involve the function of knowing, but turns out
+after the event, as reflected upon, to have had a significance. "In
+saying that the smell is finally experienced as _meaning_ gratification
+... we retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the
+smell--and this is what is signified by 'cognitive.' Yet the smell is
+not cognitional, because it did not knowingly intend to mean this; but
+is found, after the event, to have meant it."[221] The moral is, as
+usual, that the findings of reflection must not be read back into the
+former unreflective experience.
+
+In the truly 'cognitional' experience the smell is then and there
+experienced as meaning or symbolizing the rose. "An experience is a
+knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and
+connection of two elements of the following sort: _one means or intends
+the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already
+present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same
+fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its
+companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it
+sets up_."[222] In the 'cognitional' situation, the smell is then and
+there experienced as signifying the presence of a rose in the vicinity,
+and the rose must be experienced as a present fact, before the meaning
+of the smell is completely fulfilled and verified.
+
+It will be seen at once that this description of knowing follows the
+lines laid down by James in his chapter on "Reasoning" in the
+_Principles of Psychology_. In the process of reasoning the situation is
+analyzed; some particular feature of it is abstracted and made the
+middle term in an inference. The smell, as thus abstracted, is said to
+have the function of knowing, or meaning, the rose whose reality it
+evidences.
+
+Dewey's treatment of knowledge, however, is far too simple. The function
+of meaning, symbolizing, or 'pointing' does not reside in the abstracted
+element as such; for the context in which the judgment occurs determines
+the choosing of the 'middle term,' as well as the direction in which it
+shall point. The situation as a whole has a rationality which resides in
+the distinctions, identities, phases of emphasis, and discriminations of
+the total experience. Rationality expresses itself in the organized
+system of experience, not in particular elements and their 'pointings.'
+Taken in this sense, rationality is present in all experience. The
+smell, in Dewey's first situation, is not 'cognitional' because the
+situation as a whole does not permit it to be, if such an expression may
+be used. The intellectual drift of the moment drives the smell away from
+the centre of attention at one time, just as at another it selects it to
+serve as an element in judgment. It is only with reference to a system
+of some kind that things can be regarded as symbols at all. Things do
+not represent one another at haphazard, but definitely and concretely;
+they imply an organization of elements having mutual implications. One
+thing implies another because both are elements in a whole which
+determines their mutual reference. This organization is present in all
+experience, not in the form of 'established habits,' but in the form of
+will and purpose.
+
+In the course of his further discussion, which need not be followed in
+detail, Dewey passes on to a consideration of truth. Truth is concerned
+with the worth or validity of ideas. But, before their validity can be
+determined, there must be a 'cognitional' experience of the type
+described above. "Before the category of confirmation or refutation can
+be introduced, there must be something which _means_ to mean something
+and which therefore can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue."[223]
+Ideas, or meanings, as directly experienced, are neither true nor false,
+but are made so by the results in which they issue. Even then, the
+outcome must be reflected upon, before they can be designated true or
+false. "_Truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only
+in situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced
+fulfilments and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and
+contrasted with reference to the question of the worth, as to
+reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of
+meanings._"[224] This makes the whole problem of truth a relatively
+simple affair. The symbol and its 'pointing' are taken as a single,
+objective fact, to be tested, and, if verified, labelled 'true.'
+Meanings, after all, are not so simple as this scheme would imply.
+
+As the intellectual life of man is more subtle and universal than Dewey
+represents it to be, so is truth, as that which thought seeks to
+establish, something deeper-lying and more comprehensive. Ideas are not
+simple and isolated facts; their truth is not strictly their own, but is
+reflected into them from the objective order to which they pertain. The
+possibility of making observations and experiments, and of having ideas,
+rests upon the presence in and through experience of that directing
+influence which we call valid knowledge, or truth. An idea, to be true,
+must fit in with this general body of truth. Not correspondence with its
+single object, but correspondence with the whole organized body of
+knowledge, is the test of the truth of an idea. The attempt to describe
+knowledge as a particular occurrence, fact, or function, is foredoomed
+to failure. It should be noted also that Dewey's 'description,'
+throughout this essay, is anything but a direct, empirical examination
+of thought. He presents a schematized picture of reality which, like an
+engineer's diagram, leaves out the cloying details of the object it is
+supposed to represent.
+
+The sceptical and positivistic results of Dewey's treatment of knowledge
+are set forth in an article entitled "Some Implications of
+Anti-Intellectualism," published in the _Journal of Philosophy,
+Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in 1910.[225] This was not included
+in the volume of collected essays published in the same year, but may be
+regarded as of some importance.
+
+After some comments on current anti-intellectualistic tendencies, Dewey
+proceeds to distinguish his own anti-intellectualism from that of
+others. This type "starts from acts, functions, as primary data,
+functions both biological and social in character; from organic
+responses, readjustments. It treats the knowledge standpoint, in all its
+patterns, structures, and purposes, as evolving out of, and operating in
+the interests of, the guidance and enrichment of these primary
+functions. The vice of intellectualism from this standpoint is not in
+making of logical relations and functions in and for knowledge, but in a
+false abstraction of knowledge (and the logical) from its working
+context."[226]
+
+The manner in which this exaltation of the "primary" functions at the
+expense of knowledge affects philosophy is indicated in the following
+passage: "Philosophy is itself a mode of knowing, and of knowing wherein
+reflective thinking is much in play.... As a mode of knowledge, it
+arises, like any intellectual undertaking, out of certain typical
+perplexities and conflicts of behavior, and its purpose is to help
+straighten these out. Philosophy may indeed render things more
+intelligible or give greater insight into existence; but these
+considerations are subject to the final criterion of what it means to
+acquire insight and to make things intelligible, _i. e._, namely,
+service of _special_ purposes in behavior, and limit by the _special_
+problems in which the need of insight arises. This is not to say that
+instrumentalism is merely a methodology or an epistemology preliminary
+to more ultimate philosophic or metaphysical inquiries, for it involves
+the doctrine that the origin, structure, and purpose of knowing are such
+as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of
+Being."[227]
+
+In the last analysis, this appears to be a confession, rather than an
+argument. It is the inevitable outcome of the functional analysis of
+intelligence. Thought is this organ, with these functions, and is
+capable of so much and no more. The limit to its capacity is set by the
+description of its nature. The nature of the functionalistic limitation
+of thought is well expressed in the words 'special' and 'specific.'
+Since thought is the servant of the 'primary' modes of experience, it
+can only deal with the problems set for it by preceding non-reflective
+processes. These problems are 'specific' because they are concrete
+problems of action, and are concerned with particular aspects of the
+environment. Dewey's formidable positivism would vanish at once,
+however, if his special psychology of the thought-process should be
+found untenable. Thought is limited, according to Dewey, because it is a
+very special form of activity, operating occasionally in the interest of
+the direct modes of experiencing.
+
+Probably every philosopher recognizes that speculation cannot be allowed
+to run wild. Some problems are worth while, others are artificial and
+trivial, and some means must be found for separating the sound and
+substantial from the tawdry and sentimental. The question is, however,
+whether Dewey's psychology furnishes a ground for such distinctions.
+Again, it should be noted that, in spite of the limitations placed upon
+thought by its very nature, as described by Dewey, certain philosophers,
+by his own confession, are guilty of "wholesale inquiries into the
+nature of Being." If thought can deal only with specific problems, then
+there can be no question as to whether philosophy _ought_ to be
+metaphysical. It is a repetition of the case of psychological _versus_
+ethical hedonism.
+
+Modern idealists would resent the imputation that there is any
+inclination on their part to deny the need for a critical attitude
+toward the problems and methods of philosophy. Kant's criticism of the
+'dogmatists' for their undiscriminating employment of the categories in
+the interpretation of reality, established an attitude which has been
+steadily maintained by his philosophical descendants. The idealist, in
+fact, has accused Dewey of laxity in the criticism of his own methods
+and presuppositions. The categories of description and natural selection
+by means of which his functionalism is established, it is argued, are of
+little service in the sphere of mind. And while Dewey accepts an
+evolutionary view of reality in general, the idealist has found
+evolutionism, at least in its biological form, too limited in scope to
+serve the extensive interests of philosophy. Dewey is right in opposing
+false problems and fanciful solutions in philosophy; but these evils are
+to be corrected, not by functional psychology, but by an empirical
+criticism of each method and each problem as it arises.
+
+It has been seen that, even in these more constructive essays, Dewey's
+position is largely defined in negatives. What might be expected, then,
+of the essays which are primarily critical? Perhaps the best answer will
+be afforded by a close analysis of one or more of them. Idealism, as has
+been said, receives most of Dewey's attention. There are three essays in
+_The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, which bear directly against
+idealism. One, "The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth," is directed
+against Bradley; another, "Experience and Objective Idealism," is a
+historical discussion of idealistic views. The third, which is broadest
+in scope, is entitled "Beliefs and Existences." This was originally
+delivered as the presidential address at the meeting of the American
+Philosophical Association in December, 1905, and was printed in the
+_Philosophical Review_ in March, 1906, under the title, "Beliefs and
+Realities."
+
+Dewey begins with a discussion of the personal and human character of
+beliefs. "Beliefs," he says, "look both ways, towards persons and
+towards things.... They form or judge--justify or condemn--the agents
+who entertain them and who insist upon them.... To believe is to ascribe
+value, impute meaning, assign import."[228] Beliefs are entertained by
+persons; by men as individuals and not as professional beings. Because
+they are essentially human, beliefs issue in action, and have their
+import in conduct. "That believed better is held to, asserted, affirmed,
+acted upon.... That believed worse is fled, resisted, transformed into
+an instrument for the better."[229] Beliefs, then, have a human side;
+they belong to people, and have a character which is expressed in the
+conduct to which they lead.
+
+On the other hand, beliefs look towards things. "'Reality' naturally
+instigates belief. It appraises itself and through this self-appraisal
+manages its affairs.... It is interpretation; not merely existence aware
+of itself as fact, but existence discerning, judging itself, approving
+and disapproving."[230] The vital connection between belief as personal,
+and as directed upon things, cannot be disregarded. "We cannot keep
+connection on one side and throw it away on the other. We cannot
+preserve significance and decline the personal attitude in which it is
+inscribed and operative...."[231] To take the world as something
+existing by itself, is to overlook the fact that it is always somebody's
+world, "and you shall not have completed your metaphysics till you have
+told whose world is meant and how and what for--in what bias and to what
+effect."[232]
+
+But philosophers have been guilty of error here. They have thrown aside
+all consideration of belief as a personal fact in reality, and have
+taken "an oath of allegiance to Reality, objective, universal, complete;
+made perhaps of atoms, perhaps of sensations, perhaps of logical
+meanings."[233] This Reality leaves no place for belief; for belief, as
+having to do with human adventures, can have no place in a cut and dried
+cosmos. The search for a world which is eternally fixed in eternal
+meanings has developed the present wondrous and formidable technique of
+philosophy.
+
+The attempt to exclude the human element from belief has resulted in
+philosophical errors. Philosophers have divided reality into two parts,
+"one of which shall alone be good and true 'Reality,' ... while the
+other part, that which is excluded, shall be referred exclusively to
+belief and treated as mere appearance...."[234] To cap the climax, this
+division of the world into two parts must be made by some philosopher
+who, being human, employs his own beliefs, and classifies things on the
+basis of his own experience. Can it be done? We are today in the
+presence of a revolt against such tendencies, Dewey says; and he
+proposes to give some sketch, "(1) of the historical tendencies which
+have shaped the situation in which a Stoic theory of knowledge claims
+metaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies that have furnished the
+despised principle of belief opportunity and means of reassertion."[235]
+
+Throughout this introduction Dewey speaks with considerable feeling, as
+if the question were a moral one, rather than a disquisition concerning
+the best method of dealing with the personal aspects of thought. His
+meaning, however, is far from being apparent. What does it mean to say
+that a Stoic theory of knowledge holds a monopoly in modern philosophy?
+In what sense has the philosophy of the past been misanthropic? _Is_
+Humanism a product of the twentieth century? Dewey's assertions are
+broad and sweeping; too broad even for a popular discourse, let alone a
+philosophical address. Perhaps his attitude will be more fully expressed
+in the historical inquiry which follows.
+
+Dewey begins this inquiry with the period of the rise of Christianity,
+which, because it emphasized faith and the personal attitude, seemed in
+a fair way to do justice to human belief. "That the ultimate principle
+of conduct is affectional and volitional; that God is love; that access
+to the principle is by faith, a personal attitude; that belief,
+surpassing logical basis and warrant, works out through its own
+operation its own fulfilling evidence: such was the implied moral
+metaphysic of Christianity."[236] But these implications had to be
+worked out into a theory, and the only logical or metaphysical systems
+which offered themselves as a basis for organization were those Stoic
+systems which "identified true existence with the proper object of
+logical reason." Aristotle alone among the ancients gave practical
+thought its due attention, but he, unfortunately, failed to assimilate
+"his idea of theoretical to his notion of practical knowledge."[237] In
+the Greek systems generally, "desiring reason culminating in beliefs
+relating to imperfect existence, stands forever in contrast with
+passionless reason functioning in pure knowledge, logically complete, of
+perfect being."[238]
+
+Dewey's discussion moves too rapidly here to be convincing. He does not
+take time, for instance, to make a very important distinction between
+the Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. He does not do justice to the
+purpose which animated the Greeks in their attempt to put thought on a
+'theoretical' basis. His confusion of Platonism with Neo-Platonism is
+especially annoying. And, most assuredly, his estimate of primitive
+Christianity needs corroboration. Probably Christianity, in its
+primitive form, did lay great stress upon individual beliefs and
+persuasions, but it was expected, nevertheless, that the Holy Spirit
+working in men would produce uniform results in the way of belief. When
+the uniformity failed to materialize, Christianity was forced, in the
+interests of union, to fall back upon some objective standard by which
+belief could be tested. After this was established, an end was made of
+individual inspiration. From the earliest times, therefore, it may be
+said, Christianity sought means for the suppression of free inquiry and
+belief, a proceeding utterly opposed to the spirit of ancient Greece.
+
+"I need not remind you," Dewey continues, "how through Neo-Platonism,
+St. Augustine, and the Scholastic renaissance, these conceptions became
+imbedded in Christian philosophy; and what a reversal occurred of the
+original practical principle of Christianity. Belief is henceforth
+important because it is the mere antecedent in a finite and fallen
+world, a temporal and phenomenal world infected with non-being, of true
+knowledge to be achieved only in a world of completed Being."[239]
+Through the hundreds of years that intervened before the world's
+awakening, the 'Stoic dogma,' enforced by authority, held the world in
+thrall. And still Dewey finds the mediaeval Absolutism in many respects
+more merciful than the Absolutism of modern philosophy. "For my part, I
+can but think that mediaeval absolutism, with its provision for
+authoritative supernatural assistance in this world and assertion of
+supernatural realization in the next, was more logical, as well as more
+humane, then the modern absolutism, that, with the same logical
+premises, bids man find adequate consolation and support in the fact
+that, after all, his strivings are already eternally fulfilled, his
+errors already eternally transcended, his partial beliefs already
+eternally comprehended."[240] Dewey takes no note of the fact that
+philosophy, as involving really free inquiry, was dead during the whole
+period of mediaeval predominance.
+
+The modern age, Dewey continues, brought intelligence back to earth
+again, but only partially. Fixed being was still supposed to be the
+object of thought. "The principle of the inherent relation of thought to
+being was preserved intact, but its practical locus was moved down from
+the next world to this."[241] Aristotle's mode of dealing with the
+Platonic ideas was followed, and Spinoza was the great exponent of "the
+strict correlation of the attribute of matter with the attribute of
+thought."
+
+But, again, the modern conception of knowledge failed to do justice to
+belief, in spite of the compromise that gave the natural world to
+intelligence, and the spiritual world to faith. This compromise could
+not endure, for Science encroached upon the field of religious belief,
+and invaded the sphere of the personal and emotional. "Knowledge, in its
+general theory, as philosophy, went the same way. It was pre-committed
+to the old notion: the absolutely real is the object of _knowledge_, and
+hence is something universal and impersonal. So, whether by the road of
+sensationalism or rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism or objective
+idealism, it came about that concrete selves, specific feeling and
+willing beings, were relegated with the beliefs in which they declare
+themselves to the 'phenomenal.'"[242] Feeling, volition, desiring
+thought have never received the justice due them in the whole course of
+philosophy. This is Dewey's conclusion. Little can be said in praise of
+his historical survey. There is scarcely a statement to which exception
+could not be taken, for the history of philosophy is not amenable to
+generalized treatment of this character.
+
+The reader turns more hopefully toward the third part of the essay, in
+which he is promised a positive statement of the new theory which does
+full justice to belief. "First, then, the very use of the knowledge
+standpoint, the very expression of the knowledge preoccupation, has
+produced methods and tests that, when formulated, intimate a radically
+different conception of knowledge, and of its relation to existence and
+belief, than the orthodox one."[243]
+
+But after this not unpromising introduction, Dewey falls into the
+polemical strain again. The argument need not be followed in detail,
+since it consists largely in a reassertion of the validity of belief as
+an element in knowledge. The general conclusion is that modern
+scientific investigation reveals itself, when examined, as nothing more
+that the "rendering into a systematic technique, into an art
+deliberately and delightfully pursued, the rougher and cruder means by
+which practical human beings have in all ages worked out the
+implications of their beliefs, tested them, and endeavored in the
+interests of economy, efficiency, and freedom, to render them coherent
+with one another."[244] This is presumably true. If no more is implied
+than is definitely asserted in this passage, the reader is apt to wonder
+who would deny it.
+
+Dewey again claims for his theory the support of modern science.
+"Biology, psychology, and the social sciences proffer an imposing body
+of concrete facts that also point to the rehabilitation of
+belief...."[245] Psychology has revised its notions in terms of
+beliefs. 'Motor' is writ large on the face of sensation, perception,
+conception, cognition in general. Biology shows that the organic
+instruments of the intellectual life were evolved for specifically
+practical purposes. The historical sciences show that knowledge is a
+social instrument for the purpose of meeting social needs. This
+testimony is not philosophy, Dewey says, but it has a bearing on
+philosophy. The new sciences have at least as much importance as
+mathematics and physics. "Such being the case, the reasons for ruling
+psychology and sociology and allied sciences out of competency to give
+philosophic testimony have more significance than the bare denial of
+jurisdiction."[246] The idealists, apparently, have been the worst
+offenders in this connection. "One would be almost justified in
+construing idealism as a Pickwickian scheme, so willing is it to
+idealize the principle of intelligence at the expense of its specific
+undertakings, were it not that this reluctance is the necessary outcome
+of the Stoic basis and tenor of idealism--its preoccupation with logical
+contents and relations in abstraction from their _situs_ and function in
+conscious living beings."[247]
+
+In conclusion, Dewey warns against certain possible misunderstandings.
+The pragmatic philosopher, he says, is not opposed to objective
+realities, and logical and universal thinking. Again, it is not to be
+supposed that science is any the less exact by reason of being
+instrumental to human beliefs. "Because reason is a scheme of working
+out the meanings of convictions in terms of one another and of the
+consequences they import in further experience, convictions are the
+more, not the less, amenable and responsible to the full exercise of
+reason."[248] And finally, Dewey assures the reader that the outcome of
+his discussion is not a solution, but a problem. Nobody is apt to
+dispute that statement.
+
+This very unsatisfactory essay is, nevertheless, a fair specimen of the
+polemical literature which was produced by Dewey and others during these
+years. Pragmatism was trying to make converts, and the _argumentum ad
+hominem_ was freely employed. If the opposition was painted a good deal
+blacker than was necessary, the end was supposed to justify the evident
+exaggeration. And so, in this essay, after accusing his contemporaries
+of adherence to tenets that they would have indignantly repudiated,
+after a wholesale and indiscriminate condemnation of idealism, Dewey
+concludes with--a problem. This period of propaganda is now quite
+definitely a thing of the past. Philosophical discussion, especially
+since the beginning of the great war, has entered upon a new epoch of
+sanity, and, perhaps, of constructive effort.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[212] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 227.
+
+[213] _Ibid._, p. 228. In connection with the discussion which follows
+see Bradley "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," in _Essays on
+Truth and Reality_, Chapter VI.
+
+[214] _Ibid._, p. 229.
+
+[215] _Op. cit._, p. 239.
+
+[216] _Ibid._, p. 240.
+
+[217] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, pp. 77-111.
+
+[218] _Ibid._, p. 77.
+
+[219] _Ibid._, p. 78.
+
+[220] _Op. cit._
+
+[221] _Ibid._, p. 84.
+
+[222] _Op. cit._, p. 90. Author's italics.
+
+[223] _Op. cit._, p. 87.
+
+[224] _Ibid._, p. 95. Author's italics.
+
+[225] Vol. VII. pp. 477-481.
+
+[226] _Ibid._, p. 478.
+
+[227] _Op. cit._, p. 479.
+
+[228] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 169.
+
+[229] _Ibid._, p. 170.
+
+[230] _Ibid._, p. 171.
+
+[231] _Ibid._
+
+[232] _Ibid._
+
+[233] _Ibid._, p. 172.
+
+[234] _Op. cit._, p. 175.
+
+[235] _Ibid._, p. 177.
+
+[236] _Ibid._, p. 17?.
+
+[237] _Op. cit._, p. 179.
+
+[238] _Ibid._
+
+[239] _Op. cit._
+
+[240] _Ibid._, p. 180.
+
+[241] _Ibid._, p. 181.
+
+[242] _Op. cit._, p. 183.
+
+[243] _Ibid._, p. 184.
+
+[244] _Ibid._, p. 187.
+
+[245] _Ibid._, p. 189.
+
+[246] _Op. cit._, p. 190.
+
+[247] _Ibid._, p. 191 f.
+
+[248] _Ibid._, p. 194.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+LATER DEVELOPMENTS
+
+
+Neo-realism began to flourish in this country after 1900, its rise being
+nearly contemporary with the spread of pragmatism. Many neo-realists,
+indeed, consider themselves followers of James. Dewey views the new
+realism, along with pragmatism and 'naturalistic idealism,' as "part and
+parcel of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction."[249] The
+neo-realists, like the pragmatists, have been active in the field of
+controversy, and the pages of the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,
+and Scientific Methods_ are filled with exchanges between the
+representatives of the two schools, in the form of notes, articles,
+discussions, agreements, and disclaimers. Dewey has more sympathy for
+realism than for idealism. He finds among the writers of this school,
+however, a tendency toward the epistemological interpretation of thought
+which he so strongly opposes. An excellent statement of his estimate of
+realism is furnished by his "Brief Studies in Realism," published in the
+_Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in
+1911.[250]
+
+In beginning these studies Dewey observes that certain idealistic
+writers (not named) have been employing in support of their idealism
+certain facts which have an obvious physical nature and explanation.
+Such illusions as that of the bent stick in the water, the converging
+railway tracks, and the double image that occurs when the eye-ball is
+pressed, have, as the realists have well proved, a physical explanation
+which is entirely adequate. Why is it that the idealists remain
+unimpressed by this demonstration? There is a certain element in the
+realistic explanation which undoubtedly explains the reluctance of the
+idealists to be convinced. "Many realists, in offering the type of
+explanation adduced above, have treated the cases of seen light,
+doubled imagery, as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an
+inherent cognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as _cases
+of knowledge_, instead of as simply natural events...."[251]
+
+Dewey draws a distinction, at this point, between naïve and presentative
+realism, employing, by way of illustration, the 'star' illusion, which
+turns upon the peculiar fact that a star may be seen upon the earth long
+after it has ceased to exist. The naïve realist remains in the sphere of
+natural explanation. He accounts for the star illusion in physical
+terms. The astronomical star and the perceived star are two physical
+events within a continuous physical order or process. But the
+presentative realist maintains that, since the two stars are numerically
+separate, the astronomical star must be the 'real' star, while the
+perceived star is merely mental; the real star exists in independence of
+a knowing subject, while the perceived star is related to a mind. The
+naïve realist has no need of the hypothesis of a knower, since he can
+furnish an adequate physical account of the numerical duplicity of the
+star. Dewey favors the naïve standpoint, and affirms that presentative
+realism is tainted by an epistemological subjectivism. "Once depart," he
+says, "from this thorough naïveté, and substitute for it the
+psychological theory that perception is a cognitive presentation of an
+object to a mind, and the first step is taken on the road which ends in
+an idealistic system."[252]
+
+The presentative realist, Dewey continues, finds himself possessed of
+two kinds of knowledge, when he comes to take account of inference; for
+inference is "in the field as an obvious and undisputed case of
+knowledge." There is the knowledge of perception by a knower, and the
+inferential knowledge which passes beyond perception. All reality,
+consequently, is related, directly or indirectly, to the knowing
+subject, and idealism is triumphant. But the real difficulty of the
+realist's position is that, if perception is a mode of knowing, it
+stands in unfavorable contrast with knowledge by inference. How can the
+inferred reality of the star be established, considering the
+subjectivity of all perception?
+
+Dewey is alert to the dangers which result from subjectivism, but does
+not distinguish, as carefully as he might, between knowledge as
+inference, and knowledge as perceptual awareness. Thus, while it might
+be granted that the subjective mind is a vicious abstraction, it does
+not follow that Dewey's particular interpretation of the function of
+inference is correct. And, although the "unwinking, unremitting eye" of
+the subjective knower might make experience merely a mental affair,
+there is no reason to believe that the operation of inference in
+perception would lead to the same result, for inference and awareness
+are quite distinct, in historical meaning and function. It is, in fact,
+a mere accident that inference and awareness (in the subjective sense)
+should both be called knowledge.
+
+In opposition to presentative realism, Dewey offers his 'naturalistic'
+interpretation of knowledge.[253] He finds that the function of
+inference, "although embodying the logical relation, is itself a natural
+and specifically detectable process among natural things--it is not a
+non-natural or epistemological relation, that is, a relation to a mind
+or knower not in the natural series...."[254] As has been observed,
+Dewey is safe in maintaining that inference is _not_ an operation
+performed by a subjective knower, but it does not follow from this that
+his interpretation of inference is correct. In fact, a discussion of
+inference is irrelevant to the matters which Dewey is here considering.
+
+In the second part of the essay, the discussion passes into a keen and
+rather clever recital of the difficulties that result from taking the
+knowledge relation to be 'ubiquitous.'[255] Since this relation is a
+constant factor in experience, it would seem as if it might be
+eliminated from philosophical calculations. The realist would be glad to
+eliminate it, but the idealist is not so willing; for, "since the point
+at issue is precisely the statement of the most universally defining
+trait of existence as existence, the invitation deliberately to
+disregard the most universal trait is nothing more or less than an
+invitation to philosophic suicide."[256] It is, Dewey says, as if two
+philosophers should set out to ascertain the relation which holds
+between an organism as 'eater' and the environment as 'food,' and one
+should find the essential thing to be the food, the other the eating.
+The 'foodists' would represent the realists, the 'eaterists' the
+idealists. No advance, he believes, can be made on this basis.
+
+In opposition to the epistemologists, Dewey would consider the knowledge
+relation not ubiquitous, but specific and occasional. As man bears other
+relations to his environment than that of eater, so is he also something
+more than a knower. "If the one who is knower is, in relation to
+objects, something else and more than their knower, and if objects are,
+_in relation to the one who knows them_, something else and other than
+things in a knowledge relation, there is somewhat to define and
+discuss...."[2] Dewey proposes to advance certain facts to support his
+contention that knowing is "a relation to things which depends upon
+other and more primary connections between a self and things; a relation
+which grows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates
+in their interests at specifiable crises."[257]
+
+This brings the discussion back to familiar ground again, and nothing is
+added to his previous statements of the functional conception of
+knowledge. While the realist (explicitly or implicitly) conceives the
+knowledge relation as obtaining between a subject knower and the
+external world, Dewey interprets the knowledge relation in terms of
+organism and environment. The 'ubiquity' of the knowledge relation is
+disposed of, as has been seen, by conceiving knowledge from an entirely
+different standpoint; by reducing all knowledge to inference, and
+abolishing the knowing subject. Dewey is plainly under the impression
+that the only alternative to the ubiquitous knower is his naturalistic,
+biological interpretation of the processes of inference.
+
+In support of his naturalistic logic, Dewey argues as follows: (1) All
+perception involves reference to an organism. "We might about as well
+talk of the production of a specimen case of water as a presentation of
+water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too accustomed to talk
+about perceptions and the organism."[258] (2) Awareness is only a single
+phase of experience. We 'know' only a small part of the causes which
+affect us as agents. "This means, of course, that things, the things
+that come to be _known_, are primarily not objects of awareness, but
+causes of weal and woe, things to get and things to avoid, means and
+obstacles, tools and results."[259] (3) Knowing is only a special phase
+of the behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation, but very important as having
+to do with means for the practical and scientific control of the
+environment.
+
+In the final analysis, it will be seen that Dewey refutes the realist by
+substituting inference for what the realist calls 'consciousness,' and
+settling the issue by this triumph in the field of dialectics, rather
+than by an appeal to the facts. Nowhere does Dewey do justice to those
+concrete situations which, to the realist, seem to necessitate a
+definition of consciousness as awareness. His attitude toward the
+realists may be summed up in the statement that he finds in most
+realistic systems the fault to which his logical theory is especially
+opposed: the tendency to define the problem of logic as that of the
+relation of thought at large to reality at large, and to distinguish the
+content of mind from the content of the world on an existential rather
+than on a functional basis.
+
+One of Dewey's more recent studies, "The Logic of Judgments of
+Practise,"[260] seems to add something positive to his interpretation of
+knowledge. A practical judgment, Dewey explains at the outset of this
+study, is differentiated from others, not by having a separate organ and
+source, but by having a specific sort of subject-matter. It is concerned
+with things to be done or situations demanding action. "He had better
+consult a physician," and "It would be well for you to invest in these
+bonds," are examples of the practical judgment.
+
+These propositions, as will be seen, are not cast in what the logician
+calls logical form, with regular terms and copula. When put in that
+form, they seem to lose the direct reference to action which, Dewey
+says, differentiates them from the 'descriptive' judgment of the form
+_S_ is _P_.[261] This apparently trivial matter is really important.
+Although every statement embodies judgment, some statements do not
+reflect the ground upon which they are asserted. In this condition they
+may be viewed as opinions, suggestions, or guesses, looking towards
+judgment rather than reflecting its results. True judgment is occupied
+with reasons, proofs, and grounds, and does not concern itself with
+action as action. Only when taken as the expression of an individual's
+attitude, do Dewey's practical judgments (or assertions) possess the
+direct reference to action which he selects as their chief
+characteristic. The statement, "You ought to invest in these bonds,"
+does, indeed, suggest a specific action, but in so doing it loses its
+character as a judgment. Put in more logical form, "You are one of those
+who should invest in these bonds," the proposition is more clearly the
+expression of a judgment, and leads back to its premises. Attention
+turns from specific action as such to action as a typical or universal
+fact. In short, Dewey's practical judgment is not a true judgment; it
+will be seen that it is studied, not as a logical, but as a
+psychological phenomenon.
+
+In pursuance of his psychological method, Dewey discovers several
+interesting facts about judgments of practice.(1) These judgments imply
+an incomplete situation,--concretely and specifically incomplete; they
+express a need. (2) The judgment is itself a factor in assisting toward
+the completion of the situation, since it directs an action necessary to
+the fulfilment of the need. (3) The subject-matter of the judgment
+expresses the fact that one outcome is to be preferred to another. The
+element of preference is peculiar to the practical judgment, for it is
+not found in merely descriptive judgments, or those 'confined to the
+given.' (4) A practical judgment implies both means and end, the act
+that completes, and the completeness. It is in this respect 'binary.'
+(5) The judgment of what is to be done demands an accurate statement of
+the course of action to be pursued and the means to be employed, and
+these are to be determined relatively to the end in view. (6) It finally
+appears that what is true of the practical judgment may be true of all
+judgments of fact; it may be held that "all judgments of fact have
+reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and the
+discovery of means for their attempted realization."[262]
+
+This ingenious reading of functionalism out of the practical judgment
+is, after all, merely a drawing forth of the psychological implications
+previously placed in it. That judgment is an instrument for completing a
+situation; that it is linked up with action through desire and
+preference; that it seeks to determine the means for effecting a
+practical outcome,--these typically instrumental notions are of one
+piece with the system of belief that led Dewey to hit upon the practical
+judgment as the embodiment of a direction to action. It is important to
+distinguish between the logical and the psychological aspects of these
+propositions. Action as psychological is one thing; as the
+subject-matter of judgment, it is another. In coming to a decision as to
+how to act, the agent sets his proposed action over against himself, and
+considers it in its universal and typical character. His motor
+tendencies, his feelings, his desires factor in the situation
+psychologically considered; but they do not enter judgment as
+psychological facts, but rather, if at all, as data which have a
+significance beyond their mere particularity. Dewey remains at the
+psychological standpoint, giving no attention to the genuinely logical
+aspects of his 'judgments of practice.'
+
+From the study of the practical judgment, Dewey passes on to a
+consideration of judgments of value, proposing to maintain that "value
+judgments are a species of practical judgments."[263] There will be a
+distinct gain for moral and economic theory, he believes, in treating
+value as concerned with acts necessary to complete a given
+need-situation. There is no obvious reason why Dewey should pass to the
+pragmatic theory of value through the medium of the practical judgment,
+since it could be directly considered on its own account. At any rate,
+the discussion of value judgments which follows must stand on its own
+merits; it has no vital relation to what precedes.
+
+It is, as usual, the psychological characteristics of the value judgment
+that attract Dewey's attention. Any process of judgment, according to
+his analysis, deals with a specific subject-matter, not from the
+standpoint of any objective quality it may possess, but with reference
+to its functional capacity. "Relative, or comparative, durability,
+cheapness, suitability, style, esthetic attractiveness [_e. g._, in a
+suit of clothes] constitute value traits. They are traits of objects not
+_per se_, but _as entering into a possible and foreseen completing of
+the situation_. Their value is their force in precisely this
+function."[264]
+
+Attention should not be distracted from this interpretation of value,
+Dewey warns, through confusing the value sought with the price or market
+value of the goods. Price values, like the qualities and patterns of the
+goods, are data which must be considered in making the judgment, but
+they are not the values which the judgment seeks. The value to be
+determined is here, is specific, and must be established by reference to
+the specific or psychological situation as it presents itself.
+
+It is true, as Dewey says, that in judgment a value is being established
+which has not been determined previously. But it must be insisted that
+this value is not estimated by reference to the specific situation in
+its limited aspects. The weight of the past bears against the moment;
+the act of judgment bases itself upon knowledge objective and
+substantial; the test of the value of the thing is its place and
+function, not in the here and now, but in the whole system of
+experience. Dewey has excluded the reference of the thing to objective,
+organized reality, by specifying that its value shall be decided upon
+with reference to a specific situation. This limitation of the judgment
+situation is imposed upon it from without, and from a special point of
+view,--that of functional psychology. Every object and every situation
+has its quality of uniqueness and particularity; but the judgment, as
+judgment, is not concerned with this aspect of things. Judgment seizes
+upon the generic aspect of objects; this kind of a suit of clothes is
+the kind that is appropriate to this type of situation. The movement of
+judgment is objective and universal, not subjective and psychological.
+
+Dewey finds one alternative especially opposed to his 'specific'
+judgment of value; that is, the proposition that evaluation involves a
+comparison of the present object with some fixed standard. When the
+fixed standard is investigated, it is found to depend on something else,
+and this on something else again in an infinite regress. Finally, the
+_Summum Bonum_, as the absolute end term of such a _regressus_, turns
+out to be a fiction. Dewey is quite right in maintaining that value is
+not something eternally fixed. This does not, however, remove the
+possibility of 'real' value, as opposed to mere expediency.
+
+Value as established, Dewey continues, must be taken into consideration
+in making a value judgment. At the same time, it will not do to accept
+the established value from mere force of habit. Ultimately, he finds,
+all genuine valuation implies a degree of revaluation. "To many," he
+observes, "it will appear to be a survival of an idealistic
+epistemology,"[265] presumably because it implies a real change in
+reality, as opposed to a fixed and rigid order of external reality. But
+practical judgments, Dewey says, as having reference to proposed acts,
+necessarily look toward some proposed change which the act is to effect.
+It is not in an epistemological, but in a practical sense, that judgment
+involves a change in values.
+
+The outcome of the discussion so far, Dewey believes, is to show, first
+of all, that "the passage of a proposition into action is not a miracle,
+but the realization of its own character--its own meaning as
+logical,"[266] and, in the second place, to suggest that all judgments,
+not merely practical ones, may have their import in reference to some
+difference to be brought about through action.
+
+In the third part of the essay, Dewey's discussion leads him back to
+sense perceptions as forms of practical judgment. There is no doubt, in
+his mind, that many perceptions do have an import for action. Not merely
+sign-posts, and familiar symbols of the kind, but many perceptions
+lacking this obvious reference, have a significance for conduct. It must
+not, of course, be supposed that all perception, at any one time, has
+cognitive properties; for some of the perceptions have esthetic, and
+other non-cognitive properties. Only certain elements of a situation
+have the function of cognition.
+
+Dewey goes on to say that care must be taken in the use made of these
+sign-functions in connection with inference. "There is a great
+difference between saying that the perception of a shape affords an
+indication of how to act and saying that the perception of shape is
+itself an inference."[267] No judgment, Dewey seems to imply, is
+involved in responding to the motor cue furnished by a familiar object.
+Again, the common idea that present perception consists of sensations as
+immediate, plus inferred images, implies that every perception involves
+inference. But the merging of sensations and images in perception can be
+explained naturally, by the fusion of nervous processes, and no
+supplementary (transcendental) act of mind is needed to explain the
+integrity of experience.
+
+The tendency to take perception as the object of knowledge, Dewey
+continues, instead of as simply cognitive, a term in knowledge, is due
+to two chief causes. The first is that in practical judgments the
+pointing of the thing towards action is so universal a trait as to be
+overlooked, and the second is that signs, because of their importance,
+become objects of study on their own account, and in this condition
+cease to function directly as cognitive. Dewey means, apparently, that
+because the cognitive aspect of things is never attended to except when
+they are 'known,' or treated as objects of judgment, there is a tendency
+to suppose that they always have the character that pertains to them as
+'known' things.
+
+Again, Dewey says, perception may be translated as the effect of a cause
+that produced it. But the cause does not ordinarily appear in
+experience, and the perceptions, as effects, remain isolated from the
+system of things. Truth and error then become matters of the relation of
+the perception to its cause. The difficulties attendant upon this view
+can be avoided by taking sense perceptions as terms in practical
+judgments. Here the 'other term' which is sought is the action proposed
+by the perception. "To borrow an illustration of Professor Woodbridge's:
+A certain sound indicates to the mother that her baby needs attention.
+If there is error it is not because the sound ought to mean so many
+vibrations of the air, while as matter of fact it doesn't even suggest
+air vibrations, but because there is wrong inference as to the act to be
+performed."[268] The idea is tested, not by its correspondence with some
+formal reality, but by its ability to lead up to the experience to which
+it points.
+
+From the consideration of error as cognitive, Dewey passes on to
+consider its status as primitive sense data. He draws a distinction
+between sensation as psychological and as logical. Ordinary sensation,
+just as it comes, is often too confused to serve as a basis for
+inference. "It has often been pointed out that sense qualities being
+just what they are, it is illegitimate to introduce such notions as
+obscurity or confusion into them: a slightly illuminated color is just
+as irretrievably what it is, as clearly itself, as an object in the
+broad glare of noon-day."[269] But when a confused object is made a
+datum for inference, its confusion is just the thing to be got rid of.
+It is broken up by analysis into simple elements, and the psychologist's
+sensations are logical products, not psychological facts. "Locke writes
+a mythology of the history of knowledge, starting from clear and
+distinct meanings, each simple, well-defined, sharply and unambiguously
+just what it is on its face, without concealments and complications, and
+proceeds by 'natural' compoundings up to the store of complex ideas, and
+the perception of simple relations of agreement among ideas: a
+perception always certain if the ideas are simple, and always
+controllable in the case of the complex ideas if we consider the simple
+ideas and connections by which they are reached. Thus he established the
+habit of taking logical discriminations as historical or psychological
+primitives--as 'sources' of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks
+upon inference."[270] This way of treating perception found its way into
+psychology and into empirical logic. The acceptance of the doctrine that
+all sense involves knowledge, Dewey believes, leads to an
+epistemological logic; but all perception must involve thought if the
+'given' is the simple sensation.
+
+There is nothing especially new in this critique of sensationalism.
+Historically, sensationalism had been displaced by idealism, and the
+idea that reality is a construct of ideas held together by logical
+relations was given up long before functionalism arrived on the scene.
+But if inference, or rationality, is not present in all experience as
+the combiner of simple into complex ideas, it may be present in some
+other form, even more vital. Dewey, however, does not consider such
+possibilities.
+
+Finally, in an article of slightly earlier date than the studies which
+have just been considered, Dewey returns to a consideration of
+metaphysics, and the possibility of a metaphysical standpoint in
+philosophy. This article, entitled "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical
+Inquiry,"[271] deserves careful notice.
+
+The comments of a number of mechanistic biologists on vitalism furnish
+the point of departure for Dewey's discussion. These scientists hold
+that, if the organism is considered simply as a part of external nature,
+as an existing system, it can be satisfactorily analyzed by the methods
+of physico-chemical science. But if the question of ultimate origins is
+raised, if it be asked _why_ nature exhibits certain innate
+potentialities for producing life, science can give no answer. These
+questions belong to metaphysics, and vitalistic or biocentric
+conceptions may be valid in the metaphysical sphere.
+
+This raises the question of the nature of metaphysical inquiry. Dewey
+says that the ultimate traits or tendencies which give rise to life need
+not necessarily be considered ultimate in a temporal sense. On the
+contrary, they may be viewed as permanent, 'irreducible traits,' which
+are ultimate in the sense of being always present in reality. The
+inquiry and search for these ultimate traits is what constitutes valid
+metaphysics. "They are found equally and indifferently whether a
+subject-matter in question be dated 1915 or ten million years B. C.
+Accordingly, they would seem to deserve the name of ultimate, or
+irreducible, traits. As such they may be made the object of a kind of
+inquiry differing from that which deals with the genesis of a particular
+group of existences, a kind of inquiry to which the name metaphysical
+may be given."[272]
+
+The irreducible traits which Dewey finds are, in the physical sciences,
+plurality, interaction, and change. "These traits have to be begged or
+taken in any case," for wherever and whenever we take the world, we must
+explain it as "a plurality of diverse interacting and changing
+existences."[273] The evolutionary sciences add another trait; that is,
+evolution, or development in a direction. "For evolution appears to be
+just one of the irreducible traits. In other words, it is a fact to be
+reckoned with in considering the traits of diversity, interaction, and
+change which have been enumerated as among the traits taken for granted
+in all scientific subject-matter."[274]
+
+The doctrine that plurality, interaction, change, and evolution are
+permanent traits of reality gains in clearness when contrasted with the
+opposed theories which involve creation, absolute origins, or temporal
+ultimates. The term 'ultimate origins' may be taken in a merely relative
+sense which is valid. The French language has an origin in the Latin
+tongues, which is an ultimate origin for French, but this is not an
+absolutely ultimate origin, since the Latin tongues, in their turn,
+have origins. It is, for instance, meaningless to inquire into the
+ultimate origin of the world as a whole; and it is equally futile to
+trace any part of the world back to an absolute origin. "That scientific
+inquiry does not itself deal with any question of ultimate origins,
+except in the purely relative sense already indicated, is, of course,
+recognized. But it also seems to follow from what has been said that
+scientific inquiry does not generate, or leave over, such a question for
+some other discipline, such as metaphysics, to deal with."[275]
+
+Theories like that of Laplace, for instance, trace the world back to an
+origin in some undifferentiated universe; or, in Spencer's terms, some
+state of homogeneity. From this original state the world is said to
+evolve. But the undifferentiated mass lacks the plurality, interaction,
+and change which are presupposed in all scientific explanation. These
+traits must be present before development can occur. "To get change we
+have to assume other structures which interact with it, existences not
+covered by the formula."[276] In short, although Dewey only implies
+this, all scientific explanation presupposes a system of interacting
+parts; nothing can be explained by reference to an undifferentiated
+world which lacks such traits.
+
+Dewey is particularly interested in the origin of mind or intelligence.
+In dealing with mind, he says, we must begin with the present, and in
+the present we find that the world has an organization, "in spots," of
+the kind we call intelligence. This existing intelligence cannot be
+explained by any theory which reduces it to something inferior. The
+"attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and
+irreducible existence of the thing dealt with."[277] Mind cannot be
+explained by being explained away, nor can it be explained as a
+development out of an original source in which the potentiality, or
+direction of change towards mind, was lacking.
+
+The evolution of things, Dewey says, is a real fact, and is to be
+reckoned with. Moreover, if everything that exists changes, then the
+evolution of life and mind surely have a bearing on the nature of
+physico-chemical things. They must have in them the trait of direction
+of change towards life and mind. "To say, accordingly, that the
+existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes
+impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics is to say something which
+the situation calls for."[278] In other words, the world, metaphysically
+considered, must have evolution, as well as the physico-chemical traits.
+"Without a doctrine of evolution we might be able to say, not that
+matter _caused_ life, but that matter under certain conditions of highly
+complicated and intensified interaction is living. With the doctrine of
+evolution, we can add to this statement that the interactions and
+changes of matter are themselves of a kind to bring about that complex
+and intensified interaction which is life."[279] Dewey holds that
+evolution rests upon the reality of time: "time itself, or genuine
+change in a specific direction, is itself one of the ultimate traits of
+the world irrespective of date."[280]
+
+This article presents on the whole a distinct advance over the position
+taken in the earlier essay, "Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism,"
+which was reviewed in the last chapter. Dewey is not now, to be sure,
+instituting a wholesale inquiry into the nature of being, but he betrays
+an interest in the general, as opposed to the specific traits of
+reality. He inquires into the real nature of the world, and believes
+that he discovers its ultimate traits. This essay, of course, is
+incomplete, and consequently indefinite in certain important respects.
+It may be said, nevertheless, to give an accurate view of the
+metaphysical back-ground against which all of Dewey's theories are
+projected. His metaphysics, as would be expected, are evolutionary
+throughout, and evolution is conceived, where he is at all definite, in
+biological terms.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[249] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, Introduction, p. iv.
+
+[250] Vol. VIII: "I. Naïve Realism _vs._ Presentative Realism," pp.
+393-400. "II. Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the
+Knowledge Relation," pp. 546-554.
+
+[251] _Op. cit._, p. 395.
+
+[252] _Ibid._, p. 397.
+
+[253] In this connection Dewey's disagreements with Professor McGilvary
+are of especial interest. See especially McGilvary's article, "Pure
+Experience and Reality" (_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XVI, 1907, pp.
+266-284) and Dewey's reply, together with McGilvary's rejoinder
+(_Ibid._, pp. 419-424). McGilvary failed to understand that Dewey's
+argument was conducted on a purely 'naturalistic' basis, an almost
+inevitable error, in view of Dewey's practical identification of
+psychology, biology, and logic.
+
+[254] _Ibid._, p. 399.
+
+[255] Dewey is here dealing with the 'epistemological' realists, among
+whom he includes such writers as Bertrand Russell. In an article
+entitled "The Existence of the World as a Problem" (_Philosophical
+Review_, Vol. XXIV, 1915, pp. 357-370), Dewey argues that Russell, in
+making a problem of the existence of the external world, implies its
+existence in his formulation of the problem. Dewey argues that, since
+the existence of the world is presupposed in every such formulation, it
+cannot be called in question. This is like disposing of Zeno's paradox
+on the ground that arrows fly anyway.
+
+[256] _Op. cit._, p. 548.
+
+[257] _Ibid._
+
+[258] _Op. cit._
+
+[259] _Ibid._, p. 553.
+
+[260] _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol.
+XII, 1915. Parts I and II, pp. 505-523; Part III, pp. 533-543.
+
+[261] _Ibid._, p. 506.
+
+[262] _Op. cit._, p. 511.
+
+[263] _Op. cit._, p. 514.
+
+[264] _Ibid._, p. 515.
+
+[265] _Op. cit._, p. 521.
+
+[266] _Op. cit._, p. 522 f.
+
+[267] _Ibid._, p. 536.
+
+[268] _Op. cit._, p. 538.
+
+[269] _Ibid._, p. 540.
+
+[270] _Op. cit._, p. 541.
+
+[271] _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol.
+XII, 1915, pp. 337-345.
+
+[272] _Op. cit._, p. 340.
+
+[273] _Ibid._
+
+[274] _Ibid._, p. 345.
+
+[275] _Op. cit._, p. 339.
+
+[276] _Ibid._, p. 343.
+
+[277] _Ibid._, p. 344.
+
+[278] _Op. cit._, p. 345.
+
+[279] _Ibid._
+
+[280] _Ibid._
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+CONCLUSIONS
+
+
+Dewey's interest as a philosopher centres, from first to last, upon
+knowledge and the knowing process. All that is vital in his ethical,
+social, and educational theories depends ultimately upon the special
+interpretation of the function of knowledge which constitutes his chief
+claim to philosophical distinction. Dewey's logical theory, as has been
+seen, was the natural and inevitable outcome of his demand for an
+empirical and 'psychological' description of thought as a
+'transformatory' process working actual changes in reality. If in the
+beginning of his career he found the problem of the nature of knowledge
+all-important for his own interests, he came in the end to regard it as
+the problem of problems for all philosophers. There is no mistaking
+Dewey's conviction that the special interpretation of knowledge which he
+advocates opens the door to important advances in philosophical
+speculation, while it ends all discussion of those pseudo-problems which
+result from a false, epistemological formulation of the function of
+knowledge.
+
+The history of the development of Dewey's thought, set forth in the
+preceding chapters, does not pretend to furnish an adequate estimate of
+his philosophical system. The two questions, of origin and worth, are,
+after all, distinct. The genetic account of Dewey's theory of knowledge
+may serve to make its bearings and implications better understood, may
+reveal its deeper meaning and import, but the final estimate of its
+value as a philosophical hypothesis depends on other considerations. In
+this final chapter, it is proposed to deal with the question of the
+positive value of functionalism as a working hypothesis. This criticism
+may also serve to gather together the threads of criticism and comment
+which run through the previous chapters, and reveal the general ground
+upon which the writer's opposition to Dewey's theory is based.
+
+There can be no question that Dewey's theory of knowledge rests,
+finally, upon the doctrine of 'immediate empiricism;' upon his belief in
+"the necessity of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method
+that has now made its way in all the natural sciences...."[281] This
+doctrine is clearly stated in the first essay reviewed in this study,
+"The Psychological Standpoint" (1886). To quote again from that essay:
+"The psychological standpoint as it has developed itself is this: all
+that is, is for consciousness or knowledge. The business of the
+psychologist is to give a genetic account of the various elements within
+this consciousness, and thereby fix their place, determine their
+validity, and at the same time show definitely what the real and eternal
+nature of this consciousness is."[282] The descriptive method here
+advocated does not differ, as an actual mode of procedure, from that of
+Dewey's later empiricism. It lies at the basis of all his speculation,
+earlier as well as later, and is undoubtedly the most important single
+element in his philosophical system.
+
+In "The Psychological Standpoint" Dewey ascribes the failure of the
+earlier empiricists to their desertion of the direct descriptive method
+(a criticism repeated frequently in later essays). Locke, for instance,
+instead of describing experience as it actually occurs, interprets it in
+terms of certain assumed simple sensations, the products of reflection.
+These non-experienced elements, Dewey believes, have no place in a
+purely empirical philosophy.
+
+But the empiricist must deal in some manner with the products of
+reflection. The atoms of chemistry and the elements of the psychologist
+are not experienced facts, but still they play a valuable, indispensable
+role in the technique of the sciences. What is to be done with them? It
+must be made to appear that they are valid within knowledge, but invalid
+elsewhere. This leads to a separation of knowing from other modes of
+experiencing, and the descriptive method is depended upon to maintain
+the empirical validity of the separation. It has been seen how Dewey's
+attempt to interpret knowledge led gradually to a distinction between
+the 'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' processes of experience.
+
+The completed theory of knowledge depends for its validity upon the
+distinction thus established between knowing (as reflective thought) and
+the practical attitudes of life. The concepts, elements, and other
+apparatus of reflection are employed, it is said, only when there is
+thinking,--and this is only occasionally. Theory is an instrument to be
+used in connection with that special activity, reflective thought, the
+general aim of which is the furtherance of the practical ends of life.
+
+One fairly obvious difficulty with this separation of reflection from
+the other life activities is that the 'direct descriptive method,' as
+here employed, is itself reflective. How does it come, then, that this
+particular method achieves such an effective hegemony over the other
+modes of reflection? The 'descriptive method,' as the method of pure
+experience, is made to determine or supplant all other methods. It
+defines the limits and aims of conceptual systems; it marks out the
+limits, aims, and tests of reflective thought in general. How, it may be
+asked, does the 'direct descriptive method' escape the limitations which
+it imposes upon the other forms of reflective thought?
+
+It has been seen that in Dewey's view logic is subsidiary to psychology.
+But psychology (his psychology) results from the application of the
+'descriptive method' to experience. The 'descriptive method,' it may be
+inferred from this, is not subject to logical criticism. On the
+contrary, it is the basis of all logic. Logic, as the criticism of
+categories, is confined to the study of the instrumental concepts as
+functioning within the knowledge experience, and its limits are set by
+descriptive psychology. There is, apparently, no means by which the
+'direct descriptive method' can itself be brought under criticism.
+
+Dewey says: "By our postulate, things are what they are experienced to
+be; and, unless knowing is the sole and only genuine mode of
+experiencing, it is fallacious to say that Reality is just and
+exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower; or
+even that it _is_, relatively and piece-meal, what it is to a finite and
+partial knower."[283] Reality is not simply what it is known as, for it
+is experienced in other ways than by being known. "But I venture to
+repeat that ... the inferential factor must _exist_, or must occur, and
+that all existence is direct and vital, so that philosophy can pass upon
+its nature--as upon the nature of all of the rest of its
+subject-matter--only by first ascertaining what it exists or occurs
+_as_."[284]
+
+Reflection, then, is not designed to furnish an insight into the nature
+of things. Acquaintance with reality must be obtained, not by reflecting
+upon it, but by describing it as it occurs. Whatever else this may mean,
+it certainly aims at demonstrating the superiority of description to the
+supposedly less effective modes of thought. It cannot be conceded,
+however, that 'description,' as employed by Dewey, is non-reflective, or
+super-reflective. If things are not what they are known as, then they
+are not what they are known as to a describer. The point of this
+objection will be obvious if it is remembered that it is the method of
+'direct description' which enables Dewey to distinguish between the
+'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' activities of life, and make
+thought the servant of action. If Dewey's descriptive method is not
+reflective, then there is no such thing as reflection.
+
+Passing for the moment from this criticism, which is not apt to be
+convincing in such abstract form, it may be well to consider for a time
+the psychology upon which Dewey's logical theory is grounded: the
+psychology which is established by the 'direct descriptive method.'
+
+From the standpoint of the nervous correlates of experience, Dewey's
+theory involves two postulates: first, that customary conduct is carried
+on by an habitual set of nervous adjustments, and, second, that
+reflection is a process whereby new reactions are established when
+habitual modes of response fail to meet a critical situation.
+
+It must be clearly recognized that, so far as the nervous system is
+concerned, the scheme is highly speculative. The advance made by
+physiology towards an analysis and understanding of the minute and
+specialized parts of the nervous organism has necessarily been slow and
+uncertain. Whatever plausibility Dewey's theory possesses must depend,
+not upon the technical results of neurology, but upon the external
+evidence which seems to justify some such scheme of nervous
+organization.
+
+An examination of this evidence shows that it falls under two main
+heads: (1) facts drawn from the observation of the outward behavior of
+the organism, and (2) facts derived from an introspective analysis of
+the thought-process.
+
+The study of behavior shows that man thinks only now and then. Most of
+his conduct is, literally, thoughtless. It is said that thought is
+outwardly manifested by a characteristic attitude, marked by hesitation
+and an obvious effort at adjustment. The introspective analysis of the
+thought-process shows that it alone, among experiences, is accompanied
+by analysis, abstraction, and mediation. Again, both the internal and
+external evidence show that a puzzling situation (whose nervous
+correlate is a conflict of impulses) is the stimulus which awakens
+thought. These are important items in the list of evidence which
+supports the functional theory.
+
+It would be a tedious and unnecessary task to subject each of these bits
+of evidence to empirical criticism. It will be better to deal with them
+by showing that they do not necessarily imply functionalism, since they
+are compatible with a psychology directly opposed to the fundamental
+assumptions of Dewey's theory.
+
+It is doubtless true that men think only occasionally and with some
+reluctance. This is a common observation. What is to be made of this
+intermittance of thought? The evidence merely shows that man is more
+wide awake, energetic, and alert at some times than at others. On these
+occasions every faculty of the organism is in operation, higher as well
+as lower centres are pitched to a high degree of responsiveness, not at
+hap-hazard, to be sure, but _apropos_--tuned to the situation. In saying
+that men think only now and then nothing more is necessarily implied
+than that men are for the most part sluggish and indifferent, and the
+periods of high intensification of the normal processes contrast sharply
+with the habitual lethargy of conduct.
+
+Against Dewey, it will be maintained here that thought cannot be
+defined as a special kind of activity considered from the side of the
+organism. The life processes are constantly welded into a single unified
+activity, which may, as a whole, be directed upon different objects.
+Thus, from the side of its objects, this life activity may be called
+eating, running, reading, and whatever else one chooses. Thinking, from
+this standpoint, may be defined as the direction of effort upon symbols
+and abstract terms. But thinking in this case would be identified on the
+basis of its content, not in terms of special nervous activities in the
+organism. Whether, therefore, thinking signifies that intense periodical
+activity which has been noted, or preoccupation with a certain kind of
+subject-matter, it in no case implies the operation of a special organic
+faculty of the type described by Dewey.
+
+But, again, it is said that true reflection is marked by a certain
+characteristic bodily attitude, which bespeaks inner conflict and a
+search for adjustment. This contention seems to have little ground in
+fact. The puzzled, hesitating, undecided expression that is usually
+supposed to betray deep cogitation may in fact mean simply hesitation
+and bewilderment,--the need for thought, rather than its presence. The
+expression reveals a certain degree of incompetence and sluggishness in
+the individual concerned, and signifies a lack of wide-awakeness and
+responsiveness. A student puzzling over his algebra, a speaker
+extemporizing an argument, a ball-player using all his resources to
+defeat the enemy, have attitudes so unlike that no analysis could
+discover in them a common form of expression. And yet it would be
+madness to deny that thinking attends their various performances. There
+is, in short, no evidence from the side of bodily expression to indicate
+the presence in man of a special nervous faculty called reflection.
+
+Consider next the contention that the cue to thought is a puzzling
+situation, involving a problem. No problem, no thought; no thought, no
+problem. This may mean either that a man finding himself in a difficult
+situation uses all his energy and resource to escape from it, or, that
+he never concerns himself with abstract symbols except under the spur of
+necessity. The former meaning contains some truth, but the latter is
+what Dewey would call a 'dark saying.' If by 'thought' be meant that
+period of high activity of all the faculties which is only occasional,
+it is doubtless true enough that a problem is frequently needed to
+awaken it. Man is content to let life glide along with a minimum of
+effort; he cannot, if he would, long maintain the state of high activity
+here called 'thinking.' As a consequence of not thinking when he should,
+man frequently finds himself involved in situations requiring the
+exercise of all the energy and resource he possesses. But the really
+efficient 'thinker' is the man who keeps his eyes open, who sees ahead.
+He is not efficient merely because of the excellence of his established
+modes of response, but, more particularly, because he is alive and
+alert. His thinking is effective in preventing difficult situations, as
+well as in getting out of them.
+
+Defining 'thought,' however, as the direction of activity upon symbols
+and conceptions, there seems to be little warrant for asserting that it
+functions only on the occasion of a concrete, specific problem. One
+would say, on the contrary, that this would be an unfavorable occasion
+for the study of fundamental principles, whether scientific or
+practical. Summing up the external evidence, then, one would say that it
+accords as well with the hypothesis that the life processes constitute a
+single activity directed upon various objects, as with the hypothesis
+that thought is a very special organic activity, having a special
+biological function. At least, the evidence for the existence of such a
+special faculty is dubious and uncertain.
+
+What does the internal evidence prove? The analysis of thought contained
+in James's chapter on "Reasoning" in the _Principles of Psychology_ has
+been the guide for Dewey and other pragmatists in this connection.[285]
+James undertakes to show that reasoning is marked off from other
+processes by the employment of analysis, abstraction, and the use of
+mediating terms. It must be urged here, not only against James, but
+against a considerable modern tradition, that this account of thinking
+is misleading and inaccurate. The question to be faced, of course, is
+whether the processes of thought differ radically from the
+non-reflective processes _in kind_, or whether they are simply the
+intensification of processes which attend all conscious life. It should
+be noted that no concession is made to the notion that thinking is a
+special kind of process; only its subject-matter is special, or else
+thought is simply a period of wide-awakeness and alertness. In the
+latter sense, thought involves an intensification of the powers of
+observation, an awakening of memory, a general stimulation of all the
+faculties. It calls for the fullest possible apprehension, demands the
+most complete insight into the nature of the situation that the
+capacities can provide. The contrast between the adequate view of
+reality achieved in this manner and the common and inadequate
+apprehension of ordinary life is very great, and might easily lead to
+the supposition that thinking (so understood) contains elements which
+are added through the activities of a special nerve process.
+
+But is it only in such moments that we deliberately resolve a situation
+into its elements, and abstract an 'essence' to serve as a middle term
+in inference? It is certain that at such moments these processes are
+more distinct than at other times; but the whole situation, for that
+matter, stands out more clearly and distinctly. Perception is keener,
+memory more definite, feeling more intense. In less degree, however, all
+attention involves analysis and abstraction. Experience has always a
+focus and a margin; there is a constant selecting and analyzing out of
+important elements, which in turn lead to further conclusions and acts,
+through associations by contiguity and similarity. This process appears
+in an intensified form in the high moments of life. In short, thought
+and passive perception are differentiated, not by the elements which
+compose them, but by the degree of energy that goes into perception,
+memory, feeling, and discrimination. There is nothing in the evidence to
+show that thinking is a special kind of activity, which operates now and
+then. On the contrary, there is every reason to hold to the position
+that the life processes are one and inseparable, operating continually
+in conjunction.
+
+What shall be said, then, with reference to the assertion that thought
+operates in the interests of the non-cognitive life processes? That it
+comes 'after something and for the sake of something,' namely, 'direct'
+experience? Since the separation of the activities into various
+'functions' cannot be allowed, by occasional thought must then be meant
+those moments of energetic aliveness described above. Translating,
+Dewey's theory would read something like this: Man employs his faculties
+to the fullest extent only when he is compelled to do so. He gets along
+habitually, that is, with a minimum of effort, as long as he can, but
+rouses himself and makes an earnest effort to comprehend the world only
+when his environment presents him with difficulties which demand
+solution. The test of man's thinking consists in its efficiency in
+getting him out of trouble, and enabling him to return to his habitual
+modes of sub-conscious conduct with a minimum of annoyance. In short,
+thinking is an instrument which subserves man's natural laziness, and
+its test is the efficiency with which it promotes an easy, or, at any
+rate, a satisfactory mode of existence.
+
+No doubt some men, perhaps many men, do follow such a programme; but it
+would not be kind to Nature to assert that she planned it so.
+
+This separation of the activities of life into several distinct
+processes having each a special function looks like a survival of the
+old faculty psychology, against which modern thought has protested as
+much as against anything whatever. The conception of the organic
+processes as separate in action has all the faults of a merely
+mechanical representation of consciousness. Doubtless some advantage is
+to be obtained, for purposes of investigation, by treating thought,
+appreciation, and affection separately; but it is a serious error to
+take this provisional distinction as real. It is a curious fact that
+Dewey, with all his opposition to such modes of procedure, himself falls
+into this abstract way of treating the 'functions' of experience, seeing
+not the beam that is in his own eye.
+
+It is this very form of treatment, strangely enough, which enables Dewey
+to call biology to the support of his interpretation of the function of
+knowledge. According to the Darwinian theory, survival of the species is
+dependent upon the development of special structures and capacities
+which enable the organism to adjust itself to its environment. Dewey
+finds, following a familiar argument, that the lower animals are adapted
+to their environment by special habits of reaction which are relatively
+fixed and inelastic. Man, on the contrary, has an exceedingly plastic
+nervous system, which enables him to meet changing conditions. Man is
+not only highly adapted, but highly adaptable. This trait of plasticity,
+or adaptability, Dewey believes, is a product of natural selection, and,
+of course, in the final analysis, this high degree of plasticity is the
+thought function.
+
+It is scarcely necessary to say that this treatment of thought is highly
+speculative. Dewey offers little concrete evidence to support his
+position; indeed, it would require the labor of a Darwin to supply the
+needed evidence. Instead of grounding his theories upon the results of
+science, Dewey adapts the ever elastic 'evolutionary method' (not really
+that of biological evolution, however indeterminate) to his own scheme
+of things. It would be hard to discover in philosophical literature a
+method more purely theoretical and even dialectical than that whereby
+Dewey gives his logical theory the support of evolutionary theory.
+
+The ultimately mechanical tendencies of his argument are conspicuous, in
+spite of all disclaimers. The effect of his analysis is to set
+plasticity or adaptability off by itself, as a special trait or feature
+of the nervous system. The lower forms of life are governed, we are
+told, by fixed reflexes, and the trait of adaptability appears at some
+higher stage in the process as a superadded capacity of the nervous
+system, correlated, no doubt, with special nervous structures.
+Evolutionism would not serve Dewey so well, had he not previously made
+this separation between the organic functions and their correlated
+structures; but, given this abstract treatment of the life processes, he
+is able to make the doctrine of selection contribute to its support. In
+opposition to Dewey's argument, it would be reasonable to contend that
+plasticity is inherent in all nervous substance. The higher organisms
+are more adaptable, because there is more to be modified in them,--more
+nerves and synapses, more pliability. There is no sound empirical reason
+for accepting Dewey's biological conclusions.
+
+Taking Dewey's theory at its face value,--and it would be presumptuous
+to search for hidden meanings,--its net result is to place the function
+of knowing in an embarrassing situation with respect to its capacity for
+giving a correct report of reality. Dewey expressly denies, indeed, that
+the purpose of knowing is to give an account of the nature of things.
+Reality, he asserts, is whatever it is 'experienced as being,' and it is
+normally experienced in other ways than by being known. The nature of
+reality is not hidden behind a veil, to be searched out; but is here and
+now, as it comes and goes in the form of passing experience. Knowing is
+designed to transform experience, not to bring it within the survey of
+consciousness.
+
+How does it stand, then, with Dewey's own account of the knowledge
+process? He has reflected upon experience, and claims to have given a
+correct account of its nature. Dewey's conception of the processes of
+experience is genuinely conceptual, a thought product, designed to
+furnish a solid basis for belief and calculation. But reflection, by his
+own account, is shut in to its own moment, cannot apprehend the true
+nature of 'non-cognitional' experiences, and cannot, therefore, deal
+adequately with any problems except such as are furnished it by other
+'functions.' No wonder that 'anti-intellectualism' should result from
+such a conception of knowledge.
+
+Philosophers have always held that the purpose of reflection (whatever
+reflection may be, psychologically) is the attainment of a reliable
+insight into the nature of the world. Practical considerations compel
+this view. Ordinary, casual observation is superficial and unsystematic;
+it never penetrates beneath the surface. Doubtless reality is, in some
+degree, what it is in unreflective moments; but it is frequently
+something more, as man learns to his sorrow. Reflection displaces the
+casual, haphazard attitude, in the attempt to get at the real nature of
+the world.
+
+The results of reflection, moreover, are cumulative. It tends to build
+up, by gradual accretions, a conceptual view of reality which may serve
+as a relatively stable basis for conduct and calculation. Thought does,
+indeed, possess a transforming function. The reasoned knowledge of
+things is gradually extended beyond the occasional moments of inquiring
+thought, supplanting the casual view with a more penetrating insight;
+reality becomes more and better _known_, and less merely _experienced_.
+
+Dewey reverses this view in a curious manner. It is 'experience' that is
+built up by the action of thought, not knowledge itself. This play on
+terms might be innocuous, if it were not accompanied by his separation
+of the knowing function from others. Dewey makes 'knowing' the servant
+of 'direct experience' by giving it the function of reconstructing the
+habits of the organism, in order that unreflective experience may be
+maintained with a minimum of effort. The non-reflective experience
+becomes the valuable experience, and knowledge is made to minister unto
+it. This is truly a 'transvaluation of values.'
+
+Dewey asks: "What is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete
+world of experience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction, and
+in a world of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and
+ideal?"[286] This sharp separation of thought from action is vigorously
+maintained. Following are some of the terms by means of which the
+difference between direct and reflective experience is expressed:
+'direct practice,' 'derived theory;' 'primary construction,' 'secondary
+criticism;' 'living appreciation,' 'abstract description;' 'active
+endeavor,' 'pale reflection.'[287] This casual, easy distinction escapes
+criticism because it seems harmless and unimportant. The distinction,
+however, is _not_ real. It does not correspond to the simple facts of
+life. Thinking, far from being 'pale reflection,' is often a strenuous
+and energetic 'activity.' Reflection, not 'direct experience,' is often,
+at least, at the high moment of life. Experience becomes unmeaning on
+any other basis. 'Living appreciation' and 'primary construction'
+involve thought in a high degree; 'pale reflection' is lazy
+contemplation, lacking the spark of life that characterizes true
+thought.
+
+There is no escape from Dewey's needlessly alarming conclusions, except
+by maintaining that thought accompanies all conscious life, in greater
+or less degree, and that the moment of _real_, earnest thinking is at
+the high tide of life, when all the powers are awake and operating.
+Thought must be made integral with all other activities, a feature of
+the total life organization, rather than an isolated phenomenon. Man is
+a thinking organism, not an organism with a thinker.
+
+It is not to be supposed for a moment that by 'thought' is here meant
+the activity of a merely subjective knower. Dewey does, indeed, deal
+effectively with the subjective ego, and with representative
+perceptionism. But by 'thought' is here meant reflection, judgment,
+inference; and in this sense thought is said to be present in all
+experience. There can be no question of the relation of thought, so
+understood, to reality; for the reason that it has been so integrated
+with experience as to be inseparable from it. Setting aside knowing as
+the awareness of a conscious subject, there remains an issue with Dewey
+concerning the actual place of thought, as an empirical process, in
+experience, and the issue must be settled on definite and really
+empirical grounds. So much, then, for 'functionalism' and its
+psychology.
+
+Something should be said, before closing this discussion, concerning
+philosophical methods in general, since Dewey's psychological approach
+to the problems of philosophy must be held responsible for his
+anti-intellectualistic results, with their sceptical implications. In
+the beginning of his career, as has been seen, Dewey adopted the
+'psychological method,' and he has adhered to it consistently ever
+since. This initial attitude, although he was not aware of it for many
+years, cut him off from the community of understanding that exists among
+modern idealists concerning the proper aims and purposes of
+philosophical inquiry. Although at first a professed follower of Green
+and Caird, Dewey's method was not reconcilable with idealistic
+procedure, and in a very real sense he never was an idealist. The
+virulence of his later attacks on 'intellectualism' may be explained in
+terms of his reaction against a philosophical method which interfered
+with the development of his own 'naturalistic' tendencies.
+
+The method of idealism, or speculative philosophy, is logical; but it
+may perfectly well be empirical at the same time. To the
+anti-intellectualist empirical logic is an anomaly, a red blue-bird, so
+to speak. The philosophical logician is represented as one who evolves
+reality out of his own consciousness; who labors with the concepts which
+have their abode in the mental sphere, and, by means of the principle of
+contradiction, forces them into harmony until they provide a perfectly
+consistent representation of the external world which, because of its
+perfect rationality, must somehow correspond with the cosmic reality. In
+spite of the fact that no man possesses, at least in a sane condition,
+the mental equipment requisite for such a performance, certain critics
+have not hesitated to impute this kind of logical procedure to the
+idealists. To quote from Dewey himself: "For modern philosophy is, as
+every college senior recites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps
+our books and lectures sometimes forget to tell the senior, has absorbed
+Stoic dogma. Passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete
+subjection to a ready-made and finished reality ... is its professed
+ideal.... Philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge which is other
+than the propitious outgrowth of beliefs that shall develop aforetime
+their ulterior implications in order to recast them ..., the dream of a
+knowledge that has to do with objects having no nature save to be
+known."[288]
+
+This charge against modern idealism has little foundation. Speculative
+philosophy repudiated, long ago, the 'epistemological standpoint' as
+defined by Dewey. Idealists have not fostered the conception of a
+knowing subject shut in to its own states, seeking information about an
+impersonal reality over against itself. Note, for example, this comment
+of Pringle-Pattison on Kant, made over thirty-five years ago: "The
+distinction between mind and the world, which is valid only from a
+certain point of view, he took as an absolute separation. He took it, to
+use a current phrase, abstractly--that is to say, as a mere fact, a fact
+standing by itself and true in any reference. And of course when two
+things are completely separate, they can only be brought together by a
+bond which is mechanical, external, and accidental to the real nature
+of both."[289] Dewey himself never condemned 'epistemology' more
+effectively. But it is useless to cite instances, for any serious
+student familiar with the literature of modern philosophy ought to know
+that 'idealism' has never really been 'epistemological' in the sense
+meant by Dewey and his disciples. Subjectivism is not idealism,--the
+stolid dogmatism of neo-realism to the contrary notwithstanding.
+
+Idealism holds, speaking more positively, that philosophers must submit
+the conceptions and methods which they employ to a preliminary immanent
+criticism, in order to determine the limits within which they may be
+validly applied. Every genuine category or method is valid within a
+certain sphere of relevance, and the business of criticism is to
+determine by empirical investigation or by 'ideal experiment' (which
+means much the same thing) what concrete significance the conception is
+capable of bearing. Dewey, from the standpoint of idealism, is guilty of
+a somewhat uncritical use of the categories of 'description' and
+'evolution.' Are the categories of biology fitted to explain mind and
+spirit? Instead of instituting an inquiry designed to answer that
+question, Dewey accepts 'evolutionism' as final, and attempts to force
+all phenomena into conformity with his resulting logical scheme. He
+misses the valuable checks upon thought which are furnished by the
+'critical method,' and is none too sensitive to the technical results of
+the special sciences.
+
+The logical approach to philosophy strictly involves certain
+implications which have been overlooked by many of its critics. It may
+well be admitted that our real categories are not fixed and final, but
+are perpetually in process of reconstruction. The process of criticism
+inevitably makes manifest the human and empirical character of the
+particular forms of reflective thought. It recognizes the fact of
+development, both in knowledge and in reality, and by this very
+recognition the value of knowledge is enhanced. It is forced, by the
+very nature of its method, to recognize the concrete and practical
+bearings of thought. Indeed, there is a sense in which idealism would
+declare that there is no thought--when thought, that is, is taken to
+mean an isolated fact out of relation to the world. It is not possible
+to make this retort upon the critics of idealism without recognizing
+that there has been a vast misjudgment, amounting almost to
+misrepresentation, of the intellectual ideals of modern speculative
+philosophy.
+
+To conclude, it is neither by abstract logical processes, nor yet by the
+dogmatic employment of scientific categories, that philosophy makes
+progress, but by an empirical process which unites criticism and
+experiment. In speaking of the development of modern idealism, Bosanquet
+says: "All difficulties about the general possibility--the possibility
+in principle--of apprehending reality in knowledge and preception were
+flung aside as antiquated lumber. What was undertaken was the direct
+adventure of knowing; of shaping a view of the universe which should
+include and express reality in its completeness. The test and criterion
+were not any speculative assumption of any kind whatever. They were the
+direct work of the function of knowledge in exhibiting what could and
+what could not maintain itself when all the facts were confronted and
+set in the order they themselves demanded. The method of inquiry was
+ideal experiment."[290]
+
+When all has been said, this method remains the natural and normal one.
+Dewey's 'psychological method,' by contrast, seems strained and
+far-fetched, an artificial and externally motived attempt to guide the
+intellect, which only by depending upon its own resources and its own
+increasing insight can hope to attain the distant and difficult, but
+never really foreign goal.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[281] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 240.
+
+[282] _Op. cit._, Mind, Vol. XI, p. 8 f.
+
+[283] "The Experimental Method," _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p.
+228.
+
+[284] "The Experimental Method," _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p.
+240.
+
+[285] See the review of Dewey's essay, "The Experimental Method," in
+Chapter VII of this study, p. 91 ff.
+
+[286] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 4.
+
+[287] _Ibid._, p. 2.
+
+[288] "Beliefs and Existences," _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_,
+p. 172 f.
+
+[289] _The Philosophical Radicals_, p. 297. The essay in which it
+occurs, "Philosophy as a Criticism of Categories," was first published
+in 1883, in the volume _Essays on Philosophical Criticism_.
+
+[290] "Realism and Metaphysics," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XXVI,
+1917, p. 8.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of John Dewey's logical theory, by 
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+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" />
+    <title>
+      The Project Gutenberg eBook of John Dewey's Logical Theory, by Delton Thomas Howard.
+    </title>
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+<pre>
+
+Project Gutenberg's John Dewey's logical theory, by Delton Thomas Howard
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: John Dewey's logical theory
+
+Author: Delton Thomas Howard
+
+Release Date: November 26, 2011 [EBook #38141]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Martin Pettit and the
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
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+</pre>
+
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p>
+
+<p class="bold">CORNELL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY</p>
+
+<p class="bold">No. 11</p>
+
+<h1><span>JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY</span><br /><br /><span id="id1">BY</span><br /><span>DELTON THOMAS HOWARD, A.M.</span></h1>
+
+<p class="center">FORMERLY FELLOW IN THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY</p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<p class="center">A THESIS<br />
+<span class="smcap">Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of<br />
+Cornell University in Partial Fulfilment of the<br />
+Requirements for the Degree of Doctor<br />of Philosophy</span></p>
+
+<p class="tbrk">&nbsp;</p>
+
+<p class="center">NEW YORK<br />
+LONGMANS, GREEN, &amp; CO.<br />1919</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</a></span></p>
+
+<p class="center">PRESS OF<br />THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY<br />LANCASTER, PA.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>PREFACE</span></h2>
+
+<p>It seems unnecessary to offer an apology for an historical treatment of
+Professor Dewey's logical theories, since functionalism glories in the
+genetic method. To be sure, certain more extreme radicals are opposed to
+a genetic interpretation of the history of human thought, but this is
+inconsistent. At any rate, the historical method employed in the
+following study may escape censure by reason of its simple character,
+for it is little more than a critical review of Professor Dewey's
+writings in their historical order, with no discussion of influences and
+connections, and with little insistence upon rigid lines of development.
+It is proposed to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" as far as
+possible; to discover what topics interested Professor Dewey, how he
+dealt with them, and what conclusions he arrived at. This plan has an
+especial advantage when applied to a body of doctrine which, like
+Professor Dewey's, does not possess a systematic form of its own, since
+it avoids the distortion which a more rigid method would be apt to produce.</p>
+
+<p>It has not been possible, within the limits of the present study, to
+take note of all of Professor Dewey's writings, and no reference has
+been made to some which are of undoubted interest and importance. Among
+these may be mentioned especially his books and papers on educational
+topics and a number of his ethical writings. Attention has been devoted
+almost exclusively to those writings which have some important bearing
+upon his logical theory. The division into chapters is partly arbitrary,
+although the periods indicated are quite clearly marked by the different
+directions which Professor Dewey's interests took from time to time. It
+will be seen that there is considerable chance for error in
+distinguishing between the important and the unimportant, and in
+selecting the essays which lie in the natural line of the author's
+development. But, <i>valeat quantum</i>, as William James would say.</p>
+
+<p>The criticisms and comments which have been made from time to time, as
+seemed appropriate, may be considered pertinent or irrelevant according
+to the views of the reader. It is hoped that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span> they are not entirely
+aside from the mark, and that they do not interfere with a fair
+presentation of the author's views. The last chapter is devoted to a
+direct criticism of Professor Dewey's functionalism, with some comments
+on the general nature of philosophical method.</p>
+
+<p>Since this thesis was written, Professor Dewey has published two or
+three books and numerous articles, which are perhaps more important than
+any of his previous writings. The volume of <i>Essays in Experimental
+Logic</i> (1916) is a distinct advance upon <i>The Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy and Other Essays</i>, published six years earlier. Most of these
+essays, however, are considered here in their original form, and the new
+material, while interesting, presents no vital change of standpoint. It
+might be well to call attention to the excellent introductory essay
+which Professor Dewey has provided for this new volume. Some mention
+might also be made of the volume of essays by eight representative
+pragmatists, which appeared last year (1917) under the title, <i>Creative
+Intelligence</i>. My comments on Professor Dewey's contribution to the
+volume have been printed elsewhere.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> It has not seemed necessary, in
+the absence of significant developments, to extend the thesis beyond its
+original limits, and it goes to press, therefore, substantially as
+written two years ago.</p>
+
+<p>I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the faculty of the Sage
+School of Philosophy for many valuable suggestions and kindly
+encouragement in the course of my work. I am most deeply indebted to
+Professor Ernest Albee for his patient guidance and helpful criticism.
+Many of his suggestions, both as to plan and detail, have been adopted
+and embodied in the thesis, and these have contributed materially to
+such logical coherence and technical accuracy as it may possess. The
+particular views expressed are, of course, my own. I wish also to thank
+Professor J. E. Creighton especially for his friendly interest and for
+many suggestions which assisted the progress of my work, as well as for
+his kindness in looking over the proofs.</p>
+
+<p class="right"><span class="smcap">D. T. Howard.</span></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Evanston, Illinois</span>,<br />
+<span class="s2">&nbsp;</span>June, 1918.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "The Pragmatic Method," <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,
+and Scientific Methods</i>, 1918, Vol. XV, pp. 149-156.</p></div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CONTENTS</span></h2>
+
+<table summary="CONTENTS">
+  <tr>
+    <td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="smcap">Chapter</span></td>
+    <td><span class="smcap">Page</span></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>I.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;"Psychology as Philosophic Method"</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>II.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;The Development of the Psychological Standpoint</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>III.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;"Moral Theory and Practice"</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_33">33</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>IV.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;Functional Psychology</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_47">47</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>V.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;The Evolutionary Standpoint</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_59">59</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>VI.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;"Studies in Logical Theory"</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>VII.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;The Polemical Period</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_88">88</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>VIII.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;Later Developments</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>IX.</td>
+    <td class="left">&nbsp;&nbsp;Conclusions</td>
+    <td><a href="#Page_119">119</a></td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER I</span> <span class="smaller">"PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD"</span></h2>
+
+<p>Dewey's earliest standpoint in philosophy is presented in two articles
+published in <i>Mind</i> in 1886: "The Psychological Standpoint," and
+"Psychology as Philosophic Method."<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> These articles appear to have
+been written in connection with his <i>Psychology</i>, which was published in
+the same year, and which represents the same general point of view as
+applied to the study of mental phenomena. For the purposes of the
+present study attention may be confined to the two articles in <i>Mind</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey begins his argument, in "The Psychological Standpoint," with a
+reference to Professor Green's remark that the psychological standpoint
+is what marks the difference between transcendentalism and British
+empiricism. Dewey takes exception to this view, and asserts that the two
+schools hold this standpoint in common, and, furthermore, that the
+psychological standpoint has been the strength of British empiricism and
+desertion of that standpoint its weakness. Shadworth Hodgson's comment
+on this proposal testifies to its audacity. In a review of Dewey's
+article, he says: "If for instance we are told by a competent writer,
+that Absolute Idealism is not only a truth of experience but one
+attained directly by the method of experiential psychology, we should
+not allow our astonishment to prevent our examining the arguments, by
+virtue of which English psychology attains the results of German
+transcendentalism without quitting the ground of experience."<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey defines his psychological standpoint as follows: "We are not to
+determine the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical
+inquiry by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element
+in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related to our mind,
+or is an 'idea'.... Or, in the ordinary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> way of putting it, the nature
+of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out
+what experience says about them."<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The implications of this definition
+do not appear at first sight, but they become clearer as the discussion
+proceeds.</p>
+
+<p>Locke, Dewey continues, deserted the psychological standpoint because he
+did not, as he proposed, explain the nature of such things as matter and
+mind by reference to experience. On the contrary, he explained
+experience through the assumption of the two unknowable substances,
+matter and mind. Berkeley also deserted the psychological standpoint, in
+effect, by having recourse to a purely transcendent Spirit. Even Hume
+deserted it by assuming as the only reals certain unrelated sensations,
+and by trying to explain the origin of experience and knowledge by their
+combination. These reals were supposed to exist in independence of an
+organized experience, and to constitute it by their association. It
+might be argued that Hume's sensations are found in experience by
+analysis, and this would probably be true. But the sensations are
+nothing apart from the consciousness in which they are found. "Such a
+sensation," Dewey says, "a sensation which exists only within and for
+experience, is not one which can be used to account for experience. It
+is but one element in an organic whole, and can no more account for the
+whole, than a given digestive act can account for the existence of a
+living body."<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p>
+
+<p>So far Dewey is merely restating the criticism of English empiricism
+that had been made by Green and his followers. Reality, as experienced,
+is a whole of organically related parts, not a mechanical compound of
+elements. Whatever is to be explained must be taken as a fact of
+experience, and its meaning will be revealed in terms of its position
+and function within the whole. But while Dewey employs the language of
+idealism, it is doubtful whether he has grasped the full significance of
+the "concrete universal" of the Hegelian school. The following passage
+illustrates the difficulty: "The psychological standpoint as it has
+developed itself is this: all that is, is for consciousness or
+knowledge. The business of the psychologist is to give a genetic<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>
+account of the various elements within this consciousness, and thereby
+fix their place, determine their validity, and at the same time show
+definitely what the real and eternal nature of this consciousness
+is."<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p>
+
+<p>Consciousness (used here as identical with 'experience') is apparently
+interpreted as a structure made up of elements related in a determinable
+order, and having, consequently, a 'real and eternal nature.' The result
+is a 'structural' view of reality, and the type of idealism for which
+Dewey stands may fittingly be called 'structural' idealism. This type of
+idealism does, in fact, hold a position intermediate between English
+empiricism and German transcendentalism. But it would not commonly be
+considered a synthesis of the best characteristics of the two schools.
+'Structural' idealism is, historically considered, a reversion to Kant
+which retains the mechanical elements of the <i>Critique</i>, but fails to
+reckon with the truly organic mode of interpretation in which it
+culminates. As experience, from Kant's undeveloped position, is a
+structure of sensations and forms, so Dewey's 'consciousness' is a
+compound of separate elements or existences related in a 'real and
+eternal' order.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey illustrates his method, in the discussion which follows, by
+employing it, or showing how it should be employed, in the definition of
+certain typical objects of philosophical inquiry. The first to be
+considered are subject and object. In dealing with the relation of
+subject to object, the psychological method will attempt to show how
+consciousness differentiates itself, or 'specifies' itself, into subject
+and object. These terms will be viewed as related terms within the whole
+of 'consciousness,' rather than as elements existing prior to or in
+independence of the whole in which they are found.</p>
+
+<p>There is a type of realism which illustrates the opposite or ontological
+method. It is led, through a study of the dependence of the mind upon
+the organism, to a position in which subject and object fall apart, out
+of relation to each other. The separation of the two leads to the
+positing of a third term, an unknown <i>x</i>, which is supposed to unite
+them. The psychological method<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> would hold that the two objects have
+their union, not in an unknown 'real,' but in the 'consciousness' in
+which they appear. The individual consciousness as subject, and the
+objects over against it, are elements at once distinguished and related
+within the whole. All the terms are facts of experience, and none are to
+be assumed as ontological reals.</p>
+
+<p>Subjective idealism, Dewey continues, makes a similar error in failing
+to discriminate between the ego, or individual consciousness, and the
+Absolute Consciousness within which ego and object are differentiated
+elements. It fails to see that subject and object are complements, and
+inexplicable except as related elements in a larger whole. The
+individual consciousness, again, and the universal 'Consciousness,' are
+to be defined by reference to experience. It is not to be assumed at the
+start, as the subjective idealists assume, that the nature of the
+individual consciousness is known. The ego is to be defined, not
+assumed, and this is the essence of the psychological method.</p>
+
+<p>So far, two factors in Dewey's standpoint are clearly discernible. In
+the first place, all noumena and transcendent reals are to be rejected
+as means of explanation, and definition is to be wholly in terms of
+experienced elements, as experienced. In the second place, experience is
+to be regarded as a rational system of related elements, while
+explanation is to consist in tracing out the relations which any element
+bears to the whole. The universal 'Consciousness' is the whole, and the
+individual mind, again, is an element within the whole, to be explained
+by tracing out the relations which it bears to other elements and to the
+whole system. It is not easy to avoid the conclusion that Dewey
+conceives of 'consciousness' as a construct of existentially distinct
+terms.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey does not actually treat subject and object, individual and
+universal consciousness, in the empirical manner for which he contends.
+He merely outlines a method; and, while this has a negative bearing as
+against transcendent modes of explanation, it has little content of its
+own. But in spite of Dewey's lack of explicitness, it is evident that he
+tends to view his 'objects of philosophical inquiry' as so many concrete
+particular existences<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> or things. The idea that they can be empirically
+marked out and investigated seems to imply this. But subject, object,
+individual, and universal are certainly not reducible to particular
+sensations, even though it must be admitted that they have a reference
+to particulars. These abstract concepts had been a source of difficulty
+to the empiricists, because they had not been able to reduce them to
+particular impressions, and Dewey's proposed method appears to involve
+the same difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>In his second article, on "Psychology as Philosophic Method," Dewey
+proposes to show that his standpoint is practically identical with that
+of transcendental idealism. This is made possible, he believes, through
+the fact that, since experience or consciousness is the only reality,
+psychology, as the scientific account of this reality, becomes identical
+with philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>In maintaining his position, Dewey finds it necessary to criticise the
+tendency, found in certain idealists, to treat psychology merely as a
+special science. This view of psychology is attained, Dewey observes, by
+regarding man under two arbitrarily determined aspects. Taken as a
+finite being acting amid finite things, a knowing, willing, feeling
+phenomenon, man is said to be the object of a special science,
+psychology. But in another aspect man is infinite, the universal
+self-consciousness, and as such is the object of philosophy. This
+distinction between the two aspects of man's nature, Dewey believes,
+cannot be maintained. As a distinction, it must arise within
+consciousness, and it must therefore be a psychological distinction.
+Psychology cannot limit itself to anything less than the whole of
+experience, and cannot, therefore, be a special science dependent, like
+others, upon philosophy for its working concepts. On the contrary, the
+method of psychology must be the method of philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey reaches this result quite easily, because he makes psychology the
+science of reality to begin with. "The universe," he says, "except as
+realized in an individual, has no existence.... Self-consciousness means
+simply an individualized universe; and if this universe has <i>not</i> been
+realized in man, if man be not self-conscious, then no philosophy
+whatever is possible. If it <i>has</i> been realized, it is in and through
+psychological experience<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> that this realization has occurred. Psychology
+is the scientific account of this realization, of this individualized
+universe, of this self-consciousness."<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p>
+
+<p>It is difficult to understand exactly what these expressions meant for
+Dewey. Granting that the human mind is both individual and universal,
+what objection could be raised against the study of its individual or
+finite aspects as the special subject-matter of a particular science?
+All the sciences, as Dewey was aware, are abstract in method. Dewey's
+position appears to be that the universal and individual aspects of
+consciousness are nothing apart from each other, and must be studied
+together. But 'consciousness' in Dewey's view is, in fact, two
+consciousnesses. Reality as a whole is a Consciousness, and the
+individual mind is another consciousness. A problem arises, therefore,
+as to their connection. Dewey affirms that, unless they are united,
+unless the universal is given in the individual consciousness, there can
+be no science of the whole, and therefore no philosophy. The
+epistemological problem of the relation of the mind to reality becomes,
+accordingly, the <i>raison d'&ecirc;tre</i> of his method. The problem was an
+inheritance from subjective idealism. It may be pointed out that there
+is some similarity between Dewey's standpoint and Berkeley's. Both
+conceive of consciousness as a construct of elements, and Dewey's
+'Consciousness in general' holds much the same relation to the finite
+consciousness that the Divine Mind holds to the individual consciousness
+in Berkeley's system. The similarity between the two standpoints must
+not be overemphasized, but it is none the less suggestive and
+interesting.</p>
+
+<p>In attempting to determine the proper status of psychology as a science,
+Dewey is led into a more detailed exposition of his standpoint. His
+position in general is well indicated in the following passage: "In
+short, the real <i>esse</i> of things is neither their <i>percipi</i>, nor their
+<i>intelligi</i> alone; it is their <i>experiri</i>."<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> The science of the
+<i>intelligi</i> is logic, and of the <i>percipi</i>, philosophy of nature. But
+these are abstractions from the <i>experiri</i>, the science of which is
+psychology. If it be denied that the <i>experiri</i>, self-conscious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span>ness in
+its wholeness, can be the subject-matter of psychology, then the
+possibility of philosophy is also denied. "If man, as matter of fact,
+does not realise the nature of the eternal and the universal <i>within</i>
+himself, as the essence of his own being; if he does not at one stage of
+his experience consciously, and in all stages implicitly, lay hold of
+this universal and eternal, then it is mere matter of words to say that
+he can give no account of things as they universally and eternally are.
+To deny, therefore, that self-consciousness is a matter of psychological
+experience is to deny the possibility of any philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Dewey
+assures us again that his method alone will solve the epistemological
+problem.</p>
+
+<p>Self-consciousness, as that within which things exist <i>sub specie
+&aelig;ternitatis</i> and <i>in ordine ad universum</i>, must be the object of
+psychology. The refusal to take self-consciousness as an experienced
+fact, Dewey says, results in such failures as are seen in Kant, Hegel,
+and even Green and Caird, to give any adequate account of the nature of
+the Absolute. Kant, for purely logical reasons, denied that
+self-consciousness could be an object of experience, although he
+admitted conceptions and perceptions as matters of experience. As a
+result of his attitude, conception and perception were never brought
+into organic connection; the self-conscious, eternal order of the world
+was referred to something back of experience. Dewey attributes Kant's
+failure to his logical method, which led him away from the psychological
+standpoint in which he would have found self-consciousness as a directly
+presented fact.</p>
+
+<p>This criticism of Kant's 'logical method' fails to take account of the
+transitional nature of Kant's standpoint. Looking backward, it is easy
+enough to ask why Kant did not begin with the organic view of experience
+at which he finally arrived. But the answer must be that the organic
+standpoint did not exist until Kant, by his 'logical method,' had
+brought it to light. The Kantian interpretation of experience, in which,
+as Dewey asserts, conception and perception were never brought into
+organic relation, is a half-way stage between mechanism and organism.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>
+But how does Dewey propose to improve upon Kant's position? He will
+first of all put Kant's noumenal self back into experience, as a fact in
+consciousness. But how will this help to bring perception and conception
+into closer union? There seems to be no answer. Dewey's view appears to
+be that organic relations are achieved whenever an object is made a part
+of experience and so brought into connection with other experienced
+facts. 'Organic relation' is interpreted as equivalent to 'mental
+relation.' But mental relations are not organic because they are mental.
+It would be as easy to assert that they are mechanical. The test lies in
+the nature of the relations which are actually found in the mental
+sphere and the fitness of the organic categories to express them.
+Dewey's 'consciousness,' as has been said before, appears to be a
+structure, not an organism. Its parts are external to each other,
+however closely they may be related. An organic view of experience would
+begin with a denial of the actuality of bare facts or sensations, and
+would not waver in maintaining that standpoint to the end.</p>
+
+<p>Hegel's advance upon Kant, Dewey continues, "consisted essentially in
+showing that Kant's <i>logical</i> standard was erroneous, and that, as a
+matter of logic, the only true criterion or standard was the organic
+notion, or <i>Begriff</i>, which is a systematic totality, and accordingly
+able to explain both itself and also the simpler processes and
+principles."<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The logical reformation which Hegel accomplished was
+most important, but the work of Kant still needed to be completed by
+"showing self-consciousness as a fact of experience, as well as
+perception through organic forms and thinking through organic
+principles."<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> This element is latent in Hegel, Dewey believes, but
+needs to be brought out.</p>
+
+<p>T. H. Green comes under the same criticism. He followed Kant's logical
+method, and as a consequence arrived at the same negative results. The
+nature of self-consciousness remains unknown to Green; he can affirm its
+existence, but cannot describe its nature. Dewey quotes that passage
+from the <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i> in which Green says:<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> "As to what
+that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>consciousness in itself or in its completeness is, we can only
+make negative statements. <i>That</i> there is such a consciousness is
+implied in the existence of the world; but <i>what</i> it is we only know
+through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and
+interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent
+experience." If, Dewey observes, Green had begun with the latter point
+of view, and had taken self-consciousness as at least partially realized
+in finite minds, he would have been able to make some positive
+statements about it. Dewey, however, has not given the most adequate
+interpretation of Green's 'Spiritual Principle in Nature.' This was
+evidently, for Green, a symbol of the intelligibility of the world as
+organically conceived, an order which could not be comprehended by the
+mechanical categories, but which was nevertheless real. As Green tended
+to hypostatize the organic conception, so Dewey would make it a concrete
+reality, with the further specification that it must be something given
+to psychological observation.</p>
+
+<p>The chief point of Dewey's criticism of the idealists is that they fail
+to establish self-consciousness as an experienced fact; and, Dewey
+maintains, it must be so established if it is to be anything real and
+genuine. If it is anything that can be discussed at all, it must be an
+element in experience; and if it is in experience, it must be the
+subject-matter of psychology. It is inevitable, from Dewey's standpoint,
+that transcendentalism should adopt his psychological method.</p>
+
+<p>In the further development of his standpoint, Dewey considers (1) the
+relations of psychology to the special sciences, and (2) the relation of
+psychology to logic. Dewey's conception of the relation of psychology to
+the special sciences is well illustrated in the following passage:
+"Mathematics, physics, biology exist, because conscious experience
+reveals itself to be of such a nature, that one may make virtual
+abstraction from the whole, and consider a part by itself, without
+damage, so long as the treatment is purely scientific, that is, so long
+as the implicit connection with the whole is left undisturbed, and the
+attempt is not made to present this partial science as metaphysic, or as
+an explanation of the whole, as is the usual fashion of our uncritical
+so-called<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> 'scientific philosophies.' Nay more, this abstraction of some
+one sphere is itself a living function of the psychologic experience. It
+is not merely something which it allows: it is something which it
+<i>does</i>. It is the analytic aspect of its own activity, whereby it
+deepens and renders explicit, realizes its own nature.... The analytic
+movement constitutes the special sciences; the synthetic constitutes the
+philosophy of nature; the self-developing activity itself, as
+psychology, constitutes philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p>
+
+<p>The special sciences are regarded as abstractions from the central or
+psychological point of view, but they are legitimate abstractions,
+constituted by a proper analytic movement of the total
+self-consciousness, which specifies itself into the special branches of
+knowledge. If we begin with any special science, and drive it back to
+its fundamentals, it reveals its abstractness, and thought is led
+forward into other sciences, and finally into philosophy, as the science
+of the whole. But philosophy, first appearing as a special science,
+turns out to be science; it is presupposed in all the special sciences,
+and is their basis. But where does psychology stand in this
+classification?</p>
+
+<p>At first sight psychology appears to be a special science, abstract like
+the others. "As to systematic observation, experiment, conclusion and
+verification, it can differ in no essential way from any one of
+them."<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> But psychology, like philosophy, turns out to be a science of
+the whole. Each special science investigates a special sphere of
+conscious experience. "From one science to another we go, asking for
+some explanation of conscious experience, until we come to
+psychology.... But the very process that has made necessary this new
+science reveals also that each of the former sciences existed only in
+abstraction from it. Each dealt with some one phase of conscious
+experience, and for that very reason could not deal with the totality
+which gave it its being, consciousness."<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Philosophy and psychology
+therefore mainly coincide, and the method of psychology, properly
+developed, becomes the method of philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>If psychology is to be identified with philosophy in this fashion,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> the
+mere change of name would seem to be superfluous. There would be no
+reason for maintaining psychology as a separate discipline. Perhaps
+Dewey did not intend that it should be maintained separately. In that
+case, the total effect of his argument would be to prescribe certain
+methods for philosophy. It seems necessary to suppose that Dewey
+proposed to merge philosophy in psychology, and make it an exact science
+while retaining its universality. "Science," he argued, "is the
+systematic account, or <i>reason</i> of <i>fact</i>; Psychology is the completed
+systematic account of the ultimate fact, which, as fact, reveals itself
+as reason...."<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Self-consciousness in its ultimate nature is
+conceived of as a special fact, over and above what it includes in the
+way of particulars. Psychology, as the science of this ultimate fact,
+must at the same time be philosophy. The identification of the two
+disciplines depends upon taking the 'wholeness' of reality as a 'fact,'
+which can be brought under observation. This is a natural conclusion
+from Dewey's structural view of reality.</p>
+
+<p>In taking up the subject of the relation of psychology to logic, Dewey
+remarks that in philosophy matter and form cannot be separated.
+"Self-consciousness is the final truth, and in self-consciousness the
+form as organic system and the content as organized system are exactly
+equal to each other."<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Logic abstracts from the whole, gives us only
+the form, or <i>intelligi</i> of reality, and is therefore only one moment in
+philosophy. Since logic is an abstraction from Nature, we cannot get
+from logic back to Nature, by means of logic. We do, as a matter of
+fact, make the transition in philosophy, because the facts force us back
+to Nature. Just as in Hegel's logic, the category of quality, when
+pressed, reveals itself as inadequate to express the facts, and is
+compelled to pass into the category of quantity, so does logic as a
+whole, when pressed, reveal its inadequacy to express the whole of
+reality. The transition from category to category in the Hegelian logic
+is not an unfolding of the forms as forms, but results from a compulsion
+exerted by the facts, when the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> categories are used to explain them.
+Logic is, and must remain, abstract in all its processes, and its
+outcome (with Hegel, <i>Geist</i>) may assert the abstract necessity of one
+self-conscious whole, but cannot give the reality. "Logic cannot reach,
+however much it may point to, an actual individual. The gathering up of
+the universe into one self-conscious individuality it may assert as
+<i>necessary</i>, it cannot give it as <i>reality</i>."<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Taken as an abstract
+method, logic is apt to result in a pantheism, "where the only real is
+the <i>Idee</i>, and where all its factors and moments, including spirit and
+nature, are real only at different stages or phases of the <i>Idee</i>, but
+vanish as imperfect ways of looking at things ... when we reach the
+<i>Idee</i>."<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey has in mind logic as a science of the forms of reality taken in
+abstraction from their content. In reality, however, there can be no
+logic of concepts apart from their concrete application. Hegel certainly
+never believed that it was possible to abstract the logical forms from
+reality and study them in their isolation. As against a purely formal
+logic, if such a thing were possible, Dewey's criticism would be valid,
+but the transcendental logic of his time was not formal in this sense.
+The psychological method which Dewey offers as a substitute for the
+logical method escapes, he believes, the difficulties of the latter
+method. At the same time it preserves, in his opinion, the essential
+spirit of the Hegelian method. Dewey's comments show that he conceives
+his method to be a restatement, in improved form, of the doctrine of the
+'concrete universal.' But the 'psychological method' and the method of
+idealism are, if anything, antithetical. An excellent summary of Dewey's
+theory is afforded by the following passage: "Only a living actual Fact
+can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in
+virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being. It is with this
+fact, conscious experience in its entirety, that psychology as method
+begins. It thus brings to clear light of day the presupposition implicit
+in every philosophy, and thereby affords logic, as well as the
+philosophy of nature, its basis, ideal and surety. If we have determined
+the nature of reality, by a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> process whose content equals its form, we
+can show the meaning, worth and limits of any one moment of this
+reality."<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p>
+
+<p>It would be useless to speculate upon the various possible
+interpretations that might be given of Dewey's psychological method. The
+most critical examination of the text will not dispel its vagueness, nor
+afford an answer to the many questions that arise. It does, however,
+throw an interesting light on certain tendencies in Dewey's own
+thinking.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's attempt to show that English empiricism and transcendentalism
+have a common psychological basis must be regarded as a failure. That
+the nature of the attempt reveals a misunderstanding, or fatal lack of
+appreciation, on the part of Dewey, of the critical philosophy and the
+later development of idealism by Hegel, has already been suggested. He
+does not appear to have grasped the significance of the movement from
+Kant to Hegel. Kant, of course, believed that the <i>a priori</i> forms of
+experience could be determined by a process of critical analysis, which
+would reveal them in their purity. The constitutive relations of
+experience were supposed by him to be limited to the pure forms of
+sensibility, space and time, and the twelve categories of the
+understanding, which, being imposed upon the manifold of sensations, as
+organized by the productive imagination, determined once and for all the
+order of the phenomenal world. His logic, therefore, as an account of
+the forms of experience, would represent logic of the type which Dewey
+criticized. But with the rejection of Kant's noumenal world, the
+critical method assumed a different import. It was no longer to be
+supposed that reality, as knowable, was organized under the forms of a
+determinate number of categories, which could be separated out and
+classified. Kant's idea that experience was an intelligible system was
+retained, but its intelligibility was not supposed to be wholly
+comprised in man's methods of knowing it. The instrumental character of
+the categories was recognized. Criticism was directed upon the
+categories, with the object of determining their validity, spheres of
+relevance, and proper place in the system of knowledge. Such a
+criticism,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> in the nature of things, could not deal with the forms of
+thought in abstraction from their application. Direct reference to
+experience, therefore, became a necessary element in idealism. At the
+same time, philosophy became a 'criticism of categories.' The method is
+empirical, but never psychological.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey recognized the need of an empirical method in philosophy, but
+failed to show specifically how psychology could deal with philosophical
+problems. He appears to have conceived that sensation and meaning, facts
+and forms, were present in experience or 'Consciousness,' as if this
+were some total understanding which retained the elements in a fixed
+union and order. While, according to his method, the forms of this
+universal consciousness could not be considered apart from the
+particulars in which they inhered, they might be studied by a survey of
+experience, a direct appeal to consciousness, in which 'form and content
+are equal.' He seems to have held that truth is given in immediate
+experience. A study of reality as immediately given, therefore, to
+psychological observation, would provide an account of the eternal
+nature of things, as they stand in the universal mind. Dewey did not
+attempt a criticism of the categories and methods which psychology must
+employ in such a task. Had he done so, the advantages of a critical
+method might have occurred to him.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Vol. XI, pp. 1-19; pp. 153-173.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> "Illusory Psychology," <i>Mind</i>, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 478.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> "The Psychological Standpoint," <i>Mind</i>, 1886, Vol. XI, p.
+2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 8 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> "Psychology as Philosophic Method," <i>Mind</i>, 1886, Vol. XI,
+p. 157.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 160. (Observe that this is a direct reference
+to Berkeley.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 161.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Third Edition, p. 54.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Mind</i>, Vol. XI, p. 166 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 166.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 170.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 172.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER II</span> <span class="smaller">THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT</span></h2>
+
+<p>The "psychological method," as so far presented, is an outline which
+must be developed in detail before its philosophical import is revealed.
+For several years following the publication of his first articles in
+<i>Mind</i> Dewey was occupied with the task of working out his method in
+greater detail, and giving it more concrete form. His thought during
+this period follows a fairly regular order of development, which is to
+be sketched in the present chapter.</p>
+
+<p>In 1887 Dewey published in <i>Mind</i> an article entitled "Knowledge as
+Idealisation."<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> This article is, in effect, a consideration of one of
+the special problems of the "psychological method." If reality is an
+eternal and all-inclusive consciousness, in which sensations and
+meanings are ordered according to a rational system, what must be the
+nature of the finite thought-process which apprehends this reality? In
+his previous articles Dewey had proposed the "psychological method" as
+an actual mode of investigation, and questions concerning the nature of
+the human thought-process naturally forced themselves upon his
+attention.</p>
+
+<p>The thought-process is, to begin with, a relating activity which gives
+meaning to experience. Says Dewey: "When Psychology recognizes that the
+relating activity of mind is one not exercised <i>upon</i> sensations, but
+one which supplies relations and thereby makes meaning (makes
+experience, as Kant said), Psychology will be in a position to explain,
+and thus to become Philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> This statement raises the more
+specific question, what is meaning?</p>
+
+<p>Every idea, Dewey remarks, has two aspects: existence and meaning.
+"Recognizing that every psychical fact does have these two aspects, we
+shall, for the present, confine ourselves to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> asking the nature,
+function and origin of the aspect of meaning or significance&mdash;the
+content of the idea as opposed to its existence."<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> The meaning aspect
+of the idea cannot be reduced to the centrally excited image existences
+which form a part of the existence-aspect of the idea. "I repeat, as
+existence, we have only a clustering of sensuous feelings, stronger and
+weaker."<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But the thing is not perceived as a clustering of feelings;
+the sensations are immediately interpreted as a significant object.
+"Perceiving, to restate a psychological commonplace, is interpreting.
+The content of the perception is what is signified."<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Dewey's
+treatment of sensations, at this point, is somewhat uncertain. If it be
+a manifold that is given to the act of interpretation, Kant's difficulty
+is again presented. The bare sensations taken by themselves mean
+nothing, and yet everything does mean something in being apprehended.
+The conclusion should be that there is no such thing as mere existence.
+Dewey's judgment is undecided on this issue. "It is true enough," he
+says, "that without the idea <i>as existence</i> there would be no
+experience; the sensuous clustering is a condition <i>sine qua non</i> of
+all, even the highest spiritual, consciousness. But it is none the less
+true that if we could strip any psychical existence of all its qualities
+except bare existence, there would be nothing left, not even existence,
+for our intelligence.... If we take out of an experience all that it
+<i>means</i>, as distinguished from what it <i>is</i>&mdash;a particular occurrence at
+a certain time, there is no psychical experience. The barest fragment of
+consciousness that can be hit upon has meaning as well as being."<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> An
+interpretation of reality as truly organic would treat mechanical
+sensation as a pure fiction. But Dewey clings to 'existence' as a
+necessary 'aspect' of the psychical fact. The terms and relations never
+entirely fuse, although they are indispensable to each other. There is
+danger that the resulting view of experience will be somewhat angular
+and structural.</p>
+
+<p>At one point, indeed, Dewey asserts that there is no such thing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> as a
+merely immediate psychical fact, at least for our experience. "So far is
+it from being true that we know only what is <i>immediately</i> present in
+consciousness, that it should rather be said that what is <i>immediately</i>
+present is never known."<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> But in the next paragraph Dewey remarks:
+"That which is immediately present is the sensuous existence; that which
+is known is the content conveyed by this existence."<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> The sensation
+is not known, and therefore probably not experienced. In this case Dewey
+is departing from his own principles, by introducing non-experienced
+factors into his interpretation of experience. The language is
+ambiguous. If nothing is immediately given, then the sensuous content is
+not so given.</p>
+
+<p>The 'sensuous existences' assumed by Dewey are the ghosts of Kant's
+'manifold of sensation.' The difficulty comes out clearly in the
+following passage: "It is indifferent to the sensation whether it is
+interpreted as a cloud or as a mountain; a danger signal, or a signal of
+open passage. The auditory sensation remains unchanged whether it is
+interpreted as an evil spirit urging one to murder, or as intra-organic,
+due to disordered blood-pressure.... It is not the sensation in and of
+itself that means this or that object; it is the sensation as
+associated, composed, identified, or discriminated with other
+experiences; the sensation, in short, as mediated. The whole worth of
+the sensation for intelligence is the meaning it has by virtue of its
+relation to the rest of experience."<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p>
+
+<p>There is an obvious parallel between this view of experience and Kant's.
+Kant, indeed, transcended the notion that experience is a structure of
+sensations set in a frame-work of thought forms; but the first
+<i>Critique</i> undoubtedly leaves the average reader with such a conception
+of experience. It is unjust to Kant, however, to take the mechanical
+aspect of his thought as its most important phase. He stands, in the
+opinion of modern critics, at a half-way stage between the mechanism of
+the eighteenth century and the organic logic of the nineteenth, and his
+works point the way from the lower to the higher point of view.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> This
+was recognized by Hegel and by his followers in England. How does it
+happen, then, that Dewey, who was well-read in the philosophical
+literature of the day, should have persisted in a view of experience
+which appears to assume the externally organized manifold of the
+<i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>? Or, to put the question more explicitly, why
+did he retain as a fundamental assumption Kant's 'manifold of
+sensations'?</p>
+
+<p>So far, Dewey has been concerned with the nature of meaning. He now
+turns to knowledge, and the knowing process as that which gives meaning
+to experience. Knowledge, or science, he says, is a process of following
+out the ideal element in experience. "The idealisation of science is
+simply a further development of this ideal element. It is, in short,
+only rendering explicit and definite the meaning, the idea, already
+contained in perception."<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> But if perception is already organized by
+thought, the sensations must have been related in a 'productive
+imagination.' Dewey, however, does not recognize such a necessity. The
+factor of meaning is ideal, he continues, because it is not present as
+so much immediate content, but is present as symbolized or mediated. But
+the question may be asked, "Whence come the ideal elements which give to
+experience its meaning?" No answer can be given except by psychology, as
+an inquiry into the facts, as contrasted with the logical necessity of
+experience.</p>
+
+<p>Sensations acquire meaning through being identified with and
+discriminated from other sensations to which they are related. But it is
+not as mere existences that they are compared and related, but as
+already ideas or meanings. "The identification is of the meaning of the
+present sensation with some meaning previously experienced, but which,
+although previously experienced, still exists because it <i>is</i> meaning,
+and not occurrence."<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> The existences to which meanings attach come
+and go, and are new for every new appearance of the idea in
+consciousness; but the meanings remain. "The experience, as an existence
+at a given time, has forever vanished. Its meaning, as an ideal quality,
+remains as long as the mind does. Indeed, its remaining<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> is the
+remaining of the mind; the conservation of the ideal quality of
+experience is what makes the mind a permanence."<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p>
+
+<p>It is not possible, Dewey says, to imagine a primitive state in which
+unmeaning sensations existed alone. Meaning cannot arise out of that
+which has no meaning. "Sensations cannot revive each other except as
+members of one whole of meaning; and even if they could, we should have
+no beginning of significant experience. Significance, meaning, must be
+already there. Intelligence, in short, is the one indispensable
+condition of intelligent experience."<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p>
+
+<p>Thinking is an act which idealizes experience by transforming sensations
+into an intelligible whole. It works by seizing upon the ideal element
+which is already there, conserving it, and developing it. It produces
+knowledge by supplying relations to experience. Dewey realizes that his
+act of intelligence is similar to Kant's 'apperceptive unity.' He says:
+"The mention of Kant's name suggests that both his strength and his
+weakness lie in the line just mentioned. It is his strength that he
+recognizes that an apperceptive unity interpreting sensations through
+categories which constitute the synthetic content of self-consciousness
+is indispensable to experience. It is his weakness that he conceives
+this content as purely logical, and hence as formal."<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Kant's error
+was to treat the self as formal and held apart from its material. "The
+self does not work with <i>a priori</i> forms upon an <i>a posteriori</i>
+material, but intelligence as ideal (or <i>a priori</i>) constitutes
+experience (or the <i>a posteriori</i>) as having meaning."<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Dewey's
+standpoint here seems to be similar to that of Green. But as Kant's
+unity of apperception became for Green merely a symbol of the world's
+inherent intelligibility, the latter did not regard it as an actual
+process of synthesis. Dewey fails to make a distinction, which might
+have been useful to him, between Kant's unity of apperception and his
+productive imagination. It is the latter which Dewey retains, and he
+tends to identify it with the empirical process of the understanding.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>
+Knowing, psychologically considered, is a synthetic process. "And this
+is to say that experience grows as intelligence adds out of its own
+ideal content ideal quality.... The growth of the power of comparison
+implies not a formal growth, but a synthetic internal growth."<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a>
+Dewey, of course, views understanding as an integral part of reality's
+processes rather than as a process apart, but it is for him a very
+special activity, which builds up the meaning of experience. "Knowledge
+might be indifferently described, therefore, as a process of
+idealisation of experience, or of realisation of intelligence. It is
+each through the other. Ultimately the growth of experience must consist
+in the development out of itself by intelligence of its own implicit
+ideal content upon occasion of the solicitation of sensation."<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p>
+
+<p>The difficulties of Dewey's original position are numerous. The relation
+of the self, as a synthetic activity, to the "Eternal Consciousness," in
+which meaning already exists in a completed form, is especially
+perplexing. Does the self merely trace out the meaning already present
+in reality, or is it a factor in the creation of meaning? It is clear
+that if the thinking process is a genuinely synthetic activity, imposing
+meaning on sensations, it literally 'makes the world' of our experience.
+But, on the other hand, if meaning is given to thought, as a part of its
+data, the self merely reproduces in a subjective experience the thought
+which exists objectively in the eternal mind. The dilemma arises as a
+result of Dewey's initial conception of reality as a structure of
+sensations and meanings. This conception of reality must be given up, if
+the notion of thought as a process of idealization is to be retained.</p>
+
+<p>In 1888, Dewey's <i>Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human
+Understanding</i> appeared, and during the two years following he appears
+to have become interested in ethical theory, the results of his study
+beginning to appear in 1890. Dewey's ethical theories have so important
+a bearing upon his logical theory as to demand special attention. They
+will be reserved, therefore,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> for a separate chapter, and attention will
+be given here to the more strictly logical studies of the period.</p>
+
+<p>The three years which intervened between the publication of the essay on
+"Knowledge as Idealisation" and the appearance of an article "On Some
+Current Conceptions of the term 'Self,'" in <i>Mind</i> (1890),<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> did not
+serve to divert Dewey's attention from the inquiries in which he had
+previously been interested. On the contrary, the later article shows how
+persistently his mind must have dwelt upon the problems connected with
+the notion of the self as a synthetic activity in experience.</p>
+
+<p>The immediate occasion for the article on the Self was the appearance of
+Professor Andrew Seth's work, <i>Hegelianism and Personality</i> (1889).
+Dewey appears to have been influenced by Seth at an even earlier
+period,<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> and he now found the lectures on Hegel stimulating in
+connection with his own problems about thought and reality.</p>
+
+<p>It will not be necessary to go into the details of Dewey's criticism of
+the three ideas of the self presented by Seth. Since it is Dewey's own
+position that is in question, it is better to begin with his account of
+the historical origin of these definitions, "chiefly as found in Kant,
+incidentally in Hegel as related to Kant."<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Dewey turns to the
+'Transcendental Deduction,' and follows Kant's description of the
+synthetic unity of apperception. "Its gist," he says, "in the second
+edition of the <i>K.d.r.V.</i>, is the proof that the identity of
+self-consciousness involves the synthesis of the manifold of feelings
+through rules or principles which render this manifold objective, and
+that, therefore, the analytic identity of self-consciousness involves an
+objective synthetic unity of consciousness."<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> To say that
+self-consciousness is identical is a merely analytical proposition, and,
+as it stands, unfruitful. "But if we ask how we know this sameness or
+identity of consciousness, the barren principle becomes wonderfully
+fruitful."<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> In order to know reality as mine, not only must the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span>
+consciousness that it is mine accompany each particular impression, but
+each must be known as an element in <i>one</i> consciousness. "The sole way
+of accounting for this analytic identity of consciousness is through the
+activity of consciousness in connecting or 'putting together' the
+manifold of sense."<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p>
+
+<p>In the 'Deduction' of the first <i>Critique</i>, Dewey continues, Kant begins
+with the consciousness of objects, rather than with the identity of
+self-consciousness. Here also consciousness implies a unity, which is
+not merely formal, but one which actually connects the manifold of sense
+by an act. "Whether, then, we inquire what is involved in mere sameness
+of consciousness, or what is involved in an objective world, we get the
+same answer: a consciousness which is not formal or analytic, but which
+is synthetic of sense, and which acts universally (according to
+principles) in this synthesis."<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p>
+
+<p>The term 'Self,' as thus employed by Kant, Dewey says, is the
+correlative of the intelligible world. "It is the transcendental self
+looked at as 'there,' as a product, instead of as an activity or
+process."<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> This, however, by no means exhausts what Kant means by the
+self, for while he proceeds in the 'Deduction' as if the manifold of
+sense and the synthetic unity of the self were strictly correlative, he
+assumes a different attitude elsewhere. The manifold of sense is
+something in relation to the thing-in-itself, and the forms of thought
+have a reference beyond their mere application to the manifold. In the
+other connections the self appears as something purely formal; something
+apart from its manifestation in experience. In view of the wider meaning
+of the self, Dewey asks, "Can the result of the transcendental deduction
+stand without further interpretation?" It would appear that the content
+of the self is not the same as the content of the known world. The self
+is too great to exhaust itself in relation to sensation. "Sense is, as
+it were, inadequate to the relations which constitute
+self-consciousness, and thus there must also remain a surplusage in the
+self, not entering into<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> the make-up of the known world."<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> This
+follows from the fact that, while the self is unconditioned, the
+manifold of sensation is conditioned, as given, by the forms of space
+and time. "Experience can never be complete enough to have a content
+equal to that of self-consciousness, for experience can never escape its
+limitation through space and time. Self-consciousness is real, and not
+merely logical; it is the ground of the reality of experience; it is
+wider than experience, and yet is unknown except so far as it is
+reflected through its own determinations in experience,&mdash;this is the
+result of our analysis of Kant, the <i>Ding-an-Sich</i> being eliminated but
+the Kantian method and all presuppositions not involved in the notion of
+the <i>Ding-an-Sich</i> being retained."<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey's interpretation of Kant's doctrine as presented in the
+'Deductions' is no doubt essentially correct. But granting that Kant
+found it necessary to introduce a synthesis in imagination to account
+for the unity of experience and justify our knowledge of its relations,
+it must not be forgotten that this necessity followed from the nature of
+his presuppositions. If the primal reality is a 'manifold of
+sensations,' proceeding from a noumenal source, and lacking meaning and
+relations, it follows that the manifold must be gathered up into a unity
+before the experience which we actually apprehend can be accounted for.
+But if reality is experience, possessing order and coherence in its own
+nature, the productive imagination is rendered superfluous. Dewey,
+however, clings to the notion that thought is a "synthetic activity"
+which makes experience, and draws support from Kant for his doctrine.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey now inquires what relation this revised Kantian conception of the
+self bears to the view advanced by Seth, viz., that the idea of
+self-consciousness is the highest category of thought and explanation.
+Kant had tried to discover the different forms of synthesis, by a method
+somewhat artificial to be sure, and had found twelve of them. While
+Hegel's independent derivation and independent placing of the categories
+must be accepted, it does not follow that the idea of self-consciousness
+can be included in the list, even if it be considered the highest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>
+category. "For it is impossible as long as we retain Kant's fundamental
+presupposition&mdash;the idea of the partial determination of sensation by
+relation to perception, apart from its relation to conception&mdash;to employ
+self-consciousness as a principle of explaining any fact of
+experience."<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> It cannot be said of the self of Kant that it is simply
+an hypostatized category. "It is more, because the self of Kant ... is
+more than any category: it is a real activity or being."<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></p>
+
+<p>Hegel, Dewey continues, develops only one aspect of Kant's <i>Critique</i>,
+that is, the logical aspect, and consequently does not fulfil Kant's
+entire purpose. "This is, I repeat, not an immanent 'criticism of
+categories' but an analysis of experience into its aspects and really
+constituent elements."<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> Dewey, as usual, shows his opposition to a
+'merely logical' method in philosophy. He plainly indicates his
+dissatisfaction with the Hegelian development of Kant's standpoint. He
+is unfair to Hegel, however, in attributing to him a 'merely logical'
+method. Kant's self was, as Dewey asserts, something more than a
+category of thought, but it is scarcely illuminating to say of Kant that
+his purpose was the analysis of experience into its 'constituent
+elements.' Kant did, indeed, analyze experience, but this analysis must
+be regarded as incidental to a larger purpose. No criticism need be made
+of Dewey's preference for the psychological, as opposed to the logical
+aspects of Kant's work. The only comment to be made is that this
+attitude is not in line with the modern development of idealism.</p>
+
+<p>The question which finally emerges, as the result of Dewey's inquiry, is
+this: What is the nature of this self-activity which is more than the
+mere category of self-consciousness? "As long as sensation was regarded
+as given by a thing-in-itself, it was possible to form a conception of
+the self which did not identify it with the world. But when sense is
+regarded as having meaning only because it is 'there' as determined by
+thought, just as thought is 'there' only as determining sense, it would
+seem either that the self is just their synthetic unity (thus equalling
+the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> world) or that it must be thrust back of experience, and become a
+thing-in-itself. The activity of the self can hardly be a third
+something distinct from thought and from sense, and it cannot be their
+synthetic union. What, then, is it?"<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Green, Dewey says, attempted to
+solve the difficulty by his "idea of a completely realized self making
+an animal organism the vehicle of its own reproduction in time."<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a>
+This attempt was at least in the right direction, acknowledging as it
+did the fact that the self is something more than the highest category
+of thought.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey admits his difficulties in a way that makes extended comment
+unnecessary. He does not challenge the validity of the Hegelian
+development of the Kantian categories, but proposes to make more of the
+self than the Hegelians ordinarily do. This synthetic self-activity must
+reveal itself as a concrete process; that is one of the demands of his
+psychological standpoint. It is impossible to foresee what this process
+would be as an actual fact of experience.</p>
+
+<p>Although the next article which is to be considered does not offer a
+direct answer to the problems which have so far been raised, it
+nevertheless indicates the general direction which Dewey's thought is to
+take. This article, on "The Present Position of Logical Theory," was
+published in the <i>Monist</i> in 1891.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> Dewey appears at this time as the
+champion of the transcendental, or Hegelian logic, in opposition to
+formal and inductive logic. His attitude toward Hegel undergoes a marked
+change at this period. Dewey's general objection to formal logic is well
+expressed in the following passage: "It is assumed, in fine, that
+thought has a nature of its own independent of facts or subject-matter;
+that this thought, <i>per se</i>, has certain forms, and that these forms are
+not forms which the facts themselves take, varying with the facts, but
+are rigid frames, into which the facts are to be set. Now all of this
+conception&mdash;the notion that the mind has a faculty of thought apart from
+things, the notion that this faculty is constructed, in and of itself,
+with a fixed framework, the notion that thinking is the imposing of this
+fixed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> framework on some unyielding matter called particular objects, or
+facts&mdash;all of this conception appears to me as highly scholastic."<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a>
+The inductive logic, Dewey says, still clings to the notion of thought
+as a faculty apart from its material, operating with bare forms upon
+sensations. Kant had been guilty of this separation and never overcame
+it successfully. Because formal logic views thought as a process apart
+from the matter with which it has to deal, it can never be the logic of
+science. "For if science means anything, it is that our ideas, our
+judgments may in some degree reflect and report the fact itself. Science
+means, on one hand, that thought is free to attack and get hold of its
+subject-matter, and, on the other, that fact is free to break through
+into thought; free to impress itself&mdash;or rather to express itself&mdash;in
+intelligence without vitiation or deflection. Scientific men are true to
+the instinct of the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct <i>a
+priori</i> factor supplied to fact from the mind. Apriorism of this sort
+must seem like an effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of
+fact, to bring them under the yoke of fixed, external forms."<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a></p>
+
+<p>In opposition to this formal, and, as he calls it, subjective standpoint
+in logic, Dewey stands for the transcendental logic, which supposes that
+there is some kind of vital connection between thought and fact; "that
+thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process of
+translation from brute impression to lucent meaning."<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> Hegel holds
+this view of logic. "This, then, is why I conceive Hegel&mdash;entirely apart
+from the value of any special results&mdash;to represent the quintessence of
+the scientific spirit. He denies not only the possibility of getting
+truth out of a formal, apart thought, but he denies the existence of any
+faculty of thought which is other than the expression of fact
+itself."<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> At another place Dewey expresses his view of Hegel as
+follows: "Relations of thought are, to Hegel, the typical forms of
+meaning which the subject-matter takes in its various progressive stages
+of being understood."<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p><p>Dewey's defence of the transcendental logic is vigorous. He maintains
+that the disrespect into which the transcendental logic had fallen, was
+due to the fact that the popular comprehension of the transcendental
+movement had been arrested at Kant, and had never gone on to Hegel.</p>
+
+<p>The objection made to Kant's standpoint is that it treated thought as a
+process over against experience, imposing its forms upon it from
+without. "Kant never dreams, for a moment, of questioning the existence
+of a special faculty of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms.
+He states and restates that thought in itself exists apart from fact and
+occupies itself with fact given to it from without."<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> While Kant gave
+the death blow to a merely formal conception of thought, indirectly, and
+opened up the way for an organic interpretation, he did not achieve the
+higher standpoint himself. Remaining at the standpoint of Kant,
+therefore, the critic of the transcendental logic has much to complain
+of. Scientific men deal with facts, look to them for guidance, and must
+suppose that thought and fact pass into each other directly, and without
+vitiation or deflection. They are correct in opposing a conception which
+would interpose conditions between thought on the one hand and the facts
+on the other.</p>
+
+<p>But Hegel is true to the scientific spirit. "When Hegel calls thought
+objective he means just what he says: that there is no special, apart
+faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind existing separate
+from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective thought is the
+meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by methods of thought
+he understands simply the processes in which this meaning of fact is
+evolved."<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p>
+
+<p>If Hegel is true to the scientific spirit; if his logic presupposes that
+there is an intrinsic connection of thought and fact, and views science
+simply as the progressive realization of the world's ideality, then the
+only questions to be asked about his logic are questions of fact
+concerning his treatment of the categories. Is the world such a
+connected system as he holds it to be? "And, if a system, does it, in
+particular, present such phases (such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> relations, categories) as Hegel
+shows forth?"<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> These questions are wholly objective. Such a logic as
+Hegel's could scarcely make headway when it was first produced, because
+the significance of the world, its ideal character, had not been brought
+to light through the sciences. We are now reaching a stage, however,
+where science has brought the ideality of the world into the foreground,
+where it may become as real and objective a material of study as
+molecules and vibrations.</p>
+
+<p>This appreciation of Hegel would seem to indicate that Dewey has finally
+grasped the significance of Hegel's development of the Kantian
+standpoint. A close reading of the article, however, dispels this
+impression. Dewey believes that he has found in Hegel a support for his
+own psychological method in philosophy. It is scarcely necessary to say
+that Hegel's standpoint was anything but psychological. Dewey has
+already given up Kant; he will presently desert Hegel. A psychological
+interpretation of the thought-process in its relations to reality is not
+compatible with the critical method in philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>In the next article to be examined, "The Superstition of Necessity," in
+the <i>Monist</i> (1893),<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> Dewey begins to attain the psychological
+description of thought at which he had been aiming. This article was
+suggested, as Dewey indicates in a foot-note, by Mr. C. S. Pierce's
+article, "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," in the <i>Monist</i>
+(1892).<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> Although Dewey acknowledges his indebtedness to Pierce for
+certain suggestions, the two articles have little in common.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey had consistently maintained that thought is a synthetic activity
+through which reality is idealized or takes on meaning. It is from this
+standpoint that he approaches the subject of necessity. The following
+passage reveals the connection between his former position and the one
+that he is now approaching: "The whole, although first in the order of
+reality, is last in the order of knowledge. The complete statement of
+the whole is the goal, not the beginning of wisdom. We begin, therefore,
+with fragments, which are taken for wholes; and it is only by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> piecing
+together these fragments, and by the transformation of them involved in
+this combination, that we arrive at the real fact. There comes a stage
+at which the recognition of the unity begins to dawn upon us, and yet,
+the tradition of the many distinct wholes survives; judgment has to
+combine these two contradictory conceptions; it does so by the theory
+that the dawning unity is an effect necessarily produced by the
+interaction of the former wholes. Only as the consciousness of the unity
+grows still more is it seen that instead of a group of independent
+facts, held together by 'necessary' ties, there is one reality, of which
+we have been apprehending various fragments in succession and
+attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence. We learn (but
+only at the end) that instead of discovering and then connecting
+together a number of separate realities, we have been engaged in the
+progressive definition of one fact."<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey adds to his idea that our knowledge of reality is a progressive
+development of its implicit ideality through a synthetic
+thought-process, the specification that the process of idealization
+occurs in connection with particular crises and situations. There comes
+a stage, he says, when unity begins to dawn and meaning emerges.
+Necessity is a term used in connection with these transitions from
+partial to greater realization of the world's total meaning. Necessity
+is a middle term, or go-between. It marks a critical stage in the
+development of knowledge. No necessity attaches to a whole, as such.
+"<i>Qua</i> whole, the fact simply is what it is; while the parts, instead of
+being necessitated either by one another or by the whole, are the
+analyzed factors constituting, in their complete circuit, the
+whole."<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> But when the original whole breaks up, through its inability
+to comprehend new facts under its unity, a process of judgment occurs
+which aims at the establishment of a new unity. "The judgment of
+necessity, in other words, is exactly and solely the transition in our
+knowledge from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis.
+Its value is just the value of this transition; as negating the old
+partial and isolated <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>judgments&mdash;in its backward look&mdash;necessity has
+meaning; in its forward look&mdash;with reference to the resulting completely
+organized subject-matter&mdash;it is itself as false as the isolated
+judgments which it replaces."<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> We say that things must be so, when we
+do not know that they are so; that is, while we are in course of
+determining what they are. Necessity has its value exclusively in this
+transition.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey attempts to show, in a discussion which need not be followed in
+detail, that there is nothing radical in his view, and that it finds
+support among the idealists and empiricists alike. Thinkers of both
+schools (he quotes Caird and Venn) admit that the process of judgment
+involves a change in objects, at least as they are for us. There is a
+transformation of their value and meaning. "This point being held in
+common, both schools must agree that <i>the progress of judgment is
+equivalent to a change in the value of objects</i>&mdash;that objects as they
+are for us, as known, change with the development of our judgments."<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a>
+Dewey proposes to give a more specific description of this process of
+transformation, and especially, to show how the idea of necessity is
+involved in it.</p>
+
+<p>The process of transformation is occasioned by practical necessity. Men
+have a tendency to take objects as just so much and no more; to attach
+to a given subject-matter these predicates, and no others. There is a
+principle of inertia, or economy, in the mind, which leads it to
+maintain objects in their <i>status quo</i> as long as possible. "There is no
+doubt that the reluctance of the mind to give up an object once made
+lies deep in its economies.... I wish here to call attention to the fact
+that the forming of a number of distinct objects has its origin in
+practical needs of our nature. The analysis and synthesis which is first
+made is that of most practical importance...."<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> We tend to retain
+such objects as we have, and it is not until "the original
+subject-matter has been overloaded with various and opposing predicates
+that we think of doubting the correctness of our first judgments, of
+putting our first objects under suspicion."<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> Once the Ptolemaic
+system is well established, cycles and epicycles are added without
+number, rather than reconstruct the original object. When, finally, we
+are compelled to make some change, we tend to invent some new object to
+which the predicates can attach. "When qualities arise so incompatible
+with the object already formed that they cannot be referred to that
+object, it is easier to form a new object on their basis than it is to
+doubt the correctness of the old...."<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Let us suppose, then, that
+under stress of practical need, we refer the new predicates to some new
+object, and have, as a consequence, two objects. (Dewey illustrates this
+situation by specific examples.) This separation of the two objects
+cannot continue long, before we begin to discover that the two objects
+are related elements in a larger whole. "The wall of partition between
+the two separate 'objects' cannot be broken at one attack; they have to
+be worn away by the attrition arising from their slow movement into one
+another. It is the 'necessary' influence which one exerts upon the other
+that finally rubs away the separateness and leaves them revealed as
+elements of one unified whole."<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p>
+
+<p>The concept of necessity has its validity in such a movement of judgment
+as has been described. "Necessity, as the middle term, is the mid-wife
+which, from the dying isolation of judgments, delivers the unified
+judgment just coming into life&mdash;it being understood that the
+separateness of the original judgments is not as yet quite negated, nor
+the unity of the coming judgment quite attained."<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> The judgment of
+necessity connects itself with certain facts in the situation which are
+immediately concerned with our practical activities. These are facts
+which, before the crisis arises, have been neglected; they are elements
+in the situation which have been regarded as unessential, as not yet
+making up a part of the original object. "Although after our desire has
+been met they have been eliminated as accidental, as irrelevant, yet
+when the experience is again desired their integral membership in the
+real fact has to be recognized. This is done under the guise of
+considering them as means which are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> necessary to bring about the
+end."<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a> We have the if so, then so situation. "<i>If</i> we are to reach an
+end we <i>must</i> take certain means; while so far as we want an undefined
+end, an end in general, conditions which accompany it are mere
+accidents."<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> The end of this process of judgment in which necessity
+appears as a half-way stage, is the unity of reality; a whole into which
+the formerly discordant factors can be gathered together.</p>
+
+<p>Only a detailed study of the original text, with its careful
+illustrations, can furnish a thorough understanding of Dewey's position.
+Enough has been said, however, to show that this psychological account
+of the judgment process is a natural outgrowth of his former views, and
+that, as it stands, it is still in conformity with his original
+idealism. The article as a whole marks a half-way stage in Dewey's
+philosophical development. Looking backward, it is a partial fulfilment
+of the demands of "The Psychological Standpoint." It is a psychological
+description of the processes whereby self-consciousness specifies itself
+into parts which are still related to the whole. Looking forward, it
+forecasts the functional theory of knowledge. We have, to begin with,
+objects given as familiar or known experiences. So long as these are not
+put under suspicion or examined, they simply are themselves, or are
+non-cognitionally experienced. But on the occasion of a conflict in
+experience between opposed facts and their meanings, a process of
+judgment arises, whose function is to restore unity. It is in this
+process of judgment as an operation in the interests of the unity of
+experience, that the concepts, necessity and contingency, have their
+valid application and use. They are instruments for effecting a
+transformation of experience. This is the root idea of functional
+instrumentalism. It is apparent, therefore, that Dewey's later
+functionalism resulted from the natural growth and development of the
+psychological standpoint which he adopted at the beginning of his
+philosophical career.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Vol. XII, pp. 382-396.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 394.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 383.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 384.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 385.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 388.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 390.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 392.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 393.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 394.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 395.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 396. (The last sentence forecasts Dewey's
+later contention that knowing is a specific act operating upon the
+occasion of need.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Vol. XV, pp. 58-74.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> See <i>Mind</i>, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 170.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 63.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 64.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 65.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 67.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 68.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 70.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 71.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 73.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> Vol. II, pp. 1-17.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 14.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 12 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 14.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Vol. III, pp. 362-379.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> Vol. II, pp. 321-337.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. III, 1893, p. 364.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 363.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 364 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 367.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 366.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 367.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 368.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 363.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 372.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER III</span> <span class="smaller">"MORAL THEORY AND PRACTICE"</span></h2>
+
+<p>Dewey's ethical theory, as has already been indicated, stands in close
+relation to his general theory of knowledge. Since it has been found
+expedient to treat the ethical theory separately, it will be necessary
+to go back some two years and trace it from its beginnings. The order of
+arrangement that has been chosen is fortunate in this respect, since it
+brings into close connection two articles which are really companion
+pieces, in spite of the two-year interval which separates them. These
+are "The Superstition of Necessity," which was considered at the close
+of the last chapter, and "Moral Theory and Practice," an article
+published in <i>The International Journal of Ethics</i>, in January,
+1891.<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> This latter article, now to be examined, is one of Dewey's
+first serious undertakings in the field of ethical theory, and probably
+represents some of the results of his study in connection with his
+text-book, <i>Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics</i>, published in the
+same year (1891).</p>
+
+<p>The immediate occasion for the article is explained by Dewey in his
+introductory remarks: "In the first number of this journal four writers
+touch upon the same question,&mdash;the relation of moral theory to moral
+practice."<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> The four writers mentioned were Sidgwick, Adler,
+Bosanquet, and Salter. None of them, according to Dewey, had directly
+discussed the relation of moral theory to practice. "But," he says,
+"finding the subject touched upon ... in so many ways, I was led to
+attempt to clear up my own ideas."<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p>
+
+<p>There seems to exist, Dewey continues, "the idea that moral theory is
+something other than, or something beyond, an analysis of conduct,&mdash;the
+idea that it is not simply and wholly 'the theory<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> of practice.'"<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> It
+is often defined, for instance, as an inquiry into the metaphysics of
+morals, which has nothing to do with practice. But, Dewey believes,
+there must be some intrinsic connection between the theory of morals and
+moral practice. Such intrinsic connection may be denied on the ground
+that practice existed long before theory made its appearance. Codes of
+morality were in existence before Plato, Kant, or Spencer rose to
+speculate upon them. This raises the question, What is theory?</p>
+
+<p>Moral theory is nothing more than a proposed act in idea. It is insight,
+or perception of the relations and bearings of the contemplated act. "It
+is all one with moral <i>insight</i>, and moral insight is the recognition of
+the relationships in hand. This is a very tame and prosaic conception.
+It makes moral insight, and therefore moral theory, consist simply in
+the everyday workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures
+drygoods, drives nails, sells wheat, and invents the telephone."<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> The
+nature of theory as idea is more definitely described. "It is the
+construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. <i>It
+is, therefore, the doing,&mdash;the act itself, in its emerging.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p>
+
+<p>Theory is practice in idea, or as foreseen; it is the perception of what
+ought to be done. This, at least, is what moral theory is. Dewey's
+demand that fact and theory must have some intrinsic connection,
+unsatisfied in the articles reviewed in the previous chapter, is met
+here by discovering a connecting link in <i>action</i>. Theory is "<i>the
+doing,&mdash;the act itself in its emerging</i>." The reduction of thought to
+terms of action, here implied, is a serious step. It marks a new
+tendency in Dewey's speculation. Dewey does not claim, in the present
+article, that his remarks hold good for all theory. "Physical science,"
+he remarks, "does deal with abstractions, with hypothesis. It says, 'If
+this, then that.' It deals with the relations of conditions and not with
+facts, or individuals, at all. It says, 'I have nothing to do with your
+concrete falling stone, but I can tell you this, that it is a law of
+falling bodies that, etc.'"<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> But moral theory is compelled to deal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>
+with concrete situations. It must be a theory which can be applied
+directly to the particular case. Moral theory cannot exist simply in a
+book. Since, moreover, there is no such thing as theory in the abstract,
+there can be no abstract theory of morals.</p>
+
+<p>There can be no difficulty, Dewey believes, in understanding moral
+theory as action in idea. All action that is intelligent, all conduct,
+that is, involves theory. "For any <i>act</i> (as distinct from mere impulse)
+there must be 'theory,' and the wider the act, the greater its import,
+the more exigent the demand for theory."<a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> This does not, however,
+answer the question how any particular moral theory, the Kantian, the
+Hedonistic, or the Hegelian, is related to action. These systems
+present, not 'moral ideas' as explained above, but 'ideas about
+morality.' What relation have ideas about morality to specific moral
+conduct?</p>
+
+<p>The answer to this question is to be obtained through an understanding
+of the nature of the moral situation. If an act is moral, it must be
+intelligent; as moral conduct, it implies insight into the situation at
+hand. This insight is obtained by an examination and analysis of the
+concrete situation. "This is evidently a work of analysis. Like every
+analysis, it requires that the one making it be in possession of certain
+working tools. I cannot resolve this practical situation which faces me
+by merely looking at it. I must attack it with such instruments of
+analysis as I have at hand. <i>What we call moral rules are precisely such
+tools of analysis.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> The Golden Rule is such an instrument of
+analysis. Taken by itself, it offers no direct information as to what is
+to be done. "The rule is a counsel of perfection; it is a warning that
+in my analysis of the moral situation (that is, of the conditions of
+practice) I be impartial as to the effects on me and thee.'"<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> Every
+rule which is of any use at all is employed in a similar fashion.</p>
+
+<p>But this is not, so far, a statement of the nature of moral theory,
+since only particular rules have been considered. Ethical theory, in its
+wider significance, is a reflective process in which, as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> one might say,
+the 'tools of analysis' are shaped and adapted to their work. These
+rules are not fixed things, made once and for all, but of such a nature
+that they preserve their effectiveness only as they are constantly
+renewed and reshaped. Ethical theory brings the Golden Rule together
+with other general ideas, conforms them to each other, and in this way
+gives the moral rule a great scope in practice. All moral theory,
+therefore, is finally linked up with practice. "It bears much the same
+relation to the particular rule as this to the special case. It is a
+tool for the analysis of its meaning, and thereby a tool for giving it
+greater effect."<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> In ethical theory we find moral rules in the
+making. Ideas about morals are simply moral ideas in the course of being
+formed.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey presents here an instrumental theory of knowledge and concepts.
+But it differs widely from the instrumentalism of the Neo-Hegelian
+school both in its form and derivation. Dewey reaches his
+instrumentalism through a psychological analysis of the judgment
+process. He finds that theory is related to fact through action, and
+since he had been unable to give a concrete account of this relationship
+at a previous time, the conclusion may be regarded as a discovery of
+considerable moment for his philosophical method. Dewey's
+instrumentalism rests upon a very special psychological interpretation,
+which puts action first and thought second. Unable to discover an overt
+connection between fact and thought, he delves underground for it, and
+finds it in the activities of the nervous organism. This discovery, he
+believes, solves once and for all the ancient riddle of the relation of
+thought to reality.</p>
+
+<p>In the concluding part of the article Dewey takes up the consideration
+of moral obligation. "What is the relation of knowledge, of theory, to
+that Ought which seems to be the very essence of moral conduct?"<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> The
+answer anticipates in some measure the position which was taken later,
+as has been seen, in regard to necessity. The concept of obligation,
+like that of necessity, Dewey believes, has relevance only for the
+judgment situation. "But," Dewey says, "limiting the question as best I
+can, I<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> should say (first) that the 'ought' always rises from and falls
+back into the 'is,' and (secondly) that the 'ought' is itself an
+'is,'&mdash;the 'is' of action."<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Obligation is not something added to the
+conclusion of a judgment, something which gives a moral aspect to what
+had been a coldly intellectual matter. The 'ought' finds an integral
+place in the judgment process. "The difference between saying, 'this act
+is the one to be done, ...' and saying, 'The act <i>ought</i> to be done,' is
+merely verbal. The analysis of action is from the first an analysis of
+what is to be done; how, then, should it come out excepting with a 'this
+should be done'?"<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> The peculiarity of the 'ought' is that it applies
+to conduct or action, whereas the 'is' applies to the facts. It has
+reference to doing, or acting, as the situation demands. "This, then, is
+the relation of moral theory and practice. Theory is the cross-section
+of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should
+be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: in is theory in
+action."<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p>
+
+<p>The parallel between this article and "The Superstition of Necessity" is
+too obvious to require formulation, and the same criticism that applies
+to the one is applicable to the other. "The Superstition of Necessity"
+is more detailed and concrete in its treatment of the judgment process
+than this earlier article, as might be expected, but the fundamental
+position is essentially the same. The synthetic activity of the self,
+the thought-process, finally appears as the servant of action, or, more
+exactly, as itself a special mode of organic activity in general.</p>
+
+<p>From the basis of the standpoint which he had now attained Dewey
+attempted a criticism of Green's moral theory, in two articles in the
+<i>Philosophical Review</i>, in 1892 and 1893. The first of these, entitled
+"Green's Theory of the Moral Motive,"<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> appeared almost two years
+after the article on "Moral Theory and Practice." The continuity of
+Dewey's thought during the intervening period, however, is indicated by
+the fact that the first four pages of the article to be considered are
+given over to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> an introductory discussion which repeats in almost
+identical terms the position taken in "Moral Theory and Practice." Dewey
+himself calls attention to this fact in a foot-note.</p>
+
+<p>There must be, Dewey again asserts, some vital connection of theory with
+practice. "Ethical theory must be a general statement of the reality
+involved in every moral situation. It must be action stated in its more
+generic terms, terms so generic that every individual action will fall
+within the outlines it sets forth. If the theory agrees with these
+requirements, then we have for use in any special case a tool for
+analyzing that case; a method for attacking and reducing it, for laying
+it open so that the action called for in order to meet, to satisfy it,
+may readily appear."<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> Dewey argues that moral theory cannot possibly
+give directions for every concrete case, but that it by no means follows
+that theory can stand aside from the specific case and say: "What have I
+to do with thee? Thou art empirical, and I am the metaphysics of
+conduct."</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's preliminary remarks are introductory to a consideration of
+Green's ethical theory. "His theory would, I think," Dewey says, "be
+commonly regarded as the best of the modern attempts to form a
+metaphysic of ethic. I wish, using this as type, to point out the
+inadequacy of such metaphysical theories, on the ground that they fail
+to meet the demand just made of truly ethical theory, that it lend
+itself to translation into concrete terms, and thereby to the guidance,
+the direction of actual conduct."<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> Dewey recognizes that Green is
+better than his theory, but says that the theory, taken in logical
+strictness, cannot meet individual needs.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey makes a special demand of Green's theory. He demands, that is,
+that it supply a body of rules, or guides to action which can be
+employed by the moral agent as tools of analysis in cases requiring
+moral judgment. It is evident in advance that Green's theory was built
+upon a different plan, and can not meet the conditions which Dewey
+prescribes. The general nature of Green's inquiry is well stated in the
+following summary by Professor Thilly: "The truth in Green's thought is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>
+this: the purpose of all social devotion and reform is, after all, the
+perfection of man on the spiritual side, the development of men of
+character and ideals.... The final purpose of all moral endeavor must be
+the realization of an attitude of the human soul, of some form of noble
+consciousness in human personalities.... It is well enough to feed and
+house human bodies, but the paramount question will always be: What
+kinds of souls are to dwell in these bodies?"<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> To put the matter in
+more technical terms, Green is concerned with ends and values. His
+question is not, What is the best means of accomplishing a given
+purpose, but, What end is worth attaining? Such an inquiry has no
+immediate relation to action. It may lead to conclusions which become
+determining factors in action, but the process of inquiry has no direct
+reference to conduct. Dewey, having reduced thought to a function of
+activity, must proceed, by logical necessity, to carry the same
+reduction into the field of theory in general. This he does in thorough
+style. His demand that moral theory shall concern itself with concrete
+and 'specific' situations is a result of the same tendency. Since action
+can only be described as response to a 'situation,' thought, as a
+function of activity, must likewise be directed upon a 'situation.'
+Conduct in general and values in general become impossible under his
+system, because there is no such thing as an activity-in-general of the
+organism. Ends, in other words, exist only for thought, when thought is
+interpreted as transcending action, and being, in some sense,
+self-contained. When thought is interpreted as a kind of 'indirect
+activity,' its capacity for metaphysical inquiry vanishes along with its
+independence.</p>
+
+<p>It would have been more in keeping with sound criticism had Dewey
+himself taken note of the important divergence in aim and intent between
+his work and Green's. As a consequence of his failure to do so, he
+fails, necessarily, to do justice to Green's standpoint. The criticism
+which he directs against Green's moral theory may be briefly summed up
+as follows.</p>
+
+<p>Green tends to repeat the Kantian separation of the self as reason from
+the self as want or desire. "The dualism between<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> reason and sense is
+given up, indeed, but only to be replaced by a dualism between the end
+which would satisfy the self as a unity or whole, and that which
+satisfies it in the particular circumstances of actual conduct."<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> As
+a consequence of the separation of the ideal from the actual, no action
+can satisfy the whole self, and thus no action can be truly moral. "No
+thorough-going theory of total depravity ever made righteousness more
+impossible to the natural man than Green makes it to a human being by
+the very constitution of his being...."<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> Dewey traces this separation
+of the self as reason from the self as desire through those passages in
+which Green describes the moral agent as one who distinguishes himself
+from his desires (Book II, <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>). "The process of
+moral experience involves, therefore, a process in which the self, in
+becoming conscious of its want, objectifies that want by setting it over
+against itself; distinguishing the want from self and self from want....
+Now this theory so far might be developed in either of two
+directions."<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p>
+
+<p>In the first place, the self-distinguishing process may be an activity
+by means of which the self specifies its own activity and satisfaction.
+"The particular desires and ends would be the modes in which the self
+relieved itself of its abstractness, its undeveloped character, and
+assumed concrete existence.... The unity of the self would stand in no
+opposition to the particularity of the special desire; on the contrary,
+the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires would be the
+synthetic and analytic aspects of one and the same reality, neither
+having any advantage metaphysical or ethical over the other!"<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> But
+Green, unfortunately, does not develop his theory in this concrete
+direction. The self does not specify itself in the particulars, but
+remains apart from them. "The objectification is not of the self in the
+special end; but the self remains behind setting the special object over
+against itself as not adequate to itself.... The unity of the self sets
+up an ideal of satisfaction for itself as it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> withdraws from the special
+want, and this ideal set up through negation of the particular desire
+and its satisfaction constitutes the moral ideal. It is forever
+unrealizable, because it forever negates the special activities through
+which alone it might, after all, realize itself."<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> In completing this
+argument Dewey refers to certain well-known passages in the <i>Prolegomena
+to Ethics</i>, in which Green states that the moral ideal is never
+completely attainable. Green's abstract conception of the self as that
+which forever sets itself over against its desires is, Dewey argues, not
+only useless as an ideal for action, but positively opposed to moral
+striving. "It supervenes, not as a power active in its own satisfaction,
+but to make us realize the unsatisfactoriness of such seeming
+satisfactions as we may happen to get, and to keep us striving for
+something which we can never get!"<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a> The most that can be made of
+Green's moral ideal is to conceive it as the bare form of unity in
+conduct. Employed as a tool of analysis, as a moral rule, it might tell
+us, "Whatever the situation, seek for its unity." But it can scarcely go
+even as far as this in the direction of concreteness, for it says: "<i>No</i>
+unity can be found in the situation because the situation is particular,
+and therefore set over against the unity."<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p>
+
+<p>Most students of Green would undoubtedly say that this account of his
+moral theory is entirely one-sided, and fails to reckon with certain
+elements which should properly be taken into account. In the first
+place, Green is defining the moral agent as he finds him, and is
+reporting what seems to him a fact when he says that the moral ideal is
+too high to be realized in this life. Having a spiritual nature, man
+fails to find satisfaction in the goods of natural life. Dewey should
+address himself to the facts in refuting Green's analysis of human
+nature. In the second place, with respect to Green's separation of the
+self as unity from the self as a manifold of desires, Dewey's criticism
+may be flatly rejected. Green raises the question himself: "'Do you
+mean,' it may be asked, 'to assert the existence of a mysterious
+abstract entity which you call the self of a man, apart from all his
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span>particular feelings, desires, and thoughts&mdash;all the experience of his
+inner life?'"<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> Green takes time to state his position as clearly as
+possible. He repudiates the idea of an abstract self apart from desire.
+The following passage is typical of his remarks: "Just as we hold that
+our desires, feelings, and thoughts would not be what they are&mdash;would
+not be those of a man&mdash;if not related to a subject which distinguishes
+itself from each and all of them; so we hold that this subject would not
+be what it is, if it were not related to the particular feelings,
+desires, and thoughts, which it thus distinguishes from and presents to
+itself."<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> It will be remembered also, that in moral action the agent
+identifies himself with his desires, or adopts them as his own, and the
+ability to do this is the chief mark of human intelligence. But man
+could not identify himself with his desires, or 'specify himself in
+them,' as Dewey says, did he not at the same time have the capacity to
+differentiate himself from them.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's further remarks on Green's ideal need not be followed in detail,
+since they rest upon a misapprehension of Green's purpose, and add
+little to what he has already said. Taking the moral ideal as something
+that can never be realized in this life, Dewey inquires what use can be
+made of it. He considers three modes in which Green might have given
+content to the ideal, as a working principle, and finds that it cannot
+be made, in any of these ways, to serve as a tool of analysis. Green was
+not prepared to meet these 'pragmatic' requirements. He did not propose
+his ideal as a principle of conduct, in Dewey's sense; he stated that,
+as a matter of fact, man is more than natural, and that, as such a
+being, his ideals can never be completely met by natural objects. How
+man is to act, in view of his spiritual nature, is a further question:
+but the realization which the individual has of his own spiritual nature
+must of necessity be a large factor in the determination of his conduct.
+The 'Spiritual Nature,' in Green's terminology, meant a 'not-natural'
+nature, and 'not-natural' in turn meant a nature that is not definable
+in mechanical or biological terms. Dewey's criticism, therefore, went
+wide of the mark.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span></p><p>In November, 1893, Dewey followed his criticism of Green's moral motive
+by a second article in the <i>Philosophical Review</i> on "Self-realization
+as the Moral Ideal."<a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> It continues the criticism which has already
+been made of Green, but from a different point of departure.</p>
+
+<p>The idea of self-realization in ethics, Dewey begins, may be helpful or
+harmful according to the way in which the ideas of the self and its
+realization are worked out in the concrete. The mere idea of a self to
+be realized is, of course, abstract; it is merely the statement of a
+problem, which needs to be worked out and given content. By way of
+introducing his own idea of self-realization, Dewey proposes to
+criticize a certain conception of the self which he finds in current
+discussion. "The notion which I wish to criticize," he says, "is that of
+the self as a presupposed fixed <i>schema</i> or outline, while realization
+consists in the filling up of this <i>schema</i>. The notion which I would
+suggest as substitute is that of the self as always a concrete
+<i>specific</i> activity; and, therefore, (to anticipate) of the identity of
+self and realization."<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Such a presupposed fixed self is to be found
+in Green's "Eternally complete Consciousness."</p>
+
+<p>The idea of self-realization implies capacities or possibilities. To
+translate capacity into actuality, as the conception of the fixed self
+seems to do, is to vitiate the whole idea of possibility. There must,
+then, be some conception of unrealized powers which will meet this
+difficulty. The way to a valid conception is through the realization
+that capacities are always specific. "The capacities of a child, for
+example, are not simply of <i>a</i> child, not of a man, but of <i>this</i> child,
+not of any other."<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> Whatever else capacity may be, whether infinite
+or not, it must be an element in an actual situation. As specific
+things, moreover, capacities reside in activities, which are now going
+on. The capacity of a child to become a musician consists in this fact:
+"Even <i>now</i> he has a certain quickness, vividness, and plasticity of
+vision, a certain deftness of hand, and a certain motor <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span>co&ouml;rdination by
+which his hand is stimulated to work in harmony with his eye."<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p>
+
+<p>How do these specific, actual activities come to be called capacities?
+There is a peculiar psychological reason for this which James has
+pointed out, in his statement that essence "is that <i>which is so
+important for my interests</i> that, comparatively, other properties may be
+omitted."<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> When we pay attention to any activity, there is a natural
+tendency to select only that portion of it that is of immediate
+interest, and to exclude the rest as irrelevant. "In the act of vision,
+for example," Dewey tells us, "the thing that seems nearest us, that
+which claims continuously our attention, is the eye itself. We thus come
+to abstract the eye from all special acts of seeing; we make the eye the
+<i>essential</i> thing in sight, and conceive of the circumstances of vision
+as indeed <i>circumstances</i>; as more or less accidental concomitants of
+the permanent eye."<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> There is no eye in general; the eye is always
+given along with other circumstances which in their totality make up a
+concrete seeing situation. Nevertheless, we abstract the eye from other
+circumstances and set it up as the essence of seeing. But we cannot
+retain the eye in absolute abstraction, because the concrete
+circumstances of vision force themselves upon the attention. So we lump
+these together on the other side as a new object, and take as their
+essence the vibrations of ether. "<i>The eye now becomes the capacity of
+seeing; the vibrations of ether, conditions required for the exercise of
+the capacity.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> We keep the two abstractions, but try to restore
+the unity of the situation through taking one as capacity and the other
+as the condition of the exercise of capacity.</p>
+
+<p>But we cannot stop even with this double abstraction. "The eye in
+general and the vibrations in general do not, even in their unity,
+constitute the act of vision. A multitude of other factors are
+included."<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> Preserving the original 'core' as capacity, we tend to
+treat all the attendant circumstances which occur <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span>frequently enough to
+require taking account of, as conditions which help realize the
+abstracted reality called capacity.</p>
+
+<p>The discussion here is very much like that in "The Superstition of
+Necessity" (published in the same year), which was reviewed in the last
+chapter. Dewey calls attention to this connection in a foot-note,
+remarking that he has already developed at greater length "the idea that
+necessity and possibility are simply the two correlative abstractions
+into which the one reality falls apart during the process of our
+conscious apprehension of it."<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> The danger, Dewey says, is that the
+merely relative character of a given capacity may be overlooked, and
+that it may be ontologized into a fixed entity. This is the error, he
+thinks, into which Green fell. The ideal self, as that which capacity
+may realize, is ontologized into an already existent fact. Then we get a
+separation between the present self, as capacity, and the ideal self
+which is to be realized. The self already realized is opposed to the
+self as yet ideal. "This 'realized self' is no reality by itself; it is
+simply our partial conception of the self erected into an entity.
+Recognizing its incomplete character, we bring in what we have left out
+and call it the 'ideal self.' Then by way of dealing with the fact that
+we have not two selves here at all, but simply a less and a more
+adequate insight into the same self, we insert the idea of one of these
+selves realizing the other."<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> It is in this manner that error
+arises.</p>
+
+<p>But what is the correct attitude toward the self? First of all, the self
+must be conceived as "a working, practical self, carrying within the
+rhythm of its own process both 'realized' and 'ideal' self. The current
+ethics of the self ... are too apt to stop with a metaphysical
+definition, which seems to solve problems in general, but at the expense
+of the practical problems which alone really demand or admit
+solution."<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> The first point of the argument is that the self
+activity is individual, concrete, and specific, here and now, and the
+second point is that if the self is to be talked of in an intelligent
+way it must be taken as something empirically given. "The whole point is
+expressed when we say<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> that no possible future activities or conditions
+have anything to do with the present action except as they enable us to
+take deeper account of the present activity, to get beyond the mere
+superficies of the act, to see it in its totality."<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> The phrase,
+'realize yourself,' is a direction for knowledge; it means, see the
+wider consequences of your act, realize its wider bearings.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey says: "The fixed ideal is as distinctly the bane of ethical
+science today as the fixed universe of medi&aelig;valism was the bane of the
+natural science of the Renascence."<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> This is a strong statement,
+which indicates how wide was the gulf which now separated Dewey from
+Green, whom he formerly acknowledged as his master.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's interpretation of Green's ideal self is far from satisfactory,
+largely because of its lack of insight and appreciation. The reduction
+of thought to a 'form of activity' renders a purely theoretical inquiry
+impossible. The 'present activity,' the biological situation, becomes
+the measure of all things, even of thought. Ideals, in his own words,
+have nothing to do with present action, "except as they enable us to
+take deeper account of the present activity." Dewey's self and Green's
+are incommensurable. The former is the biological organism, with a
+capacity for indirect activity called thinking; the latter is a
+not-natural being, whose reality escapes the logic of descriptive
+science, because of the fulness of its content. Dewey's failure to
+understand this difference is significant. His acquaintance with Green
+seems to have been formal from the beginning, never intimate, and the
+articles just reviewed mark the end of Dewey's idealistic discipleship.
+His psychological idealism, in fact, was fundamentally antithetical to
+the Neo-Hegelianism which he had sought to espouse, and the development
+of his own standpoint brought out the vital differences which had been
+hidden from his earlier understanding. The idealism which seeks to view
+reality together and as a whole is forever incompatible with a method
+which seeks to interpret the whole in terms of one of its parts.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> Vol. I, pp. 186-203.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 186.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 187.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 188.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 191 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 189.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 194. Author's Italics.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 195.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 198.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 202.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 203.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> <i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. I, 1892, pp. 593-612.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 596.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 597.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> <i>History of Philosophy</i>, p. 555.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> <i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. I, 1892, p. 598.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 599.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> Compare with the passage in "Psychology as
+Philosophic Method," <i>Mind</i>, Vol. XI, p. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 600.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 601.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 602.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, third ed., p. 103.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 104.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> Vol. II, pp. 652-664.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 653.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 655.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 656.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 657.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 658. Author's italics.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, note.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 663.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 659.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 664.</p></div>
+</div>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER IV</span> <span class="smaller">FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY</span></h2>
+
+<p>It now becomes necessary to review that period of Dewey's philosophical
+career which is marked by the definite abandonment of the idealistic
+standpoint, and the adoption of the method of instrumental pragmatism.
+It has already been seen that there is a close connection between the
+"functionalism" which now begins to appear, and the "Psychological
+Standpoint" set forth in the preceding pages of this review. It is not
+possible, however, to account for all the elements which contribute to
+this development. Dewey was active in many fields and received
+suggestions from many sources. It seems best, in dealing with this
+period, to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" and avoid <i>a priori</i>
+speculation on the factors which determined the precise form of Dewey's
+mature standpoint in philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey had always kept in mind the idea that the synthetic activity
+whereby self-consciousness evolves the ideality of the world must
+operate through the human organism. He had frequently referred to
+Green's saying that the Eternal Self-Consciousness reproduces itself in
+man, and to similar notions in Caird and Kant; but he had never
+considered, in a detailed way, how the organism might serve as the
+vehicle for such a process. His ethical theory, with its analysis of
+individuality into capacity and environment, tended to bring the
+body-world relationship into the foreground, and the idea that theory is
+relative to action tended to emphasize still more the relation of
+thought to the bodily processes. Dewey finally discovers the basis upon
+which the synthetic activity of the self, the thought process, may be
+described empirically and concretely.
+Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the key-stone of his theory
+of knowledge. Thought is interpreted as a function of the organism,
+biologically considered, and the biological psychology which results
+from this mode of interpretation is commonly known as 'functional
+psychology.'</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span></p><p>The functional psychology is presented in a series of articles in the
+<i>Philosophical Review</i> and the <i>Psychological Review</i>, published between
+1894 and 1898. The most important of these is "The Reflex Arc Concept in
+Psychology," published in the <i>Psychological Review</i> in 1896.<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> Since
+it is the only article in the series which gives a complete view of the
+theory, it will be made the basis for the discussion of the functional
+theory of psychology.</p>
+
+<p>The reflex arc concept in psychology, Dewey says, recognizes that the
+sensory-motor arc is to be taken as the unit of nerve structure, and the
+type of nerve function. But psychologists do not avail themselves of the
+full value of this conception, because they still retain in connection
+with it certain distinctions which were used in the older psychology.
+"The older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current
+dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions; the older
+dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of
+stimulus and response."<a name="FNanchor_117_117" id="FNanchor_117_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> These rigid distinctions must be set aside,
+and the separated elements must be viewed as elements in one
+sensory-motor co&ouml;rdination. Each is to be defined, not as something
+existing by itself, but as an element functioning in a concrete whole of
+activity. Thus, if we are to study vision, we must first take vision as
+a sensory-motor co&ouml;rdination, the act of seeing, and within the whole we
+may then be able to distinguish certain elements, sensations, or
+movements, and define them according to their function in the total act
+of seeing. The reflex arc idea, as commonly employed, takes sensation as
+stimulus, and movement as response, as if they were actually separate
+existences, apart from a co&ouml;rdination. Response is said to follow
+sensation, but it is forgotten that the sensation which preceded was
+correlated with a response, and that the response which follows is also
+correlated with sensation. Sound, for instance, is not a mere sensation
+in itself, apart from sensory-motor co&ouml;rdination. Hearing is an act, and
+while sound may, for purposes of study, be abstracted from the total, it
+is not, in itself, independent of the total act of hearing.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p><p>"But, in spite of all this, it will be urged, there is a distinction
+between stimulus and response, between sensation and motion. Precisely;
+but we ought now to be in a condition to ask of what nature is the
+distinction, instead of taking it for granted as a distinction somehow
+lying in the existence of the facts themselves."<a name="FNanchor_118_118" id="FNanchor_118_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> The distinction
+which is to be made between them must be made on a teleological basis.
+"The fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of
+existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of
+function, or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an
+end."<a name="FNanchor_119_119" id="FNanchor_119_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> There are two kinds of teleological distinction that can be
+made between stimulus and response, or rather, the teleological
+interpretation has two phases.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, it may be assumed that all of man's activity
+furthers some general end, as, for instance, the maintenance of life.
+Then man's activity may be viewed as a sequence of acts, which tend to
+further this end, and on this basis we may separate out stimulus and
+response. "It is only when we regard the sequence of acts <i>as if</i> they
+were adapted to reach some end that it occurs to us to speak of one as
+stimulus and the other as response. Otherwise, we look at them as a
+<i>mere</i> series."<a name="FNanchor_120_120" id="FNanchor_120_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> In these cases the stimulus is as truly an act as
+the response, and what we have is a series of sensory-motor
+co&ouml;rdinations. Looking, for instance, is a sensory-motor co&ouml;rdination
+which is the stimulus or antecedent of another co&ouml;rdinated act, running
+away. The first co&ouml;rdination passes into the second, and the second may
+be viewed as a modification or reconstitution of the first.</p>
+
+<p>But this external teleological distinction between sensation and
+response is not so important as the distinction now to be made. So far
+only fixed co&ouml;rdinations, habitual modes of action, have been
+considered. But there are situations in which habitual responses and
+fixed modes of action fail: situations in which new habits are formed.
+In these situations there arises a special distinction between stimulus
+and response, for in these formative situations the stimuli and
+responses are consciously present in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> experience as such. "The circle is
+a co&ouml;rdination, some of whose members have come into conflict with each
+other. It is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution
+which occasions, which affords the genesis of, the conscious distinction
+into sensory stimulus on one side and motor response on the other."<a name="FNanchor_121_121" id="FNanchor_121_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_121_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a>
+The distinction which arises between stimulus and response is a
+distinction of function within the problematical situation. Suppose that
+a sound is heard, the character of which is uncertain, and which, as a
+co&ouml;rdination, does not readily pass into its following co&ouml;rdination, or
+habitual response. The sound is puzzling, and moves into the center of
+attention. It is fixed upon, abstracted, studied on its own account. In
+that event, the sound may be spoken of as a sensation. As a sensation,
+it is the datum of a reflective process of thought, or conscious
+inference, whose aim is to constitute the sound a stimulus, or, in other
+words, to find what response belongs to it. When this response is
+determined the problem is done with and sensory-motor unity is achieved.</p>
+
+<p>The stimulus, in these cases, is simply "that phase of activity
+requiring to be defined in order that a co&ouml;rdination may be
+completed."<a name="FNanchor_122_122" id="FNanchor_122_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> It is not any particular existence, and is not to be
+taken as an element apart from others, having an independent existence.
+But the conscious process of attending to the sensation and finding a
+response to it arises only when co&ouml;rdination is disturbed by conflicting
+factors, and the separation of stimulus from response arises only as a
+means for bringing unity into the co&ouml;rdination. The sensation, then, is
+that element which is to be attended to; upon which further response
+depends. This phase of the teleological interpretation defines each
+element by the part which it plays in the reflective process.</p>
+
+<p>If this brief summary of the article is difficult to comprehend, a
+reading of the original text will do little towards making it more
+intelligible. The doctrine presented there, however, is simple and
+coherent enough when its bearings and purpose are once understood, and,
+at the risk of being over-elaborate, it seems<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> advisable to attempt some
+remarks on the general bearing and applications of the theory.</p>
+
+<p>It must be remembered that Dewey is seeking an interpretation of the
+thought process which shall reveal it as an actual fact of experience. A
+thought which is apart from experience and not <i>in</i> it, which is shut up
+to the contemplation of its own mental states is, by its definition,
+non-experienced. It is, like Kant's 'productive imagination,' formative
+of experience, but not a part of it. Dewey holds to the belief that
+experience must be explained in terms of itself; he would do away with
+all transcendental factors in the explanation of reality. But modern
+psychological theory, Dewey believes, tends to shut thought in to the
+contemplation of its own subjective states, and thus gives it an
+extra-experiential status. A stimulus is said to strike upon an end
+organ, which sends an impulse to the cortex and there gives rise to a
+sensation which, as the effect of a stimulus, is representative of the
+real, but not real in itself. Thought, again, interprets the sensation,
+and sends out a motor impulse appropriate to the situation. These mental
+states and the thought which interprets them are, in Dewey's mind,
+wholly fictitious. The problem, then, is to give an account of the
+perceptual processes which shall eliminate the artificial states of mind
+and present mental operations as natural processes.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulty with customary psychological explanation is that it
+breaks the reflex arc of the nervous system into three parts whose
+relations are successive and causal rather than simultaneous and
+organic. There is not first a stimulus, then perception, then response;
+these processes are supplementary, not separate. Or, from another point
+of view, psychological explanation must begin with a whole process
+which, when analyzed, is seen to contain the three moments or phases:
+stimulus, sensation, and response. The whole process is primary and
+actual, the abstracted phases are secondary and derivative.</p>
+
+<p>With the disappearance of the mechanical interpretation of the
+perceptual process, mental states vanish. Representative perceptionism
+is thus done away with, together with all the problems which it
+generates.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span></p><p>The position of conscious, or reflective thought, in Dewey's scheme, is
+especially interesting. This mode of thought is not constantly
+operative, but arises only in situations of stress and strain, when
+habitual modes of response break down. A dualism is established between
+reflective thought and the habitual life processes. Dewey does not take
+the ground that these processes are supplementary, as he had done in the
+case of stimulus, sensation, and response. It will be remembered that
+Dewey had defined judgment, in his logical and ethical writings of an
+earlier period, as a special activity operating in critical situations.
+This conception of judgment is now carried over into his psychology, and
+given a biological basis. It is worth noting that this view of judgment
+was worked out in logical terms before it was reinforced by biological
+data. Nevertheless, it is through biology that Dewey is able to give his
+interpretation of the thought process that empirical concreteness which
+he demanded from the beginning, but achieved very slowly.</p>
+
+<p>The value of the functional psychology, considered merely as psychology,
+is undeniable. It is, in fact, a natural and almost inevitable step in
+the development of psychological theory. Dewey's achievement consists in
+the establishment of an organic mode of interpretation in psychology,
+intended to displace the mechanical interpretation. The mechanical
+causal series is displaced by an organic system of internally related
+parts. Dewey, however, does not display any interest in the logical
+aspects of his doctrine. He takes the biological situation literally, as
+a fact empirically given, and to be accepted without criticism.</p>
+
+<p>A discussion of the period now under consideration would not be complete
+without reference to certain articles which supplement the essay
+discussed above. The first of these is an article on "The Psychology of
+Effort," published in the <i>Philosophical Review</i> in 1897.<a name="FNanchor_123_123" id="FNanchor_123_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a></p>
+
+<p>It is not proposed to follow the argument of this article in detail, but
+to center attention upon those parts of it, especially the concluding
+pages, which have a special interest in connection<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> with the subject
+under discussion. Dewey returns, in this article, to the situation of
+effort at adjustment; to the situation in which an effort is made to
+determine the proper response to a stimulus. The opening pages are
+devoted, in the first place, to a discussion of the distinction between
+conscious effort and the mere expenditure of energy or effort as it
+appears to an outsider, and, in the second place, to maintaining, by
+means of examples, the proposition that the sense of effort is
+sensationally mediated. "How then does, say, a case of perception with
+effort differ from a case of 'easy' or effortless perception? The
+difference, I repeat, shall be wholly in sensory quale; but in <i>what</i>
+sensory quale?"<a name="FNanchor_124_124" id="FNanchor_124_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a></p>
+
+<p>The conscious sense of effort arises, Dewey answers, when there is a
+rivalry or conflict between two sensational elements in experience. "In
+the case of felt effort, certain sensory quales, usually fused, fall
+apart in consciousness, and there is an alternation, an oscillation,
+between them, accompanied by a disagreeable tone when they are apart,
+and an agreeable tone when they become fused again."<a name="FNanchor_125_125" id="FNanchor_125_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> These two sets
+of sensory elements have each a significance in terms of adjustment; one
+of them is a correlate of a habit, or fixed mode of response, and the
+other is an intruder which resists absorption into, or fusion with, the
+dominant images of the current habit or purpose. The same idea of a
+natural tendency to persist in a habitual mode of regarding things was
+met with in the last two chapters, and is qualified here by the addition
+of the idea that each sensory element represents a typical mode of
+response on the part of the organism. Dewey illustrates his notion by
+the case of learning to ride a bicycle. "Before one mounts one has
+perhaps a pretty definite visual image of himself in balance and in
+motion. This image persists as a desirability. On the other hand, there
+comes into play at once the consciousness of the familiar motor
+adjustments,&mdash;for the most part, related to walking. The two sets of
+sensations refuse to coincide, and the result is an amount of stress and
+strain relevant to the most serious problems of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> universe."<a name="FNanchor_126_126" id="FNanchor_126_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> In
+another passage, which brings out even more clearly the rivalry of the
+two sets of sensations, he says: "It means that the activity already
+going on (and, therefore, reporting itself sensationally) resists
+displacement, or transformation, by or into another activity which is
+beginning, and thus making its sensational report."<a name="FNanchor_127_127" id="FNanchor_127_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p>
+
+<p>The sense of effort, then, reduces itself to an awareness of conflict
+between two sensational elements and their motor correlates.
+"Practically stated, this means that effort is nothing more, and also
+nothing less, than tension between means and ends in action, and that
+the sense of effort is the awareness of this conflict."<a name="FNanchor_128_128" id="FNanchor_128_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p>
+
+<p>The important aspect of Dewey's argument, for the present discussion, is
+that awareness reduces to these sensational elements and their
+attributes. Throughout the article Dewey is opposing his sensational
+view of the sense of effort to what he calls the 'spiritual' or
+non-sensational view, which supposes that the sense of effort is
+something purely psychical, which accompanies the expenditure of
+physical energy. The consciousness of effort, Dewey says, is not
+something added to the effort, but is itself a certain condition
+existing in the sensory quales.</p>
+
+<p>This provision would make it necessary to identify consciousness, and,
+therefore, conscious inference, with the tensional situation which has
+been described. This being granted, all that pertains to conscious
+inference, all the methods and categories of science, would be
+applicable only in such situations of stress and strain; they would
+appear simply as instruments for effecting a readjustment; they would be
+employed exclusively in the interests of action. This is the direction
+in which Dewey is tending. No criticism of this treatment of judgment
+need be made at this time, beyond pointing out that it presents itself,
+at first sight, as an awkward and indirect mode of describing the
+relations between organic activity and intelligence, and between
+psychology and logic.</p>
+
+<p>Nothing has so far been said of the historical sources of Dewey's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>
+theory, and these may be briefly considered. There are at least two
+sources which must be taken into account: the James-Lange theory of the
+emotions, and the Neo-Hegelian ethical theory. The latter has already
+been considered to some extent, as it manifests itself in Dewey's own
+ethical theory, but its relation to his psychology has not been
+indicated. In his text-book, the <i>Outlines of a Critical Theory of
+Ethics</i> (1891), Dewey advanced certain ideas for which he claimed
+originality, at least in treatment. Among these was the analysis of
+individuality into function including capacity and environment.<a name="FNanchor_129_129" id="FNanchor_129_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p>
+
+<p>Bradley appears to have been the first among English philosophers to
+introduce that synthesis of the internal and external, of the
+intuitional and utilitarian modes of judging conduct, which became
+characteristic of Neo-Hegelian ethics. The synthesis, of course, is
+Hegelian in temper, and the <i>Ethical Studies</i> are much more suggestive,
+in general method, of the <i>Philosophie des Rechts</i> than of any previous
+English work. Utilitarianism tended to judge the moral act by its
+external, <i>de facto</i> results; intuitionism, on the contrary, attributed
+morality to the will of the agent. The former found morality to consist
+in a certain state of affairs, the latter in a certain internal
+attitude. According to the synthetic point of view, these opposed
+ethical systems are one-sided representations of the moral situation,
+each being true in its own way. To state the matter in another form, the
+moral act has a content as well as a purpose. "Let us explain," says
+Bradley. "The moral world, as we said, is a whole, and has two sides.
+There is an outer side, systems and institutions, from the family to the
+nation; this we may call the body of the moral world. And there must
+also be a soul, or else the body goes to pieces; every one knows that
+institutions without the spirit of them are dead.... We must never let
+this out of our sight, that, where the moral world exists, you have and
+you must have these two sides."<a name="FNanchor_130_130" id="FNanchor_130_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> Dewey expresses the same idea in a
+more detailed fashion. "What do we mean by individuality? We may
+distinguish two factors&mdash;or better two aspects, two sides&mdash;in
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>individuality. On one side it means special disposition, temperament,
+gifts, bent, or inclination; on the other side it means special station,
+situation, limitations, surroundings, opportunities, etc. Or, let us
+say, it means <i>specific capacity</i> and <i>specific environment</i>. Each of
+these elements apart from the other, is a bare abstraction, and without
+reality. Nor is it strictly correct to say that individuality is
+contributed by these two factors <i>together</i>. It is, rather, as intimated
+above, that each is individuality looked at from a certain point of
+view, from within and from without."<a name="FNanchor_131_131" id="FNanchor_131_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> It is a fact, empirically
+demonstrable, according to Dewey, that body and object, intention and
+foreseen consequence, interest and environment, attitude and
+objectivity, are parts of one another and of the whole moral situation.
+Each is relative to the other. "It is not, then, the environment as
+physical of which we are speaking, but as it appears to consciousness,
+as it is affected by the make-up of the agent. This is the <i>practical</i>
+or <i>moral</i> environment."<a name="FNanchor_132_132" id="FNanchor_132_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_132_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> When this relation of the inner to the
+outer is taken literally and universally, we have the essence of the
+functional psychology. Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the
+catch-word of instrumental pragmatism.</p>
+
+<p>The other source of Dewey's psychology, which is now to be considered,
+is the James-Lange theory of the emotions. The connection here is more
+obvious, but perhaps not so vital, as in the case of the ethical theory.
+From the numerous references which Dewey made to James's <i>Principles of
+Psychology</i> (1890), it is evident that he was much impressed with this
+work. The theory of emotion there presented seems to have had a special
+interest for him; so much so that he made it the subject of two articles
+in the <i>Psychological Review</i>, in 1894 and 1895, under the general
+title, "The Theory of Emotion."<a name="FNanchor_133_133" id="FNanchor_133_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> These studies bear a very close
+relation to the article on "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology"
+(1896), the standpoint being essentially the same, although developed in
+reference to a technical problem. Some indications may be given here of
+the relationships which they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> bear to the James-Lange theory on the one
+side, and functional psychology on the other. The James-Lange theory is
+itself concerned with order and connection between emotional states,
+perceptions, and responses. James says: "Our natural way of thinking
+about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact
+excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter
+state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the
+contrary, is that <i>the bodily changes follow directly the perception of
+the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they
+occur IS the emotion</i>."<a name="FNanchor_134_134" id="FNanchor_134_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> It is all a question, James says, of the
+order and sequence of these elements, and his contention is that the
+bodily changes should be interposed between the two mental states. This
+is the question with which Dewey's functional psychology is also
+concerned, the relation of response to stimulus, and the manner in which
+a stimulus is determined by a reaction 'into it.' Dewey's theory rises
+so naturally out of James's theory of the emotions as to seem but little
+more than its universal application.</p>
+
+<p>This connection is revealed in several passages in Dewey's study of the
+emotions. It is said, for instance, that the emotional situation must be
+taken as a whole, as a state, for instance, of 'being angry.' The
+several constituents of the state of anger, idea or object, affect or
+emotion, and mode of expression or behavior, are not to be taken
+separately, but all together as elements in one whole.<a name="FNanchor_135_135" id="FNanchor_135_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a> Another
+characteristic doctrine appears in the affirmation that the emotional
+attitude is to be distinguished from other attitudes by certain special
+features which it possesses. Particularly, it involves a special
+relation of stimulus to response.<a name="FNanchor_136_136" id="FNanchor_136_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> Again, there is a tendency to
+translate meaning in terms of projected activity. "The consciousness of
+our mode of behavior as affording data for other possible actions
+constitutes an objective or ideal content."<a name="FNanchor_137_137" id="FNanchor_137_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p>
+
+<p>It is enough, perhaps, to reveal these two sources as probable factors
+in the development of Dewey's psychological method.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> No speculation upon
+them is necessary. At most, they were merely contributory to Dewey's
+thought, and by fitting in with his previous ideas enabled him to give a
+more concrete presentation of his psychological theory than would
+otherwise have been possible.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> Vol. III, pp. 357-370.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_117_117" id="Footnote_117_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 357.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_118_118" id="Footnote_118_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 365.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_119_119" id="Footnote_119_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_120_120" id="Footnote_120_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 366, note.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_121_121" id="Footnote_121_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121_121"><span class="label">[121]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 370.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_122_122" id="Footnote_122_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122_122"><span class="label">[122]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 368.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_123_123" id="Footnote_123_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123_123"><span class="label">[123]</span></a> Vol. VI, pp. 43-56.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_124_124" id="Footnote_124_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124_124"><span class="label">[124]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 46.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_125_125" id="Footnote_125_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125_125"><span class="label">[125]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 48.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_126_126" id="Footnote_126_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126_126"><span class="label">[126]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 50.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_127_127" id="Footnote_127_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127_127"><span class="label">[127]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 52.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_128_128" id="Footnote_128_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128_128"><span class="label">[128]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 51.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_129_129" id="Footnote_129_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129_129"><span class="label">[129]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. viii.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_130_130" id="Footnote_130_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130_130"><span class="label">[130]</span></a> <i>Ethical Studies</i>, p. 160 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_131_131" id="Footnote_131_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131_131"><span class="label">[131]</span></a> <i>Outlines of Ethics</i>, p. 97.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_132_132" id="Footnote_132_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132_132"><span class="label">[132]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 99.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_133_133" id="Footnote_133_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133_133"><span class="label">[133]</span></a> Vol. I, pp. 553-569; Vol. II, pp. 13-32.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_134_134" id="Footnote_134_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134_134"><span class="label">[134]</span></a> <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, Vol. II, p. 449.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_135_135" id="Footnote_135_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135_135"><span class="label">[135]</span></a> <i>Psy. Rev.</i>, Vol. II, p. 15 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_136_136" id="Footnote_136_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136_136"><span class="label">[136]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 24 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_137_137" id="Footnote_137_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137_137"><span class="label">[137]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 24.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER V</span> <span class="smaller">THE EVOLUTIONARY STANDPOINT</span></h2>
+
+<p>Dewey's psychology is linked up with his logical theory, as has already
+been suggested, through the interpretation of the thought-process as a
+mode of adjustment involving inference. This conception of thought
+implies, of course, that thought is an instrument of adaptation, and
+this in turn suggests that the organ of reflection is a product of
+evolutionary forces operating on the individual and on the race. In the
+period now to be reviewed Dewey, for the first time in his career,
+displays an active and intense interest in evolutionary theory,
+especially as applied in the fields of ethics and psychology.</p>
+
+<p>An article published in the <i>Monist</i>, in 1898, on "Evolution and
+Ethics,"<a name="FNanchor_138_138" id="FNanchor_138_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> deserves special attention. The central thought of the
+article is to be found in the following passage: "The belief that
+natural selection has ceased to operate [in the human sphere] rests upon
+the assumption that there is only one form of such selection: that where
+improvement is indirectly effected by the failure of species of a
+certain type to continue to reproduce; carrying with it as its
+correlative that certain variations continue to multiply, and finally
+come to possess the land. This ordeal by death is an extremely important
+phase of natural selection, so called.... However, to identify this
+procedure absolutely with selection, seems to me to indicate a somewhat
+gross and narrow vision. Not only is one form of life as a whole
+selected at the expense of other forms, <i>but one mode of action in the
+same individual is constantly selected at the expense of others</i>. There
+is not only the trial by death, but there is the trial by the success or
+failure of special acts&mdash;the counterpart, I suppose, of physiological
+selection so called."<a name="FNanchor_139_139" id="FNanchor_139_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> We have here a refinement upon the doctrine
+of natural selection. The keynote of Dewey's new<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> psychology is a
+process of selection constantly occurring within the individual
+organism. He points out that, in dealing with man, we have a highly
+adaptable, not merely a highly adapted animal. "It is certainly implied
+in the idea of natural selection that the most effective modes of
+variation should themselves be finally selected."<a name="FNanchor_140_140" id="FNanchor_140_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> The capacity to
+vary, or adapt, is highly developed in man. Through these variations,
+the organism is able to react against the environment, changing its
+character quite completely. The environment of the modern human is
+tremendously complicated by his reaction upon it. "The growth of
+science, its application in invention to industrial life, the
+multiplication and acceleration of means of transportation and
+intercommunication, have created a peculiarly unstable
+environment."<a name="FNanchor_141_141" id="FNanchor_141_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> Under these conditions, the ability of the individual
+to adapt himself to changing circumstances is largely determined by his
+degree of flexibility in the selection of right acts and responses. "In
+the present environment, flexibility of function, the enlargement of the
+range of uses to which one and the same organ, grossly considered, may
+be put, is a great, almost the supreme, condition of success."<a name="FNanchor_142_142" id="FNanchor_142_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> The
+human mind is to be interpreted as a highly developed organ whose
+special function is to make adaptation more flexible and response more
+varied and discriminating. "That which was 'tendency to vary' in the
+animal is conscious foresight in man. That which was unconscious
+adaptation and survival in the animal, taking place by the 'cut and try'
+method until it worked itself out, is with man conscious deliberation
+and experimentation."<a name="FNanchor_143_143" id="FNanchor_143_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p>
+
+<p>This view of consciousness is worked out on the basis of an evolutionary
+metaphysics. Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the changing
+whirl of things, stimulated into action by his needs and wants, adapting
+himself to conditions, making the situation over, or meeting it
+habitually where he can and suffering the consequences where he cannot
+make the necessary<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> adjustment. If this be taken, as would seem, for the
+ultimate truth about reality and man's place in it, it must be called a
+metaphysics. Against this background Dewey's logical theory is
+developed. The most important result, from the standpoint of the student
+of mind and spirit, is the reduction of self-conscious reflection to the
+position of a nervous function of the organism. The purely theoretical
+evidence by which this position is sustained should be subjected to
+closer scrutiny than can be undertaken in this limited space.</p>
+
+<p>The purpose of reflection, then, is to enable man to adapt himself to
+his environment, understanding by the environment the whole of the
+reality which surrounds him. The test of the mind and its newly
+projected modes of response [ideas] lies in its ability to meet the
+demands of the situation. The capacities and limits of mind are
+determined by the purpose for which it was evolved; it can enable a man
+to deal more effectively with his environment; it can do nothing else.
+It cannot speculate on the nature of reality as such, nor voyage on long
+journeys in search of truth! Its business is practical, here and now.
+Its problems are always set for it by circumstances, and these
+circumstances are concrete and specific. There is no such thing as
+adaptation at large or in general.</p>
+
+<p>The business of mind is to have, and to continually reconstruct, useful
+habits. So Dewey assures the American Psychological Association in 1899,
+in an address on "Psychology and Social Practice."<a name="FNanchor_144_144" id="FNanchor_144_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> We must
+recognize, he says, "that the existing order is determined neither by
+fate nor by chance, but is based on law and order, on a system of
+existing stimuli and modes of reaction, through knowledge of which we
+can modify the practical outcome."<a name="FNanchor_145_145" id="FNanchor_145_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> Psychology uninterpreted, he
+says, will never provide ready-made materials and prescriptions for the
+ethical life. "But science, both physical and psychological, makes known
+the conditions upon which certain results depend, and therefore puts at
+the disposal of life a certain method of controlling them."<a name="FNanchor_146_146" id="FNanchor_146_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> These
+statements show the extent to which Dewey's view of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> knowledge has come
+to be controlled by biological conceptions.</p>
+
+<p>The evolutionary method is investigated in considerable detail in the
+next article to be considered, which was published in two parts in the
+<i>Philosophical Review</i>, 1902, under the title, "The Evolutionary Method
+as Applied to Morality."<a name="FNanchor_147_147" id="FNanchor_147_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a></p>
+
+<p>The fact that some philosophers deny the importance of the evolutionary
+method for ethics, holding that morality is purely a matter of value,
+and that the evolutionary method tends only to obscure differences of
+value, makes it necessary to inquire into the import and nature of this
+method. "Anyway," Dewey says, "before we either abuse or recommend
+genetic method we ought to have some answers to these questions: Just
+what is it? Just what is to come of it and how?"<a name="FNanchor_148_148" id="FNanchor_148_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a></p>
+
+<p>The experimental method in science has at least some of the traits of a
+genetic method. The nature of water, for instance, cannot be determined
+by simply observing it. But experiment brings to light the exact
+conditions under which it came into being and therefore explains it.
+"Through generating water we single out the precise and sole conditions
+which have to be fulfilled that water may present itself as an
+experienced fact. If this case be typical, then the experimental method
+is entitled to rank as genetic method; it is concerned with the manner
+or process by which anything comes into experienced existence."<a name="FNanchor_149_149" id="FNanchor_149_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p>
+
+<p>Some would deny this, on the ground that a genuinely historical event
+occupies a particular place in a historical series, from which it is
+inseparable, while in experimental science the sets or pairs of terms
+are not limited to any particular place in a historical series, but
+occur and recur. "Water is made over and over again, and, so to speak,
+at any date in the cosmic series. This deprives any account of it of
+genuinely historic quality."<a name="FNanchor_150_150" id="FNanchor_150_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> Again, it might be said in opposition
+to treating the experimental method as a genetic method, that it is
+interested in individual cases not as such, but as samples or instances.
+The particular case is only an illustration of the general relation
+which is being sought.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span></p><p>It will turn out in the course of the discussion, Dewey says, that,
+although science deals with origins, it is not, in strictness, a
+historical discipline. The distinction between the historical and other
+sciences is based on an abstraction, which has been introduced for the
+sake of more adequate control. It is only by abstraction that we get the
+pairs of facts that may show up at any time, and by abstraction we
+attribute to them a generalized character. The facts, in themselves, are
+historic.</p>
+
+<p>There is no such thing as water in general, but water is just this
+water, at this time, in this place, and it never shows itself twice,
+never recurs. The scientist must deal, therefore, with particular
+historic cases of water, and with their specific origins. "Experiment
+has to do with the conditions of production of a specific amount of
+water, at a specific time and place, under specific circumstances: in a
+word, it must deal with just <i>this</i> water. The conditions which define
+its origin must be stated with equal definiteness and
+circumstantiality."<a name="FNanchor_151_151" id="FNanchor_151_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> The instance has as definite a place in an
+historical series as has Julius Caesar. But the difference in treatment
+of the water and Caesar is due to the difference in interest. "Julius
+Caesar served a purpose which no other individual, at any other time,
+could have served. There is a peculiar flavor of human meaning and
+accomplishment about him which has no substitute or equivalent. Not so
+with water. While each portion is absolutely unique in its occurrence,
+yet one lot will serve our intellectual or practical needs just as well
+as any other."<a name="FNanchor_152_152" id="FNanchor_152_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> For this reason the specific case of water is not
+dealt with on its own account, but only as giving insight into the
+processes of its generation in general. In this way the difference
+arises between the generalized statements of physical science and the
+individualized form demanded in historical science. The abstract
+character of the physical result is recognized by the hypothetical form
+of judgment in modern logic; if certain conditions, then certain
+consequences. But the counterpart of this must not be forgotten, that
+every categorical proposition applies to an individual. Experimental
+propositions,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> therefore, have an historical value. "They take their
+rise in, and they find their application to, a world of unique and
+changing things: an evolutionary universe."<a name="FNanchor_153_153" id="FNanchor_153_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> The recognition of the
+historical character of experimental science does not in any way
+derogate from its value, but, properly understood, gives a deeper
+insight into its significance. It should be observed that here also
+Dewey treats thought, hypothesis, as coming 'after something, and for
+the sake of something.'</p>
+
+<p>This attempt to justify the historical method by showing that it is
+implied in physical experiment is of dubious value. Its net result would
+seem to be the conclusion that every fact may be dealt with either as a
+historical fact or as a datum for physical science. Even here, however,
+Dewey slurs over certain difficulties which demand close scrutiny. The
+treatment of individuality is most unsatisfactory. While each portion or
+instance of water is itself, and has its own unquestionable uniqueness,
+no case is a mere particular, but each is a true individual, which means
+that it is, as it occurs, an instance of a general phenomenon. While the
+scientist must deal with specific cases of water, he has no regard for
+their particularity, but chooses them as instances, and is from first to
+last occupied with their typical characteristics. The historian, also,
+selects relevant and representative instances, in so far as his history
+is interpretative and not mere narrative.</p>
+
+<p>A merely factual account of a series of events is not science, and never
+could be.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey now turns to the ethical field, with the purpose of showing that
+the historical method in ethics does for this science precisely what the
+experimental method does for other sciences. "History offers to us the
+only available substitute for the isolation and for the cumulative
+recombination of experiment. The early periods present us in their
+relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial
+operation of an experiment: following the phenomenon into the more
+complicated and refined form which it assumes later, is a substitute for
+the synthesis of the experiment."<a name="FNanchor_154_154" id="FNanchor_154_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> Hydrogen and oxygen are the
+historical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> antecedents of water, whose synthesis the scientist
+observes, and so the more primitive forms of conduct are the elements
+which the moralist traces in their process of becoming fused into the
+present social fabric. Primitive social practices cannot be artificially
+isolated, like the physical elements, but they can be traced to their
+historical origins, and their interweaving towards present complex
+conditions can be observed.</p>
+
+<p>The historical method is subject to two misunderstandings, Dewey says,
+one by the empiricists and materialists, the other by the idealists. The
+former, having isolated the primitive facts, suppose them to have a
+superior logical and existential value. "The earlier is regarded as
+somehow more 'real' than the later, or as furnishing the quality in
+terms of which the reality of all the later must be stated."<a name="FNanchor_155_155" id="FNanchor_155_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> The
+later is looked upon as simply a recombination of the earlier
+existences. "Writers who ought to know better tell us that if we only
+had an adequate knowledge of the 'primitive' state of the world, if we
+only had some general formula by which to circumscribe it, we could
+deduce down to its last detail the entire existing constitution of the
+world, life, and society."<a name="FNanchor_156_156" id="FNanchor_156_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> The primitive elements, however, take on
+new qualities on entering into new combinations. Water is more than
+hydrogen and oxygen. There is a similar process intervening between the
+earlier and the later in the moral field, of which the primitive state
+and the present are merely end terms. Actual study must take account of
+the whole process.</p>
+
+<p>The idealistic fallacy is of the opposite nature. It takes the final
+term of the process to be exclusively real. "The later reality is,
+therefore, to him the persistent reality in contrast with which the
+first forms are, if not illusions, at least poor excuses for being....
+It is enough for present purposes to note that we have here simply a
+particular case of the general fallacy just discussed&mdash;the emphasis of a
+particular term of the series at the expense of the process operative in
+reference to all terms."<a name="FNanchor_157_157" id="FNanchor_157_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> The true reality is the whole process,
+which is represented in empiricism only by the primitive terms, and in
+idealism only by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> the end terms. Only a historical method can deal with
+it in its entirety.</p>
+
+<p>In summing up the advantages of the historical method, Dewey says that
+it gives a complete account of the origin and development of ethical
+ideas, opinions, beliefs, and practices. "It is concerned with the
+origin and development of these customs and ideas; and with the question
+of their mode of operation after they have arisen. The described
+facts&mdash;yes; but among the facts described is precisely certain
+conditions under which various norms, ideals, and rules of action have
+originated and functioned."<a name="FNanchor_158_158" id="FNanchor_158_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> Dewey finds it irritating that the
+facts thus singled out should be treated as mere facts, apart from their
+significance. The historical method employs description, to be sure, but
+it also aims at interpretation. "The historic method is a method, first,
+for determining how specific moral values (whether in the way of
+customs, expectations, conceived ends, or rules) came to be; and second,
+for determining their significance as indicated in their career."<a name="FNanchor_159_159" id="FNanchor_159_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a></p>
+
+<p>It is true, as Dewey holds, that the historical method may furnish a
+basis for interpretation, as well as description. But the mere scrutiny
+of what has happened will not reveal the elements, nor determine their
+significance. The historian must approach his material with something
+more than his eyes. But there are many historical methods. Which shall
+be used in dealing with the development of morals?<a name="FNanchor_160_160" id="FNanchor_160_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> Chemistry, for
+instance, in interpreting the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen into water,
+employs a system of atoms related to each other in a mathematical order,
+and something similarly definite must underlie the study of morals. The
+historical method, in general, needs no defence, but since it takes many
+forms, great care must be exercised in its application. Dewey seems to
+ignore these difficulties.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's argument now leads him to a comparison of the evolutionary
+methods with the intuitional and empirical methods in ethics. In making
+the comparison, he does not propose to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> raise the question of fact
+concerning the existence of intuitions. The question to be confronted is
+rather a logical one, concerning the validity of beliefs. "Under what
+conditions alone, and in what measure or degree, are we justified in
+arguing from the existence of moral intuitions as mental states and acts
+to facts taken to correspond to them?"<a name="FNanchor_161_161" id="FNanchor_161_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p>
+
+<p>The answer is that the existence of a belief argues nothing as to its
+validity. The intuitionist takes his belief as a brute fact, unrelated
+to objective conditions. The 'inexpugnable' character of the belief
+cannot establish its validity, because the life of a single individual
+occupies but a brief span in the continuity of the social life in which
+the belief is embedded. Beliefs last for generations, and then very
+often disappear. "What guarantee have we that our present 'intuitions'
+have more validity than hundreds of past ideas that have shown
+themselves by passing away to be empty opinion or indurated
+prejudice?"<a name="FNanchor_162_162" id="FNanchor_162_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> Intuitionism has no way of guaranteeing its beliefs.</p>
+
+<p>The evolutionary method, on the other hand, is able to determine the
+validity of beliefs. "The worth of the intuition depends upon genetic
+considerations. In so far as we can state the intuition in terms of the
+conditions of its origin, development, and later career, in so far we
+have some criterion for passing judgment upon its pretensions to
+validity.... But if we cannot find such historic origin and functioning,
+the intuition remains a mere state of consciousness, a hallucination, an
+illusion, which is not made more worthy by simply multiplying the number
+of people who have participated in it."<a name="FNanchor_163_163" id="FNanchor_163_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> Certain savage races, for
+instance, possessed moral intuitions which made the practice of
+infanticide an obligation. But the fact that it was universally held
+does not establish its validity. It must be condemned or justified by
+the results to which it led.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's criticism of intuitionism scarcely does justice to that method,
+whatever may be its inherent weakness. There doubtless have been
+thinkers who held that truth is revealed to the reason of man in its
+naked purity, in the shape of apodictic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>intellectual principles. But
+even in the case of so extreme a position as that of Kant, there are
+important qualifying considerations to be taken into account. There is
+no reason to suppose that moral judgment, as Kant conceived it, was
+excluded from the consideration of relevant data, such as the knowledge
+of actual effects produced by given courses of conduct. His position
+seems to have been, not that moral judgment lacked specific content, but
+that reason took something with it to the moral situation. The
+intuitionists may have over-estimated the original endowment of the
+mind, but it must be admitted with them that the mind which approaches
+the moral situation empty of concepts cannot make moral decisions. If
+man is to hold no beliefs except those proved valid by experience, how
+can there be any to validate? Intelligence must have the capacity to
+frame beliefs in the light of its past knowledge, and its acts of
+judgment, consequently, presuppose a test of the validity of ideas which
+belongs to intelligence as such, and not to history taken abstractly.
+Beliefs are adapted to their objects in the making, and on this account
+are usually found to have had some justification, even where set aside.
+'A principle that is suitable for universal legislation already
+presupposes a content.'</p>
+
+<p>Dewey next considers the relation of the evolutionary methods to
+empiricism. "Empiricism," he says, "is no more historic in character
+than is intuitionalism. Empiricism is concerned with the moral idea or
+belief as a grouping or association of various elementary feelings. It
+regards the idea simply as a complex state which is to be explained by
+resolving it into its elementary constituents. By its logic, both the
+complex and the elements are isolated from an historic context.... The
+empirical and the genetic methods thus imply a very different
+relationship between the moral state, idea, or belief, and objective
+reality.... The empirical theory holds that the idea arises as a reflex
+of some existing object or fact. Hence the test of its objectivity is
+the faithfulness with which it reproduces that object as copy. The
+genetic theory holds that the idea arises as a response, and that the
+test of its validity is found in its later career as manifested with
+reference to the needs of the situation that evoked it."<a name="FNanchor_164_164" id="FNanchor_164_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span></p><p>Only a method that takes the world as a changing, historical thing, can
+deal with the adaptation of morality to new conditions. "Both empiricism
+and intuitionalism, though in very different ways, deny the continuity
+of the moralizing process. They set up timeless, and hence absolute and
+disconnected, ultimates; thereby they sever the problems and movements
+of the present from the past, rob the past, the sole object of calm,
+impartial, and genuinely objective study, of all instructing power, and
+leave our experience to form undirected, at the mercy of circumstance
+and arbitrariness, whether that of dogmatism or scepticism."<a name="FNanchor_165_165" id="FNanchor_165_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a></p>
+
+<p>In evaluating the article as a whole, it must be said that Dewey's study
+is not productive of definite results. The history of the past can
+undoubtedly offer to the student a mass of data that is interesting and
+instructive. The importance of this or that belief, or its value, can be
+gauged by the results which it is known to have produced. But when, in
+this day and age, the moralist sets out to find the principles which
+shall guide his own conduct, the history of morals is of no more
+importance than the observations of every day life, which reveal the
+consequences of conduct in the lives of men about him. But more
+particularly, it should be added, an estimate of present moral action
+depends, not upon truth uttered by the past, but upon truth discovered
+and interpreted by an intelligence which surveys the past and makes it
+meaningful. The past in itself is nothing; thought alone can create real
+history.</p>
+
+<p>Another article, published by Dewey in the <i>Philosophical Review</i> in
+1900, "Some Stages of Logical Thought," illustrates the employment of
+the genetic method in a more specific way.<a name="FNanchor_166_166" id="FNanchor_166_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> In his introductory
+remarks, Dewey says: "I wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking,
+easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual,
+may be identified and arranged as successive species of the relationship
+which doubting bears to assurance; as various ratios, so to speak, which
+the vigor of doubting bears to mere acquiescence. The presumption is
+that the function of questioning is one which has continually grown in
+intensity and range, that doubt is continually chased<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> back, and, being
+cornered, fights more desperately, and thus clears the ground more
+thoroughly."<a name="FNanchor_167_167" id="FNanchor_167_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> Dewey finds four stages of relationship between
+questioning and dogmatism: dogmatism, discussion, proof, and empirical
+science; and he seeks to show how each stage involves a higher degree of
+free inquiry. "Modern scientific procedure, as just set forth, seems to
+define the ideal or limit of this process. It is inquiry emancipated,
+universalized, whose sole aim and criterion is discovery, and hence it
+makes the terminus of our description. It is idle to conceal from
+ourselves, however, that this scientific procedure, as a practical
+undertaking, has not as yet reflected itself into any coherent and
+generally accepted theory of thinking...."<a name="FNanchor_168_168" id="FNanchor_168_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p>
+
+<p>It is not necessary to comment on Dewey's stages of thought. The
+similarity of this division to Comte's theological, metaphysical and
+scientific stages of explanation will be apparent. Dewey's remarks on
+the logic of the scientific stage, however, are interesting. "The simple
+fact of the case is," he says, "that there are at least three rival
+theories on the ground, each claiming to furnish the sole proper
+interpretation of the actual procedure of thought."<a name="FNanchor_169_169" id="FNanchor_169_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> There is the
+Aristotelian logic, with its fixed forms; the empirical logic, which
+holds "that only particular facts are self-supporting, and that the
+authority allowed to general principles is derivative and second
+hand;"<a name="FNanchor_170_170" id="FNanchor_170_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> and finally there is the transcendental logic, which claims,
+"by analysis of science and experience, to justify the conclusion that
+the universe itself is a construction of thought, giving evidence
+throughout of the pervasive and constitutive action of reason; and
+holds, consequently, that our logical processes are simply the reading
+off or coming to consciousness of the inherently rational structure
+already possessed by the universe in virtue of the presence within it of
+this pervasive and constitutive action of thought."<a name="FNanchor_171_171" id="FNanchor_171_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a></p>
+
+<p>None of these logics, Dewey finds, is capable of dealing with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> the
+actual procedure of science, because none of them treats thought as a
+doubt-inquiry process, but rather as something fixed and limited by
+conditions which determine its operations in advance. Dewey asks: "Does
+not an account or theory of thinking, basing itself on modern scientific
+procedure, demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of
+thought&mdash;judgment, concept, inference, subject, predicate and copula of
+judgment, etc. <i>ad indefinitum</i>&mdash;shall be interpreted simply and
+entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the
+doubt-inquiry process?"<a name="FNanchor_172_172" id="FNanchor_172_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p>
+
+<p>Seven years before, Dewey had been an ardent champion of the
+transcendental logic, on the ground that it was progressive, and he
+contrasted it most favorably with the formal logics which treat thought
+as a self-contained process. Now, however, he has a new insight. Logic
+must be reinterpreted in the light of the evolutionary or biological
+method. We shall see how this is accomplished in the next chapter.</p>
+
+<p>To the student of the history of philosophy, Dewey's treatment of the
+genetic and historical methods must seem seriously inadequate. The
+idealist, moreover, will feel that Dewey should have taken note, in his
+criticism of the idealistic standpoint, of the fact that Hegelianism was
+from first to last a historical method; that the German idealists gave
+the impulse to modern historical research, and provoked a study of the
+historical method whose results are still felt. But in turning away from
+idealism, Dewey has no word of appreciation for this aspect of the
+Hegelian philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>When the truth is boiled down, it appears that Dewey's historical
+method, in so far as he had one, was based on biological evolutionism.
+He had no interest in any other form of historical interpretation.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_138_138" id="Footnote_138_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138_138"><span class="label">[138]</span></a> Vol. VIII, pp. 321-341. The article is a criticism of
+Huxley's essay with the same title.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_139_139" id="Footnote_139_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139_139"><span class="label">[139]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 337. Italics mine.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_140_140" id="Footnote_140_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140_140"><span class="label">[140]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 338.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_141_141" id="Footnote_141_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141_141"><span class="label">[141]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 340.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_142_142" id="Footnote_142_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142_142"><span class="label">[142]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_143_143" id="Footnote_143_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143_143"><span class="label">[143]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> It should be observed that this conclusion is
+reached on a purely theoretical basis.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_144_144" id="Footnote_144_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144_144"><span class="label">[144]</span></a> Printed in the <i>Psychological Review</i>, Vol. VII, 1900,
+pp. 105-124.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_145_145" id="Footnote_145_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145_145"><span class="label">[145]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 123.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_146_146" id="Footnote_146_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146_146"><span class="label">[146]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 124.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_147_147" id="Footnote_147_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147_147"><span class="label">[147]</span></a> Vol. XI, pp. 107-124; 353-371.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_148_148" id="Footnote_148_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148_148"><span class="label">[148]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 108.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_149_149" id="Footnote_149_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149_149"><span class="label">[149]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 109.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_150_150" id="Footnote_150_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150_150"><span class="label">[150]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_151_151" id="Footnote_151_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151_151"><span class="label">[151]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 110.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_152_152" id="Footnote_152_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152_152"><span class="label">[152]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 111.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_153_153" id="Footnote_153_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153_153"><span class="label">[153]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 112.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_154_154" id="Footnote_154_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154_154"><span class="label">[154]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 113.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_155_155" id="Footnote_155_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155_155"><span class="label">[155]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 114.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_156_156" id="Footnote_156_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156_156"><span class="label">[156]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 116.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_157_157" id="Footnote_157_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157_157"><span class="label">[157]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 118.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_158_158" id="Footnote_158_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158_158"><span class="label">[158]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 355.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_159_159" id="Footnote_159_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159_159"><span class="label">[159]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 356.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_160_160" id="Footnote_160_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160_160"><span class="label">[160]</span></a> See Bosanquet's <i>Logic</i>, second edition, Chapter VII, and
+especially page 240.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_161_161" id="Footnote_161_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161_161"><span class="label">[161]</span></a> <i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. XI, p. 357.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_162_162" id="Footnote_162_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162_162"><span class="label">[162]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 360.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_163_163" id="Footnote_163_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163_163"><span class="label">[163]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 358.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_164_164" id="Footnote_164_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164_164"><span class="label">[164]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 364 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_165_165" id="Footnote_165_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165_165"><span class="label">[165]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 370.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_166_166" id="Footnote_166_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166_166"><span class="label">[166]</span></a> Vol. IX, pp. 465-489.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_167_167" id="Footnote_167_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167_167"><span class="label">[167]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 465.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_168_168" id="Footnote_168_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168_168"><span class="label">[168]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 486 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_169_169" id="Footnote_169_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169_169"><span class="label">[169]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 487.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_170_170" id="Footnote_170_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170_170"><span class="label">[170]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_171_171" id="Footnote_171_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171_171"><span class="label">[171]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_172_172" id="Footnote_172_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172_172"><span class="label">[172]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 489.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER VI</span> <span class="smaller">"STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY"</span></h2>
+
+<p>In 1903 a volume entitled <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, consisting of
+essays on logical topics by Dewey and his colleagues and pupils, was
+published under the auspices of the University of Chicago. In a review
+of this volume, Professor Pringle-Pattison remarks: "It is, indeed, most
+unusual to find a series of philosophical papers by different writers in
+which (without repetition or duplication) there is so much unity in the
+point of view and harmony in results. That this is so is a striking
+evidence of the moulding influence of Professor Dewey upon his pupils
+and coadjutors in the Chicago School of Philosophy."<a name="FNanchor_173_173" id="FNanchor_173_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> It would be a
+needless task to review the whole volume, and attention will be confined
+to the essays which constitute Dewey's special contribution to the
+undertaking. These constitute the first four chapters of the volume, and
+are devoted to a critical examination of Lotze's logic.<a name="FNanchor_174_174" id="FNanchor_174_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> Here, for
+the first time, Dewey presents in complete form the logical theory which
+stands as the goal of his previous endeavors, and marks the beginning of
+his career as a pragmatist.<a name="FNanchor_175_175" id="FNanchor_175_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a></p>
+
+<p>The first chapter of the "Studies" is devoted to a general consideration
+of the nature of logical theory. Dewey begins his discussion with an
+account of the na&iuml;ve view of thought, the view of the man of affairs or
+of the scientist, who employs ideas and reflection but has never become
+critical of his mental <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>processes; who has never reflected upon
+reflection. "If we were to ask," he says, "the thinking of na&iuml;ve life to
+present, with a minimum of theoretical elaboration, its conception of
+its own practice, we should get an answer running not unlike this:
+Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just
+as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity."<a name="FNanchor_176_176" id="FNanchor_176_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> While the
+standpoint of the na&iuml;ve man is usually hard to determine, there appears
+to be considerable justification for Dewey's statement. The common man
+does tend to view thinking as a special kind of activity, performed by
+an organ which can be 'trained,' and he is inclined to speak of
+education as a process of 'training the mind.'<a name="FNanchor_177_177" id="FNanchor_177_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey finds a large measure of truth in this na&iuml;ve view of thought.
+Thought appears to be derivative and secondary. "It comes after
+something and out of something, and for the sake of something."<a name="FNanchor_178_178" id="FNanchor_178_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> It
+is employed at need, and ceases to operate when not needed. "Taking some
+part of the universe of action, of affection, of social construction,
+under its special charge, and having busied itself therewith
+sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented, thought releases
+that topic and enters upon further more direct experience."<a name="FNanchor_179_179" id="FNanchor_179_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> There
+is a rhythm of practice and thought; man acts, thinks, and acts again.
+The business of thought is to solve practical difficulties, such as
+arise in connection with the conduct of life. The purpose for which
+thought intervenes is to enable action to get ahead by discovering a way
+out of the given difficulty. Ordinarily, the transition from thought to
+action and the reverse is accomplished without break or difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>Occasions arise, however, when thought is balked by a situation with
+which it is unable to deal, after repeated attempts. Critical reflection
+is then directed upon thought itself, and logical theory is the result.
+"The general theory of reflection, as over against its concrete
+exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> so overwhelming and
+so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is
+blocked."<a name="FNanchor_180_180" id="FNanchor_180_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_180_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> The purpose of logical theory is therefore a practical
+one, and logical theory, like ordinary reflection, is directed toward
+the removal of difficulties which stand in the way of the achievement of
+practical ends.</p>
+
+<p>This description of thought and of the nature of logical theory invites
+suspicion by its very simplicity. Nobody would deny that thought is
+linked up with practice, that the processes of life link up into one
+whole organic process, and that it would be a mistake to treat the
+cognitive processes as if they were separate from the whole. But Dewey's
+account of thought seems to fall into the very abstractness which he is
+so anxious to avoid. Experience is represented as a series of acts,
+attitudes, or functions, which follow one another in succession.
+"Thinking follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows thinking.
+Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its
+successor."<a name="FNanchor_181_181" id="FNanchor_181_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> The functions are distinct, but are united to each
+other, end to end, like links in a chain. They pass into and out of one
+another, but are not simultaneous. This description gives rise, as
+Bosanquet observes,<a name="FNanchor_182_182" id="FNanchor_182_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> to a kind of dualism between thinking and the
+other processes of life, which is made deeper because thinking is
+regarded as a very special activity, which "passes judgment upon both
+the processes and contents of other functions," and whose aim and work
+is "distinctively reconstructive or transformatory."<a name="FNanchor_183_183" id="FNanchor_183_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey's description of the processes of experience is undoubtedly
+plausible, but should not be accepted without close scrutiny of the
+facts. It has been held, in opposition to such a view, that the
+cognitive processes are so bound up with perception, feeling, willing,
+and doing, that they cannot be separated from the complex.<a name="FNanchor_184_184" id="FNanchor_184_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> Or it
+might be held that thinking and doing are <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span>simultaneous and
+complementary processes, rather than successive and supplementary. Dewey
+does not concern himself with these possibilities, seeming to take it
+for granted that his interpretation is the 'natural' one. It must be
+said, however, that Dewey's description of thought as a process is by no
+means obvious and simple; thought is not easy to describe.</p>
+
+<p>When we turn to logical theory, Dewey says, there are two directions
+which may be taken. The general features of logical theory are indicated
+by its origin. When ordinary thinking is impeded, an examination of the
+thinking function is undertaken, with the purpose of discovering its
+business and its mode of operation. The object of the examination is
+practical; to enable thinking to be carried on more effectively. If
+these conditions are kept in mind, logical theory will be guided into
+its proper channels: it will be assumed that every process of reflection
+arises with reference to some specific situation, and has to subserve a
+specific purpose dependent upon the occasion which calls it forth.
+Logical theory will determine the conditions which arouse thought, the
+mode of its operation, and the testing of its results. Such a logic,
+being true to the problems set for it by practical needs, is in no
+danger of being lost in generalities.</p>
+
+<p>But there is another direction which logical theory sometimes takes,
+unmindful of the conditions imposed by its origin. This is the
+epistemological direction. Epistemological logic concerns itself with
+the relation of thought at large to reality at large. It assumes that
+thought is a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with
+the world which is to be known. Such a logic can never be fruitful, for
+it has lost sight of its purpose in the formulation of its problem.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey is quite right in opposing a conception of thought which makes it
+a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with other life
+processes. Few recent thinkers have been guilty of that error. Lotze, to
+be sure, made the mistake of separating thought from the reality to be
+known, and therefore serves as a ready foil for Dewey's criticism. But
+Lotze's age is past and gone.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span></p><p>When the abstract conception of thought is set aside, and it is agreed
+that thought must be treated as a process among the processes of
+experience, there is still room for divergence of opinion as to the
+exact manner in which thought is related to other functions. Dewey's
+logical theory, as outlined above, depends upon a very special
+interpretation of the place which thought occupies in experience. For
+this reason he considers logic to be inseparable from psychology.
+"Psychology ... is indispensable to logical evaluation, the moment we
+treat logical theory as an account of thinking as a mode of adaptation
+to its own generating conditions, and judge its validity by reference to
+its efficiency in meeting its problems."<a name="FNanchor_185_185" id="FNanchor_185_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> Psychology, in other
+words, must substantiate Dewey's account of thought, else his 'logic'
+has no foundation. But if it were held that the cognitive processes
+cannot be separated (except by abstraction for psychological purposes)
+from other processes, there could manifestly be no such logical problem
+as Dewey has posited. Logic would be freed from reliance upon
+psychology. In this case, logical inquiry would be directed to the study
+of concepts, forms of judgment, and methods of knowledge, with the
+purpose of determining their relations, proper applications, and spheres
+of relevance. Logic would be a 'criticism of categories' rather than a
+criticism of the function of thinking. Dewey recognizes that such a
+study of method might be useful, but holds that it would be subsidiary
+to the larger problems of logic. "The distinctions and classifications
+that have been accumulated in 'formal' logic are relevant data; but they
+demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment
+to material antecedents and stimuli."<a name="FNanchor_186_186" id="FNanchor_186_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> It will be seen that the
+treatment of the forms of thought as "organs of adjustment" makes logic
+subsidiary to psychology, necessarily and completely. All follows,
+however, from the original assumption that thought is a special
+activity, clearly distinguishable from other experienced processes, and
+possessing a special function of its own.</p>
+
+<p>In his further analysis of logical theory, Dewey states that it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> has two
+phases, one general and one specific. The general problem concerns the
+relations of the various functions of experience to one another; how
+they give rise to each other, and what is their order of succession.
+This wider logic is identified with philosophy in general.<a name="FNanchor_187_187" id="FNanchor_187_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> The
+specific phase of logic, logic proper, concerns itself with the function
+of knowing as such, inquiring into its typical behavior, occasion of
+operation, divisions of labor, content, and successful employment. Dewey
+indicates the danger of identifying logic with either of these to the
+exclusion of the other, or of supposing that they can be finally
+isolated from one another. "It is necessary to work back and forth
+between the larger and the narrower fields."<a name="FNanchor_188_188" id="FNanchor_188_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p>
+
+<p>Why is it necessary to make such a distinction at all? And why necessary
+to move back and forth between the two provisional standpoints? Dewey
+might answer by the following analogy: The thought function may be
+studied, first of all, as a special organ, as an anatomist might study
+the structure of any special organ of the body; but in order to
+understand the part played by this member in the organism as a whole, it
+would be necessary to adopt a wider view, so that its place in the
+system could be determined. This is probably what Dewey means by his two
+standpoints. He says: "We keep our paths straight because we do not
+confuse the sequential, efficient, and functional relationship of types
+of experience with the contemporaneous, correlative, and structural
+distinctions of elements within a given function."<a name="FNanchor_189_189" id="FNanchor_189_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a> The first
+objection to be made to this treatment of thought is that it makes
+knowing the activity of a special organ, like liver or lungs. If this
+objection is surmounted, there remains another from the side of general
+method. The biologist not only studies the particular organs as to their
+structure and their relationships within the body, but he has a view of
+the body as a whole, of its general end and purpose. His study of the
+particular organ is in part determined by his knowledge of the relations
+between body and environment. But experience as a whole cannot be
+treated like a body, because it has no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span>environment. The analogy between
+body and its processes and experience and its processes breaks down,
+therefore, at a vital point. Dewey's genetic interpretation gains in
+plausibility when the human body, and not the whole of experience, is
+taken as the ground upon which the 'functions' are to be explained, for
+the body has an environment and purposes in relation to that
+environment. Experience as a whole possesses no such external reference.</p>
+
+<p>It will be seen that Dewey's interpretation of the function of knowing
+is not as empirical as it proposes to be. Its underlying conceptions are
+biological in character, and these conceptions are brought ready-made to
+the study of thought. Logical theory does not arise naturally and
+spontaneously from a study of the facts of mind, but the facts are
+aligned and interpreted in terms of categories selected in advance.
+Empiricism develops its theories in connection with facts, but
+rationalism (in the bad sense of the word) fits the facts into prepared
+theories. Dewey's treatment of thought is, after all, more rationalistic
+than empirical.</p>
+
+<p>To sum up Dewey's conclusions so far: Logic is the study of the function
+of knowing in relation to the other functions of experience. The wider
+logic distinguishes the function of knowing from other activities, and
+discovers its general purpose; the narrower logic examines the function
+of knowing in itself, with the object of determining its structure and
+operation. The aim of logic as a whole is to understand the operations
+of the concrete activity called knowing, with the purpose of rendering
+it more efficient. This concrete treatment of thought contrasts sharply
+with the 'epistemological' method, which sets thought over against the
+concrete processes of experience, and thus generates the false problem
+of the relation of thought in general to reality in general.</p>
+
+<p>Having stated his position, we might expect Dewey, in the course of the
+next three chapters, to enter upon a consideration of one phase or other
+of his logic. On the contrary, he proposes to take up "some of the
+considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the
+narrower conceptions of logical theory."<a name="FNanchor_190_190" id="FNanchor_190_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>First, he will consider
+the antecedent conditions and cues of the thought-process; the
+conditions which lead up to and into the function of knowing. These
+conditions lie between the thought-process and the preceding function
+(in order of time), and are therefore on the borderland between the
+wider and narrower spheres of logic.</p>
+
+<p>In defining the conditions which precede and evoke thought, Dewey says:
+"There is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some
+subject-matter of the physical or social world, or organized
+intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each other&mdash;so
+much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience, which
+accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate re-definition
+and re-relation of its tensional parts."<a name="FNanchor_191_191" id="FNanchor_191_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a> Thought is always called
+into action by the whole concrete situation in which it occurs, not by
+any particular sensation, idea, or feeling.</p>
+
+<p>The opposite interpretation of the nature of the antecedents of thought
+is furnished by Lotze, who makes them consist in bare impressions,
+'moods of ourselves,' mere states of consciousness. Dewey is quite right
+in calling these bare impressions purely fictitious, though the
+observation is by no means original. From the manner in which he
+approaches the study of the "antecedents of thought" it appears,
+however, that Dewey has something in common with Lotze. The functional
+theory, that is, allows a certain initial detachment of thought from
+reality, which must be bridged over by an empirical demonstration of its
+natural connection with preceding processes.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey is wholly justified, again, in maintaining that thought is not a
+faculty set apart from reality, and that what is 'given' to thought is a
+coherent world, not a mass of unmeaning sensations. He recognizes his
+substantial agreement with the modern idealists in these matters.<a name="FNanchor_192_192" id="FNanchor_192_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a>
+But the idealists, he believes,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> hold a constitutive conception of
+thought which is in conflict with the empirical description of thinking
+as a concrete activity in time. Reality, according to this conception,
+is a vast system of sensations brought into a rational order by logical
+forms, and finite thought, in its operations, simply apprehends or
+discovers the infinite order of the cosmos. "How does it happen," Dewey
+asks, "that the absolute constitutive and intuitive Thought does such a
+poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to
+patch up its products?"<a name="FNanchor_193_193" id="FNanchor_193_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a></p>
+
+<p>Against Lotze, such an indictment has considerable force, but its
+applicability to modern idealism is not so obvious. Modern idealism has
+insisted upon an empirical treatment of thought, and has definitely
+surrendered the abstract sensations of the older psychologies. Nor does
+idealism tend to treat finite thought as a process which merely 'copies'
+an eternally present nature. The issue between Dewey and the idealists
+is this: Does functionalism render an accurate empirical account of the
+nature of thought as a concrete process?</p>
+
+<p>In his third chapter Dewey discusses "Thought and its Subject-matter:
+The Datum of Thinking." The tensional situation passes into a thought
+situation, and reflection enters upon its work of restoring the
+equilibrium of experience. Certain characteristic processes attend the
+operation of thought. "The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or
+dichotomizes itself. There is somewhat which is untouched in the
+contention of incompatibles. There is something which remains secure,
+unquestioned. On the other hand, there are elements which are rendered
+doubtful and precarious."<a name="FNanchor_194_194" id="FNanchor_194_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> The unquestioned element is the <i>datum</i>;
+the uncertain element, the <i>ideatum</i>. Ideas are "impressions,
+suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc., the facts are crude,
+raw, unorganized, brute."<a name="FNanchor_195_195" id="FNanchor_195_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a> There is an approximation to bare meaning
+on the one hand, and bare existence on the other.</p>
+
+<p>The first dichotomy passes into a second. "Once more, and briefly, both
+datum and ideatum may ... break up, each for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> itself, into physical and
+psychical."<a name="FNanchor_196_196" id="FNanchor_196_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a> The datum, or sense material, is all, somehow, matter
+and real, but one part of it turns out to have a psychical, another a
+physical form. Similarly, the ideatum divides into what is mere fancy,
+the psychical, and what is objectively valid, the physical.</p>
+
+<p>These distinctions are divisions of labor within the thought-process.
+"All the distinctions of the thought-function, of conception as over
+against sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of
+inference in its vast diversity of operation&mdash;all these distinctions
+come within the thought situation as growing out of a characteristic
+antecedent typical formation of experience...."<a name="FNanchor_197_197" id="FNanchor_197_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> Great confusion
+results in logical theory, Dewey believes, when it is forgotten that
+these distinctions are valid only within the thought process. Their
+order of occurrence within the thought process must also be observed, if
+confusion is to be prevented. Datum and ideatum come first, psychical
+and physical next in order. "Thus the distinction between subjectivity
+and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It
+is a specification that emerges, correspondently, in <i>both</i> datum and
+ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is
+left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as
+real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is
+regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense."<a name="FNanchor_198_198" id="FNanchor_198_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey does well to call attention to the limitations of these
+categories, which cannot, indeed, be treated as absolute without serious
+error. It may be questioned, however, whether their limitations are of
+the precise nature which he describes. All depends upon the initial
+conception of the nature of thought. From Dewey's standpoint, these
+categories are 'tools of analysis' which function only within the
+thinking process; but his description of the function of knowing may be
+questioned, in which case his instrumental view of the concepts is
+rendered meaningless. A logical, as distinct from a psychological,
+treatment of the concepts mentioned, would show that their validity is
+limited to a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> certain 'sphere of relevance;' that they are applicable
+within a certain context and to a particular subject-matter. The danger
+of indiscriminate use of the categories would be avoided by the logical
+criticism even better, perhaps, than by Dewey's method.</p>
+
+<p>The discussion in Dewey's fourth and last chapter, concerning "The
+Content and Object of Thought," hinges upon a detailed criticism of
+Lotze's position, which cannot be presented here. The general bearing of
+the discussion, however, may be indicated. "To regard," says Dewey, "the
+thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as qualifications
+of 'pure thought, apart from any difference in objects,' instead of as
+successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material
+(or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism."<a name="FNanchor_199_199" id="FNanchor_199_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p>
+
+<p>Pure thought, of course, cannot be defended. At the same time, Dewey,
+like Lotze, tends to regard thought as a special function with a
+'content' of its own. If thought is regarded as a special kind of
+process, having its own content in the way of instrumental concepts, the
+question inevitably arises: How shall these forms be employed to reach
+truth? How apply them correctly to the matter in hand?</p>
+
+<p>Dewey answers that the forms and hypotheses of thought, like the tools
+and scaffoldings for its operations, are especially designed for the
+labor which they have to perform. "There is no miracle in the fact that
+tool and material are adapted to each other in the process of reaching a
+valid conclusion.... Each has been slowly evolved with reference to its
+fit employ in the entire function; and this evolution has been checked
+at every point by reference to its own correspondent."<a name="FNanchor_200_200" id="FNanchor_200_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a></p>
+
+<p>It is no doubt true that established conceptions, no less than temporary
+hypotheses, have been evolved in connection with, as a feature or part
+of, the subject-matter to which they pertain. But it is quite another
+thing to say that these evolved forms belong to thought, if by thought
+be meant the functional activity of Dewey's description. Dewey stresses
+the relevance of these forms to the thought-process, rather than their
+relevance to a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> particular sphere of discourse. His purpose is to show
+that distinctions which are valid within the process of knowing are not
+valid elsewhere, and the net result is to limit the faculty of thought
+as a whole, as well as the forms of thought.</p>
+
+<p>This result reveals itself most clearly in his discussion of the test of
+truth. "In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought, as thought,
+just as at the other limit thought originates out of a situation which
+is not reflectional in character. Interpret this before and beyond in a
+historic sense, as an affair of the place occupied and role played by
+thinking as a function in experience in relation to other functions, and
+the intermediate and instrumental character of thought, its dependence
+upon unreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon a consequent
+experience for its test of final validity, becomes significant and
+necessary."<a name="FNanchor_201_201" id="FNanchor_201_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> This notion that the test of thought must be external
+to thought depends directly upon the doctrine that thought is a special
+activity of the kind heretofore described. It results from the
+occasionalism attributed by Dewey to the thinking process.</p>
+
+<p>If the truth or falsity of an idea is not discovered by thought, then by
+what faculty might it be discovered? Perhaps by experience as a whole or
+in general. Dewey, on occasion, speaks as follows: "Experience is
+continually integrating itself into a wholeness of coherent meaning
+deepened in significance by passing through an inner distraction in
+which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered partial and
+hence objectively conscious."<a name="FNanchor_202_202" id="FNanchor_202_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> Perhaps Dewey means to say that truth
+is determined by this cosmic automatism. It is confusing, however, to be
+told in one moment that thought transforms experience, and in another
+that experience transforms itself.</p>
+
+<p>Experience, not reflection, is, then, the test of truth and thought.
+Such a statement would not be possible, except in connection with a
+psychology which deliberately sets experience over against reflection,
+making the latter a peculiar, although dependent, process. Lotze,
+indeed, makes the separation of thought from experience quite complete.
+Dewey attempts to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> bring them together by his psychological method, but
+does not completely succeed. In the meantime modern idealism has
+suggested that thought and experience are merely parts of one general
+process, constantly operating in conjunction. To one who believes that
+the various processes or 'functions' of experience constitute a single
+organ of life, the proposition that experience, rather than reflection,
+is the judge of truth, becomes meaningless.</p>
+
+<p>In an essay on "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of
+Morality" in another volume of the Chicago Publications of 1903,<a name="FNanchor_203_203" id="FNanchor_203_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a>
+Dewey presents a positive statement of his logical theory which is an
+excellent supplement to the critical study of Lotze.</p>
+
+<p>Science, Dewey remarks in introducing this essay, is a systematized body
+of knowledge. Knowledge may be taken either as a body of facts or as a
+process of arranging a body of facts; as results or the acquiring of
+results. The latter phase of science is the more important. "As used in
+this article, 'scientific' means regular methods of controlling the
+formation of judgments regarding some subject-matter."<a name="FNanchor_204_204" id="FNanchor_204_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a> In the
+scientific attitude, beliefs are looked upon as <i>conclusions</i>, and as
+conclusions they look in two directions. They look backward towards the
+ground from which they are empirically derived, and which renders them
+valid, and they look forward, as meaning, to being the ground from which
+further conclusions can be deduced. "So far as we engage in this
+procedure, we look at our respective acts of judging not as independent
+and detached, but as an interrelated system, within which every
+assertion entitles us to other assertions (which must be carefully
+deduced since they constitute its meaning) and to which we are entitled
+only through other assertions (so that they must be carefully searched
+for). 'Scientific' as used in this article thus means the possibility of
+establishing an order of judgments such that each one when made is of
+use in determining other judgments, thereby securing control of their
+formation."<a name="FNanchor_205_205" id="FNanchor_205_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span></p><p>This view of science as an order of judgments requires a special
+treatment of the generic ideas, the 'conclusions,' or universals of
+science. The individual judgment, 'This, <i>A</i>, is <i>B</i>,' expresses an
+identity. But it is much better expressed in hypothetical form.
+"Identification, in other words, is secure only when it can be made
+through (1) breaking up the analyzed. This of na&iuml;ve judgment into
+determinate traits, (2) breaking up the predicate into a similar
+combination of elements, and (3) establishing uniform connection between
+some of the elements in the subject and some in the predicate."<a name="FNanchor_206_206" id="FNanchor_206_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a>
+Identity exists amid relevant differences, and the more intimately the
+system of differents is understood, the more positive is the
+determination of identity. This will be recognized as the 'concrete
+universal' of the Hegelian logicians.</p>
+
+<p>But, Dewey says, modern logicians tend to disregard judgment as act, and
+pay attention to it only as content. The generic ideas are studied in
+independence of their applications, as if this were a matter of no
+concern in logic. "In truth, there is no such thing as control of one
+content by mere reference to another content as such. To recognize this
+impossibility is to recognize that the control of the formation of the
+judgment is always through the medium of an act by which the respective
+contents of both the individual judgment and of the universal
+proposition are selected and brought into relationship to each
+other."<a name="FNanchor_207_207" id="FNanchor_207_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a> The individual act of judgment is necessary to logical
+theory, because the act of the individual forms the connecting link
+between the generic idea and the specific details of the situation.
+There must be some means whereby the instrumental concept is brought to
+bear upon its appropriate material. "The logical process includes, as an
+organic part of itself, the selection and reference of that particular
+one of the system which is relevant to the particular case. This
+individualized selection and adaptation is an integral portion of the
+logic of the situation. And such selection and adjustment is clearly in
+the nature of an act."<a name="FNanchor_208_208" id="FNanchor_208_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a></p>
+
+<p>This problem of the relation of the categories to their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span>subject-matter
+is an acute one for Dewey, because of limitations placed upon thought.
+He decides that the idea must be, in some fashion, self-selective, must
+signify its own fitness to a given subject-matter. But it can only be
+self-selective by being itself in the nature of an act. It turns out
+that the generic idea has been evolved in connection with acts of
+judgment, and its own applicability is born in it. "The activity which
+selects and employs is logical, not extra-logical, just because the tool
+selected and employed has been invented and developed precisely for the
+sake of just such future selection and use."<a name="FNanchor_209_209" id="FNanchor_209_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a></p>
+
+<p>The logic and system of science must be embodied in the individual. He
+must be a good logical medium, his acts must be orderly and consecutive,
+and generic ideas must have a good motor basis in his organism, if he is
+to think successfully. This is the essence of Dewey's argument in the
+essay under discussion. The inference seems to be that logic cannot be
+separated from biology and psychology, since the act of knowing and the
+ideas which it employs have a physiological basis.</p>
+
+<p>It is difficult to see, however, how such a standpoint could prove
+useful in the practical study of logic. Certainly little headway could
+be made toward a study of the proper use and limitations of the
+categories by an investigation of the human nervous system. And to what
+extent would physiology illuminate the problem of the relation of the
+generic ideas to their appropriate objects? Although Dewey decides that
+the relationship must have its ground in the motor activities of the
+organism, his conclusion has little empirical evidence to support it.</p>
+
+<p>A practical, workable conception of the relations between generic ideas
+and their objects must be based on considerations less obscure. Why not
+be content to verify, by criticism, the truth that experience and
+thoughts about experience develop together, with the result that each
+theory, hypothesis, or method is applicable within the sphere where it
+was born? Why wait upon psychology for confirmation of a truth so
+obvious and important?</p>
+
+<p>Bosanquet remarks: "Either one may speak as if reality were<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> relative to
+the individual mind, a ridiculous idea ..., or one may become interested
+in tracing the germination and growth of ideas in the individual mind as
+typical facts indeed, but only as one animal's habits are typical of
+those of others, and we may slur over the primary basis of logic, which
+is its relation to reality. For mental facts unrelated to reality are no
+knowledge, and therefore have no place in logic."<a name="FNanchor_210_210" id="FNanchor_210_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a> Bosanquet
+emphasizes an important truth neglected by Dewey. Logic is not concerned
+with ideas as things existing in individuals, nor with conceptions as
+individual modes of response. Truth has little to do with the individual
+as such, though the individual might well concern himself about truth.
+Truth is objective, super-individual, and logic is the study of the
+objective verity of thought. The proposition, 'All life is from the
+living,' finds no premises in the nerve tissues of the scientist who
+accepts it. How does the proposition square up with reality or
+experience? That is the question, and it can only be answered by turning
+away from psychology to empirical verification, involving a critical
+test of the applicability of the thought to reality.</p>
+
+<p>In the strictly ethical part of the essay, Dewey tries to show that
+moral judgments, at least, involve the character of the agent and his
+specific acts as data. Intellectual judgments, on the other hand, may
+disregard the acts of the individual; they are left out of account,
+"when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference
+with respect to the <i>particular</i> object or content judged."<a name="FNanchor_211_211" id="FNanchor_211_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a> It will
+be seen that the distinction between moral and intellectual judgments is
+made on the basis of their content. But Dewey is committed to the
+doctrine that judgments are to be differentiated as acts, on a
+psychological basis. In any case, if the character and acts of a man are
+to be judged, they must be treated objectively, and the relevance of the
+judge's ideas to the man's actual character cannot be decided by a
+psychological analysis of the judge's mind. Right and wrong, whether
+moral or intellectual, are not attributes of the individual nervous
+system.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_173_173" id="Footnote_173_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173_173"><span class="label">[173]</span></a> <i>The Philosophical Radicals</i>, "Dewey's Studies in Logical
+Theory," p. 179. The essay was originally printed as a critical notice
+in the <i>Philosophical Review</i>, November, 1904.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_174_174" id="Footnote_174_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174_174"><span class="label">[174]</span></a> Since this was written (1915-16), Dewey's chapters have
+been reprinted in a volume entitled <i>Essays in Experimental Logic</i>,
+published by the University of Chicago Press (June, 1916). They are
+preceded, in this new setting, by a special introductory chapter, and
+numerous alterations have been made which do not, however, affect the
+fundamental standpoint.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_175_175" id="Footnote_175_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175_175"><span class="label">[175]</span></a> See James's review, "The Chicago School," <i>Psychological
+Bulletin</i>, Vol. I, 1904, pp. 1-5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_176_176" id="Footnote_176_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176_176"><span class="label">[176]</span></a> <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, p. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_177_177" id="Footnote_177_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177_177"><span class="label">[177]</span></a> Compare Dewey, <i>How We Think</i> (1910), Chapter II, "The
+Need for Training Thought."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_178_178" id="Footnote_178_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178_178"><span class="label">[178]</span></a> <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, p. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_179_179" id="Footnote_179_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179_179"><span class="label">[179]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_180_180" id="Footnote_180_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180_180"><span class="label">[180]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 3 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_181_181" id="Footnote_181_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181_181"><span class="label">[181]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 16.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_182_182" id="Footnote_182_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182_182"><span class="label">[182]</span></a> <i>Logic</i>, second ed., Vol. II, p. 270.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_183_183" id="Footnote_183_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183_183"><span class="label">[183]</span></a> <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, p. x.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_184_184" id="Footnote_184_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184_184"><span class="label">[184]</span></a> "Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of
+abstract cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course
+of its development carries these along with it. There is, of course,
+such a thing as what we have called abstract cognition; but the
+different moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may
+name the life of thought." Creighton, "Experience and Thought,"
+<i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. XV, 1906, p. 487 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_185_185" id="Footnote_185_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185_185"><span class="label">[185]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_186_186" id="Footnote_186_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186_186"><span class="label">[186]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_187_187" id="Footnote_187_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187_187"><span class="label">[187]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, pp. 18-19.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_188_188" id="Footnote_188_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188_188"><span class="label">[188]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 23.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_189_189" id="Footnote_189_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189_189"><span class="label">[189]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 17.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_190_190" id="Footnote_190_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190_190"><span class="label">[190]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 23.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_191_191" id="Footnote_191_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191_191"><span class="label">[191]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 39 f. Bradley suggests a similar idea of
+the 'tensional situation.' See, for instance, <i>Ethical Studies</i>, p. 65,
+where he remarks: "We have conflicting desires, say A and B; we feel two
+tensions, two drawings (so to speak) but we can not actually affirm
+ourselves in both." A more complete statement of the 'tensional
+situation' will be found on page 239 of the same work and in various
+other passages.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_192_192" id="Footnote_192_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192_192"><span class="label">[192]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 43-44.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_193_193" id="Footnote_193_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193_193"><span class="label">[193]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 45.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_194_194" id="Footnote_194_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194_194"><span class="label">[194]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 50.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_195_195" id="Footnote_195_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195_195"><span class="label">[195]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 52.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_196_196" id="Footnote_196_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196_196"><span class="label">[196]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_197_197" id="Footnote_197_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197_197"><span class="label">[197]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 47.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_198_198" id="Footnote_198_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198_198"><span class="label">[198]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 53.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_199_199" id="Footnote_199_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199_199"><span class="label">[199]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 61 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_200_200" id="Footnote_200_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200_200"><span class="label">[200]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 80.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_201_201" id="Footnote_201_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201_201"><span class="label">[201]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 85.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_202_202" id="Footnote_202_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202_202"><span class="label">[202]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_203_203" id="Footnote_203_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203_203"><span class="label">[203]</span></a> <i>Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago</i>,
+First Series, Vol. III, pp. 115-139.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_204_204" id="Footnote_204_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204_204"><span class="label">[204]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 115.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_205_205" id="Footnote_205_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205_205"><span class="label">[205]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 116.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_206_206" id="Footnote_206_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206_206"><span class="label">[206]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 120.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_207_207" id="Footnote_207_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207_207"><span class="label">[207]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 121.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_208_208" id="Footnote_208_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208_208"><span class="label">[208]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 122.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_209_209" id="Footnote_209_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209_209"><span class="label">[209]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_210_210" id="Footnote_210_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210_210"><span class="label">[210]</span></a> <i>Logic</i>, second ed., Vol. I, p. 232.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_211_211" id="Footnote_211_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211_211"><span class="label">[211]</span></a> <i>Decennial Publication of the University of Chicago</i>,
+First Series, Vol. III, p. 127.</p></div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER VII</span> <span class="smaller">THE POLEMICAL PERIOD</span></h2>
+
+<p>After the publication of the <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, Dewey entered
+upon what may be called the polemical period of his career. He joined
+forces with James and Schiller in the promotion of the new movement
+called 'Pragmatism.' The <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods</i>, instituted at Columbia University in 1904, the same
+year in which Dewey accepted a professorship in that institution, became
+a convenient medium for the expression of his views, and every volume of
+this periodical will be found to contain notes, discussions, and
+articles by Dewey and his followers, bearing on current controversy. He
+also published many articles in other journals, technical and popular.
+In 1910, the most important of these essays were collected into a
+volume, published under the title, <i>The Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy, and Other Essays</i>. For purposes of discussion, these essays
+may be divided into two classes: those of a more constructive character,
+setting forth Dewey's own standpoint, and those which are mainly
+polemical, directed against opposing standpoints, chiefly the
+idealistic. The constructive writings will be given first consideration.</p>
+
+<p>The essay on "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," first published in
+the <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, in
+July, 1905, and later reprinted in the volume of collected essays,
+offers a convenient point of departure. Dewey observes that many of the
+difficulties in current controversy can be traced to presuppositions
+tacitly held by thinkers as to what experience means. Dewey attempts to
+make his own presuppositions explicit, with the object of clearing up
+this confusion.</p>
+
+<p>"Immediate empiricism," he says, "postulates that things&mdash;anything,
+everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term
+'thing'&mdash;are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> wishes to
+describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as
+being."<a name="FNanchor_212_212" id="FNanchor_212_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> The idealists, on the contrary, hold "that things (or,
+ultimately, Reality, Being) <i>are</i> only and just what they are <i>known</i> to
+be or that things are, or Reality <i>is</i>, what it is for a conscious
+knower&mdash;whether the knower be conceived primarily as a perceiver or as a
+thinker being a further, and secondary, question. This is the
+root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective,
+psychological or epistemological."<a name="FNanchor_213_213" id="FNanchor_213_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a> Knowing is merely one mode of
+experiencing, and things may be experienced in other ways, as, for
+instance, aesthetically, morally, technologically, or economically. This
+follows Dewey's familiar division of the processes of experience into
+separate 'functions' or activities. It becomes the duty of the
+philosopher, following this scheme, to find out "<i>what</i> sort of an
+experience knowing is&mdash;or, concretely how things are experienced when
+they are experienced <i>as</i> known things."<a name="FNanchor_214_214" id="FNanchor_214_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey fails, in this essay, to draw a distinction which is highly
+important, between knowledge as awareness and knowledge as reflection.
+This results in some confusion. For the present, he is concerned with
+knowledge as awareness. He employs an illustration to make his meaning
+clear; the experience of fright at a noise, which turns out, when
+examined and known, to be the tapping of a window shade. What is
+originally experienced is a frightful noise. If, after examination, the
+'frightfulness' is classified as 'psychical,' while the 'real' fact is
+said to be harmless, there is no warrant for reading this distinction
+back into the original experience. The argument is directed against that
+mode of explaining the difference between the psychical and the physical
+which employs a subjective mind or 'knower' as the container of the
+merely subjective aspects of reality. Dewey would hold that mind, used
+in this sense, is a fiction, having a small explanatory value, and
+creating more problems than it solves. The difference between psychical
+and physical is relative,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> not absolute. The frightful noise first heard
+was neither psychical nor physical; it was what it was experienced as,
+and the experience contained no such distinction, nor did it contain a
+'knower.' The noise <i>as known</i>, after the intervention of an act of
+judgment, contained these elements (except the 'knower'), but the thing
+is not merely what it is known as. There is no warrant for reading the
+distinctions made by judgment back into a situation where judgment was
+not operative. The original fact was precisely what it was experienced
+as.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's purpose, though not well stated, seems to be the complete
+rejection of the notion of knowledge as awareness, or of the subjective
+knower. He discovers at the same time an opportunity to substantiate his
+own descriptive account of knowing (or reflection) as an occasional
+function. The two enterprises, however, should be kept distinct.
+Granting that the subjective knower of the older epistemology should be
+dismissed from philosophy, it does not follow that Dewey's special
+interpretation of the function of reflection is the only substitute.</p>
+
+<p>The principle of immediate empiricism, Dewey says, furnishes no positive
+truth. It is simply a method. Not a single philosophical proposition can
+be deduced from it. The application of the method is indicated in the
+following proposition: "If you wish to find out what subjective,
+objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose,
+activity, evil, being, quality&mdash;any philosophic term, in short&mdash;means,
+go to experience and see what the thing is experienced <i>as</i>."<a name="FNanchor_215_215" id="FNanchor_215_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> This
+recipe cannot be taken literally. Dewey probably means that each concept
+has, or should have, a positive empirical reference, and is significant
+only in that reference. He is a firm believer, however, in the
+descriptive method. In a note, he remarks that he would employ in
+philosophy "the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in
+all the natural sciences, with such modifications, of course, as the
+subject itself entails."<a name="FNanchor_216_216" id="FNanchor_216_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> This remark calls for closer examination
+than can be made here. It may be said in passing, however, that
+'scientific description'<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> is by no means so simple a method of procedure
+as Dewey would seem to indicate. 'Scientific description,' as actually
+employed, is a highly elaborated and specialized method of dealing with
+experience. The whole subject, indeed, is involved, and requires
+cautious treatment. Dewey's somewhat ingenuous hope, that the
+identification of his method with the methods of science will add to its
+impressiveness, is in danger, unfortunately, of being vitiated through
+the suspicion that he is, after all, not in close touch with the methods
+of science.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey employs the descriptive method chiefly as a means for
+substantiating his special interpretation of the judgment process. His
+use of the method in this connection is well illustrated by an article
+called "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge"<a name="FNanchor_217_217" id="FNanchor_217_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> (1906), in which he
+attempts "to find out <i>what</i> sort of an experience knowing is" through
+an appeal to immediate experience. "It should be possible," he says, "to
+discern and describe a knowing as one identifies any object, concern, or
+event.... What we want is just something which takes itself as
+knowledge, rightly or wrongly."<a name="FNanchor_218_218" id="FNanchor_218_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> The difficulty lies not in finding
+a case of knowing, but in describing it when found. Dewey selects a case
+to be described, and, as usual, chooses a simple one.</p>
+
+<p>"This means," he says, "a specific case, a sample.... Our recourse is to
+an example so simple, so much on its face as to be as innocent as may be
+of assumptions.... Let us suppose a smell, just a floating odor."<a name="FNanchor_219_219" id="FNanchor_219_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a>
+The level at which this illustration is taken is significant. Is it
+possible to suppose that anything so complex, varied, myriad-sided as
+that something we call knowledge, can be discovered and described within
+the limits of so simple an instance?</p>
+
+<p>Dewey employs the smell in three situations, the first representing the
+'non-cognitional,' the second the 'cognitive,' and the third the
+genuinely 'cognitional' situation. The first, or 'non-cognitional'
+situation is described as follows: "But, let us say, the smell is not
+the smell <i>of</i> the rose; the resulting change of the organism is not a
+sense of walking and reaching; the delicious<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> finale is not the
+fulfilment of the movement, and, through that, of the original smell;
+'is not,' in each case meaning is 'not experienced as' such. We may
+take, in short, these experiences in a brutely serial fashion. The
+smell, <i>S</i>, is replaced (and displaced) by a felt movement, <i>K</i>, this is
+replaced by the gratification, <i>G</i>. Viewed from without, as we are now
+regarding it, there is <i>S-K-G</i>. But from within, for itself, it is now
+<i>S</i>, now <i>K</i>, now <i>G</i>, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is
+there looking before and after; memory and anticipation are not born.
+Such an experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor
+does it exercise a cognitive function."<a name="FNanchor_220_220" id="FNanchor_220_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a></p>
+
+<p>It will be seen at once that this is not a description of an actual
+human experience, but a schematic story designed to illustrate a
+comparatively simple point. In this situation the person concerned does
+not deliberately and consciously recognize the smell as the smell of a
+rose; he is not aware of any symbolic character in the smell, it does
+not enter as a middle term into a process of inference. In such a
+situation, Dewey believes, it would be wrong to read into the smell a
+cognitive property which it does not, as experienced, possess.</p>
+
+<p>In the second, or 'cognitive' situation, the smell as originally
+experienced does not involve the function of knowing, but turns out
+after the event, as reflected upon, to have had a significance. "In
+saying that the smell is finally experienced as <i>meaning</i> gratification
+... we retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the
+smell&mdash;and this is what is signified by 'cognitive.' Yet the smell is
+not cognitional, because it did not knowingly intend to mean this; but
+is found, after the event, to have meant it."<a name="FNanchor_221_221" id="FNanchor_221_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a> The moral is, as
+usual, that the findings of reflection must not be read back into the
+former unreflective experience.</p>
+
+<p>In the truly 'cognitional' experience the smell is then and there
+experienced as meaning or symbolizing the rose. "An experience is a
+knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and
+connection of two elements of the following sort: <i>one means</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> <i>or intends
+the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already
+present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same
+fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its
+companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it
+sets up</i>."<a name="FNanchor_222_222" id="FNanchor_222_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a> In the 'cognitional' situation, the smell is then and
+there experienced as signifying the presence of a rose in the vicinity,
+and the rose must be experienced as a present fact, before the meaning
+of the smell is completely fulfilled and verified.</p>
+
+<p>It will be seen at once that this description of knowing follows the
+lines laid down by James in his chapter on "Reasoning" in the
+<i>Principles of Psychology</i>. In the process of reasoning the situation is
+analyzed; some particular feature of it is abstracted and made the
+middle term in an inference. The smell, as thus abstracted, is said to
+have the function of knowing, or meaning, the rose whose reality it
+evidences.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey's treatment of knowledge, however, is far too simple. The function
+of meaning, symbolizing, or 'pointing' does not reside in the abstracted
+element as such; for the context in which the judgment occurs determines
+the choosing of the 'middle term,' as well as the direction in which it
+shall point. The situation as a whole has a rationality which resides in
+the distinctions, identities, phases of emphasis, and discriminations of
+the total experience. Rationality expresses itself in the organized
+system of experience, not in particular elements and their 'pointings.'
+Taken in this sense, rationality is present in all experience. The
+smell, in Dewey's first situation, is not 'cognitional' because the
+situation as a whole does not permit it to be, if such an expression may
+be used. The intellectual drift of the moment drives the smell away from
+the centre of attention at one time, just as at another it selects it to
+serve as an element in judgment. It is only with reference to a system
+of some kind that things can be regarded as symbols at all. Things do
+not represent one another at haphazard, but definitely and concretely;
+they imply an organization of elements having mutual implications. One
+thing implies another because both are elements in a whole which
+determines their mutual reference. This organization is present<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> in all
+experience, not in the form of 'established habits,' but in the form of
+will and purpose.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of his further discussion, which need not be followed in
+detail, Dewey passes on to a consideration of truth. Truth is concerned
+with the worth or validity of ideas. But, before their validity can be
+determined, there must be a 'cognitional' experience of the type
+described above. "Before the category of confirmation or refutation can
+be introduced, there must be something which <i>means</i> to mean something
+and which therefore can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue."<a name="FNanchor_223_223" id="FNanchor_223_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a>
+Ideas, or meanings, as directly experienced, are neither true nor false,
+but are made so by the results in which they issue. Even then, the
+outcome must be reflected upon, before they can be designated true or
+false. "<i>Truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only
+in situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced
+fulfilments and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and
+contrasted with reference to the question of the worth, as to
+reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of
+meanings.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_224_224" id="FNanchor_224_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224_224" class="fnanchor">[224]</a> This makes the whole problem of truth a relatively
+simple affair. The symbol and its 'pointing' are taken as a single,
+objective fact, to be tested, and, if verified, labelled 'true.'
+Meanings, after all, are not so simple as this scheme would imply.</p>
+
+<p>As the intellectual life of man is more subtle and universal than Dewey
+represents it to be, so is truth, as that which thought seeks to
+establish, something deeper-lying and more comprehensive. Ideas are not
+simple and isolated facts; their truth is not strictly their own, but is
+reflected into them from the objective order to which they pertain. The
+possibility of making observations and experiments, and of having ideas,
+rests upon the presence in and through experience of that directing
+influence which we call valid knowledge, or truth. An idea, to be true,
+must fit in with this general body of truth. Not correspondence with its
+single object, but correspondence with the whole organized body of
+knowledge, is the test of the truth of an idea. The attempt to describe
+knowledge as a particular occurrence, fact,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> or function, is foredoomed
+to failure. It should be noted also that Dewey's 'description,'
+throughout this essay, is anything but a direct, empirical examination
+of thought. He presents a schematized picture of reality which, like an
+engineer's diagram, leaves out the cloying details of the object it is
+supposed to represent.</p>
+
+<p>The sceptical and positivistic results of Dewey's treatment of knowledge
+are set forth in an article entitled "Some Implications of
+Anti-Intellectualism," published in the <i>Journal of Philosophy,
+Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, in 1910.<a name="FNanchor_225_225" id="FNanchor_225_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a> This was not included
+in the volume of collected essays published in the same year, but may be
+regarded as of some importance.</p>
+
+<p>After some comments on current anti-intellectualistic tendencies, Dewey
+proceeds to distinguish his own anti-intellectualism from that of
+others. This type "starts from acts, functions, as primary data,
+functions both biological and social in character; from organic
+responses, readjustments. It treats the knowledge standpoint, in all its
+patterns, structures, and purposes, as evolving out of, and operating in
+the interests of, the guidance and enrichment of these primary
+functions. The vice of intellectualism from this standpoint is not in
+making of logical relations and functions in and for knowledge, but in a
+false abstraction of knowledge (and the logical) from its working
+context."<a name="FNanchor_226_226" id="FNanchor_226_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a></p>
+
+<p>The manner in which this exaltation of the "primary" functions at the
+expense of knowledge affects philosophy is indicated in the following
+passage: "Philosophy is itself a mode of knowing, and of knowing wherein
+reflective thinking is much in play.... As a mode of knowledge, it
+arises, like any intellectual undertaking, out of certain typical
+perplexities and conflicts of behavior, and its purpose is to help
+straighten these out. Philosophy may indeed render things more
+intelligible or give greater insight into existence; but these
+considerations are subject to the final criterion of what it means to
+acquire insight and to make things intelligible, <i>i. e.</i>, namely,
+service of <i>special</i> purposes in behavior, and limit by the <i>special</i>
+problems in which the need of insight<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> arises. This is not to say that
+instrumentalism is merely a methodology or an epistemology preliminary
+to more ultimate philosophic or metaphysical inquiries, for it involves
+the doctrine that the origin, structure, and purpose of knowing are such
+as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of
+Being."<a name="FNanchor_227_227" id="FNanchor_227_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a></p>
+
+<p>In the last analysis, this appears to be a confession, rather than an
+argument. It is the inevitable outcome of the functional analysis of
+intelligence. Thought is this organ, with these functions, and is
+capable of so much and no more. The limit to its capacity is set by the
+description of its nature. The nature of the functionalistic limitation
+of thought is well expressed in the words 'special' and 'specific.'
+Since thought is the servant of the 'primary' modes of experience, it
+can only deal with the problems set for it by preceding non-reflective
+processes. These problems are 'specific' because they are concrete
+problems of action, and are concerned with particular aspects of the
+environment. Dewey's formidable positivism would vanish at once,
+however, if his special psychology of the thought-process should be
+found untenable. Thought is limited, according to Dewey, because it is a
+very special form of activity, operating occasionally in the interest of
+the direct modes of experiencing.</p>
+
+<p>Probably every philosopher recognizes that speculation cannot be allowed
+to run wild. Some problems are worth while, others are artificial and
+trivial, and some means must be found for separating the sound and
+substantial from the tawdry and sentimental. The question is, however,
+whether Dewey's psychology furnishes a ground for such distinctions.
+Again, it should be noted that, in spite of the limitations placed upon
+thought by its very nature, as described by Dewey, certain philosophers,
+by his own confession, are guilty of "wholesale inquiries into the
+nature of Being." If thought can deal only with specific problems, then
+there can be no question as to whether philosophy <i>ought</i> to be
+metaphysical. It is a repetition of the case of psychological <i>versus</i>
+ethical hedonism.</p>
+
+<p>Modern idealists would resent the imputation that there is any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>
+inclination on their part to deny the need for a critical attitude
+toward the problems and methods of philosophy. Kant's criticism of the
+'dogmatists' for their undiscriminating employment of the categories in
+the interpretation of reality, established an attitude which has been
+steadily maintained by his philosophical descendants. The idealist, in
+fact, has accused Dewey of laxity in the criticism of his own methods
+and presuppositions. The categories of description and natural selection
+by means of which his functionalism is established, it is argued, are of
+little service in the sphere of mind. And while Dewey accepts an
+evolutionary view of reality in general, the idealist has found
+evolutionism, at least in its biological form, too limited in scope to
+serve the extensive interests of philosophy. Dewey is right in opposing
+false problems and fanciful solutions in philosophy; but these evils are
+to be corrected, not by functional psychology, but by an empirical
+criticism of each method and each problem as it arises.</p>
+
+<p>It has been seen that, even in these more constructive essays, Dewey's
+position is largely defined in negatives. What might be expected, then,
+of the essays which are primarily critical? Perhaps the best answer will
+be afforded by a close analysis of one or more of them. Idealism, as has
+been said, receives most of Dewey's attention. There are three essays in
+<i>The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy</i>, which bear directly against
+idealism. One, "The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth," is directed
+against Bradley; another, "Experience and Objective Idealism," is a
+historical discussion of idealistic views. The third, which is broadest
+in scope, is entitled "Beliefs and Existences." This was originally
+delivered as the presidential address at the meeting of the American
+Philosophical Association in December, 1905, and was printed in the
+<i>Philosophical Review</i> in March, 1906, under the title, "Beliefs and
+Realities."</p>
+
+<p>Dewey begins with a discussion of the personal and human character of
+beliefs. "Beliefs," he says, "look both ways, towards persons and
+towards things.... They form or judge&mdash;justify or condemn&mdash;the agents
+who entertain them and who insist upon them.... To believe is to ascribe
+value, impute<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> meaning, assign import."<a name="FNanchor_228_228" id="FNanchor_228_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a> Beliefs are entertained by
+persons; by men as individuals and not as professional beings. Because
+they are essentially human, beliefs issue in action, and have their
+import in conduct. "That believed better is held to, asserted, affirmed,
+acted upon.... That believed worse is fled, resisted, transformed into
+an instrument for the better."<a name="FNanchor_229_229" id="FNanchor_229_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> Beliefs, then, have a human side;
+they belong to people, and have a character which is expressed in the
+conduct to which they lead.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, beliefs look towards things. "'Reality' naturally
+instigates belief. It appraises itself and through this self-appraisal
+manages its affairs.... It is interpretation; not merely existence aware
+of itself as fact, but existence discerning, judging itself, approving
+and disapproving."<a name="FNanchor_230_230" id="FNanchor_230_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> The vital connection between belief as personal,
+and as directed upon things, cannot be disregarded. "We cannot keep
+connection on one side and throw it away on the other. We cannot
+preserve significance and decline the personal attitude in which it is
+inscribed and operative...."<a name="FNanchor_231_231" id="FNanchor_231_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231_231" class="fnanchor">[231]</a> To take the world as something
+existing by itself, is to overlook the fact that it is always somebody's
+world, "and you shall not have completed your metaphysics till you have
+told whose world is meant and how and what for&mdash;in what bias and to what
+effect."<a name="FNanchor_232_232" id="FNanchor_232_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a></p>
+
+<p>But philosophers have been guilty of error here. They have thrown aside
+all consideration of belief as a personal fact in reality, and have
+taken "an oath of allegiance to Reality, objective, universal, complete;
+made perhaps of atoms, perhaps of sensations, perhaps of logical
+meanings."<a name="FNanchor_233_233" id="FNanchor_233_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> This Reality leaves no place for belief; for belief, as
+having to do with human adventures, can have no place in a cut and dried
+cosmos. The search for a world which is eternally fixed in eternal
+meanings has developed the present wondrous and formidable technique of
+philosophy.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p><p>The attempt to exclude the human element from belief has resulted in
+philosophical errors. Philosophers have divided reality into two parts,
+"one of which shall alone be good and true 'Reality,' ... while the
+other part, that which is excluded, shall be referred exclusively to
+belief and treated as mere appearance...."<a name="FNanchor_234_234" id="FNanchor_234_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> To cap the climax, this
+division of the world into two parts must be made by some philosopher
+who, being human, employs his own beliefs, and classifies things on the
+basis of his own experience. Can it be done? We are today in the
+presence of a revolt against such tendencies, Dewey says; and he
+proposes to give some sketch, "(1) of the historical tendencies which
+have shaped the situation in which a Stoic theory of knowledge claims
+metaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies that have furnished the
+despised principle of belief opportunity and means of reassertion."<a name="FNanchor_235_235" id="FNanchor_235_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a></p>
+
+<p>Throughout this introduction Dewey speaks with considerable feeling, as
+if the question were a moral one, rather than a disquisition concerning
+the best method of dealing with the personal aspects of thought. His
+meaning, however, is far from being apparent. What does it mean to say
+that a Stoic theory of knowledge holds a monopoly in modern philosophy?
+In what sense has the philosophy of the past been misanthropic? <i>Is</i>
+Humanism a product of the twentieth century? Dewey's assertions are
+broad and sweeping; too broad even for a popular discourse, let alone a
+philosophical address. Perhaps his attitude will be more fully expressed
+in the historical inquiry which follows.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey begins this inquiry with the period of the rise of Christianity,
+which, because it emphasized faith and the personal attitude, seemed in
+a fair way to do justice to human belief. "That the ultimate principle
+of conduct is affectional and volitional; that God is love; that access
+to the principle is by faith, a personal attitude; that belief,
+surpassing logical basis and warrant, works out through its own
+operation its own fulfilling evidence: such was the implied moral
+metaphysic of Christianity."<a name="FNanchor_236_236" id="FNanchor_236_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> But these implications had to be
+worked out into a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> theory, and the only logical or metaphysical systems
+which offered themselves as a basis for organization were those Stoic
+systems which "identified true existence with the proper object of
+logical reason." Aristotle alone among the ancients gave practical
+thought its due attention, but he, unfortunately, failed to assimilate
+"his idea of theoretical to his notion of practical knowledge."<a name="FNanchor_237_237" id="FNanchor_237_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237_237" class="fnanchor">[237]</a> In
+the Greek systems generally, "desiring reason culminating in beliefs
+relating to imperfect existence, stands forever in contrast with
+passionless reason functioning in pure knowledge, logically complete, of
+perfect being."<a name="FNanchor_238_238" id="FNanchor_238_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey's discussion moves too rapidly here to be convincing. He does not
+take time, for instance, to make a very important distinction between
+the Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. He does not do justice to the
+purpose which animated the Greeks in their attempt to put thought on a
+'theoretical' basis. His confusion of Platonism with Neo-Platonism is
+especially annoying. And, most assuredly, his estimate of primitive
+Christianity needs corroboration. Probably Christianity, in its
+primitive form, did lay great stress upon individual beliefs and
+persuasions, but it was expected, nevertheless, that the Holy Spirit
+working in men would produce uniform results in the way of belief. When
+the uniformity failed to materialize, Christianity was forced, in the
+interests of union, to fall back upon some objective standard by which
+belief could be tested. After this was established, an end was made of
+individual inspiration. From the earliest times, therefore, it may be
+said, Christianity sought means for the suppression of free inquiry and
+belief, a proceeding utterly opposed to the spirit of ancient Greece.</p>
+
+<p>"I need not remind you," Dewey continues, "how through Neo-Platonism,
+St. Augustine, and the Scholastic renaissance, these conceptions became
+imbedded in Christian philosophy; and what a reversal occurred of the
+original practical principle of Christianity. Belief is henceforth
+important because it is the mere antecedent in a finite and fallen
+world, a temporal and phenomenal world infected with non-being, of true
+knowledge to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> be achieved only in a world of completed Being."<a name="FNanchor_239_239" id="FNanchor_239_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239_239" class="fnanchor">[239]</a>
+Through the hundreds of years that intervened before the world's
+awakening, the 'Stoic dogma,' enforced by authority, held the world in
+thrall. And still Dewey finds the mediaeval Absolutism in many respects
+more merciful than the Absolutism of modern philosophy. "For my part, I
+can but think that mediaeval absolutism, with its provision for
+authoritative supernatural assistance in this world and assertion of
+supernatural realization in the next, was more logical, as well as more
+humane, then the modern absolutism, that, with the same logical
+premises, bids man find adequate consolation and support in the fact
+that, after all, his strivings are already eternally fulfilled, his
+errors already eternally transcended, his partial beliefs already
+eternally comprehended."<a name="FNanchor_240_240" id="FNanchor_240_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_240_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> Dewey takes no note of the fact that
+philosophy, as involving really free inquiry, was dead during the whole
+period of mediaeval predominance.</p>
+
+<p>The modern age, Dewey continues, brought intelligence back to earth
+again, but only partially. Fixed being was still supposed to be the
+object of thought. "The principle of the inherent relation of thought to
+being was preserved intact, but its practical locus was moved down from
+the next world to this."<a name="FNanchor_241_241" id="FNanchor_241_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a> Aristotle's mode of dealing with the
+Platonic ideas was followed, and Spinoza was the great exponent of "the
+strict correlation of the attribute of matter with the attribute of
+thought."</p>
+
+<p>But, again, the modern conception of knowledge failed to do justice to
+belief, in spite of the compromise that gave the natural world to
+intelligence, and the spiritual world to faith. This compromise could
+not endure, for Science encroached upon the field of religious belief,
+and invaded the sphere of the personal and emotional. "Knowledge, in its
+general theory, as philosophy, went the same way. It was pre-committed
+to the old notion: the absolutely real is the object of <i>knowledge</i>, and
+hence is something universal and impersonal. So, whether by the road of
+sensationalism or rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism or objective
+idealism, it came about that concrete selves, specific<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> feeling and
+willing beings, were relegated with the beliefs in which they declare
+themselves to the 'phenomenal.'"<a name="FNanchor_242_242" id="FNanchor_242_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> Feeling, volition, desiring
+thought have never received the justice due them in the whole course of
+philosophy. This is Dewey's conclusion. Little can be said in praise of
+his historical survey. There is scarcely a statement to which exception
+could not be taken, for the history of philosophy is not amenable to
+generalized treatment of this character.</p>
+
+<p>The reader turns more hopefully toward the third part of the essay, in
+which he is promised a positive statement of the new theory which does
+full justice to belief. "First, then, the very use of the knowledge
+standpoint, the very expression of the knowledge preoccupation, has
+produced methods and tests that, when formulated, intimate a radically
+different conception of knowledge, and of its relation to existence and
+belief, than the orthodox one."<a name="FNanchor_243_243" id="FNanchor_243_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p>
+
+<p>But after this not unpromising introduction, Dewey falls into the
+polemical strain again. The argument need not be followed in detail,
+since it consists largely in a reassertion of the validity of belief as
+an element in knowledge. The general conclusion is that modern
+scientific investigation reveals itself, when examined, as nothing more
+that the "rendering into a systematic technique, into an art
+deliberately and delightfully pursued, the rougher and cruder means by
+which practical human beings have in all ages worked out the
+implications of their beliefs, tested them, and endeavored in the
+interests of economy, efficiency, and freedom, to render them coherent
+with one another."<a name="FNanchor_244_244" id="FNanchor_244_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> This is presumably true. If no more is implied
+than is definitely asserted in this passage, the reader is apt to wonder
+who would deny it.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey again claims for his theory the support of modern science.
+"Biology, psychology, and the social sciences proffer an imposing body
+of concrete facts that also point to the rehabilitation of
+belief...."<a name="FNanchor_245_245" id="FNanchor_245_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> Psychology has revised its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> notions in terms of
+beliefs. 'Motor' is writ large on the face of sensation, perception,
+conception, cognition in general. Biology shows that the organic
+instruments of the intellectual life were evolved for specifically
+practical purposes. The historical sciences show that knowledge is a
+social instrument for the purpose of meeting social needs. This
+testimony is not philosophy, Dewey says, but it has a bearing on
+philosophy. The new sciences have at least as much importance as
+mathematics and physics. "Such being the case, the reasons for ruling
+psychology and sociology and allied sciences out of competency to give
+philosophic testimony have more significance than the bare denial of
+jurisdiction."<a name="FNanchor_246_246" id="FNanchor_246_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> The idealists, apparently, have been the worst
+offenders in this connection. "One would be almost justified in
+construing idealism as a Pickwickian scheme, so willing is it to
+idealize the principle of intelligence at the expense of its specific
+undertakings, were it not that this reluctance is the necessary outcome
+of the Stoic basis and tenor of idealism&mdash;its preoccupation with logical
+contents and relations in abstraction from their <i>situs</i> and function in
+conscious living beings."<a name="FNanchor_247_247" id="FNanchor_247_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a></p>
+
+<p>In conclusion, Dewey warns against certain possible misunderstandings.
+The pragmatic philosopher, he says, is not opposed to objective
+realities, and logical and universal thinking. Again, it is not to be
+supposed that science is any the less exact by reason of being
+instrumental to human beliefs. "Because reason is a scheme of working
+out the meanings of convictions in terms of one another and of the
+consequences they import in further experience, convictions are the
+more, not the less, amenable and responsible to the full exercise of
+reason."<a name="FNanchor_248_248" id="FNanchor_248_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> And finally, Dewey assures the reader that the outcome of
+his discussion is not a solution, but a problem. Nobody is apt to
+dispute that statement.</p>
+
+<p>This very unsatisfactory essay is, nevertheless, a fair specimen of the
+polemical literature which was produced by Dewey and others during these
+years. Pragmatism was trying to make converts, and the <i>argumentum ad
+hominem</i> was freely employed.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> If the opposition was painted a good deal
+blacker than was necessary, the end was supposed to justify the evident
+exaggeration. And so, in this essay, after accusing his contemporaries
+of adherence to tenets that they would have indignantly repudiated,
+after a wholesale and indiscriminate condemnation of idealism, Dewey
+concludes with&mdash;a problem. This period of propaganda is now quite
+definitely a thing of the past. Philosophical discussion, especially
+since the beginning of the great war, has entered upon a new epoch of
+sanity, and, perhaps, of constructive effort.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_212_212" id="Footnote_212_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212_212"><span class="label">[212]</span></a> <i>The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy</i>, p. 227.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_213_213" id="Footnote_213_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213_213"><span class="label">[213]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 228. In connection with the discussion which
+follows see Bradley "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," in
+<i>Essays on Truth and Reality</i>, Chapter VI.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_214_214" id="Footnote_214_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214_214"><span class="label">[214]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 229.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_215_215" id="Footnote_215_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215_215"><span class="label">[215]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 239.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_216_216" id="Footnote_216_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216_216"><span class="label">[216]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 240.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_217_217" id="Footnote_217_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217_217"><span class="label">[217]</span></a> <i>The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy</i>, pp. 77-111.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_218_218" id="Footnote_218_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218_218"><span class="label">[218]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 77.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_219_219" id="Footnote_219_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219_219"><span class="label">[219]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 78.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_220_220" id="Footnote_220_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220_220"><span class="label">[220]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_221_221" id="Footnote_221_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221_221"><span class="label">[221]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 84.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_222_222" id="Footnote_222_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222_222"><span class="label">[222]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 90. Author's italics.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_223_223" id="Footnote_223_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223_223"><span class="label">[223]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 87.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_224_224" id="Footnote_224_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224_224"><span class="label">[224]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 95. Author's italics.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_225_225" id="Footnote_225_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225_225"><span class="label">[225]</span></a> Vol. VII. pp. 477-481.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_226_226" id="Footnote_226_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226_226"><span class="label">[226]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 478.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_227_227" id="Footnote_227_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227_227"><span class="label">[227]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 479.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_228_228" id="Footnote_228_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228_228"><span class="label">[228]</span></a> <i>Influence of Darwin on Philosophy</i>, p. 169.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_229_229" id="Footnote_229_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229_229"><span class="label">[229]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 170.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_230_230" id="Footnote_230_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230_230"><span class="label">[230]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 171.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_231_231" id="Footnote_231_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231_231"><span class="label">[231]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_232_232" id="Footnote_232_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232_232"><span class="label">[232]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_233_233" id="Footnote_233_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233_233"><span class="label">[233]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 172.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_234_234" id="Footnote_234_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234_234"><span class="label">[234]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 175.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_235_235" id="Footnote_235_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235_235"><span class="label">[235]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 177.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_236_236" id="Footnote_236_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236_236"><span class="label">[236]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 17?.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_237_237" id="Footnote_237_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237_237"><span class="label">[237]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 179.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_238_238" id="Footnote_238_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238_238"><span class="label">[238]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_239_239" id="Footnote_239_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239_239"><span class="label">[239]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_240_240" id="Footnote_240_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240_240"><span class="label">[240]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 180.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_241_241" id="Footnote_241_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241_241"><span class="label">[241]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 181.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_242_242" id="Footnote_242_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242_242"><span class="label">[242]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 183.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_243_243" id="Footnote_243_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243_243"><span class="label">[243]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 184.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_244_244" id="Footnote_244_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244_244"><span class="label">[244]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 187.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_245_245" id="Footnote_245_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245_245"><span class="label">[245]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 189.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_246_246" id="Footnote_246_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246_246"><span class="label">[246]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 190.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_247_247" id="Footnote_247_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247_247"><span class="label">[247]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 191 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_248_248" id="Footnote_248_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248_248"><span class="label">[248]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 194.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER VIII</span> <span class="smaller">LATER DEVELOPMENTS</span></h2>
+
+<p>Neo-realism began to flourish in this country after 1900, its rise being
+nearly contemporary with the spread of pragmatism. Many neo-realists,
+indeed, consider themselves followers of James. Dewey views the new
+realism, along with pragmatism and 'naturalistic idealism,' as "part and
+parcel of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction."<a name="FNanchor_249_249" id="FNanchor_249_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> The
+neo-realists, like the pragmatists, have been active in the field of
+controversy, and the pages of the <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,
+and Scientific Methods</i> are filled with exchanges between the
+representatives of the two schools, in the form of notes, articles,
+discussions, agreements, and disclaimers. Dewey has more sympathy for
+realism than for idealism. He finds among the writers of this school,
+however, a tendency toward the epistemological interpretation of thought
+which he so strongly opposes. An excellent statement of his estimate of
+realism is furnished by his "Brief Studies in Realism," published in the
+<i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods</i>, in
+1911.<a name="FNanchor_250_250" id="FNanchor_250_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250_250" class="fnanchor">[250]</a></p>
+
+<p>In beginning these studies Dewey observes that certain idealistic
+writers (not named) have been employing in support of their idealism
+certain facts which have an obvious physical nature and explanation.
+Such illusions as that of the bent stick in the water, the converging
+railway tracks, and the double image that occurs when the eye-ball is
+pressed, have, as the realists have well proved, a physical explanation
+which is entirely adequate. Why is it that the idealists remain
+unimpressed by this demonstration? There is a certain element in the
+realistic explanation which undoubtedly explains the reluctance of the
+idealists to be convinced. "Many realists, in offering the type of
+explanation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> adduced above, have treated the cases of seen light,
+doubled imagery, as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an
+inherent cognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as <i>cases
+of knowledge</i>, instead of as simply natural events...."<a name="FNanchor_251_251" id="FNanchor_251_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a></p>
+
+<p>Dewey draws a distinction, at this point, between na&iuml;ve and presentative
+realism, employing, by way of illustration, the 'star' illusion, which
+turns upon the peculiar fact that a star may be seen upon the earth long
+after it has ceased to exist. The na&iuml;ve realist remains in the sphere of
+natural explanation. He accounts for the star illusion in physical
+terms. The astronomical star and the perceived star are two physical
+events within a continuous physical order or process. But the
+presentative realist maintains that, since the two stars are numerically
+separate, the astronomical star must be the 'real' star, while the
+perceived star is merely mental; the real star exists in independence of
+a knowing subject, while the perceived star is related to a mind. The
+na&iuml;ve realist has no need of the hypothesis of a knower, since he can
+furnish an adequate physical account of the numerical duplicity of the
+star. Dewey favors the na&iuml;ve standpoint, and affirms that presentative
+realism is tainted by an epistemological subjectivism. "Once depart," he
+says, "from this thorough na&iuml;vet&eacute;, and substitute for it the
+psychological theory that perception is a cognitive presentation of an
+object to a mind, and the first step is taken on the road which ends in
+an idealistic system."<a name="FNanchor_252_252" id="FNanchor_252_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a></p>
+
+<p>The presentative realist, Dewey continues, finds himself possessed of
+two kinds of knowledge, when he comes to take account of inference; for
+inference is "in the field as an obvious and undisputed case of
+knowledge." There is the knowledge of perception by a knower, and the
+inferential knowledge which passes beyond perception. All reality,
+consequently, is related, directly or indirectly, to the knowing
+subject, and idealism is triumphant. But the real difficulty of the
+realist's position is that, if perception is a mode of knowing, it
+stands in unfavorable contrast with knowledge by inference. How can the
+inferred reality of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> star be established, considering the
+subjectivity of all perception?</p>
+
+<p>Dewey is alert to the dangers which result from subjectivism, but does
+not distinguish, as carefully as he might, between knowledge as
+inference, and knowledge as perceptual awareness. Thus, while it might
+be granted that the subjective mind is a vicious abstraction, it does
+not follow that Dewey's particular interpretation of the function of
+inference is correct. And, although the "unwinking, unremitting eye" of
+the subjective knower might make experience merely a mental affair,
+there is no reason to believe that the operation of inference in
+perception would lead to the same result, for inference and awareness
+are quite distinct, in historical meaning and function. It is, in fact,
+a mere accident that inference and awareness (in the subjective sense)
+should both be called knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>In opposition to presentative realism, Dewey offers his 'naturalistic'
+interpretation of knowledge.<a name="FNanchor_253_253" id="FNanchor_253_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253_253" class="fnanchor">[253]</a> He finds that the function of
+inference, "although embodying the logical relation, is itself a natural
+and specifically detectable process among natural things&mdash;it is not a
+non-natural or epistemological relation, that is, a relation to a mind
+or knower not in the natural series...."<a name="FNanchor_254_254" id="FNanchor_254_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> As has been observed,
+Dewey is safe in maintaining that inference is <i>not</i> an operation
+performed by a subjective knower, but it does not follow from this that
+his interpretation of inference is correct. In fact, a discussion of
+inference is irrelevant to the matters which Dewey is here considering.</p>
+
+<p>In the second part of the essay, the discussion passes into a keen and
+rather clever recital of the difficulties that result from taking the
+knowledge relation to be 'ubiquitous.'<a name="FNanchor_255_255" id="FNanchor_255_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> Since this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> relation is a
+constant factor in experience, it would seem as if it might be
+eliminated from philosophical calculations. The realist would be glad to
+eliminate it, but the idealist is not so willing; for, "since the point
+at issue is precisely the statement of the most universally defining
+trait of existence as existence, the invitation deliberately to
+disregard the most universal trait is nothing more or less than an
+invitation to philosophic suicide."<a name="FNanchor_256_256" id="FNanchor_256_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a> It is, Dewey says, as if two
+philosophers should set out to ascertain the relation which holds
+between an organism as 'eater' and the environment as 'food,' and one
+should find the essential thing to be the food, the other the eating.
+The 'foodists' would represent the realists, the 'eaterists' the
+idealists. No advance, he believes, can be made on this basis.</p>
+
+<p>In opposition to the epistemologists, Dewey would consider the knowledge
+relation not ubiquitous, but specific and occasional. As man bears other
+relations to his environment than that of eater, so is he also something
+more than a knower. "If the one who is knower is, in relation to
+objects, something else and more than their knower, and if objects are,
+<i>in relation to the one who knows them</i>, something else and other than
+things in a knowledge relation, there is somewhat to define and
+discuss...."[2] Dewey proposes to advance certain facts to support his
+contention that knowing is "a relation to things which depends upon
+other and more primary connections between a self and things; a relation
+which grows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates
+in their interests at specifiable crises."<a name="FNanchor_257_257" id="FNanchor_257_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a></p>
+
+<p>This brings the discussion back to familiar ground again, and nothing is
+added to his previous statements of the functional conception of
+knowledge. While the realist (explicitly or implicitly) conceives the
+knowledge relation as obtaining between a subject knower and the
+external world, Dewey interprets the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> knowledge relation in terms of
+organism and environment. The 'ubiquity' of the knowledge relation is
+disposed of, as has been seen, by conceiving knowledge from an entirely
+different standpoint; by reducing all knowledge to inference, and
+abolishing the knowing subject. Dewey is plainly under the impression
+that the only alternative to the ubiquitous knower is his naturalistic,
+biological interpretation of the processes of inference.</p>
+
+<p>In support of his naturalistic logic, Dewey argues as follows: (1) All
+perception involves reference to an organism. "We might about as well
+talk of the production of a specimen case of water as a presentation of
+water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too accustomed to talk
+about perceptions and the organism."<a name="FNanchor_258_258" id="FNanchor_258_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> (2) Awareness is only a single
+phase of experience. We 'know' only a small part of the causes which
+affect us as agents. "This means, of course, that things, the things
+that come to be <i>known</i>, are primarily not objects of awareness, but
+causes of weal and woe, things to get and things to avoid, means and
+obstacles, tools and results."<a name="FNanchor_259_259" id="FNanchor_259_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> (3) Knowing is only a special phase
+of the behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation, but very important as having
+to do with means for the practical and scientific control of the
+environment.</p>
+
+<p>In the final analysis, it will be seen that Dewey refutes the realist by
+substituting inference for what the realist calls 'consciousness,' and
+settling the issue by this triumph in the field of dialectics, rather
+than by an appeal to the facts. Nowhere does Dewey do justice to those
+concrete situations which, to the realist, seem to necessitate a
+definition of consciousness as awareness. His attitude toward the
+realists may be summed up in the statement that he finds in most
+realistic systems the fault to which his logical theory is especially
+opposed: the tendency to define the problem of logic as that of the
+relation of thought at large to reality at large, and to distinguish the
+content of mind from the content of the world on an existential rather
+than on a functional basis.</p>
+
+<p>One of Dewey's more recent studies, "The Logic of Judgments<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> of
+Practise,"<a name="FNanchor_260_260" id="FNanchor_260_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_260_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a> seems to add something positive to his interpretation of
+knowledge. A practical judgment, Dewey explains at the outset of this
+study, is differentiated from others, not by having a separate organ and
+source, but by having a specific sort of subject-matter. It is concerned
+with things to be done or situations demanding action. "He had better
+consult a physician," and "It would be well for you to invest in these
+bonds," are examples of the practical judgment.</p>
+
+<p>These propositions, as will be seen, are not cast in what the logician
+calls logical form, with regular terms and copula. When put in that
+form, they seem to lose the direct reference to action which, Dewey
+says, differentiates them from the 'descriptive' judgment of the form
+<i>S</i> is <i>P</i>.<a name="FNanchor_261_261" id="FNanchor_261_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> This apparently trivial matter is really important.
+Although every statement embodies judgment, some statements do not
+reflect the ground upon which they are asserted. In this condition they
+may be viewed as opinions, suggestions, or guesses, looking towards
+judgment rather than reflecting its results. True judgment is occupied
+with reasons, proofs, and grounds, and does not concern itself with
+action as action. Only when taken as the expression of an individual's
+attitude, do Dewey's practical judgments (or assertions) possess the
+direct reference to action which he selects as their chief
+characteristic. The statement, "You ought to invest in these bonds,"
+does, indeed, suggest a specific action, but in so doing it loses its
+character as a judgment. Put in more logical form, "You are one of those
+who should invest in these bonds," the proposition is more clearly the
+expression of a judgment, and leads back to its premises. Attention
+turns from specific action as such to action as a typical or universal
+fact. In short, Dewey's practical judgment is not a true judgment; it
+will be seen that it is studied, not as a logical, but as a
+psychological phenomenon.</p>
+
+<p>In pursuance of his psychological method, Dewey discovers several
+interesting facts about judgments of practice.(1) These judgments imply
+an incomplete situation,&mdash;concretely and specifically incomplete; they
+express a need. (2) The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span>judgment is itself a factor in assisting toward
+the completion of the situation, since it directs an action necessary to
+the fulfilment of the need. (3) The subject-matter of the judgment
+expresses the fact that one outcome is to be preferred to another. The
+element of preference is peculiar to the practical judgment, for it is
+not found in merely descriptive judgments, or those 'confined to the
+given.' (4) A practical judgment implies both means and end, the act
+that completes, and the completeness. It is in this respect 'binary.'
+(5) The judgment of what is to be done demands an accurate statement of
+the course of action to be pursued and the means to be employed, and
+these are to be determined relatively to the end in view. (6) It finally
+appears that what is true of the practical judgment may be true of all
+judgments of fact; it may be held that "all judgments of fact have
+reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and the
+discovery of means for their attempted realization."<a name="FNanchor_262_262" id="FNanchor_262_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a></p>
+
+<p>This ingenious reading of functionalism out of the practical judgment
+is, after all, merely a drawing forth of the psychological implications
+previously placed in it. That judgment is an instrument for completing a
+situation; that it is linked up with action through desire and
+preference; that it seeks to determine the means for effecting a
+practical outcome,&mdash;these typically instrumental notions are of one
+piece with the system of belief that led Dewey to hit upon the practical
+judgment as the embodiment of a direction to action. It is important to
+distinguish between the logical and the psychological aspects of these
+propositions. Action as psychological is one thing; as the
+subject-matter of judgment, it is another. In coming to a decision as to
+how to act, the agent sets his proposed action over against himself, and
+considers it in its universal and typical character. His motor
+tendencies, his feelings, his desires factor in the situation
+psychologically considered; but they do not enter judgment as
+psychological facts, but rather, if at all, as data which have a
+significance beyond their mere particularity. Dewey remains at the
+psychological standpoint, giving no attention to the genuinely logical
+aspects of his 'judgments of practice.'</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span></p><p>From the study of the practical judgment, Dewey passes on to a
+consideration of judgments of value, proposing to maintain that "value
+judgments are a species of practical judgments."<a name="FNanchor_263_263" id="FNanchor_263_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_263_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> There will be a
+distinct gain for moral and economic theory, he believes, in treating
+value as concerned with acts necessary to complete a given
+need-situation. There is no obvious reason why Dewey should pass to the
+pragmatic theory of value through the medium of the practical judgment,
+since it could be directly considered on its own account. At any rate,
+the discussion of value judgments which follows must stand on its own
+merits; it has no vital relation to what precedes.</p>
+
+<p>It is, as usual, the psychological characteristics of the value judgment
+that attract Dewey's attention. Any process of judgment, according to
+his analysis, deals with a specific subject-matter, not from the
+standpoint of any objective quality it may possess, but with reference
+to its functional capacity. "Relative, or comparative, durability,
+cheapness, suitability, style, esthetic attractiveness [<i>e. g.</i>, in a
+suit of clothes] constitute value traits. They are traits of objects not
+<i>per se</i>, but <i>as entering into a possible and foreseen completing of
+the situation</i>. Their value is their force in precisely this
+function."<a name="FNanchor_264_264" id="FNanchor_264_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a></p>
+
+<p>Attention should not be distracted from this interpretation of value,
+Dewey warns, through confusing the value sought with the price or market
+value of the goods. Price values, like the qualities and patterns of the
+goods, are data which must be considered in making the judgment, but
+they are not the values which the judgment seeks. The value to be
+determined is here, is specific, and must be established by reference to
+the specific or psychological situation as it presents itself.</p>
+
+<p>It is true, as Dewey says, that in judgment a value is being established
+which has not been determined previously. But it must be insisted that
+this value is not estimated by reference to the specific situation in
+its limited aspects. The weight of the past bears against the moment;
+the act of judgment bases itself upon knowledge objective and
+substantial; the test of the value<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> of the thing is its place and
+function, not in the here and now, but in the whole system of
+experience. Dewey has excluded the reference of the thing to objective,
+organized reality, by specifying that its value shall be decided upon
+with reference to a specific situation. This limitation of the judgment
+situation is imposed upon it from without, and from a special point of
+view,&mdash;that of functional psychology. Every object and every situation
+has its quality of uniqueness and particularity; but the judgment, as
+judgment, is not concerned with this aspect of things. Judgment seizes
+upon the generic aspect of objects; this kind of a suit of clothes is
+the kind that is appropriate to this type of situation. The movement of
+judgment is objective and universal, not subjective and psychological.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey finds one alternative especially opposed to his 'specific'
+judgment of value; that is, the proposition that evaluation involves a
+comparison of the present object with some fixed standard. When the
+fixed standard is investigated, it is found to depend on something else,
+and this on something else again in an infinite regress. Finally, the
+<i>Summum Bonum</i>, as the absolute end term of such a <i>regressus</i>, turns
+out to be a fiction. Dewey is quite right in maintaining that value is
+not something eternally fixed. This does not, however, remove the
+possibility of 'real' value, as opposed to mere expediency.</p>
+
+<p>Value as established, Dewey continues, must be taken into consideration
+in making a value judgment. At the same time, it will not do to accept
+the established value from mere force of habit. Ultimately, he finds,
+all genuine valuation implies a degree of revaluation. "To many," he
+observes, "it will appear to be a survival of an idealistic
+epistemology,"<a name="FNanchor_265_265" id="FNanchor_265_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_265_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a> presumably because it implies a real change in
+reality, as opposed to a fixed and rigid order of external reality. But
+practical judgments, Dewey says, as having reference to proposed acts,
+necessarily look toward some proposed change which the act is to effect.
+It is not in an epistemological, but in a practical sense, that judgment
+involves a change in values.</p>
+
+<p>The outcome of the discussion so far, Dewey believes, is to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> show, first
+of all, that "the passage of a proposition into action is not a miracle,
+but the realization of its own character&mdash;its own meaning as
+logical,"<a name="FNanchor_266_266" id="FNanchor_266_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_266_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a> and, in the second place, to suggest that all judgments,
+not merely practical ones, may have their import in reference to some
+difference to be brought about through action.</p>
+
+<p>In the third part of the essay, Dewey's discussion leads him back to
+sense perceptions as forms of practical judgment. There is no doubt, in
+his mind, that many perceptions do have an import for action. Not merely
+sign-posts, and familiar symbols of the kind, but many perceptions
+lacking this obvious reference, have a significance for conduct. It must
+not, of course, be supposed that all perception, at any one time, has
+cognitive properties; for some of the perceptions have esthetic, and
+other non-cognitive properties. Only certain elements of a situation
+have the function of cognition.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey goes on to say that care must be taken in the use made of these
+sign-functions in connection with inference. "There is a great
+difference between saying that the perception of a shape affords an
+indication of how to act and saying that the perception of shape is
+itself an inference."<a name="FNanchor_267_267" id="FNanchor_267_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_267_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> No judgment, Dewey seems to imply, is
+involved in responding to the motor cue furnished by a familiar object.
+Again, the common idea that present perception consists of sensations as
+immediate, plus inferred images, implies that every perception involves
+inference. But the merging of sensations and images in perception can be
+explained naturally, by the fusion of nervous processes, and no
+supplementary (transcendental) act of mind is needed to explain the
+integrity of experience.</p>
+
+<p>The tendency to take perception as the object of knowledge, Dewey
+continues, instead of as simply cognitive, a term in knowledge, is due
+to two chief causes. The first is that in practical judgments the
+pointing of the thing towards action is so universal a trait as to be
+overlooked, and the second is that signs, because of their importance,
+become objects of study on their own account, and in this condition
+cease to function directly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> as cognitive. Dewey means, apparently, that
+because the cognitive aspect of things is never attended to except when
+they are 'known,' or treated as objects of judgment, there is a tendency
+to suppose that they always have the character that pertains to them as
+'known' things.</p>
+
+<p>Again, Dewey says, perception may be translated as the effect of a cause
+that produced it. But the cause does not ordinarily appear in
+experience, and the perceptions, as effects, remain isolated from the
+system of things. Truth and error then become matters of the relation of
+the perception to its cause. The difficulties attendant upon this view
+can be avoided by taking sense perceptions as terms in practical
+judgments. Here the 'other term' which is sought is the action proposed
+by the perception. "To borrow an illustration of Professor Woodbridge's:
+A certain sound indicates to the mother that her baby needs attention.
+If there is error it is not because the sound ought to mean so many
+vibrations of the air, while as matter of fact it doesn't even suggest
+air vibrations, but because there is wrong inference as to the act to be
+performed."<a name="FNanchor_268_268" id="FNanchor_268_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_268_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a> The idea is tested, not by its correspondence with some
+formal reality, but by its ability to lead up to the experience to which
+it points.</p>
+
+<p>From the consideration of error as cognitive, Dewey passes on to
+consider its status as primitive sense data. He draws a distinction
+between sensation as psychological and as logical. Ordinary sensation,
+just as it comes, is often too confused to serve as a basis for
+inference. "It has often been pointed out that sense qualities being
+just what they are, it is illegitimate to introduce such notions as
+obscurity or confusion into them: a slightly illuminated color is just
+as irretrievably what it is, as clearly itself, as an object in the
+broad glare of noon-day."<a name="FNanchor_269_269" id="FNanchor_269_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> But when a confused object is made a
+datum for inference, its confusion is just the thing to be got rid of.
+It is broken up by analysis into simple elements, and the psychologist's
+sensations are logical products, not psychological facts. "Locke writes
+a mythology of the history of knowledge, starting from clear and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>
+distinct meanings, each simple, well-defined, sharply and unambiguously
+just what it is on its face, without concealments and complications, and
+proceeds by 'natural' compoundings up to the store of complex ideas, and
+the perception of simple relations of agreement among ideas: a
+perception always certain if the ideas are simple, and always
+controllable in the case of the complex ideas if we consider the simple
+ideas and connections by which they are reached. Thus he established the
+habit of taking logical discriminations as historical or psychological
+primitives&mdash;as 'sources' of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks
+upon inference."<a name="FNanchor_270_270" id="FNanchor_270_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a> This way of treating perception found its way into
+psychology and into empirical logic. The acceptance of the doctrine that
+all sense involves knowledge, Dewey believes, leads to an
+epistemological logic; but all perception must involve thought if the
+'given' is the simple sensation.</p>
+
+<p>There is nothing especially new in this critique of sensationalism.
+Historically, sensationalism had been displaced by idealism, and the
+idea that reality is a construct of ideas held together by logical
+relations was given up long before functionalism arrived on the scene.
+But if inference, or rationality, is not present in all experience as
+the combiner of simple into complex ideas, it may be present in some
+other form, even more vital. Dewey, however, does not consider such
+possibilities.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, in an article of slightly earlier date than the studies which
+have just been considered, Dewey returns to a consideration of
+metaphysics, and the possibility of a metaphysical standpoint in
+philosophy. This article, entitled "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical
+Inquiry,"<a name="FNanchor_271_271" id="FNanchor_271_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> deserves careful notice.</p>
+
+<p>The comments of a number of mechanistic biologists on vitalism furnish
+the point of departure for Dewey's discussion. These scientists hold
+that, if the organism is considered simply as a part of external nature,
+as an existing system, it can be satisfactorily analyzed by the methods
+of physico-chemical science. But if the question of ultimate origins is
+raised, if it be asked <i>why</i> nature exhibits certain innate
+potentialities for <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span>producing life, science can give no answer. These
+questions belong to metaphysics, and vitalistic or biocentric
+conceptions may be valid in the metaphysical sphere.</p>
+
+<p>This raises the question of the nature of metaphysical inquiry. Dewey
+says that the ultimate traits or tendencies which give rise to life need
+not necessarily be considered ultimate in a temporal sense. On the
+contrary, they may be viewed as permanent, 'irreducible traits,' which
+are ultimate in the sense of being always present in reality. The
+inquiry and search for these ultimate traits is what constitutes valid
+metaphysics. "They are found equally and indifferently whether a
+subject-matter in question be dated 1915 or ten million years B. C.
+Accordingly, they would seem to deserve the name of ultimate, or
+irreducible, traits. As such they may be made the object of a kind of
+inquiry differing from that which deals with the genesis of a particular
+group of existences, a kind of inquiry to which the name metaphysical
+may be given."<a name="FNanchor_272_272" id="FNanchor_272_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a></p>
+
+<p>The irreducible traits which Dewey finds are, in the physical sciences,
+plurality, interaction, and change. "These traits have to be begged or
+taken in any case," for wherever and whenever we take the world, we must
+explain it as "a plurality of diverse interacting and changing
+existences."<a name="FNanchor_273_273" id="FNanchor_273_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> The evolutionary sciences add another trait; that is,
+evolution, or development in a direction. "For evolution appears to be
+just one of the irreducible traits. In other words, it is a fact to be
+reckoned with in considering the traits of diversity, interaction, and
+change which have been enumerated as among the traits taken for granted
+in all scientific subject-matter."<a name="FNanchor_274_274" id="FNanchor_274_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_274_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a></p>
+
+<p>The doctrine that plurality, interaction, change, and evolution are
+permanent traits of reality gains in clearness when contrasted with the
+opposed theories which involve creation, absolute origins, or temporal
+ultimates. The term 'ultimate origins' may be taken in a merely relative
+sense which is valid. The French language has an origin in the Latin
+tongues, which is an ultimate origin for French, but this is not an
+absolutely ultimate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> origin, since the Latin tongues, in their turn,
+have origins. It is, for instance, meaningless to inquire into the
+ultimate origin of the world as a whole; and it is equally futile to
+trace any part of the world back to an absolute origin. "That scientific
+inquiry does not itself deal with any question of ultimate origins,
+except in the purely relative sense already indicated, is, of course,
+recognized. But it also seems to follow from what has been said that
+scientific inquiry does not generate, or leave over, such a question for
+some other discipline, such as metaphysics, to deal with."<a name="FNanchor_275_275" id="FNanchor_275_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a></p>
+
+<p>Theories like that of Laplace, for instance, trace the world back to an
+origin in some undifferentiated universe; or, in Spencer's terms, some
+state of homogeneity. From this original state the world is said to
+evolve. But the undifferentiated mass lacks the plurality, interaction,
+and change which are presupposed in all scientific explanation. These
+traits must be present before development can occur. "To get change we
+have to assume other structures which interact with it, existences not
+covered by the formula."<a name="FNanchor_276_276" id="FNanchor_276_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> In short, although Dewey only implies
+this, all scientific explanation presupposes a system of interacting
+parts; nothing can be explained by reference to an undifferentiated
+world which lacks such traits.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey is particularly interested in the origin of mind or intelligence.
+In dealing with mind, he says, we must begin with the present, and in
+the present we find that the world has an organization, "in spots," of
+the kind we call intelligence. This existing intelligence cannot be
+explained by any theory which reduces it to something inferior. The
+"attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and
+irreducible existence of the thing dealt with."<a name="FNanchor_277_277" id="FNanchor_277_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_277_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> Mind cannot be
+explained by being explained away, nor can it be explained as a
+development out of an original source in which the potentiality, or
+direction of change towards mind, was lacking.</p>
+
+<p>The evolution of things, Dewey says, is a real fact, and is to be
+reckoned with. Moreover, if everything that exists changes,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> then the
+evolution of life and mind surely have a bearing on the nature of
+physico-chemical things. They must have in them the trait of direction
+of change towards life and mind. "To say, accordingly, that the
+existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes
+impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics is to say something which
+the situation calls for."<a name="FNanchor_278_278" id="FNanchor_278_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278_278" class="fnanchor">[278]</a> In other words, the world, metaphysically
+considered, must have evolution, as well as the physico-chemical traits.
+"Without a doctrine of evolution we might be able to say, not that
+matter <i>caused</i> life, but that matter under certain conditions of highly
+complicated and intensified interaction is living. With the doctrine of
+evolution, we can add to this statement that the interactions and
+changes of matter are themselves of a kind to bring about that complex
+and intensified interaction which is life."<a name="FNanchor_279_279" id="FNanchor_279_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a> Dewey holds that
+evolution rests upon the reality of time: "time itself, or genuine
+change in a specific direction, is itself one of the ultimate traits of
+the world irrespective of date."<a name="FNanchor_280_280" id="FNanchor_280_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a></p>
+
+<p>This article presents on the whole a distinct advance over the position
+taken in the earlier essay, "Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism,"
+which was reviewed in the last chapter. Dewey is not now, to be sure,
+instituting a wholesale inquiry into the nature of being, but he betrays
+an interest in the general, as opposed to the specific traits of
+reality. He inquires into the real nature of the world, and believes
+that he discovers its ultimate traits. This essay, of course, is
+incomplete, and consequently indefinite in certain important respects.
+It may be said, nevertheless, to give an accurate view of the
+metaphysical back-ground against which all of Dewey's theories are
+projected. His metaphysics, as would be expected, are evolutionary
+throughout, and evolution is conceived, where he is at all definite, in
+biological terms.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_249_249" id="Footnote_249_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249_249"><span class="label">[249]</span></a> <i>Influence of Darwin on Philosophy</i>, Introduction, p.
+iv.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_250_250" id="Footnote_250_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250_250"><span class="label">[250]</span></a> Vol. VIII: "I. Na&iuml;ve Realism <i>vs.</i> Presentative Realism,"
+pp. 393-400. "II. Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the
+Knowledge Relation," pp. 546-554.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_251_251" id="Footnote_251_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251_251"><span class="label">[251]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 395.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_252_252" id="Footnote_252_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252_252"><span class="label">[252]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 397.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_253_253" id="Footnote_253_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253_253"><span class="label">[253]</span></a> In this connection Dewey's disagreements with Professor
+McGilvary are of especial interest. See especially McGilvary's article,
+"Pure Experience and Reality" (<i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. XVI, 1907,
+pp. 266-284) and Dewey's reply, together with McGilvary's rejoinder
+(<i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 419-424). McGilvary failed to understand that Dewey's
+argument was conducted on a purely 'naturalistic' basis, an almost
+inevitable error, in view of Dewey's practical identification of
+psychology, biology, and logic.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_254_254" id="Footnote_254_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254_254"><span class="label">[254]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 399.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_255_255" id="Footnote_255_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255_255"><span class="label">[255]</span></a> Dewey is here dealing with the 'epistemological'
+realists, among whom he includes such writers as Bertrand Russell. In an
+article entitled "The Existence of the World as a Problem"
+(<i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol. XXIV, 1915, pp. 357-370), Dewey argues
+that Russell, in making a problem of the existence of the external
+world, implies its existence in his formulation of the problem. Dewey
+argues that, since the existence of the world is presupposed in every
+such formulation, it cannot be called in question. This is like
+disposing of Zeno's paradox on the ground that arrows fly anyway.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_256_256" id="Footnote_256_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256_256"><span class="label">[256]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 548.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_257_257" id="Footnote_257_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257_257"><span class="label">[257]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_258_258" id="Footnote_258_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258_258"><span class="label">[258]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_259_259" id="Footnote_259_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_259_259"><span class="label">[259]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 553.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_260_260" id="Footnote_260_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_260_260"><span class="label">[260]</span></a> <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific
+Methods</i>, Vol. XII, 1915. Parts I and II, pp. 505-523; Part III, pp.
+533-543.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_261_261" id="Footnote_261_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261_261"><span class="label">[261]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 506.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_262_262" id="Footnote_262_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262_262"><span class="label">[262]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 511.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_263_263" id="Footnote_263_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_263_263"><span class="label">[263]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 514.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_264_264" id="Footnote_264_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_264_264"><span class="label">[264]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 515.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_265_265" id="Footnote_265_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265_265"><span class="label">[265]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 521.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_266_266" id="Footnote_266_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266_266"><span class="label">[266]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 522 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_267_267" id="Footnote_267_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267_267"><span class="label">[267]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 536.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_268_268" id="Footnote_268_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268_268"><span class="label">[268]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 538.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_269_269" id="Footnote_269_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269_269"><span class="label">[269]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 540.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_270_270" id="Footnote_270_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270_270"><span class="label">[270]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 541.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_271_271" id="Footnote_271_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271_271"><span class="label">[271]</span></a> <i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific
+Methods</i>, Vol. XII, 1915, pp. 337-345.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_272_272" id="Footnote_272_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_272_272"><span class="label">[272]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 340.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_273_273" id="Footnote_273_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273_273"><span class="label">[273]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_274_274" id="Footnote_274_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_274_274"><span class="label">[274]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 345.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_275_275" id="Footnote_275_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_275_275"><span class="label">[275]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 339.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_276_276" id="Footnote_276_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276_276"><span class="label">[276]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 343.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_277_277" id="Footnote_277_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277_277"><span class="label">[277]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 344.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_278_278" id="Footnote_278_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278_278"><span class="label">[278]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 345.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_279_279" id="Footnote_279_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279_279"><span class="label">[279]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_280_280" id="Footnote_280_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_280_280"><span class="label">[280]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><span>CHAPTER IX</span> <span class="smaller">CONCLUSIONS</span></h2>
+
+<p>Dewey's interest as a philosopher centres, from first to last, upon
+knowledge and the knowing process. All that is vital in his ethical,
+social, and educational theories depends ultimately upon the special
+interpretation of the function of knowledge which constitutes his chief
+claim to philosophical distinction. Dewey's logical theory, as has been
+seen, was the natural and inevitable outcome of his demand for an
+empirical and 'psychological' description of thought as a
+'transformatory' process working actual changes in reality. If in the
+beginning of his career he found the problem of the nature of knowledge
+all-important for his own interests, he came in the end to regard it as
+the problem of problems for all philosophers. There is no mistaking
+Dewey's conviction that the special interpretation of knowledge which he
+advocates opens the door to important advances in philosophical
+speculation, while it ends all discussion of those pseudo-problems which
+result from a false, epistemological formulation of the function of
+knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>The history of the development of Dewey's thought, set forth in the
+preceding chapters, does not pretend to furnish an adequate estimate of
+his philosophical system. The two questions, of origin and worth, are,
+after all, distinct. The genetic account of Dewey's theory of knowledge
+may serve to make its bearings and implications better understood, may
+reveal its deeper meaning and import, but the final estimate of its
+value as a philosophical hypothesis depends on other considerations. In
+this final chapter, it is proposed to deal with the question of the
+positive value of functionalism as a working hypothesis. This criticism
+may also serve to gather together the threads of criticism and comment
+which run through the previous chapters, and reveal the general ground
+upon which the writer's opposition to Dewey's theory is based.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span></p><p>There can be no question that Dewey's theory of knowledge rests,
+finally, upon the doctrine of 'immediate empiricism;' upon his belief in
+"the necessity of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method
+that has now made its way in all the natural sciences...."<a name="FNanchor_281_281" id="FNanchor_281_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> This
+doctrine is clearly stated in the first essay reviewed in this study,
+"The Psychological Standpoint" (1886). To quote again from that essay:
+"The psychological standpoint as it has developed itself is this: all
+that is, is for consciousness or knowledge. The business of the
+psychologist is to give a genetic account of the various elements within
+this consciousness, and thereby fix their place, determine their
+validity, and at the same time show definitely what the real and eternal
+nature of this consciousness is."<a name="FNanchor_282_282" id="FNanchor_282_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> The descriptive method here
+advocated does not differ, as an actual mode of procedure, from that of
+Dewey's later empiricism. It lies at the basis of all his speculation,
+earlier as well as later, and is undoubtedly the most important single
+element in his philosophical system.</p>
+
+<p>In "The Psychological Standpoint" Dewey ascribes the failure of the
+earlier empiricists to their desertion of the direct descriptive method
+(a criticism repeated frequently in later essays). Locke, for instance,
+instead of describing experience as it actually occurs, interprets it in
+terms of certain assumed simple sensations, the products of reflection.
+These non-experienced elements, Dewey believes, have no place in a
+purely empirical philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>But the empiricist must deal in some manner with the products of
+reflection. The atoms of chemistry and the elements of the psychologist
+are not experienced facts, but still they play a valuable, indispensable
+role in the technique of the sciences. What is to be done with them? It
+must be made to appear that they are valid within knowledge, but invalid
+elsewhere. This leads to a separation of knowing from other modes of
+experiencing, and the descriptive method is depended upon to maintain
+the empirical validity of the separation. It has been seen how Dewey's
+attempt to interpret knowledge led gradually to a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>distinction between
+the 'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' processes of experience.</p>
+
+<p>The completed theory of knowledge depends for its validity upon the
+distinction thus established between knowing (as reflective thought) and
+the practical attitudes of life. The concepts, elements, and other
+apparatus of reflection are employed, it is said, only when there is
+thinking,&mdash;and this is only occasionally. Theory is an instrument to be
+used in connection with that special activity, reflective thought, the
+general aim of which is the furtherance of the practical ends of life.</p>
+
+<p>One fairly obvious difficulty with this separation of reflection from
+the other life activities is that the 'direct descriptive method,' as
+here employed, is itself reflective. How does it come, then, that this
+particular method achieves such an effective hegemony over the other
+modes of reflection? The 'descriptive method,' as the method of pure
+experience, is made to determine or supplant all other methods. It
+defines the limits and aims of conceptual systems; it marks out the
+limits, aims, and tests of reflective thought in general. How, it may be
+asked, does the 'direct descriptive method' escape the limitations which
+it imposes upon the other forms of reflective thought?</p>
+
+<p>It has been seen that in Dewey's view logic is subsidiary to psychology.
+But psychology (his psychology) results from the application of the
+'descriptive method' to experience. The 'descriptive method,' it may be
+inferred from this, is not subject to logical criticism. On the
+contrary, it is the basis of all logic. Logic, as the criticism of
+categories, is confined to the study of the instrumental concepts as
+functioning within the knowledge experience, and its limits are set by
+descriptive psychology. There is, apparently, no means by which the
+'direct descriptive method' can itself be brought under criticism.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey says: "By our postulate, things are what they are experienced to
+be; and, unless knowing is the sole and only genuine mode of
+experiencing, it is fallacious to say that Reality is just and
+exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower; or
+even that it <i>is</i>, relatively and piece-meal, what it is to a finite and
+partial knower."<a name="FNanchor_283_283" id="FNanchor_283_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> Reality is not simply what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> it is known as, for it
+is experienced in other ways than by being known. "But I venture to
+repeat that ... the inferential factor must <i>exist</i>, or must occur, and
+that all existence is direct and vital, so that philosophy can pass upon
+its nature&mdash;as upon the nature of all of the rest of its
+subject-matter&mdash;only by first ascertaining what it exists or occurs
+<i>as</i>."<a name="FNanchor_284_284" id="FNanchor_284_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_284_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a></p>
+
+<p>Reflection, then, is not designed to furnish an insight into the nature
+of things. Acquaintance with reality must be obtained, not by reflecting
+upon it, but by describing it as it occurs. Whatever else this may mean,
+it certainly aims at demonstrating the superiority of description to the
+supposedly less effective modes of thought. It cannot be conceded,
+however, that 'description,' as employed by Dewey, is non-reflective, or
+super-reflective. If things are not what they are known as, then they
+are not what they are known as to a describer. The point of this
+objection will be obvious if it is remembered that it is the method of
+'direct description' which enables Dewey to distinguish between the
+'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' activities of life, and make
+thought the servant of action. If Dewey's descriptive method is not
+reflective, then there is no such thing as reflection.</p>
+
+<p>Passing for the moment from this criticism, which is not apt to be
+convincing in such abstract form, it may be well to consider for a time
+the psychology upon which Dewey's logical theory is grounded: the
+psychology which is established by the 'direct descriptive method.'</p>
+
+<p>From the standpoint of the nervous correlates of experience, Dewey's
+theory involves two postulates: first, that customary conduct is carried
+on by an habitual set of nervous adjustments, and, second, that
+reflection is a process whereby new reactions are established when
+habitual modes of response fail to meet a critical situation.</p>
+
+<p>It must be clearly recognized that, so far as the nervous system is
+concerned, the scheme is highly speculative. The advance made by
+physiology towards an analysis and understanding of the minute and
+specialized parts of the nervous organism has necessarily been slow and
+uncertain. Whatever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> plausibility Dewey's theory possesses must depend,
+not upon the technical results of neurology, but upon the external
+evidence which seems to justify some such scheme of nervous
+organization.</p>
+
+<p>An examination of this evidence shows that it falls under two main
+heads: (1) facts drawn from the observation of the outward behavior of
+the organism, and (2) facts derived from an introspective analysis of
+the thought-process.</p>
+
+<p>The study of behavior shows that man thinks only now and then. Most of
+his conduct is, literally, thoughtless. It is said that thought is
+outwardly manifested by a characteristic attitude, marked by hesitation
+and an obvious effort at adjustment. The introspective analysis of the
+thought-process shows that it alone, among experiences, is accompanied
+by analysis, abstraction, and mediation. Again, both the internal and
+external evidence show that a puzzling situation (whose nervous
+correlate is a conflict of impulses) is the stimulus which awakens
+thought. These are important items in the list of evidence which
+supports the functional theory.</p>
+
+<p>It would be a tedious and unnecessary task to subject each of these bits
+of evidence to empirical criticism. It will be better to deal with them
+by showing that they do not necessarily imply functionalism, since they
+are compatible with a psychology directly opposed to the fundamental
+assumptions of Dewey's theory.</p>
+
+<p>It is doubtless true that men think only occasionally and with some
+reluctance. This is a common observation. What is to be made of this
+intermittance of thought? The evidence merely shows that man is more
+wide awake, energetic, and alert at some times than at others. On these
+occasions every faculty of the organism is in operation, higher as well
+as lower centres are pitched to a high degree of responsiveness, not at
+hap-hazard, to be sure, but <i>apropos</i>&mdash;tuned to the situation. In saying
+that men think only now and then nothing more is necessarily implied
+than that men are for the most part sluggish and indifferent, and the
+periods of high intensification of the normal processes contrast sharply
+with the habitual lethargy of conduct.</p>
+
+<p>Against Dewey, it will be maintained here that thought cannot<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> be
+defined as a special kind of activity considered from the side of the
+organism. The life processes are constantly welded into a single unified
+activity, which may, as a whole, be directed upon different objects.
+Thus, from the side of its objects, this life activity may be called
+eating, running, reading, and whatever else one chooses. Thinking, from
+this standpoint, may be defined as the direction of effort upon symbols
+and abstract terms. But thinking in this case would be identified on the
+basis of its content, not in terms of special nervous activities in the
+organism. Whether, therefore, thinking signifies that intense periodical
+activity which has been noted, or preoccupation with a certain kind of
+subject-matter, it in no case implies the operation of a special organic
+faculty of the type described by Dewey.</p>
+
+<p>But, again, it is said that true reflection is marked by a certain
+characteristic bodily attitude, which bespeaks inner conflict and a
+search for adjustment. This contention seems to have little ground in
+fact. The puzzled, hesitating, undecided expression that is usually
+supposed to betray deep cogitation may in fact mean simply hesitation
+and bewilderment,&mdash;the need for thought, rather than its presence. The
+expression reveals a certain degree of incompetence and sluggishness in
+the individual concerned, and signifies a lack of wide-awakeness and
+responsiveness. A student puzzling over his algebra, a speaker
+extemporizing an argument, a ball-player using all his resources to
+defeat the enemy, have attitudes so unlike that no analysis could
+discover in them a common form of expression. And yet it would be
+madness to deny that thinking attends their various performances. There
+is, in short, no evidence from the side of bodily expression to indicate
+the presence in man of a special nervous faculty called reflection.</p>
+
+<p>Consider next the contention that the cue to thought is a puzzling
+situation, involving a problem. No problem, no thought; no thought, no
+problem. This may mean either that a man finding himself in a difficult
+situation uses all his energy and resource to escape from it, or, that
+he never concerns himself with abstract symbols except under the spur of
+necessity. The former meaning contains some truth, but the latter is
+what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> Dewey would call a 'dark saying.' If by 'thought' be meant that
+period of high activity of all the faculties which is only occasional,
+it is doubtless true enough that a problem is frequently needed to
+awaken it. Man is content to let life glide along with a minimum of
+effort; he cannot, if he would, long maintain the state of high activity
+here called 'thinking.' As a consequence of not thinking when he should,
+man frequently finds himself involved in situations requiring the
+exercise of all the energy and resource he possesses. But the really
+efficient 'thinker' is the man who keeps his eyes open, who sees ahead.
+He is not efficient merely because of the excellence of his established
+modes of response, but, more particularly, because he is alive and
+alert. His thinking is effective in preventing difficult situations, as
+well as in getting out of them.</p>
+
+<p>Defining 'thought,' however, as the direction of activity upon symbols
+and conceptions, there seems to be little warrant for asserting that it
+functions only on the occasion of a concrete, specific problem. One
+would say, on the contrary, that this would be an unfavorable occasion
+for the study of fundamental principles, whether scientific or
+practical. Summing up the external evidence, then, one would say that it
+accords as well with the hypothesis that the life processes constitute a
+single activity directed upon various objects, as with the hypothesis
+that thought is a very special organic activity, having a special
+biological function. At least, the evidence for the existence of such a
+special faculty is dubious and uncertain.</p>
+
+<p>What does the internal evidence prove? The analysis of thought contained
+in James's chapter on "Reasoning" in the <i>Principles of Psychology</i> has
+been the guide for Dewey and other pragmatists in this connection.<a name="FNanchor_285_285" id="FNanchor_285_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a>
+James undertakes to show that reasoning is marked off from other
+processes by the employment of analysis, abstraction, and the use of
+mediating terms. It must be urged here, not only against James, but
+against a considerable modern tradition, that this account of thinking
+is misleading and inaccurate. The question to be faced, of course, is
+whether the processes of thought differ radically from the
+<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span>non-reflective processes <i>in kind</i>, or whether they are simply the
+intensification of processes which attend all conscious life. It should
+be noted that no concession is made to the notion that thinking is a
+special kind of process; only its subject-matter is special, or else
+thought is simply a period of wide-awakeness and alertness. In the
+latter sense, thought involves an intensification of the powers of
+observation, an awakening of memory, a general stimulation of all the
+faculties. It calls for the fullest possible apprehension, demands the
+most complete insight into the nature of the situation that the
+capacities can provide. The contrast between the adequate view of
+reality achieved in this manner and the common and inadequate
+apprehension of ordinary life is very great, and might easily lead to
+the supposition that thinking (so understood) contains elements which
+are added through the activities of a special nerve process.</p>
+
+<p>But is it only in such moments that we deliberately resolve a situation
+into its elements, and abstract an 'essence' to serve as a middle term
+in inference? It is certain that at such moments these processes are
+more distinct than at other times; but the whole situation, for that
+matter, stands out more clearly and distinctly. Perception is keener,
+memory more definite, feeling more intense. In less degree, however, all
+attention involves analysis and abstraction. Experience has always a
+focus and a margin; there is a constant selecting and analyzing out of
+important elements, which in turn lead to further conclusions and acts,
+through associations by contiguity and similarity. This process appears
+in an intensified form in the high moments of life. In short, thought
+and passive perception are differentiated, not by the elements which
+compose them, but by the degree of energy that goes into perception,
+memory, feeling, and discrimination. There is nothing in the evidence to
+show that thinking is a special kind of activity, which operates now and
+then. On the contrary, there is every reason to hold to the position
+that the life processes are one and inseparable, operating continually
+in conjunction.</p>
+
+<p>What shall be said, then, with reference to the assertion that thought
+operates in the interests of the non-cognitive life <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>processes? That it
+comes 'after something and for the sake of something,' namely, 'direct'
+experience? Since the separation of the activities into various
+'functions' cannot be allowed, by occasional thought must then be meant
+those moments of energetic aliveness described above. Translating,
+Dewey's theory would read something like this: Man employs his faculties
+to the fullest extent only when he is compelled to do so. He gets along
+habitually, that is, with a minimum of effort, as long as he can, but
+rouses himself and makes an earnest effort to comprehend the world only
+when his environment presents him with difficulties which demand
+solution. The test of man's thinking consists in its efficiency in
+getting him out of trouble, and enabling him to return to his habitual
+modes of sub-conscious conduct with a minimum of annoyance. In short,
+thinking is an instrument which subserves man's natural laziness, and
+its test is the efficiency with which it promotes an easy, or, at any
+rate, a satisfactory mode of existence.</p>
+
+<p>No doubt some men, perhaps many men, do follow such a programme; but it
+would not be kind to Nature to assert that she planned it so.</p>
+
+<p>This separation of the activities of life into several distinct
+processes having each a special function looks like a survival of the
+old faculty psychology, against which modern thought has protested as
+much as against anything whatever. The conception of the organic
+processes as separate in action has all the faults of a merely
+mechanical representation of consciousness. Doubtless some advantage is
+to be obtained, for purposes of investigation, by treating thought,
+appreciation, and affection separately; but it is a serious error to
+take this provisional distinction as real. It is a curious fact that
+Dewey, with all his opposition to such modes of procedure, himself falls
+into this abstract way of treating the 'functions' of experience, seeing
+not the beam that is in his own eye.</p>
+
+<p>It is this very form of treatment, strangely enough, which enables Dewey
+to call biology to the support of his interpretation of the function of
+knowledge. According to the Darwinian theory, survival of the species is
+dependent upon the development<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> of special structures and capacities
+which enable the organism to adjust itself to its environment. Dewey
+finds, following a familiar argument, that the lower animals are adapted
+to their environment by special habits of reaction which are relatively
+fixed and inelastic. Man, on the contrary, has an exceedingly plastic
+nervous system, which enables him to meet changing conditions. Man is
+not only highly adapted, but highly adaptable. This trait of plasticity,
+or adaptability, Dewey believes, is a product of natural selection, and,
+of course, in the final analysis, this high degree of plasticity is the
+thought function.</p>
+
+<p>It is scarcely necessary to say that this treatment of thought is highly
+speculative. Dewey offers little concrete evidence to support his
+position; indeed, it would require the labor of a Darwin to supply the
+needed evidence. Instead of grounding his theories upon the results of
+science, Dewey adapts the ever elastic 'evolutionary method' (not really
+that of biological evolution, however indeterminate) to his own scheme
+of things. It would be hard to discover in philosophical literature a
+method more purely theoretical and even dialectical than that whereby
+Dewey gives his logical theory the support of evolutionary theory.</p>
+
+<p>The ultimately mechanical tendencies of his argument are conspicuous, in
+spite of all disclaimers. The effect of his analysis is to set
+plasticity or adaptability off by itself, as a special trait or feature
+of the nervous system. The lower forms of life are governed, we are
+told, by fixed reflexes, and the trait of adaptability appears at some
+higher stage in the process as a superadded capacity of the nervous
+system, correlated, no doubt, with special nervous structures.
+Evolutionism would not serve Dewey so well, had he not previously made
+this separation between the organic functions and their correlated
+structures; but, given this abstract treatment of the life processes, he
+is able to make the doctrine of selection contribute to its support. In
+opposition to Dewey's argument, it would be reasonable to contend that
+plasticity is inherent in all nervous substance. The higher organisms
+are more adaptable, because there is more to be modified in them,&mdash;more
+nerves and synapses, more pliability. There is no sound empirical reason
+for accepting Dewey's biological conclusions.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span></p><p>Taking Dewey's theory at its face value,&mdash;and it would be presumptuous
+to search for hidden meanings,&mdash;its net result is to place the function
+of knowing in an embarrassing situation with respect to its capacity for
+giving a correct report of reality. Dewey expressly denies, indeed, that
+the purpose of knowing is to give an account of the nature of things.
+Reality, he asserts, is whatever it is 'experienced as being,' and it is
+normally experienced in other ways than by being known. The nature of
+reality is not hidden behind a veil, to be searched out; but is here and
+now, as it comes and goes in the form of passing experience. Knowing is
+designed to transform experience, not to bring it within the survey of
+consciousness.</p>
+
+<p>How does it stand, then, with Dewey's own account of the knowledge
+process? He has reflected upon experience, and claims to have given a
+correct account of its nature. Dewey's conception of the processes of
+experience is genuinely conceptual, a thought product, designed to
+furnish a solid basis for belief and calculation. But reflection, by his
+own account, is shut in to its own moment, cannot apprehend the true
+nature of 'non-cognitional' experiences, and cannot, therefore, deal
+adequately with any problems except such as are furnished it by other
+'functions.' No wonder that 'anti-intellectualism' should result from
+such a conception of knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>Philosophers have always held that the purpose of reflection (whatever
+reflection may be, psychologically) is the attainment of a reliable
+insight into the nature of the world. Practical considerations compel
+this view. Ordinary, casual observation is superficial and unsystematic;
+it never penetrates beneath the surface. Doubtless reality is, in some
+degree, what it is in unreflective moments; but it is frequently
+something more, as man learns to his sorrow. Reflection displaces the
+casual, haphazard attitude, in the attempt to get at the real nature of
+the world.</p>
+
+<p>The results of reflection, moreover, are cumulative. It tends to build
+up, by gradual accretions, a conceptual view of reality which may serve
+as a relatively stable basis for conduct and calculation. Thought does,
+indeed, possess a transforming function. The reasoned knowledge of
+things is gradually extended beyond<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> the occasional moments of inquiring
+thought, supplanting the casual view with a more penetrating insight;
+reality becomes more and better <i>known</i>, and less merely <i>experienced</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Dewey reverses this view in a curious manner. It is 'experience' that is
+built up by the action of thought, not knowledge itself. This play on
+terms might be innocuous, if it were not accompanied by his separation
+of the knowing function from others. Dewey makes 'knowing' the servant
+of 'direct experience' by giving it the function of reconstructing the
+habits of the organism, in order that unreflective experience may be
+maintained with a minimum of effort. The non-reflective experience
+becomes the valuable experience, and knowledge is made to minister unto
+it. This is truly a 'transvaluation of values.'</p>
+
+<p>Dewey asks: "What is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete
+world of experience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction, and
+in a world of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and
+ideal?"<a name="FNanchor_286_286" id="FNanchor_286_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286_286" class="fnanchor">[286]</a> This sharp separation of thought from action is vigorously
+maintained. Following are some of the terms by means of which the
+difference between direct and reflective experience is expressed:
+'direct practice,' 'derived theory;' 'primary construction,' 'secondary
+criticism;' 'living appreciation,' 'abstract description;' 'active
+endeavor,' 'pale reflection.'<a name="FNanchor_287_287" id="FNanchor_287_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287_287" class="fnanchor">[287]</a> This casual, easy distinction escapes
+criticism because it seems harmless and unimportant. The distinction,
+however, is <i>not</i> real. It does not correspond to the simple facts of
+life. Thinking, far from being 'pale reflection,' is often a strenuous
+and energetic 'activity.' Reflection, not 'direct experience,' is often,
+at least, at the high moment of life. Experience becomes unmeaning on
+any other basis. 'Living appreciation' and 'primary construction'
+involve thought in a high degree; 'pale reflection' is lazy
+contemplation, lacking the spark of life that characterizes true
+thought.</p>
+
+<p>There is no escape from Dewey's needlessly alarming conclusions, except
+by maintaining that thought accompanies all conscious life, in greater
+or less degree, and that the moment of <i>real</i>, earnest thinking is at
+the high tide of life, when all the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> powers are awake and operating.
+Thought must be made integral with all other activities, a feature of
+the total life organization, rather than an isolated phenomenon. Man is
+a thinking organism, not an organism with a thinker.</p>
+
+<p>It is not to be supposed for a moment that by 'thought' is here meant
+the activity of a merely subjective knower. Dewey does, indeed, deal
+effectively with the subjective ego, and with representative
+perceptionism. But by 'thought' is here meant reflection, judgment,
+inference; and in this sense thought is said to be present in all
+experience. There can be no question of the relation of thought, so
+understood, to reality; for the reason that it has been so integrated
+with experience as to be inseparable from it. Setting aside knowing as
+the awareness of a conscious subject, there remains an issue with Dewey
+concerning the actual place of thought, as an empirical process, in
+experience, and the issue must be settled on definite and really
+empirical grounds. So much, then, for 'functionalism' and its
+psychology.</p>
+
+<p>Something should be said, before closing this discussion, concerning
+philosophical methods in general, since Dewey's psychological approach
+to the problems of philosophy must be held responsible for his
+anti-intellectualistic results, with their sceptical implications. In
+the beginning of his career, as has been seen, Dewey adopted the
+'psychological method,' and he has adhered to it consistently ever
+since. This initial attitude, although he was not aware of it for many
+years, cut him off from the community of understanding that exists among
+modern idealists concerning the proper aims and purposes of
+philosophical inquiry. Although at first a professed follower of Green
+and Caird, Dewey's method was not reconcilable with idealistic
+procedure, and in a very real sense he never was an idealist. The
+virulence of his later attacks on 'intellectualism' may be explained in
+terms of his reaction against a philosophical method which interfered
+with the development of his own 'naturalistic' tendencies.</p>
+
+<p>The method of idealism, or speculative philosophy, is logical; but it
+may perfectly well be empirical at the same time. To the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>
+anti-intellectualist empirical logic is an anomaly, a red blue-bird, so
+to speak. The philosophical logician is represented as one who evolves
+reality out of his own consciousness; who labors with the concepts which
+have their abode in the mental sphere, and, by means of the principle of
+contradiction, forces them into harmony until they provide a perfectly
+consistent representation of the external world which, because of its
+perfect rationality, must somehow correspond with the cosmic reality. In
+spite of the fact that no man possesses, at least in a sane condition,
+the mental equipment requisite for such a performance, certain critics
+have not hesitated to impute this kind of logical procedure to the
+idealists. To quote from Dewey himself: "For modern philosophy is, as
+every college senior recites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps
+our books and lectures sometimes forget to tell the senior, has absorbed
+Stoic dogma. Passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete
+subjection to a ready-made and finished reality ... is its professed
+ideal.... Philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge which is other
+than the propitious outgrowth of beliefs that shall develop aforetime
+their ulterior implications in order to recast them ..., the dream of a
+knowledge that has to do with objects having no nature save to be
+known."<a name="FNanchor_288_288" id="FNanchor_288_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a></p>
+
+<p>This charge against modern idealism has little foundation. Speculative
+philosophy repudiated, long ago, the 'epistemological standpoint' as
+defined by Dewey. Idealists have not fostered the conception of a
+knowing subject shut in to its own states, seeking information about an
+impersonal reality over against itself. Note, for example, this comment
+of Pringle-Pattison on Kant, made over thirty-five years ago: "The
+distinction between mind and the world, which is valid only from a
+certain point of view, he took as an absolute separation. He took it, to
+use a current phrase, abstractly&mdash;that is to say, as a mere fact, a fact
+standing by itself and true in any reference. And of course when two
+things are completely separate, they can only be brought together by a
+bond which is mechanical, external, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> accidental to the real nature
+of both."<a name="FNanchor_289_289" id="FNanchor_289_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289_289" class="fnanchor">[289]</a> Dewey himself never condemned 'epistemology' more
+effectively. But it is useless to cite instances, for any serious
+student familiar with the literature of modern philosophy ought to know
+that 'idealism' has never really been 'epistemological' in the sense
+meant by Dewey and his disciples. Subjectivism is not idealism,&mdash;the
+stolid dogmatism of neo-realism to the contrary notwithstanding.</p>
+
+<p>Idealism holds, speaking more positively, that philosophers must submit
+the conceptions and methods which they employ to a preliminary immanent
+criticism, in order to determine the limits within which they may be
+validly applied. Every genuine category or method is valid within a
+certain sphere of relevance, and the business of criticism is to
+determine by empirical investigation or by 'ideal experiment' (which
+means much the same thing) what concrete significance the conception is
+capable of bearing. Dewey, from the standpoint of idealism, is guilty of
+a somewhat uncritical use of the categories of 'description' and
+'evolution.' Are the categories of biology fitted to explain mind and
+spirit? Instead of instituting an inquiry designed to answer that
+question, Dewey accepts 'evolutionism' as final, and attempts to force
+all phenomena into conformity with his resulting logical scheme. He
+misses the valuable checks upon thought which are furnished by the
+'critical method,' and is none too sensitive to the technical results of
+the special sciences.</p>
+
+<p>The logical approach to philosophy strictly involves certain
+implications which have been overlooked by many of its critics. It may
+well be admitted that our real categories are not fixed and final, but
+are perpetually in process of reconstruction. The process of criticism
+inevitably makes manifest the human and empirical character of the
+particular forms of reflective thought. It recognizes the fact of
+development, both in knowledge and in reality, and by this very
+recognition the value of knowledge is enhanced. It is forced, by the
+very nature of its method, to recognize the concrete and practical
+bearings of thought. Indeed, there is a sense in which idealism would
+declare that there is no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> thought&mdash;when thought, that is, is taken to
+mean an isolated fact out of relation to the world. It is not possible
+to make this retort upon the critics of idealism without recognizing
+that there has been a vast misjudgment, amounting almost to
+misrepresentation, of the intellectual ideals of modern speculative
+philosophy.</p>
+
+<p>To conclude, it is neither by abstract logical processes, nor yet by the
+dogmatic employment of scientific categories, that philosophy makes
+progress, but by an empirical process which unites criticism and
+experiment. In speaking of the development of modern idealism, Bosanquet
+says: "All difficulties about the general possibility&mdash;the possibility
+in principle&mdash;of apprehending reality in knowledge and preception were
+flung aside as antiquated lumber. What was undertaken was the direct
+adventure of knowing; of shaping a view of the universe which should
+include and express reality in its completeness. The test and criterion
+were not any speculative assumption of any kind whatever. They were the
+direct work of the function of knowledge in exhibiting what could and
+what could not maintain itself when all the facts were confronted and
+set in the order they themselves demanded. The method of inquiry was
+ideal experiment."<a name="FNanchor_290_290" id="FNanchor_290_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_290_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a></p>
+
+<p>When all has been said, this method remains the natural and normal one.
+Dewey's 'psychological method,' by contrast, seems strained and
+far-fetched, an artificial and externally motived attempt to guide the
+intellect, which only by depending upon its own resources and its own
+increasing insight can hope to attain the distant and difficult, but
+never really foreign goal.</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_281_281" id="Footnote_281_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_281_281"><span class="label">[281]</span></a> <i>The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy</i>, p. 240.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_282_282" id="Footnote_282_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282_282"><span class="label">[282]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i>, Mind, Vol. XI, p. 8 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_283_283" id="Footnote_283_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283_283"><span class="label">[283]</span></a> "The Experimental Method," <i>Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy</i>, p. 228.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_284_284" id="Footnote_284_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284_284"><span class="label">[284]</span></a> "The Experimental Method," <i>Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy</i>, p. 240.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_285_285" id="Footnote_285_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_285_285"><span class="label">[285]</span></a> See the review of Dewey's essay, "The Experimental
+Method," in Chapter VII of this study, p. 91 ff.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_286_286" id="Footnote_286_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_286_286"><span class="label">[286]</span></a> <i>Studies in Logical Theory</i>, p. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_287_287" id="Footnote_287_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287_287"><span class="label">[287]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_288_288" id="Footnote_288_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288_288"><span class="label">[288]</span></a> "Beliefs and Existences," <i>The Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy</i>, p. 172 f.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_289_289" id="Footnote_289_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_289_289"><span class="label">[289]</span></a> <i>The Philosophical Radicals</i>, p. 297. The essay in which
+it occurs, "Philosophy as a Criticism of Categories," was first
+published in 1883, in the volume <i>Essays on Philosophical Criticism</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_290_290" id="Footnote_290_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_290_290"><span class="label">[290]</span></a> "Realism and Metaphysics," <i>Philosophical Review</i>, Vol.
+XXVI, 1917, p. 8.</p></div>
+
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of John Dewey's logical theory, by 
+Delton Thomas Howard
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diff --git a/38141.txt b/38141.txt
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+Project Gutenberg's John Dewey's logical theory, by Delton Thomas Howard
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: John Dewey's logical theory
+
+Author: Delton Thomas Howard
+
+Release Date: November 26, 2011 [EBook #38141]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Martin Pettit and the
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
+(This file was produced from images generously made
+available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+CORNELL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
+
+No. 11
+
+
+JOHN DEWEY'S LOGICAL THEORY
+
+
+BY
+
+DELTON THOMAS HOWARD, A.M.
+
+FORMERLY FELLOW IN THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+A THESIS
+PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
+CORNELL UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
+REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+NEW YORK
+LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.
+1919
+
+
+PRESS OF
+THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY
+LANCASTER, PA.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+It seems unnecessary to offer an apology for an historical treatment of
+Professor Dewey's logical theories, since functionalism glories in the
+genetic method. To be sure, certain more extreme radicals are opposed to
+a genetic interpretation of the history of human thought, but this is
+inconsistent. At any rate, the historical method employed in the
+following study may escape censure by reason of its simple character,
+for it is little more than a critical review of Professor Dewey's
+writings in their historical order, with no discussion of influences and
+connections, and with little insistence upon rigid lines of development.
+It is proposed to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" as far as
+possible; to discover what topics interested Professor Dewey, how he
+dealt with them, and what conclusions he arrived at. This plan has an
+especial advantage when applied to a body of doctrine which, like
+Professor Dewey's, does not possess a systematic form of its own, since
+it avoids the distortion which a more rigid method would be apt to
+produce.
+
+It has not been possible, within the limits of the present study, to
+take note of all of Professor Dewey's writings, and no reference has
+been made to some which are of undoubted interest and importance. Among
+these may be mentioned especially his books and papers on educational
+topics and a number of his ethical writings. Attention has been devoted
+almost exclusively to those writings which have some important bearing
+upon his logical theory. The division into chapters is partly arbitrary,
+although the periods indicated are quite clearly marked by the different
+directions which Professor Dewey's interests took from time to time. It
+will be seen that there is considerable chance for error in
+distinguishing between the important and the unimportant, and in
+selecting the essays which lie in the natural line of the author's
+development. But, _valeat quantum_, as William James would say.
+
+The criticisms and comments which have been made from time to time, as
+seemed appropriate, may be considered pertinent or irrelevant according
+to the views of the reader. It is hoped that they are not entirely
+aside from the mark, and that they do not interfere with a fair
+presentation of the author's views. The last chapter is devoted to a
+direct criticism of Professor Dewey's functionalism, with some comments
+on the general nature of philosophical method.
+
+Since this thesis was written, Professor Dewey has published two or
+three books and numerous articles, which are perhaps more important than
+any of his previous writings. The volume of _Essays in Experimental
+Logic_ (1916) is a distinct advance upon _The Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy and Other Essays_, published six years earlier. Most of these
+essays, however, are considered here in their original form, and the new
+material, while interesting, presents no vital change of standpoint. It
+might be well to call attention to the excellent introductory essay
+which Professor Dewey has provided for this new volume. Some mention
+might also be made of the volume of essays by eight representative
+pragmatists, which appeared last year (1917) under the title, _Creative
+Intelligence_. My comments on Professor Dewey's contribution to the
+volume have been printed elsewhere.[1] It has not seemed necessary, in
+the absence of significant developments, to extend the thesis beyond its
+original limits, and it goes to press, therefore, substantially as
+written two years ago.
+
+I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the faculty of the Sage
+School of Philosophy for many valuable suggestions and kindly
+encouragement in the course of my work. I am most deeply indebted to
+Professor Ernest Albee for his patient guidance and helpful criticism.
+Many of his suggestions, both as to plan and detail, have been adopted
+and embodied in the thesis, and these have contributed materially to
+such logical coherence and technical accuracy as it may possess. The
+particular views expressed are, of course, my own. I wish also to thank
+Professor J. E. Creighton especially for his friendly interest and for
+many suggestions which assisted the progress of my work, as well as for
+his kindness in looking over the proofs.
+
+D. T. HOWARD.
+
+EVANSTON, ILLINOIS,
+June, 1918.
+
+FOOTNOTE:
+
+[1] "The Pragmatic Method," _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods_, 1918, Vol. XV, pp. 149-156.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+CHAPTER                                                        PAGE
+
+   I. "Psychology as Philosophic Method"                          1
+
+  II. The Development of the Psychological Standpoint            15
+
+ III. "Moral Theory and Practice"                                33
+
+  IV. Functional Psychology                                      47
+
+   V. The Evolutionary Standpoint                                59
+
+  VI. "Studies in Logical Theory"                                72
+
+ VII. The Polemical Period                                       88
+
+VIII. Later Developments                                        105
+
+  IX. Conclusions                                               119
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+"PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHIC METHOD"
+
+
+Dewey's earliest standpoint in philosophy is presented in two articles
+published in _Mind_ in 1886: "The Psychological Standpoint," and
+"Psychology as Philosophic Method."[2] These articles appear to have
+been written in connection with his _Psychology_, which was published in
+the same year, and which represents the same general point of view as
+applied to the study of mental phenomena. For the purposes of the
+present study attention may be confined to the two articles in _Mind_.
+
+Dewey begins his argument, in "The Psychological Standpoint," with a
+reference to Professor Green's remark that the psychological standpoint
+is what marks the difference between transcendentalism and British
+empiricism. Dewey takes exception to this view, and asserts that the two
+schools hold this standpoint in common, and, furthermore, that the
+psychological standpoint has been the strength of British empiricism and
+desertion of that standpoint its weakness. Shadworth Hodgson's comment
+on this proposal testifies to its audacity. In a review of Dewey's
+article, he says: "If for instance we are told by a competent writer,
+that Absolute Idealism is not only a truth of experience but one
+attained directly by the method of experiential psychology, we should
+not allow our astonishment to prevent our examining the arguments, by
+virtue of which English psychology attains the results of German
+transcendentalism without quitting the ground of experience."[3]
+
+Dewey defines his psychological standpoint as follows: "We are not to
+determine the nature of reality or of any object of philosophical
+inquiry by examining it as it is in itself, but only as it is an element
+in our knowledge, in our experience, only as it is related to our mind,
+or is an 'idea'.... Or, in the ordinary way of putting it, the nature
+of all objects of philosophical inquiry is to be fixed by finding out
+what experience says about them."[4] The implications of this definition
+do not appear at first sight, but they become clearer as the discussion
+proceeds.
+
+Locke, Dewey continues, deserted the psychological standpoint because he
+did not, as he proposed, explain the nature of such things as matter and
+mind by reference to experience. On the contrary, he explained
+experience through the assumption of the two unknowable substances,
+matter and mind. Berkeley also deserted the psychological standpoint, in
+effect, by having recourse to a purely transcendent Spirit. Even Hume
+deserted it by assuming as the only reals certain unrelated sensations,
+and by trying to explain the origin of experience and knowledge by their
+combination. These reals were supposed to exist in independence of an
+organized experience, and to constitute it by their association. It
+might be argued that Hume's sensations are found in experience by
+analysis, and this would probably be true. But the sensations are
+nothing apart from the consciousness in which they are found. "Such a
+sensation," Dewey says, "a sensation which exists only within and for
+experience, is not one which can be used to account for experience. It
+is but one element in an organic whole, and can no more account for the
+whole, than a given digestive act can account for the existence of a
+living body."[5]
+
+So far Dewey is merely restating the criticism of English empiricism
+that had been made by Green and his followers. Reality, as experienced,
+is a whole of organically related parts, not a mechanical compound of
+elements. Whatever is to be explained must be taken as a fact of
+experience, and its meaning will be revealed in terms of its position
+and function within the whole. But while Dewey employs the language of
+idealism, it is doubtful whether he has grasped the full significance of
+the "concrete universal" of the Hegelian school. The following passage
+illustrates the difficulty: "The psychological standpoint as it has
+developed itself is this: all that is, is for consciousness or
+knowledge. The business of the psychologist is to give a genetic
+account of the various elements within this consciousness, and thereby
+fix their place, determine their validity, and at the same time show
+definitely what the real and eternal nature of this consciousness
+is."[6]
+
+Consciousness (used here as identical with 'experience') is apparently
+interpreted as a structure made up of elements related in a determinable
+order, and having, consequently, a 'real and eternal nature.' The result
+is a 'structural' view of reality, and the type of idealism for which
+Dewey stands may fittingly be called 'structural' idealism. This type of
+idealism does, in fact, hold a position intermediate between English
+empiricism and German transcendentalism. But it would not commonly be
+considered a synthesis of the best characteristics of the two schools.
+'Structural' idealism is, historically considered, a reversion to Kant
+which retains the mechanical elements of the _Critique_, but fails to
+reckon with the truly organic mode of interpretation in which it
+culminates. As experience, from Kant's undeveloped position, is a
+structure of sensations and forms, so Dewey's 'consciousness' is a
+compound of separate elements or existences related in a 'real and
+eternal' order.
+
+Dewey illustrates his method, in the discussion which follows, by
+employing it, or showing how it should be employed, in the definition of
+certain typical objects of philosophical inquiry. The first to be
+considered are subject and object. In dealing with the relation of
+subject to object, the psychological method will attempt to show how
+consciousness differentiates itself, or 'specifies' itself, into subject
+and object. These terms will be viewed as related terms within the whole
+of 'consciousness,' rather than as elements existing prior to or in
+independence of the whole in which they are found.
+
+There is a type of realism which illustrates the opposite or ontological
+method. It is led, through a study of the dependence of the mind upon
+the organism, to a position in which subject and object fall apart, out
+of relation to each other. The separation of the two leads to the
+positing of a third term, an unknown _x_, which is supposed to unite
+them. The psychological method would hold that the two objects have
+their union, not in an unknown 'real,' but in the 'consciousness' in
+which they appear. The individual consciousness as subject, and the
+objects over against it, are elements at once distinguished and related
+within the whole. All the terms are facts of experience, and none are to
+be assumed as ontological reals.
+
+Subjective idealism, Dewey continues, makes a similar error in failing
+to discriminate between the ego, or individual consciousness, and the
+Absolute Consciousness within which ego and object are differentiated
+elements. It fails to see that subject and object are complements, and
+inexplicable except as related elements in a larger whole. The
+individual consciousness, again, and the universal 'Consciousness,' are
+to be defined by reference to experience. It is not to be assumed at the
+start, as the subjective idealists assume, that the nature of the
+individual consciousness is known. The ego is to be defined, not
+assumed, and this is the essence of the psychological method.
+
+So far, two factors in Dewey's standpoint are clearly discernible. In
+the first place, all noumena and transcendent reals are to be rejected
+as means of explanation, and definition is to be wholly in terms of
+experienced elements, as experienced. In the second place, experience is
+to be regarded as a rational system of related elements, while
+explanation is to consist in tracing out the relations which any element
+bears to the whole. The universal 'Consciousness' is the whole, and the
+individual mind, again, is an element within the whole, to be explained
+by tracing out the relations which it bears to other elements and to the
+whole system. It is not easy to avoid the conclusion that Dewey
+conceives of 'consciousness' as a construct of existentially distinct
+terms.
+
+Dewey does not actually treat subject and object, individual and
+universal consciousness, in the empirical manner for which he contends.
+He merely outlines a method; and, while this has a negative bearing as
+against transcendent modes of explanation, it has little content of its
+own. But in spite of Dewey's lack of explicitness, it is evident that he
+tends to view his 'objects of philosophical inquiry' as so many concrete
+particular existences or things. The idea that they can be empirically
+marked out and investigated seems to imply this. But subject, object,
+individual, and universal are certainly not reducible to particular
+sensations, even though it must be admitted that they have a reference
+to particulars. These abstract concepts had been a source of difficulty
+to the empiricists, because they had not been able to reduce them to
+particular impressions, and Dewey's proposed method appears to involve
+the same difficulty.
+
+In his second article, on "Psychology as Philosophic Method," Dewey
+proposes to show that his standpoint is practically identical with that
+of transcendental idealism. This is made possible, he believes, through
+the fact that, since experience or consciousness is the only reality,
+psychology, as the scientific account of this reality, becomes identical
+with philosophy.
+
+In maintaining his position, Dewey finds it necessary to criticise the
+tendency, found in certain idealists, to treat psychology merely as a
+special science. This view of psychology is attained, Dewey observes, by
+regarding man under two arbitrarily determined aspects. Taken as a
+finite being acting amid finite things, a knowing, willing, feeling
+phenomenon, man is said to be the object of a special science,
+psychology. But in another aspect man is infinite, the universal
+self-consciousness, and as such is the object of philosophy. This
+distinction between the two aspects of man's nature, Dewey believes,
+cannot be maintained. As a distinction, it must arise within
+consciousness, and it must therefore be a psychological distinction.
+Psychology cannot limit itself to anything less than the whole of
+experience, and cannot, therefore, be a special science dependent, like
+others, upon philosophy for its working concepts. On the contrary, the
+method of psychology must be the method of philosophy.
+
+Dewey reaches this result quite easily, because he makes psychology the
+science of reality to begin with. "The universe," he says, "except as
+realized in an individual, has no existence.... Self-consciousness means
+simply an individualized universe; and if this universe has _not_ been
+realized in man, if man be not self-conscious, then no philosophy
+whatever is possible. If it _has_ been realized, it is in and through
+psychological experience that this realization has occurred. Psychology
+is the scientific account of this realization, of this individualized
+universe, of this self-consciousness."[7]
+
+It is difficult to understand exactly what these expressions meant for
+Dewey. Granting that the human mind is both individual and universal,
+what objection could be raised against the study of its individual or
+finite aspects as the special subject-matter of a particular science?
+All the sciences, as Dewey was aware, are abstract in method. Dewey's
+position appears to be that the universal and individual aspects of
+consciousness are nothing apart from each other, and must be studied
+together. But 'consciousness' in Dewey's view is, in fact, two
+consciousnesses. Reality as a whole is a Consciousness, and the
+individual mind is another consciousness. A problem arises, therefore,
+as to their connection. Dewey affirms that, unless they are united,
+unless the universal is given in the individual consciousness, there can
+be no science of the whole, and therefore no philosophy. The
+epistemological problem of the relation of the mind to reality becomes,
+accordingly, the _raison d'etre_ of his method. The problem was an
+inheritance from subjective idealism. It may be pointed out that there
+is some similarity between Dewey's standpoint and Berkeley's. Both
+conceive of consciousness as a construct of elements, and Dewey's
+'Consciousness in general' holds much the same relation to the finite
+consciousness that the Divine Mind holds to the individual consciousness
+in Berkeley's system. The similarity between the two standpoints must
+not be overemphasized, but it is none the less suggestive and
+interesting.
+
+In attempting to determine the proper status of psychology as a science,
+Dewey is led into a more detailed exposition of his standpoint. His
+position in general is well indicated in the following passage: "In
+short, the real _esse_ of things is neither their _percipi_, nor their
+_intelligi_ alone; it is their _experiri_."[8] The science of the
+_intelligi_ is logic, and of the _percipi_, philosophy of nature. But
+these are abstractions from the _experiri_, the science of which is
+psychology. If it be denied that the _experiri_, self-consciousness in
+its wholeness, can be the subject-matter of psychology, then the
+possibility of philosophy is also denied. "If man, as matter of fact,
+does not realise the nature of the eternal and the universal _within_
+himself, as the essence of his own being; if he does not at one stage of
+his experience consciously, and in all stages implicitly, lay hold of
+this universal and eternal, then it is mere matter of words to say that
+he can give no account of things as they universally and eternally are.
+To deny, therefore, that self-consciousness is a matter of psychological
+experience is to deny the possibility of any philosophy."[9] Dewey
+assures us again that his method alone will solve the epistemological
+problem.
+
+Self-consciousness, as that within which things exist _sub specie
+aeternitatis_ and _in ordine ad universum_, must be the object of
+psychology. The refusal to take self-consciousness as an experienced
+fact, Dewey says, results in such failures as are seen in Kant, Hegel,
+and even Green and Caird, to give any adequate account of the nature of
+the Absolute. Kant, for purely logical reasons, denied that
+self-consciousness could be an object of experience, although he
+admitted conceptions and perceptions as matters of experience. As a
+result of his attitude, conception and perception were never brought
+into organic connection; the self-conscious, eternal order of the world
+was referred to something back of experience. Dewey attributes Kant's
+failure to his logical method, which led him away from the psychological
+standpoint in which he would have found self-consciousness as a directly
+presented fact.
+
+This criticism of Kant's 'logical method' fails to take account of the
+transitional nature of Kant's standpoint. Looking backward, it is easy
+enough to ask why Kant did not begin with the organic view of experience
+at which he finally arrived. But the answer must be that the organic
+standpoint did not exist until Kant, by his 'logical method,' had
+brought it to light. The Kantian interpretation of experience, in which,
+as Dewey asserts, conception and perception were never brought into
+organic relation, is a half-way stage between mechanism and organism.
+But how does Dewey propose to improve upon Kant's position? He will
+first of all put Kant's noumenal self back into experience, as a fact in
+consciousness. But how will this help to bring perception and conception
+into closer union? There seems to be no answer. Dewey's view appears to
+be that organic relations are achieved whenever an object is made a part
+of experience and so brought into connection with other experienced
+facts. 'Organic relation' is interpreted as equivalent to 'mental
+relation.' But mental relations are not organic because they are mental.
+It would be as easy to assert that they are mechanical. The test lies in
+the nature of the relations which are actually found in the mental
+sphere and the fitness of the organic categories to express them.
+Dewey's 'consciousness,' as has been said before, appears to be a
+structure, not an organism. Its parts are external to each other,
+however closely they may be related. An organic view of experience would
+begin with a denial of the actuality of bare facts or sensations, and
+would not waver in maintaining that standpoint to the end.
+
+Hegel's advance upon Kant, Dewey continues, "consisted essentially in
+showing that Kant's _logical_ standard was erroneous, and that, as a
+matter of logic, the only true criterion or standard was the organic
+notion, or _Begriff_, which is a systematic totality, and accordingly
+able to explain both itself and also the simpler processes and
+principles."[10] The logical reformation which Hegel accomplished was
+most important, but the work of Kant still needed to be completed by
+"showing self-consciousness as a fact of experience, as well as
+perception through organic forms and thinking through organic
+principles."[11] This element is latent in Hegel, Dewey believes, but
+needs to be brought out.
+
+T. H. Green comes under the same criticism. He followed Kant's logical
+method, and as a consequence arrived at the same negative results. The
+nature of self-consciousness remains unknown to Green; he can affirm its
+existence, but cannot describe its nature. Dewey quotes that passage
+from the _Prolegomena to Ethics_ in which Green says:[12] "As to what
+that consciousness in itself or in its completeness is, we can only
+make negative statements. _That_ there is such a consciousness is
+implied in the existence of the world; but _what_ it is we only know
+through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and
+interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent
+experience." If, Dewey observes, Green had begun with the latter point
+of view, and had taken self-consciousness as at least partially realized
+in finite minds, he would have been able to make some positive
+statements about it. Dewey, however, has not given the most adequate
+interpretation of Green's 'Spiritual Principle in Nature.' This was
+evidently, for Green, a symbol of the intelligibility of the world as
+organically conceived, an order which could not be comprehended by the
+mechanical categories, but which was nevertheless real. As Green tended
+to hypostatize the organic conception, so Dewey would make it a concrete
+reality, with the further specification that it must be something given
+to psychological observation.
+
+The chief point of Dewey's criticism of the idealists is that they fail
+to establish self-consciousness as an experienced fact; and, Dewey
+maintains, it must be so established if it is to be anything real and
+genuine. If it is anything that can be discussed at all, it must be an
+element in experience; and if it is in experience, it must be the
+subject-matter of psychology. It is inevitable, from Dewey's standpoint,
+that transcendentalism should adopt his psychological method.
+
+In the further development of his standpoint, Dewey considers (1) the
+relations of psychology to the special sciences, and (2) the relation of
+psychology to logic. Dewey's conception of the relation of psychology to
+the special sciences is well illustrated in the following passage:
+"Mathematics, physics, biology exist, because conscious experience
+reveals itself to be of such a nature, that one may make virtual
+abstraction from the whole, and consider a part by itself, without
+damage, so long as the treatment is purely scientific, that is, so long
+as the implicit connection with the whole is left undisturbed, and the
+attempt is not made to present this partial science as metaphysic, or as
+an explanation of the whole, as is the usual fashion of our uncritical
+so-called 'scientific philosophies.' Nay more, this abstraction of some
+one sphere is itself a living function of the psychologic experience. It
+is not merely something which it allows: it is something which it
+_does_. It is the analytic aspect of its own activity, whereby it
+deepens and renders explicit, realizes its own nature.... The analytic
+movement constitutes the special sciences; the synthetic constitutes the
+philosophy of nature; the self-developing activity itself, as
+psychology, constitutes philosophy."[13]
+
+The special sciences are regarded as abstractions from the central or
+psychological point of view, but they are legitimate abstractions,
+constituted by a proper analytic movement of the total
+self-consciousness, which specifies itself into the special branches of
+knowledge. If we begin with any special science, and drive it back to
+its fundamentals, it reveals its abstractness, and thought is led
+forward into other sciences, and finally into philosophy, as the science
+of the whole. But philosophy, first appearing as a special science,
+turns out to be science; it is presupposed in all the special sciences,
+and is their basis. But where does psychology stand in this
+classification?
+
+At first sight psychology appears to be a special science, abstract like
+the others. "As to systematic observation, experiment, conclusion and
+verification, it can differ in no essential way from any one of
+them."[14] But psychology, like philosophy, turns out to be a science of
+the whole. Each special science investigates a special sphere of
+conscious experience. "From one science to another we go, asking for
+some explanation of conscious experience, until we come to
+psychology.... But the very process that has made necessary this new
+science reveals also that each of the former sciences existed only in
+abstraction from it. Each dealt with some one phase of conscious
+experience, and for that very reason could not deal with the totality
+which gave it its being, consciousness."[15] Philosophy and psychology
+therefore mainly coincide, and the method of psychology, properly
+developed, becomes the method of philosophy.
+
+If psychology is to be identified with philosophy in this fashion, the
+mere change of name would seem to be superfluous. There would be no
+reason for maintaining psychology as a separate discipline. Perhaps
+Dewey did not intend that it should be maintained separately. In that
+case, the total effect of his argument would be to prescribe certain
+methods for philosophy. It seems necessary to suppose that Dewey
+proposed to merge philosophy in psychology, and make it an exact science
+while retaining its universality. "Science," he argued, "is the
+systematic account, or _reason_ of _fact_; Psychology is the completed
+systematic account of the ultimate fact, which, as fact, reveals itself
+as reason...."[16] Self-consciousness in its ultimate nature is
+conceived of as a special fact, over and above what it includes in the
+way of particulars. Psychology, as the science of this ultimate fact,
+must at the same time be philosophy. The identification of the two
+disciplines depends upon taking the 'wholeness' of reality as a 'fact,'
+which can be brought under observation. This is a natural conclusion
+from Dewey's structural view of reality.
+
+In taking up the subject of the relation of psychology to logic, Dewey
+remarks that in philosophy matter and form cannot be separated.
+"Self-consciousness is the final truth, and in self-consciousness the
+form as organic system and the content as organized system are exactly
+equal to each other."[17] Logic abstracts from the whole, gives us only
+the form, or _intelligi_ of reality, and is therefore only one moment in
+philosophy. Since logic is an abstraction from Nature, we cannot get
+from logic back to Nature, by means of logic. We do, as a matter of
+fact, make the transition in philosophy, because the facts force us back
+to Nature. Just as in Hegel's logic, the category of quality, when
+pressed, reveals itself as inadequate to express the facts, and is
+compelled to pass into the category of quantity, so does logic as a
+whole, when pressed, reveal its inadequacy to express the whole of
+reality. The transition from category to category in the Hegelian logic
+is not an unfolding of the forms as forms, but results from a compulsion
+exerted by the facts, when the categories are used to explain them.
+Logic is, and must remain, abstract in all its processes, and its
+outcome (with Hegel, _Geist_) may assert the abstract necessity of one
+self-conscious whole, but cannot give the reality. "Logic cannot reach,
+however much it may point to, an actual individual. The gathering up of
+the universe into one self-conscious individuality it may assert as
+_necessary_, it cannot give it as _reality_."[18] Taken as an abstract
+method, logic is apt to result in a pantheism, "where the only real is
+the _Idee_, and where all its factors and moments, including spirit and
+nature, are real only at different stages or phases of the _Idee_, but
+vanish as imperfect ways of looking at things ... when we reach the
+_Idee_."[19]
+
+Dewey has in mind logic as a science of the forms of reality taken in
+abstraction from their content. In reality, however, there can be no
+logic of concepts apart from their concrete application. Hegel certainly
+never believed that it was possible to abstract the logical forms from
+reality and study them in their isolation. As against a purely formal
+logic, if such a thing were possible, Dewey's criticism would be valid,
+but the transcendental logic of his time was not formal in this sense.
+The psychological method which Dewey offers as a substitute for the
+logical method escapes, he believes, the difficulties of the latter
+method. At the same time it preserves, in his opinion, the essential
+spirit of the Hegelian method. Dewey's comments show that he conceives
+his method to be a restatement, in improved form, of the doctrine of the
+'concrete universal.' But the 'psychological method' and the method of
+idealism are, if anything, antithetical. An excellent summary of Dewey's
+theory is afforded by the following passage: "Only a living actual Fact
+can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in
+virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being. It is with this
+fact, conscious experience in its entirety, that psychology as method
+begins. It thus brings to clear light of day the presupposition implicit
+in every philosophy, and thereby affords logic, as well as the
+philosophy of nature, its basis, ideal and surety. If we have determined
+the nature of reality, by a process whose content equals its form, we
+can show the meaning, worth and limits of any one moment of this
+reality."[20]
+
+It would be useless to speculate upon the various possible
+interpretations that might be given of Dewey's psychological method. The
+most critical examination of the text will not dispel its vagueness, nor
+afford an answer to the many questions that arise. It does, however,
+throw an interesting light on certain tendencies in Dewey's own
+thinking.
+
+Dewey's attempt to show that English empiricism and transcendentalism
+have a common psychological basis must be regarded as a failure. That
+the nature of the attempt reveals a misunderstanding, or fatal lack of
+appreciation, on the part of Dewey, of the critical philosophy and the
+later development of idealism by Hegel, has already been suggested. He
+does not appear to have grasped the significance of the movement from
+Kant to Hegel. Kant, of course, believed that the _a priori_ forms of
+experience could be determined by a process of critical analysis, which
+would reveal them in their purity. The constitutive relations of
+experience were supposed by him to be limited to the pure forms of
+sensibility, space and time, and the twelve categories of the
+understanding, which, being imposed upon the manifold of sensations, as
+organized by the productive imagination, determined once and for all the
+order of the phenomenal world. His logic, therefore, as an account of
+the forms of experience, would represent logic of the type which Dewey
+criticized. But with the rejection of Kant's noumenal world, the
+critical method assumed a different import. It was no longer to be
+supposed that reality, as knowable, was organized under the forms of a
+determinate number of categories, which could be separated out and
+classified. Kant's idea that experience was an intelligible system was
+retained, but its intelligibility was not supposed to be wholly
+comprised in man's methods of knowing it. The instrumental character of
+the categories was recognized. Criticism was directed upon the
+categories, with the object of determining their validity, spheres of
+relevance, and proper place in the system of knowledge. Such a
+criticism, in the nature of things, could not deal with the forms of
+thought in abstraction from their application. Direct reference to
+experience, therefore, became a necessary element in idealism. At the
+same time, philosophy became a 'criticism of categories.' The method is
+empirical, but never psychological.
+
+Dewey recognized the need of an empirical method in philosophy, but
+failed to show specifically how psychology could deal with philosophical
+problems. He appears to have conceived that sensation and meaning, facts
+and forms, were present in experience or 'Consciousness,' as if this
+were some total understanding which retained the elements in a fixed
+union and order. While, according to his method, the forms of this
+universal consciousness could not be considered apart from the
+particulars in which they inhered, they might be studied by a survey of
+experience, a direct appeal to consciousness, in which 'form and content
+are equal.' He seems to have held that truth is given in immediate
+experience. A study of reality as immediately given, therefore, to
+psychological observation, would provide an account of the eternal
+nature of things, as they stand in the universal mind. Dewey did not
+attempt a criticism of the categories and methods which psychology must
+employ in such a task. Had he done so, the advantages of a critical
+method might have occurred to him.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[2] Vol. XI, pp. 1-19; pp. 153-173.
+
+[3] "Illusory Psychology," _Mind_, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 478.
+
+[4] "The Psychological Standpoint," _Mind_, 1886, Vol. XI, p. 2.
+
+[5] _Ibid._, p. 7.
+
+[6] _Op. cit._, p. 8 f.
+
+[7] "Psychology as Philosophic Method," _Mind_, 1886, Vol. XI, p. 157.
+
+[8] _Ibid._, p. 160. (Observe that this is a direct reference to
+Berkeley.)
+
+[9] _Op. cit._
+
+[10] _Op. cit._, p. 161.
+
+[11] _Ibid._
+
+[12] Third Edition, p. 54.
+
+[13] _Mind_, Vol. XI, p. 166 f.
+
+[14] _Ibid._, p. 166.
+
+[15] _Ibid._
+
+[16] _Op. cit._, p. 170.
+
+[17] _Ibid._
+
+[18] _Op. cit._, p. 172.
+
+[19] _Ibid._
+
+[20] _Op. cit._
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT
+
+
+The "psychological method," as so far presented, is an outline which
+must be developed in detail before its philosophical import is revealed.
+For several years following the publication of his first articles in
+_Mind_ Dewey was occupied with the task of working out his method in
+greater detail, and giving it more concrete form. His thought during
+this period follows a fairly regular order of development, which is to
+be sketched in the present chapter.
+
+In 1887 Dewey published in _Mind_ an article entitled "Knowledge as
+Idealisation."[21] This article is, in effect, a consideration of one of
+the special problems of the "psychological method." If reality is an
+eternal and all-inclusive consciousness, in which sensations and
+meanings are ordered according to a rational system, what must be the
+nature of the finite thought-process which apprehends this reality? In
+his previous articles Dewey had proposed the "psychological method" as
+an actual mode of investigation, and questions concerning the nature of
+the human thought-process naturally forced themselves upon his
+attention.
+
+The thought-process is, to begin with, a relating activity which gives
+meaning to experience. Says Dewey: "When Psychology recognizes that the
+relating activity of mind is one not exercised _upon_ sensations, but
+one which supplies relations and thereby makes meaning (makes
+experience, as Kant said), Psychology will be in a position to explain,
+and thus to become Philosophy."[22] This statement raises the more
+specific question, what is meaning?
+
+Every idea, Dewey remarks, has two aspects: existence and meaning.
+"Recognizing that every psychical fact does have these two aspects, we
+shall, for the present, confine ourselves to asking the nature,
+function and origin of the aspect of meaning or significance--the
+content of the idea as opposed to its existence."[23] The meaning aspect
+of the idea cannot be reduced to the centrally excited image existences
+which form a part of the existence-aspect of the idea. "I repeat, as
+existence, we have only a clustering of sensuous feelings, stronger and
+weaker."[24] But the thing is not perceived as a clustering of feelings;
+the sensations are immediately interpreted as a significant object.
+"Perceiving, to restate a psychological commonplace, is interpreting.
+The content of the perception is what is signified."[25] Dewey's
+treatment of sensations, at this point, is somewhat uncertain. If it be
+a manifold that is given to the act of interpretation, Kant's difficulty
+is again presented. The bare sensations taken by themselves mean
+nothing, and yet everything does mean something in being apprehended.
+The conclusion should be that there is no such thing as mere existence.
+Dewey's judgment is undecided on this issue. "It is true enough," he
+says, "that without the idea _as existence_ there would be no
+experience; the sensuous clustering is a condition _sine qua non_ of
+all, even the highest spiritual, consciousness. But it is none the less
+true that if we could strip any psychical existence of all its qualities
+except bare existence, there would be nothing left, not even existence,
+for our intelligence.... If we take out of an experience all that it
+_means_, as distinguished from what it _is_--a particular occurrence at
+a certain time, there is no psychical experience. The barest fragment of
+consciousness that can be hit upon has meaning as well as being."[26] An
+interpretation of reality as truly organic would treat mechanical
+sensation as a pure fiction. But Dewey clings to 'existence' as a
+necessary 'aspect' of the psychical fact. The terms and relations never
+entirely fuse, although they are indispensable to each other. There is
+danger that the resulting view of experience will be somewhat angular
+and structural.
+
+At one point, indeed, Dewey asserts that there is no such thing as a
+merely immediate psychical fact, at least for our experience. "So far is
+it from being true that we know only what is _immediately_ present in
+consciousness, that it should rather be said that what is _immediately_
+present is never known."[27] But in the next paragraph Dewey remarks:
+"That which is immediately present is the sensuous existence; that which
+is known is the content conveyed by this existence."[28] The sensation
+is not known, and therefore probably not experienced. In this case Dewey
+is departing from his own principles, by introducing non-experienced
+factors into his interpretation of experience. The language is
+ambiguous. If nothing is immediately given, then the sensuous content is
+not so given.
+
+The 'sensuous existences' assumed by Dewey are the ghosts of Kant's
+'manifold of sensation.' The difficulty comes out clearly in the
+following passage: "It is indifferent to the sensation whether it is
+interpreted as a cloud or as a mountain; a danger signal, or a signal of
+open passage. The auditory sensation remains unchanged whether it is
+interpreted as an evil spirit urging one to murder, or as intra-organic,
+due to disordered blood-pressure.... It is not the sensation in and of
+itself that means this or that object; it is the sensation as
+associated, composed, identified, or discriminated with other
+experiences; the sensation, in short, as mediated. The whole worth of
+the sensation for intelligence is the meaning it has by virtue of its
+relation to the rest of experience."[29]
+
+There is an obvious parallel between this view of experience and Kant's.
+Kant, indeed, transcended the notion that experience is a structure of
+sensations set in a frame-work of thought forms; but the first
+_Critique_ undoubtedly leaves the average reader with such a conception
+of experience. It is unjust to Kant, however, to take the mechanical
+aspect of his thought as its most important phase. He stands, in the
+opinion of modern critics, at a half-way stage between the mechanism of
+the eighteenth century and the organic logic of the nineteenth, and his
+works point the way from the lower to the higher point of view. This
+was recognized by Hegel and by his followers in England. How does it
+happen, then, that Dewey, who was well-read in the philosophical
+literature of the day, should have persisted in a view of experience
+which appears to assume the externally organized manifold of the
+_Critique of Pure Reason_? Or, to put the question more explicitly, why
+did he retain as a fundamental assumption Kant's 'manifold of
+sensations'?
+
+So far, Dewey has been concerned with the nature of meaning. He now
+turns to knowledge, and the knowing process as that which gives meaning
+to experience. Knowledge, or science, he says, is a process of following
+out the ideal element in experience. "The idealisation of science is
+simply a further development of this ideal element. It is, in short,
+only rendering explicit and definite the meaning, the idea, already
+contained in perception."[30] But if perception is already organized by
+thought, the sensations must have been related in a 'productive
+imagination.' Dewey, however, does not recognize such a necessity. The
+factor of meaning is ideal, he continues, because it is not present as
+so much immediate content, but is present as symbolized or mediated. But
+the question may be asked, "Whence come the ideal elements which give to
+experience its meaning?" No answer can be given except by psychology, as
+an inquiry into the facts, as contrasted with the logical necessity of
+experience.
+
+Sensations acquire meaning through being identified with and
+discriminated from other sensations to which they are related. But it is
+not as mere existences that they are compared and related, but as
+already ideas or meanings. "The identification is of the meaning of the
+present sensation with some meaning previously experienced, but which,
+although previously experienced, still exists because it _is_ meaning,
+and not occurrence."[31] The existences to which meanings attach come
+and go, and are new for every new appearance of the idea in
+consciousness; but the meanings remain. "The experience, as an existence
+at a given time, has forever vanished. Its meaning, as an ideal quality,
+remains as long as the mind does. Indeed, its remaining is the
+remaining of the mind; the conservation of the ideal quality of
+experience is what makes the mind a permanence."[32]
+
+It is not possible, Dewey says, to imagine a primitive state in which
+unmeaning sensations existed alone. Meaning cannot arise out of that
+which has no meaning. "Sensations cannot revive each other except as
+members of one whole of meaning; and even if they could, we should have
+no beginning of significant experience. Significance, meaning, must be
+already there. Intelligence, in short, is the one indispensable
+condition of intelligent experience."[33]
+
+Thinking is an act which idealizes experience by transforming sensations
+into an intelligible whole. It works by seizing upon the ideal element
+which is already there, conserving it, and developing it. It produces
+knowledge by supplying relations to experience. Dewey realizes that his
+act of intelligence is similar to Kant's 'apperceptive unity.' He says:
+"The mention of Kant's name suggests that both his strength and his
+weakness lie in the line just mentioned. It is his strength that he
+recognizes that an apperceptive unity interpreting sensations through
+categories which constitute the synthetic content of self-consciousness
+is indispensable to experience. It is his weakness that he conceives
+this content as purely logical, and hence as formal."[34] Kant's error
+was to treat the self as formal and held apart from its material. "The
+self does not work with _a priori_ forms upon an _a posteriori_
+material, but intelligence as ideal (or _a priori_) constitutes
+experience (or the _a posteriori_) as having meaning."[35] Dewey's
+standpoint here seems to be similar to that of Green. But as Kant's
+unity of apperception became for Green merely a symbol of the world's
+inherent intelligibility, the latter did not regard it as an actual
+process of synthesis. Dewey fails to make a distinction, which might
+have been useful to him, between Kant's unity of apperception and his
+productive imagination. It is the latter which Dewey retains, and he
+tends to identify it with the empirical process of the understanding.
+Knowing, psychologically considered, is a synthetic process. "And this
+is to say that experience grows as intelligence adds out of its own
+ideal content ideal quality.... The growth of the power of comparison
+implies not a formal growth, but a synthetic internal growth."[36]
+Dewey, of course, views understanding as an integral part of reality's
+processes rather than as a process apart, but it is for him a very
+special activity, which builds up the meaning of experience. "Knowledge
+might be indifferently described, therefore, as a process of
+idealisation of experience, or of realisation of intelligence. It is
+each through the other. Ultimately the growth of experience must consist
+in the development out of itself by intelligence of its own implicit
+ideal content upon occasion of the solicitation of sensation."[37]
+
+The difficulties of Dewey's original position are numerous. The relation
+of the self, as a synthetic activity, to the "Eternal Consciousness," in
+which meaning already exists in a completed form, is especially
+perplexing. Does the self merely trace out the meaning already present
+in reality, or is it a factor in the creation of meaning? It is clear
+that if the thinking process is a genuinely synthetic activity, imposing
+meaning on sensations, it literally 'makes the world' of our experience.
+But, on the other hand, if meaning is given to thought, as a part of its
+data, the self merely reproduces in a subjective experience the thought
+which exists objectively in the eternal mind. The dilemma arises as a
+result of Dewey's initial conception of reality as a structure of
+sensations and meanings. This conception of reality must be given up, if
+the notion of thought as a process of idealization is to be retained.
+
+In 1888, Dewey's _Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human
+Understanding_ appeared, and during the two years following he appears
+to have become interested in ethical theory, the results of his study
+beginning to appear in 1890. Dewey's ethical theories have so important
+a bearing upon his logical theory as to demand special attention. They
+will be reserved, therefore, for a separate chapter, and attention will
+be given here to the more strictly logical studies of the period.
+
+The three years which intervened between the publication of the essay on
+"Knowledge as Idealisation" and the appearance of an article "On Some
+Current Conceptions of the term 'Self,'" in _Mind_ (1890),[38] did not
+serve to divert Dewey's attention from the inquiries in which he had
+previously been interested. On the contrary, the later article shows how
+persistently his mind must have dwelt upon the problems connected with
+the notion of the self as a synthetic activity in experience.
+
+The immediate occasion for the article on the Self was the appearance of
+Professor Andrew Seth's work, _Hegelianism and Personality_ (1889).
+Dewey appears to have been influenced by Seth at an even earlier
+period,[39] and he now found the lectures on Hegel stimulating in
+connection with his own problems about thought and reality.
+
+It will not be necessary to go into the details of Dewey's criticism of
+the three ideas of the self presented by Seth. Since it is Dewey's own
+position that is in question, it is better to begin with his account of
+the historical origin of these definitions, "chiefly as found in Kant,
+incidentally in Hegel as related to Kant."[40] Dewey turns to the
+'Transcendental Deduction,' and follows Kant's description of the
+synthetic unity of apperception. "Its gist," he says, "in the second
+edition of the _K.d.r.V._, is the proof that the identity of
+self-consciousness involves the synthesis of the manifold of feelings
+through rules or principles which render this manifold objective, and
+that, therefore, the analytic identity of self-consciousness involves an
+objective synthetic unity of consciousness."[41] To say that
+self-consciousness is identical is a merely analytical proposition, and,
+as it stands, unfruitful. "But if we ask how we know this sameness or
+identity of consciousness, the barren principle becomes wonderfully
+fruitful."[42] In order to know reality as mine, not only must the
+consciousness that it is mine accompany each particular impression, but
+each must be known as an element in _one_ consciousness. "The sole way
+of accounting for this analytic identity of consciousness is through the
+activity of consciousness in connecting or 'putting together' the
+manifold of sense."[43]
+
+In the 'Deduction' of the first _Critique_, Dewey continues, Kant begins
+with the consciousness of objects, rather than with the identity of
+self-consciousness. Here also consciousness implies a unity, which is
+not merely formal, but one which actually connects the manifold of sense
+by an act. "Whether, then, we inquire what is involved in mere sameness
+of consciousness, or what is involved in an objective world, we get the
+same answer: a consciousness which is not formal or analytic, but which
+is synthetic of sense, and which acts universally (according to
+principles) in this synthesis."[44]
+
+The term 'Self,' as thus employed by Kant, Dewey says, is the
+correlative of the intelligible world. "It is the transcendental self
+looked at as 'there,' as a product, instead of as an activity or
+process."[45] This, however, by no means exhausts what Kant means by the
+self, for while he proceeds in the 'Deduction' as if the manifold of
+sense and the synthetic unity of the self were strictly correlative, he
+assumes a different attitude elsewhere. The manifold of sense is
+something in relation to the thing-in-itself, and the forms of thought
+have a reference beyond their mere application to the manifold. In the
+other connections the self appears as something purely formal; something
+apart from its manifestation in experience. In view of the wider meaning
+of the self, Dewey asks, "Can the result of the transcendental deduction
+stand without further interpretation?" It would appear that the content
+of the self is not the same as the content of the known world. The self
+is too great to exhaust itself in relation to sensation. "Sense is, as
+it were, inadequate to the relations which constitute
+self-consciousness, and thus there must also remain a surplusage in the
+self, not entering into the make-up of the known world."[46] This
+follows from the fact that, while the self is unconditioned, the
+manifold of sensation is conditioned, as given, by the forms of space
+and time. "Experience can never be complete enough to have a content
+equal to that of self-consciousness, for experience can never escape its
+limitation through space and time. Self-consciousness is real, and not
+merely logical; it is the ground of the reality of experience; it is
+wider than experience, and yet is unknown except so far as it is
+reflected through its own determinations in experience,--this is the
+result of our analysis of Kant, the _Ding-an-Sich_ being eliminated but
+the Kantian method and all presuppositions not involved in the notion of
+the _Ding-an-Sich_ being retained."[47]
+
+Dewey's interpretation of Kant's doctrine as presented in the
+'Deductions' is no doubt essentially correct. But granting that Kant
+found it necessary to introduce a synthesis in imagination to account
+for the unity of experience and justify our knowledge of its relations,
+it must not be forgotten that this necessity followed from the nature of
+his presuppositions. If the primal reality is a 'manifold of
+sensations,' proceeding from a noumenal source, and lacking meaning and
+relations, it follows that the manifold must be gathered up into a unity
+before the experience which we actually apprehend can be accounted for.
+But if reality is experience, possessing order and coherence in its own
+nature, the productive imagination is rendered superfluous. Dewey,
+however, clings to the notion that thought is a "synthetic activity"
+which makes experience, and draws support from Kant for his doctrine.
+
+Dewey now inquires what relation this revised Kantian conception of the
+self bears to the view advanced by Seth, viz., that the idea of
+self-consciousness is the highest category of thought and explanation.
+Kant had tried to discover the different forms of synthesis, by a method
+somewhat artificial to be sure, and had found twelve of them. While
+Hegel's independent derivation and independent placing of the categories
+must be accepted, it does not follow that the idea of self-consciousness
+can be included in the list, even if it be considered the highest
+category. "For it is impossible as long as we retain Kant's fundamental
+presupposition--the idea of the partial determination of sensation by
+relation to perception, apart from its relation to conception--to employ
+self-consciousness as a principle of explaining any fact of
+experience."[48] It cannot be said of the self of Kant that it is simply
+an hypostatized category. "It is more, because the self of Kant ... is
+more than any category: it is a real activity or being."[49]
+
+Hegel, Dewey continues, develops only one aspect of Kant's _Critique_,
+that is, the logical aspect, and consequently does not fulfil Kant's
+entire purpose. "This is, I repeat, not an immanent 'criticism of
+categories' but an analysis of experience into its aspects and really
+constituent elements."[50] Dewey, as usual, shows his opposition to a
+'merely logical' method in philosophy. He plainly indicates his
+dissatisfaction with the Hegelian development of Kant's standpoint. He
+is unfair to Hegel, however, in attributing to him a 'merely logical'
+method. Kant's self was, as Dewey asserts, something more than a
+category of thought, but it is scarcely illuminating to say of Kant that
+his purpose was the analysis of experience into its 'constituent
+elements.' Kant did, indeed, analyze experience, but this analysis must
+be regarded as incidental to a larger purpose. No criticism need be made
+of Dewey's preference for the psychological, as opposed to the logical
+aspects of Kant's work. The only comment to be made is that this
+attitude is not in line with the modern development of idealism.
+
+The question which finally emerges, as the result of Dewey's inquiry, is
+this: What is the nature of this self-activity which is more than the
+mere category of self-consciousness? "As long as sensation was regarded
+as given by a thing-in-itself, it was possible to form a conception of
+the self which did not identify it with the world. But when sense is
+regarded as having meaning only because it is 'there' as determined by
+thought, just as thought is 'there' only as determining sense, it would
+seem either that the self is just their synthetic unity (thus equalling
+the world) or that it must be thrust back of experience, and become a
+thing-in-itself. The activity of the self can hardly be a third
+something distinct from thought and from sense, and it cannot be their
+synthetic union. What, then, is it?"[51] Green, Dewey says, attempted to
+solve the difficulty by his "idea of a completely realized self making
+an animal organism the vehicle of its own reproduction in time."[52]
+This attempt was at least in the right direction, acknowledging as it
+did the fact that the self is something more than the highest category
+of thought.
+
+Dewey admits his difficulties in a way that makes extended comment
+unnecessary. He does not challenge the validity of the Hegelian
+development of the Kantian categories, but proposes to make more of the
+self than the Hegelians ordinarily do. This synthetic self-activity must
+reveal itself as a concrete process; that is one of the demands of his
+psychological standpoint. It is impossible to foresee what this process
+would be as an actual fact of experience.
+
+Although the next article which is to be considered does not offer a
+direct answer to the problems which have so far been raised, it
+nevertheless indicates the general direction which Dewey's thought is to
+take. This article, on "The Present Position of Logical Theory," was
+published in the _Monist_ in 1891.[53] Dewey appears at this time as the
+champion of the transcendental, or Hegelian logic, in opposition to
+formal and inductive logic. His attitude toward Hegel undergoes a marked
+change at this period. Dewey's general objection to formal logic is well
+expressed in the following passage: "It is assumed, in fine, that
+thought has a nature of its own independent of facts or subject-matter;
+that this thought, _per se_, has certain forms, and that these forms are
+not forms which the facts themselves take, varying with the facts, but
+are rigid frames, into which the facts are to be set. Now all of this
+conception--the notion that the mind has a faculty of thought apart from
+things, the notion that this faculty is constructed, in and of itself,
+with a fixed framework, the notion that thinking is the imposing of this
+fixed framework on some unyielding matter called particular objects, or
+facts--all of this conception appears to me as highly scholastic."[54]
+The inductive logic, Dewey says, still clings to the notion of thought
+as a faculty apart from its material, operating with bare forms upon
+sensations. Kant had been guilty of this separation and never overcame
+it successfully. Because formal logic views thought as a process apart
+from the matter with which it has to deal, it can never be the logic of
+science. "For if science means anything, it is that our ideas, our
+judgments may in some degree reflect and report the fact itself. Science
+means, on one hand, that thought is free to attack and get hold of its
+subject-matter, and, on the other, that fact is free to break through
+into thought; free to impress itself--or rather to express itself--in
+intelligence without vitiation or deflection. Scientific men are true to
+the instinct of the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct _a
+priori_ factor supplied to fact from the mind. Apriorism of this sort
+must seem like an effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of
+fact, to bring them under the yoke of fixed, external forms."[55]
+
+In opposition to this formal, and, as he calls it, subjective standpoint
+in logic, Dewey stands for the transcendental logic, which supposes that
+there is some kind of vital connection between thought and fact; "that
+thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process of
+translation from brute impression to lucent meaning."[56] Hegel holds
+this view of logic. "This, then, is why I conceive Hegel--entirely apart
+from the value of any special results--to represent the quintessence of
+the scientific spirit. He denies not only the possibility of getting
+truth out of a formal, apart thought, but he denies the existence of any
+faculty of thought which is other than the expression of fact
+itself."[57] At another place Dewey expresses his view of Hegel as
+follows: "Relations of thought are, to Hegel, the typical forms of
+meaning which the subject-matter takes in its various progressive stages
+of being understood."[58]
+
+Dewey's defence of the transcendental logic is vigorous. He maintains
+that the disrespect into which the transcendental logic had fallen, was
+due to the fact that the popular comprehension of the transcendental
+movement had been arrested at Kant, and had never gone on to Hegel.
+
+The objection made to Kant's standpoint is that it treated thought as a
+process over against experience, imposing its forms upon it from
+without. "Kant never dreams, for a moment, of questioning the existence
+of a special faculty of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms.
+He states and restates that thought in itself exists apart from fact and
+occupies itself with fact given to it from without."[59] While Kant gave
+the death blow to a merely formal conception of thought, indirectly, and
+opened up the way for an organic interpretation, he did not achieve the
+higher standpoint himself. Remaining at the standpoint of Kant,
+therefore, the critic of the transcendental logic has much to complain
+of. Scientific men deal with facts, look to them for guidance, and must
+suppose that thought and fact pass into each other directly, and without
+vitiation or deflection. They are correct in opposing a conception which
+would interpose conditions between thought on the one hand and the facts
+on the other.
+
+But Hegel is true to the scientific spirit. "When Hegel calls thought
+objective he means just what he says: that there is no special, apart
+faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind existing separate
+from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective thought is the
+meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by methods of thought
+he understands simply the processes in which this meaning of fact is
+evolved."[60]
+
+If Hegel is true to the scientific spirit; if his logic presupposes that
+there is an intrinsic connection of thought and fact, and views science
+simply as the progressive realization of the world's ideality, then the
+only questions to be asked about his logic are questions of fact
+concerning his treatment of the categories. Is the world such a
+connected system as he holds it to be? "And, if a system, does it, in
+particular, present such phases (such relations, categories) as Hegel
+shows forth?"[61] These questions are wholly objective. Such a logic as
+Hegel's could scarcely make headway when it was first produced, because
+the significance of the world, its ideal character, had not been brought
+to light through the sciences. We are now reaching a stage, however,
+where science has brought the ideality of the world into the foreground,
+where it may become as real and objective a material of study as
+molecules and vibrations.
+
+This appreciation of Hegel would seem to indicate that Dewey has finally
+grasped the significance of Hegel's development of the Kantian
+standpoint. A close reading of the article, however, dispels this
+impression. Dewey believes that he has found in Hegel a support for his
+own psychological method in philosophy. It is scarcely necessary to say
+that Hegel's standpoint was anything but psychological. Dewey has
+already given up Kant; he will presently desert Hegel. A psychological
+interpretation of the thought-process in its relations to reality is not
+compatible with the critical method in philosophy.
+
+In the next article to be examined, "The Superstition of Necessity," in
+the _Monist_ (1893),[62] Dewey begins to attain the psychological
+description of thought at which he had been aiming. This article was
+suggested, as Dewey indicates in a foot-note, by Mr. C. S. Pierce's
+article, "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," in the _Monist_
+(1892).[63] Although Dewey acknowledges his indebtedness to Pierce for
+certain suggestions, the two articles have little in common.
+
+Dewey had consistently maintained that thought is a synthetic activity
+through which reality is idealized or takes on meaning. It is from this
+standpoint that he approaches the subject of necessity. The following
+passage reveals the connection between his former position and the one
+that he is now approaching: "The whole, although first in the order of
+reality, is last in the order of knowledge. The complete statement of
+the whole is the goal, not the beginning of wisdom. We begin, therefore,
+with fragments, which are taken for wholes; and it is only by piecing
+together these fragments, and by the transformation of them involved in
+this combination, that we arrive at the real fact. There comes a stage
+at which the recognition of the unity begins to dawn upon us, and yet,
+the tradition of the many distinct wholes survives; judgment has to
+combine these two contradictory conceptions; it does so by the theory
+that the dawning unity is an effect necessarily produced by the
+interaction of the former wholes. Only as the consciousness of the unity
+grows still more is it seen that instead of a group of independent
+facts, held together by 'necessary' ties, there is one reality, of which
+we have been apprehending various fragments in succession and
+attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence. We learn (but
+only at the end) that instead of discovering and then connecting
+together a number of separate realities, we have been engaged in the
+progressive definition of one fact."[64]
+
+Dewey adds to his idea that our knowledge of reality is a progressive
+development of its implicit ideality through a synthetic
+thought-process, the specification that the process of idealization
+occurs in connection with particular crises and situations. There comes
+a stage, he says, when unity begins to dawn and meaning emerges.
+Necessity is a term used in connection with these transitions from
+partial to greater realization of the world's total meaning. Necessity
+is a middle term, or go-between. It marks a critical stage in the
+development of knowledge. No necessity attaches to a whole, as such.
+"_Qua_ whole, the fact simply is what it is; while the parts, instead of
+being necessitated either by one another or by the whole, are the
+analyzed factors constituting, in their complete circuit, the
+whole."[65] But when the original whole breaks up, through its inability
+to comprehend new facts under its unity, a process of judgment occurs
+which aims at the establishment of a new unity. "The judgment of
+necessity, in other words, is exactly and solely the transition in our
+knowledge from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis.
+Its value is just the value of this transition; as negating the old
+partial and isolated judgments--in its backward look--necessity has
+meaning; in its forward look--with reference to the resulting completely
+organized subject-matter--it is itself as false as the isolated
+judgments which it replaces."[66] We say that things must be so, when we
+do not know that they are so; that is, while we are in course of
+determining what they are. Necessity has its value exclusively in this
+transition.
+
+Dewey attempts to show, in a discussion which need not be followed in
+detail, that there is nothing radical in his view, and that it finds
+support among the idealists and empiricists alike. Thinkers of both
+schools (he quotes Caird and Venn) admit that the process of judgment
+involves a change in objects, at least as they are for us. There is a
+transformation of their value and meaning. "This point being held in
+common, both schools must agree that _the progress of judgment is
+equivalent to a change in the value of objects_--that objects as they
+are for us, as known, change with the development of our judgments."[67]
+Dewey proposes to give a more specific description of this process of
+transformation, and especially, to show how the idea of necessity is
+involved in it.
+
+The process of transformation is occasioned by practical necessity. Men
+have a tendency to take objects as just so much and no more; to attach
+to a given subject-matter these predicates, and no others. There is a
+principle of inertia, or economy, in the mind, which leads it to
+maintain objects in their _status quo_ as long as possible. "There is no
+doubt that the reluctance of the mind to give up an object once made
+lies deep in its economies.... I wish here to call attention to the fact
+that the forming of a number of distinct objects has its origin in
+practical needs of our nature. The analysis and synthesis which is first
+made is that of most practical importance...."[68] We tend to retain
+such objects as we have, and it is not until "the original
+subject-matter has been overloaded with various and opposing predicates
+that we think of doubting the correctness of our first judgments, of
+putting our first objects under suspicion."[69] Once the Ptolemaic
+system is well established, cycles and epicycles are added without
+number, rather than reconstruct the original object. When, finally, we
+are compelled to make some change, we tend to invent some new object to
+which the predicates can attach. "When qualities arise so incompatible
+with the object already formed that they cannot be referred to that
+object, it is easier to form a new object on their basis than it is to
+doubt the correctness of the old...."[70] Let us suppose, then, that
+under stress of practical need, we refer the new predicates to some new
+object, and have, as a consequence, two objects. (Dewey illustrates this
+situation by specific examples.) This separation of the two objects
+cannot continue long, before we begin to discover that the two objects
+are related elements in a larger whole. "The wall of partition between
+the two separate 'objects' cannot be broken at one attack; they have to
+be worn away by the attrition arising from their slow movement into one
+another. It is the 'necessary' influence which one exerts upon the other
+that finally rubs away the separateness and leaves them revealed as
+elements of one unified whole."[71]
+
+The concept of necessity has its validity in such a movement of judgment
+as has been described. "Necessity, as the middle term, is the mid-wife
+which, from the dying isolation of judgments, delivers the unified
+judgment just coming into life--it being understood that the
+separateness of the original judgments is not as yet quite negated, nor
+the unity of the coming judgment quite attained."[72] The judgment of
+necessity connects itself with certain facts in the situation which are
+immediately concerned with our practical activities. These are facts
+which, before the crisis arises, have been neglected; they are elements
+in the situation which have been regarded as unessential, as not yet
+making up a part of the original object. "Although after our desire has
+been met they have been eliminated as accidental, as irrelevant, yet
+when the experience is again desired their integral membership in the
+real fact has to be recognized. This is done under the guise of
+considering them as means which are necessary to bring about the
+end."[73] We have the if so, then so situation. "_If_ we are to reach an
+end we _must_ take certain means; while so far as we want an undefined
+end, an end in general, conditions which accompany it are mere
+accidents."[74] The end of this process of judgment in which necessity
+appears as a half-way stage, is the unity of reality; a whole into which
+the formerly discordant factors can be gathered together.
+
+Only a detailed study of the original text, with its careful
+illustrations, can furnish a thorough understanding of Dewey's position.
+Enough has been said, however, to show that this psychological account
+of the judgment process is a natural outgrowth of his former views, and
+that, as it stands, it is still in conformity with his original
+idealism. The article as a whole marks a half-way stage in Dewey's
+philosophical development. Looking backward, it is a partial fulfilment
+of the demands of "The Psychological Standpoint." It is a psychological
+description of the processes whereby self-consciousness specifies itself
+into parts which are still related to the whole. Looking forward, it
+forecasts the functional theory of knowledge. We have, to begin with,
+objects given as familiar or known experiences. So long as these are not
+put under suspicion or examined, they simply are themselves, or are
+non-cognitionally experienced. But on the occasion of a conflict in
+experience between opposed facts and their meanings, a process of
+judgment arises, whose function is to restore unity. It is in this
+process of judgment as an operation in the interests of the unity of
+experience, that the concepts, necessity and contingency, have their
+valid application and use. They are instruments for effecting a
+transformation of experience. This is the root idea of functional
+instrumentalism. It is apparent, therefore, that Dewey's later
+functionalism resulted from the natural growth and development of the
+psychological standpoint which he adopted at the beginning of his
+philosophical career.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[21] Vol. XII, pp. 382-396.
+
+[22] _Ibid._, p. 394.
+
+[23] _Op. cit._, p. 383.
+
+[24] _Ibid._
+
+[25] _Ibid._, p. 384.
+
+[26] _Ibid._
+
+[27] _Op. cit._, p. 385.
+
+[28] _Ibid._
+
+[29] _Ibid._, p. 388.
+
+[30] _Op. cit._, p. 390.
+
+[31] _Ibid._, p. 392.
+
+[32] _Op. cit._
+
+[33] _Ibid._, p. 393.
+
+[34] _Ibid._, p. 394.
+
+[35] _Ibid._, p. 395.
+
+[36] _Op. cit._
+
+[37] _Ibid._, p. 396. (The last sentence forecasts Dewey's later
+contention that knowing is a specific act operating upon the occasion of
+need.)
+
+[38] Vol. XV, pp. 58-74.
+
+[39] See _Mind_, Vol. XI, 1886, p. 170.
+
+[40] _Ibid._, p. 63.
+
+[41] _Ibid._
+
+[42] _Ibid._, p. 64.
+
+[43] _Op. cit._
+
+[44] _Ibid._, p. 65.
+
+[45] _Ibid._
+
+[46] _Op. cit._, p. 67.
+
+[47] _Ibid._, p. 68.
+
+[48] _Op. cit._, p. 70.
+
+[49] _Ibid._, p. 71.
+
+[50] _Ibid._
+
+[51] _Op. cit._, p. 73.
+
+[52] _Ibid._
+
+[53] Vol. II, pp. 1-17.
+
+[54] _Op. cit._, p. 4.
+
+[55] _Ibid._, p. 12.
+
+[56] _Ibid._, p. 3.
+
+[57] _Ibid._, p. 14.
+
+[58] _Ibid._, p. 13.
+
+[59] _Op. cit._, p. 11.
+
+[60] _Ibid._, p. 12 f.
+
+[61] _Op. cit._, p. 14.
+
+[62] Vol. III, pp. 362-379.
+
+[63] Vol. II, pp. 321-337.
+
+[64] _The Monist_, Vol. III, 1893, p. 364.
+
+[65] _Ibid._, p. 363.
+
+[66] _Op. cit._
+
+[67] _Ibid._, p. 364 f.
+
+[68] _Ibid._, p. 367.
+
+[69] _Ibid._, p. 366.
+
+[70] _Op. cit._, p. 367.
+
+[71] _Ibid._, p. 368.
+
+[72] _Ibid._, p. 363.
+
+[73] _Op. cit._, p. 372.
+
+[74] _Ibid._
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+"MORAL THEORY AND PRACTICE"
+
+
+Dewey's ethical theory, as has already been indicated, stands in close
+relation to his general theory of knowledge. Since it has been found
+expedient to treat the ethical theory separately, it will be necessary
+to go back some two years and trace it from its beginnings. The order of
+arrangement that has been chosen is fortunate in this respect, since it
+brings into close connection two articles which are really companion
+pieces, in spite of the two-year interval which separates them. These
+are "The Superstition of Necessity," which was considered at the close
+of the last chapter, and "Moral Theory and Practice," an article
+published in _The International Journal of Ethics_, in January,
+1891.[75] This latter article, now to be examined, is one of Dewey's
+first serious undertakings in the field of ethical theory, and probably
+represents some of the results of his study in connection with his
+text-book, _Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics_, published in the
+same year (1891).
+
+The immediate occasion for the article is explained by Dewey in his
+introductory remarks: "In the first number of this journal four writers
+touch upon the same question,--the relation of moral theory to moral
+practice."[76] The four writers mentioned were Sidgwick, Adler,
+Bosanquet, and Salter. None of them, according to Dewey, had directly
+discussed the relation of moral theory to practice. "But," he says,
+"finding the subject touched upon ... in so many ways, I was led to
+attempt to clear up my own ideas."[77]
+
+There seems to exist, Dewey continues, "the idea that moral theory is
+something other than, or something beyond, an analysis of conduct,--the
+idea that it is not simply and wholly 'the theory of practice.'"[78] It
+is often defined, for instance, as an inquiry into the metaphysics of
+morals, which has nothing to do with practice. But, Dewey believes,
+there must be some intrinsic connection between the theory of morals and
+moral practice. Such intrinsic connection may be denied on the ground
+that practice existed long before theory made its appearance. Codes of
+morality were in existence before Plato, Kant, or Spencer rose to
+speculate upon them. This raises the question, What is theory?
+
+Moral theory is nothing more than a proposed act in idea. It is insight,
+or perception of the relations and bearings of the contemplated act. "It
+is all one with moral _insight_, and moral insight is the recognition of
+the relationships in hand. This is a very tame and prosaic conception.
+It makes moral insight, and therefore moral theory, consist simply in
+the everyday workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures
+drygoods, drives nails, sells wheat, and invents the telephone."[79] The
+nature of theory as idea is more definitely described. "It is the
+construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. _It
+is, therefore, the doing,--the act itself, in its emerging._"[80]
+
+Theory is practice in idea, or as foreseen; it is the perception of what
+ought to be done. This, at least, is what moral theory is. Dewey's
+demand that fact and theory must have some intrinsic connection,
+unsatisfied in the articles reviewed in the previous chapter, is met
+here by discovering a connecting link in _action_. Theory is "_the
+doing,--the act itself in its emerging_." The reduction of thought to
+terms of action, here implied, is a serious step. It marks a new
+tendency in Dewey's speculation. Dewey does not claim, in the present
+article, that his remarks hold good for all theory. "Physical science,"
+he remarks, "does deal with abstractions, with hypothesis. It says, 'If
+this, then that.' It deals with the relations of conditions and not with
+facts, or individuals, at all. It says, 'I have nothing to do with your
+concrete falling stone, but I can tell you this, that it is a law of
+falling bodies that, etc.'"[81] But moral theory is compelled to deal
+with concrete situations. It must be a theory which can be applied
+directly to the particular case. Moral theory cannot exist simply in a
+book. Since, moreover, there is no such thing as theory in the abstract,
+there can be no abstract theory of morals.
+
+There can be no difficulty, Dewey believes, in understanding moral
+theory as action in idea. All action that is intelligent, all conduct,
+that is, involves theory. "For any _act_ (as distinct from mere impulse)
+there must be 'theory,' and the wider the act, the greater its import,
+the more exigent the demand for theory."[82] This does not, however,
+answer the question how any particular moral theory, the Kantian, the
+Hedonistic, or the Hegelian, is related to action. These systems
+present, not 'moral ideas' as explained above, but 'ideas about
+morality.' What relation have ideas about morality to specific moral
+conduct?
+
+The answer to this question is to be obtained through an understanding
+of the nature of the moral situation. If an act is moral, it must be
+intelligent; as moral conduct, it implies insight into the situation at
+hand. This insight is obtained by an examination and analysis of the
+concrete situation. "This is evidently a work of analysis. Like every
+analysis, it requires that the one making it be in possession of certain
+working tools. I cannot resolve this practical situation which faces me
+by merely looking at it. I must attack it with such instruments of
+analysis as I have at hand. _What we call moral rules are precisely such
+tools of analysis._"[83] The Golden Rule is such an instrument of
+analysis. Taken by itself, it offers no direct information as to what is
+to be done. "The rule is a counsel of perfection; it is a warning that
+in my analysis of the moral situation (that is, of the conditions of
+practice) I be impartial as to the effects on me and thee.'"[84] Every
+rule which is of any use at all is employed in a similar fashion.
+
+But this is not, so far, a statement of the nature of moral theory,
+since only particular rules have been considered. Ethical theory, in its
+wider significance, is a reflective process in which, as one might say,
+the 'tools of analysis' are shaped and adapted to their work. These
+rules are not fixed things, made once and for all, but of such a nature
+that they preserve their effectiveness only as they are constantly
+renewed and reshaped. Ethical theory brings the Golden Rule together
+with other general ideas, conforms them to each other, and in this way
+gives the moral rule a great scope in practice. All moral theory,
+therefore, is finally linked up with practice. "It bears much the same
+relation to the particular rule as this to the special case. It is a
+tool for the analysis of its meaning, and thereby a tool for giving it
+greater effect."[85] In ethical theory we find moral rules in the
+making. Ideas about morals are simply moral ideas in the course of being
+formed.
+
+Dewey presents here an instrumental theory of knowledge and concepts.
+But it differs widely from the instrumentalism of the Neo-Hegelian
+school both in its form and derivation. Dewey reaches his
+instrumentalism through a psychological analysis of the judgment
+process. He finds that theory is related to fact through action, and
+since he had been unable to give a concrete account of this relationship
+at a previous time, the conclusion may be regarded as a discovery of
+considerable moment for his philosophical method. Dewey's
+instrumentalism rests upon a very special psychological interpretation,
+which puts action first and thought second. Unable to discover an overt
+connection between fact and thought, he delves underground for it, and
+finds it in the activities of the nervous organism. This discovery, he
+believes, solves once and for all the ancient riddle of the relation of
+thought to reality.
+
+In the concluding part of the article Dewey takes up the consideration
+of moral obligation. "What is the relation of knowledge, of theory, to
+that Ought which seems to be the very essence of moral conduct?"[86] The
+answer anticipates in some measure the position which was taken later,
+as has been seen, in regard to necessity. The concept of obligation,
+like that of necessity, Dewey believes, has relevance only for the
+judgment situation. "But," Dewey says, "limiting the question as best I
+can, I should say (first) that the 'ought' always rises from and falls
+back into the 'is,' and (secondly) that the 'ought' is itself an
+'is,'--the 'is' of action."[87] Obligation is not something added to the
+conclusion of a judgment, something which gives a moral aspect to what
+had been a coldly intellectual matter. The 'ought' finds an integral
+place in the judgment process. "The difference between saying, 'this act
+is the one to be done, ...' and saying, 'The act _ought_ to be done,' is
+merely verbal. The analysis of action is from the first an analysis of
+what is to be done; how, then, should it come out excepting with a 'this
+should be done'?"[88] The peculiarity of the 'ought' is that it applies
+to conduct or action, whereas the 'is' applies to the facts. It has
+reference to doing, or acting, as the situation demands. "This, then, is
+the relation of moral theory and practice. Theory is the cross-section
+of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should
+be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: in is theory in
+action."[89]
+
+The parallel between this article and "The Superstition of Necessity" is
+too obvious to require formulation, and the same criticism that applies
+to the one is applicable to the other. "The Superstition of Necessity"
+is more detailed and concrete in its treatment of the judgment process
+than this earlier article, as might be expected, but the fundamental
+position is essentially the same. The synthetic activity of the self,
+the thought-process, finally appears as the servant of action, or, more
+exactly, as itself a special mode of organic activity in general.
+
+From the basis of the standpoint which he had now attained Dewey
+attempted a criticism of Green's moral theory, in two articles in the
+_Philosophical Review_, in 1892 and 1893. The first of these, entitled
+"Green's Theory of the Moral Motive,"[90] appeared almost two years
+after the article on "Moral Theory and Practice." The continuity of
+Dewey's thought during the intervening period, however, is indicated by
+the fact that the first four pages of the article to be considered are
+given over to an introductory discussion which repeats in almost
+identical terms the position taken in "Moral Theory and Practice." Dewey
+himself calls attention to this fact in a foot-note.
+
+There must be, Dewey again asserts, some vital connection of theory with
+practice. "Ethical theory must be a general statement of the reality
+involved in every moral situation. It must be action stated in its more
+generic terms, terms so generic that every individual action will fall
+within the outlines it sets forth. If the theory agrees with these
+requirements, then we have for use in any special case a tool for
+analyzing that case; a method for attacking and reducing it, for laying
+it open so that the action called for in order to meet, to satisfy it,
+may readily appear."[91] Dewey argues that moral theory cannot possibly
+give directions for every concrete case, but that it by no means follows
+that theory can stand aside from the specific case and say: "What have I
+to do with thee? Thou art empirical, and I am the metaphysics of
+conduct."
+
+Dewey's preliminary remarks are introductory to a consideration of
+Green's ethical theory. "His theory would, I think," Dewey says, "be
+commonly regarded as the best of the modern attempts to form a
+metaphysic of ethic. I wish, using this as type, to point out the
+inadequacy of such metaphysical theories, on the ground that they fail
+to meet the demand just made of truly ethical theory, that it lend
+itself to translation into concrete terms, and thereby to the guidance,
+the direction of actual conduct."[92] Dewey recognizes that Green is
+better than his theory, but says that the theory, taken in logical
+strictness, cannot meet individual needs.
+
+Dewey makes a special demand of Green's theory. He demands, that is,
+that it supply a body of rules, or guides to action which can be
+employed by the moral agent as tools of analysis in cases requiring
+moral judgment. It is evident in advance that Green's theory was built
+upon a different plan, and can not meet the conditions which Dewey
+prescribes. The general nature of Green's inquiry is well stated in the
+following summary by Professor Thilly: "The truth in Green's thought is
+this: the purpose of all social devotion and reform is, after all, the
+perfection of man on the spiritual side, the development of men of
+character and ideals.... The final purpose of all moral endeavor must be
+the realization of an attitude of the human soul, of some form of noble
+consciousness in human personalities.... It is well enough to feed and
+house human bodies, but the paramount question will always be: What
+kinds of souls are to dwell in these bodies?"[93] To put the matter in
+more technical terms, Green is concerned with ends and values. His
+question is not, What is the best means of accomplishing a given
+purpose, but, What end is worth attaining? Such an inquiry has no
+immediate relation to action. It may lead to conclusions which become
+determining factors in action, but the process of inquiry has no direct
+reference to conduct. Dewey, having reduced thought to a function of
+activity, must proceed, by logical necessity, to carry the same
+reduction into the field of theory in general. This he does in thorough
+style. His demand that moral theory shall concern itself with concrete
+and 'specific' situations is a result of the same tendency. Since action
+can only be described as response to a 'situation,' thought, as a
+function of activity, must likewise be directed upon a 'situation.'
+Conduct in general and values in general become impossible under his
+system, because there is no such thing as an activity-in-general of the
+organism. Ends, in other words, exist only for thought, when thought is
+interpreted as transcending action, and being, in some sense,
+self-contained. When thought is interpreted as a kind of 'indirect
+activity,' its capacity for metaphysical inquiry vanishes along with its
+independence.
+
+It would have been more in keeping with sound criticism had Dewey
+himself taken note of the important divergence in aim and intent between
+his work and Green's. As a consequence of his failure to do so, he
+fails, necessarily, to do justice to Green's standpoint. The criticism
+which he directs against Green's moral theory may be briefly summed up
+as follows.
+
+Green tends to repeat the Kantian separation of the self as reason from
+the self as want or desire. "The dualism between reason and sense is
+given up, indeed, but only to be replaced by a dualism between the end
+which would satisfy the self as a unity or whole, and that which
+satisfies it in the particular circumstances of actual conduct."[94] As
+a consequence of the separation of the ideal from the actual, no action
+can satisfy the whole self, and thus no action can be truly moral. "No
+thorough-going theory of total depravity ever made righteousness more
+impossible to the natural man than Green makes it to a human being by
+the very constitution of his being...."[95] Dewey traces this separation
+of the self as reason from the self as desire through those passages in
+which Green describes the moral agent as one who distinguishes himself
+from his desires (Book II, _Prolegomena to Ethics_). "The process of
+moral experience involves, therefore, a process in which the self, in
+becoming conscious of its want, objectifies that want by setting it over
+against itself; distinguishing the want from self and self from want....
+Now this theory so far might be developed in either of two
+directions."[96]
+
+In the first place, the self-distinguishing process may be an activity
+by means of which the self specifies its own activity and satisfaction.
+"The particular desires and ends would be the modes in which the self
+relieved itself of its abstractness, its undeveloped character, and
+assumed concrete existence.... The unity of the self would stand in no
+opposition to the particularity of the special desire; on the contrary,
+the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires would be the
+synthetic and analytic aspects of one and the same reality, neither
+having any advantage metaphysical or ethical over the other!"[97] But
+Green, unfortunately, does not develop his theory in this concrete
+direction. The self does not specify itself in the particulars, but
+remains apart from them. "The objectification is not of the self in the
+special end; but the self remains behind setting the special object over
+against itself as not adequate to itself.... The unity of the self sets
+up an ideal of satisfaction for itself as it withdraws from the special
+want, and this ideal set up through negation of the particular desire
+and its satisfaction constitutes the moral ideal. It is forever
+unrealizable, because it forever negates the special activities through
+which alone it might, after all, realize itself."[98] In completing this
+argument Dewey refers to certain well-known passages in the _Prolegomena
+to Ethics_, in which Green states that the moral ideal is never
+completely attainable. Green's abstract conception of the self as that
+which forever sets itself over against its desires is, Dewey argues, not
+only useless as an ideal for action, but positively opposed to moral
+striving. "It supervenes, not as a power active in its own satisfaction,
+but to make us realize the unsatisfactoriness of such seeming
+satisfactions as we may happen to get, and to keep us striving for
+something which we can never get!"[99] The most that can be made of
+Green's moral ideal is to conceive it as the bare form of unity in
+conduct. Employed as a tool of analysis, as a moral rule, it might tell
+us, "Whatever the situation, seek for its unity." But it can scarcely go
+even as far as this in the direction of concreteness, for it says: "_No_
+unity can be found in the situation because the situation is particular,
+and therefore set over against the unity."[100]
+
+Most students of Green would undoubtedly say that this account of his
+moral theory is entirely one-sided, and fails to reckon with certain
+elements which should properly be taken into account. In the first
+place, Green is defining the moral agent as he finds him, and is
+reporting what seems to him a fact when he says that the moral ideal is
+too high to be realized in this life. Having a spiritual nature, man
+fails to find satisfaction in the goods of natural life. Dewey should
+address himself to the facts in refuting Green's analysis of human
+nature. In the second place, with respect to Green's separation of the
+self as unity from the self as a manifold of desires, Dewey's criticism
+may be flatly rejected. Green raises the question himself: "'Do you
+mean,' it may be asked, 'to assert the existence of a mysterious
+abstract entity which you call the self of a man, apart from all his
+particular feelings, desires, and thoughts--all the experience of his
+inner life?'"[101] Green takes time to state his position as clearly as
+possible. He repudiates the idea of an abstract self apart from desire.
+The following passage is typical of his remarks: "Just as we hold that
+our desires, feelings, and thoughts would not be what they are--would
+not be those of a man--if not related to a subject which distinguishes
+itself from each and all of them; so we hold that this subject would not
+be what it is, if it were not related to the particular feelings,
+desires, and thoughts, which it thus distinguishes from and presents to
+itself."[102] It will be remembered also, that in moral action the agent
+identifies himself with his desires, or adopts them as his own, and the
+ability to do this is the chief mark of human intelligence. But man
+could not identify himself with his desires, or 'specify himself in
+them,' as Dewey says, did he not at the same time have the capacity to
+differentiate himself from them.
+
+Dewey's further remarks on Green's ideal need not be followed in detail,
+since they rest upon a misapprehension of Green's purpose, and add
+little to what he has already said. Taking the moral ideal as something
+that can never be realized in this life, Dewey inquires what use can be
+made of it. He considers three modes in which Green might have given
+content to the ideal, as a working principle, and finds that it cannot
+be made, in any of these ways, to serve as a tool of analysis. Green was
+not prepared to meet these 'pragmatic' requirements. He did not propose
+his ideal as a principle of conduct, in Dewey's sense; he stated that,
+as a matter of fact, man is more than natural, and that, as such a
+being, his ideals can never be completely met by natural objects. How
+man is to act, in view of his spiritual nature, is a further question:
+but the realization which the individual has of his own spiritual nature
+must of necessity be a large factor in the determination of his conduct.
+The 'Spiritual Nature,' in Green's terminology, meant a 'not-natural'
+nature, and 'not-natural' in turn meant a nature that is not definable
+in mechanical or biological terms. Dewey's criticism, therefore, went
+wide of the mark.
+
+In November, 1893, Dewey followed his criticism of Green's moral motive
+by a second article in the _Philosophical Review_ on "Self-realization
+as the Moral Ideal."[103] It continues the criticism which has already
+been made of Green, but from a different point of departure.
+
+The idea of self-realization in ethics, Dewey begins, may be helpful or
+harmful according to the way in which the ideas of the self and its
+realization are worked out in the concrete. The mere idea of a self to
+be realized is, of course, abstract; it is merely the statement of a
+problem, which needs to be worked out and given content. By way of
+introducing his own idea of self-realization, Dewey proposes to
+criticize a certain conception of the self which he finds in current
+discussion. "The notion which I wish to criticize," he says, "is that of
+the self as a presupposed fixed _schema_ or outline, while realization
+consists in the filling up of this _schema_. The notion which I would
+suggest as substitute is that of the self as always a concrete
+_specific_ activity; and, therefore, (to anticipate) of the identity of
+self and realization."[104] Such a presupposed fixed self is to be found
+in Green's "Eternally complete Consciousness."
+
+The idea of self-realization implies capacities or possibilities. To
+translate capacity into actuality, as the conception of the fixed self
+seems to do, is to vitiate the whole idea of possibility. There must,
+then, be some conception of unrealized powers which will meet this
+difficulty. The way to a valid conception is through the realization
+that capacities are always specific. "The capacities of a child, for
+example, are not simply of _a_ child, not of a man, but of _this_ child,
+not of any other."[105] Whatever else capacity may be, whether infinite
+or not, it must be an element in an actual situation. As specific
+things, moreover, capacities reside in activities, which are now going
+on. The capacity of a child to become a musician consists in this fact:
+"Even _now_ he has a certain quickness, vividness, and plasticity of
+vision, a certain deftness of hand, and a certain motor coordination by
+which his hand is stimulated to work in harmony with his eye."[106]
+
+How do these specific, actual activities come to be called capacities?
+There is a peculiar psychological reason for this which James has
+pointed out, in his statement that essence "is that _which is so
+important for my interests_ that, comparatively, other properties may be
+omitted."[107] When we pay attention to any activity, there is a natural
+tendency to select only that portion of it that is of immediate
+interest, and to exclude the rest as irrelevant. "In the act of vision,
+for example," Dewey tells us, "the thing that seems nearest us, that
+which claims continuously our attention, is the eye itself. We thus come
+to abstract the eye from all special acts of seeing; we make the eye the
+_essential_ thing in sight, and conceive of the circumstances of vision
+as indeed _circumstances_; as more or less accidental concomitants of
+the permanent eye."[108] There is no eye in general; the eye is always
+given along with other circumstances which in their totality make up a
+concrete seeing situation. Nevertheless, we abstract the eye from other
+circumstances and set it up as the essence of seeing. But we cannot
+retain the eye in absolute abstraction, because the concrete
+circumstances of vision force themselves upon the attention. So we lump
+these together on the other side as a new object, and take as their
+essence the vibrations of ether. "_The eye now becomes the capacity of
+seeing; the vibrations of ether, conditions required for the exercise of
+the capacity._"[109] We keep the two abstractions, but try to restore
+the unity of the situation through taking one as capacity and the other
+as the condition of the exercise of capacity.
+
+But we cannot stop even with this double abstraction. "The eye in
+general and the vibrations in general do not, even in their unity,
+constitute the act of vision. A multitude of other factors are
+included."[110] Preserving the original 'core' as capacity, we tend to
+treat all the attendant circumstances which occur frequently enough to
+require taking account of, as conditions which help realize the
+abstracted reality called capacity.
+
+The discussion here is very much like that in "The Superstition of
+Necessity" (published in the same year), which was reviewed in the last
+chapter. Dewey calls attention to this connection in a foot-note,
+remarking that he has already developed at greater length "the idea that
+necessity and possibility are simply the two correlative abstractions
+into which the one reality falls apart during the process of our
+conscious apprehension of it."[111] The danger, Dewey says, is that the
+merely relative character of a given capacity may be overlooked, and
+that it may be ontologized into a fixed entity. This is the error, he
+thinks, into which Green fell. The ideal self, as that which capacity
+may realize, is ontologized into an already existent fact. Then we get a
+separation between the present self, as capacity, and the ideal self
+which is to be realized. The self already realized is opposed to the
+self as yet ideal. "This 'realized self' is no reality by itself; it is
+simply our partial conception of the self erected into an entity.
+Recognizing its incomplete character, we bring in what we have left out
+and call it the 'ideal self.' Then by way of dealing with the fact that
+we have not two selves here at all, but simply a less and a more
+adequate insight into the same self, we insert the idea of one of these
+selves realizing the other."[112] It is in this manner that error
+arises.
+
+But what is the correct attitude toward the self? First of all, the self
+must be conceived as "a working, practical self, carrying within the
+rhythm of its own process both 'realized' and 'ideal' self. The current
+ethics of the self ... are too apt to stop with a metaphysical
+definition, which seems to solve problems in general, but at the expense
+of the practical problems which alone really demand or admit
+solution."[113] The first point of the argument is that the self
+activity is individual, concrete, and specific, here and now, and the
+second point is that if the self is to be talked of in an intelligent
+way it must be taken as something empirically given. "The whole point is
+expressed when we say that no possible future activities or conditions
+have anything to do with the present action except as they enable us to
+take deeper account of the present activity, to get beyond the mere
+superficies of the act, to see it in its totality."[114] The phrase,
+'realize yourself,' is a direction for knowledge; it means, see the
+wider consequences of your act, realize its wider bearings.
+
+Dewey says: "The fixed ideal is as distinctly the bane of ethical
+science today as the fixed universe of mediaevalism was the bane of the
+natural science of the Renascence."[115] This is a strong statement,
+which indicates how wide was the gulf which now separated Dewey from
+Green, whom he formerly acknowledged as his master.
+
+Dewey's interpretation of Green's ideal self is far from satisfactory,
+largely because of its lack of insight and appreciation. The reduction
+of thought to a 'form of activity' renders a purely theoretical inquiry
+impossible. The 'present activity,' the biological situation, becomes
+the measure of all things, even of thought. Ideals, in his own words,
+have nothing to do with present action, "except as they enable us to
+take deeper account of the present activity." Dewey's self and Green's
+are incommensurable. The former is the biological organism, with a
+capacity for indirect activity called thinking; the latter is a
+not-natural being, whose reality escapes the logic of descriptive
+science, because of the fulness of its content. Dewey's failure to
+understand this difference is significant. His acquaintance with Green
+seems to have been formal from the beginning, never intimate, and the
+articles just reviewed mark the end of Dewey's idealistic discipleship.
+His psychological idealism, in fact, was fundamentally antithetical to
+the Neo-Hegelianism which he had sought to espouse, and the development
+of his own standpoint brought out the vital differences which had been
+hidden from his earlier understanding. The idealism which seeks to view
+reality together and as a whole is forever incompatible with a method
+which seeks to interpret the whole in terms of one of its parts.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[75] Vol. I, pp. 186-203.
+
+[76] _Ibid._, p. 186.
+
+[77] _Ibid._
+
+[78] _Op. cit._, p. 187.
+
+[79] _Ibid._, p. 188.
+
+[80] _Ibid._
+
+[81] _Ibid._, p. 191 f.
+
+[82] _Op. cit._, p. 189.
+
+[83] _Ibid._, p. 194. Author's Italics.
+
+[84] _Ibid._
+
+[85] _Op. cit._, p. 195.
+
+[86] _Ibid._, p. 198.
+
+[87] _Op. cit._
+
+[88] _Ibid._, p. 202.
+
+[89] _Ibid._, p. 203.
+
+[90] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. I, 1892, pp. 593-612.
+
+[91] _Op. cit._, p. 596.
+
+[92] _Ibid._, p. 597.
+
+[93] _History of Philosophy_, p. 555.
+
+[94] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. I, 1892, p. 598.
+
+[95] _Ibid._
+
+[96] _Ibid._, p. 599.
+
+[97] _Ibid._ Compare with the passage in "Psychology as Philosophic
+Method," _Mind_, Vol. XI, p. 9.
+
+[98] _Op. cit._, p. 600.
+
+[99] _Ibid._, p. 601.
+
+[100] _Ibid._, p. 602.
+
+[101] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, third ed., p. 103.
+
+[102] _Ibid._, p. 104.
+
+[103] Vol. II, pp. 652-664.
+
+[104] _Ibid._, p. 653.
+
+[105] _Ibid._, p. 655.
+
+[106] _Op. cit._, p. 656.
+
+[107] _Ibid._, p. 657.
+
+[108] _Ibid._
+
+[109] _Ibid._, p. 658. Author's italics.
+
+[110] _Ibid._
+
+[111] _Op. cit._, note.
+
+[112] _Ibid._, p. 663.
+
+[113] _Ibid._
+
+[114] _Op. cit._, p. 659.
+
+[115] _Ibid._, p. 664.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
+
+
+It now becomes necessary to review that period of Dewey's philosophical
+career which is marked by the definite abandonment of the idealistic
+standpoint, and the adoption of the method of instrumental pragmatism.
+It has already been seen that there is a close connection between the
+"functionalism" which now begins to appear, and the "Psychological
+Standpoint" set forth in the preceding pages of this review. It is not
+possible, however, to account for all the elements which contribute to
+this development. Dewey was active in many fields and received
+suggestions from many sources. It seems best, in dealing with this
+period, to "follow the lead of the subject-matter" and avoid _a priori_
+speculation on the factors which determined the precise form of Dewey's
+mature standpoint in philosophy.
+
+Dewey had always kept in mind the idea that the synthetic activity
+whereby self-consciousness evolves the ideality of the world must
+operate through the human organism. He had frequently referred to
+Green's saying that the Eternal Self-Consciousness reproduces itself in
+man, and to similar notions in Caird and Kant; but he had never
+considered, in a detailed way, how the organism might serve as the
+vehicle for such a process. His ethical theory, with its analysis of
+individuality into capacity and environment, tended to bring the
+body-world relationship into the foreground, and the idea that theory is
+relative to action tended to emphasize still more the relation of
+thought to the bodily processes. Dewey finally discovers the basis upon
+which the synthetic activity of the self, the thought process, may be
+described empirically and concretely.
+Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the key-stone of his theory
+of knowledge. Thought is interpreted as a function of the organism,
+biologically considered, and the biological psychology which results
+from this mode of interpretation is commonly known as 'functional
+psychology.'
+
+The functional psychology is presented in a series of articles in the
+_Philosophical Review_ and the _Psychological Review_, published between
+1894 and 1898. The most important of these is "The Reflex Arc Concept in
+Psychology," published in the _Psychological Review_ in 1896.[116] Since
+it is the only article in the series which gives a complete view of the
+theory, it will be made the basis for the discussion of the functional
+theory of psychology.
+
+The reflex arc concept in psychology, Dewey says, recognizes that the
+sensory-motor arc is to be taken as the unit of nerve structure, and the
+type of nerve function. But psychologists do not avail themselves of the
+full value of this conception, because they still retain in connection
+with it certain distinctions which were used in the older psychology.
+"The older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the current
+dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions; the older
+dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism of
+stimulus and response."[117] These rigid distinctions must be set aside,
+and the separated elements must be viewed as elements in one
+sensory-motor coordination. Each is to be defined, not as something
+existing by itself, but as an element functioning in a concrete whole of
+activity. Thus, if we are to study vision, we must first take vision as
+a sensory-motor coordination, the act of seeing, and within the whole we
+may then be able to distinguish certain elements, sensations, or
+movements, and define them according to their function in the total act
+of seeing. The reflex arc idea, as commonly employed, takes sensation as
+stimulus, and movement as response, as if they were actually separate
+existences, apart from a coordination. Response is said to follow
+sensation, but it is forgotten that the sensation which preceded was
+correlated with a response, and that the response which follows is also
+correlated with sensation. Sound, for instance, is not a mere sensation
+in itself, apart from sensory-motor coordination. Hearing is an act, and
+while sound may, for purposes of study, be abstracted from the total, it
+is not, in itself, independent of the total act of hearing.
+
+"But, in spite of all this, it will be urged, there is a distinction
+between stimulus and response, between sensation and motion. Precisely;
+but we ought now to be in a condition to ask of what nature is the
+distinction, instead of taking it for granted as a distinction somehow
+lying in the existence of the facts themselves."[118] The distinction
+which is to be made between them must be made on a teleological basis.
+"The fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of
+existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of
+function, or part played, with reference to reaching or maintaining an
+end."[119] There are two kinds of teleological distinction that can be
+made between stimulus and response, or rather, the teleological
+interpretation has two phases.
+
+In the first place, it may be assumed that all of man's activity
+furthers some general end, as, for instance, the maintenance of life.
+Then man's activity may be viewed as a sequence of acts, which tend to
+further this end, and on this basis we may separate out stimulus and
+response. "It is only when we regard the sequence of acts _as if_ they
+were adapted to reach some end that it occurs to us to speak of one as
+stimulus and the other as response. Otherwise, we look at them as a
+_mere_ series."[120] In these cases the stimulus is as truly an act as
+the response, and what we have is a series of sensory-motor
+coordinations. Looking, for instance, is a sensory-motor coordination
+which is the stimulus or antecedent of another coordinated act, running
+away. The first coordination passes into the second, and the second may
+be viewed as a modification or reconstitution of the first.
+
+But this external teleological distinction between sensation and
+response is not so important as the distinction now to be made. So far
+only fixed coordinations, habitual modes of action, have been
+considered. But there are situations in which habitual responses and
+fixed modes of action fail: situations in which new habits are formed.
+In these situations there arises a special distinction between stimulus
+and response, for in these formative situations the stimuli and
+responses are consciously present in experience as such. "The circle is
+a coordination, some of whose members have come into conflict with each
+other. It is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution
+which occasions, which affords the genesis of, the conscious distinction
+into sensory stimulus on one side and motor response on the other."[121]
+The distinction which arises between stimulus and response is a
+distinction of function within the problematical situation. Suppose that
+a sound is heard, the character of which is uncertain, and which, as a
+coordination, does not readily pass into its following coordination, or
+habitual response. The sound is puzzling, and moves into the center of
+attention. It is fixed upon, abstracted, studied on its own account. In
+that event, the sound may be spoken of as a sensation. As a sensation,
+it is the datum of a reflective process of thought, or conscious
+inference, whose aim is to constitute the sound a stimulus, or, in other
+words, to find what response belongs to it. When this response is
+determined the problem is done with and sensory-motor unity is achieved.
+
+The stimulus, in these cases, is simply "that phase of activity
+requiring to be defined in order that a coordination may be
+completed."[122] It is not any particular existence, and is not to be
+taken as an element apart from others, having an independent existence.
+But the conscious process of attending to the sensation and finding a
+response to it arises only when coordination is disturbed by conflicting
+factors, and the separation of stimulus from response arises only as a
+means for bringing unity into the coordination. The sensation, then, is
+that element which is to be attended to; upon which further response
+depends. This phase of the teleological interpretation defines each
+element by the part which it plays in the reflective process.
+
+If this brief summary of the article is difficult to comprehend, a
+reading of the original text will do little towards making it more
+intelligible. The doctrine presented there, however, is simple and
+coherent enough when its bearings and purpose are once understood, and,
+at the risk of being over-elaborate, it seems advisable to attempt some
+remarks on the general bearing and applications of the theory.
+
+It must be remembered that Dewey is seeking an interpretation of the
+thought process which shall reveal it as an actual fact of experience. A
+thought which is apart from experience and not _in_ it, which is shut up
+to the contemplation of its own mental states is, by its definition,
+non-experienced. It is, like Kant's 'productive imagination,' formative
+of experience, but not a part of it. Dewey holds to the belief that
+experience must be explained in terms of itself; he would do away with
+all transcendental factors in the explanation of reality. But modern
+psychological theory, Dewey believes, tends to shut thought in to the
+contemplation of its own subjective states, and thus gives it an
+extra-experiential status. A stimulus is said to strike upon an end
+organ, which sends an impulse to the cortex and there gives rise to a
+sensation which, as the effect of a stimulus, is representative of the
+real, but not real in itself. Thought, again, interprets the sensation,
+and sends out a motor impulse appropriate to the situation. These mental
+states and the thought which interprets them are, in Dewey's mind,
+wholly fictitious. The problem, then, is to give an account of the
+perceptual processes which shall eliminate the artificial states of mind
+and present mental operations as natural processes.
+
+The difficulty with customary psychological explanation is that it
+breaks the reflex arc of the nervous system into three parts whose
+relations are successive and causal rather than simultaneous and
+organic. There is not first a stimulus, then perception, then response;
+these processes are supplementary, not separate. Or, from another point
+of view, psychological explanation must begin with a whole process
+which, when analyzed, is seen to contain the three moments or phases:
+stimulus, sensation, and response. The whole process is primary and
+actual, the abstracted phases are secondary and derivative.
+
+With the disappearance of the mechanical interpretation of the
+perceptual process, mental states vanish. Representative perceptionism
+is thus done away with, together with all the problems which it
+generates.
+
+The position of conscious, or reflective thought, in Dewey's scheme, is
+especially interesting. This mode of thought is not constantly
+operative, but arises only in situations of stress and strain, when
+habitual modes of response break down. A dualism is established between
+reflective thought and the habitual life processes. Dewey does not take
+the ground that these processes are supplementary, as he had done in the
+case of stimulus, sensation, and response. It will be remembered that
+Dewey had defined judgment, in his logical and ethical writings of an
+earlier period, as a special activity operating in critical situations.
+This conception of judgment is now carried over into his psychology, and
+given a biological basis. It is worth noting that this view of judgment
+was worked out in logical terms before it was reinforced by biological
+data. Nevertheless, it is through biology that Dewey is able to give his
+interpretation of the thought process that empirical concreteness which
+he demanded from the beginning, but achieved very slowly.
+
+The value of the functional psychology, considered merely as psychology,
+is undeniable. It is, in fact, a natural and almost inevitable step in
+the development of psychological theory. Dewey's achievement consists in
+the establishment of an organic mode of interpretation in psychology,
+intended to displace the mechanical interpretation. The mechanical
+causal series is displaced by an organic system of internally related
+parts. Dewey, however, does not display any interest in the logical
+aspects of his doctrine. He takes the biological situation literally, as
+a fact empirically given, and to be accepted without criticism.
+
+A discussion of the period now under consideration would not be complete
+without reference to certain articles which supplement the essay
+discussed above. The first of these is an article on "The Psychology of
+Effort," published in the _Philosophical Review_ in 1897.[123]
+
+It is not proposed to follow the argument of this article in detail, but
+to center attention upon those parts of it, especially the concluding
+pages, which have a special interest in connection with the subject
+under discussion. Dewey returns, in this article, to the situation of
+effort at adjustment; to the situation in which an effort is made to
+determine the proper response to a stimulus. The opening pages are
+devoted, in the first place, to a discussion of the distinction between
+conscious effort and the mere expenditure of energy or effort as it
+appears to an outsider, and, in the second place, to maintaining, by
+means of examples, the proposition that the sense of effort is
+sensationally mediated. "How then does, say, a case of perception with
+effort differ from a case of 'easy' or effortless perception? The
+difference, I repeat, shall be wholly in sensory quale; but in _what_
+sensory quale?"[124]
+
+The conscious sense of effort arises, Dewey answers, when there is a
+rivalry or conflict between two sensational elements in experience. "In
+the case of felt effort, certain sensory quales, usually fused, fall
+apart in consciousness, and there is an alternation, an oscillation,
+between them, accompanied by a disagreeable tone when they are apart,
+and an agreeable tone when they become fused again."[125] These two sets
+of sensory elements have each a significance in terms of adjustment; one
+of them is a correlate of a habit, or fixed mode of response, and the
+other is an intruder which resists absorption into, or fusion with, the
+dominant images of the current habit or purpose. The same idea of a
+natural tendency to persist in a habitual mode of regarding things was
+met with in the last two chapters, and is qualified here by the addition
+of the idea that each sensory element represents a typical mode of
+response on the part of the organism. Dewey illustrates his notion by
+the case of learning to ride a bicycle. "Before one mounts one has
+perhaps a pretty definite visual image of himself in balance and in
+motion. This image persists as a desirability. On the other hand, there
+comes into play at once the consciousness of the familiar motor
+adjustments,--for the most part, related to walking. The two sets of
+sensations refuse to coincide, and the result is an amount of stress and
+strain relevant to the most serious problems of the universe."[126] In
+another passage, which brings out even more clearly the rivalry of the
+two sets of sensations, he says: "It means that the activity already
+going on (and, therefore, reporting itself sensationally) resists
+displacement, or transformation, by or into another activity which is
+beginning, and thus making its sensational report."[127]
+
+The sense of effort, then, reduces itself to an awareness of conflict
+between two sensational elements and their motor correlates.
+"Practically stated, this means that effort is nothing more, and also
+nothing less, than tension between means and ends in action, and that
+the sense of effort is the awareness of this conflict."[128]
+
+The important aspect of Dewey's argument, for the present discussion, is
+that awareness reduces to these sensational elements and their
+attributes. Throughout the article Dewey is opposing his sensational
+view of the sense of effort to what he calls the 'spiritual' or
+non-sensational view, which supposes that the sense of effort is
+something purely psychical, which accompanies the expenditure of
+physical energy. The consciousness of effort, Dewey says, is not
+something added to the effort, but is itself a certain condition
+existing in the sensory quales.
+
+This provision would make it necessary to identify consciousness, and,
+therefore, conscious inference, with the tensional situation which has
+been described. This being granted, all that pertains to conscious
+inference, all the methods and categories of science, would be
+applicable only in such situations of stress and strain; they would
+appear simply as instruments for effecting a readjustment; they would be
+employed exclusively in the interests of action. This is the direction
+in which Dewey is tending. No criticism of this treatment of judgment
+need be made at this time, beyond pointing out that it presents itself,
+at first sight, as an awkward and indirect mode of describing the
+relations between organic activity and intelligence, and between
+psychology and logic.
+
+Nothing has so far been said of the historical sources of Dewey's
+theory, and these may be briefly considered. There are at least two
+sources which must be taken into account: the James-Lange theory of the
+emotions, and the Neo-Hegelian ethical theory. The latter has already
+been considered to some extent, as it manifests itself in Dewey's own
+ethical theory, but its relation to his psychology has not been
+indicated. In his text-book, the _Outlines of a Critical Theory of
+Ethics_ (1891), Dewey advanced certain ideas for which he claimed
+originality, at least in treatment. Among these was the analysis of
+individuality into function including capacity and environment.[129]
+
+Bradley appears to have been the first among English philosophers to
+introduce that synthesis of the internal and external, of the
+intuitional and utilitarian modes of judging conduct, which became
+characteristic of Neo-Hegelian ethics. The synthesis, of course, is
+Hegelian in temper, and the _Ethical Studies_ are much more suggestive,
+in general method, of the _Philosophie des Rechts_ than of any previous
+English work. Utilitarianism tended to judge the moral act by its
+external, _de facto_ results; intuitionism, on the contrary, attributed
+morality to the will of the agent. The former found morality to consist
+in a certain state of affairs, the latter in a certain internal
+attitude. According to the synthetic point of view, these opposed
+ethical systems are one-sided representations of the moral situation,
+each being true in its own way. To state the matter in another form, the
+moral act has a content as well as a purpose. "Let us explain," says
+Bradley. "The moral world, as we said, is a whole, and has two sides.
+There is an outer side, systems and institutions, from the family to the
+nation; this we may call the body of the moral world. And there must
+also be a soul, or else the body goes to pieces; every one knows that
+institutions without the spirit of them are dead.... We must never let
+this out of our sight, that, where the moral world exists, you have and
+you must have these two sides."[130] Dewey expresses the same idea in a
+more detailed fashion. "What do we mean by individuality? We may
+distinguish two factors--or better two aspects, two sides--in
+individuality. On one side it means special disposition, temperament,
+gifts, bent, or inclination; on the other side it means special station,
+situation, limitations, surroundings, opportunities, etc. Or, let us
+say, it means _specific capacity_ and _specific environment_. Each of
+these elements apart from the other, is a bare abstraction, and without
+reality. Nor is it strictly correct to say that individuality is
+contributed by these two factors _together_. It is, rather, as intimated
+above, that each is individuality looked at from a certain point of
+view, from within and from without."[131] It is a fact, empirically
+demonstrable, according to Dewey, that body and object, intention and
+foreseen consequence, interest and environment, attitude and
+objectivity, are parts of one another and of the whole moral situation.
+Each is relative to the other. "It is not, then, the environment as
+physical of which we are speaking, but as it appears to consciousness,
+as it is affected by the make-up of the agent. This is the _practical_
+or _moral_ environment."[132] When this relation of the inner to the
+outer is taken literally and universally, we have the essence of the
+functional psychology. Organism-in-relation-to-environment becomes the
+catch-word of instrumental pragmatism.
+
+The other source of Dewey's psychology, which is now to be considered,
+is the James-Lange theory of the emotions. The connection here is more
+obvious, but perhaps not so vital, as in the case of the ethical theory.
+From the numerous references which Dewey made to James's _Principles of
+Psychology_ (1890), it is evident that he was much impressed with this
+work. The theory of emotion there presented seems to have had a special
+interest for him; so much so that he made it the subject of two articles
+in the _Psychological Review_, in 1894 and 1895, under the general
+title, "The Theory of Emotion."[133] These studies bear a very close
+relation to the article on "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology"
+(1896), the standpoint being essentially the same, although developed in
+reference to a technical problem. Some indications may be given here of
+the relationships which they bear to the James-Lange theory on the one
+side, and functional psychology on the other. The James-Lange theory is
+itself concerned with order and connection between emotional states,
+perceptions, and responses. James says: "Our natural way of thinking
+about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact
+excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter
+state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the
+contrary, is that _the bodily changes follow directly the perception of
+the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they
+occur IS the emotion_."[134] It is all a question, James says, of the
+order and sequence of these elements, and his contention is that the
+bodily changes should be interposed between the two mental states. This
+is the question with which Dewey's functional psychology is also
+concerned, the relation of response to stimulus, and the manner in which
+a stimulus is determined by a reaction 'into it.' Dewey's theory rises
+so naturally out of James's theory of the emotions as to seem but little
+more than its universal application.
+
+This connection is revealed in several passages in Dewey's study of the
+emotions. It is said, for instance, that the emotional situation must be
+taken as a whole, as a state, for instance, of 'being angry.' The
+several constituents of the state of anger, idea or object, affect or
+emotion, and mode of expression or behavior, are not to be taken
+separately, but all together as elements in one whole.[135] Another
+characteristic doctrine appears in the affirmation that the emotional
+attitude is to be distinguished from other attitudes by certain special
+features which it possesses. Particularly, it involves a special
+relation of stimulus to response.[136] Again, there is a tendency to
+translate meaning in terms of projected activity. "The consciousness of
+our mode of behavior as affording data for other possible actions
+constitutes an objective or ideal content."[137]
+
+It is enough, perhaps, to reveal these two sources as probable factors
+in the development of Dewey's psychological method. No speculation upon
+them is necessary. At most, they were merely contributory to Dewey's
+thought, and by fitting in with his previous ideas enabled him to give a
+more concrete presentation of his psychological theory than would
+otherwise have been possible.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[116] Vol. III, pp. 357-370.
+
+[117] _Ibid._, p. 357.
+
+[118] _Op. cit._, p. 365.
+
+[119] _Ibid._
+
+[120] _Ibid._, p. 366, note.
+
+[121] _Op. cit._, p. 370.
+
+[122] _Ibid._, p. 368.
+
+[123] Vol. VI, pp. 43-56.
+
+[124] _Op. cit._, p. 46.
+
+[125] _Ibid._, p. 48.
+
+[126] _Op. cit._, p. 50.
+
+[127] _Ibid._, p. 52.
+
+[128] _Ibid._, p. 51.
+
+[129] _Op. cit._, p. viii.
+
+[130] _Ethical Studies_, p. 160 f.
+
+[131] _Outlines of Ethics_, p. 97.
+
+[132] _Ibid._, p. 99.
+
+[133] Vol. I, pp. 553-569; Vol. II, pp. 13-32.
+
+[134] _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, p. 449.
+
+[135] _Psy. Rev._, Vol. II, p. 15 f.
+
+[136] _Ibid._, p. 24 f.
+
+[137] _Ibid._, p. 24.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE EVOLUTIONARY STANDPOINT
+
+
+Dewey's psychology is linked up with his logical theory, as has already
+been suggested, through the interpretation of the thought-process as a
+mode of adjustment involving inference. This conception of thought
+implies, of course, that thought is an instrument of adaptation, and
+this in turn suggests that the organ of reflection is a product of
+evolutionary forces operating on the individual and on the race. In the
+period now to be reviewed Dewey, for the first time in his career,
+displays an active and intense interest in evolutionary theory,
+especially as applied in the fields of ethics and psychology.
+
+An article published in the _Monist_, in 1898, on "Evolution and
+Ethics,"[138] deserves special attention. The central thought of the
+article is to be found in the following passage: "The belief that
+natural selection has ceased to operate [in the human sphere] rests upon
+the assumption that there is only one form of such selection: that where
+improvement is indirectly effected by the failure of species of a
+certain type to continue to reproduce; carrying with it as its
+correlative that certain variations continue to multiply, and finally
+come to possess the land. This ordeal by death is an extremely important
+phase of natural selection, so called.... However, to identify this
+procedure absolutely with selection, seems to me to indicate a somewhat
+gross and narrow vision. Not only is one form of life as a whole
+selected at the expense of other forms, _but one mode of action in the
+same individual is constantly selected at the expense of others_. There
+is not only the trial by death, but there is the trial by the success or
+failure of special acts--the counterpart, I suppose, of physiological
+selection so called."[139] We have here a refinement upon the doctrine
+of natural selection. The keynote of Dewey's new psychology is a
+process of selection constantly occurring within the individual
+organism. He points out that, in dealing with man, we have a highly
+adaptable, not merely a highly adapted animal. "It is certainly implied
+in the idea of natural selection that the most effective modes of
+variation should themselves be finally selected."[140] The capacity to
+vary, or adapt, is highly developed in man. Through these variations,
+the organism is able to react against the environment, changing its
+character quite completely. The environment of the modern human is
+tremendously complicated by his reaction upon it. "The growth of
+science, its application in invention to industrial life, the
+multiplication and acceleration of means of transportation and
+intercommunication, have created a peculiarly unstable
+environment."[141] Under these conditions, the ability of the individual
+to adapt himself to changing circumstances is largely determined by his
+degree of flexibility in the selection of right acts and responses. "In
+the present environment, flexibility of function, the enlargement of the
+range of uses to which one and the same organ, grossly considered, may
+be put, is a great, almost the supreme, condition of success."[142] The
+human mind is to be interpreted as a highly developed organ whose
+special function is to make adaptation more flexible and response more
+varied and discriminating. "That which was 'tendency to vary' in the
+animal is conscious foresight in man. That which was unconscious
+adaptation and survival in the animal, taking place by the 'cut and try'
+method until it worked itself out, is with man conscious deliberation
+and experimentation."[143]
+
+This view of consciousness is worked out on the basis of an evolutionary
+metaphysics. Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the changing
+whirl of things, stimulated into action by his needs and wants, adapting
+himself to conditions, making the situation over, or meeting it
+habitually where he can and suffering the consequences where he cannot
+make the necessary adjustment. If this be taken, as would seem, for the
+ultimate truth about reality and man's place in it, it must be called a
+metaphysics. Against this background Dewey's logical theory is
+developed. The most important result, from the standpoint of the student
+of mind and spirit, is the reduction of self-conscious reflection to the
+position of a nervous function of the organism. The purely theoretical
+evidence by which this position is sustained should be subjected to
+closer scrutiny than can be undertaken in this limited space.
+
+The purpose of reflection, then, is to enable man to adapt himself to
+his environment, understanding by the environment the whole of the
+reality which surrounds him. The test of the mind and its newly
+projected modes of response [ideas] lies in its ability to meet the
+demands of the situation. The capacities and limits of mind are
+determined by the purpose for which it was evolved; it can enable a man
+to deal more effectively with his environment; it can do nothing else.
+It cannot speculate on the nature of reality as such, nor voyage on long
+journeys in search of truth! Its business is practical, here and now.
+Its problems are always set for it by circumstances, and these
+circumstances are concrete and specific. There is no such thing as
+adaptation at large or in general.
+
+The business of mind is to have, and to continually reconstruct, useful
+habits. So Dewey assures the American Psychological Association in 1899,
+in an address on "Psychology and Social Practice."[144] We must
+recognize, he says, "that the existing order is determined neither by
+fate nor by chance, but is based on law and order, on a system of
+existing stimuli and modes of reaction, through knowledge of which we
+can modify the practical outcome."[145] Psychology uninterpreted, he
+says, will never provide ready-made materials and prescriptions for the
+ethical life. "But science, both physical and psychological, makes known
+the conditions upon which certain results depend, and therefore puts at
+the disposal of life a certain method of controlling them."[146] These
+statements show the extent to which Dewey's view of knowledge has come
+to be controlled by biological conceptions.
+
+The evolutionary method is investigated in considerable detail in the
+next article to be considered, which was published in two parts in the
+_Philosophical Review_, 1902, under the title, "The Evolutionary Method
+as Applied to Morality."[147]
+
+The fact that some philosophers deny the importance of the evolutionary
+method for ethics, holding that morality is purely a matter of value,
+and that the evolutionary method tends only to obscure differences of
+value, makes it necessary to inquire into the import and nature of this
+method. "Anyway," Dewey says, "before we either abuse or recommend
+genetic method we ought to have some answers to these questions: Just
+what is it? Just what is to come of it and how?"[148]
+
+The experimental method in science has at least some of the traits of a
+genetic method. The nature of water, for instance, cannot be determined
+by simply observing it. But experiment brings to light the exact
+conditions under which it came into being and therefore explains it.
+"Through generating water we single out the precise and sole conditions
+which have to be fulfilled that water may present itself as an
+experienced fact. If this case be typical, then the experimental method
+is entitled to rank as genetic method; it is concerned with the manner
+or process by which anything comes into experienced existence."[149]
+
+Some would deny this, on the ground that a genuinely historical event
+occupies a particular place in a historical series, from which it is
+inseparable, while in experimental science the sets or pairs of terms
+are not limited to any particular place in a historical series, but
+occur and recur. "Water is made over and over again, and, so to speak,
+at any date in the cosmic series. This deprives any account of it of
+genuinely historic quality."[150] Again, it might be said in opposition
+to treating the experimental method as a genetic method, that it is
+interested in individual cases not as such, but as samples or instances.
+The particular case is only an illustration of the general relation
+which is being sought.
+
+It will turn out in the course of the discussion, Dewey says, that,
+although science deals with origins, it is not, in strictness, a
+historical discipline. The distinction between the historical and other
+sciences is based on an abstraction, which has been introduced for the
+sake of more adequate control. It is only by abstraction that we get the
+pairs of facts that may show up at any time, and by abstraction we
+attribute to them a generalized character. The facts, in themselves, are
+historic.
+
+There is no such thing as water in general, but water is just this
+water, at this time, in this place, and it never shows itself twice,
+never recurs. The scientist must deal, therefore, with particular
+historic cases of water, and with their specific origins. "Experiment
+has to do with the conditions of production of a specific amount of
+water, at a specific time and place, under specific circumstances: in a
+word, it must deal with just _this_ water. The conditions which define
+its origin must be stated with equal definiteness and
+circumstantiality."[151] The instance has as definite a place in an
+historical series as has Julius Caesar. But the difference in treatment
+of the water and Caesar is due to the difference in interest. "Julius
+Caesar served a purpose which no other individual, at any other time,
+could have served. There is a peculiar flavor of human meaning and
+accomplishment about him which has no substitute or equivalent. Not so
+with water. While each portion is absolutely unique in its occurrence,
+yet one lot will serve our intellectual or practical needs just as well
+as any other."[152] For this reason the specific case of water is not
+dealt with on its own account, but only as giving insight into the
+processes of its generation in general. In this way the difference
+arises between the generalized statements of physical science and the
+individualized form demanded in historical science. The abstract
+character of the physical result is recognized by the hypothetical form
+of judgment in modern logic; if certain conditions, then certain
+consequences. But the counterpart of this must not be forgotten, that
+every categorical proposition applies to an individual. Experimental
+propositions, therefore, have an historical value. "They take their
+rise in, and they find their application to, a world of unique and
+changing things: an evolutionary universe."[153] The recognition of the
+historical character of experimental science does not in any way
+derogate from its value, but, properly understood, gives a deeper
+insight into its significance. It should be observed that here also
+Dewey treats thought, hypothesis, as coming 'after something, and for
+the sake of something.'
+
+This attempt to justify the historical method by showing that it is
+implied in physical experiment is of dubious value. Its net result would
+seem to be the conclusion that every fact may be dealt with either as a
+historical fact or as a datum for physical science. Even here, however,
+Dewey slurs over certain difficulties which demand close scrutiny. The
+treatment of individuality is most unsatisfactory. While each portion or
+instance of water is itself, and has its own unquestionable uniqueness,
+no case is a mere particular, but each is a true individual, which means
+that it is, as it occurs, an instance of a general phenomenon. While the
+scientist must deal with specific cases of water, he has no regard for
+their particularity, but chooses them as instances, and is from first to
+last occupied with their typical characteristics. The historian, also,
+selects relevant and representative instances, in so far as his history
+is interpretative and not mere narrative.
+
+A merely factual account of a series of events is not science, and never
+could be.
+
+Dewey now turns to the ethical field, with the purpose of showing that
+the historical method in ethics does for this science precisely what the
+experimental method does for other sciences. "History offers to us the
+only available substitute for the isolation and for the cumulative
+recombination of experiment. The early periods present us in their
+relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial
+operation of an experiment: following the phenomenon into the more
+complicated and refined form which it assumes later, is a substitute for
+the synthesis of the experiment."[154] Hydrogen and oxygen are the
+historical antecedents of water, whose synthesis the scientist
+observes, and so the more primitive forms of conduct are the elements
+which the moralist traces in their process of becoming fused into the
+present social fabric. Primitive social practices cannot be artificially
+isolated, like the physical elements, but they can be traced to their
+historical origins, and their interweaving towards present complex
+conditions can be observed.
+
+The historical method is subject to two misunderstandings, Dewey says,
+one by the empiricists and materialists, the other by the idealists. The
+former, having isolated the primitive facts, suppose them to have a
+superior logical and existential value. "The earlier is regarded as
+somehow more 'real' than the later, or as furnishing the quality in
+terms of which the reality of all the later must be stated."[155] The
+later is looked upon as simply a recombination of the earlier
+existences. "Writers who ought to know better tell us that if we only
+had an adequate knowledge of the 'primitive' state of the world, if we
+only had some general formula by which to circumscribe it, we could
+deduce down to its last detail the entire existing constitution of the
+world, life, and society."[156] The primitive elements, however, take on
+new qualities on entering into new combinations. Water is more than
+hydrogen and oxygen. There is a similar process intervening between the
+earlier and the later in the moral field, of which the primitive state
+and the present are merely end terms. Actual study must take account of
+the whole process.
+
+The idealistic fallacy is of the opposite nature. It takes the final
+term of the process to be exclusively real. "The later reality is,
+therefore, to him the persistent reality in contrast with which the
+first forms are, if not illusions, at least poor excuses for being....
+It is enough for present purposes to note that we have here simply a
+particular case of the general fallacy just discussed--the emphasis of a
+particular term of the series at the expense of the process operative in
+reference to all terms."[157] The true reality is the whole process,
+which is represented in empiricism only by the primitive terms, and in
+idealism only by the end terms. Only a historical method can deal with
+it in its entirety.
+
+In summing up the advantages of the historical method, Dewey says that
+it gives a complete account of the origin and development of ethical
+ideas, opinions, beliefs, and practices. "It is concerned with the
+origin and development of these customs and ideas; and with the question
+of their mode of operation after they have arisen. The described
+facts--yes; but among the facts described is precisely certain
+conditions under which various norms, ideals, and rules of action have
+originated and functioned."[158] Dewey finds it irritating that the
+facts thus singled out should be treated as mere facts, apart from their
+significance. The historical method employs description, to be sure, but
+it also aims at interpretation. "The historic method is a method, first,
+for determining how specific moral values (whether in the way of
+customs, expectations, conceived ends, or rules) came to be; and second,
+for determining their significance as indicated in their career."[159]
+
+It is true, as Dewey holds, that the historical method may furnish a
+basis for interpretation, as well as description. But the mere scrutiny
+of what has happened will not reveal the elements, nor determine their
+significance. The historian must approach his material with something
+more than his eyes. But there are many historical methods. Which shall
+be used in dealing with the development of morals?[160] Chemistry, for
+instance, in interpreting the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen into water,
+employs a system of atoms related to each other in a mathematical order,
+and something similarly definite must underlie the study of morals. The
+historical method, in general, needs no defence, but since it takes many
+forms, great care must be exercised in its application. Dewey seems to
+ignore these difficulties.
+
+Dewey's argument now leads him to a comparison of the evolutionary
+methods with the intuitional and empirical methods in ethics. In making
+the comparison, he does not propose to raise the question of fact
+concerning the existence of intuitions. The question to be confronted is
+rather a logical one, concerning the validity of beliefs. "Under what
+conditions alone, and in what measure or degree, are we justified in
+arguing from the existence of moral intuitions as mental states and acts
+to facts taken to correspond to them?"[161]
+
+The answer is that the existence of a belief argues nothing as to its
+validity. The intuitionist takes his belief as a brute fact, unrelated
+to objective conditions. The 'inexpugnable' character of the belief
+cannot establish its validity, because the life of a single individual
+occupies but a brief span in the continuity of the social life in which
+the belief is embedded. Beliefs last for generations, and then very
+often disappear. "What guarantee have we that our present 'intuitions'
+have more validity than hundreds of past ideas that have shown
+themselves by passing away to be empty opinion or indurated
+prejudice?"[162] Intuitionism has no way of guaranteeing its beliefs.
+
+The evolutionary method, on the other hand, is able to determine the
+validity of beliefs. "The worth of the intuition depends upon genetic
+considerations. In so far as we can state the intuition in terms of the
+conditions of its origin, development, and later career, in so far we
+have some criterion for passing judgment upon its pretensions to
+validity.... But if we cannot find such historic origin and functioning,
+the intuition remains a mere state of consciousness, a hallucination, an
+illusion, which is not made more worthy by simply multiplying the number
+of people who have participated in it."[163] Certain savage races, for
+instance, possessed moral intuitions which made the practice of
+infanticide an obligation. But the fact that it was universally held
+does not establish its validity. It must be condemned or justified by
+the results to which it led.
+
+Dewey's criticism of intuitionism scarcely does justice to that method,
+whatever may be its inherent weakness. There doubtless have been
+thinkers who held that truth is revealed to the reason of man in its
+naked purity, in the shape of apodictic intellectual principles. But
+even in the case of so extreme a position as that of Kant, there are
+important qualifying considerations to be taken into account. There is
+no reason to suppose that moral judgment, as Kant conceived it, was
+excluded from the consideration of relevant data, such as the knowledge
+of actual effects produced by given courses of conduct. His position
+seems to have been, not that moral judgment lacked specific content, but
+that reason took something with it to the moral situation. The
+intuitionists may have over-estimated the original endowment of the
+mind, but it must be admitted with them that the mind which approaches
+the moral situation empty of concepts cannot make moral decisions. If
+man is to hold no beliefs except those proved valid by experience, how
+can there be any to validate? Intelligence must have the capacity to
+frame beliefs in the light of its past knowledge, and its acts of
+judgment, consequently, presuppose a test of the validity of ideas which
+belongs to intelligence as such, and not to history taken abstractly.
+Beliefs are adapted to their objects in the making, and on this account
+are usually found to have had some justification, even where set aside.
+'A principle that is suitable for universal legislation already
+presupposes a content.'
+
+Dewey next considers the relation of the evolutionary methods to
+empiricism. "Empiricism," he says, "is no more historic in character
+than is intuitionalism. Empiricism is concerned with the moral idea or
+belief as a grouping or association of various elementary feelings. It
+regards the idea simply as a complex state which is to be explained by
+resolving it into its elementary constituents. By its logic, both the
+complex and the elements are isolated from an historic context.... The
+empirical and the genetic methods thus imply a very different
+relationship between the moral state, idea, or belief, and objective
+reality.... The empirical theory holds that the idea arises as a reflex
+of some existing object or fact. Hence the test of its objectivity is
+the faithfulness with which it reproduces that object as copy. The
+genetic theory holds that the idea arises as a response, and that the
+test of its validity is found in its later career as manifested with
+reference to the needs of the situation that evoked it."[164]
+
+Only a method that takes the world as a changing, historical thing, can
+deal with the adaptation of morality to new conditions. "Both empiricism
+and intuitionalism, though in very different ways, deny the continuity
+of the moralizing process. They set up timeless, and hence absolute and
+disconnected, ultimates; thereby they sever the problems and movements
+of the present from the past, rob the past, the sole object of calm,
+impartial, and genuinely objective study, of all instructing power, and
+leave our experience to form undirected, at the mercy of circumstance
+and arbitrariness, whether that of dogmatism or scepticism."[165]
+
+In evaluating the article as a whole, it must be said that Dewey's study
+is not productive of definite results. The history of the past can
+undoubtedly offer to the student a mass of data that is interesting and
+instructive. The importance of this or that belief, or its value, can be
+gauged by the results which it is known to have produced. But when, in
+this day and age, the moralist sets out to find the principles which
+shall guide his own conduct, the history of morals is of no more
+importance than the observations of every day life, which reveal the
+consequences of conduct in the lives of men about him. But more
+particularly, it should be added, an estimate of present moral action
+depends, not upon truth uttered by the past, but upon truth discovered
+and interpreted by an intelligence which surveys the past and makes it
+meaningful. The past in itself is nothing; thought alone can create real
+history.
+
+Another article, published by Dewey in the _Philosophical Review_ in
+1900, "Some Stages of Logical Thought," illustrates the employment of
+the genetic method in a more specific way.[166] In his introductory
+remarks, Dewey says: "I wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking,
+easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual,
+may be identified and arranged as successive species of the relationship
+which doubting bears to assurance; as various ratios, so to speak, which
+the vigor of doubting bears to mere acquiescence. The presumption is
+that the function of questioning is one which has continually grown in
+intensity and range, that doubt is continually chased back, and, being
+cornered, fights more desperately, and thus clears the ground more
+thoroughly."[167] Dewey finds four stages of relationship between
+questioning and dogmatism: dogmatism, discussion, proof, and empirical
+science; and he seeks to show how each stage involves a higher degree of
+free inquiry. "Modern scientific procedure, as just set forth, seems to
+define the ideal or limit of this process. It is inquiry emancipated,
+universalized, whose sole aim and criterion is discovery, and hence it
+makes the terminus of our description. It is idle to conceal from
+ourselves, however, that this scientific procedure, as a practical
+undertaking, has not as yet reflected itself into any coherent and
+generally accepted theory of thinking...."[168]
+
+It is not necessary to comment on Dewey's stages of thought. The
+similarity of this division to Comte's theological, metaphysical and
+scientific stages of explanation will be apparent. Dewey's remarks on
+the logic of the scientific stage, however, are interesting. "The simple
+fact of the case is," he says, "that there are at least three rival
+theories on the ground, each claiming to furnish the sole proper
+interpretation of the actual procedure of thought."[169] There is the
+Aristotelian logic, with its fixed forms; the empirical logic, which
+holds "that only particular facts are self-supporting, and that the
+authority allowed to general principles is derivative and second
+hand;"[170] and finally there is the transcendental logic, which claims,
+"by analysis of science and experience, to justify the conclusion that
+the universe itself is a construction of thought, giving evidence
+throughout of the pervasive and constitutive action of reason; and
+holds, consequently, that our logical processes are simply the reading
+off or coming to consciousness of the inherently rational structure
+already possessed by the universe in virtue of the presence within it of
+this pervasive and constitutive action of thought."[171]
+
+None of these logics, Dewey finds, is capable of dealing with the
+actual procedure of science, because none of them treats thought as a
+doubt-inquiry process, but rather as something fixed and limited by
+conditions which determine its operations in advance. Dewey asks: "Does
+not an account or theory of thinking, basing itself on modern scientific
+procedure, demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of
+thought--judgment, concept, inference, subject, predicate and copula of
+judgment, etc. _ad indefinitum_--shall be interpreted simply and
+entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the
+doubt-inquiry process?"[172]
+
+Seven years before, Dewey had been an ardent champion of the
+transcendental logic, on the ground that it was progressive, and he
+contrasted it most favorably with the formal logics which treat thought
+as a self-contained process. Now, however, he has a new insight. Logic
+must be reinterpreted in the light of the evolutionary or biological
+method. We shall see how this is accomplished in the next chapter.
+
+To the student of the history of philosophy, Dewey's treatment of the
+genetic and historical methods must seem seriously inadequate. The
+idealist, moreover, will feel that Dewey should have taken note, in his
+criticism of the idealistic standpoint, of the fact that Hegelianism was
+from first to last a historical method; that the German idealists gave
+the impulse to modern historical research, and provoked a study of the
+historical method whose results are still felt. But in turning away from
+idealism, Dewey has no word of appreciation for this aspect of the
+Hegelian philosophy.
+
+When the truth is boiled down, it appears that Dewey's historical
+method, in so far as he had one, was based on biological evolutionism.
+He had no interest in any other form of historical interpretation.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[138] Vol. VIII, pp. 321-341. The article is a criticism of Huxley's
+essay with the same title.
+
+[139] _Ibid._, p. 337. Italics mine.
+
+[140] _Op. cit._, p. 338.
+
+[141] _Ibid._, p. 340.
+
+[142] _Ibid._
+
+[143] _Ibid._ It should be observed that this conclusion is reached on a
+purely theoretical basis.
+
+[144] Printed in the _Psychological Review_, Vol. VII, 1900, pp.
+105-124.
+
+[145] _Ibid._, p. 123.
+
+[146] _Ibid._, p. 124.
+
+[147] Vol. XI, pp. 107-124; 353-371.
+
+[148] _Ibid._, p. 108.
+
+[149] _Ibid._, p. 109.
+
+[150] _Ibid._
+
+[151] _Op. cit._, p. 110.
+
+[152] _Ibid._, p. 111.
+
+[153] _Op. cit._, p. 112.
+
+[154] _Ibid._, p. 113.
+
+[155] _Op. cit._, p. 114.
+
+[156] _Ibid._, p. 116.
+
+[157] _Ibid._, p. 118.
+
+[158] _Op. cit._, p. 355.
+
+[159] _Ibid._, p. 356.
+
+[160] See Bosanquet's _Logic_, second edition, Chapter VII, and
+especially page 240.
+
+[161] _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, p. 357.
+
+[162] _Ibid._, p. 360.
+
+[163] _Ibid._, p. 358.
+
+[164] _Op. cit._, p. 364 f.
+
+[165] _Op. cit._, p. 370.
+
+[166] Vol. IX, pp. 465-489.
+
+[167] _Op. cit._, p. 465.
+
+[168] _Ibid._, p. 486 f.
+
+[169] _Ibid._, p. 487.
+
+[170] _Ibid._
+
+[171] _Ibid._
+
+[172] _Op. cit._, p. 489.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+"STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY"
+
+
+In 1903 a volume entitled _Studies in Logical Theory_, consisting of
+essays on logical topics by Dewey and his colleagues and pupils, was
+published under the auspices of the University of Chicago. In a review
+of this volume, Professor Pringle-Pattison remarks: "It is, indeed, most
+unusual to find a series of philosophical papers by different writers in
+which (without repetition or duplication) there is so much unity in the
+point of view and harmony in results. That this is so is a striking
+evidence of the moulding influence of Professor Dewey upon his pupils
+and coadjutors in the Chicago School of Philosophy."[173] It would be a
+needless task to review the whole volume, and attention will be confined
+to the essays which constitute Dewey's special contribution to the
+undertaking. These constitute the first four chapters of the volume, and
+are devoted to a critical examination of Lotze's logic.[174] Here, for
+the first time, Dewey presents in complete form the logical theory which
+stands as the goal of his previous endeavors, and marks the beginning of
+his career as a pragmatist.[175]
+
+The first chapter of the "Studies" is devoted to a general consideration
+of the nature of logical theory. Dewey begins his discussion with an
+account of the naive view of thought, the view of the man of affairs or
+of the scientist, who employs ideas and reflection but has never become
+critical of his mental processes; who has never reflected upon
+reflection. "If we were to ask," he says, "the thinking of naive life to
+present, with a minimum of theoretical elaboration, its conception of
+its own practice, we should get an answer running not unlike this:
+Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just
+as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity."[176] While the
+standpoint of the naive man is usually hard to determine, there appears
+to be considerable justification for Dewey's statement. The common man
+does tend to view thinking as a special kind of activity, performed by
+an organ which can be 'trained,' and he is inclined to speak of
+education as a process of 'training the mind.'[177]
+
+Dewey finds a large measure of truth in this naive view of thought.
+Thought appears to be derivative and secondary. "It comes after
+something and out of something, and for the sake of something."[178] It
+is employed at need, and ceases to operate when not needed. "Taking some
+part of the universe of action, of affection, of social construction,
+under its special charge, and having busied itself therewith
+sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented, thought releases
+that topic and enters upon further more direct experience."[179] There
+is a rhythm of practice and thought; man acts, thinks, and acts again.
+The business of thought is to solve practical difficulties, such as
+arise in connection with the conduct of life. The purpose for which
+thought intervenes is to enable action to get ahead by discovering a way
+out of the given difficulty. Ordinarily, the transition from thought to
+action and the reverse is accomplished without break or difficulty.
+
+Occasions arise, however, when thought is balked by a situation with
+which it is unable to deal, after repeated attempts. Critical reflection
+is then directed upon thought itself, and logical theory is the result.
+"The general theory of reflection, as over against its concrete
+exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so overwhelming and
+so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is
+blocked."[180] The purpose of logical theory is therefore a practical
+one, and logical theory, like ordinary reflection, is directed toward
+the removal of difficulties which stand in the way of the achievement of
+practical ends.
+
+This description of thought and of the nature of logical theory invites
+suspicion by its very simplicity. Nobody would deny that thought is
+linked up with practice, that the processes of life link up into one
+whole organic process, and that it would be a mistake to treat the
+cognitive processes as if they were separate from the whole. But Dewey's
+account of thought seems to fall into the very abstractness which he is
+so anxious to avoid. Experience is represented as a series of acts,
+attitudes, or functions, which follow one another in succession.
+"Thinking follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows thinking.
+Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its
+successor."[181] The functions are distinct, but are united to each
+other, end to end, like links in a chain. They pass into and out of one
+another, but are not simultaneous. This description gives rise, as
+Bosanquet observes,[182] to a kind of dualism between thinking and the
+other processes of life, which is made deeper because thinking is
+regarded as a very special activity, which "passes judgment upon both
+the processes and contents of other functions," and whose aim and work
+is "distinctively reconstructive or transformatory."[183]
+
+Dewey's description of the processes of experience is undoubtedly
+plausible, but should not be accepted without close scrutiny of the
+facts. It has been held, in opposition to such a view, that the
+cognitive processes are so bound up with perception, feeling, willing,
+and doing, that they cannot be separated from the complex.[184] Or it
+might be held that thinking and doing are simultaneous and
+complementary processes, rather than successive and supplementary. Dewey
+does not concern himself with these possibilities, seeming to take it
+for granted that his interpretation is the 'natural' one. It must be
+said, however, that Dewey's description of thought as a process is by no
+means obvious and simple; thought is not easy to describe.
+
+When we turn to logical theory, Dewey says, there are two directions
+which may be taken. The general features of logical theory are indicated
+by its origin. When ordinary thinking is impeded, an examination of the
+thinking function is undertaken, with the purpose of discovering its
+business and its mode of operation. The object of the examination is
+practical; to enable thinking to be carried on more effectively. If
+these conditions are kept in mind, logical theory will be guided into
+its proper channels: it will be assumed that every process of reflection
+arises with reference to some specific situation, and has to subserve a
+specific purpose dependent upon the occasion which calls it forth.
+Logical theory will determine the conditions which arouse thought, the
+mode of its operation, and the testing of its results. Such a logic,
+being true to the problems set for it by practical needs, is in no
+danger of being lost in generalities.
+
+But there is another direction which logical theory sometimes takes,
+unmindful of the conditions imposed by its origin. This is the
+epistemological direction. Epistemological logic concerns itself with
+the relation of thought at large to reality at large. It assumes that
+thought is a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with
+the world which is to be known. Such a logic can never be fruitful, for
+it has lost sight of its purpose in the formulation of its problem.
+
+Dewey is quite right in opposing a conception of thought which makes it
+a self-contained activity, having no vital connection with other life
+processes. Few recent thinkers have been guilty of that error. Lotze, to
+be sure, made the mistake of separating thought from the reality to be
+known, and therefore serves as a ready foil for Dewey's criticism. But
+Lotze's age is past and gone.
+
+When the abstract conception of thought is set aside, and it is agreed
+that thought must be treated as a process among the processes of
+experience, there is still room for divergence of opinion as to the
+exact manner in which thought is related to other functions. Dewey's
+logical theory, as outlined above, depends upon a very special
+interpretation of the place which thought occupies in experience. For
+this reason he considers logic to be inseparable from psychology.
+"Psychology ... is indispensable to logical evaluation, the moment we
+treat logical theory as an account of thinking as a mode of adaptation
+to its own generating conditions, and judge its validity by reference to
+its efficiency in meeting its problems."[185] Psychology, in other
+words, must substantiate Dewey's account of thought, else his 'logic'
+has no foundation. But if it were held that the cognitive processes
+cannot be separated (except by abstraction for psychological purposes)
+from other processes, there could manifestly be no such logical problem
+as Dewey has posited. Logic would be freed from reliance upon
+psychology. In this case, logical inquiry would be directed to the study
+of concepts, forms of judgment, and methods of knowledge, with the
+purpose of determining their relations, proper applications, and spheres
+of relevance. Logic would be a 'criticism of categories' rather than a
+criticism of the function of thinking. Dewey recognizes that such a
+study of method might be useful, but holds that it would be subsidiary
+to the larger problems of logic. "The distinctions and classifications
+that have been accumulated in 'formal' logic are relevant data; but they
+demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment
+to material antecedents and stimuli."[186] It will be seen that the
+treatment of the forms of thought as "organs of adjustment" makes logic
+subsidiary to psychology, necessarily and completely. All follows,
+however, from the original assumption that thought is a special
+activity, clearly distinguishable from other experienced processes, and
+possessing a special function of its own.
+
+In his further analysis of logical theory, Dewey states that it has two
+phases, one general and one specific. The general problem concerns the
+relations of the various functions of experience to one another; how
+they give rise to each other, and what is their order of succession.
+This wider logic is identified with philosophy in general.[187] The
+specific phase of logic, logic proper, concerns itself with the function
+of knowing as such, inquiring into its typical behavior, occasion of
+operation, divisions of labor, content, and successful employment. Dewey
+indicates the danger of identifying logic with either of these to the
+exclusion of the other, or of supposing that they can be finally
+isolated from one another. "It is necessary to work back and forth
+between the larger and the narrower fields."[188]
+
+Why is it necessary to make such a distinction at all? And why necessary
+to move back and forth between the two provisional standpoints? Dewey
+might answer by the following analogy: The thought function may be
+studied, first of all, as a special organ, as an anatomist might study
+the structure of any special organ of the body; but in order to
+understand the part played by this member in the organism as a whole, it
+would be necessary to adopt a wider view, so that its place in the
+system could be determined. This is probably what Dewey means by his two
+standpoints. He says: "We keep our paths straight because we do not
+confuse the sequential, efficient, and functional relationship of types
+of experience with the contemporaneous, correlative, and structural
+distinctions of elements within a given function."[189] The first
+objection to be made to this treatment of thought is that it makes
+knowing the activity of a special organ, like liver or lungs. If this
+objection is surmounted, there remains another from the side of general
+method. The biologist not only studies the particular organs as to their
+structure and their relationships within the body, but he has a view of
+the body as a whole, of its general end and purpose. His study of the
+particular organ is in part determined by his knowledge of the relations
+between body and environment. But experience as a whole cannot be
+treated like a body, because it has no environment. The analogy between
+body and its processes and experience and its processes breaks down,
+therefore, at a vital point. Dewey's genetic interpretation gains in
+plausibility when the human body, and not the whole of experience, is
+taken as the ground upon which the 'functions' are to be explained, for
+the body has an environment and purposes in relation to that
+environment. Experience as a whole possesses no such external reference.
+
+It will be seen that Dewey's interpretation of the function of knowing
+is not as empirical as it proposes to be. Its underlying conceptions are
+biological in character, and these conceptions are brought ready-made to
+the study of thought. Logical theory does not arise naturally and
+spontaneously from a study of the facts of mind, but the facts are
+aligned and interpreted in terms of categories selected in advance.
+Empiricism develops its theories in connection with facts, but
+rationalism (in the bad sense of the word) fits the facts into prepared
+theories. Dewey's treatment of thought is, after all, more rationalistic
+than empirical.
+
+To sum up Dewey's conclusions so far: Logic is the study of the function
+of knowing in relation to the other functions of experience. The wider
+logic distinguishes the function of knowing from other activities, and
+discovers its general purpose; the narrower logic examines the function
+of knowing in itself, with the object of determining its structure and
+operation. The aim of logic as a whole is to understand the operations
+of the concrete activity called knowing, with the purpose of rendering
+it more efficient. This concrete treatment of thought contrasts sharply
+with the 'epistemological' method, which sets thought over against the
+concrete processes of experience, and thus generates the false problem
+of the relation of thought in general to reality in general.
+
+Having stated his position, we might expect Dewey, in the course of the
+next three chapters, to enter upon a consideration of one phase or other
+of his logic. On the contrary, he proposes to take up "some of the
+considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the
+narrower conceptions of logical theory."[190] First, he will consider
+the antecedent conditions and cues of the thought-process; the
+conditions which lead up to and into the function of knowing. These
+conditions lie between the thought-process and the preceding function
+(in order of time), and are therefore on the borderland between the
+wider and narrower spheres of logic.
+
+In defining the conditions which precede and evoke thought, Dewey says:
+"There is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some
+subject-matter of the physical or social world, or organized
+intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each other--so
+much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience, which
+accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate re-definition
+and re-relation of its tensional parts."[191] Thought is always called
+into action by the whole concrete situation in which it occurs, not by
+any particular sensation, idea, or feeling.
+
+The opposite interpretation of the nature of the antecedents of thought
+is furnished by Lotze, who makes them consist in bare impressions,
+'moods of ourselves,' mere states of consciousness. Dewey is quite right
+in calling these bare impressions purely fictitious, though the
+observation is by no means original. From the manner in which he
+approaches the study of the "antecedents of thought" it appears,
+however, that Dewey has something in common with Lotze. The functional
+theory, that is, allows a certain initial detachment of thought from
+reality, which must be bridged over by an empirical demonstration of its
+natural connection with preceding processes.
+
+Dewey is wholly justified, again, in maintaining that thought is not a
+faculty set apart from reality, and that what is 'given' to thought is a
+coherent world, not a mass of unmeaning sensations. He recognizes his
+substantial agreement with the modern idealists in these matters.[192]
+But the idealists, he believes, hold a constitutive conception of
+thought which is in conflict with the empirical description of thinking
+as a concrete activity in time. Reality, according to this conception,
+is a vast system of sensations brought into a rational order by logical
+forms, and finite thought, in its operations, simply apprehends or
+discovers the infinite order of the cosmos. "How does it happen," Dewey
+asks, "that the absolute constitutive and intuitive Thought does such a
+poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to
+patch up its products?"[193]
+
+Against Lotze, such an indictment has considerable force, but its
+applicability to modern idealism is not so obvious. Modern idealism has
+insisted upon an empirical treatment of thought, and has definitely
+surrendered the abstract sensations of the older psychologies. Nor does
+idealism tend to treat finite thought as a process which merely 'copies'
+an eternally present nature. The issue between Dewey and the idealists
+is this: Does functionalism render an accurate empirical account of the
+nature of thought as a concrete process?
+
+In his third chapter Dewey discusses "Thought and its Subject-matter:
+The Datum of Thinking." The tensional situation passes into a thought
+situation, and reflection enters upon its work of restoring the
+equilibrium of experience. Certain characteristic processes attend the
+operation of thought. "The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or
+dichotomizes itself. There is somewhat which is untouched in the
+contention of incompatibles. There is something which remains secure,
+unquestioned. On the other hand, there are elements which are rendered
+doubtful and precarious."[194] The unquestioned element is the _datum_;
+the uncertain element, the _ideatum_. Ideas are "impressions,
+suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc., the facts are crude,
+raw, unorganized, brute."[195] There is an approximation to bare meaning
+on the one hand, and bare existence on the other.
+
+The first dichotomy passes into a second. "Once more, and briefly, both
+datum and ideatum may ... break up, each for itself, into physical and
+psychical."[196] The datum, or sense material, is all, somehow, matter
+and real, but one part of it turns out to have a psychical, another a
+physical form. Similarly, the ideatum divides into what is mere fancy,
+the psychical, and what is objectively valid, the physical.
+
+These distinctions are divisions of labor within the thought-process.
+"All the distinctions of the thought-function, of conception as over
+against sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of
+inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions
+come within the thought situation as growing out of a characteristic
+antecedent typical formation of experience...."[197] Great confusion
+results in logical theory, Dewey believes, when it is forgotten that
+these distinctions are valid only within the thought process. Their
+order of occurrence within the thought process must also be observed, if
+confusion is to be prevented. Datum and ideatum come first, psychical
+and physical next in order. "Thus the distinction between subjectivity
+and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It
+is a specification that emerges, correspondently, in _both_ datum and
+ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is
+left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as
+real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is
+regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense."[198]
+
+Dewey does well to call attention to the limitations of these
+categories, which cannot, indeed, be treated as absolute without serious
+error. It may be questioned, however, whether their limitations are of
+the precise nature which he describes. All depends upon the initial
+conception of the nature of thought. From Dewey's standpoint, these
+categories are 'tools of analysis' which function only within the
+thinking process; but his description of the function of knowing may be
+questioned, in which case his instrumental view of the concepts is
+rendered meaningless. A logical, as distinct from a psychological,
+treatment of the concepts mentioned, would show that their validity is
+limited to a certain 'sphere of relevance;' that they are applicable
+within a certain context and to a particular subject-matter. The danger
+of indiscriminate use of the categories would be avoided by the logical
+criticism even better, perhaps, than by Dewey's method.
+
+The discussion in Dewey's fourth and last chapter, concerning "The
+Content and Object of Thought," hinges upon a detailed criticism of
+Lotze's position, which cannot be presented here. The general bearing of
+the discussion, however, may be indicated. "To regard," says Dewey, "the
+thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as qualifications
+of 'pure thought, apart from any difference in objects,' instead of as
+successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material
+(or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism."[199]
+
+Pure thought, of course, cannot be defended. At the same time, Dewey,
+like Lotze, tends to regard thought as a special function with a
+'content' of its own. If thought is regarded as a special kind of
+process, having its own content in the way of instrumental concepts, the
+question inevitably arises: How shall these forms be employed to reach
+truth? How apply them correctly to the matter in hand?
+
+Dewey answers that the forms and hypotheses of thought, like the tools
+and scaffoldings for its operations, are especially designed for the
+labor which they have to perform. "There is no miracle in the fact that
+tool and material are adapted to each other in the process of reaching a
+valid conclusion.... Each has been slowly evolved with reference to its
+fit employ in the entire function; and this evolution has been checked
+at every point by reference to its own correspondent."[200]
+
+It is no doubt true that established conceptions, no less than temporary
+hypotheses, have been evolved in connection with, as a feature or part
+of, the subject-matter to which they pertain. But it is quite another
+thing to say that these evolved forms belong to thought, if by thought
+be meant the functional activity of Dewey's description. Dewey stresses
+the relevance of these forms to the thought-process, rather than their
+relevance to a particular sphere of discourse. His purpose is to show
+that distinctions which are valid within the process of knowing are not
+valid elsewhere, and the net result is to limit the faculty of thought
+as a whole, as well as the forms of thought.
+
+This result reveals itself most clearly in his discussion of the test of
+truth. "In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought, as thought,
+just as at the other limit thought originates out of a situation which
+is not reflectional in character. Interpret this before and beyond in a
+historic sense, as an affair of the place occupied and role played by
+thinking as a function in experience in relation to other functions, and
+the intermediate and instrumental character of thought, its dependence
+upon unreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon a consequent
+experience for its test of final validity, becomes significant and
+necessary."[201] This notion that the test of thought must be external
+to thought depends directly upon the doctrine that thought is a special
+activity of the kind heretofore described. It results from the
+occasionalism attributed by Dewey to the thinking process.
+
+If the truth or falsity of an idea is not discovered by thought, then by
+what faculty might it be discovered? Perhaps by experience as a whole or
+in general. Dewey, on occasion, speaks as follows: "Experience is
+continually integrating itself into a wholeness of coherent meaning
+deepened in significance by passing through an inner distraction in
+which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered partial and
+hence objectively conscious."[202] Perhaps Dewey means to say that truth
+is determined by this cosmic automatism. It is confusing, however, to be
+told in one moment that thought transforms experience, and in another
+that experience transforms itself.
+
+Experience, not reflection, is, then, the test of truth and thought.
+Such a statement would not be possible, except in connection with a
+psychology which deliberately sets experience over against reflection,
+making the latter a peculiar, although dependent, process. Lotze,
+indeed, makes the separation of thought from experience quite complete.
+Dewey attempts to bring them together by his psychological method, but
+does not completely succeed. In the meantime modern idealism has
+suggested that thought and experience are merely parts of one general
+process, constantly operating in conjunction. To one who believes that
+the various processes or 'functions' of experience constitute a single
+organ of life, the proposition that experience, rather than reflection,
+is the judge of truth, becomes meaningless.
+
+In an essay on "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of
+Morality" in another volume of the Chicago Publications of 1903,[203]
+Dewey presents a positive statement of his logical theory which is an
+excellent supplement to the critical study of Lotze.
+
+Science, Dewey remarks in introducing this essay, is a systematized body
+of knowledge. Knowledge may be taken either as a body of facts or as a
+process of arranging a body of facts; as results or the acquiring of
+results. The latter phase of science is the more important. "As used in
+this article, 'scientific' means regular methods of controlling the
+formation of judgments regarding some subject-matter."[204] In the
+scientific attitude, beliefs are looked upon as _conclusions_, and as
+conclusions they look in two directions. They look backward towards the
+ground from which they are empirically derived, and which renders them
+valid, and they look forward, as meaning, to being the ground from which
+further conclusions can be deduced. "So far as we engage in this
+procedure, we look at our respective acts of judging not as independent
+and detached, but as an interrelated system, within which every
+assertion entitles us to other assertions (which must be carefully
+deduced since they constitute its meaning) and to which we are entitled
+only through other assertions (so that they must be carefully searched
+for). 'Scientific' as used in this article thus means the possibility of
+establishing an order of judgments such that each one when made is of
+use in determining other judgments, thereby securing control of their
+formation."[205]
+
+This view of science as an order of judgments requires a special
+treatment of the generic ideas, the 'conclusions,' or universals of
+science. The individual judgment, 'This, _A_, is _B_,' expresses an
+identity. But it is much better expressed in hypothetical form.
+"Identification, in other words, is secure only when it can be made
+through (1) breaking up the analyzed. This of naive judgment into
+determinate traits, (2) breaking up the predicate into a similar
+combination of elements, and (3) establishing uniform connection between
+some of the elements in the subject and some in the predicate."[206]
+Identity exists amid relevant differences, and the more intimately the
+system of differents is understood, the more positive is the
+determination of identity. This will be recognized as the 'concrete
+universal' of the Hegelian logicians.
+
+But, Dewey says, modern logicians tend to disregard judgment as act, and
+pay attention to it only as content. The generic ideas are studied in
+independence of their applications, as if this were a matter of no
+concern in logic. "In truth, there is no such thing as control of one
+content by mere reference to another content as such. To recognize this
+impossibility is to recognize that the control of the formation of the
+judgment is always through the medium of an act by which the respective
+contents of both the individual judgment and of the universal
+proposition are selected and brought into relationship to each
+other."[207] The individual act of judgment is necessary to logical
+theory, because the act of the individual forms the connecting link
+between the generic idea and the specific details of the situation.
+There must be some means whereby the instrumental concept is brought to
+bear upon its appropriate material. "The logical process includes, as an
+organic part of itself, the selection and reference of that particular
+one of the system which is relevant to the particular case. This
+individualized selection and adaptation is an integral portion of the
+logic of the situation. And such selection and adjustment is clearly in
+the nature of an act."[208]
+
+This problem of the relation of the categories to their subject-matter
+is an acute one for Dewey, because of limitations placed upon thought.
+He decides that the idea must be, in some fashion, self-selective, must
+signify its own fitness to a given subject-matter. But it can only be
+self-selective by being itself in the nature of an act. It turns out
+that the generic idea has been evolved in connection with acts of
+judgment, and its own applicability is born in it. "The activity which
+selects and employs is logical, not extra-logical, just because the tool
+selected and employed has been invented and developed precisely for the
+sake of just such future selection and use."[209]
+
+The logic and system of science must be embodied in the individual. He
+must be a good logical medium, his acts must be orderly and consecutive,
+and generic ideas must have a good motor basis in his organism, if he is
+to think successfully. This is the essence of Dewey's argument in the
+essay under discussion. The inference seems to be that logic cannot be
+separated from biology and psychology, since the act of knowing and the
+ideas which it employs have a physiological basis.
+
+It is difficult to see, however, how such a standpoint could prove
+useful in the practical study of logic. Certainly little headway could
+be made toward a study of the proper use and limitations of the
+categories by an investigation of the human nervous system. And to what
+extent would physiology illuminate the problem of the relation of the
+generic ideas to their appropriate objects? Although Dewey decides that
+the relationship must have its ground in the motor activities of the
+organism, his conclusion has little empirical evidence to support it.
+
+A practical, workable conception of the relations between generic ideas
+and their objects must be based on considerations less obscure. Why not
+be content to verify, by criticism, the truth that experience and
+thoughts about experience develop together, with the result that each
+theory, hypothesis, or method is applicable within the sphere where it
+was born? Why wait upon psychology for confirmation of a truth so
+obvious and important?
+
+Bosanquet remarks: "Either one may speak as if reality were relative to
+the individual mind, a ridiculous idea ..., or one may become interested
+in tracing the germination and growth of ideas in the individual mind as
+typical facts indeed, but only as one animal's habits are typical of
+those of others, and we may slur over the primary basis of logic, which
+is its relation to reality. For mental facts unrelated to reality are no
+knowledge, and therefore have no place in logic."[210] Bosanquet
+emphasizes an important truth neglected by Dewey. Logic is not concerned
+with ideas as things existing in individuals, nor with conceptions as
+individual modes of response. Truth has little to do with the individual
+as such, though the individual might well concern himself about truth.
+Truth is objective, super-individual, and logic is the study of the
+objective verity of thought. The proposition, 'All life is from the
+living,' finds no premises in the nerve tissues of the scientist who
+accepts it. How does the proposition square up with reality or
+experience? That is the question, and it can only be answered by turning
+away from psychology to empirical verification, involving a critical
+test of the applicability of the thought to reality.
+
+In the strictly ethical part of the essay, Dewey tries to show that
+moral judgments, at least, involve the character of the agent and his
+specific acts as data. Intellectual judgments, on the other hand, may
+disregard the acts of the individual; they are left out of account,
+"when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference
+with respect to the _particular_ object or content judged."[211] It will
+be seen that the distinction between moral and intellectual judgments is
+made on the basis of their content. But Dewey is committed to the
+doctrine that judgments are to be differentiated as acts, on a
+psychological basis. In any case, if the character and acts of a man are
+to be judged, they must be treated objectively, and the relevance of the
+judge's ideas to the man's actual character cannot be decided by a
+psychological analysis of the judge's mind. Right and wrong, whether
+moral or intellectual, are not attributes of the individual nervous
+system.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[173] _The Philosophical Radicals_, "Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory,"
+p. 179. The essay was originally printed as a critical notice in the
+_Philosophical Review_, November, 1904.
+
+[174] Since this was written (1915-16), Dewey's chapters have been
+reprinted in a volume entitled _Essays in Experimental Logic_, published
+by the University of Chicago Press (June, 1916). They are preceded, in
+this new setting, by a special introductory chapter, and numerous
+alterations have been made which do not, however, affect the fundamental
+standpoint.
+
+[175] See James's review, "The Chicago School," _Psychological
+Bulletin_, Vol. I, 1904, pp. 1-5.
+
+[176] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 2.
+
+[177] Compare Dewey, _How We Think_ (1910), Chapter II, "The Need for
+Training Thought."
+
+[178] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 1.
+
+[179] _Ibid._, p. 2.
+
+[180] _Op. cit._, p. 3 f.
+
+[181] _Ibid._, p. 16.
+
+[182] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. II, p. 270.
+
+[183] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. x.
+
+[184] "Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract
+cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course of its
+development carries these along with it. There is, of course, such a
+thing as what we have called abstract cognition; but the different
+moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the
+life of thought." Creighton, "Experience and Thought," _Philosophical
+Review_, Vol. XV, 1906, p. 487 f.
+
+[185] _Op. cit._, p. 15.
+
+[186] _Ibid._, p. 8.
+
+[187] _Op. cit._, pp. 18-19.
+
+[188] _Ibid._, p. 23.
+
+[189] _Ibid._, p. 17.
+
+[190] _Op. cit._, p. 23.
+
+[191] _Op. cit._, p. 39 f. Bradley suggests a similar idea of the
+'tensional situation.' See, for instance, _Ethical Studies_, p. 65,
+where he remarks: "We have conflicting desires, say A and B; we feel two
+tensions, two drawings (so to speak) but we can not actually affirm
+ourselves in both." A more complete statement of the 'tensional
+situation' will be found on page 239 of the same work and in various
+other passages.
+
+[192] _Ibid._, pp. 43-44.
+
+[193] _Op. cit._, p. 45.
+
+[194] _Ibid._, p. 50.
+
+[195] _Ibid._, p. 52.
+
+[196] _Op. cit._
+
+[197] _Ibid._, p. 47.
+
+[198] _Ibid._, p. 53.
+
+[199] _Op. cit._, p. 61 f.
+
+[200] _Ibid._, p. 80.
+
+[201] _Op. cit._, p. 85.
+
+[202] _Ibid._
+
+[203] _Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_, First
+Series, Vol. III, pp. 115-139.
+
+[204] _Ibid._, p. 115.
+
+[205] _Ibid._, p. 116.
+
+[206] _Op. cit._, p. 120.
+
+[207] _Ibid._, p. 121.
+
+[208] _Ibid._, p. 122.
+
+[209] _Op. cit._
+
+[210] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. I, p. 232.
+
+[211] _Decennial Publication of the University of Chicago_, First
+Series, Vol. III, p. 127.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE POLEMICAL PERIOD
+
+
+After the publication of the _Studies in Logical Theory_, Dewey entered
+upon what may be called the polemical period of his career. He joined
+forces with James and Schiller in the promotion of the new movement
+called 'Pragmatism.' The _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
+Scientific Methods_, instituted at Columbia University in 1904, the same
+year in which Dewey accepted a professorship in that institution, became
+a convenient medium for the expression of his views, and every volume of
+this periodical will be found to contain notes, discussions, and
+articles by Dewey and his followers, bearing on current controversy. He
+also published many articles in other journals, technical and popular.
+In 1910, the most important of these essays were collected into a
+volume, published under the title, _The Influence of Darwin on
+Philosophy, and Other Essays_. For purposes of discussion, these essays
+may be divided into two classes: those of a more constructive character,
+setting forth Dewey's own standpoint, and those which are mainly
+polemical, directed against opposing standpoints, chiefly the
+idealistic. The constructive writings will be given first consideration.
+
+The essay on "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," first published in
+the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in
+July, 1905, and later reprinted in the volume of collected essays,
+offers a convenient point of departure. Dewey observes that many of the
+difficulties in current controversy can be traced to presuppositions
+tacitly held by thinkers as to what experience means. Dewey attempts to
+make his own presuppositions explicit, with the object of clearing up
+this confusion.
+
+"Immediate empiricism," he says, "postulates that things--anything,
+everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term
+'thing'--are what they are experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to
+describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as
+being."[212] The idealists, on the contrary, hold "that things (or,
+ultimately, Reality, Being) _are_ only and just what they are _known_ to
+be or that things are, or Reality _is_, what it is for a conscious
+knower--whether the knower be conceived primarily as a perceiver or as a
+thinker being a further, and secondary, question. This is the
+root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective,
+psychological or epistemological."[213] Knowing is merely one mode of
+experiencing, and things may be experienced in other ways, as, for
+instance, aesthetically, morally, technologically, or economically. This
+follows Dewey's familiar division of the processes of experience into
+separate 'functions' or activities. It becomes the duty of the
+philosopher, following this scheme, to find out "_what_ sort of an
+experience knowing is--or, concretely how things are experienced when
+they are experienced _as_ known things."[214]
+
+Dewey fails, in this essay, to draw a distinction which is highly
+important, between knowledge as awareness and knowledge as reflection.
+This results in some confusion. For the present, he is concerned with
+knowledge as awareness. He employs an illustration to make his meaning
+clear; the experience of fright at a noise, which turns out, when
+examined and known, to be the tapping of a window shade. What is
+originally experienced is a frightful noise. If, after examination, the
+'frightfulness' is classified as 'psychical,' while the 'real' fact is
+said to be harmless, there is no warrant for reading this distinction
+back into the original experience. The argument is directed against that
+mode of explaining the difference between the psychical and the physical
+which employs a subjective mind or 'knower' as the container of the
+merely subjective aspects of reality. Dewey would hold that mind, used
+in this sense, is a fiction, having a small explanatory value, and
+creating more problems than it solves. The difference between psychical
+and physical is relative, not absolute. The frightful noise first heard
+was neither psychical nor physical; it was what it was experienced as,
+and the experience contained no such distinction, nor did it contain a
+'knower.' The noise _as known_, after the intervention of an act of
+judgment, contained these elements (except the 'knower'), but the thing
+is not merely what it is known as. There is no warrant for reading the
+distinctions made by judgment back into a situation where judgment was
+not operative. The original fact was precisely what it was experienced
+as.
+
+Dewey's purpose, though not well stated, seems to be the complete
+rejection of the notion of knowledge as awareness, or of the subjective
+knower. He discovers at the same time an opportunity to substantiate his
+own descriptive account of knowing (or reflection) as an occasional
+function. The two enterprises, however, should be kept distinct.
+Granting that the subjective knower of the older epistemology should be
+dismissed from philosophy, it does not follow that Dewey's special
+interpretation of the function of reflection is the only substitute.
+
+The principle of immediate empiricism, Dewey says, furnishes no positive
+truth. It is simply a method. Not a single philosophical proposition can
+be deduced from it. The application of the method is indicated in the
+following proposition: "If you wish to find out what subjective,
+objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose,
+activity, evil, being, quality--any philosophic term, in short--means,
+go to experience and see what the thing is experienced _as_."[215] This
+recipe cannot be taken literally. Dewey probably means that each concept
+has, or should have, a positive empirical reference, and is significant
+only in that reference. He is a firm believer, however, in the
+descriptive method. In a note, he remarks that he would employ in
+philosophy "the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in
+all the natural sciences, with such modifications, of course, as the
+subject itself entails."[216] This remark calls for closer examination
+than can be made here. It may be said in passing, however, that
+'scientific description' is by no means so simple a method of procedure
+as Dewey would seem to indicate. 'Scientific description,' as actually
+employed, is a highly elaborated and specialized method of dealing with
+experience. The whole subject, indeed, is involved, and requires
+cautious treatment. Dewey's somewhat ingenuous hope, that the
+identification of his method with the methods of science will add to its
+impressiveness, is in danger, unfortunately, of being vitiated through
+the suspicion that he is, after all, not in close touch with the methods
+of science.
+
+Dewey employs the descriptive method chiefly as a means for
+substantiating his special interpretation of the judgment process. His
+use of the method in this connection is well illustrated by an article
+called "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge"[217] (1906), in which he
+attempts "to find out _what_ sort of an experience knowing is" through
+an appeal to immediate experience. "It should be possible," he says, "to
+discern and describe a knowing as one identifies any object, concern, or
+event.... What we want is just something which takes itself as
+knowledge, rightly or wrongly."[218] The difficulty lies not in finding
+a case of knowing, but in describing it when found. Dewey selects a case
+to be described, and, as usual, chooses a simple one.
+
+"This means," he says, "a specific case, a sample.... Our recourse is to
+an example so simple, so much on its face as to be as innocent as may be
+of assumptions.... Let us suppose a smell, just a floating odor."[219]
+The level at which this illustration is taken is significant. Is it
+possible to suppose that anything so complex, varied, myriad-sided as
+that something we call knowledge, can be discovered and described within
+the limits of so simple an instance?
+
+Dewey employs the smell in three situations, the first representing the
+'non-cognitional,' the second the 'cognitive,' and the third the
+genuinely 'cognitional' situation. The first, or 'non-cognitional'
+situation is described as follows: "But, let us say, the smell is not
+the smell _of_ the rose; the resulting change of the organism is not a
+sense of walking and reaching; the delicious finale is not the
+fulfilment of the movement, and, through that, of the original smell;
+'is not,' in each case meaning is 'not experienced as' such. We may
+take, in short, these experiences in a brutely serial fashion. The
+smell, _S_, is replaced (and displaced) by a felt movement, _K_, this is
+replaced by the gratification, _G_. Viewed from without, as we are now
+regarding it, there is _S-K-G_. But from within, for itself, it is now
+_S_, now _K_, now _G_, and so on to the end of the chapter. Nowhere is
+there looking before and after; memory and anticipation are not born.
+Such an experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor
+does it exercise a cognitive function."[220]
+
+It will be seen at once that this is not a description of an actual
+human experience, but a schematic story designed to illustrate a
+comparatively simple point. In this situation the person concerned does
+not deliberately and consciously recognize the smell as the smell of a
+rose; he is not aware of any symbolic character in the smell, it does
+not enter as a middle term into a process of inference. In such a
+situation, Dewey believes, it would be wrong to read into the smell a
+cognitive property which it does not, as experienced, possess.
+
+In the second, or 'cognitive' situation, the smell as originally
+experienced does not involve the function of knowing, but turns out
+after the event, as reflected upon, to have had a significance. "In
+saying that the smell is finally experienced as _meaning_ gratification
+... we retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the
+smell--and this is what is signified by 'cognitive.' Yet the smell is
+not cognitional, because it did not knowingly intend to mean this; but
+is found, after the event, to have meant it."[221] The moral is, as
+usual, that the findings of reflection must not be read back into the
+former unreflective experience.
+
+In the truly 'cognitional' experience the smell is then and there
+experienced as meaning or symbolizing the rose. "An experience is a
+knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and
+connection of two elements of the following sort: _one means or intends
+the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already
+present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same
+fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its
+companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it
+sets up_."[222] In the 'cognitional' situation, the smell is then and
+there experienced as signifying the presence of a rose in the vicinity,
+and the rose must be experienced as a present fact, before the meaning
+of the smell is completely fulfilled and verified.
+
+It will be seen at once that this description of knowing follows the
+lines laid down by James in his chapter on "Reasoning" in the
+_Principles of Psychology_. In the process of reasoning the situation is
+analyzed; some particular feature of it is abstracted and made the
+middle term in an inference. The smell, as thus abstracted, is said to
+have the function of knowing, or meaning, the rose whose reality it
+evidences.
+
+Dewey's treatment of knowledge, however, is far too simple. The function
+of meaning, symbolizing, or 'pointing' does not reside in the abstracted
+element as such; for the context in which the judgment occurs determines
+the choosing of the 'middle term,' as well as the direction in which it
+shall point. The situation as a whole has a rationality which resides in
+the distinctions, identities, phases of emphasis, and discriminations of
+the total experience. Rationality expresses itself in the organized
+system of experience, not in particular elements and their 'pointings.'
+Taken in this sense, rationality is present in all experience. The
+smell, in Dewey's first situation, is not 'cognitional' because the
+situation as a whole does not permit it to be, if such an expression may
+be used. The intellectual drift of the moment drives the smell away from
+the centre of attention at one time, just as at another it selects it to
+serve as an element in judgment. It is only with reference to a system
+of some kind that things can be regarded as symbols at all. Things do
+not represent one another at haphazard, but definitely and concretely;
+they imply an organization of elements having mutual implications. One
+thing implies another because both are elements in a whole which
+determines their mutual reference. This organization is present in all
+experience, not in the form of 'established habits,' but in the form of
+will and purpose.
+
+In the course of his further discussion, which need not be followed in
+detail, Dewey passes on to a consideration of truth. Truth is concerned
+with the worth or validity of ideas. But, before their validity can be
+determined, there must be a 'cognitional' experience of the type
+described above. "Before the category of confirmation or refutation can
+be introduced, there must be something which _means_ to mean something
+and which therefore can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue."[223]
+Ideas, or meanings, as directly experienced, are neither true nor false,
+but are made so by the results in which they issue. Even then, the
+outcome must be reflected upon, before they can be designated true or
+false. "_Truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only
+in situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced
+fulfilments and non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and
+contrasted with reference to the question of the worth, as to
+reliability of meaning, of the given meaning or class of
+meanings._"[224] This makes the whole problem of truth a relatively
+simple affair. The symbol and its 'pointing' are taken as a single,
+objective fact, to be tested, and, if verified, labelled 'true.'
+Meanings, after all, are not so simple as this scheme would imply.
+
+As the intellectual life of man is more subtle and universal than Dewey
+represents it to be, so is truth, as that which thought seeks to
+establish, something deeper-lying and more comprehensive. Ideas are not
+simple and isolated facts; their truth is not strictly their own, but is
+reflected into them from the objective order to which they pertain. The
+possibility of making observations and experiments, and of having ideas,
+rests upon the presence in and through experience of that directing
+influence which we call valid knowledge, or truth. An idea, to be true,
+must fit in with this general body of truth. Not correspondence with its
+single object, but correspondence with the whole organized body of
+knowledge, is the test of the truth of an idea. The attempt to describe
+knowledge as a particular occurrence, fact, or function, is foredoomed
+to failure. It should be noted also that Dewey's 'description,'
+throughout this essay, is anything but a direct, empirical examination
+of thought. He presents a schematized picture of reality which, like an
+engineer's diagram, leaves out the cloying details of the object it is
+supposed to represent.
+
+The sceptical and positivistic results of Dewey's treatment of knowledge
+are set forth in an article entitled "Some Implications of
+Anti-Intellectualism," published in the _Journal of Philosophy,
+Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in 1910.[225] This was not included
+in the volume of collected essays published in the same year, but may be
+regarded as of some importance.
+
+After some comments on current anti-intellectualistic tendencies, Dewey
+proceeds to distinguish his own anti-intellectualism from that of
+others. This type "starts from acts, functions, as primary data,
+functions both biological and social in character; from organic
+responses, readjustments. It treats the knowledge standpoint, in all its
+patterns, structures, and purposes, as evolving out of, and operating in
+the interests of, the guidance and enrichment of these primary
+functions. The vice of intellectualism from this standpoint is not in
+making of logical relations and functions in and for knowledge, but in a
+false abstraction of knowledge (and the logical) from its working
+context."[226]
+
+The manner in which this exaltation of the "primary" functions at the
+expense of knowledge affects philosophy is indicated in the following
+passage: "Philosophy is itself a mode of knowing, and of knowing wherein
+reflective thinking is much in play.... As a mode of knowledge, it
+arises, like any intellectual undertaking, out of certain typical
+perplexities and conflicts of behavior, and its purpose is to help
+straighten these out. Philosophy may indeed render things more
+intelligible or give greater insight into existence; but these
+considerations are subject to the final criterion of what it means to
+acquire insight and to make things intelligible, _i. e._, namely,
+service of _special_ purposes in behavior, and limit by the _special_
+problems in which the need of insight arises. This is not to say that
+instrumentalism is merely a methodology or an epistemology preliminary
+to more ultimate philosophic or metaphysical inquiries, for it involves
+the doctrine that the origin, structure, and purpose of knowing are such
+as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of
+Being."[227]
+
+In the last analysis, this appears to be a confession, rather than an
+argument. It is the inevitable outcome of the functional analysis of
+intelligence. Thought is this organ, with these functions, and is
+capable of so much and no more. The limit to its capacity is set by the
+description of its nature. The nature of the functionalistic limitation
+of thought is well expressed in the words 'special' and 'specific.'
+Since thought is the servant of the 'primary' modes of experience, it
+can only deal with the problems set for it by preceding non-reflective
+processes. These problems are 'specific' because they are concrete
+problems of action, and are concerned with particular aspects of the
+environment. Dewey's formidable positivism would vanish at once,
+however, if his special psychology of the thought-process should be
+found untenable. Thought is limited, according to Dewey, because it is a
+very special form of activity, operating occasionally in the interest of
+the direct modes of experiencing.
+
+Probably every philosopher recognizes that speculation cannot be allowed
+to run wild. Some problems are worth while, others are artificial and
+trivial, and some means must be found for separating the sound and
+substantial from the tawdry and sentimental. The question is, however,
+whether Dewey's psychology furnishes a ground for such distinctions.
+Again, it should be noted that, in spite of the limitations placed upon
+thought by its very nature, as described by Dewey, certain philosophers,
+by his own confession, are guilty of "wholesale inquiries into the
+nature of Being." If thought can deal only with specific problems, then
+there can be no question as to whether philosophy _ought_ to be
+metaphysical. It is a repetition of the case of psychological _versus_
+ethical hedonism.
+
+Modern idealists would resent the imputation that there is any
+inclination on their part to deny the need for a critical attitude
+toward the problems and methods of philosophy. Kant's criticism of the
+'dogmatists' for their undiscriminating employment of the categories in
+the interpretation of reality, established an attitude which has been
+steadily maintained by his philosophical descendants. The idealist, in
+fact, has accused Dewey of laxity in the criticism of his own methods
+and presuppositions. The categories of description and natural selection
+by means of which his functionalism is established, it is argued, are of
+little service in the sphere of mind. And while Dewey accepts an
+evolutionary view of reality in general, the idealist has found
+evolutionism, at least in its biological form, too limited in scope to
+serve the extensive interests of philosophy. Dewey is right in opposing
+false problems and fanciful solutions in philosophy; but these evils are
+to be corrected, not by functional psychology, but by an empirical
+criticism of each method and each problem as it arises.
+
+It has been seen that, even in these more constructive essays, Dewey's
+position is largely defined in negatives. What might be expected, then,
+of the essays which are primarily critical? Perhaps the best answer will
+be afforded by a close analysis of one or more of them. Idealism, as has
+been said, receives most of Dewey's attention. There are three essays in
+_The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, which bear directly against
+idealism. One, "The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth," is directed
+against Bradley; another, "Experience and Objective Idealism," is a
+historical discussion of idealistic views. The third, which is broadest
+in scope, is entitled "Beliefs and Existences." This was originally
+delivered as the presidential address at the meeting of the American
+Philosophical Association in December, 1905, and was printed in the
+_Philosophical Review_ in March, 1906, under the title, "Beliefs and
+Realities."
+
+Dewey begins with a discussion of the personal and human character of
+beliefs. "Beliefs," he says, "look both ways, towards persons and
+towards things.... They form or judge--justify or condemn--the agents
+who entertain them and who insist upon them.... To believe is to ascribe
+value, impute meaning, assign import."[228] Beliefs are entertained by
+persons; by men as individuals and not as professional beings. Because
+they are essentially human, beliefs issue in action, and have their
+import in conduct. "That believed better is held to, asserted, affirmed,
+acted upon.... That believed worse is fled, resisted, transformed into
+an instrument for the better."[229] Beliefs, then, have a human side;
+they belong to people, and have a character which is expressed in the
+conduct to which they lead.
+
+On the other hand, beliefs look towards things. "'Reality' naturally
+instigates belief. It appraises itself and through this self-appraisal
+manages its affairs.... It is interpretation; not merely existence aware
+of itself as fact, but existence discerning, judging itself, approving
+and disapproving."[230] The vital connection between belief as personal,
+and as directed upon things, cannot be disregarded. "We cannot keep
+connection on one side and throw it away on the other. We cannot
+preserve significance and decline the personal attitude in which it is
+inscribed and operative...."[231] To take the world as something
+existing by itself, is to overlook the fact that it is always somebody's
+world, "and you shall not have completed your metaphysics till you have
+told whose world is meant and how and what for--in what bias and to what
+effect."[232]
+
+But philosophers have been guilty of error here. They have thrown aside
+all consideration of belief as a personal fact in reality, and have
+taken "an oath of allegiance to Reality, objective, universal, complete;
+made perhaps of atoms, perhaps of sensations, perhaps of logical
+meanings."[233] This Reality leaves no place for belief; for belief, as
+having to do with human adventures, can have no place in a cut and dried
+cosmos. The search for a world which is eternally fixed in eternal
+meanings has developed the present wondrous and formidable technique of
+philosophy.
+
+The attempt to exclude the human element from belief has resulted in
+philosophical errors. Philosophers have divided reality into two parts,
+"one of which shall alone be good and true 'Reality,' ... while the
+other part, that which is excluded, shall be referred exclusively to
+belief and treated as mere appearance...."[234] To cap the climax, this
+division of the world into two parts must be made by some philosopher
+who, being human, employs his own beliefs, and classifies things on the
+basis of his own experience. Can it be done? We are today in the
+presence of a revolt against such tendencies, Dewey says; and he
+proposes to give some sketch, "(1) of the historical tendencies which
+have shaped the situation in which a Stoic theory of knowledge claims
+metaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies that have furnished the
+despised principle of belief opportunity and means of reassertion."[235]
+
+Throughout this introduction Dewey speaks with considerable feeling, as
+if the question were a moral one, rather than a disquisition concerning
+the best method of dealing with the personal aspects of thought. His
+meaning, however, is far from being apparent. What does it mean to say
+that a Stoic theory of knowledge holds a monopoly in modern philosophy?
+In what sense has the philosophy of the past been misanthropic? _Is_
+Humanism a product of the twentieth century? Dewey's assertions are
+broad and sweeping; too broad even for a popular discourse, let alone a
+philosophical address. Perhaps his attitude will be more fully expressed
+in the historical inquiry which follows.
+
+Dewey begins this inquiry with the period of the rise of Christianity,
+which, because it emphasized faith and the personal attitude, seemed in
+a fair way to do justice to human belief. "That the ultimate principle
+of conduct is affectional and volitional; that God is love; that access
+to the principle is by faith, a personal attitude; that belief,
+surpassing logical basis and warrant, works out through its own
+operation its own fulfilling evidence: such was the implied moral
+metaphysic of Christianity."[236] But these implications had to be
+worked out into a theory, and the only logical or metaphysical systems
+which offered themselves as a basis for organization were those Stoic
+systems which "identified true existence with the proper object of
+logical reason." Aristotle alone among the ancients gave practical
+thought its due attention, but he, unfortunately, failed to assimilate
+"his idea of theoretical to his notion of practical knowledge."[237] In
+the Greek systems generally, "desiring reason culminating in beliefs
+relating to imperfect existence, stands forever in contrast with
+passionless reason functioning in pure knowledge, logically complete, of
+perfect being."[238]
+
+Dewey's discussion moves too rapidly here to be convincing. He does not
+take time, for instance, to make a very important distinction between
+the Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. He does not do justice to the
+purpose which animated the Greeks in their attempt to put thought on a
+'theoretical' basis. His confusion of Platonism with Neo-Platonism is
+especially annoying. And, most assuredly, his estimate of primitive
+Christianity needs corroboration. Probably Christianity, in its
+primitive form, did lay great stress upon individual beliefs and
+persuasions, but it was expected, nevertheless, that the Holy Spirit
+working in men would produce uniform results in the way of belief. When
+the uniformity failed to materialize, Christianity was forced, in the
+interests of union, to fall back upon some objective standard by which
+belief could be tested. After this was established, an end was made of
+individual inspiration. From the earliest times, therefore, it may be
+said, Christianity sought means for the suppression of free inquiry and
+belief, a proceeding utterly opposed to the spirit of ancient Greece.
+
+"I need not remind you," Dewey continues, "how through Neo-Platonism,
+St. Augustine, and the Scholastic renaissance, these conceptions became
+imbedded in Christian philosophy; and what a reversal occurred of the
+original practical principle of Christianity. Belief is henceforth
+important because it is the mere antecedent in a finite and fallen
+world, a temporal and phenomenal world infected with non-being, of true
+knowledge to be achieved only in a world of completed Being."[239]
+Through the hundreds of years that intervened before the world's
+awakening, the 'Stoic dogma,' enforced by authority, held the world in
+thrall. And still Dewey finds the mediaeval Absolutism in many respects
+more merciful than the Absolutism of modern philosophy. "For my part, I
+can but think that mediaeval absolutism, with its provision for
+authoritative supernatural assistance in this world and assertion of
+supernatural realization in the next, was more logical, as well as more
+humane, then the modern absolutism, that, with the same logical
+premises, bids man find adequate consolation and support in the fact
+that, after all, his strivings are already eternally fulfilled, his
+errors already eternally transcended, his partial beliefs already
+eternally comprehended."[240] Dewey takes no note of the fact that
+philosophy, as involving really free inquiry, was dead during the whole
+period of mediaeval predominance.
+
+The modern age, Dewey continues, brought intelligence back to earth
+again, but only partially. Fixed being was still supposed to be the
+object of thought. "The principle of the inherent relation of thought to
+being was preserved intact, but its practical locus was moved down from
+the next world to this."[241] Aristotle's mode of dealing with the
+Platonic ideas was followed, and Spinoza was the great exponent of "the
+strict correlation of the attribute of matter with the attribute of
+thought."
+
+But, again, the modern conception of knowledge failed to do justice to
+belief, in spite of the compromise that gave the natural world to
+intelligence, and the spiritual world to faith. This compromise could
+not endure, for Science encroached upon the field of religious belief,
+and invaded the sphere of the personal and emotional. "Knowledge, in its
+general theory, as philosophy, went the same way. It was pre-committed
+to the old notion: the absolutely real is the object of _knowledge_, and
+hence is something universal and impersonal. So, whether by the road of
+sensationalism or rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism or objective
+idealism, it came about that concrete selves, specific feeling and
+willing beings, were relegated with the beliefs in which they declare
+themselves to the 'phenomenal.'"[242] Feeling, volition, desiring
+thought have never received the justice due them in the whole course of
+philosophy. This is Dewey's conclusion. Little can be said in praise of
+his historical survey. There is scarcely a statement to which exception
+could not be taken, for the history of philosophy is not amenable to
+generalized treatment of this character.
+
+The reader turns more hopefully toward the third part of the essay, in
+which he is promised a positive statement of the new theory which does
+full justice to belief. "First, then, the very use of the knowledge
+standpoint, the very expression of the knowledge preoccupation, has
+produced methods and tests that, when formulated, intimate a radically
+different conception of knowledge, and of its relation to existence and
+belief, than the orthodox one."[243]
+
+But after this not unpromising introduction, Dewey falls into the
+polemical strain again. The argument need not be followed in detail,
+since it consists largely in a reassertion of the validity of belief as
+an element in knowledge. The general conclusion is that modern
+scientific investigation reveals itself, when examined, as nothing more
+that the "rendering into a systematic technique, into an art
+deliberately and delightfully pursued, the rougher and cruder means by
+which practical human beings have in all ages worked out the
+implications of their beliefs, tested them, and endeavored in the
+interests of economy, efficiency, and freedom, to render them coherent
+with one another."[244] This is presumably true. If no more is implied
+than is definitely asserted in this passage, the reader is apt to wonder
+who would deny it.
+
+Dewey again claims for his theory the support of modern science.
+"Biology, psychology, and the social sciences proffer an imposing body
+of concrete facts that also point to the rehabilitation of
+belief...."[245] Psychology has revised its notions in terms of
+beliefs. 'Motor' is writ large on the face of sensation, perception,
+conception, cognition in general. Biology shows that the organic
+instruments of the intellectual life were evolved for specifically
+practical purposes. The historical sciences show that knowledge is a
+social instrument for the purpose of meeting social needs. This
+testimony is not philosophy, Dewey says, but it has a bearing on
+philosophy. The new sciences have at least as much importance as
+mathematics and physics. "Such being the case, the reasons for ruling
+psychology and sociology and allied sciences out of competency to give
+philosophic testimony have more significance than the bare denial of
+jurisdiction."[246] The idealists, apparently, have been the worst
+offenders in this connection. "One would be almost justified in
+construing idealism as a Pickwickian scheme, so willing is it to
+idealize the principle of intelligence at the expense of its specific
+undertakings, were it not that this reluctance is the necessary outcome
+of the Stoic basis and tenor of idealism--its preoccupation with logical
+contents and relations in abstraction from their _situs_ and function in
+conscious living beings."[247]
+
+In conclusion, Dewey warns against certain possible misunderstandings.
+The pragmatic philosopher, he says, is not opposed to objective
+realities, and logical and universal thinking. Again, it is not to be
+supposed that science is any the less exact by reason of being
+instrumental to human beliefs. "Because reason is a scheme of working
+out the meanings of convictions in terms of one another and of the
+consequences they import in further experience, convictions are the
+more, not the less, amenable and responsible to the full exercise of
+reason."[248] And finally, Dewey assures the reader that the outcome of
+his discussion is not a solution, but a problem. Nobody is apt to
+dispute that statement.
+
+This very unsatisfactory essay is, nevertheless, a fair specimen of the
+polemical literature which was produced by Dewey and others during these
+years. Pragmatism was trying to make converts, and the _argumentum ad
+hominem_ was freely employed. If the opposition was painted a good deal
+blacker than was necessary, the end was supposed to justify the evident
+exaggeration. And so, in this essay, after accusing his contemporaries
+of adherence to tenets that they would have indignantly repudiated,
+after a wholesale and indiscriminate condemnation of idealism, Dewey
+concludes with--a problem. This period of propaganda is now quite
+definitely a thing of the past. Philosophical discussion, especially
+since the beginning of the great war, has entered upon a new epoch of
+sanity, and, perhaps, of constructive effort.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[212] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 227.
+
+[213] _Ibid._, p. 228. In connection with the discussion which follows
+see Bradley "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," in _Essays on
+Truth and Reality_, Chapter VI.
+
+[214] _Ibid._, p. 229.
+
+[215] _Op. cit._, p. 239.
+
+[216] _Ibid._, p. 240.
+
+[217] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, pp. 77-111.
+
+[218] _Ibid._, p. 77.
+
+[219] _Ibid._, p. 78.
+
+[220] _Op. cit._
+
+[221] _Ibid._, p. 84.
+
+[222] _Op. cit._, p. 90. Author's italics.
+
+[223] _Op. cit._, p. 87.
+
+[224] _Ibid._, p. 95. Author's italics.
+
+[225] Vol. VII. pp. 477-481.
+
+[226] _Ibid._, p. 478.
+
+[227] _Op. cit._, p. 479.
+
+[228] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 169.
+
+[229] _Ibid._, p. 170.
+
+[230] _Ibid._, p. 171.
+
+[231] _Ibid._
+
+[232] _Ibid._
+
+[233] _Ibid._, p. 172.
+
+[234] _Op. cit._, p. 175.
+
+[235] _Ibid._, p. 177.
+
+[236] _Ibid._, p. 17?.
+
+[237] _Op. cit._, p. 179.
+
+[238] _Ibid._
+
+[239] _Op. cit._
+
+[240] _Ibid._, p. 180.
+
+[241] _Ibid._, p. 181.
+
+[242] _Op. cit._, p. 183.
+
+[243] _Ibid._, p. 184.
+
+[244] _Ibid._, p. 187.
+
+[245] _Ibid._, p. 189.
+
+[246] _Op. cit._, p. 190.
+
+[247] _Ibid._, p. 191 f.
+
+[248] _Ibid._, p. 194.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+LATER DEVELOPMENTS
+
+
+Neo-realism began to flourish in this country after 1900, its rise being
+nearly contemporary with the spread of pragmatism. Many neo-realists,
+indeed, consider themselves followers of James. Dewey views the new
+realism, along with pragmatism and 'naturalistic idealism,' as "part and
+parcel of a general movement of intellectual reconstruction."[249] The
+neo-realists, like the pragmatists, have been active in the field of
+controversy, and the pages of the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology,
+and Scientific Methods_ are filled with exchanges between the
+representatives of the two schools, in the form of notes, articles,
+discussions, agreements, and disclaimers. Dewey has more sympathy for
+realism than for idealism. He finds among the writers of this school,
+however, a tendency toward the epistemological interpretation of thought
+which he so strongly opposes. An excellent statement of his estimate of
+realism is furnished by his "Brief Studies in Realism," published in the
+_Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in
+1911.[250]
+
+In beginning these studies Dewey observes that certain idealistic
+writers (not named) have been employing in support of their idealism
+certain facts which have an obvious physical nature and explanation.
+Such illusions as that of the bent stick in the water, the converging
+railway tracks, and the double image that occurs when the eye-ball is
+pressed, have, as the realists have well proved, a physical explanation
+which is entirely adequate. Why is it that the idealists remain
+unimpressed by this demonstration? There is a certain element in the
+realistic explanation which undoubtedly explains the reluctance of the
+idealists to be convinced. "Many realists, in offering the type of
+explanation adduced above, have treated the cases of seen light,
+doubled imagery, as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an
+inherent cognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as _cases
+of knowledge_, instead of as simply natural events...."[251]
+
+Dewey draws a distinction, at this point, between naive and presentative
+realism, employing, by way of illustration, the 'star' illusion, which
+turns upon the peculiar fact that a star may be seen upon the earth long
+after it has ceased to exist. The naive realist remains in the sphere of
+natural explanation. He accounts for the star illusion in physical
+terms. The astronomical star and the perceived star are two physical
+events within a continuous physical order or process. But the
+presentative realist maintains that, since the two stars are numerically
+separate, the astronomical star must be the 'real' star, while the
+perceived star is merely mental; the real star exists in independence of
+a knowing subject, while the perceived star is related to a mind. The
+naive realist has no need of the hypothesis of a knower, since he can
+furnish an adequate physical account of the numerical duplicity of the
+star. Dewey favors the naive standpoint, and affirms that presentative
+realism is tainted by an epistemological subjectivism. "Once depart," he
+says, "from this thorough naivete, and substitute for it the
+psychological theory that perception is a cognitive presentation of an
+object to a mind, and the first step is taken on the road which ends in
+an idealistic system."[252]
+
+The presentative realist, Dewey continues, finds himself possessed of
+two kinds of knowledge, when he comes to take account of inference; for
+inference is "in the field as an obvious and undisputed case of
+knowledge." There is the knowledge of perception by a knower, and the
+inferential knowledge which passes beyond perception. All reality,
+consequently, is related, directly or indirectly, to the knowing
+subject, and idealism is triumphant. But the real difficulty of the
+realist's position is that, if perception is a mode of knowing, it
+stands in unfavorable contrast with knowledge by inference. How can the
+inferred reality of the star be established, considering the
+subjectivity of all perception?
+
+Dewey is alert to the dangers which result from subjectivism, but does
+not distinguish, as carefully as he might, between knowledge as
+inference, and knowledge as perceptual awareness. Thus, while it might
+be granted that the subjective mind is a vicious abstraction, it does
+not follow that Dewey's particular interpretation of the function of
+inference is correct. And, although the "unwinking, unremitting eye" of
+the subjective knower might make experience merely a mental affair,
+there is no reason to believe that the operation of inference in
+perception would lead to the same result, for inference and awareness
+are quite distinct, in historical meaning and function. It is, in fact,
+a mere accident that inference and awareness (in the subjective sense)
+should both be called knowledge.
+
+In opposition to presentative realism, Dewey offers his 'naturalistic'
+interpretation of knowledge.[253] He finds that the function of
+inference, "although embodying the logical relation, is itself a natural
+and specifically detectable process among natural things--it is not a
+non-natural or epistemological relation, that is, a relation to a mind
+or knower not in the natural series...."[254] As has been observed,
+Dewey is safe in maintaining that inference is _not_ an operation
+performed by a subjective knower, but it does not follow from this that
+his interpretation of inference is correct. In fact, a discussion of
+inference is irrelevant to the matters which Dewey is here considering.
+
+In the second part of the essay, the discussion passes into a keen and
+rather clever recital of the difficulties that result from taking the
+knowledge relation to be 'ubiquitous.'[255] Since this relation is a
+constant factor in experience, it would seem as if it might be
+eliminated from philosophical calculations. The realist would be glad to
+eliminate it, but the idealist is not so willing; for, "since the point
+at issue is precisely the statement of the most universally defining
+trait of existence as existence, the invitation deliberately to
+disregard the most universal trait is nothing more or less than an
+invitation to philosophic suicide."[256] It is, Dewey says, as if two
+philosophers should set out to ascertain the relation which holds
+between an organism as 'eater' and the environment as 'food,' and one
+should find the essential thing to be the food, the other the eating.
+The 'foodists' would represent the realists, the 'eaterists' the
+idealists. No advance, he believes, can be made on this basis.
+
+In opposition to the epistemologists, Dewey would consider the knowledge
+relation not ubiquitous, but specific and occasional. As man bears other
+relations to his environment than that of eater, so is he also something
+more than a knower. "If the one who is knower is, in relation to
+objects, something else and more than their knower, and if objects are,
+_in relation to the one who knows them_, something else and other than
+things in a knowledge relation, there is somewhat to define and
+discuss...."[2] Dewey proposes to advance certain facts to support his
+contention that knowing is "a relation to things which depends upon
+other and more primary connections between a self and things; a relation
+which grows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates
+in their interests at specifiable crises."[257]
+
+This brings the discussion back to familiar ground again, and nothing is
+added to his previous statements of the functional conception of
+knowledge. While the realist (explicitly or implicitly) conceives the
+knowledge relation as obtaining between a subject knower and the
+external world, Dewey interprets the knowledge relation in terms of
+organism and environment. The 'ubiquity' of the knowledge relation is
+disposed of, as has been seen, by conceiving knowledge from an entirely
+different standpoint; by reducing all knowledge to inference, and
+abolishing the knowing subject. Dewey is plainly under the impression
+that the only alternative to the ubiquitous knower is his naturalistic,
+biological interpretation of the processes of inference.
+
+In support of his naturalistic logic, Dewey argues as follows: (1) All
+perception involves reference to an organism. "We might about as well
+talk of the production of a specimen case of water as a presentation of
+water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too accustomed to talk
+about perceptions and the organism."[258] (2) Awareness is only a single
+phase of experience. We 'know' only a small part of the causes which
+affect us as agents. "This means, of course, that things, the things
+that come to be _known_, are primarily not objects of awareness, but
+causes of weal and woe, things to get and things to avoid, means and
+obstacles, tools and results."[259] (3) Knowing is only a special phase
+of the behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation, but very important as having
+to do with means for the practical and scientific control of the
+environment.
+
+In the final analysis, it will be seen that Dewey refutes the realist by
+substituting inference for what the realist calls 'consciousness,' and
+settling the issue by this triumph in the field of dialectics, rather
+than by an appeal to the facts. Nowhere does Dewey do justice to those
+concrete situations which, to the realist, seem to necessitate a
+definition of consciousness as awareness. His attitude toward the
+realists may be summed up in the statement that he finds in most
+realistic systems the fault to which his logical theory is especially
+opposed: the tendency to define the problem of logic as that of the
+relation of thought at large to reality at large, and to distinguish the
+content of mind from the content of the world on an existential rather
+than on a functional basis.
+
+One of Dewey's more recent studies, "The Logic of Judgments of
+Practise,"[260] seems to add something positive to his interpretation of
+knowledge. A practical judgment, Dewey explains at the outset of this
+study, is differentiated from others, not by having a separate organ and
+source, but by having a specific sort of subject-matter. It is concerned
+with things to be done or situations demanding action. "He had better
+consult a physician," and "It would be well for you to invest in these
+bonds," are examples of the practical judgment.
+
+These propositions, as will be seen, are not cast in what the logician
+calls logical form, with regular terms and copula. When put in that
+form, they seem to lose the direct reference to action which, Dewey
+says, differentiates them from the 'descriptive' judgment of the form
+_S_ is _P_.[261] This apparently trivial matter is really important.
+Although every statement embodies judgment, some statements do not
+reflect the ground upon which they are asserted. In this condition they
+may be viewed as opinions, suggestions, or guesses, looking towards
+judgment rather than reflecting its results. True judgment is occupied
+with reasons, proofs, and grounds, and does not concern itself with
+action as action. Only when taken as the expression of an individual's
+attitude, do Dewey's practical judgments (or assertions) possess the
+direct reference to action which he selects as their chief
+characteristic. The statement, "You ought to invest in these bonds,"
+does, indeed, suggest a specific action, but in so doing it loses its
+character as a judgment. Put in more logical form, "You are one of those
+who should invest in these bonds," the proposition is more clearly the
+expression of a judgment, and leads back to its premises. Attention
+turns from specific action as such to action as a typical or universal
+fact. In short, Dewey's practical judgment is not a true judgment; it
+will be seen that it is studied, not as a logical, but as a
+psychological phenomenon.
+
+In pursuance of his psychological method, Dewey discovers several
+interesting facts about judgments of practice.(1) These judgments imply
+an incomplete situation,--concretely and specifically incomplete; they
+express a need. (2) The judgment is itself a factor in assisting toward
+the completion of the situation, since it directs an action necessary to
+the fulfilment of the need. (3) The subject-matter of the judgment
+expresses the fact that one outcome is to be preferred to another. The
+element of preference is peculiar to the practical judgment, for it is
+not found in merely descriptive judgments, or those 'confined to the
+given.' (4) A practical judgment implies both means and end, the act
+that completes, and the completeness. It is in this respect 'binary.'
+(5) The judgment of what is to be done demands an accurate statement of
+the course of action to be pursued and the means to be employed, and
+these are to be determined relatively to the end in view. (6) It finally
+appears that what is true of the practical judgment may be true of all
+judgments of fact; it may be held that "all judgments of fact have
+reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and the
+discovery of means for their attempted realization."[262]
+
+This ingenious reading of functionalism out of the practical judgment
+is, after all, merely a drawing forth of the psychological implications
+previously placed in it. That judgment is an instrument for completing a
+situation; that it is linked up with action through desire and
+preference; that it seeks to determine the means for effecting a
+practical outcome,--these typically instrumental notions are of one
+piece with the system of belief that led Dewey to hit upon the practical
+judgment as the embodiment of a direction to action. It is important to
+distinguish between the logical and the psychological aspects of these
+propositions. Action as psychological is one thing; as the
+subject-matter of judgment, it is another. In coming to a decision as to
+how to act, the agent sets his proposed action over against himself, and
+considers it in its universal and typical character. His motor
+tendencies, his feelings, his desires factor in the situation
+psychologically considered; but they do not enter judgment as
+psychological facts, but rather, if at all, as data which have a
+significance beyond their mere particularity. Dewey remains at the
+psychological standpoint, giving no attention to the genuinely logical
+aspects of his 'judgments of practice.'
+
+From the study of the practical judgment, Dewey passes on to a
+consideration of judgments of value, proposing to maintain that "value
+judgments are a species of practical judgments."[263] There will be a
+distinct gain for moral and economic theory, he believes, in treating
+value as concerned with acts necessary to complete a given
+need-situation. There is no obvious reason why Dewey should pass to the
+pragmatic theory of value through the medium of the practical judgment,
+since it could be directly considered on its own account. At any rate,
+the discussion of value judgments which follows must stand on its own
+merits; it has no vital relation to what precedes.
+
+It is, as usual, the psychological characteristics of the value judgment
+that attract Dewey's attention. Any process of judgment, according to
+his analysis, deals with a specific subject-matter, not from the
+standpoint of any objective quality it may possess, but with reference
+to its functional capacity. "Relative, or comparative, durability,
+cheapness, suitability, style, esthetic attractiveness [_e. g._, in a
+suit of clothes] constitute value traits. They are traits of objects not
+_per se_, but _as entering into a possible and foreseen completing of
+the situation_. Their value is their force in precisely this
+function."[264]
+
+Attention should not be distracted from this interpretation of value,
+Dewey warns, through confusing the value sought with the price or market
+value of the goods. Price values, like the qualities and patterns of the
+goods, are data which must be considered in making the judgment, but
+they are not the values which the judgment seeks. The value to be
+determined is here, is specific, and must be established by reference to
+the specific or psychological situation as it presents itself.
+
+It is true, as Dewey says, that in judgment a value is being established
+which has not been determined previously. But it must be insisted that
+this value is not estimated by reference to the specific situation in
+its limited aspects. The weight of the past bears against the moment;
+the act of judgment bases itself upon knowledge objective and
+substantial; the test of the value of the thing is its place and
+function, not in the here and now, but in the whole system of
+experience. Dewey has excluded the reference of the thing to objective,
+organized reality, by specifying that its value shall be decided upon
+with reference to a specific situation. This limitation of the judgment
+situation is imposed upon it from without, and from a special point of
+view,--that of functional psychology. Every object and every situation
+has its quality of uniqueness and particularity; but the judgment, as
+judgment, is not concerned with this aspect of things. Judgment seizes
+upon the generic aspect of objects; this kind of a suit of clothes is
+the kind that is appropriate to this type of situation. The movement of
+judgment is objective and universal, not subjective and psychological.
+
+Dewey finds one alternative especially opposed to his 'specific'
+judgment of value; that is, the proposition that evaluation involves a
+comparison of the present object with some fixed standard. When the
+fixed standard is investigated, it is found to depend on something else,
+and this on something else again in an infinite regress. Finally, the
+_Summum Bonum_, as the absolute end term of such a _regressus_, turns
+out to be a fiction. Dewey is quite right in maintaining that value is
+not something eternally fixed. This does not, however, remove the
+possibility of 'real' value, as opposed to mere expediency.
+
+Value as established, Dewey continues, must be taken into consideration
+in making a value judgment. At the same time, it will not do to accept
+the established value from mere force of habit. Ultimately, he finds,
+all genuine valuation implies a degree of revaluation. "To many," he
+observes, "it will appear to be a survival of an idealistic
+epistemology,"[265] presumably because it implies a real change in
+reality, as opposed to a fixed and rigid order of external reality. But
+practical judgments, Dewey says, as having reference to proposed acts,
+necessarily look toward some proposed change which the act is to effect.
+It is not in an epistemological, but in a practical sense, that judgment
+involves a change in values.
+
+The outcome of the discussion so far, Dewey believes, is to show, first
+of all, that "the passage of a proposition into action is not a miracle,
+but the realization of its own character--its own meaning as
+logical,"[266] and, in the second place, to suggest that all judgments,
+not merely practical ones, may have their import in reference to some
+difference to be brought about through action.
+
+In the third part of the essay, Dewey's discussion leads him back to
+sense perceptions as forms of practical judgment. There is no doubt, in
+his mind, that many perceptions do have an import for action. Not merely
+sign-posts, and familiar symbols of the kind, but many perceptions
+lacking this obvious reference, have a significance for conduct. It must
+not, of course, be supposed that all perception, at any one time, has
+cognitive properties; for some of the perceptions have esthetic, and
+other non-cognitive properties. Only certain elements of a situation
+have the function of cognition.
+
+Dewey goes on to say that care must be taken in the use made of these
+sign-functions in connection with inference. "There is a great
+difference between saying that the perception of a shape affords an
+indication of how to act and saying that the perception of shape is
+itself an inference."[267] No judgment, Dewey seems to imply, is
+involved in responding to the motor cue furnished by a familiar object.
+Again, the common idea that present perception consists of sensations as
+immediate, plus inferred images, implies that every perception involves
+inference. But the merging of sensations and images in perception can be
+explained naturally, by the fusion of nervous processes, and no
+supplementary (transcendental) act of mind is needed to explain the
+integrity of experience.
+
+The tendency to take perception as the object of knowledge, Dewey
+continues, instead of as simply cognitive, a term in knowledge, is due
+to two chief causes. The first is that in practical judgments the
+pointing of the thing towards action is so universal a trait as to be
+overlooked, and the second is that signs, because of their importance,
+become objects of study on their own account, and in this condition
+cease to function directly as cognitive. Dewey means, apparently, that
+because the cognitive aspect of things is never attended to except when
+they are 'known,' or treated as objects of judgment, there is a tendency
+to suppose that they always have the character that pertains to them as
+'known' things.
+
+Again, Dewey says, perception may be translated as the effect of a cause
+that produced it. But the cause does not ordinarily appear in
+experience, and the perceptions, as effects, remain isolated from the
+system of things. Truth and error then become matters of the relation of
+the perception to its cause. The difficulties attendant upon this view
+can be avoided by taking sense perceptions as terms in practical
+judgments. Here the 'other term' which is sought is the action proposed
+by the perception. "To borrow an illustration of Professor Woodbridge's:
+A certain sound indicates to the mother that her baby needs attention.
+If there is error it is not because the sound ought to mean so many
+vibrations of the air, while as matter of fact it doesn't even suggest
+air vibrations, but because there is wrong inference as to the act to be
+performed."[268] The idea is tested, not by its correspondence with some
+formal reality, but by its ability to lead up to the experience to which
+it points.
+
+From the consideration of error as cognitive, Dewey passes on to
+consider its status as primitive sense data. He draws a distinction
+between sensation as psychological and as logical. Ordinary sensation,
+just as it comes, is often too confused to serve as a basis for
+inference. "It has often been pointed out that sense qualities being
+just what they are, it is illegitimate to introduce such notions as
+obscurity or confusion into them: a slightly illuminated color is just
+as irretrievably what it is, as clearly itself, as an object in the
+broad glare of noon-day."[269] But when a confused object is made a
+datum for inference, its confusion is just the thing to be got rid of.
+It is broken up by analysis into simple elements, and the psychologist's
+sensations are logical products, not psychological facts. "Locke writes
+a mythology of the history of knowledge, starting from clear and
+distinct meanings, each simple, well-defined, sharply and unambiguously
+just what it is on its face, without concealments and complications, and
+proceeds by 'natural' compoundings up to the store of complex ideas, and
+the perception of simple relations of agreement among ideas: a
+perception always certain if the ideas are simple, and always
+controllable in the case of the complex ideas if we consider the simple
+ideas and connections by which they are reached. Thus he established the
+habit of taking logical discriminations as historical or psychological
+primitives--as 'sources' of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks
+upon inference."[270] This way of treating perception found its way into
+psychology and into empirical logic. The acceptance of the doctrine that
+all sense involves knowledge, Dewey believes, leads to an
+epistemological logic; but all perception must involve thought if the
+'given' is the simple sensation.
+
+There is nothing especially new in this critique of sensationalism.
+Historically, sensationalism had been displaced by idealism, and the
+idea that reality is a construct of ideas held together by logical
+relations was given up long before functionalism arrived on the scene.
+But if inference, or rationality, is not present in all experience as
+the combiner of simple into complex ideas, it may be present in some
+other form, even more vital. Dewey, however, does not consider such
+possibilities.
+
+Finally, in an article of slightly earlier date than the studies which
+have just been considered, Dewey returns to a consideration of
+metaphysics, and the possibility of a metaphysical standpoint in
+philosophy. This article, entitled "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical
+Inquiry,"[271] deserves careful notice.
+
+The comments of a number of mechanistic biologists on vitalism furnish
+the point of departure for Dewey's discussion. These scientists hold
+that, if the organism is considered simply as a part of external nature,
+as an existing system, it can be satisfactorily analyzed by the methods
+of physico-chemical science. But if the question of ultimate origins is
+raised, if it be asked _why_ nature exhibits certain innate
+potentialities for producing life, science can give no answer. These
+questions belong to metaphysics, and vitalistic or biocentric
+conceptions may be valid in the metaphysical sphere.
+
+This raises the question of the nature of metaphysical inquiry. Dewey
+says that the ultimate traits or tendencies which give rise to life need
+not necessarily be considered ultimate in a temporal sense. On the
+contrary, they may be viewed as permanent, 'irreducible traits,' which
+are ultimate in the sense of being always present in reality. The
+inquiry and search for these ultimate traits is what constitutes valid
+metaphysics. "They are found equally and indifferently whether a
+subject-matter in question be dated 1915 or ten million years B. C.
+Accordingly, they would seem to deserve the name of ultimate, or
+irreducible, traits. As such they may be made the object of a kind of
+inquiry differing from that which deals with the genesis of a particular
+group of existences, a kind of inquiry to which the name metaphysical
+may be given."[272]
+
+The irreducible traits which Dewey finds are, in the physical sciences,
+plurality, interaction, and change. "These traits have to be begged or
+taken in any case," for wherever and whenever we take the world, we must
+explain it as "a plurality of diverse interacting and changing
+existences."[273] The evolutionary sciences add another trait; that is,
+evolution, or development in a direction. "For evolution appears to be
+just one of the irreducible traits. In other words, it is a fact to be
+reckoned with in considering the traits of diversity, interaction, and
+change which have been enumerated as among the traits taken for granted
+in all scientific subject-matter."[274]
+
+The doctrine that plurality, interaction, change, and evolution are
+permanent traits of reality gains in clearness when contrasted with the
+opposed theories which involve creation, absolute origins, or temporal
+ultimates. The term 'ultimate origins' may be taken in a merely relative
+sense which is valid. The French language has an origin in the Latin
+tongues, which is an ultimate origin for French, but this is not an
+absolutely ultimate origin, since the Latin tongues, in their turn,
+have origins. It is, for instance, meaningless to inquire into the
+ultimate origin of the world as a whole; and it is equally futile to
+trace any part of the world back to an absolute origin. "That scientific
+inquiry does not itself deal with any question of ultimate origins,
+except in the purely relative sense already indicated, is, of course,
+recognized. But it also seems to follow from what has been said that
+scientific inquiry does not generate, or leave over, such a question for
+some other discipline, such as metaphysics, to deal with."[275]
+
+Theories like that of Laplace, for instance, trace the world back to an
+origin in some undifferentiated universe; or, in Spencer's terms, some
+state of homogeneity. From this original state the world is said to
+evolve. But the undifferentiated mass lacks the plurality, interaction,
+and change which are presupposed in all scientific explanation. These
+traits must be present before development can occur. "To get change we
+have to assume other structures which interact with it, existences not
+covered by the formula."[276] In short, although Dewey only implies
+this, all scientific explanation presupposes a system of interacting
+parts; nothing can be explained by reference to an undifferentiated
+world which lacks such traits.
+
+Dewey is particularly interested in the origin of mind or intelligence.
+In dealing with mind, he says, we must begin with the present, and in
+the present we find that the world has an organization, "in spots," of
+the kind we call intelligence. This existing intelligence cannot be
+explained by any theory which reduces it to something inferior. The
+"attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and
+irreducible existence of the thing dealt with."[277] Mind cannot be
+explained by being explained away, nor can it be explained as a
+development out of an original source in which the potentiality, or
+direction of change towards mind, was lacking.
+
+The evolution of things, Dewey says, is a real fact, and is to be
+reckoned with. Moreover, if everything that exists changes, then the
+evolution of life and mind surely have a bearing on the nature of
+physico-chemical things. They must have in them the trait of direction
+of change towards life and mind. "To say, accordingly, that the
+existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes
+impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics is to say something which
+the situation calls for."[278] In other words, the world, metaphysically
+considered, must have evolution, as well as the physico-chemical traits.
+"Without a doctrine of evolution we might be able to say, not that
+matter _caused_ life, but that matter under certain conditions of highly
+complicated and intensified interaction is living. With the doctrine of
+evolution, we can add to this statement that the interactions and
+changes of matter are themselves of a kind to bring about that complex
+and intensified interaction which is life."[279] Dewey holds that
+evolution rests upon the reality of time: "time itself, or genuine
+change in a specific direction, is itself one of the ultimate traits of
+the world irrespective of date."[280]
+
+This article presents on the whole a distinct advance over the position
+taken in the earlier essay, "Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism,"
+which was reviewed in the last chapter. Dewey is not now, to be sure,
+instituting a wholesale inquiry into the nature of being, but he betrays
+an interest in the general, as opposed to the specific traits of
+reality. He inquires into the real nature of the world, and believes
+that he discovers its ultimate traits. This essay, of course, is
+incomplete, and consequently indefinite in certain important respects.
+It may be said, nevertheless, to give an accurate view of the
+metaphysical back-ground against which all of Dewey's theories are
+projected. His metaphysics, as would be expected, are evolutionary
+throughout, and evolution is conceived, where he is at all definite, in
+biological terms.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[249] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, Introduction, p. iv.
+
+[250] Vol. VIII: "I. Naive Realism _vs._ Presentative Realism," pp.
+393-400. "II. Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the
+Knowledge Relation," pp. 546-554.
+
+[251] _Op. cit._, p. 395.
+
+[252] _Ibid._, p. 397.
+
+[253] In this connection Dewey's disagreements with Professor McGilvary
+are of especial interest. See especially McGilvary's article, "Pure
+Experience and Reality" (_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XVI, 1907, pp.
+266-284) and Dewey's reply, together with McGilvary's rejoinder
+(_Ibid._, pp. 419-424). McGilvary failed to understand that Dewey's
+argument was conducted on a purely 'naturalistic' basis, an almost
+inevitable error, in view of Dewey's practical identification of
+psychology, biology, and logic.
+
+[254] _Ibid._, p. 399.
+
+[255] Dewey is here dealing with the 'epistemological' realists, among
+whom he includes such writers as Bertrand Russell. In an article
+entitled "The Existence of the World as a Problem" (_Philosophical
+Review_, Vol. XXIV, 1915, pp. 357-370), Dewey argues that Russell, in
+making a problem of the existence of the external world, implies its
+existence in his formulation of the problem. Dewey argues that, since
+the existence of the world is presupposed in every such formulation, it
+cannot be called in question. This is like disposing of Zeno's paradox
+on the ground that arrows fly anyway.
+
+[256] _Op. cit._, p. 548.
+
+[257] _Ibid._
+
+[258] _Op. cit._
+
+[259] _Ibid._, p. 553.
+
+[260] _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol.
+XII, 1915. Parts I and II, pp. 505-523; Part III, pp. 533-543.
+
+[261] _Ibid._, p. 506.
+
+[262] _Op. cit._, p. 511.
+
+[263] _Op. cit._, p. 514.
+
+[264] _Ibid._, p. 515.
+
+[265] _Op. cit._, p. 521.
+
+[266] _Op. cit._, p. 522 f.
+
+[267] _Ibid._, p. 536.
+
+[268] _Op. cit._, p. 538.
+
+[269] _Ibid._, p. 540.
+
+[270] _Op. cit._, p. 541.
+
+[271] _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, Vol.
+XII, 1915, pp. 337-345.
+
+[272] _Op. cit._, p. 340.
+
+[273] _Ibid._
+
+[274] _Ibid._, p. 345.
+
+[275] _Op. cit._, p. 339.
+
+[276] _Ibid._, p. 343.
+
+[277] _Ibid._, p. 344.
+
+[278] _Op. cit._, p. 345.
+
+[279] _Ibid._
+
+[280] _Ibid._
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+CONCLUSIONS
+
+
+Dewey's interest as a philosopher centres, from first to last, upon
+knowledge and the knowing process. All that is vital in his ethical,
+social, and educational theories depends ultimately upon the special
+interpretation of the function of knowledge which constitutes his chief
+claim to philosophical distinction. Dewey's logical theory, as has been
+seen, was the natural and inevitable outcome of his demand for an
+empirical and 'psychological' description of thought as a
+'transformatory' process working actual changes in reality. If in the
+beginning of his career he found the problem of the nature of knowledge
+all-important for his own interests, he came in the end to regard it as
+the problem of problems for all philosophers. There is no mistaking
+Dewey's conviction that the special interpretation of knowledge which he
+advocates opens the door to important advances in philosophical
+speculation, while it ends all discussion of those pseudo-problems which
+result from a false, epistemological formulation of the function of
+knowledge.
+
+The history of the development of Dewey's thought, set forth in the
+preceding chapters, does not pretend to furnish an adequate estimate of
+his philosophical system. The two questions, of origin and worth, are,
+after all, distinct. The genetic account of Dewey's theory of knowledge
+may serve to make its bearings and implications better understood, may
+reveal its deeper meaning and import, but the final estimate of its
+value as a philosophical hypothesis depends on other considerations. In
+this final chapter, it is proposed to deal with the question of the
+positive value of functionalism as a working hypothesis. This criticism
+may also serve to gather together the threads of criticism and comment
+which run through the previous chapters, and reveal the general ground
+upon which the writer's opposition to Dewey's theory is based.
+
+There can be no question that Dewey's theory of knowledge rests,
+finally, upon the doctrine of 'immediate empiricism;' upon his belief in
+"the necessity of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method
+that has now made its way in all the natural sciences...."[281] This
+doctrine is clearly stated in the first essay reviewed in this study,
+"The Psychological Standpoint" (1886). To quote again from that essay:
+"The psychological standpoint as it has developed itself is this: all
+that is, is for consciousness or knowledge. The business of the
+psychologist is to give a genetic account of the various elements within
+this consciousness, and thereby fix their place, determine their
+validity, and at the same time show definitely what the real and eternal
+nature of this consciousness is."[282] The descriptive method here
+advocated does not differ, as an actual mode of procedure, from that of
+Dewey's later empiricism. It lies at the basis of all his speculation,
+earlier as well as later, and is undoubtedly the most important single
+element in his philosophical system.
+
+In "The Psychological Standpoint" Dewey ascribes the failure of the
+earlier empiricists to their desertion of the direct descriptive method
+(a criticism repeated frequently in later essays). Locke, for instance,
+instead of describing experience as it actually occurs, interprets it in
+terms of certain assumed simple sensations, the products of reflection.
+These non-experienced elements, Dewey believes, have no place in a
+purely empirical philosophy.
+
+But the empiricist must deal in some manner with the products of
+reflection. The atoms of chemistry and the elements of the psychologist
+are not experienced facts, but still they play a valuable, indispensable
+role in the technique of the sciences. What is to be done with them? It
+must be made to appear that they are valid within knowledge, but invalid
+elsewhere. This leads to a separation of knowing from other modes of
+experiencing, and the descriptive method is depended upon to maintain
+the empirical validity of the separation. It has been seen how Dewey's
+attempt to interpret knowledge led gradually to a distinction between
+the 'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' processes of experience.
+
+The completed theory of knowledge depends for its validity upon the
+distinction thus established between knowing (as reflective thought) and
+the practical attitudes of life. The concepts, elements, and other
+apparatus of reflection are employed, it is said, only when there is
+thinking,--and this is only occasionally. Theory is an instrument to be
+used in connection with that special activity, reflective thought, the
+general aim of which is the furtherance of the practical ends of life.
+
+One fairly obvious difficulty with this separation of reflection from
+the other life activities is that the 'direct descriptive method,' as
+here employed, is itself reflective. How does it come, then, that this
+particular method achieves such an effective hegemony over the other
+modes of reflection? The 'descriptive method,' as the method of pure
+experience, is made to determine or supplant all other methods. It
+defines the limits and aims of conceptual systems; it marks out the
+limits, aims, and tests of reflective thought in general. How, it may be
+asked, does the 'direct descriptive method' escape the limitations which
+it imposes upon the other forms of reflective thought?
+
+It has been seen that in Dewey's view logic is subsidiary to psychology.
+But psychology (his psychology) results from the application of the
+'descriptive method' to experience. The 'descriptive method,' it may be
+inferred from this, is not subject to logical criticism. On the
+contrary, it is the basis of all logic. Logic, as the criticism of
+categories, is confined to the study of the instrumental concepts as
+functioning within the knowledge experience, and its limits are set by
+descriptive psychology. There is, apparently, no means by which the
+'direct descriptive method' can itself be brought under criticism.
+
+Dewey says: "By our postulate, things are what they are experienced to
+be; and, unless knowing is the sole and only genuine mode of
+experiencing, it is fallacious to say that Reality is just and
+exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower; or
+even that it _is_, relatively and piece-meal, what it is to a finite and
+partial knower."[283] Reality is not simply what it is known as, for it
+is experienced in other ways than by being known. "But I venture to
+repeat that ... the inferential factor must _exist_, or must occur, and
+that all existence is direct and vital, so that philosophy can pass upon
+its nature--as upon the nature of all of the rest of its
+subject-matter--only by first ascertaining what it exists or occurs
+_as_."[284]
+
+Reflection, then, is not designed to furnish an insight into the nature
+of things. Acquaintance with reality must be obtained, not by reflecting
+upon it, but by describing it as it occurs. Whatever else this may mean,
+it certainly aims at demonstrating the superiority of description to the
+supposedly less effective modes of thought. It cannot be conceded,
+however, that 'description,' as employed by Dewey, is non-reflective, or
+super-reflective. If things are not what they are known as, then they
+are not what they are known as to a describer. The point of this
+objection will be obvious if it is remembered that it is the method of
+'direct description' which enables Dewey to distinguish between the
+'cognitional' and the 'non-cognitional' activities of life, and make
+thought the servant of action. If Dewey's descriptive method is not
+reflective, then there is no such thing as reflection.
+
+Passing for the moment from this criticism, which is not apt to be
+convincing in such abstract form, it may be well to consider for a time
+the psychology upon which Dewey's logical theory is grounded: the
+psychology which is established by the 'direct descriptive method.'
+
+From the standpoint of the nervous correlates of experience, Dewey's
+theory involves two postulates: first, that customary conduct is carried
+on by an habitual set of nervous adjustments, and, second, that
+reflection is a process whereby new reactions are established when
+habitual modes of response fail to meet a critical situation.
+
+It must be clearly recognized that, so far as the nervous system is
+concerned, the scheme is highly speculative. The advance made by
+physiology towards an analysis and understanding of the minute and
+specialized parts of the nervous organism has necessarily been slow and
+uncertain. Whatever plausibility Dewey's theory possesses must depend,
+not upon the technical results of neurology, but upon the external
+evidence which seems to justify some such scheme of nervous
+organization.
+
+An examination of this evidence shows that it falls under two main
+heads: (1) facts drawn from the observation of the outward behavior of
+the organism, and (2) facts derived from an introspective analysis of
+the thought-process.
+
+The study of behavior shows that man thinks only now and then. Most of
+his conduct is, literally, thoughtless. It is said that thought is
+outwardly manifested by a characteristic attitude, marked by hesitation
+and an obvious effort at adjustment. The introspective analysis of the
+thought-process shows that it alone, among experiences, is accompanied
+by analysis, abstraction, and mediation. Again, both the internal and
+external evidence show that a puzzling situation (whose nervous
+correlate is a conflict of impulses) is the stimulus which awakens
+thought. These are important items in the list of evidence which
+supports the functional theory.
+
+It would be a tedious and unnecessary task to subject each of these bits
+of evidence to empirical criticism. It will be better to deal with them
+by showing that they do not necessarily imply functionalism, since they
+are compatible with a psychology directly opposed to the fundamental
+assumptions of Dewey's theory.
+
+It is doubtless true that men think only occasionally and with some
+reluctance. This is a common observation. What is to be made of this
+intermittance of thought? The evidence merely shows that man is more
+wide awake, energetic, and alert at some times than at others. On these
+occasions every faculty of the organism is in operation, higher as well
+as lower centres are pitched to a high degree of responsiveness, not at
+hap-hazard, to be sure, but _apropos_--tuned to the situation. In saying
+that men think only now and then nothing more is necessarily implied
+than that men are for the most part sluggish and indifferent, and the
+periods of high intensification of the normal processes contrast sharply
+with the habitual lethargy of conduct.
+
+Against Dewey, it will be maintained here that thought cannot be
+defined as a special kind of activity considered from the side of the
+organism. The life processes are constantly welded into a single unified
+activity, which may, as a whole, be directed upon different objects.
+Thus, from the side of its objects, this life activity may be called
+eating, running, reading, and whatever else one chooses. Thinking, from
+this standpoint, may be defined as the direction of effort upon symbols
+and abstract terms. But thinking in this case would be identified on the
+basis of its content, not in terms of special nervous activities in the
+organism. Whether, therefore, thinking signifies that intense periodical
+activity which has been noted, or preoccupation with a certain kind of
+subject-matter, it in no case implies the operation of a special organic
+faculty of the type described by Dewey.
+
+But, again, it is said that true reflection is marked by a certain
+characteristic bodily attitude, which bespeaks inner conflict and a
+search for adjustment. This contention seems to have little ground in
+fact. The puzzled, hesitating, undecided expression that is usually
+supposed to betray deep cogitation may in fact mean simply hesitation
+and bewilderment,--the need for thought, rather than its presence. The
+expression reveals a certain degree of incompetence and sluggishness in
+the individual concerned, and signifies a lack of wide-awakeness and
+responsiveness. A student puzzling over his algebra, a speaker
+extemporizing an argument, a ball-player using all his resources to
+defeat the enemy, have attitudes so unlike that no analysis could
+discover in them a common form of expression. And yet it would be
+madness to deny that thinking attends their various performances. There
+is, in short, no evidence from the side of bodily expression to indicate
+the presence in man of a special nervous faculty called reflection.
+
+Consider next the contention that the cue to thought is a puzzling
+situation, involving a problem. No problem, no thought; no thought, no
+problem. This may mean either that a man finding himself in a difficult
+situation uses all his energy and resource to escape from it, or, that
+he never concerns himself with abstract symbols except under the spur of
+necessity. The former meaning contains some truth, but the latter is
+what Dewey would call a 'dark saying.' If by 'thought' be meant that
+period of high activity of all the faculties which is only occasional,
+it is doubtless true enough that a problem is frequently needed to
+awaken it. Man is content to let life glide along with a minimum of
+effort; he cannot, if he would, long maintain the state of high activity
+here called 'thinking.' As a consequence of not thinking when he should,
+man frequently finds himself involved in situations requiring the
+exercise of all the energy and resource he possesses. But the really
+efficient 'thinker' is the man who keeps his eyes open, who sees ahead.
+He is not efficient merely because of the excellence of his established
+modes of response, but, more particularly, because he is alive and
+alert. His thinking is effective in preventing difficult situations, as
+well as in getting out of them.
+
+Defining 'thought,' however, as the direction of activity upon symbols
+and conceptions, there seems to be little warrant for asserting that it
+functions only on the occasion of a concrete, specific problem. One
+would say, on the contrary, that this would be an unfavorable occasion
+for the study of fundamental principles, whether scientific or
+practical. Summing up the external evidence, then, one would say that it
+accords as well with the hypothesis that the life processes constitute a
+single activity directed upon various objects, as with the hypothesis
+that thought is a very special organic activity, having a special
+biological function. At least, the evidence for the existence of such a
+special faculty is dubious and uncertain.
+
+What does the internal evidence prove? The analysis of thought contained
+in James's chapter on "Reasoning" in the _Principles of Psychology_ has
+been the guide for Dewey and other pragmatists in this connection.[285]
+James undertakes to show that reasoning is marked off from other
+processes by the employment of analysis, abstraction, and the use of
+mediating terms. It must be urged here, not only against James, but
+against a considerable modern tradition, that this account of thinking
+is misleading and inaccurate. The question to be faced, of course, is
+whether the processes of thought differ radically from the
+non-reflective processes _in kind_, or whether they are simply the
+intensification of processes which attend all conscious life. It should
+be noted that no concession is made to the notion that thinking is a
+special kind of process; only its subject-matter is special, or else
+thought is simply a period of wide-awakeness and alertness. In the
+latter sense, thought involves an intensification of the powers of
+observation, an awakening of memory, a general stimulation of all the
+faculties. It calls for the fullest possible apprehension, demands the
+most complete insight into the nature of the situation that the
+capacities can provide. The contrast between the adequate view of
+reality achieved in this manner and the common and inadequate
+apprehension of ordinary life is very great, and might easily lead to
+the supposition that thinking (so understood) contains elements which
+are added through the activities of a special nerve process.
+
+But is it only in such moments that we deliberately resolve a situation
+into its elements, and abstract an 'essence' to serve as a middle term
+in inference? It is certain that at such moments these processes are
+more distinct than at other times; but the whole situation, for that
+matter, stands out more clearly and distinctly. Perception is keener,
+memory more definite, feeling more intense. In less degree, however, all
+attention involves analysis and abstraction. Experience has always a
+focus and a margin; there is a constant selecting and analyzing out of
+important elements, which in turn lead to further conclusions and acts,
+through associations by contiguity and similarity. This process appears
+in an intensified form in the high moments of life. In short, thought
+and passive perception are differentiated, not by the elements which
+compose them, but by the degree of energy that goes into perception,
+memory, feeling, and discrimination. There is nothing in the evidence to
+show that thinking is a special kind of activity, which operates now and
+then. On the contrary, there is every reason to hold to the position
+that the life processes are one and inseparable, operating continually
+in conjunction.
+
+What shall be said, then, with reference to the assertion that thought
+operates in the interests of the non-cognitive life processes? That it
+comes 'after something and for the sake of something,' namely, 'direct'
+experience? Since the separation of the activities into various
+'functions' cannot be allowed, by occasional thought must then be meant
+those moments of energetic aliveness described above. Translating,
+Dewey's theory would read something like this: Man employs his faculties
+to the fullest extent only when he is compelled to do so. He gets along
+habitually, that is, with a minimum of effort, as long as he can, but
+rouses himself and makes an earnest effort to comprehend the world only
+when his environment presents him with difficulties which demand
+solution. The test of man's thinking consists in its efficiency in
+getting him out of trouble, and enabling him to return to his habitual
+modes of sub-conscious conduct with a minimum of annoyance. In short,
+thinking is an instrument which subserves man's natural laziness, and
+its test is the efficiency with which it promotes an easy, or, at any
+rate, a satisfactory mode of existence.
+
+No doubt some men, perhaps many men, do follow such a programme; but it
+would not be kind to Nature to assert that she planned it so.
+
+This separation of the activities of life into several distinct
+processes having each a special function looks like a survival of the
+old faculty psychology, against which modern thought has protested as
+much as against anything whatever. The conception of the organic
+processes as separate in action has all the faults of a merely
+mechanical representation of consciousness. Doubtless some advantage is
+to be obtained, for purposes of investigation, by treating thought,
+appreciation, and affection separately; but it is a serious error to
+take this provisional distinction as real. It is a curious fact that
+Dewey, with all his opposition to such modes of procedure, himself falls
+into this abstract way of treating the 'functions' of experience, seeing
+not the beam that is in his own eye.
+
+It is this very form of treatment, strangely enough, which enables Dewey
+to call biology to the support of his interpretation of the function of
+knowledge. According to the Darwinian theory, survival of the species is
+dependent upon the development of special structures and capacities
+which enable the organism to adjust itself to its environment. Dewey
+finds, following a familiar argument, that the lower animals are adapted
+to their environment by special habits of reaction which are relatively
+fixed and inelastic. Man, on the contrary, has an exceedingly plastic
+nervous system, which enables him to meet changing conditions. Man is
+not only highly adapted, but highly adaptable. This trait of plasticity,
+or adaptability, Dewey believes, is a product of natural selection, and,
+of course, in the final analysis, this high degree of plasticity is the
+thought function.
+
+It is scarcely necessary to say that this treatment of thought is highly
+speculative. Dewey offers little concrete evidence to support his
+position; indeed, it would require the labor of a Darwin to supply the
+needed evidence. Instead of grounding his theories upon the results of
+science, Dewey adapts the ever elastic 'evolutionary method' (not really
+that of biological evolution, however indeterminate) to his own scheme
+of things. It would be hard to discover in philosophical literature a
+method more purely theoretical and even dialectical than that whereby
+Dewey gives his logical theory the support of evolutionary theory.
+
+The ultimately mechanical tendencies of his argument are conspicuous, in
+spite of all disclaimers. The effect of his analysis is to set
+plasticity or adaptability off by itself, as a special trait or feature
+of the nervous system. The lower forms of life are governed, we are
+told, by fixed reflexes, and the trait of adaptability appears at some
+higher stage in the process as a superadded capacity of the nervous
+system, correlated, no doubt, with special nervous structures.
+Evolutionism would not serve Dewey so well, had he not previously made
+this separation between the organic functions and their correlated
+structures; but, given this abstract treatment of the life processes, he
+is able to make the doctrine of selection contribute to its support. In
+opposition to Dewey's argument, it would be reasonable to contend that
+plasticity is inherent in all nervous substance. The higher organisms
+are more adaptable, because there is more to be modified in them,--more
+nerves and synapses, more pliability. There is no sound empirical reason
+for accepting Dewey's biological conclusions.
+
+Taking Dewey's theory at its face value,--and it would be presumptuous
+to search for hidden meanings,--its net result is to place the function
+of knowing in an embarrassing situation with respect to its capacity for
+giving a correct report of reality. Dewey expressly denies, indeed, that
+the purpose of knowing is to give an account of the nature of things.
+Reality, he asserts, is whatever it is 'experienced as being,' and it is
+normally experienced in other ways than by being known. The nature of
+reality is not hidden behind a veil, to be searched out; but is here and
+now, as it comes and goes in the form of passing experience. Knowing is
+designed to transform experience, not to bring it within the survey of
+consciousness.
+
+How does it stand, then, with Dewey's own account of the knowledge
+process? He has reflected upon experience, and claims to have given a
+correct account of its nature. Dewey's conception of the processes of
+experience is genuinely conceptual, a thought product, designed to
+furnish a solid basis for belief and calculation. But reflection, by his
+own account, is shut in to its own moment, cannot apprehend the true
+nature of 'non-cognitional' experiences, and cannot, therefore, deal
+adequately with any problems except such as are furnished it by other
+'functions.' No wonder that 'anti-intellectualism' should result from
+such a conception of knowledge.
+
+Philosophers have always held that the purpose of reflection (whatever
+reflection may be, psychologically) is the attainment of a reliable
+insight into the nature of the world. Practical considerations compel
+this view. Ordinary, casual observation is superficial and unsystematic;
+it never penetrates beneath the surface. Doubtless reality is, in some
+degree, what it is in unreflective moments; but it is frequently
+something more, as man learns to his sorrow. Reflection displaces the
+casual, haphazard attitude, in the attempt to get at the real nature of
+the world.
+
+The results of reflection, moreover, are cumulative. It tends to build
+up, by gradual accretions, a conceptual view of reality which may serve
+as a relatively stable basis for conduct and calculation. Thought does,
+indeed, possess a transforming function. The reasoned knowledge of
+things is gradually extended beyond the occasional moments of inquiring
+thought, supplanting the casual view with a more penetrating insight;
+reality becomes more and better _known_, and less merely _experienced_.
+
+Dewey reverses this view in a curious manner. It is 'experience' that is
+built up by the action of thought, not knowledge itself. This play on
+terms might be innocuous, if it were not accompanied by his separation
+of the knowing function from others. Dewey makes 'knowing' the servant
+of 'direct experience' by giving it the function of reconstructing the
+habits of the organism, in order that unreflective experience may be
+maintained with a minimum of effort. The non-reflective experience
+becomes the valuable experience, and knowledge is made to minister unto
+it. This is truly a 'transvaluation of values.'
+
+Dewey asks: "What is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete
+world of experience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction, and
+in a world of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and
+ideal?"[286] This sharp separation of thought from action is vigorously
+maintained. Following are some of the terms by means of which the
+difference between direct and reflective experience is expressed:
+'direct practice,' 'derived theory;' 'primary construction,' 'secondary
+criticism;' 'living appreciation,' 'abstract description;' 'active
+endeavor,' 'pale reflection.'[287] This casual, easy distinction escapes
+criticism because it seems harmless and unimportant. The distinction,
+however, is _not_ real. It does not correspond to the simple facts of
+life. Thinking, far from being 'pale reflection,' is often a strenuous
+and energetic 'activity.' Reflection, not 'direct experience,' is often,
+at least, at the high moment of life. Experience becomes unmeaning on
+any other basis. 'Living appreciation' and 'primary construction'
+involve thought in a high degree; 'pale reflection' is lazy
+contemplation, lacking the spark of life that characterizes true
+thought.
+
+There is no escape from Dewey's needlessly alarming conclusions, except
+by maintaining that thought accompanies all conscious life, in greater
+or less degree, and that the moment of _real_, earnest thinking is at
+the high tide of life, when all the powers are awake and operating.
+Thought must be made integral with all other activities, a feature of
+the total life organization, rather than an isolated phenomenon. Man is
+a thinking organism, not an organism with a thinker.
+
+It is not to be supposed for a moment that by 'thought' is here meant
+the activity of a merely subjective knower. Dewey does, indeed, deal
+effectively with the subjective ego, and with representative
+perceptionism. But by 'thought' is here meant reflection, judgment,
+inference; and in this sense thought is said to be present in all
+experience. There can be no question of the relation of thought, so
+understood, to reality; for the reason that it has been so integrated
+with experience as to be inseparable from it. Setting aside knowing as
+the awareness of a conscious subject, there remains an issue with Dewey
+concerning the actual place of thought, as an empirical process, in
+experience, and the issue must be settled on definite and really
+empirical grounds. So much, then, for 'functionalism' and its
+psychology.
+
+Something should be said, before closing this discussion, concerning
+philosophical methods in general, since Dewey's psychological approach
+to the problems of philosophy must be held responsible for his
+anti-intellectualistic results, with their sceptical implications. In
+the beginning of his career, as has been seen, Dewey adopted the
+'psychological method,' and he has adhered to it consistently ever
+since. This initial attitude, although he was not aware of it for many
+years, cut him off from the community of understanding that exists among
+modern idealists concerning the proper aims and purposes of
+philosophical inquiry. Although at first a professed follower of Green
+and Caird, Dewey's method was not reconcilable with idealistic
+procedure, and in a very real sense he never was an idealist. The
+virulence of his later attacks on 'intellectualism' may be explained in
+terms of his reaction against a philosophical method which interfered
+with the development of his own 'naturalistic' tendencies.
+
+The method of idealism, or speculative philosophy, is logical; but it
+may perfectly well be empirical at the same time. To the
+anti-intellectualist empirical logic is an anomaly, a red blue-bird, so
+to speak. The philosophical logician is represented as one who evolves
+reality out of his own consciousness; who labors with the concepts which
+have their abode in the mental sphere, and, by means of the principle of
+contradiction, forces them into harmony until they provide a perfectly
+consistent representation of the external world which, because of its
+perfect rationality, must somehow correspond with the cosmic reality. In
+spite of the fact that no man possesses, at least in a sane condition,
+the mental equipment requisite for such a performance, certain critics
+have not hesitated to impute this kind of logical procedure to the
+idealists. To quote from Dewey himself: "For modern philosophy is, as
+every college senior recites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps
+our books and lectures sometimes forget to tell the senior, has absorbed
+Stoic dogma. Passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete
+subjection to a ready-made and finished reality ... is its professed
+ideal.... Philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge which is other
+than the propitious outgrowth of beliefs that shall develop aforetime
+their ulterior implications in order to recast them ..., the dream of a
+knowledge that has to do with objects having no nature save to be
+known."[288]
+
+This charge against modern idealism has little foundation. Speculative
+philosophy repudiated, long ago, the 'epistemological standpoint' as
+defined by Dewey. Idealists have not fostered the conception of a
+knowing subject shut in to its own states, seeking information about an
+impersonal reality over against itself. Note, for example, this comment
+of Pringle-Pattison on Kant, made over thirty-five years ago: "The
+distinction between mind and the world, which is valid only from a
+certain point of view, he took as an absolute separation. He took it, to
+use a current phrase, abstractly--that is to say, as a mere fact, a fact
+standing by itself and true in any reference. And of course when two
+things are completely separate, they can only be brought together by a
+bond which is mechanical, external, and accidental to the real nature
+of both."[289] Dewey himself never condemned 'epistemology' more
+effectively. But it is useless to cite instances, for any serious
+student familiar with the literature of modern philosophy ought to know
+that 'idealism' has never really been 'epistemological' in the sense
+meant by Dewey and his disciples. Subjectivism is not idealism,--the
+stolid dogmatism of neo-realism to the contrary notwithstanding.
+
+Idealism holds, speaking more positively, that philosophers must submit
+the conceptions and methods which they employ to a preliminary immanent
+criticism, in order to determine the limits within which they may be
+validly applied. Every genuine category or method is valid within a
+certain sphere of relevance, and the business of criticism is to
+determine by empirical investigation or by 'ideal experiment' (which
+means much the same thing) what concrete significance the conception is
+capable of bearing. Dewey, from the standpoint of idealism, is guilty of
+a somewhat uncritical use of the categories of 'description' and
+'evolution.' Are the categories of biology fitted to explain mind and
+spirit? Instead of instituting an inquiry designed to answer that
+question, Dewey accepts 'evolutionism' as final, and attempts to force
+all phenomena into conformity with his resulting logical scheme. He
+misses the valuable checks upon thought which are furnished by the
+'critical method,' and is none too sensitive to the technical results of
+the special sciences.
+
+The logical approach to philosophy strictly involves certain
+implications which have been overlooked by many of its critics. It may
+well be admitted that our real categories are not fixed and final, but
+are perpetually in process of reconstruction. The process of criticism
+inevitably makes manifest the human and empirical character of the
+particular forms of reflective thought. It recognizes the fact of
+development, both in knowledge and in reality, and by this very
+recognition the value of knowledge is enhanced. It is forced, by the
+very nature of its method, to recognize the concrete and practical
+bearings of thought. Indeed, there is a sense in which idealism would
+declare that there is no thought--when thought, that is, is taken to
+mean an isolated fact out of relation to the world. It is not possible
+to make this retort upon the critics of idealism without recognizing
+that there has been a vast misjudgment, amounting almost to
+misrepresentation, of the intellectual ideals of modern speculative
+philosophy.
+
+To conclude, it is neither by abstract logical processes, nor yet by the
+dogmatic employment of scientific categories, that philosophy makes
+progress, but by an empirical process which unites criticism and
+experiment. In speaking of the development of modern idealism, Bosanquet
+says: "All difficulties about the general possibility--the possibility
+in principle--of apprehending reality in knowledge and preception were
+flung aside as antiquated lumber. What was undertaken was the direct
+adventure of knowing; of shaping a view of the universe which should
+include and express reality in its completeness. The test and criterion
+were not any speculative assumption of any kind whatever. They were the
+direct work of the function of knowledge in exhibiting what could and
+what could not maintain itself when all the facts were confronted and
+set in the order they themselves demanded. The method of inquiry was
+ideal experiment."[290]
+
+When all has been said, this method remains the natural and normal one.
+Dewey's 'psychological method,' by contrast, seems strained and
+far-fetched, an artificial and externally motived attempt to guide the
+intellect, which only by depending upon its own resources and its own
+increasing insight can hope to attain the distant and difficult, but
+never really foreign goal.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[281] _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p. 240.
+
+[282] _Op. cit._, Mind, Vol. XI, p. 8 f.
+
+[283] "The Experimental Method," _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p.
+228.
+
+[284] "The Experimental Method," _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, p.
+240.
+
+[285] See the review of Dewey's essay, "The Experimental Method," in
+Chapter VII of this study, p. 91 ff.
+
+[286] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 4.
+
+[287] _Ibid._, p. 2.
+
+[288] "Beliefs and Existences," _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_,
+p. 172 f.
+
+[289] _The Philosophical Radicals_, p. 297. The essay in which it
+occurs, "Philosophy as a Criticism of Categories," was first published
+in 1883, in the volume _Essays on Philosophical Criticism_.
+
+[290] "Realism and Metaphysics," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XXVI,
+1917, p. 8.
+
+
+
+
+
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